Quotes of the Day:
"Patience strengthens the spirit, sweetens the temper, stifles anger, extinguishes envy, subdues pride, bridles the tongue."
- George Horne
"It is time for us to realize that we’re too great a nation to limit ourselves to small dreams. We’re not, as some would have us believe, doomed to an inevitable decline. I do not believe in a fate that will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing. So, with all the creative energy at our command, let us begin an era of national renewal. Let us renew our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let us renew our faith and our hope. We have every right to dream heroic dreams. Those who say that we’re in a time when there are no heroes, they just don’t know where to look."
- Ronald Reagan, 1981
"Among a people generally corrupt liberty cannot long exist."
- Edmund Burke
1. Why a Korean End of War Declaration Is Just Diplomatic Symbolism
2. End of war in our time
3. In Korea, thinking about China
4. Moon stresses need for defense capabilities befitting S. Korea's geopolitical position
5. Former USFK commander "Korea's military power is frankly far behind"
6. Women who flee North Korea also escape a harsh patriarchy
7. US-China conflict ignites new 'Cold War' in supply chain
8. North Korea set for key party meeting amid deadlock in nuclear negotiations
9. Kim Jong-un's decade in power
10. Lee pledges to build nuclear submarines, launch space command
1. Why a Korean End of War Declaration Is Just Diplomatic Symbolism
Important analysis from Professor Kelly. This is one of the most succinct and best analyses of the issue I have read. And importantly it is without emotion and over the top rhetoric, just sound arguments.
I would just add with some irony that the actual issue dividing the Koreas is really just that - the division of the peninsula. Even the 1953 Armistice in paragraph 60 recognized the ultimate political solution was to solve the "Korea question" the unnatural division of the peninsula. Although that is not the point of this essay, Professor Kelly does provide insights on why the Korea question is not easily solved.
But I really like the summary of the three "issues gaps" that must be resolved:
1) North Korean weapons of mass destruction
2) The North Korean army right on the South Korean border
3) North Korean human rights
I will be saving this essay for future reference and citation.
Why a Korean End of War Declaration Is Just Diplomatic Symbolism
As the presidency of Moon Jae-In in South Korea winds down, Moon has pushed hard for an ‘end of war declaration’ (EoW) over the still legally unfinished Korean War. Last week, I argued in this magazine that this declaration is a curious approach. The inter-Korean armistice is pretty stable, and when it is broken, it is North Korea which does the breaking through its frequent border provocations. Also, legally, no one really knows what this declaration would do. A treaty is a well-established tool for ending wars; an EoW declaration is a diplomatic neologism. It is not clear if this declaration is intended to replace the armistice or a potential treaty, or supplement them in some unknown way. Or perhaps it is just symbolism.
If it is just symbolism, then signing it is irrelevant. But if the goal is to actually make Korea safer, then the declaration must actually address the outstanding issues between the two Koreas. Indeed, that is the whole point of a treaty. A treaty represents not just a cessation of hostilities between parties – an armistice – but also terms which both sides accept to end the political differences which motivated the conflict. Treaties are politically easier if one side is definitively defeated on the battlefield, like in World War I and II. The Korean War ended in a stalemate, which is the reason a treaty has been so elusive.
Negotiate the Actual Issues Dividing the Koreas
Unfortunately, an EoW declaration elides all this, making the declaration more rhetorical than substantive. Its advocates claim it advances peace, but that is not the issue on the peninsula. Peace via deterrence is stable in Korea; South Korea would not be the world’s tenth-largest economy if it were fighting an active war for 70 years. President Moon speaks of an “unstable armistice regime” but omits that it is North Korea which causes that instability. North Korea’s long and violent history of provocations is well-known, while the US and South Korea have no record of kinetic retaliation. In fact, if the EoW were to finally stop North Korea from launching cross-border strikes, that would actually be a good reason to sign it. But no one actually believes Pyongyang will commit to that.
As David Maxwell rightly points out in these pages, everyone wants peace in Korea. Only the most extreme, irresponsible observers of Korea supported US President Donald Trump’s war threats in 2017, for example. The real issue preventing a treaty in Korea is not hawkish disdain for ‘peace,’ but the wide gaps – political and military – between the two Koreas. These will be resolved through either negotiated terms, or Southern-led unification after the North’s collapse. Northern-led unification is highly unlikely, of course, but so is North Korea’s collapse. Hence the only likely outcomes are a continuation of the stalemate, or negotiations on those gaps which the EoW does not address.
Three Issues Undercut the End of War Declaration
Here a just three of those issue gaps which must actually be resolved – or least narrowed – for a North-South deal more meaningful than a nonbinding declaration:
1) North Korean weapons of mass destruction
Analysts widely agree that North Korea will not fully de-nuclearize/de-missilize. Complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament was almost certainly never feasible. But Pyongyang might trade away some of its WMD or freeze production at current levels. What would the North want for such a concession? Money? Sanctions rollback? Permanent South Korean aid? Moon claims to have a good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Instead of pushing the US and China to sign an empty statement, he should get Kim to give a list of what he wants for a freeze.
2) The North Korean army right on the South Korean border
North Korea stations around 1 million soldiers south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Most of them are near the demilitarized zone north of the South Korean capital Seoul. In a war, they would presumably flood south to knock out Seoul, the South’s center of gravity. The North also stations long-range artillery and short-range missiles there to bombard Seoul. What would the North want to retrench these forces? A withdrawal of US ground troops from South Korea (which is not the same as ending the alliance)? A reduction in size or budget of the South Korean military? Sanctions rollback?
3) North Korean human rights
One of the core problems with brokering deals with North Korea is the moral discomfort much of the world feels over Pyongyang’s extreme human rights abuses. The definitive report on this subject, from the United Nations, analogizes the North’s camps to Nazi concentration camps and recommends that Kim Jong Un be sent before the International Criminal Court. Conservatives particularly will have a hard time accepting any kind of final deal with North Korea which does not liberalize it somewhat. Here too Moon could be helpful. As a dove on the North, he is in a better position to communicate to Kim that the North needs to give the international community at least some progress on this issue in order for any deal to endure more hawkish future governments. Presumably Kim would ask for something in exchange.
North Korea will presumably ask for a lot for these changes. We may not accept those swaps and need to negotiate in detail. But at least we would know what the North wants. These are obviously deep cleavages between North and South. But they, not ‘peace,’ are the real issues, and the best legacy Moon could leave is outlines of possible deals on these and other issues.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. He is a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
2. End of war in our time
A critical analysis of the end of war declaration proposal by the Moon administration.
We should keep these excerpts in mind:
Ten years after the signing of the treaty, World War II broke out. (Germany and Japan also were the signatories of the pact.) The only peaceful result of a pact aiming for peace was the awarding of Nobel Peace Prize to Kellogg. The treaty could not prevent wars down the road.
...
If leaders believe they can control any pacts or treaties with other countries, they indulge in fantasy or cannot tell facts from wishful thinking or are adept at cheating people. A peace treaty can bring about a fleeting moment of peace — not a permanent peace — in human history. Countries ardently championing peace have mostly lost peace — and were forced into submission. They learn lessons from history, but ignore them for political goals.
...
Why does Moon so ardently adhere to a declaration which “can be cancelled at any time”? And why does his diplomatic aide try to create a situation from which the country cannot escape? Somewhere between the two incompatible destinations lies the truth, which can help disarm South Korea. Moon and his staff will try to paint over the negative picture with the sugarcoated illusion of “unifying the same people.” Such desires have long been embedded in our politics since the liberation of the country in 1945.
As Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, said, “Truthful words are not beautiful while beautiful words are not truthful.” How beautiful such words as “peace” or “end-of-war” really are! And how naïve — and dangerous — is a leader who has the conviction that an end-of-war declaration will bring an end to war.
Sunday
December 26, 2021
End of war in our time
Choi Jin-seok
The author is an honorary professor of philosophy at Sogang University.
On August 27, 1928 — 10 years after the end of World War I — a multilateral agreement was signed by 15 countries to prevent war in the future. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was first proposed by U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and later joined by up to 63 countries to establish “the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.” The pact outlawed war for the first time in human history.
Ten years after the signing of the treaty, World War II broke out. (Germany and Japan also were the signatories of the pact.) The only peaceful result of a pact aiming for peace was the awarding of Nobel Peace Prize to Kellogg. The treaty could not prevent wars down the road.
On September 29, 1938, a decade later, the Munich Agreement was signed by German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier. After returning to Britain, Chamberlain extolled his achievement of “peace for our time,” but the treaty only helped Germany buy the time needed to reinforce its military power. Six months later, Germany started World War II with its occupation of Czechoslovakia. “We have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat,” Winston Churchill exclaimed in a speech at the House of Commons delivered six days after the return of Chamberlain. “And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning.” But the unenlightened populace only ridiculed him as a warmonger.
Moon without credibility on security
If leaders believe they can control any pacts or treaties with other countries, they indulge in fantasy or cannot tell facts from wishful thinking or are adept at cheating people. A peace treaty can bring about a fleeting moment of peace — not a permanent peace — in human history. Countries ardently championing peace have mostly lost peace — and were forced into submission. They learn lessons from history, but ignore them for political goals.
President Moon Jae-in also seems to comprehend the vanity of treaties or pacts. In a Fox News interview on September 25, 2018, he said, “A declaration to end the Korean War can be cancelled at any time as it’s just a political announcement.” It was very awkward for a head of state to justify cancellation of a certain declaration. But in the 6th ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum in Washington in November this year, First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-gun underscored the need to create a “diplomatic frame” in which “no one can escape from an end-of-war declaration.” What does such a big gap between the head of state and his aide represent? Probably it suggests their determination to pressure related parties sign on an end-of-war declaration — and persevere — even if it brings about serious side effects no one can get away from.
I oppose an end-of-war declaration President Moon wants to make for the following reasons. First, it certainly will not be effective, as he said it can be cancelled at any time. Second, the frame no parties can flee from can pose dangers to our security. On national security, the president has consistently failed to get trust from the people.
President Moon Jae-in speaks with Kim Yo-jong, left, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, while watching a North Korean orchestra’s performance in Seoul in February 2018. After her visit to the Blue House during the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, North Korea said Moon’s proposal of an end-of-war declaration was not a bad idea if South Korea and the United States end their hostilities toward Pyongyang. [YONHAP]
Celebrating the day with K-pop stars
Behind the sensitive issue of an end-of-war declaration are North Korean nuclear weapons. On the threat from North Korea, the late presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun — and current President Moon Jae-in — took the same position. While concealing — or at least dismissing — the nuclear threats from the start, they said in chorus, “North Korea does not have the will or ability to develop nukes.” President Roh fought hard against the U.S. over the issue and advocated Pyongyang’s position on the international stage as he confessed later. President Moon accepted — or intentionally brushed off — the North’s armaments. His arguments for the use of an end-of war declaration to resume denuclearization talks do not make sense, as they represents a critical lack of strategic consistency — in other words, an ominous illusion.
President Moon used his “five recruitment principles” only to get votes in the 2017 presidential election and abandoned them shortly after his election victory. What Moon said in his inaugural speech was not kept at all. Instead, lies — and blaming others — prevailed throughout his five-year term. Politics feeds on rhetoric, but since his words lost credibility, it is very hard to trust what he says about the end-of-war declaration. Given the way he spoke, it is reasonable to assume that the declaration he wants to draw will be different from what he says.
On national security, Moon took a path other than safeguarding our national integrity and interests. Such examples are plenty. On Armed Forces Day on Oct. 1, he spent time celebrating the day with K-pop stars at night for the first time even without staging a military parade so as not to provoke a nuclear-armed North Korea. Despite his position as the commander in chief, he has been bent on repressing people who fought for the country and instead engrossed with honoring people who fought against the country as activists — largely thanks to his slanted ideological perspective.
A declaration shaking security
An incident epitomizing Moon’s unique approach to national security took place on June 4 in the headquarters of the National Security Service (NIS). When the top spy agency changed its motto from “Anonymous Dedication to Freedom and Truth” to “Limitless Loyalty and Devotion to the Nation and the People,” it borrowed the calligraphic style of activist and economist Shin Young-bok who had been released on parole by admitting to his involvement in a 1968 underground Communist movement linked to North Korea after serving 20 years of a life sentence for violating the National Security Act. Moon’s use of Shin’s calligraphic style dumbfounded the spy agency and the public. As chief commander, Moon not only praised the former inmate as a great thinker at home and abroad, but also proposed to take pictures with a North Korean delegation led by Kim Yo-jong — North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister — in front of Shin’s work of art at the Blue House when North Korea participated in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. That was totally out of sync with anyone’s presidency.
Due to Moon’s diehard ambiguity over the Cheoan sinking from a North Korean torpedo attack, Capt. Choi Won-il and his surviving sailors are still demanding a clear answer from the president over who committed the attack. They are wondering whose side the president wants to take. Wouldn’t an end-of-war declaration be made in line with what North Korea wants — rather than for South Korea’s sake?
All political systems backfire if they are not backed by collective rationality. Democracy thrives on mature citizenship, but without it, democracy turns into mobocracy. Due to deep-rooted ideological warfare, our democracy is morphing into mobocracy. Given Moon’s past trajectory, an end-of-war declaration will likely bring about dire side effects.
If the proclamation is made, the issue of how to dismantle the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) in South Korea will be brought up first followed by a strong demand to disband the Korea-U.S. alliance and countless placards along the street calling for the pullout of the U.S Forces Korea (USFK). Abroad, North Korea, China and Russia will insist on the three demands. That is a destined path regardless of whether a clause pledging to maintain the military status quo is included in the declaration. Moon and his aides are former democracy activists who once championed the termination of the alliance and withdrawal of the USFK.
Does a pact bring an end to war?
Why does Moon so ardently adhere to a declaration which “can be cancelled at any time”? And why does his diplomatic aide try to create a situation from which the country cannot escape? Somewhere between the two incompatible destinations lies the truth, which can help disarm South Korea. Moon and his staff will try to paint over the negative picture with the sugarcoated illusion of “unifying the same people.” Such desires have long been embedded in our politics since the liberation of the country in 1945.
As Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, said, “Truthful words are not beautiful while beautiful words are not truthful.” How beautiful such words as “peace” or “end-of-war” really are! And how naïve — and dangerous — is a leader who has the conviction that an end-of-war declaration will bring an end to war.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
3. In Korea, thinking about China
Ambassador Stepehens critiques the China issue for the US and the ROK.
Key excerpts:
But I departed Korea after two weeks thinking that, above all, Koreans and Americans need to talk more with each other about China, and the reshaping of our respective understanding of and relationships with China. This is the big strategic shift in the global landscape, and we need to explore it candidly and continuously, among and between our two countries, at every level of the public and private sectors.
The problem is neither Korea nor the United States have a coherent “China policy.”
South Korea’s used to be relatively simple: Korea looked to China as a key economic partner and essential to hopes for inter-Korean progress; the United States was the security partner and ally It was never as simple as it looked, and now the “China for the economy, U.S. for security” formulation has frayed.
Sunday
December 26, 2021
In Korea, thinking about China
Kathleen Stephens
The author was U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2008 to 2011. She is the president of the Korea Economic Institute of America located in Washington, D.C.
The Korean Air flight from Los Angeles landed at Incheon Airport early dawn the last Monday of November. I was on it, and I was nervous. I hadn’t been in Korea — or anywhere outside the U.S. — in almost two years. When I last departed Seoul in February 2020, a Korean friend gave me a small gift bag filled with KF-94 masks, saying, “You might need these.” What an understatement that turned out to be.
Now I was back, still wearing a KF-94 mask, this time from those received in a “care package” the Korea Foundation had mailed to former Peace Corps volunteers. The departure from Los Angeles had been fraught, Southern California’s misnamed “freeways” gridlocked and LAX airport choked with post-Thanksgiving travelers returning from long-postponed family reunions. Over Thanksgiving it had taken me multiple tries and many hours to navigate the chaotic PCR testing process at a local pharmacy, and the list of documents I’d need to present upon arrival in Korea was daunting.
But the flight was smooth, passed quickly by watching Korean movies, and Incheon Airport was immaculate and eerily quiet in the early dawn as we deplaned. There were numerous new pandemic-related layers of inspections, but they were thorough, efficient and professional. I was impressed. Dawn was breaking as I began the drive into Seoul, and before 9 a.m. I was outside a local health center for another PCR test. Again the process was well-organized. Standing in a quiet line under a chilly winter sky, Korea did seem like a “Land of Morning Calm,” especially after living through America’s disastrous Covid-19 experience, with over 800,000 deaths, including one out of every 100 Americans over age 65.
I’ve lived 11 years spread over four decades in Korea, and visited countless times. Every time I feel I must discover Korea anew; the proverb “In 10 years, even the mountains and rivers change,” is literally true in Korea, and even an understatement. I quickly realized that this time, I had to pay especially close attention; digital contact with Korea, including hundreds of hours on Zoom and other online platforms, had left out a lot.
U.S. President Joe Biden speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in a virtual summit from the White House on Nov. 15 amid the deepening tension between the two countries over global hegemony. [UPI/YONHAP]
I was struck by the depth of weariness in Korea with the pandemic and the way it has disrupted and intruded into every aspect of life, further exacerbated by the unpredictable and worrisome impact of the Omicron variant. Korea’s public health system and bureaucratic competence may be envied by those of us who live in countries where we don’t take these things for granted. But from Koreans, I heard that “Covid blue” (depression) was bleeding into “red” (anger) and “black” (despair). Korean resilience and adaptability in responding to the challenges of the past two years is more appreciated from the outside than in Korea itself. The viruses of disinformation, politicization, and polarization are circulating in Korea, too, though at this point not as virulently as elsewhere.
I found worry in Korea about a lot of other things in addition to when and how the Covid-19 crisis will play itself out. A presidential election widely viewed as uninspiring or worse. Narrowing economic opportunities for the rising generation. Korea’s multiple generation gaps. Feminism and anti-feminism. Questions about America’s future direction, and whether it will include Trump or Trumpism. What’s next with a self-isolated North Korea. Are the U.S. and China headed for a cold war, or a hot one. Why the Biden Administration hasn’t gotten around to nominating a new ambassador to South Korea, especially given the priority attached to the alliance. All topics for more dialogue, preferably increasingly in-person. And for some future columns.
But I departed Korea after two weeks thinking that, above all, Koreans and Americans need to talk more with each other about China, and the reshaping of our respective understanding of and relationships with China. This is the big strategic shift in the global landscape, and we need to explore it candidly and continuously, among and between our two countries, at every level of the public and private sectors.
The problem is neither Korea nor the United States have a coherent “China policy.”
South Korea’s used to be relatively simple: Korea looked to China as a key economic partner and essential to hopes for inter-Korean progress; the United States was the security partner and ally It was never as simple as it looked, and now the “China for the economy, U.S. for security” formulation has frayed. The economic space has been securitized. Most of the lines between economic and commercial activities and the security sphere have blurred or even disappeared, as we see in policy priorities to establish trusted supply chains and protect sensitive technology and intellectual property, or in the heavy-handed economic punishment China has meted out to South Korea and Australia for security policies it dislikes. South Korean public sentiment toward China has turned strongly negative. But South Korea must also consider the important Beijing-Pyongyang relationship, and Korea’s own geographical proximity and long and complex historical ties with China. Whoever wins the March presidential election, the new president will continue to face the challenge of positioning South Korea on a range of issues with China-related implications, from the Quad to Taiwan to the South China Sea.
It’s hard to remember now, but the United States national security strategy shift from one based on counterterrorism (the poorly-named “Global War on Terror”) to great power rivalry is relatively recent. Under Biden the early emphasis has been on strengthening alliances and partnerships, especially in Asia, and building multilateral cooperation through the Quad, AUKUS, and more. Secretary of State Tony Blinken gave a speech titled “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in Indonesia on Dec. 14 which was described by the New York Times as “downplaying direct confrontation” between the United States and China making a “soft-power” pitch that the United States is a better bet as a partner than China.
To me, and likely to many in Korea and throughout Asia, this is a welcome approach, as was the softer discourse of the Biden-Xi virtual summit on Nov. 15. But just as the Biden-Xi summit did not alter the established “strategic competition” lens through which Washington sees U.S.-China relations, Blinken’s speech mention of a “comprehensive Indo-Pacific economic framework” under development in Washington did not assuage the criticism that the United States has been missing-in-action on the trade front since withdrawing from the TPP. Nonetheless, Blinken and other officials have outlined a wide range of issues on which the U.S. is looking for greater cooperation with allies like South Korea, including supply chain resiliency, clean energy, decarbonization, infrastructure, democracy, vaccines and much more. Perhaps such functional cooperation, important in its own right, can help address regional and global challenges. But many will require a complicated public-private sector approach. And they fall short of being an articulated “China policy.”
I was a senior official at the State Department’s East Asia Bureau in 2005 when then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick gave the speech in which he coined the term “responsible stakeholder” to describe our hoped-for future for China and U.S.-China relations. The Chinese even back then never liked the term; for one it was very difficult to translate, and perhaps found it condescending, or insincere. But I think it would be infinitely harder to have a “China speech” now, or to come up with a term to replace that earlier, discarded one. That’s probably why we got the “Indo-Pacific” speech first.
More important than a single speech or summit, what I take from my two weeks in Korea is that Americans and Koreans need to have continual, deep conversations about China, about our respective histories and relationships, and about our shared futures. Perhaps we can begin with a book club: On my flight back to Washington I took a break from Korean movies to reread a short 2021 book by Yale University Professor Odd Arne Westad entitled “Empire and Righteous Nation: 600 Years of China-Korea Relations.”
Westad dedicates the book, “To the united and peaceful Korea of the future.”
To achieve that future, we need to understand and better deal with the dangerous moment we are in. We’ll need some history for that.
4. Moon stresses need for defense capabilities befitting S. Korea's geopolitical position
The right words here I think:
"Our defense capabilities are needed not only for deterrence against North Korea, but also for the autonomy of our country stuck between great powers," Moon was quoted by Park as saying.
"We should be equipped with defense capabilities befitting such a geopolitical location," he added.
The president also said that the strengthening of defense capabilities is directly linked to South Korea's economy, as the country continues to expand its footholds in the global defense markets.
Moon stresses need for defense capabilities befitting S. Korea's geopolitical position | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 26 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in has pointed out the need for South Korea to have defense capabilities not only to deter North Korean threats but also to cope with its geopolitical position "stuck between great powers," his aide said Sunday.
Moon made the remarks during a meeting with his secretaries last month while commenting on the country's project to acquire a light aircraft carrier by 2033, Park Soo-hyun, his chief secretary for public communication, wrote on Facebook.
"Our defense capabilities are needed not only for deterrence against North Korea, but also for the autonomy of our country stuck between great powers," Moon was quoted by Park as saying.
"We should be equipped with defense capabilities befitting such a geopolitical location," he added.
The president also said that the strengthening of defense capabilities is directly linked to South Korea's economy, as the country continues to expand its footholds in the global defense markets.
The Navy's push to secure the light aircraft carrier has reflected South Korea's ambitions to bolster its defense beyond its shores in a region surrounded by major military powers like China, Russia and Japan.
After the National Assembly passed a budget for the carrier project earlier this month, the country is expected to begin a process for the vessel's basic design in the latter half of next year, the defense ministry has said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Former USFK commander "Korea's military power is frankly far behind"
This is a Google translation of a Donga Ilbo article. Please be careful with the translation. The title is referring to missile defense,not overall Korean military power. He did not say the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) "uptodate." He said it is still in effect. General Abrams requested an update to the SPG in 2019 but ROK MND opposed it.
Former USFK commander "Korea's military power is frankly far behind"
Enter 2021-12-25 08:30Update 2021-12-25 09:15
“The 11-year-old Strategic Planning Guideline is still up to date… “The threat from North Korea and China is evolving”
“I wonder what we are trying to achieve in the declaration of an end to the Korean War… It could lead to the result that the UNC is no longer needed.”
Former USFK commander Robert Abrams, who returned to the United States after completing his mission in July, pointed out that South Korea's military capabilities are still insufficient.
Abrams, the former commander of the United States, appeared on 'Washington Talk' on the 25th and said, "Korea should acquire strategic strike capabilities and develop and deploy a Korean-style integrated air missile defense system." “It’s frankly far behind,” he replied.
“The North Korean military continues to test solid fuel missiles, which poses a serious threat to South Korea, USFK and Japan,” he said. Solid fuel simply means that missiles can be hidden underground and fired very quickly. These missiles are far more accurate than the old '70s liquid-fueled missiles. It can also carry much larger warheads.”
Regarding the agreement between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and South Korean Defense Minister Seo Wook earlier this month on a new strategic planning guide (SPG) for operational planning, he said, “I think this should have been implemented long ago. I think it's because he took a very strong stance on that."
He said, “Korea’s current operational plan is based on the 2010 Strategic Planning Guidelines. It's been 11 years. When I arrived in South Korea in November 2018, I reviewed the current operational plan in detail, and in March 2019, during my first training as a commander of the UNC, CFC, and USFK, a new operational plan was needed to reflect all changes since 2010. found out In the summer of 2019, we submitted an official request for the renewal of these Strategic Plan guidelines. However, at the 2019 US-Korea Security Council (SCM) meeting, the ROK Ministry of National Defense did not support the need for a new strategic planning guideline. I didn't give a specific reason," he recalled.
“The North Korean threat has evolved. There are also short-range ballistic missiles and advanced artillery systems, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles. These are things that did not exist until 2010. And it's no secret that China has significantly increased their presence on and around the Korean Peninsula since 2010. Over the past three years, the number of cases of Chinese intrusion into South Korean air defense identification zones has increased by 300%. We are also seeing an increase in Chinese fishing boats fishing illegally along the Northern Limit Line (NLL). All of these should be addressed in the operational plan. It is not in the current strategic planning guidelines.”
Regarding the Moon Jae-in administration's push for an end-of-war declaration, he said, "My question is that it is not clear what we are trying to achieve from a declaration of an end to the war. It is possible that there will be arguments that need to be looked into. Then it will be a slippery slope. 'The United Nations Command was created to fight in war, and once the war is over, the UNC is no longer needed, right?' It could lead to the result of countries saying this. Without the UNC, there would be no more armistice agreements, but we have not made one step forward in denuclearization. Today, North Korea is clearly threatening with nuclear weapons.”
Park Tae-geun, reporter for Donga.com ptk@donga.com
6. Women who flee North Korea also escape a harsh patriarchy
The left handed compliment of South Korea is also revealing. But there can be no whataboutism - it is the Kim family regime that is truly evil and a threat to Korean women in the north
Excerpts:
Lee acknowledged that the North Korean perspective on women I slowly changing, “it has not progressed as far as South Korea.”
That these two women find South Korea to be an egalitarian utopia is particularly telling. South Korea ranked 104th out of 156 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2021 Global Gender Gap report, between Indonesia and Cambodia. The report did not rank North Korea due to lack of available data.
Life as a mother in North Korea is so hard that women no longer want to have children, the 2012 escapee Park said.
“Why should they suffer having a child in North Korea. Why make life worse by having a child in a place with no pleasures nor answers, where we can’t even fend for ourselves,” she said.
Though the global Me Too movement has not spread widely in North Korea, Park said that some women do stand up for themselves to protect their rights.
“Me Too isn’t a thing yet. Many women are reluctant to report such things because they are too shy about speaking up.”
Kim and Lee recently vacationed together in Jeju, a large island off South Korea’s southern coast known for its beaches, resorts and tourist attractions. Reflecting on their past two years in South Korea, they both said they are closer to achieving their dreams now than they were at any time in the North.
“I want to become a nurse and work in a hospital, with competence and composure,” Lee said.
Women who flee North Korea also escape a harsh patriarchy
Life in North Korea as mother, housekeeper and breadwinner is exhausting, escapees say.
Kim Seo-yeong and Lee Su-jin left North Korea to make a dangerous 3,700-mile-trek to freedom not only to escape a tyrannical government and a dire economy. They also wanted to escape a relentlessly patriarchal society that would have tied their destinies to the men in their lives.
In North Korea, they said, their identities would be limited to being wives, mothers or housekeepers. As two twenty-somethings, Kim Seo-yeong and Lee Su-jin (both pseudonyms) yearned for more.
“To be honest, I lived a hopeless life in North Korea,” Kim Seo-young told RFA. “It’s not easy to live in a society where I can’t do what I want to, and where my efforts don’t bear fruit.”
She and Lee Su-jin were part of a group of 13 North Korean escapees who arrived in Southeast Asia in October 2019, en route to their final destination, South Korea, the following year.
“Not being allowed to pursue my dreams pained me the most,” Lee told RFA.
“I really wanted to attend medical school, but I couldn’t go because of my todae,” she said, referring to the North Korean government’s practice of ranking every citizen’s social standing based on their assessment of their family’s loyalty dating back several generations.
“Many people are held back by their todae, no matter how smart or motivated they are.”
Three of four escapees are female
Her only hope for any kind of success, she said, was to “find a good man and get married right away.”
More than 33,000 North Koreans have successfully made their way to South Korea in the past several decades, according to statistics from the South Korean Ministry of Unification. More than 72% of these escapees have been female.
Young women in North Korea are under intense societal and familial pressure to get married early, so much so that a wedding can feel more like an obligation than a voluntary choice.
This is even true for women with successful careers, according to Lindsey Miller, the wife of a former British diplomat stationed in Pyongyang.
A bride and groom pose before a fountain during a wedding photo shoot at a park in Pyongyang on April 18, 2019. (Photo by Ed JONES / AFP)
Miller, who lived in the North Korean capital between 2017 and 2019, told RFA she frequently interacted with female officials of the North Korean Labor Party and with single women from privileged families.
“[One woman] said the pressure from her parents to date and find someone was very strong. I heard from other North Korean women in Pyongyang who told me they felt under pressure from their parents as they got older, to find a husband to get married and have a family,” Miller said.
Death of autonomy
Kim and Lee said they came to view marriage as the death of their autonomy.
“In North Korea, once you marry and have a child, your own life as a woman ends,” Kim said. “The ambitions you had in your youth become irrelevant after getting married and having children. It’s really sad.”
“When I was in North Korea, I thought often that I want to get married late,” Lee said. “My aunt always said that the earlier women get married and settle down, the better, but I did not like that.”
A woman carrying a baby on her back rides on a motorbike with a North Korean soldier along the banks of the Yalu River near the North Korean town of Qing Cheng, located around 50 kilometres north of the Chinese border city of Dandong September 12, 2008.
A married woman must fulfill three roles: caretaker, housekeeper and, increasingly, breadwinner.
In years past men could support their families with the salary they got from their government-assigned jobs. But after the economy tanked with the collapse of North Korea’s main patron the Soviet Union 30 years ago, monthly salaries could barely cover a day’s expenses.
With housing and other basic necessities tied to their state jobs, men were unable to walk away, despite the meager pay. Increasingly, wives had to make money to support the family, usually by running family businesses trading in marketplaces that sprung up to serve demands the crumbling state sector failed to meet.
“It’s genuinely exhausting being a woman in North Korea,” said Park Sun-hwa, an escapee in her 40s who settled in South Korea in 2012, told RFA.
“The men cannot go out and earn money, so in order for us to prosper, women have no choice but to go out to make money while also doing all the housework,” Park Sun-hwa, also a pseudonym, said.
Mustered for free labor
In addition to their family duties, women are also routinely mobilized for free labor on government projects and mustered to waive flags in crowds for visiting foreign delegations, Kim Hye-yeong, a 50-year-old escapee who settled in South Korea in 2002, told RFA.
A North Korean cheerleading group wave flags to propaganda music near a road intersection as people start their day early morning on Saturday, June 17, 2017, in Pyongyang, North Korea. (AP Photo/Wong Maye-E)
“During the morning rush hour, the members of the Socialist Women’s Union must play the drums and sing as part of the government’s propaganda efforts. They also have to deal with various tasks as assigned by the neighborhood watch unit, starting with cleaning the village every morning. When it snows, the main road must be cleared, and snow must be removed,” Kim Hye-yeong, a pseudonym, said.
“In South Korea, men have a duty to earn money and take responsibility for the household, but North Korean men are forced to work [almost] without pay, making it hard for everyone to survive,” said Kim.
“It’s so frustrating. It’s been many years since I left my hometown and came here, and it makes my heart ache every time I hear the news that nothing has changed and things have gotten worse,” she said.
Lee said that North Korean society generally disregards the concerns of women.
“Everyone just thinks that women should marry, have kids and submit to their husbands. This is so unlike South Korea, which has the mindset that women and men should be equal,” said Lee.
Kim Seoyoung and Lee Sujin who enjoy traveling in Jeju Island.
‘A place with no pleasures’
Lee acknowledged that the North Korean perspective on women I slowly changing, “it has not progressed as far as South Korea.”
That these two women find South Korea to be an egalitarian utopia is particularly telling. South Korea ranked 104th out of 156 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2021 Global Gender Gap report, between Indonesia and Cambodia. The report did not rank North Korea due to lack of available data.
Life as a mother in North Korea is so hard that women no longer want to have children, the 2012 escapee Park said.
“Why should they suffer having a child in North Korea. Why make life worse by having a child in a place with no pleasures nor answers, where we can’t even fend for ourselves,” she said.
Though the global Me Too movement has not spread widely in North Korea, Park said that some women do stand up for themselves to protect their rights.
“Me Too isn’t a thing yet. Many women are reluctant to report such things because they are too shy about speaking up.”
Kim and Lee recently vacationed together in Jeju, a large island off South Korea’s southern coast known for its beaches, resorts and tourist attractions. Reflecting on their past two years in South Korea, they both said they are closer to achieving their dreams now than they were at any time in the North.
“I want to become a nurse and work in a hospital, with competence and composure,” Lee said.
Translated by RFA’s Korean Service Written in English by Eugene Whong.
7. US-China conflict ignites new 'Cold War' in supply chain
From semiconductors to climate change.
US-China conflict ignites new 'Cold War' in supply chain
Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry Chairman Chey Tae-won speaks to reporters on the latest issues surrounding Korean companies during an interview at KCCI's headquarters, Wednesday. Courtesy of KCCI
By Kim Hyun-bin
Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI) Chairman Chey Tae-won says the ongoing trade conflict between Washington and Beijing has altered the global supply chain structure, resulting in a renewed "Cold War."
"Looking at the global supply chain, there is a change, especially in the context of the U.S.-China conflict. In the past, the entire global supply chain was shared, but now they are forced to split into factions," Chey said during a year-end meeting with reporters at the KCCI's headquarters, Wednesday. His remarks were embargoed until Sunday afternoon.
As semiconductor shortages have been impacting backbone industries in the United States ― from iPhones to new vehicles ― since the COVID-19 outbreak early last year, Washington has started to reorganize its global supply chain, focusing on the semiconductor and battery industries.
Washington is calling on the Korean government and businesses to back U.S. President Joe Biden's semiconductor initiatives. At the same time, Beijing has also asked the Korean government to explore ways to strengthen cooperation in the chip and battery supply chains.
Korea has been stuck in the middle of a tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, as Korean semiconductor companies require advanced technology from the U.S., while China is the largest market and core manufacturing base for Korean companies. According to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), China accounted for 41.4 percent of Korea's semiconductor exports as of October of this year.
The KCCI chief also pointed out that the supply chain restructuring presents "both opportunities and risks," but is expected to benefit some industries more than others. KCCI is the country's most influential business lobby representing the interests of Korea's leading conglomerates.
"We believe that semiconductor demand will continue solidly, and we are also increasing the supply side, so there will be no problem with the supply of semiconductors," he said.
Specifically, the automotive industry has been hit hard by chip shortages leading to the temporary shutdowns of plants.
"I didn't know the chip shortages would have this much impact," Chey said.
Countries were hit by memory chip shortages in 2017 and 2018, which Chey says show the unpredictable nature of the industry and prove just how difficult it is to prepare ahead.
"No one could have predicted it," he told reporters.
Chey went on to say that Korea is not the only country to face semiconductor and battery shortages. He said that the problem should be viewed as a matter of national security that can be resolved through communication with other countries.
"Each country is approaching the issue in regards to security. It's not a matter of diplomacy or national defense, but rather, the issue is being seen as part of developing economic security. In Europe and the United States, this issue is also being addressed by their respective defense agencies. Aside from traditional thinking, they see economic security as a national defense issue, and come up with their own policies," Chey said. "Semiconductors and carbon issues are all connected. It is a global problem and our core industries are all interrelated. Korea must set a vision and direction and communicate with other countries."
Chey believes global warming is a "terrifying" issue that must not be ignored, citing a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimating that a two-degree Celsius rise in global temperature will create more than 10 times the cost of carbon neutrality in terms of economic losses, and urging the public and private sector to cooperate to achieve the goal of net-zero carbon emissions.
"A policy that imposes fines and taxes on carbon emissions alone cannot achieve this goal. Also the government's policy focused on reducing carbon is not enough. I think there needs to be a public-private cooperation project," he added.
8. North Korea set for key party meeting amid deadlock in nuclear negotiations
Is the party going to party like it's 1999? I think not (apologies for the sarcasm)
North Korea set for key party meeting amid deadlock in nuclear negotiations
A session of the meetings held by North Korean Army's educators, Dec. 4 and 5, is presided over by the country's leader Kim Jong-un at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency, Dec. 7. Yonhap
North Korea is expected to convene a key party meeting within the coming week amid expectations it could unveil the country's policy directions for next year in the face of a prolonged stalemate in its denuclearization negotiations with the United States.
The North's official Korean Central News Agency said earlier this month that the ruling Workers' Party will hold a plenary meeting of its central committee "in the last third of December" to "discuss and decide on work plans for the New Year."
Experts say the upcoming party event could replace North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's annual New Year's Day address, which is closely watched by the outside world for clues on the country's stance on the nuclear talks and inter-Korean relations.
Kim skipped such speeches in the past two years, opting instead to unveil key messages via major party sessions around the turn of the year.
At the end of 2019, Kim presided over a four-day party plenary session and accused Washington of "hostile acts" against Pyongyang. This year, he convened a rare party congress in January and called the U.S. the North's "principal enemy."
The upcoming session is drawing attention, as it may offer a clue to the unpredictable regime's next step regarding the nuclear talks with the U.S., which have been stalled since the collapse of a 2019 summit in Hanoi.
At the North's last party plenary session held in June, Kim ordered officials to stay ready for both dialogue and confrontation.
The U.S. has urged North Korea to return to negotiations, but Pyongyang is demanding Washington first retract what it calls "double standards" and a "hostile policy" against its regime.
Earlier this month, President Joe Biden's administration imposed fresh sanctions on North Korea's Defense Minister Ri Yong-gil and other entities for their alleged ties to human rights abuses in a move feared to dampen South Korean President Moon Jae-in's hope for the resumption of dialogue.
The North's economy is also expected to be high on the agenda at the upcoming meeting as the country is struggling from crippling sanctions and a protracted border closure due to COVID-19.
At the January party congress, Kim called for achieving economic development under a new five-year plan after admitting the failure of his previous strategy.
The party session also comes as the North is set to mark the 10th anniversary of Kim's rise to power.
Kim officially took the helm of the North on Dec. 30, 2011, with the "supreme commandership of the Korean People's Army," 13 days after his father and the country's former leader, Kim Jong-il, died.
North Korea has been creating a commemorative mood ahead of the anniversary, highlighting Kim's achievements in a series of state media reports.
"The North has been frequently holding politburo meetings and plenary sessions to decide key policy issues after Kim rose to power in an indication the party has become a core decision-making platform," an official at Seoul's unification ministry said. "We will closely monitor the event as the North's stance on South Korea and the U.S. could be discussed." (Yonhap)
9. Kim Jong-un's decade in power
As an accused "collapsist" (and as someone how co-authored the first plan for north Korean instability and collapse) I will say again that those of us who wrote the plan never predicted that north Korea would collapse and certainly not when it would collapse - only how it could collapse read Robert Collins' seven phases of regime collapse which has stood the test of time: read HERE) and that if the regime does collapse it will be catastrophic for the peninsula, the region, and the world and our thesis was (and remains) we need to prepare for it in case it does happen.
Kim Jong-un's decade in power
By John Burton
"North Korea as we know it is over. Whether it comes apart in the next few weeks or over several months, the regime will not be able to hold together after the untimely death of its leader, Kim Jong-il."
That was the bold prediction of Victor Cha, a top North Korean expert in Washington, D.C., writing in the New York Times in December 2011. With Kim Jong-un now celebrating his 10th anniversary in power as dictator, Cha's comment is a reminder that forecasting what will happen in North Korea often amounts to a fool's errand.
Predictions of North Korea's collapse have become routine over the last 30 years. When I was the Financial Times correspondent in Seoul in the 1990s, I remember being told by my editors to prepare to write about North Korea's downfall after the death of Kim Il-sung. Of course, his son, Kim Jong-il, would go on to rule for the next 17 years.
Recurrent predictions about North Korea's collapse seem to amount to a sort of wish fulfillment among U.S. leaders. It was the views of Cha and others in the American foreign policy establishment that persuaded the administration of President Barack Obama to adopt a strategy of "strategic patience" toward Pyongyang. It was believed that it made little sense for Washington to engage with North Korea when it was likely that the country would soon be thrown on the scrapheap of history.
I am reminded of all this when reading recent articles marking the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong-un's rule. Once again, North Korea appears to be "economically broken, starving and politically isolated" as Cha described the situation in 2011.
The current dominant narrative is that Kim's attempts at economic reform to improve the lives of his people have failed and the country is now on the edge of collapse.
Shortly after taking power, Kim promised to build an "economically powerful state." Initial steps included allowing a measure of private enterprise in the agricultural sector and permitting the growth of informal markets. In addition, he oversaw a frenzy of "socialist construction" in Pyongyang with the erection of new modern buildings and the opening of more shops and restaurants.
But two developments brought this period of economic expansion to an end. One was the imposition of tougher international sanctions in 2017 after Kim continued to aggressively push for the testing of nuclear weapons and missiles.
Then came the COVID-19 threat in 2020 which resulted in North Korea imposing one of the world's strictest border closures out of fear that the pandemic could overwhelm the country's fragile healthcare system. The economy has also been struggling with severe weather conditions, including flooding, that has affected the agricultural sector and resulted in food shortages, with Kim admitting the food situation had become "tense."
But Kim can also count several "successes" ― at least from his own perspective ― that he has achieved during the past 10 years.
The first is that he is in power at all. It was the perception that Kim was not up to the task of ruling North Korea after his father died that led Cha and others to believe that the country would soon fall apart. But Kim proved that he was a tough and skilled political fighter, conducting purges of potential domestic opponents that included killing his own uncle and half-brother.
Another achievement is that Kim has built an extensive nuclear-armed ballistic missile force that might be capable of hitting the U.S. This has increased Kim's strategic leverage and might make it nearly impossible now for the U.S. to take him down.
North Korea's increased military power has also helped raise the global profile of Kim. He has held summits with the leaders of China, Russia and South Korea and, perhaps more importantly, with U.S. President Donald Trump that established Kim as a regional leader who had to be taken seriously.
Geostrategic developments, mainly growing tensions between China and the U.S., will benefit North Korea. Although China in the last few years supported increased international sanctions against North Korea to push Pyongyang toward denuclearization, it might be willing to adopt a more tolerant approach towards its isolated neighbor in the future. As North Korea's largest trading partner, Beijing may decide to step up its support for the Kim regime to counterbalance rising U.S. pressure on China in East Asia.
There are already signs of this happening as trade begins to recover from North Korea's pandemic-related border closures. There are indications that China is increasing its shipments of crude oil and fertilizer to North Korea after Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed economic cooperation this summer.
Although Pyongyang will face difficult times ahead, China's support will likely keep the North Korean economy afloat and Kim in power.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
10. Lee pledges to build nuclear submarines, launch space command
Nuclear powered submarines are a vanity project. Better to invest in integrated missile defense, counterfire, diesel powered submarines, advanced aircraft, and ships that are aegis equipped.
Lee pledges to build nuclear submarines, launch space command
Lee says he will adopt a hybrid system of conscript and volunteer military if elected
Published : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:06 Updated : Dec 24, 2021 - 17:09
Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party, speaks during a press conference in Seoul on Dec. 24. (Yonhap)
South Korean presidential hopeful Lee Jae-myung on Friday promised to push forward with plans to build a nuclear-powered submarine and launch a space command against multifaceted threats as part of his policy manifesto.
The presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea announced his envisioned defense and security policies at a news conference, under the theme of “fostering a smart, powerful force.”
Lee called for a new, multidomain approach to protecting national security against diverse and non-traditional threats.
“We now need to find a new direction in national security against new emerging threats and a demographic cliff,” Lee said. “We should thoroughly examine and prepare for threats stemming from (security) uncertainties and protect the people and the territory of the Republic of Korea with rapid defense innovation and change.”
The key of his election pledges is to build the “smart, powerful force” optimized for a new battlefield environment by utilizing the advanced technology of the “4th Industrial Revolution.“
To that end, Lee promised to advance the weapons system and “strengthen the core military capability to respond to nuclear and weapons of mass destruction WMD threats.”
Lee notably raised the need to establish a nuclear-powered attack submarine, which also has been pursued by the Moon Jae-in government.
“I will secure the core military capability for preparing for the future war,” Lee said. “Based on the solid South Korea-US alliance, I will push ahead with building a nuclear-powered submarine, which is capable of ambushing, monitoring, and reconnoitering underwater for a long time, against North Korean nuclear threats.”
The presidential hopeful also unveiled its plan to expand a military operations area into space by establishing a “space command” and “defense space network” consisting of early-warning satellites and micro surveillance and reconnaissance satellites.
Hybrid of conscription and all-volunteer military
Another key pledge is to restructure military service and expand the professional volunteer service, with the goal of fostering more capable and specialized personnel in preparation for the demographic cliff in South Korea.
Lee essentially said he would introduce a new hybrid system for military personnel, between a conscription and an all-volunteer military system, seeking a midpoint between the two. But the presidential candidate elucidated he would basically adhere to the current mandatory military service.
In the new system, South Korean citizens who are subject to mandatory military service would have two options: Signing up as a conscript and serving as a professional non-commissioned officer.
The non-commissioned officers will be assigned to duties requiring combat skills and specialty, which include operating high-tech military equipment.
If he is elected as president, Lee said he would reduce the number of conscripts from 300,000 to 150,000 during his term.
The ruling party’s presidential candidate, instead, will increase the number of professional non-commissioned officers by 50,000 through conscription and additionally hire 50,000 civilian employees with expertise in administration, logistics, and education to support the military.
Lee aims to maintain a standing force of 400,000 personnel after restructuring the military, pushing forward his plans to improve the environment for military service. The plans include the renovation of barracks, an upgrade in the quality of meals for military service, and support for education.
The ruling party’s presidential candidate also promised to raise the salary of conscripted soldiers to the level of the minimum wage and pay around 2 million won ($1,700).
Lee said he would directly take the initiative in “defense innovation” by establishing a presidential committee.
By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
