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Quotes of the Day:
“great writers are indecent people
they live unfairly
saving the best part for paper.
good human beings see the world
so that bastards like me can keep
creating art,
become immortal.
if you read this after I am dead
it means I made it.”
-Charles Bukowski, The People Look Like Flowers at Last
"Strategy is, at some level, the ability to predict what’s going to happen, but it’s also about understanding the context in which it is being formulated. And then you have to be open-minded to the fact that you’re not going to get it right at the very beginning."
–Martin Dempsey
"Unconventional warfare (UW) is the primary mission that most distinguishes SF. The inherently interagency, multinational, and widely dispersed activities of UW are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in denied areas to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow oppressive regimes. UW operations are politically sensitive activities that involve a high degree of military risk and, therefore, require distinct authorities and innovative campaign design. The demands of UW missions require mature SF Soldiers who are adept at interacting with a wide range of actors and agencies capable of, and trusted with, sensitive and largely independent operations. The payoff—what makes SF UW activities worth the risk to forces in a denied area—is the subsequent weak defensive posture the enemy must take in order to defend everything and thereby defend nothing well.
Whether the mission is UW, FID, or simply direct action, SF is designed and trained to understand the balance between diplomacy and force, and which is most applicable for creating \ the conditions for a favorable conflict resolution. This judgment has been honed over decades of engagement with allies, coalition partners, and indigenous populations and provides the United States a discreet, low-signature, small-footprint alternative to aJTF or other large military force structure."
FM 3-18, Special Forces Operations, 2014
1. China carries out military exercises near Taiwan and Japan, sending 47 aircraft across Taiwan Strait in 'strike drill'
2. Is Japan’s New National Security Strategy A Paradigm Shift? – Analysis
3. TikTok bans on government devices raise questions about platform’s future
4. Chinese fleet of militarised ships ‘a threat to trade’
5. Three substations attacked in Washington state
6. Russia goes to war but Ukrainian resistance wins hearts and minds: 2022 in Review
7. China, Japan up military ante on the Nansei Islands
8. Why China’s attempt to set up more military bases abroad may run into rough weather
9. Biden Escalates The Economic War With China
10. Explained: How Joe Biden repaired America's ties with the world in 2022
11. West Point to remove Robert E. Lee portrait, bust
12. Chinese dark influence coming to light in Thailand
13. Demystifying China’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Debt Restructuring
14. Marcos Jr shows the way to balance US and China
15. Assessing The Network-State in 2050
16. Putin says Russia ready to negotiate over Ukraine
17. Robert Kagan Peddles the Failed Doctrine of ‘Liberal Hegemony’
18. With ‘Zero Covid,’ China Proved It’s Good at Control. Governance Is Harder.
19. With Record Military Incursions, China Warns Taiwan and U.S.
20. The Last Gasp of Peace: The Christmas Truce of 1914 and the Modern Profession of Arms
1. China carries out military exercises near Taiwan and Japan, sending 47 aircraft across Taiwan Strait in 'strike drill'
China carries out military exercises near Taiwan and Japan, sending 47 aircraft across Taiwan Strait in 'strike drill' | CNN
CNN · by Eric Cheung,Jessie Yeung,emiko jozuka · December 26, 2022
Taipei, Taiwan CNN —
China sent 47 aircraft across the median line of the Taiwan Strait on Sunday, its largest incursion into Taiwan’s air defense zone in recent months, as Beijing steps-up efforts to normalize aggressive military operations around the self-ruled island.
The incursions were made by 42 J-10, J-11, J-16 and Su-30 fighter jets, two Y-8 maritime patrol aircrafts, a KJ-500 early warning aircraft, as well as a CH-4 and a WZ-7 military drone, according to the Taiwanese defense ministry.
It added that a total of 71 Chinese aircraft were spotted around the island, and that Taiwan’s military have responded by tasking combat air patrol aircrafts, navy vessels, and land-based missile systems.
The flights, part of a so-called “strike drill” according to China’s military, follow naval exercises by a Chinese aircraft carrier group in the Western Pacific close to Japan on Friday.
Chinese aircraft taking part in military drills around the Taiwan Strait on December 25, 2022.
PLA Eastern Theater Command/Weibo
China’s ruling Communist Party views Taiwan – a democratically governed island of 24 million – as part of its territory, despite having never controlled it. It has long vowed to “reunify” the island with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.
Tensions surrounding Taiwan have increased markedly this year. A visit to the island by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in August prompted fury from the Communist Party and an immediate flurry of military exercises.
Since then, Beijing has stepped up aggressive military pressure tactics on the island, sending fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, the body of water separating Taiwan and China and into the island’s air defense identification zone – a buffer of airspace commonly referred to as an ADIZ.
For decades, the median line had served as an informal demarcation line between the two, with military incursions across it being rare.
The newest activities came as the Chinese military’s Eastern Theater Command said Sunday it conducted joint combat readiness patrol and “strike drills” around Taiwan, in response to “provocations” between Taiwan and the United States, without providing specific details.
“The troops will take all necessary measures to resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the Eastern Theater Command said.
On Friday, US President Joe Biden signed a sweeping new defense bill into law that included the establishment of a defense modernization program for Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression.
A Chinese military jet flies over Pingtan island, one of mainland China's closest point from Taiwan, in Fujian province on August 5, 2022. - Taiwan blasted its "evil neighbour next door" on August 5 after China encircled the island with a series of huge military drills that were condemned by the United States and other Western allies. (Photo by Hector RETAMAL / AFP) (Photo by HECTOR RETAMAL/AFP via Getty Images)
Hector Retamal/AFP/Getty Images
Taiwan will treat Chinese military flights into its airspace as 'first strike,' defense minister says
The Taiwanese defense ministry responded in a statement Sunday night that it has confidence in defending its sovereignty. “The actions of the Chinese Communist Party highlighted its mentality of using force to resolve differences, which undermines regional peace and stability,” it said.
“The cooperation between Taiwan and the United States will help safeguard a free, open and stable Indo-Pacific region. The military will continue to strengthen military preparedness based on enemy threats and self-defense needs,” it added.
In November, Biden met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in-person for the first time during his presidency at the G20 summit in Indonesia. Afterward, Biden described the three-hour meeting as “open and candid,” and cast doubt on an imminent invasion of Taiwan.
Formal bilateral talks on climate cooperation are expected to resume as well as part of a broader set of agreements between Biden and Xi – with China having previously halted talks as part of retaliation for Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
Drills near Japan
Last Friday, China also conducted a series of military drills close to Japan’s southern Okinawa island in the Pacific Ocean, according to Japanese authorities.
The Chinese navy’s Liaoning aircraft carrier, as well as two destroyers and a frigate, sailed about 560 kilometers (about 348 miles) east of Kitadaito Island, located off Okinawa’s east coast, on December 21, according to Japan’s Joint Staff. The vessels also sailed roughly 120 kilometers (74 miles) east of Okinotorishima, located further southeast, on December 22.
Then on Friday, around 180 carrier-based fighter jets and helicopters took off and landed on the Liaoning aircraft carrier, according to Japan’s defense ministry.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces responded by dispatching two escort ships to collect information and carry out warning and surveillance, the ministry said.
Tensions between China and Japan have also been rising steadily, with Beijing growing its naval and air forces in areas near Japan. China also claims the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited Japanese-controlled chain in the East China Sea.
Chinese ships have been making frequent forays near the islands, which it calls the Diaoyus, while Japan scrambles warplanes almost daily in response to Chinese planes nearing its airspace.
Earlier this month, Japan unveiled a new national security plan that signals the country’s biggest military buildup since World War II, doubling defense spending and veering from its pacifist constitution in the face of growing threats China, North Korea and Russia.
CNN · by Eric Cheung,Jessie Yeung,emiko jozuka · December 26, 2022
2. Is Japan’s New National Security Strategy A Paradigm Shift? – Analysis
Excerpts:
The new NSS invests in the current rules-based order instead of deviating from it. Through this strategy, Japan wants to prevent Chinese hegemony emerging within the region.
Notwithstanding, Japan has been consistent fostering engagement through trade policies that include China such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) but at times exclude China such as the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan continues to build multi-layered and multilateral partnerships throughout the region. This includes the Japan EU-Economic Partnership Agreement and trade agreements with the United States. It continues to advocate for digital agreements within the region and it continues to invest huge amounts of resources in terms of ODA and FDI to help build infrastructure and connectivity in Southeast Asia and South Asia in order to make these regions more strategically autonomous so that they can make different decisions when it comes to code of codes of conduct in the South China Sea and dealing with diplomacy in general within the region.
Is Japan’s New National Security Strategy A Paradigm Shift? – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by Geopolitical Monitor · December 26, 2022
By Stephen Nagy*
With the release of Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), we have seen a chorus of commentators discuss the new strategy from the viewpoint of departing from Japan’s pacifist constitution. The Hindustan Times calls it a game-changer, whereas the China Daily called the new strategy “disconcerting.” In a statement in the Global Timesby a spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, responding specifically to language describing China as the “greatest strategic challenge ever,” the official strongly protested: “saying such things within the documents severely distorts the facts, violates the principles and spirit of the four China-Japan political documents, wantonly hypes the ‘China threat’ and provokes regional tension and confrontation.”
Allies of Japan including the US, Canada, and Australia have welcomed a more proactive and 21st century NSS. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Japan Chair Chris Johnstone calls it transformative by “shattering policy norms in place for much of the period since World War II.” In contrast, the United States Institute of Peace’s Senior Policy Analyst Mirna Galic stresses that “the name is new, but the document is really the latest update of the intermittently released National Defence Program Guidelines, which were last updated in 2018. Similarly, the new defence build-up plan is an updated version of 2018’s Mid-Term Defense Program.”
In reality, the new NSS is both transformative in focusing on counterstrike capabilities and boosting defence spending and consistent with Japan continuing to be deeply wedded to its longstanding commitment to being a peace-loving nation. The NSS highlights that Japan has a decades-long record of accomplishment of maintaining a basic policy of an exclusively nationally defence-oriented policy. This includes not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries. Importantly, Japan remains committed to observing the three non-nuclear principles of not producing, possessing, or allowing transit of nuclear weapons through Japan.
This position was re-informed at the Shangri La dialogue in June 2022 by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio in which he launched his Kishida Vision for Peace. There again, he stressed that Japan will never acquire nuclear weapons and it will retain its non-nuclear principles.
Seen alongside the year-by-year 10% plus increase in military spending between 2000-2010 and the latest increase of 7.1% for fiscal year 2022 in China reaching about $229 billion UDS in 2022, Japan’s modest increase to 2% of GDP over five years seems inadequate to deal with the growing challenges associated with China’s rapid militarization. In fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] in April 2021, “China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined.”
Considering the failure of Article 9 of the Japanese pacifist constitution to halt or positively influence the successive military budget increases by Chinese counterparts, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the decades-long process of North Korea building weapons of mass destruction, the new NSS is a realistic approach to mitigating the increasingly severe security challenges within the region. This conclusion becomes even more self-evident when we reflect upon the North Korean testing of a plethora of different missile systems and launch vehicles into the Sea of Japan and over Japan as well as the military threat towards Taiwan.
Critics will argue that the Liberal Democratic Party with this new NSS has been able to find a loophole in Japan’s legislation to overcome the limitations associated with Article 9 of Japan’s constitution. Others suggest that “it’s a hard time to be a Pacifist in Japan nowadays” intimating that pacificism is disappearing in Japan as it lurches to right of center.
As a matter of fact, the strategy is based on an adherence to the Japan-US Alliance as the cornerstone of Japan’s security in the Indo-Pacific. This includes prioritizing cooperation with like-minded countries in line with a defensive approach to dealing with Japan’s challenges within the region.
Calling out China as a strategic challenge in new NSS is consistent with the conclusions of many states. Canada’s recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy labels China an increasingly “disruptive global power.” The US is more explicit in its Indo-Pacific Strategy suggesting that “China is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power.” The EU and ASEAN are more sanguine in their respective Indo-Pacific frameworks. The EU stressed that it “will promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence by EU Member States in the Indo-Pacific” while ASEAN stresses the “strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit and respect for international law, such as UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 3 other relevant UN treaties and conventions.”
The common thread explicitly or implicitly articulated in these various documents is that the rules-based order is being challenged and that each country, union or association must work to preserve the post-WW2 order that has been the foundation for the stable, peaceful development, and prosperity that the Indo-Pacific has become dependent on.
Japan’s post-WW2 approach to dealing with security challenges within the region – including economic engagement, diplomacy, overseas development aid (ODA) and investment of FDI into the Indo-Pacific region – has not accrued the same benefits for all regional players. In the case of China, North Korea, and Russia what we have seen is China move from a position of reform and opening in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s to a rapidly militarizing country that has created artificial islands and militarize those islands in the South China Sea, threatening sea lines of communication for not only Japan, but Southeast Asian countries, the United States, as well as other countries that use the South China Sea to ferry their goods in and out of the region as well as energy resources.
As late as this summer, China engaged in military exercises in and around Taiwan, launching five ballistic missiles into Japan’s EEZs, and continues to send ships that are heavily armed coast guard vessels into the waters around the Senkaku Islands. North Korea also continues to build its weapons of mass destruction and launch vehicles. This is despite numerous efforts to engage in diplomatic initiatives to find a solution to the differences that lie between North Korea as well as the stakeholders in the region, including South Korea, Russia, China, United States and Japan.
Lastly, Russia with its invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that Japan’s approach to security in the post-WW2 period needs a fundamental rethink. The national security strategy is that fundamental rethink recognizing the importance of working with like-minded countries that focus on rule-of-law, human rights, democracy, and stability. Japan’s security is inextricably linked to a stable rule-based international order, an order that has brought prosperity, peace, and stability to not only Japan but to the Indo Pacific region and beyond.
The new NSS invests in the current rules-based order instead of deviating from it. Through this strategy, Japan wants to prevent Chinese hegemony emerging within the region.
Notwithstanding, Japan has been consistent fostering engagement through trade policies that include China such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) but at times exclude China such as the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan continues to build multi-layered and multilateral partnerships throughout the region. This includes the Japan EU-Economic Partnership Agreement and trade agreements with the United States. It continues to advocate for digital agreements within the region and it continues to invest huge amounts of resources in terms of ODA and FDI to help build infrastructure and connectivity in Southeast Asia and South Asia in order to make these regions more strategically autonomous so that they can make different decisions when it comes to code of codes of conduct in the South China Sea and dealing with diplomacy in general within the region.
*Stephen R. Nagy is a senior associate professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo, a senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs. This article was published by the Geopolitical Monitor.com
eurasiareview.com · by Geopolitical Monitor · December 26, 2022
3. TikTok bans on government devices raise questions about platform’s future
Will this cause social unrest in the US?
How will corporations that exploit TikTok respond? (e.g., Amazon)
My daughter also mentioned that Instagram and YouTube are migrating to TikTok. It is becoming the news and entertainment focal point.
TikTok bans on government devices raise questions about platform’s future
BY INES KAGUBARE - 12/25/22 5:23 PM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/3783922-tiktok-bans-on-government-devices-raise-questions-about-platforms-future/
TikTok is getting banned from a growing number of federal and state devices, underscoring how political winds are turning against the platform given worries about China and raising questions about its future.
The latest development is the decision by Republicans and Democrats in Congress to include a measure banning TikTok from devices used by federal employees in the $1.7 trillion year-end omnibus bill setting out federal funding for the next year.
It follows similar moves by a host of state governments to keep TikTok off devices held by state government workers.
The decisions appear unlikely to lead to further bans on TikTok, which is owned by Chinese-based company ByteDance, on private devices, despite the introduction of such a ban in Congress last week.
“As far as individual users are concerned, at least for right now and for the time being, I don’t think it’s going to have much of an impact on the accessibility to individual consumers because the direct threat to users has not yet been recognized,” said Cyrus Walker, the founder and managing principal at cybersecurity firm Data Defenders.
The wildly popular social media platform has made serious inroads in the United States, with more than 85 million users in the U.S. alone, and is widely used across the country — particularly by people under the age of 20.
Walker, however, said the attention given to the bans on TikTok for devices used by federal and state workers could spark a wider conversation about privacy and security concerns with the app.
He also said it could lead private companies to tell their employees to keep the app off work phones.
“As we see this momentum build in the municipal space restricting or banning TikTok altogether, I think you’re going to see corporations, particularly larger ones, follow suit because of the threat of corporate espionage that could take place at a larger level,” he said.
Lawmakers have become increasingly concerned that by downloading the app, government workers are giving the Chinese government potential access to their devices that it could use to collect data on U.S. citizens.
Hannah Kelley, a research assistant in the technology and national security program at the Center for a New American Security, said that if the TikTok ban on federal government devices does become law, it would at least make some Americans question the validity of those concerns and ask themselves: “If the government isn’t comfortable with this app existing on federal infrastructure, should I be comfortable with it operating within my own home?”
Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), part of the group of bipartisan lawmakers who introduced legislation that would prohibit the use of TikTok nationwide, argued the possibly security threats of the app do extend to regular citizens.
“The federal government has yet to take a single meaningful action to protect American users from the threat of TikTok,” Rubio said in a statement.
“This isn’t about creative videos — this is about an app that is collecting data on tens of millions of American children and adults every day,” he added.
Introducing the bill, Rubio and Reps. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) and Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.) cited concerns recently raised by the FBI and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that the app is being used to spy on Americans in that way.
FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr said in an interview with Axios last month that Congress banning the app was the only path forward in light of such concerns.
“There simply isn’t a world in which you could come up with sufficient protection on the data that you could have sufficient confidence that it’s not finding its way back into the hands of the [Chinese Communist Party],” Carr said.
The concerns date back to the Trump administration, which attempted to ban the social media platform in 2020 with an executive order that was later blocked by a federal court.
TikTok, which has pushed back on the concerns, said it was disappointed with states banning the app on government devices.
“We’re disappointed that so many states are jumping on the bandwagon to enact policies based on unfounded, politically charged falsehoods about TikTok,” a spokesperson said.
The spokesperson also denied that TikTok shares information with the Chinese Communist Party.
Experts are skeptical about that denial, however. They say that since TikTok is owned by a Chinese-based company, it is likely subject to Chinese laws, which require companies to comply with requests from the government for access to data originating from such apps.
“I mean, basically, you’re giving China an open door into your device and into your network,” Walker said.
“Just that relationship alone is a significant threat and risk to U.S. government assets,” he said, referring to ByteDance’s ownership of TikTok.
Beyond a ban on TikTok, Walker said the potential security threats posed by the platform could also plausibly be reduced if ByteDance were to sell it to an American company and completely divest itself from the app’s ownership. But he thinks such a move is unlikely.
He recommended that regular citizens worried about their privacy should simply delete TikTok from their phones.
Jamil Jaffer, founder and executive director of the National Security Institute at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, similarly advised that users practice more caution.
“American consumers should be much more careful with their kids and their families using TikTok because while it may be a very appealing app to use from a social perspective, it is hugely problematic from a data collection and surveillance perspective,” he said.
But he also went a step further than Walker, who thinks regular citizens shouldn’t be forced not to use the app, arguing that it should be banned for all users across the U.S., regardless of whether they work for government or not, to protect the country.
“The problem is they’re collecting data on Americans … and use that data to leverage it against us as a nation,” Jaffer said. “I don’t think the ban should be about the government alone.”
“Clearly government employees shouldn’t have TikTok on their phone, but the app should be banned across the United States,” he added.
4. Chinese fleet of militarised ships ‘a threat to trade’
Excerpts:
In historical terms, Holslag compares western dependency on consumer goods made in China to Britain’s use of the opium trade to consolidate its imperial power over the Chinese.
“Today it looks like a reverse of the 19th-century Opium Wars; we have dependency and sort of addiction on Chinese consumer goods,” he said. “In the longer run, we as a society, not just governments, have to reduce our reliance on Chinese consumer goods. You could call it an economic detox.”
Chinese fleet of militarised ships ‘a threat to trade’
Bruno Waterfield, Brussels
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-fleet-militarised-ships-threat-trade-taiwan-386v50q3g
December 26 2022, The Times
China’s domination of international shipping and control of key European ports would enable it to choke global trade in the event of a conflict with the West over Taiwan, an EU research paper has warned.
The paper, which draws on Chinese government documents, found that “there is a growing politicisation and militarisation of China’s civilian maritime sector” at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
“Given the impact of the current war in Ukraine, it is crucial for Europe’s security and prosperity to critically evaluate this vulnerability,” said the paper’s author, Professor Jonathan Holslag of the Brussels VUB university and the Belgian Royal Higher Institute for Defence.
China is the largest shipbuilder in the world, with the Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) building about 41 per cent of all ships. Chinese-flagged vessels must now be built to military specifications, able to carry troops and tanks, according to government doctrine.
Holslag fears that while the EU sees globalisation and open international trade as an end in itself, it is for China a means to extend its political and military power. Beijing’s “economic, political and military ambitions are inseparable,” he said.
“This comes as a challenge to the EU which, for a long time, has expected nationalism to disappear and to rely for its own interest on an open global market rather than policies of control and independence.”
His research has highlighted that as Europe’s maritime strength declines, China’s has grown. Almost a third of all maritime trade is controlled by China, which has the world’s largest state-flagged shipping fleet. It controls 18 per cent of all container shipments, 12 per cent of crude oil tankers and 13 per cent of liquefied natural gas transports.
The European share of shipbuilding has shrunk to 4 per cent from 45 per cent in the 1980s. The continent’s share of the global shipping fleet is down from 20 per cent to 16 per cent. EU governments ban state subsidies for shipbuilding but China has stepped up state aid.
“The pursuit of political control and security — maritime nationalism — has remained prominent,” Holslag said. “China considers maritime power as an important building block of its national power and crucial for its national economic security. China has vast maritime power. Contrary to other countries, most of its maritime assets are controlled by the state.”
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed Europe’s economic dependence on Russian fossil fuels, Holslag argues, but our economies are even more dependent on China at a time of growing tension between Beijing and Washington, with intense Chinese sabre-rattling over Taiwan. “It is very important that we reduce this dependence on China. Because in the long run, we risk becoming vulnerable, especially in the event of a war with Taiwan,” he said.
In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has strengthened its political grip on all large state-owned maritime companies, such as CSSC, China Ocean Shipping Company (Cosco) and China Merchants Group (CMG).
China’s CSSC shipbuilding giant regards itself, according to internal documents, as “a central enterprise in the military industry” and a “strong fighting fortress”. Cosco shipping, which has a large presence in Britain’s biggest container port of Felixstowe, emphasises that “strengthening party building is the root and soul” with communist commissars on every ship “erecting an ideological fortress”.
The Chinese government demands all merchant shipping is dual military and civilian use and roll-on, roll-off ferries have been designed and used for military exercises including landing operations. “Each Chinese ship is a ship of war. The crews chiefly consist of military personnel,” said Holslag. “In China ships need to be built to military specifications to allow them to transport tanks. Ferries have to be able to sail the high seas and can bring tanks and amphibious craft on land.”
Xu Lirong, the party secretary at Cosco, recently declared the mission is China’s “control over the entire supply chain” and his company role is to help “take control of major transportation hubs and channels”.
Cosco holds important financial stakes in many key European ports, including Germany’s Hamburg, Piraeus in Greece, Le Havre in France, and Zeebrugge and Antwerp in Belgium.
In historical terms, Holslag compares western dependency on consumer goods made in China to Britain’s use of the opium trade to consolidate its imperial power over the Chinese.
“Today it looks like a reverse of the 19th-century Opium Wars; we have dependency and sort of addiction on Chinese consumer goods,” he said. “In the longer run, we as a society, not just governments, have to reduce our reliance on Chinese consumer goods. You could call it an economic detox.”
5. Three substations attacked in Washington state
Moore County near Fort Bragg. Now Pierce County near Fort Lewis. Someone will draw conclusions due to proximity.
But I would like to highlight this excerpt from the Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare."
However, by using the combination method, a completely different scenario and game can occur: if the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being aware of this at all and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent's computer system in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty. This admittedly does not attain to the domain spoken of by Sun Zi, wherein "the other army is subdued without fighting." However, it can be considered to be "subduing the other army through clever operations." It is very clear who was superior and who inferior when comparing these two methods of operation.
This is, however, only a thought. However, it is certainly a feasible thought. Based on this thought, we need only shake the kaleidoscope of addition to be able to combine into an inexhaustible variety of methods of operation.
Three substations attacked in Washington state
Power appears to have been restored to many of those left in the dark after electricity infrastructure in the Tacoma area was vandalized.
NBC News · by Dennis Romero · December 26, 2022
Three electricity substations in the Tacoma, Washington, area were attacked Sunday, affecting as many as 14,000 customers, authorities said.
The Pierce County Sheriff’s Department described the early morning attacks on two Tacoma Public Utilities substations and a Puget Sound Energy facility as acts of vandalism, with those responsible unidentified.
"It is unknown if there are any motives or if this was a coordinated attack on the power systems," the sheriff’s department said in a statement.
The agency estimated that the number of affected homes and businesses was 14,000 at one point Sunday.
Tacoma Public Utilities said that more than 7,000 of its customers in the communities of Graham and Elk Plain were without power Sunday and that it continued to work on restoration late in the day.
Puget Sound Energy said on its website that more than 1,200 customers were without power Sunday — with the vast majority having been reconnected — but it wasn't clear whether that was connected to the attack. It didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
It appears that electricity for many of those TPU customers has been restored — the national blackout tracker PowerOutage.us reported late Sunday afternoon that fewer than 5,000 customers remained in the dark across the state.
In a statement, TPU said, "Two of our substations were deliberately targeted by physical attacks."
The sheriff's department said a person or people broke into facilities and vandalized equipment in each of those attacks, the first of which was reported at 2:39 a.m.
TPU said federal law enforcement alerted it this month to the possibility of attacks and recommended a security assessment. It wouldn't say what measures, if any, it took.
At the same time, Oregon Public Broadcasting and KUOW public radio of Seattle reported that separate attacks on six substations operated by Portland General Electric, the Bonneville Power Administration, the Cowlitz County Public Utility District and Puget Sound Energy in Washington and Oregon had taken place mid-November. The incidents are alleged to have included breaches of utility properties, the outlets said.
On Dec. 3, vandals attacked two Duke Energy substations in Moore County, North Carolina, leaving 45,000 customers in the dark for more than three days, officials said. People with guns opened fire and, in one case, breached a facility, they said, and they remained outstanding nearly a month later.
As electricity was restored to the last of the North Carolina customers Dec. 7, someone opened fire near a Duke Energy hydro facility in Ridgeway, South Carolina, about 130 miles south of Moore County. Federal investigators were comparing ballistics evidence in both attacks to determine whether they were connected.
Investigators probing the North Carolina attacks were looking at online conspiracy theories to determine whether any played a role, two senior law enforcement officials briefed on the matter said this month.
A prevailing theory was that the outages were intended to shut down a drag performance, "Downtown Divas," at Sunrise Theater in Southern Pines, North Carolina. Anti-LGBTQ demonstrators targeted the location in the days leading up to the Saturday night event, which continued in the dark before it ended early.
Power infrastructure has long been on the attack wish list of white supremacists and other right-wing extremists who seek American "destabilization," Brian Levin, the director of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University, San Bernardino, said in February.
Early this year, three men pleaded guilty in connection with a plot to disrupt the electricity grid, sow civil unrest and economic uncertainty, and ultimately trigger a race war, federal prosecutors said at the time.
There's no indication the Washington, Oregon and Carolinas attacks shared similar motives. Saturday's Tacoma-area attacks remained under investigation.
NBC News · by Dennis Romero · December 26, 2022
6. Russia goes to war but Ukrainian resistance wins hearts and minds: 2022 in Review
Watching this video should win your hearts and minds: Kyiv Calling (We live for resistance). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWQUkRKqp2E
Russia goes to war but Ukrainian resistance wins hearts and minds: 2022 in Review - Breaking Defense
From Germany's defense investment to the coming expansion of NATO, Russia's invasion sent paradigm-shifting shock waves through Europe.
breakingdefense.com · by Tim Martin · December 23, 2022
The Ukrainian Air Force has maintained a high operational tempo since Russia’s February 2022 invasion. (Ukrainian Air Force Command)
BELFAST – Europe’s worst security crisis since the Second World War, prompted by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, stands unfortunately as the only logical starting point to open up a look back at the European defense landscape in 2022.
As the conflict continues to rage, 10 months on, it is difficult not to think of the scale of devastation that has seen major Ukrainian cities destroyed by indiscriminate Russian bombing campaigns.
To put matters in perspective, think of Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, estimating that 40,000 Ukrainian civilians and 200,000 personnel from Ukrainian and Russian armed forces have “probably” been killed in the war, as of November.
[This article is one of many in a series in which Breaking Defense reporters look back on the most significant (and entertaining) news stories of 2022 and look forward to what 2023 may hold.]
The reaction from European governments and NATO countries to support Ukraine by urgently supplying weapons and increasing defense budgets has to be considered a watershed moment in international relations, marking a display of transatlantic unity few thought possible.
Singling out one nation for praise seems trite in the circumstances, given the international outpouring of support, but from a European security point of view, after decades of miserly defense spending and being viewed within NATO circles as a liability, Germany’s €100 billion ($101 billion USD) special arms fund announcement, a matter of days after the war, must be given the credit it so rightly deserves.
That means Germany will acquire best in class aircraft like Lockheed Martin’s F-35A fighter jet and potentially become the force within NATO its economic stature so obviously demands. Gone too is long held resistance to weapons exports, with Berlin transferring a variety of equipment to the Ukrainian cause.
The decision by Sweden and Finland to join NATO might also be written in history books as a fearless one, in the context of Russian President Vladimir Putin seeing alliance expansion as a primary motivation to start the war, much less escalate it.
While NATO entry brings with it new strategic security assurances, uncertainty continues to hang over more immediate defense industrial base matters and most pressingly the ability of European governments to replenish munition stockpiles in an expedited manner.
This is not unique of course to Europe, with the Pentagon faced with the same problem, but with civilian lives in Ukraine ultimately depending on those stockpiles increasing, production contracts and procurement approvals should, ethically, not be allowed to proceed at a peacetime pace.
Let me not end on that worrying note, for there have been signs of progress, in relative terms, that the fortunes of Ukraine are changing for the better.
The scenes of joy as residents welcomed Ukrainian forces into the streets of Kherson, upon reclaiming the port city, proved that defiance and resistance are working. Recent reports of Ukrainian drones striking Russian territory, including the Engels-2 airbase that hosts Tu-95 long range bombers, are also being written of as evidence that preemptive strikes are an additional option for Ukraine to counter Russia’s cruise missile threat.
Additionally, Moscow’s over reliance on Iranian drones is being judged as a sign of desperation, linked to a low level cruise missile arsenal.
All told, Ukraine’s most remarkable achievement surely has to be staying in a fight against a would-be superpower that was widely expected to invade and conquer by leveraging an equipment advantage so vast as to induce fear in peer military rivals, the US included.
For now, it is difficult to imagine a ceasefire taking place or a peace agreement being brokered, but those must be priorities in 2023 if Europe is to move away from a nuclear precipice and return to democratic norms.
breakingdefense.com · by Tim Martin · December 23, 2022
7. China, Japan up military ante on the Nansei Islands
Excerpts:
From Japan’s perspective, Scott writes that Japan aims to build an “island wall” in the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands to check China’s naval maneuvers. Asia Times has previously reported that Japan plans to deploy 1,000 long-range missiles on its fighter jets, warships and launchers based in the Nansei Islands.
Apart from deterring China’s naval maneuvers, these missiles are part of Japan’s plans to acquire counterstrike capabilities aimed at China and North Korea’s extensive missile arsenals.
In addition, Asia Times has previously reported on US plans to build a “missile wall” in the First Island Chain, having developed the Typhon land-based missile launcher capable of firing SM-6 Standard interceptors and Tomahawk cruise missiles and the OpFires hypersonic missile. The US can deploy these missile platforms to Japan if the need arises.
However, counterstrike capabilities may be a fig leaf cover for “pre-emptive strike”, as it makes little sense for Japan to base its strategic deterrent on conventional missiles against nuclear-armed adversaries.
Japan may thus be caught in a conundrum that while it develops offensive capabilities and slowly abandons its post-World War II pacifist orientation, it still relies on the US nuclear umbrella for strategic deterrence.
China, Japan up military ante on the Nansei Islands
China cranks up attack drills around strategic islands in apparent response to Japan’s intent to double its defense spending
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 25, 2022
China has stepped up its naval and air drills around the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands, ratcheting tensions alongside a rapidly re-arming Japan.
Japan News recently reported that a Chinese carrier battlegroup spearheaded by the Liaoning has been conducting naval drills simulating an attack on the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands since December 16, with the exercises set to end on December 26.
The Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times identifies the ships as the Type 055 cruiser Lhasa, the Type 052D destroyer Kaifeng, the Type 903A replenishment ship Taihu, and the hull number 796 electronic reconnaissance vessel.
Japan News notes that the Type 055 and Type 052D are capable of land attacks and that the Liaoning’s air wing has started nighttime take-off and landing drills.
The report cites the Japanese Ministry of Defense saying that China’s carrier battle group entered the Western Pacific on December 16, passing through Okinawa and the Miyako Strait. The following day, the vessels were spotted 260 kilometers west-southwest of Okidaito Island, with Japan reportedly last spotting them 450 kilometers off Kitadaito Island.
The source says ship-borne aircraft can reach the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands in five to 10 minutes from the last known location. It also mentions that China will rehearse long-range missile strikes on the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands, on which Japan plans to base long-range cruise missiles, and that 130 shipborne helicopter and aircraft landings have already been conducted.
These exercises come after Japan unveiled a record-breaking US$55 billion defense budget for 2023, a 20% increase from the previous year, in response to rising China and North Korea security concerns.
Reports indicated that Japan’s budget increase is part of its new National Security Strategy that aims to bring defense spending up to 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027, matching NATO standards and turning Japan into the third-largest military spender worldwide after the US and China.
Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) soldiers position the PAC-3 missile unit. Photo: Agencies
It also mentions that Japan’s new strategy and increased defense spending aim to provide a “counterstrike capability” against China, Russia and North Korea.
The Financial Times reported last week that Japan would spend $313 billion over the next five years to purchase US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles, upgrade its anti-ship missiles, develop hypersonic weapons, upgrade its Patriot missile radars, create a 20,000-strong cyber team and procure critical supplies such as ammunition and fuel.
The Nansei/Ryukyu Islands hold significant strategic military value for both China and Japan. In a September 2021 article for the peer-reviewed Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, David Scott mentions that small islands like the Nansei/Ryukyu have a “suction effect” on great powers as they can serve as logistics staging points, protective barriers, forward operating bases and geographical markers to extend maritime claims.
In an October 2013 OPRI Center for Island Studies article, Akimoto Kazumine notes that during the Cold War the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands acted as a containment line for the US and Japan against Soviet naval forces.
Today, Kazumine says that the modernizing People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) is rapidly expanding its activities on the high seas, but first must pass through the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands to reach the Western Pacific and through the disputed South China Sea to reach the Indian Ocean.
With the Nansei/Ryukyu Island’s strategic value in mind, China and Japan view these features through the respective lenses of their military strategies. First, Scott notes that China wants to break through the so-called First Island Chain, which spans the Kuril and Nansei Islands in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and northern Borneo.
China has multiple reasons why it wants to break out of the First Island Chain. Asia Times has previously noted that the limited range of China’s JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) may force its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to sail into the Western Pacific to hit targets in the US mainland.
However, China may be eliminating this limitation by developing the newer JL-3 SLBM, which can hit targets in the US mainland from protected bastions in the South China Sea.
Besides getting its SSBNs within missile firing range to hit the US mainland, China may need to cross several island chokepoints to enforce a Taiwan blockade. If China were to outflank and blockade Taiwan, PLA-N warships would have to pass through the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands and Bashi Channel.
The Nansei/Ryukyu Islands circled on a Google-generated map. Source: Google
However, these naval maneuvers could leave PLA-N warships vulnerable while transiting these maritime chokepoints. US and Japanese forces can detect, track and engage PLA-N forces from Japan, and US forces stationed in Guam can check PLA-N maneuvers south of Taiwan.
In addition, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara write in a 2010 article for the think tank Jamestown Foundation that China may seek to wrest control of the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands in an island-hopping operation reminiscent of World War II in the Pacific.
Holmes and Yoshihara note that if China had the Nansei/Rykyu Islands under its control, then it would be able to deploy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) platforms on the occupied islands and thus enable the PLA to mount a Defense in Depth (DiD) against US and Japanese forces.
From Japan’s perspective, Scott writes that Japan aims to build an “island wall” in the Nansei/Ryukyu Islands to check China’s naval maneuvers. Asia Times has previously reported that Japan plans to deploy 1,000 long-range missiles on its fighter jets, warships and launchers based in the Nansei Islands.
Apart from deterring China’s naval maneuvers, these missiles are part of Japan’s plans to acquire counterstrike capabilities aimed at China and North Korea’s extensive missile arsenals.
In addition, Asia Times has previously reported on US plans to build a “missile wall” in the First Island Chain, having developed the Typhon land-based missile launcher capable of firing SM-6 Standard interceptors and Tomahawk cruise missiles and the OpFires hypersonic missile. The US can deploy these missile platforms to Japan if the need arises.
However, counterstrike capabilities may be a fig leaf cover for “pre-emptive strike”, as it makes little sense for Japan to base its strategic deterrent on conventional missiles against nuclear-armed adversaries.
Japan may thus be caught in a conundrum that while it develops offensive capabilities and slowly abandons its post-World War II pacifist orientation, it still relies on the US nuclear umbrella for strategic deterrence.
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 25, 2022
8. Why China’s attempt to set up more military bases abroad may run into rough weather
Photos and imagery at the link.
When trying to grow strong (and extend power and influence) becomes a weakness and vulnerability. One Belt One Road can be a major weak point to be exploited.
Why China’s attempt to set up more military bases abroad may run into rough weather
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/why-chinas-military-bases-abroad-are-aggressive-attempts-but-face-serious-hurdles-11871511.html
The rising global power China is using its surplus funds, offering financial inducements and using its Belt and Road Initiative to extend influence and acquire military bases abroad
Air Marshal Anil Chopra December 26, 2022 12:25:36 IST
Chinese President Xi Jinping
The sea-faring Europeans moved out to far-off lands in 17th and 18th centuries after the industrial revolution in search of natural resources. They initially set up facilities at port cities and then moved inland to colonise the nation. After World War II, the Americans and the Soviet Union build military bases across the globe to extend power and influence. Many other powers have set up smaller military bases overseas.
The rising global power China is now doing the same by using its surplus funds, offering financial inducements and using its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to extend influence and acquire military bases abroad. Notable among Chinese military bases is the Ream naval base in Cambodia, People’s Liberation Army Support Base at Djibouti, a military post in south-eastern Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan, and the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Golden Wheel Project that brings cooperation for positioning and supporting the DF-3 and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles in Saudi Arabia since the establishment of Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force in 1984.
A permanent Chinese military installation has come up in Equatorial Guinea on the Atlantic coast. China also has many police and intelligence posts across the globe. They also have research stations, coastal radars, space tracking stations in different parts of the world. Global geopolitics and local opposition continue to pose hurdles. Among its political messaging and global reach, China provides more troops to UN Security Council (UNSC) peacekeeping missions than all the other UNSC permanent members combined. Chinese state-owned enterprises already spend $10 billion on security globally, which includes hiring Chinese security support, ranging from regular military and civilian police to ‘private’ security companies.
Satellite imagery of the Chinese naval base in Djibouti. Image courtesy Google Earth via News.com.au, 2021
Djibouti: The flagship Chinese military base
In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, on the coast of the Horn of Africa. It is at the strategic entrance to the Red Sea corridor across Yemen. Interestingly, Djibouti also hosts military installations belonging to the United States, the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Beijing claims its Djibouti military presence as part of the international effort to combat piracy and protect global trade passing through the Suez Canal. The facilities at the military base support military logistics for Chinese troops in the Gulf of Aden.
The heavily fortified base is 0.5 square kilometres in size and staffed by nearly 2,000 personnel, and has an underground space of 23,000 square meters. There is a 400m runway with an air traffic control tower, as well as a large helicopter apron. There is a PLA Support Base Hospital. Completed in December 2019, the 1,120-foot pier is reportedly long enough to be able to fit the PLAN’s two new aircraft carriers and other warships or at least four nuclear-powered submarines. The close proximity to a US base has created geopolitical tensions.
The United States had earlier blocked a Russian base in 2014, and started a $1 billion upgrade of its base “Camp Lemonnier”. Djiboutian President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh claimed that the United States had a “fixation” about the Chinese base and complained “incessantly” that the Chinese were hampering their operations. He also said that the Japanese were even more worried than the Americans. The Chinese have claimed that the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force sent divers to approach a Chinese warship while it was docked at the base, who were detected and driven off. Both the US and China claim of spy aircraft are being used to snoop on facilities.
Ream Naval Base on 21 May 2021, after the new Chinese construction on the northern end of the base. CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Maxar
Ream Naval Base, Cambodia
Ream Naval Base is a facility operated by the Royal Cambodian Navy on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. The approximately 190 acres base has been the site of annual joint Cambodian-United States training and naval exercises under the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) programme since 2010.
In July 2019, Western media revealed that a secret agreement allowed the Chinese PLA Navy (PLAN) exclusive access to about one-third of the Ream naval base for up to 30 years. It would give Beijing a new southern flank on the South China Sea (SCS), and only its second overseas naval foothold after a base in Djibouti. Such hosting of foreign armed forces was against the Cambodian constitution as well as the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements that ended the Cambodian Civil War.
Cambodia initially denied such lease, but in 2021, the Cambodian defence minister admitted that China was helping build infrastructure at Ream and continued to maintain that there were no strings attached. One of two US-funded buildings on the base was demolished in September 2020. In October 2020, dredging work was undertaken around the base, in order to accommodate larger vessels, in a project supported by the Chinese Government. The USA slapped arms and a dual-use-item embargo on Cambodia on in December 2021, even though this may push Cambodia closer to China. There has been an adverse reaction from Cambodian opposition and the public to China militarising Cambodia’s coast in the garb of ambitious infrastructure projects.
China has reconstructed and extended a deep water commercial port in Bata, Equatorial Guinea. Image courtesy SCMP Weibo handle
China’s military base in Equatorial Guinea
Equatorial Guinea is one of Africa’s smallest countries overlooking the Atlantic and brings China physically closer to the USA and Europe. Beijing plans to set up a permanent military naval installation. It also exposes it African investment policy and intent and sends shivers on other aid-receiving African nations.
The West sees it as having far-reaching geopolitical implications. Africa is the largest recipient of China’s $1 trillion BRI with 46 African nations (over 1 billion people) being on board. The new military bases also mean eroding US dominance.
There are already nearly 10,000 Chinese enterprises in Africa, generating $180 billion a year in revenues and could reach $250 billion by as early as 2025, according to a 2017 McKinsey report. Nearly one million Chinese citizens live in Africa to support and operate Chinese investments. China has its own integrated economic, policing, and security apparatus to secure these assets, albeit there are no overt heavy troop presence in the continent yet.
The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) coordinates between China and all states in Africa (except the Kingdom of Eswatini, which recognises Taiwan). Beijing is already looking at creating a pan-African security architecture with China at its core. The deep-water commercial port, and naval base, in Equatorial Guinea may be the beginning of that phase. The port could be used for rearming with munitions and repair naval vessels. Equatorial Guinea boasts the highest GDP per capita, primarily because of its over 1 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves.
While US oil companies have conducted most of Equatorial Guinea’s oil exploration and production, China has become the country’s primary development partner. The Chinese banks funded the $2 billion oil-backed buyer’s credit facility at the Port of Bata that was eventually inaugurated in 2019. For years led by very corrupt, self-serving leaders, Equatorial Guinea has now become increasingly indebted to China with debt in 2021 mounting to 49.7 per cent of GDP. Despite last-minute US intervention and advice, the current government appears to be moving ahead with plans to host a Chinese naval base.
Chinese work halted at Khalifa port in UAE. Image courtesy adports.ae
Cargo Port at Khalifa, UAE
In 2018, the UAE and China signed a $300 million deal to upgrade the COSCO Shipping Ports Abu Dhabi Terminal. This port is located near both Al Dhafra Air Base and Jebel Ali port. The latter in Dubai is the busiest port outside the USA for US Navy ship visits. China’s giant COSCO shipping conglomerate had built and now operates a commercial container terminal at Khalifa. There were allegations that secret military facilities were being developed there clandestinely. The UAE was not in the picture.
The UAE has never had an agreement, plan, talks or intention to host a Chinese military base or outpost of any kind, UAE. Embassy in Washington confirmed. Alarmed US officials warned Emirati government, a Mideast ally, that Chinese military presence could hinder ties. The construction was halted.
China’s effort to establish a military foothold in the UAE reflects the challenges the West and the world at large face from Chinese influence peddling. The UAE is a major oil and gas producer and hosts US military forces. It was the first Arab country to send troops to Afghanistan following the US intervention in late 2001.
The US had recently brokered the Abraham Accords that normalized relations between Israel and some Gulf States, including the UAE. Beijing was building counters with trade deals and now trying to expand its military presence. In recent years, China has strengthened its economic ties with the UAE and is now one of its largest trading partners as well as the biggest consumer of Gulf oil.
The UAE, meanwhile, has embraced China’s Huawei Technologies Co.’s telecom infrastructure, which senior Western officials warn leaves it vulnerable to Chinese espionage. The UAE cooperation with China had threatened the planned $23 billion sale of as many as 50 US F-35 fifth-generation fighter aircraft, 18 Reaper drones and other advanced munitions. But the deal is back on track.
Construction of a new Chinese-funded base in Tajikistan. Satellite image courtesy Radio Free Europe
Gorno-Badakhshan Tajikistan
The US intelligence agencies have reported that China will build a new base for special operations near the Afghanistan border. It will be located in the eastern Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous province near the Pamir Mountains. Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry and China’s Public Security Ministry (Police) signed an agreement. The focus would be on counterterrorism amid rising concerns over instability in neighbouring Afghanistan.
The base will be owned by Tajikistan’s Rapid Reaction Group or Special Forces and financed by China for a cost of $10 million. Currently, Chinese troops will not be stationed there. Earlier there were reports of a secret Chinese military base located in the Murghab district a few kilometres from the new base. China is thus trying to get a military base in Tajikistan.
Gwadar Port. Image courtesy Modern Diplomacy
Port at Gwadar
China has built commercial port facilities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka that could be used by its rapidly expanding navy. The Gwadar Port in the Balochistan province of Pakistan is situated on the Arabian Sea. It is under the administrative control of Pakistan and operational control of the China Overseas Port Holding Company. The port is an important part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is 170 kilometres to the east of Chabahar Port in Iran.
Gwadar’s potential to be a deep-water sea port was first noted in 1954, while the city was still under Omani sovereignty. The port was inaugurated 2007 by Pervez Musharraf after four years of construction, at a cost of $248 million. In 2015, it was decided that the city and port would be further developed under CPEC at a cost of $1.62 billion. The port will also be the site of a floating liquefied natural gas facility that will be built as part of the larger $2.5 billion Gwadar-Nawabshah segment of the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline project. Construction began in June 2016 on the Gwadar Special Economic Zone, which is being built on 2,292-acre site adjacent to Gwadar’s port.
In 2017, around 2000 acre land was leased to a Chinese company for 43 years for the development of Gwadar Special Economy Zone. On 31 May 2021 Gwadar Port became fully operational.
The Straits of Malacca provide China with its shortest maritime access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Malacca is dominated by many adversary navies. Gwadar Port is now a means to circumvent the Straits of Malacca. The sea route via the Straits of Malacca is roughly 12,000 kilometres, while the distance from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang province is approximately 3,500 kilometres. However, the cost of moving oil overland is far greater. Even if an oil pipeline were to be built, its initial cost will be very high. Yet, the CPEC project and the Sino-Myanmar pipelines will help Chinese energy imports to circumvent the “Malacca Dilemma”.
More importantly, China’s stake in Gwadar would give it another naval logistic and basing facility. It will also complement China’s Western Development plan, which includes not only Xinjiang, but also the neighbouring regions of Tibet and Qinghai. China will allow CPEC and Gwadar to various Central Asian republics and gain dependency and influence.
The PLAN exercises regularly with the Pakistan Navy (PN). PLAN anti-piracy escort force regularly calls at Karachi on their way to deployments in the Gulf of Aden. PN inventory has a large number of Chinese-origin ships and platforms. Reports have surfaced of the deployment of Chinese submarines at Gwadar. One day Gwadar could hold large ships of the size of aircraft carriers. Gwadar will also allow PLAN enhanced military monitoring capability in the region.
Chabahar port. Image courtesy Modern Diplomacy
Comparison to Chabahar Port projects
India Ports Global Private Limited is refurbishing a 640-meter-long container handling facility and reconstructing a 600-meter-long berth at the Port of Chabahar, Iran, and modernising ancillary infrastructure at the berths. This will allow Indian goods to be exported to Iran, with the possibility of onward connections to Afghanistan and Central Asia, and even Russia and Europe. Chabahar is at a much smaller scale and investment and cannot be considered as a counter to Gwadar. Interestingly, both Pakistan and China had been invited to contribute to the Chabahar project before India, but neither China nor Pakistan had expressed interest in joining.
Hambantota International Port, Sri Lanka. Image courtesy Maritime Gateway
Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka
The deep water Hambantota International Port, Sri Lanka was opened on 18 November 2010, and is Sri Lanka’s second largest port, after the Port of Colombo. In 2020, the port handled 1.8 million tonnes of LPG and dry bulk cargo. In 2016, at operating profit of just US$1.81 million it was considered economically unviable.
As debt repayment got difficult, the government decided to privatise. 70 per cent stake was sold to raise foreign exchange in order to repay maturing sovereign bonds unrelated to the port. China Merchants Port won the bid and paid US$1.12 billion to Sri Lanka, and were to spend additional amounts to develop the port into full operation. Simultaneously a 99-year lease on the port was granted to the company.
Sri Lanka is situated along the key shipping route between the Malacca Straits and the Suez Canal, which links Asia and Europe. An estimated 36,000 ships, including 4,500 oil tankers, use the route annually. The Port at Colombo, caters mainly to container handling and was unable to provide facilities for port-related industries and services. Hambantota, which has a natural harbour is located on the southern tip of Sri Lanka and closer to international shipping routes. It would also save time for the detour to Colombo. In July 2018, the Sri Lankan government announced it would relocate its naval base at Galle to Hambantota.
Hambantota was important for China’s economic and military expansion in the Indian Ocean, enhancing its footprint of ‘strategic support bases’ through the backdoor (debt-trap diplomacy). India and the United States had raised concerns that Chinese control of the Hambantota port could harm their interests in the Indian Ocean.
In February 2021, the Sri Lankan foreign minister Dinesh Gunawardena said the lease of the Hambantota port to China was a mistake made by the previous government, and that Colombo was revisiting the agreement. There is no way Beijing will dilute the lease given the fact that China doesn’t seal a deal of this nature with assured strategic gains without buying the host country’s hierarchy.
Interestingly, in May 2019, Sri Lanka signed a deal with India and Japan to develop the deep-sea East Container Terminal at the Colombo Port. Sri Lanka retains 51 per cent stakes with India and Japan 49 per cent each.
In a related development, Feydhoo Finolhu, the nearest uninhabited island to capital Malé in the Maldives, was leased to China for 50 years in 2017, and is being expanded by reclamation and increasing Chinese BRI footprint in the Indian Ocean.
Chinese interest in the “Little Children” of South Pacific. Image courtesy Asia Media International
China in Pacific Islands
China has already emerged as the Pacific Islands region’s largest lender by disbursing bilateral loans amounting to US $1.3 billion between 2012 and 2022. Chinese loans account for more than 60 percent of Tonga’s external debt, and 50 percent of Vanuatu’s. Chinese government has signed a security deal with the Solomon Islands which paves the way for China to deploy security forces and PLAN could use the ports of the Pacific island nation. This gives China a strategic foothold in the Pacific. The agreement evoked concern from Australia and the United States. In 2018 Vanuatu became a signatory to BRI. More recently, Chinese involvement in the Solomon Islands has been highlighted, with the late-November riots resulting in large parts of Honiara’s Chinatown being burned down. In 2019, the Solomon authorities proposed to lease Tulagi Island to a Chinese developer for a special economic zone. The agreement was finally never concluded. China has also been exerting influence in Kiribati. China hosted a Pacific islands meeting in Fiji, in May 2022, with security ties in focus. A draft communique and five-year action plan was sent by China to the invited nations, which included Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, and Niue ahead of the meeting. China was seeking a sweeping regional trade and security agreement. The United States, Australia, Japan and New Zealand expressed concern and the proposal could not be pushed through.
Chinese Police Overseas Service Stations
The “overseas service station” also called “Overseas 110” (the emergency number for police) were established by China’s Ministry of Public Security in other countries starting 2014. As of October 2022, a total of 54 such stations had been established in 30 countries These centers did not have policing authority but were meant to assist crime victims while dealing with the host country’s police and integrating new immigrants. China claims that they provide Chinese nationals in foreign countries with bureaucratic assistance, such as document renewals, and to fight transnational crime. However, in 2022, a human rights group published a report that these offices were part of a programme named “Operation Fox Hunt”, and were used to harass and coerce individuals wanted by the Chinese government, including dissidents. Modus operandi was threats to their families and themselves, pressuring them to return to China where they would then be detained.
The report led to increased scrutiny and investigations of the stations by the governments of host countries. They were accused of political influence operations. In response, some countries, such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands began investigating and some, such as, the overseas service stations in Dublin were ordered to close in October 2022.
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that, as the Chinese government had failed to notify the country about the stations through diplomatic means, they had been operating illegally, with further investigation to be conducted into their conduct. In November 2022, Canada summoned the Chinese ambassador and issued a “cease and desist” warning concerning the stations. In December 2022, Italy announced that its police would cease joint patrols with Chinese police officers inside of Italian cities. There were no such stations in India.
Conclusion
The traditionally inward looking China has become more extrovert in its military aspirations since Chairman Xi Jinping took over the reins. The US Department of Defence is on record as saying that China is pursuing additional military facilities to support naval, air, ground, and cyber and space power projection. The USA has made a list of potential locations for new Chinese bases which include Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, UAE, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Namibia, Angola and Tajikistan.
In March 2017, China announced increasing its marine corps from 20,000 to 100,000 for overseas tasks (mentioning Djibouti and Gwadar), plus increasing PLAN’s strength by 15 percent from the existing 2,35,000. Chinese overseas projects usually have covert PLA presence, as would be in Hambantota and Colombo. Sri Lanka clearly is the diamond in China’s ‘string of pearls’ surrounding India and Beijing is intent on dominating the India Ocean. There is speculation that China’s Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) will be operational in the Indian Ocean within five years. Djibouti and Pakistan would be MEU bases for sure but mobile MEUs patrolling the seas could berth at Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar on the pretext of rest, recoup and repairs. Enlarged PLAN presence around Sri Lanka can hinder the switching of Indian naval forces between the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.
But everything is not smooth sailing. Gwadar which has been the poster child of potential Chinese military bases, is facing security threats related to terrorism and separatist activities. China’s predatory lending practices have resulted in debt-trap issues in most BRI recipient countries. Many countries in Asia and Africa are initial victims of Chinese geostrategic leveraging through debt. Free world has realised the Chinese expansionist designs, and are intervening with host nations. The non-repayment of debt by many countries is already putting pressure on Chinese banks and economy. Clearly China is facing hurdles in getting more military bases abroad.
The writer is Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed are personal.
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Updated Date: December 26, 2022 14:32:56 IST
9. Biden Escalates The Economic War With China
Biden Escalates The Economic War With China
Forbes · by Milton Ezrati · December 25, 2022
Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. Biden on the right. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
Getty Images
President Joe Biden has taken the dispute with China to new levels – far beyond anything done by or even proposed by his predecessor, Donald Trump. Before Trump, presidents tended to categorized America’s relationship with China as a kind of partnership. There were complaints about some Chinese practices but no action. Trump changed that. Characterizing China as an economic competitor, he imposed heavy tariffs on Chinese goods coming into this country. Biden has not only kept those tariffs in place, but he has also imposed export controls and visa limits as well as restrictions on investment flows. The recently passed CHIPS for America Act adds subsidies for domestic production of semiconductors into the mix.
When in 2018 Trump started to impose tariffs on Chinese goods, the commentariat and many academics were highly critical. Some argued that the levies would hurt the American economy more than they would China’s. That claim was always dubious, since sales in America are much more important to China than sales in China are to America. Others worried, as it turned out unnecessarily, that the tariffs would invite a crippling retaliation not only from China but from other nations as well. More telling in the environment of 2018 were the complaints that tariffs ran counter to the free trade and globalization on which elite opinion seemed to believe political liberalization and world economic prosperity rested.
Trump defended his actions, albeit inarticulately. He claimed that he had no desire to stop world trade but rather was using tariffs to pressure Beijing to abandon its unfair trade policies, such as the use of domestic subsidies and the theft of patents, as well as its insistence that foreigners doing business in China transfer technology and trade secrets to a Chinese partner. That White House’s explanation did little to stop the criticism, while the tariffs did little to change Chinese policies.
Now, less than four years later, and without a word of criticism, the Biden administration has gone a lot further. This White House has kept all the Trump tariffs in place and for the same reasons as the Trump White House explained them. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai has stated repeatedly that they offer “a significant piece of leverage” to get Beijing to change its unfair trade practices. On top of this, the present administration has with the recently passed CHIPS for America Act introduced export controls and subsidies of the sort China uses to support its domestic industrial development, in this case to support the domestic American production of semiconductors. Other acts working their way through Congress and clearly supported by this White House would impose limits on American investment in China.
The latest action uses the CHIPS for America Act to enlist the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to limit China’s access to advanced semiconductors, chip making equipment, and supercomputer components. Already in response, the important semiconductor tool manufacturer, ASML, has told its American employees to stop servicing Chinese customers, though typical of Washington, TSMC, Samsung, and SK Hynix have obtained exceptions that allow them to continue shipping similar equipment to China.
It is interesting that while Biden keeps upping the ante with China, he has received none of the criticism that the commentariat and the academic community heaped on Trump. Partisan politics might explain the difference. Much of the commentariat and the academic community identify with the party presently in power and what is more showed a personal and intense animosity toward Trump. But if partisan feelings can explain some of this difference, more likely and more interesting is how this lack of criticism captures a steep decline in elite support for globalization and free trade. It is a remarkable turn and seemingly a complete one in just 3-4 years.
Forbes · by Milton Ezrati · December 25, 2022
10. Explained: How Joe Biden repaired America's ties with the world in 2022
Alliances are key to US national security.
Protecting values versus projecting values.
Excerpts:
A move to become more active in international affairs is welcomed by observers, with a degree of caution. US involvement needs to be enough to be effective, but not too much to be dominating. And this has been backed by recent opinion polls on US foreign policy.
Rather than attempting to build democratic nations overseas, the Biden administration is adopting what some are calling “fortress liberalism” — the protection of democracy where it already exists, such as Ukraine.
Mindful of public concerns over the possibility of boots on the ground, Biden’s approach stops short of resuming the military operations of the Bush and Obama administrations.
Whether the level of support for Ukraine is enough remains to be seen. Experts warn that a severe economic downturn for the US could reduce public support for the amount being authorised.
What is clear, however, is that support for Ukraine will continue in one form or another, as Biden continues to repair America’s relationships with the rest of the world.
Explained: How Joe Biden repaired America's ties with the world in 2022
https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/explained-how-joe-biden-repaired-americas-ties-with-the-world-in-2022-11874121.html
It is no surprise that the US has taken a more central role in international affairs under Joe Biden’s leadership. The US president's foreign policy is an explicit repudiation of Donald Trump’s 'America First' legacy
The Conversation December 26, 2022 15:24:38 IST
In his inaugural address in January 2021, Joe Biden announced that the US would ‘repair our alliances and engage with the world once again’. AP
The US reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has marked a significant transformation in US foreign policy during 2022. President Joe Biden’s wide-ranging backing for Ukraine has met with support from both Democrats and Republicans. In doing so, it has ended any question of a return to his predecessor Donald Trump’s isolationism.
In his inaugural address in January 2021, Biden announced that the US would “repair our alliances and engage with the world once again”.
US leadership on environmental issues started on the first day of his presidency when the US rejoined the Paris climate agreement.
Biden’s continued determination to lead on international issues could also be seen through the US’s agreement to the creation of a “loss and damage” fund at Egypt’s COP27, after a 30-year-long objection. The fund is designed to compensate poorer countries for climate damages.
Swivel from Trump’s policy
During the Trump presidency, the US withdrew from international treaties and adopted an “America first” attitude towards international affairs. Trump pulled the US out of the Iran nuclear deal which had removed sanctions on Iran in return for a restricted nuclear programme.
In addition, he withdrew the US from the Paris climate agreement, and coerced Canada and Mexico to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in a way that disproportionately benefited the US.
NAFTA, which established a free trade zone between the US, Canada and Mexico, had been in place since 1994. Trump was a long-term critic, calling it “the worst trade deal signed anywhere”.
Experts have identified Joe Biden’s foreign policy as an explicit repudiation of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ legacy in favour of ‘the restoration of the multilateral order.’ AP
Trump’s determination to put America first led to a decline in the US’s global leadership. Some commentators have gone further and suggested that this decline undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty.
It is no surprise that the US has taken a more central role in international affairs under Biden’s leadership. In his presidential campaign, he promised to restore America’s “respected leadership on the world stage”.
Experts have identified Biden’s foreign policy as an explicit repudiation of Trump’s “America First” legacy in favour of “the restoration of the multilateral order”.
But it was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that meant the US had to take the lead in international diplomacy again. Throughout the conflict, it has been resolute in its support of Ukraine — supplying more than $68 billion (£56 billion) in military and humanitarian aid while encouraging its global partners to add their support.
Internally, there has been considerable bipartisan support for Biden’s policy towards Ukraine. The only sustained Republican opposition has come from the extreme right of the party, mostly consisting of Trump loyalists.
These opponents, such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, have vowed that “not another penny” would be sent to Ukraine. But this opposition is a small minority and significantly outnumbered by those, on both sides of the political divide, who have pledged to continue supporting Ukraine’s defence.
Public opinion on Ukraine
Surveys have shown that the American public generally supports Biden’s response to Ukraine. The most positive responses praised his avoidance of direct conflict with Russia, while the most negative suggested more technologically advanced weaponry should be supplied.
However, foreign policy decisions have not all gone well for Biden. In August 2021, US forces withdrew from Afghanistan in a chaotic manner. This was quickly followed by the collapse of the US-supported Afghan government.
The US withdrawal brought international and domestic criticism and undermined Biden’s attempts to re-establish American global diplomatic leadership.
Although Biden was blamed for the manner of this withdrawal, Trump’s ceasefire agreement with the Taliban in February 2020, and subsequent signposted withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, has been identified by experts as the catalyst for the collapse of the western-backed Afghan government.
After the midterms
In the recent midterms, surveys indicated that Biden’s support of Ukraine — and his foreign policy in general — failed to register as a priority issue with voters.
The US support is not some populist policy but a determination to fulfil Biden’s promise of “a strong and trusted partner for peace, progress, and security”.
Almost two years later, it’s clear that Biden has no intention of diminishing the US’s role in international affairs. In his latest National Security Strategy, he declared: “Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been.”
A Ukrainian self-propelled artillery shoots towards Russian forces at a frontline in Kharkiv region, Ukraine. AP
The new Congress, with a Republican majority in the House, is unlikely to hinder America’s re-emergence into international affairs. Biden is very experienced in working with Republicans in Congress, and that will likely continue in the immediate future.
And Biden has been active in deciding NATO’s position on Ukraine. When questioned at a NATO summit in June, he said on behalf of all the allies that they would “stick with Ukraine, as long as it takes, and in fact make sure they are not defeated”.
A move to become more active in international affairs is welcomed by observers, with a degree of caution. US involvement needs to be enough to be effective, but not too much to be dominating. And this has been backed by recent opinion polls on US foreign policy.
Rather than attempting to build democratic nations overseas, the Biden administration is adopting what some are calling “fortress liberalism” — the protection of democracy where it already exists, such as Ukraine.
Mindful of public concerns over the possibility of boots on the ground, Biden’s approach stops short of resuming the military operations of the Bush and Obama administrations.
Whether the level of support for Ukraine is enough remains to be seen. Experts warn that a severe economic downturn for the US could reduce public support for the amount being authorised.
What is clear, however, is that support for Ukraine will continue in one form or another, as Biden continues to repair America’s relationships with the rest of the world.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Updated Date: December 26, 2022 15:24:38 IST
11. West Point to remove Robert E. Lee portrait, bust
West Point to remove Robert E. Lee portrait, bust
BY IAN SWANSON - 12/24/22 7:35 PM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3787737-west-point-to-remove-robert-e-lee-portrait-bust/
West Point over its holiday break will remove a portrait of Robert E. Lee in Confederate uniform as well as a bust of the general from prominent spots on campus, carrying out directives that were included in a defense authorization bill for 2021.
Lt. Gen. Steven W. Gilland announced these steps and more in a letter to the West Point community posted on the military academy’s web site.
“During the holiday break, we will begin a multi-phased process, in accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) directives, to remove, rename or modify assets and real property at the United States Military Academy (USMA) and West Point installation that commemorate or memorialize the Confederacy or those who voluntarily served with the Confederacy,” Gilland wrote.
The changes come after demands to remove Confederate statues, busts and portraits gained steam following George Floyd’s killing by police in Minneapolis in the summer of 2020.
Statues of Lee, the general who led the South in the Civil War, have been at the forefront of the effort. At the end of 2020, a statue of Lee was removed from the U.S. Capitol at the request of Virginia state leaders.
Gilland said that a team of stakeholders and experts over the past several weeks had developed a plan to meet all of the recommendations by the Congressional Naming Commission under Defense Department directives.
The Lee portrait will be removed from the military academy’s library and placed in storage at West Point’s museum. Separately, a portrait of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who led union troops against Lee in the civil war, will be moved from the library to Grant Hall.
A stone bust of Lee at Reconciliation Plaza will also be removed and placed in storage, while an accompanying bust of Grant will be moved to the front of Grant Hall.
The school is also replacing a quote from Lee at Honor Plaza. A committee set up by the school is to choose a new quote to replace Lee’s, with plans for it to be instated by the spring of next year.
Stone markers in Reconciliation Plaza that the Naming Commission determined commemorate the Confederacy will also be modified with new language and images, while “still conveying the Plaza’s central message of reconciliation.”
Finally, a series of streets, buildings and areas that carry Lee’s name will also be changed.
“In the case of those items that were class gifts (specifically, Honor Plaza and Reconciliation Plaza), we will continue to work closely with those classes throughout this process,” Gilland wrote. “Any costs associated with the Commission’s recommendations will be resourced within the Department of Defense.”
12. Chinese dark influence coming to light in Thailand
Thailand must recognize the Chinese strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it with information and a superior political warfare strategy. Easier said than done.
Excerpts:
There is a reluctance to criticize or scrutinize China given the royal princess Sirindhorn’s much-publicized love of China and her extensive travels there.
The powerful Chinese–Thai businesses that control much of the Thai economy, such as the Charoen Pokphand Group, are close to China. The CEO of Charoen Pokphand Group Dhanin Chearavanont goes by the name Xie Guomin in China and is president of the China Federation of Overseas Chinese Businessmen — a United Front Work Group affiliate.
Some political parties are funded by these sources, including Palang Pracharat, which allegedly accepted a 3 million baht (US$84,250) bribe from a Chinese businessman running an illegal nightclub in Pattaya.
Given that this is the first time that this issue has received media attention on such a large scale, it is possible that “gray capital” will become a substantive issue in next year’s election. Some, such as the Move Forward Party’s Rangsiman Rome have not been afraid to bring corruption into the spotlight.
Chinese dark influence coming to light in Thailand
Chinese ‘gray money’ making Thai headlines as criminal elements use drug and gambling profits to buy real estate and perhaps political influence
asiatimes.com · by Greg Raymond · December 25, 2022
Two scandals converged in November 2022 in Thailand, forming a perfect storm that threatens the government party Palang Pracharat’s already shaky prospects at the upcoming 2023 national election.
The scandals have also illuminated a growing problem that has remained largely out of Thai news headlines in recent years — the nexus between Chinese capital, crime and Thai politicians.
The government was forced to back down on a proposal that intended to increase foreign investment by lifting Thailand’s longstanding prohibition on foreigners owning land.
A united front opposed to the measure, including fellow Palang Pracharat member Pareena Kraikupt, deployed one of the most potent rhetorical weapons in Thailand’s political arsenal — that of khai chat, or selling out the nation.
Thai police also announced they had conducted raids in Bangkok and arrested a Chinese national who was using fake Thai identity cards and in possession of cash, luxury cars and property titles.
This converged precisely with an objection that opponents of the land sale reform measure had raised —that relaxed laws could increase the flow of Chinese “gray money” (thun chin sithao) into Thailand. “Gray money” refers to proceeds from criminal enterprises — including drugs and gambling — laundered through purchases of real estate.
The Thai police stated in a subsequent briefing that money from the Golden Triangle drug trade, which has increased in recent years, was financing the Chinese crime bosses’ acquisition of Thai passports, identities and land. Other former and serving politicians have come forward with their knowledge of the activities of Chinese Triad gangs in Thailand.
Detained Chinese involved in an online scam in Thailand in a file photo. Image: Twitter / The Nation
Most disturbing are allegations, floated by many, that these gangs are not afraid of either the police or the law because Thai laws are implemented weakly and without transparency. This is because the gangs are backed by Thai politicians and officials.
Signs of Chinese capital and influence corroding the integrity of Thailand’s political processes have been present for some time and were flagged as early as the 1990s.
A 1992 Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs document warned that the Chinese side could “exploit close (personal) relationships with Thai elites and high-ranking officials in the Thai capital” and obtain insights from Sino-Thais in private enterprise.
In 2020, the Thai Department of Special Investigation revealed a large criminal network involving foreign Chinese nationals that obtained Thai identity cards registered to non-existent individuals and used them to establish Thai-registered companies.
The network of 104 companies, which was ostensibly involved in legitimate businesses such as real estate, was moving hundreds of millions of dollars suspiciously, suggesting money laundering or tax avoidance.
One of the individuals named in the investigation, Wang Hongbin, carried multiple passports and was well-connected with both the overseas Chinese business community and Thai politicians, including former prime minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.
In 2013, Wang, with then-speaker of the House of Representatives Somsak Kiatsuranont, created a fake position in parliament called the “Director of Chinese Affairs Department to the President of National Assembly of Thailand.”
A corresponding letterhead — with the Thai parliament’s crest combining Chinese and Thai script — was also created. The fictitious department invited dozens of Chinese provincial officials to visit Thailand. Wang has been able to remain active in Thailand, despite being under criminal investigation, suggesting patronage from within the Thai establishment.
Thai reluctance to grapple with this problem stems from multiple sources.
As many as a third of Bangkok’s population have some Chinese heritage stemming from waves of Chinese migration over the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Chinese diasporas have suffered much discrimination and Chinese-Thai people may be concerned about this issue stoking animosity.
There is a reluctance to criticize or scrutinize China given the royal princess Sirindhorn’s much-publicized love of China and her extensive travels there.
The powerful Chinese–Thai businesses that control much of the Thai economy, such as the Charoen Pokphand Group, are close to China. The CEO of Charoen Pokphand Group Dhanin Chearavanont goes by the name Xie Guomin in China and is president of the China Federation of Overseas Chinese Businessmen — a United Front Work Group affiliate.
CP Group founder Dhanin Chearavanont speaks at a conference in a file photo. Photo: Facebook
Some political parties are funded by these sources, including Palang Pracharat, which allegedly accepted a 3 million baht (US$84,250) bribe from a Chinese businessman running an illegal nightclub in Pattaya.
Given that this is the first time that this issue has received media attention on such a large scale, it is possible that “gray capital” will become a substantive issue in next year’s election. Some, such as the Move Forward Party’s Rangsiman Rome have not been afraid to bring corruption into the spotlight.
Greg Raymond is a Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
This article, republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.
asiatimes.com · by Greg Raymond · December 25, 2022
13. Demystifying China’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Debt Restructuring
Opportunities within crisis?
Excerpts:
This means that, amid Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring process, there might be a need to gain consensus among a wide array of Chinese state-linked entities, not simply the policy banks and the political leadership. The political leadership also faces a constraint with regards to offering debt relief to foreign countries: a potential perception among Chinese citizens that their government is subsidizing other countries in crisis at a time they themselves have been struggling through the COVID-19 pandemic and an overall economic slowdown.
Therefore, Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring cannot be looked at in isolation as a domestic crisis, which Sri Lanka has to handle on its own. It is deeply embedded both within a global emerging market debt crisis and a moment of rethinking within China about its global role as a creditor. What happens in countries like Suriname, Zambia, Ghana, Ecuador, and Pakistan has a bearing on what happens in Sri Lanka, and vice versa. These are all co-evolving crises, to which the global and domestic responses need to happen in coordination. But in doing so, neither can one forget the domestic complexities that must be overcome. The nuances of Sri Lanka’s situation carry lessons for both the ongoing processes on debt restructuring and for other countries facing debt distress.
Demystifying China’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Debt Restructuring
Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring is deeply embedded both within a global emerging market debt crisis and a moment of rethinking within China about its global role as a creditor.
By Umesh Moramudali and Thilina Panduwawala
December 20, 2022
thediplomat.com · by Umesh Moramudali · December 20, 2022
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Currently, Sri Lanka is in the process of restructuring its foreign debt after announcing the country’s first sovereign default on April 12. As the largest bilateral creditor, China is playing a key role in Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring process.
The topic is not merely a domestic and bilateral matter. Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring, and China’s engagement within it, is receiving global attention given the debt distress across emerging markets and the significant lending China has done to such countries over the past decade or so. During her recent visit to China, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva discussed China’s role in addressing the emerging market debt crisis, with special reference to Sri Lanka and Zambia. According to the IMF, discussions with Chinese authorities were fruitful and the IMF sees space for a platform for more systematic engagement on debt issues, where China can play an active role.
On Sri Lanka specifically, the island-nation is expecting China’s assurance regarding debt restructuring in the coming months, which will pave the way to obtain IMF board approval for the $2.9 billion, four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. The initial expectation was that Sri Lanka would reach an agreement on financing assurances with its major bilateral creditors (China, India, and the Paris Club, led by Japan) by November or early December and get the IMF Executive Board’s approval in December. China’s approach and assurances are vital in this process, because the other creditors are waiting on China to confirm its own offers. However, no firm financing assurances have been reached with the bilateral creditors so far. The IMF Executive Board’s meeting schedule indicates that it will not discuss Sri Lanka’s EFF in December. Thus, the IMF program can only commence in early 2023.
China’s response to Sri Lanka’s debt crisis has not been proactive, but neither has it been negative. During a Chinese Foreign Ministry Press briefing on December 5, the spokesperson noted that “China attaches high importance to Sri Lanka’s difficulties and challenges,” and said that it supports relevant financial institutions in discussing with Sri Lanka and properly resolving them.
Understanding China’s role in Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring process requires a complete picture of 1) how much Sri Lanka actually owes to Chinese creditors and 2) the composition of those loans. While the often-cited number is that Sri Lanka’s debt to China is approximately 10 to 15 percent of its total public external debt, its debt to Chinese creditors amounted to approximately $7.3 billion, or 19.6 percent, of the country’s total outstanding foreign debt as of the end of 2021, as detailed in our briefing paper published by China Africa Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI) at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. The largest share of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt consists of Eurobonds (international sovereign bonds), which accounted for 36 percent of the country’s public and publicly guaranteed foreign debt by the end of May 2022.
While the often-quoted numbers are lower than our calculations, it is important to emphasize that there was no “hidden debt.” Our numbers are in line with both the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance’s figures provided in creditor presentations in November.
Then where does the often-quoted figure that China accounts for a 10-15 percent share of Sri Lanka’s external debt originate from? There are two reasons for this underestimation of Sri Lanka’s Chinese debt stock: First, the exclusion of debt recorded under state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the easily referred to central government debt in Sri Lanka, and, second, Foreign Currency Term Financing Facility or term loans obtained from China Development Bank (CDB) being classified as market borrowings instead of bilateral debt within the central government debt figures. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance’s External Resources Department, while reporting bilateral debt from China as 10 percent of the total as per their classification, had made it very clear that these calculations exclude SOE loans, while term loans from CDB were categorized as market borrowings (as they were first obtained through a commercial bidding process in 2018) obtained at commercial interest rates – albeit below the cost of international sovereign bonds (ISBs).
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The exclusion of a significant part of SOE debt from the topline figure is an interesting story. During 2005-2010, most of the Chinese lending provided to Sri Lanka went to project financing. Of the debt outstanding at the end of 2010, 90 percent was from China Exim Bank. Three of the largest projects financed by China Exim Bank in Sri Lanka were the Norochcholai Puttalam Coal Power Plant, Hambantota Port, and Mattala Airport. Each of these assets are owned by the respective SOEs, which are the largest service providers in each sector. For example, Norochcholai Puttalam Coal Power Plant is an asset of the Ceylon Electricity Board, which provides around 40 percent of the country’s electricity generation. Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) owns Hambantota Port, while the Airport and Aviation Services Limited owns the Mattala Airport.
However, loans to construct these infrastructure project were obtained by the Sri Lankan government as a borrower, not by these SOEs. Since it was the government that obtained these loans, there was no need of a public guarantee. These loans therefore were recorded as central government debt until 2013.
In 2013-14, the loans obtained to construct these infrastructure projects were transferred to the respective SOEs under a directive from the cabinet of ministers. At the end of 2015, these loans amounted to approximately to $2.4 billion, or 3.1 percent of GDP. Therefore, recording these loans under SOEs allowed the government to show a lower central government debt-to-GDP ratio of 78.5 percent for 2015, instead of 81.6 percent.
However, public debt as recorded by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka continued to report these SOE loans as a separate category alongside publicly guaranteed SOE debt, leading to public debt ratio of 85.3 percent at the end of 2015. So, Sri Lanka’s public institutions did not “hide” these loans; they were just more complicated to pinpoint through casual observation due to the complicated classification system.
Sri Lanka’s Previous Debt Restructuring Efforts With China
Although Sri Lanka has not defaulted on its debt before, the country has grappled with severe external debt and balance of payment (BOP) issues for decades. These issues became more severe after 2010 as a result of the significant increase in the country’s foreign debt burden with its rising reliance on commercial borrowings, including ISBs or Eurobonds, raised largely from institutional investors based in the West) and export credit to finance projects (with China’s policy banks being the largest source). The repayments on these loans increased significantly from 2014 onward. To tackle these debt repayment and BOP challenges, Sri Lanka used various methods, including obtaining a EFF program from the IMF in 2016.
Sri Lanka also sought to increase FDI and restructure loans obtained from China. In 2014, then-Treasury Secretary P.B. Jayasundara requested that China Exim Bank restructure loans obtained to construct the Hambantota Port. There was no request for principal haircuts. Instead, Sri Lanka’s request was to reduce interest rates and extend payback periods, making it viable to operate as a joint venture with two Chinese SOEs.
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It is important to note that this request came in September 2014, just before Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Sri Lanka. This visit in turn took place just four months before Sri Lanka’s presidential election, in which Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had been in power since 2005, was defeated.
During Xi’s visit, Sri Lanka signed a Supply Operate Transfer agreement to further develop Hambantota Port terminals as a joint venture with China Harbor Engineering and China Merchant Port (CM Port). Therefore, the major aim of this debt restructuring request was to help further develop the port and reduce losses incurred by the SLPA. Further development of Hambantota, while retaining overall state ownership, was politically important for Rajapaksa.
Regardless of the motive, this proposed loan restructuring did not happen. Rajapaksa lost the 2015 presidential election and the plans for the port changed, with the new government agreeing to lease Hambantota to CM Port in late 2016.
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Sri Lanka’s second effort to seek debt relief from China was in 2017, when then Prime Minister (and current President) Ranil Wickremasinghe visited China and met with Chinese leaders. At the time, Sri Lanka had requested debt relief from China, but the request was dismissed the Chinese. This was according to former Minister for Special Projects Sarath Amunugama, who told the Sri Lankan Parliament on August 10, 2017 that China turned down Sri Lanka’s request for debt relief. Amunugama summarized China’s attitude as follows: “We had lent to many countries in the world. If we give debt relief to Sri Lanka, 30-40 will ask for same treatment.”
His statement clearly echoes China’s sentiment regarding debt restructuring. Chinese financial institutions do not like principal haircuts and are afraid to set a precedent by extending such an offer to one country. According to Kanyi Lui, head of China practice at the law firm Pinsent Masons, principal haircuts on loans might require approval from China’s State Council – the highest political authority – and due to bank officers taking personal accountability for loans they handle there is a reluctance to restructure loans at the bank level.
Historically, China has a history of principal haircuts with regards to the interest-free loans provided as official development assistance via the Ministry of Commerce since the 1960s, as highlighted by Professor Deborah Brautigam in her book “The Dragon’s Gift.” But this is not the case with regards to lending by China’s financial institutions, especially the two major policy banks relevant to Sri Lanka, China Exim Bank and CDB, which have only existed since the mid-1990s. In the most recent example, both banks provided an interest rate moratorium and maturity extensions, without principal haircuts, to Ecuador in September of this year.
Sri Lanka’s Future Debt Restructuring With China
Given that China is Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor, finalization or even basic agreements pertaining to debt restructuring require its involvement and support. But we are not talking about dealing with one entity. There are a few Chinese financial institutions that have provided loans to Sri Lanka. Based on relevant studies and scholars who follow Chinese financial institutions, it is clear that these banks make their own decisions. Sri Lanka has borrowed heavily from both China Exim and CDB, which operate in separate ways, so they cannot be expected to act in concert in the debt restructuring negotiations.
Even within China Exim Bank, there are different departments that provide different kinds of lending. Our briefing paper showed that Sri Lanka had both commercial and concessional loans from the bank, with the concessional ones having their lower interest rates being subsidized by the Chinese government. Therefore, a great deal of consensus within and between policy banks is required for China to formulate its approach to debt restructuring.
The complexities of debt restructuring don’t end there. Both China Exim and CDB lending are attached to activities of Chinese SOEs. While the loans were provided by CDB and Exim, the benefits were received by the SOEs that implemented the projects. That is the basis of export credit lending: A significant portion of the inputs for the projects are exported from China and the projects involve Chinese construction firms. This means, in the debt restructuring process, banks become the risk bearers while the SOEs have already gained the rewards. While banks can’t retroactively share the current risk with SOEs, the state-owned firms face the risk of reduced export credit financed projects to handle if the banks become more risk averse as a result of losses sustained by debt restructuring.
Jin Zhongxia, the director general of the People’s Bank of China’s department of international affairs, recently provided some insights into the complexities of debt restructuring. Addressing the China Finance 40 Forum held in Beijing, Jin noted that it is essential for China to coordinate all its involved creditor organizations (such as CDB and Exim Bank), which independently select most of their lending projects and follow a more or less commercial logic.
“If now the government is to tell them what to do, it is a complicated process as the government did not participate in most of the project-level decisions in the first place,” Jin said. He added that Chinese creditor organizations have relatively little experience dealing with large-scale debt restructures and need to learn by doing.
Chinese banks’ inexperience with overseas lending is a matter constantly highlighted by Michael Pettis, who has pointed out that most of China’s development finance in the Global South was driven by inexperience and very poor assessments both of the risks involved and of their own capabilities. Jin’s statement reflects a realization among Chinese banks regarding the consequences of inexperienced lending and the complexities of handling those consequences.
This means that, amid Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring process, there might be a need to gain consensus among a wide array of Chinese state-linked entities, not simply the policy banks and the political leadership. The political leadership also faces a constraint with regards to offering debt relief to foreign countries: a potential perception among Chinese citizens that their government is subsidizing other countries in crisis at a time they themselves have been struggling through the COVID-19 pandemic and an overall economic slowdown.
Therefore, Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring cannot be looked at in isolation as a domestic crisis, which Sri Lanka has to handle on its own. It is deeply embedded both within a global emerging market debt crisis and a moment of rethinking within China about its global role as a creditor. What happens in countries like Suriname, Zambia, Ghana, Ecuador, and Pakistan has a bearing on what happens in Sri Lanka, and vice versa. These are all co-evolving crises, to which the global and domestic responses need to happen in coordination. But in doing so, neither can one forget the domestic complexities that must be overcome. The nuances of Sri Lanka’s situation carry lessons for both the ongoing processes on debt restructuring and for other countries facing debt distress.
This article contains a summary of our recent briefing paper, “Evolution of Chinese Lending to Sri Lanka Since the mid-2000s – Separating Myth from Reality,” published by SAIS-CARI. The full paper provides a detailed analysis about Sri Lanka’s Chinese loans.
thediplomat.com · by Umesh Moramudali · December 20, 2022
14. Marcos Jr shows the way to balance US and China
Excerpts:
In a statement immediately following reports of China’s reclamation activities over Philippine-claimed land features, the US State Department declared, “The United States stands with our ally, the Philippines, in upholding the rules-based international order and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as guaranteed under international law.”
China has consistently criticized “external meddling” in the maritime disputes. The problem, however, is that it can’t afford to alienate the new Filipino president lest the Southeast Asian country may double down on its alliance with Washington.
It remains to be seen what incentives China is willing to offer the Filipino president next month in order to counterbalance strengthening Philippine-US military cooperation under his administration.
Across Southeast Asia, the past year has seen several regional states astutely navigate US-China strategic competition to their own benefit. ASEAN nations that hosted three major summits in November were at the forefront of efforts to mediate between the two superpowers.
Cognizant of their historical role as a bridge between the West and China, Singaporean leaders have openly called on both sides to exercise caution, re-establish communication channels, and avoid “sleepwalk[ing] into conflict.” The influential city-state has also warned of the disruptive consequences of unrestrained technological and economic warfare between the two superpowers.
Even more dramatic, however, were the successful efforts by Indonesia, the Group of 20 (G20) president this year, to nudge the rival powers towards dialogue.
The upshot was the historic summit between Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping and Biden on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, which produced an unexpected détente between the rival superpowers.
In short, 2022 underscored the capacity and willingness of Southeast Asian nations to not only survive but even thrive in an intense new era of Sino-American completion.
Marcos Jr shows the way to balance US and China
Philippine leader is strengthening US military ties while simultaneously promising China a new ‘golden era’ of economic relations
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · December 23, 2022
MANILA – Just weeks before Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s maiden visit to China, bilateral tensions in the South China Sea are once on the boil.
China is now building up several unoccupied land features in the contested maritime area, according to recent reports citing Western officials, an apparent unprecedented move on territories it didn’t already occupy.
In a strongly-worded statement, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the Spratly group of islands.
“We are seriously concerned as such activities contravene the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award,” said the DFA in a statement, referring to 2002 agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China and a ruling at the Hague, which categorically rejected Beijing’s expansive claims in adjacent waters.
Marcos Jr has repeatedly maintained that bilateral relations with China should not be defined by a single issue. Yet the maritime disputes continue to haunt long-running efforts to deepen bilateral relations between the two neighbors.
For its part, China has also been perturbed by Manila’s swift pivot back to Washington under Marcos Jr, who has welcomed expanded defense cooperation with the Pentagon after a cool period under his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte.
The Biden administration has gone the extra mile to win over the new Filipino president, whose family still faces multiple court cases in the US over human rights and corruption issues.
China is likely intent on signaling its dismay with the new direction in Philippine foreign policy, yet at the same time likely won’t want to squander the chances for a “new golden era” of bilateral relations under the Marcos Jr administration.
Manila now finds itself in a strategic sweet spot, wherein it can simultaneously court two superpowers while pursuing its own economic and military interests.
In fact, the past year has shown that several Southeast Asian countries have not only deftly navigated Sino-American competition, but have also managed to nudge the two superpowers towards favorable outcomes, most notably during the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia.
Having it both ways
Earlier this week, Bloomberg reported that, based on satellite imagery taken on November 4, 2022, by Maxar Technologies, Beijing had begun consolidating its reclamation activities dating back to 2014 on the Eldad Reef, which is claimed by both China and the Philippines.
Last week, the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) similarly expressed concerns over the reported swarming of Chinese vessels in Manila-claimed Iroquois Reef and Sabina Shoal in the same area. Acting Defense Secretary Jose Faustino warned, “we will not give up a single square inch of Philippine territory.”
Activists display anti-China placards and flags during a protest at a park in Manila on June 18, 2019, after a Chinese vessel collided with a Philippine fishing boat, which sank in the disputed South China Sea. Photo: AFP / Ted Aljibe
Last month, the Philippines was also alarmed over another incident whereby a Chinese military vessel “forcefully” seized rocket debris, which was initially retrieved by a Philippine navy vessel. This year alone, Manila filed 193 note verbales in response to Chinese provocations in the disputed waters.
The timing and growing intensity of China’s provocations of the Philippines are unlikely to be coincidental. By several indications, Chinese authorities seem to have been caught off guard by the radical shift in Philippine foreign policy in the past six months.
Ahead of declaring his presidential candidacy last year, Marcos Jr categorically defended Duterte’s Beijing-friendly foreign policy. As a leading candidate, he effectively parroted much of Duterte’s conciliatory and at times subservient rhetoric towards China, while barely mentioning the Philippines’ defense alliance with the US.
During his interactions with Chinese officials, Marcos Jr is known to evoke his family’s long-standing relationship with Beijing, which dates back to his father’s normalization of bilateral ties with Maoist China.
Once in power, the new Filipino president underscored his commitment to a “new golden era” of relations with China, which he described as the Philippines’ “strongest partner” for post-pandemic economic recovery.
With mounting public debt and a large number of unfinished infrastructure projects, Marcos Jr has actively courted Chinese investments in the Philippines. As such, Beijing likely expected the new Filipino president to mimic his predecessor’s China-centered foreign policy.
In stark contrast to the often defeatist rhetoric of his predecessor, Marcos Jr has also taken an uncompromising position on the South China Sea disputes with China. In another major departure, Marcos Jr also openly welcomed expanded defense and strategic ties with Western allies and partners.
In his first few months in office, Marcos Jr met US President Joe Biden twice in person, while hosting US Vice President Kamala Harris and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Manila. While Duterte repeatedly threatened to end the Philippine-US alliance, Marcos Jr is set to oversee the largest wargames and largest number of joint military activities between the two allies next year.
Much to Beijing’s chagrin, the Philippines is also set to greenlight American access to key bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which was signed in 2014 but broadly constrained by the Duterte administration.
Philippine and US Marines during a surface-to-air missile simulation as part of exercise Kamandag joint exercises on October 10, 2019. The exercises were expanded to include Japanese and Korean forces this year. Photo: Lance Cpl. Brienna Tuck / US Marine Corps
To make matters worse for China, the new administration in the Philippines has expressed its willingness to open strategically-located bases close to both the South China Sea as well as Taiwan’s southern shores in the near future.
Just as important is Marcos Jr’s decision to walk back his earlier promise to hand the prized defense secretary position to Vice-President Sara Duterte, who has echoed her father’s Beijing-friendly positions. Instead, veteran generals and diplomats with known US-friendly views have been appointed to top strategic positions in the Marcos Jr’s national security establishment.
Tail wagging the dog
In a statement immediately following reports of China’s reclamation activities over Philippine-claimed land features, the US State Department declared, “The United States stands with our ally, the Philippines, in upholding the rules-based international order and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as guaranteed under international law.”
China has consistently criticized “external meddling” in the maritime disputes. The problem, however, is that it can’t afford to alienate the new Filipino president lest the Southeast Asian country may double down on its alliance with Washington.
It remains to be seen what incentives China is willing to offer the Filipino president next month in order to counterbalance strengthening Philippine-US military cooperation under his administration.
Across Southeast Asia, the past year has seen several regional states astutely navigate US-China strategic competition to their own benefit. ASEAN nations that hosted three major summits in November were at the forefront of efforts to mediate between the two superpowers.
Cognizant of their historical role as a bridge between the West and China, Singaporean leaders have openly called on both sides to exercise caution, re-establish communication channels, and avoid “sleepwalk[ing] into conflict.” The influential city-state has also warned of the disruptive consequences of unrestrained technological and economic warfare between the two superpowers.
Even more dramatic, however, were the successful efforts by Indonesia, the Group of 20 (G20) president this year, to nudge the rival powers towards dialogue.
The upshot was the historic summit between Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping and Biden on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, which produced an unexpected détente between the rival superpowers.
In short, 2022 underscored the capacity and willingness of Southeast Asian nations to not only survive but even thrive in an intense new era of Sino-American completion.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · December 23, 2022
15. Assessing The Network-State in 2050
Some interesting food for thought here.
Excerpt:
If war comes, nation-states will consider how to fight against an adversary that is not bound by territorial lines. Nation-states will have an advantage in that they control the physical means of production for commodities such as food and raw materials, but as the world becomes more connected to the internet, networks will still have a reach into this domain. The rise of the network-state makes it more important than ever for nation-states to control their physical infrastructure and learn to project power in the cognitive domain. Advanced missile systems and drones will do little to threaten the power of the network-state; instead, offensive capabilities will be limited to information campaigns and sophisticated cyber-attacks will allow the nation-state to protect its interests in a world where borders become meaningless.
Assessing The Network-State in 2050
divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · December 26, 2022
Bryce Johnston (@am_Bryce) is an U.S. Army officer currently serving in the 173 rd Airborne Brigade. He is a West Point graduate and a Fulbright Scholar. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Assessing The Network-State in 2050
Date Originally Written: December 12, 2022.
Date Originally Published: December 26, 2022.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is an active-duty U.S. Army officer whose studies intersect technology and politics. His assessment combines Balaji Srinivasan’s concept of the network-state with Chamath Palihapitiya’s[1] claim that the marginal cost of energy and computation will eventually reach zero. The article is written from the point of view of an advisor to nation-states.
Summary: Online communities have become an integral part of life in 2022. As money, computing power, and energy become cheaper, citizens may find themselves identifying more with an immersive online network than their nation. If this trend continues, the world’s balance of power may soon include powerful network-states that do not respect political boundaries and control important aspects of the globe’s information domain.
Text: The nation-state was the primary actor in international affairs for the last two centuries; advances in digital technology may ensure the network-state dominates the next two centuries. The network-state, as conceived by Balaji Srinivasan, is a cohesive digital community that is capable of achieving political aims and is recognized as sovereign by the international community[2]. The citizens of the network-state are not tied to a physical location. Instead, they gain their political and cultural identity through their affiliation with a global network connected through digital technology. The idea of the network-state poses an immediate challenge to the nation-state whose legitimacy comes through its ability to protect its physical territory. By 2050, nation-states like the United States of America could compete with sovereign entities that exist within their borders.
An accepted definition of a state is an entity that has a monopoly on violence within its territory[3]. While a network-state may have a weak claim to a monopoly of physical violence, they could monopolize an alternate form of power that is just as important. Most aspects of modern life rely on the cooperation of networks. A network-state that has a monopoly over the traffic that comes through it could very easily erode the will of a nation-state by denying its citizens the ability to move money, communicate with family, or even drive their car. One only has to look at China today to see this sort of power in action.
Culturally, citizens in developed countries have grown used to spending most of their time online. The average American spends about eight hours online engaged with digital media[4]. Digital communities such as QAnon and WallStreetBets have been able to coordinate their members to affect the physical world. These communities were able to distill a strong sense of identity in their members even though they only ever interacted with each other in an online forum. Advances in generative media, virtual reality hardware, and digital currencies will only make these communities more engaging in the near future.
The network-state is not inevitable. Three conditions are necessary to create the technology needed to sustain a politically viable digital community that spans the world by 2050. First, the marginal cost of capital must approach zero. The last decade saw interest rates stay near zero. Cheap money leads to the misallocation of capital towards frivolous endeavors, but it also nudges technologists to place a higher value on innovations that have a longer time horizon[5]. Artificial intelligence, crypto, and virtual reality all need significant investments to make them viable for the market. These same technologies also make up the building blocks of the network-state.
Second, the marginal cost of computing must approach zero. The technologies mentioned above require vast amounts of computational power. To persuade millions of users to make their online community the core of their identity, online communities will need to provide a persistent level of immersion that is not feasible today. This technical challenge is best understood by looking at the billions of dollars it took to allow Mark Zuckerberg’s metaverse citizens to traverse their community on legs[6]. Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors on microchips will double every year, has remained largely true for the last forty years[7]. While this pattern will likely come to an end, other technologies such as NVIDIA’s specialized graphic chips and quantum computing will ensure that the cost of computing power will drop over time[8].
Finally, the marginal cost of energy must approach zero. Improvements in computing technology will likely make systems more energy efficient, but digital communities that encompass a majority of mankind will require a large amount of energy. The ability to transfer this energy to decentralized nodes will become important as network-states span vast swaths of the earth. Solar panels and battery stations are already becoming cheap enough for individuals to buy. As these materials become cheaper and more reliable, most of the citizens in a network-state likely provide their own power. This decoupling from national grids and fossil fuels will not only allow these citizens to run their machines uninhibited but make them less vulnerable to coercion by nation-states who derive their power from energy production.
The likelihood of these conditions occurring by 2050 is high. Investors like billionaire Chamath Palihapitiya are already betting on a drastic reduction in the cost of energy and computing power[9]. Assuming these three trends do allow for the creation of sovereign network-states, the balance of power on the global stage will shift. A world in which there is a unipolar moment amongst nation-states does not preclude the existence of a multipolar balance amongst network-states. Nation-states and network-states will not compete for many of the same resources, but the proliferation of new sovereign entities creates more opportunities for friction and miscalculation.
If war comes, nation-states will consider how to fight against an adversary that is not bound by territorial lines. Nation-states will have an advantage in that they control the physical means of production for commodities such as food and raw materials, but as the world becomes more connected to the internet, networks will still have a reach into this domain. The rise of the network-state makes it more important than ever for nation-states to control their physical infrastructure and learn to project power in the cognitive domain. Advanced missile systems and drones will do little to threaten the power of the network-state; instead, offensive capabilities will be limited to information campaigns and sophisticated cyber-attacks will allow the nation-state to protect its interests in a world where borders become meaningless.
Endnotes:
[1] Fridman, L. (November 15, 2022). Chamath Palihapitiya: Money, Success, Startups, Energy, Poker & Happiness (No. 338). Retrieved December 1, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFQUDCgMjRc
[2] Balaji, S. (2022, July 4). The Network-state in One Sentence. The Network-state. https://thenetworkstate.com/the-network-state-in-one-sentence
[3] Waters, T., & Waters, D. (2015). Politics As Vocation. In Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society (pp. 129-198). Palgrave MacMillan, New York.
[4] Statista Research Department. (2022, August 16). Time spent with digital media in the U.S. 2011-2024. Statista Media. https://www.statista.com/statistics/262340/daily-time-spent-with-digital-media-according-to-us-consumsers
[5] Caggese, A., & Perez-Orive, A. (2017). Capital misallocation and secular stagnation. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 9.
[6] Klee, M. (2022, October 12). After Spending Billions on the Metaverse, Mark Zuckerberg Is Left Standing on Virtual Legs. Rolling Stone. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/capital-misallocation-and-secular-stagnation.html
[7] Roser, M., Ritchie, H., & Mathieu, E. (2022, March). Technological Change. Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/transistors-per-microprocessor
[8] Sterling, B. (2020, March 10). Preparing for the end of Moore’s Law. Wired. https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2020/03/preparing-end-moores-law/
[9] Fridman, L. (November 15, 2022). Chamath Palihapitiya: Money, Success, Startups, Energy, Poker & Happiness (No. 338). Retrieved December 1, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFQUDCgMjRc
divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · December 26, 2022
16. Putin says Russia ready to negotiate over Ukraine
Putin says Russia ready to negotiate over Ukraine
Reuters · by Guy Faulconbridge
- Summary
- Putin says West trying to break up Russia
- Accuses Kyiv, West of refusing to negotiate
- Ukraine: Putin needs to come back to reality
- Says 99.9% of Russians ready to defend the motherland
MOSCOW, Dec 25 (Reuters) - Russia is ready to negotiate with all parties involved in the war in Ukraine but Kyiv and its Western backers have refused to engage in talks, President Vladimir Putin said in an interview aired on Sunday.
Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine has triggered the most deadly conflict in Europe since World War Two and the biggest confrontation between Moscow and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
There is, thus far, little end in sight to the war.
The Kremlin says it will fight until all its aims are achieved while Kyiv says it will not rest until every Russian soldier is ejected from all of its territory, including Crimea which Russia annexed in 2014.
"We are ready to negotiate with everyone involved about acceptable solutions, but that is up to them - we are not the ones refusing to negotiate, they are," Putin told Rossiya 1 state television in the interview.
CIA Director William Burns said in an interview published this month that while most conflicts end in negotiation, the CIA's assessment was that Russia was not yet serious about a real negotiation to end the war.
An adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that Putin needed to return to reality and acknowledge that it was Russia which did not want any negotiations.
"Russia single-handedly attacked Ukraine and is killing citizens," Mykhailo Podolyak said on Twitter. "Russia doesn’t want negotiations, but tries to avoid responsibility."
'NO OTHER CHOICE'
Putin said Russia was acting in the "right direction" in Ukraine because the West, led by the United States, was trying to cleave Russia apart. Washington denies it is plotting Russia's collapse.
"I believe that we are acting in the right direction, we are defending our national interests, the interests of our citizens, our people. And we have no other choice but to protect our citizens," Putin said.
Asked if the geopolitical conflict with the West was approaching a dangerous level, Putin said: "I don't think it's so dangerous."
Putin said the West had begun the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 by toppling a pro-Russian president in the Maidan Revolution protests.
Soon after that revolution, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and Russian-backed separatist forces began fighting Ukraine's armed forces in eastern Ukraine.
"Actually, the fundamental thing here is the policy of our geopolitical opponents which is aimed at pulling apart Russia, historical Russia," Putin said.
Putin casts what he calls a "special military operation" in Ukraine as a watershed moment when Moscow finally stood up to a Western bloc he says has been seeking to destroy Russia since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union.
Ukraine and the West say Putin has no justification for what they cast as an imperial-style war of occupation which has sown suffering and death across Ukraine.
Putin described Russia as a "unique country" and said the vast majority of its people were united in wanting to defend it.
"As for the main part - the 99.9% of our citizens, our people who are ready to give everything for the interests of the Motherland – there is nothing unusual for me here," Putin said.
"This just once again convinces me that Russia is a unique country and that we have an exceptional people. This has been confirmed throughout the history of Russia's existence."
Additional reporting by Pavel Polityuk in Kyiv Editing by Gareth Jones
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Guy Faulconbridge
17. Robert Kagan Peddles the Failed Doctrine of ‘Liberal Hegemony’
Conclusion:
Robert Kagan is on an ideological crusade — one whose failures are sadly manifest in so many American military cemeteries here and abroad. His realist critics rightly distinguish between vital and peripheral interests and ground their appreciation of U.S. national security on geopolitics rather than on a “liberal world order.” There indeed may be geopolitical reasons to aid Ukraine against Russian aggression and, especially, to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion or attack, but promoting U.S. liberal hegemony is not one of them. We should learn from our mistakes, not repeat them.
Robert Kagan Peddles the Failed Doctrine of ‘Liberal Hegemony’ -
spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · December 26, 2022
Robert Kagan Peddles the Failed Doctrine of ‘Liberal Hegemony’
He makes no distinction between America’s vital and peripheral interests.
December 25, 2022, 9:09 PM
Robert Kagan speaks about the liberal world order, Dec. 5, 2018 (Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs/YouTube)
Washington, D.C., is one of those places where having a track record of being wrong has few consequences. Washington think tanks and news outlets are full of “deep thinkers” and “observers” whose flawed analyses, failed policy proposals, and inaccurate predictions don’t undermine their status as “opinion makers” to whom the country should listen. One such deep thinker is Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution, who championed the endless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars and added little, if anything, to U.S. national security. But according to Kagan’s latest article in Foreign Affairs, the United States did not wage those wars — and did not wage any of its 20th-century wars — for selfish national-security interests. Instead, Kagan writes, we fought those wars and should fight more such wars to maintain a “liberal world beyond [our] shores.”
Kagan’s immediate purpose in this article is to justify U.S. support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, but his larger purpose is to promote a national-security doctrine that he calls “liberal hegemony.” America fought in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq in 1991, the Balkans in the 1990s, Libya in 2011, and Afghanistan and Iraq again in the 21st century, he contends, “to defend and support the hegemony of liberalism.” All of these wars, he writes, were “wars of choice,” not “wars of necessity.” “Not one [of those wars] was necessary to defend the United States’ direct security; all in one way or another were about shaping the international environment,” he explains. For Kagan, the Russia–Ukraine conflict — in which he calls us a “co-belligerent” — and a possible war in the South China Sea fit into this same category.
For Kagan, there is apparently no distinction between America’s vital and peripheral interests — all are worth fighting for. And, for Kagan, the defining U.S. national-security interest is supporting the “liberal world order” beyond our shores regardless of the specific national-security interests at stake in a conflict. The U.S., he writes, should have strongly opposed Russia in Georgia in 2008, in the Crimea in 2014, and in Syria. This, mind you, at the same time we were fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Kagan is nothing if not persistent. In his 2018 book The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World, Kagan warned that “the liberal order is like a garden, artificial and forever threatened by the forces of nature,” and it can only be preserved by a “persistent, unending struggle against the vines and weeds that are constantly working to undermine it from within and overwhelm it from without.” He identified the “vines and weeds” that threaten the liberal world order from outside as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, but he added that America is threatened from within by conservatives who yearn “for order, for strong leadership, and … for the security of family, tribe, and nation.” No “America First” foreign policy for Kagan.
READ MORE from Francis P. Sempa: The Left’s Anti-Nationalism Is the Ideology of Western Suicide
Kagan decries the influence of foreign-policy “realists,” naming E.H. Carr, George F. Kennan, Nicholas J. Spykman, and, surprisingly, former President Barack Obama, who were and are mainly concerned with maintaining the global balance of power instead of promoting liberal hegemony. “The defense of Ukraine,” he writes in the Foreign Affairs piece, “is a defense of the liberal hegemony,” and “the liberal world order will be threatened if Ukraine falls.” Kagan’s logic, therefore, would have U.S. and NATO troops fighting on Ukraine’s side, though he does not expressly say that.
Kagan’s doctrine of liberal hegemony is Wilsonian or, perhaps, “Bushian.” Woodrow Wilson talked about making the world “safe for democracy.” George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks talked about spreading democracy throughout the world. Kagan believes that we reluctantly inherited Great Britain’s defense of the liberal world order after World War I, but that was a war fought to uphold the European balance of power, not to protect a “liberal world order” that did not even exist at the time, unless Kagan believes that the European monarchs were secretly “liberals.” That war and the major wars that followed in the 20th century — including Korea and Vietnam — were wars about the balance of power, despite all the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations.
Robert Kagan is on an ideological crusade — one whose failures are sadly manifest in so many American military cemeteries here and abroad. His realist critics rightly distinguish between vital and peripheral interests and ground their appreciation of U.S. national security on geopolitics rather than on a “liberal world order.” There indeed may be geopolitical reasons to aid Ukraine against Russian aggression and, especially, to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion or attack, but promoting U.S. liberal hegemony is not one of them. We should learn from our mistakes, not repeat them.
spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · December 26, 2022
18. With ‘Zero Covid,’ China Proved It’s Good at Control. Governance Is Harder.
A good bumper sticker. Control Easy. Governance Hard.
With ‘Zero Covid,’ China Proved It’s Good at Control. Governance Is Harder.
nytimes.com · by Li Yuan · December 26, 2022
For a powerful government that has bragged about its command of the country, its absence at a moment of crisis has made the public question its credibility.
Testing booths, ubiquitous throughout China, have been mostly empty since the Chinese government abandoned its “zero Covid” policy.Credit...Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times
In its single-minded pursuit of the “zero Covid” strategy, the Chinese government was omnipresent and omnipotent, using its unlimited resources and unchecked power to control the nation. After having nearly exhausted its resources and the good will of the public, the government has now simply disappeared, just as many Chinese are getting very ill with the virus or dying from it.
For much of this year, Yang, an engineer in Shenzhen, took Covid tests nearly every day, from one of the more than 40 government-built booths in his neighborhood. Whenever he missed one, he would get text reminders from his district. After buying pain relief medication, he got calls from three different community workers because the state had strict rules about the sale of such over-the-counter drugs.
Since the Chinese leadership abruptly abandoned its stringent “zero Covid” policy several weeks ago, Mr. Yang has rarely heard from the government.
“No one is in charge now,” said Mr. Yang, who asked to be identified only by his surname because of safety concerns. His daughter’s school was still open last week even though most students were staying home, either because they were ill or worried about getting sick. There’s no national mask mandate. People with mild symptoms are showing up at work because no one bothers to check in on them anymore. Medicines are in short supply, so Mr. Yang is sharing what he has with friends. His family has four rapid test kits, which are being saved until they’re really needed.
For a powerful government that likes to brag about its command of the country and has published a four-volume compilation of speeches and articles by its top leader titled “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China,” the absence of direction at a moment of crisis has made the public question the legitimacy and the credibility of the Chinese Communist Party.
It also highlights a crucial but not always obvious distinction in leadership.
“The ability to control is different from the ability to govern,” Chen Tianyong, an entrepreneur, wrote on his social media WeChat timeline last week.
Xu Kaizhen, a best-selling author famous for novels that explore the intricate workings of China’s bureaucratic politics, wrote on his verified Weibo account that the abrupt change made it abundantly clear “what our government will do, what it likes to do, what it can do, what it doesn’t like to do, what it can’t do and what it doesn’t want to do.”
If good governance is about transparency, responsibility, accountability and responsiveness to the needs of the people, the Chinese government has barely practiced it, either in its harsh “zero Covid” policy, or in its haphazard reopening.
It could have spent its resources on increasing vaccine coverage among older people and adding I.C.U. beds. Instead, it spent money on mass Covid testing and building enormous quarantine camps.
Understand the Situation in China
The Communist Party cast aside restrictive “zero Covid” policy, which set off mass protests that were a rare challenge to the Communist leadership.
It could have communicated scientific facts about symptoms and death rates of the Omicron variant. Instead, it fanned fears about Covid.
It could have stocked up on fever medicines and provided the public with the best vaccines available. Instead, it made it extremely difficult for people to buy antipyretics and didn’t approve the public use of foreign mRNA vaccines, which have proven more effective than the Chinese ones in preventing severe symptoms.
Unlike many governments that took steps to flatten the infection curve before reopening, the Chinese government suddenly let go of nearly all restrictions, most likely an effort to rush an enormous country to herd immunity while leaving the old and vulnerable in precarious situations.
Its main advice to the public: “You’re in charge of your own health.” The slogan has since earlier this year been promoted and repeated by state media and local governments since the reopening.
But the pandemic is a public health crisis, and such crises are part of the reason governments exist.
The change in pandemic control strategy doesn’t mean the government “can sit on its hands,” Wu Jinglian, a top Chinese economist known for advocating for smaller government, told the Caixin magazine. It “must avoid going from one extreme to the other.”
Qin Liwen, a former journalist, wrote on her WeChat timeline: “Only when a government does what it’s supposed to do, can the people be responsible for themselves.”
The local governments haven’t been doing much either. Many officials are probably waiting for guidance from their superiors. “Zero Covid” could be quantified so everyone knew what to do. In a top-down system like the Communist Party, the underlings are often at a loss for what to do when the big boss doesn’t set a goal.
Mr. Xi has said nothing about the end of the country’s “zero Covid” policy, which was considered his signature campaign. The state media reported repeatedly in the past three years that the Chinese leader “took personal command and planned the response” in China’s war against the pandemic.
It would be wise for the officials to wait for his directive. But the public can’t wait.
Emotions are running high as millions of people are becoming infected every day, leaving pharmacy shelves empty, medical workers overwhelmed and morgues full.
“The virus wasn’t eliminated to zero,” a recent Weibo comment said. “The government’s credibility has been reduced to zero.”
A widely circulated WeChat article speculated that the shortage of fever medications reflected the government’s lack of preparation for loosening control. And if the government had shown the same political will that it had in implementing “zero Covid,” the article argued, it could have ensured there was ample supply of such medication.
“It doesn’t care about the ordinary people, leaving them to fend for themselves and even delighting in their chaos,” the article said, and it urged officials to show up where the public most needed them to win back trust.
The low confidence in the government is forcing people to help themselves and help one another. In local WeChat groups, people made arrangements to share their fever medicines and rapid test kits with their neighbors.
Tencent, the social media giant, also built a WeChat program where people could ask for medications from strangers with extra. The help requests are modest: six tablets of acetaminophen; four tablets of ibuprofen; two rapid test kits; one thermometer.
They are asking strangers for help because they’re not getting it from their government.
“Don’t expect anything from Leviathan — there’s no point in appealing, either,” Chen Min, a former journalist better known by his pen name, Xiao Shu, wrote on his WeChat timeline, referring to the central government. “In the end, we have to help ourselves.”
Only by building an extensive network of social connections, he continued, “can we weave a real social safety net in the darkest moment, build a real Noah’s ark and save countless lives.”
This is exactly the type of governance crisis about which Mr. Xi had once warned the party.
“It is not up to us to judge our party’s governance capacity or performance; they must and can only be judged by the people,” Mr. Xi said in a speech in 2013. “If we are pretentious and divorce ourselves from the people or put ourselves above them, we will surely be abandoned by them. This is the case for any party, and is an iron law which admits of no exception.”
nytimes.com · by Li Yuan · December 26, 2022
19. With Record Military Incursions, China Warns Taiwan and U.S.
With Record Military Incursions, China Warns Taiwan and U.S.
nytimes.com · by Chang Che · December 26, 2022
Taiwan said China sent 71 military aircraft near the island days after President Biden bolstered U.S. support for Taiwan.
Fighter jets of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducting a combat training exercise around Taiwan in August.Credit...Gong Yulong/Xinhua, via Associated Press
China sent a record number of military aircraft to menace self-ruled Taiwan in a large show of force to the Biden administration, signaling that Beijing wants to maintain pressure on Taiwan even as some tensions between the superpowers are easing.
The swarm of Chinese fighter jets, maritime patrol planes and drones that buzzed the airspace near Taiwan in the 24-hour period leading to Monday morning demonstrated Beijing’s appetite for confrontation with the United States over Taiwan, the island democracy China claims as its territory.
The military activity — which, according to Taiwan, included at least 71 Chinese aircraft — came days after President Biden’s latest move to expand American support for the island. Beijing has denounced the United States’ effort as an attempt to contain China and interfere in its domestic affairs.
Tensions over Taiwan have been rising in the months since House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August, prompting Beijing to step up its activity in the area with several days of live-fire drills. China said that the exercise was aimed at honing its ability to conduct joint patrols and military strikes, but also made clear what the target was.
“This was a firm response to the current escalation of collusion and provocations by the U.S. and Taiwan,” Senior Colonel Shi Yi, a spokesman for the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army, which faces Taiwan, said in a statement issued Sunday.
The military policy bill that President Biden signed into legislation on Friday lays out lawmakers’ national security priorities for the coming year. This year, U.S. lawmakers, eyeing the protracted war in Europe and rising tensions with China, approved funding for Ukraine and authorized up to $10 billion over the next five years for Taiwan.
“Such a large-scale action is, of course, a response to President Biden’s signing of the act,” said Su Tzu-yun, a security analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei. “This pattern will likely continue.”
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“The United States has walked from strategic ambiguity to constructive clarity,” said Mr. Su, referring to the latest military legislation. “Biden has turned Taiwan into a quasi-partner that fits the role of a security partner in his Indo-Pacific strategy.”
For years, China has sent naval and air forces into the southwest corner of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone as a way to test and wear down the island's resolve against a possible military offensive. The air defense identification zone, or ADIZ, is larger than the sovereign airspace claimed by Taiwan, and serves as a unilaterally declared area in which the island’s authorities claim special rights to tell aircraft to identify themselves.
China’s military flights around Taiwan have increased following Ms. Pelosi’s visit, a trip that reinforced suspicion in Beijing that the United States has loosened its commitment to a “one China” policy. Under that policy, Washington acknowledges, but does not endorse, Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. Washington also says that settling Taiwan’s status must be done peacefully, and a 1979 law asserts that the United States may intervene if Taiwan is attacked. Chinese officials and experts say that successive American presidents have tilted toward Taiwan, while American officials say that Beijing has destabilized cross-strait relations through bellicose acts and rhetoric.
The latest military exercise was notable for breaking a single-day record, both in total number of aircraft deployed as well as the number that crossed the so-called median line, an informal boundary between the two sides. Forty-seven out of the 71 aircraft crossed that line, according to the Taiwanese defense ministry. Passing over the line is seen as more provocative, because the aircraft would be on a straight course over Taiwan if they did not veer away.
In a statement on Monday, the defense ministry said that the Taiwanese military was monitoring the situation and tasked its combat air patrol, Navy vessels and land-based missile systems to respond.
“What the Chinese Communist Party has been doing has once again highlighted its mentality of using force to resolve differences and undermine regional peace and stability,” the Taiwanese defense ministry said in a statement on Sunday.
Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Beijing who is a former Chinese military officer, said in an interview that the new U.S. defense legislation amounted to a test of China’s boundaries. “The People’s Liberation Army would use severe military drills to warn the United States that if it insists on going its own way, there will be no peace in the Taiwan Strait,” he said.
Taiwan has recently pushed to strengthen its own military, fueled by concerns over undertrained staff as well as newfound urgency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. President Tsai Ing-wen will hold a news conference on Tuesday, according to the Taiwanese presidential office. She is expected to outline a plan to extend the period of military conscription from four months to a year.
China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, has in recent months tried to stabilize relations with the United States and other Western governments, which deteriorated for years over human rights issues, technology and trade tensions, as well as deepening distrust over Taiwan. But when Mr. Xi and President Biden held a face-to-face summit in Bali in November, Mr. Xi also emphasized that Taiwan’s future and American support for the island remain a potential fuse of crisis, even conflict.
“President Xi stressed that the Taiwan question is ‘the core of the core interests of China,’ the bedrock of the political foundation of China-U.S. relations, and the red line that the United States must not and should not cross,” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said at the time.
Mr. Xi, like previous Communist Party leaders, has said he wants to peacefully bring Taiwan under Chinese rule but will not rule out the use of force. Many experts say the balance of armed strength across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China’s favor, and some believe that Mr. Xi could intensify military pressure on Taiwan in coming years.
But the Pentagon’s latest annual report about the Chinese armed forces, released last month, said that attempting to seize control of Taiwan remained a daunting, and potentially devastating, gamble for Mr. Xi.
“Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations,” the report stated. The potential setbacks and a likely wave of international opprobrium, it added, would make an invasion a “significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.”
nytimes.com · by Chang Che · December 26, 2022
20. The Last Gasp of Peace: The Christmas Truce of 1914 and the Modern Profession of Arms
Excerpt:
The most important lesson of the Christmas Truce has nothing to do with religion, holidays, or peace. I am not advocating that we do not seek to kill the enemy or destroy their capacity for war. Quite the opposite, actually. The image of those soldiers shaking hands in No-Man’s Land is meant only to remind us that the enemy is human. There is an inextricable bond of commonality, even between soldiers who fight against each other. Whether watching enemies in a neighboring trench or following them from thousands of miles away through the lens of an unmanned aircraft, it is incumbent on all members of the profession of arms to recognize the burden that comes with taking lives. We use terms like “military-aged male” because it makes the strike decision easier. We are not reminded that the target is a son, brother, or father with his own list of life goals and desires. The Christmas Truce should remind every service member of the incredible gravity of our role.
The Last Gasp of Peace: The Christmas Truce of 1914 and the Modern Profession of Arms - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Joseph D. Eanett · December 26, 2022
Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in 2019.
The story of the Christmas Truce of 1914 is often considered “played out,” especially in historical circles, but it is a compelling tale; its best and most impactful role is on the young minds of the military who have not yet heard it. It is hard for most to come to terms with the horrors of the Western Front, and equally challenging to understand the willingness of soldiers to set aside their differences in the midst of so much death. The actions of the Christmas Truce do not echo with the heroism of Pickett’s Charge, the audacity of Theodore Roosevelt Jr. using his cane to direct landings on Utah Beach, or the bravery of the USS Johnston charging the Japanese fleet at the Battle off Samar. Over the last twelve years, I have returned to this story every year as a teaching moment for the airmen I have led, and now for the midshipmen I teach at the U.S. Naval Academy. It has been a valuable framework for me to remind them how serious their jobs are. It is odd to consider that I teach this to Air Force and Navy members, the services with the least appreciation for the trenches of World War I, but I think that is what makes it more important. Most members of these services bear the particular burden of executing combat without staring into the eyes of the enemy. But the lesson of the truce is important for all armed services. Members of the profession of arms should remember the Christmas Truce for everything it was, and they should learn about it because of all the things it was not.
At the end of the first four months of World War I, the armies in Europe had experienced what may have been the greatest military bloodletting in history. Between August and December 1914, 116,000 German and 189,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers were killed, but that still fell short of the 16,200 soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force and 30,000 Belgians killed alongside the soul-crushing 300,000 French soldiers in the same four-month span. On the Eastern Front, Russian causalities approached 2 million.
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The number of military dead from the first four months of World War I does not faze most historians. It is, after all, but a fraction of the overall toll of that war. However, for those just joining today’s military, modern context provides a stinging dose of reality. The total number of military personnel (American and coalition forces, as well as local military and national police) killed in the “Global War on Terror” from October 2001 to November 2018 was just over 125,000, with slightly fewer opposition dead. More men died on one side of the trenches in four months than were killed in combat across a war now stretching into its nineteenth year. That kind of loss, in human terms, much less the costs to military strategy and political capital, is truly unfathomable.
Among that level of death on both sides, the idea that a moment of friendly peace could spontaneously break out strikes the modern mind as almost nonsense, a mental non-starter. Yet, it happened. There was no particular location or unit where the truce began. It did not, like Athena, burst forth upon the fields of World War I fully formed. It grew slowly and sporadically in many areas at the same time. There was no unified plan or conspiracy to begin such truces, though senior leaders anticipated them. General Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff, expressly forbade such action and promised punishments for those who attempted to arrange a truce. However, even threats from the top of the chain proved no match for the holiday spirit of the men in the trenches.
On Christmas Eve, 1914, the overtures began. Given the love of Christmas generally associated with Germanic culture and tradition, it is not surprising that German or Austrian forces instigated most of the breakouts of peace. All day long, German units dispatched low-ranking soldiers to supply depots in the rear lines to secure special food items, mail, and small hand-held Christmas trees complete with candles and decorations. Carl Mühlegg, a private in the 17th Bavarian Regiment stationed near Langemarck, accomplished the eighteen-mile roundtrip hike to deliver a tree to his captain. The officer solemnly lit the candles and wished peace for his soldiers, Germany, and the world. Mühlegg later wrote, “Never was I more keenly aware of the insanity of war.”
In isolated pockets along the Western Front, gunfire mostly ceased on Christmas Eve, and throughout the day the cessation spread. By the time dusk encroached on France, violence was the oddity. Most propositions of peace began reasonably innocuously. In the evening quiet, without the background din of artillery and rifle fire, soldiers exchanged shouts between the trenches to wish each other “Happy Christmas” as well as pass the traditional barbed comments and trash-talk expected from members of militaries. They shared these greetings with banners and chalkboards, but mostly through song, as German regimental songs were met with British renditions of popular music, and back and forth it went between the trenches. At nightfall, the Western Front took on a different appearance. Near Chapelle d’Armentières on the French-Belgian border, Christmas trees with lit candles lined the ramparts of German trenches “like the footlights of a theatre,” according to one British soldier. Against this backdrop, German renditions of “Stille Nacht” (Silent Night) gently wafted over trench lines. The British listened awestruck. At the song’s conclusion, several British units, some even to their surprise, broke into applause or shot flares to signal their approval. The British demanded encores, and ad hoc caroling competitions developed up and down the Western Front.
From singing came the first overtures to cross No-Man’s Land. The signboards requesting “no fighting” and wishing each other Merry Christmas soon became requests to talk. On the French lines, German officers called “Kamarades, Kamarades! Rendezvous!” while waving white flags. As dawn broke on Christmas Day, the guns remained silent, other than areas of contact between Russians and Serbs, and where French Foreign Legionnaires were deployed in Alsace. The acts of friendship were varied, depending on the area, the nature of the troops on both sides, and the landscape of the battlefield. The most common was the exchanging of trinkets. Soldiers exchanged buttons, cap badges, insignias, and cigarettes, but the most prized exchanges were the small tins of sweets and tobacco given to members of the British Expeditionary Forces by the Princess Mary’s Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Christmas Fund and the German belt buckle emblazoned with the Gott mit uns (God is with us) slogan.
Less traditional acts occurred, as well. The soldiers held burial ceremonies in No-Man’s Land for the still unrecovered fallen soldiers of both sides. Soldiers from both armies attended, and a chaplain from each trench read the service, alternating between English and German. Food and drinks were shared, stories and letters exchanged, and soldiers swapped addresses so they could write to each other after the war. The 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers shared two barrels of beer with the Germans, though neither army had the stomach to enjoy the French beer, which both sides described, in the most positive words, as “rotten.”
Most famous of all were the football matches (soccer games, for we American heathens). In the areas where No-Man’s Land was not a ruined landscape of craters, soldiers took advantage of the truce to run freely in the open beyond the trenches. The vast majority of the matches were friendly pickup games or intra- and inter-unit competitions. However, there were several instances of cross-trench football in the Flanders sector. Often some of the best bartering was done as part of claiming victory in one of the matches, such as the kilt-clad Sutherland Highlanders challenging the 133rd Saxon Regiment to a match for a bottle of schnapps. There was no universally agreed upon victor of the matches in this 1914 World [War] Cup, with matches going in favor of both sides on multiple occasions.
The peace was not to last. As reports of the activities of the truce spread up the various chains of command, the response from senior leadership was less than enthusiastic. Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces, angered by the contravention of earlier orders to avoid such behavior, recalled that “I issued immediate orders to prevent the recurrence of such conduct,” and ordered punishments for those know to have fraternized with the enemy. The response was no more muted at the headquarters of the French, Belgian, German, or Austro-Hungarian armies, with threats of punishment mixing with orders to recommence bombardments. The newspapers and photographs made quite the sensation of the spontaneous peace, but despite the success of the truce in 1914 and the depth of its meaning to the soldiers, it never recurred.
The soldiers who crossed the trenches on Christmas Day were not a movement to end the war, and none expected the ceasefire to extend beyond the day. A British soldier recounted, “There was not an atom of hate on either side that day. And yet, on our side, not for a moment was the will to war and the will to beat them relaxed.” After the day of peace, the soldiers parted ways with the understanding that they could be friendly, but not friends. One German solider offered a farewell to his counterpart, saying “Today we have peace. Tomorrow you fight for your country; I fight for mine. Good luck.” There were attempts at another truce in 1915, but on a dramatically more limited scale and duration. The events of the War overtook the minds of the soldiers. The spring of 1915 saw the sinking of the Lusitania and the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the first zeppelin bombings of London and the first use of poison gas at Ypres. By Christmas of 1916, the solidarity of soldiers was replaced by animosity for the length, awfulness, and conduct of the war, and the feelings of the Christmas Truce never came again.
I find remarkably deep meaning in the events of the Christmas Truce for no other reason than that among so much destruction, no amount of hatred or bitterness could overcome their common humanity. This fact has compelled me to share this story with my airmen, and more recently, my midshipmen, every December. Among the roughly 2,000 servicemembers I have worked with in my career so far, there is a lasting impact for those who had the patience to read or listen. Each time, I recount the details of the truce and the horrors of the Western Front, I try to share the following lesson: Duty and humanity are virtues that bind all in the profession of arms, but they exist in tension with each other and must be precariously balanced.
The soldiers of World War I spent one day celebrating their common humanity and another 1,567 destroying it. The war would go on to claim the lives of an additional seven million soldiers. It was a brief and unrepeatable instance. No person in the trenches of 1914 had the authority to end the war, and their discipline as well as honor demanded that they return to fighting. Anything else would be mutiny or desertion. Wars are fought between nations, and soldiers are but tools of those political disagreements. Nor should the lessons of the Christmas Truce be taken strictly along religious lines. In 1968, U.S. forces decided to respect the North Vietnamese call for a seven-day ceasefire for the Vietnamese celebration of the Lunar New Year, and three days later the Tet Truce turned into the Tet Offensive. In 1973, Israel was attacked by an Egyptian-led coalition on Yom Kippur, which also fell within the holy month of Ramadan.
The most important lesson of the Christmas Truce has nothing to do with religion, holidays, or peace. I am not advocating that we do not seek to kill the enemy or destroy their capacity for war. Quite the opposite, actually. The image of those soldiers shaking hands in No-Man’s Land is meant only to remind us that the enemy is human. There is an inextricable bond of commonality, even between soldiers who fight against each other. Whether watching enemies in a neighboring trench or following them from thousands of miles away through the lens of an unmanned aircraft, it is incumbent on all members of the profession of arms to recognize the burden that comes with taking lives. We use terms like “military-aged male” because it makes the strike decision easier. We are not reminded that the target is a son, brother, or father with his own list of life goals and desires. The Christmas Truce should remind every service member of the incredible gravity of our role.
It is a difficult job. As service members, we stand ready to conduct violence on behalf of others. The reason we exist is to hurt people and break things. It is not a responsibility to be taken lightly, nor something to be considered in jest. We stand in defense of others, whether as soldiers or marines with the power of life or death over insurgents, or as airmen and sailors ready to release thousands of nuclear weapons at a moment’s notice. That level of responsibility, to the nation, to each other, and to mankind, is incredible and speaks to the trust placed in us by the citizens of the world.
Combat is the realm of soldiers, the dispassionate art of taking and holding the battlefield through victory over opposing forces by force of arms. There should be no anger or hatred in combat. Soldiers of each side are doing their jobs. Yet it seems that instances of respect between opposing forces have lessened significantly since WWII. Acts such as the Japanese sailors’ salutes of respect to the crew of the USS Johnston after their heroic last stand at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, or the escort of a crippled and defenseless B-17 by a German fighter beyond the range of antiaircraft fire, are much harder to find in the Cold War and post-Cold War world. To acknowledge the humanity of an enemy and yet pursue one’s duty to kill drastically increases the weight of those soldiers’ burdens as they accept the true moral cost of war. It is important that successive generations strive to fight wars with such a high moral bar.
I end every year in the same way. I remind my students of President Kennedy’s assertion at the Commencement Address to American University’s class of 1963, when he reminded us that “in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.” Finally, I give a charge to everyone, whether airmen or midshipmen, and now to the world. I ask them to consider what anger they can let go, what hatred could be forgiven or feud ended, if only they are willing to step out of their trenches. What can one person accomplish, and what can all of humanity accomplish, if just for one day all the old hatreds were laid down, bread was broken with enemies, and all came to the stark realization that we are equally human?
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Joe Eanett has spent the last 12 years on active duty as a U.S. Air Force officer in the security forces and intelligence career fields. He is currently assigned as an instructor of naval history at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is a 2007 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and received a Master’s in Military History from Norwich University. He deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom with the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and supported the recovery efforts of the 2011 Japanese tsunami as part of Operation Tomodachi.
The opinions expressed are those of the author along and do not reflect those of the U.S. Air Force. U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
Image: U.K. Government
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Joseph D. Eanett · December 26, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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