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Quotes of the Day:
"You can surmount the obstacles in your path if you are determined, courageous and hard-working. Never be faint-hearted. Be resolute, but never bitter."
– Ralph Bunche
"We must dissent from the indifference. We must dissent from the apathy. We must dissent from the fear, the hatred and the mistrust. We must dissent from a nation that has buried its head in the sand, waiting in vain for the needs of its poor, its elderly, and its sick to disappear and just blow away. We must dissent from a government that has left its young without jobs, education or hope. We must dissent from the poverty of vision and the absence of moral leadership. We must dissent because America can do better, because America has no choice but to do better."
– Thurgood Marshall
"I feel safe even in the midst of my enemies; for the truth is powerful and will prevail."
–Sojourner Truth
Note: I will be on overseas travel the next 5 days so my message timing will be erratic.
1. N.K. leader Kim sends New Year's message to Putin, calls bilateral ties 'precious common asset'
2. Resettlement centers for N. Korean defectors to be integrated next year
3. U.S. lawmakers submit resolution decrying China's actions against Japan, reaffirming U.S. commitment to allies
4. Poll finds majority backs 'peaceful two-state' approach to unification
5. Defense ministry dismisses general-level officer over martial law involvement
6. Kim Jong Un highlights military agenda
7. Philippines buys two South Korean frigates in $600 million deal
8. South Korea-U.S. nuclear submarine deal may progress
9. Lee to seek Beijing’s support on N. Korea, economic cooperation during January trip
10. Finding a Trump–Kim Jong-un opening around an April U.S.–China summit will be key
11. Progressives also call disinformation law unconstitutional
12. Korea moves to end overseas adoptions by 2029
13. [Wang Son-taek] New missions for Koreans in 2026
1. N.K. leader Kim sends New Year's message to Putin, calls bilateral ties 'precious common asset'
Comment: The BFFs just keep getting tighter.
N.K. leader Kim sends New Year's message to Putin, calls bilateral ties 'precious common asset' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · December 27, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251227000400315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Dec. 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sent a message of greetings to Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of New Year's Day, calling the two countries' relations a "precious common asset," the North's state media said Saturday.
In the message, Kim described this year as a "meaningful" one when the two countries "steadily wrote a great biography of the alliance" through "full mutual support and selfless encouragement," according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Kim's greeting came after Putin himself sent a New Year's message to the North Korean leader on Dec. 18.
"I think that today's DPRK-Russia alliance ... is a precious common asset to be carried forward forever not only in the present era but also by posterity generation after generation," Kim said, using the acronym of North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Kim said the North-Russia relations have been further consolidated into the "sincerest alliance of sharing blood, life and death in the same trench," as he referred to the North's troop deployment to Russia to support the war with Ukraine.
"Now no one can break the relations between the peoples of the two countries and their unity, supported firmly by embodiment of the strong will and strength to defend the just aspirations of the times and set right history," he said.
North Korea and Russia have been deepening their military cooperation since Putin and Kim signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty during their summit in Pyongyang in June 2024. Since last year, the North has sent around 15,000 combat troops to support Moscow's war against Ukraine.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin during their summit talks in Beijing, China, on Sept. 3, 2025, in this file photo from the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · December 27, 2025
2. Resettlement centers for N. Korean defectors to be integrated next year
Comment: Perhaps the ROK government should expend more effort to convince China to do the right thing which is to allow Koreans from the north to have refugee status so they can come to the South rather than be forcibly repatriated to the north. Then perhaps all the unification facilities can be fully used.
Resettlement centers for N. Korean defectors to be integrated next year | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 26, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251226004000315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Dec. 26 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Friday it plans to integrate the main center and branch of Hanawon, the state facility for supporting North Korean defectors' resettlement, next year amid a sharp decline in the number of such people coming to South Korea in recent years.
Currently, the headquarters of Hanawon is located in Anseong, just south of Seoul, to help the resettlement of female North Korean defectors, and its branch is being operated in Hwacheon, Gangwon Province, for male defectors.
"The government is reviewing measures to integrate those two facilities and redeploy personnel to ensure efficient operations and implement them as soon as possible," Chang Yoon-jeong, the ministry's deputy spokesperson, told a press briefing.
The move comes as the number of North Koreans entering the South has plunged since the North sealed its borders during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The number of defectors peaked at 2,914 in 2009 before falling to 1,047 in 2019. It has since dropped sharply to 229 in 2020, when Pyongyang closed its borders to block the pandemic from spreading, and has yet to recover, with only 236 defectors recorded last year.
The integration plan was reported to President Lee Jae Myung during last week's briefing for the ministry's 2026 policy plan.
This file photo taken July 12, 2002, shows the resettlement center for North Korean defectors, also known as Hanawon, located in Anseong, about 65 kilometers south of Seoul. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 26, 2025
3. U.S. lawmakers submit resolution decrying China's actions against Japan, reaffirming U.S. commitment to allies
Summary:
A bipartisan group of U.S. House members introduced a resolution condemning what it calls China’s “coercive” actions against Japan and reaffirming America’s “ironclad” commitment to allies in the Asia-Indo-Pacific. Led by Rep. Young Kim and joined by Reps. Ami Bera, Andy Barr, Diana DeGette, and Joaquin Castro, the measure cites Beijing’s travel advisories, economic pressure, and other steps targeting Tokyo after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments linking Taiwan Strait security to Japan’s survival. It stresses shared U.S.–Japan interests in Taiwan peace and reiterates that the U.S.-Japan treaty covers the Senkaku Islands.
Comment: US Alliances have long been a bi-partisan issue and I hope they can remain that way. What they did not address in this is that all our alliances are inextricably linked, If something happens in Taiwan it will affect the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. If the Philippines, then Japan and Korea. If Korea then Japan and the Philippines (and Taiwan on as well). We cannot consider our alliances and the security issues as discrete or separate unrelated issues. They are all linked in various ways.
U.S. lawmakers submit resolution decrying China's actions against Japan, reaffirming U.S. commitment to allies | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · December 27, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251227000200315
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 26 (Yonhap) -- A group of U.S. lawmakers introduced a House resolution condemning what they called "coercive" actions by China against Japan, and reaffirming the United States' "ironclad" commitment to its allies in the Indo-Pacific, Congress's website showed Friday.
Rep. Young Kim (R-CA), Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA), Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY), Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO) and Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX) proposed the resolution to the lower chamber on Dec. 19, following Beijing's travel advisories, economic pressure and other steps against Tokyo over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's remarks last month regarding security in the Taiwan Strait.
The resolution pointed out that the United States has a "vital" interest in "supporting its allies against coercion and in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific," as it criticized China's recent actions against Japan and recognized the shared interest of the U.S. and Japan in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.
"Attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to intimidate or punish our allies for speaking out undermine the rules-based international order and threaten regional stability," Kim was quoted as saying in a press release.
"This resolution sends a clear message that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Japan and our allies against authoritarian aggression."
This photo, taken on March 25, 2024, shows Rep. Young Kim (R-CA) speaking during a visit to South Korea's unification ministry in Seoul. (Yonhap)
Bera called for the U.S. to stand together with Japan.
"I commend Japan's steadfast commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and fully support Japan's right to speak up in defense of its own security," he said. "This resolution reaffirms the U.S. Congress's ironclad commitment to the U.S.–Japan alliance and to upholding the rules-based international order."
The resolution also highlighted the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty that applies to the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyudao in China.
Kim is the chair of the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, while Bera is its ranking member, Barr and DeGette are co-chairs of the Congressional Study Group on Japan, and Castro is a Japan Caucus co-chair.
This photo, taken on June 16, 2024, shows Ami Bera (D-CA) speaking during an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Washington. (Yonhap)
Appearing at a parliamentary session last month, Takaichi hinted that a military blockade around Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan, which could possibly draw a Japanese military response. This remark irked Beijing, which took a series of steps, including suspending Japanese seafood imports.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · December 27, 2025
4. Poll finds majority backs 'peaceful two-state' approach to unification
Summary:
A South Korean survey released December 26 found majority support for a “peaceful two-state” concept that prioritizes easing inter-Korean hostility to enable peaceful coexistence before pursuing long-term unification. The Democratic Peaceful Unification Advisory Council said 55.5% agreed with that approach, while 40.5% disagreed. The poll also showed 56.8% approval of the Lee Jae-myung administration’s north Korea policy direction, and 35.1% disapproval. Looking to next year, 49.4% expected no change in inter-Korean relations, 34.3% predicted improvement, and 13.6% deterioration. Unification remained necessary for 68%, mainly for economic development and reducing war risk.
Comment: Acceptance of peaceful co-existence is acceptance of sentencing 26 million Koreans in the north to suffering and torture for eh rest of their lives. But at least 68% support unification for economic development and peace.
Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.
World News Dec. 26, 2025 / 8:38 PM / Updated at 8:38 PM
Poll finds majority backs 'peaceful two-state' approach to unification
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/26/poll-peaceful-two-state/8841766753419/
Former Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan, new senior vice chairman of the presidential Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, speaks dung a ceremony at the council's secretariat in Seoul, South Korea, 03 November 2025, to mark his inauguration. The council advises the president on unification issues for policymaking purposes. Photo by YONHAP/EPA
Dec. 26 (Asia Today) -- A South Korean public opinion survey released Friday found majority support for a concept described as a "peaceful two-state" approach aimed at long-term unification, with respondents saying tensions should be eased first to pursue peaceful coexistence.
The Democratic Peaceful Unification Advisory Council said its fourth-quarter national unification opinion survey found 55.5% agreed with the view that hostility between South and North Korea should be resolved first to achieve peaceful coexistence and pursue long-term unification. About 40.5% disagreed.
The survey also found 56.8% approved of the Lee Jae-myung administration's North Korea policy direction, including goals described as a Korean Peninsula "free from war worries," "a new era of peaceful coexistence" and "joint growth" between the two Koreas. About 35.1% disapproved.
On prospects for inter-Korean relations next year, 49.4% said they expected no change, 34.3% predicted improvement and 13.6% forecast deterioration.
Related
Asked about the necessity of unification, 68% said it is necessary, down 0.6 percentage points from the previous quarter. The most-cited reasons were economic development, at 28.2%, and eliminating the threat of war, at 27.6%.
Views of North Korea were nearly split, with 44% seeing it as an object of vigilance and hostility and 42.7% seeing it as an object of cooperation and support.
The council said the survey was conducted over three days from Friday through Sunday among 1,000 adults ages 19 and older. It reported a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points, using proportional allocation by gender, age and region and a combined telephone interview method on landlines and mobile phones.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
5. Defense ministry dismisses general-level officer over martial law involvement
Comment: Unfortunately the martial law debacle is going to be the gift that keeps on giving for some time I am afraid.
Defense ministry dismisses general-level officer over martial law involvement | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Jae-eun · December 26, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251226009500320
SEOUL, Dec. 26 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry on Friday dismissed an Army brigadier general for his involvement in former President Yoon Suk Yeol's botched martial law bid.
The decision came after the defense minister held a committee meeting last week to decide on disciplinary action against seven general-level officers involved in the martial law bid on Dec. 3 last year.
On Friday, the ministry said two of them received "grave" disciplinary action. They included Army Brig. Gen. Lee Jae-sik, who was reportedly dismissed. The other, also an Army brigadier general, was reportedly demoted.
Lee served as the planning and coordination chief for the martial law command at the time of its declaration.
"In addition to the two individuals announced today, we plan to make further announcements once the process of notifying (the generals) of the disciplinary measures taken against them is complete," an official from the ministry said.
The other general-level officers include Kwak Jong-keun, former chief of the Army Special Warfare Command; Yeo In-hyung, former head of the Defense Counterintelligence Command; and Lee Jin-woo, former head of the Capital Defense Command. They are also expected to face hefty penalties from the committee.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back speaks during a policy briefing to President Lee Jae Myung at the defense ministry in Seoul, in this file photo taken Dec. 18, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
fairydust@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Jae-eun · December 26, 2025
6. Kim Jong Un highlights military agenda
Summary:
Kim Jong Un visited a munitions factory and directed expanded production capacity for missiles and artillery shells, plus modernization of military industrial facilities, KCNA reported December 26. He reviewed annual and fourth-quarter output, then ordered broader capacity growth and preparations to meet modernization and production targets expected to be set at the Ninth Party Congress, likely early next year. Kim said sustaining long-term missile and artillery force demand could require creating new military industrial enterprises. State media did not identify the site or visit date, but photos suggested Hwasong (KN-series) missile production and 240mm multiple-launch rocket artillery shells. The imagery appeared designed to warn South Korea while signaling potential Russia supply. KCNA also announced the death of senior protocol official Kim Chang Sun.
Comment: Who said Songun (military first politics) was over?
Kim Jong Un highlights military agenda
Posted December. 27, 2025 10:13,
Updated December. 27, 2025 10:13
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251227/6030694/1
Kim Jong Un, chairman of North Korea’s State Affairs Commission, visited a munitions factory and ordered an expansion of missile and artillery shell production capacity, along with the modernization of military industrial facilities, the Korean Central News Agency reported on Dec. 26. The visit came as Kim continues a series of military moves following the unveiling of a nuclear armed strategic ballistic missile submarine, or SSBN. The steps suggest an effort to raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula ahead of the Ninth Party Congress, which is expected early next year.
During his visit to a key military industrial enterprise, Kim was briefed on this year’s missile and artillery shell production results, as well as fourth quarter output conditions. He called for an expansion of what he described as overall production capacity. Kim said the missile and artillery shell sector occupies the most important position in strengthening war deterrence and stressed the need for thorough preparations to unconditionally accept and responsibly implement the modernization and production targets to be presented by the Ninth Party Congress. He also said that meeting the long term demand of the country’s missile and artillery forces would require establishing new military industrial enterprises in line with plans to be decided at the congress.
For a second consecutive day, North Korea did not disclose when Kim visited the munitions factory or where the facility is located. However, photographs released by state media suggest the site was a production plant for Hwasong series, or KN, missiles and 240 mm multiple launch rocket system artillery shells. By simultaneously showcasing KN series missiles and artillery shells capable of striking South Korea, Pyongyang appears to have sent overlapping messages. The display suggests both a direct warning toward South Korea and a signal of its willingness to supply artillery shells to Russia with the war in Ukraine in mind.
Meanwhile, the Korean Central News Agency reported the death of Kim Chang Sun, vice director of the State Affairs Commission, who handled protocol for the inter Korean summits in 2018 and 2019 and two North Korea U.S. summits. After Kim Jong Un came to power, Kim Chang Sun served as chief of staff overseeing protocol for the country’s top leader and his family. He was widely known as Kim’s “butler.”
Na-Ri Shin journari@donga.com
7. Philippines buys two South Korean frigates in $600 million deal
Comment: Partner in the Arsenal of democracies. (but remember it is three to make one)
Philippines buys two South Korean frigates in $600 million deal
Posted December. 27, 2025 10:14,
Updated December. 27, 2025 10:14
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251227/6030721/1
South Korea and the Philippines signed a contract on Dec. 26 to export two frigates worth about $600 million, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration said. The deal is part of the Philippine Navy’s second frigate acquisition project, which aims to modernize its fleet.
HD Hyundai Heavy Industries will build two advanced 3,200-ton frigates and deliver them to the Philippine Navy by 2029. The contract is valued at $578 million, or about 840 billion won.
The Defense Acquisition Program Administration described the agreement as a major achievement resulting from the government’s proactive defense sales diplomacy, as well as the technological capabilities and sustained efforts of domestic defense companies. It added that a commitment to continued defense cooperation, made at the South Korea-Philippines summit held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Gyeongju in October, helped propel the project forward.
In 2016, the Philippines decided to procure two frigates built by HD Hyundai Heavy Industries as part of its first frigate acquisition project. The two 2,600-ton Jose Rizal-class frigates were delivered in 2020 and 2021 and have since served as the backbone of the Philippine Navy’s maritime operations, the administration said. The Philippines later signed additional contracts with HD Hyundai Heavy Industries for a total of 10 vessels, including two patrol vessels in 2021 and six offshore patrol vessels in 2022. It has also decided on two occasions, in 2014 and again this year, to acquire a total of 24 South Korean-made FA-50 light attack aircraft, effectively making South Korean defense systems a core component of its armed forces.
Lee Yong-cheol, head of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, said the second frigate contract symbolizes the Philippine government’s strong and continued trust in South Korean defense technology. He added that the government plans to further expand defense cooperation with the Philippines, including in guided weapons and space-related fields.
Sang-Ho Yun ysh1005@donga.com
8. South Korea-U.S. nuclear submarine deal may progress
Summary:
Hanwha’s Alex Wong says a South Korea–U.S. nuclear-powered submarine agreement may advance faster than Australia’s AUKUS pathway because Seoul and Washington have aligned policy intent and overlapping interests. He argues the deal will not copy AUKUS, and could be simpler, including on securing reactor fuel, though enrichment and the fuel cycle remain key unresolved issues under discussion. Wong endorses a parallel construction concept: South Korea would build its own boats domestically, while U.S. submarines could be built at facilities such as Hanwha’s Philly Shipyard using the MASGA shipbuilding cooperation fund. He links the initiative to deterrence against regional threats and to countering China’s naval power, and says broader shipbuilding cooperation could expand from maintenance to joint production, potentially including combatants under the “Golden Fleet” concept.
Comment: Faster than AUKUS?
South Korea-U.S. nuclear submarine deal may progress
Posted December. 26, 2025 09:04,
Updated December. 26, 2025 09:21
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251226/6028846/1
“A South Korea-U.S. agreement on nuclear-powered submarines will not exactly mirror the AUKUS model, but in many ways it will be simpler,” said Alex Wong, global chief strategy officer of Hanwha Group, in an interview with The Dong-A Ilbo. "Political direction and policy intent are aligned between South Korea and the United States, and their interests coincide.”
Under the AUKUS pact, Australia previously agreed to receive nuclear-powered submarines from the United States and later signed a separate deal allowing the transfer of military-grade nuclear material. South Korea recently reached a separate agreement with the United States to pursue nuclear-powered submarines. Wong said Seoul could advance more quickly than Canberra in key steps, including securing nuclear fuel supplies.
On the so-called parallel South Korea-U.S. submarine construction plan, Wong described it as “a fully viable approach,” adding, “Hanwha is ready to execute it if the South Korea-U.S. governments decide to proceed.”
Under the plan, South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarines would be built domestically, while U.S. nuclear-powered submarines would be constructed at facilities such as Hanwha Philly Shipyard using the MASGA fund, a South Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation initiative.
Wong previously served as deputy national security adviser at the White House National Security Council during the early phase of Donald Trump’s second term, overseeing daily coordination of national security policy. During Trump’s first term, he was deputy special representative for North Korea policy at the U.S. State Department. He played a key role in North Korea-U.S. dialogue, including the 2019 leaders’ meeting at Panmunjom.
The interviews were conducted via video on Dec. 18 and in writing on Dec. 24, Eastern time.
Wong said, “The strongest binding force in international agreements comes when actions serve both sides’ interests. A nuclear submarine agreement benefits both South Korea and the United States.” He said South Korea could strengthen its military capabilities and enhance deterrence against potential aggression by acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. From the U.S. perspective, he emphasized that South Korea’s possession of nuclear submarines would strengthen allied capabilities and help maintain peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
Wong suggested that the Trump administration may have supported the move in part because South Korea’s nuclear submarines could help counter China’s naval power. The administration’s recently released National Security Strategy identified defending the First Island Chain and Taiwan from China as one of its core security objectives.
He said diplomatic consultations are ongoing between South Korea and U.S. authorities on detailed implementation measures to operationalize the nuclear submarine construction approved by President Trump, and he predicted the process would proceed more smoothly than in Australia’s case. Wong added that a key issue remains the nuclear fuel enrichment cycle, specifically how reactor fuel will be secured, and said the two governments are currently discussing possible implementation options.
Wong stressed that efforts to revive the U.S. shipbuilding industry are heavily influenced by security and strategic considerations. He said the United States has sought to maintain the world’s strongest navy for the past 70 years, and that sustaining and rebuilding the naval industrial base is tied to clear strategic and military interests. He added that the U.S. aims to preserve peace by strengthening key capabilities in coordination with allies such as South Korea and Japan. This suggests that South Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation is directly linked to U.S. national security concerns, including strategic competition with China, beyond purely economic or industrial factors.
Wong said the Trump second administration placed high value on South Korea’s shipbuilding industry for its advanced manufacturing technology, adherence to schedules, and production efficiency. He noted that South Korean shipyards, including Hanwha, already participate in maintenance, repair, and overhaul work for U.S. Navy vessels. He predicted that future cooperation could include producing noncombat vessels, joint production, and, in the long term, even the construction of combat ships.
Regarding legal constraints under current U.S. law, including the Byrnes-Tollefson Act, which restricts the overseas construction of U.S. naval vessels, Wong said discussions are ongoing across the U.S. government, the national security community, and Congress on where to draw the line. He suggested there may be indirect ways to address the issue.
He also commented on President Trump’s Dec. 22 announcement of the “Golden Fleet” construction plan, in which Trump specifically mentioned that frigate production would be pursued in cooperation with Hanwha. Wong said Hanwha has the expertise and capabilities to build any force element required by the U.S. Navy under the Golden Fleet initiative.
Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com
9. Lee to seek Beijing’s support on N. Korea, economic cooperation during January trip
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung is expected to use an early January trip to China to stabilize South Korea–China relations while seeking Beijing’s cooperation on the north Korea nuclear issue, sanctions, and pathways to restart U.S.–north Korea and inter-Korean dialogue. The visit would be Lee’s first to China since taking office and the first by a sitting South Korean president since 2019, following Xi Jinping’s late October trip to South Korea for APEC. Analysts frame the trip as pragmatic risk management: creating a more predictable external environment for South Korea’s economy, with a large business delegation expected and emphasis on selective cooperation in AI, biotech, green industries, and other high-tech sectors where supply chains remain intertwined. The agenda is complicated by unresolved frictions over West Sea issues and Seoul’s U.S.-backed nuclear-powered submarine plans.
Comment: Why would Xi want to support the ROK on north Korea?
Lee to seek Beijing’s support on N. Korea, economic cooperation during January trip
Text Size
Pri
By Alyssa Chen
- Published Dec 27, 2025 7:00 am KST
- Updated Dec 27, 2025 9:32 am KST
Lee Jae Myung’s anticipated trip to China in early January could provide a more predictable framework for South Korea-China ties, experts say
President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping drink Horangi draft yuja makgeolli at the gala dinner for the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leaders’ Meeting at the Lahan Select hotel in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Oct. 31. Yonhap
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is expected to seek common ground with Beijing on issues such as North Korea’s nuclear program and sanctions during his January trip, while also working to steady bilateral ties in hopes of creating a more predictable external environment for the country’s economy and businesses, according to experts.
Lee is set to visit China in early January, marking his first trip to the country since taking office in June. It is the first visit to China by a sitting South Korean president since Moon Jae-in attended the Korea-Japan-China summit in 2019.
The upcoming visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to South Korea in late October for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting — Xi’s first visit to Korea since 2014. Although details have yet to be announced by either side, a South Korean official said earlier that the two countries were in talks and more information would be made public shortly.
Raising further anticipation for Lee’s visit, South Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo held a strategic vice-ministerial dialogue with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu in Beijing last week.
The two officials discussed “mutual issues of interest, including the West Sea issue,” as well as “regional and international situations, including the Korean Peninsula,” according to the South Korean foreign ministry. Notably, this was the first such consultation since their last meeting in July of last year.
Experts said that during the upcoming trip, the Lee administration is likely to seek Beijing’s help in bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, as communication between the two Koreas remains at a standstill.
Niu Xiaoping, a Korean Peninsula specialist at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said that the exchange of visits by the two countries’ leaders within just three months underscores their commitment to deepening ties.
Prospects are also growing for a summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump — who last met in 2019 — on the occasion of Trump’s planned April visit to China for talks with Xi. Trump may seek to reengage with North Korea to secure a diplomatic victory ahead of the November midterm congressional elections.
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas in Panmunjom, South Korea, June 30, 2019. Yonhap-Reuters.
According to Niu, Seoul views Trump’s April visit as a critical moment that could shape the future trajectory of the Korean peninsula.
“Seoul is eager to reach a consensus with Beijing on key issues such as the North Korean nuclear program and sanctions, while also seeking China’s support and cooperation in facilitating U.S.-North Korea dialogue and inter-Korean talks,” she added.
Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, noted that Lee may use his trip to press China to take action on North Korea’s nuclear program, noting that the issue was absent from Beijing’s latest policy white paper and from Washington’s most recent National Security Strategy.
“President Lee may deliver a message to China, urging it to place greater focus on the issue of denuclearization,” he said. “However, Beijing is in a delicate position now. Pyongyang has declared itself a nuclear weapons state. Any push from China for denuclearization is likely to fall on deaf ears in Pyongyang. Even if China were to exert pressure, it would likely prove ineffective.”
Meanwhile, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification are at odds over their approach to North Korea. The Ministry of Unification advocates for a North Korea-focused, inter-Korean bilateral strategy, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prioritizes an international coordination framework led by the United States.
The unification ministry is not participating in the consultative talks between Seoul and Washington that commenced last week.
“Clarifying the priority of policy goals toward North Korea is a pressing issue [South] Korea needs to address, which would also enable better cooperation with China,” Niu said.
She added that visiting China before his confirmed Japan trip in mid-January demonstrated Lee’s balanced approach and avoided the perception of favoring Japan.
“It is possible that Lee hopes to act as a ‘mediator’ or ‘messenger,’ seeking a potential breakthrough for future trilateral cooperation,” she said.
Adding to the anticipation, major South Korean conglomerate leaders are expected to accompany Lee on his visit, with a business delegation of around 200 executives set to travel to Beijing. This marks the first South Korean business delegation to visit China since December 2019.
Liu Ziyang, a professor of global business at Kyonggi University, said that Lee’s subsequent visit to China could help solidify and institutionalize the political consensus achieved at the previous meeting.
“One of Lee’s core objectives for the China trip is to stabilize expectations in bilateral relations, so as to create a more predictable external environment for South Korea’s economy and businesses,” he added.
In the last meeting, Xi called for bilateral cooperation in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, biopharmaceuticals, green industries and the silver economy.
A television screen at a train station in Seoul shows a news broadcast of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Nov. 1. Yonhap-AFP.
Liu noted that cooperation in high-tech industries could become one of the most practical breakthroughs for China and South Korea, with both nations likely to pursue “selective cooperation under limited competition.”
“South Korea and China face both competition and strong complementarities in sectors such as semiconductors, new materials, artificial intelligence and life sciences. Their industrial supply chains have been deeply intertwined for years, making a complete ‘decoupling’ economically and technologically unrealistic,” he said.
He added that this type of high-tech collaboration is driven by industrial efficiency, technological advancement and market demand, making it a natural area for mutual cooperation that relies less on external conditions.
“Overall, this visit should be understood as a pragmatic, risk management-oriented initiative, helping to provide a more stable and predictable framework for South Korea-China ties,” Liu said.
Despite renewed diplomatic momentum, thorny issues remain, including Seoul’s U.S.-backed plan to build nuclear-powered submarines and Beijing’s expanding presence in the West Sea.
Progress is being made on the nuclear-powered submarine deal, as Seoul plans to equip its submarines with reactors using low-enriched fuel at levels of 20 percent or less. Korea and the U.S. have agreed to pursue a separate agreement to formalize the process, with working-level discussions scheduled for early next year.
In the North, Kim Jong-un recently made an on-site inspection of an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, which is currently under construction. According to the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency on Thursday, Kim called Seoul’s submarine plan an offensive act and a threat to North Korea, while vowing to strengthen its own nuclear submarine capabilities.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un conducts an on-site inspection of the nation's submarine under construction, in this photo released by Pyongyang's state-run Korean Central News Agency, Thursday. Yonhap
Kang noted that South Korea is a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is under strict oversight from international monitoring agencies, unlike some others.
“If Beijing takes a lenient or noncritical approach toward North Korea (on its nuclear-powered submarine) while directing criticism at South Korea, it would be unacceptable for Seoul,” he added.
Niu noted that if the nuclear-powered submarine issue and West Sea disputes are not effectively communicated and managed in advance, they could become triggers for tensions in China-South Korea relations.
Alyssa Chen is a reporter with the South China Morning Post. She is currently based in Seoul, writing for both The Korea Times and the South China Morning Post under an exchange program.
10. Finding a Trump–Kim Jong-un opening around an April U.S.–China summit will be key
Summary:
Koh Yu-hwan argues that north Korea’s expected Ninth Workers’ Party Congress, likely early 2026, will be a strategic inflection point that sets policy lines for five years. He contrasts Kim Jong-un’s effort to normalize party governance with Kim Jong-il’s irregular, military-first rule under economic strain. The congress may codify Pyongyang’s “two hostile states” line toward the South, clarify doctrine on war aims, and formalize a dual-track buildup of nuclear and conventional forces shaped by lessons from Ukraine and regional modernization. Koh says meaningful doctrinal change is unlikely without a shift in U.S. relations, but Pyongyang still appears to keep summit diplomacy alive. A potential opening, he concludes, could be a Trump–Kim meeting timed around a likely April U.S.–China leaders’ summit.
Comment: What are the odds? Why would KJU want to meet? What can he get out of a meeting? What are we willing to give him to give him the incentive to meet? Nothing I hope because if we give him concessions just for a meeting Kim will know his political warfare strategy is successful.
Finding a Trump–Kim Jong-un opening around an April U.S.–China summit will be key
Published: 26 Dec. 2025, 00:03
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-12-26/opinion/columns/Finding-a-TrumpKim-Jongun-opening-around-an-April-USChina-summit-will-be-key/2486596
Koh Yu-hwan
The author is an emeritus professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University and former director of the Institute for Unification Studies.
North Korea’s ninth Workers’ Party Congress, which Pyongyang has signaled will be held early next year, is expected to mark another inflection point on the Korean Peninsula. The party congress sets the broad contours of the country's strategic direction and domestic and foreign policies for the next five years. As the North remains a central security actor on the peninsula, the decisions adopted there could shape regional dynamics for years to come.
Kim Jong-un, chairman of North Korea’s State Affairs Commission, delivers the opening address at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang on Jan. 5, 2021, according to a report published the following day by the party’s official newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun. The paper said Kim took the podium at about 9 a.m. alongside members of the Political Bureau of the party’s Central Committee. [RODONG SINMUN/YONHAP]
North Korea defines itself as a form of “real socialism” in which the party comes first. Once the party decides, the state implements. Since the 1980s, however, the Workers’ Party has operated irregularly. Party rules under Kim Il Sung mandated a congress every five years, but after the sixth congress in 1980, North Korea failed to convene another for 36 years. Kim Il Sung’s instruction to raise living standards and proceed to a seventh congress was never realized. That goal referred to what propaganda described as the people’s long-cherished wish to eat white rice with meaty soup, wear silk clothes and live in tiled-roof houses, a stage equated with the “complete victory of socialism.” The third seven-year economic plan launched in 1987 collapsed, followed by the famine years known as the “Arduous March,” during which countless people died of hunger.
Economic hardship also shaped party governance under Kim Jong-il. His theory of the “sociopolitical organism” likened the leader to the brain and the party to the heart. Without regular congresses, that heart could not function properly. Kim Jong-il went so far as to criticize the party as an “aging” or “corpse” party and elevated the military through the doctrine of songun, or military-first politics. Major decisions were made through direct rule centered on close aides rather than party organs. Kim Jong-il’s reluctance to appear in public or deliver speeches contributed to perceptions of a reclusive style of governance.
By contrast, Kim Jong-un, who took power in his late 20s, has focused on restoring party functions and normalizing the party-state system. Since his ascent, party congresses and major meetings have largely followed the schedules set out in party rules and the constitution. North Korea labeled the eighth party congress in 2021 a “turning point.” Over the past five years, it has claimed achievements in strengthening party authority, advancing nuclear capabilities, promoting living standards through initiatives such as the “20×10 regional development policy,” and deepening alignment with China and Russia.
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Against this backdrop, the ninth party congress will be closely watched as a compass for North Korea’s ideological line, immediate goals and core policies for the next five years. A key question is whether Pyongyang will formally assess the initiatives launched after the eighth congress and introduce a revised guiding ideology that reflects shifting circumstances. Unlike Kim Jong-il, who sought to preserve his father’s legacy intact under the banner of governing by the final say, Kim Jong-un has shown a greater willingness to differentiate himself from his predecessors. Should his approach be articulated alongside that of his father and grandfather, it would signal a milestone in his bid to stand fully on his own.
Another focal point is how the party will codify policy changes toward the South and unification. In late 2023, Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations as those between “two hostile states.” That shift makes revisions unavoidable to party language that had described nationwide democratic development as an immediate objective. How Pyongyang addresses concepts such as occupying and incorporating South Korea in wartime, and its decision to abandon terms like "unification" and "reconciliation," will bear directly on the prospects of engagement pursued by the administration of Lee Jae Myung.
Security issues extending beyond the peninsula are also at stake. Kim Jong-un said during a September visit to a defense science institute that the ninth congress would present a line of pursuing nuclear forces and conventional forces in parallel. North Korea’s deployment of troops to the war in Ukraine exposed it to the battlefield impact of drones and other advanced conventional weapons. Seeing nuclear-armed Russia suffer territorial incursions likely reinforced the limits of nuclear deterrence alone. Korea’s growing conventional capabilities and closer integration with U.S. nuclear forces may further shape Pyongyang’s calculations. If North Korea accelerates advanced weapons development under a dual-track strategy, regional arms competition will intensify, as illustrated by its recent disclosure of an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered submarine project following Seoul’s renewed push for such vessels.
Other points to watch include how Pyongyang frames relations with longstanding adversaries such as the United States and Japan, and whether the party signals anything about succession, particularly regarding the leader's daughter, Ju-ae. Party rules set the minimum age for membership at 18, making it unlikely she will hold a formal post soon. Still, symbolic language could offer clues to future plans for the leadership.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and his daughter, Ju-ae, attend the inauguration ceremony for the Wonsan-Kalma coastal tourist zone on June 24 in this image provided by the state-run Korean Central Television on June 26. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION]
The supreme leader system thrives on crisis. From Pyongyang’s perspective, sustained hostility with Korea and the United States may reinforce regime stability. Fundamental shifts in party doctrine are therefore unlikely until relations with Washington change in ways that permit ideological recalibration. Reducing structural instability on the peninsula requires moving from the armistice to a peace regime. If U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision for peace and Kim Jong-un’s concept of two hostile states fail to find common ground, tensions are likely to rise further.
One encouraging sign is that Pyongyang has not abandoned hopes of improving ties with Washington. Even if the upcoming party congress adopts measures that heighten tension, a future course correction through a summit remains possible. That is why attention is likely to focus on whether a U.S.-North Korea summit could emerge around an expected U.S.-China leaders’ meeting next April.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
11. Progressives also call disinformation law unconstitutional
Summary:
South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party pushed through a revision to the Information and Communications Network Act, branded an “anti-disinformation law,” triggering backlash from conservatives and fractures inside the progressive bloc. Smaller progressive parties warned the standards for “public interest” harm are vague and could enable arbitrary suppression of criticism, urging President Lee Jae-myung to veto or return the bill. The measure authorizes punitive damages up to five times assessed harm against media outlets or YouTubers found to have intentionally spread fabricated or manipulated information, and allows Korea Communications Commission fines up to 10 billion won for repeat offenders after court rulings. The People Power Party calls it an unconstitutional gag order and plans court challenges. Some Democrats also abstained, citing dropped defamation reforms.
Comment: "Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must begin by subduing the freeness of speech." ―Silence Dogood, likely pseudonym of Benjamin Franklin.
World News Dec. 26, 2025 / 8:28 PM / Updated at 8:28 PM
Progressives also call disinformation law unconstitutional
By Asia Today
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/26/politics-information-communication-network-act/1501766753706/
1 of 4 | Jung Cheong-rae, leader of South Korea’s Democratic Party, speaks during his first news conference after taking office at the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 26. Photo by Asia Today
Dec. 26 (Asia Today) -- A controversial revision to South Korea's Information and Communications Network Act, driven through the National Assembly by the ruling Democratic Party, is facing a growing backlash not only from conservatives but also from within the broader progressive camp, with critics urging President Lee Jae-myung to exercise his veto.
The amendment, often dubbed the "anti-disinformation law," passed the Assembly on Dec. 24 as the Democratic Party leveraged its 170-seat majority. However, smaller progressive allies - including the Progressive Party, the Basic Income Party and the Social Democratic Party - either opposed the bill or abstained, warning that it could violate constitutional protections on freedom of expression.
"The criteria for judging what constitutes harm to the public interest are unclear," Sohn Sol, senior spokesperson for the Progressive Party, said in a statement on Wednesday. "There is a serious risk the law could be abused as a tool to arbitrarily suppress speech critical of those in power," she said, calling on the president to return the bill to the Assembly.
During the plenary vote, Progressive Party lawmaker Jung Hye-kyung voted against the bill, while Sohn abstained. Lawmakers Yong Hye-in of the Basic Income Party and Han Chang-min of the Social Democratic Party also cast abstentions. Even Park Joo-min, a Democratic Party lawmaker, abstained, later saying that key provisions he had championed - including the complete repeal of criminal defamation for statements of fact and changes to complaint-based prosecution - were not included in the final version.
The revised law allows courts to award punitive damages of up to five times the assessed harm against media outlets or YouTubers found to have intentionally disseminated fabricated or manipulated information. It also empowers the Korea Communications Commission to impose fines of up to 10 billion won ($7.7 million) on those who repeatedly distribute content ruled to be false by the courts. Supporters argue the measures are necessary to dismantle profit-driven fake news operations.
Despite criticism from both opposition parties and parts of the progressive bloc, the Democratic Party has held firm. Party leader Jung Cheong-rae said "irresponsible freedoms that fuel chaos and profit from malicious agitation cannot be left unchecked," while Supreme Council member Han Jun-ho dismissed warnings about chilled speech as "overblown."
The main opposition People Power Party said it would seek legal remedies, including filing a jurisdictional dispute with the Constitutional Court, calling the law "an unconstitutional gag order that suffocates liberal democracy." Floor leader Song Eon-seok urged President Lee to "immediately exercise his veto."
Attention has also turned to the Justice Innovation Party, which played a swing role in the legislative process. While the party initially pushed alternative proposals - including limits on punitive damages claims by public officials and repeal of criminal defamation for factual statements - those demands were not fully reflected. The party ultimately backed the Democratic Party's bill, citing future discussions on criminal law revisions, while securing amendments to strengthen defendants' rights for journalists and other targets of lawsuits.
--Copyright by Asiatoday
12. Korea moves to end overseas adoptions by 2029
Summary:
South Korea plans to largely end overseas adoptions by 2029, making intercountry placement an exception rather than a norm, and shifting adoption authority from private agencies to the state. The Health and Welfare Ministry approved a five-year “Third Basic Plan for Child Policy” that prioritizes domestic adoption and expands state control from placement decisions through post-adoption monitoring. Korea already moved toward a public adoption system in July, and it ratified the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption in October to tighten safeguards. The blueprint also restructures foster care under full state management, strengthens oversight of placements and facilities, expands family reunification support, and adds deeper reviews of child deaths amid abuse concerns.
Korea moves to end overseas adoptions by 2029
koreaherald.com · Park Han-na · December 26, 2025
https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10644273
Lee Myung-ok, pictured as a baby, was adopted by a family in Norway in 1972 at six months old. (Photo courtesy of Global Overseas Adoptees' Link)
The South Korean government is preparing to end overseas adoptions by 2029, shifting responsibility for adoption from private agencies to the state in a move officials say is aimed at strengthening child protection.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare said Friday it has approved a five-year child welfare blueprint, formally titled the Third Basic Plan for Child Policy, which prioritizes domestic adoption and charts a gradual end to overseas adoptions. The plan was endorsed by a government coordination committee chaired by the prime minister.
The scheme anchors the child welfare agenda of President Lee Jae Myung, who has described Korea’s history of overseas adoption as a national failure.
“The country once carried the shameful label of an exporter of children,” Lee said in October, pledging that the state would assume responsibility for adoptees.
Under the new framework, the government will oversee the entire adoption process, from placement decisions to post-adoption monitoring, with the Welfare Ministry acting as the central authority.
Overseas adoptions will be allowed only in exceptional cases, with procedures handled directly through coordination with foreign governments.
Korea formally shifted toward a public adoption system in July, transferring management from private agencies to central and local governments.
In October, it ratified the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, strengthening safeguards for children moved across borders.
The plan also overhauls foster care, moving child placements under full state management and recognizing foster families as a formal family category with expanded legal authority.
Provincial governments will be required to regularly assess foster homes, adoptive families and child care facilities, while support for reunification with biological families will be expanded.
In response to repeated child abuse deaths, the government will establish a special review body to conduct in depth analyses of fatal cases and is considering a broader system to examine the causes of all child deaths.
Beyond adoption, the plan broadens social support. Child allowances will be gradually extended to children under 13 by 2030, with additional payments for nonmetropolitan and depopulating regions.
The government also plans to introduce short-term parental leave, expand overnight community child care and broaden vaccination coverage.
Undocumented migrant children will be granted temporary residency through March 2028 to ensure access to education while officials study the introduction of universal birth registration.
Vice Health Minister Lee Seu-ran said the measures aim to establish a system in which children are treated as rights-holders and the state bears primary responsibility for their protection.
hnpark@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Park Han-na · December 26, 2025
13. [Wang Son-taek] New missions for Koreans in 2026
Summary:
Wang Son-taek argues South Korea should treat 2026 as a year of national upgrade, not mere recovery. He credits citizens and institutions for containing a 2025 constitutional crisis and weathering U.S. tariff shocks with restraint, but warns the underlying problems persist. He calls for deeper democratic safeguards beyond courtroom accountability, especially against abuse of power and misinformation. On economics, he says tariff pressure reflects structural U.S. politics and great power competition, so Korea needs integrated diplomacy, trade, and industrial strategy to improve competitiveness. He adds Lee Jae-myung’s “K-Initiative” as a bid for global standard-setting. All three require reducing polarization through restrained rhetoric, inclusive governance, and more constructive roles for scholars.
Comment: He omitted the most important mission: the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
[Wang Son-taek] New missions for Koreans in 2026
koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · December 25, 2025
https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10643454
As 2025 draws to a close, it is natural to offer respect and comfort to the people of South Korea. Internally, the country overcame an unprecedented constitutional crisis triggered by an insurrection attempt involving a sitting president. Externally, it navigated the shockwaves of US President Donald Trump’s aggressive tariff campaign with a degree of composure and strategic restraint. These outcomes were made possible not by chance, but by mature citizens and solid institutions.
However, to describe 2025 simply as a year “successfully overcome” would not be sufficient. The crises have not been fully resolved, and more importantly, they have left behind challenges that demand careful attention. South Korea still stands at a pivotal moment where hardship can either harden into stagnation or be transformed into an opportunity for national upgrade.
Before turning to the tasks, it is worth pausing to recognize the quiet strength shown by ordinary Koreans throughout 2025. In the face of political turmoil, social division and persistent uncertainty, most citizens chose patience, prudence and participation over frustration, panic and violence. There were almost no mass breakdowns of order, no retreat into institutional nihilism.
Civic norms prevailed. Courts functioned, elections retained legitimacy, markets avoided panic and daily life continued with remarkable resilience. This collective restraint and maturity deserve acknowledgment. Democracies do not survive solely because constitutions are well written; they survive because citizens choose, repeatedly, to uphold them even when trust in leaders falters.
Yet admiration alone is not enough. The first unfinished task lies in the aftermath of the insurrection crisis itself. Legal and judicial processes are ongoing, but accountability cannot be limited to courtroom outcomes. The deeper question concerns democratic resilience: how to redesign safeguards that prevent the abuse of power, how to reinforce checks that failed under pressure and how to address the social conditions that allowed misinformation and conspiracy narratives to spread so rapidly. The year 2026 must not be framed merely as a period of recovery, but as a moment for institutional recalibration.
A second major challenge concerns trade and industrial strategy. Korea’s response to the Trump administration’s tariff offensive has, so far, succeeded in preventing immediate damage. But stopping the bleeding is not the same as curing the disease. Tariff pressure is not a temporary anomaly; it reflects the structural convergence of US domestic politics and intensifying great-power competition.
The next round of negotiations is likely to be even more demanding. Korea’s objective must go beyond temporary relief. The true goal should be industrial improvement. Achieving this will require a full-spectrum national effort in which diplomacy, trade policy, and industrial strategy move in concert rather than in parallel silos.
A third national task should be added to this agenda: the pursuit of the K-Initiative. Proposed by President Lee Jae-myung, the initiative envisions Korea as a country that helps set global standards across multiple fields from technology and industry to governance, democracy, culture and social policy. In essence, it is a call for Korea to move beyond adaptation and toward leadership.
What makes the K-Initiative distinctive is its clarity: the ambition to share Korea’s experiences. That a country which stood among the world’s poorest just six decades ago can now aspire to become a global standard-setter is both remarkable and deeply symbolic. The K-Initiative is therefore not merely a policy slogan; it is an expression of national confidence shaped by historical experience. If pursued seriously, it can align democratic renewal, economic restructuring and global leadership into a single, forward-looking national project.
These tasks of strengthening democracy, restructuring its economic foundations and advancing the K-Initiative share a common prerequisite: the effective mobilization of national capacity. Here, Korea faces a critical obstacle. Political polarization has reached a level that significantly undermines collective action. A political culture that prioritizes demonization over persuasion and short-term factional gain over long-term national interest drains the country’s ability to respond coherently to complex challenges.
For Korea in 2026, therefore, the most urgent task is not rhetorical unity but the practical mitigation of political polarization. This is not a moral appeal but a strategic necessity. As long as polarization dominates public life, reforms will stall, negotiations will weaken and national energy will be wasted on internal conflict rather than external competition.
Several concrete steps are needed. First, political leaders must exercise restraint in their use of language. Extreme rhetoric that frames opponents as existential enemies may energize supporters in the short term, but it erodes trust and weakens governance over time. A broad social campaign emphasizing responsible political communication, which values accuracy, proportionality and respect, would help accommodate constructive competition among political groups while reducing perpetual confrontation.
Second, the government must demonstrate a commitment to inclusive governance. While close coordination with the ruling party is inevitable, systematic information sharing with opposition parties on major national issues is equally important. When opposition forces are treated solely as obstacles rather than stakeholders, policy becomes hostage to partisan conflict. The process of governance itself must convey a message of integration rather than exclusion.
Third, intellectuals and scholars must play a more active public role. Rather than siding with one political camp or another, they should help articulate long-term national direction and facilitate reasoned public debate during moments of controversy. Democracies are sustained not only by political competition, but by the presence of credible intermediaries who can translate complexity into shared understanding.
What made 2025 a remarkable year was the collective composure of the Korean people, grounded in the conviction that democracy is the backbone of the nation and that sovereignty ultimately resides with its citizens. What will define 2026 is whether that composure is rewarded with meaningful reform and strategic clarity. Many nations survive crises; fewer use them to change course. Korea is still standing at that crossroads.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · December 25, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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