Quotes of the Day:

"Measuring success in cultural diplomacy - the use of education, creative expression in any form, or people-to-people exchange to increase understanding across regions, cultures, or peoples - is challenging. How does one quantify changes in attitude, abandoning stereotypes, or feeling empathy as a result of a performance, a film, a book?"

– Cynthia P. Schneider

"Presidents should do whatever possible and practical to encourage an environment of cooperation and bipartisanship. And they should maintain a certain level of decorum, diplomacy and decency. But, at the end of the day, presidents get elected to enact change."

– Mark McKinnon

"And we ought to work our diplomacy first and I think it's a reason it's going to respond increasingly to our diplomacy particularly with the president's direct involvement in the peace process, and I think that's extraordinarily important."

– Frank Carlucci

1. Trump ousts more Biden-era ambassadors

2. Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov: The Four Stages of Ideological Subversion (1984)

3. Understanding Resistance and Mobilization in Mexico: Beyond the 2025 Gen-Z Contestation of Cartel-Led Governance

4. Beyond the U.S.-Israel MOU: The Case for a Strategic Partnership Agreement

5. How Beijing Built Arms Industry to Rival the West

6. U.S. Coast Guard Chasing Another Tanker Involved in Shipping Venezuela Oil

7. US military to stop shooting pigs and goats for medic training

8. Russian General Killed by Car Bomb in Moscow

9. US launches operation to ‘eliminate’ ISIS fighters in Syria: Hegseth

10. Opinion | Trump is losing sight of America’s real terrorist threat

11. What We Know About U.S. Interceptions of Oil Tankers in Venezuela

12. The Pentagon wants a common network for its counter-drone systems

13. Pentagon preps to enforce ban on companies with ‘indirect’ ties to China

14.Army Slashes Mandatory Training, Shifts Focus Back to Warfighting

15. Ukraine at the Negotiation Crossroads: Strategic Takeaways from Five Conflicts

16. Army tosses out its Spiritual Fitness Guide after four months

17. Counteroffensive Irregular Warfare: A Doctrine of Signature Reduction for Strategic Competition

18. Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force: Strategic Leap or Burdened Gamble?

19. The Illiberal International: Authoritarian Cooperation Is Reshaping the Global Order

1. Trump ousts more Biden-era ambassadors

Summary:

POTUS is pushing out roughly two dozen career ambassadors appointed under President Biden by ordering them to leave their posts early next year, part of a broader effort to realign U.S. diplomatic leadership with his “America First” priorities. These recalls affect missions across Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere, and have drawn concern from lawmakers and the American Foreign Service association about politicizing the diplomatic corps and hollowing out experienced representation abroad. Many affected ambassadors will return to Washington for reassignment, but their early removal is unusual for career foreign service officers.

Comment: Here is a link to all the political appointee positions that are filled, nominated, holdover, or vacant.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2025/trump-appointee-tracker/

Exclusive

Trump ousts more Biden-era ambassadors

The envoys are career Foreign Service officers, making the decision to remove them unusual.

By Nahal Toosi12/19/2025 01:20 PM ESTUpdated: 12/19/2025 04:03 PM EST

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/19/trump-ousts-more-biden-era-ambassadors-00700351

Around two dozen ambassadors are being told to leave their posts, a State Department official said. | Alastair Pike/AFP/Getty Images

The Trump administration is recalling a number of career ambassadors appointed by former President Joe Biden, according to a State Department official familiar with the situation and the head of the diplomats’ union.

John Dinkelman, president of the American Foreign Service Association, the diplomats’ union, said the group had been getting anecdotal reports from ambassadors as far afield as East Asia and the Pacific who were told via phone calls that they had to be gone by Jan. 15 or Jan. 16. The envoys were not given a reason.

Around two dozen ambassadors are being told to leave their posts, the State Department official said, having been granted anonymity because the topic involves personnel issues. Dinkelman said he did not have complete information on how many were being recalled.

The move is the latest major shake-up of the diplomatic ranks under President Donald Trump. It is particularly unusual because it involves envoys who hail from the career Foreign Service.

While it is normal for new presidents to replace political appointees serving as ambassadors, career diplomats are typically allowed to continue serving because it is understood that, by virtue of being in the Foreign Service, they will carry out the wishes of whoever is in the White House regardless of political party.

But the Trump administration has had little trust in the career ranks at the State Department. Its officials have called the State Department a bastion of liberalism, and the administration has already pushed out thousands of department employees.

Dinkelman decried the administration’s actions, suggesting it would hurt the standing of U.S. diplomacy.

“It continues to undermine the confidence in the professional Foreign Service’s ability to effectively carry out the policies of the elected leadership of our nation,” he said.

In a statement, the State Department insisted that the recalls were “a standard process in any administration.”

“An ambassador is a personal representative of the president and it is the president’s right to ensure that he has individuals in these countries who advance the America First agenda,” the department said in the statement.

Ambassadors do serve at the pleasure of the president, regardless of whether they are political nominees or Foreign Service members.

But while Trump was quick to push out Biden’s political appointees from such roles upon taking office, he has been slow to fill many ambassadorships, and some nominations have stalled in the Senate.

“We have about 80 vacant ambassadorships,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Yet, President Trump is giving away U.S. leadership to China and Russia by removing qualified career ambassadors who serve faithfully no matter who’s in power.”

Eric Bazail-Eimil contributed to this report.

Filed Under: 

• State DepartmentJoe BidenForeign AffairsDonald TrumpRecalled Ambassadors

2. Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov: The Four Stages of Ideological Subversion (1984)

Comment: I am sure most have seen this video or read about it. But it is worth listening to again (or reading the transcript).  

Videos at the link.

We should all recognize this process:

STAGES OF SUBVERSION:

1) DEMORALIZATION

2) DESTABILIZATION

3) CRISIS

4) “NORMALIZATION”

What is subversion?

• The undermining of the power and authority of an established system or institution.
• As in: "the ruthless subversion of democracy"

The question is can we inoculate and defend ourselves, our society, and our nation against this process?

POTUS told us how to in 2017 in NSS:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access the 2017 NSS HERE

Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov: The Four Stages of Ideological Subversion (1984)

by SWJ Staff

|

12.21.2025 at 09:43pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/21/former-kgb-agent-yuri-bezmenov-the-four-stages-of-ideological-subversion-1984/

STAGES OF SUBVERSION:

1) DEMORALIZATION

2) DESTABILIZATION

3) CRISIS

4) “NORMALIZATION”

The above video presents an interview with Yuri Bezmenov, a former KGB operative who defected to the West. He describes methods used to influence and destabilize societies from within. He explains a sequence of systemic shifts designed to erode societal cohesion over time, focusing on information saturation, cultural demoralization, and institutional degradation. Bezmenov discusses how weaponized narratives, media influence, and educational channels can reshape perceptions and weaken trust in governing structures. He emphasizes the role of propaganda and psychological operations in creating long-term shifts in public opinion and social norms. These concepts resonate with contemporary challenges in irregular and political warfare where adversaries use information operations, social media amplification, and subversive messaging to exploit societal divisions. Bezmenov’s breakdown reflects ongoing debates about the human domain, influence operations, and the resilience of democratic institutions.

“Yuri Bezmenov (alias Tomas Schuman), a Soviet KGB defector, explains in detail his scheme for the KGB process of subversion and takeover of target societies at a lecture in Los Angeles, 1983.

Yuri Bezmenov was a former KGB propagandist who was assigned to New Dehli, India – and defected to the West in 1970. Bezmenov explains his background, some of his training, and exactly how Soviet propaganda is spread in other countries in order to subvert their teachers, politicians, and other policy makers to a mindset receptive to the Soviet ideology. He also explains in detail the goal of Soviet propaganda as total subversion of another country and the four-step formula for achieving this goal. He recalls the details of how he escaped India, defected to the West, and settled in Montreal as an announcer for the CBC.

Note the segments starting at around 14 and 24 minutes into the video.”

Find a transcript of the above lecture here.

3. Understanding Resistance and Mobilization in Mexico: Beyond the 2025 Gen-Z Contestation of Cartel-Led Governance

Summary:

Mexico’s late-2025 protest surge was widely misread as a Gen Z contagion or a right-wing political maneuver. They assess it as a broader, state-versus-capital revolt that was catalyzed by the assassination of Uruapan’s mayor, Carlos Manzo, and powered largely by rural farmers and the Movimiento Sombrero operating across many states at once. Gen Z participation mattered, but more as an accelerant and a messaging layer, including the One Piece pirate flag and a 12-point civic petition focused on accountability, electoral oversight, justice reform, and demilitarizing internal security under citizen control.

Excerpts:

Conclusion

The November 2025 protests reveal a Mexico caught between deepening structural violence and an evolving landscape of civic resistance. While early narratives from media outlets and government officials miscast the demonstrations as either a Gen-Z phenomenon or a partisan maneuver, the evidence underscores a broader, more consequential reality: rural farmers, regional communities, and emergent youth coalitions together drove the largest non-electoral mobilization around insecurity in half a decade. The simultaneous eruptions across more than fifty cities, coupled with the unprecedented turnout following the assassination of Mayor Carlos Manzo, demonstrate that resistance to the state has expanded far beyond Mexico City’s traditional protest culture. It now includes constituencies historically marginalized from national decision-making and increasingly disillusioned by Morena’s inability to stem violence or corruption.

The alliance between Gen Z groups and the Movimiento Sombrero symbolizes a convergence of grievances—one rooted in rural collapse and state abandonment, the other grounded in generational precarity and exposure to endemic violence. Their demands, articulated in the Pliego Petitorio, signal not a revolutionary project but a civic one: demands for accountability, demilitarization, transparency, and meaningful participation in governance. Yet the prospects for lasting reform remain constrained by a fragmented protest ecosystem, the absence of durable organizational structures, and a federal government increasingly inclined toward centralization rather than consultation. Public opinion data likewise reflects this ambivalence: broad sympathy for the protesters’ message paired with skepticism over whether the state will listen.

Ultimately, the 15N protests should be understood not as an isolated moment but as a barometer of Mexico’s wider political destabilization. With violence rising, institutional trust eroding, and regional states bearing the brunt of an ungoverned security environment, Mexico stands at a critical inflection point. Whether the unlikely coalition forged in November can translate moral outrage into sustained civic pressure remains uncertain. But the movement has already exposed a truth the federal government can no longer ignore: resistance in Mexico is no longer confined to the periphery—it is now a national force shaped by farmers, students, women, workers, and young people who have the most to lose from a failing state, and the most to gain from demanding its renewal.

Understanding Resistance and Mobilization in Mexico: Beyond the 2025 Gen-Z Contestation of Cartel-Led Governance

by Robert S. Burrell, by Manuel Carranza

|

12.22.2025 at 12:23am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/22/understanding-resistance-and-mobilization-in-mexico-beyond-the-2025-gen-z-contestation-of-cartel-led-governance/

Movimiento Sombrero protesting in Colima on 15 November 2025. Source: Alamy (Under License).

On 15 November 2025, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Mexico City[1] to protest cartel violence and government corruption, resulting in over 100 injuries, primarily among police officers. Several prominent media outlets attributed[2] these actions to domestic Gen-Z tied to global trends; meanwhile, the Mexican government claimed that right-wing political groups organized the protests, but the evidence contradicts both these claims. The most significant population organizing the demonstration were farmers from rural states, also evidenced by the fact that protests occurred[3] in the states of Guadalajara, Nuevo León, Michoacán, Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Chiapas, and Oaxaca simultaneously[4] (and even previously for over a week)[5]. In fact, as clearly seen in many photos and videos of the events nationwide, the Movimiento Sombrero (Sombrero Movement) clearly played the larger and more organized role. So, what is truly happening in Mexico? We explore the conclusive metrics that depict the nature of Mexico’s resistance in 2025.

A History of Protest and Insurrection

Historically, there has perpetually existed a political divide in Mexico between the power brokers in the capital and the needs of the people in its 31 states. Over time, this division has resulted in multiple insurgencies and revolutions. It’s important to note that Claudia Sheinbaum previously served as the Mayor of Mexico City, as did the previous President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Although Mexico City ranks among the largest cities globally, boasting a population of 22.75 million, the belief that Sheinbaum serves the interests of the oligarchs in the capital resonated deeply on 1 November 2025, following the assassination of Carlos Manzo Rodríguez, the Mayor of Uruapan in Michoacán. Manzo was an outspoken opponent of both the cartels and the rampant government corruption. He had also publicly requested that Sheinbaum provide him protection from the cartels. Unfortunately, his plea[6] went unheeded.

In addition to one of the highest murder rates[7] on earth, political assassinations are a rampant phenomenon in Mexico, the government of which cannot enforce accountability. In January, we detailed the murder[8] of forty-three politicians and political candidates between July 2023 and June 2024 (see map below). Instead of recognizing the plea of farmers in Michoacán to enforce the rule of law, Sheinbaum blamed the 15N riots on her right-wing opponents.

Figure 1. Political Assassinations in Mexico, July 2023-June 2024. Source: The Authors, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2025.2450847 .

Resistance in Mexico in 2024

In the past, Mexico’s protest culture, like much of the world, has been left-leaning. The founder of the socialist Morena party, López Obrador, was the first candidate to fully exploit social movements in the country, primarily those mobilized against state repression and forced disappearances. As cartels and the military became more deeply entangled in politics, protesting the government increasingly also meant protesting the cartels. Yet after his election, AMLO was not effective at reducing crime. The truth commission for the “Dirty War” and similar initiatives gained no traction, and the military quickly shut them down.

There have been a few far-right movements that protested against Morena—including Frente Nacionalista de México (FRENA),[9] composed of conservative elites—which have been widely mocked and socially isolated (FRENA portray[10] itself as nationalist defenders against a corrupt, narratives which combine class resentment, racial hierarchies, and authoritarian nostalgia). In recent years, grassroots movements have gained notable momentum, including the +43 Movement[11]—sparked by the disappearance of 43 Mexican students in Ayotzinapa—and influential feminist organizations mobilizing against femicide and sexual violence. Over the last decade, these alternative activist groups have grown in both scale and intensity, developing powerful iconography along the way. Despite popular support for President Sheinbaum, the trend of growing frustration with the government’s inability to enforce the rule of law is expanding.

+43 Protestors in Mexico City on 26 September 2025. Source: Alamy (Under License).

Mexico remains one of the highest conflict zones in the world, which Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) ranks as the fourth highest, just behind Palestine, Myanmar, and Syria. During the year 2024, intrastate resistance in Mexico included[12] 5,462 demonstrations or protests and 6,766 acts of political violence with 7,466 reported fatalities. While the capital receives considerable attention for its protest outbreaks, the states face considerably more resistance to governance, especially in the agricultural strongholds of Guerrero, Veracruz, Guanajuato, Sinaloa, and Michoacan, along with the industrial state of Nuevo Leon, which serves as a major center for the US auto industry. These statistics indicate that farmers and ranchers—such as those affiliated with Movimiento Sombrero—demonstrate a higher degree of resistance to the state than the Gen-Z–driven movements that have drawn attention in Mexico City. Furthermore, these figures indicate that political violence is significantly more prevalent in the states than in the capital. This is further illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Political Violence, Protests, and Riots in Mexico in 2024 by State. Source: The Authors (ACLED Data).

The major organizations operate along a continuum of resistance, challenging state authority in ways that range from advocating reforms to outright rejecting the rule of law. Using ACLED data, the most active groups can be identified, and the accompanying figure arranges them from left to right, beginning with legal and nonviolent actors—labor unions, students, women’s groups, educators, and farmers. Others employ extralegal tactics, such as the +43 Movement and feminist collectives like Bloque Negro. Illicit actors, including La Familia Michoacana and similar groups, frequently resort to violence against both rivals and the state. At the far end of the spectrum are the two major transnational criminal organizations, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS), which directly compete with the state. As of now, no group possesses the capability or influence to confront the Mexican state as a true belligerent, leaving the far-right category empty.

Figure 2. Mexico’s Resistance Continuum in 2024. Source: The Authors.

Resistance in Mexico in 2025

In 2025, resistance to governance is converging from various sectors, including drug cartels, corrupt officials, farmers, and even factions within the ruling party. This widespread dissent highlights the complex challenges facing the country’s political landscape. Mexico remains on the verge of a political or social explosion, particularly the divide between the states and the central government. These protests might not escalate into something larger, but they are representative of deeper geopolitical pressures—and of the internal realignment and contestation happening within Morena itself. Opposition parties have openly said that they plan to capitalize on Morena’s cannibalism even though they expect minimal outcomes.

The current wave of Gen Z resistance symbolism includes the pirate flag from ‘One Piece,’[13] which has been used in protests globally in 2025, including Indonesia[14], Nepal[15], Madagascar[16], Morrocco[17], Peru[18], and France[19]. Its adoption in the 15 November movements in Mexico City is not surprising. Latin America has long absorbed political “currents” from abroad. However, just like the events which caused the downfall of governments in Nepal, Madagascar, and Peru, these movements are all very unique, only adopting a universal symbol, not a universal cause. Similarly, some of the protestors on 15 November (in Mexico City in particular) displayed the One Piece symbol in unity with the global trend but with particular complaints about Mexico’s lack of governance.

When it comes to the assassination[20] of the mayor of Uruapan, Carlos Manzo, there are many competing narratives about his martyrdom. He was an independent who ran with Morena, later left the party, and became a political liability once he began speaking out against crime. The extent of his antagonism toward Morena is disputed—some claim he remained an ally, while others depict him as part of the opposition. As Sheinbaum tries to present herself as confronting crime, Carlos Manzo’s death demonstrates her inability to do so effectively. Within Morena, Sheinbaum has begun sidelining AMLO’s closest allies as corruption investigations have surfaced, including cases against the Secretary of the Interior Adán Augusto López[21] and the head of AMLO’s intelligence agency Audomaro Martínez[22].

An Unlikely Alliance

The collaboration of the Gen Z and Sombrero Movement in the 15N demonstrations represents one of the largest non-electoral protest waves in Mexico in recent years. According to the Government of Mexico City, cited by Milenio, approximately 17,000 people participated in the main march toward the Zócalo[23]. El Sol de México documented coordinated protests in more than 50 cities, estimating an additional 30,000–40,000 participants nationwide, with major flashpoints in Guadalajara, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, and Veracruz[24]. Together, these reports place total participation between 45,000 and 55,000 people, excluding earlier localized demonstrations.

Gen Z Protester in Mexico City with ‘One Piece’ Pirate Flag on 15 November 2025. Source: Flickr (CC by 4.0), https://www.flickr.com/photos/eneas/54932910234/.

A week earlier, on 8 November 2025, the assassination of Uruapan mayor Carlos Manzo had triggered a separate mass rally drawing more than 60,000 people, according to EFE and CNN Español.[25] Although not part of the November 15 events, that march was the direct catalyst for the nationwide mobilization that followed. When both waves are considered together, the November protest cycle surpassed 100,000 participants nationwide, an extraordinary figure for grass-roots mobilization.

As an alternative measurement, La Jornada reported 4,000 participants in Nuevo León and Michoacán, 5,000 in Aguascalientes, and “more than 1,000” each in Chihuahua, Chiapas, and Oaxaca, while noting smaller crowds—fewer than 1,000—in the rest of the country. It also recorded 20,000 protesters in Jalisco.[26] Excluding Mexico City, this yields a national total of roughly 43,000–45,000, consistent with the El Sol de México range. These converging estimates place the likely scale of the 15 November demonstrations at 40,000–55,000 participants nationwide, excluding the 60,000 in Uruapan.

Comparative data from the Carnegie Endowment’s Global Protest Tracker[27] show that most Mexican protests in recent years have been significantly smaller. The Farmer Protests (2023) drew about 100 people; the Truckers’ Strike (2024) and Judicial Reform Protests (2024) about 1,000; while the Anti-AMLO and Feminist Protests (2020–2024) mobilized around 10,000 each. Only the Protect Democracy / INE Protest in February 2024 reached a genuinely mass scale with nearly 700,000 participants nationwide. In this context, the Gen Z / Sombrero mobilizations occupy a mid-to-upper tier: larger than most sectoral protests, comparable to feminist marches, yet far below the electoral-reform or pro-democracy mega-rallies.

Overall, the combined evidence from Milenio, El Sol de México, and La Jornada indicates that the Gen Z and Sombrero demonstrations constituted the largest public mobilization related to insecurity and political violence in Mexico since 2020. With 40,000–55,000 nationwide on 15 November and over 60 thousand in Uruapan, the protests rank among the five largest mass movements in Mexico between 2020 and 2025. They reveal how a localized act of political violence can ignite a decentralized, cross-generational national movement demanding accountability and security.

What Does the Alliance Want and Can it be Achieved?

The Gen Z protestors issued a 12-point Citizens’ Petition[28] calling for voter oversight, anti-corruption reforms, demilitarization of internal security, and the restoration of public trust through civic participation. This generational push[29] for transparency and accountability is specifically listed as follows:

• Establish citizen-initiated recall mechanisms to remove the president from office
• Replace officials with a direct citizen vote
• Prohibit partisan interference in voting
• Establish safeguards against corruption
• Create an independent citizen organization for the transparency of elections
• Create an independent body to audit elections
• Reform the justice system
• Improve indigenous and regional representation in Congress
• Demilitarize law enforcement
• Strengthen law enforcement with citizen oversight
• Include voices with moral authority in councils
• Consult with citizens to expand this petition

While the demonstrations received international recognition, observers remain divided over the long-term impact of the November 2025 protests. Some analysts, such as Enrique Krauze, warned that without a structured organization to articulate and sustain the Pliego Petitorio’s demands, the movement risks dissipating without tangible[30] results. Others, such as Lorenzo Cordoba (chairman of the National Electoral Institute and a significant organizer of democracy protests), denounced the government’s heavy-handed response as a display of force which exposed Morena’s authoritarian drift, demonstrated by footage[31] of police repression during the march. More broadly, Mexico’s democratic institutions have shown steady erosion since the López Obrador administration, amid what analysts describe as a growing polycrisis[32] of insecurity, institutional decay, and political polarization.

Public opinion presents a cautious yet critical perspective on the long-term effects of the protests. According to a Politico M[33] poll (on 28 November 2025), 37% of respondents believe the marches can produce meaningful change, while 38% think they may have an impact but only temporarily, and 25% argue that demonstrations need to be complemented by more substantive forms of resistance to be effective. Perceptions of government responsiveness to protest remain skeptical: 45% believe the administration should engage in dialogue and negotiate with protesters; 25% think Morena should address the underlying causes before implementing control measures; 16% emphasize the need to follow security protocols while avoiding excessive use of force; and 14% stress that the right to protest must be guaranteed.

In perspective, Gen Z accounts for roughly 30% of Mexico’s population but faces limited economic, social, and educational opportunities that undermine long-term human security. Rates of anxiety and depression have increased, and many young people struggle to secure formal employment, which is often scarce, low-paying, and lacks social protections. Even with higher education, access to decent jobs remains limited, and gender inequality exacerbates these challenges for women. More gravely, this generation is the most likely to suffer violence. In 2024, INEGI[34] reported 33,550 homicides nationwide, with 11,585 victims (34.5%) in the Gen Z population. From 2006–2025, over 53,000 of the 130,000 disappearances in Mexico were Gen Z victims, including 73.7% of missing women.

Conclusion

The November 2025 protests reveal a Mexico caught between deepening structural violence and an evolving landscape of civic resistance. While early narratives from media outlets and government officials miscast the demonstrations as either a Gen-Z phenomenon or a partisan maneuver, the evidence underscores a broader, more consequential reality: rural farmers, regional communities, and emergent youth coalitions together drove the largest non-electoral mobilization around insecurity in half a decade. The simultaneous eruptions across more than fifty cities, coupled with the unprecedented turnout following the assassination of Mayor Carlos Manzo, demonstrate that resistance to the state has expanded far beyond Mexico City’s traditional protest culture. It now includes constituencies historically marginalized from national decision-making and increasingly disillusioned by Morena’s inability to stem violence or corruption.

The alliance between Gen Z groups and the Movimiento Sombrero symbolizes a convergence of grievances—one rooted in rural collapse and state abandonment, the other grounded in generational precarity and exposure to endemic violence. Their demands, articulated in the Pliego Petitorio, signal not a revolutionary project but a civic one: demands for accountability, demilitarization, transparency, and meaningful participation in governance. Yet the prospects for lasting reform remain constrained by a fragmented protest ecosystem, the absence of durable organizational structures, and a federal government increasingly inclined toward centralization rather than consultation. Public opinion data likewise reflects this ambivalence: broad sympathy for the protesters’ message paired with skepticism over whether the state will listen.

Ultimately, the 15N protests should be understood not as an isolated moment but as a barometer of Mexico’s wider political destabilization. With violence rising, institutional trust eroding, and regional states bearing the brunt of an ungoverned security environment, Mexico stands at a critical inflection point. Whether the unlikely coalition forged in November can translate moral outrage into sustained civic pressure remains uncertain. But the movement has already exposed a truth the federal government can no longer ignore: resistance in Mexico is no longer confined to the periphery—it is now a national force shaped by farmers, students, women, workers, and young people who have the most to lose from a failing state, and the most to gain from demanding its renewal.

Endnotes

[1] Ioan Grillo, CrashOut: Inside the 15N Protests and Riots. Substack. 16 November 2025, https://substack.com/home/post/p-179095401.

[2] Associated Press, “Thousands protest crime and corruption in Mexico City as ‘Gen Z’ protests gain momentum.” CNN. 16 November 2025 (Updated), https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/americas/genz-protests-mexico-sheinbaum-latam-intl.

[3] Nina Kravinsky, “Thousands Join ‘Gen Z’ Protests Across Mexico Against Crime and Corruption.” KJZZ – Fronteras Desk. 17 November 2025, https://www.kjzz.org/fronteras-desk/2025-11-17/thousands-join-gen-z-protests-across-mexico-against-crime-and-corruption.

[4] Letstown, “Marcha hacia Carlos Manzo en Zitácuaro, Michoacán.” Photograph, Own Work. 15 November 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Carlos_Manzo_marcha_Zit%C3%A1cuaro.webm.

[5] Max Saltman and Mauricio Torres, “Murder of popular mayor spurs violent protests in Mexican state.” CNN Americas. 4 November 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/04/americas/mexico-protest-mayor-murder-latam-intl.

[6] “Uruapan Mayor Carlos Manzo Shot, Killed During Day of the Dead Appearance.” ABC7 Los Angeles. 4 November 2025, https://abc7.com/post/uruapan-mayor-carlos-manzo-shot-killed-during-day-dead-appearance-president-sheinbaum-rules-changes-security/18109141/.

[7] “Murder Rate by Country.” World Population Review. n.d. (Accessed 15 December 2025),https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/murder-rate-by-country.

[8] Robert S. Burrell and Manuel Carranza, “Are Mexican Cartels Terrorists? Why Understanding Resilience and Resistance in Mexico Matters.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2025: pp. 1–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2025.2450847.

[9] David Pavón-Cuéllar, “La nueva ultraderecha latinoamericana (1992-2018).” Marxismo Crítico. 26 June 2018, https://marxismocritico.com/2018/06/26/la-nueva-ultraderecha-latinoamericana/.

[10] Abraham Trejo and Gabriela Cruz. Telegram es campo fértil para el odio: el caso FRENA. Serie “Construcción del odio en redes sociales,” Informe No. 6. Coordinación del Seminario sobre Violencia y Paz: Sergio Aguayo. Seminario sobre Violencia y Paz (SVyP) de El Colegio de México – Proyecto Odio y Concordia, 3 de mayo de 2021, https://violenciaypaz.colmex.mx/archivos/UHVibGljYWNpb24KIDE0CmRvY3VtZW50bw==/POyC_Construcción_del_odio_Informe_6.pdf

.

[11] Alma Guillermoprieto, “Forty-Three Mexican Students Went Missing. What Really Happened to Them?” The New Yorker. 4 March 2024, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/03/11/what-really-happened-to-the-forty-three.

[12] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). n.d. (Accessed 8 December 2025), https://acleddata.com/.

[13] BBC World Service, “How an anime pirate flag became a protest symbol.” What in the World (Weekend Edition Sunday). 2:02 Minute Video. 16 October 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfVoArmSk1o.

[14] Kelly Ng, “How a cartoon skull became a symbol of defiance in Indonesia.” BBC News. 6 August 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3ezvj4d111o.

[15] Lex Harvey, “Gen Z protesters are uniting behind a manga pirate flag.” CNN. 20 September 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/19/asia/one-piece-flag-indonesia-nepal-protesters-intl-hnk-dst.

[16] Nora Litoussi and The FRANCE 24 Observers, “One Piece manga revolt protests in Asia-Pacific.” France 24. 6 October 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20251006-one-piece-manga-revolt-morocco-indonesia-nepal-madagascar.

[17] Kate Bartlett, “Why Gen Z protesters worldwide are flying an anime pirate flag.” NPR World / Weekend Edition Sunday. 5 October 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/10/05/nx-s1-5560980/gen-z-protesters-one-piece-pirate-flag.

[18] Victoria Valenzuela, “Youth protesters ousted Peru president not done.” Waging Nonviolence. 18 November 2025, https://wagingnonviolence.org/2025/11/youth-protesters-ousted-peru-president-boluarte-not-done/ and CNN Español / EFE, “Manifestación en Uruapan tras asesinato del alcalde Carlos Manzo.” CNN Español / EFE. 8 November 2025, https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/11/08/mexico/manifestacion-uruapan-asesinato-alcalde-carlos-manzo-efe.

[19] Michaël Szadkowski and Pauline Croquet, “The ‘One Piece’ flag finds its place in protests across France.” Le Monde. 20 September 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2025/09/20/the-one-piece-flag-finds-its-place-in-protests-across-france_6745567_13.html.

[20] CBS News Staff and Associated Press, “Suspect arrested in assassination of Mexican mayor who pushed government to tackle violent crime.” CBS News. 19 November 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/suspect-arrested-assassination-mayor-mexico-carlos-manzo-uruapan/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[21] MND Staff, “Opposition formally accuses AMLO’s ex-interior minister of ties to Tabasco crime gang.” Mexico News Daily. 31 July 2025, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/adan-augusto-lopez-tabasco-la-barredora/.

[22] Tim Golden, “Inside the Risky U.S. Probe of Allegations That Drug Mafias Financed a Campaign of Mexico’s President López Obrador.” Propublica. 19 July 2024, https://www.propublica.org/article/mexico-amlo-dea-probe-cartel-campaign-donations#.

[23] Armando Martínez, “¿Cuántas personas asistieron a la marcha de la Generación Z en CdMx?” Milenio. 15 November 2025, https://www.milenio.com/comunidad/cuantas-personas-asisitieron-a-marcha-de-la-generacion-z-en-cdmx.

[24] Wendy Vega, “Movimiento del Sombrero y Generación Z se unen en protesta nacional contra el gobierno.” El Sol de México. 15 November 2025, https://oem.com.mx/elsoldemexico/mexico/movimiento-del-sombrero-y-generacion-z-se-unen-en-protestas-nacional-contra-el-gobierno-26809096.

[25] EFE, “Más de 60.000 personas se manifiestan en Uruapan tras el asesinato del alcalde Carlos Manzo.” CNN Español. 8 November 2025, https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/11/08/mexico/manifestacion-uruapan-asesinato-alcalde-carlos-manzo-efe.

[26] Socorro Martínez Ortiz and Ruth Zavaleta Salgado, “Marcha de la Generación Z en México.” La Jornada / ljz.mx. 21 November 2025, https://ljz.mx/21/11/2025/marcha-de-la-generacion-z-en-mexico/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[27] Global Protest Tracker, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. n.d. (Accessed 15 December 2025),https://carnegieendowment.org/features/global-protest-tracker?lang=en.

[28] Redacción Línea Política, “Generación Z presenta pliego petitorio previo a la marcha del 15 de noviembre; estas son sus exigencias.” Línea Política. 14 November 2025, https://lineapolitica.com/generacion-z-presenta-pliego-petitorio-previo-a-la-marcha-del-15-de-noviembre-estas-son-sus-exigencias/.

[29] “Marcha de la Generación Z en México.” La Jornada Zacatecas. 21 November 2025, https://ljz.mx/21/11/2025/marcha-de-la-generacion-z-en-mexico/.

[30] Enrique Krauze, “Juventud agraviada: La generación Z no parece estar dispuesta a perder el futuro. Ojalá se organicen y articulen sus demandas.” Letras Libres. 24 November 2025, https://letraslibres.com/politica/enrique-krauze-juventud-agraviada/.

[31] Lorenzo Córdova, “Las crisis sólo revelan la verdadera esencia autoritaria de la 4T.” Latinus Opinión(podcast/column). 25 November 2025, https://latinus.us/mexico/2025/11/25/en-opinion-de-lorenzo-cordova-las-crisis-solo-revelan-la-verdadera-esencia-autoritaria-de-la-4t-157819.html.  

[32] Vanessa Rubio-Márquez, “Mexico’s Fork in the Road: Rule of Law or Authoritarian Shift?” Freedom and Prosperity Around the World 2025 (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council). 7 March 2025,https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/mexicos-fork-in-the-road-rule-of-law-or-authoritarian-shift.

[33] Politico MX Poll Team, “¿Marchar en México: movimiento social o desahogo colectivo?” Politico MX Polls.28 November 2025, https://polls.politico.mx/2025/11/28/marchar-en-mexico-movimiento-social-o-desahogo-colectivo/.

[34] Ruth Zavaleta Salgado, “Los del sombrero de paja: La Generación Z representa 30% de la población.” Excélsior Opinión. 15 November 2025, https://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/ruth-zavaleta-salgado/los-del-sombrero-de-paja/1751860.

Tags: Competitive Control, Mexico, Protests

About The Authors

• 
  
• Robert S. Burrell
• Robert S. Burrell, PhD is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. He is also a 2025 Irregular Warfare Initiative Fellow, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point. For more information, see https://www.robertburrell.com.
• View all posts 
• 
  
• Manuel Carranza
• Manuel Carranza is a Research Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6777-6143.

4. Beyond the U.S.-Israel MOU: The Case for a Strategic Partnership Agreement

Summary:

Bradley Bowman argues the 2016 U.S.-Israel MOU, expiring in 2028, should be replaced by a binding Strategic Partnership Agreement that couples U.S. assistance with measurable Israeli contributions. He proposes Israel commit to sustaining 4.5 to 5 percent GDP defense spending, buying at least $1 billion annually in U.S.-made hardware with Israeli funds, and investing $150 million a year in joint R&D tied to priority technologies. In return, Washington would provide about $5 billion annually via a Partnership Investment Incentive, spent only in the United States and on mutually defined readiness and defense industrial base priorities, while preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge.

December 19, 2025 | Insight

Beyond the U.S.-Israel MOU: The Case for a Strategic Partnership Agreement

fdd.org · Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/19/beyond-the-u-s-israel-mou-the-case-for-a-strategic-partnership-agreement/

In one’s personal life and in the life of a nation, it is good to have friends. It is even better to have capable and motivated friends, especially when one confronts increasingly formidable enemies who cooperate with one another. The Trump administration may publish its new National Defense Strategy soon, and its lines of effort will include “increasing burden-sharing with U.S. allies” and “supercharging the U.S. defense industrial base,” according to a December 6 speech by Secretary Pete Hegseth previewing the strategy.

To support those priorities and better secure American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, President Trump should work with Israel to negotiate what would be known as the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The SPA would be the successor to the current U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which sets important conditions for bilateral security assistance but will expire in 2028.

The SPA would include both Israeli and American commitments. Israel, for its part, would commit to 1) spending at least 4.5 or 5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) each year on defense for the duration of the agreement; 2) spending at least $1 billion each year of its own resources procuring American-made military hardware and boosting the American defense industrial base (DIB); and 3) investing at least $150 million each year on combined U.S.-Israel military research and development efforts to advance shared combat readiness priorities.

In return for these commitments, the United States would provide Israel $5 billion each year through what would be known as a Partnership Investment Incentive – or PII. This PII would provide funding via existing foreign military financing (FMF) mechanisms that Israel would use to procure American military hardware, but there would be two differences compared to the current MOU. First, Israel would be required to spend all PII in the United States. Israel would also be required to spend PII in areas designated by both militaries as combat preparedness priorities and by the Pentagon as DIB priorities. PII could also be used to support efforts to deepen security cooperation with Saudi Arabia and encourage normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem, while maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME).

President Trump “likes helping countries that help themselves, and we feel the same way. That’s the nature of partnerships rather than dependencies. It’s what we owe our friends and, most importantly, what we owe the American people,” Secretary Hegseth said at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 6, after citing Israel as one of America’s “model allies.”

To understand why Israel is a “model” partner, how Americans benefit from U.S.-Israel security cooperation, and how both countries can best advance shared interests in the future, it is helpful to explore the strategic context and the potential components of the SPA.

Israel’s Record of Advancing American Interests

The current MOU, signed in September 2016, covers fiscal years (FY) 2019 to 2028. It provides Israel $3.3 billion per year in foreign military financing (FMF) and $500 million per year for cooperative missile defense programs for a total of $3.8 billion per year or $38 billion altogether over the 10-year period. This funding has played an instrumental role in helping Israel become the preeminent military power in the Middle East, one that can and does take the fight to America’s adversaries in the region, including Iran and its terror proxies. The assistance America provides is an investment that has paid significant dividends.

That military capability was on full display during the 12-Day War in June, in which Israel damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities and severely degraded its air and missile defenses and ballistic missile production capacity. In Operation Midnight Hammer, when President Trump decided to send American B-2 bombers to hit hardened and deeply buried targets associated with Iran’s nuclear program, the job for the American pilots was less difficult because of the impressive work the Israeli Air Force had already done, relying heavily on its American-made F-15, F-16, and F-35 fighter jets flown by capable Israeli pilots launching, in some cases, American-made munitions.

That same military prowess, empowered by American support, was on display against Hezbollah, the U.S.-designated terrorist organization in Lebanon. Hezbollah started attacking Israel on October 8, 2023, one day after Hamas’s barbaric terrorist assault. The group’s top commanders included Fuad Shukr, who the U.S. government says played a key role in the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing that resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. military personnel. As part of the Rewards for Justice Program, the United States had offered a $5 million reward for information that would bring him to justice. That effort did not yield any results.

But on July 30, 2024, as part of its military operations against Hezbollah, Israel killed Shukr using American-made aircraft and likely an American air-launched munition. He will never again harm American troops — thanks to the Israelis. That is more than burden sharing. That is Israel accomplishing objectives that make Americans safer without putting a single U.S. service member in harm’s way. America needs partners like that.

Israeli military prowess also empowers American diplomacy. When President Trump or future presidents warn that there will be consequences for aggression, Iran and its terror proxies must worry that Israeli forces, and not just the U.S. military, is prepared to back up Washington’s words with decisive action. In short, Israel’s hammer makes pronouncements from Washington even more powerful. That’s why American efforts to build Israeli military capability are a wise investment — and not charity.

To be sure, Israel may not have one of the largest economies in the world and is certainly not an industrial superpower. Israel does, however, consistently create world-class military technologies from which Americans regularly benefit. This includes technology developed years ago to detect, map, and destroy Hezbollah and Hamas terror tunnels that Israel shared with the United States. The United States used these Israeli technologies to find and neutralize drug-smuggling tunnels under our southern border that could also be used by terrorists to infiltrate the United States. These same technologies developed in Israel also helped U.S. troops deployed to the Middle East expose tunnels that Islamic State terrorists used to approach, surveil, and attack U.S. military bases.

Due to necessity, culture, and size, Israel, a country of around 10 million people, is unusually effective at quickly fielding cutting-edge military technologies. The United States, for its part, has consistently struggled to go quickly from military concept to fielded combat capability, and many troops did not return home as a result, or returned with permanent wounds, both seen and unseen. “On average, the Department of Defense takes almost 12 years to deliver the first version of a weapon system,” according to a June 11, 2025, Government Accountability Office report. “That’s not nearly fast enough to keep up with emerging threats or deliver innovative technology,” the GAO concluded.

The United States has periodically purchased weapons systems from Israel to fill significant military capability gaps more quickly. The U.S. Army, for example, purchased the Trophy Active Protection System (APS) from Israel in 2018 to protect American M1 Abrams main battle tanks from rockets and missiles. But the Army could have closed this gap far sooner — the Trophy system has been operational in the Israeli military since at least 2011. Meanwhile, U.S. Army testimony in May 2018 made clear that American programs that might have provided a similar kind of protection were still “not ready yet for full rate production.” With new conflicts potentially looming, America’s warfighters may pay a steep price in the future if the Pentagon cannot move more quickly from identified requirements to fielded combat capability.

Echoing bipartisan concerns for years, Secretary Hegseth has rightly bemoaned the fact that Pentagon processes have “moved at the speed of paperwork, not war.” In a speech on acquisition reform on November 7, he emphasized the need to ensure “speed replaces process, money follows need, joint problems drive action, experimentation accelerates delivery and the services move faster and smarter.” Israel can support this vital effort.

At a time when China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are pursuing “unprecedented levels of cooperation,” according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine, an American partner such as Israel is a national security asset that should be nurtured. By helping to secure American interests in the Middle East, Israel lightens the U.S. burden there and enables Washington to focus more on priorities elsewhere, including the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, consistent with Trump’s new National Security Strategy.

Essential Components of a U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Agreement

A U.S.-Israel SPA could pick up where the MOU will leave off when it expires in 2028, enabling Israel to continue advancing U.S. interests. The SPA could begin in fiscal year 2029 and be negotiated to last for 10 years or longer. To maximize the value of the SPA for the United States, U.S. negotiators should suggest that Israel formally agree to three major commitments related, respectively, to its defense spending, procurement of American weapons, and investment in cooperative U.S.-Israel military research and development.

Defense Spending Commitment

First, as part of the SPA, Israel could agree to spend no less than 4.5 or even 5 percent of its GDP on defense each year. That is an extraordinary amount for a democracy to spend on defense — more than any NATO member state, including the United States, was estimated to spend this year. Yet Israel reached that level in 2023, before the war begun by Hamas pushed spending even higher.

For a decade, the United States has been spending around 3 percent of its GDP on defense. According to a NATO report with data current as of June 2025, only two members — Poland and Lithuania — were estimated to spend 4 percent or more of GDP on defense this year.

Source: NATO

Notably, in the June 25, 2025, NATO Hague Summit Declaration, President Trump elicited commitments from America’s NATO allies to spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035. In other words, if Israel were to commit to spending 4.5 or 5 percent of its GDP on defense each year of the SPA, it would be spending around 30 to 40 percent more by that measure on defense than NATO members are expected to spend in 2035 – six years earlier than the NATO requirement.

For those concerned about the burden on Israel, it is worth noting that Israel spent roughly 4 percent of GDP on defense in 2022 and 5 percent in 2023. In 2024, the first full year after the October 7 terror attack, Israel spent roughly 8 percent of GDP on defense and then 7 percent in 2025. While the 2026 number is not finalized, the expected figure is roughly 6 percent. Some in Israel might be reluctant to commit to spending at least 4.5 or 5 percent of GDP on defense for 10 years or more, but the shock of the October 7 assault and the multi-front war that followed show there is a clear need. Israel must replenish, expand, and modernize its military capabilities – and that will not be cheap.

Requirement for Israeli Purchase of U.S. Military Hardware

The second key component of the SPA would be an Israeli commitment to spend a certain amount each year in the United States procuring American-made military hardware. This commitment would be in addition to any Israeli spending related to foreign military financing or PII funding (see below). U.S. negotiators could suggest a floor of $1 billion per year as a starting point. This injection of Israeli resources would create American jobs, spur the economy, and bolster the U.S. DIB, by increasing production capacity and keeping assembly lines and supply networks active and healthy.

In addition to benefiting U.S. interests and the American worker, this commitment would serve Israel’s interests, as it needs to procure large quantities of American military hardware. Turning this plan into a firm commitment would explicitly, tangibly, and publicly demonstrate Israel’s commitment to the partnership and investment in the American DIB.

Requirement To Invest in Cooperative Research and Development

Finally, the third key commitment in the SPA would be for Israel to spend millions each year to help fund combined military research and development efforts identified by the U.S.-Israel Operations-Technology Working Group (OTWG) to meet common requirements identified by the Pentagon’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development. A starting point for negotiations could be $150 million per year. This minimum investment figure could increase each year in proportion to the growth of Israel’s GDP the previous year.

There are ample additional opportunities for collaboration. The OTWG includes sub-working groups focused on artificial intelligence/autonomy, directed energy, counter-unmanned aerial systems, biotechnology, integrated network systems-of-systems, and hypersonic capabilities. These are among America’s top military modernization priorities and Israel is already helping. If new priorities emerge, the OTWG could establish new sub-working groups. The United States could match Israeli funding using mechanisms like those employed by the Capability Development and Innovation Divisions in the Pentagon (formerly known as the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate).

U.S. Partnership Investment Incentive Funding

In return for these significant Israeli commitments, the United States, as part of the SPA, could commit to providing Israel with PII funding via the existing FMF mechanism. Israel would use this funding to procure American-made military hardware. Pursuant to negotiations, the amount of PII could be $5 billion or so per year, which would represent roughly the inflation adjusted value of the $3.8 billion figure negotiated in 2016. Regardless of the amount, there would be important differences between the old FMF and the new PII, even though PII could be delivered using existing mechanisms.

Israel would be required to spend all the PII funding solely in the United States, which would benefit American workers, a major administration priority. There would be no so-called “off-shore procurement” (OSP) funding that has permitted Israel to spend a portion of FMF outside the United States. Under the current MOU, Israel was permitted to spend $815 million in fiscal year 2019 outside the United States. Over the 10 years covered by the current MOU, that amount gradually declines to zero in FY 2028. Under the SPA, all PII would be spent in the United States starting in the first year (FY 2029) and would stay that way throughout the entire SPA term. Eliminating OSP would also incentivize Israeli companies to partner even more with American defense companies, further strengthening the American DIB and providing both partners additional opportunities to benefit from each other’s innovation. That would, in turn, help Israel build redundant production capacity in the United States to complement production capacity in Israel. That is important in case Israeli factories are damaged in a major war or the mobilization of reservists deprives those factories of workers when they are needed most. It is worth remembering that thousands of Israelis left their factories to fight after October 7.

Any Israelis concerned about the lack of OSP authority can take comfort in the fact that it is not necessary, as Israel needs to spend well more than $5 billion per year in the United States to procure needed weapons. The Department of State, for example, announced on February 7, 2025, a foreign military sale to Israel for almost $7 billion in American military equipment.

A second difference between existing FMF and a PII would be that Israel would, under the SPA, also agree to spend all PII not just in the United States, but on areas designated by the Pentagon as top American combat preparedness priorities — a condition that would further bolster the U.S. DIB. The negotiation process for the SPA could formally identify these areas to ensure they are mutually agreeable. They could include air superiority, air and missile defense, and precision strike, for example.

A benefit of PII is that it would help Washington ensure Israel maintains its QME relative to other states in the region. The administration is eager to expand security cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including the potential provision of F-35s. This plan should not move forward unless concerns about Saudi Arabia’s military cooperation with China are resolved. If those concerns are conclusively addressed and Riyadh agrees to normalize relations with Israel before the delivery of the first aircraft, the F-35 deal could perhaps proceed. However, in that scenario, U.S. interests and U.S. law require Washington to take additional steps to help Israel maintain its relative QME. PII could help Israel acquire the additional capability and capacity necessary to maintain its QME.

Finally, the SPA could include agreements related to non-military cooperation in areas such as agriculture and dual-use areas such as artificial intelligence. It could also include agreements codifying and expanding already impressive levels of mutually beneficial intelligence cooperation.

Conclusion

If the president were able to negotiate a Strategic Partnership Agreement like the one laid out above, it would represent a historic accomplishment, supporting the administration’s goals to strengthen America’s defense industrial base and increase partner capacity so that those nations can carry more of the security burden.

As the United States seeks to do more here at home in the Western Hemisphere while deterring aggression in the Pacific, Washington needs capable and motivated partners to defend enduring U.S. interests in the Middle East, such as countering Islamist terrorism and the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. Thankfully, that kind of partner is exactly what Americans have in Israel. A U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Agreement can help ensure that remains the case for many years to come.

Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Brad and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Brad on X @Brad_L_Bowman. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · Bradley Bowman CMPP Senior Director

5. How Beijing Built Arms Industry to Rival the West

Summary:

Beijing has executed a long, state-led drive to achieve defense industrial self-sufficiency, reducing vulnerability to Western sanctions and supply cutoffs. China moved from being the world’s largest arms importer two decades ago to falling out of the top 10 importers, while rising to the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter. It did so by restructuring state champions, concentrating talent and capital (notably the 2016 creation of AECC for jet engines), and accelerating civil military integration. China also leveraged espionage and reverse engineering to close gaps. Results include indigenous engines entering stealth fighters, rapid naval shipbuilding at scale (152 launches vs 70 for the U.S., 2015–2024), and hypersonic systems assessed as highly capable.

Comment: The evolution of strategic competition described here. I always remember hearing that China was incapable of producing its own jet engines.

How Beijing Built Arms Industry to Rival the West

WSJ

New jet engines show results of China’s military self-sufficiency push

By Chun Han Wong

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Dec. 21, 2025 10:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/how-beijing-built-arms-industry-to-rival-the-west-2ef824c7?mod=hp_lead_pos4

In 2016, Beijing launched a new aerospace conglomerate called Aero Engine Corp. of China. It had a challenging mandate: to develop top-line aircraft engines, a technology China had long struggled to master.

Less than a decade later, Beijing’s newest stealth fighters are entering service with what officials call “Chinese hearts,” or indigenously made engines.

The progress marked a milestone in China’s quest to forge an arms industry worthy of a rising global power. For years, China’s rise obscured a sobering reality: It couldn’t make all its own weapons.

Beijing is now not only producing its own armaments, it is also selling more abroad. In some military technologies, China appears to be matching major arms producers such as Russia and the U.S., or even pulling ahead.

The ability to churn out advanced armaments is a key element in Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s vision of making his country less reliant on the outside world for everything from food and energy to semiconductors. A more self-sufficient China is essential for preventing Western nations from locking it into a strategic stranglehold, Xi has argued.

Two decades ago, China imported more arms than any other country, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or Sipri, an independent think tank.

China used to rely on the likes of Russia and France for warplanes, aviation engines and air-defense systems, and even struck deals to buy military hardware from the U.S. in the 1980s, including radar systems and artillery technology.

But China’s share of global arms imports has fallen significantly and the Asian power has dropped out of the world’s top 10 buyers in recent years, according to Sipri data. Analysts say China can now produce most of the military technologies it needs, even if it continues using some foreign hardware for cost or quality reasons.

This strategic success puts China in a stronger position to wage war in the event of a superpower conflict. It reflects Beijing’s efforts to boost scientific research, restructure its state-run arms industry and tap private businesses for defense needs.

China has also closed some technological gaps through espionage and illegally reverse-engineering imported gear, Western officials and analysts say. U.S. officials have disclosed what they describe as Chinese cyberattacks aimed at stealing U.S. secrets in aerospace, maritime and other technologies.

“China used every trick in the book,” said Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher in Sipri’s arms-transfers program.

Beijing is now the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, trailing only the U.S., France and Russia, according to Sipri data. Chinese hypersonic missiles, which can travel at least five times the speed of sound and evade most air defenses, exceed Western capabilities.

The military parade in Beijing in September showcased China’s hypersonic missiles. Zhang Cheng/Xinhua/Getty Images

“China has always adhered to the principles of independence, self-reliance and indigenous innovation in weapons equipment development, relying on its own strength for research, development and production,” the Chinese Defense Ministry said in response to queries. Beijing’s arms programs, it said, are entirely meant for “safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests.”

State moves

China’s Communist Party has craved military self-sufficiency since taking power in 1949. Although it developed its own nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities under Mao Zedong, it remained behind in other modern military technologies.

A Western embargo on arms sales to China after the deadly crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 complicated the task for Beijing.

Subsequent Chinese leaders have stepped up spending to procure foreign technology and support indigenous weapons development.

In the 1990s, China bought Russian Sukhoi-27 fighters and reverse-engineered them to make its own version: the J-11s. Rostec, a Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, later accused China of illegally copying Russian military hardware, including Sukhoi planes.

In 2016, a Chinese aviation executive pleaded guilty in the U.S. to conspiring to hack and steal data from American defense contractors, including information on the C-17 transporter as well as the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters.

Beijing also reorganized its defense industry, which was dominated by state giants that had struggled with inefficiency and corruption while resisting government efforts to foster collaboration with civilian partners.

Aero Engine—which is also known as AECC, and was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2020 and 2021—was created by pooling top scientists and resources from dozens of aerospace companies and research institutes. Beijing infused the new conglomerate with billions of dollars to compete against the likes of General Electric and Pratt & Whitney. Beijing also merged two state-owned firms to create the world’s largest shipbuilder.

Such moves helped China accelerate its development of homemade aircraft carriers, submarines and warplanes, such as Beijing’s second stealth fighter, the J-35, whose public debut in 2024 meant China was joining the U.S. as the only nations operating more than one model of stealth fighter.

New thrust

Mastering jet engines was one of the biggest challenges. A top Chinese military test pilot told a Chinese newspaper in 2016 that domestically made engines struggled with insufficient thrust, high fuel consumption rates and poor reliability.

AECC boosted research collaboration with Chinese universities and said it tapped new technologies, including artificial intelligence, to speed up engine design and testing. State media portrayed AECC engineers as inspirational figures helping China break a Western technological monopoly.

The efforts have started to pay off. Newer variants of Chinese jet fighters originally designed with Russian engines—including so-called “fourth generation” fighters like the J-10 and J-11—have been fitted with engines developed and produced by Chinese entities that were brought under AECC.

China’s first fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, was displayed with a Chinese engine for the first time in 2021, roughly five years after the jet’s official unveiling.

The new J-35 stealth fighter, a rough equivalent of the American F-35, is equipped with Chinese-made engines, according to a recent state-television program. Beijing has also displayed a new variant of its Y-20 heavy transporter equipped with Chinese-made engines, replacing Russian models.

AECC-affiliated researchers are pushing to develop advanced propulsion technology, including a class of engine that can transition from low-speed to hypersonic modes, according to procurement documents obtained by researchers at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

U.S. engines still tend to be “an order of magnitude better” in terms of reliability, being able to operate for many more hours before requiring overhauls, according to Steve Russell, general manager at GE Aerospace’s advanced military projects unit Edison Works.

Nonetheless, China has “a lot of smart engineers too. They’re working fast,” Russell said at a recent think-tank discussion. “They are getting better.”

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While it is hard for Western analysts to decisively determine how advanced some of China’s domestically made arms are, clues emerged in a skirmish between Pakistan and India in May, when Pakistan’s Chinese-made J-10 fighters reportedly shot down some Indian warplanes, including at least one French-made Rafale jet, using Chinese radar-guided missiles. It was the first known aerial victory that a Chinese-made jet scored against a Western fighter.

State broadcaster China Central Television followed up days later by airing a two-part documentary—“The Legend of the J-10”—that recounted the fighter’s development from the 1980s, calling it a sign that “China’s indigenous research and development system for military aircraft has matured.”

Precise circumstances of the shootdown remain unclear. Still, it “proves what the Chinese and everyone else are saying—these are capable things and they are not to be trifled with,” said Brendan Mulvaney, director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute, a U.S. Department of the Air Force think tank.

Getting shipshape

China has also indigenized other military capabilities, including leapfrogging the U.S. in its ability to build warships quickly and cheaply. From 2015 to 2024, China’s navy launched 152 ships while the U.S. launched 70, according to estimates by independent defense analyst Tom Shugart.

The Chinese fleet is now the world’s largest by number of vessels, although the U.S. Navy says its ships are still better.

Beijing’s third and newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is the first to be fully designed and built in China, and features electromagnetic catapults for launching aircraft.

The Fujian aircraft carrier (right) was commissioned in November. Li Gang/Xinhua/Getty Images

Commissioned in November, it represents a marked upgrade from China’s first two carriers, which lack aircraft-launching catapults that are standard on American carriers. The first Chinese carrier was refurbished from a Soviet-made hull purchased from Ukraine in 1998, while the second carrier’s design was based largely on the first.

Analysts say China still has some way to go before it can outfit its entire military with domestically developed hardware. Soviet and Russian-designed aircraft still account for a significant share of China’s inventory, including strategic bombers. Foreign-designed engines still power many Chinese warplanes and helicopters.

“Xi’s thinking is that China remains the underdog in the military-innovation-industrial nexus compared with the U.S.,” said Tai Ming Cheung, a professor at UC San Diego who has written books on China’s military and arms industry.

But Xi’s goal is for China “to comprehensively challenge the U.S. for global military leadership” eventually, Cheung said.

Write to Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com

WSJ

6. U.S. Coast Guard Chasing Another Tanker Involved in Shipping Venezuela Oil

Summary:

The U.S. Coast Guard is pursuing the VLCC Bella 1, a tanker sanctioned in 2024, as the administration implements POTUS’ order for a “total and complete blockade” of sanctioned vessels moving Venezuelan oil. Officials say Bella 1 is part of a “dark” or “shadow” fleet, allegedly using false flag registration, and is subject to a judicial seizure order. The Coast Guard also boarded the Centuries, which was not on U.S., U.K., EU, or UN sanctions lists, signaling broader enforcement against tankers carrying Venezuelan crude. With about 70% of exports tied to sanctioned vessels, the action targets Maduro’s core revenue.

Comment: Coast Guard doing its job? Using the right force for the mission? 

U.S. Coast Guard Chasing Another Tanker Involved in Shipping Venezuela Oil

WSJ

Operation comes as the administration carries out Trump’s order to blockade Venezuela’s oil shipments

By Costas Paris

Follow and Shelby Holliday

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Updated Dec. 21, 2025 7:13 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/u-s-coast-guard-chasing-another-tanker-involved-in-shipping-venezuela-oil-219e7fdd

U.S. Coast Guard helicopter flies over Rafael Hernández Airport in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, amid military movements. Eva Marie Uzcategui/Reuters

• The U.S. Coast Guard is pursuing the oil tanker Bella 1, sanctioned in 2024, as part of an effort to block Venezuelan oil shipments.
• The Trump administration is escalating pressure on Venezuela, targeting a fleet of sanctioned vessels responsible for about 70% of its oil exports.
• The U.S. apprehended the tanker Centuries, which wasn’t on sanctions lists, suggesting an expansive enforcement of its policy on Venezuelan oil.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The U.S. Coast Guard is pursuing the oil tanker Bella 1, sanctioned in 2024, as part of an effort to block Venezuelan oil shipments.

The U.S. Coast Guard is pursuing an oil tanker involved in transporting oil from Venezuela, according to three U.S. officials, part of an accelerating effort by the Trump administration to block ships from moving the country’s crude.

The attempted interdiction comes a day after the U.S. apprehended an oil tanker that wasn’t on its sanctions list and after President Trump in a social-media post last Tuesday ordered a “total and complete blockade” of sanctioned tankers going into and out of Venezuela.

One of the officials said the tanker under pursuit was previously sanctioned and part of the so-called dark fleet of vessels involved in moving oil from Venezuela. The ship was flying a false flag to disguise the country where it is registered and is subject to a judicial seizure order, the official said.

Two other officials identified the ship as the Bella 1, a very large crude carrier, or VLCC, which was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2024.

The flurry of moves against tankers signaled the Trump administration was escalating its pressure campaign against Venezuela. Trump has demanded President Nicolás Maduro stop sending gang members and migrants to the U.S., halt drug trafficking and the return of former U.S. assets nationalized decades ago. He has also privately pressured the Venezuelan leader to step down.

Venezuela has rejected the U.S. demands, calling the moves against ships serving its oil sector illegal. About 70% of Venezuela’s oil exports rely on the fleet of sanctioned vessels that is increasingly being targeted by the Trump administration, and the U.S. actions strike at the heart of Maduro’s grip on power by threatening oil revenue vital to the regime.

The Bella 1 is seen earlier this year. Hakon Rimmereid/Reuters

The Bella 1’s registered owner is Istanbul-based Louis Marine Shipholding Enterprises S.A., according to shipping data and analytics provider Kpler. The company didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

The vessel was one of three crude carriers that were heading to Venezuela, but turned around last week to avoid detection, one U.S. official said.

In the separate operation Saturday, the Coast Guard boarded a Panamanian-flagged oil tanker named the Centuries that had been docked in Venezuela, according to Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. The Centuries wasn’t included on sanctions lists from the U.S., U.K., European Union or the United Nations, according to Kpler.

Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, said Saturday night in a social-media post that the Centuries “was a falsely flagged vessel operating as part of the Venezuelan shadow fleet to traffic stolen oil and fund the narcoterrorist Maduro regime.”

The apprehension of the Centuries “suggests that the U.S. is using an expansive concept of sanctioned tankers in enforcing its policy, and that it is treating all tankers carrying Venezuelan oil as potentially subject to seizure,” said Francisco Rodriguez, a Venezuela analyst at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. “This escalates U.S. policy into a de facto total naval blockade of Venezuelan oil exports, which would have major negative effects on the Venezuelan economy,” he said.

The Pentagon is moving some of its most advanced units and weapons closer to Venezuela as tensions run high between President Trump and Nicolás Maduro. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday maps the buildup in the Caribbean. Photo Illustration: Annie Zhao

The Centuries’ registered owner, Hong Kong-based Centuries Shipping, didn’t immediately respond to calls seeking comment. The ship had loaded 1.8 million barrels of crude oil at Venezuela’s Jose terminal and had been signaling its destination as Malaysia at the point it was intercepted, one of the officials said.

The U.S. took control of another U.S.-sanctioned tanker named the Skipper earlier this month. It has been heading toward the Texas coast under U.S. control.

Write to Costas Paris at costas.paris@wsj.com and Shelby Holliday at shelby.holliday@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 22, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Chasing Tanker Bound For Venezuela'.

WSJ

7. US military to stop shooting pigs and goats for medic training

Summary:

The FY2026 defense bill bans “live fire” medic training that shoots pigs and goats, citing modern simulators that better replicate battlefield trauma. Rep. Vern Buchanan led the push. The Defense Health Agency says DoD will shift to modeling and simulation, though other animal uses, including weapon wounding and certain trauma procedures, remain permitted.

Excerpts:

Buchanan’s office said the Defense Department will continue to allow training that involves stabbing, burning and using blunt instruments on animals, while also allowing “weapon wounding,” which is when the military tests weapons on animals. Animal rights groups say the animals are supposed to be anesthetized during such training and testing.

...

The GAO report stated the animals are placed under anesthesia and then euthanized.

“Live animals such as pigs and goats are used in trauma training because their organs and tissues are similar to humans, they have biological variation that can complicate treatment and provide opportunities to control medical conditions,” the report stated.

Comment: I hope the exceptions above allow Special Forces Medical training to continue unhindered. The Special Operations medical professionals know what they are doing and what the force needs to be properly trained. I recall listening to a Special Forces Sergeant Major telling a congressional delegation that was visiting the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center at Fort Bragg that he did not want the first time for a medic to be feeling around the blood and guts inside of someone's stomach to be his own in the field. He wanted our medics to have the one of a kind experience that only live tissue training can give them. I concur.  

However, If we eliminate live tissue training our operators are going to suffer in the field. Again as noted, the treatment of these animals is done with the utmost care to reduce any suffering. It would be a terrible move by Congress to eliminate live tissue training in our Special Forces Medical training because it will affect the health and welfare of our troops especially those requiring care in austere, remote, denied environments where MEDEVAC capabilities to support the Golden Hour do not exist. We are putting our operators at risk. I hope that these Congressmen will be Andrews the next time an operator arrives for a dignified transfer ceremony so they can personally witness the results of their votes. 

Apologies for the rant. But show me I am wrong about the need for live tissue training in special operations medical training..

US military to stop shooting pigs and goats for medic training

militarytimes.com · Ben Finley, The Associated Press Friday, Dec 19, 2025

The U.S. military will stop its practice of shooting pigs and goats to help prepare medics for treating wounded troops in a combat zone, ending an exercise made obsolete by simulators that mimic battlefield injuries.

The prohibition on “live fire” training that includes animals is part of this year’s annual defense bill, although other uses of animals for wartime training will continue The ban was championed by Rep. Vern Buchanan, a Florida Republican who often focuses on animal rights issues.

Buchanan called the change “a major step forward in reducing unnecessary suffering in military practices.”

“With today’s advanced simulation technology, we can prepare our medics for the battlefield while reducing harm to animals,” he said in a statement to The Associated Press. “As Co-Chair of the Animal Protection Caucus, I’m proud to continue leading efforts to end outdated and inhumane practices.”

Buchanan’s office said the Defense Department will continue to allow training that involves stabbing, burning and using blunt instruments on animals, while also allowing “weapon wounding,” which is when the military tests weapons on animals. Animal rights groups say the animals are supposed to be anesthetized during such training and testing.

The Defense Health Agency, which oversees the training, said in a statement Friday that the Defense Department, “remains committed to replacement of animal models without compromising the quality of medical training.”

The agency cited the establishment of its Defense Medical Modeling and Simulation Office as a testament to those efforts, which include “realistic training scenarios to ensure medical providers are well-prepared to care for the combat-wounded.”

Groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals declared victory, saying the change will spare the lives of thousands of animals each year and “marks a historic shift toward state-of-the-art, human-relevant simulation technology.”

It’s unclear how often the military uses animals for training. Previous defense bills and other pieces of legislation have sought to reduce their use for trauma training, according to a 2022 report from the Government Accountability Office, an independent agency that serves Congress.

The 2013 defense bill required the Pentagon to submit a report that outlined a strategy for transitioning to human-based training methods, the GAO said. A 2018 statute required the secretary of defense to ensure the military used simulation technology “to the maximum extent practicable” or unless use of animals was deemed necessary by the medical chain of command.

The GAO report stated the animals are placed under anesthesia and then euthanized.

“Live animals such as pigs and goats are used in trauma training because their organs and tissues are similar to humans, they have biological variation that can complicate treatment and provide opportunities to control medical conditions,” the report stated.

But groups such as the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine say anesthetized pigs and goats do little to prepare medics or corpsmen for treating wounded servicemembers. They said the advent of “cut suits” that are worn by people are much better at mimicking an injured human who is moaning and writhing.

“The big argument is this is a living, breathing thing that they have to take care of and there’s this level of realism,” said Erin Griffith, a retired Navy doctor and member of the physicians committee. “But replicating what it’s like when their buddy is shot and bleeding and awake is very different.”

8. Russian General Killed by Car Bomb in Moscow

Summary:

Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov, head of Russia’s General Staff operational training directorate, was killed in Moscow when a bomb attached under his vehicle detonated around 7 a.m. Russian investigators said Ukrainian special services may be involved, though Kyiv has not commented. The killing fits a pattern of targeted attacks on Russian military figures.

Comment: The only good Russian is... (apologies for the attempt at gallows humor). Ukrainian SOF are getting very bold. How are Russian generals dealing with these attacks?

Russian General Killed by Car Bomb in Moscow

WSJ

Russia says Ukraine may be responsible for the killing of the head of the General Staff’s army operational training directorate

By Matthew Luxmoore

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Dec. 22, 2025 6:12 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russian-general-killed-by-car-bomb-in-moscow-4c8c2f78

The scene of the explosion in Moscow on Monday. Anastasia Barashkova/Reuters

A Russian general was killed when a bomb fitted to the underside of his vehicle exploded early Monday, Russia’s investigative committee said, an attack that Moscow said could have been planned by Ukraine.

Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov, who headed the General Staff’s army operational training directorate, had just begun his commute to work at around 7 a.m. local time when a bomb attached to his Kia Sorento detonated, according to Russian media.

Sarvarov had driven several meters in the car park outside his housing block when the blast riddled his body with shrapnel.

Authorities said they were questioning witnesses and reviewing footage from cameras in the district of south Moscow where Sarvarov was killed.

Sarvarov, 56, was a highly decorated officer who graduated from a tank command school in the waning years of the Soviet Union and served in the conflicts fueled by its collapse. He fought in Chechnya and in a brief war in North Ossetia in the 1990s, and later took part in Russia’s military intervention in Syria.

Russian investigators said Ukrainian special services may have been involved in the attack. Kyiv hasn’t commented. But Sarvarov’s killing would be the latest in a series of apparent assassinations of members of Russia’s military command since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

In December of last year, Ukraine’s SBU security service claimed responsibility for an attack that killed Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, the commander of a Russian unit designed to protect troops from chemical, radiological and biological attack. Kirillov was killed when a scooter blew up beside him on the snowy streets of Moscow.

Ukraine is also suspected of being behind the assassinations of a top Russian missile scientist, a pro-Moscow former Ukrainian lawmaker and a prominent nationalist war blogger. In 2022, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Kyiv was responsible for the killing of Daria Dugina, the daughter of a prominent far-right Russian ideologue.

Kyiv has sought to use targeted attacks against Russian military commanders and prominent pro-war figures to gain an edge in war against a superior Russian military buoyed by greater reserves of manpower and equipment.

It has at times recruited people inside Russia who have shown a willingness to aid the Ukrainian cause, and given them detailed instructions on how to orchestrate attacks. One such case was a daring drone attack by the SBU in June that destroyed or damaged dozens of warplanes at four military airports deep inside Russia, in the biggest blow of the war against Moscow’s long-range bomber fleet.

Such attacks have been orchestrated not only by the SBU but also by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR. On Monday, HUR posted a video purporting to show burning Russian jet fighters on the territory of a military airport. The agency said that one of its agents had sneaked onto the air base in Lipetsk, in western Russia, overnight into Sunday and set ablaze an SU-30 and SU-27 jet.

HUR said the sabotage had caused $100 million in damages and rendered the two aircraft inoperable. It said its agent made it out of the airfield undetected and is now in Ukraine.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

9. US launches operation to ‘eliminate’ ISIS fighters in Syria: Hegseth

Summary:

SECDEF/SECWAR announced a new U.S. operation in Syria to “eliminate” ISIS fighters, infrastructure, and weapons sites after three U.S. citizens were killed on December 13 in the Syrian desert. The dead included two Iowa National Guard soldiers and a civilian interpreter, and three other U.S. troops were wounded. The administration blames ISIS. POTUS vowed serious retaliation while noting Syrian forces are operating alongside U.S. troops and expanding cooperation with Syrian security services. Syrian media reported strikes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and near Palmyra. A U.S. official cited F-15s, A-10s, and Apaches, with more strikes expected.

US launches operation to ‘eliminate’ ISIS fighters in Syria: Hegseth

militarytimes.com · Konstantin Toropin, Ben Finley and Aamer Madhani, the Associated Press · December 19, 2025

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/12/19/us-launches-operation-to-eliminate-isis-fighters-in-syria-hegseth/?utm

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has announced the start of an operation to “eliminate ISIS fighters, infrastructure and weapons sites” in Syria following the deaths of three U.S. citizens.

“This is not the beginning of a war — it is a declaration of vengeance. The United States of America, under President Trump’s leadership, will never hesitate and never relent to defend our people,” he said Friday on social media.

Two Iowa National Guard members and a U.S. civilian interpreter were killed Dec. 13 in an attack in the Syrian desert that the Trump administration has blamed on the Islamic State group. The slain National Guard members were among hundreds of U.S. troops deployed in eastern Syria as part of a coalition fighting IS.

Soon after word of the deaths, President Donald Trump pledged “very serious retaliation” but stressed that Syria was fighting alongside U.S. troops. Trump has said Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa was “extremely angry and disturbed by this attack” and the shooting attack by a gunman came as the U.S. military is expanding its cooperation with Syrian security forces.

Syrian state television reported that strikes hit targets in rural areas of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces and in the Jabal al-Amour area near Palmyra. It said they targeted “weapons storage sites and headquarters used by ISIS as launching points for its operations in the region.”

A U.S. official told The Associated Press that the attack was conducted using F-15 Eagle jets, A-10 Thunderbolt ground attack aircraft and AH-64 Apache helicopters. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive operations, said more strikes should be expected.

When asked for further information, the Pentagon referred AP to Hegseth’s social media post.

White House officials noted that Trump had made clear that retaliation was coming.

“President Trump told the world that the United States would retaliate for the killing of our heroes by ISIS in Syria, and he is delivering on that promise,” White House deputy press secretary Anna Kelly said in a statement.

Trump this week met privately with the families of the slain Americans at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware before he joined top military officials and other dignitaries on the tarmac for the dignified transfer, a solemn and largely silent ritual honoring U.S. service members killed in action.

The guardsmen killed in Syria on Saturday were Sgt. Edgar Brian Torres-Tovar, 25, of Des Moines, and Sgt. William Nathaniel Howard, 29, of Marshalltown, according to the U.S. Army. Ayad Mansoor Sakat, of Macomb, Michigan, a U.S. civilian working as an interpreter, was also killed.

The shooting nearly a week ago near the historic city of Palmyra also wounded three other U.S. troops as well as members of Syria’s security forces, and the gunman was killed. The assailant had joined Syria’s internal security forces as a base security guard two months ago and recently was reassigned because of suspicions that he might be affiliated with IS, Interior Ministry spokesperson Nour al-Din al-Baba has said.

The man stormed a meeting between U.S. and Syrian security officials who were having lunch together and opened fire after clashing with Syrian guards.

Associated Press writer Abby Sewell in Beirut, Lebanon, contributed.

10. Opinion | Trump is losing sight of America’s real terrorist threat

Summary:

Max Boot argues the Trump administration is misallocating counterterrorism attention toward cartels, Venezuela, and antifa while the more lethal Salafi-jihadi threat persists. He contends cartels are profit-driven, antifa is fragmented, and Venezuela is not comparable to state sponsors like Iran. He cites recent ISIS-linked attacks and plots worldwide as evidence the danger remains acute. Boot warns policy choices are weakening long-term counterterrorism: shifting DHS and FBI resources to immigration enforcement, reducing online counter-propaganda capacity, moving to close U.S. international broadcasters, cutting foreign aid that supports partners and detention operations in Syria, straining alliances and intelligence sharing, and staffing key posts with unqualified officials.

Comment: Is he wrong? Do we have our priorities correct? 

Opinion | Trump is losing sight of America’s real terrorist threat

Washington Post · Max Boot

ISIS and al-Qaeda thrive as Trump recklessly reallocates scarce security resources.

December 22, 2025 at 6:30 a.m. ESTToday at 6:30 a.m. EST

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/12/22/terrorism-antifa-cartels-islamic-state-trump/

The Trump administration has been reallocating scarce federal resources to combating drug cartels (“narco-terrorists”), the Venezuelan state (“a foreign terrorist organization”) and leftist groups like antifa (a “violent fifth column of domestic terrorists”). Aside from obvious concerns about legality, these actions also raise serious questions about the administration’s priorities and distribution of resources.

Drug cartels may be evil, but they are ultimately driven by profit and not by a murderous ideology like the Islamic State is. Antifa is a loose-knit group of activists who may be guilty of scattered acts of violence, but they’re not plotting mass casualty events like al-Qaeda does. The Venezuelan regime is complicit in human rights violations and drug trafficking, but it is not a state sponsor of terrorism like, say, Iran.

While the administration focuses on pseudo-terrorists, it risks losing focus on the battle against actual no-kidding terrorists. Just a week ago, a father-son team of ISIS-inspired terrorists killed 15 people at Sydney’s Bondi Beach during a Hanukkah celebration, shortly after an ISIS fighter in Syria killed two U.S. service members and an American civilian. (On Friday, U.S. forces bombed dozens of sites in Syria in retaliation.)

Other recent terrorist attacks by Islamic State adherents include the Jan. 1 truck attack in New Orleans, which killed 14 people, plus the perpetrator; an Oct. 2 attack at a synagogue in England, which killed two, including a man shot by police; a June 22 suicide bombing on a Greek Orthodox church in Syria, which killed 25; and a March 22, 2024, attack on a concert hall in Moscow, which killed more than 140. Many other schemes have been foiled, including a plan last year to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna and a recent alleged vehicle-ramming plot in Germany.

Though the Islamic State has lost its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq, the organization continues to propagate jihadist ideology, primarily online, with the recent Israel-Gaza war drawing fresh recruits to its cause. It has affiliates from Afghanistan to Africa to the Philippines (where the Bondi Beach suspects traveled last month). Al-Qaeda also has affiliates across the globe, including one that is on the verge of seizing power in Mali.

A March U.S. intelligence report warned that Islamic State “will continue to seek to attack the West, including the United States,” and that al-Qaeda also “maintains its intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens.” Two terrorism experts note that there are now “five times as many Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups designated by the U.S. Department of State” as there were on Sept. 11, 2001.

Combating jihadist groups requires a comprehensive, long-term strategy; a few U.S. airstrikes, like the ones in Syria on Friday, won’t achieve much. Yet many of the administration’s actions undercut attempts to fight these terrorist groups.

First, resources at the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI have been shifted toward immigration enforcement and away from terrorism and other concerns. Nearly one-fourth of all FBI agents are working on immigration cases, even though most of the people being deported have no criminal record.

Second, the State Department has closed offices dedicating to combating disinformation online, and the Trump administration is pressuring social media sites to scale back content moderation efforts. The administration has even threatened to deny visas to foreign workers involved in content moderation, and it is lobbying the European Union to relax its digital security standards.

This is billed as a fight against “censorship,” and it’s primarily motivated by a desire to stop the deplatforming of right-wing trolls. But it will also have the effect of giving the Islamic State and other militant groups greater leeway online. The organization already uses sites such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X, Telegram and WhatsApp to radicalize followers.

Third, the administration’s attempts to close Voice of America, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other broadcasters — many offering programming in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu and other languages — make it harder for the U.S. government to counter jihadist propaganda.

Fourth, Trump’s drastic reduction in U.S. foreign aid has impeded efforts to assist allies in the Global South to stop the spread of Islamist extremism. Earlier this year, the administration even briefly cut off funding for Kurdish forces in Syria who are guarding prison camps holding 8,000 Islamic State fighters and 27,000 family members. If those detainees are released, the Islamic State threat will metastasize. Though essential funding was resumed, U.S. support is at such a low level that authorities are struggling to hold the camps together. At least Trump, while reducing U.S. troop numbers in Syria, hasn’t pulled them out altogether — as he tried to do in 2018.

Fifth, the administration’s contempt for U.S. allies and international norms imperils the international cooperation needed to fight terrorist networks. For example, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard all but blamed Australia for the Bondi Beach shooting. She wrote on X that it was “the direct result of the massive influx of Islamists to Australia,” and added, “It is probably too late for Europe — and maybe Australia.” That is not the kind of message that someone in Gabbard’s position should be sending to one of America’s closest partners. Some allies are now curtailing intelligence sharing with Washington.

Sixth, and finally, the Trump administration has endangered the counterterrorism fight by appointing so many unqualified officials. Examples include Gabbard herself (she is a conspiracy monger with no intelligence community experience); the ex-podcaster who was appointed FBI deputy director and is now leaving his job after less than a year; and the 22-year-old former intern given a senior terrorism-prevention post at the Department of Homeland Security.

The administration’s preoccupation with ideologically manufactured faux threats leaves America more vulnerable to the very real threat of Islamist militant terrorism.

Washington Post · Max Boot

11. What We Know About U.S. Interceptions of Oil Tankers in Venezuela

Summary:

U.S. enforcement against Venezuelan oil shipments escalated over the weekend. The Coast Guard attempted to board the Bella 1 in the Caribbean, describing it as effectively stateless and therefore subject to boarding under international law, with a U.S. seizure warrant tied to its earlier role in Iranian oil trafficking. The tanker refused, fled into the Atlantic, and broadcast repeated distress alerts as U.S. forces pursued. In a separate action, the Coast Guard stopped and boarded the Panamanian flagged Centuries, which had recently loaded Venezuelan crude, to verify registration, despite no seizure warrant. A previously seized tanker, Skipper, is being escorted to Texas. Maduro has ordered naval escorts, raising confrontation risk.

What We Know About U.S. Interceptions of Oil Tankers in Venezuela

NY Times · Genevieve Glatsky · December 22, 2025

By Genevieve Glatsky

Genevieve Glatsky reported from Bogotá, Colombia.

Dec. 22, 2025, 

5:03 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/22/us/politics/trump-oil-tankers-venezuela.html

A Venezuela-bound vessel fled after rebuffing an attempt by the Coast Guard to seize it, the latest twist in the escalating U.S. pressure campaign against the Maduro government.

Listen to this article · 6:14 min Learn more

A frame grab from a video posted on social media by Kristi Noem, the homeland security secretary, showed a helicopter flying over Centuries, another oil tanker, which was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard on Saturday.Credit...Agence France-Presse, via U.S. Homeland Security Secretary

President Trump’s drive to crack down on vessels moving oil from Venezuela, an escalating part of his pressure campaign against the government of Nicolás Maduro, took an unusual turn over the weekend.

In the Caribbean Sea on Saturday, the U.S. Coast Guard tried to intercept a tanker called the Bella 1, which officials said was not flying a valid national flag, making it a stateless vessel subject to boarding under international law. U.S. officials had obtained a seizure warrant for the Bella 1 based on its prior involvement in the Iranian oil trade, but officials said the ship refused to submit and sailed away.

Here’s what we know about the situation.

The ship fled into the Atlantic Ocean.

Ship-tracking data showed the Bella 1 had been en route to load Venezuelan crude oil and was not carrying cargo. The vessel has been under U.S. sanctions since last year for transporting Iranian oil, which the authorities say was used to finance terrorism.

The Bella 1 had not yet entered Venezuelan waters and was not under naval escort. The cargo it was scheduled to pick up had been purchased by a Panamanian businessman recently put under sanctions by the United States for ties to the Maduro family, according to data from Venezuela’s state oil company.

U.S. forces approached the Bella 1 late on Saturday. But it refused to be boarded, instead turning and creating what one U.S. official described as “an active pursuit.”

By Sunday, the Bella 1 was still fleeing the Caribbean and was broadcasting distress signals to nearby ships, according to radio messages reviewed by The New York Times and first posted online by a maritime blogger. The vessel was traveling northeast into the Atlantic Ocean, more than 300 miles away from Antigua and Barbuda, the messages showed. By Sunday evening, Bella 1 had sent over 75 alerts.

It is not clear what steps the United States is taking to pursue the ship. The White House said Mr. Trump would make an announcement on Monday afternoon with his defense secretary and his navy secretary but provided no indication of the subject.

The tanker was one of two intercepted by the U.S. this weekend.

The Coast Guard on Saturday stopped and boarded the Centuries, a tanker that had recently loaded Venezuelan oil, reportedly for a Chinese trader. The U.S. authorities did not have a seizure warrant for the Panamanian-flagged vessel and said they were verifying the validity of its registration. It was unclear how long the ship would be detained.

On Dec. 10, the United States had seized another tanker, the Skipper, which was transporting Venezuelan crude but had earlier carried Iranian oil. The Skipper has been escorted to Galveston, Texas.

Mr. Maduro has responded by ordering the Venezuelan Navy to escort some tankers, raising the risk of armed confrontation at sea.

A U.S. military helicopter flying over the Panama-flagged Centuries, which was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard east of Barbados in the Caribbean Sea, on Saturday. U.S. authorities did not have a seizure warrant for the Panamanian-flagged vessel and said they were verifying the validity of its registration.Credit...Department of Homeland Security, via Reuters

U.S. officials say the operations aim to weaken Maduro’s finances.

Trump administration officials have sought to justify the effort to curb tanker traffic in and out of Venezuela by arguing that it is necessary to choke off oil export revenue that funds narco-terrorism, according to officials. Mr. Trump has accused Mr. Maduro of stealing oil from American companies and using petroleum revenues to fund criminal activity, though he has offered no evidence for those claims.

The threat of additional seizures is already influencing tanker routes. Some vessels that appeared to be heading to Venezuela have turned around, according to global shipping monitors. Much of Venezuela’s oil is sold to China, some through Cuba, and some is licensed to the United States.

The actions have fueled uncertainty about the administration’s ultimate aims. Allowing most ships to continue operating would fall short of a true blockade — an act of war — and instead resemble a series of law enforcement operations.

Blocking the tankers is part of a larger anti-Maduro effort by the U.S.

The Trump administration spent the past few months building up a heavy military presence in the Caribbean under the banner of a counternarcotics campaign.

The United States has attacked boats the Trump administration says were smuggling drugs, killing at least 104 people. Mr. Trump has accused Venezuela of flooding the U.S. with fentanyl.

But Venezuela is not a drug producer and has no known role in the fentanyl trade. Most cocaine transiting the country is bound for Europe, and many legal experts say the strikes on the boats are unlawful.

Privately, U.S. officials say the campaign is aimed less at curbing drug trafficking than at removing Mr. Maduro, long accused by successive Democratic and Republican administrations of rigging elections, repressing dissent and committing human rights abuses.

More recently, Mr. Trump and his advisers have pointed to another objective: gaining leverage over Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, the largest in the world and the backbone of its economy. Venezuela once welcomed American energy companies and Mr. Trump has indicated he wants access to those resources again.

The targeted ships are part of a “ghost fleet.”

Experts estimate up to 20 percent of global tankers move oil from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia in violation of U.S. sanctions. These ships often disguise their location and file false paperwork. The Bella 1, for instance, faked its location signal on a previous voyage.

U.S. officials say they have identified other tankers carrying Venezuelan oil whose previous involvement in the Iranian oil trade makes them subject to U.S. sanctions. Mr. Trump said last week that more seizures could follow, announcing a “complete blockade” of “sanctioned oil tankers” traveling to and from Venezuela. But at least one vessel boarded by U.S. forces, the Centuries, does not appear on the Treasury Department’s public sanctions list.

Venezuela’s government has condemned the boarding of the Centuries as theft and hijacking, accusing the United States of forcibly disappearing the crew.

Genevieve Glatsky is a reporter for The Times, based in Bogotá, Colombia.

See more on: U.S. Coast Guard, Nicolás Maduro, Donald Trump

NY Times · Genevieve Glatsky · December 22, 2025

12. The Pentagon wants a common network for its counter-drone systems

Summary:

An Army-led Joint Interagency Task Force 401 wants a common command-and-control network that can run any approved counter-drone system sold through a federal marketplace. The goal is shared regional data and standardized training across DoD, DHS, and FBI, despite costly enterprise software licenses. Candidates are due early 2026, supporting security for events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

The Pentagon wants a common network for its counter-drone systems

defenseone.com · Meghann Myers

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/12/pentagon-wants-common-network-its-counter-drone-systems/410302/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story&utm

U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross delivers remarks at a JIATF 401 Interagency Summit at the Mark Center, Alexandria Va., Nov. 25, 2025. U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza

The Army-led task force wants candidates by early next year.

|

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

December 19, 2025

An Army-led task force is looking for one command-and-control system that can run any of the counter-unmanned aerial systems equipment that government agencies can buy through their online marketplace.

All of the different military installations running cUAS systems in one region, for example, need to be able to share data, the leader of Joint Interagency Task Force 401 told reporters on Friday, but the licenses for shared software are expensive.

“That new capability has got to plug in immediately to a common C2 framework, and so I'm excited about that. We plan to do that in the next 90 days,” said Brig. Gen. Matt Ross. “That's a huge lift, if you look at an enterprise-wide license—that usually takes over a year—but it will make a big difference for all of our installation commanders and for our services.”

Since the task force stood up in August, Ross and his team have been focused and testing and evaluating cUAS system components that can then go onto the marketplace, as well as standardizing training on the systems that will be used across the Defense Department, the Homeland Security Department and the FBI.

The FBI-run National Counter-UAS Center is now preparing law enforcement for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which will see matches played in New York, Los Angeles, Houston and several other major U.S. cities.

Ross and his task force have been working closely with federal agencies to prepare for any drone threats during the World Cup, he said, “to make sure that they have an informed picture of the threat and understanding of what these systems can and cannot do, make sure that they have access to counter-UAS capability.”

DHS is well-equipped to deal with larger drone threats, Ross added, but his task force focuses on drones that weigh under 55 lbs. Not only is it inefficient to shoot them down with missiles, but the assumption is they’ll be used over populated areas that would take too much collateral damage with that strategy.

“I want to make sure that we have just as robust protection against Group 1 and Group 2 systems that are smaller and much more likely to be seen over a widely attended gathering, stadium, or a watch party specifically for the World Cup,” he said.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll met with local law enforcement from the cities two weeks ago, Ross added, to talk about threats and ways to mitigate them.

“And that includes active patrolling, that includes putting out notices to the population about not bringing your drones to the game,” he said, as well as prosecuting anyone who does fly their drones to the fullest extent of the law.

Help us report on the future of national security. Contact Meghann Myers: mmyers@defenseone.com, meghannmyers.55 on Signal.

13. Pentagon preps to enforce ban on companies with ‘indirect’ ties to China

Summary:

The Pentagon is preparing to enforce a Congress-mandated ban intended to purge “Chinese-military companies” from defense supply chains, including firms with indirect ties. Officials say primes often lack visibility into subcontractor affiliations, so DoD plans to use supply-chain “illumination” data next year to identify risks and warn contractors early. Direct contracting with firms on the 1260H list will be barred for new or renewed contracts starting June 2026. A broader indirect ban on end products or services linked to listed entities takes effect June 30, 2027, though components may be exempt. The effort aligns with the 2024 defense industrial strategy’s onshoring and friend-shoring goals.

Comment: How did Chinese military companies get into our supply chain in the first palace? Is it because of other legislation requiring DOD/DOW to purchase from the lowest bidder? Or is it simply US defense firms looking for the lowest cost parts. components, and equipment? I honestly do not know.

Pentagon preps to enforce ban on companies with ‘indirect’ ties to China

Defense firms will be notified of potential links to blacklisted Chinese-military companies a year before the contracting ban goes into effect, the assistant defense secretary for industrial policy said.

By Lauren C. Williams

Business Editor

December 19, 2025

defenseone.com · Lauren C. Williams

The Pentagon wants to eliminate Chinese military companies from the defense industry’s supply chains, so it’s preparing to alert contractors next year of any possible ties before a Congress-mandated ban takes effect, a defense policy official said Wednesday.

The Defense Department keeps a public list of banned “Chinese-military companies,” which it updates periodically. But avoiding companies with indirect ties can be more challenging than avoiding companies on that list, particularly since some prime contractors don’t know the affiliations of their subcontractors.

“There's a lot of firms that are doing business, either knowingly or unknowingly, with firms that are connected to [banned] firms,” Michael Cadenazzi, the Pentagon’s head of industrial base policy, said during an Atlantic Council event on Wednesday. “We need to illuminate those challenges and those connections. We need to connect with the programs and the firms that are likely affected by this. And we need to [make] a direct effort to go ahead and remove them.”

Congress prohibited the government from doing business with certain China-based companies directly, as part of section 1260H of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, and indirectly, as part of section 805 of the 2024 NDAA. Enforcement for the latter is expected to take full effect by June 30, 2027, according to the bill text.

“People need to get ahead of it, because if you're starting to ask for a waiver starting in [2027], I think that's going to be a painful process for everyone,” Cadenazzi said.

That banned list is the basis for enforcement, and starting next year it will be consequential, according to a formal defense official.

“Being on the 1260H list is a flag and it may make a contracting officer look twice as to whether this is a relationship in which they want to engage,” the former official said.

Starting in June 2026, the Pentagon will be banned from directly entering into any new or renewed contracts with companies on that list. And in June 2027, the Defense Department won’t be able to contract—even indirectly— with end-products or services developed by entities on the 1260H banned list.

That indirect ban has a nuance in that it doesn't apply to components, but it’s not clear yet how the Pentagon will address that.

“In DOD procurement, there's a difference between a component and an end item that's ready to be used immediately,” the official said. “The components of that car—the spark plugs and the gas cap and the engine, perhaps. Those components are not affected by this indirect procurement ban. So, it'll be very interesting to see how DOD interprets that to give this indirect ban teeth in a way that matters, while at the same time not requiring DOD to go under the hood of the car…which is not usually feasible.”

The plan dovetails with the Pentagon’s inaugural defense industrial strategy and implementation plan published in 2024, which called for assessing supply chain vulnerabilities and onshoring critical production capacity over the next several years.

“Diversifying supply chains through domestic investment will bolster resilience in the most critical supply chains, which currently rely partially on sources outside of the United States,” the implementation plan states. “Securely producing the defense products, services, and technologies needed now and in the future at sufficient speed, scale, and cost requires a host of measures to mitigate or eliminate critical supply chain vulnerabilities, including single or sole sourcing and supply chains linked to adversarial actions. The most urgent of these measures address supply chain visibility, on-shoring and ‘friend-shoring,’ sole sourcing, cyber security, and bulwarks against sourcing materials and capital from adversaries.”

Next year, the Pentagon plans to help companies track their subcontractors’ affiliations using “available supply chain illumination data” to identify risks, notify partners, and then find “a mechanism by which we can track it over time,” Cadenazzi said.

The move will likely push companies to look for alternative suppliers, which could, in turn, create domestic supply chains and potentially rely on those of allies and partners.

“We think it's going to be a great opportunity [for] us to shift investment into domestic firms and increase the amount of demand,” Cadenazzi said. “And that's a key part of the acquisition transformation strategy itself…increasing the demand signal for firms. So, anything we can do to increase demand is a great thing. We think this will be a key enabler of that.”

defenseone.com · Lauren C. Williams

14. Army Slashes Mandatory Training, Shifts Focus Back to Warfighting

​Summary:

The Army is overhauling AR 350-1 to cut more than 350 hours of mandatory annual training and return time to warfighting. Required programs drop from 27 to 16, and the regulation shrinks to about half its prior length. Eleven formerly mandatory items become optional or commander-directed, including resilience modules, Law of War, OPSEC refreshers, CBRN passive defense, and several online compliance tasks. The change applies to active, Guard, and Reserve forces as implementation runs into 2026. Readiness validation shifts away from self-reported checklists toward Combat Training Center performance. Supporters cite more range and field time, while critics warn of uneven standards and higher risk in ethics, medical, and cyber readiness.

Comment: A good step forward. When I took command of our battalion in 2000 a warrant officer handed me his analysis of all required training from our high HQ. As I recall it required some 450 days to accomplish all the required annual training. His point to me was that if I wanted to add any more mandatory requirements I would need to get a bigger calendar.  His serious point was to ask me how to protect the time of our key operations units (in this case or ODAs) and give them the maximum opportunity to train without excessive high level requirements.

I also remember being a company commander in an Infantry battalion (1-506th) in Korea on the DMZ. We were preparing for our battalion ARTEP evaluation. The battalion commander was not satisfied with our training and he radically changed the training scheduled as we prepared for the ARTEP. We focused almost exclusively on squad level training because the squads were the most important and he believed that if our swords were well trained our battalion would be successful And he was right. Our plattons, companies, and the battalion were all successfully evaluated because our squads performed superbly.

Army Slashes Mandatory Training, Shifts Focus Back to Warfighting

The U.S. Army is rewriting how it trains its force, and this time it is cutting deep.

https://sofrep.com/news/sofrep-daily-2025-dec-21-pm/

Under a sweeping overhaul of Army Regulation 350-1, the service is eliminating more than 350 hours of mandatory annual training, freeing units to focus on combat skills instead of administrative checklists.

The revised regulation trims required programs from 27 to 16 and shrinks the document itself from more than 250 pages to roughly 132.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George has been blunt about the intent: reduce administrative burden so soldiers can “train like they fight.”

The changes remove or make optional 11 programs that were previously mandatory across the force. These include structured self-development modules, resilience training, CBRN passive defense, Law of War instruction, OPSEC refreshers, iPERMS maintenance, and several online compliance requirements. Commanders now have wide discretion to determine what non-essential training is necessary based on their unit’s mission-essential tasks.

The draft regulation was released April 1, 2025, with implementation continuing into 2026. The overhaul applies across the force, impacting active duty, National Guard, and Reserve units, roughly 450,000 soldiers in total. Much of the time savings comes from reduced online and distributed learning requirements that previously spilled into off-duty hours.

Instead of internal readiness metrics and self-reported compliance, the Army is shifting evaluation authority outward. Combat Training Center rotations at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center will increasingly serve as the primary readiness validators.

The Army wants results in the dirt, not receipts in a binder.

Early feedback from units already operating under the revised guidance is mixed but notable. Some commanders report 20 to 30 percent increases in range time and field training exercises, with fewer calendar interruptions for mandatory briefings and computer-based training. The Army sees this as a direct readiness boost, especially as units prepare for large-scale combat operations rather than counterinsurgency rotations.

The cuts, however, are not without controversy.

Critics warn that making programs like resilience training, Law of War instruction, and even combat lifesaver skills optional risks creating uneven standards across the force. Retired officers have raised concerns that younger leaders may lack a shared framework for mental health discussions as experienced NCOs and officers retire. Others point out that CLS skills and rules-of-engagement training saved lives in past wars and may matter even more in fast-moving peer conflicts.

There are also longer-term risks. Reduced cybersecurity and privacy training, mirrored in other Department of War initiatives, has raised concerns about force vulnerability in an era of AI-driven threats and persistent cyber intrusion. With commanders setting priorities locally, the Army could see fragmentation in training quality between units.

For now, the Army is betting that time returned to squads, ranges, and collective training outweighs the risks. The message from the top is clear: fewer slides, fewer checklists, more dirt time.

Whether that gamble pays off will be measured old-school … in combat effectiveness.

15. Ukraine at the Negotiation Crossroads: Strategic Takeaways from Five Conflicts

​Summary:

Olga Usenko argues Ukraine’s negotiation choices can be assessed through five historical war-termination models: burnout (Iran-Iraq), armistice (Korea), Finlandization (Winter War), recurring crisis (India-Pakistan), and hybrid occupation with political capture (Georgia). Each model implies different tradeoffs between territorial outcome and postwar stability. Her core finding is that most plausible endgames are strategically risky for Ukraine unless anchored in strong, durable Western security guarantees and credible deterrence. Armistice or burnout may stop attrition but freeze occupation and normalize instability. Finlandization concedes territory and constrains sovereignty. Recurring crisis and Georgian-style outcomes institutionalize chronic coercion. She stresses agency, non-recognition of annexation, and EU anchored recovery under imperfect security.

Excerpts:

Conclusions

This analysis shows that the war in Ukraine could end in several ways, but the implications of these outcomes for sovereignty, stability, and the European and global security order vary widely. Historical models show that outcomes which erode agency, concede territory without credible guarantees, or rely on weak deterrence tend to perpetuate long-term vulnerability. Conversely, settlements anchored in strong external commitments and preserved sovereignty tend to produce more durable equilibria.

At the same time, the analysis underscores the vulnerability of any settlement that depends disproportionately on sustained U.S. engagement, particularly given signals of strategic retrenchment and political variability. This reinforces the need for a more European-led, institutionalized security architecture, capable of providing durable guarantees even as U.S. commitments fluctuate. The comparative spectrum developed here shows that Ukraine’s future security trajectory and its place within the Euro-Atlantic architecture will be determined by the strategic quality of peace, not merely the cessation of hostilities. The decisive question is not when the war ends, but what kind of order follows it.

Ukraine at the Negotiation Crossroads: Strategic Takeaways from Five Conflicts

by Olga Usenko

|

12.22.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/22/war-termination-ukraine-five-models/

Abstract

How large-scale interstate wars end has profound implications for political order, territorial control, and long-term stability. This article addresses: What pathways of war termination are plausible in the current phase of the Russia — Ukraine war, and what strategic risks or opportunities do they generate for Ukraine and the wider European security architecture? To answer this, the article develops a comparative, historically grounded framework that synthesizes five war-termination models — burnout, armistice, Finlandization, recurring crisis dynamics, and hybrid occupation, drawn from well-documented historical cases of protracted conflict. Using structured focused comparison, each model is analyzed in terms of its termination mechanisms, territorial outcomes, post-war security architecture, and equilibrium stability, then mapped onto a two-dimensional spectrum (territorial change vs. stability).

The analysis demonstrates that these models produce qualitatively different strategic trajectories, ranging from sovereignty-preserving equilibria to outcomes that institutionalize instability or external influence. A central finding is that most endgames pose significant risks for Ukraine unless anchored in strong and enduring Western security guarantees. The article contributes to war-termination scholarship by adapting classical models to hybrid interstate conflict and offering a framework for evaluating negotiation outcomes in real time.

Introduction

As Ukraine enters a phase of intensified negotiations, five historical conflict models show that its long-term security depends not only on how the war ends, but also on how the West structures the subsequent peace. The question of how large interstate wars terminate remains an underexamined problem in international security studies, and Ukraine’s case now carries global implications for the future of European and transatlantic stability.

According to an analysis by the American Enterprise Institute, a Russian victory would force the United States to spend an additional $808 billion over five years to reinforce NATO. This is nearly seven times the current $112 billion in U.S. support for Ukraine, and it would create a 2,600-mile militarized frontier on Europe’s eastern border, underscoring the broader geopolitical stakes of Ukraine’s endgame.

This article therefore asks: How do historical war-termination models illuminate the range of plausible endgames in Ukraine, and what strategic risks or opportunities do they imply for sovereignty, reconstruction, and the Euro-Atlantic security architecture? By comparing these models and extracting cross-cutting lessons, the paper offers a structured framework for assessing negotiation risks and determining the conditions necessary for achieving a lasting and strategically sound peace.

Evaluating Five Models of Conflict Termination

The conflict burnout model, drawn from the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), describes a prolonged, attritional conflict that ends only when both sides are too exhausted politically, economically, and militarily to continue. The war termination was not driven by diplomatic compromise but by mutual depletion and the realization that further fighting risks regime or state collapse. Each side clings to maximalist goals until exhaustion forces a ceasefire, which usually restores the status quo rather than producing a decisive victory.

For Ukraine, such a burnout-driven resolution carries profound risks: frozen lines, incomplete sovereignty restoration, and gradual erosion of reform momentum. Sustained Western aid remains decisive, and its decline would accelerate the burnout process, undermining Ukraine’s resilience. If the war ends due to exhaustion rather than a clear victory or political compromise, Europe will face a prolonged crisis characterized by entrenched front lines. Prolonged insecurity and unfinished sovereignty will challenge the continent’s vision of Ukraine’s strategic integration within the EU and NATO.

The Korean-style armistice model is based on the historical experience of the Korean War (1950–1953). The war ended with a military agreement that suspended active hostilities instead of a political peace treaty. This agreement established a line of demarcation and a buffer zone that is monitored by neutral or joint security mechanisms. Historically, the 1953 Korean Armistice emerged only after a prolonged military stalemate, with both sides recognizing that battlefield victory was unattainable at acceptable cost. Negotiations unfolded under fire, and the resulting agreement separated military suspension from political settlement, producing stability through deterrence rather than reconciliation.

For Ukraine, an armistice could reduce daily attrition and open limited space for reconstruction behind a secure zone, but it would come with serious strategic costs — loss of the territorial integrity, incomplete sovereignty restoration and legitimization of occupation and annexation.

Its long-term viability would depend on a combination of Ukraine’s own border security and credible Western-backed deterrence to prevent Russia from testing the line. Therefore, without Western guarantees, especially strong U.S. security commitments, a demarcation line could become unstable and vulnerable to renewed coercion. Stability on the Korean Peninsula, for example, relies on sustained U.S. – ROK deterrence structures. A state of war on the continent would require Europe to maintain defense expenditures and security commitments indefinitely toward a non-NATO state and accept a heavily militarized frontier with Russia. Additionally, this scenario would delay Ukraine’s integration with the EU.

A Finlandization-style settlement following the Winter War (1939–1940), envisions Ukraine preserving its statehood but conceding parts of its territory in exchange for an end to large-scale hostilities and a guarantee of formal sovereignty (“Finlandization” in Western debate refers to a state that remains formally sovereign but is strategically constrained and politically self-restrained to accommodate the interests of a more powerful neighboring adversary). Historically, Finland accepted substantial territorial losses and adopted long-term neutrality under Soviet pressure remaining democratic but exercising strict self-restraint in foreign and security policy to accommodate Moscow’s interests.

According to this scenario, territorial concessions would legitimize Russia’s gains, undermine the principle of sovereignty, and destabilize Ukrainian domestic politics, where public support for EU and NATO membership has risen sharply since 2022. A Finlandized Ukraine would face enduring limits on military cooperation and pressure to adopt a long-term neutrality, an outcome that is politically unlikely given public opinion trends. Without strong Western security guarantees, such an arrangement would normalize a Russian sphere of influence within Europe and erode the foundations of Euro-Atlantic security.

The India-Pakistan model describes a pattern in which unresolved sovereignty disputes produce recurring cycles of escalation, short, limited wars, and crisis bargaining rather than a definitive settlement. This dynamic described as the “resolve paradox” allows both sides to de-escalate once they believe they have demonstrated sufficient resolve, even as it reinforces the drivers of the next confrontation. Diplomatically, the pattern highlights the critical role of external powers, notably the United States, which repeatedly intervenes to impose temporary ceasefires and halt escalation, as seen in the most recent crisis where Washington mediated to prevent a potential war between the two nuclear-armed states.

Applied to Ukraine, this model becomes plausible if the war ends without a political resolution and contested borders harden into a militarized frontier. In such a scenario, periodic flare-ups — drone attacks, artillery exchanges, and sabotage could replace full-scale offensives, requiring constant Western mediation to avoid uncontrolled escalation. Such a pattern would trap Ukraine in a cycle of instability, force sustained defense mobilization, and embed a long-term security fault line inside Europe, diverting resources, complicating reconstruction and integration into NATO or EU structures, as well as broader strategic predictability.

A Georgian scenario envisions Russia maintaining control over part of Ukraine without full annexation, while simultaneously cultivating or installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv to secure long-term leverage. This case mirrors Russia’s strategy in Georgia, where Moscow combined military occupation with deep political influence, using proxy authorities, economic coercion, and information operations to shape the country’s trajectory. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has exercised continuous effective control for decades, embedding itself as both occupier and political arbiter while manipulating peacekeeping mechanisms to its advantage. Hybrid tactics, such as border shifts, intimidation, transferring strategic assets to Russian control, and psychological operations, further eroded Georgian sovereignty and promoted the perception that Russian dominance was unavoidable.

For Ukraine, such an outcome would mean formal independence paired with deep strategic vulnerability. The country would become further fragmented and subject to ongoing territorial pressure and internal political capture. Such a scenario would jeopardize reconstruction efforts, weaken democratic institutions, and undermine Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Western support could diminish if Kyiv’s leadership drifted toward Moscow’s orbit, echoing Georgia’s experience, normalizing partial occupation and entrenching a long-term security fracture within Europe.

Endgame Models in Comparative Perspective

The comparative value of the analysis is most evident when these five war-termination models are considered in relation to one another, complementing the individual case research. Figure 1 presents a two-axis spectrum mapping each model according to two salient analytical dimensions for Ukraine: territorial outcome (ranging from restored to conceded territory) and post-war stability (from durable equilibrium to chronic instability). The goal is not to make predictions, but rather to make structured comparisons, identify patterns, constraints, and strategic consequences that consistently reappear across different models, and apply these insights to Ukraine’s contemporary negotiation environment. This spectrum was developed by examining four termination mechanisms: (1) the process by which hostilities ceased, (2) the extent of territorial change, (3) the security architecture that emerged after the cessation of violence, and (4) the durability of the resulting equilibrium. Each case was then abstracted into a core conflict-ending logic and placed in a two-dimensional matrix.

Figure 1. Spectrum of War Termination Models

When placed on this spectrum, the models reveal distinct strategic trajectories. Burnout and Armistice represent outcomes in which fighting stops but the political conflict is unresolved, producing frozen front lines with varying degrees of territorial cost and long-term stability. Finlandization reflects a settlement based on territorial concession and externally constrained neutrality, resulting in a politically sovereign but strategically limited state. The India — Pakistan pattern illustrates how unresolved sovereignty disputes can crystallize into recurring crisis dynamics, creating an unstable and militarized equilibrium over decades. At the far end of the spectrum is the Georgian scenario, representing the most adverse outcome of partial occupation combined with hybrid political influence that hollows out formal sovereignty and stalls integration into wider security communities, such as NATO and the EU.

This mapping reveals that most endgames pose significant vulnerabilities for Ukraine unless they are backed by robust and lasting Western security guarantees. Models that preserve sovereignty and are backed by credible deterrence strategies provide the most promising path to long-term stability. Conversely, outcomes involving territorial concessions, externally imposed neutrality, or low-deterrence equilibria risk perpetuating instability and limiting Ukraine’s future strategic choices.

Strategic Lessons for Ukraine

First, Ukraine must retain full agency in shaping any settlement. Historical experience from Finlandization to the Georgian case shows that outcomes imposed externally, or negotiated over the head of the victim state, produce fragile arrangements that erode sovereignty over time. A settlement perceived as coerced or externally designed risks destabilizing Ukrainian domestic politics, fracturing public trust, and weakening long-term resilience.

Second, strategic clarity is essential because ambiguity breeds vulnerability. The experience of the Baltic states whose unequivocal commitment to Western political, military, and economic integration strengthened their security stands in sharp contrast to the Balkans, where prolonged strategic ambiguity contributed to instability and external coercion. This reinforces the lesson from every scenario: ambiguity is dangerous, and Ukraine’s security depends on unambiguous Western anchoring, not “neutrality-for-peace” arrangements that historically erode sovereignty.

Third, no settlement should legitimize territorial losses or transform de facto lines into de jure borders. In every relevant case, freezing lines without resolving claims (Korea, Kashmir, Georgia) produced permanent instability. Diplomatic insights reinforce that Ukraine must uphold strict non-recognition of Russian occupation, preserving legal sovereignty and future leverage, just as the Baltic states did during fifty years of Soviet control.

Fourth, any future settlement will endure only if anchored in strong, institutionalized Western, above all European security guarantees. Historical precedents show that armistices and exhaustion-based ceasefires collapse without credible deterrence. The current war has demonstrated that Russia’s aims are revisionist rather than defensive. Ukraine therefore cannot rely on Russian restraint; its long-term security depends on embedding itself within European-led security structures. Europe has shifted from a supporting role to the central driver of Ukraine’s security, making Ukraine’s sovereignty inseparable from its own strategic stability. Only a robust, Europe-backed deterrence architecture can prevent renewed coercion and sustain a negotiated end to the war.

Finally, Ukraine must strengthen a resilient interim state while preserving the path to full restoration. Historical conflicts demonstrate that unresolved wars often enter prolonged transitional phases, but societies that continue reforming, rebuilding, and integrating during these periods emerge stronger and with greater leverage. As several diplomatic practitioners noted, Ukraine cannot afford to delay economic recovery, institutional reform, or progress toward EU accession until a perfect peace is achieved. Therefore, the priority is an interim strategy that enables recovery under imperfect security conditions, ensuring that no temporary arrangement becomes a permanent constraint. A democratic Ukraine anchored in the EU is the strongest foundation for safeguarding sovereignty today and achieving full territorial reintegration tomorrow.

Conclusions

This analysis shows that the war in Ukraine could end in several ways, but the implications of these outcomes for sovereignty, stability, and the European and global security order vary widely. Historical models show that outcomes which erode agency, concede territory without credible guarantees, or rely on weak deterrence tend to perpetuate long-term vulnerability. Conversely, settlements anchored in strong external commitments and preserved sovereignty tend to produce more durable equilibria.

At the same time, the analysis underscores the vulnerability of any settlement that depends disproportionately on sustained U.S. engagement, particularly given signals of strategic retrenchment and political variability. This reinforces the need for a more European-led, institutionalized security architecture, capable of providing durable guarantees even as U.S. commitments fluctuate. The comparative spectrum developed here shows that Ukraine’s future security trajectory and its place within the Euro-Atlantic architecture will be determined by the strategic quality of peace, not merely the cessation of hostilities. The decisive question is not when the war ends, but what kind of order follows it.

Read all of Small Wars Journal’s great content on the Russia-Ukraine War.

Tags: Deterrence, frozen conflicts, Russia-Ukraine War, security guarantees, Ukraine, war termination

About The Author

• 
  
• Olga Usenko
• Olga Usenko, PhD, is a Ukrainian legal market analyst, researcher, and media manager with nearly twenty years of experience leading high-impact analytical and policy-oriented projects. She served for more than a decade as Editor-in-Chief of The Ukrainian Journal of Business Law and leads Ukrainian Law Firms: A Handbook for Foreign Clients, the country’s foremost English-language legal directory.
• Usenko is a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow at Arizona State University, where her work focuses on war-termination scenarios, post-war reconstruction, and Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic and global economic systems. She previously contributed to Ukraine’s earliest economic assessments of EU – Ukraine Free Trade Agreement at the International Centre for Policy Studies.
• https://www.linkedin.com/in/olgausenko/

16. Army tosses out its Spiritual Fitness Guide after four months

Summary:

The Army has canceled its Spiritual Fitness Guide less than five months after launch under the Holistic Health and Fitness program. Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the directive, arguing chaplains were being treated like therapists and criticizing the guide as too focused on “feelings” and “playfulness” with minimal mention of God. The order took effect immediately, and Army web pages for the guide were removed.

Comment: In my experience military Chaplains have always ministered to all regardless of religion. None of them ever pushed their religion on me or those with whom I served.. I am not sure the SECDEF/SECWAR understands the role of our Chaplains.

Army tosses out its Spiritual Fitness Guide after four months

taskandpurpose.com · Nicholas Slayton

The recently launched effort to boost resilience in the “spiritual domain” is already canceled.

Nicholas Slayton

Published Dec 20, 2025 3:31 PM EST

https://taskandpurpose.com/military-life/army-tosses-spiritual-fitness-guide/?utm

The Army is scrapping its Spiritual Fitness Guide after less than five months in use.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the change in a video on social media on Tuesday. He largely addressed changes to the Army Chaplain Corps, in which he said that “chaplains have been minimized, viewed by many as therapists instead of ministers.” As part of his comments he criticized the recently implemented tool, saying that the Army is “tossing it.”

“It mentions God one time. That’s it,” Hegseth said. “It mentions feelings 11 times. It even mentions playfulness, whatever that is, nine times.”

Army spokesman Tony McCormick confirmed to Task & Purpose that the directive went into effect “immediately.”

“We are aggressively moving forward with Secretary Hegseth’s intent to discontinue the Army Spiritual Fitness Guide,” he said.

The pages on the Army’s website that contained information on the guide and its related material have also been taken down, with the URLs redirecting to 404 error pages, or other “not found” results.

The Army rolled it out at the start of August. The plan, along with its “battlebook” was part of the Army’s Holistic Health and Fitness program, also known as H2F. It began development in the fall of 2024, but was released Aug. 1, under Hegseth’s time as Secretary of Defense.

The idea behind the guide, the Army said at the time, was to help soldiers grow in the “spiritual domain” a term meant to cover mental and emotional health. In the same way that the Army pushed troops to grow stronger physically this would help them spiritually.

“It is a practical, leader-focused resource highlighting the importance of spiritual readiness, defined as the ability to endure, overcome, and grow through adversity,” Sgt. Maj. Meaghan Simmons, the Army Chaplain Corps regimental sergeant major, said in a statement to Task & Purpose in August.

The guide, along with its battlebook — a “field-ready manual” for soldiers on deployment meant to help them — is meant to help soldiers deal with stresses from service and life, strengthen their mindfulness and find greater purpose, the Army said. Among other aspects, it features a number of motivational quotes, from presidents to military figures such as Gen. George Patton. The Army Chaplain Corps said in August that the guide is not limited or constrained by a specific belief system.

Update: 12/21/2025; This article has been updated noting that Army web pages about the Spiritual Fitness Guide no longer work.

​17. Counteroffensive Irregular Warfare: A Doctrine of Signature Reduction for Strategic Competition

​Summary:

Christopher Moede argues U.S. SOF have allowed counteroffensive irregular warfare capacity to atrophy as strategic competition replaces the GWOT, leaving the West exposed to gray-zone strategies. He proposes “signature reduction” as a human-centered doctrine that deliberately manages physical and digital detectability to restore freedom of maneuver below the threshold of armed conflict. Using examples of mobile and wearable-device exposure, he contends attribution now creates mission and force risk at scale. Moede frames signature reduction as a modern retrieval of OSS-era tradecraft, complementing technology rather than replacing people. He recommends institutionalizing it in IW doctrine, planning guidance, and enterprise-wide training standards under DoD policy and SOF governance.

Excerpt:

Conclusion: Renewing SOF Capability from Within

The modern competition space demands both a capability and capacity from individuals to organizations that achieve meaningful strategic effects. This is the context in which signature reduction best applies, as a counteroffensive IW key that might unlock the potential for renewal within the SOF enterprise. The costs of inaction amount to a fundamentally decisive loss of human primacy in favor of technological bias in an arena in which humans are said to be more important than hardware. SOF welcome technological innovation as a complement to operational necessity, but not as a replacement for fundamental capabilities or capacities. The doctrine of signature reduction recognizes the asymmetry of digital technology in relation to the physical domain and equips SOF to both renew core IW capacities while retaining its human-centric essence.

Counteroffensive Irregular Warfare: A Doctrine of Signature Reduction for Strategic Competition

by Christopher Moede

|

12.22.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/22/counteroffensive-irregular-warfare/

Abstract:  This article argues that U.S. Special Operations Forces have experienced an atrophy in counteroffensive irregular warfare capacity amid the shift to strategic competition, leaving Western interests vulnerable to adversarial gray-zone strategies. It advances signature reduction—the deliberate management of physical and digital detectability—as a human-centered doctrine capable of restoring freedom of maneuver, renewing Special Operations Forces (SOF) heritage competencies, and providing a scalable counteroffensive IW framework below the threshold of armed conflict. The author contends that institutionalizing signature reduction within IW doctrine and training is essential to preserving human primacy in an era of asymmetric technological competition.

The Strategic Imperative for Irregular Warfare

The world has gone digital. When wearable Strava fitness trackers exposed the location of previously undisclosed U.S. special operations forces operating locations in Syria in 2018, policies were quickly put in place to ban the devices. Operations continued with little risk to the mission or force. A mere four years later, when Russian surveillance equipment observed a small number of mobile devices registered in the UK on Ukrainian networks at a military base near the Polish border, 30 Russian cruise missiles tore into the facility where British volunteer fighters had been, killing 35. The technology-fueled contrast between these operational vignettes starkly exposes the hidden costs of attribution in strategic competition – tech which poses exponential risk to both mission and force beyond that which has previously been visible in the past three decades of warfare. Irregular warfare finds itself most authentically in the dynamic heart of this contrast, not as an ancillary auxiliary but rather a central character.

DoDI 3000.07 defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as a “form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.” IW can be conducted either proactively to impose costs on an adversary’s capabilities and capacities or employed as a counteroffensive against an adversary’s specific aggressive behavior. This essay argues for a spirit of retrieval of the essential elements of IW from SOF heritage organizations such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to renew institutional primacy for the art and science of IW. The shift from the Global War on Terror to strategic competition has revealed atrophied IW capacity. Rather than espousing the wholesale disposal of existing policy, structures, or systems in an apparently strong but ultimately frantic and ineffectual call to arms, what is necessary is the strengthening of these atrophied SOF capabilities – in light of strategic competition – as a catalyst to spur growth in capacity and effects. The doctrine that represents this growth is that of signature reduction, the counteroffensive IW key to renewal beginning in the SOF enterprise and the humans that comprise it.

Technology in Modern Competition

Within policy circles, we are becoming increasingly and rightly troubled by the proactive IW efforts levied upon us in the context of strategic competition. These efforts are best represented by adversarial doctrines such as Russian New Generation Warfare or Chinese Unrestricted Warfare. This is clearly on display on the ground in war-torn Ukraine: Warfare has metastasized into a Frankensteinian hybrid – World War I-style trench brutality grafted onto the AI-driven, lethal-effects drone warfare of tomorrow. Indeed, Ukraine is but one such demonstration of a new form of hybrid warfare in which asymmetry has not been greater. Breakneck, commercially fueled technological innovation splices itself into geopolitics, order of battle, and sheer numbers of bodies available to fight. The conditions and challenges of this environment have rightly proven a clarion call for a SOF enterprise, which certainly honed its craft in decades of legacy SOF activity, but which atrophied other capabilities and capacities – namely, an adequate counteroffensive IW capacity – necessary to bring a whole and effective response to bear well before conflict arises.

Indeed, the costs imposed on Western interests by adversarial doctrines in other theaters and domains appear disturbingly disproportionate to the relative capabilities and capacities of their zealous apparatchiks. The advantages here remain clear and distinct insofar as the United States and its allies maintain an adequate innate advantage across numerous sectors, such as economic influence, technological innovation, energy, and aerospace and defense. Yet, seemingly hampered by a multiplicity of factors, the United States and its allies lack the unitive principle demonstrated by competitors such as China. This unitive principle is necessary to mount an adequate response employing a whole-of-government approach. What is necessary then is not the disposal of existing mechanisms, but rather an organic renewal of IW activities from within.

Retrieving Human-Centered IW in Strategic Competition

To that end, we discover the doctrinal key of the science of signature reduction, or “the intentional implementation of practices to diminish the ‘signature’, or attributable and detectable characteristics, of an individual or organization across both the physical and digital domains”. The context of signature reduction is best understood in light of the concept of gray zone warfare, or that which encompasses state and non-state actions conducted below the threshold of armed conflict but above routine competition.

As the West’s doctrinal rejoinder to strategic competition, it is necessary to develop and reach a sound understanding of the necessity for gray zone warfare in light of adversarial strategies. It is also necessary to mount an adequate response that offers freedom of maneuver and freedom for action in such a way as to meaningfully and strategically compete. This necessitates integrated humans who can maneuver and act on the ground, hearkening back to the SOF truths and the stuff of legend from SOF heritage organizations such as the OSS.

Indeed, when routine competition rises to conflict, interceptor missile inventories eventually run low, critical ammunition shortfalls occur, and overly expensive lethal drones prove ineffective. What remains decisive in the face of uncertainty, ambiguity, and exposure is not a 900% increase in drone manufacturing capacity or its competing production goal, but the integrated human in action. It is within the historical context of the OSS that we recall the spirit of retrieval, which readily relieves us of our rabid obsession with rapid, commercially fueled technological innovation and which situates us more firmly not on frantic (or scalable) calls to arms, but a real foundation from which true and lasting growth can occur. With the human person at the center of its aim, signature reduction thus reveals itself as the most proper and willing instrument: as the doctrinal representative of counteroffensive IW capability and capacity from within the heart of the SOF enterprise and its heritage.

Signature Reduction: Doctrine and Practice

Signature reduction, then, is precisely the integrated capability and discipline stemming from a mindset and practice of identifying, managing, and reducing the physical and digital signatures of both individuals and organizations personally and operationally. This allows SOF to preserve operational freedom of maneuver and freedom for action in asymmetric environments, while reducing all-hazards risks in such a way as to preserve operational effectiveness.

To begin the retrieval and renewal of counteroffensive IW capacity and capability through the doctrine of signature reduction, the Department of Defense would:

• In accordance with DoDI 3000.07, identify and name signature reduction as a priority concept of IW policy through the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), for recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.
• Through USD(P), incorporate signature reduction as both an IW concept and approach into strategic planning and guidance documents.
• Assist USD(P) in developing and supervising the implementation of signature reduction policy with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), particularly in creating and codifying standards for signature reduction training, capabilities, and capacity within the SOF enterprise.
• Incorporate signature reduction training standards in curriculum development within the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), in collaboration with public and private partners for enterprise-wide effects.

Conclusion: Renewing SOF Capability from Within

The modern competition space demands both a capability and capacity from individuals to organizations that achieve meaningful strategic effects. This is the context in which signature reduction best applies, as a counteroffensive IW key that might unlock the potential for renewal within the SOF enterprise. The costs of inaction amount to a fundamentally decisive loss of human primacy in favor of technological bias in an arena in which humans are said to be more important than hardware. SOF welcome technological innovation as a complement to operational necessity, but not as a replacement for fundamental capabilities or capacities. The doctrine of signature reduction recognizes the asymmetry of digital technology in relation to the physical domain and equips SOF to both renew core IW capacities while retaining its human-centric essence.

Check out all the great material Small Wars Journal has to offer.

Tags: asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, military technology, Special Operations, Special Operations Forces, strategy

About The Author

• 
  
• Christopher Moede
• Christopher Moede is the director of the Institute for Signature Reduction, an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit charitable organization dedicated to advancing the disciplines of signature reduction, digital force protection, and cyber privacy in support of national defense and public institutions. In this capacity, Chris develops instruction for SOF units on emerging technology-based threat vectors and the operational risks of digital exposure, and explores how signature reduction can serve as a doctrinal foundation for modern irregular warfare. Chris previously served as a mission commander in a selectively manned unit.

18. Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force: Strategic Leap or Burdened Gamble?

Summary:

Tahir Azad assesses Pakistan’s planned Army Rocket Force Command, announced August 13, 2025, as a potentially costly and destabilizing duplication of existing missile governance under the Strategic Plans Division. He argues the May 2025 India Pakistan clash exposed gaps in Pakistan’s conventional deterrence as improved BrahMos strikes penetrated defenses, while India advances hypersonic programs. A separate rocket force could strain budgets, create C4ISR and interservice coordination problems, and blur nuclear versus conventional signaling, increasing miscalculation risk. Azad recommends upgrading “Full Spectrum Deterrence” to an FSD+ model by prioritizing hypersonic R&D, electronic warfare, integrated networks, and modernization within current structures, rather than building a new command.

Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force: Strategic Leap or Burdened Gamble?

by Tahir Azad

|

12.22.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/22/pakistans-army-rocket-force/

Introduction

On August 13, 2025, the Prime Minister of Pakistan announced the establishment of a new Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC). This directive would possess contemporary technology and the capability to engage the adversary from all directions. There is no revealed public information regarding the ARFC structure, size, or mission. The official statement just discusses that the focus will be on conventional missile systems rather than nuclear delivery vehicles, which remain under the prime control of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Some commentators thought that this announcement of an ARFC was a vital step to deter India, which is growing its missile and hypersonic capabilities. However, this ARFC has raised various questions. What is the need for raising a separate command while Pakistan already has an established strategic forces command structure? Additionally, it is also confronting many domestic challenges, such as its political instability, a suffering economy, and security problems. The discussion regarding the formation of a distinct rocket force in Pakistan, or the evolution of its current Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) strategy into an advanced variant known as Full Spectrum Deterrence Plus (FSD+) is pivotal to the changing geopolitical landscape of South Asia.

FSD, a concept that ensures a reaction to threats across all tiers of conflict, has long been integral to Pakistan’s deterrence strategy. Since the early 2010s, this posture has served as a robust barrier against Indian military pressure. However, the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan has revealed significant vulnerabilities and gaps. India utilized enhanced models of the BrahMos missile, capable of travelling at nearly supersonic speeds. These missiles successfully penetrated Pakistani defenses and struck vital targets, including those in proximity to the capital Islamabad. The strikes were alarming both symbolically and strategically, as they demonstrated that Pakistan’s air defense systems and conventional deterrent missiles were unable to consistently intercept or neutralize India’s precision-guided threats. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully conducted a test of the Extended Trajectory Long Duration Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM), in July 2025, a new hypersonic weapon developed under Project Vishnu. For the first time in decades, Pakistan’s authorities confront the disconcerting prospect that India might execute a limited, rapid strike campaign beneath the nuclear threshold with a significant likelihood of success.

Advocates of the planned ARFC emphasize that consolidating all conventional missile units under a single command will enhance their readiness, training, and operational efficiency. However, these explanations fail to consider that establishing a new military branch is not only excessively costly but also strategically unwise. Establishing a rocket force will further exacerbate an already strained defense budget. Pakistan’s economy has often faced crises, depending on IMF bailouts while contending with inflation, debt, and sluggish progress. Although defense spending remains a paramount priority, fulfilling critical civilian needs such as post-flood reconstruction, natural disaster relief, combating poverty, and implementing governmental reforms is increasingly challenging. The establishment of a new rocket force command will necessitate an expenditure of billions of rupees for infrastructure, bases, supplies, personnel, and secured integrated communication systems. A new command-and-control system that operates in conjunction with the SPD would also be necessary. In summary, it may evolve into an additional expensive military organization at the most inappropriate moment for Pakistan, which cannot afford to replicate institutions.

Maintenance Issues

Concerns also exist about the technical and operational implications of a rocket force. Missile brigades must remain mobile, dispersed, and vigilant to avert pre-emptive destruction. If these forces were deployed along the border or at strategic locations, they would require sophisticated methods for communication and collaboration with the Navy and Air Force as well. The May 2025 crisis revealed issues with the deconfliction of drone operations, cruise missile strikes, and air defense deployments. In the event of a war, India would likely conduct a comprehensive strike targeting missile units, air bases, naval ports, command centers, and radar installations. If a rocket force operates as an independent entity, the likelihood of coordination issues may diminish the efficacy of retaliation. Possessing missiles alone is insufficient for effective deterrence; they must also be integrated into a cohesive Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) network. A rocket force may evolve into a distinct and ineffective branch if Pakistan fails to invest significantly in its integration.

A further unanswered question is the quantity of missiles required to render such a force credible. Nuclear deterrence requires only a limited quantity of robust missiles, but conventional missile deterrence is contingent upon the total number available. Pakistan requires several short and medium-range missiles to overwhelm Indian defenses and inhibit India’s conventional military options. India’s land size, terrain, and missile defense systems like the S-400 would again be a serious challenge for ARFC. However, each missile system is prohibitively costly to manufacture, maintain, and operate. Maintaining brigades on heightened alert renders training, logistics, and command readiness increasingly critical. Currently, the SPD, the secretariat and operational arm of the National Command Authority (NCA), oversees the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and Deployment Control Committee (DCC). It ensures that both nuclear and conventional missiles are perpetually prepared for deployment. Establishing a new rocket force would necessitate the replication of this role, the allocation of resources, and the redistribution of personnel, finances, and expertise. This type of duplication may exacerbate the situation by establishing two competing bureaucracies vying for the same finite resources.

Communication Issues

The transfer of authority also presents security concerns. The SPD and the NCA administer Pakistan’s nuclear command system in a centralized and professional manner, garnering global recognition. Introducing an additional rocket force command may obfuscate the chain of command on the oversight of specific rockets and their operational timelines. Furthermore, safety and security concerns and unauthorized use are additional issues. During a crisis, it may be challenging for India or other nations to ascertain whether a Pakistani missile launch is nuclear in nature. The risk of misinterpretation and inadvertent escalation would be far greater. The US Department of Defense has issued warnings regarding these risks in China, where the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) possesses dual-capable missile brigades, complicating the distinction between nuclear and conventional armaments. For Pakistan, rivalling this paradigm may result in increased instability rather than enhanced stability.

Hypersonic Deterrence Over Conventional Defense

This concept is reinforced by examples from across the globe. The utilization of hypersonic Kinzhal missiles by Russia in the conflict with Ukraine has demonstrated how velocity and agility may circumvent air defenses. Ukraine’s utilization of Western-supplied systems, such as Patriot missiles, has enhanced its missile interception capabilities; nonetheless, this advancement has incurred significant costs and limitations in coverage. In June 2025, in response to Israel’s airstrikes, Iran commenced a synchronized attack on Israel using high-speed missiles and drones, overwhelming even the most sophisticated layered missile defense system globally. Although Israel successfully intercepted the majority of the missiles, the strain on its systems demonstrated the challenges of maintaining a prolonged defense against high-velocity saturation attacks. These recent examples validate that the future of deterrence resides not in conventional missile brigades, but in hypersonic capabilities, the integration of electronic warfare, and robust command networks. Conventional missile forces are increasingly vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks or interceptions prior to missile launch. Conversely, hypersonic weapons, until now, remain exceedingly difficult to defend against.

India’s confidence in the S-400 Triumph system demonstrates this predicament. It is a fact that the S-400 can intercept and defend against aircraft, drones, and conventional ballistic or cruise missiles in many layers; however, it is incapable of countering hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that travel at Mach 7 and display unpredictable maneuverability. Pakistan might counter India’s multibillion-dollar S-400 and other missile defense systems by prioritizing hypersonic research and development. This would re-establish the equilibrium of deterrence at a considerably lower expense than the formation of a new rocket force. Hypersonic weapons affiliate effectively with an FSD+ doctrine, wherein survivability, precision, and velocity offer substantial deterrence without necessitating a significant expansion of force structures.

Other Areas of Focus

The development of news on the rocket force is particularly strange given Pakistan’s domestic non-traditional security challenges. The nation is perpetually vulnerable to terrorist assaults, experiencing terrorism in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and is rife with corruption. Natural disasters, such as floods, continue to devastate infrastructure and require assistance from other nations. In this context, allocating funds for a new rocket force may be perceived as misplacing priorities domestically with military vanity projects being developed amidst economic hardship and inadequate governance. Critics have often cautioned that augmenting military power without enhancing civilian authority in Pakistan exacerbates authoritarianism and complicates governmental accountability. The ARF may exemplify military institutional inflation at a time when Pakistan requires a more equitable distribution of power between civilian authorities and the military.

Alternative Ideas and Conclusion

Modernizing existing structures inside an FSD+ framework would be advantageous. This would position hypersonic weapons as central to deterrence, use electromagnetic warfare to disrupt Indian targeting and surveillance, implement layered missile defenses to intercept incoming strikes, and establish a fully integrated C4ISR network that links air, naval, and ground forces. Pakistan should refrain from usurping the SPD’s responsibilities; rather, it needs to reinforce its position as the sole custodian of missile forces. This approach conserves resources, enhances clarity, and reinforces deterrence in the era of hypersonic weaponry. This also enhances Pakistan’s capacity to interact with China, which is rapidly advancing in hypersonic technologies and may be willing to share certain capabilities or engage in joint research. This proposal would enable Pakistan to advance to modern deterrence strategies rather than allocate resources to outdated missile battalions.

The issue is not whether Pakistan must alter its deterrent posture; the May 2025 crisis unequivocally demonstrated that it must. The inquiry pertains to the manner in which it will transform. Establishing an independent rocket force may provide prestige, but it could also result in redundancy, excessive expenditure, and instability. Conversely, transforming FSD into FSD+ through substantial investment, integration, and defensive innovation offers enduring deterrence aligned with the evolving strategic landscape in South Asia. Pakistan is unable to implement a new command structure at this time due to the prevailing economic, political, and national conditions. It must undertake strategic investments, rather than institutional ones, to survive in the hypersonic era.

Tags: India, India-Pakistan Conflict, Missile Defense, Pakistan, Pakistan Rock Fore

About The Author

• 
  
• Tahir Azad
• Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. He previously served as an Affiliate Researcher at King’s College London and held fellowships at Sandia National Laboratories (USA), the University of Bristol, the University of Georgia USA, the Graduate Institute Geneva, ISDP Stockholm, and PRIF Germany. He completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Leicester and holds a PhD in Strategic & Nuclear Studies from National Defence University (NDU), Pakistan. Azad also worked as a Research Fellow and Programme Coordinator at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), Pakistan. His research focuses on nuclear politics, missile proliferation, China’s military modernisation, politics & security in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East regions, and South Asian strategic affairs.

19. The Illiberal International: Authoritarian Cooperation Is Reshaping the Global Order

​Summary:

Cheeseman, Bianchi, and Cyr argue an “illiberal international” is taking shape, with autocrats, illiberal leaders inside democracies, antisystem parties, and sympathetic private actors coordinating across borders to weaken liberal norms. They describe networks that pool money, disinformation, technology, and diplomatic cover, often via opaque finance and criminal enablers, and cite growing coordination tracked in thousands of cross-border interactions. They contend democratic cooperation is faltering, with some former champions, including the United States under POTUS, easing pressure on autocrats and cutting support for media and civil society. The result is a widening capability gap that sustains authoritarianism, accelerates democratic backsliding, and increases conflict and instability.

​Comment:

Finally, today’s democratic alliance needs diverse leadership. European and North American countries should not be the only ones to set the agenda. Democracy promotion requires a broad coalition with new ideas and new energy, and this momentum is likely to come from other parts of the world. In July, for instance, participants at the Democracia Siempre (Democracy Always) summit, hosted by Chile and attended by leaders from Brazil, Colombia, Spain, and Uruguay, agreed to assemble an international network of government and civil society members to work toward the goal of building inclusive, responsive democracies.

Democracy is being contested in every arena, and it must be defended in each and every one. This will require democratic governments—and pro-democracy civil society groups, media, and international institutions—to not only strengthen their political systems at home but also take on the illiberal networks that are empowering authoritarian movements around the world. Superior coordination is giving autocracy an edge. Until the remaining members of the democratic alliance update their own strategies, all they face is further decline.

The Illiberal International

Foreign Affairs · More by Nic Cheeseman · December 16, 2025

Nic Cheeseman, Matías Bianchi, and Jennifer Cyr

Authoritarian Cooperation Is Reshaping the Global Order

January/February 2026 Published on December 16, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/illiberal-international-cheeseman-bianchi-cyr

RAUL ARIAS

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During the interwar years, support for revolutionary, anticapitalist parties by the Soviet-led Communist International laid the groundwork for the expansion of communism after World War II. Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-led international order promoted liberalism and democracy, albeit unevenly, enabling waves of democratic transitions worldwide. Today, political cooperation across borders is advancing autocracy. The momentum lies with a mix of authoritarian and illiberal governments, antisystem parties—typically but not only on the far right—and sympathetic private actors that are coordinating their messaging and lending each other material support.

What links these actors is not where they sit on the political spectrum, but how they relate to democratic institutions and liberal values, including constraints on executive power, safeguards for civil liberties, and the rule of law. From illiberal leaders within historically democratic states, such as U.S. President Donald Trump, to fully established autocrats, such as Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko—often referred to as “Europe’s last dictator”—they share a readiness to personalize power, weaken checks and balances, and deploy disinformation to erode accountability. By hollowing out pluralism and delegitimizing their opponents, these leaders, to varying degrees, roll back political rights and civil liberties. And by pooling resources, amplifying disinformation, and shielding one another diplomatically, they participate in cross-border illiberal networks whose growing capabilities and influence are tilting the global balance in favor of autocracy.

This “illiberal international” was perhaps most visible in Beijing in September 2025, when three of the world’s most prominent autocrats—Chinese leader Xi Jinping, North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose countries cooperate closely on economic and security matters—stood together, projecting defiance of liberal norms. But that summit was just the tip of the iceberg. In 2024 alone, the Authoritarian Collaboration Index published by the U.S.-based nonprofit Action for Democracy tracked more than 45,000 high-level meetings, media partnerships, and other such incidents of coordination among “authoritarian regimes, authoritarian-leaning governments, and authoritarian-leaning opposition parties” around the globe.

Cooperation among democracies, meanwhile, is faltering. Twentieth-­century Western support for democracy was often self-serving and inconsistent, but at its peak, it encouraged political liberalization by using economic incentives, a powerful ideological brand, and coordinated diplomatic pressure. After the Cold War, conditions on aid, trade access, and diplomatic engagement continued to reward reform and isolate repression. Yet the funding, energy, and capabilities of the democratic alliance have declined as the institutions of the liberal order lose their potency and the conviction of remaining members wavers. Some former champions of democracy—most notably the United States under Trump—are actively enabling or legitimizing illiberal networks. Even countries that have remained proudly democratic have become more cautious and reactive, taking steps to mitigate interference in their own affairs but stopping short of taking the fight to illiberal regimes.

As the capability gap between authoritarian and democratic networks widens, authoritarian rule has become easier to sustain and democratic backsliding harder to combat. This development should be worrying not only to those who care about political rights and civil liberties. Authoritarian countries are more prone to conflict, instability, and repression than democratic ones, and most of them perform poorly when it comes to inclusive development, producing a world that is less safe, less free, and less prosperous. And as long as democratic coordination remains less bold and less inspired than its authoritarian counterpart, there is every reason to expect that autocracy will continue to spread.

A WORLD SAFE FOR AUTOCRACY

Liberal democracy has become an endangered species. The world is a quarter century into a democratic recession; according to the widely cited Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index, 45 countries shifted away from democracy and toward autocracy in 2025. Only 29 countries can now be considered full democracies.

Digging a little deeper, the outlook is even worse. For much of the twentieth century, democracies typically managed to recover after backsliding. In Uruguay, a democratic restoration followed less than ten years after a 1933 coup; in India, 1977 elections ushered in a rocky but durable democratic revival after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s centralization of authority in the 1970s. In recent decades, however, rebounds have become rare and precarious. In research published in the Journal of Democracy, we found that since 1994, of the 19 countries that experienced a period of autocratization and then successfully recovered their previous level of democracy, 17 began backsliding again within five years. Instead of snapping back into shape, democratic institutions remain damaged.

One of the biggest changes in the past three decades is the rise of the support network that autocrats and would-be autocrats now enjoy. There are historical precedents for cross-border coordination among autocrats, from the fascist axis of the 1930s to Soviet-backed networks during the Cold War. But the authoritarian alliance that has emerged since the early 1990s, when autocracy was in recession worldwide, is different in form and content from those that came before.

Criminal networks are often integral to authoritarian collaborations.

First, it is increasingly well resourced. There are now roughly as many authoritarian countries in the world as democratic ones, but autocracies collectively have more people and are growing wealthier. Today, governments on the authoritarian spectrum (including many that hold elections, such as India) together represent more than 70 percent of the world’s population. They also enjoyed a 46 percent share of global GDP (measured by purchasing power parity) in 2022—up from just 24 percent in 1992—according to V-Dem data. That number is expected to rise further. Authoritarian states’ willingness to manipulate politics across borders has grown with their economic and military power, and their ability to do so has expanded with advancements in digital technology. A new tier of regionally influential middle powers, which includes countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, has lent additional strength to authoritarians’ global influence. And whereas the years after the end of the Cold War saw new democratic regional bodies established or existing ones, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, strengthened, for the past few decades most new regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023, have been formed among authoritarians.

Today’s illiberal international is not directed by Beijing or Moscow, the way the Soviet-led Communist International, or Comintern, and later the Warsaw Pact structured ideological and military coordination during the Cold War. Instead, it operates as a collection of overlapping networks that provide fertile ground for the construction of a more authoritarian world. The disparate elements of this system—Russian mercenaries, money from the ruling dynasties of the Arab Gulf states, Chinese and U.S. surveillance technologies, and far-right political parties in Europe and North America—are not organized from a single command center, nor do they always work toward the same purpose. But their activities often reinforce one another. Authoritarians in the Central African Republic and Mali, for example, have received security assistance from Russian private military companies, which in turn were financed by illicit gold deals between companies in these countries and the UAE. Meanwhile, the UAE has used Russian mercenaries to funnel arms to its allies in countries such as Sudan. Together, these relationships entrench authoritarian control.

Collaboration takes several forms. One involves direct cooperation among nondemocratic powers, most notably China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. These countries often share military intelligence and extend diplomatic protection to one another. Through vetoes at the United Nations (in the case of China and Russia), joint statements in multilateral forums, and defense and trade agreements that lack oversight measures, they help create a permissive environment in which repression is normalized and accountability diluted. By offering economic lifelines to sanctioned countries, they reduce the effectiveness of Western efforts to foster democracy and deter repression. And by defending each other’s human rights records and promoting institutions such as the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization as alternatives to Western-led groups, they signal to would-be autocrats that authoritarian governance can command legitimacy and support on the global stage.

Putin, Xi, and Kim in Beijing, September 2025 Florence Lo / Reuters

These five countries also interfere across borders to varying degrees. Despite regularly invoking sovereignty to deflect criticism of their own human rights abuses, they do not hesitate to intervene in other countries’ political systems and civic institutions to empower groups aligned with their worldviews or to discredit critics and pro-democracy forces. Russia, for example, has covertly funded sympathetic political parties, spread disinformation through state-sponsored news outlets such as RT and Sputnik, and launched social media campaigns and cyberattacks to distort public debate and influence elections in countries including France, Moldova, and Romania. Similarly, China has used its network of Confucius Institutes (organizations promoting Chinese language and culture), diaspora associations, and state-linked media to shape political discussion and suppress criticism abroad, including by pressuring universities, intimidating journalists, and supporting pro-Beijing candidates in places such as Australia and Taiwan. In effect, these efforts extend authoritarian influence into democratic arenas while eroding the norms of transparency and pluralism on which democracy depends.

Authoritarian middle powers are also deploying military and financial tools to entrench illiberal governance and suppress democratic openings abroad. Turkey’s supply of Bayraktar TB2 drones to incumbent strongmen in countries at war, such as Azerbaijan and Libya, has given those leaders decisive battlefield advantages and reinforced military regimes resistant to international accountability. The UAE has likewise supported repressive actors across Africa and the Middle East, including Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, one of the belligerents in the country’s civil war that the UN has accused of committing horrendous atrocities. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has backed autocratic leaders and counterrevolutionary movements since the Arab Spring, most notably giving financial and diplomatic aid to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime in Egypt since the 2013 military coup that brought him to power—and that put a definitive end to Egypt’s short-lived democratic opening.

Illicit or criminal networks are often integral to these international collaborations. Shell companies, covert donations, and opaque real estate ventures launder money that bankrolls political actors abroad. These flows exacerbate corruption and represent a direct threat to democracy as they infiltrate legislatures and parties in the very countries that still aspire to defend liberal norms. The “Laundromat” corruption network in Azerbaijan, for example, spent nearly $3 billion in bribes to people, including European lawmakers, who would mute criticism of the country’s human rights abuses and whitewash its record at the Council of Europe, a regional human rights organization. In Spain, the far-right party Vox, which advocates restrictions on minority rights and opposes gender equality legislation, confirmed that it received a loan of around $10 million from MBH Bank (then MKB Bank) in Hungary for its 2023 electoral campaign. According to reporting by Reuters and Politico Europe, MBH Bank is partly owned by a close ally and former business partner of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Although the loan’s legality is contested, the occurrence of a transaction between a far-right campaign and a financial institution embedded in Orban’s patronage network is significant. With this kind of funding available from illiberal regimes, would-be autocrats and defenders of authoritarianism can more easily keep their causes alive and gain a financial advantage over their pro-democracy rivals.

TRUST BUSTERS

Another key part of the illiberal project is the diffusion of authoritarian-­friendly ideologies. Illiberal governments, politicians, intellectuals, and civil society groups around the world design and share narratives that reject democratic norms and values. They rarely hold the same worldviews—illiberal and autocratizing leaders can sit at opposite ideological extremes—but their messaging tends to have features in common. It often includes calls to roll back women’s rights and limit protections for LGBTQ communities, for instance. In Europe and the United States, right-wing parties and organizations typically frame these rights as threats to traditional family structures, religious freedom, or national identity, whereas their counterparts in Russia and parts of Africa and Latin America often portray gender equality and reproductive rights as foreign, Western impositions that undermine cultural sovereignty. More important than these variations, however, is the shared aim of the messaging: to sow doubt about democratic institutions, the universality of human rights, and the legitimacy of Western morality and government.

Such attempts have become ubiquitous. The European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic agency, has compiled since 2023 an annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats that documents efforts by actors such as China and Russia to spread harmful and divisive disinformation. The third report, released in March 2025, analyzed a sample of more than 500 incidents of information manipulation that were promoted through more than 38,000 channels. Many of these information campaigns boosted messages associated with right-wing politics and populism, but their broader effect is to erode trust in democratic governance and normalize illiberal or antidemocratic speech.

A 2024 campaign in France, for example, saw five coffins draped in the French flag and marked “French soldiers in Ukraine” placed near the foot of the Eiffel Tower, a stunt designed to generate both offline and online attention. French authorities suspect that Russian-linked actors planned the display to inflame public anger at the French government over its policies in support of Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s 2022 invasion. Earlier, in a Russian operation known as Doppelgänger, first exposed in late 2022, actors linked to Moscow created cloned versions of major European media outlets. These websites circulated pro-Kremlin disinformation about Ukraine, the Paris Olympics, and other topics in European politics. The stories they produced were then picked up by Russian diplomatic accounts in countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Slovakia, as well as by far-right media outlets and online influencers in Europe and the United States, extending the reach of the campaign.

Democracies are playing by the rules of a game that no longer exists.

Some narrative diffusion is more closely coordinated. The Make Europe Great Again rally in Madrid in February 2025, co-hosted by the right-wing European party Patriots.EU, gathered far-right parties from across the continent. The Conservative Political Action Conference, an annual gathering of conservative activists and politicians, began in the United States but has been staged in Hungary and Poland in recent years, too, drawing in thousands of participants from countries across Europe, Latin America, and beyond. Attendees endorse each other in speeches, cultivate networks of contacts, and share ideas, building international connections that provide visibility and legitimacy for domestic movements. And because these events include both conventional conservative discourse and outright disinformation, they can blur the boundary between the two, making authoritarian messaging appear more palatable to mainstream audiences.

Sometimes, the promotion of illiberal visions of governance and development is even more overt. The Chinese Communist Party, for example, has increased the training programs it provides regularly for party leaders and government officials in African countries including Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania. The sessions have been described, by at least one participant, as teaching government officials what can be achieved “without the messiness of democracy.”

Sympathetic business leaders have also grasped new opportunities to amplify illiberal narratives for global audiences. For instance, since taking over Twitter (now X) in 2022, Elon Musk has used the platform to spread right-wing disinformation about politicians and candidates he opposes. He has dismantled safeguards against extremist content, too, and relentlessly attacked the mainstream media. These highly visible interventions into politics both inside and outside the United States amplify hate speech, endanger the freedom of the press, empower politicians and citizens who target minorities and marginalized groups, and impede citizens’ ability to make informed choices at the ballot box.

If the goal of illiberal messaging is to reduce popular confidence and trust in democratic institutions, it appears to be working. According to the political scientist Will Jennings, trust in national parliaments in democratic countries has declined by around eight percent since 1990, reflecting a “public discontent with politics” that “has expanded in terms of its scope and intensity.” In turn, the erosion of trust has weakened the social contract that sustains representative government, leaving democracies more vulnerable to populist demagogues, institutional paralysis, and the gradual normalization of authoritarian alternatives.

MAN TO MAN

A final way that autocratic and authoritarian-leaning leaders support each other across borders is through personal relationships. When former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faced prosecution over an alleged plot to overturn the result of Brazil’s 2022 election, for instance, Trump publicly condemned Brazil’s judiciary, and the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the lead judge in the case. Trump also imposed an extra 40 percent tariff on Brazilian goods, which Brasília interpreted partly as punishment for the government’s pursuit of Bolsonaro.

Personalized engagement is not always reliable. Orban and Putin once shared a close working relationship, grounded in energy deals and mutual illiberalism. Their cooperation made Hungary heavily dependent on Russian gas and gave Moscow a channel for influence within the EU. But the partnership soured after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when EU sanctions and funding freezes forced Budapest to quietly seek alternative energy sources, leading to tensions in its relationship with Moscow. A similar marriage of convenience connected Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the UAE in the early 2010s, when Emirati investments helped Erdogan entrench his patronage networks and centralize power. But Turkey’s relationship with the UAE soon collapsed during the Arab Spring protests over Erdogan’s support for political Islamists the Emirati government opposed. Authoritarian cooperation may be expedient, but it tends to be brittle. Cooperation is not always successful in protecting authoritarian figures, either. Brazil’s Supreme Courtconvicted Bolsonaro in September for his role in the coup plot, despite Trump’s taunts and tariffs.

Still, these informal ties matter. Having backers abroad gives illiberal leaders financial lifelines, diplomatic cover, and evidence of external legitimacy—advantages that can blunt domestic pressure and help them survive sanctions or internal dissent. In turn, this transnational support raises the stakes for potential challengers, who have less reason to think the government will hesitate to retaliate against them. Resistance to authoritarian creep thus becomes riskier and less likely to succeed.

OUT OF THE FIGHT

For decades, democratic networks had the upper hand. Democracies shaped the twentieth-century global order by creating and upholding institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and a wider constellation of international financial and legal bodies that embedded liberal norms, provided collective security guarantees, and demonstrated the material benefits of belonging to the democratic alliance. Yet democracies have failed to preserve their advantages. Democratic institutions’ preference for procedural neutrality and consensus has allowed illiberal actors to test the limits of—and often bend—those institutions from within. Democracies, moreover, are struggling to recruit other countries to their side. In regions such as Latin America, where the United States spent much of the twentieth century supporting military rule, many countries were already skeptical of Washington’s post–Cold War pivot urging governments to democratize. Across Africa and Asia, leaders who are regularly asked to “choose democracy” see fewer and fewer reasons to do so as their citizens grow dissatisfied with electoral systems that do not deliver desirable economic results.

Even the pro-democracy narrative, which inspired citizens and movements throughout the twentieth century, has become stale and uninspiring. Some major democracies have begun to avoid the term “democracy” altogether. In the United Kingdom, for example, successive governments have described their foreign policy in terms of promoting “open societies,” deliberately deemphasizing the defense of democracy so as not to embarrass authoritarian partners. And attempts to reinvigorate the democratic brand—such as the Summit for Democracy, which U.S. President Joe Biden convened in 2021, 2023, and 2024—instead reveal its shortcomings, generating little enthusiasm from civil society and drawing even less public attention.

The current U.S. administration has also forfeited leadership of the democratic alliance. In July 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio instructed American diplomats to “avoid opining on the fairness or integrity” of foreign elections and on “the democratic values” of foreign countries. And the administration’s dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development has removed essential funding for investigative journalists, human rights monitors, election observers, and other pro-democracy groups around the world. Europe, where austerity measures and mounting fiscal constraints have tightened foreign aid budgets, is unlikely to pick up the slack. Groups that might otherwise act to defend democratic norms are therefore scrambling to cover core costs, leaving a clear lane for authoritarian governments and movements.

Democrats are playing by the rules of a game that no longer exists. They are relying on sterile communiqués, predictable conferences, and cautious diplomacy while their opponents have become more ruthless, more imaginative, and better networked. Halting the expansion of the illiberal international will require democracy’s defenders to rethink their approach.

Erdogan and Orban in Istanbul, December 2025 Mustafa Kamaci / PPO / Reuters

The first step is to reclaim the narrative. Pro-democracy actors need to make democratic values culturally relevant, meet citizens where they are, and show them how democracy improves everyday life. A recent example in France illustrates the potential for such a strategy: ahead of the 2024 legislative elections, a WhatsApp network of 130 activists, influencers, and grassroots organizers—figures trusted within their communities—produced short videos, memes, and message templates that explained the stakes of the election, countered misleading information, and encouraged people to vote with a tone that was personal, hopeful, and creative. Participants in the network also created an open group on Telegram to share tips for getting involved in the campaign, including ways to volunteer on election day, with more than 30,000 users.

Democracies must also address authoritarian disinformation more effectively. The EU has made some progress: its 2022 Digital Services Act required large platforms such as Meta and X to remove illegal content swiftly, disclose their content-moderation algorithms, and curb the amplification of disinformation through recommendation features, and European diplomats regularly call out Chinese and Russian state-linked media and troll networks for spreading fabricated stories. But one regional effort is not enough. Just as authoritarian governments share tactics and amplify one another’s messaging, democratic governments must pool resources and intelligence and jointly establish clear standards for online platforms to promote information integrity.

Financing is key. Democratic governments must expand and protect funding channels to ensure that activists, independent journalists, and civic organizations can investigate corruption, expose disinformation, and mobilize citizens without fear of financial retaliation. They can offer tax deductions, matching grants, and public-private partnerships, for instance, to encourage the private sector to channel corporate social responsibility funds toward media freedom and civic innovation. Democracies must also shut down the illicit financial flows that fill authoritarian coffers. This requires intelligence sharing, cross-border asset tracing, and greater enforcement of legal tools such as EU anti-money-laundering directives, sanctions like those of the United States’ Magnitsky Act that target human rights abusers, and anti-bribery and asset recovery provisions under the UN Convention Against Corruption. The EU has begun to make progress in these areas and may take further steps under its recently announced “Democracy Shield” initiative, but democratic governments overall need to do much more to cut authoritarian actors off from the financial and diplomatic systems that sustain them.

Finally, today’s democratic alliance needs diverse leadership. European and North American countries should not be the only ones to set the agenda. Democracy promotion requires a broad coalition with new ideas and new energy, and this momentum is likely to come from other parts of the world. In July, for instance, participants at the Democracia Siempre (Democracy Always) summit, hosted by Chile and attended by leaders from Brazil, Colombia, Spain, and Uruguay, agreed to assemble an international network of government and civil society members to work toward the goal of building inclusive, responsive democracies.

Democracy is being contested in every arena, and it must be defended in each and every one. This will require democratic governments—and pro-democracy civil society groups, media, and international institutions—to not only strengthen their political systems at home but also take on the illiberal networks that are empowering authoritarian movements around the world. Superior coordination is giving autocracy an edge. Until the remaining members of the democratic alliance update their own strategies, all they face is further decline.

NIC CHEESEMAN is Director of the Centre for Elections, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation at the University of Birmingham.

MATÍAS BIANCHI is Director of Asuntos del Sur, a think tank in Buenos Aires.

JENNIFER CYR is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires.

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Foreign Affairs · More by Nic Cheeseman · December 16, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com