Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"You must not only aim right, but draw the bow with all your might."

- Henry David Thoreau

"Yet somehow our society must make it right and possible for old people not to fear the young or be deserted by them, for the test of a civilization is in the way that it cares for its helpless members."

- Pearl Buck

"It takes as much energy to wish as it does to plan."

- Eleanor Roosevelt

1. China Is Stealing AI Secrets to Turbocharge Spying, U.S. Says

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 24, 2023

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, December 24, 2023

4. Israel Dismantles Tunnel Network That Served as Hamas Command Center

5. Where Did the Houthis Get Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles?

6. Japan pouring billions into sea-based missile defense

7. Russian Troops Surrendering in 'Whole Groups’ Because of ‘Inhumane Commanders’

8. Fort Liberty removes last Confederate commemoration on post (Schoomaker and Beckwith)

9. US tensions with China are fraying long-cultivated academic ties. Will the chill hurt US interests?

10. Southeast Asia Appears Stuck In A History Trap – Analysis

11. Why China is keeping its distance as Russia and North Korea cosy up

12. The Trouble With a Cease-Fire

13. A second American civil war wouldn’t look like a movie

14. The guardrails that once prevented wars are failing

15. Maersk to restart Red Sea shipping as U.S.-led security force deploys

16. Like Santa’s reindeer, C-130 cargo planes spread Christmas joy across the Pacific

17. Populists — On the Right and the Left — Are Playing Havoc with American Foreign Policy | Opinion

1. China Is Stealing AI Secrets to Turbocharge Spying, U.S. Says

Excerpts:

U.S. authorities believe Chinese intelligence operatives are correlating sensitive information across the databases they have stolen over the years from OPM, health insurers and banks—including fingerprints, foreign contacts, financial debts and personal medical records—to locate and track undercover U.S. spies and pinpoint officials with security clearances. Passport information stolen in the Marriott hack could help spies monitor a government official’s travel, for example, counterintelligence analysts have said.

“China can harness AI to build a dossier on virtually every American, with details ranging from their health records to credit cards and from passport numbers to the names and addresses of their parents and children,” said Glenn Gerstell, a former general counsel at the National Security Agency. “Take those dossiers and add a few hundred thousand hackers working for the Chinese government, and we’ve got a scary potential national security threat.”

Although executives including Smith are concerned by the weaponization of AI, they point out that this technology can be used to spot and mitigate attacks, too.

“We believe that if we do our work well and we’re determined to do our work well, we can use AI as a more potent defensive shield than it can be used as an offensive weapon,” Smith said. “And that’s what we need to do.”

China Is Stealing AI Secrets to Turbocharge Spying, U.S. Says

U.S. officials are worried about hacking and insider theft of AI secrets, which China has denied

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/china-is-stealing-ai-secrets-to-turbocharge-spying-u-s-says-00413594?mod=hp_lead_pos7

EMIL LENDOF/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL; ISTOCK

By Robert McMillan

, Dustin Volz

and Aruna Viswanatha

Updated Dec. 25, 2023 12:01 am ET

On a July day in 2018, Xiaolang Zhang headed to the San Jose, Calif., airport to board a flight to Beijing. He had passed the checkpoint at Terminal B when his journey was abruptly cut short by federal agents.

After a tipoff by

Apple’s security team, the former Apple employee was arrested and charged with stealing trade secrets related to the company’s autonomous-driving program.It was a skirmish in a continuing shadow war between the U.S. and China for supremacy in artificial intelligence. The two rivals are seeking any advantage to jump ahead in mastering a technology with the potential to reshape economies, geopolitics and war.

Artificial intelligence has been on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s list of critical U.S. technologies to protect, just as China placed it on a list of technologies it wanted its scientists to achieve breakthroughs on by 2025. China’s AI capabilities are already believed to be formidable, but U.S. intelligence authorities have lately made new warnings beyond the threat of intellectual-property theft.

Instead of just stealing trade secrets, the FBI and other agencies believe China could use AI to gather and stockpile data on Americans at a scale that was never before possible.

China has been linked to a number of significant thefts of personal data over the years, and artificial intelligence could be used as an “amplifier” to support further hacking operations, FBI Director Christopher Wray said, speaking at a press conference in Silicon Valley earlier this year.

“Now they are working to use AI to improve their already-massive hacking operations using our own technology against us,” Wray said.

China has denied engaging in hacking into U.S. networks. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said this summer that the U.S. was the “biggest hacking empire and global cyber thief” in the world, in response to allegations that Beijing had hacked into the unclassified email systems of several top-level Biden administration officials. A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington didn’t respond to requests for comment.

In recent years, the FBI’s interest in protecting American innovations in the area has more squarely targeted manufacturers of chips powerful enough to process artificial-intelligence programs, rather than on artificial-intelligence companies themselves. Even if insiders or hackers were able to steal algorithms underpinning an advanced system today, that system could be obsolete and overtaken by larger advancements by other engineers in six months, several former U.S. officials said.

In 2022, the chip-manufacturing technology supplier

Applied Materials sued a China-owned rival, Mattson Technology, alleging that a former Applied engineer stole trade secrets from Applied before leaving for Mattson. The case attracted the interest of federal prosecutors, although no criminal charges have been filed, according to people familiar with the matter.Mattson hasn’t been contacted by any federal agency over the matter, and there is no evidence that any Applied information taken was ever used by Mattson, a company spokesman said. Mattson, based in Fremont, Calif., was acquired in 2016 by an investment arm of the city of Beijing, which currently owns about 45% of the company, the spokesman said.

The case remains in litigation. In November, Mattson sued Applied, claiming that engineers at Applied had applied for patents using intellectual property developed while they were working at Mattson.

Fears of how China could use AI have grown so acute over the past year that the FBI director and leaders of other Western intelligence agencies met in October with technology leaders in the field to discuss the issue.

Makers of AI technology are concerned about their secrets making their way to China, too, according to executives at these companies. Recently, OpenAI reached out to the FBI after a forensic investigation of a former employee’s laptop raised suspicions that the employee had taken company secrets to China, according to people familiar with the company. The employee was later exonerated, according to a person familiar with the matter.

U.S. intelligence analysts have worried for years about the long-tail espionage dividends that China is believed to be reaping from amassing enormous troves of hacked personal information belonging to American officials and business executives.

Over the past decade, Beijing has been linked to the hacks of hundreds of millions of customer records from

Marriott International, the credit agency Equifax and the health insurer Anthem (now known as Elevance Health), among others, as well as more than 20 million personnel files on current and former U.S. government workers and their families from the Office of Personnel Management. The heists were so huge and frequent that Hillary Clinton, then a Democratic presidential candidate, accused China of “trying to hack into everything that doesn’t move.” China has denied responsibility for each of those heists.China was so good at stealing private information—billions of pieces of data in all, according to U.S. officials, criminal indictments and cyber-threat researchers—that its hackers had likely collected too much of a good thing: an informational treasure trove so vast that humans would be incapable of locating the right patterns. Artificial intelligence, however, would have no such limitations.

Microsoft believes China is already using its AI capabilities to comb these vast data sets, said Brad Smith, the company’s president, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.“Initially the big question was did anyone, including the Chinese, have the capacity to use machine learning and fundamentally AI to federate these data sets and then use them for targeting,” he said. “In the last two years we’ve seen evidence that that, in fact, has happened.”

Smith cited the 2021 China-linked attack on tens of thousands of servers running Microsoft’s email software as an example. “We saw clear indications of very specific targeting,” he said. “I think we should assume that AI will be used to continue to refine and improve targeting, among other things.” Smith didn’t address the issue of AI technology being stolen by China.

In the 2018 case, the former Apple employee Zhang pleaded guilty to stealing trade secrets and is set to be sentenced in February. His plea agreement is under seal. Apple declined to comment.

U.S. authorities believe Chinese intelligence operatives are correlating sensitive information across the databases they have stolen over the years from OPM, health insurers and banks—including fingerprints, foreign contacts, financial debts and personal medical records—to locate and track undercover U.S. spies and pinpoint officials with security clearances. Passport information stolen in the Marriott hack could help spies monitor a government official’s travel, for example, counterintelligence analysts have said.

“China can harness AI to build a dossier on virtually every American, with details ranging from their health records to credit cards and from passport numbers to the names and addresses of their parents and children,” said Glenn Gerstell, a former general counsel at the National Security Agency. “Take those dossiers and add a few hundred thousand hackers working for the Chinese government, and we’ve got a scary potential national security threat.”

Although executives including Smith are concerned by the weaponization of AI, they point out that this technology can be used to spot and mitigate attacks, too.

“We believe that if we do our work well and we’re determined to do our work well, we can use AI as a more potent defensive shield than it can be used as an offensive weapon,” Smith said. “And that’s what we need to do.”

Write to Robert McMillan at robert.mcmillan@wsj.com, Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com and Aruna Viswanatha at aruna.viswanatha@wsj.com

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 24, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023

Key Takeaways:

European Union (EU) Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a limited territorial victory in Ukraine and will continue the war “until the final victory.”
Russian forces are reportedly decreasing aviation activity and their use of glide bombs in Ukraine after Ukrainian forces shot down three Russian Su-34s in southern Ukraine between December 21 and 22.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 23 to 24.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov further detailed Ukraine’s efforts to establish a sustainable wartime force-generation apparatus and an effective defense industrial base (DIB) during an interview published on December 24.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel, while also presenting himself as an effective Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces.
Russia appears to be continuing its efforts to build out a military occupation force in Ukraine separate from its frontline units through the use of its newly formed Rosgvardia units.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade edited its acknowledgement that its personnel are deliberately using chemical weapons in Ukraine in a likely effort to hide what could be evidence of an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is party.
Russia’s labor shortage, which is partially a result of the war in Ukraine, reportedly amounted to about 4.8 million people in 2023 and will likely continue to exacerbate struggling Kremlin efforts aimed at increasing Russian economic capacity.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and near Avdiivka as positional engagements continue along the entire line of contact.
The newly formed 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) operating in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky is continuing to suffer losses.
Russian officials claimed that Russia’s handling of the situation at the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is sufficient, despite recent unsafe incidents during Russian occupation of the plant.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 24, 2023

Dec 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 24, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 24, 2023, 5:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: ISW and CTP will not publish a campaign assessment (or maps) tomorrow, December 25, in observance of the Christmas holiday. Coverage will resume Tuesday, December 26.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on December 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

European Union (EU) Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a limited territorial victory in Ukraine and will continue the war “until the final victory.”[1] Borrell reported on December 24 that Putin would not be satisfied with capturing a “piece” of Ukraine and allowing the rest of Ukraine to join the EU.[2] Borrell added that Putin will not “give up the war” and called on the West to prepare for a “conflict of high intensity for a long time.”[3] Borrell’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russia is not interested in a ceasefire or good-faith negotiations with Ukraine but retains its maximalist goals of a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[4]

Russian forces are reportedly decreasing aviation activity and their use of glide bombs in Ukraine after Ukrainian forces shot down three Russian Su-34s in southern Ukraine between December 21 and 22. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on December 24 that Russian forces decreased their use of glide bombs and air strikes in southern Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 24 that Russian forces are limiting their use of manned aviation near occupied Crimea, particularly in the northwestern Black Sea region.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may have recently intensified their use of glide bombs against Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in part because Ukrainian forces reportedly suppressed Russian long-range artillery in the area.[7] Continued decreased Russian glide bomb strikes in Kherson Oblast may present an opportunity for Ukrainian forces to operate more freely in near rear areas in west bank Kherson Oblast and establish a safer position on the east (left) bank from which to conduct future operations if the Ukrainian high command so chose. Russian forces reportedly use glide bomb strikes so that Russian aircraft can remain 50 to 70 kilometers behind the line of combat engagement, and the decreased Russian use of glide bombs suggests that Russian forces are concerned about Ukrainian air defense capabilities following recent losses.[8] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on December 23 that Russian forces also reduced their use of aviation and increased their use of strike drones in the Kupyansk and Bakhmut directions.[9] Ihnat also stated on December 24 that Ukrainian forces can deploy air defense systems in any direction, not only in those where Russian forces suffered aircraft loses.[10]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 16 Shahed-131/-136 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces downed 15 drones over Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[11] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two missiles of an unknown type against civil infrastructure in Kherson City.[12] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that Russian forces continue to conduct strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that although Ukrainian forces down these projectiles, Ukrainian officials purposefully do not identify Ukrainian infrastructure objects that Russian forces target.[13] Yusov also stated that Russian forces are conducting strikes “more frugally” than in winter 2022 but noted that Russian forces are still capable of conducting powerful missile strikes.[14]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov further detailed Ukraine’s efforts to establish a sustainable wartime force-generation apparatus and an effective defense industrial base (DIB) during an interview published on December 24. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne published an interview on December 24 wherein Umerov stated that Ukrainian military and civilian officials are developing a more transparent recruitment process for military service that will more clearly communicate to the Ukrainian public how one enters military service, undergoes training, receives leave, and concludes service during the war.[15] Umerov stated that there will be no “demobilization” until after the war is over but that Ukraine must find solutions that provide rest and partial release from military service.[16] Umerov added that Ukrainian officials are trying to improve bureaucratic force-generation systems by unifying draft databases and streamlining notification systems.[17]

Umerov stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will soon submit a plan to address a Ukrainian military proposal to mobilize another 450,000 to 500,000 Ukrainians, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged on December 19.[18] Umerov did not disclose the nature of the plan or the number of Ukrainians whom the Ukrainian MoD will propose to mobilize.[19] Umerov commented that the Ukrainian MoD will propose a 25-to-60 draft-age range only if Ukrainian society accepts the arguments behind the proposal.[20] Ukraine’s current lower-end age limit for conscription is 27, which is high for a state fighting an existential war at the scale of the one that Ukraine is fighting. The current age limit likely aims to allow a generation of Ukrainians to continue receiving an education and provide critical human capital to Ukraine in the long-term. Developing and implementing a stable force-generation approach that addresses Ukrainian military requirements is a complicated political, social, and military issue — one that will continue to produce tensions normal for a society at war.

Umerov also stated that Ukraine has developed a strategy for domestic defense production and has launched programs to reduce the risk of shortages of ammunition, missiles, and other military equipment.[21] Umerov stated that the Ukrainian MoD is currently weighing the financial avenues for its DIB development strategy, including issuing contracts and developing joint ventures between Ukrainian and foreign enterprises.[22] Umerov stated that Ukraine is beginning to work with several hundred drone manufacturers to improve the “huge bureaucracy” involved in producing drones and plans to provide Ukrainian forces with an unspecified number of drones that Ukrainian officials have previously called for to be produced in 2024.[23] Zelensky stated on December 19 that Ukraine intends to produce a million drones in 2024.[24]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel, while also presenting himself as an effective Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published footage on December 24 of a December 19 ceremony at the Russian National Defense Management Center where Putin spoke with Russian military personnel who said that they wanted to see their loved ones but that their commanders had to give them leave. Putin responded, “Let them rest! The commander has already decided. That’s me.”[25] Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, present at the time, said simply, “It is.”[26] Putin seemingly spontaneously granting Russian personnel leave is indicative of Putin’s continued effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader who responds to his troops‘ requests and rewards those who are loyal to him, while reminding the Russian public that Gerasimov is subordinate to him.[27] The interaction between Putin and the Russian servicemen was likely staged in order to bolster Putin’s reputation and once again cast Gerasimov in the role of inefficient bureaucrat, as Putin began to do during his “Direct Line” session on December 14.[28]

Russia appears to be continuing its efforts to build out a military occupation force in Ukraine separate from its frontline units through the use of its newly formed Rosgvardia units. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 24 that the Russian command completed the deployment of the three newly formed regiments of Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose Brigade — the 900th, 901st, and 902nd Special Purpose Regiments — to occupied Donetsk Oblast.[29] Mashovets stated that the Russian command based the 116th Special Purpose Brigade in Chystiakove (70km east of Donetsk City); the 900th Special Purpose Regiment in Melekyne (22km southwest of Mariupol); the 901st Special Purpose Regiment in Snizhne (80km east of Donetsk City); and the 902nd Special Purpose Regiment seven kilometers north of Chystiakove. Mashovets assessed that the 116th Special Purpose Brigade will perform “stabilization functions” in occupied Ukraine on a “permanent basis.” Russian local media reported that Rosgvardia began forming the 116th Special Purpose Brigade specifically for service in occupied Donetsk Oblast in early September 2023.[30] ISW later observed in late October that the 116th Special Purpose Brigade received a Russian T-80BV tank that Wagner Group fighters used in the June 2023 armed rebellion.[31]

The short timeframe and the deployment locations of the new Rosgvardia regiments indicate that the Kremlin is actively attempting to use these forces to solidify Russia’s control over occupied rear areas. Mashovets observed that Rosgvardia likely moved up to 6,000 troops from Russia to occupied Ukraine as part of the deployment of the 116th Special Purpose Brigade, increasing the number of Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine to 34,300 troops. While ISW cannot independently verify Mashovets’ number of deployed Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine, Russia’s recent efforts to legalize Rosgvardia’s access to recruiting volunteers, the Kremlin’s approval to provide Rosgvardia heavy military equipment, and the 116th Special Purpose Brigade’s basing in occupied Donetsk Oblast are indicators that Russia is attempting to expand Rosgvardia forces to establish a separate military occupation force.[32] Moscow is likely trying to recruit and deploy military occupation forces to further impede Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, establish permanent control over occupied areas, and suppress partisan activity without fixing frontline troops in occupation duty indefinitely.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade edited its acknowledgement that its personnel are deliberately using chemical weapons in Ukraine in a likely effort to hide what could be evidence of an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is party. The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade stated on its Telegram channel on December 22 that the brigade is using a “radical change in tactics” against Ukrainian forces in Krynky (on the eastern bank of Kherson Oblast) by dropping K-51 grenades from drones onto Ukrainian positions.[33] K-51 aerosol grenades are filled with irritant CS gas (2-Chlorobenzalmalononitrile), a type of tear gas used for riot control (also known as a Riot Control Agent [RCA]), which the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits as a method of warfare.[34] Between the time of ISW’s data collection on December 23 and this December 24 update the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s Telegram edited the post to delete the specific reference to the K-51 grenade.[35] The original phrasing of the post, however, can be still observed on Russian social media accounts that posted screenshots of it, directly reposted the original acknowledgement (since edits to Telegram posts do not affect reposts of an unedited post), or archived the original post — all confirming that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade did publish the use of K-51 grenades and then edited its post.[36] ISW has not determined when the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade made the edit. A Russian milblogger indirectly criticized the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade on December 22 for exposing a new tactic, which suggests that Russian forces may intend to deliberately use K-51s or other RCAs elsewhere along the front.[37] The Russian milblogger’s complaints or wider reporting about the acknowledgement may have prompted the 810th Naval infantry Brigade, or some Russian official to tell the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, to edit the post.

Russia’s labor shortage, which is partially a result of the war in Ukraine, reportedly amounted to about 4.8 million people in 2023 and will likely continue to exacerbate struggling Kremlin efforts aimed at increasing Russian economic capacity. Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya reported on December 24 that according to the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data indicates that the number of workers needed to fill vacant positions in mid-2023 was 6.8% of the total number of employed people, amounting to about 4.8 million people across Russia.[38] Russian President Vladimir Putin noted the connection between labor shortages and the development of Russia’s migrant policy on December 4.[39] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is struggling to reconcile inconsistent and contradictory policies that attempt to appease the Russian ultranationalist community by disincentivizing migrant workers from working in Russia while simultaneously trying to increase Russian industrial capacity and force generation.[40]

Key Takeaways:

European Union (EU) Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a limited territorial victory in Ukraine and will continue the war “until the final victory.”
Russian forces are reportedly decreasing aviation activity and their use of glide bombs in Ukraine after Ukrainian forces shot down three Russian Su-34s in southern Ukraine between December 21 and 22.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 23 to 24.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov further detailed Ukraine’s efforts to establish a sustainable wartime force-generation apparatus and an effective defense industrial base (DIB) during an interview published on December 24.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel, while also presenting himself as an effective Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces.
Russia appears to be continuing its efforts to build out a military occupation force in Ukraine separate from its frontline units through the use of its newly formed Rosgvardia units.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade edited its acknowledgement that its personnel are deliberately using chemical weapons in Ukraine in a likely effort to hide what could be evidence of an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is party.
Russia’s labor shortage, which is partially a result of the war in Ukraine, reportedly amounted to about 4.8 million people in 2023 and will likely continue to exacerbate struggling Kremlin efforts aimed at increasing Russian economic capacity.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and near Avdiivka as positional engagements continue along the entire line of contact.
The newly formed 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) operating in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky is continuing to suffer losses.
Russian officials claimed that Russia’s handling of the situation at the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is sufficient, despite recent unsafe incidents during Russian occupation of the plant.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

NOTE: ISW has restructured the operational kinetic axis sections of the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to more accurately reflect the positional nature of fighting on the battlefield. Operational kinetic axis paragraphs will be shorter and more synthetic to convey the same assessment in fewer words and not to overwhelm the reader with long lists of settlement names. The level of detail included in the report has not decreased. The report’s endnotes still contain the same level of sourcing, and ISW encourages readers interested in tactical granular details to read them. ISW will explicitly flag major operational inflections in axis text as usual, so the lack of named settlements should not be taken as an indication of gains or losses of territory or changes in the frontline. ISW will lead operational axes with confirmed map changes to accord with the daily map products produced by the Geospatial Intelligence Team, supplemented by Ukrainian and Russian claims, and will also list order of battle (ORBAT) details in each axis section when available.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on December 24 shows that Russian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are less than four kilometers away from Terny, although the geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces are slightly over four kilometers away from the outskirts of Terny.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[43] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional engagements continued in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka and Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove) and in the Lyman direction east of Yampolivka (northwest of Kreminna); south of Kuzmyne (southwest of Kreminna); and near Terny (west of Kreminna), Torske (west of Kreminna), Dibrova, and the Serebryanske forest area (both southwest of Kreminna).[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have increased the amount of artillery strikes in the Khortytsya direction (Kupyansk, Lyman, and Bakhmut directions) to over 1,000 strikes per day.[45] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces reportedly made recent gains near Bakhmut, although there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 24 that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Verkhnokamianske (30km northeast of Bakhmut) and in the vicinity of Bakhmut near Khromove and Klishchiivka.[47] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka and Vasyukivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivdenne.[48] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian command is deploying elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) near Kurdyumivka (southwest of Bakhmut) after withdrawing these elements from fighting near Krynky and Pidstepne in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast for reconstitution and replenishment over an unspecified period of time.[49]

Russian forces recently made advances near Avdiivka and continued positional engagements with Ukrainian forces on December 24. Geolocated footage published on December 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Stepove (north of Avdiivka).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured the entirety of the vineyard area southeast of Avdiivka but that Ukrainian forces still control an unspecified part of the nearby industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka.[51] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters from Vodyane towards Pervomaiske southwest of Avdiivka and 200 meters towards the southwestern outskirts of Avdiivka itself.[52] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements occurred northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and in the direction of Ocheretyne; north of Avdiivka near Stepove; and southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[53] Ukrainian Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces have intensified shelling of Avdiivka in the past day.[54]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements west and southwest on Donetsk City on December 24. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Marinka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[55] Mashovets stated on December 24 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) and the 225th and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near Novomykhailivka.[56] Mashovets claimed that elements of 139th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (29th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) and the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District) are also operating in the Novomykhailivka area.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly did not conduct offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the area.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces mostly engaged in mutual shelling and that Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful attacks near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) in the past week.[59]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements occurred near Robotyne and Verbove and south of Hulyaipole (36km east of Orikhiv).[60] Russian milbloggers continued to comment that poor weather conditions are affecting Russian and Ukrainian forces‘ ability to conduct ground maneuver.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that a poorly trained "special contingent” deployed to the Robotyne area and reinforced an unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) unit – in line with Russian VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky’s December 23 statement that new graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School deployed to combat zones before their intended deployment date.[62] Elements of the Russian 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[63]

Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of December 24, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances in the area. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued on the east bank, including near Krynky.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have been unable to push Ukrainian forces out of the bridgehead in Krynky in the past week due to effective Ukrainian drones and electronic warfare (EW) complexes.[65] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the 2nd VDV Battalion of the Russian 337th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) moved to the Krynky area to join the “Enerhodar” combat group of forces.[66] Mashovets stated that detachments of the 345th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) from reserves of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces replaced the 2nd VDV Battalion within the “Enerhodar” group. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 328th and 337th VDV Regiments (104th VDV Division); 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District); and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) have been operating near Krynky for the past three weeks.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The newly formed 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) operating near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast is continuing to suffer losses. The mother of a Russian mobilized serviceman in the 337th VDV Regiment recorded a video appeal in which she stated that the entire 1st Company of the regiment was recently buried after fighting in the Krynky area.[67] The mother added that servicemen operating in this direction do not have effective guidance from mid-level commanders, lack artillery support, and spend 20 days in a row in trenches without water and other supplies. The mother concluded her appeal by asking Russian commanders to not use elements of the regiment as “cannon fodder.” Russian VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky published a video on December 23, in which he likely tried to address Russians’ concerns over Russia’s inability to push Ukrainian forces to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and mentioned some VDV manpower losses.[68] It is possible that Teplinsky, at least in part, was attempting to address concerned relatives of servicemen of the 104th VDV Division – which, he observed, was less combat effective than other Russian VDV elements.

Teplinsky and the Russian VDV command also appear to be facing issues with insubordination within the ranks of the 104th VDV Division. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News amplified a video on December 24, which shows a Russian commander punishing several men of the newly-formed 345th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) for failing to follow his orders by making them jump into a hole completely naked at night.[69] Elements of the 345th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating under Teplinsky’s command within the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces in southern Ukraine, and this footage indicates that Teplinsky may be facing insubordination challenges as a result of VDV losses on the east bank of the Dnipro River and/or the inexperience and insufficient preparation of VDV soldiers and their junior officers in this area.[70]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials claimed that Russia’s handling of the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is sufficient, despite recent unsafe incidents during Russian occupation of the plant. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on December 24 that the Permanent Mission of Russia to international organizations in Vienna told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that there is a sufficient number of personnel at the ZNPP to ensure its safe operation in cold and hot shutdown modes and conduct scheduled maintenance and that radiation at the facility does not exceed permissible levels.[71] Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on November 16 that Russian authorities’ actions at the ZNPP led to a leak of a boric acid solution into steam generators, and the Ukrainian Energy Ministry and IAEA recently reported on December 2 that the ZNPP lost connection with both of its external power lines for five and a half hours.[72]

Russian occupation authorities continued to build out electoral infrastructure in occupied Ukraine as part of efforts to legitimize Russian occupation and elections. Occupation officials stated that signature collection points to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign began operating in occupied Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson oblasts and that citizens must have Russian passports to participate.[73]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, December 24, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2023

Key Takeaways:

The Houthi movement likely conducted four attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea. Iran and the Houthis are functioning as a coalition to conduct combined military operations targeting international shipping in the Red Sea.
Multiple Israeli sources told Israeli media that Egypt presented a three-stage ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal to Israel and Hamas. Informed sources told Saudi Arabia-based al Sharq that Hamas “expressed agreement” with a separate Egyptian initiative that seeks to form a “technocratic” Palestinian government after the war.
Israel announced that 15 of its soldiers were killed by enemy action across the Gaza Strip in several engagements.
The Israeli Army Radio’s military correspondent reported that Hamas is implementing lessons learned in the fight against the IDF to improve its ability to defend against IDF operations.
Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against IDF clearing operations in Jabalia. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis.
Palestinian militias conducted at least one rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank.
Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Senior Advisor Ali Asghar Khaji discussed the Israel-Hamas war in a meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Vladimir Safronkov in Tehran.

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 24, 2023

Dec 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, December 24, 2023

Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Note: ISW and CTP will not publish an Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update (or maps) tomorrow, December 25, in observance of the Christmas holiday. Coverage will resume Tuesday, December 26.

Key Takeaways:

The Houthi movement likely conducted four attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea. Iran and the Houthis are functioning as a coalition to conduct combined military operations targeting international shipping in the Red Sea.
Multiple Israeli sources told Israeli media that Egypt presented a three-stage ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal to Israel and Hamas. Informed sources told Saudi Arabia-based al Sharq that Hamas “expressed agreement” with a separate Egyptian initiative that seeks to form a “technocratic” Palestinian government after the war.
Israel announced that 15 of its soldiers were killed by enemy action across the Gaza Strip in several engagements.
The Israeli Army Radio’s military correspondent reported that Hamas is implementing lessons learned in the fight against the IDF to improve its ability to defend against IDF operations.
Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against IDF clearing operations in Jabalia. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis.
Palestinian militias conducted at least one rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank.
Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Senior Advisor Ali Asghar Khaji discussed the Israel-Hamas war in a meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Vladimir Safronkov in Tehran.

The Houthi movement likely conducted four attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea on December 23.

US CENTCOM reported that unidentified fighters fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into international shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea.[1] A Yemeni journalist reported that Houthis launched both missiles from Huban, Taiz governorate.[2] CENTCOM said that no ships reported that they were hit by the missiles.[3]
US CENTCOM reported that unidentified fighters targeted the USS Laboon in the southern Red Sea with four drones.[4] CENTCOM reported that the drones originated from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory. The USS Laboon intercepted all four drones and reported no injuries or damage from the attack.
Houthi fighters conducted two attacks targeting the Norwegian-flagged Blaamanen and Indian-flagged Saibaba with one-way attack drones in the southern Red Sea.[5] The Blaamanen reported that the Houthi drone missed the ship. The Saibaban reported that one attack drone hit the ship but did not cause in casualties among the crew. CENTCOM reported that the USS Laboon responded to distress signals from both vessels at approximately 2000 local time.[6]

Iran and the Houthis are functioning as a coalition to conduct combined military operations targeting international shipping in the Red Sea. Iran considers the Axis of Resistance as its unconventional alliance of state, semi-state, and non-state actors.[7] Their anti-US and anti-Israeli ideology unites the Axis of Resistance, creating strategic alignment across its members. Multiple US officials have highlighted the role Iran plays in the targeting and execution of Houthi attacks against international shipping.[8] Iran provides the weapons and uses advisers on the ground in Yemen and at least one spy ship anchored in the Red Sea to support its Houthi partners, who execute the attacks based on Iranian advice and intelligence.[9]

Iranian state media claimed that the US-led Red Sea security coalition, Operation Prosperity Guardian, is collapsing.[10] An Iranian state Arabic-language media outlet claimed that France, Spain, and Italy’s decision to operate outside of Operation Prosperity Guardian was evidence that they and other countries in the coalition are unwilling to be the "aggressor” in the Red Sea to protect Israeli economic interests.[11] The outlet reiterated the Houthi’s false claim that its fighters only target ships en route to Israel. Recent Houthi attacks have targeted many commercial ships not traveling to Israel. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian on December 18 as a multinational security force to address security challenges in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden following Houthi attacks threatening freedom of navigation.[12] Austin reported that the coalition is composed of the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain.[13] Italy and France released separate statements announcing that their forces would operate independently in the Red Sea to secure freedom of navigation and would not operate under Operation Prosperity Guardian.[14] Spanish officials said separately that their forces would only operate under a NATO- or EU-led operations.[15]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Multiple Israeli sources told Israeli media that Egypt presented a three-stage ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal to Israel and Hamas.[16] The first phase of the deal would include Hamas releasing 40 women, the elderly, and sick men in exchange for a two-to-three week pause in fighting. The second phase would include the release of female Israeli soldiers and dead hostages and discussion on the “day after” the war in the Gaza Strip.[17] The third phase would include the release of Israeli men and soldiers in return for the release of Palestinian fighters from Israeli prisons and the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip.

Senior Israeli officials told an Israeli journalist that the Egyptian proposal was not ready and “preliminary” but that the presentation of the proposal was “positive.”[18] One official added that Israel is “considering” the plan, but another official added that it is “difficult to see” how Israel could agree to the plan’s third stage.[19] The official added that the plan’s first stage is nearly identical to the hostage exchange plan that Mossad Director David Barnea proposed to Qatar on December 18, which called for the release of forty Israeli hostages in exchange for at least a weeklong pause in fighting.[20] A senior Israeli official told the journalist that Israeli officials are not sure if Hamas would agree to the plan. Hamas said on December 23 that it will not discuss any prisoner exchange until there is a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[21] A separate Israeli media outlet reported that Israel is prepared to execute the plan’s first stage, but that the second two phases are unacceptable.[22]

Informed sources told Saudi Arabia-based al Sharq that Hamas “expressed agreement” with a separate Egyptian initiative that seeks to form a “technocratic” Palestinian government after the war.[23] Al Sharq reported on December 24 that Egypt presented the concept to unspecified Palestinian factions. The initiative notably does not contain a provision to disarm or disband Hamas as a governing body or a military force based on the details reported publicly. Israel’s stated objective for the war is the destruction of Hamas’ military and governing capacity. Al Sharq reported that Hamas seeks to hold its Israeli hostages as leverage to encourage Israel to end the war.

A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) delegation traveled to Cairo on December 24, to discuss hostage-for-prisoner exchanges with Egypt, meaning that PIJ would likely be involved in any the Egyptian initiative to end the war and form a “technocratic” government.[24] A PIJ official told Reuters that its talks in Cairo would “center on ‘ways to end’” the Israeli ground operation into the Gaza Strip. The official added that PIJ would not release hostages for prisoners until Israel agrees to a “ceasefire.”

Israel announced that 15 of its soldiers were killed by enemy action across the Gaza Strip in several engagements on December 23 and 24.[25] This rate of casualties makes December 23 and 24 one of the deadliest two-day periods for the IDF since the war began.[26] The IDF has said that 154 of its soldiers have died since the ground operation into the Gaza Strip began.[27]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated Israel’s war aims in response to criticism from his economy minister on December 24. The minister said that it is “unacceptable that [Israel] would endanger [Israeli] soldiers” by sending troops into uncleared areas without preparatory bombardments.[28] Netanyahu responded that the IDF makes its decisions based on the context on the ground. He also reiterated that Israel "will fight to the end” and that “this will be a prolonged war” aimed at freeing hostages and “eliminating Hamas.”[29]

The Israeli Army Radio’s military correspondent reported on December 24 that Hamas is implementing lessons learned in the fight against the IDF to improve its ability to defend against IDF operations. The correspondent said that Hamas is now executing “guerrilla warfare.” He said that Hamas is learning “how the IDF works and what its weak points are.”[30] The correspondent said that Hamas learned that the IDF uses unarmored vehicles to travel down some roads that Israeli forces believe are safe and that the Hamas has begun to target these unarmored vehicles.[31] He added that the IDF is forced to prioritize "strategic tunnels” due to the large number of Hamas tunnels, which allows Hamas to take advantage of other small tunnel shafts to mount attacks on IDF units.[32]

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against IDF clearing operations in Jabalia on December 24. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—said that they engaged advancing Israeli forces with thermobaric rockets and anti-tank rockets between an unspecified “military camp” and Jabalia City.[33] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of X—said that its forces were defending against IDF advances in Jabalia City.[34] The al Qassem Brigades also claimed two attacks in al Qasaib neighborhood in Jabalia, including a combined operation with the al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).[35] The IDF’s 460th Brigade Combat Team reported on December 24 that it killed seven Hamas fighters and destroyed four Hamas observation posts in Jabalia.[36]

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Zaytoun on December 24. The al Quds Brigades claimed that it fired two rocket propelled grenades and detonated an anti-tank sticky grenade targeting Israeli vehicles in Zaytoun.[37]

The al Qassem Brigades also attacked Israeli infantry conducting clearing operations near Juhor ad Dik on December 24.[38] It claimed that the attack killed six Israeli soldiers but provided no supporting evidence.

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on December 24. Israeli forces captured a weapons and explosives cache in Khan Younis on December 24.[39] The al Quds Brigades shelled advancing Israeli forces east of Khan Younis.[40] The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—said that it attacked Israeli forces advancing east of Khan Younis.[41]

Palestinian militias conducted at least one rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on December 24. The al Quds Brigades claimed that it shelled Sufa using mortars on December 24.[42] Palestinian media said that rocket fire targeting two other areas in southern Israel causing sirens to sound off.[43] CTP-ISW could not verify launches or impacts elsewhere in southern Israel, and no Palestinian militias claimed the attacks.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank overnight on December 24.[44] Palestinian fighters blocked roads with burning tires and targeted Israeli forces with multiple improvised explosive devices (IED) in Tulkarm and Tulkarm refugee camp.[45] Nablus locals posted footage of heavy fire exchanges between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters.[46]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 24.[47] LH claimed five attacks targeting civilian and military targets in Israel.[48]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Pentagon confirmed that Iran conducted the one-way drone attack on the Israeli-linked Chem Pluto off the coast of India on December 23.[49] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the attack was likely part of Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s efforts to signal their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.[50]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Senior Advisor Ali Asghar Khaji discussed the Israel-Hamas war in a meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Vladimir Safronkov in Tehran on December 24.[51] Khaji and Safronkov discussed “political ways” to end the Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip, implement an immediate ceasefire, and provide humanitarian aid to Gazans.

4. Israel Dismantles Tunnel Network That Served as Hamas Command Center

Excerpts:

Overnight Sunday, Israeli airstrikes killed dozens of Palestinians in a refugee camp in central Gaza, according to aid workers and the Palestinian health authorities.

The Israeli military said late Sunday that it had dismantled the tunnel built by Hamas to shelter commanders directing the Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel, which killed some 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians. One of Israel’s major challenges in the war against Hamas is breaking up the extensive tunnel network that enables militants to elude Israeli forces, store weapons and emerge to launch surprise attacks, the military says.

The underground network was built over two levels, the first of which was about 30 feet below ground and the second dozens of feet further down, the military said. Israeli forces said they found weapons, weapons manufacturing facilities and emergency shelters. One tunnel branch exited directly to the residence of Hamas’s northern brigade commander, Ahmed al-Ghandour, who took part in overseeing the Oct. 7 attack and who Hamas confirmed was killed in November.

Israel’s military said one of the tunnels in the network was also used to hold Israeli hostages. The bodies of five hostages were recovered from a tunnel within the northern command center, the military said. Analysts said that is an indicator that the tunnels were very important to Hamas.

Israel Dismantles Tunnel Network That Served as Hamas Command Center

Airstrikes kill dozens in central Gaza; fighting continues in southern part of enclave

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-dismantles-tunnel-network-that-served-as-hamas-command-center-51c017d4?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Carrie Keller-Lynn

Dec. 25, 2023 8:16 am ET

Palestinians comb the rubble after Israeli airstrikes on the Al Maghazi refugee camp in central Gaza. PHOTO: MOHAMMED TALATENE/ZUMA PRESS

The Israeli military said it dismantled a large, underground tunnel complex that served as Hamas’s northern command center as fighting continued in the southern Hamas stronghold of Khan Younis.

Israel said Monday that it killed a Hamas commander and a number of militants in Khan Younis, as the military shifts its focus from the north of the enclave, where it has increasing control, to the south, where it believes senior Hamas leadership is hiding.

Overnight Sunday, Israeli airstrikes killed dozens of Palestinians in a refugee camp in central Gaza, according to aid workers and the Palestinian health authorities.

The Israeli military said late Sunday that it had dismantled the tunnel built by Hamas to shelter commanders directing the Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel, which killed some 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians. One of Israel’s major challenges in the war against Hamas is breaking up the extensive tunnel network that enables militants to elude Israeli forces, store weapons and emerge to launch surprise attacks, the military says.

More than 70 people were killed and dozens more wounded in Israeli airstrikes on the Al Maghazi camp, according to Palestinian health authorities. PHOTO: MOHAMMED TALATENE/ZUMA PRESS

The underground network was built over two levels, the first of which was about 30 feet below ground and the second dozens of feet further down, the military said. Israeli forces said they found weapons, weapons manufacturing facilities and emergency shelters. One tunnel branch exited directly to the residence of Hamas’s northern brigade commander, Ahmed al-Ghandour, who took part in overseeing the Oct. 7 attack and who Hamas confirmed was killed in November.

Israel’s military said one of the tunnels in the network was also used to hold Israeli hostages. The bodies of five hostages were recovered from a tunnel within the northern command center, the military said. Analysts said that is an indicator that the tunnels were very important to Hamas.

In his traditional Christmas message, Pope Francis addressed the conflict. He appealed for an end to military operations in Gaza, “with their appalling harvest of innocent civilian victims,” and called for the provision of humanitarian aid to the battered enclave.

Israeli Military Finds Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack

Where Did the Houthis Get Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles?

Houthi rocketeers have fired an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)—a genre of weaponry ostensibly possessed only by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force—against merchant shipping.

The National Interest · by James Holmes · December 23, 2023

In recent weeks Houthi rebels fighting for control of Yemen have lashed out at mercantile shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and southern Red Sea indiscriminately, in hopes of stemming the flow of goods to Israel and raising the price of seaborne trade for countries that back the Israeli campaign in Gaza. Yemen sits astride the critical juncture between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, making such a campaign possible. But while the low-grade maritime war has made headlines, giving rise to a multinational coalition to defend freedom of the sea, reportage has muffled a glaring point about the war almost into silence.

How did Houthi Rebels get Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM)?

Specifically, on at least one occasion, Houthi rocketeers have fired an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)—a genre of weaponry ostensibly possessed only by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force—against merchant shipping. On December 3 the U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East region, reported that Yemeni rebels had lofted an antiship ballistic missile toward the U.K.-owned, Bahamanian-flagged cargo ship Unity Explorer. No less an authority than The Economist confirmed the ASBM attack.

This is a big deal.

No disrespect to the Houthi scientific-technical enterprise, which I’m sure is formidable, but it strains credulity to believe a substate group—and a group that happens to be supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, an informal client of China—has mastered technology that’s beyond everybody except Chinese engineers.

So is Beijing proliferating missile technology? It sure looks that way. Occam’s Razor says so. Whether it’s doing so inadvertently or deliberately is another question. Now, Chinese Communist Party potentates are on record opposing missile proliferation. China is not a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the informal nonproliferation body that strives to clamp down on the spread of guided missiles that could be used to deliver unconventional or conventional payloads. But it has applied for MTCR membership and agreed to enforce the regime’s guidelines on stemming proliferation while its application for membership remains under review.

Unwitting proliferation is a possibility. During the founding decades of the People’s Republic of China, in fact, the imperative to proliferate arms was etched on the institutional culture of the PLA. The armed forces had every incentive to arm others for cash. They had to raise much of their own budget amid straitened finances. Those habits of mind and deed persisted into the post-Cold War years. It’s not impossible that illicit transactions could take place unbeknownst to the Chinese Communist Party.

But even if the impulse to proliferate persists within China’s military, it seems doubtful it would extend to surreptitiously exporting frontline armaments such as antiship ballistic missiles. As noted up front, the PLA has, or until recently had, a monopoly on ASBMs. That’s a monopoly worth guarding. Rocket Force DF-21D and DF-26 missiles anchor China’s anti-access and area-denial network, affording commanders the option to strike not just land targets but moving ships at sea up to 2,000 nautical miles distant. That PLA overseers, acting on their own, would transfer a weapon system of such potency to Iran—whence it might find its way into the Houthi, Hamas, or Hezbollah arsenals, given Tehran’s proclivities—seems a stretch. Military officialdom would balk at a move of that political magnitude.

Or so you would think.

Which leaves conscious choice on the part of party leaders. There is sound strategic logic behind proliferating ASBMs around the Eurasian perimeter, even though the blowback from putting this novel technology in unpredictable hands could prove severe. During World War II geopolitics maven Nicholas Spykman, building on previous work by the likes of Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan, portrayed the Eurasian “heartland” as the key to world politics and the “rimlands” separating the heartland from the sea as an oceangoing hegemon’s portal to project influence into the Eurasian supercontinent.

A Great Britain in its imperial heyday, or a postwar America could maneuver around the Eurasian periphery, setting the political and strategic agenda from the sea. But as Spykman pointed out, that could only happen if the Royal Navy or U.S. Navy could get to the rimlands. A dominant navy couldn’t control events unless it could wrest command of the “marginal seas” around the periphery from local defenders.

Strategies aimed at warding off a dominant Western navy make eminent sense if you’re sitting in Beijing, or Tehran, or Moscow today. Enter the antiship ballistic missile. Over the past century-plus, advances in maritime weapons technology have superempowered lesser navies as well as coastal defenders fighting from shore. First came the torpedo and sea mine, which gave small craft such as submarines and torpedo boats the ability to land heavy blows against battleships and cruisers, then the coin of the realm of naval warfare. Then came military aviation, which enabled carrier and land-based warplanes to strike at capital ships at long range. And then came the guided-missile revolution, which further skewed the balance toward shore-based sea power.

Merging these once and future bleeding-edge technologies into access and area denial could allow resident Asian powers to undo centuries of Western maritime supremacy—and in turn undo Western stewardship over the international order. Such a project would comport with stated aims out of China and kindred powers, not to mention substate antagonists like the Houthis.

And yet. It remains hard to fathom why any sensible competitor would deliberately export technology that could be turned against it. Alliances, coalitions, and partnerships are perishable, while weapons endure—witness the spectacle of Soviet-equipped armed forces clashing in Ukraine. Proliferating antiship ballistic missiles would be an endeavor fraught with risk and peril for China.

One hopes dwellers in the shadowy world of classified intelligence are looking into this matter, in an effort to parse not just what has transpired but what China’s motives might be and what the future may hold in Eurasia’s environs. Foresight constitutes the first step toward wise counterstrategy.

Developing.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

All images are Creative Commons.

The National Interest · by James Holmes · December 23, 2023

6. Japan pouring billions into sea-based missile defense

Excerpts:

Naval News describes the ASEV as similar to two Maya-class ships with a Mk-45 (Mod.4) 5-inch/62-caliber (127 mm) main gun, SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 missiles. The ASEVs are set to be upgradeable throughout their projected 40-year service lives.

In an August 2023 article for The Warzone, Thomas Newdick notes that the new ships will take on a more extensive counter-hypersonic weapons capability over time with the addition of new weaponry.

Newdick says the vessel will also include the latest and much more capable version of Type 12 anti-ship missiles now in development, giving them a kinetic capability beyond their anti-air/anti-ballistic missile role.

...

Still, Japan will find it challenging to maintain its ASEVs around the clock, compared to land-based missile defenses that can be held at constant readiness, and will likely face the same operational problems besetting its Aegis destroyer fleet regarding logistics, personnel and maintenance.

At the same time, Japan’s ASEVs will no doubt become priority targets for China’s DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles and North Korea’s extensive missile arsenal.

Japan pouring billions into sea-based missile defense

Aegis System Equipped Vessel project marks hard shift from land to naval missile defense, with an eye on China and North Korea

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 25, 2023

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) has allocated substantial funding to build two massive Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV), marking a pivotal shift from land-based systems to a more dynamic and versatile naval approach to countering ballistic missile threats from China and North Korea.

Naval News reported that the MOD has secured US$2.6 billion (373.1 billion yen) for fiscal year 2024 to build two ASEVs. The big-ticket budget allocation comes after Japan scrapped earlier plans to deploy a land-based Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system.

Naval News notes that Japan’s MOD plans to begin building the first ship in the next fiscal year and requested 379.7 billion yen in a defense budget request on August 31.

It says that the final budget for the ASEVs’ construction is almost the same as ordered. Naval News says that Defense Minister Minoru Kihara met with Finance Minister Shunichi Suzuki to discuss the matter on December 19.

Japan’s MOD has selected Lockheed Martin-made AN/SPY-7 solid-state radars (SSRs) for the two ASEVs over Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6 radar, which was initially designed for US Navy warships equipped with the Aegis Combat System.

A Japanese Aegis Ashore destroyer. Image: Twitter

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is expected to take delivery of the first ASEV during fiscal year 2027, with the second one delivered in fiscal 2028, according to the Naval News report.

Naval News describes the ASEV as similar to two Maya-class ships with a Mk-45 (Mod.4) 5-inch/62-caliber (127 mm) main gun, SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 missiles. The ASEVs are set to be upgradeable throughout their projected 40-year service lives.

In an August 2023 article for The Warzone, Thomas Newdick notes that the new ships will take on a more extensive counter-hypersonic weapons capability over time with the addition of new weaponry.

Newdick says the vessel will also include the latest and much more capable version of Type 12 anti-ship missiles now in development, giving them a kinetic capability beyond their anti-air/anti-ballistic missile role.

He notes that the ASEVs will have 128 vertical launch cells and a 240-strong crew and that from fiscal year 2032 the ASEVs will be armed with high-power laser weapons, primarily for use against hostile drones.

Newdick mentions that the ASEVs are meant to be a follow-on to the Maya-class, with their design making them multi-role conventional surface combatants and not just floating missile defense platforms.

He also draws comparisons between the ASEV and China’s Type 55 cruisers, saying that while the ASEV is more focused on missile defense, the Type 55 performs a broader range of missions such as operating as part of a carrier battlegroup or the flagship of a surface action group.

Japan’s 2023 Defense White Paper says that the ASEV will provide integrated air and missile defense capabilities in response to increasingly sophisticated airborne threats.

Akihisa Nagashima, in an August 2021 Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) paper, mentions that given North Korea’s increasing missile threats, Japan needs a missile defense system that can defend against missile attacks 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

Nagashima says that the ASEVs could free US and Japanese Aegis destroyers from ballistic missile defense (BMD) patrols in the Sea of Japan, increasing their availability for operations in southwestern Japan, particularly around the Ryukyu Islands.

That, in turn, would allow them to refocus on their primary missions of fleet air defense and anti-submarine warfare against Chinese incursions into the open waters of the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait.

The ASEVs can also enhance the survivability of Japan’s missile defenses against a potential saturation attack from China or North Korea. Asia Times noted this month that China has enough munitions to hit 500 critical targets in Japan, with land-based missile defense-related infrastructure likely to be on any Chinese target list.

ASEVs could provide a mobile, survivable platform to maintain missile defense capabilities and cover the gaps in Japan’s land-based defenses. Aside from lasers, Japan’s ASEVs may be armed with railguns.

In October 2023, Asia Times reported that Japan had successfully tested a medium-caliber maritime electromagnetic railgun via an offshore platform, indicating the potential for shipborne deployment aboard ASEVs.

The test was conducted by Japan’s Acquisition Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The railgun uses electromagnetic energy to propel projectiles at extremely high velocities, potentially reaching hypersonic speeds.

Japan plans to deploy the weapon on land and at sea. The railgun can fire 40 mm steel projectiles weighing 320 grams each and will eventually run on 20 megajoules of charge energy.

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Railguns have numerous advantages over missiles and could prove to be the most cost-effective defense against hypersonic threats. Railgun projectiles are comparatively more affordable per round, costing at most US$35,000 while an SM-3 missile round costs $30 million.

Moreover, railgun projectiles are devoid of explosives and eliminate targets solely through kinetic energy, unlike artillery shells and missiles. This feature reduces the burden on logistics and improves handling safety, allowing for storing additional ammunition on ships or in batteries located on land.

Japan has successfully tested its railgun at sea. Image: ATLA via X/Twitter

Railguns are also unaffected by weather and line-of-sight conditions, unlike laser weapons, which represent an alternative missile defense technology. Still, Japan’s ASEVs will hardly eliminate or neutralize China and North Korea’s evolving missile threats.

Still, Japan will find it challenging to maintain its ASEVs around the clock, compared to land-based missile defenses that can be held at constant readiness, and will likely face the same operational problems besetting its Aegis destroyer fleet regarding logistics, personnel and maintenance.

At the same time, Japan’s ASEVs will no doubt become priority targets for China’s DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles and North Korea’s extensive missile arsenal.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 25, 2023

7. Russian Troops Surrendering in 'Whole Groups’ Because of ‘Inhumane Commanders’

Russian Troops Surrendering in 'Whole Groups’ Because of ‘Inhumane Commanders’

by Kyiv Post | December 25, 2023, 1:56 pm | Comments ( 1)

kyivpost.com

There’s plenty of video evidence to support the claim including one which emerged yesterday showing Russian soldiers rallying against their “lying commanders.”

by Kyiv Post | December 25, 2023, 1:56 pm |

File photo of Russian troops surrendering. PHOTO: Ukrinform

“Entire groups” of Russian soldiers are surrendering en-masse due to the “inhuman attitude” of their commanders, the Ukrainian military has said.

According to Oleksandr Shtupun, the spokesman for the Tavria Grouping of Troops, more and more of Moscow’s troops are also snubbing orders to assault Ukrainian positions.

Speaking on national TV, he said: “It should be noted that whole groups of Russian soldiers are seen surrendering.

“One of the reasons that the enemy does this is what I’d say is inhuman attitude on the part of their command.

“For refusing to deploy on pointless assaults or for other offenses, some officers would strip them naked in winter cold and hold them in cold pits, beating them and threatening them with execution.”

There is plenty of evidence to support Shtupun’s claim – last month a video emerged showing Russian soldiers being beaten and forced to dig holes in which they were made to stand for hours.

The video – posted online by the Russian anti-corruption group Gulagu.net – shows a number of men cowering on the ground as they’re beaten by sticks.

Later in the footage, another solider repeatedly fires a gun just inches from a soldier’s head, narrowly missing him.

Вторая армия мира, процесс воспитания трусов и наркоманов, часть 1 (полное видео https://t.co/sKAl1cFTJq, да, может, кто-то определит место действия?) #всрф #роа #русскиймир pic.twitter.com/k60RVSicau

— Necro Mancer (@666_mancer) November 14, 2023

And just yesterday a video emerged of a group of Russian soldiers in an expletive-laden video expressing their outrage at learning they will not be territorial defense soldiers as they thought, but would be assault troops sent to the front with no training.

President Zelensky's Christmas Address in Full

"For the second year now, we have learned another form of it, another dimension. This is Christmas in times of full-scale war."

Recorded at an unknown location, a group of men can be seen chanting “f**king commanders.”

The camera then pans to one soldier who launches into a furious tirade. “Check this out,” he says.

“We’ve been here since the 26th, f**king officers have been f**king lying to our faces that we are territorial defense.

"We haven't seen or held an assault rifle yet," Russian soldiers complain that they are being sent to the front without training.

But that's exactly what Putin's plan is — he has a huge amount of human resources for "meat assaults". pic.twitter.com/LLbW5ogMXr

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) December 23, 2023

“And now the lieutenant colonel came out and said it’s the first time he’s heard that, and it turns out we are a rifle unit.

“We are f**king assault troops, we are not territorial defense and they just tell us now!”

kyivpost.com

8. Fort Liberty removes last Confederate commemoration on post (Schoomaker and Beckwith)

Fort Liberty removes last Confederate commemoration on post

fayobserver.com

View Original

FORT LIBERTY — Fort Liberty completed its redesignation this month by renaming its final road and building named after a Confederate.

In December 2020, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act, which includes a provision mandating military installations named after Confederates to be renamed.

Fort Liberty, which was named after Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg, was renamed in June, and roads and other buildings on post named after Confederates have been renamed throughout the year.

Lodge and road renamed

McKellar Lodge and road, previously named after Confederate Capt. John McKellar, were renamed after two Special Forces soldiers, during a Dec. 15 ceremony.

The road is now named after retired Gen. Peter Schoomaker, while the lodge is renamed after retired Col. Charles Beckwith.

Schoomaker's and Beckwith’s names received the most support among a group of more than 20 others who served during all eras, said Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps and Fort Liberty.

“And if you look at their careers, you know exactly why,” Donahue said during the ceremony.

Both Schoomaker and Beckwith have historical ties to multiple units on the installation and took part in Operation Eagle Claw, the mission to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980, a Fort Liberty news release stated.

Retired Command Sgt. Maj. and Green Beret Ronnie McCain, who participated in the review committee for Fort Liberty’s redesignation, said that although some local veterans had initial pushback about the renaming, most have become supportive after seeing individuals with ties to the installation like Schoomaker and Beckwith being recognized.

“Gen. Schoomaker and Col. Beckwith represent what the community is all about — patriotism and service,” McCain said.

Beckwith Lodge

According to Beckwith’s biography, he was drafted by the Green Bay Packers while playing football for the University of Georgia, but turned down the offer to serve in the Army, and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1952.

In 1958, Beckwith volunteered for Special Forces and was assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group at then-Fort Bragg.

He deployed to Laos in 1960 for two years during Operation Hotfoot and was sent as an exchange officer to the British 22nd Special Air Service in 1962, conducting counterinsurgency operations in Malaya with the British unit.

According to his biography, his service with the British unit forged his concept for an American Special Air service unit.

In 1965, Beckwith volunteered to return to Vietnam, where he commanded a “high-priority Special Forces unit” with the code name Project Delta, his biography states.

While leading B-52 aircraft in the rescue of the besieged Special Forces camp at Plei Me, Beckwith was wounded in 1966.

He returned to Vietnam in 1968 to command the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division for nine months during several combat missions.

After commanding a control team with the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand from 1973 to 1974, he became commandant for the U.S. Army Special Warfare School in 1975.

He helped create the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, which founded in November 1977 as a counterterrorist unit and had its first mission to Iran to rescue 54 American hostages.

Beckwith’s recommendations to Congress after the failed mission to Iran helped create the Joint Special Operations Command, according to his biography.

Beckwith retired in 1981 and formed a consulting agency based in Austin, Texas, and died from natural causes June 13, 1994.

Beckwith’s daughter, former Army Reserve Maj. Connie Howe, attended the redesignation ceremony on the family’s behalf.

“Knowing that McKellar’s Lodge started off as a log cabin where back in the 1920s officers would come and rest their horses and take a break would have appealed to my dad,” Howe said.

She referenced a nearby pond being the location where then-Brig. Gen. William Yarborough met with former President John F. Kennedy in 1961 and persuaded Kennedy to allow the green beret to be the official headgear for Special Forces.

“So a lot went on here and of course all of the families that have come through McKellar’s Lodge, my father, he fished out on that pond. This couldn’t have been a better choice,” Howe said.

Schoomaker Road

According to the news release, Schoomaker served under Beckwith’s command in 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha and later took command of the unit.

Schoomaker started his career as an armored officer and served at installations throughout the U.S. and Germany, before becoming commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, Donahue said.

“If you look at everything he had to develop, the standards, the discipline, everything that has become that organization — he's the person that represents that,” Donahue said.

After his 2000 retirement, Schoomaker became chief of staff of the Army in 2003 and retired in 2007 with more than 35 years of service.

“What he did to make sure our Army could go and sustain two campaigns in two different countries — absolutely amazing,” Donahue said. “If there’s any question (about) his peers and subordinates nominating him to have this naming — that's the why.”

These 9 Fort Bragg roads will be renamed

PHOTOS: 3rd Special Forces Group commemorates renaming Randolph Street to R. Miller Street

During the ceremony, Schoomarker said he considers it an honor to have the road renamed after him.

“But I want you to know this will always be the road to Range 19 out here and was traveled by some extraordinary people every day that served faithfully and honorably,” he said.

With Fort Liberty’s redesignation completed, garrison commander Col. John Wilcox said honoring Schoomaker and Beckwith is a capstone and a reminder of soldiers' service to the nation throughout history.

“For anyone who knows anything about the (special operation forces) community, these two are synonymous with what special operations represents, honoring the best of the community,” Wilcox said in the news release. “Some names have changed, but there is no change in the focus and dedication of our soldiers.”

Staff writer Rachael Riley can be reached at rriley@fayobserver.com or 910-486-3528.

9. US tensions with China are fraying long-cultivated academic ties. Will the chill hurt US interests?

I suppose it depends on how you define US interests.

Excerpts:

In August, Fu was joined by Guan Kunliang, a fellow scientist in San Diego, who also was investigated. Guan was banned from applying for NIH grants for two years. Guan didn’t lose his job, but his lab had shrunk. Now, he’s rebuilding a molecular cell biology lab at Westlake.

Li Chenjian, a former vice provost of Peking University, said the talent loss to China is a complicated question and the worry might be overblown because the U.S. remains the go-to place for the world’s best brains and has an excess of talent.

More than 87% of Chinese students who received their doctorates in the U.S. had planned to stay in the U.S. from 2005 to 2015, according to the National Science Foundation. The percentage fell to 73.9 in 2021 but rose to 76.7 in 2022, above the average of 74.3% for all foreign students who had earned research doctorate degrees in the U.S.

Rao Yi, a prominent neurobiologist who returned to China from the U.S. in 2007, said American policies related to the China Initiative were “morally wrong.”

“We will see how long it will take for the U.S. government and its morally upright scientists to correct such mistakes and come around to see the bigger picture of human development, beyond petty-mindedness and shortsightedness,” he said. “Throughout history, it is always the morally corrupt governments which advocate the blocking of scientific communication and persecution of scientists.”

US tensions with China are fraying long-cultivated academic ties. Will the chill hurt US interests?

AP · December 23, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — In the 1980s, Fu Xiangdong was a young Chinese virology student who came to the United States to study biochemistry. More than three decades later, he had a prestigious professorship in California and was conducting promising research on Parkinson’s disease.

But now Fu is doing his research at a Chinese university. His American career was derailed as U.S.-China relations unraveled, putting his collaborations with a Chinese university under scrutiny. He ended up resigning.

Fu’s story mirrors the rise and fall of U.S.-China academic engagement.

Beginning in 1978, such cooperation expanded for decades, largely insulated from the fluctuations in relations between the two countries. Today, it’s in decline, with Washington viewing Beijing as a strategic rival and there are growing fears about Chinese spying. The number of Chinese students in the United States is down, and U.S.-Chinese research collaboration is shrinking. Academics are shying away from potential China projects over fears that seemingly minor missteps could end their careers.

This decline isn’t hurting just students and researchers. Analysts say it will undercut American competitiveness and weaken global efforts to address health issues. Previous collaborations have led to significant advances, including in influenza surveillance and vaccine development.

“That’s been really harmful to U.S. science,” said Deborah Seligsohn, a former U.S. diplomat in Beijing and now a political scientist at Villanova University. “We are producing less science because of this falloff.”

For some, given the heightened U.S.-China tensions, the prospect for scientific advances needs to take a back seat to security concerns. In their view, such cooperation aids China by giving it access to sensitive commercial, defense and technological information. They also fear the Chinese government is using its presence in American universities to monitor and harass dissidents.

Those concerns were at the core of the China Initiative, a program begun in 2018 by the Justice Department under the Trump administration to uncover acts of economic espionage. While it failed to catch any spies, the effort did have an impact on researchers in American schools.

Under the initiative, Gang Chen, a professor of mechanical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was charged in 2021 with hiding links with the Chinese government. Prosecutors eventually dropped all charges, but Chen lost his research group. He said his family went through a hard time and has yet to recover.

Chen said investigations and wrongful prosecutions like his “are pushing out talents.”

“That’s going to hurt U.S. scientific enterprise, hurt U.S. competitiveness,” he said.

The Biden administration ended the China Initiative in 2022, but there are other efforts targeting scholars with Chinese connections.

In Florida, a state law aimed at curbing influences from foreign countries has raised concerns that students from China could effectively be banned from labs at the state’s public universities.

This month, a group of Republican senators expressed concerns about Beijing’s influence on American campuses through student groups and urged the Justice Department to determine whether such groups should be registered as foreign agents.

Miles Yu, director of the China Center at Hudson Institute, said Beijing has exploited U.S. higher education and research institutes to modernize its economy and military.

“For some time, out of cultural, self-interest reasons, many people have double loyalty, erroneously thinking it’s OK to serve the interests of both the U.S. and China,” Yu said.

The U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement — the first major pact between the two countries, signed in 1979 — was set to lapse this year. In August, Congress extended the agreement by six months, but its future also hangs in the balance.

If there is a new agreement, it should take into account new advances in science and technology, Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador to China, said recently.

There were only 700 American students studying in China, Burns said, compared with nearly 300,000 Chinese students in the U.S., which is down from a peak of about 372,000 in 2019-2020.

By October, nearly all Confucius Institutes, a Beijing-backed Chinese language and culture program, had closed on American university campuses. Their number fell from about 100 in 2019 to fewer than five now, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

The National Institute of Health in 2018 began an investigation into foreign ties by asking dozens of American institutions to look into whether their faculty members might have violated policies regarding use of federal money, usually in cases involving partnerships with Chinese institutions.

In the case of Fu, then a professor at the University of California, San Diego, his links with Wuhan University were the focus of the NIH investigation. Fu insisted that federal money was never used toward work there, according to the local news outlet La Jolla Light, but the university ruled against him.

In a China Initiative case, Charles Lieber, a former chair of chemistry and chemical biology at Harvard University, was found guilty in December 2021 of lying to the federal government about his affiliations with a Chinese university and a Chinese government talent-recruitment program.

Chen, the MIT professor, said once-encouraged collaborations suddenly became problematic. Disclosure rules had been unclear, and in many cases such collaborations had been commended, he said.

“Very few people in the general public understand that most U.S. universities, including MIT, don’t take on any secret research projects on campus,” Chen said. “We aim to publish our research findings.”

The investigations have had negative effects on university campuses. “People are so fearful that, if you check the wrong box, you could be accused of lying to the government,” Chen said.

In June, an academic study published in the peer-reviewed Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences journal said the China Initiative likely has caused widespread fear and anxiety among scientists of Chinese descent.

The study, which surveyed 1,304 scientists of Chinese descent employed by American universities, showed many considered leaving the U.S. or no longer applying for federal grants, the researchers wrote.

An analysis of research papers in the PubMed database showed that, as of 2021, U.S. scientists still co-wrote more papers with scientists from China than from any other country, but those with a history of collaborating with China experienced a decline in research productivity after 2019, soon after the NIH investigation started.

The study, to be published in the PNAS journal by the year’s end, found the impact of U.S.-based scholars in collaboration with China, as measured by citations, fell by 10%.

“It has a chilling effect on science” said Ruixue Jia, the study’s leading researcher, of the NIH investigation. “While researchers tried to finish existing cooperative projects, they were unwilling to start new ones, and the results could become worse. Both countries have been hurt.”

Three months after Fu resigned from the California school, his name appeared on the website of Westlake University, a private research university in the Chinese city of Hangzhou. At Westlake, Fu leads a lab to tackle issues in RNA biology and regenerative medicine.

In August, Fu was joined by Guan Kunliang, a fellow scientist in San Diego, who also was investigated. Guan was banned from applying for NIH grants for two years. Guan didn’t lose his job, but his lab had shrunk. Now, he’s rebuilding a molecular cell biology lab at Westlake.

Li Chenjian, a former vice provost of Peking University, said the talent loss to China is a complicated question and the worry might be overblown because the U.S. remains the go-to place for the world’s best brains and has an excess of talent.

More than 87% of Chinese students who received their doctorates in the U.S. had planned to stay in the U.S. from 2005 to 2015, according to the National Science Foundation. The percentage fell to 73.9 in 2021 but rose to 76.7 in 2022, above the average of 74.3% for all foreign students who had earned research doctorate degrees in the U.S.

Rao Yi, a prominent neurobiologist who returned to China from the U.S. in 2007, said American policies related to the China Initiative were “morally wrong.”

“We will see how long it will take for the U.S. government and its morally upright scientists to correct such mistakes and come around to see the bigger picture of human development, beyond petty-mindedness and shortsightedness,” he said. “Throughout history, it is always the morally corrupt governments which advocate the blocking of scientific communication and persecution of scientists.”

___

Associated Press writers Christina Larson and Collin Binkley contributed to this report

AP · December 23, 2023

10. Southeast Asia Appears Stuck In A History Trap – Analysis

Excerpts:

They hold onto the hope that Washington and Beijing will finally see sense and agree that because things were much better for all in the 2000s that should be their shared vision for the future.

If there is a purpose to “hedging”, it is presumably to play both superpowers off against one another to extract the most benefits. Yet the downside is that you make yourself dependent on both sides, as has been the case: As a share of overall ASEAN trade, the United States and China have taken on a larger, not smaller, percentage in recent years.

Hedging, as manifested today, is to take both sides, rather than to take neither side. That is problematic, to say the least, if there is a possibility of both sides going to war, when you will be forced by events outside your control and at a time not of your choosing to decide which side to take.

None of this is unreasonable from an emotional level; it’s only natural for Southeast Asian leaders, by 1999, to have been jubilant that the horrors of the 20th century were over and that their societies could finally have the stability to become prosperous – thanks to the Inter-Cold War Era.

It’s only natural to want the good times to continue. Sadly, they’re over and the world is once again a far more unstable and unpredictable place, including in ASEAN’s northwest. Nostalgia for times past will only get you so far.

Southeast Asia Appears Stuck In A History Trap – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · December 25, 2023

By David Hutt

The story Southeast Asia likes to tell itself is that, by the late 1990s, it had something like its “end of history” moment.

By 1999, the region was free of colonialism, with the last push made by Timor-Leste, which that year held a referendum to throw off Indonesian imperialism. With that development, the region’s national borders appeared to be finally decided and revanchism, although it was still voiced on the fringes, had ended.

All Southeast Asian countries, except Timor-Leste, were members of ASEAN. Communist Vietnam and Laos were stable and internationally accepted. Anti-communist tyrants like Indonesia’s Suharto, Burma’s Ne Win and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines had either resigned or been ousted.

And the worst crimes of the Cold War-era, including the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia, were not just over but there was to finally be some sort of justice. In 1999, the holdout Khmer Rouge leaders finally surrendered and Ta Mok, its former army chief, was symbolically arrested by the local authorities.

Today, however, Southeast Asia finds itself trapped by history.

On the one hand, it became evident in February 2021 that not all of 20th-century history was over. The military coup in Myanmar that month awakened many to the reality that some elements of the pre-Cold War period had not been solved.

Indeed, Myanmar has been trapped in the early 20th century since independence from Britain in 1948. Whereas all other Southeast Asian threw off their colonial powers and then resolved their internal battles over what form of government would follow, Myanmar did not.

Myanmar as outlier

Anti-colonial struggles are conflicts against a foreign aggressor and civil wars at the same time. It is not enough to claim self-determination; it must be determined what sort of self you want once free.

The partition of Vietnam was both things at once. Many historians date the Cambodian Civil War as beginning in either 1967 (with the Samlaut Uprising) or 1979 (with the Lon Nol “coup”) but those same political schisms were latent, though blanketed, under Nordom Sihanouk’s regime that ruled after independence.

The People’s Power uprising in the Philippines in 1986 was essentially the answer to the question — constitutional or personalist rule — that was posed when the country gained independence from Spain in 1898, and, indeed, was the internal debate within almost all of José Rizal’s writings.

But Myanmar never went through this process — or, rather, successive military juntas never allowed the question to be seriously explored. The 1962 coup effectively froze in time the question of self-determination of Myanmar’s myriad ethnic minorities, a remnant of colonial rule.

In two ways, Myanmar under the military remained a colonial holdout: The Bamar center colonized the ethnic periphery and the anti-colonial struggle was never allowed to fully run its course. The cataclysm of the 2021 military coup appears to be the event that will finally bring this historical question to a proper solution.

The answer offered by the anti-junta movement, centered on the National Unity Government, is a revolutionary federal state, in which Myanmar maintains its same territorial borders but vastly more power and autonomy is given to the ethnic areas, while at the same time the national army, a product of anti-colonialism, will be dissolved and something (perhaps a network of militias) will take its place.

The junta’s answer, the same that its predecessors offered, is devolution based on the permission of a central authority, implemented through peace talks. The problem with this answer, as has been the case in the past, is that it is dependent not upon rules or laws but the whims of whichever general is sitting in Naypyidaw, so essentially yet another delay in answering the post-colonial civil war question.

Yet, for now at least, according to some hopeful observers, the forces of revolution are prevailing over the forces of reaction in Myanmar.

Baked-in crisis

Alas, the rest of Southeast Asia seems unwilling to accept that a historical reckoning must happen in Myanmar for there to be any progress.

One can put aside the fatuousness of permitting Myanmar entrance into ASEAN in 1997 before those civil-war conflicts were solved, yet ASEAN still doesn’t accept that by doing so it institutionalized those conflicts into the regional system.

In other words, by accepting Myanmar into the ASEAN bloc, the rest of the region (perhaps) unwittingly accepted a share of responsibility for solving those historical conflicts. This point is still not appreciated by ASEAN in its continued insistence that the solution to the current crisis is to return to a point in time: the status quo ante.

Yet, even if that return was feasible, which it isn’t, ASEAN would still be left with the situation of Myanmar’s 20th-century conflicts sparking another similar crisis at some point in the future.

ASEAN is, therefore, trapped in apparently thinking that Myanmar is unique in that it won’t have to go through the same bloody processes that the rest of the region did — a final reckoning of post-colonial civil wars — and clearly thinks that the region’s responsibility is to forestall, not assist, this process.

On the other hand, Southeast Asia is also in a history trap of believing that the post-Cold War era is still alive.

It can be fairly said that the region, aside from China, was the biggest beneficiary of the world order left after the collapse of communism in Europe. A cursory look at how the region has developed economically, culturally and socially since 1989 is enough to make that argument.

But what should we call the period between 1989 and, roughly, 2019? The “Chimerica Era”, that chimera when the United States and China thought they could get along and when the West thought that Beijing was playing by the same rules? Or, perhaps, the “Inter-Cold War Era?”

Nostalgia not enough

In any case, that period is now over. Yet, Southeast Asia’s leaders still think that they can deny its disappearance by repeatedly stating their opposition to what has come after – a “New Cold War” – as if denying something’s existence makes it not exist.

They hold onto the hope that Washington and Beijing will finally see sense and agree that because things were much better for all in the 2000s that should be their shared vision for the future.

If there is a purpose to “hedging”, it is presumably to play both superpowers off against one another to extract the most benefits. Yet the downside is that you make yourself dependent on both sides, as has been the case: As a share of overall ASEAN trade, the United States and China have taken on a larger, not smaller, percentage in recent years.

Hedging, as manifested today, is to take both sides, rather than to take neither side. That is problematic, to say the least, if there is a possibility of both sides going to war, when you will be forced by events outside your control and at a time not of your choosing to decide which side to take.

None of this is unreasonable from an emotional level; it’s only natural for Southeast Asian leaders, by 1999, to have been jubilant that the horrors of the 20th century were over and that their societies could finally have the stability to become prosperous – thanks to the Inter-Cold War Era.

It’s only natural to want the good times to continue. Sadly, they’re over and the world is once again a far more unstable and unpredictable place, including in ASEAN’s northwest. Nostalgia for times past will only get you so far.

David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. As a journalist, he has covered Southeast Asian politics since 2014. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of Radio Free Asia and RFA sister organization BenarNews

eurasiareview.com · December 25, 2023

11. Why China is keeping its distance as Russia and North Korea cosy up

Perhaps China wants to allow Russia and north Korea to create dilemmas for the US and the international community while it can appear to keep its hands clean in some areas..

China Diplomacy

Why China is keeping its distance as Russia and North Korea cosy up

Beijing, a close partner of Moscow and Pyongyang, is staying quiet about the growing alignment between its two neighbours
Observers say China is cautious about joining trilateral axis that could trigger ‘new cold war’ as it positions itself as regional ‘stabiliser’
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3246165/why-china-keeping-its-distance-russia-and-north-korea-cosy?utm_source=pocket_saves

Kawala Xie

+ FOLLOWPublished: 6:00am, 25 Dec, 2023

At last month’s meeting between the foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea – their first in four years – Beijing pledged to be Northeast Asia’s “stabiliser” while opposing bloc-based cooperation, as the launch of North Korea’s spy satellite loomed.

The satellite, allegedly capable of spying on the White House and US naval bases, was the first to successfully enter orbit following previous failed attempts. This prompted South Korean intelligence to speculate that North Korea had received key technical support from Russia in return for delivery of weapons to support the war in Ukraine. Both Russia and North Korea have denied any arms deal.

The matter was widely speculated to have been discussed at a rare meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in September.

Satellite imagery suggests North Korea is supplying Russia with weapons through Rason port

Engagement between the two nations has grown amid international isolation.

Advertisement | All is calm.

Xi Jinping tells North Korea’s Kim he can make ‘greater contribution’ to ties

2 Nov 2023

At the closely watched summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Joe Biden last month, the two leaders agreed to manage heightening tensions between the two superpowers. However, there were no breakthroughs on major points of contention such as the growing military competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The US and its treaty allies Japan and South Korea have increased military coordination to tackle what they call an “increasingly assertive” China in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s relations with its two East Asian neighbours have also been strained in recent years.

But the China-Japan-South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting last month offered a fresh opportunity to repair ties, with an aim to refocus on economic cooperation.

Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University, said that given the recent signs of improving ties with the US, Japan and South Korea, China was unlikely to engage in trilateral activities with Russia and North Korea that would escalate tensions again, such as a joint military drill.

“The situation on the [Korean] peninsula is still very dangerous,” Shi said. “China does not think it needs to get closer with a close-enough North Korea, which is one of the sources of high tension on the peninsula.”

North Korea reportedly photographs White House and Pentagon with spy satellite

Yongwook Ryu, a China and Korea affairs specialist at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, said China was reluctant to participate in a three-way military drill because it was concerned that doing so would amount to a “new cold war” – something China has accused the United States of conducting.

Chinese and US envoys to the UN Security Council traded blame on Tuesday when they met to discuss North Korea’s recent military activities, including an intercontinental ballistic missile launch last week. North Korea’s fifth ICBM launch this year, the highest annual number ever, followed US plans to include nuclear operation exercises in joint military drills with South Korea, and the reported arrival of a US nuclear submarine at a South Korean port.

US representative Robert Wood demanded that China and Russia join the rest of the council to “act” on Pyongyang, while China’s Geng Shuang, in a veiled swipe at the US, blamed “a certain country” for escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula by offering “extended deterrents” and strengthening regional military alliances.

North Korea to keep ‘raising the stakes’ with more ICBM tests expected

Beijing has been reluctant to condemn North Korea’s military developments and opposes new Security Council sanctions, saying it would not solve the problem. It has instead called for Pyongyang’s legitimate security concerns to be addressed and a “dual suspension” approach to achieve denuclearisation – requiring North Korea to freeze its missile and nuclear programme and the South Korea and the US to halt joint military exercises.

North Korea and the US held a few rounds of nuclear talks while former US president Donald Trump was in office, but those ended in stalemates after the two countries failed to agree on a common approach to denuclearisation. Pyongyang has since ramped up missile launches and threatened a seventh nuclear test, with the US and South Korea expanding their large-scale military drills in response.

US presses China on North Korea’s weapons supplies to Russia

30 Oct 2023

Observers have said Beijing might prefer to maintain the status quo on the peninsula out of fears that pressuring North Korea too hard could make it an enemy.

Ryu noted that given the intensifying US-China rivalry, it was in Beijing’s interests for Washington to be tied up in North Korean military threats.

“While Beijing does not deliberately incite instability and conflict on the Korean peninsula, instability on the peninsula – falling short of actual military conflict – would serve Beijing’s interests by diverting the attention and resources of the US and its key allies such as Japan,” he said.

“How much Beijing prioritises the Korean peninsula over other issues such as its rivalry with the US and Taiwan is questionable. Hence it is doubtful if and to what extent Beijing will actually play a constructive role in constraining the North’s provocative behaviour,” Ryu said, adding there was also no guarantee Pyongyang would heed Beijing’s advice or suggestions.

The international community has repeatedly urged China to help to stop North Korea’s military aggression, but Beijing has often hinted that it does not have the required influence over Pyongyang.

“Good relations between China and North Korea and China’s influence on North Korea are two different concepts,” Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said in September when asked about Seoul’s request for Beijing to do more to rein in Pyongyang.

In an interview with The Telegraph last month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol said China had an important role to play in regional stability, and he believed China’s alignment with North Korea and Russia would not serve its interests.

China, Japan, South Korea’s top diplomats agree to revive leadership summit

26 Nov 2023

Daniel Russel, who served as US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under former president Barack Obama, said Beijing’s “standoffishness” towards the closer alignment between Russia and North Korea was because it did not want to be held accountable for the “misbehaviour of a partner nation”.

“Beijing does not want to pay a price or be held responsible for provocative behaviour by North Korea that China has no control over,” said Russel, who is now vice-president of the Asia Society Policy Institute.

“Beijing offers rhetorical and other forms of support to Russia and North Korea where it essentially costs China nothing, but balks at overt support for their behaviour when it risks retaliation or international condemnation,” Russel said, citing as an example China’s denial of having provided arms for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Russel added that China might also be wary of Russia and North Korea’s growing alignment because it could weaken Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang.

“North Korean leaders have long tried to play one major power off against another, and Kim’s opportunistic embrace of Vladimir Putin is the latest example. Kim is attempting to gain leverage over Beijing – or weaken Beijing’s leverage over him – by showing that he has options other than China,” he said.

Kim told Putin that relations with Russia were the “very first priority” for his country when the pair met in September, prompting speculation about whether Pyongyang had pivoted from Beijing to Moscow.

But he appeared to want to assure Xi that North Korea’s relations with China were “as close as usual”, as he wrote in a letter to the Chinese leader a week after his meeting with Putin.

Deputy foreign minister Pak, the first and most senior North Korean official to visit China after the Covid-19 pandemic, vowed during his trip last week to deepen ties to “safeguard common interests”. His visit prompted speculation of paving the way for in-person talks next year between Xi and Kim, who have not met since 2019.

Yun Sun, director of the China Programme at the Washington-based Stimson Centre think tank, doubted that there had been a priority shift in North Korea’s policy.

“China is the single largest supporter of the North Korean economy through aid and trade. It also carries much more influence than Russia does regionally and globally today,” she said.

CONVERSATIONS (20)

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Kawala Xie

Kawala joined the Post in 2022 and has worked in both news and tech after graduating from Columbia Journalism School. Previously based in the US and Australia, she has worked for multiple international news outlets including Al Jazeera, SBS Australia and Shenzhen Television. She specialises in Asia affairs, breaking news reporting and video production.

12. The Trouble With a Cease-Fire

Excerpts:

What, then, can the international community do to ease the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population? First, it should pressure Israeli operations to become more precise in their use of force. To date, Israel’s operations have included at least 29,000 airstrikes—not to mention significant amounts of artillery and ground operations. Israeli analyses of these strikes, as well as the relatively high rates of friendly fire between Israeli military units (believed to be up to 20 percent of Israeli casualties), suggest that, at the very least, Israel has loosened its rules of engagement for this war. Tightening these rules would save lives among both the Israeli military and Palestinian civilians.

The international community should also push for increased humanitarian aid for Gaza. While Israelis accuse Hamas of stealing aid for its own purposes, at least some of it gets through to Gaza’s population. In particular, with winter coming, and many of Gaza’s buildings destroyed, the international community should look to provide temporary housing to Gaza’s population. Of course, such housing is contingent upon having relatively safe places to put it, so the international community should also push Israel to create safe havens in spaces it has already cleared of Hamas militants.

Finally, the international community should force a hard and necessary conversation with Israel the day after the war ends. If there is to be any silver lining in all the death and destruction in Gaza, then it should be that this war opens the aperture for a more lasting political solution, rather than a continuous cycle of violence that has plagued the region ever since the Israeli withdrawal from the strip in 2005. Should Israel succeed in its war aims and drive Hamas out, it’s incumbent on Israel—as well as the international community—to provide the space for a liberal Palestinian nationalist movement to take Hamas’s place. That, in turn, requires Israel to make real concessions, not only in Gaza, but in the West Bank as well.

That is the trouble with cease-fires: They are short-term fixes amid the lasting problem of war. Given all the blood that has already been spilled, the international community must ensure that this war results not in some sort of temporary truce, but a lasting peace.

The Trouble With a Cease-Fire

And what the international community should do instead in the Israel-Hamas war.

By Raphael S. Cohen, the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation’s Project Air Force.

Foreign Policy · by Raphael S. Cohen · December 27, 2023

December 22, 2023, 3:26 PM

Seeing the imagery coming out of Gaza, it’s no wonder that 153 out of 193 states in the United Nations General Assembly and two-thirds of Americans support a cease-fire. The Hamas-controlled Gaza Ministry of Health reports that more than 20,000 Palestinians—many of them civilians—have died so far, and the numbers are climbing. As of the end of November, some 60 percent of the homes in Gaza had been damaged or destroyed. Fuel, medicine, and food are all in short supply. Given all of this, who would not want such devastation to end?

Strategically, however, calls for a cease-fire—as opposed to a short pause in fighting, such as the one-week truce proposed by Israel and rejected by Hamas this week—are a mistake. These calls from the international community are, for starters, unlikely to change Israeli policy. But more importantly, they actually end up making what is already an undeniably bad situation even worse. That is because successful cease-fires require both sides to believe that such a cessation serves their interests. After a week in Israel talking to senior Israeli military and security officials and everyday Israelis, I can say that this is simply not the case right now.

Even before the Oct. 7 attacks, the Israeli electorate was growing more skeptical of a peaceful two-state solution. One of the perverse ironies of the Oct. 7 attacks is that some of the communities hardest hit by the atrocities—the kibbutzim deeply rooted in Israel’s socialist past—were also some of the most staunchly pro-peace voices in Israeli society. Today, buildings across Israel are filled with photographs of the hostages and streets are filled with posters that, roughly translated, declare “together to victory.” In a society that was so recently reeling from deep polarization and mass protests, Israelis from across the political spectrum are now fully united at least in one respect: their desire for the destruction of Hamas.

Much of this broad commitment to Hamas’s destruction stems less from seeking revenge or even appeasing anger (although there is, to be sure, some of this in play as well), but rather an even more basic and powerful emotion: fear. Prior to the attack, Israeli security officials regarded Hamas as a second-tier threat, ranking below Iran and its premier proxy, Hezbollah. While Israel expected Hamas to launch rockets or occasionally kidnap Israelis, Israeli security officials never believed Hamas could conduct an attack at the scale or complexity of Oct. 7.

The attacks that morning shattered many Israelis’ sense of security in profound ways. Hamas operatives killed, raped, and tortured Israelis—both soldiers and civilians—in a brutal but highly methodical fashion. According Israeli military officers I interviewed, captured plans indicate that Hamas meticulously planned its assault, down to naming the owners of individual houses and even identifying who owned dogs. Captured weaponry suggests that Hamas planned to advance up to 30 kilometers into Israel and hold the territory for days. For context, Tel Aviv is a mere 60 kilometers from the Gaza border.

Indeed, the wounds of Oct. 7 remain fresh. More than 200,000 Israelis—from the Gaza border and from the Lebanese border—remain internally displaced. Over 10,000 rockets have been fired into Israel since the war began; hundreds of rockets are fired into Israel weekly, including into major cities like Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Since Oct. 7, 260,000 Israelis have applied for gun permits, and approvals have increased thirtyfold from a similar time period prior to the conflict. And with a currently mobilized army of a half-million in a country of fewer than 10 million, practically everyone has a family member either at or ready for war. Given that Hamas promised to repeat the Oct. 7 attack until Israel’s annihilation, it is no wonder that Israelis nearly uniformly want, as one Israeli politician put it to me, to “finish the job” this time around.

Against this backdrop, to Israelis, the international calls for a cease-fire ring hollow. Some seem tone-deaf. Francesca Albanese, the United Nations special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, even claimed that Israel never had a right to self-defense, because Gaza is “under belligerent occupation,” ignoring both the immediate reality of the Oct. 7 attacks and the broader context that Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005.

Other calls for a cease-fire smack of blatant hypocrisy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan—who is one of the most prolific jailers of journalists in the world and is also engaged in his own crackdown on Kurdish militant groups—quickly proclaimed Israel “a war criminal to the world.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is conducting an increasingly genocidal campaign in Ukraine, now wants to “stop the bloodshed” in Gaza. And Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may decry the “crimes against Palestinians” but will torture and kill those who dare protest his regime and its strict interpretation of Islamic law.

It’s not merely that the calls for a cease-fire will likely go unheeded, however. They are likely having a perverse effect. As Israel senses the window for action closing, it increases the pressure to go fast and destroy Hamas infrastructure while it still can, rather than conduct a slower, more deliberate campaign to root out Hamas networks. The popular slogan heard at protests around the world—“from the river to the sea”—fuels Israel’s sense that it is locked in an existential battle. When countries face existential threats, they will go to any length to guarantee their security and are less—rather than more—likely to act with restraint.

Even if the calls for cease-fire are ultimately successful, the outcome will not be a pretty one. Israel, fearing a repeat of Oct. 7, will fortify its border with Gaza, turning it into something more akin to the Demilitarized Zone in Korea—with more walls, obstacles, and minefields—than its current state. Reconstruction will become significantly more difficult, as Israel will restrict what aid enters Gaza, again tempered by the fear that Hamas will use everything from concrete to fuel to rebuild its military infrastructure. Israel would also likely ban the 18,000 Gazans who previously worked in Israel, given the fears that some of them could have been a conduit of Hamas’s intelligence-gathering efforts, further stifling the chances that the Gazan economy bounces back from the conflict. Military operations would not cease, either. Hamas would still try to attack Israel; Israel would still strike Hamas and other military groups in return. Ultimately, these conditions would lay the seeds for yet another, potentially even bloodier Gaza war.

What, then, can the international community do to ease the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population? First, it should pressure Israeli operations to become more precise in their use of force. To date, Israel’s operations have included at least 29,000 airstrikes—not to mention significant amounts of artillery and ground operations. Israeli analyses of these strikes, as well as the relatively high rates of friendly fire between Israeli military units (believed to be up to 20 percent of Israeli casualties), suggest that, at the very least, Israel has loosened its rules of engagement for this war. Tightening these rules would save lives among both the Israeli military and Palestinian civilians.

The international community should also push for increased humanitarian aid for Gaza. While Israelis accuse Hamas of stealing aid for its own purposes, at least some of it gets through to Gaza’s population. In particular, with winter coming, and many of Gaza’s buildings destroyed, the international community should look to provide temporary housing to Gaza’s population. Of course, such housing is contingent upon having relatively safe places to put it, so the international community should also push Israel to create safe havens in spaces it has already cleared of Hamas militants.

Finally, the international community should force a hard and necessary conversation with Israel the day after the war ends. If there is to be any silver lining in all the death and destruction in Gaza, then it should be that this war opens the aperture for a more lasting political solution, rather than a continuous cycle of violence that has plagued the region ever since the Israeli withdrawal from the strip in 2005. Should Israel succeed in its war aims and drive Hamas out, it’s incumbent on Israel—as well as the international community—to provide the space for a liberal Palestinian nationalist movement to take Hamas’s place. That, in turn, requires Israel to make real concessions, not only in Gaza, but in the West Bank as well.

That is the trouble with cease-fires: They are short-term fixes amid the lasting problem of war. Given all the blood that has already been spilled, the international community must ensure that this war results not in some sort of temporary truce, but a lasting peace.

Foreign Policy · by Raphael S. Cohen · December 27, 2023

13. A second American civil war wouldn’t look like a movie

I often ask those who talk about secession to describe what it would be like. And those who say that a civil war is coming or is necessary as well. But no one ever can give any kind of description. Mr. Bonennberger is the first I have seen try.

And for those who still believe in their oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, how do you suppose we should address the threat of secession and civil war?

But Mr. Boneneberger ends on a somewhat optimistic note, though we have to be cautious and never say never.

Excerpt:

Though a civil war can feel frighteningly possible in the U.S. in 2024, it remains extremely implausible. These wars are by far the hardest and bloodiest, and no sane American would trade a Biden-run or Trump-run government for months or years of war, starvation, environmental catastrophe and plague — let alone the social costs that would be incurred by the victor.

A second American civil war wouldn’t look like a movie

BY ADRIAN BONENBERGER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 12/24/23 11:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4374348-a-second-american-civil-war-wouldnt-look-like-a-movie/

The best single description of civil war I have ever encountered is a scene from Ernest Hemingway’s “For Whom the Bell Tolls.”Set during the Spanish Civil War, a Spanish woman loyal to the Republic named Pilar describes the first days of the war. For two dozen pages, she describes the murder of her hometown’s most prominent fascists after declaring for the Republic. She finishes the story by calling it “the worst day of my life until one other day,” then states that the worst day was when the fascists took the town three days later.

The recently released trailer for “Civil War,” an upcoming movie from indie studio A24, has spurred discussion about a hypothetical civil war in America. The trailer follows a former conflict journalist, played by Kirsten Dunst, as she and her crew try to make sense of a country plunged into uncertainty and chaos when 19 states secede.

Details of the movie’s plot are sketchy. But a promotional map shared on the platform formerly called Twitter breaks the U.S. into five factions: Western Forces comprised of the northwest and manifesting an Idaho militia vibe; republics in Texas and California (California appears to be allied with the Western Forces); the “Florida Alliance” made up of some of the former Confederacy; and the remaining “Loyalist” states.

The map is fantastical in more ways than one. The disunited states would never shatter so cleanly. Lines, especially those demarcating nations, are rarely clean during war. A civil war in the United States in 2024 would be a giant yellow-colored map speckled with spreading blotches of blue and red.

The first and most urgent mission of any secessionist movement is securing its own territory, not marching outward. And that’s very difficult, even for a government under normal circumstances.

Think about it this way. You’re the leader of a secessionist state. You raise a militia or fall in on military units that defect to you. Is your first action bringing that military elsewhere to fight? Or securing your own territory, to which you have a tenuous and contested claim, and which is objectively very difficult to do in any organized sense of things?

It’s obviously the latter.

Take Georgia as an example — a state that has seceded in the past, and secedes again in the movie. Secession would plunge it neck deep into a massive, bloody, state-wide battle between those seeking to uphold secession and those hoping to remain part of the U.S.

On a map, Georgia is considered a “red” state — but look closer and it’s not so clear. Fort Moore (formerly Benning) is a massive federal military installation in the northwest of the state, hosting tens of thousands of troops from around the country. Savannah is near another large base, on the Atlantic Ocean. Atlanta is politically dissimilar from the countryside, has over 6 million people in the state’s northwest — and nearby is Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, the primary hub and home base for Delta Airlines.

Assume one could muster the military force necessary to take and hold Atlanta — hundreds of thousands strong, at least, who all need to be fed, equipped and resourced — or to surround Atlanta and bring it under siege, without worrying about threats from Savannah or Fort Moore. This process would take months at least and result in heavy casualties and entail starvation among a civilian population.

This would be the rule, not the exception, across America within states that seceded, and in “loyalist” states with their own restive territories. Bitterly contested conflicts would rage across much of the continental U.S. as competing groups consolidated power, with massive populations in every state rejecting the decision to stay loyal to the U.S. or rejecting the decision to secede.

The war would be difficult on its own terms; moving militaries even under ideal conditions in peacetime (good roads and infrastructure, good logistical support) is no small thing. I can tell you that, as a company executive officer (XO) in the U.S. military, responsible for organizing the logistics for 142 paratroopers and all their weapons and equipment, it is a great mess of inconveniences and problems that becomes exponentially more difficult the more people are involved.

If being a company grade XO is bachelor’s degree work, battalion and brigade grade XO work requires a master’s degree, and divisional and corps grade XO work requires a PhD or equivalent. Offensive operations of the type needed to seize territory and defeat hostile armies are complex, and few countries today field militaries capable of carrying out maneuvers with or without defensive pressure. In a civil war, such maneuvers would be under continuous harassment from insurgents and hostile forces.

The war part of the civil war would be the most urgent challenge, but every seceding group would also have to stand up new structures to replace those lost by the sudden absence of the federal government. Significantly, these states would need to reinvent government capable of organizing their populations for war. They’d need to initiate diplomacy to lobby for external assistance.

But there are more mundane considerations. If the war took place during the summer, Southern states such as Texas, Alabama, Georgia and Florida would need to keep an eye on hurricanes; California on wildfires. Without FEMA, these fledgling governments would be fully responsible for shouldering the burden of damage.

Though a civil war can feel frighteningly possible in the U.S. in 2024, it remains extremely implausible. These wars are by far the hardest and bloodiest, and no sane American would trade a Biden-run or Trump-run government for months or years of war, starvation, environmental catastrophe and plague — let alone the social costs that would be incurred by the victor.

Adrian Bonenberger is a writer and a veteran of the U.S. Army. He edits and writes for Military Media.

14. The guardrails that once prevented wars are failing

Excerpts:

For anybody who truly wants to see, the writing is on the wall. The next decade or so could be filled with more fighting and upheaval than the world has seen in almost a century. And the barriers that stopped wars from breaking out in the past — from Western sanctions to citizen uprisings — have all eroded severely.

And as these existing guardrails break down, new ones aren’t being built to replace them, which means we may be entering a period akin to the Wild West. Moreover, as nukes begin to spread on the back of wars and flashpoints — like Russian nuclear warheads in Belarus, or South Korea wanting to host American nuclear weapons — a new game of “nuclear chess” has begun.

Thus, the most pressing challenge facing the world now is to change the global architecture in such a way that when wars do break out, new solutions exist to contain them and maintain a certain status quo. One such idea would be an agreement between the G20, stating that nations who start the next wars will lose their ability to trade with the group’s members.

Otherwise, as nations and businesses are busy running from fire to fire, from war to war, the forces that have the potential to truly transform the world (and humanity) — from climate change and AI to demographic crisis — will start to unleash chaos without limits.

The guardrails that once prevented wars are failing

Politico · by Abishur Prakash · December 25, 2023

Opinion

Wars are no longer black-swan events. They are a regular occurrence, representing the most significant transformation in global affairs since 9/11.

A Ukrainian soldier looks out from a tank as he holds his position near to the town of Bakhmut, Donetsk region | Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images

December 25, 2023 4:00 am CET

5 minutes read

Abishur Prakash is the founder of the Geopolitical Business, Inc. He is a global keynote speaker and the author of five books. His latest book is called “The World Is Vertical.”

The Israel-Hamas war is an ominous message to the world: The guardrails that long stopped wars from breaking out are now effectively failing.

Of course, Ukraine was the first sign of this. After Russia invaded the country, it quickly became the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. Except, at the onset, the world didn’t know what to make of it. Was this a “one-off” event or the start of something else?

The latest flareup in the Middle East answers this question.

The conflict between Israel and Hamas signals that a new era has begun — one where wars are no longer black-swan events that occur every decade or so. Rather, they are becoming a regular occurrence, representing the most significant transformation to global affairs since 9/11. This is a pivotal moment in history, as it signals that whatever stood in the way of conflicts erupting is now falling by the wayside. Nations are no longer scared to throw punches, and war has become acceptable again.

While the spotlight is on Israel-Hamas, there’s also the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh; soldiers at heightened readiness on the border between Serbia and Kosovo; military coups spreading throughout Africa from Gabon to Niger; and frequent clashes between India and China. Then, alongside all this, there’s the potential for the current Hamas war to spread across the region.

This new era is shaking the foundation the world has stood on since World War II. And it represents global “structural change,” which will affect everything from connectivity to technology and sustainability.

Firstly, as wars break out, they are starting to fragment the neighborhoods around them, accelerating vertical globalization — creating an environment filled with walls and barriers. Whatever integration existed, and was being nurtured, is now being reversed.

In the Middle East, for example, Saudi Arabia has now “frozen” normalizing relations with Israel — a step that was being brokered by the United States. And if the Arab world once again starts to view Israel as the “black sheep,” it will fracture the new economic connections that have been forming — like those between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — and are reliant on a unified, stable Middle East.

Additionally, as this new era of war unfolds, the world will start to view the West differently — especially the U.S. As more conflicts erupt, many nations may begin questioning whether the Western camp is losing its power to call the shots and steer the world. And if the threat of Western sanctions is no longer paralyzing to nations, it will likely cause countries to start managing wars in their own unique ways.

We are already seeing examples of this. For instance, when the Israel-Hamas war broke out in October, the Saudi crown prince dialed his Iranian counterpart to discuss the conflict. This is unprecedented — and it represents this new era’s “geopolitical nuances.”

Furthermore, when it comes to bringing “peace” to conflicts, newly emerging diplomatic forums will also start to compete with established ones. Of course, the United Nations remains pivotal, but it is no longer the only diplomatic option — there is the recently expanded BRICS bloc and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) too. And in some cases, governments are shunning diplomacy entirely. So, which one of these competing geopolitical blocs will nations at war turn to?

Israeli tank drives near Gaza, as viewed from the Israeli side of the border on December 21, 2023 | Maja Hitij/Getty Images

Finally, there is a new group of “problem solvers” emerging as well — nations attempting to stop war and offer “postwar solutions.” In the case of the Ukraine war, the new broker is Qatar, hoping that Arab neutrality can bring Moscow and Kyiv to the negotiating table. And, of course, countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Singapore stand ready to do the same. These nations will continue to bring their own formula and ideas to this new era of war, shaping what regions and economies look like post-conflict.

For anybody who truly wants to see, the writing is on the wall. The next decade or so could be filled with more fighting and upheaval than the world has seen in almost a century. And the barriers that stopped wars from breaking out in the past — from Western sanctions to citizen uprisings — have all eroded severely.

And as these existing guardrails break down, new ones aren’t being built to replace them, which means we may be entering a period akin to the Wild West. Moreover, as nukes begin to spread on the back of wars and flashpoints — like Russian nuclear warheads in Belarus, or South Korea wanting to host American nuclear weapons — a new game of “nuclear chess” has begun.

Thus, the most pressing challenge facing the world now is to change the global architecture in such a way that when wars do break out, new solutions exist to contain them and maintain a certain status quo. One such idea would be an agreement between the G20, stating that nations who start the next wars will lose their ability to trade with the group’s members.

Otherwise, as nations and businesses are busy running from fire to fire, from war to war, the forces that have the potential to truly transform the world (and humanity) — from climate change and AI to demographic crisis — will start to unleash chaos without limits.

Politico · by Abishur Prakash · December 25, 2023

15. Maersk to restart Red Sea shipping as U.S.-led security force deploys

Maersk to restart Red Sea shipping as U.S.-led security force deploys

https://www.axios.com/2023/12/25/maersk-red-sea-shipping-us-led-force-deploys

Rebecca Falconer

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The Maersk Sentosa container ship sails southbound to exit the Suez Canal in Suez, Egypt, on Thursday, Dec. 21. Photo: Stringer/Bloomberg via Getty Images

Maersk announced plans Sunday to resume shipments through the Red Sea after suspending operations earlier this month due to missile and drone attacks on vessels in the region.

Why it matters: Maersk was one of several global shipping giants to reroute vessels away from the key commercial route due to the Iran-backed Houthi rebels' attacks from Yemen, but the firm cited the deployment of a U.S.-led multinational maritime security force as the reason why it had decided to return.

Yes, but: The shipping and logistics company noted in a customer advisory that "the overall risk in the area is not eliminated" and it could again "initiate diversion plans" if there are further safety concerns.

The big picture: The Houthis began attacking merchant ships before or after they moved through the Suez Canal in October in response to the Israel-Hamas war.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced last week the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian in response to the attacks, which Pentagon officials said "will serve the highway patrol in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to respond to and assist as necessary commercial vessels that are transiting this vital international waterway."
U.S. Central Command said in a statement Saturday that an American Navy destroyer had shot down four drones in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen patrolling in the southern Red Sea as part of OPG.

What they're saying: Maersk said in its advisory that as of Sunday it had "received confirmation" that the OPG had been "deployed to allow maritime commerce to pass" through the region.

"This is most welcome news for the entire industry and indeed the functionality of global trade," the company said.
"With the OPG initiative in operation, we are preparing to allow for vessels to resume transit through the Red Sea both eastbound and westbound," it added.
"We are currently working on plans for the first vessels to make the transit and for this to happen as soon as operationally possible. While doing so, ensuring the safety of our employees is of the utmost importance and our number one priority in handling the challenging situation in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden area."

Go deeper... Mapped: Houthi shipping vessel attacks around the Red Sea

16. Like Santa’s reindeer, C-130 cargo planes spread Christmas joy across the Pacific

Like Santa’s reindeer, C-130 cargo planes spread Christmas joy across the Pacific

washingtontimes.com · by Jennifer Harper

A U.S. Air Force pilot flies a C-130J Super Hercules for Operation Christmas Drop over the Federated States of Micronesia, Dec. 3, 2023. This is OCD’s 72nd year delivering supplies such as clothes, toiletries, toys, fishing gear, and more across … A U.S. Air Force pilot flies … more >

By - The Washington Times - Sunday, December 24, 2023

NEWS AND OPINION:

Let’s journey to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, located 3,800 miles west of Hawaii and established in 1945 as a B-29 bomber base. The base is home to 8,000 joint service members, civilians, and contractors, including 2,500 dependents. Here’s an idea of the Christmas season on the base:

“Operation Christmas Drop is the Department of Defense’s longest-running humanitarian airlift operation. The tradition began during the Christmas season in 1952 when a B-29 Superfortress aircrew saw islanders waving at them from the island of Kapingamarangi, 3,500 miles southwest of Hawaii. In the spirit of Christmas, the aircrew dropped a bundle of supplies attached to a parachute to the islanders below, giving the operation its name. Today, aairdropoperations include more than 50 islands throughout the Pacific,” notes a written report from the base itself, which can be found at Andersen.af.mil/ocd.

“Operation Christmas Drop is a PACAF event which includes a partnership between the 374th Airlift Wing, Yokota Air Base, Japan; the 36th Wing, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; 734th Air Mobility Squadron, Andersen AFB of the 515th Air Mobility Operations Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii; the University of Guam; and the ‘Operation Christmas Drop’ private organization which leads the fundraising and donations for the operation. Andersen is used as a ‘base camp’ to airlift the donated goods to islanders throughout Micronesia,” the report said.

“C-130J Super Hercules crews airdrop food, supplies, educational materials, and toys to islanders throughout the Federated States of Micronesia, and Republic of Palau. These islands are some of the most remote locations on the globe spanning a distance nearly as broad as the continental U.S.” it advised.

For those who need a translation, PACAF stands for “Pacific Air Forces” and “C-130J” is a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.

The effort began Dec. 6 and delivered nonperishable food, fishing supplies, school books and toys to 42,000 people on 58 remote islands across 1.8 million square miles, and included support from volunteers along with multi-national aircrews from Japan, South Korea and Canada, and ground support from Philippines and Australia.

REAGAN’S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

Ronald Reagan was an eloquent president, that is for sure. Here is what he said in his Christmas message to the nation in 1981.

“On Christmas, we celebrate the birth of Christ with prayer, feasting, and great merriment. But, most of all, we experience it in our hearts. For, more than just a day, Christmas is a state of mind. It is found throughout the year whenever faith overcomes doubt, hope conquers despair, and love triumphs over hate,” Reagan told Americans that year.

“It is present when men of any creed bring love and understanding to the hearts of their fellow man. The feeling is seen in the wondrous faces of children and in the hopeful eyes of the aged. It overflows the hearts of cheerful givers and the souls of the caring. And it is reflected in the brilliant colors, joyful sounds, and beauty of the winter season,” he said.

“Let us resolve to honor this spirit of Christmas and strive to keep it throughout the year. Nancy and I ask you to join us in a prayer that prudence, wisdom, and understanding might descend on the people of all nations — so that during the year ahead we may realize an ancient and wondrous dream: Peace on earth, good will toward men.”

EISENHOWER’S EGG NOG

The 34th president of the United States had a recipe for egg nog. And here it is, courtesy of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, which included this version of the seasonal drink in “Ike’s Cookbook” — which also offered recipes for biscuits, chili con carne and “President Eisenhower’s Old Fashioned Beef Stew.”

But on to the egg nog recipe. Here it is, verbatim from the source:

“Egg Nog

1 doz. egg yolks

1 lb. granulated sugar

1 qt. bourbon (part of this may be either rum or brandy)

1 qt. coffee cream

1 qt. whipping cream.

“Put the dozen egg yolks in an electric mixer. Feed in the granulated sugar very slowly so as to get a completely smooth, clear light mixture. When this is perfectly smooth, begin to add the bourbon very slowly. (The process up to here would normally consume at least 30 minutes — with a good mixer.) Add one quart of coffee cream.

“Put the whole thing in the ice box until a half hour before serving, at which time the whipping cream should be beaten until only moderately thick. Be careful not to get it too thick. Mix it slowly into mixture and serve with nutmeg.”

Find the Eisenhower Presidential Library at EisenhowerLibrary.gov. For a closer look at the president’s personal life, go to the “The Eisenhowers” pull-down menu and click on the “Ike and Mamie’s Favorites” section.

THE COOKIE FACTOR

Monmouth University has looked into the Christmas cookie preferences of the nation’s citizenry to discover that a “frosted sugar cookie” is the favorite, according to its very specific poll. About a third of respondents — 32% — preferred the sugar cookie.

Next on the cookie popularity parade comes gingerbread cookies, favored by 12%, followed by chocolate chip cookies (favored by 11%), snickerdoodles (6%), butter cookies (4%), chocolate cookies (4%); peanut butter cookies (4%) — plus spice cookies, fruit and nut cookies, oatmeal and almond cookies, plus teacakes and brownies — all favored by 2% of the respondents.

And one more finding: Another 13% cited a wide range of unspecified “other varieties,” according to the poll.

See more of the survey and its particulars in the Poll du Jour at column’s end

POLL DU JOUR

• 89% of U.S. adults celebrate Christmas.

• 79% think that Santa Claus would put them on a “nice list”

• 76% play Christmas music during the entire holiday season.

• 75% decorate their home.

• 69% make Christmas candy, cookies, or desserts

• 47% have a favorite Christmas cookie.

• 43% volunteer for charitable activities.

• 9% go caroling.

SOURCE: A Monmouth University poll of 803 U.S. adults conducted Nov. 30-Dec. 4. Respondents could cite multiple activities.

• Merry Christmas, and thank you for reading Inside the Beltway.

• Jennifer Harper can be reached at jharper@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Jennifer Harper

17. Populists — On the Right and the Left — Are Playing Havoc with American Foreign Policy | Opinion

Populists — On the Right and the Left — Are Playing Havoc with American Foreign Policy | Opinion

Published 12/25/23 07:00 AM ET

Bill Schneider

themessenger.com · December 25, 2023

Dangerous divisions are opening up in both political parties over foreign policy. Israel’s war in Gaza is throwing the traditional Democratic Party establishment — of which President Biden is very much a member — on the defensive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is opening up a similar fault line in the Republican Party — between the old internationalist Republican establishment (Ronald Reagan, the Bushes) and the new Donald Trump isolationists (“America First”). In both cases, populists are challenging longstanding establishment convictions.

Democratic support for Israel dates back to President Harry Truman, who was the first world leader to officially recognize Israel eleven minutes after Israel declared its independence in 1948. That commitment was sustained by President Biden after Hamas terrorists from Gaza massacred 1,200 Israelis and seized 240 hostages. “Let there be no doubt,” Biden said, “the United States has Israel’s back. We will make sure the Jewish and democratic State of Israel can defend itself today, tomorrow, as we always have. It’s as simple as that.”

Not exactly.

The U.S. now has a well-established progressive movement that sprang into action when Israel declared war on Hamas and began retaliatory attacks against Hamas in Gaza. According to Gaza health officials, nearly 20,000 Palestinians have been killed. Anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian protests quickly emerged in major cities and on college campuses where left-wing activists saw the issue not as retaliation against terrorists, but as a violation of racial and social justice. They are demanding that the U.S. end its support for white European “colonizers” who they believe are victimizing indigenous Palestinian Arabs.

Many left-wing activists are Jewish, but their commitment is more to Jewish values (social justice, equal rights) than to Zionism (the Israeli national movement). However, since Israel is a Jewish state, criticism of Israel (anti-Zionism) began to shade into anti-Semitism, which has historically been identified with the political right (fascists in Europe, right-wing extremists in the U.S.). We are now seeing anti-Semitism in what has long been considered “progressive space,” such as elite college campuses.

Left-wing activists are pressuring establishment Democrats to criticize Israel’s war policies — with some success. President Biden told supporters that Israel was beginning to lose support in the world because of its “indiscriminate bombing” in Gaza. After meeting with Arab leaders, Vice President Kamala Harris, who has stronger ties to the left than President Biden does, said, “As Israel defends itself, it matters how. … International humanitarian law must be respected. Too many innocent Palestinians have been killed.”

The division is beginning to show up among congressional Democrats. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) — who is Jewish — is preparing to force a Senate vote on whether Israel has committed war crimes. When Republican House leaders demanded a vote on a resolution saying “anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism,” only 13 Democrats voted no, 95 voted yes and 92 refused to take a position, voting “present.”

A New York Times-Siena College poll shows more sympathy for Israel among Republicans (79%) than among Democrats (32%). Democrats’ sympathy for Palestinians was slightly higher (34%). Israel, it should be noted, now has the most right-wing government in its history.

The reverse is true for the conflict in Ukraine. A Harvard-Harris poll this month asked voters whether they support an additional $50 billion in aid to Ukraine “to help it in its war with Russia” — 63% of Democrats, but only 36% of Republicans, said yes.

After his meeting this month with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President Biden declared that if Congress fails to approve more military aid to Ukraine, they will give Russian President Vladimir Putin “the greatest Christmas gift they could possibly give him.” With the Cold War over and Donald Trump, a longtime Ukrainian skeptic, dominating the Republican Party, Republicans are returning to their traditional isolationism. President Biden has warned, “History will judge harshly those who turn their backs on freedom’s cause.”

Trump, like most autocrats, expresses admiration for strong leaders like Putin and contempt for leaders he considers weak, like Biden. In a campaign speech, Trump quoted Putin approvingly for saying that the criminal charges against Trump are politically motivated: “It shows the rottenness of the America political system, which cannot pretend to teach others about democracy.” Trump added, “They’re all laughing at us.”

Congress is so alarmed by Trump’s frequent criticism of NATO that it recently approved a measure that will prevent a U.S. withdrawal from NATO without congressional approval. Now Republicans are insisting on tougher U.S. border controls — which outraged progressives are calling “the most exclusionary immigration policies in over 100 years” — as a prerequisite for approving more aid to Ukraine, even though the two issues are unrelated.

“I told President Zelensky: ‘Here’s the problem. It’s got nothing to do with you,’” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) told reporters. Graham told the Washington Post, “I’ve got to tell my party something they don’t want to hear: We are going to help Ukraine.”

Bill Schneider is an emeritus professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and author of “Standoff: How America Became Ungovernable.”

themessenger.com · December 25, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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