Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quote of the Day:

“How can an act done under compulsion have any moral element in it, seeing that what is moral is the free act of an intelligent being?”

- Auberon Herbert

"In any campaign in the future, the participant who fails to take proper cognizance of guerrilla warfare, either in the planning or execution stages, may suffer severe setbacks, if not eventual defeat."

- Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, September 1950

"Before the U.S. Government decides to render support to a resistance, it establishes contact with representatives of a resistance organization to assess the compatibility of U.S. and resistance interests and objectives. This assessment is largely a political negotiation between the U.S. Government and the resistance organization. Once the U.S. Government establishes compatibility, it assesses the resistance potential."

FM 3-18 Special Forces Operations, 2014

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 28

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1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 28

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28

Key Takeaways

The Russian offensive against Bakhmut is likely culminating.
Russian forces appear to be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast and appear less likely to conduct a new offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast in the winter of 2023.
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate that Russia has no genuine intention of engaging in negotiations with Ukraine by insisting that Ukraine accept Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian land.
The Kremlin continues to present the US transfer of Patriot air defense systems as an escalation in US-Russia relations, but ISW forecasts with high confidence that Russia will not deliberately seek to escalate to a major conflict with NATO as a result.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations toward Kreminna, where Russian forces continued counterattacks to regain lost positions.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued defensive and rotational operations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
The Kremlin has approved additional funds for the development of defensive fortifications and is attempting to staff fortification efforts in Russian border areas and occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 28

Dec 28, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

George Barros, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 28, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian offensive against Bakhmut is likely culminating as ISW forecasted on December 27.[1] US military doctrine defines culmination as the "point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense,” and “when a force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause.”[2] If Russian forces in Bakhmut have indeed culminated, they may nevertheless continue to attack aggressively. Culminated Russian forces may continue to conduct ineffective squad-sized assaults against Bakhmut, though these assaults would be very unlikely to make operationally significant gains.

Several indicators support the assessment that Russian forces around Bakhmut have culminated.

Senior Ukrainian officials are visiting frontline positions in Bakhmut unimpeded. Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) chief, Kyrylo Budanov, visited Bakhmut on December 27-28 and was geolocated to within at least 600 meters of the previously recorded Russian forward line of troops.[3] Budanov’s visit supports previous Ukrainian social media reports that Ukrainian forces conducted a tactical counterattack that repelled Russian forces from the outskirts of Bakhmut on December 21.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Bakhmut on December 20.[5]

Recent combat footage supports ISW’s previous assessment that Russian forces are operating in squad-sized assault groups due to combat losses.[6] Combat footage posted on December 26 shows Ukrainian fire defeating squad-sized groups of 5-10 unsupported Russian infantry attempting a disorderedly assault on Novoselivske in Luhansk Oblast.[7] This footage, while not from Bakhmut, is consistent with a senior Ukrainian official’s report that Russian forces in the Bakhmut area are no longer operating as company and battalion tactical groups but are instead operating in smaller groups of 10 to 15 servicemembers (squad-size organizations) as of December 27.[8]

Russian airborne forces (VDV) are reportedly augmenting Wagner Group operations around Bakhmut. A Russian source reported that Wagner and VDV elements conducted joint operations in Bakhmut on December 27.[9] The report, if true, marks an inflection given that the Wagner Group has been conducting information operations to assert that the Wagner Group forces exclusively are operating in Bakhmut.[10] The conventional Russian military supporting Wagner Group elements in Bakhmut—after Wagner took efforts to emphasize it exclusively is responsible for the Bakhmut sector—would be consistent with indicators for the Wagner Group forces’ culmination. ISW has previously assessed that Wagner Group forces are serving a chiefly attritional role around Bakhmut and have therefore likely become degraded to a near-debilitating extent and need reinforcement from more conventional Russian elements.[11] High rates of attrition amongst the forces responsible for the offensive on Bakhmut may expedite the culmination unless notable numbers of regular Russian military units are sent to sustain the offensive and delay or avert its culmination.

Russian forces appear to be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast, although it is unclear whether for defensive or offensive operations. Russian forces continue accumulating equipment and forces in Luhansk. VDV elements that were likely previously operating in Kherson Oblast appear to have redeployed to Luhansk Oblast following the Russian withdrawal from west bank Kherson Oblast in November.[12] Social media images from late December increasingly show Russian equipment in transit in Luhansk Oblast.[13] Russian forces are operating military district-level thermobaric artillery assets in the Luhansk area of operations, which may indicate a prioritization of operations in this area.[14] Ukrainian intelligence reported on December 26 that the Russian military appointed a new Western Military District (WMD) commander who is commanding Russian forces out of a command post in Boguchar, Voronezh Oblast.[15] WMD elements (such as the 144th Motorized Rifle Division) are the principal forces operating in the Luhansk sector and a command change could indicate efforts to support a new decisive effort in this area. Senior Ukrainian officials have stated that Russian forces in Belarus and Zaporizhia are not forming strike groups as of late December, but notably have not made similar statements about Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast.[16] Russian forces have been establishing extensive trenches and field fortifications in Luhansk Oblast for several months—activity that could support a planned Russian decisive effort in the vicinity of Luhansk Oblast.[17] The aforementioned indicators may suggest that Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast are preparing for an offensive operation, as ISW has previously forecasted, but may also indicate preparation for larger spoiling attacks or a defensive counterattack to take advantage of Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts in the area that the Russians expect to stop.[18]

Russian forces appear less likely to conduct a new offensive in the Zaporizhia Oblast over the winter. Russian forces are likely establishing defenses against possible Ukrainian offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[19] Russian forces likely destroyed a bridge over a river in Polohy on December 28.[20] A senior Ukrainian military official stated on December 28 that there are no signs of Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast forming strike groups despite some rotations and deployments there.[21] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on December 27 that Ukrainian forces will conduct an offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast but that the offensive is not imminent because of muddy conditions.[22] Recent Russian mining and fortification efforts in Zaporizhia Oblast and the Dnipro River coastline indicate that Russian forces do not seek to conduct an offensive there.[23]

The Kremlin continues to systematically deny Ukrainian sovereignty and reiterate that Russia has no genuine intention to engage in negotiation with Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the Ukrainian proposal to prepare a peace initiative at the United Nations in February and emphasized that no peace plan can exist for Ukraine without accounting for the entry of Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts into the Russian Federation.[24] Peskov clearly indicated that the Kremlin has no genuine intent to compromise its demands, thus directly undermining the Kremlin’s own narrative that Russia is willing to talk but Ukraine is not.[25] ISW has continuously reported that Russia is using the discussion of negotiations as an information operation to force Ukraine into making massive concessions on Russia’s terms.[26] Russian leaders' insistence that Ukraine enter negotiations having accepted the illegal Russian annexation of more than 100,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian land emphasizes the lack of genuine interest in negotiations on the part of the Kremlin.

The Kremlin continues to present the US transfer of Patriot air defense systems and accompanying trainers to Ukraine as an escalation in US-Russia relations, despite the fact that the transfer is if anything less escalatory than previous Western military shipments to Ukraine because Patriot is a purely defensive system. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed in a televised interview on December 28 that US officials had guaranteed to not send Patriot air defense trainers to Ukraine in an effort to refrain from participating in the war.[27] The Kremlin has previously highlighted the US transfer of Patriot air-defense systems in accusations that the United States and the West are waging a proxy war in Ukraine with the intent of weakening or destroying the Russian Federation.[28] The Kremlin uses these accusations in support of information operations that aim to frame Ukraine as a Western puppet devoid of sovereignty and to weaken Western security assistance to Ukraine by stoking fears of Russian escalation.[29] The Kremlin could use any Western transfer of military equipment to Ukraine as support for these information operations. The Kremlin’s decision to react to the transfer of the Patriot air defense systems more strongly than to previous weapons transfers indicates that the Kremlin is more concerned with the effect Western help can have on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine than with supposed Russian fears of putative Ukrainian offensive actions against the Russian Federation itself using Western systems. That observation is worth considering in the context of Western discussions of providing Ukraine with Western tanks, long-range attack systems, and other capabilities.

ISW forecasts with high confidence that Putin will not seek to engage NATO militarily at this time in response to the provision of any of the Western military systems currently under discussion. Russia is barely holding off the Ukrainian military at a fearful cost to itself and Russian forces in Ukraine could not survive a serious conflict with NATO at this time. The risks of deliberate Russian escalation to a major conflict with NATO in the foreseeable future are thus extremely low.

Key Takeaways

The Russian offensive against Bakhmut is likely culminating.
Russian forces appear to be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast and appear less likely to conduct a new offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast in the winter of 2023.
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate that Russia has no genuine intention of engaging in negotiations with Ukraine by insisting that Ukraine accept Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian land.
The Kremlin continues to present the US transfer of Patriot air defense systems as an escalation in US-Russia relations, but ISW forecasts with high confidence that Russia will not deliberately seek to escalate to a major conflict with NATO as a result.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations toward Kreminna, where Russian forces continued counterattacks to regain lost positions.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued defensive and rotational operations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
The Kremlin has approved additional funds for the development of defensive fortifications and is attempting to staff fortification efforts in Russian border areas and occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna on December 28. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an assault near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) where there is reportedly fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces for a section of the R-66 highway that leads into Kreminna.[30] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct operations to liberate Kreminna, although he emphasized that it is too early to discuss the settlement’s capture.[31] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian civilian workers and Russian military command have evacuated from Kreminna, possibly indicating that Russian forces are preparing for an intensified Ukrainian effort to seize the settlement.[32] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct long-term methodical probing of Russian positions in the vicinity of Kreminna and are suffering heavy losses in these operations.[33] A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing an offensive on Kreminna simultaneously from three directions.[34] ISW does not make assessments about specific future Ukrainian operations. A social media source posted footage on December 27 claiming that Ukrainian forces captured Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), although ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[35]

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions in the Kreminna area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Ploshchanka (16km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that on December 27 elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District and the 74th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District pushed Ukrainian forces out of strategic high elevation positions near the Balka Zhuravka River (16km northwest of Kreminna).[37] The Russian milblogger also claimed that on December 27 elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division conducted assaults in the direction of Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed on December 28 that Russian forces attempted to advance near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna)[39]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on December 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut; within 30km northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmtuske, and Pidhorodne; and within 11km southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka and Klishchiivka.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Wagner Group pushed through Ukrainian fortified positions in Soledar and established control over two strongholds near Pidhorodne.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing from positions near Bakhmut toward Soledar and tried to advance towards Bakhmut from positions southeast of Soledar.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting Ukrainian forces in urban areas in the southern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[43] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are suffering heavy losses in the Bakhmut area.[44] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults south of Bakhmut near Dyliivka and Opytne and captured strongholds on the eastern outskirts of Klishchiivka.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka and within 32km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Marinka, and Pobieda.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults southwest of Avdiivka in the direction of Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Novomykhailivka, and from the direction of Opytne.[47] Another Russian milblogger posted footage on December 28 purporting to show elements of the 11th Regiment of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia fighting Ukrainian forces in the eastern outskirts of Pervomaiske.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also tried to advance near Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) and Oleksandropil (17km northeast of Avdiivka).[49]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault in western Donetsk Oblast on December 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Zolota Nyva (66km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces also destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Volodymyrivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[52]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive and rotational operations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on December 28. The Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces, Yevhen Yerin, stated that Russian troops in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions are undertaking rotational measures and changing their positions to compensate for constant degradation due to Ukrainian strikes.[53] Yerin also noted that Russian troops in Zaporizhia Oblast may be creating new, more powerful units but that such units remain unlikely to form a strike group capable of offensive actions, thereby suggesting that these newly forming units are defensive in nature.[54] Yerin’s observations most likely mean that these reported units are comprised of infantry elements without sufficient armored vehicles or artillery assets for large-scale offensive operations. Satellite imagery taken on December 22 and posted on December 28 additionally shows the construction of Russian defensive field fortifications along the T0401 Tokmak-Polohy highway.[55]

Russian sources continue to clarify the current Russian force composition in southern Ukraine. A delegation of Russian officials, including First Deputy Head of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Kiriyenko and Federation Council Deputy Head Andriy Turchak, visited soldiers of the 98th Airborne Division and inspected defensive lines on the east bank of Kherson Oblast on December 28.[56] Russian sources also indicated the elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps and of the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District are conducting defensive operations along unspecified sectors of the front in Zaporizhia Oblast.[57] The 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade was previously active on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast prior to the withdrawal in November.[58] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[59]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian concentration areas in the rear areas of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that December 26 Ukrainian strikes hit Russian positions in Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast, about 45km south of Nova Kakhovka along the T2202 Nova Kakhovka-Arminansk route.[60] Residents of Velyka Lepetykha, Kakhovka, and Radensk (all on the east bank of Kherson Oblast) reported the sound of explosions due to potential Ukrainian strikes.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes destroyed an S-300 anti-aircraft missile system and various other pieces of military equipment and wounded 150 Russian personnel in an unspecified location in Zaporizhia Oblast.[62]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin has approved additional funds for the development of defensive fortifications and is attempting to staff fortification efforts in Russian border areas and occupied Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin announced on December 27 that the Kremlin has allocated 34 billion rubles (approximately $467 million dollars) for the construction of fortifications in regions bordering Ukraine, likely including in illegally annexed Ukrainian territories.[63] Russian occupation officials have previously boasted about the construction of defensive lines in Zaporizhia Oblast, and satellite imagery showed that Russian forces and Wagner Group are fortifying positions in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and Crimea.[64] Mishustin also promised that the Kremlin will conduct checks on the proper allocation of funds to satisfy the needs of the "special military operation.” A Russian opposition outlet reported that Russian authorities are reportedly inviting janitors and public sanitation workers in Moscow to volunteer to dig trenches in Donbas in exchange for a one-time payment of 50,000 rubles (about $700) and a daily compensation of 1,000 rubles per day (about $14).[65]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to expand social benefits to participants of the “special military operation” while continuing to deny that Russians are participating in a full-fledged war. Putin signed a law on December 28 that provides free social services to disabled individuals who have participated in a combat operation. Putin had also extended such a provision to participants of World War II, survivors of the Leningrad blockade, and survivors of the siege of Sevastopol during World War II.[66] The Kremlin had only previously offered such accommodations for free to persons affected by emergencies and minors. Putin had introduced several benefits to individuals involved in his war effort—servicemen and civilians—that commit Russia to a long-term financial responsibility.[67] Putin continues to undertake costly provisions for a campaign that he is unable to declare a war.

Russian officials may be fearing the long-term detrimental consequences of the Russian war on Russia’s population. Russian Union of Lawyers Head Igor Trunov stated on December 28 that the Russian Health Ministry has determined that it can offer federal financial support for free conservation and storage of the sperm of mobilized servicemen who participate in the war between 2022 and 2024 in response to his appeal to create a “free cryobank of genetic material.”[68] Trunov stated that the Russian Union of Lawyers plans to seek the free cryopreservation of genetic material on behalf of several interested couples whose husbands were mobilized. The Russian Ministry of Health has yet to officially comment on Trunov’s statements.

Russian forces are continuing to face low morale and poor discipline problems, resulting in violent incidents within the military. A Russian opposition outlet reported that a drunk mobilized Russian serviceman beat his commander to death in Chelyabinsk Oblast.[69] Local Russian outlets also reported that a Russian mobilized serviceman was found dead by strangulation in Saratov Oblast. The mobilized man also reportedly had hematomas and abrasions on his body.[70]

Ukrainian media amplified footage on December 28 reportedly showing a fire at the Russian 150th Motorized Riffle Division’s barracks in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.[71]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to restrict movement out of occupied areas. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported that Russian forces are enforcing a 24-hour curfew in settlements of the Vasylivka and Polohy raions of Zaporizhia Oblast.[72] Fedorov also noted that Russian forces are establishing roadblocks within Melitopol and increasing filtration and other law enforcement measures.[73] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also stated that occupation authorities entirely closed the checkpoint in Vasylivka and will only open it on January 15 for pedestrian (as opposed to motor) traffic.[74]

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to facilitate the bureaucratic, administrative, and economic integration of occupied areas of Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on December 28 that the Kremlin is rushing passportization measures in occupied Luhansk Oblast, especially in regard to registering Ukrainian children under the age of 14 to obtain Russian citizenship.[75] Haidai reported that this means that parents must also have Russian passports, and that parents are threatened with the refusal of social benefits if they refuse to obtain passports for themselves or their children.[76] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin additionally presented a certificate of registration for the Donetsk regional branch of the United Russia party political council on December 27, thus officially certifying the integration of his administration with the regional political branch of the United Russia party.[77] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevheny Balitsky claimed that the Zaporizhia occupation administration is continuing efforts to "rubleize” Zaporizhia Oblast and indicated that 12% to 15% of currency in circulation in Zaporizhia Oblast is still hryvnias, despite concentrated efforts to ban hryvnia exchanges.

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted a video on December 27 showing Russian servicemen conducting tactical training with Belarusian personnel at an unspecified training ground in Belarus. The Russian MoD reiterated that Russian and Belarusian units form a combined Regional Grouping of Forces within the Union State.[78]
The Minsk Military Commandant’s Office stated on December 27 that Belarusian military authorities are conducting a series of unspecified measures to transition from peacetime to wartime as part of a Belarusian comprehensive snap readiness check.[79]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of December 27.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[3] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/nachalnyk-hur-mo-ukrainy-vidvidav-peredovi-pozytsii-ukrainskykh-syl-oborony-v-bakhmuti.html; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1608100756954939392; https://twitter.com/DI_Ukraine/status/1608035113933176832; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1608095244758687744; https://t.me/killpukin/12702; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1608097041275817984

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... office.net/evergreen-assets/safelinks/1/atp-safelinks.html

[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/12/28/oznak-formuvannya-vorogom-udarnogo-ugrupovannya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-narazi-nemaye-yevgen-yerin/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cninYJtXAeNLgRdF7Kc... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jXoWN4bTf1krtoZ8xrc...

[20] https://t.me/vrogov/6806 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/73833; https://suspilne dot media/348006-u-pologah-na-zaporizzi-okupanti-pidirvali-pisohidnij-mist/

[21] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/12/28/oznak-formuvannya-vorogom-udarnogo-ugrupovannya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-narazi-nemaye-yevgen-yerin/

[24] https://tass dot ru/politika/16704397

[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/16708791

[31] https://suspilne dot media/348106-recnik-shidnogo-ugrupovanna-zsu-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-bila-kreminnoi/

[32] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7696; https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9015 ; https://suspilne dot media/348106-recnik-shidnogo-ugrupovanna-zsu-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-bila-kreminnoi/

[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/12/28/oznak-formuvannya-vorogom-udarnogo-ugrupovannya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-narazi-nemaye-yevgen-yerin/

[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/12/28/oznak-formuvannya-vorogom-udarnogo-ugrupovannya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-narazi-nemaye-yevgen-yerin/

[66] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/28/putin-podpisal-zakon-o-besplatnom-sotsosbsluzhivanii-dlya-invalidov-boevyh-deystviy

[67] https://www.pnp dot ru/social/putin-podpisal-zakon-o-statuse-veterana-boevykh-deystviy-dlya-uchastnikov-specoperacii.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/19/putin-rasporyadilsya-vydelit-uchastnikam-voyny-zemelnye-uchastki-v-podmoskovie-krymu-i-sevastopole

[68] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64107729; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/28/glava-soyuza-advokatov-rossii-mobilizovannye-poluchat-vozmozhnost-besplatno-zamorozit-spermu; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16702093

[69] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1608032534289416193?s=20&t=pv... https://74 dot ru/text/criminal/2022/12/28/71935904/

[70] https://fn-volga dot ru/news/view/id/198405; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1608030585578000385?s=20&t=pv...

[71] https://glavred dot net/world/pod-rostovom-dotla-vygorela-kazarma-motostrelkovoy-divizii-10436741.html; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/25583; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love...

[74] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/28/okupanty-planuyut-zaprovadyty-pishyj-rezhym-na-propusknomu-punkti-v-vasylivczi/

understandingwar.org

2. Army special operations rethinking force structure, tech

People (us old guys) will be upset about any changes to the A Team. Frankly I do not think it is worth arguing over the A-Team. I think other changes/proposals are much more important. I will support 12 or 16 soldiers (recall a SEAL Platoon is 16 SEALs - we should be careful about making SF and SEALs the same size - it will be more ammunition for the bean counters to make all SOF fungible as the 2010 QDR did when it said there are "600 SOF teams" and included all ODAs, SEAL Platoons, MArSOC Teams (MSOT), CA Teams, Tactical PSYOP eams, CCT, STS, etc, etc. counting each onas one of the 600 SOF Teams - Again special operations elements are not fungible.)

Here are some things we should focus on that go well beyond reorganizing the A Team.

Reestablishing the Special Action Force (e.g. SAFASIA and 8th SAF in Panama) but in all theaters - each specifically task organized for the conditions of the heater and the required missions. (SAF later became the Security Assistance Force in the 1981 Low Intensity Conflict Manual). For a discussion of the SAF concept see "Special Forces Missions: Return to the Roots for a Vision of the Future." HERE. For the detailed SAF in Army doctrine see the 1963 FM 31-22 US Army Forces in Counterinsurgency (HERE)

SAF ASIA HERE and HERE

8th SAF HERE and HERE and HERE

Re-establish permanent SF (SOF detachments) overseas in the right strategic locations with the right task organization for the conditions and mission.

Examples to use for models: DET-A in Berlin (HERE), the 46th SF Company in Thailand (HERE and HERE ) , the Taiwan Resident Detachment (HERE), and Special Forces Detachment Korea (HERE this detachment still exists today).

Permanently forward station a Special Forces battalion in every theater around the world (a task organized SF Battalion with CA and PSYOP and others). Permanently forward station the 4th battalions of the SF groups in every theater.

Develop plans inspired by the 1962 "US Overseas Internal Development Plan" (HERE) such as this "Draft Political Warfare Plan" in 2015 (HERE)

We also need to learn to conduct global assessments in the "gray zone" like BG Richard Stilwell's "Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War." ( HERE )

Then there are things at the national level above SOF such as organizing for political warfare (HERE)

Army special operations rethinking force structure, tech

news.yahoo.com · by Davis WinkieDecember 28, 2022, 5:56 AM·1 min read

The next year could prove pivotal for the Army’s most elite forces, as ongoing experiments with force structure and how to best integrate technical expertise at the tactical level could reshape the way the service’s special operations look and fight.

Army Times obtained an exclusive interview with the commanding general of Army Special Operations Command at the Association of the U.S. Army conference in October, highlighting the pilot programs for the publication’s November cover story.

Lt. Gen. Jon Braga explained that the increasing role that space and cyber operations play in competition and conflicts (such as the ongoing war in Ukraine) has necessitated a reconsideration of long-held truths. The recently-unveiled “influence triad” is a framework to help commanders consider special operations, space and cyber together in a modern-era “combined arms” model.

The command is experimenting with expanding the size of the Special Forces operational detachment-alpha from the traditional 12 soldiers to 16. Other “convergence” efforts are underway to integrate all three branches of Army SOF at the battalion and brigade headquarters levels rather than keeping them siloed by branch as they currently are.

Braga also said that the command is experimenting with creating a new career field with a tech focus to help take some of the technical load off of the soldiers currently on the teams.

The commander indicated that other options could be on the table as well, such as restructuring the reserve component civil affairs and psychological operations formations.

news.yahoo.com · by Davis WinkieDecember 28, 2022, 5:56 AM·1 min read

3. Sikorsky-Boeing protest Army's FLRAA award to Bell Textron

Sikorsky-Boeing protest Army's FLRAA award to Bell Textron - Breaking Defense

GAO has up to 100 days to rule in a bid protest, but the congressional watchdog agency strives to resolve cases as quickly as possible.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · December 28, 2022

Concept art of the Sikorsky Boeing Defiant rotorcraft. (Sikorsky Boeing)

WASHINGTON — Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky and teammate Boeing today formally protested the Army’s choice of Bell Textron’s V-280 Valor tiltrotor in the coveted Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) competition, asking the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the decision.

“Based on a thorough review of the information and feedback provided by the Army, Lockheed Martin Sikorsky, on behalf of Team DEFIANT, is challenging the FLRAA decision. The data and discussions lead us to believe the proposals were not consistently evaluated to deliver the best value in the interest of the Army, our Soldiers and American taxpayers,” the two companies declared in a statement.

On Dec. 4, the Army announced it had selected the Valor over the Defiant. The announced deal is worth up to $1.3 billion with the initial obligation valued at $232 million over the next 19 months. However, should the FLRAA program move into full production, the Army estimates it could be worth $70 billion over its lifetime.

Given the money involved, a bid protest wasn’t unexpected. Following the award announcement, Douglas Bush, the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, told reporters on Dec. 5 that the service’s FLRAA schedule already has “accounted” for a protest.

GAO has up to 100 days to rule in a bid protest, but the congressional watchdog agency strives to resolve cases as quickly as possible.

Some analysts believe the choice of Bell’s tiltrotor-based Valor over Sikorsky-Boeing’s coaxial rotor Defiant X could also shape the technological direction of the Army’s upcoming Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) competition. FARA is the potential replacement for the retired OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. For that competition, Bell’s 360 Invictus is up against Sikorsky’s Raider X.

FARA flight testing is still a ways away, delayed at least a year in part due to problems with the Improved Turbine Engine Program. Army officials have said they are hopeful prototype flights can begin in fiscal 2024.

4. Russia Celebrates Turning Elon Musk Into a Useful Idiot

Russia Celebrates Turning Elon Musk Into a Useful Idiot

The billionaire Twitter boss may have been joking when he gushed at a Putin underling’s bizarre predictions of global chaos. Kremlin admirers don’t care.

Julia Davis

Published Dec. 28, 2022 1:33PM ET

The Daily Beast · December 28, 2022

Photo by CARINA JOHANSEN/NTB/AFP via Getty Images

On Monday, former Russian President and current Vladimir Putin stooge Dmitry Medvedev issued a flurry of outlandish predictions on his personal Twitter account.

Among them: a Fourth Reich will be created in Europe; there will be a war between France and said Fourth Reich; Poland and Hungary will attack and occupy western regions of Ukraine; civil war will break out in the U.S., which would then split up, with Elon Musk emerging as a president; the E.U. will collapse; the International Monetary Fund would cease to exist; and all stock markets and financial activities will leave Europe and the U.S. and move to Asia.

The so-called forecast made waves in the international media, and earned a response from Twitter boss Musk, who called Medvedev’s ramblings “an epic thread.” True to form, Musk later suggested he was trolling. But candid discussions by Russian pundits suggest Medvedev’s posts were merely a crude plot designed to pollute the Western info-space with narratives of the Kremlin’s choosing—in other words, a troll of his own.

And while it may have been tongue in cheek, Musk’s initial response prompted Russian talking heads to conclude that this info-mission was successfully accomplished.

As Putin’s invasion of Ukraine continues to sputter and stall, Russia’s efforts on the information front are proceeding much more smoothly. One aspect of this warfare is focused on convincing the West that it is about to suffer a series of severe consequences as a result of its support of Ukraine’s resistance against the invading Russian forces. Targeting foreign audiences, state-controlled international media network RT released a distasteful Christmas ad, telling Westerners they will soon be freezing in their homes and eating pet hamsters out of desperation.

Photo by Contributor/Getty Images

Medvedev’s forecast of doom and gloom followed in the same footsteps. It wasn’t meant to be taken seriously, merely striving to muddy the waters. Maximizing the exposure was key, which is why Medvedev’s predictions included the improbable suggestion that foreign-born Musk would become the next president over what is left of the “disintegrating” United States.

The apparent aim of this claim was to attract Musk’s attention, prompting his social media engagement—and it worked like a charm. His Twitter reply to Medvedev’s harebrained pronouncements amplified their Westward spread.

During Tuesday’s broadcast of Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda, writer Nikolai Starikov appeared on the segment hosted by journalist Vladimir Vorsobin, and the two discussed Medvedev’s controversial Twitter thread, divining the dark and gloomy future for Western countries and institutions. While Starikov gushed over Medvedev’s proposals, Vorsobin said he was unpleasantly surprised by their juvenile and facetious nature. The journalist complained about Russian diplomacy descending into the realm of Internet blogging and slinging mud at their opponents, even at the high level of prominent government officials like Medvedev.

Vorsobin noted that Medvedev’s forecast was almost entirely implausible, rendering it pointless as a conversation-starter. Starikov disagreed: “We’re constantly living according to the agenda dictated by Western politicians, Western media, etc. We are discussing what they said, we’re boiling in somebody else’s juices. I believe that one of Russia’s current goals is to be more present in the Western agenda, so that they will discuss what we said or wrote, what kinds of proposals we have, what we’re predicting.... I believe that this forecast was written to make them discuss it in the West. This goal was achieved. Elon Musk reacted.”

Perhaps realizing he might be used by the Kremlin’s propaganda apparatus, Musk added another reply to Medvedev’s Twitter thread, describing his musings as “the most absurd predictions I’ve ever heard.” Nonetheless, the damage of amplifying Russian narratives was already done.

Months earlier, discussions on Kremlin-controlled Russian state television repeatedly veered into Moscow’s intent to take advantage of Musk’s large following to further Russia’s agenda. Appearing on The Evening With Vladimir Solovyov back in October, filmmaker Karen Shakhnazarov opined about Musk’s “tens of millions of fans” and their potential usefulness for Russia’s “info-war tactics” in spreading the narratives set forth by Moscow. Host Vladimir Solovyov enthusiastically supported the idea of engaging “comrade Musk” and proposed Dmitry Medvedev as someone who could be the conduit in Russia’s charm offensive. Americanist Dmitry Drobnitsky noted that while there is no one in the West worth talking to, Russia could “grab a hold and shake them up, for sure.”

Solovyov concurred: “We can troll them.”

Indeed, Medvedev’s dubious forecast is being seen by pro-Kremlin voices as an example of successful trolling. During his segment on Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda, Vorsobin complained that since Medvedev is playing loose with facts and his forecasts, they wouldn’t be treated with seriousness or result in any meaningful discussions. Starikov disagreed, pointing out that Putin recently appointed Medvedev his first deputy in the Military Industrial Commission he chairs—therefore, as a high-ranking government official, his utterances should be treated with the utmost seriousness.

Vorsobin bristled: “Pardon, but when a person is appointed to a high-level position, why is he writing these kinds of things that should be treated ironically? He is involved in serious government business. Why did our top state officials start trolling?” Pointing out some of Medvedev’s predictions about the Fourth Reich and the disintegration of Western countries and institutions, Vorsobin added: “Pardon, this is not just fiction, it’s phantasmagoria.”

Starikov retorted: “It’s not required for all of this to actually happen. Among other things, this is a reminder for Europeans and for the Americans, as to where they pushed the more-or-less stable system that they themselves have built. Now, anything can happen.”

He reiterated: “No one is trying to prompt them to have serious discussions.... This is an element of manipulation of the people.”

Starikov explained: “When you inject this information over there, by getting it published by an important Russian official, containing information that is unusual for Western ears, they start reacting to it. This is just one publication, there should be 50 of them, being posted everyday…. We should be dictating global narratives…. This is an info-diversion in the Western media space.”

He went on to argue that some of Medvedev’s predictions might actually come true in the near future.

Vorsobin then burst his propaganda bubble by surmising: “These are just wet dreams.”

The Daily Beast · December 28, 2022

5. Opinion – Why the Russian doomsday scenario hasn't happened — yet By John Nagl

Excerpts:

History doesn’t repeat itself, but it sometimes rhymes. The United States is again supplying arms to a brave people resisting a Russian invasion. Three decades ago, the abject failure of Russian arms in Afghanistan helped destroy the Soviet Union; Putin’s floundering attempt to restore the glory of Soviet Empire by capturing Ukraine has done lasting economic damage to Russia and likely ends with Putin’s departure from power.

A key remaining question is whether Putin is capable of lashing out with a catastrophic escalation. But such an outrage would result in the most severe consequences for Russia and likely hasten Putin’s downfall. Like the rapid fall of Kyiv, nuclear weapons didn't materialize in 2022. And that is one thing we can be truly grateful for. So far.

Opinion – Why the Russian doomsday scenario hasn't happened — yet

Never have I been so thankful to be wrong about a war

Dec. 28, 2022, 6:00 AM EST

By John Nagl, retired Army officer and associate professor of Warfighting Studies at the Army War College

NBC News · December 28, 2022

2022 was bad — but it could have been worse. This essay is part of an end-of-the-year series looking at the silver linings.

Never have I been so thankful to be wrong.

Before Russia invaded Ukraine in February — after the delivery of perishable blood to Russian units made it clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s saber rattling was just not an exercise, after it became clear that Russia would invade the largest country in Europe, but before the tanks started rolling — I predicted that Russia would take Kyiv quickly, possibly within a week. I was mostly convinced that the brave and strong Ukrainians would fall to the inexorable logic of numbers in war.

I was wrong.

I was mostly convinced that the brave and strong Ukrainians would fall to the inexorable logic of numbers in war.

To be fair, I had good company in being wrong; Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior officer in the American military privy to daily briefings by the best intelligence community in the world, was reportedly wrong, too.

So was Putin himself; the Russian leader expected such a quick victory that he may have had his officers pack their dress uniforms with their invasion gear for a victory parade in Kyiv.

Putin’s overconfidence was one of the reasons that he — and Gen. Milley, and I — were wrong about the prospect of a quick Russian victory. I’ve fought in tanks in two wars; there is no spare room for dress uniforms. Any incredibly limited surplus space should have been filled with rations and bullets. Preparing for a short war also meant that some Russian forces may literally have run out of gas on the road to Kyiv. Other planning failures included not destroying Ukrainian air defenses early in the invasion, resulting in catastrophe for the Russian air force and for airborne troops tasked with seizing the Kyiv airport as part of a quick coup de main. The Russian military did not plan for a prolonged fight.

A look back at Ukraine's year of heartbreak and heroism

Dec. 25, 202204:11

The Russian military also did not train for a prolonged fight. Russia’s vaunted army, at least as far as Ukraine is concerned, looks like a paper tiger. Putin’s efforts to restore the Russian military to its Soviet-era glory have been marred by corruption. For months he refused to appoint a single commander in charge of the entire operation, perhaps afraid that someone with that much power might turn against his regime. Some soldiers reported being given less than an hour’s notice that they were about to engage in a shooting war. The list of Russian mistakes is nearly endless; the invasion violated nearly all principles of war, and the results have been appalling, resulting in the destruction of some of Russia’s most elite units.

Of course, the biggest reason I was wrong was the courage and skill of the Ukrainians, whose fighting fury exceeded any reasonable expectation of even the best-informed military analyst; spectacular political leadership has certainly also helped. In my partial defense, I did not underestimate the Ukrainian’s will to fight; I expected that after losing a conventional war, they would emulate my former foes in Iraq by conducting an insurgency that I predicted would ultimately bleed Russia dry. This would echo the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan 30 years ago, a disaster in which brave Afghan fighters armed with American anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles defeated a much larger and better equipped force, eventually forcing it to withdraw in disarray and contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself just a few years later.

History doesn’t repeat itself, but it sometimes rhymes. The United States is again supplying arms to a brave people resisting a Russian invasion. Three decades ago, the abject failure of Russian arms in Afghanistan helped destroy the Soviet Union; Putin’s floundering attempt to restore the glory of Soviet Empire by capturing Ukraine has done lasting economic damage to Russia and likely ends with Putin’s departure from power.

A key remaining question is whether Putin is capable of lashing out with a catastrophic escalation. But such an outrage would result in the most severe consequences for Russia and likely hasten Putin’s downfall. Like the rapid fall of Kyiv, nuclear weapons didn't materialize in 2022. And that is one thing we can be truly grateful for. So far.

NBC News · December 28, 2022

6. Triple threat: Russia, Iran, and North Korea trade arms to get around sanctions

Excerpts:

In cases for which cooperative implementation of sanctions is unlikely, the US government has developed an extraterritorial toolset that it has used to punish and disrupt proliferators and sanction evaders that lie outside the reach of US jurisdiction. Covert action can yield effects too. This may include sting and lure operations, or the insertion of compromised technology into illicit supply chains. Actions like these come with the risk of political and diplomatic blowback, but the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and the threat from Russian aggression may lead Washington to judge such risks worth taking.

Iranian and North Korean contributions to support Putin’s war in Ukraine are concerning, albeit not entirely surprising. Nor are the measures Moscow will use to circumvent sanctions to engage in illicit trade with Iran, North Korea, and other willing partners. The United States and its partners are faced with much of the same capacity, resource, and political challenges that have plagued previous efforts to counter sanctions evasion and illicit arms trade for decades. Will they overcome them this time around?

Triple threat: Russia, Iran, and North Korea trade arms to get around sanctions

By Darya Dolzikova, Daniel Salisbury | December 28, 2022

thebulletin.org · · December 28, 2022

By | December 28, 2022

According to US intelligence Iran may be preparing to ship Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. Reports last week also suggested that the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has purchased munitions from North Korea. Image of an Iranian Fateh-110 missile being launched during the Great prophet-7 military exercise in 2012 (Hossein Velayati / CC BY 4.0).

On December 16, CIA Director William Burns expressed concern over what he believes to be “at least the beginnings of a full-fledged defense partnership” between Iran and Russia. A few days earlier, the Russian military launched a wave of Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in an attack on Kyiv. These developments followed months of Iranian UAV use by Russian forces in Ukraine and discussion of potential Iranian missile transfers to the Russian military. Recent reports also suggest that the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has purchased infantry rockets and missiles from North Korea, several months after US officials first suggested Russia had approached that country for munitions.

Cooperation in the economic and military sphere between countries under sanctions and arms embargoes is not a new phenomenon. Recent reports of Russian procurement of military equipment from Iran and North Korea, therefore, come as no surprise. As Russia faces ever-tightening restrictions on its economy and military procurement, Moscow will likely continue leveraging trade opportunities that Tehran and Pyongyang present, relying on well-established methods of illicit trade and sanction evasion. To develop more effective countermeasures, it is important to understand how Moscow may rely on established sanction-evasion practices and the unique challenges it may present.

Mutually beneficial partnerships. As Russia again comes under expanding Western trade and financial restrictions, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran all stand to benefit from closer economic cooperation. Besides selling drones to Russia, Iran has reportedly deployed personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to train the Russian military in using its UAVs. Recent US intelligence assessments also suggested that Iran is preparing to ship Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. Speaking in early December, White House National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby said that the growing Iran-Russia military cooperation could also potentially include Russian transfers of Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets to Iran and the development of a joint UAV assembly line in Russia.

While there is no visual confirmation yet of arms transfer to the Wagner Group or the Russian military, North Korea’s military capabilities may be relevant to Russia’s needs. Both countries rely extensively on artillery in their military doctrines, with Russian supply chains increasingly under pressure to produce shells. North Korea’s weaponry is also largely based on aging Soviet-era designs—of which Pyongyang has sold maintenance and upgrade packages to overseas customers in recent years. This may provide opportunities for further cooperation with Moscow and the replenishment and repair of the mothballed Soviet systems, either for deployment in Ukraine or for use in future conflicts.

The shuttering of many Western market opportunities to Russian firms could also open new—albeit limited—opportunities for economically isolated and cash-strapped Pyongyang and Tehran. While Russia has long criticized international and unilateral sanctions on North Korea and Iran—and has been accused of skirting them on occasion—Moscow had not gone so far as to blatantly disregard them altogether. However, that calculus may be changing as reports emerge of new Iran-Russia economic cooperation in the energy, aerospace, and automotive sectors. Meanwhile, analysts have speculated that Pyongyang may accept compensation for any weapons sales to Russia in the form of cash transfers, fuel, or advanced weapons—all of which North Korea has struggled to procure under international sanctions.

Long experience in arms trade under sanctions. Tehran, Pyongyang, and Moscow all have extensive experience living and trading under sanctions. Iran has been subject to a US trade embargo since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and—because of its nuclear program—to progressively expansive international trade restrictions, including in arms and weapons systems. As part of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), most international restrictions on trade with Iran have been lifted, including many—although not all—prohibitions on weapons trade.

North Korea and the Soviet Union had faced similar trade restrictions since the 1950s—including embargoes on arms and technology by members and allies of the Western bloc of countries. Since 2006, North Korea has also been subject to universal and vastly expanding UN sanctions as a direct result of Pyongyang’s nuclear-related activities. In Russia’s case, many Western controls were relaxed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, following Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, Western countries reintroduced some restrictions on arms-related transfers to Russia. These have been further expanded after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

To sanction North Korea, sanction those that won’t—Russia and China

Despite restrictions, all three countries managed to procure weapons and related dual-use technologies to sustain—and advance—their military capabilities. The Soviet Union constructed a vast military-industrial complex during the Cold War by harnessing domestic capabilities and procuring from Western markets, both legally and illicitly. Iran and North Korea have also managed to advance their nuclear and missile programs despite sanctions, sometimes by cooperating. North Korean arms and related technologies—often based on Soviet designs supplied to Pyongyang by Moscow during the Cold War—have made their way to, among other countries, Syria, Myanmar, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda. Iran has also provided extensive military support to the Syrian regime during the country’s civil war and has armed destabilizing non-state actors across the Middle East.

Reusing and adapting sanction-evasion methods. Illicit transfers and procurement of weapons and related technologies by Russia, Iran, and North Korea have historically relied on sanction-evasion strategies that have allowed sanctioned entities to obscure their involvement in the prohibited movement of goods. These methods have relied on the establishment of complex procurement and financial networks, involving a myriad of front companies, bank accounts, and procurement agents in third countries with poor sanction-compliance practices. Diplomats and intelligence officers have leveraged government resources and diplomatic privileges to support the creation and operation of these networks. Corrupt facilitators—which include government officials, compliance officers, lawyers, and accountants—have “greased the wheels” or turned a blind eye where needed.

If Moscow seeks to expand its military and economic cooperation with Tehran and Pyongyang, it will rely on many of these same tried-and-tested methods of sanction evasion and illicit procurement. Russian companies have already demonstrated their reliance on front companies and procurement agents in Europe, North America, and Asia to source Western components for their integration into military systems. The chief executive officer of one Russian logistics company, Novelco, even gave a seminar on trade under sanctions, highlighting the value of “friendly” countries like Turkey as transshipment hubs. Many of the countries targeted by Moscow to facilitate illicit trade—including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong—have been well-established jurisdictions of convenience for sanction evaders, like Iran and North Korea.

China’s apparent unwillingness to support sanctions on Russia is particularly concerning. The country has facilitated North Korean circumvention of UN sanctions in the past. It is also the top importer of Iranian oil (in defiance of US sanctions on the purchase of Iranian petroleum) and has reportedly facilitated the illicit transfer of missile technology between Iran and North Korea. Hong Kong and Chinese entities already appear to be acting as intermediaries in the supply of Western components for integration into Russian weapons systems. As a major economy, and a key financial and shipping hub, China’s willingness to cooperate with Western efforts at stemming Russian trade in arms and related technologies will be a key factor in their success.

Russia will undoubtedly also look to recent Iranian and North Korean successes in sanction evasion as it seeks to adapt established practices to new realities. Countries and banks that have demonstrated their continued inability—or unwillingness—to root out sanctioned Iranian and North Korean activities, will likely attract illicit business from Moscow as well. North Korean and Iranian sanction-evasion methods for trade in certain commodities (like coal or oil) may also provide learning opportunities for Moscow.

Russia poses new challenges. But Russia’s re-entry into this heavily “sanctioned club” of countries will present some unique enforcement challenges as well. Sanctions against Russia have been pursued by a relatively small number of Ukrainian allies, led by the United States and the European Union. This lack of a global consensus means that Moscow will have a wide range of third countries to choose from in facilitating the circumvention of unilateral sanctions. Russia’s veto power at the UN Security Council also means that the adoption of any international trade restrictions will be impossible.

The 2022 nuclear year in review: A global nuclear order in shambles

Opportunities for Western states to interdict shipments of military or strategic goods will be limited if Russia finds ways to avoid transshipment through jurisdictions sympathetic to Western sanctions. For instance, if North Korea were to supply military goods to Moscow, the shared land border will afford no opportunities for interdiction. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran appear to be establishing a trade corridor through the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov. Iran has also reportedly been delivering drones to Russia by air, which is more challenging to interdict than maritime transfers. Russia also appears to be using at least several countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia to transship goods from the European Union. Moscow may seek to also use these regions as a land route to transship goods between Russia and Iran, making interdiction dependent on the transit countries’ ability and willingness to implement sanctions.

Russia also has a greater capacity for sanction-busting than Iran and North Korea. A relatively stronger economy, a bigger military-industrial complex, as well as a greater intelligence, diplomatic and commercial presence abroad, provide Russia with greater resources to establish and operate sanction-evasion operations. But, in turn, the needs of the Russian economy, its military-industrial complex, and its armed forces during wartime are also much greater than, for example, North Korea’s.

Strengthening and adapting countermeasures. Efforts to counter Russia’s sanctions evasion will require strengthening the implementation of existing countermeasures, as well as adapting these measures to new challenges. In jurisdictions that have adopted sanctions on Russia, improving private sector awareness of sanction-evasion methods is key. Governments should continue to identify—and sanction—entities involved in sanction evasion themselves; investigative journalists and research institutions can support them in this work. However, identifying and issuing advisories on observed sanction-evasion patterns, high-risk third countries, and goods of particular interest to sanction evaders will help businesses take a more nuanced and effective approach to the implementation of sanctions on Russia.

The United States and its allies should also continue to engage with countries that could play the role of third-country facilitators, helping strengthen these countries’ export controls and sanctions implementation. Engagement with countries lying geographically between Russia and Iran and those with a record of being exploited by sanction evaders for their illicit activities could prove particularly valuable.

In addition, maintaining a dialogue with China, a key determinant of the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia, and making clear the potential costs of providing material support to Putin’s illegal invasion will be equally important. Governments, researchers, and journalists should shine a light on any support by Chinese entities to Russia’s defense industries. This will both help to highlight the nature of the challenge and may help rattle Beijing toward greater restraint.

In cases for which cooperative implementation of sanctions is unlikely, the US government has developed an extraterritorial toolset that it has used to punish and disrupt proliferators and sanction evaders that lie outside the reach of US jurisdiction. Covert action can yield effects too. This may include sting and lure operations, or the insertion of compromised technology into illicit supply chains. Actions like these come with the risk of political and diplomatic blowback, but the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and the threat from Russian aggression may lead Washington to judge such risks worth taking.

Iranian and North Korean contributions to support Putin’s war in Ukraine are concerning, albeit not entirely surprising. Nor are the measures Moscow will use to circumvent sanctions to engage in illicit trade with Iran, North Korea, and other willing partners. The United States and its partners are faced with much of the same capacity, resource, and political challenges that have plagued previous efforts to counter sanctions evasion and illicit arms trade for decades. Will they overcome them this time around?

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Darya Dolzikova

Darya Dolzikova is a research fellow in proliferation and nuclear policy at the Royal United Services Institute in London. Her research focuses on... Read More

Daniel Salisbury

Daniel Salisbury is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London and an associate fellow at the... Read More

7. Ukraine Sets Sights on Retaking Key Eastern City

Ukraine Sets Sights on Retaking Key Eastern City

Recapturing Kreminna could mark breakthrough for Ukraine’s efforts to dislodge Russian occupation of its east

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-sets-sights-on-retaking-key-eastern-city-11672233106?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

By Matthew LuxmooreFollow

Updated Dec. 28, 2022 10:43 am ET

KYIV, Ukraine—Ukrainian authorities said their army was closing in on the Russian-occupied city of Kreminna, control of which could allow Kyiv to significantly expand its efforts to retake Russian-held areas in Ukraine’s east.

Kreminna, a city in the eastern Luhansk region with a prewar population of 18,000, is being abandoned by Russia’s military command as Ukrainian troops advance through the mined and heavily fortified area surrounding it, said Serhiy Haidai, the governor of Luhansk.

“When we de-occupy Kreminna, it will be the turn of other Luhansk cities,” Mr. Haidai said in a televised interview Wednesday. His description of the situation around Kreminna couldn’t be independently verified.

Mr. Haidai said Russian military officials had moved from Kreminna to other nearby settlements and that civilians who had arrived from Russian territory to serve as medics and repair workers in the city had fled or returned home.

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The U.K.’s Defense Ministry said in its intelligence briefing on Wednesday that Russia was fortifying the area around Kreminna and is likely to give priority to holding the line there.

Ukraine’s eastern military command said capturing Kreminna would likely take time. “When we achieve substantial results there, I will definitely let people know,” military spokesman Serhiy Cherevaty told Ukrainian television. “For now I urge patience.”

The capture of Kreminna would give Ukraine access to major roads leading to the city of Rubizhne and the nearby industrial center of Severodonetsk, both heavily damaged in fighting over the summer, as well as to the town of Starobilsk.

Many of the Russian units attacking the city of Bakhmut to the south are advancing from Rubizhne and Severodonetsk, Mr. Haidai said, meaning that securing Kreminna and launching offensives on those cities could allow Ukraine to disrupt Russia’s onslaught against Bakhmut, aiding its embattled Ukrainian defenders.

Starobilsk, on the other hand, overlooks key roads across the region, Mr. Haidai said. “Whoever controls Starobilsk can essentially control with firepower the entire logistics of Luhansk region,” he said. “There’ll be almost no road left along which the enemy can calmly transfer either equipment or manpower.”

Kreminna would be a symbolic prize for Kyiv, giving Ukraine a solid foothold in Luhansk, a region which has been under near-total Russian control since the summer.

Since launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, Russian President Vladimir Putin has named control of the Luhansk and adjacent Donetsk regions as among Moscow’s main military goals, expounding a false narrative about oppressed Russian speakers there whom his army was sent to liberate.

Following an abortive advance on Kyiv in February and March, Russia narrowed the focus of its invasion and gave priority to its offensive in eastern Ukraine. But after making slow gains, its advances there have largely ground to a halt, and it has expended huge resources in recent months in a so-far unsuccessful bid to take Bakhmut.

Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar on Monday described Bakhmut as Ukraine’s “eastern fortress,” and said Russia had concentrated a huge amount of firepower there as it seeks to capture the Donetsk region by the end of this year. Ukraine’s defenders currently hold around 40% of the region. Taking Kreminna could help reverse the momentum in the east and put Russia on the defensive in Donetsk too.

After 10 months of fighting, both sides are eager to show they can make gains despite the onset of winter.

Ukraine’s government wants to show the U.S. and other Western countries, who are providing crucial weaponry and financing, that it can retake more Russian-occupied territory, amid signs that Washington and some European capitals want Kyiv to consider negotiations. Ukrainian officials are trying to reassure its Western backers that they are open to diplomacy but fear Russia would use talks to consolidate its occupation of swaths of the country’s east and south.

A maternity unit in Kherson, southern Ukraine, on Wednesday. Ukrainian forces retook the city last month.

PHOTO: DIMITAR DILKOFF/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he is open to good-faith negotiations with Russia, which he refers to as a “terrorist state,” and has proposed a 10-point peace plan which includes security guarantees for Ukraine. His team is currently fleshing out the plan and aims to present it on or around the first anniversary of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, according to European and Ukrainian diplomats.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Wednesday that Russia doesn’t view Ukrainian government statements as a genuine peace initiative because Kyiv doesn’t accept Russia’s territorial claims to regions that are internationally recognized as Ukrainian. “There cannot be any kind of peace plan by Ukraine that would not take into account the realities at the moment,” Mr. Peskov told reporters.

Ukrainian forces recaptured the southern city of Kherson in November, the only regional capital that Russia had taken after its February invasion. Russian forces were forced to withdraw to positions east of the Dnipro River following relentless Ukrainian attacks using sophisticated Western weaponry.

For Russia, the seizure of any Ukrainian settlement would help raise flagging morale after months of attritional warfare that has yielded no major breakthroughs for its military since July.

Russia’s invasion force has been expanded with often-undertrained men drafted in a mobilization drive ordered by Mr. Putin in September. Some of those soldiers have been involved in Russia’s monthslong effort to seize Bakhmut, alongside mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group.

Russian government officials haven’t commented on Ukrainian claims about Kreminna.

Andrei Marochko, a Russian-installed military official in occupied Luhansk, told Russian state media on Wednesday that Ukraine could launch an assault on Kreminna from three directions at once. He said wet winter conditions are unlikely to slow its advance since the ground near Kreminna is solid and the surrounding forested areas would help it conceal forces and equipment involved in attacks.

Inside Occupied Mariupol: Residents Scramble to Find Missing as Russia Rebuilds

How to fight domestic terrorism? First, officials have to define it.

The Washington Post · by Hannah Allam · December 28, 2022

Drawing inspiration from a far-right shooter in New Zealand, the gunman who killed 10 Black shoppers at a Buffalo supermarket in the spring used racist, dehumanizing language in his writings, singling out Jews as the real problem to be “dealt with in time.”

Nevertheless, at a congressional hearing this month on the threat of violent white supremacy, two Republican lawmakers cherry-picked a word in the Buffalo killer’s screed — “socialist” — to cast him as a radical leftist. They did not note that the shooter was referring to National Socialism, the ideology of the German Nazi Party, as Democrats and witnesses on the panel pointedly clarified.

“Any sober look” at the Buffalo shooter’s hate-filled manifesto, Oren Segal of the Anti-Defamation League told the lawmakers, “would recognize that attack as clearly a white-supremacist attack.”

The exchange shows the tricky role of language in the politically charged struggle over how to talk about domestic terrorism. Republican leaders portray the far left and far right as equally dangerous, an assertion contradicted by White House assessments that “the most persistent and lethal threats” to the country come from the violent right.

But “far right” also is an imperfect term, analysts say, and does not capture the complex ideologies, including some that overlap with the anarchist left, that have fueled recent attacks.

That fuzziness leaves room for bad-faith arguments and misinformation, miring an urgent threat in partisan point-scoring. Terrorism researchers said they had hoped that rising political violence culminating in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol would jolt leaders into action. Instead, they say, efforts to address violent extremism have stalled over semantics and an eagerness to blame “the other side.”

This month, just before the House Jan. 6 committee released a final report on its probe of the Capitol insurrection, Republican lawmakers released their own version, which blamed Democratic leaders for security lapses and did not mention President Donald Trump’s fiery remarks or that Trump waited hours before urging the mob to leave.

Also this month, as first reported by Roll Call, lawmakers who wrote the final defense authorization bill “deleted or diluted” all seven House-passed provisions related to extremism in the U.S. military or broader society.

Outside the government, extremism researchers are increasingly vocal with claims that the Department of Homeland Security is blocking their federally funded projects out of unspecified privacy concerns they believe are linked in part to the politics around domestic terrorism.

Analysts predict an even more contested discourse once Republicans assume control of the House. They expect that GOP leaders will mute domestic-terrorism talk and steer the focus of inquiries toward “radical leftists,” who are nowhere near as lethal or active, according to attack data.

Heidi Beirich, co-founder of the nonprofit Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, said Republicans not only “try to bury the problem” but have fielded dozens of candidates who ran on platforms that invoked far-right, conspiratorial ideas such as the engineered “replacement” of White people, a theme expressed by men accused in the mass killings of Jewish worshipers at a Pittsburgh synagogue and Latinos at a Walmart in El Paso, among other attacks.

An Anti-Defamation League report, “Extremism on the Ballot,” counted at least a dozen candidates in the 2022 midterms with explicit ties to extremist movements, and around 100 others had been linked in varying degrees to extremist ideologies. They were almost exclusively Republicans.

“The party itself has candidates who are running on the same idea as what inspires domestic terrorism,” Beirich said with an incredulous chuckle. “I’m laughing because it’s hard to believe I’m saying this. There will be no will for Republicans to look at any of this. Once again, terrorism — just like January 6 — ends up being a completely partisan issue that stymies any efforts to address it.”

Republicans generally have opposed government-funded attempts to study domestic terrorism, joined by influential right-wing outlets in portraying the issue as a “thought police” exercise designed to vilify conservatives and, ultimately, disarm gun-owning Americans.

GOP officials also complain of a double standard, arguing that mainstream news outlets and Democratic leaders disproportionately focus on the right-wing threat and give a pass to “antifa rioters” and left-wing extremists such as the gunman who shot six people, including then-House Majority Whip Steve Scalise (R-La.), during a congressional baseball practice in 2017.

One striking example of how deeply the partisan divide runs on this issue was in Republican reactions to the news that a violent attacker targeting House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) had bludgeoned her husband, Paul Pelosi, with a hammer, according to authorities.

Some Republicans, including Virginia Gov. Glenn Youngkin and Rep. Andy Biggs of Arizona, were criticized for remarks seen as minimizing or mocking the assault. Influential right-wing figures tried to portray the suspect as a leftist because he had a history of dabbling in all sorts of extremism before becoming fixated on Democrats, Nancy Pelosi in particular, according to court documents and a social media trail. Within the GOP, there was little appetite for introspection on how the party’s relentless demonization of Pelosi might have contributed to the mobilization of a violent fringe.

Pelosi has described Republican reactions as “disgraceful.”

Language has always played a fraught role in debates over which ideologies are labeled threats to national security. After the 9/11 attacks, Muslim advocacy groups spent years protesting that counterterrorism officials used stigmatizing rhetoric that led to civil-liberties violations and Islamophobic backlash.

Republican demands for more-nuanced language on domestic terrorism emerged as the threat evolved and FBI attack data made clear that the biggest threat now comes from far-right movements such as those involved in the Capitol attack. Soon, the surveillance and profiling that were staples of the government’s fight against Islamist militancy — and which were broadly supported by Republican leaders — were reframed in conservative outlets as part of an unconstitutional witch hunt against Christian “patriots.”

During the Trump years, Republicans typically avoided dwelling on the far-right threat unless far-left “antifa” militants were mentioned as equally concerning, a notion that took hold across wide swaths of the right.

In early 2019, during the Trump administration, Elizabeth Neumann was serving as a senior DHS counterterrorism official. A gunman had just attacked the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Neumann recalled, and the FBI and National Counterterrorism Center began rethinking domestic-terrorism strategies.

More than six months later, “well after a whole bunch of other attacks had happened,” Neumann said, officials finally arranged a conference on domestic threats. When the teams briefed her on the work, Neumann said, she was floored to hear a fixation on definitions — finding a balance between categories that were precise enough for researchers and not too polarizing for politicians.

“I felt like we were so focused on definitions that we were kind of missing the point that we were not organized or structured [and didn’t] have any programs that are actually going to address the threat,” said Neumann, now chief strategy officer at Moonshot, a company that combats online extremism.

In that era, federal authorities started using phrases such as “RMVE,” for “racially motivated violent extremism,” which was criticized as a euphemism for deadly white supremacists. The term was also vague enough that it allowed officials pushing a “both sides” agenda to introduce a sub-category on “black identity violent extremism,” drawing outrage from civil rights groups who called it an attempt to equate Black Lives Matter protesters with far-right militants.

At a hearing in 2019, in response to questioning by Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.), FBI Director Christopher A. Wray said the controversial category had been retired: “We don’t use the term ‘black identity extremism’ anymore.”

“Despite this announcement, serious concerns about the FBI’s obfuscation of the threat posed by white supremacists remain,” Booker said in a statement at the time, noting that the majority of domestic terrorist attacks in recent years had come from far-right assailants. He added, “The FBI should not be in the business of using phrases and categories that confuses this point.”

The change in administration when Joe Biden came to office introduced yet another round of confusion for researchers trying to keep up with the federal government’s shifting, acronym-filled language on domestic terrorism.

They had just gotten used to calling the DHS office overseeing counterextremism strategies the “TVTP,” for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, when it was re-branded in 2021 as CP3, the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships. The Trump administration’s labels such as “anarcho-Marxist violent revolutionaries” were retired. Ditto for “ethno-violence,” a softening of “white-supremacist violence,” analysts recalled.

But there was also an acknowledgment in and out of government that the old left-right terrorism spectrum was outdated, incapable of reflecting how online radicalization grabs from various ideologies and defies simple categorization. White-supremacist attackers sometimes espouse environmental extremism or misogynistic incel rhetoric. Anti-government “boogaloo” militants march alongside black-nationalist gun groups. Neo-Nazis invoke language and tactics from Islamist militants.

That blending of ideologies led to terms such as “salad-bar extremism” or “fringe fluidity” entering the lexicon of domestic terrorism studies. But where analysts saw nuance that better captures the complexity of attacks, conservative influencers saw wiggle room to further confuse public understanding of the problem and its links to right-wing politics.

The lingering confusion has hampered even DHS’s ability to identify red flags within department ranks, according to a 2022 DHS report on insider threats that found information gaps based on “a lack of an official definition of ‘domestic violence extremist’” or guidance on what constitutes extremist activity.

“It’s very much a contextual term that’s in the eye of the beholder,” Neumann said. “It’s kind of funny — we’ve now, for 21 years, spent all sorts of money on countering violent extremism and yet we don’t have a definition for what that is.”

If the government’s classifications are confusing to its own professional analysts, they are probably indecipherable to Americans trying to understand the rise in extremist violence. “RMVE” is still in use, as a subset of “DVE,” or “domestic violent extremism.” And “domestic” refers to, say, armed anti-government groups or militant anarchists, not to be confused with “homegrown,” which is reserved for U.S. operatives of foreign militant groups such as the Islamic State.

“It sounds like gobbledygook,” Beirich said. “For an average person, you have no idea what they’re talking about. The definitions keep shifting.”

In its first report on the international far-right threat, the United Nations in October introduced yet another category, for attacks fueled by xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief — XRIRB, an acronym that has “broken my brain,” tweeted Anna Meier, a U.K.-based scholar of white-supremacist violence.

Cynthia Miller-Idriss, who leads the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL) at American University, said: “All these labels have been attempts not to use the words ‘right’ or ‘left’ in any of this. But then it gets confusing because they’re using these awful acronyms, and no one’s using the same ones. It just becomes this alphabet soup.”

In recent months, the Biden administration has used the catchall “hate-fueled violence,” which encompasses bias-motivated crimes as well as mass-casualty terrorist attacks. Miller-Idriss praised the term for its inclusivity but said she worries that it, too, could be used to avoid the tougher conversation that unequivocally recognizes far-right movements — namely neo-Nazi groups and armed anti-government groups — as the main drivers of political violence.

“There are deep-rooted things like misogyny, antisemitism and different forms of racism that cut across the spectrum,” Miller-Idriss said. “However, the organized terroristic domestic extremist violence is coming from the far right.”

The Washington Post · by Hannah Allam · December 28, 2022

9. Russia’s New Winter War

Excerpts:

Yet Putin’s greatest triumph in Russian eyes was the covert seizure of Crimea the year before by infiltrating it with un-uniformed “little green men” from special forces. This was part of Putin’s angry reaction to the Maidan revolution in Kyiv, which forced his ally President Viktor Yanukovych to flee and led to the start of fighting in the Donbas of Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine.

In February 2022, eight years later, Putin launched his “special military operation” in Ukraine. At the time, the vanguard was told to bring their parade uniforms ready to celebrate victory—one of the greatest examples of military hubris in history. Yet seven disastrous months later, when the Kremlin was finally forced to order a “partial mobilization” of the Russian population, it had to warn those called up that uniforms and equipment were in short supply. They would have to provide their own body armor and even ask their mothers and girlfriends for sanitary pads to use instead of field dressings. The lack of bandages is astonishing, especially now as winter intensifies, since they are vital to keep frost from entering open wounds. Adding to the dangers are mortar rounds hitting frozen ground: unlike soft mud, which absorbs most of the blast, frozen ground causes fragments to ricochet, in sometimes lethal ways.

Putin’s new commander in chief in the south, General Sergei Surovikin, is determined to clamp down on attempts by some conscripts to avoid combat. Many have been resorting to the sabotage of fuel, weapons, and vehicles, to say nothing of self-inflicted wounds and desertion. Yet the Russian army’s long-standing structural problem—its shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers—has also led to a terrible record of maintaining weapons, equipment, and vehicles. These problems will become especially costly in winter with sensitive technology such as drones.

As both sides enter a far more challenging season of fighting, the outcome will largely depend on morale and determination. While Russian troops curse their shortages and lack of hot food, Ukrainian troops are now benefitting from supplies of insulated camouflage suits, tents with stoves, and sleeping bags provided by Canada and the Nordic nations. Putin seems to be in denial about the state of his army and the way that General Winter will favor his opponents. He may also have made another mistake by concentrating his missiles against Ukraine’s energy network and its vulnerable civilian population. They will endure the greatest suffering, but there is little chance that they will break.

Russia’s New Winter War

Could Putin Go the Way of Napoleon and Hitler?

By Antony Beevor

December 29, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Antony Beevor · December 29, 2022

One of Russia’s greatest military victories came with the coldest European winter in 500 years. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Tsar Peter the Great struggled to repel the formidable forces of Charles XII of Sweden, advancing on Moscow. Then came the Great Frost of 1708–9. Birds were said to have frozen in midflight and dropped dead to the ground. Charles’s army of more than 40,000 men soon lost half its strength from exposure and starvation. In an attempt to escape the cold, the Swedish king led the remnants of his army south into Ukraine to join the Cossack leader, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, and his forces. But the damage was done. The following summer, Peter’s Russian army routed Charles’s weakened forces at the Battle of Poltava, bringing an end to Sweden’s empire and its designs on Russia.

The Swedes were neither the first nor the last European army to suffer the ravages of “General Winter” on Russia’s frontiers. Exacerbated by the vast expanse of the Eurasian landmass, winter fighting there has often proved to be the downfall of great armies. For centuries, this phenomenon has often worked to Russia’s advantage, as a succession of powerful militaries have succumbed to inadequate equipment, deficient supply lines, and poor preparation. But as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine enters the harshest months of the year, there are many indications that this time it may be Russia, rather than its adversary, that suffers the worst consequences.

His Empire for a Horse

Europe’s best-known winter defeat in Russia came in 1812—just over a century after the Battle of Poltava—when Napoleon’s Grande Armée retreated from Moscow. Russia’s scorched-earth tactics, which left the French with no food or shelter along the line of withdrawal, made the effect even more deadly. Yet the greatest casualties had occurred earlier.

The Grande Armée had been almost half a million strong when it crossed the River Neman, the frontier between Prussia and Russia, in June 1812. But it soon lost a third of its strength from summer heat, disease, hunger, and exhaustion as the emperor forced his men on toward Moscow. Although the retreat into Russia’s expanse was unintended at first, Tsar Alexander I’s commanders soon realized the advantage. They kept withdrawing east and did not make a stand until General Mikhail Kutuzov was ordered to halt Napoleon at Borodino, 75 miles west of Moscow. The battle proved a costly victory for the French, even though it enabled them to enter Moscow unopposed.

But it was the approaching winter that proved fatal for the invaders. Napoleon wasted five weeks in Moscow expecting the tsar to come to terms. When the Grande Armée finally started to withdraw to central Europe on October 19, the soldiers were still wearing their summer uniforms. They had also lost their baggage trains and could expect little food along the way. Their greatest deficiency was in cavalry to hold off marauding Cossacks. The shaggy Cossack ponies were accustomed to the winter blizzards, which began a month later, while the last of the chargers and draft horses from western Europe collapsed from the cold and lack of forage. Starving soldiers hacked off their meat even before they were dead. Desertion or surrender was far from a guarantee of survival. Avenging Cossacks waited to skewer enemy soldiers on their long lances; Russian peasants simply slaughtered them with scythes. By early December, Napoleon feared a coup d’état during his absence, and, abandoning his army, headed for Paris before his frozen men could reach safety. By this point, his forces had suffered nearly 400,000 casualties, and he had lost his reputation for invincibility on the battlefield.

Less well known, although perhaps equally significant, was the way Russia won. Despite having lost 200,000 of its own men, Russia’s military leadership was far less concerned about casualties than was Napoleon. Russian officers still treated their peasant soldiers as little better than the serfs (and serfdom would not be abolished in Russia for another 50 years). This lack of interest in soldiers’ well-being—and the casual attitude to massive losses through so-called meat-grinder tactics—are apparent in Putin’s army in Ukraine today.

Red Terror, White Frost

Another half century later, in World War I, the attitude of Russia’s military authorities had barely changed. Their men were expendable. Trench life for the rank and file along the eastern front that ran through Belorussia, Galicia, and Romania from 1915 to 1917 was an inhuman experience. And many resented that officers retired each night to the warmth and relative comfort of peasant log huts behind the front.

“Having dug themselves into the ground,” the Russian writer and anti-tsarist Maxim Gorky observed of the enlisted men, “they live in rain and snow, in filth, in cramped conditions; they are being worn out by disease and eaten by vermin; they live like beasts.” Many lacked boots and had to resort to bast shoes made from birch bark. Stations for treating the wounded at the front were almost as primitive as they had been in the Crimean War. This reality was in cruel contrast to the photographs of the tsarina and her grand duchess daughters immaculately dressed as nurses before the February 1917 revolution.

Winter conditions in the Russian Civil War (1917–21) were even worse. The most pitiful victims were the civilian refugees fleeing the Bolshevik onslaught, or what became known as the Red Terror. During the winter of 1919, the collapse of Admiral Kolchak’s White Russian armies in Siberia produced terrible scenes along the jammed Trans-Siberian Railroad. Aristocrats, middle-class families, and anti-Bolsheviks of all backgrounds were trying to escape to Vladivostok in the far east to avoid capture by the Communist Red Army, which was advancing from the Urals.

In WWI, many Russians lacked boots and had to resort to shoes made of birch bark.

By mid-December of that year, the Reds caught up with the tail of the line and took the southern Siberian city and industrial hub of Novo-Nikolaevsk (present-day Novosibirsk), along with numerous trains still blocked there. The city itself was in the grip of a typhus epidemic. All horses, carts, and sledges available had already been taken so the desperate set out on foot, not knowing that further ahead in Krasnoyarsk cases had reached more than 30,000.

“A mass retreat is one of the saddest and most despairing sights in the world,” Captain Brian Horrocks, a British officer in the Allied intervention in Russia, wrote. “The sick just fell down and died in the snow.” He was horrified by the squalid condition even of those refugees who had managed to find a place in packed cattle wagons. Most wagons lacked any heating as temperatures dropped to as low as minus 30 degrees Celsius. “The thing which impressed me most was the fortitude with which the women, many of them reared in luxury, were facing their hopeless future,” he wrote. “The menfolk were much more given to self-pity.” Kolchak’s staff officers were by then drinking themselves into oblivion.

As White Russian, Czech, and Polish commanders argued bitterly over priority for their troop trains, starving and frozen refugees were dying at an alarming rate. One officer wrote that trains at some Siberian stations were unloading hundreds of bodies of people who had died from cold and disease. “These bodies were stacked up at the stations like so much cordwood,” another officer wrote. “Those who remained alive never talked, never thought of anything save how they might escape death and get farther and farther away from the Bolsheviks.”

In the northern Caucasus, known for its blazing summer heat, winter could sometimes produce drops in temperature of more than 30 degrees Celsius in less than an hour. In February 1920, General Dmitry Pavlov’s cavalry divisions were caught in the open by a sudden blizzard. Pavlov “lost half of his horses which froze in the steppe,” the Red Army high command noted. But the human losses were far worse. “We left behind in the steppe thousands of men frozen to death, and the blizzard buried them,” a Cossack officer recounted. Those who survived did so by huddling against their horses. Pavlov, who had ignored warnings of the possible change in the weather, suffered severe frostbite himself.

Stalin’s Ice Breakers

By the twentieth century, winter conditions on the Eurasian landmass posed a growing threat not just to humans and horses but also to military weaponry. Sometimes this worked to Russia’s detriment. Despite its disproportionate strength and its massive expenditure of ammunition, the Soviet army failed to break Finnish resistance in the Winter War of 1939–40, following Stalin’s invasion of Finland. The Finns, proving themselves even better practitioners of winter tactics than their invaders, terrorized Red Army soldiers by day and night as their white-camouflaged ski troops launched surprise attacks from forests, then disappeared like ghosts. Their bravery and skill persuaded Stalin to accept Finland’s independence. But it also served as a lesson for the war to come.

During the rapid military mechanization between the two world wars, the Soviet Union had created the largest tank force in the world. The Red Army at least learned that guns and engines needed special lubricants in extreme conditions. Such measures proved key in Stalin’s ability to block Hitler’s armies in front of Moscow in December 1941. Both the German army and the Luftwaffe were unprepared. They had to light fires under their vehicles and aircraft engines to defrost them.

German soldiers referred bitterly to winter conditions as “weather for Russians.” They envied the Red Army’s winter uniforms, with white camouflage suits and padded cotton jackets, which were far more effective than German greatcoats. Russian military historians have attributed the comparatively low rate of frostbite and trench foot among Soviet forces to their old military practice of using layered linen foot bandages instead of socks. German soldiers also suffered more rapidly because their jackboots had steel studs that drained any warmth. In February 1943, when the remnants of Field Marshal Paulus’s Sixth Army finally surrendered at Stalingrad—the psychological turning point of World War II—more than 90,000 German prisoners limped out of the city on frost-ravaged feet. Yet their suffering had been caused less by cold than by Hitler’s orders to hold on there and the inability of German panzers with their narrow tracks to counterattack in the snow.

“General Winter” also played a major role in the Red Army’s final victory in 1945. The great Soviet breakthrough in January, a charge from the River Vistula to the River Oder, depended on the weather. Russian forecasters had predicted “a strange winter,” with “heavy rain and wet snow” after the hard frosts of January. An order went out to repair boots. Stalin and the Red Army’s supreme command set January 12 as the start date for the offensive, so that the Soviets’ tank armies could take advantage of the deep-frozen ground before any thaw set in. Characteristically, Stalin falsely claimed that he had advanced the date from January 20 to take pressure off the Americans in the Ardennes. (U.S. forces had already halted the German offensive there just after Christmas.) In fact, there was another motive: Stalin wanted to control the bulk of Polish territory before he met U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta in the first week of February.

More than 90,000 German prisoners limped out of Stalingrad on frost-ravaged feet.

Stalin’s commanders did not let him down. “Our tanks move faster than the trains to Berlin,” boasted the ebullient Colonel Iosif Gusakovsky. He had not bothered to wait for bridging equipment to reach the frontlines before attempting to cross the River Pilica. He simply ordered his leading tanks to smash the ice with gunfire, then to drive straight across the riverbed. The tanks, acting like icebreakers, pushed the ice aside “with a terrible thundering noise,” a terrifying experience for the poor drivers. The German eastern front in Poland collapsed under the armored onslaught, once again because the Soviet T-34’s broad tracks could cope with the ice and snow far better than any German panzer.

After 1945, the Red Army’s achievements in winter warfare gave it a fearsome reputation in the West. It was not until the Soviet Union’s ill-planned invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968—the Warsaw Pact forces lacked maps, food supplies, and fuel—that Western analysts first began to suspect that they might have overestimated the Soviets’ warfighting abilities.

Finally, in the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet empire was marked by its doomed struggle to control Afghanistan, a terrain that made winter warfare impossible for conventional armies. Then, during the economic collapse in the 1990s, Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s government often proved unable to pay officers and soldiers alike and corruption became institutionalized. Conscripts were frequently on the edge of starvation because their rations were sold off; theft, bullying, and ill discipline became rampant. Spare parts from vehicles, as well as anything from fuel to light bulbs, boots, and especially any cold weather kit, disappeared onto the black market.

Corruption became even worse following Russia’s chaotic invasion of Georgia in 2008. Putin began throwing money at the armed forces. The waste on prestige projects encouraged contractors and generals alike to pad their bank accounts. Little appears to have been done in reassessing military doctrine. The Russian idea of urban warfare had still not evolved from World War II, with their artillery, the “god of war,” smashing everything to rubble. This approach would continue during Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war from 2015.

Yet Putin’s greatest triumph in Russian eyes was the covert seizure of Crimea the year before by infiltrating it with un-uniformed “little green men” from special forces. This was part of Putin’s angry reaction to the Maidan revolution in Kyiv, which forced his ally President Viktor Yanukovych to flee and led to the start of fighting in the Donbas of Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine.

Putin in Denial

In February 2022, eight years later, Putin launched his “special military operation” in Ukraine. At the time, the vanguard was told to bring their parade uniforms ready to celebrate victory—one of the greatest examples of military hubris in history. Yet seven disastrous months later, when the Kremlin was finally forced to order a “partial mobilization” of the Russian population, it had to warn those called up that uniforms and equipment were in short supply. They would have to provide their own body armor and even ask their mothers and girlfriends for sanitary pads to use instead of field dressings. The lack of bandages is astonishing, especially now as winter intensifies, since they are vital to keep frost from entering open wounds. Adding to the dangers are mortar rounds hitting frozen ground: unlike soft mud, which absorbs most of the blast, frozen ground causes fragments to ricochet, in sometimes lethal ways.

Putin’s new commander in chief in the south, General Sergei Surovikin, is determined to clamp down on attempts by some conscripts to avoid combat. Many have been resorting to the sabotage of fuel, weapons, and vehicles, to say nothing of self-inflicted wounds and desertion. Yet the Russian army’s long-standing structural problem—its shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers—has also led to a terrible record of maintaining weapons, equipment, and vehicles. These problems will become especially costly in winter with sensitive technology such as drones.

As both sides enter a far more challenging season of fighting, the outcome will largely depend on morale and determination. While Russian troops curse their shortages and lack of hot food, Ukrainian troops are now benefitting from supplies of insulated camouflage suits, tents with stoves, and sleeping bags provided by Canada and the Nordic nations. Putin seems to be in denial about the state of his army and the way that General Winter will favor his opponents. He may also have made another mistake by concentrating his missiles against Ukraine’s energy network and its vulnerable civilian population. They will endure the greatest suffering, but there is little chance that they will break.

ANTONY BEEVOR is the author of Russia—Revolution and Civil War 1917–1921.

Foreign Affairs · by Antony Beevor · December 29, 2022

10. How Narcissism Is Tearing Us Apart

Self-righteousness is a good description of so many of the commentary I read on social media.

Common sense recommendations for overcoming collective narcissism.

How Narcissism Is Tearing Us Apart

A collective sense of self-righteousness has profound effects on social bonds.

Craig Harper Ph.D.

Articles of Heterodoxy

Posted December 28, 2022 | Reviewed by Lybi Ma

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/articles-of-heterodoxy/202212/how-narcissism-is-tearing-us-apart

KEY POINTS

Modern societies are increasingly polarized along ideological lines.
Collective narcissism may help to explain how ideological groups are becoming increasingly extreme.
Contemplating and reflecting on our narcissistic tendencies may help us to heal some of our divides.

Modern democratic societies have seen intergroup relations crumble over the past half century, and psychologists have been attempting to study this phenomenon for decades. Although many psychologists have looked at the cognitive and motivational differences between ideological groups, these studies do not always recognize how those on the extremes of the political spectrum can often look more similar than they do differently. Looking at the extent to which people are invested in their ideology, and how this affects polarization, may be a more fruitful pathway to understanding our current predicament.

Clay Banks (via Unsplash)

A Collective Sense of Righteousness

Collective narcissism is a social psychological phenomenon that refers to the narcissistic tendencies of a group or collective. It is characterized by the group's belief in its own superiority and special status, as well as its need for admiration and attention from others. Collective narcissism is different from individual narcissism, which refers to a personality trait characterized by an inflated sense of self-importance and a need for admiration from others. There is often a focus on the differences observed between ingroup and outgroup members among those high in collective narcissism, with a tendency to see threats from outgroups in a more acute manner.

While individual narcissism is a personality trait that is specific to an individual, collective narcissism is a trait that is shared among members of a group or collective. It is often seen in groups that are highly cohesive, where members have a strong sense of belonging and identification with the group. These groups may include nationalist or ethnic groups, religious groups, or political organizations, but ostensibly less important group identities (sports teams) may also be liable to succumbing to narcissistic beliefs, too. Collective narcissism can also be seen in groups that are defined by a shared ideology or belief system, such as social movements or activist groups.

It is here that we see links to modern social movements, particularly in the US (where political partisans favoring candidates from either the Democrats or Republicans focus more on maligning the other side than presenting a positive vision of how their ideology could improve American society) and the UK (where debates and disagreements about Brexit continue to divide the population).

Effects of Collective Narcissism

Collective narcissism is often fueled by leaders or influential members of the group who promote a sense of grandiosity and entitlement among group members. These leaders may use various tactics to reinforce the group's narcissistic beliefs, such as manipulating group members' emotions, manipulating information to support the group's beliefs, and encouraging group members to view outsiders as a threat.

Collective narcissism can also be fueled by external factors, such as social media and the media in general. Social media platforms can create echo chambers that amplify the views and beliefs of a particular group, leading to a distorted sense of reality and a reinforcement of narcissistic beliefs. The media can also contribute to collective narcissism by promoting certain groups or ideologies, and by portraying certain groups as superior or entitled to special treatment.

Routes to Overcoming Collective Narcissism

Collective narcissism can have both positive and negative consequences for group members and for society as a whole. On the positive side, it can contribute to group cohesion and solidarity, as well as provide a sense of pride and purpose for group members. However, it can also lead to negative outcomes, such as aggression towards outsiders or other groups, and a tendency to view other groups as inferior or threatening. This can lead to intergroup conflict, prejudice, and discrimination, and can contribute to societal divides and polarization.

In light of these negative effects, it is important for individuals and groups to recognize and challenge their own narcissistic tendencies, and to strive for a more inclusive and respectful society. There are several ways that this can be achieved:

Encourage open and respectful dialogue: Encourage individuals to engage in respectful and open-minded discussions with those who hold different political views. This can help to foster understanding and empathy and can lead to more productive conversations.
Focus on common ground: Try to identify and emphasize areas of agreement or common ground, rather than stressing differences or trying to win arguments.
Promote empathy: Encourage individuals to try to understand and appreciate the experiences, perspectives, and concerns of those with different political views.
Foster a sense of community: Work to build a sense of community and shared purpose, and focus on the common good.
Encourage critical thinking: Encourage individuals to critically evaluate information and sources, rather than blindly accepting or rejecting ideas based on preconceived beliefs.

By implementing these strategies, we can work towards a more inclusive and respectful society, reduce our collectively narcissistic impulses, and work toward healing some of the divides caused by political polarization.

About the Author

Craig Harper, Ph.D., is an academic and psychological scientist. His research interests lie in the psychological processes that underpin decision-making in relation to controversial social and political topics.

Online: My Research on Google Scholar, Instagram, Twitter

11. Biden administration working to halt Iran from delivering drones to Russia

Biden administration working to halt Iran from delivering drones to Russia

BY BRAD DRESS - 12/28/22 10:11 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3790514-biden-administration-working-to-halt-iran-from-delivering-drones-to-russia/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

The Biden administration is reportedly working to curb Iran’s ability to deliver drones to Russian troops for use in Ukraine by expanding efforts to choke Tehran’s production of the unmanned aerial vehicles.

The New York Times reported on the expanded push Wednesday, citing unnamed intelligence, military and national security officials. The administration is focusing on depriving Iran of the parts it needs to produce the drones.

Adrienne Watson, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, told the newspaper officials are “looking at ways to target” Iranian drone production “through sanctions, export controls, and talking to private companies whose parts have been used in the production.”

“We are assessing further steps we can take in terms of export controls to restrict Iran’s access to technologies used in drones,” Watson said.

The U.S. is also helping Ukrainian defenders target sites where drones are being launched and providing equipment to detect the drones early after launch, according to the Times.

Iranian drones are mostly assembled through parts produced in the U.S., Europe and Asia, according to a November report from a weapons research group, Conflict Armament Research.

U.S. companies with parts ending up in the explosive drones, including Dallas-based Texas Instruments, have condemned the use of their technology in the drones.

CNN reported this month the Biden administration was creating a task force to investigate how U.S. tech was ending up in the Iranian drones.

Iranian drones have been deployed for widespread use in Ukraine since the fall. Russian forces have used them to attack critical infrastructure and energy grids in the country.

The U.S. has sanctioned Iranian entities and two companies in the United Arab Emirates allegedly involved with manufacturing the drones.

12. Biden’s ‘stalemate strategy’ in Ukraine does not deter Russia and encourages China on Taiwan

Excerpts:

Biden has said four times that Washington will defend Taiwan, only to have his subordinates’ “clarifications” drain his remarks of meaning each time. Biden is clearly trying to dispel the ambiguity that began with the Clinton administration in 1995. The circumstances have changed in significant ways in the four decades since, many of which have eroded U.S. credibility and increased the danger of Beijing making a strategic miscalculation — so the need for clarity on Taiwan is even more compelling. What happens to Taiwan surely will impact the security fate of the entire region, just as Ukraine’s future is tied inextricably to Europe’s.

Given the stakes in the democracy versus authoritarianism confrontation that the Trump and Biden administrations both correctly discerned, global security is also fatefully implicated. The two administrations’ efforts to strengthen allies’ contributions to the collective defense, greatly intensified by the Biden team, provide a hopeful basis for avoiding in the Indo-Pacific what has happened in Europe — but only if it is bolstered by sustained U.S. leadership.

Presently, Biden’s stalemate strategy in Ukraine well suits Xi Jinping’s “new normal” approach to squeezing Taiwan. Western strategic clarity is needed in both theaters to deter further Russia’s revanchism and China’s expansionism.

Biden’s ‘stalemate strategy’ in Ukraine does not deter Russia and encourages China on Taiwan

BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 12/27/22 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3788825-bidens-stalemate-strategy-in-ukraine-does-not-deter-russia-and-encourages-china-on-taiwan/

At his news conference with President Volodymyr Zelensky, President Biden was posed this question by a Ukrainian journalist:

“When the full-scale invasion started, U.S. officials said that Ukraine cannot receive Patriots because, as you said, it might be unnecessary escalation. And now it is happening. … And now Ukraine desperately needs more capabilities, including long-range missiles — ATACMS. Maybe I sound naïve, but can we make a long story short and give Ukraine all the capabilities it needs and liberate all territories, sooner rather than later?”

After an awkward wisecrack and the requisite audience tittering, Biden rephrased the question:

“Why don’t we just give Ukraine everything there is to give? … [T]he idea that we would give Ukraine materiel that is fundamentally different than is already going there would have a prospect of breaking up NATO and breaking up the European Union and the rest of the world. …[T]hey’re not looking to go to war with Russia. They’re not looking for a third World War. And I think it can all be avoided by making sure that Ukraine is able to succeed on the battlefield. … [T]here’s more to say, but I probably already said too much.”

Put bluntly, Biden was saying our European allies wouldn’t let America do all we could to help Ukraine for fear of further antagonizing Vladimir Putin. He was describing the reverse scenario from what occurred in March, when Poland offered Ukraine Russian MiGs to establish the no-fly zone that Biden had refused, and he vetoed Poland’s idea as well.

A consensus organization such as NATO necessarily operates on a lowest common denominator basis, which is why Turkey has been able to withhold its consent to the accession of Finland and Sweden until it receives concessions on unrelated matters.

History eventually may reveal the accurate mix of U.S. leadership and European trepidation, but it was Biden who mentioned the danger of WWIII even before Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Since Patriots now will be provided, either the NATO assessment has changed or Washington has decided to disregard it after all.

Taiwan is the other flashpoint for war, created by blatant authoritarian aggression against a vulnerable democracy. The tension between the West’s resolve and its fear of escalation on display in Ukraine has serious implications for American and allied security commitments to Taiwan. The democratic island is perilously close to attack from China, Russia’s “no-limits strategic partner,” and the United States is the only power that can deter or, if necessary, defeat it.

The evolution of American and Western security commitments in the two situations offers ominous comparisons. When Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1997, the United States, United Kingdom and Russia guaranteed its security. In 2008, Washington led NATO in declaring that “Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO.”

Yet, when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, the U.S. and NATO did nothing. And in 2021, when Washington’s intelligence was certain that Russia was preparing a fresh invasion of Ukraine, the West was unwilling or unable to deter it, again for fear of confronting Russia. So, Putin continues to escalate his inhuman aggression against the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian civilization and threatens even worse escalation if the West rallies further to Ukraine’s defense.

When the Carter administration in 1979 switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing and terminated the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to restore as much of the diplomatic and security relationship as possible. It declared Taiwan’s security “a matter of grave concern to the United States” and pledged to provide it with defensive weapons. It also required the executive branch to “maintain the capacity … to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan — but it did not commit the U.S. to utilize that capacity.

In an almost totally ignored, but potentially momentous, provision, the TRA also stated that America’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with China was contingent on “the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” It would greatly strengthen U.S. deterrence if Biden, unlike all his predecessors, would invoke that language and publicly declare that Washington not only will defend Taiwan but will break off relations with Beijing until peace and Taiwan’s independence are secured.

What has become known as America’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” has so shrouded U.S. intentions that neither Taiwan nor China, nor U.S. allies, nor Russia or other Chinese

Allies — perhaps not even Washington itself — knows for sure what the United States will do if China attacks Taiwan. Nor do they know how America will respond if Beijing imposes a sustained blockade on Taiwan like the no-fly, no-sail zone it temporarily established after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) visited the democratic island in August, without any significant Western action.

Biden has said four times that Washington will defend Taiwan, only to have his subordinates’ “clarifications” drain his remarks of meaning each time. Biden is clearly trying to dispel the ambiguity that began with the Clinton administration in 1995. The circumstances have changed in significant ways in the four decades since, many of which have eroded U.S. credibility and increased the danger of Beijing making a strategic miscalculation — so the need for clarity on Taiwan is even more compelling. What happens to Taiwan surely will impact the security fate of the entire region, just as Ukraine’s future is tied inextricably to Europe’s.

Given the stakes in the democracy versus authoritarianism confrontation that the Trump and Biden administrations both correctly discerned, global security is also fatefully implicated. The two administrations’ efforts to strengthen allies’ contributions to the collective defense, greatly intensified by the Biden team, provide a hopeful basis for avoiding in the Indo-Pacific what has happened in Europe — but only if it is bolstered by sustained U.S. leadership.

Presently, Biden’s stalemate strategy in Ukraine well suits Xi Jinping’s “new normal” approach to squeezing Taiwan. Western strategic clarity is needed in both theaters to deter further Russia’s revanchism and China’s expansionism.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.

13. Inside the Ukrainian counteroffensive that shocked Putin and reshaped the war

A long read. Please go to the link below to read this in proper format and view the photos, maps, and graphics..

Inside the Ukrainian counteroffensive that shocked Putin and reshaped the war

By Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne, Serhiy Morgunov and Kamila Hrabchuk

December 29, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/29/ukraine-offensive-kharkiv-kherson-donetsk/

KHARKIV, Ukraine — After weeks of fighting for scraps of territory on the war’s bloodiest front, Oleh, a 21-year-old Ukrainian company commander, was summoned suddenly last August, along with thousands of other soldiers, to an obscure rendezvous point in the Kharkiv region.

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At his last position, relentless Russian artillery fire had stalked his men’s every step. But here, in a patch of villages, farmland and streams in Ukraine’s northeast, the quiet was deeply alarming. “The silence bothered me the most,” Oleh said. “It seemed off. How could this be?”

Even more unsettling were the orders his superiors handed down: to charge as far as 40 miles into enemy territory at high speed in an audacious, top-secret counteroffensive — directly between the Russian-occupied stronghold of Izyum and Russia’s own Belgorod region dotted with military bases. It seemed preposterous. “Some kind of dubious operation,” Oleh said.

Oleh, a 21-year-old Ukrainian company commander who took part in September's Kharkiv counteroffensive. (Serhiy Morgunov for The Washington Post)

But after a summer of heavy Russian casualties and President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to conscript reinforcements, the Kremlin’s troops were badly depleted. A shift of units south — to defend the captured regional capital of Kherson amid talk of a big Ukrainian push there — had left the Kharkiv area exposed.

It was a stunning vulnerability, confirmed by Ukrainian reconnaissance teams and small drones. And Kyiv would exploit it to change the dynamic of the war, and achieve Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s goal of redrawing the battlefield map before winter.

5 key takeaways on how Ukraine’s counteroffensives reshaped the war

After Russia’s invasion began on Feb. 24, Ukrainian troops forced Russia’s retreat from Kyiv in an underdog triumph that ended the first stage of the conflict. Thwarted from conquering the capital, Russia concentrated its power in the south and east, pummeling Ukrainian forces until new, longer-range weapons arrived from the United States and Europe and helped stall Moscow’s advances. Ukraine had survived but, after a half-year of war, one-quarter of its territory was still occupied and its military had failed to show it could launch an offensive to retake substantial ground.

That was about to change.

In early September, Ukrainian forces would steamroll across hundreds of square miles, routing the Russians and surprising themselves. The Kharkiv offensive revealed the inability of an undermanned and underequipped Russian force to hold territory across a vast front. It shocked the Kremlin, and it proved to Ukraine’s supporters that they were not wasting billions in weapons and economic aid.

A Russian military vehicle and ammunition left behind in the Kharkiv region after Ukraine’s armed forces carried out a surprise counteroffensive. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)

Putin was forced to conscript hundreds of thousands of men, making the costs of war clear to a Russian population that had isolated itself from its leader’s “special military operation.” The mobilization set off unrest but was too late to stop Ukraine’s momentum from spreading south to Kherson, where, after hard combat and significant losses, Kyiv’s forces in November recaptured the only regional capital that Putin had seized since the start of the war.

This reconstruction of the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives is based on interviews with more than 35 people, including Ukrainian commanders, officials in Kyiv and combat troops, as well as senior U.S. and European military and political officials.

Areas reclaimed by Ukraine through counteroffensives

Russian-held areas

BELARUS

RUSSIA

Chernihiv

Belgorod

Sumy

Valuyki

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Izyum

Starobilsk

UKRAINE

Balakliya

LUHANSK

Cherkasy

Slovyansk

Luhansk

Dnipro

Donetsk

DONETSK

Zaporizhzhia

Kherson

ZAPORIZHZHIA

Area held

by Russian-

backed

separatists

since 2014

Mariupol

Melitopol

Mykolaiv

MOL.

KHERSON

Odessa

RUSSIA

Kerch

CRIMEA

Annexed by Russia

in 2014

ROM.

Sevastopol

Control areas as of Dec. 27

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, AEI’s Critical Threats Project

LARIS KARKLIS/THE WASHINGTON POST

What emerges is a story of how deepening cooperation with NATO powers, especially the United States, enabled Ukrainian forces — backed with weapons, intelligence and advice — to seize the initiative on the battlefield, expose Putin’s annexation claims as a fantasy, and build faith at home and abroad that Russia could be defeated.

“Our relationship with all of our partners changed immediately,” said Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, who commanded the Kharkiv offensive. “That is, they saw that we could achieve victory — and the help they were providing was being used with effect.”

In the last days of August, Syrsky met in a large operations room in Ukraine’s east with his top aides and key brigade commanders. Before them was a 520-square-foot 3D-printed terrain map of the part of the Kharkiv region occupied by Russia.

Each commander walked the path of his unit’s planned assault amid the replica cities, hills and rivers, acting out its mission and discussing coordination, contingencies and worst-case scenarios. Officers used laser pointers to spotlight trouble spots.

“It was painstaking work,” Syrsky said.

War in Ukraine has decimated a once feared Russian brigade

Since at least the spring, Syrsky had been considering the Kharkiv region, and the strategic cities of Balakliya and Izyum, as vulnerable points for the Russians.

He started thinking about how he would conduct an offensive by driving deep into Russian-held territory from an unexpected area north of the two cities, cutting off Russian forces from reserves across the nearby border and putting both Balakliya and Izyum at risk of encirclement.

The geography and the positioning of Russian forces convinced him it could be accomplished in a single, rapid blow — ideally so fast that Russia would not be able to regroup.

When orders went out from the Ukrainian General Staff last summer for commanders to come up with possible diversionary operations to draw Russian forces away from the defense of Kherson, Syrsky knew what he would propose.

“The enemy … thought that, because so many forces had been built up in Izyum and more were stationed over the Russian border in the Belgorod region, ‘you’d have to be crazy to move and try to strike right in the middle and split the two,’” Syrsky said. “But the thought was there.”

Ukrainian Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, who commanded the Kharkiv counteroffensive, said speed was critical. “Everything depended on the first day — how far we could break through,” he said. (Anastasia Vlasova for The Washington Post)

In the early stages of the war, Russia had converted Izyum into a military stronghold, eyeing the city as the base for a pincer movement that would surround Ukrainian forces in the east. At the height of its preparations, according to Syrsky, Russia had amassed 24 battalion tactical groups — about 18,000 troops — in Izyum and surrounding towns, along with stockpiles of weapons and ammunition.

By August, in part thanks to detailed intelligence supplied by the United States, Syrsky saw that the number of battalions in Izyum had dropped by at least half, as Russia relocated its most experienced fighters to Kherson.

“In the history of wars, there have been many cases when an attack on a diversionary axis — that is, on a secondary axis — turns into the main axis,” Syrsky said. “The prospects were all there, because … the enemy absolutely didn’t expect that we would attack in the exact place where we delivered the main blow.”

Syrsky calculated that Ukraine could not afford the losses that would come with attacking towns and cities head-on. Instead, he planned to sweep across the front, encircling population centers and forcing the enemy to retreat.

Speed was essential. If the Russians sent in reserves from across the border, large numbers of Ukrainian troops could get cut off behind enemy lines.

“Everything depended on the first day — how far we could break through,” Syrsky said. “The farther we went, the less they could do, the more their units would be cut off and isolated under psychological pressure.”

By August, the Ukrainians had all but run out of the Soviet-era ammunition used by most of their artillery. Western allies were rushing in NATO-standard ammunition and systems — but not enough.

Inside the monumental, stop-start effort to arm Ukraine

In a risky decision, Ukraine moved some of the most valuable Western weapons systems away from hotter spots on the eastern front. Each attacking brigade was armed with at least eight M777 howitzers, commanders said. In some cases, the M777s arrived at encampments the night before the assault began. Extra drones were also brought in to ensure that brigades could pinpoint targets and use less ammunition.

Ukrainian troops fire a M777 howitzer at front-line Russian forces in the Kharkiv region in July. In early September, Ukraine would begin its surprise counteroffensive. (Gleb Garanich/Reuters)

Maj. Gen. Andriy Malinovsky, head of missile forces and artillery training for the Ukrainian army, was still worried the force could need more than 100,000 munitions. The Ukrainians had only tens of thousands — not enough for a protracted slog. (Ultimately, Malinovsky said, they used about 32,500 over five days).

U.S. intelligence helped ration the ammunition through accurate targeting. After many months, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials, the two partners had worked out a real-time regimen: The Ukrainians would outline the types of high-value targets they were looking for in an area, and the United States would use its vast geospatial intelligence apparatus to respond with precise locations.

The Americans, however, were not deeply involved in planning the Kharkiv offensive and learned about it relatively late, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

Despite attempts at secrecy, the Russians eventually realized that the Ukrainians were up to something.

Thanks to Russian bureaucracy, Syrsky said, the information “didn’t reach anyone or it wasn’t taken into account.”

At the Pentagon, officials suspected that Russia’s leadership didn’t fully realize the vulnerabilities on the Kharkiv front because battlefield commanders were lying. Another hypothesis, a senior U.S. defense official said, was that Russia saw the onslaught coming but didn’t have enough men to stop it.

The Ukrainians moved pontoon bridges around, hoping to trick the Russians into expecting a direct assault on Izyum, rather than a drive deep into territory some 30 miles northwest.

By mid-August, Syrsky was confident the plan would work — but he needed to sell it to Zelensky. He described the mission as a chance to liberate a large swath of territory with minimal resources and losses.

Zelensky, craving a big battlefield win, approved the attack.

Russia and Ukraine are fighting the first full-scale drone war

III

On Sept. 6, just past 3:30 a.m., Oleh’s company of about 100 soldiers, part of the 25th Airborne Assault Brigade, began to advance in small columns of three infantry fighting vehicles each. For hours before they started to move, Ukrainian artillerymen had been pounding Russian positions with U.S.-made M270 multiple launch rocket systems.

Oleh, seen in the Donetsk region in December, said of the counteroffensive: “We broke through the front line, and the enemy started panicking.” (Serhiy Morgunov for The Washington Post)

Command posts. Ammunition depots. Fuel storage facilities. The firing was relentless. Across the front, Ukrainian military officials later said, Russian soldiers or their separatist proxies struggled to receive orders or coordinate with nearby forces as the rockets rained down. Some troops began to retreat.

“We broke through the front line, and the enemy started panicking,” Oleh said, speaking on the condition he be referred to by his first name because his relatives live in Russian-occupied territory. “They were panicking because we attacked all front-line positions at once — the entire front line itself was enormous — and everywhere there was a breakthrough.”

By the end of that first day, Oleh’s company had advanced about 11 miles with little resistance, reaching the edge of Volokhiv Yar, a picturesque town in a ravine. Capturing this key junction would allow Ukrainian forces to block two major highways heading into Izyum and Balakliya.

That morning, Evhenii Andrushenko woke up to four Russian tanks parked in front of his home in Volokhiv Yar. Soldiers were sitting in a gazebo alongside his fence, he said. “They were sitting there drinking beer,” Andrushenko said. “And talking about where to run.”

Detail

Kyiv

Ukraine’s successful

Kharkiv counteroffensive

required two simultaneous

advances into Russian-

held areas:

Russian-controlled

area

Belgorod

RUSSIA

Toward Kupyansk

and points north

Toward Izyum

and points south

Vovchansk

Area recaptured

by Ukraine in Sept.

UKRAINE

Kharkiv

KHARKIV

Chuhuiv

Kupyansk

Andriivka

Volokhiv Yar

Sept. 6

LUHANSK

Balakliya

Russian-held

areas

Donets R.

Kun’e

Svatove

Izyum

Sept. 12

Starobilsk

Korovii

Yar

20 MILES

Kreminna

Lyman

Barvinkove

Oct. 1

Slovyansk

Severodonetsk

Kramatorsk

Donets R.

DONETSK

Bakhmut

Popasna

LUHANSK

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, AEI’s Critical Threats Project

LARIS KARKLIS/THE WASHINGTON POST

Oleh and his troops moved into the town. They had accomplished their first objective. And just as quickly they moved on, racing southeast for several days, with relatively little resistance, into spaces abandoned by Russian forces.

Under the original battle plan, the company, by Day 7, was to take up a position on a ridge north of Izyum, some 40 miles from the offensive’s starting point. But the day before, Oleh was summoned with other company commanders to a meeting. “Half the units in Izyum, maybe even the majority, are simply fleeing,” their battalion commander said. “So, we’re entering Izyum.”

Destroyed Russian military equipment in the center of Izyum on Sept. 14. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

Oleh’s company went first and dug in at the first Russian checkpoint in the city. Within minutes, a boxy Zhiguli sedan with flags and the painted letter “Z” — a symbol of the invaders — came speeding up the road filled with fighters.

If they were trying to flee, they were headed in the wrong direction.

“Come this way, my sweet,” Oleh said.

A soldier blasted the car with a rocket-propelled grenade.

“Enemy eliminated,” he said.

In the distance, the Ukrainian troops could see other Russian vehicles heading in the correct direction — out of the city.

“We expected that we would fulfill all the missions of the operation,” Syrsky said. “But that there would be this kind of cascading collapse — I didn’t expect that.”

A Ukrainian tank crew on the road to Izyum during the counteroffensive. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

When Oleh’s company entered central Izyum, having made it there without any losses, the troops were dumbfounded at what lay before them: Tanks in working order, ready to be driven. Abandoned artillery pieces, ready to be fired. Fuel tankers “filled up to the eyeballs.” Tons of ammunition and light weapons.

The Russian troops had had everything they needed for a serious defense, Oleh thought, except the will to fight and, apparently, enough men. Even the elite Russian units left in the area bolted, realizing Moscow had no backup cavalry to send.

“When we entered Izyum, some kind of feeling arose, like the taste of victory,” said the company’s 36-year-old chief sergeant, Anton Chornyi. “It seemed to everyone like the beginning of the end.”

Anton Chornyi, the 36-year-old chief sergeant in Oleh's company. (Serhiy Morgunov for The Washington Post)

Oleh fired up his Starlink satellite internet and placed a call. Some 75 miles east of where he stood, his parents were living under occupation in the city of Starobilsk in the Luhansk region.

“What on earth are you guys up to over there?” his father asked. Russian forces in Starobilsk had just fled, his father said, and separatist fighters were now manning the checkpoints.

Oleh told him they had taken Izyum and chased the Russians out of hundreds of square miles of territory in a matter of days.

“Well done! Well done!” his father said.

“Don’t worry,” Oleh said. “Soon we’ll be in Starobilsk.”

He wasn’t fully kidding. Oleh, it seemed, could soon be going home.

The rout in the Kharkiv region rocked Moscow.

Putin’s refusal for months to take the political risk of announcing a draft had had disastrous consequences.

Left with little choice, he declared what he called a “partial mobilization” to conscript up to 300,000 troops, his biggest and riskiest escalation since the start of the war. Hundreds of thousands of Russian men fled the country in a frenzy.

In a speech, Putin characterized the mobilization as a necessary step to fend off Western nations bent on destroying Russia. He also suggested he might use nuclear weapons.

Russia’s annexation puts world ‘two or three steps away’ from nuclear war

“This is not a bluff,” Putin said.

Men board a train in Prudboi in Russia's southwest after President Vladimir Putin ordered a "partial mobilization" in the wake of Ukraine's victory in Kharkiv. (AP)

Putin sped up his annexation plans, declaring Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to be part of Russia despite lacking full control over them.

“I want the Kyiv authorities and their real masters in the West to hear me, so that they remember this,” Putin said in a speech. “People living in Luhansk and Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are becoming our citizens. Forever.”

On Oct. 8, Putin also designated Gen. Sergei Surovikin the first sole commander to lead Russia’s war across the entire theater.

With a direct line to Surovikin, Putin began to receive a more unvarnished picture of the problems on the battlefield, according to two people familiar with the matter, who said that previously Putin had been given overly rosy assessments by his top defense officials.

The peril of his disconnect from reality could not be mistaken. Zelensky had arrived to stand in the center of Izyum.

After his company’s victory, Oleh’s soldiers spent about a week in Izyum in mid-September, relishing the thought that the war’s end was near. Then they headed southeast, crossing into the Donetsk region on orders to retake the city of Lyman.

Reality resurfaced along the way.

In a line of trees near the village of Korovii Yar, the company came under fire from three Russian tanks. Five men from Oleh’s company were killed, according to the chief sergeant. Twelve were wounded, including a squadron commander who led his soldiers for four hours after shrapnel ravaged his jaw. The Ukrainians ultimately took the village, Oleh said, but the racing advance had stalled to something tougher and slower.

Russia is fighting for land already in ruins

Gains in the direction of Lyman would be hard-fought.

Ukrainian soldiers scramble to take cover during intense Russian shelling outside Lyman in June. Ukrainians would also clash with Russian forces near Lyman in the September counteroffensive. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)

Oleh was 13 years old in 2014 when war came to his native Luhansk region. The Kremlin fueled a separatist conflict, forcing Kyiv to fight for the predominantly Russian-speaking territory in the east. But even in an area that historically had Russian sympathies, a young Oleh was always sure of his stance.

“I’m not a herd, and I don’t have a shepherd,” he said. “I was born and raised in an independent country. I have my own opinion, which in Ukraine has a right to live and exist. I don’t know how it is in Russia.”

After ninth grade, Oleh left for a local military school, then enrolled at the Odessa Military Academy in the department of airborne assault forces. Three and a half years into his four-year degree, war broke out. The students were sent straight to the front. Oleh ended up back in Ukraine’s east, first as a platoon commander and later as a company commander, leading soldiers who in many cases were years older than he was.

After Korovii Yar, the company moved farther south, taking up a position outside Lyman. The Russians in the city were nearly surrounded, but unlike their compatriots in Izyum, they fought.

“There was so much enemy artillery fire — everything they had, all the artillery they had, the tanks, everything, was unloading right onto us, onto us, onto us,” Oleh said. The only route out of Lyman for the Russians was a road with little cover. Finally, one night, the Ukrainian company heard the rumble of a large column of vehicles and covered the road with artillery fire.

Lyman, too, had fallen.

In Lyman, liberated by Ukraine in the counteroffensive, a sign warning of mines stands near a car spray-painted with a “Z,” the symbol of Russian forces. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)

In the days since, Oleh’s company has advanced 17 miles east, just past the border of the Luhansk region, where Russia is deploying drafted conscripts by the truckload onto the front line 36 miles from his hometown.

On east front with Ukrainian troops: Constant shelling, no heat or coffee

“It’s still quite a long ways to my city,” Oleh said. “But every day we get closer and closer. I can’t wait.”

Kharkiv gave the Ukrainians a chance to push on an open door. Kherson presented a solid wall.

Over months of occupation, the Russians had dug trenches and built large defenses. The farmland of the steppe offered little natural cover for an attacking force, and a maze of irrigation canals as obstacles. Moscow had brought in its best troops.

“The minefields they set up there — they practically didn’t know themselves how many they set up. Everyone who came there would change them and add additional minefields,” said Maj. Gen. Andriy Kovalchuk, who was tasked with leading the Kherson counteroffensive. “We didn’t have the option to advance rapidly.”

To decide how to go about the operation, Ukrainian commanders arrived in Germany last July for a war-gaming session with their American and British counterparts.

At the time, the Ukrainians were considering a far broader counteroffensive across the entire southern front, including a drive to the coast in the Zaporizhzhia region that would sever Moscow’s coveted “land bridge” connecting mainland Russia with Crimea, which was illegally annexed in 2014.

In a room full of maps and spreadsheets, the Ukrainians ran their own “tabletop exercise,” describing the order of battle — what formations they would use, where the units would go and in what sequence — and the likely Russian response.

Maj. Gen. Andriy Kovalchuk, the initial commander of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kherson region. (Ukrainian Operative Commandment South)

The American and British war-gamers ran their own simulations using the same inputs but different software and analysis. They couldn’t get the operation to work.

Given the numbers of Ukrainian troops and available stockpiles of ammunition, the planners concluded that the Ukrainians would exhaust their combat power before achieving the offensive’s objectives.

“This was them asking for our advice,” said a senior U.S. defense official, who like others in this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military planning. “And our advice was, ‘Hey, guys, you’re going to bite off more than you can chew. This isn’t going to work out well.’”

Beyond the risk of running out of steam, a Zaporizhzhia offensive might have pushed Ukrainian forces into a pocket the Russians could surround with reinforcements sent along two axes, from Crimea and Russia.

“Our commanders thought the Ukrainians left pretty determined that they were going to do the whole thing anyway — just that there was a lot of pressure to do the whole thing,” the defense official said.

The White House reiterated the U.S. military’s analysis in talks with Zelensky’s office.

National security adviser Jake Sullivan talked to the Ukrainian president’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, about the plans for a broad southern counteroffensive, according to people familiar with the discussions.

A bunker abandoned by the Russians during Ukraine's counteroffensive in Kherson. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

The Ukrainians accepted the advice and undertook a narrower campaign focused on Kherson city, which sits on the west side of the Dnieper River, separated from Russian-held territory to the east.

“I give the Ukrainians a lot of credit,” the defense official said. “They allowed reality to move them toward a more limited set of objectives in Kherson. And they were nimble enough to exploit an opportunity in the north. That’s a lot.”

Kovalchuk set out to bisect the Russian-occupied area on the west side of the Dnieper and trap the Russian forces. “My task was not only to liberate the territory,” he said. “My task from the start was to occlude and destroy the force. That is, to not let them leave or exist.”

The objectives of the Kherson offensive were to bisect the Russian-

occupied area west of the Dnieper River and trap the Kremlin

forces there, and to get within artillery range of Kherson

city and three key river crossings.

Toward Kherson city

and points south

Area reclaimed

by Ukraine by

Nov. 11 as

Russia withdraws.

Dudchany

Davydiv

Brid

Kyiv

Russian-controlled

area

Bruskynske

Detail

Snihurivka

Beryslav

Hydroelectric

dam

Nova

Kakhovka

Zelenyi

Hai

Antonovsky

railway bridge

Mykolaiv

Antonovsky

Bridge

Kherson

Northern

Crimean

Canal

Russian-

controlled

area

Skadovsk

15 MILES

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, AEI’s Critical Threats Project

LARIS KARKLIS/THE WASHINGTON POST

Failing that, the goal was to force them to flee. The 25,000 Russian troops in that portion of Kherson, separated by the broad river from their supplies, had been placed in a highly exposed position. If enough military pressure was applied, Moscow would have no choice but to retreat, Kovalchuk said.

Russia had to arm and feed its forces via three crossings: the Antonovsky Bridge, the Antonovsky railway bridge and the Nova Kakhovka dam, part of a hydroelectric facility with a road running on top of it.

Russian troops patrol in May at the Nova Kakhovka dam, on the Dnieper River in the Kherson region. The dam and two other river crossings were key targets in the offensive. (AP)

The two bridges were targeted with U.S.-supplied M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems — or HIMARS launchers, which have a range of 50 miles — and were quickly rendered impassable.

“There were moments when we turned off their supply lines completely, and they still managed to build crossings,” Kovalchuk said. “They managed to replenish ammunition. … It was very difficult.”

Kovalchuk considered flooding the river. The Ukrainians, he said, even conducted a test strike with a HIMARS launcher on one of the floodgates at the Nova Kakhovka dam, making three holes in the metal to see if the Dnieper’s water could be raised enough to stymie Russian crossings but not flood nearby villages.

The test was a success, Kovalchuk said, but the step remained a last resort. He held off.

VII

At the outset of the Kherson offensive, Ukrainian forces charged through Russia’s first-line defenses. Then they met fierce resistance.

A 32-year-old company commander named Yurii in Ukraine’s 35th Marine Brigade led his platoons in early September across a small river under fire, only to face a dug-in second line outside the village of Bruskynske, about 50 miles northeast of Kherson city. The Russians had been in the area for months, lining trenches with concrete and hiding tanks in deep ditches in the ground.

There, Yurii’s men felt the full force of Russian aviation. Russian military aircraft dropped high-explosive FAB bombs on his unit, which initially didn’t have any weaponry to defend itself or target the planes.

“This is a munition that leaves nothing behind,” Yurii said. “That explosion, that wave — when it’s 200 meters away, you feel it very strongly. It throws you back. … When we had direct hits on the positions with FABs, there was nothing left of the people.”

Ukrainian forces in the area were trying to push southward to bisect the Russian-occupied territory west of the Dnieper and get within artillery range of the Nova Kakhovka dam.

Ukrainian losses quickly mounted. With increasing numbers of armored vehicles destroyed or out of service, medics had to use pickup trucks to shuttle the wounded, often under fire from the Russians. Later, they used a Russian-made car.

“During the next evacuation, my combat medic was hit by shrapnel through the window directly into the car,” Yurii said. “During those two weeks, there was not a single window left in the car. Everything was smashed by shrapnel. But still the evacuations took place.”

By October, Ukraine had begun stabilizing the situation, and Yurii was dispatched to enter the nearby village of Davydiv Brid. There, he climbed a red metal structure, bursting with happiness, to record on camera that the village had been liberated.

A strong wind gusted. “We solemnly hang a blue-yellow flag above Davydiv Brid,” he yelled into the gale. “Glory to Ukraine!”

VIII

Back in Kyiv, impatience was growing.

Kovalchuk was insisting it was just a matter of time before the Russians retreated — the leaves were about to fall off the trees, the river would freeze in winter, the Russian forces were running low on supplies.

But for Kyiv, Kovalchuk wasn’t moving fast enough. He was replaced by Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavsky, a deputy of Syrsky’s during the Kharkiv operation.

Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavsky, a deputy of Syrsky’s in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. He replaced Kovalchuk as commander of the Kherson operation. (Joint Press Center of the Tavriia Defense Task Force)

A senior Ukrainian government official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly, said Kovalchuk “wasn’t getting the job done.”

But the change wasn’t publicly announced, the official said, so as not to provide Russia with any kind of propaganda victory. The Americans were informed.

“I think there were folks who were probably getting impatient with the movement in the south,” said a senior U.S. military official. “It was a really good start and then it just kind of stopped.”

Tarnavsky, the new commander, said he applied some of the principles he and Syrsky had used in Kharkiv, attacking where the Russians least expected it.

He said he singled out the territory between Mykolaiv and Kherson — flat farmland with few trees and obstructive concrete irrigation canals — as the place to mount the main offensive drive. “The calculation,” Tarnavsky said, “was the enemy wouldn’t think we would do it there.”

Responsibility for that difficult stretch of front, northwest of Kherson, fell to Col. Vadym Sukharevsky, commander of the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade.

His men had charged through Russia’s front lines, overcoming losses, and were pushing against ferocious resistance to get close enough to strike the river crossings into Kherson with artillery. That fire would also make Russian resupply trips by pontoon barges nearly impossible. His forces were almost there. “It was literally a battle for every meter,” Sukharevsky said.

Up against elite Russian air-assault units, Sukharevsky’s less experienced troops were forced to engage in what he called battlefield “folk art.”

A Ukrainian volunteer soldier trains with a Mavic drone. (Sasha Maslov for the Washington Post)

They modified the batteries in off-the-shelf DJI Mavic drones so the copters could fly four times farther, up to 13 miles. They obtained an additive used to give natural gas its scent and launched the foul odor into enemy trenches. They accepted drones from cigarette smugglers and transformed them into self-detonating explosives.

“Our army is used to fighting with improvised means,” Sukharevsky said.

One of his platoon commanders, Chief Sgt. Yevhen Ignatenko, the owner of a large Kherson grain-shipping business and a regional politician, explained how best to destroy his own barges, which Russia had requisitioned to ferry forces and supplies across the Dnieper.

Ignatenko drew on a lifetime of local knowledge — back roads, canals, pumping stations — to figure out how to advance through the difficult terrain. He also gathered information about the Russians’ activities from a network of sources behind enemy lines.

A burned car marked with the warning "mines" sits along the road to Zelenyi Hai village in November. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

On the night of Nov. 9, Sukharevsky said, the brigade closed in on Zelenyi Hai, a village that put Kherson within artillery range. The Ukrainians began striking the river, he said. But the Russians had begun retreating days earlier.

Sukharevsky said he credits Ukraine’s victory partly to the artillery systems, guided munitions and long-range rocket launchers sent by the West, which eventually wore down a Russian force already low on ammunition and struggling with supply lines.

The pressure from Ukrainian troops forced the retreat, but they didn’t manage to run down or destroy the fleeing Russians. Mines, in some cases laid a meter apart and three rows deep or tucked into thin strips on the roads, prevented the Ukrainians from giving chase.

“They didn’t hold back,” Sukharevsky said. “They mined with everything, even new means we had never heard of.”

When Zelensky visited Izyum in mid-September, days after Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive, the officials with him were tense, even though he was still some 12 miles from the front line. A visit to Kherson, with Russian snipers just across the river, posed a much greater risk.

Zelensky, however, could not be kept away.

Tarnavsky stood beside Zelensky on Kherson’s central square. “I was amazed at the people I saw,” Tarnavsky said. “All of their faces, there was just joy on them.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visits the liberated city of Kherson on Nov. 14. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

Zelensky raised the flag over a liberated city for the second time in two months and described the moment as the “beginning of the end of the war.”

Ignatenko, the regional politician and Kherson shipping magnate serving in the 59th Brigade, sent a drone up over the river and found one of his barges half-submerged near the Antonovsky Bridge, but others were missing.

“We’ll find them,” Ignatenko said. “And if we don’t find them, we’ll build new ones. It’s okay. At least we will be a free country.”

Shane Harris in Washington and Mary Ilyushina in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.

War in Ukraine: What you need to know

The latest: French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu arrived in Kyiv Wednesday to discuss further military support for Ukraine, marking his first visit to the country in the 10 months since Russia invaded. In Kyiv, officials warned the capital would see emergency power outages all winter, despite workers racing to repair infrastructure damaged by shelling. Read the latest updates here.

Russia’s Gamble: The Post examined the road to war in Ukraine, and Western efforts to unite to thwart the Kremlin’s plans, through extensive interviews with more than three dozen senior U.S., Ukrainian, European and NATO officials.

Photos: Washington Post photographers have been on the ground from the beginning of the war — here’s some of their most powerful work.

How you can help: Here are ways those in the U.S. can support the Ukrainian people as well as what people around the world have been donating.

Read our full coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war. Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for updates and exclusive video.

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Isabelle Khurshudyan is a foreign correspondent based in Kyiv. A University of South Carolina graduate, she has worked at The Washington Post since 2014, previously as a correspondent in the Moscow bureau and as a sports reporter covering the Washington Capitals. Twitter

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Paul Sonne covers national security, focusing on Russia and Europe. He previously reported for the Wall Street Journal from Moscow, London and Washington. Twitter

14. 7 Jumps, 7 Continents, 7 Days: Triple 7 Expedition Will Set Records, Benefit Gold Star Families

Wow. Quite a transportation and logistics challenge.

7 Jumps, 7 Continents, 7 Days: Triple 7 Expedition Will Set Records, Benefit Gold Star Families

coffeeordie.com · by Jenna Biter · December 28, 2022

Coolidge, Ariz. — A ground crew member tipped his head back and searched the sky for parachutes.

More than a mile up, the Triple 7 Expedition jump team was falling toward earth. One by one, canopies ballooned against the wide Arizona sky — orange, blue, gray, red.

Within seconds, eight parachutes were inflated, and the jumpers turned to fly toward the 50-meter patch of grass.

On cue, the ground crewman sprinted to a line of smoke canisters laid out in the dirt. He pulled a pin on each and stepped back. Red smoke billowed into the air.

Above, the jumpers reacted, maneuvering to avoid flying over the smoke, setting up their landing patterns parallel to the red clouds.

Retired Navy SEAL Mike Barker prepares to land on a training trip to Coolidge, Arizona, one month before the Triple 7 Expedition starts in January 2023. Legacy Expeditions photo.

Smoke is often used at desert drop zones like Coolidge to warn jumpers of dust devils swirling across a landing area. But for the Triple 7 team, it was a key part of the early December rehearsal.

The next time the team would jump together would be over Antarctica. There, floating above a landscape of unbroken, featureless ice, fixing on a cloud of red smoke might be the key to finding a way safely to the ground.

Triple 7 Expedition

In early January, a team of former special operators and skydiving veterans will attempt to rewrite the record book for skydiving expeditions. Just after New Year’s, the Triple 7 Expedition plans to jump into Union Glacier Camp, Antarctica, a remote base open only three months out of the year on the world’s harshest continent.

Once on the ground, the Triple 7 jumpers will launch into a breakneck global race to become the first team to skydive on all seven continents in seven days.

As they scramble between continents, the jumpers plan to set world records. But, more importantly, the team aims to raise millions of dollars for Folds of Honor, a US nonprofit that provides thousands of scholarships annually to Gold Star families.

Former Recon Marine and retired Navy SEAL Mike Sarraille walks with his parachute in Coolidge, Arizona, December 2022. Legacy Expeditions photo.

Nearly all the Triple 7 jumpers are veterans of the US special operations community, including the man who dreamed it up. Mike Sarraille is a former Recon Marine and retired Navy SEAL who now runs the adventure firm Legacy Expeditions with Andy Stumpf.

Sarraille began to think about jumping on seven continents in seven days after an ambitious trip in 2021: He jumped into five of the world’s highest drop zones in the Himalayas in 15 days.

“We raised $200,000 for the Special Operations Warrior Foundation, and we also dedicated those jumps to the guys of Extortion 17,” Sarraille said. “And that was sort of the first trip for Legacy Expeditions.”

In 2022, Sarraille and Stumpf, himself a retired SEAL and a world record-holding wingsuiter, completed 16 skydives in Iceland to honor fallen service members and again raise money for SOWF.

But the Triple 7 jumps will be a new level for the pair.

The Triple 7 team debriefs after a skydive at Complete Parachute Solutions in Coolidge, Arizona, in December 2022. Legacy Expeditions photo.

BOULAY

“This is the biggest,” Sarraille said. “I think this is going to give us some gravitas, some momentum to start getting more veterans on these trips, and to feel that camaraderie again.”

The Team

Triple 7’s team of 10 veterans — nine jumpers and one tandem passenger — includes three other former SEALs, Mike Barker, Erik Prince, and Fred Williams.

The team’s tandem master is Nick Kush, a retired Navy explosive ordnance disposal tech who spent nearly all of his career in the naval special warfare world. His tandem passenger will be 73-year-old former Marine Jim Wigginton.

Wigginton has already jumped as a passenger on all seven continents, completing his first go in about six months.

Retired Army Ranger Jariko Denman, former Marine Corps scout sniper Logan Stark, and retired Canadian special operator Glenn Cowan round out the expedition team.

Denman and Stark work for Black Rifle Coffee Company, which is a major sponsor of the Triple 7 Expedition and owns Coffee or Die Magazine.

The Triple 7 team’s tandem master Nick Kush completes a skydive with Jim Wigginton as his passenger at Coolidge, Arizona, Dec. 6, 2022. Legacy Expeditions photo.

While Triple 7’s team of 10 veterans will do the jumping, about 15 medical, research, and operations personnel will support the record attempt, tracking health metrics and troubleshooting travel issues, like commercial flight changes.

A documentary team led by Dan Myrick of The Blair Witch Project will also follow the expedition.

The Cause

Triple 7 could be called “Quadruple 7.” The expedition team is attempting seven continents, seven skydives, in seven days, to raise $7 million for Folds of Honor.

Cowan, the only Canadian on the team, told Coffee or Die that the trip’s appeal is both the adventure and the purpose.

“I think I’m most looking forward to representing the vision, representing what this stands for, the sense of accomplishment of actually pulling it off,” Cowan said. “The world record I could personally care less about — that’s nice to have. I think it’s just bringing awareness, raising money for Folds.”

Former Canadian special operator Glenn Cowan prepares for a skydive in Arizona, December 2022. Legacy Expeditions photo.

Larry Robinson, Folds of Honor’s vice president of development, told Coffee or Die that the nonprofit only has one mission.

“It’s to provide educational scholarships to the spouses and children of wounded and fallen service members, as well as first responders,” Robinson said.

Each Folds of Honor scholarship rings up to a maximum of $5,000. But Robinson likes to think of the impact in terms of lives changed rather than the money raised.

“Obviously, we’re doing this to fund some scholarships,” Robinson said. “More than that is to do seven continents in seven days and raise $7 million and change 1,400 lives.”

The Route

The trip will begin when the team gathers on New Year’s Eve in Punta Arenas, Chile. From there, the veterans will travel to Antarctica. The clock for the world record will start with their first jump, planned for Jan. 9.

The Triple 7 team will wear these hand-painted helmets on their skydiving expedition in January 2023. Legacy Expeditions photo.

That’s where the red smoke will come back into play.

“Everything will be white,” said Kush, the team’s tandem master.

Antarctica offers a unique challenge for jumpers. Visually, the drop zone sits on a cue-ball-like glacier with no trees or landmarks to gauge distance. The ice-covered ground can be so smooth that even experienced jumpers may not realize how high they are.

To give the jumpers a clear target to focus on and indicate wind direction and speed, the ground crew will set off smoke canisters. In Arizona, the crew popped smoke as a trial run, so the jumpers know what to look for when they descend on Antarctica.

From Antarctica, the Triple 7 team will fly to Santiago, Chile, to jump into South America. Next, the expedition will head to Miami, Florida, for North America; then Barcelona, Spain, for Europe; and Cairo, Egypt, for Africa.

Retired Navy explosive ordnance disposal tech Nick Kush and the other Triple 7 team members assemble before a skydive at Coolidge, Arizona, December 2022. Legacy Expeditions photo.

There the team plans to jump over the Egyptian pyramids, one of the Seven Wonders of the World. Then the jumpers will head to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, for the skydive in Asia.

“I feel like it could be done in five days if we had private aircraft, right?” Kush said. But he said funding the cost for private flights wasn’t feasible, so the team will rely on commercial travel.

“It’s a big ask,” Kush said. “The great thing is, if it’s hard for us, it’d be hard for anybody else.”

From the UAE, the Triple 7 team’s last leg will be in Perth, Australia.

“There are going to be highs and lows behind the whole thing,” Kush said. “But I think it’s going to be a remarkable experience in hindsight, you know, overcoming the challenges, overcoming a little bit of anticipation, fear.”

The team will cap the trip with a celebratory eighth jump in Tampa, Florida.

coffeeordie.com · by Jenna Biter · December 28, 2022

15. Laughing in Putin’s face is one of Ukraine’s greatest weapons

Laughing in Putin’s face is one of Ukraine’s greatest weapons

From rude road signs to Putin memes, it’s not just the country’s president who is an expert in comedy

Colin Freeman

28 December 2022 • 12:00pm

The Telegraph · by Colin Freeman

One of the tipples I’ve been enjoying this Christmas is a bottle of bubbly from Slivino, a vineyard on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. It’s not Dom Perignon, but it is still in a class of its own – a Ukrainian “Grad Cru” of 2022 – and no, that’s not a spelling mistake on the label.

Back in May, I interviewed Slivino’s owner, Georgiy Molchanov, who was carrying on despite incoming salvoes of Russian Grad missiles. Several still lay embedded amid his vines, tempting me into the odd gag about his wine having “notes of gunpowder” and a “metallic finish”.

Seven months later, Molchanov has made the joke his own, producing 20 bottles of “Grad Cru” with a label showing a missile truck mounted with a champagne bottle firing a cork. Such marketing might be a little feisty to get it stocked in Oddbins. In Ukraine, however, it’s just one example of how people have chosen to laugh in the face of danger.

Molchanov, who sent me a bottle of the wine last month, has auctioned off the rest to raise money for the war effort, with one bottle fetching nearly £2,500. “The proceeds will buy a pickup truck for the army, and will help to bring victory closer,” he told me.

The ‘Grad Cru’ bottles, from the vineyard of Georgiy Molchanov, features a missile truck with a bottle firing a cork on the label

And the wine is not the only jokey memorabilia I have from the war. There’s also my packet of “F--- You Russian battleship” coffee, for example, made in honour of the Ukrainian naval rating who defied orders to surrender.

Then there’s a bottle of “Putin is a D---head” beer, brewed by hipsters at a craft brewery in Lviv, who deploy humour quite literally as a weapon of war. When the invasion began, they instructed locals in how to convert their empty beer bottles into Molotov cocktails to throw at Russian tanks.

True, a touch of salty humour is a feature of most wars, from songs like Hitler Has Only Got One Ball through to trench newspapers like the Dead Horse Corner Gazette, which aired soldiers’ uncensored gags in the First World War. In Ukraine, though, it seems like nearly everyone is a comedian – not just Volodymr Zelensky, the country’s comic-turned president. From guerrilla marketing like Grad Cru through to spoof holiday ads warning Russians not to visit Crimea, Ukrainians have found endless ways to see the funny side of World War III.

And on a serious note, laughing in Mr Putin’s face helps a great deal, according to Tetyana Ogarkova, a Ukrainian cultural critic. “Humour and irony is not what you expect in a situation so cruel and tragic as this,” she tells me from Kyiv. “To be honest, I think we were all a bit surprised, but it started the moment the war began.”

Unusually, many of the jokes are not the work of internet wags, but government ministries – not normally organisations known for their risqué sense of humour. Arriving in Kyiv in March for example, I found that all the motorway signs had been altered to tell the Russian army where to go, as it were:

Road directions in eastern Kiev for Russian army. Rough translation:

Ahead: Go f*** yourself

Left: Go f*** yourself again

Right: Russia is that f***ing way pic.twitter.com/5WvVq9dImB

— colin freeman (@colinfreeman99) March 13, 2022

Even Ukraine’s taxman has got in on the act, issuing a jokey declaration after local farmers were filmed towing away captured Russian tanks. In one of the few tax notices ever to raise a smile, officials said that captured Russian armour was too cheaply made to be tax-liable. “Most enemy military equipment usually comes to you already destroyed and disabled,” they added, gleefully. “That makes it impossible to evaluate.”

So where do all these wise-cracking bureaucrats come from? After all, it’s hard to imagine the British government doing the same, given HMG’s record with tedious mantras like “See it, Say it, Sorted”.

Far from having a dedicated Ministry of Humour, it seems largely just a reflection of the youthfulness of President Zelensky’s administration, who were mostly in their late 30s when he swept to power in 2019. Many were friends from his days at Kvartal 95, the TV production company that had already made him Ukraine’s answer to The Daily Show’s Jon Stewart. So they understand the type of gags that appeal to the Netflix generation and get a laugh on Twitter – a place where standard government propaganda might fall very flat. Their output also contrasts with the Kremlin’s, which sticks largely to pictures of a gloomy-looking Mr Putin holding meetings.

Among those with the deftest comic touch is Kyiv’s defence ministry, whose “Ukraine Oscars 2022” went viral with its spoof awards. The country’s farmers won “”#Best Supporting Actor” for towing away Russian tanks, while the Turkish Bayraktor drone won “Best International Feature”.

In August, when Ukrainian saboteurs blew up airfields in occupied Crimea, the defence ministry put out a mock travel advert advising Russians to holiday elsewhere. “Unless they want an unpleasantly hot summer break, we advise our Russian guests not to visit,” the ministry warned, as a video showed Russian sunbathers fleeing huge explosions in the distance.

Much of the humour is aimed at Ukraine’s audiences in the West, on whom it relies for weapons support. When Liz Truss was ousted as prime minister, Kyiv even put out a mock “Better Call Saul” tweet with a picture of Boris Johnson, hinting it might be good to bring back Ukraine’s most famous supporter (it was later deleted). But the morale boost it provides to Ukraine’s own people is huge.

“Laughing together at something unites people, and within a community, there’s more space for resistance,” says Orgarkova. “Also, when you laugh, you feel less afraid, and you can only do it if you are free.”

Accordingly, many of the jokes are aimed at Mr Putin – such as those on the Ukrainian Memes Forces Twitter feed, which has 350,000 followers. One shows Putin signing documents on the accession of Mercury, Venus, Mars and Jupiter to the Russian Federation (a reference to the sham referendums earlier this year in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine). Another has him channelling the villain from Shrek to deliver a message to Russian draftees:

pic.twitter.com/UPyg1x15tQ

— Ukrainian Memes Forces (@uamemesforces) September 21, 2022

The refusal to take Putin’s threats seriously has also made minor celebrities of otherwise obscure public servants, such as Andrey Nebitov, a stern-looking Kyiv police spokesman. His videos, where he disapprovingly inspects captured Russian equipment – much of it dating back to the 1970s – have become a YouTube sensation.

Also earning cult status is Operator Starsky, a soldier famous for his parody of “unboxing” videos, where a social media influencer examines the contents of a newly-arrived Amazon delivery. In one, Starsky looks at a Russian-made reconnaissance drone, revealing its state-of-the-art technology to be a shop-bought Japanese camera. “A Russian drone without a single Russian part,” he says.

Indeed, as the war has progressed, the one person who has not been making many jokes is President Zelensky, whose own background as a comic sometimes jarred on the world stage. After one speech just ahead of the war, when he joked that Ukraine would organise a special “Day of Unity” festival if Russia invaded, he was forced to clarify to foreign diplomats that he was being ironic.

Since the conflict started, however, the president’s pithy, impassioned addresses from his Kyiv bunker have been praised the world over, casting him as a Churchill for the smartphone age. In his place on the comic’s stage, though, it seems a whole nation now stands.

The Telegraph · by Colin Freeman

16. Under New Defense Plan, Japan May Become ‘Normal’ World Power

Under New Defense Plan, Japan May Become ‘Normal’ World Power

December 28, 2022 3:24 AM

William Gallo

voanews.com

Seoul, South Korea —

Japan this month took a major step toward loosening its postwar military restraints, unveiling new policies that will allow the Asian giant to play a much bigger role in regional and global security affairs.

Under a new National Security Strategy (NSS) and two other documents released in mid-December, Japan will roughly double defense spending over the next five years and for the first time deploy missiles that can hit military targets in other countries.

The policies smash through decades-old taboos in Japan, which has embraced a relatively restrained defense posture under its technically pacifist constitution drafted by the United States following Tokyo’s defeat in World War II.

“By realizing the vision articulated in the three documents, Japan might finally become a ‘normal nation’ in terms of its ability to defend itself,” said Tobias Harris, a Japan politics specialist and deputy director at the German Marshall Fund.

“But these documents are the result of a long-term process of thinking about Japan’s changing threat environment,” Harris said in a blog post.

SEE ALSO:

Japan Announces Major Defense Overhaul

Japan has steadily boosted its de facto military, called the Japan Self-Defense Forces, especially as China has become more powerful and assertive with its neighbors over the last decade or so.

But Japan’s self-imposed constitutional restraints mean its military power does not measure up to its economic prowess. Though Japan has the world’s third-largest economy, it ranks only ninth in global defense spending.

That could soon change. The new plan would boost defense spending to 2% of Japan’s GDP, up from the traditional 1%, over the next five years. Japan would then only trail the United States and China in overall defense spending, barring any other changes in the global rankings.

Counterstrike capability

One of the most significant aspects of Japan’s new defense changes is the authorization of what Tokyo refers to as “counterstrike capability,” or the ability to hit bases on enemy territory.

Acquisition of such weapons has long been controversial, since Japan’s constitution has been interpreted as prohibiting arms that can be deemed as offensive, not defensive, in nature.

Instead of acquiring such weapons, Japan has historically relied on missile defense, as well as the firepower of its treaty ally, the United States.

However, Japan’s updated NSS says having counterstrike capability is a “minimum necessary measure for self-defense.”

By obtaining such capabilities, Japan can deter enemy attacks, the document adds, noting that preemptive strikes “needless to say…remain impermissible.”

As part of its counterstrike plans, Japanese officials say Tokyo intends to buy hundreds of U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles, which have a range of up to 2,500 kilometers.

Japan’s dangerous neighborhood

Those capabilities are meant to help Japan deal with what the NSS describes as “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War Two.”

Japan is especially worried about China, which has become more authoritarian at home and more assertive about defending its interests abroad.

In recent years, China has expanded military exercises near Japan-claimed islands, often in coordination with Russia.

Beijing has also escalated its threats toward self-ruled Taiwan and refuses to rule out taking it by force. If China were to invade Taiwan, many Japanese fear they would be pulled into a conflict. Those fears were heightened in August when China fired ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during a show of force against Taiwan.

According to the NSS, China is “the greatest strategic challenge” facing Japan.

North Korea, meanwhile, presents a “more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before,” the document says.

This year, nuclear-armed North Korea has launched a record number of ballistic missiles, including some that flew over Japan, prompting residents to take shelter. Pyongyang has also adopted a more aggressive nuclear posture, even asserting its willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively.

Russia, too, is defined in the NSS as a “strong security concern” due to its closer ties with China and invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of its weaker neighbor shocked many in Japan, and analysts say the war is playing a significant role in convincing Tokyo to embrace a more assertive foreign policy.

Under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Japan has been on the frontlines of an international effort to punish Moscow for its war. Recent opinion polls show broad public support for that approach, as well as for Japan’s defense buildup.

“Japan is more willing to join the United States and other like-minded democracies to compete with those autocracies and hostile nuclear powers,” says Tetsuo Kotani, senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Regional reaction

In a statement, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan praised Japan’s new defense strategy as a “bold and historic step to strengthen and defend the free and open Indo-Pacific.”

But perhaps predictably, China, North Korea, and Russia condemned Japan’s announcement.

Moscow accused Japan of embracing “unbridled militarization.” Pyongyang denounced the plan as a “serious challenge” to international peace. In Beijing, officials said Japan was “hyping up the ‘China threat’ to find an excuse for its military buildup,” but was doomed to fail.

Those criticisms risk being seen as hypocritical, since each nation is embarking on its own military modernization.

“These are all countries that have huge stockpiles of long-range missiles,” points out James Brown, associate professor of political science at Temple University in Tokyo. “So, the idea that they should be criticizing Japan for a much more measured and moderate change in its security stance, I think, is without foundation.”

voanews.com

17. ‘Special pay’ keeps Pentagon’s cyber experts from jumping ship

Serving out an enlistment contract and not re-enlisting should not be considered "jumping ship."

‘Special pay’ keeps Pentagon’s cyber experts from jumping ship

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · December 28, 2022

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military is paying tens of millions of dollars each year above set compensation rates to keep sought-after cyber experts onboard and engaged on the digital front lines, according to a federal watchdog.

The services “spent at least $160 million on cyber retention bonuses annually” from fiscal 2017 to 2021, the Government Accountability Office said in a workforce evaluation published this month. Staffing levels across most related career fields that the auditor studied, including in the Army, Air Force and Navy, remained above 80% in the same timeframe.

Special pay is meant to help ensure the military holds on to its top performers, has people in hard-to-fill roles and maintains much-needed expertise amid rivaling opportunities with outside companies or other federal agencies. The services determine how to distribute the incentives, with guidance flowing from the Department of Defense.

The department’s ability to sustain a ready and sufficient cyber cohort is critical to the shielding of its networks and its most sensitive information as well as the execution of digital strikes or influence campaigns on foreign countries or militant groups. Recruitment woes, however, have consumed headlines; the U.S. Army, for example, suffered a shortfall of 15,000 recruits in fiscal 2022. That left the service 20,000 or so troops short of its end-strength number authorized by Congress.

‘Secure, survive, strike’: The Navy’s new approach for cyber dominance

Military members were warned in February that they are targets for cyberattacks amid the Russia-Ukraine war and turbulent Sino-U.S. relations.

“To accomplish its national security mission and defend a wide range of critical infrastructure, DoD must recruit, train, and retain a knowledgeable and skilled cyber workforce,” reads the report. “However, DoD faces increasing competition from the private sector looking to recruit top cyber talent to protect systems and data from a barrage of foreign attacks.”

Competition with the private sector — and even within government — for young, highly skilled workers in emerging tech fields is fierce. Big Tech offers nearly uncapped salaries, competitive benefits and workplace flexibility, though recent layoffs are creating a labor pool the government hopes to tap.

To lure in the talent they need, and keep the staff they have, federal workplaces have looked to incentives, monetary and otherwise. In years with staffing gaps, the military services rolled out bonuses and other perks to recruit and retain.

The civilian side of government has taken a similar approach. The White House’s Office of Personnel Management just concluded its annual review of special rate requests for salary adjustments for specific occupations, grades or locations “to alleviate existing or likely significant recruitment or retention difficulties.” Other agencies have deviated from the General Schedule to create job-specific pay systems and invoke special hiring authorities.

Army Cyber Command officials told the GAO that money spent on retention bonuses is offset by the costs of recruitment and training to replace cyber personnel. The replacement cost for a service member in the 17C career field, or cyber operations specialist, who is certified to fill the interactive on-net operator role is about $400,000, while the retention bonus offered to a person with that training is $92,000 spread over six years, the report notes.

Can the Army fill its ranks?

Digital fluency is increasingly important, defense and intelligence officials say, as the U.S. ratchets up competition with China and Russia, top national security threats, according to the National Defense Strategy. Both wield significant cyber weaponry: Chinese-sponsored cyberattacks have breached a Navy contractor’s computers, jeopardizing information related to secret work on an anti-ship missile, and virtual Russian belligerence targeted U.S. elections and lubricated its war machine in Ukraine.

As a result, cyber cliques in the U.S. military are expected to expand in coming years. The Army, specifically, plans to double the size of its active-duty cyber forces by the end of the decade.

“You will continue to see the growth of our cyber branch, as we proliferate cyber-electromagnetic activities, capabilities,” Lt. Gen. John Morrison, deputy chief of staff, G-6, told reporters in June. “Think cyber and electronic warfare, integrated together, throughout all of our tactical formations.”

The Army requested $16.6 billion in cyber and information technology funding for fiscal 2023. Congressional leaders last week unveiled a $1.7 trillion government spending package, which included $858 billion for defense.

Davis Winkie with Army Times contributed to this article.

About Colin Demarest and Molly Weisner

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

Molly Weisner is a staff reporter for Federal Times where she covers labor, policy and contracting pertaining to the government workforce. She made previous stops at USA Today and McClatchy as a digital producer, and worked at The New York Times as a copy editor. Molly majored in journalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

18. Troops Are Getting Cyber Training and Then Rapidly Leaving the Military, Report Finds

What is the reality? Are special pays retaining them or are they leaving the military?

Troops Are Getting Cyber Training and Then Rapidly Leaving the Military, Report Finds

military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · December 27, 2022

The military has been competing with the private sector to recruit and retain a workforce with critical cyber skills -- a decade-long contest where pay, purpose and personnel management have driven the flow of talent, and the services appear to be losing, according to a government watchdog report.

Troops who receive extensive cyber training, lured by the lucrative private sector, are parting ways with the military services quicker than some branches can offset the cost of that training.

The Pentagon's efforts have been hamstrung by unclear service obligations and mistracked staffing data in some branches, according to a report from Congress' Government Accountability Office that was released Wednesday.

The GAO focused on what the military calls Interactive On-Net Operator, or ION, training -- a valuable skill set that revolves around "network reconnaissance" and analysis to identify adversary strongpoints and vulnerabilities, according to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

It is one of three skills that U.S. Cyber Command identified as critical to its mission as the military announced plans this year to increase its cyber workforce over the next half decade.

The Army -- which is looking to double its cyber force -- and Marine Corps came up short on their investment in that skill, and are not getting back what they've put into training troops who assume those roles. And outside of the Navy, all branches had little visibility on how they tracked those billets.

"Personnel who complete training to fill the ION work role -- which may take a year or more and costs the department hundreds of thousands of dollars -- may not remain in the military to use those skills for a significant length of time after training," the report said.

The GAO report, which was ordered by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2022 to review the military's cyber recruiting and retention efforts, pointed to a too short -- or in the Marine Corps' case, completely absent -- service obligation that would offset the time and cost it takes to train a service member.

The watchdog said it could take one to three years to train a service member as an ION operator at a cost of up to half a million dollars per troop, though potentially as low as $220,000.

"Cyber training in general is very complex just because of how technical the issues are," one military cyber officer told Military.com on Tuesday, adding that regardless of branch, that complexity will equate to a longer training time. The officer, who requested anonymity due to concerns about reprisals for talking without authorization, said the ION training is particularly intensive because it involves an uncompromising mission.

"The risk surrounding that skill set is tremendous," the officer said. "They are operating inside target environments, they are operating inside adversary networks, and so they cannot afford to make a single mistake."

The Navy and Air Force took steps to ensure a return on their investment in cyber training by implementing an additional three-year service obligation for those who go through the courses.

For the Army, which did not have a clear obligation, the GAO estimated that officers may owe as little as 1.88 years, and enlisted personnel nearly two-and-a-half.

The report found that nearly every branch had limited visibility on their cyber personnel. Traditional troop tracking systems used by the services for nearly every other military career clashed with Cyber Command definitions, leading to bottom-up data gathering and unseen shortages.

The Navy was the exception to this issue; the sea service tracked its cyber personnel using enlistment codes that "mimic" Cyber Command's, leading to better visibility on staffing shortages.

Still, staffing gaps exist between how many roles were authorized and how many were actually filled, especially for warrant officers. The Navy and Air Force were able to staff their cyber career fields at more than 80%; the Army "improved," rising above 80% in 2021; and the Marine Corps "generally did not exceed" 80%.

It's unclear why the services would treat the cyber domain, and the jobs focused on the area, so differently.

"Those skill sets are extremely hard to come by," the cyber officer said. "These trainings do have a fairly substantial washout rate, and so the reality is not only do you have a lengthy amount of time you put into these people, you also have a finite number of people, frankly, that have the skill set to complete the training."

The GAO report made six recommendations, namely that the Army and Marine Corps "clearly define active-duty service obligations for ION training" and that all branches align their personnel tracking to Cyber Command's work roles.

The Department of Defense concurred with all of the GAO recommendations, but both entities stopped short of recommending an increase in service obligation to offset the training time-cost.

The report recognized the underlying pay competition between the military and the private sector, noting that the Pentagon has thrown "at least" $160 million in retention bonuses at cyber troops in the last five years.

Combined with dismal recruiting numbers, the lack of return on investment and a competitive private market, the current money -- even matched with an exciting purpose -- might not be enough.

-- Drew F. Lawrence can be reached at drew.lawrence@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @df_lawrence.

military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · December 27, 2022

19. $100 Billion For Ukraine? Congress Needs to Explain Why

I think that is the President's responsibility. On the one hand I am all for transparency and accountability and ensuring the public is informed. But I fear LTC (RET) Davis is not interested in that and only in criticizing the administrative decisions and forcing the US to end its support for Ukraine.

$100 Billion For Ukraine? Congress Needs to Explain Why

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · December 27, 2022

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last week became the first foreign wartime leader since Winston Churchill in December 1942 to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. While he received a rousing standing ovation for his remarks and will likely secure $47 billion in additional support from Congress, it is now necessary for Congress to explain to the American people how U.S. interests are being advanced by the nearly $100 billion we’ve given Ukraine to date, what this new support will be used for, and how we will know if the money has been wisely spent.

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First, let’s examine what Ukraine got as a result of Zelensky’s trip. The marquis capacity was Biden’s formally announcement that the U.S. Patriot air defense system will be sent to Ukraine, along with over 200,000 rounds of artillery, rockets, and tank rounds. While many in the U.S. and Ukraine were excited about the Patriot announcement, it is important to understand what one battery can and cannot do.

Limited Effect of a Patriot

Last week Russia launched its ninth round of strategic missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since mid-October, crippling almost half of the country’s electricity generation. Zelensky has been pleading for air defense from the United States and the West almost since the beginning of the war. In the past months, however, the West has been more than generous, providing large numbers of modern air defense systems. The question: Does adding this Patriot battery represent a game-changer for Ukraine? The honest short answer: no.

A Patriot battery ordinarily operates as part of an integrated defense system that may include numerous U.S. and NATO installations. A battery requires a staff of 90 personnel, which will typically need 90 days of training before they can go into operation. A single battery, however, can generally defend a single point target. It is possible for a battery to defend a large portion of, say, the capital city of Kyiv, but even then, not the entire city. As exposed in 2019 when a Saudi-operated Patriot system failed to stop a complex aerial attack from Iran, the system is not foolproof.

The reality is that some number of months from now, a single Patriot will go into operation at a selected location in Ukraine. It won’t change the broader dynamics of Ukrainian anti-missile capabilities.

What Ukraine Says It Needs

Assuming U.S. President Joe Biden eventually signs the $47 billion support package into law, an examination of where that money goes exposes that only about $14 billion will go toward additional new weapons.

In a series of interviews earlier this month in The Economist and the Guardian, top Ukrainian military and political leaders specified the minimum weaponry requirements to give Ukraine a realistic chance to take the offensive in 2023. Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, commander of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, said he needed at least 1,500 modern armored vehicles (including 300 tanks and 500 artillery pieces). During Zelensky’s Washington speech, he added “I assure you that Ukrainian soldiers can perfectly operate American tanks and planes themselves.”

The fact that Zelensky left Washington and Biden remained silent on sending more than one Patriot battery and no tanks, armored personnel carriers, or hundreds of new artillery pieces is telling.

An analysis of what the United States and NATO are doing – and what they are not doing – makes it clear that our primary objective is indeed to avoid any direct clashes with Russia that all too easily could spiral into a nuclear conflict. That is the right course of action, and I commend the White House for their considered restraint. However, that leaves another question unaddressed: What is America’s intended end state in this conflict, and what is Congress’ strategy regarding future support?

Since the package was signed into law last week, the U.S. has now allocated over $100 billion on the war in Ukraine, which is $16 billion more than the entire Russian military budget for 2023. Congress owes it to the American people to explain how the expenditure of that much money for a non-treaty ally provides $100 billion-worth of national security. What does Congress expect that money to produce? (In other words, what is the expected or hoped-for outcome?) How will we know if the money is a good investment – and what will Congress do in 2023?

These are not minor questions, because as we have seen from two decades of disastrous involvement in our own war in Afghanistan – where we squandered close to $2 trillion – Congress can often get carried away with the emotions of a situation. Many suggest that just perpetuating the war by providing enough weapons and support to Ukraine to prevent it from losing helps U.S. interests by ensuring Russian conventional military power will continue to be degraded. That, however, is a dubious strategy, as it concurrently ensures that the Ukraiiane people will continue to die in large numbers.

The stakes are too high for mistakes in our support of Ukraine. Before allocating another dollar in 2023, Congress should explain to the American people how this money advances the vital national interests of our country. Otherwise, we need a new plan.

Author Expertise and Experience: A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of the book “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis1.

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · December 27, 2022

20. A special ops vet wrote a epic rock song about service

YouTube video at the link: https://taskandpurpose.com/culture/dan-schilling-spent-brass/?utm

Good song. I will add it to my playlist.

I wish Task and Purpose would do a story on Bones Fork and their music. https://bonesfork.com/ (Meet the Green Berets who started a rock band)

A special ops vet wrote a epic rock song about service

“I’ve lived those things, I’ve danced on the edge of self-destruction.”

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED DEC 28, 2022 3:17 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · December 28, 2022

The trouble started with a modern alt-rock song. Dan Schilling enjoyed the rhythm, but as he listened to the lyrics, they just didn’t sit right with him. .

“I looked at the lyrics and the essence was all veterans are war criminals and it fucking pissed me off,” Schilling told Task & Purpose.

Schilling is an Air Force special operations veteran with more than 30 years in the military. After an initial stint in the Army, he joined the Air Force and was selected to join the ranks of the elite combat control community as a Special Tactics Officer. He has numerous deployments under his belt, including Operation Gothic Serpent — better known as Black Hawk Down. He’s also the author of multiple books, including The New York Times bestseller Alone at Dawn: Medal of Honor Recipient John Chapman and the Untold Story of the World’s Deadliest Special Operations Force.

Schilling can’t recall the name of the song that set him off, but it made him want to write something with the opposite message. Most songs with military themes are not positive, Schilling said, with a tendency to demonize veterans and their actions in combat or make life after service seem like miserable, trauma-ridden affairs. The songs that feel accurate — he pointed to pieces by Lee Greenwood — were ballads or softer songs.

“No one I know in my 31 years in special ops [would] play those songs,” he said. “I don’t play that to get pumped up.”

So he started writing something more positive that could also be a good rock song. By his own admission, that was weird. He’s been a fighter and an author, but writing music was a shift. The end result is “Sons of War/Veteran,” a 7-minute-long rock track from the band Spent Brass.

He wrote the lyrics in 2020, but then life and world events forced him to set the project aside, but he couldn’t get the idea out of his head. He contacted guitarist, singer, and producer Duane Hibbard in early 2022. A trip to Los Angeles resulted in the two brainstorming ideas, to craft “an anthem for guys who go to war,” as Schilling put it. Together they formed Spent Brass.

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From there they started recording, working with producer Michael Parnin of Blacksound Studios, who helped hone the sound. They brought in session musicians and spent a lot of time in the studio. Hibbard sings while Parnin is on lead guitar. The lyrics came from him, but Schilling stresses he wanted solid musicians to perform the song. He plays a bit of music but not at the level he wanted for this project. However, he does contribute keyboards at the end of the track.

As for writing the song, Schilling said he’s a “bit self-conscious” about it. Writing it based on his own experiences was a vulnerable process. “I’ve lived those things, I’ve danced on the edge of self-destruction,” he added.

The song is two in one. The first part, “Sons of War,” is about three people who sign up for the military, not knowing what they’ll get into and what combat is like. The second part, “Veteran,” deals with the trauma that comes after only two come back. Schilling compared it to “Funeral for a Friend/Love Lies Bleeding” by Elton John, another paired track where the two parts play off each other.

Schilling stressed one of the most important things for “Sons of War/Veteran” is that it had to be a good song. He enjoyed the other song’s rhythm, after all. He pointed to Rush as an inspiration, as well as Led Zeppelin and AC/DC. Right now the track is Spent Brass’ sole offering, but Schilling said he’d like to do more.

For now, the goal is for it to be something that urges people to turn up the volume when they play the track in their car.

“My hope was that this song rocks enough that guys I wrote it for will enjoy it and powerful enough to leave an indelible emotional impact crater,” Schilling said, “one you want to revisit over and over again.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

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Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here.

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · December 28, 2022

21. 'We Fight With Our Brains. They Fight With Numbers': Ukrainian Paratroopers On The Battle For The Donbas City of Kreminna

"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence (though I would argue Chamberlain's bayonet charge was a brilliant move requiring great intellect to understand the effect it would achieve in the face of an imminent rout that would have been catastrophic - so I will not denigrate a bayonet charge).

I also like the late General Wayne Downing's adaptation of the SAS motto - "Who thinks, wins."

And General Schoomaker used to say when he was CINCSOC: "Train for certainty. Educate for uncertainty."

'We Fight With Our Brains. They Fight With Numbers': Ukrainian Paratroopers On The Battle For The Donbas City of Kreminna

December 28, 2022 12:56 GMT

By Borys Sachalko

rferl.org · by Borys Sachalko

KREMINNA, Ukraine -- For the paratroopers of a Ukrainian airborne brigade, there’s only one way to describe the waves of Russian infantry who are relentlessly pressing the Ukrainian lines in and around this Donbas city: Meat.

"First, they throw in the mobilized soldiers for certain death, like meat," said one soldier who asked not to be identified due to military regulations. "Then, if they break through, the more experienced fighters move in."

With Russia's invasion of Ukraine now in its 11th month, the ferocity of the fighting in Kreminna is matched only by the intensity of the fighting 80 kilometers to the south, in the city of Bakhmut.

But according to interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and accounts published on Russian military blogger accounts on Telegram and elsewhere, the bloodshed is no less senseless and relentless. It's unclear how long it will last, though: One Ukrainian official claims that Kreminna is on the verge of being recaptured by Ukrainian forces.

WATCH: Ukrainian troops say Russia, despite larger numbers, is burning through its infantry by sending in inexperienced soldiers with "no tactics at all."

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"Bakhmut, Kreminna: The situation there is difficult, excruciating," President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address on December 26. The Russians "are using all available resources -- and these are significant resources -- to squeeze out some sort of progress."

Located in the Luhansk region, just across the administrative border with the Donetsk region, Kreminna sits on a major north-south highway about 25 kilometers northwest of Syevyerodonetsk. That city was captured by Russian forces in late June after a brutal siege and intense, street-by-street urban combat.

In September, Ukrainian forces pulled off a surprise counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region to the northwest, forcing Russian troops into a wide retreat. Ukrainian forces also recaptured the city of Lyman, in the Donetsk region, and began pushing east to Kreminna and to the town of Svatove, further north.

Since then, Ukraine's advances in this section of the battlefield have stalled, particularly as Russia began channeling its poorly trained, newly mobilized troops to reinforce their defenses.

Svatove Kreminna - Ukraine's Eastern Front

Serhiy Hayday, the head of the Luhansk regional military administration, said in a post on Twitter on December 26 that Russian civilian authorities and local military command units had pulled back from Kreminna, withdrawing to safer territory further east.

That report could not independently confirmed.

"The Russians understand that if they lose Kreminna, their entire line of defense will fall," Hayday said in a separate post on Telegram.

WATCH: Ukrainian soldiers defending the key eastern city of Bakhmut say the battles are constant and "cruel," describing ineffective Russian tactics that are endlessly repeated. They say Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Captured Russians say their comrades face execution on desertion charges if they don't keep moving.

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In a post two days later, he suggested that if Ukrainian forces take back Kreminna, they may also swiftly recapture several other cities or towns in the Luhansk region, saying that "after all, they have been destroyed to such an extent that they cannot be defended."

Soldiers interviewed by Current Time on December 24 not far from the front line in Kreminna said they were upbeat about Ukraine's ability to hold its lines, and described constant assaults by Russian units.

"In the case of the Kharkiv offensive, they were more dispersed. Now they are very focused. There are a lot of them," another soldier said in an interview.

"We fight with our brains. They fight with numbers. Because their resources --we're not revealing some secret here -- are much greater than ours," he said.

In some locations, including in Bakhmut, photographs and videos posted by military bloggers and even the soldiers themselves point to outdated battlefield tactics that are reminiscent of World War-I trench warfare, in which waves of infantrymen advance across open fields and try to storm enemy trenches, only to be mowed down by gunfire.

Smoke billows after Russian attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut on December 27.

The Ukrainian soldiers near Kreminna said they'd seen similar tactics.

"They just push and shove their way through. And a lot of them die. Because they have no tactics, nothing of the sort," another soldier said. "They just go like meat. There were some cases when the infantry said that they went in without any [armed vehicles], or without machine guns."

"They have a lot of artillery," a fourth soldier said, adding that the newer shells that have been provided by the United States and NATO allies to Ukraine are more effective. "Our [artillery] hits with 5- to 10-meter accuracy. But these new ones that we’ve been given, it's 4 to 5 meters."

Another soldier said Ukrainian forces were focused on disrupting Russian supply lines in the settlements around Kreminna.

"The enemy's logistics routes run through these villages. And, as we know, logistics is a priority. A fighter who isn't backed up properly can't fight," he said. "There's a railway junction. [Seizing it] will greatly disrupt their logistics. Then, I think, they will retreat from Bakhmut."

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based research group, said reports indicated that Russian units fighting along the Svatove-Kreminna front line included mobilized soldiers from the Moscow region, as well as the 144th Motor Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army and the 8th Combined Arms Army.

"This composite force grouping suggests that Russian forces are pulling troops from various points throughout the theater to fill holes in the Svatove-Kreminna line and compensate for the continued degradation of conventional units," the institute said in its December 26 report.

Written by Mike Eckel based on reporting by Borys Sachalko of Current Time

Borys Sachalko is a correspondent in Kyiv for Current Time, the Russian-language network run by RFE/RL in cooperation with VOA. Born in Ukraine, he is a graduate of Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. Before joining Current Time’s Kyiv team in 2021, Sachalko worked for the Ukrainian TV channel STB.
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rferl.org · by Borys Sachalko

22. Who’s Attacking Our Power Grid?

Who’s Attacking Our Power Grid? | National Review

https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/whos-attacking-our-power-grid/?utm_source=pocket_saves

By JIM GERAGHTY

December 27, 2022 10:15 AM

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On the menu today: I hope you had a wonderful Christmas. I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but it appears someone is attacking the electrical power grid of the Seattle area, which comes after a series of similar incidents elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest as well as in Florida. And the FBI never caught the guy who attacked the electrical grid down in North Carolina earlier this month. Shooting up a power substation is apparently the latest fad.

Electric Boogaloo

Picture it: It’s Christmas, you’re about to prepare a big meal for the whole family, and the power goes out — all the lights, the refrigerator, your computer and cellphone charger, the works. That happened this year for a lot of families in the Seattle area, but it wasn’t wind, snow, or bad weather; someone shot up their local power substation.

Russia launches massive missile barrage across Ukraine

AP · by RENATA BRITO and HANNA ARHIROVA · December 29, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Multiple regions of Ukraine, including its capital, faced a massive Russian missile attack Thursday, the biggest wave of strikes in weeks targeting power stations and other critical infrastructure during freezing weather.

Air raid sirens rang out across the country. Ukraine’s military chief, Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said preliminary data showed Russia fired 69 missiles at energy facilities and Ukrainian forces shot down 54 of them. There were no immediate reports of any deaths.

Russia dispatched explosive drones to selected regions overnight before broadening the barrage with “air and sea-based cruise missiles launched from strategic aircraft and ships” in the morning, the Ukrainian air force reported.

The widespread attack was the latest in a series of Russian strikes on power and water supplies that have increased the Ukrainian population’s suffering. Moscow has launched such attacks on a weekly basis since October, while its ground forces struggle to advance.

On Thursday, air defense systems were activated in the capital, Kyiv, to fend off strikes, according to the regional administration. Sounds of explosions were heard in the city.

At least three people were wounded and hospitalized, including a 14-year- old girl, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. He warned of power outages in the capital, asking people to stockpile water and to charge their electronic devices.

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Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba condemned Russia for launching the missiles amid the winter holidays, calling it an act of “senseless barbarism.”

“There can be no ‘neutrality’ in the face of such mass war crimes. Pretending to be ‘neutral’ equals taking Russia’s side,” Kuleba tweeted.

After more than 10 months of fighting, Russia and Ukraine are locked in a grinding battle of attrition. The Ukrainian military has reclaimed swaths of Russian-occupied territory in the country’s northeast and south, and continues to resist persistent Russian attempts to seize all of the industrial Donbas region.

At the same time, Moscow has methodically targeted Ukrainian power facilities and other key infrastructure in a bid to weaken the country’s resolve and force it to negotiate on Russian terms.

While the Ukrainian military reported success in shooting down incoming Russian missiles and explosive drones after earlier attacks, some still reached their targets. Most cities have gone without heat, internet service and electricity for hours or days at a time.

Anastasia, a medic who took shelter Thursday at a central Kyiv subway station and gave only her first name, said she was tired of the war. “We don’t know how long the war will last. It’s hard to be afraid every day and put your life on hold,” she said.

Numerous explosions also took place in Kharkiv, which is located in eastern Ukraine and the country’s second-largest city, and in the city of Lviv near the border with Poland, according to their mayors.

About 90% of Lviv was without electricity, Mayor Andriy Sadovyi wrote on Telegram. Trams and trolley buses were not working, and residents might experience water interruptions, he said.

Ukrainian authorities in several regions said some incoming Russian missiles were intercepted.

The governor of southern Ukraine’s Mykolaiv province, Vitaliy Kim, said five missiles were shot down over the Black Sea. The Ukrainian military’s command North said two were downed over the Sumy region, located on the border with Russia in the country’s northeast.

Fragments from downed Russian missiles damaged two private buildings in the Darnytskyi district of Kyiv, the city administration said. An industrial facility and a playground in neighborhoods located across the Dnieper River also were damaged, city officials said. No casualties were immediately reported.

As the latest wave of Russian strikes began Thursday, authorities in the Dnipro, Odesa and Kryvyi Rih regions said they switched off electricity to minimize the damage to critical infrastructure facilities if they were hit.

Earlier this month, the United States agreed to give a Patriot missile battery to Ukraine to boost the country’s defense. The U.S. and other allies also pledged to provide energy-related equipment to help Ukraine withstand the attacks on its infrastructure.

Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said Russia was aiming to “destroy critical infrastructure and kill civilians en masse.”

“We’re waiting for further proposals from ‘peacekeepers’ about ‘peaceful settlement,’ ‘security guarantees for RF’ and undesirability of provocations,” Podolyak wrote on Twitter, a sarcastic reference to statements from some in the West who urged Ukraine to seek a political settlement of the conflict.

Kuleba, the Ukrainian foreign minister, said Monday that his nation wants a “peace” summit within two months at the United Nations with Secretary-General António Guterres as mediator. He said Russia must face a war-crimes tribunal before his country directly talks with Moscow but that other nations should feel free to engage with the Russians.

Commenting on the summit proposal Thursday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova dismissed it as “delirious” and “hollow,” describing the proposal as a “publicity stunt by Washington that tries to cast the Kyiv regime as a peacemaker.”

“It’s an attempt to give a semblance of legitimacy to a meaningless discussion that will not be followed by any concrete steps,” Zakharova said during a briefing.

Russian officials have said that any peace plan can only proceed from Kyiv’s recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over the regions it illegally annexed from Ukraine in September.

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by RENATA BRITO and HANNA ARHIROVA · December 29, 2022

24. ‘I think of them’: Abducted Nigerian schoolgirls remembered

I think too few people are thinking of them.

‘I think of them’: Abducted Nigerian schoolgirls remembered

AP · by CHINEDU ASADU · December 29, 2022

ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — Margret Yama’s phone screensaver is a picture of her cousin, Rifkatu Galang, who is still held by Boko Haram extremists nearly nine years after she and 275 other girls were seized from their school in northeastern Nigeria.

Yama was among those taken but later freed. Dozens of others have been rescued or found, but 94, including her cousin, remain missing in what was one of the Islamic extremist group’s most daring attacks in Nigeria.

“I saved her as my screensaver so that any time I see her face, it will remind me to be praying for her to return” along with the others, 25-year-old Yama said. “They are in my prayers every day.”

On April 14, 2014, Boko Haram stormed the Government Girls Secondary School in the Chibok community in Borno state and abducted the girls as they prepared for science exams. Many of the girls remained missing, sparking the #BringBackOurGirls social media campaign that involved celebrities worldwide including former U.S. first lady Michelle Obama.

Now, the missing girls are being remembered in new sculptures created by French artist Prune Nourry in collaboration with Obafemi Awolowo University.

Inspired by ancient Nigerian Ife terracotta heads, the series titled “Statues Also Breathe” tries to recreate the girls’ facial expressions and hair patterns. Nourry hopes the sculptures on display in Nigeria’s commercial hub of Lagos will remind the world of a largely forgotten tragedy.

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“These heads personify the absent girls, still missing, so that we don’t forget them, and raise the question of the rights of girls to a safe education on a global scale,” the artist told The Associated Press.

This year, about a dozen of the missing girls returned amid news that some had died in custody. Brief hope quickly faded into more anguish for families of the ones still missing.

Zanna Lawan, whose daughter was 16 when she was abducted, said one of the girls who returned this year told him that “Aisha has two children with Boko Haram but lost one of her elder sons.”

All of the girls in captivity are married now, Lawan said. “There is nothing I am feeling good for because of this. All that I am now looking for is to see my daughter alive.”

The girls who regained their freedom this year did not come home alone. All had children, 24 total, from the extremists, the parents said.

Over the years, freed girls have spoken of how the fighters forced them into marriages. As the years went by, others who resisted eventually gave in.

“If you see anyone that got married, it is her choice. She is the one that decided that she has lost hope,” said Yama, who regained her freedom in 2017. “Most of them, I think, it is losing hope that made them to marry.”

Yama recalled life in the militants’ camps: The girls, when not separated to make their whereabouts difficult for Nigerian security forces to trace, were usually together, often doing nothing. Access to them was restricted except for their husbands.

“We were just together like one family,” Yama said.

Her mother died shortly after she was abducted in 2014. At least 30 other parents have died in various circumstances since their daughters were taken, according to Lawan, one of the leaders of the Chibok parents’ association.

“Even if you are well, when you are traumatized, anything can happen. If you have a sickness, that will increase to another sickness because of your daughter,” he said.

A year after the girls were kidnapped, now-President Muhammadu Buhari rode a wave of goodwill to power after promising to rescue them. Last week, the nation’s national security adviser, Babagana Monguno, said the military remains committed to the cause but said it involves an “intelligence-driven process, which means it is going to be, unfortunately, painstaking.”

Many parents, however, are beginning to question the government’s commitment to the girls’ freedom. And the Chibok community continues to suffer attacks from Boko Haram and a breakaway faction that has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group.

“I know the Nigerian army, they can finish this work within 24 hours, but I don’t know what makes it to be so difficult” said Yakubu Nkeki, whose niece was among the girls freed.

As chair of the Chibok girls’ parents union, Nkeki tries his best to offer hope to families.

“Even though my own has regained freedom, I don’t have peace of mind,” he said.

While studying law at American University of Nigeria, Yama continues trying to navigate her life back to normalcy after years of living with the extremists.

Studies can be challenging because books are one of the luxuries the girls never had while in captivity, she said. Her biggest challenge, though, is staying hopeful that her cousin and all the other girls will return home one day.

AP · by CHINEDU ASADU · December 29, 2022

25. U.S.-Trained Afghan Soldiers Angry Over Their Plight Are Ready To Join Russia's War Against Ukraine

U.S.-Trained Afghan Soldiers Angry Over Their Plight Are Ready To Join Russia's War Against Ukraine

By RFE/RL's Radio Azadi

Michael Scollon

rferl.org

December 27, 2022

Afghan National Army commandos take position during a military operation in Helmand Province in October 2016.

Lost status and a desperate existence in Iran are driving thousands of former Afghan troops -- many of them elite commandos trained by the United States -- to consider fighting as mercenaries in Ukraine and other battlefields.

Many ex-Afghan security personnel accuse the United States of abandoning them after the Taliban regained power last year. They also say poverty and security concerns are factoring into their decisions to take a private Russian mercenary group up on its recruitment offers.

According to WhatsApp messages viewed by RFE/RL's Radio Azadi, some former Afghan commandos are already making the move to join the Vagner Group, also known as Wagner, a private paramilitary organization that plays a prominent role in the Kremlin's war against Ukraine.

We had no place to live in Afghanistan anymore, because the Taliban terrorists chased us."

Others currently living in Iran, where thousands of former Afghan soldiers sought refuge following the Taliban's seizure of their native Afghanistan in August 2021, say they are living a meager existence, resorting to manual labor or even rifling through garbage to sell to make ends meet.

It marks a major turnaround for the former members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and its elite commando force, which were trained by the United States and Western allies and formed the backbone of the former Afghan government's efforts to defend the country and combat the Taliban and the Islamic State extremist group.

Afghan soldiers in Iran who have said they plan to take Vagner up on its recruitment offers say they were betrayed by the United States and the U.S.-backed Afghan government that they fought for. Many blame them for their current predicament.

The Taliban rapidly seized control of the country as the United States pulled out its forces from Afghanistan. Without U.S. assistance, Afghan forces quickly capitulated, and many Afghan leaders fled abroad as Taliban fighters descended on Kabul.

"After the fall of the country's traitorous presidential regime, [the United States] sold us out and surrendered the country to terrorists (the Taliban)," one former member of the Afghan special forces, who did not provide his name, said in an audio recording posted on a WhatsApp channel subscribed to by former members of the Afghan military.

"We had no place to live in Afghanistan anymore, because the Taliban terrorists chased us," he said in the audio, which was posted on December 3. "Several of our peers were captured and beheaded, and we were forced to leave Afghanistan."

No Life On The Run

RFE/RL was unable to independently verify the soldier's claims, but the extrajudicial killings of former Afghan military and government workers is well-documented, with 100 such slayings recorded in the first months of Taliban rule alone.

Also widespread and well-documented is the belief among former Afghan soldiers, translators, and government workers that they were abandoned by their U.S. allies and that the former Afghan government botched the war effort and stole funds that had been allocated to the army.

Those claims have been backed by a recent report by Business Insider documenting that former Afghan officials smuggled nearly $1 billion in gold and cash out of the country as their government neared collapse.

In November, the U.S. Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) cited corruption as among the factors that hastened the fall of the Afghan government and paved the way for the Taliban to reestablish control of Afghanistan.

Tens of thousands of Afghan troops who fought alongside Western allied forces over nearly two decades in Afghanistan are believed to have been left behind when the United States withdrew the last of its forces on August 30, 2021.

While an estimated 80,000 at-risk Afghans were airlifted out, those who were not had to fend for themselves, leading to concerns that tens of thousands of U.S.-trained troops would have no alternative but to flee the country, or join the Taliban or a regional adversary.

Many of them went into hiding in Afghanistan at risk of being hunted down by the Taliban, or fled abroad. By some accounts, up to 30,000 former Afghan soldiers made their way to Iran.

Fighting For Dollars

The former soldier who discussed his situation on WhatsApp said he fled to Iran for his safety and had lived there for several months. After receiving word that the Vagner group was recruiting Afghans to fight in Ukraine, he said he signed up.

"Afghanistan, NATO, and the United States brought us in as young men and abandoned us," he said. "Russia started a program. They were recruiting certain units and taking them to the war in Ukraine. So, a number of our fellow soldiers signed up, and we are going to Russia soon."

Another former soldier, in an audio message posted on the same WhatsApp channel on December 3, said he and a group of colleagues had recently arrived in Iran with the intention of joining Vagner to fight for Russia in Ukraine after hearing about the mercenary group's recruitment offers.

Serious security and economic problems and extreme poverty and desperation have forced them to do this for a bite of bread, to survive, and to escape the pursuit and torture of the Taliban."

-- General Farid Ahmadi

He claimed that Iran was aware of the recruitment effort and was even aiding the process of transferring Afghan soldiers to Russia.

"We were in Afghanistan, and there were many rumors being spread that former military personnel had gone to Russia through Iran," the soldier said, speaking anonymously. "We registered here in Iran. They transferred a few people before us."

The soldier said that former Afghan soldiers were being offered permanent citizenship in Russia in exchange for fighting in Ukraine.

The former special forces officer said that his decision to sign on with Vagner was influenced by safety concerns in Afghanistan, where he said he and his fellow soldiers had lived in hiding and poverty for 14 months, and the chance for a better life for his family.

"We came alone, but a number of those who were transferred earlier are now with their families [in Russia]," he said. "We decided to go because of our situation and that of our children.

"We couldn't leave the house. Most of our friends were arrested and killed, and most of them, like me, fled to Iran or Tajikistan," he said.

We understand some Afghans may be vulnerable to [Vagner's] monetary inducements, but would caution anyone from joining in the illegal invasion of Ukraine."

-- U.S. State Department spokesman

The former Afghan officer estimated that, based on his conversations, some 2,500 Afghan soldiers had left Afghanistan with the intention of going to Russia, where he said he was offered $2,500 for six months of training and $3,000 once he goes to Ukraine to fight.

Those figures correspond roughly with other reports and testimonials about Vagner's recruitment drive, which also say that Afghan special forces troops and their families were being offered safe haven and $1,500 a month to move to Russia and subsequently fight in Ukraine.

General Farid Ahmadi, a former commander of the special operations corps of the deposed Republic of Afghanistan, told Radio Azadi that he believes security and financial concerns are driving many former Afghan soldiers to consider fighting with Vagner.

"Serious security and economic problems and extreme poverty and desperation have forced them to do this for a bite of bread, to survive, and to escape the pursuit and torture of the Taliban," Ahmadi said in a live interview via Skype this month.

Radio Azadi has documented the lives of some former Afghan soldiers living in Iran, where they say they are reeling from their lost status and dire financial situations.

Former Afghan special forces commander Sayed Ahmad Nouri collecting garbage in Iran.

Sayed Ahmad Nouri, 38, said he used to serve as a special forces commander in western Afghanistan but now has to collect garbage in Mashhad to provide for his large family.

Nouri laments that he used to direct hundreds of troops and "tanks would move under my command, and I had complete authority," while serving with the ANA. Now, he said, his family of 12 lives in a one-room apartment and "are sleeping on top of one another."

Abdul Ahad Safi, a former ranking official who headed a government department fighting organized crime in Afghanistan's Herat Province, now does manual labor at a Mashhad workshop to support his family of five.

He told Radio Azadi that he can "barely keep himself alive" because "my income does not cover our expenses.”

Former organized-crime fighter Abdul Ahad Safi doing manual labor in Iran.

Bad Consequences

Aside from Russia's war against Ukraine, a small number of former Afghan soldiers have been recruited to fight in other conflicts, including for Iran in Yemen, and in Syria and even in Nagorno-Karabakh, according to Ahmadi.

There has been no evidence that Afghan forces have actually reached the battlefield in Ukraine, and the country's security service did not reply to queries sent by RFE/RL regarding the possibility that Afghans were fighting for Vagner in Ukraine.

In response to questions by RFE/RL, a U.S. State Department spokesman said in written comments that the department was aware of unconfirmed reports that the Vagner group is recruiting former Afghan soldiers living outside of Afghanistan.

"We understand some Afghans may be vulnerable to [Vagner's] monetary inducements, but would caution anyone from joining in the illegal invasion of Ukraine," the spokesman said, adding that the Vagner group "is used by the Russian government to support its dangerous and destabilizing foreign policy, while attempting to maintain deniability."

Regarding claims by Afghan soldiers that they were abandoned by the United States in Afghanistan, the spokesman acknowledged the difficulties Afghans face in leaving the country, but said, "We continue to monitor the economic situation of Afghanistan and provide assistance, where possible, to the people of Afghanistan as part of our enduring commitment."

26. Attacks on US power stations spark fears of neo-Nazi campaign to ignite conflict

Attacks on US power stations spark fears of neo-Nazi campaign to ignite conflict

Vandals knock out electricity in part of Washington state after warnings from officials that extremists are seeking to start a race war by targeting power grid

https://www.timesofisrael.com/attacks-on-us-power-stations-spark-fears-of-neo-nazi-campaign-to-ignite-conflict/?utm_source=pocket_reader

By AFP

27 December 2022, 11:35 pm

Illustrative: A neo-Nazi with an iron cross tattoo attends a rally in Newnan, Georgia, April 21, 2018. (AP Photo/David Goldman)

Vandalism at four power stations in the western US state of Washington over the weekend added to concerns of a possible nationwide campaign by right-wing extremists to stir fears and spark civil conflict.

Local police on Tuesday gave no information on who they suspected was behind the vandalism, which knocked out power on Christmas Day for some 14,000 in Tacoma, a port city area south of Seattle.

Tacoma Public Utilities, which owned two of the facilities targeted on Sunday, said in a statement that it was alerted by federal law enforcement in early December about threats to its grid.

The Pierce County Sheriff’s office said Sunday it was investigating but had made no arrests and did not know if it was a coordinated attack.

The office said in a statement that it was aware of similar incidents elsewhere in Washington, in Oregon and in North Carolina.

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“It could be any number of reasons at this point,” it said. We have to investigate and not just jump to conclusions.”

But it followed warnings by US officials that neo-Nazis who say they want to spark a race war were targeting electricity stations.

Violent extremists “have developed credible, specific plans to attack electricity infrastructure since at least 2020, identifying the electric grid as a particularly attractive target given its interdependency with other infrastructure sectors,” the Department of Homeland Security said in a January intelligence memo, according to US media.

In early December, 45,000 homes and businesses in Moore County, North Carolina were out of power after someone used a high-powered rifle to damage two electricity substations.

Illustrative: Members of the National Socialists Movement and the White Knights of the Klu Klux Klan salute during a rally, April 21, 2012, at the Capitol in Frankfort, Kentucky. (AP Photo/John Flavell)

In February, three men with neo-Nazi ties pleaded guilty in Columbus, Ohio to plotting to use rifles and explosives to damage power stations in various locations.

They pursued “a disturbing plot, in furtherance of white supremacist ideology, to attack energy facilities in order to damage the economy and stoke division in our country,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen at the time.

And last year five men who allegedly belonged to white supremacist and neo-Nazi online discussion groups were charged in North Carolina with planning attacks on power stations.

They planned the attack to create “general chaos” as part of their “goal of creating a white ethno-state,” the indictment said.

Jon Wellinghoff, the former chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, said on CNN in early December that the Moore County attack resembled one on an electricity network substation near San Jose, California in 2013.

In that case, which has never been solved, one or more people fired close to 100 rounds at the station, damaging 17 high-voltage transformers at a cost of $15 million.

The Washington Post said after the Moore County incident that law enforcement was investigating eight incidents in four states.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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U.S.-Trained Afghan Soldiers Angry Over Their Plight Are Ready To Join Russia's War Against Ukraine

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