Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"You can surmount the obstacles in your path if you are determined, courageous and hard-working. Never be faint-hearted. Be resolute, but never bitter."

– Ralph Bunche

"We must dissent from the indifference. We must dissent from the apathy. We must dissent from the fear, the hatred and the mistrust. We must dissent from a nation that has buried its head in the sand, waiting in vain for the needs of its poor, its elderly, and its sick to disappear and just blow away. We must dissent from a government that has left its young without jobs, education or hope. We must dissent from the poverty of vision and the absence of moral leadership. We must dissent because America can do better, because America has no choice but to do better."

– Thurgood Marshall

"I feel safe even in the midst of my enemies; for the truth is powerful and will prevail."

–Sojourner Truth

Note: I will be on overseas travel the next 5 days so my message timing will be erratic.

1. U.S. Strikes on Nigeria Targeted Islamic State Camps With Missile Barrage

2. Trump’s Claims About Nigeria Strike Belie a Complex Situation on the Ground

3. Zelensky to Meet Trump on Closing Gaps in Draft Peace Deal

4. Here’s What Is in the 20-Point Peace Plan for Ukraine

5. Saudi Arabia Strikes Yemeni Militia Backed by Rival Gulf Power U.A.E.

6. Opinion | Ukraine’s New Concessions for Peace

7. Chinese military simulated battles near Mexico, Cuba and Taiwan, CCTV report shows

8. Taiwan Opposition Starts Long-Shot Bid to Impeach President

9. Air Force abandons sweeping reoptimization as Army, Marines push forward with transformation efforts

10. Crisis Response as Deterrence: Strategizing the Use of Elite Capabilities to Deter Adversary Aggression

11. Frogmen and Fast Boats: The Future of Irregular Warfare in the Maritime Domain

12. A Deeply Flawed Military Strategy (Book Review)

13. Forging the Framework: Evolving Law, Policy, and Doctrine for the U.S. Military’s Domestic Response

14. Keeping the Marine Corps Amphibious

15. China: An Ally Waiting for Russia’s Defeat?

16. Why Russians haven't risen up to stop the Ukraine war

17. Archive Lawsuit Opens Vladimir Putin Memcons/Telcons

18. Thailand, Cambodia Agree Immediate Cease-Fire in Border Clashes

19. A Tiny Pacific Paradise Is Gaming the U.S.-China Rivalry Over Minerals

1. U.S. Strikes on Nigeria Targeted Islamic State Camps With Missile Barrage

Summary:

On Christmas Day, POTUS ordered missile strikes from a U.S. Navy warship in the Gulf of Guinea against two alleged Islamic State camps in northwest Nigeria. U.S. Africa Command said the attack used U.S. and Nigerian intelligence and killed multiple militants, while withholding operational details. POTUS framed the strike as protecting Nigerian Christians and called the violence “genocide,” a message echoed by Defense/War Secretary Pete Hegseth, who hinted at more action. Nigeria’s government pushed back, saying terrorists target all communities and warning against a sectarian framing. Analysts noted uncertainty about militant identities and said strikes may have limited effect without follow-on ground operations.

Comment: What is the effect we are trying to achieve? What is the political outcome- the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, sustain, and advance US interests?

U.S. Strikes on Nigeria Targeted Islamic State Camps With Missile Barrage

WSJ

The military said multiple militants had been killed in an attack that again showed President Trump’s focus on deterring violence against Christians

By Alexandra Wexler

, Marcus Weisgerber

and Nicholas Bariyo

Updated Dec. 26, 2025 3:52 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/nigeria-says-strikes-were-aimed-at-protecting-all-religions-not-just-christians-1b3676cf?mod=hp_lead_pos1

Nigerian police personnel securing the scene of an airstrike near the village of Jabo on Friday. Tunde Omolehin/Associated Press

The U.S. launched missile strikes from a Navy warship against two alleged Islamic State camps in Nigeria on Christmas Day, killing multiple militants.
The U.S. military echoed President Trump’s social-media statement that the strikes aimed to protect Nigeria’s Christian population from Islamic State.
The Nigerian government disputes claims that only Christians are targeted, stating that terrorist violence affects all communities.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

The U.S. launched missile strikes from a Navy warship against two alleged Islamic State camps in Nigeria on Christmas Day, killing multiple militants.

The Christmas Day attack in Nigeria ordered by President Trump targeted two alleged Islamic State camps with more than a dozen missiles fired from a U.S. Navy warship, killing multiple militants, according to a U.S. official and a Pentagon statement.

U.S. Africa Command, which conducted the strike, said it was directed at militants “in known ISIS camps” and used intelligence from U.S. and Nigerian forces. The command said it would continue to assess the results of the strikes but wouldn’t release operational details for security reasons.

The military echoed Trump’s social-media post Thursday that said the strikes aimed at protecting the country’s Christian population from Islamic State. Trump characterized the violence against Nigeria’s Christians as a “genocide” on Fox News Radio last month, and said the U.S. could go in “guns-a-blazing,” with the goal of wiping out Islamist militants.

“The President was clear last month: the killing of innocent Christians in Nigeria (and elsewhere) must end,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted on X after Trump’s announcement.

Hegseth indicated there could be additional military action. “More to come…”

The U.S. ship that fired the missiles was in the Gulf of Guinea off the coast of Nigeria, the U.S. official said.

On Friday, Nigerian authorities were adamant that the U.S. strikes weren’t aimed at protecting any particular religious group. The Nigerian government disputes that Christians are the only group being targeted, previously labeling the claims a “gross misrepresentation of the reality.”

“Terrorist violence in any form whether directed at Christians, Muslims, or other communities remains an affront to Nigeria’s values and to international peace and security,” a spokesman for Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

The statement contrasted with a social-media post by Trump, who wrote Thursday that he had “previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight there was.”

Islamic State has a foothold in the country’s restive north, where it has conducted attacks against both Muslims and Christians.

Andrew Lebovich, a researcher who studies militant groups in North Africa and the Sahel region at the Dutch think tank Clingendael, said northwest Nigeria is a base of operations for militant groups, some with ties to Islamic State, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. There aren’t many Christians in the area, he said.

“There’s a lot of ambiguity, at least in the public record, about who the militants are, where they’re even active, and who their affiliations are with,” Lebovich said.

Inside Nigeria, the northwest is known for its criminal gangs known locally as “bandits” who abduct children, churchgoers and others in exchange for ransom payments. The Nigerian government designated the bandits as terrorists under domestic law in January 2022, allowing increased use of the military against them.

Villagers in the Tambuwal area of Sokoto heard explosions late Thursday night, with a missile hitting farmland in a predominantly Muslim area and causing a fire. “We’ve never seen anything like this,” said Mainasara Mohammed, 40 years old, a resident of Jabo village, near one of the strikes.

A woman reading the Bible during a church service in Lagos, Nigeria. Violence has escalated against Christians in the north, and between Christians and Muslims in central Nigeria. Sunday Alamba/Associated Press

He said villagers rushed to the scene to pick up fragments of the missile before security agencies arrived. He wasn’t aware of any fatalities in the area.

Mainasara, a Muslim, said that militants are active in the area and that his village was attacked about six months ago.

Chidi Nwaonu, a Nigerian analyst at the U.K. risk-management firm Peccavi Consulting, said airstrikes could have a limited tactical effect on the relatively small contingent of Islamic State militants in Nigeria’s northwest, unless there is a coordinated ground campaign.

“These are lightly armed, highly mobile forces,” he said of the region’s militants. “They don’t need to hold ground; they can simply cache weapons and move.”

Analysts said Sokoto may have been targeted because of its strategic placement in the Sahel, the semiarid strip south of the Sahara, where Al Qaeda and Islamic State are conducting insurgencies. Washington spent hundreds of millions of dollars arming and training local militaries to battle those insurgents over the past decade.

Nigerian President Bola Tinubu—a Muslim married to a prominent Christian Pentecostal preacher—has been trying to persuade the U.S. and Trump that authorities are working to protect both Christian and Muslim Nigerians. Last month, the government declared a national “security emergency,” authorizing the police and army to recruit and train additional personnel.

Nigeria has a population of some 237 million people, roughly split between Muslims who are predominantly in the north, and Christians who are mostly in the south. Violence against Christians has escalated in northern Nigeria during the past decade, as Islamist extremists such as Boko Haram wage an insurgency against the country’s secular government and expand their influence in the region.

Newsletter Sign-up

What’s News

Catch up on the headlines, understand the news and make better decisions, free in your inbox daily. Enjoy a free article in every edition.

Boko Haram captured global attention in 2014 when it abducted 276 students from the Government Secondary School in Chibok, sparking the #BringBackOurGirls campaign on social media. The group is concentrated in the country’s northeast, where competition for territory with other extremist groups including Islamic State has turned the Lake Chad region, at the intersection of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, into a hotbed of jihadist activity, according to analysts.

In Nigeria’s central region, Christian farmers have been battling for years with a tribe of largely Muslim cattle herdsmen over dwindling natural resources. The result of these parallel conflicts is the widespread killing and abduction of both Christian and Muslim civilians.

Trump’s base within the U.S. Christian political right has been calling for the U.S. to take targeted action specifically against the killings of Christians in Nigeria.

“For Trump, this looks more like politics to appease his base,” said Bulama Bukarti, a Nigerian human-rights lawyer and security analyst.

Most people who live in northwest Nigeria are Muslims, who have generally suffered more than Christians from Islamic State attacks, he said. “To most Nigerians, this is a matter of life and death.”

Some Nigerians welcomed U.S. intervention, citing their own government’s failure to make headway against terrorism and banditry since the kidnapping of the Chibok girls more than a decade ago.

“Nigerian citizens will be happy with any help that is toward bringing to an end the persistent killings by bandits and terrorists,” said John Joseph Hayab, chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria. “May this collaboration not be a once-off activity, but should remain a continual activity until every terrorist is defeated in Nigeria.”

Write to Alexandra Wexler at alexandra.wexler@wsj.com and Nicholas Bariyo at nicholas.bariyo@wsj.com

WSJ

2. Trump’s Claims About Nigeria Strike Belie a Complex Situation on the Ground

Summary:

After U.S. strikes in northwestern Nigeria, POTUS said he hit Islamic State terrorists killing Christians. Analysts and local leaders argued the picture is more complex. Sokoto State is overwhelmingly Muslim, and monitors say Muslims bear much of the violence there; the bishop of Sokoto said the area does not face Christian persecution. Experts also dispute whether the “Lakurawa” militants in Sokoto are tied to Islamic State’s Sahel branch, with some calling evidence thin. Nigeria, while rejecting “Christian genocide” claims, cooperated and supplied intelligence, urging U.S. messaging not to hinge on religion. Damage assessments may take days.

Comment: It is going to take some effective explaining to the American people to understand the rationale for these strikes and what they are intended to accomplish. I expect to hear hints at "wag the dog."

Trump’s Claims About Nigeria Strike Belie a Complex Situation on the Ground

NY Times · Ismail Auwal · December 26, 2025

By Ruth Maclean Saikou Jammeh and Ismail Auwal

Ruth Maclean and Saikou Jammeh cover West and Central Africa. Ismail Auwal writes about northern Nigeria and reported from Jos, Nigeria.

Dec. 26, 2025

Updated 4:30 p.m. ET

President Trump said the targets of airstrikes in Nigeria were Islamic State terrorists responsible for killing Christians, but experts question his framing.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/26/world/africa/trump-isis-strikes-nigeria-christians-facts.html

President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Fla., on Monday. He said that the targets of Thursday’s strike on Sokoto State in Nigeria were members of the Islamic State.Credit...Eric Lee for The New York Times

Ruth Maclean and Saikou Jammeh cover West and Central Africa. Ismail Auwal writes about northern Nigeria and reported from Jos, Nigeria.

Dec. 26, 2025Updated 4:30 p.m. ET

After the U.S. military launched airstrikes on sites in northwestern Nigeria on Thursday, President Trump said the targets were Islamic State terrorists “who have been targeting and viciously killing, primarily, innocent Christians.”

But analysts say that the situation on the ground is more complicated.

Sokoto State, which was hit by more than 12 Tomahawk missiles Thursday night, is populated overwhelmingly by Muslims, who bear the brunt of terrorist attacks there, according to analysts and groups that monitor conflict. Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah of Sokoto said recently that the area does “not have a problem with persecution” of Christians.

And analysts are divided over the existence of ties between insurgent groups in Sokoto and the Islamic State.

Some analysts say that the violent attackers in Sokoto, who are colloquially known as the Lakurawa, have links to the Islamic State’s Sahel Province branch, which is mostly farther north and west, in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

The New York Times

But other analysts say evidence of those links is inconclusive, as the identity of the Lakurawa group remains very murky. Its militants have operated in Sokoto and other Nigerian states for years, winning popularity by fighting local bandits at first and then turning on the rural population.

Even as the Nigerian authorities have disputed Mr. Trump’s claims about a Christian “genocide,” they have chosen to respond to his threats by cooperating with his administration. Nigeria has taken the opportunity to use U.S. firepower against insurgents that have plagued rural communities in the country’s northwest.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Nigeria? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The Nigerian government made it clear on Friday that it was on board with the airstrikes.

“There’s general consensus that we are facing a major threat from terrorism,” Nigeria’s foreign minister, Yusuf Tuggar, said in an interview. “We need to do something fast to bring it to an end.” If that meant partnering with the United States or other countries to carry out strikes, he added, “We’ve always been receptive to that.”

After discussions between the U.S. Department of War and Nigeria’s Ministry of Defense, Mr. Tuggar said Secretary of State Marco Rubio called him on Thursday evening. They talked for 19 minutes, during which Mr. Tuggar emphasized that communications about the strikes should not “get bogged down on the issue of religion.” Then, he said he relayed the conversation to Nigeria’s president, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who approved the strikes.

Alkasim Abdulkadir, a spokesman for Mr. Tuggar, said that Nigeria had also provided American forces with intelligence for the airstrikes.

The strikes were “meant to deter further operations of bandits in that area,” Mr. Abdulkadir said. “Air power is something that they can’t fight against.”

Mr. Tuggar said that there may be further strikes, but only with Nigerian approval.

“It’s going to continue in the same format, and it’s going to be on a needs basis and based on the assessment of the two partners,” he said.

What the strikes immediately achieved is not clear, though reports emerged on Friday morning that one of the areas that was hit was the outskirts of Jabo, a town in Sokoto that analysts said was not known to harbor any terrorist or bandit groups.

A U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, said on Friday that the location of the strikes was so remote that it might take a few days before American analysts could assess any damage that strikes had caused.

Police officers in Nigeria securing the site of a U.S. airstrike in Jabo, Nigeria, on Friday.Credit...Tunde Omolehin/Associated Press

Shafi’u Aliyu Jabo, 35, a resident of Jabo, described in an interview hearing a strike in the middle of the night.

“We heard a booming sound like that of an aircraft, coming from the western part of the town and going east,” he said. “Then a sound like a siren, followed by a powerful air force that nearly shifted the roofs of our houses.”

He said that nearby residents, thinking an aircraft had crashed, rushed to a nearby farm, where they found pieces of ordnance. A farmer’s hut had been set on fire, but nobody was hurt, he said. He added that he did not know of any terrorist camps in the area.

Nigeria is home to hundreds of millions of Muslims and Christians, and Sokoto State is home to the sultan of Sokoto, the spiritual leader of Nigeria’s Muslim population.

Last month, Mr. Trump threatened to strike Nigeria or send troops there if the government did not “move fast” to stop what he has called a “genocide” against Christians in the country.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, is racked by widespread, complex violence against Muslims and Christians alike, and the Nigerian government has rejected Mr. Trump’s characterization. But it also sent a delegation to Washington to speak with American officials about security cooperation.

The strikes would be likely to resonate with some American Christians and political allies of Mr. Trump who have amplified the narrative that Christians in Nigeria are being singled out for persecution, analysts said. s

“Is the attack against ISIS in Nigeria connected to a broader counterterrorism campaign? Or are these strikes intended to assuage Christians in the United States that form part of the president’s base?” said Colin P. Clarke, executive director of the Soufan Center, an intelligence and consulting firm in New York, in an email to The New York Times.

“I’m all for combating ISIS in Africa, but the raison d’être shouldn’t be ideological or religious,” Mr. Clarke added. “The U.S. should be dismantling the ISIS threat in Africa because it poses a national security risk to American interests.”

Traffic into and out of Jabo on Friday.Credit...Tunde Omolehin/Associated Press

Still, some in Nigeria were puzzled by the choice to strike in Sokoto State.

Analysts say that the terrorist group in Nigeria with the best documented links to the Islamic State is in northeastern Nigeria, on the other side of the country from Sokoto State. That group, Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP, splintered off from Boko Haram, another jihadist group.

“If the bomb had been dropped in Sambisa Forest, nobody would be surprised,” said Kabir Adamu, an analyst with a private security consulting firm, referring to an area of northeastern Nigeria that was taken over by Boko Haram and later by ISWAP. “Because everybody kind of knows that’s one of the strongholds of the target group.”

Terrorist groups operating in the Sahel, an enormous region across north-central Africa, have recently been moving down into Nigeria’s northern border area and to neighboring coastal countries like Benin and Togo, analysts say.

The groups have been operating mainly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, turning the Sahel into a global terrorism hot spot responsible for over half of all terrorism-related deaths last year, according to the United Nations. Analysts say their encroachment farther south reflects an ambition to recruit and secure new logistical hubs.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Washington.

Ruth Maclean is the West Africa bureau chief for The Times, covering 25 countries including Nigeria, Congo, the countries in the Sahel region as well as Central Africa.

Saikou Jammeh is a reporter and researcher for The Times based in Dakar, Senegal.

NY Times · Ismail Auwal · December 26, 2025

3. Zelensky to Meet Trump on Closing Gaps in Draft Peace Deal

Summary:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says he will meet POTUS in Florida on Sunday to close remaining gaps in a U.S.-drafted peace framework for ending the war with Russia. Zelensky called the 20-point plan about 90 percent complete after weeks of talks between U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators, with input from Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Key disputes involve territorial arrangements in Donetsk, the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and the scope of security guarantees for Ukraine. Kyiv resists territorial concessions, citing constitutional limits, and seeks U.S. pressure if Moscow rejects the deal. Zelensky also says a referendum and elections could follow any agreement.

Comment: What comes next when Putin rejects the deal? Again, what is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will support, protect, and advance US and Ukrainian interests?

Zelensky to Meet Trump on Closing Gaps in Draft Peace Deal

WSJ

High level talks come after a flurry of U.S.-Ukraine negotiations, but Moscow remains a possible obstacle

By Anastasiia Malenko

Updated Dec. 26, 2025 12:34 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/zelensky-to-meet-trump-on-closing-gaps-in-draft-peace-deal-5f04c692?mod=hp_lead_pos2

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Trump at an August White House meeting with other world leaders. Alex Brandon/AP

Ukrainian President Zelensky said he plans to meet President Trump in Florida on Sunday to finalize a draft peace deal with Russia.
The 20-point peace plan is 90% complete, Zelensky said, with key disagreements remaining over the Donetsk region and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.
Ukraine would likely hold a referendum on territorial concessions and presidential elections if the deal is agreed to, potentially allowing online voting for citizens abroad.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Ukrainian President Zelensky said he plans to meet President Trump in Florida on Sunday to finalize a draft peace deal with Russia.

KYIV—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he plans to meet President Trump on Sunday in Florida, seeking to close remaining disagreements over a draft deal to end the full-scale war with Russia that has raged for nearly four years.

Zelensky has pushed for a summit with Trump to close the gaps that remain over the 20-point draft agreement and other elements of the peace agreement that are under discussion between the U.S. and Ukraine. A White House official confirmed that Trump is planning to meet with Zelensky on Sunday.

Ukrainian and U.S. negotiators have spent several weeks tweaking the plan for ending the war that was drafted by Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, with input from Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev.

The main sticking points are the future of the approximately 20% of Donetsk region that is controlled by Ukraine and Russia wants to be surrendered to it, the status of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant that is currently under Russian occupation, and the exact details of the security guarantees that Washington would provide for Ukraine.

“The 20-point plan we have been working on is 90% ready. Our task is to make sure that everything is 100% ready,” Zelensky said in an audio message shared with journalists via WhatsApp on Friday. “It isn’t easy, no one is saying that it will be 100% right away, but nevertheless, we must bring the desired result closer with every such meeting, every such conversation.”

It isn’t clear that Russia will accept the deal as negotiated between Kyiv and Washington. One of the key goals for Ukraine and its European allies is to persuade Trump that Russian President Vladimir Putin, rather than Zelensky, represents the real obstacle for peace.

Kyiv has resisted giving up Ukrainian territory in Donetsk, citing restrictions in its constitution. The U.S. is proposing a demilitarized “free economic zone” in the area. Zelensky has said he is ready to consider the idea if Russia also withdraws its forces from parts of the Donetsk region under its control.

The plan for a meeting with Trump came together after Zelensky said he spoke with Witkoff and Kushner for about an hour on Thursday. Dmitriev previously met them in Florida and relayed proposals to Putin.

Territory has emerged as the central stumbling block to a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. The initial U.S.-led proposal calls for Kyiv to surrender the “Fortress Belt,” the fortified strip of land that forms the backbone of the country’s defenses. Ukraine’s leaders cannot accept this. Illustration: Jason Boone

Zelensky said Ukraine hadn’t received the Kremlin’s reaction to the latest version of the deal but planned to communicate the need for increased pressure from the U.S., in case Russia resisted constructive engagement.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the Kremlin and the U.S. are closer to resolving the conflict in Ukraine, but that it would be inappropriate to set any deadlines, state news agency Tass reported on Friday. He said the plan discussed between the U.S. and Russia significantly differs from the plan publicized by Ukraine, according to the state news agency RIA Novosti.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday that the Kremlin agreed to continue talks with the U.S. after Dmitriev briefed Putin, according to Tass.

Zelensky said he was coordinating with European allies on Friday to determine the format of their involvement in Sunday’s meetings with the U.S., adding that their online participation was likely.

The draft agreement calls for a referendum in Ukraine on the territorial concessions, as well as presidential elections. The head of Zelensky’s parliamentary faction, David Arakhamia, said Friday that Ukraine is starting to prepare for such a vote, which could be carried out in person and online, to allow the participation of millions of Ukrainians abroad.

Write to Anastasiia Malenko at anastasiia.malenko@wsj.com

WSJ

4. Here’s What Is in the 20-Point Peace Plan for Ukraine

Summary:

Zelensky’s revised 20-point plan is a broad ceasefire-to-settlement blueprint negotiated with the United States and presented as Kyiv’s strongest push to end the war. Most points are reportedly agreed, especially security guarantees: an 800,000-strong peacetime Ukrainian force backed by Western funding, EU membership, and a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security pact approved by Congress, plus expanded European air, land, and sea support and monitoring of the line of contact. The hardest gaps are territory in Donetsk and control of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. The plan also outlines prisoner releases, post-deal elections, and an $800 billion reconstruction vision with a development fund, U.S. commercial roles, and minerals investment.

Comment: Again, what happens when this is rejected by Putin?

Here’s What Is in the 20-Point Peace Plan for Ukraine

NY Times · Constant Méheut · December 26, 2025

By Constant Méheut

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Published Dec. 24, 2025

Updated Dec. 26, 2025, 10:29 a.m. ET

The blueprint covers a broad range of issues, including territory, security guarantees and postwar reconstruction. But Russia has indicated little willingness to end the war.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/24/world/europe/what-is-in-the-20-point-ukraine-peace-plan.html

Ukrainian soldiers firing toward Russian targets in the Donetsk region in March.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Published Dec. 24, 2025Updated Dec. 26, 2025, 10:29 a.m. ET

Leer en español

A revised draft peace plan, unveiled this week by President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine after negotiations with the United States, has been portrayed by Kyiv as its best effort to end the war with Russia.

The 20 points included in the plan — which Mr. Zelensky said on Friday was “90 percent ready” — cover a broad range of issues, from the security guarantees Kyiv wants to prevent future Russian aggression to commitments to rebuild the war-ravaged nation. Mr. Zelensky acknowledged that Ukraine and the United States had yet to reach full agreement on territorial questions that have been the biggest sticking point in peace talks.

“Our goal is to bring everything to 100 percent,” he told reporters after announcing plans to travel to Florida for a meeting this weekend with President Trump. “That is not easy.”

Mr. Zelensky had said earlier in the week that the new draft was being presented by the United States to Russia. On Friday, he said Ukraine had no information on how proposed compromises offered by Ukraine were received by Moscow, which has shown little indication that it is willing to end the war.

Here’s what we know about the 20 points.

Here’s what you need to know:

What have Ukraine and the United States agreed on?

Most of the points, according to Mr. Zelensky.

The Ukrainian leader said he was especially pleased that Kyiv and Washington were largely in agreement on security guarantees to ensure that Russia does not invade Ukraine again. These guarantees would include maintaining a peacetime army of 800,000 troops funded by Western partners, as well as Ukraine’s membership in the European Union.

Mr. Zelensky wants the peace deal to include a precise date for Ukraine’s entry into the European Union, to make it a firm and concrete guarantee. But it remains uncertain whether the bloc will agree to identify such a date, given the complexity of its membership negotiations.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine speaking in Brussels last week.

The guarantees would also include a bilateral security agreement with the United States, voted on by Congress, as well as European military support to Ukraine’s defenses in the air, on land and at sea. Some European countries have said they are ready to deploy forces in Ukraine as part of this support package, though Russia has said it opposes any such troop presence.

Ukraine and the United States also agreed on a number of provisions to avoid a resumption of hostilities, such as a mechanism to monitor the line of contact. The draft plan also includes a commitment to release all prisoners of war and detained civilians, as well as to organize elections in Ukraine as soon as possible after a peace deal is signed.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia and Ukraine? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

What are the remaining sticking points?

The fate of Ukrainian-held territory in the eastern Donetsk region remains “the most complex point,” Mr. Zelensky said on Tuesday.

A previous peace proposal drafted by Russia and the United States called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the areas of Donetsk they currently hold and turn them into a neutral demilitarized zone. Kyiv rejected that option, saying it could not unilaterally cede land that Moscow had not captured.

Source: The Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (areas of control as of Dec. 8, 2025)

The compromise Mr. Zelensky outlined builds on the idea of creating a demilitarized zone in Donetsk but expands it to include not only areas vacated by Ukrainian forces but also Russian-controlled areas from which Moscow would pull its troops. A buffer zone overseen by international forces would separate the two sides within the demilitarized area.

“The Americans are trying to find a way for this to be ‘not a withdrawal,’ because we are against withdrawal,” Mr. Zelensky said. “They are looking for a demilitarized zone or a ‘free economic zone,’ meaning a format that could satisfy both sides.”

Another sticking point revolves around a Russian-occupied nuclear power plant in the southern Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine. It is Europe’s largest such plant, with a generation capacity of six gigawatts, and Kyiv says it needs it for its postwar reconstruction.

Mr. Zelensky said the United States had proposed that Washington, Kyiv and Moscow share control and profits from the plant. But he said Kyiv could not agree to trade energy with Moscow. He suggested a compromise in which the plant would operate as a joint venture between Kyiv and Washington, with the United States allowed to share its profits however it pleased. That suggested that Washington could separately strike a deal with Moscow.

On Friday, Mr. Zelensky told reporters that the “sensitive issues” — namely territory in eastern Ukraine and control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant — would be discussed in his meeting with Mr. Trump.

How could the United States profit?

Several points in the plan deal directly with America’s economic interests as part of a postwar settlement.

It envisions the creation of a “Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth sectors, including technology, data centers and artificial intelligence.” U.S. and Ukrainian companies would cooperate to support reconstruction projects, in areas including the energy sector.

The plan mentions the “extraction of minerals and natural resources” in Ukraine, something the Trump administration has made a priority for its economic interests in Ukraine.

A uranium mine in Neopalymivka, Ukraine.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

The plan says that “several funds will be established” to address Ukraine’s postwar recovery and reconstruction, with the ultimate goal of raising up to $800 billion. It says that “a leading global financial leader” will be appointed “to organize the implementation of the strategic recovery plan and to maximize opportunities for future prosperity.” That is most likely a reference to the American firm BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, which has recently been brought into the peace talks by the American side.

What has Russia said?

The Kremlin said that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia had been briefed about the negotiations. “We aim to formulate our future stance and resume our contacts shortly via the established channels currently in use,” the Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, said on Wednesday.

A spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said the following day that there had been “slow but steady progress” in negotiations with the United States. She did not provide further details.

Over the weekend, Moscow had poured cold water on the idea that a deal could be within reach. The Kremlin’s top foreign policy aide, Yuri Ushakov, called the latest U.S.-Ukrainian peace talks “rather unconstructive.”

The compromises offered by Ukraine on territorial arrangements and control of the nuclear plant are likely to be rejected by Russia. The Kremlin has repeatedly said that it aims for a full military takeover of Donetsk — whether achieved on the battlefield or at the negotiating table — and has dismissed any notion of returning the nuclear plant to Ukrainian control.

Cassandra Vinograd contributed reporting.

Constant Méheut reports on the war in Ukraine, including battlefield developments, attacks on civilian centers and how the war is affecting its people.

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 25, 2025, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Details Emerge of Draft Ukraine Peace Plan, but Putin Seems Unmoved

NY Times · Constant Méheut · December 26, 2025

5. Saudi Arabia Strikes Yemeni Militia Backed by Rival Gulf Power U.A.E.

Summary:

Saudi warplanes struck positions held by elite Yemeni forces aligned with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, sharpening a growing Saudi-UAE rivalry playing out through proxies. The strikes followed a Saudi demand that the STC pull its forces out of Hadramout, the oil-rich governorate bordering Saudi Arabia, after STC advances this month near the frontier. An STC official said the airstrikes caused no casualties and were intended as a warning to withdraw or face further action. The episode underscores the problem for Washington: two key U.S. partners backing competing factions in Yemen and Sudan. The escalation complicates POTUS’s effort to present Gulf relationships as the foundation for regional stabilization and peacemaking.

Comment: What is the escalation potential?

Saudi Arabia Strikes Yemeni Militia Backed by Rival Gulf Power U.A.E.

WSJ

Tensions between two U.S. allies heat up amid proxy conflicts in the region

Saleh al-Batati

Dec. 26, 2025 1:49 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-strikes-yemeni-militia-backed-by-rival-gulf-power-u-a-e-dcd02e91?mod=hp_lead_pos3

A rally for South Yemen independence in the southern port city of Aden, Yemen, on Thursday. Najeeb Mohamed/EPA/Shutterstock

Saudi warplanes struck a UAE-backed Yemeni militia, escalating tensions between the two Gulf powers over regional conflicts.
The strikes followed a Saudi demand for the Southern Transitional Council to withdraw forces from Hadramout governorate, bordering Saudi Arabia.
The U.S. faces challenges as its key Gulf partners, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, support rival factions in Yemen and Sudan.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Saudi warplanes struck a UAE-backed Yemeni militia, escalating tensions between the two Gulf powers over regional conflicts.

Saudi warplanes struck a Yemeni militia backed by the United Arab Emirates on Friday, as tensions between the two Gulf powers rise over their competing positions in conflicts around the region.

Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. are supporting rival factions in Sudan as well as in Yemen’s south. Tensions over Yemen have risen as forces aligned with the U.A.E.-backed Southern Transitional Council made significant gains this month, particularly in oil-rich areas near Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia.

On Friday, multiple airstrikes hit sites controlled by elite forces aligned with the STC, but caused no casualties, an STC official said. The strikes came a day after Riyadh told the STC to pull its forces out of Hadramout governorate, which borders the kingdom, said the official, who assessed that the strikes were meant as a warning to withdraw or face further military action.

The escalation in proxy fighting in Yemen as well as in Sudan, and the resulting tension between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., risks creating headaches for the Trump administration, which has invested heavily in relations with the Gulf powers. President Trump conducted a high-profile trip through the Gulf in the spring and welcomed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House last month.

The U.A.E. and Saudis are key security partners for the U.S. and important power brokers in conflicts around the region at a time when Trump is trying to establish himself as a peacemaker.

“A bedrock of the Trump administration’s policy in the Middle East is its close partnership with the Gulf states, particularly KSA and the U.A.E.,” said Adam Baron, a fellow at New America, using the initials for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. “Increasing tensions between the two will make this more difficult.”

In Yemen, the U.A.E.-backed STC controls most of the south, having outflanked Saudi-backed forces. The south itself is at odds with the Iran-backed Houthi militia, which controls most of northwestern Yemen, including the capital, San’a.

Saudi Arabia on Thursday criticized the STC for not coordinating its military moves with other constituencies in the south.

“These movements resulted in an unjustified escalation that harmed the interests of the Yemeni people,” the kingdom said.

The STC replied that it was acting to confront security threats and cut off smuggling routes used by the Houthis.

On his visit to the White House, the Saudi crown prince brought up the war in Sudan, where U.A.E. support for a rebel army has frustrated Saudi and U.S. officials alike. Trump said later on social media that he would work with Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to help mediate the conflict.

This week, U.A.E. foreign-policy adviser Anwar Gargash criticized what he called fierce campaigns against his country and denied the U.A.E. was driving events in Yemen or Sudan.

Appeared in the December 27, 2025, print edition as 'Saudi Arabia Strikes Militia in Yemen'.

WSJ

6. Opinion | Ukraine’s New Concessions for Peace

Summary:

Ukraine’s new peace posture signals a larger willingness to trade limited territorial adjustments for binding security guarantees, undercutting claims that Kyiv is blocking an end to the war. The framework discussed ahead of Zelensky’s planned Sunday meeting at Mar-a-Lago would create a demilitarized zone in Donetsk through reciprocal withdrawals, subject to Ukrainian voter approval. In return, Ukraine seeks Article 5-like guarantees, ideally explicit and U.S. Congress-backed, plus international monitoring forces. The plan would cap Ukraine’s military at 800,000 and keep open EU accession, while not foreclosing NATO. The editorial warns that guarantees must be concrete and resistant to Russian manipulation, including false-flag provocations, and argues Moscow remains the likely obstacle absent stronger pressure.

Comment: Will Putin accept these concessions or will such concessions embolden him and cause him to push for more? Or will accept now, bide his time, refit his forces, and then strike later? How effective will security guarantees be? More effective Budapest in 1993 I hope.

Opinion | Ukraine’s New Concessions for Peace

WSJ · Ukraine’s New Concessions for Peace

By The Editorial Board

Dec. 26, 2025 5:12 pm ET

Kyiv may cede territory in exchange for U.S. security guarantees.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-concessions-russia-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-98a2b5d4

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses a press conference in Kyiv, Ukraine, 22 December 2025. Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA/Shutterstock

Volodymyr Zelensky will travel to Mar-a-Lago Sunday to discuss the latest peace offer, and Ukraine’s President will come bearing more concessions. This shows again that Ukraine isn’t the obstacle to ending Vladimir Putin’s war.

The news is that, under a new U.S.-Ukraine framework accord, Kyiv may be willing to cede some land it holds in the east as part of a demilitarized front line. Ukraine had opposed giving up territory in Donetsk, where a fortified 31-mile defensive line has slowed Russian advances. But Mr. Zelensky is now saying Russia and Ukraine could both withdraw from some current positions as part of a demilitarized zone, provided it is approved by Ukrainian voters.

This is a major concession, especially given Russia’s repeated violations of the 2014 and 2015 Minsk cease-fire agreements. Mr. Putin used those fighting pauses to build up his military in Crimea and occupied Donetsk and Luhansk to prepare for his 2022 invasion.

Mr. Zelensky told the press before Christmas that, in return for Ukraine’s land concession, the West would offer Ukraine security guarantees akin to Article 5 in the NATO treaty. That’s the plank that says an attack on one is an attack on all and obliges a united response.

Details on these guarantees are said to be included in documents negotiated secretly between Ukraine and its allies. The details had better be explicit and firm, and in the case of the U.S. approved by a vote of Congress. Otherwise they won’t be worth much when Mr. Putin inevitably tests them.

These guarantees would be “considered void” if Ukraine “invades Russia or opens fire at Russian territory without provocation,” the Kyiv Independent reports. The Kremlin is notorious for its false-flag operations that blame Ukraine, and you can bet Russia will try to blow up a cease-fire with similar operations.

The framework also envisions international forces, presumably from a European coalition of the willing, at the front line to monitor and reinforce the peace. The framework doesn’t affirm a path toward NATO membership for Ukraine, but nothing released so far rules it out. It also nods at eventual Ukrainian accession to the European Union.

The framework would cap Ukraine’s military at 800,000—an improvement over the 600,000 in the earlier U.S. proposal. That’s as much as Ukraine’s population could sustain, but note that Russia would have no such limits. More important is that the West could arm Ukraine while Kyiv expands its arms production.

All of this is at least a plausible outline for a cease-fire, but Russia is unlikely to accept it. Russian commentators denounced it ahead of Christmas, and Mr. Putin’s holiday message included a nasty missile and drone barrage on Ukrainian civilians.

Mr. Trump told the New York Post on Frida that there’s a “good shot” of reaching an agreement on Sunday. But that will mean persuading Mr. Putin that Mr. Trump won’t let the Russian win at the negotiating table what he hasn’t been able to win on the battlefield.

Journal Editorial Report: The NATO Secretary General’s stark warning to Europe.

Appeared in the December 27, 2025, print edition as 'Ukraine’s New Concessions for Peace'.

WSJ · Ukraine’s New Concessions for Peace

7. Chinese military simulated battles near Mexico, Cuba and Taiwan, CCTV report shows

Summary:

CCTV footage from a PLA wargaming event in Xuchang, Henan, briefly showed simulated conflict scenarios far beyond China’s near seas, including screens depicting red and blue forces maneuvering near Cuba, Mexico, and the Gulf of Mexico, alongside scenarios focused on Taiwan and the Sea of Okhotsk. In PLA exercises, “red” typically represents Chinese forces and “blue” the opposing side, so the Latin America vignette stood out as a rare on-air glimpse of planners modeling operations close to U.S. territory. The report suggested the PLA is refining low-cost, repeatable, multi-domain simulation systems rather than revealing specific operational plans.

Comment: Deliberate leak to send a message?

As an aside, when I accompanied 15 National War College students to China in 2011 we were able to observe their equivalent of the Battle Command Training System in the 5th Armored Bde northwest of Beijing. On their computer screen we observed blue rectangles and red diamonds. Sure enough the Chinese "friendly forces" were the red diamonds, and the "enemy forces" were the blue rectangles. The computer program being projected looked uncannily similar to ours.

China’s military drills

China Military

Chinese military simulated battles near Mexico, Cuba and Taiwan, CCTV report shows

Rare insight revealed on state television in footage from a PLA wargaming event in central China where dozens of systems were demonstrated

Liu Zhen

Published: 8:02pm, 24 Dec 2025

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3337652/chinese-military-simulated-battles-near-mexico-cuba-and-taiwan-cctv-report-shows

Liu Zhen

Published: 8:02pm, 24 Dec 2025

The Chinese military has simulated battles near Mexico and Cuba during a wargaming exercise – a rare insight revealed in a report on state television.

Cuba, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, along with the Sea of Okhotsk and Taiwan, were among the locations of conflict scenarios visible on screens in a CCTV report on Friday showing People’s Liberation Army wargaming exercises.

Despite closer economic ties with countries in the region, China has a minimal military presence in Latin America. But the fact that the PLA is modelling potential conflicts there suggests a shift in the Chinese military’s global ambitions.

One screen in the report showed red and blue opposing unit “indicators” – represented by aircraft and ships – manoeuvring near the coasts of Cuba and Mexico. Some of the blue side congregated near Houston, Texas, and headed southeast into the Gulf of Mexico, while the red side was seen in the Caribbean Sea.

In a typical PLA drill, the red side usually represents the Chinese military while the blue side is the enemy.

China reveals radio communications heard before mid-air stand-off with Japanese fighters

During the CCTV report, a close-up focused on Cuba showed the lines of trajectory of aircraft and ships in the region in what was likely a simulation of a tactical operation. Chinese researchers were seen pointing to the screen and discussing the situation.

The footage was recorded at a PLA wargaming event held in Xuchang, Henan province, which was attended by 20 units from across the military and its academies. Dozens of simulation systems were demonstrated – all of them developed in China.

The report did not provide further information about any of the conflict scenarios.

In another map seen in the report, the red side was shown clustered near Russia’s far eastern coast while blue indicators were positioned over Hokkaido in Japan and the disputed Kuril Islands.

Taiwan also featured at the centre of a map in one of the wargaming systems shown in the report.

Beijing sees the self-governed island as part of China, to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the United States, do not see Taiwan as an independent state, but many oppose any forcible change to the status quo. Washington is also committed to supplying Taiwan with weapons for its defence.

With tensions rising in the region in recent years, the PLA has held frequent exercises around Taiwan and also conducted joint training with Russia in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.

The Chinese and Russian air forces held a joint patrol earlier this month, with two Russian Tu-95 bombers flying across the Sea of Japan to join two Chinese H-6 bombers over the East China Sea.

That came after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi enraged Beijing by suggesting last month that Japan could intervene militarily in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Why have Takaichi’s Taiwan comments sent China-Japan ties into a tailspin?

The CCTV report also showed the PLA simulating an air battle between Chinese J-16 fighters and French-made Rafale fighter jets.

Details of PLA war games are rarely revealed – they are usually highly classified.

According to the CCTV report, the wargaming event aimed to “help commanders learn how to fight without engaging in actual combat by creating a low-cost, immersive and repeatable adversarial environment”.

It said the PLA’s wargaming systems covered land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic domains, with integrated cutting-edge technologies such as AI-powered models, big data analytics and real-time simulation engines.

Liu Zhen

Liu Zhen joined the Post in 2015 as a reporter on the China desk. She previously worked with Reuters in Beijing.

8. Taiwan Opposition Starts Long-Shot Bid to Impeach President

Summary:

Taiwan’s Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party lawmakers have launched impeachment proceedings against President Lai Ching-te, scheduling a vote for May 19, 2026. The move is widely seen as symbolic because the opposition bloc lacks the two-thirds legislative threshold required to advance impeachment. The fight reflects a broader post-2024 standoff: Lai’s DPP holds the presidency but lost the legislature, and the opposition has used its majority to block budgets and pass bills the Presidential Office calls unconstitutional. The stated trigger is Lai’s refusal to sign an amendment shifting more central revenue to local governments, many KMT-led. Even if it advanced, court hurdles remain.

Comment: Domestic politics, yes. But internal political instability could be used by the PRC/CCP to justify actions.

Taiwan Opposition Starts Long-Shot Bid to Impeach President

Lai Ching-tePhotographer: Daniel Ceng/Anadolu/Getty Images

By Yian Lee

December 25, 2025 at 11:20 PM EST

Updated on December 26, 2025 at 4:07 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-26/taiwan-opposition-starts-long-shot-bid-to-impeach-president-lai?sref=hhjZtX76

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

Taiwan’s opposition lawmakers have begun the process of impeaching President Lai Ching-te, a bid that is almost certain to fail because they lack the votes needed.
The impeachment push reflects broader tensions between Lai and the opposition over issues ranging from relations with China and how tax funds are spent to calls for reforms of institutions.
The opposition says it wants to impeach Lai because his government refused to sign off on an amendment that would shift more fiscal revenue to city and county governments.

Taiwan’s opposition lawmakers have begun the process of impeaching President Lai Ching-te – a bid that is almost certain to fail because they lack the votes needed to see it through.

Lawmakers from the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party said Friday that they will hold an impeachment vote on May 19. While the two parties together control a majority in parliament, they fall short of the two-thirds support required for the effort to move forward, making it likely to stall at that stage.

The impeachment push reflects broader tensions between Lai and the opposition over issues ranging from relations with China and how tax funds are spent to calls for reforms of institutions such as the judiciary. Lai, who favors a tougher approach toward Beijing, won the presidency in 2024, but his Democratic Progressive Party lost control of the legislature.

Since then, opposition lawmakers have used their majority to block or delay government bills — including a record special military budget proposed in November — and pass legislation the Presidential Office says is unconstitutional. In turn, Lai’s administration has resisted implementing several opposition-backed measures, accusing lawmakers of abusing their power. Despite the standoff, Taiwan’s government has continued to function largely as normal.

The opposition says it wants to impeach Lai because his government refused to sign off on an amendment it passed that would shift more fiscal revenue to city and county governments, many of which are controlled by the KMT. Lawmakers accused him of violating constitutional checks on presidential power.

Presidential Office spokesperson Karen Kuo said before the date for the impeachment vote was set that the office respects the opposition’s move as long as it is “lawful, constitutional and procedurally sound.”

Long Odds

Even if the impeachment were to somehow clear the legislature, it would still face long adds at the Constitutional Court. All of the sitting grand justices were appointed by former President Tsai Ing-wen, who’s from Lai’s party.

The Constitutional Court recently struck down an amendment passed by opposition that had effectively frozen its operations, allowing it to resume operations. On Friday, Taiwan’s cabinet said it will seek the court’s review of pension bills passed by the lawmakers.

Unlike the budget standoffs in the US that can lead to government shutdowns, Taiwan has so far continued to operate largely as normal despite Lai’s tussles with the opposition. He is still expected to press ahead with his agenda, including the military spending plan announced earlier this year.

No Taiwan president has been impeached since the archipelago shifted to a democracy in the 1990s.

9. Air Force abandons sweeping reoptimization as Army, Marines push forward with transformation efforts

Summary:

In 2025, the Air Force reversed course on “reoptimization,” shelving more than half of the Kendall-era reforms as Secretary Troy Meink argued the scope would be overly disruptive and would fuel change-fatigue. The service dropped plans such as separate Air Base Wings and a new Integrated Capabilities Command, instead folding requirements work into A5/7 (Air Force Futures) by April 1, 2026, while keeping select reforms like cyber and IT warrant officers. In contrast, the Marines continued Force Design, expanding littoral concepts and modernizing air command-and-control while shifting acquisition toward capability portfolios. The Army accelerated a similar portfolio approach and emphasized right-to-repair in contracts, even as Congress stripped statutory provisions after industry pushback.

Comment: Are we in the interwar years as some have said? Is it the 1930s and Plan Orange or the 1980s and Airland Battle? Can we have the best of both?

Air Force abandons sweeping reoptimization as Army, Marines push forward with transformation efforts

This year the Army has embarked on one of its biggest transformations in decades, while the Air Force dropped most of its sweeping plans.

Anastasia ObisDecember 24, 2025 3:42 pm

5 min read

https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2025/12/air-force-abandons-sweeping-reoptimization-as-army-marines-push-forward-with-transformation-efforts/

The year 2025 has been transformational for the Defense Department. The Air Force scrapped most of its sweeping reoptimization initiative announced under previous leadership, while the Army undertook one of its most significant acquisition and organizational reform efforts in decades.

Air force drops Biden-era reoptimization efforts

Months after pausing its sweeping reoptimization initiative launched under former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, the service announced earlier this month that it would abandon more than half of its sweeping efforts. The proposed changes under the previous leadership were enormous in scope, spanning acquisition, recruiting, training and the management processes that deliver support services.

When Kendall announced the changes in 2023, he said it had “become clear to the entire senior leadership team” that the service was not well positioned for great power competition after spending more than two decades supporting post-9/11 conflicts and demands.

Meanwhile, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said some of the most sweeping reorganization efforts would be too disruptive.

Join us Jan. 26 for Federal News Network's Industry Exchange Cyber event for an in-depth look at the latest strategies, tools and technologies helping federal agencies stay cyber-ready. Register today!

For example, the Air Force announced it would create a new Air Base Wing organizational model under the sweeping reoptimization effort. The idea was to establish separate Air Base Wings with their own command structures to allow Combat Wings to focus solely on training and warfighting.

Meink said the decision to abandon these plans was made to “minimize change-fatigue to Airmen and enable commanders to concentrate on readiness, lethality, and mission accomplishment.”

Perhaps most notably, the Air Force scrapped plans to stand up a new Integrated Capabilities Command that would have overseen the service’s requirements process. A provisional version of the command was stood up a year ago, and functioned as the primary organization overseeing requirements for purchasing weapons. Instead, the leadership will fold its functions into the Air Force Futures, known as A5/7 by April 1, 2026.

One of the most popular changes, to bring back warrant officers within the cyber and information technology professions, will remain. For decades, the Air Force was the only service without warrant officers.

Meanwhile, the Space Force will continue implementing key elements of re-optimization efforts that were specific to the service.

Marine Corps Force Design update

The service kicked off its major “Force Design 2030” initiative in 2020 to better align itself with the National Defense Strategy and redesign its force for naval expeditionary warfare. The 10-year initiative is now simply known as “Force Design,” and while the service is still on track with the effort, budget uncertainty could affect the service’s ability to meet the initiative’s critical milestones, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith said earlier this year.

In its 2025 Force Design update, released in October after the service skipped a public update in 2024, the Marine Corps said it continues to stand up Marine Littoral Regiments — specialized units within the Marine Corps that are designed to operate in contested coastal areas.

The Corps is extending many of the advanced capabilities fielded in those regiments — including the air defense system, resilient command-and-control systems, unmanned platforms and advanced sensors — across Marine Expeditionary Units.

“This modernization strengthens the MEU’s role as a versatile, multi-domain naval expeditionary force from the sea, able to project power, seize and hold key maritime terrain, sense and make sense of the operating environment, integrate with the fleet, and directly contribute to joint kill webs,” the Force Design update reads.

In addition, the service is undertaking what it calls the most significant modernization of its Marine Air Command and Control System in a generation, merging legacy air support and air defense functions and reorganizing Marine Air Control Groups so Marines can be trained and employed in multiple roles within Marine Air Operations Centers.

The Corps is also embracing the idea of managing the acquisition system as portfolios of capabilities rather than individual programs. One example is the new capability portfolio approach in Program Executive Officer Land Systems, which will give a program responsibility for a suite of programs under a common capability area. Marine leaders say the shift will allow multiple systems to be developed and fielded together, with continuous input from the Fleet Marine Force, instead of advancing programs in isolation with a primary focus on cost.

The service’s Force Design sparked a great deal of debate, with critics arguing that the changes would weaken the Marine Corps as a combined arms force due to its divestments in armor, artillery, and aviation capabilities, limit its ground mobility and that the Marines would be less capable fighting in urban environments.

Army Transformation Initiative

Shifting away from managing individual programs to a portfolio-based structure is a big part of the Army’s transformation initiative announced in May. Stan Soloway, president and CEO of Celero Strategies and federal acquisition expert, said the move is a continuation of what the service has already been doing and “maybe somewhat of an acceleration.”

“There’s nothing radical about it,” Soloway told Federal News Network.

But Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s move to require the Army to include right-to-repair provisions in all new and existing contracts to cut costs and reduce delays caused by relying on original manufacturers for maintenance and support “might be one of the most important lines on the whole memo,” he said.

“In many ways, it is one of the huge issues they have to deal with,” Soloway said.

Commentary

Crisis Response as Deterrence: Strategizing the Use of Elite Capabilities to Deter Adversary Aggression

This commentary argues that crisis response (CR)—an irregular warfare specialization executed by elite forces—can function as a strategic instrument of deterrence. Drawing on the logic of coercion and deterrence (Clausewitz; Schelling), it examines how rapid, precise operations shape adversary perceptions by exposing vulnerabilities and signaling credible, repeatable capability without provoking escalation. Hostage rescue in denied areas illustrates CR’s fungibility: the same intelligence, access, and precision required for recovery can generate wider strategic effects. Applied to the PRC–Taiwan scenario, CR complements forward posture and allied integration by imposing uncertainty on Beijing’s timelines, resources, and domestic stability. The result is a scalable framework in which crisis response extends deterrence through agility, adaptability, and cognitive advantage short of war.

Spencer Meredith

Published

4 days ago

https://interpopulum.org/crisis-response-as-deterrence-strategizing-the-use-of-elite-capabilities-to-deter-adversary-aggression/

The potential People’s Republic of China (PRC) takeover of Taiwan includes a full spectrum of military and non-military options. Yet the capabilities to do so are secondary to the will of China’s Communist leaders to accomplish it. Given the tyranny of distance that limits U.S. and partner access and resupply, the timing of crises inside the first island chain remains decidedly in Beijing’s sphere of influence. To counter China’s preponderance of initiative and momentum emanating from the mainland, the United States and its partners have been expanding resources and operational applications to slow, if not deny, a hostile takeover. The goal is to influence adversary decision-making before needing to defeat adversary forces through combat.

Foremost have been service-specific approaches supporting the theater commander, ranging from shipbuilding and expanded air and maritime freedom-of-navigation operations[1] to offensive space and cyber capabilities.[2] Irregular warfare activities are also increasing to build and sustain resistance in the area[3] and to expose and exploit adversary vulnerabilities.[4] All told, Joint Force efforts to increase multi-domain capabilities have the potential to counter the growing threat from China. However, applying that capability within the adversary’s decision space requires more than manpower and materiel; it requires intellectual overmatch to defeat the adversary’s strategy. The Joint Force can draw on a wealth of lessons learned from the Cold War and twenty years of counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN)—to say nothing of the growing evidence from the large-scale “battle lab” in Ukraine. Yet little research has examined the potential for crisis response (CR), as an irregular-warfare specialization, to support strategic-deterrence efforts.

Crisis response spans both military and non-military actions. In the broadest sense, it entails the management of unexpected or intense events that threaten to overwhelm the normal functions of the system facing the crisis. State and societal responses depend as much on resilience built prior to crisis as they do on adaptability to respond decisively during it. This requires the ability to understand conditions accurately enough to apply processes previously proven effective under similar circumstances. For this capability to extend beyond the limits of the crisis itself, response thinking must also be strategic—able to see through the crisis to the core interests at stake. Employing a crisis response to communicate a threat to an adversary elevates it to the level of strategic coercion—the most complex and difficult of statecraft endeavors.

To lay out a possible pathway for crisis response to serve as a strategic force multiplier, this article focuses on the core logic of strategic coercion, of which deterrence is one element. It then analyzes CR as a means of supporting strategy before addressing the potential for applying elite military crisis-response capabilities to deterring China’s aggression against Taiwan.

Deterrence Is More Difficult Than It Appears

Carl von Clausewitz, the high priest of Western warfare, understood that power and initiative shape comparative advantage.[5] To weaken an adversary’s relative strengths, indirect measures can succeed so long as they do not disproportionately decrease one’s own. As a result, finding asymmetries that gain more in success than they cost in failure remains a hallmark of effective statecraft before, during, and after conflict. Those responsible for identifying and exploiting such advantages must retain boldness, both as a personal trait and as a product of education that cultivates critical and creative thinking under duress.[6] Under clandestine conditions, elite military units can afford to risk more for higher-payoff targets given the advantages of speed, surprise, and violence of action.[7]

For these small-scale operations to achieve coercive influence, they must carry over into the cognitive dimension of adversary decision-making and thus verge into strategic thinking as much as operations to shape it.[8] Deterrence, as a form of coercion, hinges on understanding adversary decision processes, which in turn relies on deep knowledge of the values and behavioral norms shaping their interests, actions, and reactions. As a central element of decision-making, risk propensity defines the willingness to endure costs for favorable benefits. Outside actors can force what would otherwise be undesirable actions more easily in areas of asymmetry, since these carry lower risks with larger margins of error that do not threaten core capabilities.[9] However, adversaries can also maintain and actively work toward generating alternatives that either balance coercive threats or supplant them through other means.

As Freedman points out, adversaries therefore possess agency within limitations—what they intend to do runs up against what they can do, both of which are influenced by their opponents.[10] The shared dynamic of inescapable constraints persists until one side can no longer participate, either through defeat or capitulation. The key to winning is to make the adversary think that victory is not possible, even if it may still be possible in reality.

Consequently, strategy becomes the exercise of coercion and counter-coercion played out across time and space with resources that are both critical for one’s side and vulnerable to the other’s predations. Influencing these kinds of relational opportunities and constraints defines coercion, which Schelling prioritized as some combination of “hurting” and “bargaining.”[11] At the core lies the anticipation of pain, which can motivate the other side to seek redress while it still retains the choice to avoid more undesirable consequences. Strength to resist can thus still be found at the bargaining table, even as it can conversely be lost through fighting what becomes a lost cause. Key to successful coercion is the ability to marry active violence to the potential for future violence should the opponent fail to relent. Recognizing that participants in conflict play multiple “variable-sum games”—such that they do not have singular, homogenized interests, preferences, or values[12]—coercion spans the power to hurt as a direct incentive and the power to deny as an indirect incentive to yield.

Throughout this strategic dialogue, successful coercion is fraught with dangers of escalation that each side seeks to manage. As the space for anticipated victory shrinks, either due to adversary actions or weakness within one’s side, the incentives to escalate increase. Kahn identifies principal ways this can compound actions and targets, widen areas under threat, and/or increase the intensity of language, actions, and actors.[13] Accordingly, a threatening act—either direct or implied—that is limited, isolated, or discrete can increase the likelihood of coercion working, because it leaves room for the adversary to offer a modicum of capitulation without fully surrendering existential interests.[14]

Herein lies the essential role of crisis response in supporting deterrence. By revealing a capability that can impose greater pain on the adversary than the isolated action itself, it can increase coercive effects with an ability that can be applied to other areas of greater significance. While the selection of targets remains concealed, the potential pain of CR activities is fungible. This expands the types and relative weight of signaling to threaten and, if needed, force the adversary into more painful circumstances. As per Clausewitz, given their limited, isolated, and discrete nature, CR capabilities threaten horizontal escalation across comparable vulnerabilities while avoiding the vertical risk so often associated with nuclear deterrence that threatens core interests. CR threatens the adversary indirectly because it does not require a specific demand; instead, it exposes a weakness that the action exploits to achieve its operational goals. By doing so, CR reinforces its coercive potential by incentivizing the adversary to react in a limited way rather than ratcheting the conflict. Thus, by raising the risks on other types of vulnerabilities rather than just a single set of targets, CR activities present a dilemma that forces the adversary into reactive decision-making, thereby taking away the initiative as a key source of power.

However, to maximize that coercive potential, crisis response must first connect what is inherently indirect to direct strategic messaging. This requires the adversary to perceive accurately and understand the leap from the crisis response itself to something more significant threatened by the capabilities being applied elsewhere. One particular activity that utilizes elite military crisis response in such a fungible way is hostage rescue in a denied area.

Hostage Rescue as Strategic Crisis Response

Operational environments directly affect the warfighting functions used during a hostage-rescue mission. Key functions include intelligence, communications, movement, and maneuver. Permissive locations offer numerous open sources to build a common intelligence picture; they also provide accessible ingress and egress options, and secure transmission of information while maneuvering onto and off the target. Operational dominance in these environments supports the protection function by closing knowledge gaps about enemy capabilities and force disposition. Diplomatic approvals, based on prior or immediate access, basing, and overflight permissions, also play a central role in enabling those advantages.

At the other end of the spectrum, denied areas undermine many of the support capabilities that units assume upon during planning and training. Terms such as “disrupted or denied comms” and “austere medicine” illustrate the constraints units must work around in the most challenging conditions, often forcing adaptations in tactics, techniques, and procedures. Between those endpoints, semi-permissive and semi-denied areas combine elements of freedom to operate with constraints on action.

Adversary strengths directly shape the operational environment. Against symmetric opponents, the United States and its partners have needed to identify “two-fors”—operations that maximize output while limiting input for activities and investments. The imperative to do more with fewer resources becomes more acute as budget pressures force the Joint Force, writ large, to do better with less. Central to those adaptations is identifying lightly protected adversary vulnerabilities that can cascade into threats against higher-priority interests. Finding gaps in defense systems at the periphery, or in similar systems used by commercial or proxy forces, can reveal edge weaknesses that point to core vulnerabilities. In that regard, hostage-rescue capabilities can produce ripple effects beyond the immediate operational area because the skills and resources employed in one context can transfer to similar conditions elsewhere—regardless of the target.

Given the political pressures and compressed timelines of hostage scenarios, rescue missions often require elite military units capable of executing Special Operations under the toughest conditions. These missions can target traditional hostage-takers—terrorist and criminal groups—as well as proxies of state adversaries. (Direct state-to-state hostage taking remains rare, given alternative avenues for coercion.) Central to rescue operations is the Special Operations targeting model: find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD). F3EAD moves quickly onto and off the target to match the short time frames of the operational context. Whether focused on high-priority site seizure, personnel recovery, or sensitive-material collection, Special Operations crisis response typically trades breadth of scope for speed of results.

Developed and refined through CT and COIN missions over the past two decades, F3EAD relies on a Joint Force–interagency–international network for intelligence assessments to find and fix targets. Partner contributions to target acquisition can increase accuracy even when constrained by classification restrictions. Given the heightened political priority of many hostage scenarios, CR may also benefit from expedited review and approval processes.

The finish phase depends on the exceptional expertise of assigned forces. Oversight and support before and during operations allow CR to be nested within larger strategic processes and to operate inside “right and left” limits that manage escalation risk. The final phases—exploit, analyze, and disseminate—extend learning across the enterprise. Passing lessons learned into other tactical and operational areas expands CR’s potential for strategic coercion.

Foremost, successful CR can undermine enemy capabilities and expose vulnerabilities through mission success against a single objective, which can then be leveraged for strategic effects in that location or elsewhere. Even while concealing the precise capabilities used in a rescue, revealing the success, and affirming the ability to do it again, shapes adversary calculations about strengths, weaknesses, and likely risks. After a rescue, an adversary must account for both the vulnerability exposed and its exploitation, which changes the calculus of relative strengths and weaknesses in future conflicts. Closing previously unknown or underprioritized gaps, restoring leaders’ confidence in rebuilt defenses, and punishing those responsible for the “embarrassment” all require time and resources. Those demands can, in turn, disrupt timelines and budgets for future hostile activity against the U.S. and its partners.

Crisis Response Support to Deterrence over Taiwan

The current and foreseeable force posture in the Indo-Pacific presents clear advantages to China. Proximity for lines of communication and control inherently privileges Beijing in its strategic calculus. By comparison, U.S. interests are more limited—focused on partnerships and commerce within a broader global footprint. Even as specific countries and industries feature prominently in U.S. strategies, the tyranny of distance and competing priorities constrain both available capabilities and future commitments. Wherever the United States postures its forces, much of the operational impact occurs through strategic signaling to assure partners and deter China, rather than through direct defense across the entire region. With the goal of preventing conflict, deterrence remains paramount, even as warfighting capabilities underpin its potential effectiveness.

In response to U.S. deterrent messages and the “muscle” necessary to back them, China’s military forces and civilian industries have developed multi-layered capabilities to defend the mainland while supporting offensive action against Taiwan. Caverley’s review of China’s “kill web” illustrates the challenge U.S. deterrence faces when seeking to impose costs inside the First Island Chain.[15] Notable features include:

overlapping and redundant anti-access/area-denial and space systems;
extensive global resource procurement to sustain war production and economic activity; and
pervasive cyber capabilities that can both attack and defend in support of military operations.

Combined with “One China” nationalism as an element of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control, the deck is not only stacked in Beijing’s favor—Beijing also holds many of the cards. How, then, can U.S. crisis-response capabilities influence Chinese decision-making if these systems already appear robust against U.S. interference?

The first step is understanding the adversary’s intrinsic vulnerabilities. The CCP governs a vast domestic empire akin to historic European dominions, characterized by diverse topography, languages, and regional identities. The weight of history has long threatened to pull China apart; the legacy of past imperial collapse still shapes CCP decision-making. This domestic fragility demands rigid control to prevent chaos, but that same control limits the social innovation needed for adaptive thinking during crisis or conflict. Sawyer highlights a stark contrast between classical Chinese strategic wisdom and Beijing’s current rigidity.[16] Across dynasties, Chinese strategists warned that political control could stifle the creative adaptation required to defeat an enemy, lessons the CCP appears to have forgotten.

China’s monolithic system may appear resilient, and its mass and geography may favor endurance, yet assumptions of U.S. weakness pose a deeper problem for Beijing than ignorance of U.S. capabilities. This leads to a second core vulnerability: the regime’s inability to understand its adversaries. Wu Ch’i, later known as Wu Tzu, argued in the fourth century BC that without genuine knowledge of the enemy, deception only compounds ignorance and brings ruin to even the best-planned strategy. Modern China’s insistence that others understand it—without reciprocating—has produced a trail of disillusioned partners. While some states still accept short-term gains from engagement, that pool is neither limitless nor uncontested. These flaws expose a key vulnerability for U.S. crisis-response strategy to exploit: Beijing’s tendency to overstep rather than merely overreach.

China’s defensive advantages on the mainland do not easily translate into offensive success. If the United States and its partners pre-position forces on and around Taiwan, defensive advantages shift toward the allies.[17] The extent of that advantage depends on their timing, duration, and intensity, but the potential to rebalance remains fluid. Moreover, while Beijing would seek rapid territorial gains, the likelihood of a prolonged regional conflict grows as U.S. policy continues to frame the CCP as a “pacing threat.” As Sun Tzu warned, stalemates offer no advantage.[18] Over time, mounting losses—economic and military—would turn such a conflict into a costly stalemate for Beijing.

China’s economic health increasingly depends on foreign-sourced materials. Globalization and market integration have eroded the CCP’s ability to insulate itself from external influence. Despite tools of control such as the “Great Firewall,” “Great Cannon,” and “social credit” system, the scale of dependence on global resources exposes vulnerabilities far beyond the loss of export markets. Damage to the defense industrial base would further compound these problems.[19]

As a result, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would need to seize Taiwan quickly to avoid prolonged economic and political shock. The CCP’s domestic legitimacy, fragile since Tiananmen, depends on maintaining prosperity and stability. As seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing property-market crisis, Beijing walks a far narrower line with its populace than official narratives suggest. If a Taiwan conflict leads to sustained economic pain and mounting casualties, internal unrest could threaten the regime more than losses on the battlefield. The larger and more interconnected China’s economy becomes, the greater the number of pressure points that U.S. and partner actions can exploit to deter escalation.

Crisis-response capabilities directly address these vulnerabilities. First, by demonstrating the U.S. ability to act when and where it chooses, CR exposes a wide range of targets Beijing would prefer to remain untouched. Using the warfighting functions as a guide, U.S. CR operations can threaten the facilities, routes, and systems that underpin China’s global reach. Unless the CCP develops isolated “China-only” versions of these assets, its vulnerabilities will multiply over time. In that sense, CR’s greatest effect is deterrent: like the sword of Damocles, the potential for CR-enabled precision strikes to disrupt essential networks heightens Beijing’s internal frictions by targeting economic pressure points. Amplifying those domestic strains—historically the CCP’s greatest fear—positions CR as a valuable tool of strategic-escalation management.

Second, the integration across U.S. and allied networks required for effective crisis response also strengthens large-scale combat readiness. CR planning and resources can extend the duration and scope of a fight to halt Chinese aggression, leveraging a multi-layered coalition. While Beijing may blunt some of these capabilities, it cannot easily account for the resilience and adaptability of U.S. partnerships. From the global war on terror to Ukraine, allied cooperation has repeatedly demonstrated endurance under pressure. Recent advances with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Australia point to a widening regional coalition to counter PRC aggression. Beyond the Indo-Pacific, growing European recognition of China’s threat adds depth to the Western response.

Finally, successful crisis-response operations demand an exquisite combination of skills, tools, and resources applied consistently across diverse environments. Few militaries can perform at that level worldwide. U.S. Special Operations Forces, however, have more than three decades of experience demonstrating such capabilities for strategic effect—from the adaptations of Operation Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu to the rapid mass evacuations under Operation Allies Refuge in Kabul. Given China’s overextended economic footprint and limited ability to defend critical nodes, lines of communication, and global supply routes, the United States and its partners face a “target-rich environment” should deterrence fail and conflict emerge. The United States would do well to publicize its crisis response successes to maximize their strategic impact on adversary decision-making. More importantly, Beijing’s leaders would do well to heed the lessons before they experience the consequences of those same capabilities in ways they can ill afford.

Endnotes

[1] Hyun-Binn Cho and Brian Chao, “Muddied Waters: Freedom-of-Navigation Operations as Signals in the South China Sea,” British Journal of International Relations 27, no. 1 (June 2024).

[2] Benjamin Jensen et al., “Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-cyber-and-space-how-united-states-can-disrupt-chinas-blockade-plans.

[3] Clementine Starling and Alyxandra Marine, “Stealth, Speed, and Adaptability: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Strategic Competition,” Atlantic Council, March 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/starling-marine-special-operations-forces-in-strategic-competition/#knowing-what-success-looks-like.

[4] Paul Rogers, “The Answers are in the Mountains: Countering Chinese Aggression with Irregular Warfare,” SOF Support, September 2025, https://sofsupport.org/the-answers-are-in-the-mountains-countering-chinese-aggression-with-irregular-warfare/.

[5] Carl Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (eds.) Princeton University Press, 1984.

[6] Carl Clausewitz, On War.

[7] Carl Clausewitz, On War.

[8] Eric Robinson et al., “Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces: A Concept for Proactive Campaigning Short of Traditional War,” RAND, 2023.

[9] Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 31–57.

[10] Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[11] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

[12] Thomas C. Schelling, “The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1959).

[13] Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009).

[14] Thomas C. Schelling, “The Threat that Leaves Something to Chance.”

[15] Jonathan Caverley, “So What? Reassessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,” Texas National Security Review 8, no. 3 (2025).

[16] Ralph Sawyer and Mei-Chun Sawyer, trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

[17] Carl Clausewitz, On War.

[18] Sunzi (Sun Tzu), The Art of War, Capstone Classics Edition (Chichester, UK: Capstone Publishing, 2010).

[19] Lumpy Lumbaca, “How Irregular Warfare can Find – and Exploit – the Vulnerabilities in China’s Defense Industrial Base,” Modern War Institute, August 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/how-irregular-warfare-can-find-and-exploit-the-vulnerabilities-in-chinas-defense-industrial-base/

CONTACT Spencer Meredith | spencer.meredith@ndu.edu

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

11. Frogmen and Fast Boats: The Future of Irregular Warfare in the Maritime Domain

Summary:

The Inter Populum article “Frogmen and Fast Boats: The Future of Irregular Warfare in the Maritime Domain” argues that irregular maritime warfare (IW-M) must be treated as a distinct strategic approach, not merely an extension of land-centric irregular warfare. It asserts that, amid great-power competition, smaller states and non-state actors can leverage asymmetric maritime tools—special operations forces, fast attack craft, littoral strike teams, and low-visibility tactics—to impose costs, deny access, and enhance deterrence in contested littorals where conventional navies are limited. The authors stress integrating SOF into IW-M campaigns to bolster partner capacity, persistent awareness, and coordinated action below the threshold of full-scale war.

Comment: Read the entire article at the link below or download the PDF here: https://interpopulum.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Frogmen-and-Fast-Boats.pdf

Article

Frogmen and Fast Boats: The Future of Irregular Warfare in the Maritime Domain

This article examines how irregular warfare in the maritime domain (IW-M) can strengthen national defense strategies for smaller states confronting more powerful naval adversaries. It argues that integrating special operations forces (SOF) into IW-M efforts provides a cost-effective, adaptable approach to defending littoral spaces, imposing costs, and enhancing deterrence. Drawing on historical examples and contemporary force design, this article identifies key conditions for success: strategic purpose, political backing, feasible objectives, and SOF-as-integrators. It offers practical insights for defense planners on how purpose-built SOF can reduce gaps in conventional naval posture and enable partners through training, exercises, and low-cost technological adaptation. As great power competition intensifies, IW-M provides a scalable, flexible framework to counter aggression, defend sovereignty, and build regional resilience when conventional options are limited, unaffordable, or politically constrained.

By John D. Willingham, Kenneth Walls Jr, and Timothy Jones

Published December 15, 2025

https://interpopulum.org/frogmen-and-fast-boats-the-future-of-irregular-warfare-in-the-maritime-domain/

12. A Deeply Flawed Military Strategy (Book Review)

Summary:

John Delury reviews Franz-Stefan Gady’s How the United States Would Fight China as a warning about America’s default theory of rapid, decisive victory. He argues the US would open with a tech-heavy bid to blind PLA C4ISR through cyber, electromagnetic, and space attacks, but China’s dispersed networks and defenses would likely absorb the blow. Success could also spur escalation as Beijing, partly blinded, strikes back hard. If the quick knockout fails, Washington shifts toward deep strikes and allied mobilization, then slides into attrition. Distance, munitions depletion, and political will become decisive.

Comment: Political will is always decisive. That is a timeless truism. We must start there. If we do not have the plicial will we will not sufficiently prepare to fight and win.

A Deeply Flawed Military Strategy

globalasia.org

Articles

A Deeply Flawed Military Strategy

By John Delury

https://globalasia.org/v20no4/book/a-deeply-flawed-military-strategy_john-delury

AUSTRIAN MILITARY analyst Franz-Stefan Gady has been studying the American way of war for a long time, from up close doing field research with troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and at a distance from his perch in Europe. Gady has come to identify its central premise as a strategy of rapid, decisive victory. This military urgency to “go big or go home” stems from political imperatives to keep casualties low and make the fighting short. American commanders are inculcated with the ideal of “shock and awe,” bringing a bazooka to a knife-fight and overwhelming the adversary with total superiority in materiel and technology. Despite a string of defeats and unpopular wars fought since 1945, this default remains the same. In How the United States Would Fight China, Gady imagines how the American way would play out in a war over the island of Taiwan. An alternate title of his book might be, How the United States Would Lose to China.

Focusing on military strategy, concepts and doctrines, Gady gives new meaning to the oft-repeated phrase “US-China systemic competition.” For the Pentagon as for the People’s Liberation Army, great-power war in the 21st century is anticipated to be a war between systems — you could even say, systems of systems. This includes, at root, political systems, given that war is “fundamentally a contest of wills.” The collective will of the American people is unleashed in a messy back and forth of two-party democracy while that of the Chinese people is driven forward by the harness of Communist Party rule. But Gady’s focus is not political systems. Instead, he takes us deep into the world of defense systems, focusing on the ways in which the US military is preparing to fight China over Taiwan — joint operations, cyber, space, air, sea and land.

Gady is confident that he knows how the US would start a war to defend Taiwan — with a swift, tech-savvy knockout punch. The “Department of War” (if it still goes by that name) would try to score a quick win in a battle of “systems of systems” by destroying the PLA’s C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). But the survivability of dispersed networks and the sophistication of Chinese defenses are likely to frustrate US commanders, who will be acting under immense pressure to score quick and decisive tactical success. The kind of war the US military is trained and incentivized to fight simply will not work against the new peer rival that the US faces on the other side of the Pacific.

Gady explains how things can go wrong, quickly, in terms of information gaps that both sides are likely to encounter. The US possesses far superior missile detection systems, but even they cannot distinguish nuclear from conventional weapons, and may have limited vision on the origin and endpoint of a missile in flight (the plot point of Netflix’s nuclear war drama A House of Dynamite). The American theory of victory presupposes “information superiority leading to a rapid decision advantage,” military jargon for blinding, crippling cyber, electromagnetic and space-based communication attacks on Chinese critical infrastructure. This initial salvo of “packages” would target military capabilities but would undoubtedly impact civilian life as a kind of digitized collateral damage. Think hospitals losing power, traffic lights and GPS malfunctioning, basic financial transactions (which Chinese do almost entirely on their smartphones) impossible. Here’s the rub: the more this initial cyber-assault succeeds at a tactical level, the greater the risk that leaders in Beijing will unleash an escalatory cyber and kinetic counterattack, afraid of what the US might be ready to do next. Beijing’s fear would be emboldened, not dampened, by having its vision impaired, but probably not blinded, after the initial attack. Political decision-makers in Washington and combatant commanders in the Pacific could then find themselves partially blinded as well, to a degree they are unused to after decades of peerless military dominance fighting far less technologically sophisticated adversaries.

The escalatory risks of shock and awe will also play out in outer space, another domain in which the US will try to “paralyse Chinese PLA military leadership in indecision.” Gady’s description of what a Sino-American space war could look like is, not surprisingly, the stuff of science fiction, with lasers and missiles shooting straight up into the sky as hundreds — by the 2030s maybe thousands, even tens of thousands — of small satellites whirl about watching the enemy and communicating to commanders. All these capabilities are also vulnerabilities, given how poorly defended space vessels tend to be. The fear of a Space Pearl Harbor has thus given rise in US defense analysis circles to arguments on the “need to pre-empt the Chinese pre-emption strikes,” a line straight out of the War Room of Dr. Strangelove.

Gady calmly describes how information gaps likely to form on both sides in the opening stage of battle could rapidly condense into a frightening black hole of escalation. If Xi Jinping does not throw up his hands in surrender after the initial cyber/space attack, US commanders will be primed to accelerate along vertical and horizontal axes of escalation. Vertical refers to “deep battle” with long-range missile strikes at targets on the mainland — not only the proximate military assets in the Eastern Theater Command across the water from Taiwan, but also political “centers of gravity,” perhaps even targeting Chairman Xi himself. If that first TKO punch doesn’t land, in other words, US commanders will be incentivized to draw their sword and try to cut off the other boxer’s head in a decapitation strike. But trying to take out Xi Jinping and/or CCP leadership is a radically different proposition than the US military’s “successful” operations targeting leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden or Muammar Gaddafi — none of whom possessed ICBMs that could strike back at the US homeland. “Horizontal” escalation refers to the likely, even necessary, role US allies will be expected to play in an all-out war. Given the mixed feelings of governments and publics across the Indo-Pacific, horizontal movements would be as difficult as vertical ones would be dangerous.

If the first attacks fail to blind the PLA and decapitate the CCP, the US will quickly find itself in a protracted war of attrition that it is ill-equipped to win. After a wave of fancy, destructive “fires” (missiles launched from sea, air, land), US stocks would suffer serious problems of depletion. In a grinding battle of resources and will, the US would be fighting not only against the enemy, but also against the tyranny of distance. Gady gives a detailed tally of the capacity and capabilities available to the US Navy and Air Force, which would bear the brunt of the physical fight. PLA ships are less than 200 kilometers away from Taiwan and mainland air bases less than 400km. Compare that with US airfields in allied nations (who will have mixed feelings about getting involved in the fight) at 1,600 kilometers away, and the closest US territory, Guam, at 2,700 km. The US will be at a significant geographical disadvantage, vulnerable to Chinese attacks on supply lines and sea lanes.

How the United States Would Fight China is a devastating critique of a flawed military strategy. The moral of the story is clear: if there is a major war over Taiwan, it will be a protracted war of attrition, not a short, sharp victory for either side. This assessment leads Gady to end his book by posing two questions of profound significance for American politicians, strategists and voters to ponder. First, is the US public willing to “carry the burden” of what an actual war to defend Taiwan is likely to look like — including the economic and social burden of preparing for such a long and destructive conflict? Second, is it worth it? “Beyond political rhetoric, is Taiwan worth a prolonged war of attrition with the world’s second-largest economy, or indeed risking a nuclear war?” If Gady’s analysis is sound, the US will need a substitute for pursuing rapid victory, and soon.

Back to Issue

(2)

How the United States Would Fight China: The Risks of Pursuing a Rapid Victory
By Franz-Stefan Gady
Oxford University Press, 2025, 256 pages, $34.99 (Hardcover)
Published: December 2025 (Vol.20 No.4)
About the author
John Delury is Global Asia regional editor.

13. Forging the Framework: Evolving Law, Policy, and Doctrine for the U.S. Military’s Domestic Response

Summary:

Small Wars Journal flags Forging the Framework (Army University Press, ed. Jonathan D. Bratten) as a timely reminder that domestic military operations are a recurring, tense feature of US civil-military history, not a rare exception. The anthology traces Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) from colonial militias through Reconstruction, labor unrest, Katrina, and post-9/11, emphasizing a framework shaped by improvisation, friction, and crisis. It highlights enduring fault lines: state versus federal authority, civil primacy versus military power, and preparedness versus overreach. Its most urgent warning is “compound crises,” where disasters, unrest, and adversary pressure collide while Guard and federal forces juggle overlapping legal authorities.

Forging the Framework: Evolving Law, Policy, and Doctrine for the U.S. Military’s Domestic Response

by SWJ Staff

12.26.2025 at 02:50pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/26/forging-the-framework-dsca-civil-military-history/

Forging the Framework: Evolving Law, Policy, and Doctrine for the U.S. Military’s Domestic Response, edited by Jonathan D. Bratten and published by Army University Press, is a timely reminder that domestic military operations are neither an anomaly nor an afterthought, but an essential, yet tenuous, mission woven into American civil-military history. The anthology argues that civil-military tension is no accident: America’s domestic response framework was forged through centuries of improvisation, friction, and crisis, shaped by recurring tensions between state and federal authority, civil primacy and military power, preparedness and overreach. By tracing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) from colonial militias through Reconstruction, labor unrest, Katrina, and post-9/11 homeland defense, the volume refuses to sanitize history, documenting both effective responses and costly failures, showing how fragile and judgment-dependent the system has always been.

The book’s contemporary relevance is clearest in its warning about compound crises. As climate disasters intensify, information warfare amplifies unrest, and adversaries develop means to stress the U.S. homeland during large-scale combat operations, the National Guard and federal forces face competing demands that existing legal compromises (e.g., the Insurrection Act, Stafford Act, Title 10/32 authorities, Dual Status Command) were never designed to absorb simultaneously.

Forging the Framework does not offer stock solutions, because the problems it addresses are structural and enduring. But it does something more valuable; it shows that the challenges of domestic military operations—legal ambiguity, command friction, civil-military tension, and the temptation to use force as a first resort rather than a last resort—are as old as the Republic itself. One must understand that history is not an academic exercise. It is operational preparation for DSCA practitioners, joint planners, strategists, and anyone interested in how the U.S. military operates within the constitutional order.

Tags: civil military relations, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), Domestic Military Operations, Homeland Defense, National Guard, Posse Comitatus Act

About The Author

SWJ Staff
SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.

14. Keeping the Marine Corps Amphibious

Summary:

Exercise Steel Knight 25 at Camp Pendleton showcased renewed ship-to-shore integration as Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACVs) and Navy LCACs moved Marines from USS Pearl Harbor to Red Beach. The 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, first to field ACVs in 2020, is building toward routine overseas deployment and combat readiness, following the retirement of the legacy AAV. Leaders highlight the coming ACV-30 with a 30mm turret and the ACV-C command-and-control variant as key enablers for island-chain operations and EABO-style communications. The article also stresses tightened safety standards, integrated blue-green checklists, and the hard work of sustaining ACV readiness amid heavy deployment demand.

Keeping the Marine Corps Amphibious - USNI News

Confidence in Amphibious Combat Vehicles Grows as Landing Craft Deploy

news.usni.org · Gidget Fuentes

Gidget Fuentes

December 23, 2025 5:26 PM

https://news.usni.org/2025/12/23/keeping-the-marine-corps-amphibious

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – A half-dozen amphibious combat vehicles swam through calm morning seas and rolled onto Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base’s Red Beach earlier this month. The ACV crews joined several others that Navy air-cushioned landing craft had already ferried from dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52) a few miles offshore.

The beach landings by ACVs and LCACs were a display of ship-to-shore integration and amphibious operations during exercise Steel Knight 25. The annual 1st Marine Division-led event is a key exercise for the West Coast-based I Marine Expeditionary Force. This year’s iteration also included U.S. 3rd Fleet and 10th Air Force units.

For the ACV crews from Camp Pendleton-based 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, the training marked another objective toward their goal of deploying and potentially fighting their vehicles overseas. The battalion, which trains and prepares vehicle crews to deploy with the Division and I MEF task forces, was the first unit to field the eight-wheeled ACV, in 2020 to replace its older tracked amphibious assault vehicles, or AAVs.

Cpl. Roberto Montelongo sat inside his ACV for a Navy LCAC ride toward the beach in a ship-to-shore display of naval integration during the annual exercise Steel Knight 25. The ACV operator had spent five days aboard San Diego, Calif.-based Pearl Harbor, his first time at sea with the Navy. Back ashore, he thought about when he deploys next year to Okinawa, Japan. It will be his first tour overseas.

“I’ve been wanting to go for three years, then I never had the opportunity,” Montelongo said. “I’ve been ready for an adventure.”

He initially trained to be an AAV operator just as “3rd Tracks,” as many still call the battalion, began transitioning to the ACV.

“We keep the Marine Corps amphibious,” he said of the vehicles. “So it’s a great job to have, and I hope it sticks around.”

The ACV didn’t impress him at first, he added, but the more he operates it, “the more happy I kind of feel with it.”

The past five years has seen a gradual roll-out and employment of the ACV. This fall, the 26-ton AAVs ended a 53-year run when the Marine Corps formally retired the vehicles during a Sept. 26 ceremony at Assault Amphibian School at Camp Pendleton.

Several incidents in 2022 prompted fielding delays, more testing, reviews and open-water restrictions and changes at the ACV schoolhouse. ACVs arrived in the Pacific just last year. Camp Pendleton-based 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and its Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were the first to deploy with an ACV platoon. Its ACVs showed its new combat capabilities to Japan-based III Marine Expeditionary Force during exercise Balikatan in the Philippines. A few months later, III MEF received its first vehicles. This year, the first ACVs integrated into Okinawa-based 31st MEU’s predeployment training and exercises, which included Talisman Sabre 2025 in Australia.

The ACV is an important ship-to-shore connector for Marine Corps ground forces, especially in the Pacific where military officials and analysts anticipate conflict across the contested islands.

A contingent of Pacific-area military officers observing the Dec. 6 beach raid reflected the high value of the ACV’s capabilities and presence in the western Pacific. Officers from Philippines and South Korea were among those who joined commanders of the Marine Corps’ West Coast-based infantry division, logistics group and air wing on a bluff at Red Beach. They also checked out the Marine Corps’ newest ACV-C, a command-and-control variant that would provide key communication links for forces fighting the multi-domain fight.

The Marine Corps is more than halfway through its ACV fielding, having received in September the 300th vehicle, which was delivered to 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion at Camp Lejeune, N.C. Marines with the battalion’s Alpha Company completed at-sea naval integration training this month off the coast of North Carolina.

Newest ACV is a ‘Game Changer’

Marines with Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, embark an amphibious combat vehicle as part of a mechanized raid course hosted by Expeditionary Operations Training Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force, on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., Sept. 30, 2025. US Marine Corps photo

Along with the ACV-C, the service is fielding a personnel variant (ACV-P), a weapons variant (ACV-30) and a recovery variant (ACV-R). Earlier this month, the Department of Defense awarded a $184.4 million contract to Michigan-based BAE Systems for the ACV-30, which features a 30mm gun and remote-controlled turret weapons system.

“That’s a big deal,” said Maj. Gen. Thomas Savage, the 1st Marine Division commander. “That gives us added combat capability, and you fight the thing like a fighting vehicle, vice just a transport vehicle. It’s going to be a game changer.”

For the Marines, the ACV-30’s arrival can’t come soon enough.

“It’s a great tool when you have a platform like ours that can land with a stabilized turret, can shoot on the move in the water, can shoot on the move on land, and it brings heavy machine guns like the .50 caliber machine gun or the MK-19 40-millimeter grenade launcher,” said Lt. Col. Fred Monday, the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion commander.

The stabilized turret is not on LCACs or landing craft units, he noted.

“So giving that option for someone to land on a beach and knowing that we can hold that beach, like we did today, is absolutely critical.”

The new ACV-C variants, when equipped with satellite and radio communications, will provide mobile C2 nodes for battle staffs in the hub-spoke-node concept of expeditionary advanced base operations across the Indo-Pacific, Marines say. The ACVs will provide voice, data and some email capabilities.

“As we go from ship to shore, there always needs to be a communication pathway from the vehicle itself back to ourselves and then to our higher headquarters or adjacent units. We just supply and supplement that,” said 1st Lt. Brandon Bennett, 3rd AABn communications officer.

Each ACV platoon is getting one or two of the vehicles, he said.

“The importance of it falls in understanding the theater in which we’re going to operate it,” Bennett said. “We are not going to be operating in the desert. We’re going where it’s more island-chain campaigns. We need to bounce from island to island. How do we do that? Ship (to) shore. What platform are we going to use? ACV. And honestly, I’m just thrilled and happy to be a part of that.”

ACVs operationally focused

Marines with Fox Company, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division prepare for ship-to-shore operations during Exercise Steel Knight 25 on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 6, 2025. US Marine Corps

Five years into fielding the ACV, 3rd AABn is reaching its stride as an ACV operational unit.

“That battalion is busy, and they’re busy [keeping] those vehicles running,” said Savage, the division commander. “Right now, we’ve got back-to-back MEUs coming up in the regular deployment cycle, and Fred Monday and his guys are working hard.”

The battalion had been “all in” to get the initial ACV platoon trained and certified to deploy with the 15th MEU, Monday said, adding “they crushed it.”

“We have met every Global Force Management requirement that’s been assigned to the battalion, plus some,” Monday said.

On average about 400 members of the 1,100-member battalion are forward-deployed or committed to a MEU or supporting the MEF, he said. The rest are either in the training cycle or back with a headquarters element.

The battalion currently has five GFM elements training for deployments. These include ACV platoons training with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and with 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines.

“Not only do I have those five requirements to go support Okinawa with 31st MEU and the West Coast MEUs, but we also have elements that are training for other deployments, getting on naval shipping and supporting other operations, activities and interests for the division,” he said. “It’s a full-scale production, and the Marines are eager because they’re actually getting back into the fight and doing what they want to do… to still serve their country, and they’re doing a pretty damn good job.”

ACV battalions, typically, train and certify crews to deploy as platoons or companies rather than as a full battalion. Steel Knight 25 offered 3rd Tracks staff the chance to get boots out to the field.

“The last time we brought the battalion out was in 2018,” said Monday. “So now we’re actually training where all my battalion staff is getting the right reps and sets – not in a cubicle, but in the discomfort of living under the stars, [sleeping] on an ISO mat where your back hurts and your shoulder hurts when you wake up. But it’s good that the whole staff is learning how to do what we would do when the time comes, if we have to go to war.”

Applying Lessons

Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Ryan Calhoun, a self-propelled artillery repairer with Fox Company, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division, prepares for ship-to-shore operations during Exercise Steel Knight 25 on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 6, 2025. US Marine Corps photo

Safety standards are amplified in the Assault Amphibian Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (AATOPS) manual.

“Every organization is evolving – it’s learning and it’s growing,” Monday said. “We actually put down a lot of lessons learned and turn them into lessons applied. So all the things we learned from – you can argue some missteps years ago where we just didn’t know – those have been applied into what we call the AATOPs.”

All crew are trained and tested on AATOPS, similar to Navy aviation’s NATOPS.

“Where we may have a misstep – where a vehicle may break down in the water or may break down on land – I’m very confident that when those bad days happen, the crew is prepared to rise to that occasion because they’re trained for it,” Monday said.

It can take a year to fully train and prepare ACV crews to deploy. That includes submerged vehicle training training and surf qualification, the latter which involves bailing out of an ACV and swimming 500 meters through the surf zone.

The focus on safety training isn’t just for ACV crews.

“When it comes to the integrated training that we do with the embarked infantry ashore as well as afloat and with the Navy, we have a deliberate training pipeline,” said Monday, who before taking battalion command led the Transition Training Unit and helped develop and implement training, evaluation, certification and standards for the community. “There’s the same standard – one standard – for anyone getting in a vehicle, and it’s the standard of being able to know that I’m confident and they’re confident in their own ability to get out.”

Anyone riding in an ACV – infantry Marines, combat camera, corpsmen, battle staff – gets safety and familiarization training. That training includes working through ACV operations and egress procedures in Camp Pendleton’s protected boat basin and a Water Integrated Training Package for infantry and other passengers that includes a swim ashore drill.

Troop commanders and embarked Marines tasked as the “rear egress operator” are also trained on opening hatches and operating the rear ramp and ensuring everyone gets out. Everyone participated in classes on the “trigger lines,” or “what right looks like (and) what right doesn’t look like,” such as water rising off the deck inside an ACV, Monday said.

Marines with 3rd AABn regularly train with battalion landing teams’ mechanized companies at the boat basin’s ramp and in the water. That time in and around an ACV has the added benefit of familiarizing Marines and other passengers about the Corps’ newest amphibious vehicle.

“I’m pretty sure they’re going to put that stuff on Facebook later when they get home, saying #ACV training,” Monday said. “But they get a chance to really go do the thing they signed up for…. The chance for them to be in a mechanized company is pretty badass, where you get to be in the well deck, splash out for the back of the ship, land on the beach – and they can charge their cell phone along the way, because they’ve got power outlets in the ACV.”

U.S. Marines with Fox Company, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division, prepare to conduct operations during Exercise Steel Knight 25 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, Dec. 6, 2025. US Marine Corps photo

The battalion commander spent part of Steel Knight 25 aboard Pearl Harbor, where his executive officer remained and planned for the ship-to-shore operations with the ship’s captain and crew guided by the Wet Well Operations and Ship-to-Shore manuals.

This is in line with the AATOPS requirement “to ensure that the blue-green team is fully integrated,” Monday said.

It includes a 15-line report that’s approved by the Marine commander and the ship’s captain, and it green-lights the operation and an integrated execution checklist and integrated conditions checklist to ensure that before Marines go in the water, they are all set. It also requires blue-green communications, command and control remain clear and constant – including on the bridge, in combat and in the well deck – throughout the operation.

“It lets us know what they’re responsible for amphibious planning considerations, tactical considerations ashore, and how we bring it together. So if we can get the team to that level, that’s how we operate inherently safe moving forward,” Monday said.

Savage, the division commander, acknowledged that more work remains in the Marine Corps’ transition from the AAV and amphibious and mechanized integration of the ACV.

“We got the system running,” he said, adding, “There’s still a lot of work to do with that… You know, we stopped doing [mechanized] integration for a while, we’ve slowed down with the sunset of the AAV and all the problems we had with that building up of the ACV.”

The ACVs, Savage said, are difficult to keep maintained properly, and the battalion doesn’t carry as much as the AAVs used to carry. “But we’ve really come a long way when it comes to what we’re doing in the water with those things and safely operating them in real-world tactical scenarios,” Savage said. “We’ve got some work to do on the ground side, but they’ve got some pretty good capability.”

Marines who operated the tracked AAVs say it’s trickier driving the ACV inside a ship or a combat town, noting the wheeled base doesn’t allow for easy maneuver through tight spaces.

But the ACV crews are committed to making it work, Savage said. Concurrently with Steel Knight, Marines with 11th MEU’s Battalion Landing Team 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines conducted ACV integration and surf training in preparation for their upcoming deployment.

“It’s like many other new systems that you get. You have glitches and you try to figure things out when you field them. But every day we’re learning more about that vehicle. We’re getting better,” Savage said.

news.usni.org · Gidget Fuentes

15. China: An Ally Waiting for Russia’s Defeat?

Summary:

China’s posture toward Russia’s war is framed as caution, not mediation: Beijing speaks the language of negotiations while avoiding binding commitments that would force an explicit choice between Moscow and the West. At the same time, the piece argues China materially cushions Russia through energy purchases and dual-use supply chains, often routed through gray channels, which blunts sanctions pressure and helps sustain the war economy. This creates a deliberate tension between peace rhetoric and war reality, with reputational and economic costs in Europe but strategic benefits in a multipolar contest. The author then pivots to a darker wager: China may be positioned to profit if Russia weakens or fractures, treating instability as an opening for resource access and territorial leverage in Siberia and the Far East.

Excerpts:

For the United States and Europe, the perspective of the disintegration of Russia looks like a catastrophe: chaos, the threat of uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons, ecological risks for the whole world. But for China this scenario opens a “window of opportunities.” Specifically, there’s a chance at a long-awaited prize — the return of “historic territories,” which in Chinese historiography are interpreted as “lost heritage”: the Far East and Siberia. On Chinese official maps these territories are colored in the colors of Chinese territory. Access to the Arctic Ocean, for the sake of which Beijing actively builds an icebreaker fleet, becomes part of this strategy.

“Return of historical justice” for China means not only territorial acquisitions. Importantly, it represents full access to the richest resources of these regions: oil, gas, rare earth metals, diamonds, platinum, forest and fresh water. These resources are capable of ensuring economic growth of China for generations ahead and of consolidating its status as a global power.

Comment: Would a loss in Ukraine be a cake in the CRInK? The idea that China seeks to exploit Russian instability seems logical on the one hand but risky and dangerous on the other. Would China really take such risks? But Russian instability is going to be dangerous for everyone.

China: An Ally Waiting for Russia’s Defeat?

Situation Reports - December 22, 2025

By Sergey E. Ivashchenko

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-an-ally-waiting-for-russias-defeat/

From the first months of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia tried to present China as a strategic partner, capable of supporting it on the international arena. However, Beijing chose a more cautious line of behavior. Chinese statements about the necessity of negotiations and peaceful settlement sound regularly, but they remain declarative. Beijing is careful to avoid concrete steps that could turn it into a full-fledged mediator.

The reasons for such caution are obvious. First, China strives to preserve the image of a global power, capable of influencing conflicts, but does not want to take upon itself responsibility for their outcome. Second, direct interference in the negotiation process would put Beijing in an uncomfortable position: it would have to openly designate whose side it stands on and take upon itself quite concrete, and not declarative, commitments. In conditions when China simultaneously develops economic ties with Russia and supports trade relations with the West, such clarity is disadvantageous.

Thus, China positions itself as a “voice of reason,” but in fact remains on the sidelines. Its role in the peace process is limited to rhetoric and diplomatic gestures, which create the appearance of activity, but do not lead to real results.

China’s Support for Russia’s War Economy

Despite statements about neutrality, China plays an important role in maintaining the Russian economy and military machine. After the introduction of Western sanctions, Moscow found itself dependent on Chinese supplies. It is not only about consumer goods, but also about critically important technologies.

Through Chinese companies, Russia receives access to electronics, components for drones, industrial equipment, and other dual-use goods. These deliveries often pass through third countries or through barely noticeable “grey” trade schemes, which Moscow calls “parallel import.” This allows Beijing formally to distance itself from Russia as from the aggressor country, but at the same time Russia receives the possibility to compensate part of the sanctions pressure and perpetuate the Ukraine war.

Economic support is also manifested in energy. China increased purchases of Russian oil and gas, taking advantage of discounts which Moscow is now forced to provide. This provides Russia with currency inflows and reduces the effect of Western restrictions. For China, however, this is strategically advantageous — it receives uninterrupted cheap resources, thereby strengthening its own energy security.

In this way, China acts as a hidden donor, whose actions to some extent soften the blow to the Russian economy, caused by colossal expenditures on military spending, decline of production, and catastrophic shortage of human resources. These actions on the part of China are not publicized, but they go far in allowing Moscow to prolong the conflict.

Balancing Peace Rhetoric and War Reality

The role of China in the Ukraine war is reflected in its international image. On the one hand, Beijing tries to present itself as a peacemaker, offering a “settlement plan” and speaking in favor of negotiations. On the other hand, its factual support of Russia leads to criticism from the West and strengthens suspicions about Beijing’s true motives.

For China this is a dual situation. On the global level it strives to strengthen the image of an alternative center of power, capable of challenging the United States and its allies. Support of Russia in this context looks like part of a strategy for creating a multipolar world. However, the position has its costs: China risks losing the trust of European countries, which see in its actions as complicity in Russia’s aggression.

In addition, participation in the conflict indirectly influences the economic prospects of China. Western companies and investors more and more often consider Beijing as an unreliable partner, which may lead to reduction of investments and technological cooperation. In the long-term perspective this limits the possibilities of China for modernization and growth.

Nevertheless, China continues to strike a balance. It does not want openly to become an ally of Russia, but also will not join Western sanctions. Such a strategy allows it to preserve flexibility and to use the war as an instrument for strengthening its own position in global geopolitics.

An Ally Awaiting Defeat?

Russia faces growing dissatisfaction at home. Colossal human losses at the front, the ongoing, though hidden, mobilization of that part of the population which is still able to hold weapons, and rapidly growing inflation, including food products — all this is that detonator which may lead to a social explosion. But even such an outcome would not be the worst-case scenario. In separate republics of the Federation, separatism is ripening. This is especially evident in the Caucasus republics, as well as in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in Yakutia, in the Far East and in Siberia, while in a special position remains the Kaliningrad enclave.

For the United States and Europe, the perspective of the disintegration of Russia looks like a catastrophe: chaos, the threat of uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons, ecological risks for the whole world. But for China this scenario opens a “window of opportunities.” Specifically, there’s a chance at a long-awaited prize — the return of “historic territories,” which in Chinese historiography are interpreted as “lost heritage”: the Far East and Siberia. On Chinese official maps these territories are colored in the colors of Chinese territory. Access to the Arctic Ocean, for the sake of which Beijing actively builds an icebreaker fleet, becomes part of this strategy.

“Return of historical justice” for China means not only territorial acquisitions. Importantly, it represents full access to the richest resources of these regions: oil, gas, rare earth metals, diamonds, platinum, forest and fresh water. These resources are capable of ensuring economic growth of China for generations ahead and of consolidating its status as a global power.

16. Why Russians haven't risen up to stop the Ukraine war

Summary:

Anna Matveeva argues Russians have not risen up largely because the war has hardened a shared identity built on perceived siege by the West. Early shock and confusion gave way, through propaganda and social pressure, to a defensive framing in which Russia is “protecting” itself, making dissent feel both dangerous and socially unacceptable. Material incentives and institutions reinforce this: recruitment continues with high wages, civic “help the army” efforts normalize participation, and the state’s paternal social contract remains expected. Matveeva adds that sanctions did not deliver the hoped-for collapse; instead, many Russians see resilience, growth, and wartime innovation as proof of national strength. Cultural turn inward and anti “cancel Russia” sentiment further consolidate cohesion, sustaining tolerance for a long war.

Comment: A good question. Some important analysis and insights.

Why Russians haven't risen up to stop the Ukraine war

responsiblestatecraft.org · Anna Matveeva

quincyinst.org

Dec 25, 2025

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russian-identity/

Inspired in part by state propaganda, many in Russia have developed an anti-Western identity

After its emergence from the Soviet collapse, the new Russia grappled with the complex issue of developing a national identity that could embrace the radical contradictions of Russia’s past and foster integration with the West while maintaining Russian distinctiveness.

The Ukraine War has significantly changed public attitudes toward this question, and led to a consolidation of most of the Russian population behind a set of national ideas. This has contributed to the resilience that Russia has shown in the war, and helped to frustrate Western hopes that economic pressure and heavy casualties would undermine support for the war and for President Vladimir Putin. To judge by the evidence to date, there is very little hope of these Western goals being achieved in the future.

The first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, sought a radical break with communism and based his rule on the negation of his country’s — and his own — past, leaving Russia with a profound sense of negative identity. Vladimir Putin, upon assuming office, presented a more positive vision centered on integration with the West (albeit on Russian terms and predicated on retaining Russian independence), but it foundered in the face of irreconcilable differences between Russia and the West.

The state has since struggled to articulate a coherent conception of identity that would define Russia’s distinctiveness. Only World War II emerged as a potential unifier, with the majority of Russians expressing their pride in Russia’s role in it, and it acquired an almost religious reverence within the leadership’s narrative.

Apart from pride in the “Great Patriotic War” (as World War II is known in Russia), the overall public response to identity construction was for a long time lukewarm. When the war in Ukraine started, without any warning to the Russian public, it was initially met with disbelief, confusion, and bewilderment. Most were concerned with their chances to navigate the troubled waters rather than providing support for their country.

No longer. Nearly four years of war has profoundly transformed Russia. Fostered by state propaganda, many ordinary Russians have developed a sense of pride that Russia has survived in the face of Western hostility. This feeling has been fed by Western expressions of contempt toward the Russian people and Russian culture — insults that are assiduously quoted by the state-controlled Russian media. The Russian public struggles to see how the situation can be viewed from the other side and acknowledge that Western concerns may have grounds behind them; for example, the Kremlin’s attempts at meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections better explain the negative attitudes toward Russia in Washington, rather than pre-existing cultural prejudices.

For some time now, patriotism has appeared to be ascendant: recruitment progresses steadily, men are willing to serve (admittedly in return for extremely high wages), and the “Help the Army” movement by women and pensioners shows no sign of abating. Speaking against the tide is considered socially unacceptable as well as dangerous.

Even though it was Russia that invaded Ukraine and that continues to attack the formerly ‘brotherly nation’, many in Russia view the war as defensive in nature and inevitable. A perception of external threat united much of the nation, and anti-Westernism became pervasive. Many Russians have become convinced that the West means Russia no good and, given an opportunity, would seek to inflict harm, unless it is strong enough to protect itself.

The state, which has a responsibility to protect, should be supported — paradoxically even when, as exemplified by the Kursk incursion, it has failed to do so. Accounts of civilians who were trapped for seven months under Ukrainian occupation brought the realities of war home to many Russians, while attacks on the Russian territory, which resulted, according to the official figures, in 621 civilian deaths, instilled a sense of insecurity in European Russia. Trump’s arrival marked a departure from hostility towards the U.S., but the prevailing attitude toward his peace initiatives is skepticism.

This new sense of national identity is not only rooted in the war. It also stems from economic dynamism. The Russian economy, the most heavily sanctioned globally, experienced sustained growth for three consecutive years. Despite inflation, there is a widespread mood of optimism about the future. The war has stimulated innovation. State and private manufacturers drive technological advancement, similar to what occurred during World War II when Katyusha rockets and T-34 tanks were created. While not all inventions may be groundbreaking, they are numerous and heavily publicized.

The Russian development model constitutes another key identity pillar. Large state obligations, public investment, affordable utilities, and low taxes are the customary norms that Russian citizens anticipate and that form the components of the social contract between them and the state. They believe that their counterparts in the West are disadvantaged in this regard.

The nation is also experiencing something of a cultural renaissance. While the public was initially shocked by the cancellation of Russian culture in the West in 2022, perceiving it as collective punishment, this has become the new normal. Consequently, attention has shifted toward domestic resources and the Russian public. Numerous new theaters, plays, music concerts, art galleries, and cultural venues have opened in major cities, catering to the growing demand for these offerings. Already, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Russians discovered their own country through travel, leading to a surge in domestic tourism, including previously inaccessible regions such as Dagestan and Chechnya.

At the start of the war, around 170 cultural figures fled Russia in protest, including Alla Pugacheva, the 76-year-old Russian diva, and Chulpan Khamatova, an actress, who starred in the internationally acclaimed “Good Bye, Lenin!” and the Russian TV series “Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes.” Out of all emigrés, perhaps these two had the widest acclaim as iconic faces of Russian popular culture. Pugacheva, moving between Israel, Cyprus, and Latvia, still commands interest among older-generation Russians due to her extravagant personality, but, as a performer, she lost prominence. Ironically, her ex-husband, Philipp Kirkorov, who stayed in Russia, became the country’s no.1 entertainer. Khamatova performs at a theater in Riga, Latvia, with the sole notable cinema role in which she is featured being a film about immigration. So far, the only cultural figure who has managed to achieve a successful career in the West is director Kirill Serebrennikov, while others have audiences chiefly among the Russian emigre circles.

Initially, the exodus of well-known figures disturbed educated Russians, but it also created space for others to move in, such as “Shaman” (Yaroslav Dronov), a prince of patriotic pop, or Yura Borisov, a leading character in the Oscar-winning “Anora” movie, who attracts offers from major international directors. Gradually, the plight of Russian figures abroad, facing alien cultural terrain and with no mass audiences or stable funding, started to generate derision back home. The thinking is that, if the Russians who left believed that their anti-war position would be rewarded by new careers in the West, they were mistaken.

Emphasis on Russian culture has become more pronounced, and not only because of the war. Russia, having rejected ‘woke’ ideology when it emerged onto the global stage, has presented itself as the ‘true,’ or traditional, 20th-century Europe. This appeals even to many liberal Russians, who aspired to join the Western civilization of the past, but not what it has become today. Even among Russians who strongly opposed the war, there is a feeling of satisfaction that Russia no longer has to defer to the West culturally.

Russia today is therefore a different country from the one that entered the war, with a greater sense of social cohesion and confidence in its own viability as a nation. In the long run, this may lead to profound changes in Russia’s identity. In the short term at least, it will sustain public willingness to continue the war.

Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn’t cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraftso that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2026. Happy Holidays!

Anna Matveeva

Dr. Anna Matveeva is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London, Russia Institute, and an author of Through Times of Trouble: Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within, Lexington Books, 2018. She specialises in issues of peace and conflict, and had a previous career at the United Nations Development Programme.

Top image credit: People walking on Red square in Moscow in winter. (Oleg Elkov/Shutterstock)

17. Archive Lawsuit Opens Vladimir Putin Memcons/Telcons

Summary:

National Security Archive documents released through a FOIA lawsuit open verbatim Putin–George W. Bush memcons and telcons from 2001–2008. The transcripts trace a rapid shift from post-9/11 partnership to open grievance as Iraq, missile defense, NATO expansion, and “color revolutions” hardened Moscow’s view of U.S. intent. Early calls show shared counterterror framing, including Putin’s Chechnya narrative, and unusually warm personal rapport. Later exchanges capture escalating strategic anxiety, especially about missile defense timelines and Russia’s “near abroad,” culminating after the 2008 Bucharest summit. The release also includes candid talk on Iran, north Korea, and China.

Comment: This is fascinating and explains a lot.

Archive Lawsuit Opens Vladimir Putin Memcons/Telcons

Verbatim transcripts with George W. Bush show trajectory from total U.S. partner after 9/11 to aggrieved interlocutor after Iraq, ABM, NATO expansion, color revolutions

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/foia-russia-programs/2025-12-23/archive-lawsuit-opens-vladimir-putin-memconstelcons

Washington, D.C., December 23, 2025 - The verbatim transcripts of Vladimir Putin's meetings and telephone calls with U.S. president George W. Bush from 2001 to 2008 opened to the public yesterday as the result of a Freedom of Information lawsuit by the National Security Archive.

The documents show that Russian president Putin was Bush's close ally in 2001 with their shared anti-terrorism focus, Putin's on Chechnya and Bush's on Al-Qaeda, to the point that Bush exclaimed "You're the type of guy I like to have in the foxhole with me."

But by the end of Bush's time in office, Putin had aired his severe criticisms of U.S. policies such as invading Iraq and expanding NATO in multiple venues including the famous Munich speech in 2007. Bush complained in a 2008 telcon that Putin "was very effective when you want to be in terms of being tough and hard" so please be "gentlemanly" in his comments at the NATO summit in Bucharest, so that Bush could visit Putin in Sochi afterwards.

Today's publication includes three of the most consequential Putin-Bush conversations, from 2001, 2005, and their last meeting in 2008.

Putin on his support for Israel: "If they need me to have a circumcision, that I can't do."

W in 2001: "You're the type of guy I like to have in the foxhole with me."

W in 2007: "I must confess I didn't realize the harshness of your reaction to the system [missile defense]. That's my fault."

Putin on Chechens 2001: "They are Bin Laden's students. Bin Laden trained them. You would know if you could see the pictures. They even look like him."

Putin 2008: "A missile launch from a submarine in Northern Europe would only take six minutes to reach Moscow." Bush: "I understand." Putin: "And we have established a set of response measures—there's nothing good about it. Within a few minutes our entire nuclear response capability will be in the sky."

The National Security Archive's director of Russia programs Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya provided the George W. Bush Library in November 2023 with a detailed Freedom of Information Act request for every conversation between Putin and Bush in the early 2000s, based on her research both on calendars and briefing books at the Bush Library in Dallas, and even more so, on the Kremlin website that frequently summarized each meeting and conversation.

But in June 2024, the George W. Bush Library informed the Archive “our best estimate at this time is that it [declassification review for the FOIA request] may be completed in approximately 12 years.”

With pro bono representation from the law firm of Goodwin Procter, the Archive filed suit in federal court in November 2024 to contest the estimated 12-year backlog of Freedom of Information requests for presidential records held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). As a result of the lawsuit, NARA processed the documents in 2025, informed both the former president and the current president in case they objected, and on December 22, informed the Archive of the release.

The Archive particularly thanks the exemplary Goodwin Procter lawyers who carried out this enormous public service, led by Jaime Santos and Andrew Kim.

The documents provide previously unavailable evidence on the close partnership between Putin and Bush after the 9/11 attacks, including extraordinary commentary by Bush on U.S. intentions in Afghanistan, year by year assessments of the U.S. debacle in Iraq, and much jocular interaction between the two presidents.

Over time the conversations become more difficult, especially around the Russian critique of American arguments for missile defense, and Putin's growing distrust of American intentions in Russia's "near abroad," the areas of the former Soviet Union where Putin keeps asserting his superior knowledge of the realities on the ground, and his own national interests.

The transcripts also provide highest-level candid discussions of Iran's nuclear ambitions, the realities of the North Korean nuclear program, and the rising power of China (Bush: "China is the biggest long term problem for both of us." Putin: "More for you." Bush: "They're not on our border....").

The nonprofit nonpartisan National Security Archive, based at George Washington University, has published award-winning books and reference collections on US-Soviet and US-Russian relations, including records of summit meetings during the Reagan, Bush 41, and Clinton administrations with their counterparts Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. The Archive won journalism's prestigious George Polk Award for “piercing self-serving veils of government secrecy.”

The Archive has brought multiple previous lawsuits under the FOIA and other federal records laws that preserved White House emails from the Reagan/Bush administrations and that saved over a billion White House email records and WhatsApp messages from President Trump's first term. Archive lawsuits have opened historic collections ranging from the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to the Chiquita Papers, to Donald Rumsfeld’s “snowflakes” written during the Iraq and Afghan wars.

READ THE Documents

Document 1

Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: Restricted Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin

Jun 16, 2001

Source

National Security Archive FOIA lawsuit, George W. Bush Library

In this first personal meeting at the Brno Castle in Slovenia Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush express respect for each other and desire to establish a close relationship. Putin tells Bush about his religious beliefs and the story of his cross that survived a fire at his dacha. In a short one-on-one meeting they cover all the most important issues of U.S.-Russian relations such as strategic stability, ABM treaty, nonproliferation, Iran, North Korea and NATO expansion. Bush tells his Russian counterpart that he believes Russia is part of the West and not an enemy, but raises a question about Putin’s treatment of a free press and military actions in Chechnya.

Putin prefers to talk about the need to combat terrorism and security threats. He is assertive and dominates the conversation, deflecting Bush’s question on press restrictions. He gives Bush a brief history lecture on (his interpretation) of the breakup of the Soviet Union: “What really happened? Soviet good will changed the world, voluntarily. And Russians gave up thousands of square kilometers of territory, voluntarily. Unheard of. Ukraine, part of Russia for centuries, given away. Kazakhstan, given away. The Caucasus, too. Hard to imagine, and done by party bosses.” Putin raises a question of Russian NATO membership and says Russia feels “left out.”

Document 2

Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation

Sep 16, 2005

Source

National Security Archive FOIA lawsuit, George W. Bush Library

Putin meets the U.S. President in the Oval Office for a plenary that covers mainly issues of nonproliferation and U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran and North Korea. The conversation shows impressively close positions on Iran and North Korea, with Putin presenting himself as an eager and supportive partner. Bush tells Putin “we don’t need a lot of religious nuts with nuclear weapons” referring to Iran. Putin gives Bush an extended presentation of the Russian understanding and concerns about Iran’s nuclear program as well as reasons Russia is engaged in the Bushehr reactor project. Putin asks Bush if the U.S. is developing a small nuclear weapon. After Rumsfeld’s detailed explanation of actual discussions of such a design, Bush says “Rumsfeld just gave away all our secrets.” Putin says he read all of them on the internet. Usual banter as seen in most Putin-Bush conversations. Moving to North Korea, Putin describes his recent visit to the country and suddenly gives Bush an insight into his own past commitment to communist ideology: “I used to be a member of the Communist Party. I believed in the ideas of communism. I was prepared to die for them. It’s a long road to inner transformation. People are limited to the cubicle they live in. And many are sincere in what they believe.”

Document 3

Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: Meeting with President of Russia

Apr 6, 2008

Source

National Security Archive FOIA lawsuit, George W. Bush Library

This is the last meeting between Putin and Bush, taking place at Putin’s residence in Bocharov Ruchei in Sochi on the Black Sea. The tone is strikingly different from the early conversations, where both presidents pledged cooperation on all issues and expressed commitment to strong personal relationship. This meeting takes place right after the NATO summit in Bucharest where tensions flared about the U.S. campaign for an invitation to Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. Putin is a gracious host and Bush is a polite guest, but they cannot avoid disagreements. Still it is impressive how they are still able to discuss substantive issues in a constructive manner. Putin gives a good explanation of the Russian perspective of missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Bush hears the Russian concerns but would not change his position. Turning to conversations in Bucharest, Putin states his strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia and says that Russia would be relying on anti-NATO forces in Ukraine and “creating problems” in Ukraine “all the time,” because it is concerned about “threat of military bases and new military systems being deployed in the proximity of Russia.” Surprisingly, in response, Bush expresses his admiration for the Russian president’s ability to present his case: “One of the things I admire about you is you weren't afraid to say it to NATO. That's very admirable. People listened carefully and had no doubt about your position. It was a good performance.”

18. Thailand, Cambodia Agree Immediate Cease-Fire in Border Clashes

Summary:

Thailand and Cambodia signed an immediate cease-fire Saturday to halt three weeks of intense fighting along their disputed border. The truce began at noon local time, and early reporting indicated clashes stopped. Since a prior truce collapsed on Dec. 8, at least 22 civilians have been killed, and Thailand says 25 soldiers died. The fighting, the deadliest in the century-old dispute, involved airstrikes, artillery, drones, and mutual accusations of attacks on civilian and cultural sites. The agreement freezes troop movement, but does not specify withdrawals, leaving durability uncertain. It calls for civilians to return home after mass displacement, includes a conditional release of 18 Cambodian POWs, and commits both sides to demining. Further talks are set in China’s Yunnan Province.

Thailand, Cambodia Agree Immediate Cease-Fire in Border Clashes

WSJ

At least 22 civilians—21 in Cambodia and one in Thailand—have been killed since an earlier truce collapsed on Dec. 8

By Gabriele Steinhauser

Updated Dec. 27, 2025 3:12 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/thailand-cambodia-agree-immediate-cease-fire-in-border-clashes-c8ec1f02

The defense ministers of Cambodia and Thailand, in an image released Saturday by Cambodian state media. Agence Kampuchea Press/Handout/Reuters

The defense ministers of Thailand and Cambodia on Saturday signed a cease-fire meant to end three weeks of deadly fighting along their disputed border.

The truce went into effect at noon local time, and initial reports from settlements along the 500-mile border suggested that clashes had indeed stopped.

At least 22 civilians—21 in Cambodia and one in Thailand—have been killed since an earlier cease-fire brokered in July by President Trump collapsed on Dec. 8. The Thai government says 25 of its soldiers have been killed, while Cambodia hasn’t disclosed military casualties.

The two bouts of fighting this year have been the deadliest on record in the century-old border dispute between the two Southeast Asian countries, and have involved the use of airstrikes, heavy artillery, drones and other weapons. Each side has accused the other of attacking civilian areas and cultural and religious sites. Around 100 people, many of them civilians, were killed during the clashes in July, according to officials from both countries.

It was unclear from the text of Saturday’s truce agreement whether it would lead to a permanent end to the conflict. Under the deal, both sides agreed to halt any movement of troops but didn’t say whether there were plans for a withdrawal of forces from the border area.

Still, it said that civilians should be able to return to their homes. More than 700,000 people on both sides of the border had fled their towns and villages this month, according to Thai and Cambodian officials.

Thailand agreed to release 18 Cambodian prisoners of war it has held since July, provided the cease-fire held for the first 72 hours, and both countries said they would work together to remove mines from the border area.

The Cambodian foreign minister, Prak Sokhonn, said he would meet his Thai counterpart in China’s Yunnan Province on Sunday and Monday for further talks at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com

WSJ

19. A Tiny Pacific Paradise Is Gaming the U.S.-China Rivalry Over Minerals

Summary:

A new resource front is opening in the South Pacific as the U.S. and China compete to access seabed minerals around the Cook Islands, where metal-rich nodules could supply cobalt, copper, manganese and some rare earths. With China dominant in refined rare earths, Washington is courting alternative sources and has moved to fast-track deep-sea mining, including licensing efforts. The Cook Islands are using the rivalry to attract investment, framing potential royalties as a route to better schools, hospitals and infrastructure. But local politics are tense, with backlash over secrecy in a China-linked exploration deal and worries about irreversible ecological damage to reefs and the wider ocean. New Zealand has also reacted, pausing some funding amid trust concerns.

Comment: But where will these rare earths be processed and refined?

A Tiny Pacific Paradise Is Gaming the U.S.-China Rivalry Over Minerals

WSJ

The Cook Islands—population 15,000—are being courted by two superpowers as they hunt for rare earths, and could stand to reap the benefits

By Yusuf Khan

| Photography by Alex King for WSJ

Dec. 26, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/a-tiny-pacific-paradise-is-gaming-the-u-s-china-rivalry-over-minerals-dccf5f1e

RAROTONGA, Cook Islands—In October, a U.S. research vessel arrived in this remote South Pacific nation to capture high-definition images of the seafloor. A few weeks later, a Chinese ship arrived to do the same thing.

The visits marked the opening of an unexpected new front in the rivalry between the U.S. and China over the world’s mineral resources.

Both countries want to unlock new deposits of rare earths, which are essential to make cars, jet fighters and other products, as well as other strategic minerals needed for products such as batteries. China currently controls around 90% of the world’s refined supply of rare earths, giving it significant leverage over the U.S.

South Pacific nations have large offshore mineral deposits—and they have never been touched.

While prospectors have long proposed mining the ocean floor, much like oil companies drill offshore, such efforts have come to nothing. The costs and environmental damage of ripping up the seabed are expected to be high.

But now, U.S.-China competition is putting offshore mining back in the spotlight. Places such as the Cook Islands are doing everything they can to play the two sides off against one another.

Earlier this year, the island nation reached a controversial deal with China in which it offered to let it explore the seafloor around its territory in return for investments in infrastructure and its fishing industry. Although the existence of a deal was made public, some details were initially kept secret, drawing protests from locals and some regional leaders.

Beijing promptly whisked Cook Islands leaders off to China to show off its mining technology, while also offering training and scholarships for Cook Islands students to study in China.

A gift from Chinese officials at the offices of the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority.

Afraid of losing out, the U.S. pushed through an agreement with the Pacific nation this August to explore and fund potential seabed mining there.

David Copley, a former U.S. Navy officer who is now Trump’s mineral czar, made a personal trip to Rarotonga, the most populous island. U.S. and Cook Islands government news releases showed him in a suit picking at pieces of pineapple and papaya as he sat opposite a group of diplomats in Hawaiian-style shirts.

In subsequent visits, U.S. representatives floated sweeteners, including offering to build an airport, supply ocean-research vessels, and even donate a bus.

Named after English explorer James Cook, the collection of 15 islands stretches across an area of ocean roughly the size of Saudi Arabia.

The jockeying has divided Rarotonga, where chickens and dogs roam freely, and buildings aren’t allowed to be bigger than the tallest coconut trees. Business meetings are held in shorts and flip-flops.

The islands “have the potential to be a power player, but do they have the capacity to be playing with the big boys?” asked Kelvin Passfield, technical director of Te Ipukarea Society, a local environmental nonprofit. “Do we know what we’re getting ourselves into?”

Wider push

Washington’s efforts to cultivate the Cook Islands reflect the Trump administration’s increasingly unorthodox approach to securing resources deemed essential to U.S. economic and military security, after China hurt American businesses by restricting access to rare-earth minerals this year.

In July, the Pentagon announced plans to take a 15%, multibillion-dollar stake in MP Materials, America’s largest rare earth miner. Two months earlier, it strong-armed Ukraine into signing an agreement giving the U.S. access to Ukrainian minerals to help compensate for American military support.

Offshore minerals have become a bigger priority. In April, President Trump signed an executive order to fast-track development of deep-sea mining, in which he pledged to start approving applications for companies to start mining in international waters.

The step had dubious legal validity, since deep-sea areas are governed by treaties administered by the United Nations, rather than individual nations. However, one Canadian-listed outfit, the Metals Company, has already applied for a U.S. license to mine in the Pacific Ocean between Mexico and Hawaii.

Access to the islands’ resources is simpler, because the metals lie within the country’s exclusive economic zone. That in theory gives it the right to grant a license to whomever it wants, though the industry is so new that some legal questions remain unanswered.

The economy of the Cook Islands is highly dependent on foreign aid and tourists. Many locals have emigrated in search of better opportunities.

“President Trump has prioritized expanding production of critical minerals in an unprecedented way,” said Anna Kelly, the White House deputy press secretary. The Trump administration also recently published a list of areas to explore in U.S. waters, including offshore California, Alaska and Hawaii, which likewise wouldn’t be governed by U.N. rules.

The Republic of Nauru, with one of the world’s smallest economies, has signed its own deal with the Metals Company. Kiribati, another island nation, has said it is exploring an offshore mining partnership with China.

Other Pacific islands are adamantly opposed, saying offshore mining is too dangerous, with science on its practicality lacking.

Island paradise

For the Cook Islands, it could be a game-changer.

Named after English explorer James Cook, who visited in the 1770s, the Cooks include 15 islands across an area roughly the size of Saudi Arabia.

The economy is highly dependent on foreign aid and tourists. Many people have emigrated for better opportunities in places such as New Zealand, leaving a local population of 15,000.

Alcohol abuse and obesity are common. Almost all food—except for fish, coconuts and some root vegetables—must be imported. People living on the more remote islands have to travel for days by boat to get basic medical care.

With little room for agriculture, the Cook Islands must import much of its food.

Thanks to their location close to tectonic plate fault lines, South Pacific islands are surrounded by potentially enormous mineral deposits. The deposits are scattered across the seabed in the form of small rocks known as nodules, akin to black golf balls filled with cobalt, copper and manganese, as well as some rare earths.

Cook Islands officials believe that royalties from offshore mining could help pay for better hospitals and schools, in effect doing for the islands what oil has done for Norway.

“Looking after [the ocean] is an imperative,” said Beverly Stacey-Ataera, commissioner of the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority, which governs seabed mining in the country. Even so, the economic benefits of mining “would be substantive.”

Power games

China has been courting the islands for years. It built the local police station, an elementary school and the irrigation system in Rarotonga.

In the deal it signed in February, Beijing offered roughly $2.3 million in aid and infrastructure, in return for pledges to cooperate on deep sea-mining research and exploration.

Beverly Stacey-Ataera, commissioner of the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority, sits beside a bowl of nodules—the small, seabed rocks that are rich in minerals.

Protests were held in Rarotonga. New Zealand, traditionally the islands’ biggest aid provider, paused funding, saying that steps needed to be taken to “repair confidence and trust” between both countries.

The U.S. ramped up its own charm offensive.

Washington was coming somewhat late to the party: It only established diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands in September 2023, as part of a Biden administration initiative to expand the U.S.’s presence in the region to counter China.

As part of its August agreement with the islands, the U.S. sent representatives from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to meet with environmental groups. That was followed by a 21-day visit of the roughly 220-foot EV Nautilus, an exploration vessel equipped with remotely operated vehicles and acoustic mapping systems, to study the seafloor.

Investors are paying attention. Moana Minerals, a wholly owned subsidiary of Houston-based Ocean Minerals, recently pitched Cook Islands mining to the U.S. House of Representatives.

Resignation

For many in Rarotonga, there is a sense of futility when it comes to U.S.-China competition and deep-sea mining, even though technically the islands haven’t yet formally legalized mining. So far, it has only extended exploration licenses.

“Inevitably it will happen,” said Mike Tavioni, who runs a carving and arts workshop dedicated to preserving Cook Islands Maori life.

“When the world needs those elements, they’re going to get” them, said the 78-year-old, smoking a cigarette and surrounded by wooden shavings. At least it would help provide more predictable revenue than tourism and fishing, he said.

Cook Islands residents, from top, Mike Tavioni, Kevin Iro and Hinano Macquarie.

Kevin Iro, a former rugby player, has suggested creating a raui—a Maori-style agreement that puts some areas off-limits to exploitation during certain seasons. He said it could be used when whales are migrating with their calves.

But he wonders if the islands would have the power to enforce it, especially when foreign interests want to extract minerals year-round. “If it is going to happen, then we have to be prepared,” he said.

Others remain skeptical.

“We don’t know what deep-sea mining will do,” said Hinano Macquarie, a local resident who spends her mornings snorkeling among the Rarotonga’s coral reefs, removing fishing nets and trash. “Will it destroy our ocean?”

“You’re talking about big powers. We’re just little people. They will control it, not us,” she said.

Write to Yusuf Khan at yusuf.khan@wsj.com

WSJ

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website