Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“He said to people: you’re free. And they said hooray, and then he showed them what freedom costs and they called him a tyrant and, as soon as he’d been betrayed, they milled around a bit like barn-bred chickens who’ve seen the big world outside for the first time, and then they went back into the warm and shut the door...”

― Terry Pratchett, Feet of Clay

“Tyranny is the exercise of some power over a man, which is not warranted by law, or necessary for the public safety. A people can never be deprived of their liberties, while they retain in their own hands, a power sufficient to any other power in the state.”

― Noah Webster

“The paralysis of potential is essential to the manufacturing of victims.”

― Stefan Molyneux

1. Putin Quietly Signals He Is Open to a Cease-Fire in Ukraine

2. Two Wars, 50 Elections: The Economy Faces Rising Geopolitical Risks

3. He Was Ready to Die, but Not to Surrender

4. From Patriot Missiles to a Mother and Her Vintage Rifle: Inside Ukraine’s Air Defense

5. How TikTok Brings War Home to Your Child

6. Nippon-US Steel deal sparks a knee-jerk backlash

7. Think China has a demographic problem? Check out Taiwan

8. American Achilles in the War on Terror

9. The return of US isolationism

10. Congress, Pentagon at odds over Pacific task force needed to prep for China war

11. Pacific Power Play: Japan’s Defense Overhaul And South Korea’s Global Arms Ascent – Analysis

12. How The Mongols Actually Conquered The World

13. Russia’s Own Troops Are Being Blown Up By Low Quality Artillery Ammo From North Korea

14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023

15. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, December 23, 2023

16. The High Price of Losing Ukraine: Part 2 — The Military Threat and Beyond

1. Putin Quietly Signals He Is Open to a Cease-Fire in Ukraine

Negotiation from actual weakness or a perceived position of strength? Is Putin over confident? Would Putin even live up to any agreement? How could Putin exploit a ceasefire?

Putin Quietly Signals He Is Open to a Cease-Fire in Ukraine

By Anton Troianovski, Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes

Dec. 23, 2023

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · December 23, 2023

Despite its bravado in public, the Kremlin has indicated its interest in striking a deal to halt the war — so long as it could still declare victory.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia speaking at a rally in February at Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Despite its bravado in public, the Kremlin has indicated its interest in striking a deal to halt the war — so long as it could still declare victory.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia speaking at a rally in February at Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Dec. 23, 2023

President Vladimir V. Putin’s confidence seems to know no bounds.

Buoyed by Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive and flagging Western support, Mr. Putin says that Russia’s war goals have not changed. Addressing his generals on Tuesday, he boasted that Ukraine was so beleaguered that Russia’s invading troops were doing “what we want.”

“We won’t give up what’s ours,” he pledged, adding dismissively, “If they want to negotiate, let them negotiate.”

But in a recent push of back-channel diplomacy, Mr. Putin has been sending a different message: He is ready to make a deal.

Mr. Putin has been signaling through intermediaries since at least September that he is open to a cease-fire that freezes the fighting along the current lines, far short of his ambitions to dominate Ukraine, two former senior Russian officials close to the Kremlin and American and international officials who have received the message from Mr. Putin’s envoys say.

In fact, Mr. Putin also sent out feelers for a cease-fire deal a year earlier, in the fall of 2022, according to American officials. That quiet overture, not previously reported, came after Ukraine routed Russia’s army in the country’s northeast. Mr. Putin indicated that he was satisfied with Russia’s captured territory and ready for an armistice, they said.

Ukrainian soldiers atop an armored vehicle last year in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv region. Credit...Finbarr O’Reilly for The New York Times

The bodies of Russian soldiers outside Lyman, Ukraine, in October 2022 after a railroad hub was retaken by Ukrainian forces.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Mr. Putin’s repeated interest in a cease-fire is an example of how opportunism and improvisation have defined his approach to the war behind closed doors. Dozens of interviews with Russians who have long known him and with international officials with insight into the Kremlin’s inner workings show a leader maneuvering to reduce risks and keep his options open in a war that has lasted longer than he expected. While deploying fiery public rhetoric, Mr. Putin privately telegraphs a desire to declare victory and move on.

“They say, ‘We are ready to have negotiations on a cease-fire,’” said one senior international official who met with top Russian officials this fall. “They want to stay where they are on the battlefield.”

There is no evidence that Ukraine’s leaders, who have pledged to retake all their territory, will accept such a deal. Some American officials say it could be a familiar Kremlin attempt at misdirection and does not reflect genuine willingness by Mr. Putin to compromise. The former Russian officials add that Mr. Putin could well change his mind again if Russian forces gain momentum.

In the past 16 months, Mr. Putin swallowed multiple humiliations — embarrassing retreats, a once-friendly warlord’s mutiny — before he arrived at his current state of relaxed confidence. All along, he waged a war that has killed or maimed hundreds of thousands while exhibiting contradictions that have become hallmarks of his rule.

While obsessed with Russia’s battlefield performance and what he sees as his historic mission to retake “original Russian lands,” he has been keen for most Russians to go on with normal life. While readying Russia for years of war, he is quietly trying to make it clear that he is ready to end it.

“He really is willing to stop at the current positions,” one of the former senior Russian officials told The New York Times, relaying a message he said the Kremlin was quietly sending. The former official added, “He’s not willing to retreat one meter.”

Passengers waiting for delayed flights in August in Moscow. The airspace had been closed that morning because of drone strikes.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

A damaged skyscraper in a Moscow business district after a reported drone attack in August.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Mr. Putin, the current and former officials said, sees a confluence of factors creating an opportune moment for a deal: a battlefield that seems stuck in a stalemate, the fallout over Ukraine’s disappointing offensive, its flagging support in the West, and, since October, the distraction of the war in Gaza. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity, like others interviewed for this article, because of the sensitive nature of the back-channel overtures.

Responding to written questions after declining an interview request, Mr. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, said in a voice message that “сonceptually, these theses you presented, they are incorrect.” Asked whether Russia was ready for a cease-fire at the current battle lines, he pointed to the president’s recent comments; Mr. Putin said this month that Russia’s war goals had not changed.

“Putin is, indeed, ready for talks, and he has said so,” Mr. Peskov said. “Russia continues to be ready, but exclusively for the achievement of its own goals.”

Ukraine has been rallying support for its own peace formula, which requires Moscow to surrender all captured Ukrainian territory and pay damages. President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday that he saw no sign that Russia wanted to negotiate.

“We just see brazen willingness to kill,” he said.

Early Talks

Mr. Putin first explored peace talks in the early weeks of the war, but they fell apart after Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine came to light. Then, in the fall of 2022, after Russia’s embarrassing retreat from northeastern Ukraine, Mr. Putin again sent messages to Kyiv and the West that he would be open to a deal to freeze the fighting, American officials say.

Some of Ukraine’s supporters, like Gen. Mark A. Milley, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraged Kyiv to negotiate because Ukraine had achieved as much on the battlefield as it could reasonably expect. But other top American officials believed it was too soon for talks. And Mr. Zelensky vowed to fight on until the entire country had been freed from Russia’s grasp.

By early 2023, gloom had settled over Moscow. On eastern Ukraine’s frozen plains, much of Russia’s prewar professional force had been decimated, leaving poorly trained draftees and convicts recruited from prisons to be gunned down in haphazardly planned infantry storms.

Mr. Putin said little in public about the war, stoking questions about his plans and motivations. In private, though, Mr. Putin embraced his role as commander in chief with an almost messianic determination during these months, the people close to the Kremlin contend. One said last February that the president held two videoconferences a day with military officials who briefed him on the minutiae of movements on the battlefield.

The funeral for Garipul S. Kadyrov, a Russian soldier who was killed while fighting in Ukraine, last month in the village of Ovsyanka, Russia.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Recruitment advertising for the Russian Army featuring the slogan, “People are not born heroes — they are self-made,” in May in Ivolginsk, Russia.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

The war was “impossible to stop,” the person said, describing a conversation with a top Russian military official, because Mr. Putin “remains consumed by all this.”

“People want to tell him only good news, and there’s not much of that,” the person said. “So you have to lie.”

Sergei K. Shoigu, the Russian defense minister, made clear in a private meeting earlier this year that, despite his setbacks, Mr. Putin was determined to keep fighting. According to the senior international official, who was present, Mr. Shoigu gave statistics showing Russia’s advantage in tanks and warplanes and its plans to increase defense production. He boasted that Russia could mobilize as many as 25 million men, the official recalled.

“For Putin, it’s about Russia versus the U.S. and the West,” the official said after the meeting. “Putin can’t afford to back down.”

Turning Points

As Ukraine launched its long-anticipated counteroffensive in June, Mr. Putin appeared tense, anxious for battlefield updates, people close to the Kremlin said. In public, Mr. Putin became a live commentator of the fight, eager to claim incremental successes.

“The enemy is trying to attack,” Mr. Putin said onstage at his marquee St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 16, describing a battle happening “right now.” “I think the armed forces of Ukraine have no chance.”

The same day, a delegation of African leaders arrived in Kyiv hoping to broker peace. At one point, Ukrainian officials rushed them into a shelter, warning of an attack. The next day, in St. Petersburg, President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa asked Mr. Putin whether he had really bombed the Ukrainian capital while the African leaders were there.

“Yes, I did,” Mr. Putin responded, according to two people close to Mr. Ramaphosa, “but I made sure it was very far from where you were.”

He still tried to play the gracious host, taking the leaders on a dinner cruise. A member of the African delegation said Mr. Putin seemed interested in preparing a channel for future talks.

“It’s not that I want to negotiate,” the person said, describing Mr. Putin’s stance. “But I need to have ready, when the time will come, a very well-conceived, intelligent, capable channel of negotiations.”

The body of a Russian soldier in July in the Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukraine was waging a counteroffensive.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Part of a delegation of African leaders to Kyiv, Ukraine, in June visited an exhibition of destroyed Russian military equipment.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

A week later, the mercenary warlord Yevgeny V. Prigozhin launched his failed mutiny.

After Mr. Prigozhin accepted a deal to retreat to Belarus, Mr. Putin proceeded to spin what seemed to be one of the most humiliating moments of his 24 years in power into a victory. He declared in a lavish Kremlin ceremony that the failure of the rebellion demonstrated the strength of the Russian state. It offered a hint of what Mr. Putin might do if he fell short of his original goals in Ukraine: declare victory and move on.

The Kremlin’s analysis appeared to be that public support for the war was broad, but not deep — meaning that most would accept whatever Mr. Putin termed a victory. One of the government’s pollsters, Valery Fyodorov, said in a September newspaper interview that only 10 to 15 percent of Russians actively supported the war, and that “most Russians are not demanding the conquest of Kyiv or Odesa.”

By the end of the summer, events were shifting in Mr. Putin’s favor. Mr. Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash, widely seen as the Kremlin’s doing, eliminated his most dangerous domestic foe. On the battlefield, Russia already appeared to be successful in repelling Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

Mr. Putin and his government exuded stability and confidence. The president continued to go for his morning swims, several people with knowledge of his schedule said. Top Kremlin officials had gone back to taking vacations.

“They’ve calmed down already,” Prime Minister Akylbek Zhaparov of Kyrgyzstan said in an interview in October, referring to the surprise and worry among many Russian officials and the elite when Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine last year. After first seeing Mr. Putin’s war as a “catastrophe,” he added, “they’ve now gotten used to it.”

Kremlin Confidence

On a Saturday in October, Mr. Putin marked his 71st birthday with the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, two Central Asian countries that have tried to take a neutral stance in the war. When they arrived at his suburban Moscow residence, Mr. Putin got behind the wheel of a new Russian-made limo, showing off one of the ways in which, in the Kremlin’s telling, Russia is becoming more self-sufficient.

Once indoors, the three leaders spoke about a plan to sell Russian gas to Uzbekistan. A person present recalled Mr. Putin’s calm confidence and relaxed body language.

“He doesn’t look like a man who’s waging war,” the person said.

A photograph released by Russian state media of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President Shavkat M. Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan in October near Moscow.Credit...Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Sputnik, via Associated Press

Police officers stood guard at the Porohovsky cemetery in St. Petersburg in August after it was announced that Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the mercenary warlord, had been buried there.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Only after a birthday lunch did they grasp the full significance of events elsewhere. It was Oct. 7.

The terrorist attack by Hamas that day — and Israel’s fierce military response — proved to be a propaganda boon for Russia, pulling attention away from Ukraine and allowing Mr. Putin to line up with much of the world in condemning the bombardment of Gaza and American support for Israel.

“He sees that the attention of the West is turning away,” said Balazs Orban, an aide to Prime Minister Viktor Orban who participated in the Hungarian leader’s meeting with Mr. Putin in October.

In late October, Grigory A. Yavlinsky, a liberal Russian politician, waited past midnight for an audience at the Kremlin. He said he tried to impress upon Mr. Putin the scale of the Russian deaths in Ukraine, which dwarfed Soviet losses over a decade of war in Afghanistan.

Then Mr. Yavlinsky made what he said was his central pitch in the 90-minute meeting: If Mr. Putin were prepared “at least to think about a cease-fire,” Mr. Yavlinsky, who was born in western Ukraine, would be ready to act as a negotiator.

“The fact that he agreed to talk to me for so long speaks for itself,” he said.

Cease-Fire Opening

Since at least September, Western officials have been picking up renewed signals that Mr. Putin is interested in a cease-fire.

The signals come through multiple channels, including via foreign governments with ties to both the United States and Russia. Unofficial Russian emissaries have spoken to interlocutors about the contours of a potential deal that Mr. Putin would accept, American officials and others said.

“Putin and the Russian army, they don’t want to stretch their capacity further,” said the international official who met with top Russian officials this fall.

Mr. Putin has also made vague public comments about being open to negotiations, which have largely been dismissed by Western commentators.

Some analysts argue that Mr. Putin benefits from a long war, and that he wants to delay any negotiation until a possible return to office by former President Donald J. Trump, the front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024. The former Russian officials said that Mr. Putin would prefer to strike a deal sooner, given the uncertainty inherent in war.

They said that Mr. Putin’s propaganda could easily spin the status quo as a victory, celebrating a land corridor to Crimea, an army that withstood Ukraine’s Western-supplied counteroffensive and Russia’s claimed annexation of four Ukrainian regions — papering over the fact that Russia doesn’t fully control them.

Ukrainian soldiers with the 22nd Mechanized Brigade firing at Russian positions in the direction of Bakhmut, in eastern Ukraine, last month. The front line has remained largely static over the past year.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

A Ukrainian soldier who was severely injured on the front line in Avdiivka, in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, in November.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

The ideal timing, one of the people said, would be before Russia’s presidential election in March. Mr. Putin is certain to secure another six-year term, but he cares deeply about the election as a marker of his domestic support.

Publicly, Mr. Putin has stuck to his aggressive stance, saying he is resisting a West seeking to destroy a 1,000-year-old Russian civilization.

But American officials see a shift in Mr. Putin’s position, noting that he is no longer demanding the departure of Mr. Zelensky’s government. They said that the cease-fire being floated by Mr. Putin would maintain a sovereign Ukraine with Kyiv as its capital, but leave Russia in control of the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it has already conquered. They added that while Mr. Putin is telegraphing that he is open to such a deal, he is waiting to be brought a more specific offer.

Among the many likely sticking points is Mr. Putin’s determination to keep Ukraine out of NATO. But one of the former Russian officials said a disagreement on that score would not be a deal breaker for Mr. Putin, because the alliance is not expected to admit Ukraine in the foreseeable future.

Still, senior American officials said they did not believe that any prominent Ukrainian politician could agree at this time to a deal leaving Russia with so much Ukrainian territory.

Russian conscripts in the Moscow region last year.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

A tour of the Victory Museum, a museum dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, in Moscow. Mr. Putin sees the current war as part of a historic Russian struggle against a West seeking to destroy a 1,000-year-old Russian civilization.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times.

Another potential impasse stems from Mr. Putin’s efforts to put the United States at the center of any negotiations.

The U.S. and Russian governments have channels for communications on issues that include prisoner swaps. But William J. Burns, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Sergei Naryshkin, the director of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, last met about a year ago in Turkey, officials said. And U.S. officials say the United States has not and will not negotiate on behalf of Ukraine.

American officials argue that regardless of Mr. Putin’s overture, Ukraine must demonstrate its staying power, and the United States must show it is willing to support Ukraine to puncture Mr. Putin’s confidence that time is on his side and to force concessions in any negotiations.

Many in the West are skeptical of a cease-fire because they say Mr. Putin would rearm for a future assault. President Edgars Rinkevics of Latvia argued in an interview that Mr. Putin was committed to war because he dreams of “re-establishing the empire.”

“They never honored any agreements,” Mr. Rinkevics said of the Russians, “and they have violated them immediately when they saw it was convenient.”

A heavily damaged church last month in the village of Bohorodychne, in Ukraine’s Donetsk region.Credit...Emile Ducke for The New York Times

Reporting was contributed by Neil MacFarquhar, John Eligon, Declan Walsh, Andrew E. Kramer and Valerie Hopkins.

Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The Times. He writes about Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. More about Anton Troianovski

Adam Entous is a Washington-based investigative correspondent and a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. Before joining the Washington bureau of The Times, he covered intelligence, national security and foreign policy for The New Yorker magazine, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. More about Adam Entous

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · December 23, 2023

2. Two Wars, 50 Elections: The Economy Faces Rising Geopolitical Risks

Excerpts:

The drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea by Iranian-backed Houthi militia are a further sign of increasing fragmentation.

In the last couple of months, there has been a rise in smaller players like Yemen, Hamas, Azerbaijan and Venezuela that are seeking to change the status quo, said Courtney Rickert McCaffrey, a geopolitical analyst at EY-Parthenon and an author of the recent report.

“Even if these conflicts are smaller, they can still affect global supply chains in unexpected ways,” she said. “Geopolitical power is becoming more dispersed,” and that increases volatility.

The Houthi assaults on vessels from around the world in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait — the aptly named Gate of Grief — on the southern end of the Red Sea have pushed up freight and insurance rates and oil prices while diverting marine traffic to a much longer and costlier route around Africa.

Last week, the United States said it would expand a military coalition to ensure the safety of ships passing through this commercial pathway, through which 12 percent of global trade passes. It is the biggest rerouting of worldwide trade since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Claus Vistesen, chief eurozone economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics, said the impact of the attacks had so far been limited. “From an economic perspective, we’re not seeing huge increase in oil and gas prices,” Mr. Vistesen said, although he acknowledged that the Red Sea assaults were the “most obvious near-term flashpoint.”

Uncertainty does have a dampening effect on the economy, though. Businesses tend to adopt a wait-and-see attitude when it comes to investment, expansions and hiring.

“Continuing volatility in geopolitical and geoeconomic relations between major economies is the biggest concern for chief risk officers in both the public and private sectors,” a midyear survey by the World Economic Forum found.

With persistent military conflicts, increasing bouts of extreme weather and a slew of major elections ahead, it’s likely that 2024 will bring more of the same.

Two Wars, 50 Elections: The Economy Faces Rising Geopolitical Risks

Next year could see increasing volatility as persistent military conflicts and economic uncertainty influence voting in national elections across the globe.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/24/business/economy/global-economic-risks-red-sea.html

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India, the world’s fastest-growing economy, will hold the biggest election next year.Credit...Rebecca Conway for The New York Times

By Patricia Cohen

Reporting from London

Dec. 24, 2023, 3:01 a.m. ET

The attacks on crucial shipping traffic in the Red Sea straits by a determined band of militants in Yemen — a spillover from the Israeli-Hamas war in Gaza — is injecting a new dose of instability into a world economy already struggling with mounting geopolitical tensions.

The risk of escalating conflict in the Middle East is the latest in a string of unpredictable crises, including the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, that have landed like swipes of a bear claw on the global economy, smacking it off course and leaving scars.

As if that weren’t enough, more volatility lies ahead in the form of a wave of national elections whose repercussions could be deep and long. More than two billion people in roughly 50 countries, including India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, the United States and the 27 nations of the European Parliament, will head to the polls. Altogether, participants in 2024’s elections olympiad account for 60 percent of the world’s economic output.

In robust democracies, elections are taking place as mistrust in government is rising, electorates are bitterly divided and there is a profound and abiding anxiety over economic prospects.

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A ship crossing the Suez Canal toward the Red Sea. Attacks on the Red Sea have pushed up freight and insurance rates.Credit...Mohamed Hossam/EPA, via Shutterstock

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A billboard promoting presidential elections in Russia, which will take place in March.Credit...Dmitri Lovetsky/Associated Press

Even in countries where elections are neither free nor fair, leaders are sensitive to the economy’s health. President Vladimir V. Putin’s decision this fall to require exporters to convert foreign currency into rubles was probably done with an eye on propping up the ruble and tamping down prices in the run-up to Russia’s presidential elections in March.

The winners will determine crucial policy decisions affecting factory subsidies, tax breaks, technology transfers, the development of artificial intelligence, regulatory controls, trade barriers, investments, debt relief and the energy transition.

A rash of electoral victories that carry angry populists into power could push governments toward tighter control of trade, foreign investment and immigration. Such policies, said Diane Coyle, a professor of public policy at the University of Cambridge, could tip the global economy into “a very different world than the one that we have been used to.”

In many places, skepticism about globalization has been fueled by stagnant incomes, declining standards of living and growing inequality. Nonetheless, Ms. Coyle said, “a world of shrinking trade is a world of shrinking income.”

And that raises the possibility of a “vicious cycle,” because the election of right-wing nationalists is likely to further weaken global growth and bruise economic fortunes, she warned.

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A campaign rally for former President Donald J. Trump in New Hampshire in December.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

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A line of migrants on their way to a Border Patrol processing center at the U.S.-Mexico border. Immigration will be a hot topic in upcoming elections.Credit...Rebecca Noble for The New York Times

Many economists have compared recent economic events to those of the 1970s, but the decade that Ms. Coyle said came to mind was the 1930s, when political upheavals and financial imbalances “played out into populism and declining trade and then extreme politics.”

The biggest election next year is in India. Currently the world’s fastest-growing economy, it is jockeying to compete with China as the world’s manufacturing hub. Taiwan’s presidential election in January has the potential to ratchet up tensions between the United States and China. In Mexico, the vote will affect the government’s approach to energy and foreign investment. And a new president in Indonesia could shift policies on critical minerals like nickel.

The U.S. presidential election, of course, will be the most significant by far for the world economy. The approaching contest is already affecting decision-making. Last week, Washington and Brussels agreed to suspend tariffs on European steel and aluminum and on American whiskey and motorcycles until after the election.

The deal enables President Biden to appear to take a tough stance on trade deals as he battles for votes. Former President Donald J. Trump, the likely Republican candidate, has championed protectionist trade policies and proposed slapping a 10 percent tariff on all goods coming into the United States — a combative move that would inevitably lead other countries to retaliate.

Mr. Trump, who has echoed authoritarian leaders, has also indicated that he would step back from America’s partnership with Europe, withdraw support for Ukraine and pursue a more confrontational stance toward China.

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Workers on a car assembly line in Hefei, China. Beijing has provided enormous incentives for electric vehicles.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

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A shipyard in India, which is jockeying to compete with China as the world’s largest manufacturing hub.Credit...Atul Loke for The New York Times

“The outcome of the elections could lead to far-reaching shifts in domestic and foreign policy issues, including on climate change, regulations and global alliances,” the consulting firm EY-Parthenon concluded in a recent report.

Next year’s global economic outlook so far is mixed. Growth in most corners of the world remains slow, and dozens of developing countries are in danger of defaulting on their sovereign debts. On the positive side of the ledger, the rapid fall in inflation is nudging central bankers to reduce interest rates or at least halt their rise. Reduced borrowing costs are generally a spur to investment and home buying.

As the world continues to fracture into uneasy alliances and rival blocs, security concerns are likely to loom even larger in economic decisions than they have so far.

China, India and Turkey stepped up to buy Russian oil, gas and coal after Europe sharply reduced its purchases in the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, tensions between China and the United States spurred Washington to respond to years of strong-handed industrial support from Beijing by providing enormous incentives for electric vehicles, semiconductors and other items deemed essential for national security.

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A protest in Yemen on Friday against the operation to safeguard trade and protect ships in the Red Sea.Credit...Osamah Yahya/EPA, via Shutterstock

The drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea by Iranian-backed Houthi militia are a further sign of increasing fragmentation.

“Even if these conflicts are smaller, they can still affect global supply chains in unexpected ways,” she said. “Geopolitical power is becoming more dispersed,” and that increases volatility.

Uncertainty does have a dampening effect on the economy, though. Businesses tend to adopt a wait-and-see attitude when it comes to investment, expansions and hiring.

With persistent military conflicts, increasing bouts of extreme weather and a slew of major elections ahead, it’s likely that 2024 will bring more of the same.

Patricia Cohen writes about global economics and is based in London. More about Patricia Cohen

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 24, 2023, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: World Economy Faces a Jumble Of Risk in 2024. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

3. He Was Ready to Die, but Not to Surrender

Another incredible story.

He Was Ready to Die, but Not to Surrender

How a Ukrainian soldier escaped from the embattled Azovstal steel complex in Mariupol and sneaked 125 miles to Ukrainian territory.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/24/world/europe/ukraine-mariupol-azpvstal.html

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Pfc. Oleksandr Ivantsov hid for a week before beginning his journey west.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

By Marc Santora

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Dec. 24, 2023,

5:00 a.m. ET

Want the latest stories related to Russia and Ukraine? Sign up for the newsletter Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send them to your inbox.

After seven days hiding in a dank and dark tunnel deep in the bowels of the sprawling Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol as the city burned around him, Pfc. Oleksandr Ivantsov was on the verge of collapse.

President Volodymyr Zelensky had ordered Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their weapons after 80 days of resistance and surrender. But Private Ivantsov had other ideas.

“When I signed up for this mission, I realized that most likely I would die,” he recalled. “I was ready to die in battle, but morally I was not ready to surrender.”

He knew his plan might sound a little crazy, but at the time, he was convinced he had a better chance of surviving by hiding out than by surrendering himself to Russians, whose widespread abuse of prisoners of war was well known to Ukrainian troops.

So he knocked a hole in a wall to get to a small tunnel, stashed some supplies and made plans to stay hidden for 10 days, hoping that the Russians who had taken control of the ruined plant would let down their guard by then, allowing him to creep through the ruins unnoticed and make his way into the city he once called home.

But after a week, he had gone through the six cans of stewed chicken and 10 cans of sardines and almost all of the eight 1.5 liter bottles of water he had secreted away.

“I felt very bad, I was dehydrated, and my thoughts were getting confused,” he said. “I realized that I had to leave because I could not live there for three more days.”

Mr. Ivantsov’s account of his escape from Azovstal is supported by photographs and videos from the city and factory that he shared with The New York Times. It was verified by superior officers and by medical records documenting his treatment after he made it to Ukrainian-controlled territory. Still, his tale seemed so far-fetched that Ukraine’s security services made him take a polygraph test to assure them he was not a double agent

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Mr. Ivantsov shows a photograph of himself at Azovstal. His tale seemed so far-fetched that Ukraine’s security services gave him a polygraph test to assure them he was not a double agent.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Mr. Ivantsov is still fighting for Ukraine, helping a drone unit outside the pulverized city of Bakhmut, where he recalled his story one sunny afternoon. He told it reluctantly, saying he could not share certain details in order to protect the Ukrainian soldiers from Azovstal still being held as prisoners of war and the civilians in the occupied territories who aided in his escape.

Private Ivantsov, 28, was thousands of miles from Ukraine when Russia began its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, working as a maritime security agent assigned to protect ships from Somali pirates on the Gulf of Aden near the Red Sea.

He had lived in Mariupol for eight years, he said, when it was a city on the rise. “They were making roads, parks, an ice palace, swimming pools, gyms,” he said. On March 14, he enlisted in the Azov regiment, a former far-right militia group that had been folded into the Ukrainian military and was leading the defense of the Azovstal plant.

By then, the battle for Mariupol was already securing its place as among the most savage of the war. As the Russians blasted the city into oblivion, thousands of civilians and soldiers barricaded themselves inside the elaborate network of bunkers under the plant, a complex about twice as large as Midtown Manhattan.

As the Ukrainian forces grew more desperate, the military leadership in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, decided to mount a daring operation to fly in support across enemy lines. Private Ivantsov volunteered for the mission, knowing he might never return.

Image

An avenue in Mariupol during the Russian campaign to take the city in April 2022.Credit...Alexander Nemenov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

On March 25, against all odds, his low-flying Mi-8 helicopter eluded Russian antiaircraft batteries and landed inside the factory grounds, delivering desperately needed supplies to the thousands of Ukrainian soldiers holed up there. A total of seven flights would manage to get through in the coming weeks.

But it was not enough. When Private Ivantsov arrived at Azovstal, the soldiers had no ammunition left for many of their heavy weapons and were running low on anti-tank mines and mortars. The civilians were surviving on dwindling rations.

“There were quite a lot of very heavily wounded people who had gangrene,” he recalled. “They were rotting there and slowly dying.”

And every day, the Russian noose around Azovstal was tightening.

On May 16, after it was clear that the Ukrainian soldiers were no longer an effective fighting force, Mr. Zelensky ordered them to surrender.

It would take four days to complete the process, giving Private Ivantsov plenty of time to reconsider his plan. But his mind was made up.

“I told everyone about my decision, and before they left, I shook hands with each of them,” he said of his compatriots, 700 of whom remain in Russian captivity. “Those who had money gave me money.”

On May 20, 2022, the last Ukrainian soldier surrendered and Private Ivantsov went into hiding in the tunnel. In addition to the food and water he had stashed, he had some coffee, tea and sugar, as well as a mattress and a sleeping bag.

Image

A photo provided by the Azov Regiment showing Ukrainian soldiers sheltering inside the steel plant on May 7, 2022.Credit...Dmytro Kozatsky/Azov Special Forces Regiment, via Associated Press

Most important, with Covid still a top concern, the plant was littered with bottles of hand sanitizer.

“It burns very well,” he said. “You can even cook with it.”

Sometimes, he said, he would just stare at the flame. When it went out, he was in total darkness.

“It reminded me of the movie ‘Buried Alive,’” he said.

As the days passed, the once unceasing thunder of bombs raining down on Azovstal was replaced by a disquieting silence.

By the seventh day, running low on water, he knew he had to leave. He changed into civilian clothes, ditched his weapons and ventured out into the factory grounds. Looking up at the sky for the first time in days, he said, he was struck by the brilliance of the stars.

He also observed that the Russian soldiers in control of Azovstal did not bother to hide their positions. “The patrols that went around the factory used flashlights, they talked loudly,” he said.

Private Ivantsov was easily able to avoid them, ducking under railroad cars when one came too close for comfort.

It took six hours, he said, and the sun was rising when he made it into the ruined city. It was hard to put what he saw into words.

“I saw animal bodies, human bodies,” he said. “There were pieces of bodies. An arm could be lying around, a dog could be pulling it somewhere.”

Making it out of Azovstal was only the first step.

“The plan was to go to the neighborhood where I used to live,” Private Ivantsov recalled. “I thought if I saw familiar faces, I would ask them for help: to wash, eat and so on.”

But nothing would go to plan. The city he had known was obliterated. Even the people he had known before the invasion were like strangers. He could not trust anyone.

He quickly realized that his only hope of evading capture was to get out of the city and head west to Ukrainian-controlled territory. He would still need help, and clearly he would have to be careful about whom to ask.

Image

The Azovstal plant patrolled by a Russian soldier in June 2022, in a photograph taken during a visit to Mariupol organized by the Russian military.Credit...Associated Press

“I always looked first to see if I could approach, assess the person,” he said. He would not have survived without the kindness of strangers who helped him, often at great risk.

“In one village, an old woman gave me water from a well to drink,” he said. There were others he would not discuss.

He was captured once while still in the city, he said, refusing to divulge any further details. Reaching the front would take him 18 days, crossing about 125 miles behind enemy lines.

By that point, his feet were bloodied and his back and knees ached so much that he had trouble walking; he had lost more than 25 pounds. When the moment came to cross into Ukrainian territory, he said, he was operating on pure adrenaline.

He thought about crossing a river that presented a natural barrier between the forces, but deemed it too dangerous. He finally decided to just forge ahead through a final 10 to 15 miles overland, past mines and other booby-traps.

“I had nerves of steel, no emotions, no thoughts, just purpose and cold calculation,” he said. “That’s how I mentally psyched myself up. I had already come to terms with my death.”

But he made it, looking wild-eyed and crazy as he struggled to convince stunned Ukrainian soldiers that his improbable story was true.

They eventually believed him, and as he was driven away from the front on his way to Kyiv for medical care and rehabilitation, he stopped at a gas station and bought a coffee and a hot dog.

He had never tasted a better hot dog, he said, or sipped a better cup of coffee.

Image

Mr. Ivantsov is still fighting for Ukraine, in a drone unit outside the pulverized city of Bakhmut.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Marc Santora has been reporting from Ukraine since the beginning of the war with Russia. He was previously based in London as an international news editor focused on breaking news events and earlier the bureau chief for East and Central Europe, based in Warsaw. He has also reported extensively from Iraq and Africa. More about Marc Santora

4. From Patriot Missiles to a Mother and Her Vintage Rifle: Inside Ukraine’s Air Defense

From Patriot Missiles to a Mother and Her Vintage Rifle: Inside Ukraine’s Air Defense

Defending against aerial threats has grown in importance globally, making Ukraine a test bed for air-defense systems

By Alistair MacDonaldFollow and Ievgeniia Sivorka

Updated Dec. 24, 2023 12:01 am ET

HTTPS://WWW.WSJ.COM/WORLD/FROM-PATRIOT-MISSILES-TO-A-MOTHER-AND-HER-VINTAGE-RIFLE-INSIDE-UKRAINES-AIR-DEFENSE-406A2CA2?MOD=WKND_POS1

KYIV, Ukraine—This winter, Ukraine’s defense against Russian missiles and drones ranges from sophisticated, multimillion-dollar U.S. Patriot systems to Svitlana Ruda, a mother of two with a 40-year-old assault rifle.

Russia has started a widely anticipated bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure, repeating a campaign last winter that led to mass blackouts and leveled apartment blocks.

Ukraine is now marshaling the various layers of its air defense, a mix of Soviet-era systems and high-tech Western equipment capable of taking out Russia’s best missiles, alongside groups of volunteers like Ruda who train their sights on the long-range drones that Moscow sends in their dozens.

Over the past week, Russia has launched scores of missiles and long-range drones that have hit civilian areas in some of Ukraine’s largest cities. Ukraine has said rocket, missile and drone attacks have damaged infrastructure and residential buildings, killing civilians.

President Volodymyr Zelensky has told Western leaders that his country needs missile-defense systems more than other weapons. But the U.S. and its allies don’t have large inventories of these systems, which can take years to be manufactured.

The war in Ukraine is a test bed for air-defense systems, which have grown in prominence more broadly as drones widen the airborne threat, and more countries—and militant groups—build up their arsenals of missiles and rockets. Their increased use is also boosting orders for the arms companies that make the systems.

“Nobody said that air defense would win a conflict, but its absence will lose one,” said Tom Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank.

Svitlana Ruda, a mother of two and a member of Mriya, a Ukrainian air-defense unit that works 24-hour shifts to protect cities from Russian drones. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Mriya, a volunteer unit that was formed early in the war, uses a range of dated Soviet-era weapons. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Air defense has been crucial for Ukraine. It has blunted missiles and drone strikes while stopping Russia’s air force from gaining free rein in Ukrainian skies, preventing it from targeting cities and the military at will.

On Friday, Ukraine’s air force said three Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers were downed in the south of the country, in one of its most successful operations against Russian air power since the start of the war.

Last winter, Russia launched around 1,000 missiles and 1,000 long-range drones at cities and infrastructure, according to Yuriy Ihnat, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force. Ukraine shot down around 70% to 75%, he said.

Russia continues to produce missiles despite predictions they would run out. Ukraine’s military intelligence agency estimates that Russia can each month produce about 100 of two different types of cruise missiles, four ultrafast hypersonic ballistic missiles and five ballistic missiles.

Air Defense

Ukraine operates a variety of Western equipment to counter aerial threats.

Select air-defense systems and their ranges

Long range:

Patriot (5 sent)

SAMP/ T (1)

Approximate distance: 60 miles

Medium range:

Nasams (20 sent by the U.S., Lithuania and Norway)

Iris-T (5)

25 miles

Short range:

Stinger (2000 sent by the U.S.)

3 miles

Sources: Congressional Research Service (Nasams); Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (stinger); staff reports

British military intelligence has said it thinks that Russia has been saving its best air-launched cruise missiles for several months to build up a “substantial stock” for a winter campaign.

Aside from simply inflicting damage, Ukrainian and Western officials say that Moscow’s winter offensive is also likely aimed at getting Kyiv to use up its stock of air-defense missiles, giving the Russian Air Force more freedom to strike ground forces.

Russia, which has previously said it doesn’t target civilians, didn’t respond to a request for comment

Even before the war, Ukraine had comparatively well-stocked missile defenses, with 403 land-based systems, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank. Donations from other countries have now taken that figure to around 564, IISS estimates. That compares with just over 1,600 for the rest of Europe combined.

Among Ukraine’s most sophisticated air-defense systems are five long-range Patriot batteries, made by RTX, sent by the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands. Kyiv also has a SAMP/T system, made by European missile specialist MBDA, that was sent by France. Both those Western systems are capable of hitting targets about 60 miles away.

These long-range systems are what Ukraine needs most, according to Philip Breedlove, a retired U.S. Air Force general, who added that the West hasn’t given enough.

“Look at how big Ukraine is and how much they have to defend,” he said.

Russia has started a widely anticipated bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure, repeating a campaign that last winter led to mass blackouts. PHOTO: VALENTYN OGIRENKO/REUTERS

Ukraine has told Western leaders that it needs missile-defense systems more than other weapons, but the U.S. and its allies don’t have large inventories. PHOTO: OLEG PETRASYUK/SHUTTERSTOCK

Most of Ukraine’s Western air-defense systems have middle distance ranges of up to around 25 miles. Those include a number of U.S. Hawk systems, at least 20 Nasams, sent by the U.S., Lithuania and Norway, and at least five of Germany’s Iris-T.

Ukraine’s shorter-distance air defenses include at least 50 Gepards, a tracked radar-operated cannon, and missiles such as the U.S. Stinger and Britain’s Starstreak.

Kyiv also uses Soviet-era long and middle-range systems. While these have been broadly successful, their stock of missiles has been depleted, according to IISS. That has prompted Ukraine and the U.S. to convert some old Soviet launchers to fire Western missiles.

Such an array of different systems could make Ukraine’s air defenses less effective, analysts say. Militaries typically integrate their air defenses.

“You need integrated fire control, so something that controls everything, that says you shoot, you don’t shoot,” said Karako, the Missile Defense Project director.

Many Western systems have been shown to be effective, allowing their manufacturers to trumpet their battlefield successes and win orders.

In September, Germany’s Diehl Defence said that its Iris-T system shot down every one of the 110 mainly cruise missiles that it targeted. Meanwhile, the Patriot has downed several of Russia’s hypersonic missiles, which Moscow has previously said were impossible to defend against.

While not equipped with weapons as sophisticated as pricey, long-range Western missiles, units such as 49-year-old Ruda’s—armed with large-caliber machine guns and assault rifles—also play an important role in countering the aerial threat from a shorter range.

The homegrown teams man machine-gun emplacements on tall buildings and patrol the edges of cities with weapons mounted on pickup trucks, typically targeting drones.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 18 drones in one night. Most of these were taken down by mobile units, Zelensky said in a Telegram post.

A member of Mriya in the Kyiv region. Ukraine’s array of different systems could make its air defenses less effective. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The unit uses a range of vintage weapons, including nearly 100-year-old copies of the British Maxim gun. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

On a recent evening outside of Kyiv, Ruda’s unit—named Mriya, Ukrainian for dream—watched the sky for Shaheds, a type of Iranian drone used by Russia that slams into its target.

Dressed in bulletproof vests and helmets the team works 24-hour shifts, within which members are given time to rest. The team uses night scopes, thermal imagers and tablets that relay a drone’s journey. Still, in one indication of how rudimentary Ukraine’s defense can be in this otherwise high-tech aerial battle, spotlights track the team’s airborne prey—evocative of World War II-era bombing raids.

The unit fires a range of dated weapons, including a 1933-made copy of a British Maxim gun.

Ukraine was originally caught off guard by the profusion of Shahed drones, and as air defenses improved, Russia has adapted its tactics.

“Shahed used to fly in a straight line and now they change direction and come from different sides,” said Serhiy Sas, 67, a former judge who helped put the Mriya unit together early in the war.

Russia has also started painting the drones black to make them harder to spot and covering them in carbon that can deflect radar waves, said Sas and Ihnat, the Air Force spokesman.

In footage of a recent downing by the Mriya unit, a spotlight illuminates the undercarriage of a Shahed before the sky is lit up with tracer fire from several guns. The drone then explodes and cheers can be heard.

Ruda’s Kalashnikov assault rifle was one of the guns that was firing at that drone. But as the debris began to fall she had to take cover. When that threat passed there was little time for celebration.

“The excitement is for a few seconds, because you know there are more coming and you have to be alert,” Ruda said.

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com

5. How TikTok Brings War Home to Your Child

Graphics, photos, and videos at the link.

Would banning TikTok "protect" our children? Or, like the bomber, will the information always get through?

How TikTok Brings War Home to Your Child

The popular app can feed young users a stream of intense, polarized and hard-to-verify videos about the Israel-Hamas war

https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-israel-gaza-hamas-war-a5dfa0ee?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1

By Sam SchechnerFollow

, Rob BarryFollow

, Georgia WellsFollow

, Jason FrenchFollow

, Brian WhittonFollow

and Kara DapenaFollow

Updated Dec. 22, 2023 9:12 am ET

Imagine your 13-year-old signs up for TikTok and, while scrolling through videos, lingers on footage of explosions, rockets and terrified families from the war in Israel and Gaza.

Your child doesn’t search or follow any accounts. But just pausing on videos about the conflict leads the app to start serving up more war-related content.

That’s what happened to a handful of automated accounts, or bots, that The Wall Street Journal created to understand what TikTok shows young users about the conflict. Those bots, registered as 13-year-old users, browsed TikTok’s For You feed, the highly personalized, never-ending stream of content curated by the algorithm.

Within hours after signing up, TikTok began serving some accounts highly polarized content, reflecting often extreme pro-Palestinian or pro-Israel positions about the conflict. Many stoked fear.

Some veered apocalyptic…

…claiming the U.S. “has decided to exterminate all Arab countries”...

…predicting World War 3……or suggesting that the Nile River had run blood red, with a reference to the Biblical end of times.

Dozens of these end-of-the-world or alarmist videos were shown more than 150 times across eight accounts registered by the Journal as 13-year-old users. Some urged viewers to prepare for an attack. “If you don’t own a gun, buy one,” one warns.

While a sizable number of the war-related videos served to the Journal’s accounts supported one side or the other in the conflict, a majority supported the Palestinian view.

Research shows that many young people increasingly get their news from TikTok. In the Journal’s experiment, the app served up some videos posted by Western and Arab news organizations. But they were a minority—about one in seven of the conflict videos. The rest were posted largely by influencers, activists, anonymous accounts, newshounds and the Israeli government.

Some of the accounts quickly fell into so-called rabbit holes, where half or more of the videos served to them were related to the war. On one account, the first conflict-related video came up as the 58th video TikTok served. After lingering on several videos like it, the account was soon inundated with videos of protests, suffering children and descriptions of death.

TikTok’s For You feed of a bot account registered as a 13-year-old

Conflict-related videosOther videos

First video served

Last

TikTok determines what content to serve to users with a sophisticated algorithm keyed on what its users watch, rather than basing it mostly on what accounts users follow or the content they subscribe to, like some other social media. This makes it challenging for researchers and parents to understand the experiences young people have on the popular app.

The bots the Journal used, which paused only on conflict-related videos, provide a glimpse of the content young users may encounter on the app, as well as a test of the guardrails TikTok sets for what videos it shows them—and in what volume.

A spokeswoman for TikTok said the Journal’s experiment “in no way reflects the behaviors or experiences of real teens on TikTok.”

“Real people like, share and search for content, favorite videos, post comments, follow others, and enjoy a wide-range of content on TikTok,” the spokeswoman said in a written statement.

TikTok said that between Oct. 7 and Nov. 30, it removed more than 6.9 million videos with shocking and graphic content, 2.4 million promoting violent and hateful organizations and individuals, 2 million with hate speech and 131,000 with harmful misinformation.

The Journal set one of the accounts to a restricted mode, which TikTok says limits content that may not be suitable for all audiences. That didn’t stop the app from inundating the user with war. Soon after signing up, the account’s feed was almost entirely dominated by vivid images and descriptions of the conflict, which began on Oct. 7, when Hamas militants crossed the border and killed about 1,200 people in Israel.

TikTok’s algorithms are uniquely powerful at picking up which videos get users’ attention and then feeding them the most engaging content on the topic. “You don’t have to doomscroll—you can just sit and watch and let the platform do the rest,” said Emerson Brooking, who studies digital platforms as a resident senior fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council, a think tank based in Washington, D.C.

Most of the videos TikTok served the Journal’s accounts don’t appear to violate the app’s community policies banning promotion of terrorist groups or content that is gory or extremely violent. But hundreds of the videos described death or showed terrified children. Many of them are difficult to verify.

Some showed people that Israel said were kidnapped or murdered by Hamas…

…including one that purported to show pixelated images of children burned to death. TikTok said this video didn’t violate its policies.

Another said it showed “a family that had Hamas terrorists in their home and murdered one of the girls in the next room.” It showed the blurred faces of two crying children, one saying “my sister died” and the other saying “I wanted her to stay” while a voice tells them to “relax, relax.” TikTok later put the video behind a warning and blocked it from being recommended on anyone’s For You feed.

TikTok also served a video that showed children crying, posted by an account the company later banned.

TikTok served the Journal’s accounts hundreds of images of mostly Gazan kids in wartime, describing some as terrified…

…injured…

…or crying.

War-related videos served at least 14 times to the bots are now marked as sensitive and sometimes blocked from being shown to younger users. Hundreds of others were later unavailable on TikTok, either because TikTok removed them or the poster took them down or made them private—but not before they were served to the Journal’s accounts.

“It’s not normal for any adult to see this amount of content, but for kids, it’s like driving 100 miles an hour without any speed bumps, being constantly inundated with demoralizing, emotional content,” said Larissa May, founder of #HalfTheStory, an education nonprofit focused on adolescent digital well-being and the influence of technology on mental health.

TikTok said its family-control features let parents filter out keywords and restrict searches for a child’s account. It also says that since Oct. 7 it has prevented teen accounts from viewing over 1 million videos containing violence or graphic content.

Of the Journal’s eight test accounts, five fell into rabbit holes within 100 videos after the first conflict-related video appeared. (A bot is considered to be in a rabbit hole if more than half of videos—a rolling average that includes the previous 25 and next 25 videos—are conflict-related.) Two others hit that point within the first 250 videos.

TikTok’s For You feed of bot accounts registered as 13-year-olds

After being served a conflict-related video

Conflict-related videos Other videos ▼When rabbit hole starts

First conflict video served250 videos later

Bot 1

Bot 2

Bot 3

Bot 4

Bot 5

Bot 6

Bot 7

Bot 8

One bot didn’t enter a rabbit hole

Similarly to other social-media platforms, much of the war content TikTok served the accounts was pro-Palestinian—accounting for 59% of the more than 4,800 videos served to the bots that the Journal reviewed and deemed relevant to the conflict or war. Some 15% of those shown were pro-Israel.

The spokeswoman for TikTok said the platform doesn’t promote one side of an issue over another.

Topics of conflict-related videos

In TikTok’s For You feed of eight bots registered as 13-year-olds

Pro-Palestinian

Pro-Israel

Neither side

699

1,270

2,851 videos served

Most of the conflict videos served to the minors were pro-Palestinian

A significant number of conflict-related videos, including media reports, didn’t obviously support one side or the other

TikTok served the Journal’s accounts videos from one pro-Palestinian account more than 90 times. The account, @free.palestine1160, has no bio but includes a link to a Qatar-based charity’s fundraising page for emergency relief and shelter in Gaza.

The charity didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Many of the account’s videos featured Gaza-based filmmaker and content creator Bisan Owda describing the human toll of Israeli air strikes and its ground campaign.

Some people in other videos accused Israeli soldiers of taunting Palestinians, including one that showed a screenshot of an Instagram post with a soldier sitting in a chair. The post was later marked on Instagram as having been altered; nearly identical versions of the photo elsewhere online suggest a table and blue graffiti were added.

“What is relevant is the fact that the soldier is proudly sitting in front of what was a civilian’s home. It’s dehumanizing,” said Nuha El-Quesny, who posted the TikTok video.

Some discussed boycotts on Western companies seen as supporting Israel.

One of the largest groups of pro-Palestinian videos showed protests or encouraged viewers to get involved in activism, with some echoing the slogan “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.”

While pro-Palestinian content was more common, the feeds were also interspersed with pro-Israel videos, including dozens from the Israeli military and government.

“I saw little kids who were beheaded. We didn’t know which head belonged to which kid,” an aid worker said in one video TikTok served the accounts. After being seen by a Journal bot, the video was later removed.

One of several videos from the Israeli military’s official account showed infrared footage of the moment it said officials decided not to bomb a building because there were too many civilians nearby.

Many others showed or described people taken hostage into Gaza on Oct. 7. One played a slow piano rendition of “Happy Birthday” for a woman named Noa Argamani, whose kidnapping was caught on video.

A number of videos, often from anonymous accounts, were outright jingoistic. Like one of an American aircraft carrier that said, over a pulsing music beat, “Say bye-bye to Gaza.”

Hundreds of the videos TikTok showed the Journal accounts evoke death without showing it directly. One video described mass graves in Gaza and watching “the bodies of children being stored in ice-cream trucks because the morgues are so full of the dead.”

One woman described her son’s call from the Nova music festival, where Hamas attackers killed hundreds of people.

She said on the phone she could hear her son tell his friends the gunmen were coming back; then she heard gunshots; then silence.

“They’re killing my son as we speak,” she said.

Other videos included messages from people saying they wanted to share a message in case they didn’t survive.

“We don’t know if we’re going to still be alive when there’s sunlight again,” one woman said. She said she and her family were refusing to evacuate Gaza City.

In another, which animates a photo of one of the victims of the Oct. 7 attack, the victim appeared to speak about how he saved lives before being shot. The video was posted to TikTok by an account identified as belonging to the victim’s girlfriend, who didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Videos served nearly 20 times included images of what appear to be bodies in burial shrouds.

Content can still be traumatizing to children even if it isn’t visually graphic.

“No child should be watching video after video of kids in war for hours a day,” May said. “Being hit with this content day after day starts to prune kids’ ability to emote and process what they are seeing, and they just start being apathetic.”

John West contributed to this article.

Sources:

@_emanboost, @theorysphere7, @uncovering_yt, @al_1713, @peace_and_love_foreverrr, @yosephhaddad, @learnarabic_with_naseem, @peace_and_love_foreverrr, @dody_do, @almayadeentv, @free.palestine1160, @devotedly.yours, @yourfavoriteguy, @falasteeenia, @idf, @israelinuk, @user6671134811741, @cbcnews, @hannahewestberg, @jessicamirandaelter, @nhintaodayne

Write to Sam Schechner at Sam.Schechner@wsj.com, Rob Barry at Rob.Barry@wsj.com, Georgia Wells at georgia.wells@wsj.com, Jason French at jason.french@wsj.com, Brian Whitton at brian.whitton@wsj.com and Kara Dapena at kara.dapena@wsj.com

Appeared in the December 22, 2023, print edition as 'What TikTok Shows Youth About the War in Gaza'.

6. Nippon-US Steel deal sparks a knee-jerk backlash

And what if Hanwha Ocean were to buy Electric Boat?

Nippon-US Steel deal sparks a knee-jerk backlash

Nationalistic US politicians wrongheadedly want to block Japanese takeover with the potential to make American steel great again

asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · December 23, 2023

Nippon Steel’s plan to acquire US Steel has triggered an uproar among the US Congress, the United Steelworkers and economic nationalists alarmed by the buyout of an American icon and the US$14.9 billion deal’s potential implications for US employment and the economy.

The reaction has been particularly strong in President Joe Biden’s birth state of Pennsylvania, where US Steel’s headquarters and several plants are located. Senator John Fetterman, a member of Biden’s Democratic Party, issued a populist statement saying:

I live across the street from US Steel’s Edgar Thompson plant in Braddock. It’s absolutely outrageous that US Steel has agreed to sell themselves to a foreign company. Steel is always about security – both our national security and the economic security of our steel communities. I am committed to doing anything I can do, using my platform and my position, to block this foreign sale.

This is yet another example of hard-working Americans being blindsided by greedy corporations willing to sell out their communities to serve their shareholders. I stand with the men and women of the [United] Steelworkers and their union way of life. We cannot allow them to be screwed over or left behind.

Fetterman was joined in opposition to the deal by a bipartisan group of politicians including Senator Bob Casey (Democrat, Pennsylvania), Senator J D Vance, (Republican, Ohio), Senator Josh Hawley (Republican, Missouri), Senator Marco Rubio (Republican, Florida), Congressman Chris Deluzio (Democrat, Pennsylvania) and Pennsylvania State Senator Jim Brewster (Democrat).

Do they have a case? On December 18, Nippon Steel and US Steel announced the signing of an agreement under which Nippon Steel will acquire 100% of US Steel in an all-cash transaction priced at $55 per share, equivalent to an equity value of $14.1 billion, Nippon will also assume US Steel’s debt, bringing the deal’s total enterprise value to $14.86 billion.

The purchase price is nearly 40% above US Steel’s closing stock price on December 15 of $39.33 and 57% more than the rival offer made by iron and steel company Cleveland-Cliffs last August, which valued US Steel at $35 per share.

US Steel’s share price jumped 26% to a 12-year high the day the Nippon transaction was announced and closed at $47.97 on December 22. Nippon Steel agreed to pay about 12 times earnings for US Steel, which is almost twice its own current valuation.

The Wall Street Journal noted, “that by shelling out so much for US Steel, Nippon [Steel] is actually making a bet that the American manufacturing renaissance will succeed, with steel demand heading structurally higher.” But, it continued, “That still won’t stop politicians from taking potshots.”

Cleveland-Cliffs CEO Lourenco Goncalves issued a statement saying:

We identified US Steel as an extremely undervalued company with significant synergy potential when combined with Cleveland-Cliffs, creating a union-friendly American champion among the top 10 steelmakers in the world.

Even though US Steel’s board of directors and CEO chose to go a different direction with a foreign buyer, their move validates our view that our sector remains undervalued by the broader market, and that a multiple re-rating for Cleveland-Cliffs is long overdue. We congratulate US Steel on their announcement and wish them luck in closing the transaction with Nippon Steel.

Closing the deal, however, could be difficult amid the nationalistic backlash. Senator Vance said, “Today, a critical piece of America’s defense industrial base was auctioned off to foreigners for cash.”

For cash plus the assumption of debt, actually, and a lot more than the competing offer. In short, a great deal for US Steel shareholders.

Japan’s Nippon Steel already has a hefty industrial presence in the US. Image: Twitter Screengrab

Nippon Steel’s share price declined after the announcement, dropping more than 5% on December 19. Since the end of November, when word of the transaction may have been circulating, it is down 13%. This raises a question: Is Nippon Steel making an overpriced mistake?

Judging from the reaction of the United Steelworkers, it might be. In both the announcement of the acquisition and its presentation to investors, Nippon Steel emphasizes that all of US Steel’s commitments to its employees and agreements – including collective bargaining agreements – with the union will be honored.

But United Steelworkers International President David McCall has his doubts. “We remained open throughout this process to working with US Steel to keep this iconic American company domestically owned and operated, but instead it chose to push aside the concerns of its dedicated workforce and sell to a foreign-owned company,” McCall said.

“Neither US Steel nor Nippon [Steel] reached out to our union regarding the deal, which is in itself a violation of our partnership agreement that requires US Steel to notify us of a change in control or business conditions,” he said.

“Based on this alone, the USW does not believe that Nippon [Steel] understands the full breadth of the obligations of all our agreements, and we do not know whether it has the capacity to live up to our existing contract,” McCall added.

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Labor has good reason to fear corporate takeovers, but it is American, not Japanese, management that is known for mass lay-offs.

In fact, US Steel’s workforce shrank from 29,000 in 2018, when then-president Donald Trump slapped a 25% tariff on imported steel, to less than 23,000 in 2022. That figure is set to drop by another 1,000 due to the downsizing of the company’s plant in Granite City, Illinois, which was announced on November 28 this year.

All in all, US Steel’s workforce has been slashed by 25% since 2018. Trump’s tariff was supposed to protect American jobs but had the opposite effect, and the union couldn’t and apparently still can’t do anything about it.

Ironically, Dan Simmons, president of United Steelworkers Local 1899, which represents the workers in Granite City, told reporters that “The optimistic side of this [the acquisition] is that Nippon [Steel] was a part of a joint venture back many years ago with National Steel, when I was an employee then and they were a good partner to have.”

Rather than downsizing, Simmons says, “The right decision would be to fire those furnaces back up and make steel again because prices are very good.”

Nippon Steel may do just that. Its rationale for the acquisition includes the attractiveness of the US steel market, where quality standards are high and the rebuilding of manufacturing and infrastructure are expected to support long-term growth in demand.

It also needs to get behind the wall of tariffs first erected by Trump and built out by Biden that is unlikely to be dismantled regardless of who wins the presidential election in November 2024.

Nippon Steel has been operating in the US through joint ventures and largely- or wholly-owned subsidiaries since the 1980s. Wheeling Nippon Steel began as a joint venture with Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel in 1984 and is now a 100%-owned subsidiary.

It was followed by the establishment of Nippon Steel Pipe America, International Crankshaft, the Indiana Precision Forge and Suzuki Garphyttan steel bar and wire companies, Standard Steel (steel wheels) and the steel sheet joint ventures NS Bluescope and AM/NS Calvert, which ArcelorMittal and Nippon Steel bought from ThyssenKrupp in 2014.

Nippon’s acquisition of US Steel, if it is completed, will be its ninth investment in the US. It would add US Steel’s integrated steel mills in the US and Slovakia to those of Nippon Steel in Japan, India, Thailand, Brazil and Sweden. Nippon Steel has downstream operations in China, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Brazil and the US.

The deal would raise Nippon Steel’s total annual crude steel capacity from 66 to 86 million metric tons as calculated using the methodology of the World Steel Association – i.e., the sum of the nominal full production capacity of companies in which it has a 30% or greater equity interest.

Nippon Steel would then vault from 4th to 2nd place in the world steel rankings, overtaking Ansteel and ArcelorMittal to become nearly two-thirds the size of China’s top-ranked Baowu Steel, which has an annual crude steel production capacity of about 130 million metric tons.

The acquisition was unanimously approved by the boards of directors of both companies. It is subject to approval by US Steel shareholders and regulatory authorities, neither of which is expected to oppose the deal.

Nippon Steel plans to fund the transaction primarily through borrowings from Japanese banks, from which commitment letters have already been received. The deal is expected to close in the second or third quarter of 2024.

If US Steel had instead accepted Cleveland-Cliff’s offer, the combined entity would have had a monopoly on blast furnace steel production in the US and a dominant share of the market for steel used in the US motor vehicle industry.

As part of the Nippon Steel Group, the US steel industry will remain competitive. US Steel will retain its brand name and headquarters in Pittsburgh under the deal.

On December 19, Senators Fetterman and Casey and Representative Deluzio sent a letter to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, who is also chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), urging her to block the proposed acquisition. They wrote:

With the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and the CHIPS and Science Act, the United States has acted to make the US market the most competitive in the world and to reshore critical supply chains. Allowing for the ownership of a major industrial participant in infrastructure and clean energy investments to be acquired by a foreign entity would be a step backwards in our commitment to supply chain integrity and economic security.”

We question whether a foreign company that has been found to be dumping steel into the US market at prices below fair market value is the best buyer for US Steel. Of further concern, Nippon Steel has facilities in the People’s Republic of China, a foreign adversary of the US.”

Senators Hawley, Vance and Rubio likewise wrote to Secretary Yellen, saying in a statement:

The transaction was not entered into with US national security in mind… [It] was not the product of careful deliberation over stakeholder interests, but rather the result of an auction to maximize shareholder returns.

Trade protections can and should induce foreign investment that expands domestic production and creates American jobs. This corporate takeover is out of step with those goals. Allowing foreign companies to buy out American companies and enjoy our trade protections subverts the very purpose for which those protections were put in place.

NSC [Nippon Steel Company] does not share US Steel’s storied connection to the United States, and its financial interests are tied into those of Japan. Earlier this year, NSC received more than $3 billion in subsidies from Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. And NSC has even flouted American trade law. As recently as August 2021, NSC was found guilty of unlawfully dumping flat-rolled steel products into the US market.

The world’s leading business dailies have taken issue with these nationalistic views. The Wall Street Journal, for one, criticized both what it sees as a throwback to protectionism and the inability of politicians to distinguish between Japan and China. It asked: “Do they think the Japanese are going to bomb Pearl Harbor?”

US Senator Marco Rubio is among those opposed to the deal. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Stefani Reynolds / Getty Images

The Financial Times, in an editorial entitled “The misguided US backlash against Nippon Steel raises a question of trust,” asks “If Japan does not count as a legitimate buyer of assets in the US, who does?”

Japan’s Nikkei said “US Steel takeover opposition sends the wrong message to Japan” and quotes Joshua Walker, president of the Japan Society, saying that “It sends all the wrong messages. We can’t celebrate Japan as our most important and critical ally and then attack Nippon Steel with the type of xenophobic rhetoric we are seeing.”

All this puts Biden, a self-proclaimed strong supporter of both labor unions and the US-Japan alliance, in a tight spot. In a statement issued by the White House, National Economic Advisor Lael Brainard said:

The President believes US Steel was an integral part of our arsenal of democracy in WWII and remains a core component of the overall domestic steel production that is critical to our national security. And he has been clear that we welcome manufacturers across the world building their futures in America with American jobs and American workers. However, he also believes the purchase of this iconic American-owned company by a foreign entity—even one from a close ally—appears to deserve serious scrutiny in terms of its potential impact on national security and supply chain reliability.

At this point, it seems likely Biden will pass the buck to Treasury’s CFIUS to approve or reject the deal. But the final decision may not be made until June or even September, which will put the US Steel-Nippon deal in a politicized spotlight in the run-up to the November 2024 election in an important swing state.

Follow this writer on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667

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asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · December 23, 2023

7. Think China has a demographic problem? Check out Taiwan

Excerpts:

In this East Asian mix, Taiwan has a more progressive society than China and a less rigid patriarchy than South Korea. It has high numbers of women participating in politics. Voter turnout among women is large, and the current president is a woman: the redoubtable Tsai Ing-wen.

Women in leadership at the local level – the all-important position of mayor – outnumber men. The sex ratio at birth has been skewed in recent history but now seems to have settled into a “within normal” range.

Given the relative advantages women enjoy in Taiwan, especially relative to South Korea, it is worth pondering the possible variables for its particularly low birth rate.

In a comparative study of mental health in Ukraine, Poland and Taiwan during the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war, researchers found post-traumatic stress effects among Taiwan respondents were only slightly lower than in Ukraine, with female gender a significant risk factor.

Vicarious experience of the war, predicated on the anticipation of conflict in their own country, appears to have prompted a high degree of anxiety in Taiwan.

This finding raises the question of whether, in addition to other social forces informing their life choices, Taiwanese live with an undercurrent of concern about the future of their country.

If so, the crisis of national security constituted by the declining birthrate would seem to be part of a vicious cycle, where a lack of security in geopolitical terms is informing decisions about whether or not to marry and have children.

Think China has a demographic problem? Check out Taiwan

Taiwan’s fast-falling birth rate is becoming a national security issue and politician calls to copulate won’t likely turn the tide

asiatimes.com · by Antonia Finnane · December 23, 2023

Christmas is coming to Taipei and the city is at least partially decked out for the season. In Muzha, on the city’s outskirts, the Catholic church has set up a nativity scene. There is as yet no baby in the manger and the scene looks rather forlorn. That’s somehow appropriate for Taiwan, where there is a dearth of actual babies in cradles.

Over the road from the church are two pet-grooming shops, testimony to the changing composition of Taiwanese households. There are more registered cats and dogs in Taiwan than there are children under ten. As the country heads towards its eighth presidential election, to be held on January 13, 2024, it is hitting a new low in births per year.

Taiwan’s fertility rate is one of many things on the minds of the three presidential candidates: front-runner Vice President Lai Ching-te, the candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); close rival Hou Yu-ih, running for the once all-powerful KMT; and Ko Wen-je, candidate for Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), the latest of a series of minor parties to make a splash in the country’s lively electoral landscape.

Ko is a populist who offers disaffected youth an alternative to the two large parties. He effectively politicized the fertility rate when he called a press conference on November 7 specifically to discuss responses to the declining birth rate.

Apart from announcing his own ten-point plan, notable for its novel pregnancy bonus, he took the opportunity to wax sarcastic about Hou’s planned third-child bonus and to attack Lai’s record on related policies.

Taiwan’s birth rate has become such a cause for concern that presidential candidates such as Hou Yu-ih (center left) have announced policies to address it. Photo: AP via AAP via The Conversation / ChiangYing-ying

In response, Lai’s team drew attention to Ko’s long history of misogynistic statements such as “unmarried women are like disabled parking spaces” and “[unmarried women] are causing instability and a national security crisis.”

In fact, all candidates take the problem of the falling birth rate seriously. For three years now, deaths have exceeded births in Taiwan. Only immigration is preventing a real decline in population.

The policies the candidates offer vary more in detail than in substance: the particular amounts of money differ, as do the circumstances under which the money is paid. But in the end, their policies all amount to throwing money at the problem.

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A long-term problem

The fertility crisis has long been a matter of concern in Taiwan. In a perfect illustration of “be careful of what you wish for”, early population planning targets set by the then-dominant KMT were met and then exceeded in the 1980s. The fertility rate dropped below replacement level in 1983 and has never recovered.

It was identified as an issue of national security in Taiwan’s first national security report, issued in 2006. Since then the issue has been consistently in the news, local and international.

It is associated with several negative economic and social indicators: the gradual increase in the burden of the national debt on each individual; the weakening of domestic demand; the reduced supply of labor; the problem of aged care in a super-aged society.

For all these reasons, politicians take the problem seriously. Nonetheless, the fertility rate is a slow burner in Taiwanese politics – it lacks the immediacy of cross-strait relations, widely held to be the main issue in the current political contest.

But there is a meeting point between the two issues. Already many fewer young men are available for military service in Taiwan than there were a decade ago. The air force in particular is low on trained personnel and its fighter pilots are exhausted from the constant need to respond to Chinese jets crossing into Taiwanese air space.

This problem is only to some degree balanced by a parallel problem in China, where the fertility rate (1.45 in 2022) is also in precipitate decline.

On neither side of the Taiwan Strait does anyone have good ideas about how to reverse the fall. Candidates for the election in Taiwan all promise potential parents enhanced financial support while no doubt fully aware of the limited effects of such measures on fertility choices.

In China, President Xi Jinping’s advice to women that they should “play their role in carrying forward the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation” seems even less likely to yield results.

Older people now outnumber the young in Taiwan. Photo: Antonia Finnane, Author provided (no reuse)

Babies? No thanks

Young women in Taiwan tend to explain their preference for pets over babies in terms of financial pressures, particularly the cost of housing. Housing is recognized as a serious problem in Taiwan and all contenders for the presidency are promising to help with housing for couples with children.

But in a society where having children is normatively associated with marriage, being married is generally a prerequisite for enjoying even existing benefits. The fertility rate for married couples in Taiwan is reasonably high, two children being standard. The key question appears not to be why don’t women have children. The question is why don’t women get married?

In Taiwan, as in much of East Asia, marriage avoidance has become a marked phenomenon. In 2021, a mere 50% of young Taiwanese between the ages of 25 and 34 were married.

Of the unmarried group, 70% of the men wanted to get married at some future date. A majority of the unmarried women had no such intention. Similarly, many more unmarried men (61.22%) than unmarried women (42.98%) wanted eventually to have children.

Since housing and raising children are costs for men as well as for women, there is presumably something more to the falling birth rate than simply the financial pressure.

Analyzing the uniformly low and falling birth rates across East Asia, Yen-hsin Alice Cheng argues the problem is grounded in the Confucian cultural bedrock of the region. Family and society are rigidly patriarchal. Workplace organization and wider societal structures are unfavorable to women.

Historical sex ratios at birth reflect, to varying degrees, a default preference for sons, Japan offering the only exception. Government initiatives frequently land on infertile ground, a phenomenon most notable in South Korea where only a small minority of women and a tiny percentage of men have taken advantage of extremely generous parental leave schemes aimed at arresting the declining birth rate.

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In this East Asian mix, Taiwan has a more progressive society than China and a less rigid patriarchy than South Korea. It has high numbers of women participating in politics. Voter turnout among women is large, and the current president is a woman: the redoubtable Tsai Ing-wen.

Women in leadership at the local level – the all-important position of mayor – outnumber men. The sex ratio at birth has been skewed in recent history but now seems to have settled into a “within normal” range.

Given the relative advantages women enjoy in Taiwan, especially relative to South Korea, it is worth pondering the possible variables for its particularly low birth rate.

A rare baby citing in Taiwan. Image: Twitter Screengrab

In a comparative study of mental health in Ukraine, Poland and Taiwan during the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war, researchers found post-traumatic stress effects among Taiwan respondents were only slightly lower than in Ukraine, with female gender a significant risk factor.

Vicarious experience of the war, predicated on the anticipation of conflict in their own country, appears to have prompted a high degree of anxiety in Taiwan.

This finding raises the question of whether, in addition to other social forces informing their life choices, Taiwanese live with an undercurrent of concern about the future of their country.

If so, the crisis of national security constituted by the declining birthrate would seem to be part of a vicious cycle, where a lack of security in geopolitical terms is informing decisions about whether or not to marry and have children.

Antonia Finnane is Professor (honorary), The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by Antonia Finnane · December 23, 2023

8. American Achilles in the War on Terror

A fascinating interview and the application of the classics to modern warfare.

American Achilles in the War on Terror

By John J. Waters

December 22, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/12/22/american_achilles_in_the_war_on_terror_1000343.html

Professor Emily Wilson has achieved celebrity status … for translating Homer.

University students use her work, and it draws leisure readers as well. Beginning with her translation of the Odyssey in 2018 and continuing with the Iliad earlier this year, Wilson has presented as fresh and vivid material that is, admittedly, old and foreign.

For years, the English translations of poets Robert Fagles and Robert Fitzgerald were responsible for passing Homer’s stories into the dreams and imaginations of modern Americans. So successful were the two Roberts that many readers reserved no space on their bookshelves for another scholar’s reading. Wilson’s new translation is worthy, though, and less for her words or ‘blank verse’ than her feel: for the players and their motivations certainly, but more so for their experience of the phenomenon of battle. Her work plumbs how it feels to fight and kill, what warriors seek to achieve through combat, and what a family stands to lose when a husband dons the helmet and marches off to war. Heroism nearly, but not quite, redeems the carnage.

Robert Fitzgerald

Poet / Navy Veteran

Those who have seen war or studied it know how combat produces a cycle of loss and compensation, and fate deals out the portions of life in unfair and unexpected ways. This is one of the themes of the Iliad – how even the greatest warriors in Western civilization fail to reclaim what they lose. “Attempts to repair one loss lead only to more losses,” Wilson writes in her introduction. “Loss can never be recouped.”

The arc of history demonstrates the activity of warfare is always changing; weapons, technology, and troop formations are constantly in flux. But the condition of war, how people experience combat, remains largely unchanged. Rather than discuss the new text in isolation, I asked Professor Wilson to apply her knowledge of the Homeric poems and her own ideas to my observations of people participating in the drama of modern war. What follows is part one of our two-part conversation.

Emily Wilson

Univ. of Pennsylvania

One evening in 2009, Alphonso told a story over beers at Pusser’s in Annapolis. There had been a Taliban ambush on a Marine logistics convoy. Someone he knew was involved. “I hope they jump me,” he said. “I want my share.” What comes to mind, hearing this vignette?

This makes me think of Iliad Book 10. This ambush episode is very unusual in the poem, because most of the fighting in The Iliad takes place during the daylight hours, where warriors confront each other face-to-face. This is fighting at night. Odysseus and Diomedes volunteer to set an ambush of Trojan forces. The sequence shows the importance not just of cleverness and strategy, but also about the kinds of extra glory people can get in special missions. If something unexpected happens and you react just right in the moment, then you get a special kind of glory, as compared to what can be gained in the main campaign. I love Book 10 because it shakes up your ideas about the kinds of terrain where war takes place. The poem as a whole is interested in all different types of warfare, different types of landscape and how the norms of military encounters change in different arenas. Diomedes and Odysseus promise not to harm the Trojan spy, Dolon, then mercilessly kill him and hang up the bloody spoils, the weapons stripped from his body, to honor the goddess Athena, who loves spoils.

Speaking of Alphonso’s “share” … I’m thinking of what Aristotle said about the “banquet of life.” Would Homer have contemplated this idea when he composed the Iliad?

Absolutely. Many of the words that are often translated as fortune or fate literally suggest portion or share—these Greek words literally mean a “part,” as if a portion or share of life. It’s as if there is a whole side of beef that is a quantity of human life and each of us gets a particular portion of it, both how long we get to be alive and also our portion of honor and glory. I think the whole story of Achilles in the Iliad focuses on his disappointment about his tiny portion of life, as the son of a goddess who knows for sure that he will die if he stays to fight at Troy. He wants a portion of honor that compensates him for his small portion of life. The public humiliation he suffers from Agamemnon, when the Greek king takes from Achilles the concubine Briseis, means Achilles has been dishonored, so his already small portion of life is no longer balanced by a large share of glory.

In 2010, Major Aaron Cunningham intoned to his students at the Infantry Officer Course about their reputations. “Your reputation begins right now,” he said. The thought planted among young Marine lieutenants that one’s reputation (as an officer, a Marine) has incalculable value in the military, much more so than in business or private life. Can you trace that idea back to the Iliad?

Well, that is certainly a theme that runs all through the poem. The Greek term most closely analogous to "reputation" is kleos, which suggests what other people hear about you. For warriors, that goal of achieving undying kleos is definitional, and gives mortal heroes the chance to live on after death. You can be known for your physical characteristics, but also in the stories of who you are and how you have performed. Stories people tell can add up to kleos or they can lead you to shame. Great warriors in the Iliad, like Hector and Achilles, are deeply concerned with preserving their kleos, which entails being known as the greatest warrior among their people. Even when his family members and other Greek leaders are telling him to stop fighting and pull back, Hector has to keep going because he wants to secure the greatest kleos, both for his lifetime and after his death.

The Basic School

Quantico, Virginia

You rely on your sergeants and corporals in combat. You rely on anybody who has “done it before.” Having “done it before” is more valuable than all the education, weaponry and preparation—it’s certainly more valuable than personal connections or credentials. Why?

Because if you don’t have experience on the ground, then there is no way you know how to judge events when they are changing fast. This question relates to the representation of different generations of warriors. Start with Nestor, the elder warrior. He has so many speeches about “back in my day” and so forth, which may seem like tedious digressions – but that character is crucial for reminding the listener that this is not the first war. The battles Nestor has participated in, with the Lapiths and Centaurs, are just one mythical precursor, along with the earlier war of Heracles against Troy, and the Theban War, all of which are precursors to the Trojan War in the world of myth. The poem draws attention to the many cities around Troy that Achilles has already sacked, and to the experience of Diomedes who succeeded in sacking Thebes. These allusions remind us that the Greek army has been sacking and campaigning for a long time. When these named warriors convene in their council meetings, discussions center on what kinds of advice matter: from those who have fought the most; or, from those who have theoretical ideas without having tested them? I think The Iliad reminds us that experience matters, but also shows you that you do not win one war by fighting the last one. Nestor’s advice always hinges on “this is how it happened back then, but things are totally different nowadays.” Experience matters but there are still so many unknowns. The poem shows you that how fast things change on the battlefield.

The film Zero Dark Thirty consecrated the killing of bin Laden. The uniforms worn by Navy SEALs who participated in that raid hang in the 9/11 museum at Ground Zero. There have been so many movies about special operators. It seems the poets of our age sing of spec ops derring-do, over and over again. Why?

SEAL Team 6

9/11 Museum

There’s just something so inspiring for people who have (and have never) served in combat to see people so clearly willing to risk their lives for the sake of a mission. I find it inspiring. I have so much admiration for people who put their whole being out there, to have complete skin in the game. That was the case in antiquity as well. Not every war is presented in simple valorizing or heroizing terms. The Iliad digs into the whole of the human spectrum about people but there is a deeper awareness of courage and how it really does matter. Courage makes people more like the gods, who never die, or perhaps humans are sometimes imagined as even greater than gods. The warriors are always conscious that they could be killed, which makes their courage and sacrifice special.

For the foot soldiers who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, though, there were endless patrols, missions and objectives. Tragedies and miracles forgotten or never known. For the foot soldiers, there are no tales of triumph, no heroes in single combat, no majestic treatments from Hollywood or in literature. Why is it disappointing for your exploits to be forgotten?

"The Iliad"

Homer

To have been involved in something that involves so much pain and wounding and not even have the glory of being remembered as a character in the story is terrible. Part of what drives Achilles’ rage is that he wants to be the main character … all the time. The poem primarily focuses on the warrior-leaders and officer class, to use an anachronistic term, but we also have a sense of the common troops who are driven into battle, the kinds of pressure that is put on people who are not the named ones. We know the leading male characters but each of those leading figures brings along nameless men who will not be remembered but are taking just as much risk and fighting the same battles. The poem gives you some tools to understand that single combat between named protagonists is not exactly what war is. We have episodes where we get the name of a character, then, a line or two later, he is dead.

Part of the story of how The Iliad represents the forgotten people is how it represents the women and old people who experience war as pure loss. Women and older people don’t have anything that they can win. The queen of Troy, Hecuba, does have an idea that there is something she could win if her son Hector can ward off the Greek armies, that she stands to win more if Hector succeeds. But for most people in the world of this poem, there's very little to hope for, and even the most minimal hopes, like the hope of survival or freedom, are repeatedly not fulfilled. It’s not that you’re a fool to have any kind of hope but most of the time when people have hope in this poem, it doesn’t work out.

John J. Waters is the author of the postwar novel River City One (Simon and Schuster), and a former deputy assistant secretary of homeland security.

9. The return of US isolationism

Excerpts:

Biden’s foreign policy leadership has largely been a boon for allies and partners around the world. Despite the Afghanistan withdrawal, the subsequent return of the Taliban and the AUKUS rollout that generated concerns from NATO allies in Europe, Biden believes in multilateral institutions. He understands that the United States has built a global order that provides security and prosperity for Americans. That same order has also provided stability, security and prosperity for key allies in the Asia Pacific like Australia.

Biden has steered the United States through a difficult period in global politics. Despite his errors and inherent biases of superpower diplomacy and foreign policy, Biden undoubtedly understands the principles of multilateralism and follows them when he can.

Because Trump is an inherently oppositional figure, his politics are rejectionist. If Biden supports US leadership, multilateral institutions and foreign policy cooperation, Trump will pursue the opposite. While immediate consequences are likely to be worse for US allies in the North Atlantic, partners in the Indo-Pacific should plan for what a Trump presidency might look like, and how they will respond to safeguard their security and prosperity at home.

The return of US isolationism | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Thomas Pepinsky · December 24, 2023

Author: Thomas Pepinsky, Cornell University

The United States is less than a year away from its next presidential election. Although former president Donald Trump faces numerous civil and criminal indictments, he will most likely be the Republican Party’s nominee for the third election in a row. Incumbent President Joe Biden will run for re-election from the Democratic Party, hoping that the country’s strong economic performance will ease voters’ concerns about his age and fitness for office.

The 2024 presidential election campaign comes at a moment of uncertainty in international politics. The United States and China are searching for a new footing, Israel continues its invasion of Gaza in response to Hamas’s terrorist actions and war crimes and Ukraine continues to mount a successful armed resistance to Russia’s illegal invasion. The Indo-Pacific security architecture is also changing, with new initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quad bringing Australia closer to the United States as a central player in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy.

The outlook of a second Trump presidency for US allies in the Asia Pacific is grim. Trump has a serious chance of being re-elected. He is the face of the Republican Party, and current polling shows Trump neck-and-neck with Biden. Although horserace polls this far in advance of the election are notoriously unreliable, the signals they are sending should not be ignored.

Trump’s second term may well be more extreme than his first term. Trump’s central policy concerns are domestic, driven by his belief that he will face a lengthy prison sentence if convicted of even a subset of his crimes. But he also understands that his political supporters would gleefully endorse dictatorial methods if used against Democrats, progressives, Muslims, immigrants, or their allies.

Trump has reportedly pledged to appoint loyal supporters to positions that have traditionally been nonpartisan and professionalised. He allegedly plans to surround himself with sycophants who will implement his most dangerous ideas about how to use federal power to crush his perceived enemies at home.

Unlike during his first term, Trump understands now that his personal fate depends on his ability to act decisively against core US institutions. This is not a secret, this is his campaign platform. He has a political team that will enable him to do this as soon as he takes office. Having failed on 6 January 2021 to overturn American democracy from the outside through seditious conspiracy, he will try to overturn it from the inside, using executive power.

Because the federal government is central to US diplomacy, defence and foreign policy, such actions will reverberate far beyond US borders. Given Trump’s fondness for Russian President Vladimir Putin, his willingness to sacrifice Ukrainian national security for his personal benefit and the decline of the moderate internationalist Republicans in Congress, many options are on the table for US policy in Europe. They include a unilateral withdrawal from NATO and a permanent end to military support for Ukraine. This focus on NATO and Russia means that the United States’ European allies stand to lose the most from Trump’s second presidency.

Trump is similarly uncommitted to maintaining the status quo security architecture in the Asia Pacific. Yet it is not clear how much he understands or cares about the region beyond his casual anti-Chinese rhetoric and curiosity about Kim Jong-un. Trump’s relative indifference to Asia suggests that US allies in the Indo-Pacific may not fare as poorly under a second Trump administration as European allies, but uncertainty itself is a threat to the regional strategic order.

Although the emerging Hamas–Putin partnership complicates Trump’s Middle East policy, Trump will likely align himself with segments of the Israeli society that seek a maximalist solution to the conflict. This solution may include a permanent reoccupation of Gaza, even more settler violence in the West Bank, massive and permanent displacement of Palestinian civilians and a decisive end to the fragile status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Any one of these outcomes would strain US alliances. There is no appetite for more dead civilians and the settler movement has no durable support outside of Israel.

Biden’s foreign policy leadership has largely been a boon for allies and partners around the world. Despite the Afghanistan withdrawal, the subsequent return of the Taliban and the AUKUS rollout that generated concerns from NATO allies in Europe, Biden believes in multilateral institutions. He understands that the United States has built a global order that provides security and prosperity for Americans. That same order has also provided stability, security and prosperity for key allies in the Asia Pacific like Australia.

Biden has steered the United States through a difficult period in global politics. Despite his errors and inherent biases of superpower diplomacy and foreign policy, Biden undoubtedly understands the principles of multilateralism and follows them when he can.

Because Trump is an inherently oppositional figure, his politics are rejectionist. If Biden supports US leadership, multilateral institutions and foreign policy cooperation, Trump will pursue the opposite. While immediate consequences are likely to be worse for US allies in the North Atlantic, partners in the Indo-Pacific should plan for what a Trump presidency might look like, and how they will respond to safeguard their security and prosperity at home.

Thomas Pepinsky is Walter F LaFeber Professor of Government and Public Policy and Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University.

eastasiaforum.org · by Thomas Pepinsky · December 24, 2023

10. Congress, Pentagon at odds over Pacific task force needed to prep for China war

Are we talking about nuclear, conventional, political, or irregular warfare? Are we effectively preparing for the most likely and most dangerous forms of warfare?

Perhaps INDOPACOM is too big for one command?

Perhaps we need a command to deal with the conventional war in Taiwan (or a JTF) as Capt Fannell recommends). But should thes same command or task forces deal with the political and irregular warfare that is currently being conducted (nuclear and conventional warfare are currently not being conducted).

Do we need a command or task force to fight the war we are in with separate commands or task forces to prepare for the other forms of warfare that might take place in the future?

Excerpts:

Retired Navy Capt. James E. Fanell, a former Pacific Fleet intelligence chief, said he spent several years working with the Pacific Fleet-led Joint Task Force 519, which operated from 1999 until it was disbanded in 2015.

Eliminating the joint task force, he said, “may have been the biggest organizational mistake the Defense Department has ever made in Asia.”

“It essentially flushed 15 years of true, joint task force coordination and collaboration amongst the four services in the Indo-Pacific in ways that have not been replicated,” Capt. Fanell said.

The lack of a joint task force within Indo-Pacific Command focused on a PLA invasion of Taiwan makes no sense, he said.

Currently, a combined forces command led by a four-star officer operates on the Korean Peninsula, and a three-star commander of U.S. forces in Japan directs defense efforts related to Japan.

“So how is it possible that there is not a dedicated four-star-led joint task force for the most likely and most dangerous scenario in the Indo-Pacific: a [Chinese] invasion of Taiwan?” Capt. Fanell said.

Congress, Pentagon at odds over Pacific task force needed to prep for China war

Indo-Pacific Command sidesteps legally mandated headquarters with smaller Guam force

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, Chinese naval frigate Binzhou takes part in joint naval drills with Russian warships in the East China Sea on Dec. 27, 2022. The head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said Monday, Dec. … In this photo released by Xinhua … more >

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, December 20, 2023

Congress and the Pentagon are battling over a legal requirement to create a joint military task force in the Pacific needed for a possible conflict with China, but lawmakers and congressional aides say the military is slow-rolling the mandate with a lesser force.

A provision of last year’s National Defense Authorization Act called on the Hawaii-based Indo-Pacific Command to create a joint force headquarters as an “operational command” by October 2024. The provision also required the Pentagon to report to Congress on plans for the joint force headquarters by June 2023.

Supporters in Congress argued that the plan is a needed first step in what lawmakers from both parties expect will be a multiservice and multinational task force under the Indo-Pacific Command.

Congress has yet to see the report, and the Indo-Pacific Command has set up a Joint Task Force-Micronesia, a lesser force that critics say is mainly designed to improve military air traffic control on Guam and falls far short of the mandate for a joint warfighting force.

Joint task forces are military units that combine forces from the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force into one unit and, in some cases, can include officers from foreign military services. They are often created to prepare for combined arms warfare, a U.S. military specialty.

The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party first disclosed the brewing political battle over the task force in May. The committee issued a report on what it views as needed steps to deter China from attacking Taiwan.

One recommendation said the Pentagon must “fully implement” legislation on a standing joint force headquarters “focused on crisis contingency command and control.”

“In a crisis, critical time could be lost adjudicating which organization or senior leader is in charge of the day-to-day conduct of various coalition operations,” the committee report said. “This type of planning should be done in peacetime, ideally with the inclusion of personnel from key allies like Japan and Australia.”

The Biden administration is said to oppose the major joint task force as too provocative in light of its renewed engagement policy with Beijing. Policymakers are said to regard the creation of a combat-oriented joint task force led by a four-star officer as upsetting relations with China.

Pentagon leaders, including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, have sought to dismiss warnings from senior U.S. military officers that a conflict with China could erupt over Taiwan or from a military mishap in the South China Sea in the next several years.

Mr. Austin and defense policy aides insist that war with China is neither imminent nor inevitable.

A Pentagon spokesman said recently in response to congressional worries over a lack of effort by the Pentagon to deter China from attacking Taiwan that U.S. and allied deterrence of a Chinese attack is “real and strong.”

The Indo-Pacific Command did not respond directly when asked whether a joint task force to prepare for a China conflict would be created.

Navy Cmdr. Matt Comer, a spokesman for Indo-Pacific Command, said the Guam force will meet the legal requirement.

“We are currently identifying personnel for Joint Task Force-Micronesia, which should reach initial operational capability in early 2024, ahead of timeline, meeting the obligations as set out in the [fiscal year National Defense Authorization Act],” he said in a statement.

Delay and the law

Rep. Michael Gallagher, a Wisconsin Republican who chairs the Select Committee on the CCP, said the Pentagon failed to meet its legal obligation to fulfill a bipartisan legislative mandate.

“The Pentagon’s delay in delivering a statutorily mandated plan for how it will implement the fiscal year 2023 NDAA’s requirement for a joint force headquarters in the Indo-Pacific does not inspire confidence,” Mr. Gallagher told The Washington Times.

“We need a permanent joint task force or joint force headquarters that is responsible for the operational employment of forces in the western Pacific. It needs to be at the four-star level, and it needs to include military staff from key allies like Australia and Japan,” Mr. Gallagher said.

Any implementation plan less than that “will miss the mark,” he added.

Sen. Roger F. Wicker of Mississippi, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Mr. Austin is “not moving at the speed of relevance” to create the joint force headquarters.

“I appreciate the Indo-Pacom commander’s intent to build out Joint Task Force-Micronesia as an interim step, but the secretary of defense has simply ignored the underlying law,” Mr. Wicker said. “The Pentagon’s failure to follow through on this legal requirement is bewildering, especially during a moment where [Chinese President] Xi Jinping just signaled again that China eventually intends to take Taiwan.”

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, Alabama Republican, said deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan is the greatest current task.

“Just today, we learned that Xi Jinping told President Biden of his plans to take Taiwan,” Mr. Rogers said.

He said he is concerned about the Pentagon’s failure to fully deliver on last year’s requirements to provide information on the establishment of an Indo-PACOM joint force headquarters.

“The FY24 NDAA includes a provision requiring DoD to finally deliver an implementation plan to Congress,” he said.

Mr. Xi told President Biden last month during a meeting in California that he was unaware of People’s Liberation Army attack plans for Taiwan but then outlined Beijing’s conditions for using military force to take over.

If Mr. Austin needs more resources to meet the legal requirement, “Congress stands ready to work with the Pentagon,” Mr. Wicker said.

Members of Congress and aides expressed puzzlement at the Pentagon’s opposition to the joint task force mandate. They noted that a key advocate was Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks.

When she was a military analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ms. Hicks co-authored a 2016 report on rebalancing forces to Asia that called for a joint task force in Asia.

That report said U.S. leaders must bolster regional security with allies by “forming a standing joint task force for maritime security.”

A Pentagon spokesman deferred comment on the controversy to Indo-Pacific Command. The spokesman declined to comment on whether Ms. Hicks supports the creation of a joint task force in the Pacific as recommended in her 2016 report.

Service rivalries

The House select committee’s recommendation for a larger task force was based on what the report said is the need to improve command and control for military operations in the Indo-Pacific.

Lawmakers are concerned that the U.S. military services within the command are battling for leadership roles in future conflicts.

The Navy has dominated the Indo-Pacific theater for decades because of the great expanses of ocean covered by the command.

The Army in the Pacific, led by Gen. Charles Flynn, has been promoting that service as a critical player in any major Asian conflict. Air Force generals also have been seeking a greater role for air power in the region.

The budding rivalries among the services drove members of Congress to seek a joint task force that could iron out differences and develop clear lines of authority and communication.

The select committee report said setting up Joint Task Force Micronesia on Guam and surrounding areas was vital.

Still, the committee said, “It is unclear if the department is on track to resolve the problem that Congress intended to solve in [the bill], which was about establishing a crisis response chain of command.”

The report said the Pentagon was required to inform Congress within six months of enactment into law in December 2022 on plans to set up “a fully equipped, empowered, and standalone joint force headquarters or joint task force in peacetime.” The panel also recommended that the Pentagon be required to explain how the joint task force will employ forces in the western Pacific in a conflict, the report said.

The Pentagon has been “slow-rolling” the creation of the task force for years, a congressional aide said.

“Getting Guam up and running and facilitating the Guam buildup is totally different from a wartime command and controller who is day in and day out … prepping for that war fight in peacetime so that you could ideally deter that conflict from happening in the first place,” the aide said.

Defense Department leaders appear to oppose congressional pressure, but members view the effort as proper oversight, the aide said.

The current National Defense Authorization Act awaiting President Biden’s signature contains language directing Mr. Austin and Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, to provide Congress with a briefing in the next three months on progress in creating a joint task force. The required briefing would include an assessment of how the task force will function as a “fully equipped and persistent joint force headquarters that would be responsible for the operational employment of forces in the Western Pacific” — a different role than that of the current JTF-Micronesia.

The briefing also would have to explain how JTF-Micronesia fulfills the 2023 law and whether an additional joint task force or joint force headquarters should be created for “operational employment of forces in the Western Pacific,” the conference report states.

A separate defense bill provision requires a study on improving the command structure and force posture in the Indo-Pacific region, another sign of congressional concerns over unclear lines of authority.

That provision would withhold certain defense funds until Mr. Austin submits the required joint force headquarters plan that was due to Congress in June.

Retired Navy Capt. James E. Fanell, a former Pacific Fleet intelligence chief, said he spent several years working with the Pacific Fleet-led Joint Task Force 519, which operated from 1999 until it was disbanded in 2015.

Eliminating the joint task force, he said, “may have been the biggest organizational mistake the Defense Department has ever made in Asia.”

“It essentially flushed 15 years of true, joint task force coordination and collaboration amongst the four services in the Indo-Pacific in ways that have not been replicated,” Capt. Fanell said.

The lack of a joint task force within Indo-Pacific Command focused on a PLA invasion of Taiwan makes no sense, he said.

Currently, a combined forces command led by a four-star officer operates on the Korean Peninsula, and a three-star commander of U.S. forces in Japan directs defense efforts related to Japan.

“So how is it possible that there is not a dedicated four-star-led joint task force for the most likely and most dangerous scenario in the Indo-Pacific: a [Chinese] invasion of Taiwan?” Capt. Fanell said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

11. Pacific Power Play: Japan’s Defense Overhaul And South Korea’s Global Arms Ascent – Analysis

Can both be partners in the Arsenal of Democracy?

Excerpts:

In a significant shift from its historical military pacifism, Japan published a new national security strategy in December 2022, overturning six decades of tradition. However, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that the country remains committed to a self-defense posture. The report from Japan’s Defense Ministry identifies China as its “greatest strategic challenge.” Kishida has further emphasized the importance of acquiring a “counterstrike capability” to effectively deter potential attacks from China.

As Japan redefines its defense posture, South Korea emerges as a noteworthy player in the global arms market. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s ambitious goal of positioning South Korea among the world’s top four weapons suppliers is backed by substantial achievements. From being ranked as the ninth-largest arms exporter globally to experiencing a remarkable 74% surge in arms sales from 2018-22, South Korea’s endeavors to strengthen its defense industry’s export-driven characteristics are bearing fruit. With a focus on economic value, increased employment, and long-term competitiveness, South Korea’s success in arms exports, projected to continue in 2023, highlights the nation’s evolving role in shaping regional security dynamics. Together, these developments underscore the dynamic nature of militarization in the Pacific, influencing the strategic calculus of nations in response to evolving security challenges.

Pacific Power Play: Japan’s Defense Overhaul And South Korea’s Global Arms Ascent – Analysis

By Syed Raiyan Amir

eurasiareview.com · December 23, 2023

The geopolitical landscape in the Pacific is undergoing a significant transformation as nations like Japan and South Korea navigate complex security challenges through substantial increases in defense spending and strategic policy shifts. In Japan, the approval of a 16.5% surge in defense spending for the fiscal year 2024, coupled with the Defense Buildup Program, reflects a decade-long commitment to fortifying national security in the face of escalating threats from China, North Korea, and Russia.

This comprehensive plan encompasses key pillars such as stand-off defense capabilities, air and missile defense, and sustainable maneuvering and deployment capabilities. Concurrently, Japan’s relaxation of arms export restrictions signals a departure from historical norms, allowing for the shipment of domestically produced weaponry, including Patriot air defense missiles, to allies like the United States.

Japan has given approval for a 16.5% increase in defense spending for the fiscal year 2024, marking a new record for the tenth consecutive year in its pursuit of the Defense Buildup Program. The approved budget of 7.95 trillion yen ($55.9 billion) is aimed at addressing heightened military threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, within what Tokyo describes as the “most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.”

This increase, inclusive of U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses, amounts to a significant 16.5% rise, totaling $7.92 billion compared to the current fiscal year. The budget plan, set to be passed by the bicameral legislature in the coming months, is the second year of the Defense Buildup Program, which outlines a five-year period with a total defense spending of $302 billion through fiscal year 2027. The plan focuses on seven key pillars to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, including stand-off defense capabilities, comprehensive air and missile defense, unmanned asset defense, cross-domain operational capabilities, command and control functions, maneuvering and deployment capability, and sustainability.

Under the stand-off defense capabilities pillar, the Ministry secured funds to develop homegrown stand-off missiles, including an upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense system is set to receive $8.77 billion for addressing new aerial threats, with allocations for the next-generation fighter program, a medium-range air-to-air guided missile, and the procurement of additional F-35A and F-35B fighter aircraft. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is allocated substantial funds, including $2.62 billion for two Aegis system-equipped vessels and $1.22 billion for two New FFM multirole frigates. The new frigates, totaling 12, will succeed the Mogami-class and feature improved capabilities, longer-range missiles, and enhanced anti-submarine capabilities.

The JMSDF also earmarked $298 million to modify its Izumo-class helicopter carriers into aircraft carriers capable of supporting Lockheed Martin F-35B fighter operations. The transformation is expected to be completed by fiscal year 2027. Meanwhile, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) focuses on strengthening security in the Nansei Islands, particularly in response to potential contingencies with China. A budget of $121.6 million is allocated to procure three maneuverable boats for swift and reliable transportation in the event of an invasion of Japan’s southwestern islands. Despite challenges such as the depreciation of the yen and rising prices, officials emphasize that there will be no reduction in the number of major weapons and equipment for fiscal year 2024, based on the Defense Buildup Program outlined in December 2022.

Japan has relaxed restrictions on arms exports, allowing the shipment of domestically produced missiles and artillery to countries, including the United States, as part of a significant policy overhaul—the most extensive in nearly a decade. The move, announced on December 22, 2023, coincides with the cabinet’s approval of a record increase in defense spending for the next year, surpassing 16 percent, reaching $56 billion. This decision comes amid escalating security tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.

The amended regulations permit Japan to export Patriot air defense missiles to the United States, a move considered pivotal in reinforcing the Japan-US alliance. While restrictions still prohibit the export of weapons to nations at war, the adjustment facilitates the United States in providing additional military aid to Ukraine. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi emphasized the significance of the policy change, stating that it not only enhances Japan’s security but also contributes to peace and stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

On December 22, 2023, the cabinet’s approval of the 2024 defense budget of 7.95 trillion yen aligns with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s objective to double defense spending to 2 percent of the gross domestic product by 2027, following the NATO standard. This budget increase supports the deployment of long-range cruise missiles capable of targeting China and North Korea. Japan’s motivation for this substantial defense expansion stems from concerns over China’s military ambitions, heightened by the Ukraine war and the potential threat to Taiwan.

North Korea’s missile launches and the prospect of future nuclear tests have also contributed to Tokyo’s decision to bolster defense spending. This shift in policy represents a departure for Japan, traditionally adhering to a stance against exporting lethal weapons, and signifies a break from its post-World War II principle of restricting the use of force to self-defense. Notably, the Patriot missile defense system, produced in Japan under license from U.S. companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, is among the weaponry supplied to Ukraine by the West.

Previously limited to exporting only components, the revised guidelines now permit the export of completed products to countries where patent holders are based, with re-exports to third countries requiring Tokyo’s permission. The ruling party has contemplated these changes for months, considering potential obstacles in exporting next-generation fighter jets developed with Britain and Italy. Additionally, there are reports of Japan considering the export of 155mm artillery shells, produced under a license from BAE Systems, to the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile, in the previous year, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol publicly set an ambitious objective of becoming one of the world’s top four weapons suppliers, following the United States, Russia, and France. While this goal might have seemed challenging just a few years ago, recent substantial deals between Seoul and its domestic arms industries have made it appear more attainable.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked South Korea as the ninth-largest arms exporter globally for the period 2018-22. Among the top 25 exporters, South Korea and China were the only two Asian nations. Notably, South Korean arms sales experienced a remarkable 74 percent surge in the five-year span from 2018-22 compared to 2013-17. The South Korean government initiated efforts in the late 2000s and early 2010s to bolster the export-driven nature of the country’s defense industry.

Kim Jae Yeop, Senior Researcher at the Sungkyun Institute for Global Strategy in Seoul, explained that these endeavors aimed not only to generate significant economic value, such as increased employment and profits for the Korean defense industry, but also to enhance its long-term competitiveness amid fierce global competition among numerous arms suppliers. These efforts appear to be yielding positive results, with Kim characterizing 2022 as a year of “unprecedented success for arms exports to foreign markets.” Defense exports in the past year reached $17.3 billion, more than doubling the $7.25 billion achieved in 2021. The trajectory is expected to continue upward in 2023, attributed to the sale of fighters to Malaysia, ground vehicles to Australia, and a rumored air defense system sale to Saudi Arabia.

Previously on August 31st, Japan’s Defense Ministry made a request for an approximately $53 billion budget for its upcoming defense fiscal year. This marks a record-breaking 13 percent increase and is the 12th consecutive annual rise in budgetary requests. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida explained that this substantial spending boost is part of a comprehensive five-year plan amounting to nearly $295 billion, aimed at fortifying Japan’s defense capabilities in response to escalating threats in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite a long-standing self-imposed cap of 1 percent of GDP, Japan aspires to allocate 2 percent of its GDP to defense spending. Within this year’s budget proposal, over $5 billion is earmarked for the development of a fleet of standoff missiles, nearly $9 billion is allocated to enhance the nation’s air and missile defense systems, and approximately $500 million is invested in next-generation fighter jets through a broader agreement with the United Kingdom and Italy.

In a significant shift from its historical military pacifism, Japan published a new national security strategy in December 2022, overturning six decades of tradition. However, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that the country remains committed to a self-defense posture. The report from Japan’s Defense Ministry identifies China as its “greatest strategic challenge.” Kishida has further emphasized the importance of acquiring a “counterstrike capability” to effectively deter potential attacks from China.

As Japan redefines its defense posture, South Korea emerges as a noteworthy player in the global arms market. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s ambitious goal of positioning South Korea among the world’s top four weapons suppliers is backed by substantial achievements. From being ranked as the ninth-largest arms exporter globally to experiencing a remarkable 74% surge in arms sales from 2018-22, South Korea’s endeavors to strengthen its defense industry’s export-driven characteristics are bearing fruit. With a focus on economic value, increased employment, and long-term competitiveness, South Korea’s success in arms exports, projected to continue in 2023, highlights the nation’s evolving role in shaping regional security dynamics. Together, these developments underscore the dynamic nature of militarization in the Pacific, influencing the strategic calculus of nations in response to evolving security challenges.

eurasiareview.com · December 23, 2023

12. How The Mongols Actually Conquered The World

Some history to consider on a Sunday.

How The Mongols Actually Conquered The World

ranker.com · by Erich B. Anderson

Erich B. Anderson

Updated December 1, 20234.4K votes924 voters80.9K views

Throughout the 13th century, the group of nomadic tribes known as the Mongols unified under a single ruler and proceeded to carve out the largest empire the world had ever seen. From the Danube River in Europe to all the way across Asia up to the Pacific Ocean, the highly mobile warriors overcame empires, kingdoms, and states they encountered until they eventually ruled over an enormous number of people.

The formidable ruler, Genghis Khan, started the impressive conquest, but it did not end with him. After his demise, the khan’s heirs successfully continued to subdue adversaries on their borders and then managed to maintain their control over the gigantic empire for 100 years. To achieve this, the Mongols not only relied on their revolutionary military tactics, but also established very effective methods to rule over so many different cultures.

Photo: Sayf al-vâhidî et al / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain
1
625 VOTES

Mongol Civil And Military Administration Was Based Solely On Merit

Once the Mongols had conquered a region, they often destroyed the previous power structure that had existed and got rid of all titles that were inherited, according to Beverly May Carl in "The Laws of Genghis Khan." These actions removed nearly all of the old nobles, replacing them with new government officials who achieved their positions from their accomplishments and were then fiercely loyal to the Mongol regime. Within this unorthodox system, even lowly shepherds and camel boys could become generals if they had the necessary skills and ability. This system allowed the most capable to rise to the top, in stark contrast to other medieval powers where promotion rested on family ties. For most powers, competence was rare but for the Mongols it was the rule, genius was expected of every commander.
Genghis also decreed that all future khans were to be elected to their position, which meant that even members of his own family were subject to the practice of meritocracy. If any individual, regardless of their lineage, attempted to seize power without winning the vote, they could be charged with a capital offense.
625 votes
Photo: Rachid Ad-Din / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain
2
550 VOTES

Mongol Religious Indifference Prevented Uprisings And Unhappiness On Religious Grounds

The Mongols had their own religion centered on the forces of nature, but unlike other groups, such as the Christians and Muslims, they did not feel obligated to spread their own beliefs to the people they conquered. So, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and every other type of worship was permitted throughout the empire without persecution.
The various religious leaders living under Mongol rule were also highly respected with exemptions from public service and taxation. And even though they were treated the same as every other enemy before they were conquered, priests, monks, nuns, mullahs, and all other religious officials were protected under Mongol law once they had submitted to the conquerors.
550 votes
Photo: Sayf al-vâhidî et al. / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain
3
440 VOTES

The Mongols Used Terror Tactics So Effectively That Armies And Cities Were Afraid To Face Them

The Mongols wanted a wave of terror to sweep through any territory before they conquered it because it was way easier to take cities freely given to them out of fear of the consequences. To achieve this goal, when the nomadic warriors defeated defiant foes, they annihilated almost the entire population, including women, children, priests, and even the cats and dogs.
The Mongols then permitted a few survivors to escape and spread the word of the atrocities committed against those who try to stand against them. Since clemency was often given to those who surrendered right away, many increasingly chose that preferred option.
440 votes
Photo: unknown / (of the reproduction) Staatsbibliothek Berlin/Schacht / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain
4
398 VOTES

Their Battlefield Logistics Allowed Greater Mobility Than Any Other Army Of The Time

Extensive preparation was crucial to any Mongol campaign, so the nomadic warriors relied upon a wide network of spies to gather intelligence on the enemy’s whereabouts before any encounter. Furthermore, Mongol scouts could travel up to 70 miles ahead of their troops to ensure that their armies were never ambushed or cut off from the rest of their forces.
Combining these tactics with their smaller armies allowed the nomadic warriors to attack their adversaries from three or more fronts simultaneously. And then, when necessary, the armies concentrated their forces to assault one key target.
398 votes
Photo: Abraham Cresques, Atlas catalan / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain
5
460 VOTES

The Silk Road Allowed The Entire Mongol Empire To Remain Well Connected

Even though the Silk Road trade routes had existed long before the Mongols carved out their empire, much of the territory they crossed over had become dangerous and had fallen out of use for the most part. The Mongols changed this by protecting the vital routes across all their land and then strongly encouraging trade as an excellent source of tax revenue, according to Crash Course World History.
In fact, the Silk Road became so safe under Mongol rule that it was said a person could travel from one end of the empire to the other with a gold plate on his head without any fear of getting assaulted. As a result of this security, not only did trade flourish, but knowledge, religion, and all sorts of cultural ideas and innovations also spread freely from east to west and vice versa.
The Mongols also created the Yam system, which was a series of way stations across the empire where riders could rest and get fresh horses in between long trips. This allowed information to spread very quickly even though the empire was so vast.
460 votes
Photo: Sayf al-Vâhidî. Hérât. Afghanistan / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain
6
462 VOTES

Mongols Outmaneuvered Almost Any Other Army They Faced

Even though the Mongols certainly used infantry from their allied contingents, the nomadic warriors themselves fought predominately as highly mobile light cavalry, according to HistoryNet. Using their bows, the Mongols attacked from a distance that was usually far enough away to be out of reach of their foe’s weapons. With these hit-and-run tactics, the horsemen could inflict heavy damage on their enemies while minimizing their own casualties and could even fire back on their pursuers behind them when running away with a technique famously called the “Parthian shot.” Once the Mongols had eventually whittled down the enemy forces enough and broke their cohesion, the nomads moved in to fight in close combat.
In strategic terms, since the ability to outmaneuver opponents was of the utmost importance, Mongol armies were relatively small in order to move as fast as possible. The cavalry was divided into contingents of 10,000 men called tumens, and in most cases, these divisions operated independently so that they could each achieve their own objectives. Occasionally, tumens combined to form larger armies for bigger battles, but it was extremely rare for there to be more than three of these divisions in one army. A major disadvantage of fighting this way meant that the Mongols were often outnumbered, but their incredible speed usually made up for this.
462 votes

ranker.com · by Erich B. Anderson

13. Russia’s Own Troops Are Being Blown Up By Low Quality Artillery Ammo From North Korea

Can we exploit this?

Russia’s Own Troops Are Being Blown Up By Low Quality Artillery Ammo From North Korea

kyivpost.com

Just last month Russian troops were pictured thanking North Korea for the artillery shells. That sentiment may well have now changed.

by Kyiv Post | December 23, 2023, 4:30 pm |

Photo: illustrative.

Russia’s increasing reliance on artillery ammo from North Korea is causing serious problems as its low quality means some shells are tearing gun barrels apart and injuring gunners, Ukraine’s military has said.

In a post on Facebook, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, said the problem was particularly rife among troops of the “Dnepr" grouping of forces operating around the southern Kherson region where they are battling a Ukrainian bridgehead.

He said: “Due to insufficient ammunition of their own production, Russian occupation troops are forced to use low-quality artillery and mortar attacks supplied from North Korea.

“Due to the unsatisfactory condition of such ammunition, there are unique cases of their tearing directly in the barrels of the occupiers' cannons and mortars, which leads to the loss of weapons and personnel.”

Last month presumably uninjured Russian soldiers posted videos on social media thanking North Korea for their new rockets and artillery shells – though evidence suggested the potentially inferior quality meant firing adjustments were needed.

In one video, a Russian soldier could be seen standing in front of a pile of rockets and thanking their “friends” from North Korea for the weapons.

#Russia / #Ukraine : A #Russian soldier released a new video of 122mm Grad rockets which were recently obtained by Russian Troops.

The rockets appear to be rare R-122 HE-FRAG rockets with F-122 fuzes. These are produced and supplied #NorthKorea/#DPRK .#UkraineRussiaWar pic.twitter.com/jzaIpMJUfn

— War Noir (@war_noir) November 8, 2023

In October, Ukraine Weapons Tracker discovered photos of artillery shells used by Russian troops and identified them as North Korean made.

According to the Ukrainian military publication “Vodogray,” the shells were copies of the Soviet 122mm OF-462 and 152mm OF-540 projectiles.

Russian Armored Assault Descends Into Farce, Most Troops Killed or Retreat

One of the Kremlin's soldiers can be seen snagging his clothing while trying to dismount from an APC before being unceremoniously dragged along the road.

They also retrieved field manuals that showed the required range corrections by using different charges for some projectiles.

The fact that these shells appeared on the front line instead of stockpiles within Russia could also signify Russia’s dwindling supply of artillery shells; Russia has been relying on its artillery superiority in its current invasion of Ukraine, with some sources putting it at ten to one heavy guns earlier this year.

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said in September that they are certain North Korea had supplied 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, as well as Grad rockets, to Russia.

US intelligence believed that North Korea had sent a thousand containers of weapons to Russia, as reported earlier by Kyiv Post.

kyivpost.com

14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2023

Key Takeaways:

The New York Times (NYT) - citing former and current senior Russian, US, and international officials - reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using back channels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire, despite Putin’s recent public statements to the contrary.
The timing of Putin’s reported interest in a ceasefire is more consistent with Russia’s ongoing efforts to delay and discourage further Western military assistance to Ukraine, than with a serious interest in ending the war other than with a full Russian victory.
Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky obliquely indicated that VDV forces are under significant pressure to conduct rapid offensive operations near Bakhmut and repel Ukrainian attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
Teplinsky also implied that the Russian military command is deploying new VDV officers and troops promptly to the frontlines without having them complete pre-combat training.
Russia's Black Sea Fleet's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade confirmed that it is deliberately using chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces in an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.
Recent analysis by OSINT analyst MT Anderson confirms that while Russian forces have moved the bulk of Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets away from occupied Sevastopol, the BSF maintains a limited naval presence in Sevastopol.
The Russian information space exploited news of a Ukrainian journalist’s decision not to return to Ukraine after an assignment abroad to amplify ongoing Russian information operations about resistance to full mobilization efforts in Ukraine that purposefully ignore the much more substantial Russian resistance to Russia’s partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022.
Russian milbloggers used the granting of Russian citizenship to Palestinian refugees on December 23 to promote the idea of Russia’s “compatriots abroad” - an oft-used Kremlin justification for its war in Ukraine.
Russian forces made recent confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Kreminna, northeast of Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) Head Yuri Slyusar stated during a television interview on December 19 that UAC will increase its production of combat aircraft in 2024 and 2025, including its production of new types of aircraft.
Russian occupation authorities are building out electoral infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to set conditions for the upcoming presidential election.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 23, 2023

Dec 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023

Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 23, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on December 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The New York Times (NYT) - citing former and current senior Russian, US, and international officials - reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using back channels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire, despite Putin’s recent public statements to the contrary.[1] NYT reported that Western officials have been picking up renewed signals through backchannels since September 2023 that Putin is interested in a ceasefire that freezes the current frontlines, but noted that Western officials warned the backchannels could be “Kremlin misdirection” and may not reflect a “genuine willingness” to negotiate.[2] NYT suggested several possible motivations Putin may have for his reported interest in a ceasefire: the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential election, a desire to “keep his options open” regarding the war’s resolution and take advantage of perceived waning Western support for Ukraine, and the “distraction” of the Israel-Hamas war.[3] All these motivations reflect temporary reasons why Putin might pursue a temporary ceasefire that would benefit Russia by allowing Russia the time to prepare for renewed aggression against Ukraine, as ISW has routinely assessed. The NYT noted that Putin’s public rhetoric, which has recently reasserted Russia’s maximalist objectives that are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender, is at odds with Putin’s reported private desire to “declare victory and move on.”[4] Neither the NYT nor its sources offered any reason to believe Putin’s backchannel communications would be more reflective of his goals than his public speeches addressing domestic, Ukrainian, and international audiences. The NYT report also failed to make clear whether Putin’s alleged interest in a ceasefire is for a temporary pause or a permanent end to the war.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told the NYT that “Russia continues to be ready [for negotiations], but exclusively for the achievement of its own goals” in response to a question about Russia’s willingness to negotiate a ceasefire on the current lines.[5] Putin has recently reiterated that his maximalist objectives in Ukraine - “denazification,” “demilitarization,” and the imposition of a “neutral status” on Ukraine - remain unchanged, and Putin and senior Kremlin officials have increasingly expressed expansionist rhetoric indicating that Putin’s objectives do not preclude further Russian territorial conquests in Ukraine.[6]

The timing of Putin’s reported interest in a ceasefire is more consistent with Russia’s ongoing efforts to delay and discourage further Western military assistance to Ukraine, than with a serious interest in ending the war other than with a full Russian victory. ISW observed similar Kremlin efforts to mislead Western policymakers into pressuring Ukraine to negotiate with Russia in winter 2022-2023, and effectively redirecting Western focus onto hypothetical negotiations rather than ensuring that Ukraine has sufficient materiel before its spring-summer counteroffensive.[7] The Kremlin is likely using backchannels to achieve a similar effect amidst Western debates for further military aid to Ukraine.

Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky obliquely indicated that VDV forces are under significant pressure to conduct rapid offensive operations near Bakhmut and repel Ukrainian attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Teplinsky published a prerecorded commencement speech on December 23 to congratulate the winter graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School in which he outlined the VDV’s involvement in ongoing combat operations in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[8] Teplinsky claimed that VDV forces repelled the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast throughout the summer and fall of 2023 and added that elements of the Russian 98th Guards VDV Division and 106th Guards VDV Divisions began offensive operations on the Soledar-Bakhmut direction in November. Teplinsky carefully caveated his discussion of VDV operations with the observation that the VDV is deliberately maintaining a slow tempo of attacks in the Bakhmut direction to avoid high casualty rates and to prioritize attriting Ukrainian forces over pushing them out from their positions. Teplinsky’s emphasis on slow advances may be an attempt to message to the highest echelon of the Russian military command – such as Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov – that the command’s expectations of rapid advances near Bakhmut are unrealistic without significant VDV casualties and sacrifices. Teplinsky released a similar video in February 2023 in which he condemned the higher military command for committing VDV troops to senseless attacks to achieve minor tactical gains at a high manpower cost, likely in reference to VDV involvement in battles for Soledar in January 2023.[9]

Teplinsky also stated that elements of the newly formed 104th VDV Division are tirelessly fighting to repel Ukrainian forces from the east bank of the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast, despite the fact that these elements are not as combat effective as other (more experienced) VDV forces. Teplinsky stated that despite the VDV’s efforts Ukrainian forces are continuing to deploy additional reinforcements to the east bank but claimed that Russia’s victory is only a matter of time. ISW observed Russian President Vladimir Putin single out the tactical and operational situation in Krynky on the east bank during his "Direct Line" forum on December 14, which may have reflected Putin’s sensitivity to continued Russian information space neuralgia about Russian operations in the area.[10] ISW assessed that Putin’s comment highlighting Russian forces’ inability to oust Ukrainian forces from the east bank was likely also a critique of Teplinsky, whom he appointed to command Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in late October 2023.[11] Teplinsky has repeatedly weaponized the Russian information space to his advantage and may have used this commencement speech to respond to the pressure from the Russian military command and the Kremlin.[12] Teplinsky specifically uses greeting videos addressed to Russian military personnel to indirectly voice his problems with the Russian military command, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably even removed his August 2 VDV Day greeting after he revealed the total number of VDV casualties since February 2022.[13] Teplinsky may also be setting information conditions to retain support from other commentators who have repeatedly voiced concern about Russia’s inability to push Ukrainian forces to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[14]

Teplinsky also implied that the Russian military command is deploying new VDV officers and troops promptly to the frontlines without having them complete pre-combat training. Teplinsky stated that “unfortunately” the April graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School deployed to combat zones before their intended unspecified autumn deployment date. While Teplinsky did not specify why the April graduates deployed significantly earlier than their slated deployment date, it is likely that these VDV forces were meant to undergo some advanced individual or unit-wide training over a six-month period – a requirement that the Russian military command evidently neglected. Teplinsky added that April graduates have already suffered casualties on the frontlines in November in an unspecified direction. Teplinsky stated that many of the December graduates will join the ranks of the 104th VDV Division in the Kherson direction and noted that the graduates have hard work ahead of them to “speed up” Ukraine’s defeat. Teplinsky may have explicitly observed that the 104th VDV Division is less combat effective to resurface the issue of the Russian command sending recent graduates of military command schools to the frontlines. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is committing all available forces to immediately reinforce its war effort in Ukraine at the expense of combat effectiveness and long-term capacity building, and Teplinsky’s account further demonstrates that similar issues also plague formerly elite forces such as the VDV.[15]

Russia's Black Sea Fleet's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade confirmed that it is deliberately using chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces in an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party. The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade published a long post to its Telegram channel on December 22 detailing a "radical change in tactics" that the brigade is using against Ukrainian forces in Krynky (on the eastern bank of Kherson Oblast).[16] The post claimed that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade rotated into the Krynky area and are applying the new tactic of "dropping K-51 grenades from drones" onto Ukrainian positions to smoke Ukrainian forces out of their positions and expose them to fire from various arms.[17] The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade additionally published footage that apparently shows such a K-51 drop on a Ukrainian position, presumably in Krynky.[18] K-51 aerosol grenades are filled with irritant CS gas (2-Chlorobenzalmalononitrile), a type of tear gas used for riot control (also known as a Riot Control Agent [RCA]).[19] The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the use of RCAs as a method of warfare, and Russia has been a state party to the CWC since 1997.[20] ISW previously observed that Russian forces used K-51 grenades against Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast in November 2022.[21]

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-136/131 drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 22-23. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched nine Shahed drones from Balaklava, occupied Crimea and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of December 22 to 23 and that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the drones.[22]

Recent analysis by OSINT analyst MT Anderson confirms that while Russian forces have moved the bulk of Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets away from occupied Sevastopol, the BSF maintains a limited naval presence in Sevastopol.[23] Anderson posted high-resolution satellite imagery from December 20 showing that two Bora-class corvettes, two Ropucha-class landing ships, one Krivak-class frigate, and the Matros Koshka bulk carrier remain at the otherwise empty BSF frigate pier in southern Sevastopol.[24] Anderson noted that it appears that Russian forces have rebuilt many of the defenses at the entrance of Sevastopol Harbor following a powerful Black Sea cyclone at the end of November.[25] Anderson also posted satellite imagery of the BSF headquarters in Sevastopol and noted that it does not appear to be undergoing renovations following a massive Ukrainian strike on the headquarters on September 22.[26] The satellite imagery additionally shows that one Ropucha-class landing ship, one Natya-class minesweeper, one Alexandrit-class minesweeper, and the Ivan Khurs Ivanov-class intelligence ship remain at the pier at Pivdenna Bay, but that the submarine pen is empty.[27] The satellite imagery confirms the absence of several major BSF naval assets, including specialized Kalibr cruise missile carriers, from the docks at Sevastopol, which supports ISW's assessment that Russia has moved many major BSF assets out of Sevastopol to Novorossiysk on an enduring basis.[28]

The Russian information space exploited news of a Ukrainian journalist’s decision not to return to Ukraine after an assignment abroad to amplify ongoing Russian information operations about resistance to full mobilization efforts in Ukraine that purposefully ignore the much more substantial Russian resistance to Russia’s partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022. Russian state media and milbloggers amplified news that a Ukrainian television journalist decided to stay in Brussels after covering the EU Summit there from December 14 to 15.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian journalist stayed in Brussels to avoid mobilization.[30] Russian outlets naturally did not mention that at least 700,000 Russians immediately left Russia when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the “partial mobilization” of 300,000 reservists on September 21, 2022.[31] The unpopularity of Russia’s partial mobilization and ensuing mass emigration led Russian authorities to engage in crypto-mobilization efforts that continue today, including recruiting volunteers and forcibly conscripting migrants and newly naturalized Russian citizens.[32] Resistance to mobilization is to be expected in a protracted and bloody war, and the disproportionate amplification of a singular prominent Ukrainian citizen’s behavior is part of ongoing Russian information operations that attempt to paint a picture of widespread resistance to the full mobilization in Ukraine made necessary by Russia’s invasion.

Russian milbloggers used the granting of Russian citizenship to Palestinian refugees on December 23 to promote the idea of Russia’s “compatriots abroad” - an oft-used Kremlin justification for its war in Ukraine. Dagestani authorities granted 45 Palestinian refugees, including seven minors, Russian citizenship on December 23, after the refugees reportedly evacuated to Dagestan from Gaza.[33] Select Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member Alexander “Sasha” Kots, expressed shock at the speed and ease of the refugees’ citizenship process and called for Russian authorities to apply this expedited citizenship process to the whole country and to Russian “compatriots” abroad who are “risking everything” to support Russia.[34] The Kremlin has intentionally and broadly defined “compatriots” as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in the Russian sphere of influence, which is not limited to those with Russian citizenship or residing in Russia.[35] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently renewed his rhetoric about the concept of “compatriots abroad” when discussing Russia’s "sovereignty,” the fiction of a “genocide in Donbas,” and Russia’s duty to protect these “compatriots” as part of justifications for Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine.[36] The fact that Kots, who is notably one of the “trusted persons” who can campaign on Putin’s behalf, invoked the narrative about “compatriots abroad” in connection with news about Palestinian refugees – as opposed to other Kremlin narratives more directly related to the Israel-Hamas war, such as Putin’s recent anti-Israel rhetoric - suggests that the “compatriots abroad” narrative may be of particular importance to the Kremlin, or is perceived as such at least by important voices in the Russian information space.[37] Select Russian information space actors may continue to seize on the issue of Palestinian refugees in Russia to advocate for a more maximalist and holistic approach to Putin's Russian World (Russkiy Mir) ideology and the intensified integration of Russian “compatriots” into the Russian world.

Key Takeaways:

The New York Times (NYT) - citing former and current senior Russian, US, and international officials - reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using back channels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire, despite Putin’s recent public statements to the contrary.
The timing of Putin’s reported interest in a ceasefire is more consistent with Russia’s ongoing efforts to delay and discourage further Western military assistance to Ukraine, than with a serious interest in ending the war other than with a full Russian victory.
Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky obliquely indicated that VDV forces are under significant pressure to conduct rapid offensive operations near Bakhmut and repel Ukrainian attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
Teplinsky also implied that the Russian military command is deploying new VDV officers and troops promptly to the frontlines without having them complete pre-combat training.
Russia's Black Sea Fleet's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade confirmed that it is deliberately using chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces in an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.
Recent analysis by OSINT analyst MT Anderson confirms that while Russian forces have moved the bulk of Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets away from occupied Sevastopol, the BSF maintains a limited naval presence in Sevastopol.
The Russian information space exploited news of a Ukrainian journalist’s decision not to return to Ukraine after an assignment abroad to amplify ongoing Russian information operations about resistance to full mobilization efforts in Ukraine that purposefully ignore the much more substantial Russian resistance to Russia’s partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022.
Russian milbloggers used the granting of Russian citizenship to Palestinian refugees on December 23 to promote the idea of Russia’s “compatriots abroad” - an oft-used Kremlin justification for its war in Ukraine.
Russian forces made recent confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Kreminna, northeast of Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) Head Yuri Slyusar stated during a television interview on December 19 that UAC will increase its production of combat aircraft in 2024 and 2025, including its production of new types of aircraft.
Russian occupation authorities are building out electoral infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to set conditions for the upcoming presidential election.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

NOTE: ISW has restructured the operational kinetic axis sections of the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to more accurately reflect the positional nature of fighting on the battlefield. Operational kinetic axis paragraphs will be shorter and more synthetic to convey the same assessment in fewer words and not to overwhelm the reader with long lists of settlement names. The level of detail included in the report has not decreased. The report’s endnotes still contain the same level of sourcing, and ISW encourages readers interested in tactical granular details to read them. ISW will explicitly flag major operational inflections in axis text as usual, so the lack of named settlements should not be taken as an indication of gains or losses of territory or changes in the frontline. ISW will lead operational axes with confirmed map changes to accord with the daily map products produced by the Geospatial Intelligence Team, supplemented by Ukrainian and Russian claims, and will also list order of battle (ORBAT) details in each axis section when available.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Kreminna. Geolocated footage posted on December 23 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains in northern Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and south of Dibrova (southwest of Kreminna).[38] Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements in the Kupyansk direction near Synkiva, Lake Lyman (just northwest of Synkivka), and Ivanivka, and west of Kreminna near Zhytlivka, Terny, Torske, and the Serebryanske forest area.[39] Elements of the Russian 6th and 20th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) (both of the Western Military District [WMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions, respectively.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on December 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Spirne.[41]

Russian forces reportedly advanced on Bakhmut’s northern, western, and southern flanks as of December 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian sources claimed on December 23 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bakhmut near Khromove; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to verify these claims.[42] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered the outskirts of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut).[43] A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces withdrew from some positions near the railway near Klishchiivka.[44] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements occurred northwest; west; and southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka.[45] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Bakhmut.[46]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Avdiivka as of December 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Avdiivka near the Avdiivka Coke Plant and towards Ocheretyne; southwest of Avdivika from Vodyane and Optyne; and southeast of Avdiivka from the industrial zone, although ISW has not observed visual evidence to verify these claims.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters towards Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka).[48] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements occurred northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Novokalynove, and Stepove and southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[49] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Avdiivka.[50]

Russian forces recently made marginal advances southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Novomykhailivka.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and near Pobieda (south of Marinka).[52] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) advanced west of Marinka.[53] Russian and Ukrainian forces stated that fighting also occurred near Mainka, Novomykhailivka, and Pobieda.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on December 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[55] Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[56]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements around Robotyne on December 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces reportedly attacked along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line south and east of Robotyne, and also attacked near Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne).[57] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[58] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov amplified footage that shows a Russian serviceman walking through a muddy trench, suggesting that weather conditions in the area are still complicating maneuver.[59] Elements of the Russian 247th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) are reportedly continuing to operate near Verbove.[60] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces are continuing to fortify Tokmak and northwestern and southern Melitopol in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[61] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces carried out a drone attack on Berdyansk on December 22 and struck a Tokmak administration building with HIMARS rockets.[62]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on December 23 shows that Russian forces advanced in the western part of Krynky on the east bank.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) captured some positions in the Krynky area.[64] Ukrainian forces maintained their positions around Krynky, where positional battles are ongoing.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) Head Yuri Slyusar stated during a television interview on December 19 that the UAC will increase its production of combat aircraft in 2024 and 2025, including its production of new types of aircraft.[66] Slyusar specifically highlighted the Su-57 aircraft as an example of UAC’s improved aircraft and claimed that Russian forces are using Su-57s in Ukraine.

Russian news outlet Zvezda reported on December 22, citing an unnamed Russian commander, that Russian forces are using a new type of 152-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells with an increased firing range in Ukraine.[67] The serviceman claimed that the shells have a firing range of more than 30 kilometers.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces are reportedly developing protective measures against Ukrainian naval drone strikes. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 23 that Russian forces are using buoys to block the entrances to harbors, and also flying various aircraft and helicopters, including radar-equipped “Seagull” Be-12 aircraft to counter Ukrainian naval drone strikes.[68] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also using radio-electronic equipment to jam drones’ communications and are launching VT-40 strike drones from small boats to destroy incoming Ukrainian naval drones.[69] Ukrainian naval drone strikes have previously damaged several Russian ships in the Black Sea and Sevastopol Bay and Russian forces.[70]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are building out electoral infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to set conditions for the upcoming presidential election. Russian sources reported on December 23 that election headquarters began collecting signatures for Russian President Vladimir Putin's nomination in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.[71] Kremlin newswire TASS noted that occupation authorities opened a signature collection point in Henichesk, occupied Kherson Oblast, in a local market for the "convenience" of residents, suggesting that occupation officials are co-locating election infrastructure with basic service infrastructure to coerce people into participating in electoral processes.[72]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely claim that Ukrainian forces are planning to launch combat flights from NATO airbases. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on December 22 that Western officials are discussing allowing Ukraine to use NATO airfields for combat operations since Ukrainian airfields are so damaged, and warned that this decision would have “grave consequences.”[73] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov issued a thinly-veiled threat towards NATO on December 18, claiming that Western discussions about allowing Ukrainian forces to use NATO airfields are “dangerous thoughts.”[74] Western officials have repeatedly stated their intention to send F-16 aircraft to Ukraine, and there is no indication that Western officials intend for Ukrainian forces to operate any aircraft from NATO airbases.[75]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

15. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, December 23, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-23-2023

Key Takeaways:

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Iran has invested in building “drone carriers” to add to its naval forces in recent years, which will amplify the threat that the Axis of Resistance poses to international shipping and other maritime targets.
Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City.
The al Qassem Brigades conducted several complex attacks on Israeli forces conducting clearing operations in Juhor ad Dik.
The IDF spokesperson said that the IDF is in “operational control” of most of the northern Gaza Strip.
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis for the third week as Palestinian militia fighters attempted to defend against Israeli advances.
Israel’s public broadcaster said that the IDF will transition to the third phase of its ground operation in the Gaza Strip in the “coming weeks” and outlined five aspects of the third phase.
Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters eight times across the West Bank.
Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia parties—established a special committee to appoint provincial councils and governors.
The Iranian regime is continuing its diplomatic and informational campaign trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to isolate Israel in the international community.

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 23, 2023

Dec 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, December 23, 2023

Nicholas Carl, Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, and Johanna Moore

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Iran has invested in building “drone carriers” to add to its naval forces in recent years, which will amplify the threat that the Axis of Resistance poses to international shipping and other maritime targets.
Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City.
The al Qassem Brigades conducted several complex attacks on Israeli forces conducting clearing operations in Juhor ad Dik.
The IDF spokesperson said that the IDF is in “operational control” of most of the northern Gaza Strip.
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis for the third week as Palestinian militia fighters attempted to defend against Israeli advances.
Israel’s public broadcaster said that the IDF will transition to the third phase of its ground operation in the Gaza Strip in the “coming weeks” and outlined five aspects of the third phase.
Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters eight times across the West Bank.
Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia parties—established a special committee to appoint provincial councils and governors.
The Iranian regime is continuing its diplomatic and informational campaign trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to isolate Israel in the international community.

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. A one-way drone struck a commercial vessel off the coast of India, causing structural damage to the ship, on December 23.[1] The vessel is partially Israeli-owned.[2] Israeli media reported that Iran was responsible for the attack, which is consistent with the ongoing anti-shipping campaign that Iran and the Houthi movement have conducted around the Bab al Mandeb in recent weeks.[3] This attack follows the Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claiming on December 22 that it conducted an unspecified attack on a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea.[4] There is no evidence that the Islamic Resistance of Iraq conducted an attack into the Mediterranean Sea at the time of writing. The claim, nevertheless, signals the readiness of the Iraqi group to participate in the Iran-led attack campaign on maritime targets. Finally, a senior commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, threatened to expand the anti-shipping campaign to the Mediterranean Sea and Strait of Gibraltar on December 23.[5] Naghdi frequently makes inflammatory threats toward Iranian adversaries, but his statement is particularly noteworthy given the drone attack off the Indian coast and the claimed attack by the Islamic Resistance of Iraq. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely messaging their capability and willingness to widen geographically their anti-shipping attack campaign in response to the United States forming a multinational naval task force to safeguard commercial traffic around the Red Sea.

Iran has invested in building “drone carriers” to add to its naval forces in recent years, which will amplify the threat that the Axis of resistance poses to international shipping and other maritime targets. Iran has built several forward base ships and other offensive vessels, sometimes constructed from converted commercial tankers, to conduct expeditionary and out-of-area operations since 2021.[6] These Iranian vessels can carry drones as well as other platforms, such as fast attack craft, helicopters, and missiles, which facilitates Iranian force projection. These Iranian ships would not likely survive conventional engagements with the United States. They can, however, support attacks on commercial traffic similar to the recent Houthi attacks around the Bab al Mandeb.

Iranian assistance to the Russian invasion of Ukraine will compound further the threat that Iranian drones pose. The war has incentivized Iran and Russia to expand their capacities to manufacture Iranian-designed, one-way attack drones. CTP-ISW previously reported on how Iran is helping to establish drone manufacturing facilities in Russia and Belarus.[7] These facilities will, in theory, allow Russian forces to more rapidly field Iranian-designed drones in Ukraine. The use of Iranian drones in Ukraine is furthermore providing Moscow and Tehran opportunities to test these platforms in a modern combat zone and learn lessons on how to use such platforms more effectively.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip on December 23. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—repurposed two unexploded Israeli rocket shells to build and detonate improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting five Israeli tanks in Jabalia on December 23.[8] The militia claimed several other attacks on Israeli infantrymen and vehicles in Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City, using anti-personnel munitions, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and thermobaric rockets.[9] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed that it destroyed two Israeli vehicles using unspecified explosives in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.[10] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters conducted a sniper attack on Israeli soldiers during clashes in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.[11] Palestinian militias have claimed nearly daily attacks in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1, suggesting that it is one of the remaining areas with significant Palestinian militia defensive capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.[12]

Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City on December 23. Israeli forces identified three Palestinian fighters firing at them on the outskirts of al Shati refugee camp and directed close air support to attack the fighters.[13] Israeli special operations forces (SOF) located a Hamas headquarters south of Gaza City that included a multi-level tunnel network connected to water and electrical infrastructure.[14] The IDF reported that Palestinian militias used the tunnels as a command-and-control center and that the tunnel allowed fighters to move between different sectors of Gaza City.[15] Israeli military analysts told the Wall Street Journal on December 23 that the IDF is increasing its focus on destroying tunnels in the northern Gaza Strip.[16] The al Qassem Brigades mortared an Israeli combat outpost south of Gaza City.[17] Enemy fighters frequently attack holding forces as they execute defensive and offensive tasks to degrade and destroy the enemy force’s military infrastructure.

The al Qassem Brigades conducted several complex attacks on Israeli forces conducting clearing operations in Juhor ad Dik on December 23. The IDF reported on December 22 that it was clearing the Juhor ad Dik area and that it located rocket launchers that Palestinian fighters used to fire rockets at Tel Aviv.[18] The al Qassem Brigades reported on December 23 that its fighters engaged Israeli forces in ”fierce battles” along Israeli lines of advance.[19] This activity suggests that Hamas forces in the area are trying to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli advances. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas fighters are attacking IDF units south of Gaza City likely from relative safe haven in the Gaza Strip’s central governorate.[20] Palestinian militia fighters are also operating north of Wadi Gaza in Juhor ad Dik proper.

The al Qassem Brigades detonated a mine field targeting Israeli forces.[21] The militia also fired anti-tank RPGs at Israeli tanks and mortars and rockets at Israeli forces.
The al Qassem Brigades detonated an anti-personnel improvised explosive device (IED) and fired small arms targeting an Israeli patrol.[22]
The al Qassem Brigades detonated a tunnel entrance rigged with explosives targeting Israeli SOF, after which the militia fighters mortared Israeli forces.[23]

The IDF spokesperson said on December 23 that the IDF is in “operational control” of most of the northern Gaza Strip.[24] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF appears to be nearing the final stages of its clearing operations in some of parts of the northern Gaza Strip but that the IDF is continuing clearing operations in other areas.[25] IDF units are executing tasks consistent with the US military’s doctrinal definition of a holding operation in al Shati Camp and Beit Hanoun.[26] The IDF is continuing clearing operations in Juhor ad Dik and Jabalia, however (see above). IDF operations in most of the northern Gaza Strip are not consistent with the US military’s doctrinal definition of a holding operation, which “involves disrupting [enemy] activities in an area and providing a good security environment for the population” and “focuses on securing the population.”[27]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis for the third week on December 23 as Palestinian militia fighters attempted to defend against Israeli advances. The IDF reported on December 23 that a SOF unit specializing in guerilla warfare has been operating in Khan Younis for weeks.[28] The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its forces lured five Israeli SOF engineers into a tunnel rigged with explosives east of Khan Younis. The militia claimed that they killed all five engineers.[29] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades claimed several mortar and rocket attacks on concentrations of Israeli forces east of Khan Younis, some of whom were advancing into Khan Younis City.[30]

Israel’s public broadcaster said that the IDF will transition to the third phase of its ground operation in the Gaza Strip in the “coming weeks” and outlined five aspects of the third phase. The first phase involved beginning clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip, and the second phase involved expanding clearing operations into the southern Gaza Strip. The report said that the third phase will include the end of major combat operations, a “reduction in forces” in the Gaza Strip, the release of reservists, a “transition to targeted raids,” and the establishment of a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.[31] Western media reported previously that this third phase will ”resemble. . . [the] narrow” US counterterrorism campaigns that aimed to kill or capture terrorist leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan.[32] This strategy failed to destroy terrorist organizations in both countries.[33] Targeted raids aimed at killing or capturing terrorist leaders can degrade a terrorist organization but cannot destroy one, particularly one as large, established, and well-organized as Hamas.

Top former Israeli officials and an Israeli war correspondent also published analysis of the war. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that Israel now only has two options to end the war: a “ceasefire with living hostages” or a “forced cessation of hostilities with dead [hostages].”[34] The former head of the IDF Operations Directorate argued that the IDF must remain in the Gaza Strip for six more months to cement its gains and accomplish Israel’s stated political objectives of destroying Hamas.[35] A veteran Israeli war correspondent’s report roughly corroborated that timeline.[36] IDF officials told the correspondent that the IDF can accomplish its objectives but that it will take ”a lot of time” and ”a heavy toll in casualties.”[37] The former Operations Directorate chief said that Israel could turn to former Palestinian Authority (PA) security official Mohammed Dahlan in the aftermath of the war.[38] Dahlan is a top Fatah party official currently exiled in the UAE, who previously led a 20,000-strong PA security force with close ties to the United States and Israel.[39] Dahlan said in a November 2023 interview with Time that he would not participate in a future Palestinian government but that he would help rebuild the Palestinian political system.[40]

Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on December 23. The National Resistance Brigade claimed two attacks targeting Kissufim and Holit.[41] The al Quds Brigades conducted one rocket attack targeting Kfar Saad.[42] Unspecified militias conducted one rocket attack targeting Beeri.[43]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters eight times across the West Bank on December 23.[44] The Hornets’ Nest, which is part of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, fired small arms targeting Israeli forces operating in Jenin and Jenin refugee camp on December 22 and 23, respectively.[45] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the Tulkarm Battalion of the al Quds Brigades separately fired small arms targeting three Israeli checkpoints around Tulkarm.[46]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 23.[47] LH claimed three unspecified attacks on IDF positions in northeastern and northwestern Israel.[48]

Israeli media reported on December 22 that the IDF will pull reservists from the line in northern Israel and replace them with regular units after the shift to the third phase of operations in the Gaza Strip.[49]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Shia Coordination Framework (SCF)—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia parties—established a special committee to appoint provincial councils and governors on December 23.[50] Iraq held its first provincial elections since 2013 on December 18. The special committee will be responsible for negotiating with Iraqi political parties to appoint provincial council members and governors based on party seat allocations. The results of the provincial elections, which are not yet finalized, will determine party seat allocations. The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced on December 21 that it will release the final results in the coming days.[51] The Iraqi Council of Representatives passed election law amendments in March 2023 that reestablished a list-based system. Under a list-based system, winning parties determine which of their candidates will be appointed to the seats the party won in the election..[52] IHEC released initial results that show that the SCF parties won over half of the total provincial council seats.[53]

US Special Envoy to Yemen Timothy Lenderking said that the United States is attempting to “avoid a wider war” and “use the tools available. . . to encourage the Houthis to dial back their reckless behavior” in an interview with the New York Times.[54] The Houthis already widened the war by committing acts of piracy and terrorism targeting international shipping in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea.

The Iranian regime is continuing its diplomatic and informational campaign trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to isolate Israel. Tehran is especially focused on trying to isolate Israel from Arab and Muslim states.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on Muslim states to cut ties and trade with Israel during a speech on December 23.[55] Khamenei stated that Muslim populations abroad should pressure their respective governments to this end. Khamenei’s website framed Muslim states as having a responsibility to prevent commercial goods and energy products from going to Israel. This rhetoric is consistent with Khamenei’s previous calls for an international embargo on Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[56]
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke at a regime-hosted international conference on Palestinian issues in Tehran on December 23.[57] Raisi repeated his usual criticisms of the United States and Israel. Raisi also downplayed the role of Hamas’ October 7 attack in initiating the war and instead framed the war as part of a larger historical struggle between Israel and Palestine. Raisi also framed Hamas’ October 7 attack as a defensive measure in response to Israeli “crimes” against the Palestinian people. Raisi called for an immediate ceasefire.
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi held a phone call with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi on December 23 to discuss bilateral relations and the Israel-Hamas war.[58] Raisi called on Egypt to do everything possible to stop Israeli attacks into the Gaza Strip. Raisi also framed Israel as “a cancerous tumor” and criticized the United States for supporting Israel, according to the official Iranian readout on Raisi‘s website.

16. The High Price of Losing Ukraine: Part 2 — The Military Threat and Beyond

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond

THE HIGH PRICE OF LOSING UKRAINE: PART 2 — THE MILITARY THREAT AND BEYOND

Dec 22, 2023 - ISW Press

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The High Price of Losing Ukraine: Part 2 — The Military Threat and Beyond

Nataliya Bugayova

December 22, 2023

Allowing Russia to win its war in Ukraine would be a self-imposed strategic defeat for the United States. The United States would face the risk of a larger and costlier war in Europe. The United States would face the worst threat from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a victorious Russia would likely emerge reconstituted and more determined to undermine the United States — and confident that it can. A Russian victory would diminish America’s deterrence around the world, emboldening others with an explicit or latent intent to harm the United States. A Russian victory would create an ugly world in which the atrocities associated with Russia’s way of war and way of ruling the populations under its control are normalized.

Most dangerous of all, however, US adversaries would learn that they can break America’s will to act in support of their strategic interests. The ground truths of this war have not changed: Russia still explicitly intends to erase Ukraine as a concept, people, and state; Ukraine’s will to fight remains strong; Russia has made no operationally significant advances this year; and Ukraine’s will combined with the West’s collective capability (which dwarfs Russia’s) can defeat Russia on the battlefield.[1] US interests still include preventing future Russian attacks on Ukraine and helping Ukraine liberate its people and territory. Supporting Ukraine is still the best path for the United States to avoid higher costs, larger escalation risks, and a greater Russian threat. What’s changing is Americans’ perceptions of their interests, not the interests themselves. That American perceptions are changing is not an accident. It is, in fact, precisely the effect the Kremlin has been seeking to achieve. The Kremlin’s principal effort is destroying America’s will by altering Americans’ understanding of their interests, and this effort appears to be working. If Russia wins in Ukraine because of the collapse of Western aid, it will be because Russia has managed to shape Americans’ understanding of reality such that the United States willingly chooses to act against its interests and values without realizing that it is doing so. Russia will have manipulated America into abandoning its own interests in a fight it could and should have won. That’s a dangerous lesson for China, Iran, and other US adversaries to learn. America’s security now and in the future, in Asia and the Middle East as well as in Europe, depends on remaining solidly connected with our strategic interests and values and demonstrating that we will not fall prey to efforts to manipulate our perceptions of those interests.

ASSESSED RISKS OF FAILURE IN UKRAINE FOR THE UNITED STATES

Another war under worse conditions

A self-imposed defeat in Ukraine will confront the United States with the real risk of another war in Europe with higher escalation risks and higher costs. Cutting aid to Ukraine will not freeze the frontlines, as ISW has assessed.[2] It will instead diminish Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military and accelerate Russia’s military drive further and further west because the fundamental driver of this war — the Kremlin’s intent to eradicate Ukraine’s identity and statehood — has not changed. Putin regularly restates this intent, most recently on December 19.[3] If Russia defeats Ukraine’s conventional military, Ukrainians will likely turn to an insurgency, as their will to defend against the existential threat remains strong. Such an insurgency will likely last years if not decades and is unlikely to be contained within Ukraine’s borders. The United States and NATO will likely face a Russian military deployed along the NATO border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean and face enormous costs and risks in deterring further Russian aggression against NATO itself, as ISW has assessed.[4] In an alternative scenario in which Russia gets a reprieve via a premature ceasefire or insufficient Western aid that halts Ukraine’s advance, but without allowing Russia to complete its conquest, Russia will rebuild and launch new attacks on Ukraine. The United States would face the high likelihood of another Russian invasion of Ukraine to complete the conquest at a higher cost of Ukrainian lives and US taxpayer dollars, the same or worse escalation risks, and under conditions that favor Russia, including degraded global support for Ukraine, degraded cohesion within Ukraine, a strengthened Putin regime, a stronger Russian military and narratives, more advantageous starting lines for Russia compared to February 2022, and higher Russian immunity to coercive measures.

The United States risks needlessly choosing a path antithetical to its interests and values when it can still help Ukraine succeed. The military challenge facing Ukraine is great but not insurmountable. The West already has in its arsenals the capabilities necessary to address nearly all challenges confronting Ukraine on the battlefield, as ISW assessed.[5] Russia, on the other hand, has not yet gotten onto the right side of the capability curve. The Kremlin has been investing in regaining its offensive capability in Ukraine and with time Russia may be able to do so, but it has not been able to do so yet. The window to expel Russia from Ukraine remains open. The West has the tools to deny Russia the reprieve on the battlefield and access to global resources Russia needs to reconstitute and end the war on the West’s terms and in the West’s interests.

Greater Russian threat to the United States

A Russian victory in Ukraine would present the West with a reconstituted and emboldened Russia that is more determined to undermine the United States. There is no going back to the pre-2022 status quo. The United States is on track to be blindsided by Russia’s transformation — again.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has permanently changed Russia. It has cemented an ultra-nationalist ideology that believes in expansion by force and that is inherently anti-Western. A Russian victory in Ukraine is a certain path to another Putin or worse. Putin has been consolidating Russia’s elites and society around his pro-war agenda through a ‘get out or get in line’ approach.[6] His invasion necessarily relies on Russians who support the war, are willing to rally support, or are simply willing to get in line. This reliance has illuminated and nurtured the full range of Russian nationalists — from the ultra-nationalists willing or seemingly willing to pursue Putin’s expansionist goals in Ukraine regardless of the cost to those largely subscribed to Putin’s goals but diverging on ways to achieve them.[7] Putin has chosen not to silence and, in some cases, has empowered the Russian milblogger community and the nationalist constituency they represent, as they have shown themselves to be effective at rallying Russians in support of the war.[8] Russian nationalists in power and society are intent on restoring Russia’s greatness and undermining the United States.[9] They are inherently anti-Western. They are also, ironically and depressingly, the closest thing to civil society Russia currently has. If Russia loses in Ukraine, their future is uncertain. Their power will most certainly grow if Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine, however, as Putin will have demonstrated by success that Russia can afford to pay horrific costs and still win because the West will eventually back down. He and his successors will seek to apply that lesson to a larger game — the destruction of NATO.

The next Russian leader after Putin may or may not be like or worse than Putin if Russia loses in Ukraine. A Russian victory in Ukraine is a nearly guaranteed path to another Putin or worse, however, because of the political imperatives that an empowered nationalist community would create. Putin recently revived his expansionist narratives that deny Ukrainian territorial integrity as part of his presidential campaign, likely to appeal to these communities.[10] The nationalists will carry Putin's intent forward (the same intent toward Ukraine, the United States, and NATO that led to the full-scale invasion) and may even generate and pursue a more extreme version of this intent.

The Kremlin is rallying Russians for a long-term fight with the West. The anti-Western narrative will become the foundation of the Kremlin’s next national myth if Russia wins. The narrative of confrontation with the West has increasingly defined Putin’s rule.[11] Missing Putin’s accumulating grudge is exactly why the West has been strategically surprised by Putin in the past.[12] The 2022 invasion has taken anti-American narratives in Russia to new heights.[13] Confrontation with the West has become the Kremlin’s central domestic justification of this war and a key justification for its own increasingly authoritarian rule — after the initial justifications about denazification, demilitarization, etc. became less resonant. Anti-Western rhetoric in Russia comes in many forms: from the Kremlin talking heads discussing a potential nuclear strike on the US[14]; to Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s insinuations about a civil war in the US[15]; to constant explicit and thinly veiled threats against NATO states,[16] including Russian propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov’s statements that one “Sarmat” [nuclear] missile is enough to drown the United Kingdom[17] [18]; to falsely blaming the United States for the Kremlin’s failures, and even implying that the United States supports terrorism in Russia.[19] It is easy to dismiss these statements as lunacy. But narratives rule Russia, they have got us where we are today with Russia, and they will shape Russia’s foreign policy for years to come. If Russia wins in Ukraine, these narratives will serve as the basis for the next Russian national myth.

The Kremlin explicitly intends to reconstitute its large-scale warfighting capability — an effort that disproportionally depends on whether Russia keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine. Russia has significantly depleted its military capability in Ukraine. But, unlike in 2022, the Kremlin today is acutely aware of its capability gap and seeks to close it. Russia is pursuing large-scale military reforms,[20] revamping its defense industrial base (DIB), investing in technological adaptation, and reconfiguring its international web of capability partners. The Russian military uses Belarus’ trainers and training grounds to augment Russian force generation capabilities.[21] The Kremlin has accelerated its militarization of Russian society by instituting mandatory patriotic and military education in Russian schools, among other measures, as it seeks to expand Russia’s future recruitment base via the indoctrination of its population.[22] [23] The Kremlin’s progress is constrained by its decision to employ half-measures for DIB revitalization, as well as the invasion cannibalizing Russia's long-term military reforms.[24] But the potential for Russia to rebuild its military should not be underestimated if the Kremlin gets a reprieve or a win in Ukraine and can focus on reconstitution with full force, new knowledge, stronger commitment, and a resilient web of military capability partners — like Iran and North Korea — that the Kremlin has codified throughout the invasion.

Russia would absorb — not just control — any areas of Ukraine and Belarus it seizes, expanding Russia’s military footprint and resource base. Russia has made alarming progress in normalizing a continuous military presence in Belarus, including securing unprecedented basing access and freedom of movement even beyond Belarusian military infrastructure.[25] A Russian victory in Ukraine would free up the Kremlin’s capacity to finalize its control over Belarus. But in such a case the Kremlin will likely go beyond control and use Russia’s ‘digestion’ playbook (its brutal rapid version in Ukraine and a softer slower version in Belarus) to erase local identity in any areas of Ukraine and Belarus that Russia manages to control.

The Kremlin is likely to pursue an outright absorption of Belarus and areas of Ukraine it manages to seize for two reasons. First, Ukraine and Belarus are core to Putin’s vision of the Russian world and also to Putin’s accelerated effort to reverse the Slavic demographic decline to prevent a looming social cohesion crisis in Russia.[26] (For similar reasons Putin has been obsessed with increasing the birth rate among Slavic Russians, russification of non-ethnic Russians, and deporting and reeducating Ukrainian children in Russia.)[27] Second, unlike in the pre-2022 world, Putin may assess that the only way to solve the Ukraine and Belarus problem for good (that is, to eliminate the risk that they might drift away from Russia in the future) is to absorb any areas Russia manages to control. Any areas in Ukraine or Belarus that Russia gets would also become permanent de facto or de jure Russian military basing. (Russia occupies 17.8 percent of Ukraine today, compared to 7.1 percent in 2021, and stands in this scenario — at a minimum — to absorb this territory to transform it into a lodgment from which to launch future offensives. The end of Western military aid would allow Russia to expand the area it controls dramatically.) Expanded Russian basing along NATO’s border will impose major risks, costs, and obligations on the alliance to defend against this expanded Russian posture.[28] Absorbing parts of Ukraine and Belarus would significantly increase Russia’s power, adding millions of people, including the skilled labor and industrial assets that remain and the territory not scorched, for the Kremlin to use for the reconstitution of the Russian military.

A Russian victory in Ukraine would increase the likelihood of military action against other Russian neighbors. The Kremlin still intends to re-establish control over its other neighbors.[29] Only now the Kremlin may have to rely on force to regain influence, as several former Soviet countries have tried to diversify away from Russia while the Kremlin has been preoccupied with Ukraine.[30] The Kremlin is acutely aware of this drift, with Kremlin outlets suggesting that Russia should invade Kazakhstan,[31] Medvedev threatening Georgia with Russia’s capability to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia,[32] and Kremlin proxies trying to destabilize Moldova.[33] In a world in which Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine, little will stop Putin from integrating other territories it chooses to perceive as its sphere of influence by force via its hybrid schemas (e.g., breakaway republics) or an outright absorption.

The Kremlin would resume its presently constrained effort to expand its global military footprint and broader influence. The Kremlin still intends to expand its foothold in the Arctic and establish control over the Northern Sea Route, pursue broader influence and military basing in Africa, and it has maintained its campaign in the Balkans.[34] The Kremlin will pursue these and other efforts with new energy, legitimacy and resources if it solidifies its gains in Ukraine.

The Kremlin would get closer to a real opportunity to break NATO. Putin sought to use its invasion of Ukraine to break NATO — an objective he failed at but continues to pursue.[35] A key Russian threat to NATO is the risk of the Kremlin manipulating NATO into disavowing its principles.[36] NATO will be discredited if Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine and its defense guarantees will be undermined. NATO’s Article 5 — the commitment to mutual self-defense — is not a magic shield. It draws its legitimacy in part from the United States’ persistent decision to commit to its partners. American leaders must remember, as the Russians surely do, that any NATO state under attack can invoke Article 5, which states that in the case of an armed attack on a member state, each other member state shall take “forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary....” Article 5 does not automatically and legally commit every member of NATO to use military force to defend a member under attack. Each NATO state will have to decide how to act. The question of the resolve of all NATO member states to go to war in defense of a member under attack is thus paramount in the efficacy of Article 5 in deterring aggression. That efficacy, therefore, is not at all independent of the demonstrated willingness of the United States and other NATO states to stand by commitments to non-NATO states. If the United States abandons Ukraine, as it abandoned its partners in Afghanistan, the certainty that the United States would fight Russia in defense of, say, one of the Baltic States, will be harmed. There is every reason to think that the United States will, in fact, honor its Article 5 obligations — but also every reason to fear that Putin and his successors will assess that it will not, in this scenario. Deterrence would be weakened, and the risk of a NATO–Russia war would increase. Putin will go after NATO’s cohesion with new force, as in this scenario Russia will have an expanded military footprint on NATO’s border and an increased ability to target societal and political cohesion within the alliance. Russia will also accelerate its information operations trying to convince Americans that the United States simply does not need NATO — a campaign that is more likely to succeed in a scenario where the Kremlin already managed to convince the United States to decrease or cease its support to Ukraine. The future of NATO is bound up with the future of Ukraine much more tightly than most people understand.

Degrading America’s will

Russia targets what it perceives to be the US center of gravity — America’s will to act. The Kremlin is using its information-based warfare together with military operations to persuade the United States to choose inaction in Ukraine. If Russia succeeds, it will not only result in catastrophic consequences for Ukraine, but also establish that the Kremlin’s reflexive control[37] is an effective asymmetric warfare capability against the United States — for other US adversaries to use if they can master it.

The Kremlin seeks to strip America of its will to act. This is one of the very few ways, and certainly the fastest, for Russia to gain the advantage in Ukraine and restore its power globally. The Kremlin perceives the United States to be the only sovereign state that stands — in terms of will and capability — between Russia and the Kremlin’s ‘rightful’ place in Ukraine and globally. Moscow sees the United States as an enemy. The Kremlin thus seeks not just to compete with the United States but to diminish US power and global influence. The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines a center of gravity as a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.[38] The Kremlin has limits on its ability to compete with or meaningfully degrade US physical strength.[39] The Kremlin has been, therefore, focused on diminishing America’s will to act, which it likely sees as America’s center of gravity. Russia seeks to shape America’s behavior to act against its interests and values, to strip the United States of the will to act altogether, and to convince the world that the United States can and should be dismissed.

The Kremlin is engaged in several lines of effort in support of this objective:

1) Russia seeks to undermine Americans’ belief in the value of action as such. Putin needs the United States to choose inaction in Ukraine, otherwise, Russia cannot win. This model has worked for Putin domestically, where the Kremlin has established inaction as a default response by Russian citizens to external and internal stimuli. Putin convinced Russians that an alternative to him is either worse or too costly to fight for.[40] The Kremlin seeks to convince the United States that Ukraine’s victory is unattainable, too costly or not in America’s interest.[41]

2) Russia seeks to undermine the perception of US credibility, power, leverage, and righteousness around the world to diminish America’s ability to inspire others to act. Even when preoccupied in Ukraine, Russia is investing in anti-US narratives, often supported by physical means, from Africa to South America.[42] The Kremlin is also targeting US allies and partners — a core pillar of US power — while simultaneously investing in an anti-US coalition in support of the same effort.

3) The Kremlin is targeting global will to act. Putin is working to create an international order that would simply accept, and never fight, Russian principles — such as the Kremlin’s claimed right to own Ukraine and commit atrocities inside of Russia and globally at will. [43] Russian officials frame this effort as Russia’s goal to “architect a fair global future.”[44]

If Russia wins in Ukraine, US adversaries will learn that the United States can be manipulated into abandoning its interests in a winnable fight. Russia cannot achieve its objectives in Ukraine if Ukraine’s will to fight persists along with adequate Western support. The Kremlin has long understood that one of the very few ways to reconcile its goals and means in Ukraine is to slow Western support to buy Russia time to regain the battlefield initiative and rebuild capability (which is what happened in winter 2022–2023)[45] or, ideally, convince the United States to stop supporting Ukraine altogether. The Kremlin has invested heavily in this effort. A recent display of confidence by Russian propagandists and Putin amid hesitations in Western discourse likely indicates the Kremlin’s perception that the United States is starting to act in Russia’s interest.[46] If the West cuts its support for Ukraine, it will likely be because the United States let Russia shape its behavior — as the fundamentals of this war, such as US interests, capabilities, and Ukraine’s will to fight, have not changed. The global anti-Western coalition will learn that it can asymmetrically defeat the West through manipulation and by outlasting it. Learning how to diminish US decision superiority is a dangerous lesson for US adversaries, especially China, to learn.

This scenario would necessarily mean that one of the few Russian capabilities that poses a real threat to the United States — information-based warfare — has received a major boost. Russian information-based warfare and reflexive control specifically have been among the stronger Russian capabilities and a core element of Russia’s strategy against the United States for years.[47] Reflexive control is how Russia fights, and it is one of the true ways in which Russia poses a threat to America beyond its nuclear arsenal. Russia’s true sphere is its global information space — communities penetrated by the Russian narratives, including in the United States. If Russia wins in Ukraine, it will likely mean that Russia has managed to change America’s perception of itself, its interests, and the risks and costs it is willing to incur — and for what purpose.

Altering America’s will is no small thing. America is an idea. America is a choice. America is a belief in the value of action. US domestic resilience and global power come in no small part from people and countries choosing the United States and from Americans preserving their agency to act with intent. An adversary learning how to alter these realities is an existential threat — especially when ideas are that adversary’s core weapon.

A geostrategic environment that favors US adversaries

Allowing Russia to win in Ukraine would result in a reshaped global order that favors US adversaries and normalizes the following ideas:

Russia (and other states strong enough) deserves its perceived sphere of influence, regardless of its neighbors’ will.
Predators can redraw borders by force and victims must justify their right to exist.
Western international institutions fail to fulfill the very missions they were built for.
Russia can treat people in areas it controls any way it wants, including subjecting them to perpetual atrocities.
The United States will face an international environment in which moral relativism further resurges and values further erode, fueled by arguments to the effect of if Russia won, maybe they were not that bad, maybe it wasn’t a black and white issue after all.

These principles are antithetical to the rules-based international order, which remains a pillar of US prosperity and security.

An ugly world

Russia winning in Ukraine would result in a world accepting of the Russian way of war and of life. Billions of people are watching this war. They will not remember the nuances. They will remember the results, including the principles that humanity collectively confronted or tolerated. If Russia wins, many horrific practices that the Kremlin is trying to justify will be normalized. To name a few:

Atrocities as a way of war that are not only not condemned but are often lauded by the Russian media, such as Russia’s deliberate attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[48]
Brutality as a way of life — both as a means to control civilian populations and to discipline warfighters, like the horrific practice of late PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin having his own men executed with sledgehammers and ‘Prigozhin’s sledgehammer’ then becoming a lauded symbol within the Russian nationalist community.[49]
A playbook for ‘disappearing’ or ‘digesting’ a nation through an identity and statehood eradication campaign that Russia is undertaking across occupied Ukraine, including forceful deportation of children.

If Russia wins, it will refocus its information efforts on rewriting history and launching narratives for why the abovementioned actions were justified through its information sphere of influence.

RISKS OF ESCALATION

The cost of failure for the United States in Ukraine is higher than the risks implicit in helping Ukraine win.

There will always be a risk of escalation, including when Putin invades Ukraine again if Russia is allowed to freeze the lines. In this scenario, however, the United States would likely face an even larger escalation risk because Russia will be closer to a direct confrontation with NATO.[50] Basing US policy on the assumption that the United States can never run the risk of a nuclear escalation means the United States has subordinated its national security to any nuclear power. Unless the United States chooses to do so, accepting the risk now to decrease the chances of a larger risk of escalation in the future remains a prudent course of action.

The West needs to recalibrate its perception of escalation based on the experience of the past two years. The Kremlin has shifted its multiple stated ‘red lines’ and has not changed its response even to direct attacks on its prized Black Sea Fleet, as well as drone strikes and operations deep into Russia.[51]

Putin remains a rational actor and often a risk-averse one. He invaded Ukraine at a moment when he expected minimal resistance from Ukraine and the West as evidenced by his assessment that Russia could conquer Ukraine in a matter of days.[52] He also invaded only after he had ensured that his domestic grip on power was solid.[53] Both facts are indicative of a risk-aware actor. Putin also has been cautious about testing the limits of the Kremlin’s information control — as the stability of his regime in part depends on it. Putin still refuses to call Russia’s war a war and is not precisely defining his vision for the end of the war. The “special military operation” framing likely reaches the limit of what Putin assesses he can demand of the Russian people, as he tries to conceal the sacrifices that Russian people will need to make to support this war — i.e., mobilization. His assessment of his regime’s stability has self-confined him to suboptimal ways of fighting.

The risk of nuclear war is inherent in any attempt to resist the aggression of any nuclear-armed state. It will be manifest if Russia attacks Ukraine again or if it threatens or attacks NATO. It will be present if China attacks Taiwan. An American policy that refuses to accept any risk of nuclear use anywhere is a policy of permanent and limitless surrender to nuclear-armed predators. Such a policy will encourage their predation and it will also encourage other predators such as Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

A Russian victory in Ukraine would create a world fundamentally antithetical to US interests and values with an empowered anti-Western coalition. US deterrence power and geopolitical standing will diminish. The cost of protecting the homeland and operating globally will rise, as will the number of national security issues the United States will have to tackle. More states and groups will challenge America at home and abroad. Latent adversarial intent is more likely to transform into action — which is how we got here in the first place, when Russia perceived the West to be weak.

The asymmetry goes both ways: Ukraine is the lynchpin on which the future of Russia’s power hinges. Russia’s ability to reconstitute; to maintain and increase its control and influence over its neighbors; the power of the Kremlin’s global narratives and ability to manipulate US will and perceptions; and the strength of Russia’s coalitions, including with US adversaries, all depend on whether Russia wins or loses in Ukraine. Helping Ukraine win would not only prevent Russia from erasing an independent nation and save the Ukrainian people from Russian atrocities and murder but would also land an asymmetric blow to the Russian threat and the anti-US coalition.

As long as Ukraine remains committed to defending itself against Russia’s aggression, the best course of action for the United States is to commit to the path of helping Ukraine win.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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