Quotes of the Day:

"Knowledge isn't free. You have to pay attention."

– Professor Richard Feynman

"In three words, I can sum up everything I have learned about life: it goes on."

– Robert Frost

"I can not teach anybody anything. I can only make them think."

– Socrates

1. Matti Friedman: The Wisdom of Hamas

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2023

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, December 28, 2023

4. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 28, 2023

5. How Librarian Spies Helped Win World War II

6. In One Brutal Tank Battle Outside Avdiivka, The Russians Lost As Many As 21 Tanks. The Ukrainians Lost Two.

7. The Ghost of GWOT Haunting the Military Recruiting Crisis

8. Small Drones Are Helping Israel Navigate the Urban Battlefield in Gaza

9. World's Largest Reserve Of REE Lithium Discovered Beneath California's Salton Sea: $540 Billion Motherlode Could Meet America's Supply Demands For Decades

10. The New Star on the Political Scene: The Chip Industry

11. Locked out of local government: Residents decry increased secrecy among towns, counties, schools

12. Peering Into the Crystal Ball: 10 National Security Predictions for 2024

13. Mongolia’s mining partnerships extract foreign policy gold

14. The U.S. and Israel Need to Take Iran On Directly

15. Iran Threatens to Take Red Sea Disruption to New Waters

16. Officials say the Chinese spy balloon used a US internet provider

17. Twelve Days of WEX-mas: New round of nuclear proliferation looms over unstable world order

18. Sexual assault prosecutions officially out of the chain of command

19. Billion-dollar scam: A sophisticated, criminal network is using modern day slaves to con thousands of Americans out of their life savings

20. IDF’s Subterranean Challenge: Profiling Gaza Metro, Hamas’s Centre Of Gravity – Analysis

21. Best way to avoid war is to not be phased by Xi

22. From force structure to lethality, Army poised to unveil key decisions: 2024 preview

23. Army numbers smallest since WWII — what units face cuts in 2024?

24. How Israel Could Lose America

25. In 2024, will the Navy again reassess increasing demands on the surface force?

26. New planes, budget constraints and great power competition: 2024 air preview

1. Matti Friedman: The Wisdom of Hamas

This is an excellent essay and the best I have read on the Hamas attack and its strategy (and the support it has around the world and why). We really need to understand this. (recognize its strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it with a superior political and information strategy as well as militarily).

We in the West not only do not understand the strategy, there are too many in the West who either deliberately support it because they are ill-informed or at best are useful idiots. It is a troubling description of the West and a sad commentary on how many of us have been manipulated.

I would say that Hamas has followed Sun Tzu well and knows its enemy (and has figured how to exploit that knowledge very well).

I hope all my friends who are journalists will take this to heart and start working to counter this.

I was not familiar with the author so here is his wikipedia bio.  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matti_Friedman

View in browser

Matti Friedman: The Wisdom of Hamas

They understand the war they’re fighting. Many in the West still don’t.

https://www.thefp.com/p/matti-friedman-the-wisdom-of-hamas?utm

MATTI FRIEDMAN

DEC 28

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PAID

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GUEST POST

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A demonstration against the Israeli bombardment in Gaza on December 23 in Istanbul, Turkey. (lker Eray via Getty Images)

JERUSALEM — In the days after Hamas terrorists invaded Israel on October 7, triggering the current war in Gaza, many believed that Hamas had erred. The word “miscalculation” recurred in news analysis and in statements from Israeli leaders. People here in Israel were galvanized into action by the massacre. Western governments responded with shock and revulsion. The civilians of Gaza were staring at a looming catastrophe. Hamas was in for it now! What were they thinking? 

But as I write nearly three months later, with several acquaintances dead in battle and one still held hostage in Gaza, it’s easier to understand what Hamas leaders were thinking. Indeed, it’s increasingly worth considering the possibility that they weren’t wrong. 

In many ways, Hamas understood the world better than we Israelis did. The men who came across the border, and those who sent them, may have grasped the current state of the West better than many Westerners. More than anything, they understood the war they’re fighting when many of us didn’t—and still don’t.

Some aspects of Hamas’s success are easy to see, like the behavior of the Western press. After dealing with reporters through many rounds of violence since coming to power in Gaza in 2007, Hamas understood that most can be co-opted or coerced, and that coverage of Gaza would reliably focus on civilian casualties, obscuring the cause of the war, portraying Israel’s military operations as atrocities, and thus pressuring Israel to stop fighting.

This may have seemed unlikely in the first few days after October 7, when the shock of Hamas’s barbarism was fresh. But it happened, as we’ve seen in a recent rash of stories containing variations on the claim that this war is one of the worst in history and that responsibility lies with Israel. 

Hamas also knew that when faced with heartbreaking images of civilian death, some Western leaders would eventually buckle and blame the Israelis, helping Hamas live to attack another day. It took about five weeks before this happened to Emmanuel Macron of France (“These babies, these ladies, these old people are bombed and killed. So there is no reason for that and no legitimacy”) and Canada’s Justin Trudeau (“The world is witnessing this killing of women, of children, of babies. This has to stop.”)

And Hamas knew that the international organizations that bankroll Gaza, like the United Nations, having mostly turned a blind eye to Hamas’s vast military buildup at their expense (and, in some cases, on their property), would focus their fury at Israel alone and do their best to blunt the consequences of Hamas’s actions. 

All of this shows not a miscalculation by Hamas, but an admirable grasp of reality. 

Getting at Hamas’s understanding of what’s going on, and at our own misunderstanding, means asking what the Hamas war is. It’s this question that will help us begin to solve one of the core mysteries of October 7: namely, why an historic massacre of Jews, even before the Israeli response got underway, triggered a powerful wave of hostility not toward the attackers—but toward Jews.

In press coverage, including countless articles I wrote myself in my years working for the international press, the Palestinians are said to be seeking an independent state and freedom from Israeli rule. The Palestinian Authority, affiliated with Fatah, is portrayed as the more responsible actor in Palestinian politics, but Hamas still appears in the context of the same story and the same shared goal.

But this isn’t what Hamas, an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, says about itself. They don’t portray their war as limited to one of Palestinians against Israelis, and in Arabic don’t necessarily use the term “Israel” or “Israelis.” Hamas explicitly understands itself as part of a war that is religious in nature and global in scope, one in which the enemy is the Jews. In this war, they understand themselves to have many allies across the world. And here, too, it’s quite clear they’re right. 

Reasonable Western people—the kind of people who grew up in friendly cities under the Pax Americana of the late 20th century, as I did—always tended to see fragments of the broader war and not the whole picture. We might have noticed a spray-painted swastika here, an anti-Israel boycott there, a synagogue shooting by a Pennsylvania gunman, a Molotov cocktail hurled at a Montreal school, the odd statement from former leaders of countries like France (“heavy financial domination of the media and the worlds of art and music”) and Malaysia (“Jews are ruling the world by proxy”). But the tendency has been to see these all as unrelated data points, rather than an illustration of the disturbing fact that hundreds of millions of people around the world, perhaps billions, believe themselves to be in conflict in some way with Jews. 

These range from much of the populations of countries like Indonesia (where there are no Jews, but where two-thirds of those polled agreed that “people hate Jews because of the way Jews behave”), to members of British labor unions, socialists in places like Colombia and Venezuela, Russian nationalists and many of their sworn enemies among Ukrainian nationalists, professors and students in the American Ivy League, ideologues and influencers in China, and clerics in mosques from Sana’a to Sydney. 

The October 7 attack and its aftermath have finally brought the disparate elements of this struggle against Jews to the surface, its participants surging into the streets and onto social media—suggesting that Hamas knew something important about the world that many of us didn’t see, or didn’t want to. 

When I was a reporter for an international news agency at the time of the Hamas takeover in Gaza in 2007,  I discovered that it was impolitic to mention what Hamas clearly announced in its founding charter from 1988: Namely, that “our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious,” and the Jews were “behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions, and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests.” 

This didn’t sound like “Free Palestine.” But as a rule, on the rare occasions that Western news organizations felt compelled to mention the document, they left those parts out. 

The historical examples from the charter suggest that in the war against Judaism, the ideologues of Hamas understand themselves to be operating in a broad coalition and carrying on a long tradition. This is true. “Islam and National Socialism are close to each other in the struggle against Judaism,” Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem and one of the fathers of the Palestinian national movement, said in 1944. This was in a speech to members of an SS division he helped raise, made up of Bosnian Muslims. “Nearly a third of the Qur’an deals with the Jews. It has demanded that all Muslims watch the Jews and fight them wherever they find them,” he said, an idea that would reappear four decades later in the Hamas charter. When the mufti testified before a British commission of inquiry in 1936, he quoted The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Tsarist forgery describing a global Jewish conspiracy, which is also the source for parts of the Hamas charter and remains popular across the Middle East. (I once found the book for sale at a good shop near the American University of Beirut.) The Hamas army, known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is named for one of the mufti’s most famous proteges.

The movement became savvy enough to water down its charter a few years ago, but its leaders have remained honest about their intent. “You have Jews everywhere,” one former Hamas minister, Fathi Hammad, shouted to a crowd in 2019, “and we must attack every Jew on the globe by way of slaughter and killing, with God’s will.” 

In the liberal West, no sane person would own up to believing The Protocols. (At least not yet; things are moving fast.) But an Italian can hold a prominent U.N. job, for example, after saying she believes a “Jewish lobby” controls America, and you can hold a tenured position at the best universities in the West if you believe that the only country on earth that must be eliminated is the Jewish one. 

My experience in the Western press corps was that sympathy for Hamas was not just real but often more substantial than sympathy for Jews. In Europe and North America, as we’ve now seen on the streets and on campuses, many on the progressive left have arrived at an ideology positing that one of the world’s most pressing problems is the State of Israel—a country that has come to be seen as the embodiment of the evils of the racist, capitalist West, if not as the world’s only “apartheid” state, that being a modern synonym for evil. 

Jews could no longer officially be hated because of their ethnicity or religion, but can legitimately be hated as supporters of “apartheid” and as the embodiment of “privilege.” The pretense that this is a critique of Israel’s military tactics, or sincere desire for a two-state solution, has now largely been dropped. 

A recent poll suggested that about two-thirds of Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 believe Jews constitute an “oppressor class.” I take this poll, like all polls, with a grain of salt, but even if it's off by half, we’re still seeing signs that many young Americans, like many people who live in other countries and cite completely different reasons, believe that Jews are a problem they need to confront. In this regard, Hamas has reason for optimism.

Many of the Westerners who work in aid organizations and in the press in the Middle East, in my own experience, hold some variation of these beliefs. This includes many Europeans who are only a generation or two removed from days when other Europeans actively prosecuted a physical war against “international Jewry.” These people, who use different language to explain their problem with the same group of people (terms like “apartheid,” “war crimes,” and “supremacy” being among those now in favor) are the people regularly in contact with Hamas, in the offices of UNRWA or Amnesty International. So it can’t have been hard for Hamas to understand that its ideas have traction beyond the Middle East. 

This explains incidents like the striking moment in 2021 when the Hamas military commander Yahya Sinwar told a VICE reporter, “I want to take this opportunity to remember the racist murder of George Floyd.” Palestinians, he said, suffered “the same type of racism.” Sinwar is a fundamentalist sociopath responsible for the carnage in Israel on October 7 and for the resulting catastrophe in Gaza, as well as the murder of several Africans caught in the attack. His statement was echoed in a call by Representative Rashida Tlaib of Michigan the same year: “What they are doing to the Palestinian people is what they continue to do to our Black brothers and sisters here.” The word “they” was striking at the time. The two of them clearly understood themselves as being part of the same struggle. 

Hamas, like the PLO before it, could always count on fellow travelers from the old left steeped in Soviet propaganda about “Zionist imperialism,” itself a variation on more venerable themes of Jewish control. But important new allies in the West have made themselves apparent with the rise of second-generation immigrants from Muslim countries, some of whom now phrase the war of their parents’ generation in progressive language, and can protest alongside pink-haired kids with “Queers for Palestine” signs, happy to discover they share a common enemy. After the October 7 attack came the jubilant paraglider posters, the applause from Black Lives Matter, and our introduction to a parade of types like the Cornell professor who declared the massacre “exhilarating.” 

From my friends in Jewish communities in North America, I hear about synagogues hiring more armed guards and installing metal detectors, long the reality in what remains of Jewish Europe. There’s a new police post outside my old elementary school in Toronto. In L.A. and London, people I know are hiding their kippot in pockets or under baseball hats. It seems strange to call any of this the “Gaza war.” 

Most of us assumed that whatever one’s approach to Israel, open talk of Jewish villainy and calls for violence were never acceptable. We now know that scores of people, including Ivy League presidents and faculty, believe it depends on the context. Hamas thinks so too, and all of this makes you wonder who really miscalculated on October 7.

You can read Matti Friedman’s last piece for The Free Press here and listen to his Honestly episode, about when Leonard Cohen visited Israel during the Yom Kippur War, here.

For more coverage on Israel and the Middle East, become a subscriber to The Free Press.

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2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023

Key Takeaways:

• The New York Times (NYT) published an oped by a member of its editorial board calling for Ukraine to engage in negotiations with and cede territory to Russia after reports emerged that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using backchannels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire. The oped largely ignores near-constant Kremlin public signaling of Russia’s continued maximalist goals in Ukraine.
• Russia has officially deployed a battalion formed of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) to the frontline in Ukraine, further confirming a myriad of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs.
• Recent incidents of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs likely implicate elements of the now notorious 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division in the abuse of POWs.
• The Russian military command will reportedly disband the "Kaskad" operational combat tactical formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) by December 31, 2023, likely as part of Russia's ongoing force formalization campaign.
• Ukrainian military officials revealed that Russian forces launched about 7,400 missiles and 3,900 Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine since launching the full-scale invasion.
• Russian mines continue to threaten civilian vessels in the Black Sea but will likely not deter civilian vessel usage of the Black Sea Humanitarian Corridor.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $250 million security assistance package for Ukraine on December 27.
• Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin acknowledged the end of his presidential campaign after failing to register with the Russian Central Elections Committee (CEC) on December 27.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rewarded prominent Russian milbloggers for their contribution to the "military-patriotic" and "military-political" sphere, mirroring previous Kremlin efforts to pander to and co-opt to the wider Russian milblogger community.
• Ukrainian forces made a confirmed advance near Bakhmut, likely within the past week.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances northwest of Avdiivka, near Marinka, and south of Hulyaipole.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on December 28 that Russia has over 640,000 contract servicemen (kontrakniki), the first Russian announcement about the number of kontrakniki in the Russian Armed Forces since the start of the full-scale invasion.
• Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical necessity, despite an apparently growing number of cases of highly infectious diseases being transmitted among Ukrainian children en route to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 28, 2023

Dec 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2023 

Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov,

George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 28, 2023, 8pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on December 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The New York Times (NYT) published an oped by a member of its editorial board calling for Ukraine to engage in negotiations with and cede territory to Russia after reports emerged that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using backchannels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire. The oped largely ignores near-constant Kremlin public signaling of Russia’s continued maximalist goals in Ukraine. The oped argues that Ukraine should not “pass up” this opportunity to possibly achieve a ceasefire despite the fact that there are multiple reasons to believe that Putin’s pro-ceasefire signaling may not be sincere, such as Putin’s demonstrated untrustworthiness and the possibility that he may intend to use time spent on prolonged negotiations to his political and military benefit.[1] The piece argues that Ukraine does not need to regain all its territory to emerge victorious from the war, but that a “strong, independent, prosperous, and secure” Western-oriented Ukraine is also a victory. The piece appeals to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to engage in ceasefire negotiations and not see negotiations as a defeat, implicitly blaming Zelensky – not Putin – for the absence of serious negotiations.

The oped’s argument implicitly relies on the assumption that Putin’s reported backchannel communications more accurately reflect Putin’s thoughts and desires than his – and other Kremlin officials’ – constant public rhetoric. Kremlin rhetoric to both international and domestic audiences has repeatedly indicated that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine or the West in good faith and intends to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine – which are completely incompatible with a strong, independent, or secure Ukraine that is a part of the West. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev gave an interview to Russian state outlet RIA Novosti on December 28, for example, in which he responded to a question about the possibility of negotiations in 2024 by stating that the war will continue and that Russia’s goals in Ukraine remain the “disarmament of Ukrainian troops” (alternative wording for the long-standing Russian demand for Ukraine’s “demilitarization”) and " the rejection by the current Ukrainian state of the ideology of neo-Nazism (alternative wording for the Kremlin’s repeated demands for Ukraine’s “denazification”).[2] Medvedev re-emphasized that the war would continue until Russia achieves regime change in Ukraine and also claimed that Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv (none of which Russia currently occupies) are “Russian cities” and complained that they are still marked as Ukrainian cities on maps. Medvedev’s comments reinforce copious other indications that Russia intends to annex or militarily occupy territory beyond the current line of contact and beyond the four (illegally) annexed oblasts and Crimea.[3] Medvedev also claimed that Russia has always been open to negotiations with Ukraine and that negotiations can continue up until the “complete defeat and capitulation” of Ukraine – in line with ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia does not intend to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s maximalist objectives, which are tantamount to Ukrainian and Western surrender, are unchanged.[4] The Ukrainian government, on the other hand, has consistently been working on its 10-point peace plan, and Zelensky stated on December 19 that Ukraine is preparing to be able to present the peace formula to Russia in the future.[5]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a number of statements on December 28 that also run contrary to the reported backchannel messaging on which the NYT oped and similar arguments rely. Lavrov claimed on December 28 in another interview with RIA Novosti that “hints and leaks” in the Western media show that the West wants to look for a way to end the war in Ukraine while still declaring a Ukrainian victory – possibly in response to Western reports about Russia’s willingness to negotiate.[6] Lavrov also claimed that Ukrainian demands for the return of its 1991 borders amount to “demands for genocide.” Lavrov claimed that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” and lamented the fall of the Soviet Union, after which millions of Russians were left outside of the borders of the Russian Federation--echoing many statements that Putin has made.[7] Lavrov’s statements appear to invoke the Kremlin’s concept of “compatriots abroad” that is used to justify Russia’s definition of its “sovereignty” and right to defend ethnic Russians and Russian speakers beyond its borders. The Kremlin has recently returned to its “compatriots abroad” narrative to justify its war in Ukraine and when discussing Russia’s imperial reconquests in and beyond Ukraine.[8]

The oped’s focus on the need for Ukraine to cede its land, finally, obscures the horrors that the Russian occupation is inflicting on the Ukrainian people living on that land. Russian forces and administrations have been engaging in large-scale and deliberate ethnic cleansing campaigns, forcibly and illegally deporting Ukrainians to Russia and replacing them with Russians and migrants to Russia.[9] Russian administrations have illegally deported tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia under various schemes, including causing Russian families to adopt them.[10] Russian administrations are systematically working to eliminate the Ukrainian language, culture, history, and ethnicity in the areas that Russian forces occupy, as ISW has repeatedly documented.[11] Many of these activities appear to violate the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and deserve at least a mention in discussions about how Ukraine’s president should cede Ukraine’s land and people to Russia.[12]

Russia has officially deployed a battalion formed of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) to the frontline in Ukraine, further confirming a myriad of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Russian state-controlled outlets RIA Novosti and Rossiya-1 reported on December 28 that soldiers from the “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” battalion, formed of Ukrainian POWs and subordinated to the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Ministry of Internal Affairs “Kaskad” formation, took part in their first engagement against Ukrainian forces near Urozhaine, western Donetsk Oblast.[13] Russian media had previously reported on October 27 that the battalion recruited around 70 Ukrainian POWs from penal colonies in Russia and sent them to train before deploying to the western Donetsk Oblast area in early November.[14] ISW continues to assess that the use of Ukrainian POWs in the “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” battalion is likely a violation of The Geneva Convention on POWs, which prohibits the use of POWs in military activities on the side of the power that has captured them and states that “no POW may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.”[15]

Recent incidents of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs likely implicate elements of the now notorious 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division in the abuse of POWs.[16] Drone footage from December 27 showed Russian forces executing three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and footage from December 13 additionally showed Russian forces in this area using Ukrainian POWs as human shields.[17] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General verified the authenticity of the December 27 video on December 28 and suggested that elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division are likely responsible for the executions, considering that the 76th is the principal Russian formation operating near Robotyne.[18] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) similarly suggested that the December 13 footage implicates elements of the 234th VDV Regiment of the 76th VDV Division in the crime of using Ukrainian POWs as human shields in the same area.[19] Various independent investigations in 2022 confirmed that the 76th VDV Division, particularly its 234th Regiment, participated in a deliberate “cleansing operation” that massacred Ukrainian civilians in Bucha, Kyiv Oblast.[20] The exact composition of the 234th VDV Regiment has likely changed since the massacres at Bucha, the continued participation of this regiment in apparent war crimes suggests that the wider VDV command may be encouraging, or at least not actively working to prevent, such practices as part of its modus operandi.

The Russian military command will reportedly disband the "Kaskad" operational combat tactical formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) by December 31, 2023, likely as part of Russia's ongoing force formalization campaign. The DNR MVD formed Kaskad in 2017, and Kaskad has operated semi-independently as a Russian irregular formation since.[21] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on December 26 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would disband one of “the most experienced, combat-ready, and well-coordinated units” in Donbas after the Russian General Staff ordered Kaskad to withdraw from its positions and disband by December 31.[22] The milblogger added on December 27 that the Russian military command had already begun withdrawing Kaskad elements from the frontlines, including 90 of its artillery systems and drone reconnaissance elements.[23] The milblogger added that Kaskad had 9,000 total personnel and claimed that Russian officials are trying to disband the formation ahead of the New Year holiday to deflect from their true intentions of seizing Kaskad’s property and assets. The milblogger claimed that many accused him of lying, but implied that he is in contact with Kaskad personnel and observed that Kaskad’s press service did not attempt to deny or downplay his original report. A Russian social media user, claiming to have connections with Kaskad elements, claimed that Kaskad is not being disbanded but rather reformed into a new structure that is not affiliated with the DNR MVD, which cannot have a police force fighting in armed combat on the frontlines according to Russian law.[24] The DNR’s “Vostok” battalion, which is part of the Kaskad formation and fighting on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, also noted that officials are currently deciding Kaskad’s and Vostok’s fates and noted that Kaskad is fully dependent on Russian military logistics.[25] Vostok added that the question of Kaskad’s existence first emerged after Russia (illegally) annexed part of the occupied Donetsk Oblast, which required the dissolution of the DNR MVD as an independent entity in order to fully integrate into Russian security structures under Russian law. Another milblogger claimed that the dissolution of Kaskad is irrelevant because its elements hid behind regular forces near Velyka Novosilka area in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and were not combat effective on the battlefield.[26]

The dissolution of Kaskad is likely part of the Russian MoD’s and the Kremlin’s effort to formalize control over some irregular forces, such as proxy militias. Russia had undertaken similar efforts to restructure and integrate the DNR’s and Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) 1st and 2nd Army Corps in early 2023, which in some cases meant eliminating individual units’ autonomy, replacing commanders, and installing rules and regulations observed by the Russian Armed Forces.[27] The Russian MoD may offer Kaskad personnel the option to sign military contracts to join formalized DNR units or offer these forces contract for volunteer military service. Both scenarios, however, will likely have implications for Kaskad’s ability to maintain its pre-formalization structure and may degrade its combat effectiveness.

Ukrainian military officials revealed that Russian forces launched about 7,400 missiles and 3,900 Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine since launching the full-scale invasion. Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated on December 28 that Russia has launched about 7,400 missiles against Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, including around 2,470 S-300/400 missiles, 900 Iskander-M missiles, and 48 Kinzhal missiles.[28] Ukrainian StratCom also reported that Russian forces have launched about 3,700 Shahed drones against Ukraine, of which Ukrainian forces have destroyed about 2,900. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on December 28 that three Russian Kalibr cruise missile carriers — including two unspecified submarines and the Admiral Makarov Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate — sortied in the Black Sea on December 28 and warned of an increased risk of Russian missile strikes because Russian missile carriers have not sortied in the Black Sea for “a very long time.”[29] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Shahed-131/136 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces shot down seven drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Zaporizhia oblasts on the night of December 27 to 28.[30]

Russian mines continue to threaten civilian vessels in the Black Sea but will likely not deter civilian vessel usage of the Black Sea Humanitarian Corridor. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on December 28 that a Russian naval mine damaged a civilian vessel sailing under the Panamanian flag on the Black Sea while the ship was traveling to a Danube River port to pick up grain, causing a fire on the vessel and injuring two crew members.[31] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that stormy weather often increases the risk of vessels hitting mines and noted the importance of continued international support for demining the Black Sea.[32] US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink reported that as of December 305 civilian vessels have transported over 10 million tons of grain and other cargo through the civilian corridor in the Black Sea, presumably since the first civilian vessel successfully departed from a Ukrainian port through the corridor on August 15.[33] Civilian ships will very likely continue to use the corridor despite the risks of Russian mines, but Russian militarization of the Black Sea continues to pose a risk to civilian ships that are carrying out critical grain transportation tasks. Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria reportedly plan to sign an agreement on demining Russian naval mines that drift into the western Black Sea in January 2024.[34]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $250 million security assistance package for Ukraine on December 27.[35] The package includes additional air defense capabilities such as munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; artillery ammunition including 155mm and 105mm rounds and over 15 million small arms ammunition rounds; and anti-tank weapons such as Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems.[36]

Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin acknowledged the end of his presidential campaign after failing to register with the Russian Central Elections Committee (CEC) on December 27. The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS), which had been organizing Girkin’s campaign on his behalf due to his imprisonment, announced on December 27 that Russian authorities did not allow Girkin to meet with a notary to verify the signatures supporting his presidential nomination.[37] RDS published a statement from Girkin on December 28 in which he said that he “had no illusions” about succeeding in a “layered system of obstacles created by the system itself.”[38] Girkin claimed that Russia is approaching a time of troubles (likely referencing the Russian Time of Troubles political crisis in the early 17th century that preceded the rise of the Romanov dynasty) and that Russia’s ability to emerge from its hardships depends on its ability to unite and organize.[39] Girkin had announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential election on November 19.[40]

The Russian MoD rewarded prominent Russian milbloggers for their contribution to the “military-patriotic” and “military-political” sphere, mirroring previous Kremlin efforts to pander to and co-opt to the wider Russian milblogger community. Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov reported on December 28 that the Russian MoD gave awards to Rybar project head Mikhail Zvinchuk and creative director Valeria Zvinchuk for their efforts in military-patriotic education and military-political work for the Russian Armed Forces.[41] Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously given Zvinchuk the Russian Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class on November 16 for Zvinchuk's efforts in supporting the Russian war in Ukraine.[42] ISW assessed at the time that Putin's award to Zvinchuk, whose Rybar channel has amassed 1.19 million followers as of December 28, 2023, was likely an attempt to gain control over the often-critical milblogger information space.[43] The tone of Rybar's coverage has notably become more complacent towards Russian military failures in Ukraine and less overtly critical of the Russian MoD since the fall of 2022 when Zvinchuk began appearing as a featured military analyst on Russian state television.[44] The fact that Zvinchuk now holds both MoD and presidential awards suggests that the Russian leadership seeks to co-opt and control milblogger reporting on the war in Ukraine and hopes to use Zvinchuk's example to incentivize similar Kremlin-favorable reporting by other milbloggers.

Key Takeaways:

• The New York Times (NYT) published an oped by a member of its editorial board calling for Ukraine to engage in negotiations with and cede territory to Russia after reports emerged that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using backchannels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire. The oped largely ignores near-constant Kremlin public signaling of Russia’s continued maximalist goals in Ukraine.
• Russia has officially deployed a battalion formed of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) to the frontline in Ukraine, further confirming a myriad of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs.
• Recent incidents of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs likely implicate elements of the now notorious 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division in the abuse of POWs.
• The Russian military command will reportedly disband the "Kaskad" operational combat tactical formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) by December 31, 2023, likely as part of Russia's ongoing force formalization campaign.
• Ukrainian military officials revealed that Russian forces launched about 7,400 missiles and 3,900 Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine since launching the full-scale invasion.
• Russian mines continue to threaten civilian vessels in the Black Sea but will likely not deter civilian vessel usage of the Black Sea Humanitarian Corridor.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $250 million security assistance package for Ukraine on December 27.
• Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin acknowledged the end of his presidential campaign after failing to register with the Russian Central Elections Committee (CEC) on December 27.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rewarded prominent Russian milbloggers for their contribution to the "military-patriotic" and "military-political" sphere, mirroring previous Kremlin efforts to pander to and co-opt to the wider Russian milblogger community.
• Ukrainian forces made a confirmed advance near Bakhmut, likely within the past week.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances northwest of Avdiivka, near Marinka, and south of Hulyaipole.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on December 28 that Russia has over 640,000 contract servicemen (kontrakniki), the first Russian announcement about the number of kontrakniki in the Russian Armed Forces since the start of the full-scale invasion.
• Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical necessity, despite an apparently growing number of cases of highly infectious diseases being transmitted among Ukrainian children en route to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[45] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured two unspecified Ukrainian positions near Synkivka, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of this purported gain.[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are moving forward slowly in the Kupyansk direction, prioritizing strikes on Ukrainian assets over making gains in ground assaults.[47] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Ivanivka, and Lake Lyman (just north of Synkivka), and west of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area, Torske, Dibrova, and Hryhorivka.[48] Ukrainian military observer Yurii Butusov posted footage on December 28 of the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a building occupied by Russian forces in Kreminna.[49] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) and unspecified airborne (VDV) Divisions are reportedly operating in this area.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements north of Bakhmut on December 28 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Spirne (northeast of Bakhmut) and unsuccessfully attacked near Vesele.[51] Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue operating near Berestove (northeast of Bakhmut), and elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in the Soledar direction (northeast of Bakhmut).[52]

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced near Bakhmut, likely within the past week, and continued positional engagements with Russian forces on December 28. Geolocated footage published on December 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced southeast of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and east of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and toward Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[54] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that the intensity of fighting has decreased near Bakhmut but that Russian forces continue attempts to capture Bohdanivka, advance toward Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut), and regain lost positions near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (southwest of Bakhmut).[55] Several milbloggers noted that it is difficult for Russian forces to capture Bohdanivka because it is located in a lowland, which allows Ukrainian forces to exert fire control over Russian positions in the lowland area.[56] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting is ongoing northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka and Khromove; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka and Kurdyumivka.[57] Elements of the Chechen “Shustry” Detachment of “Akhmat” Spetsnaz along with elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Klishchiivka.[58] Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Bakhmut.[59]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Horlivka on December 28. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Mayorske (northwest of Horlivka) and Niu York (west of Horlivka).[60] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating near Horlivka.[61]

Russian forces recently made a marginal advance northwest of Avdiivka and continued positional engagements with Ukrainian forces on December 28. Geolocated footage published on December 28 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced near the Avdiivka Coke Plant northwest of Avdiivka.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 800 meters from Sieverne (southwest of Avdiivka), near Ocheretyne along the railway line (northwest of Avdiivka), and in the industrial zone (southeast of Avdiivka).[63] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional battles continued northwest of Avdiivka east of Novobakhmutivka and near Stepove and south of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Sieverne.[64] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces have doubled their use of loitering munitions and increased the number of glide bomb strikes with Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft in the Tavriisk direction, which includes Avdiivka, western Donetsk Oblast, and Zaporizhia Oblast.[65]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Marinka on December 28 and continued positional engagements with Ukrainian forces. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Marinka and made unspecified tactical advances near Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[66] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces attacked west of Donetsk City near Marinka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[67] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that subordinate units of Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) including elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment are operating near Marinka and that elements of the 33rd and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiments are operating in the Marinka-Pobieda and Oleksandrivka-Novomykhailivka directions.[68] Mashovets also noted that individual units of the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District) and the Russian 7th Separate Operational Battalion (“Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]) are redeploying to the Novomykhailivka direction.[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area south of Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[70] Elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Mountain Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[71]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Recently posted geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces occupy Dorozhnyanka, south of Hulyaipole.[72] Russian forces have claimed to be operating in Dorozhnyanka since December 2022.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Robotyne and along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[74] One Russian milblogger, citing alleged unspecified Ukrainian military analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Robotyne and along the Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (south and east of Robotyne).[75] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces secured a small foothold north of Verbove on December 27.[76] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of these claims, however. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements occurred near Verbove and Robotyne.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike on Orikhiv.[78] Elements of the Russian 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment of Territorial Troops (TRV) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[79]

Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as of December 28, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed gains in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional fighting continued on the east bank, including in Krynky.[80] Elements of the Russian “Margelov” volunteer battalion are reportedly operating near Krynky.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD announced on December 28 that Russia has over 640,000 contract servicemen (kontrakniki) - the first-ever official Russian announcement about the number of kontrakniki in the Russian Armed Forces since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[82] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently announced that over 480,000 individuals signed military contracts with the Russian MoD in 2023, and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev similarly stated on December 28 that 500,000 kontrakniki have joined the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces since January 1, 2023.[83] The Russian MoD also claimed that over 40,000 people fought as members of BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that over 7,000 personnel operating within BARS units are currently on the battlefield.[84] The Russian MoD also noted that BARS includes Cossack units and that BARS has had the highest number of recruits from Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast, totaling 6,500 recruits. Russian officials may be counting all military personnel such as mobilized troops, actual kontrakniki, and volunteers (dobrovoltsy) as part of the presented 640,000 kontrakniki number in an effort to exaggerate the proportion of Russia’s mixed forces that seem to be professionals. The Kremlin significantly lowered qualifications for kontrakniki in early 2023, prioritizing generating a high number of recruits over recruiting a smaller cadre of more experienced men to preserve the kontrakniki service class as the backbone of Russia’s professional military force.[85]

Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that the Russian MoD may be planning to increase Russia’s expeditionary force in Ukraine by redeploying active military personnel in Russia to Ukraine.[86] SOTA observed that Russian officials prepared amendments for the law “On determining the procedure and conditions for sending military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces.” The amendments, if passed, will allow the Russian command to deploy previously uncommitted military personnel to assist the military command, formations, and military units directly involved “in the performance of tasks relating to resolving crisis situations and localizing armed conflicts in peacetime” for a period of more than 30 days but no more than one year. SOTA observed that previously the law did not provide grounds for the deployment of military personnel to localized armed conflicts in peacetime.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Russian leadership is trying to train more junior lieutenants in a compressed timeframe to offset high personnel losses among junior officers.[87] The GUR noted that Russian servicemen who pass accelerated training and are promoted to the lowest officer ranks immediately deploy to the frontlines. ISW previously observed that Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky alluded to a similar phenomenon in which VDV command schools deployed recent graduates to the frontlines in Ukraine skipping periods of either advanced training or service with units not in combat.[88]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian sources circulated close-up images of the Iranian Shahed-238 on December 28.[89] The Shahed-238 is a jet-powered version of the Shahed-131/136 variant that Russian forces widely use in Ukraine, and of which Iranian sources initially presented images in November 2023.[90] ISW has not yet confirmed the use of the Shahed-238 in Ukraine, despite previous speculation that Russian forces used these drones during an attack on Kyiv City on November 25.[91]

The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) will reportedly equip all of its Su-57 fifth generation fighter jets with new second stage engines in 2024.[92] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 28, citing high-ranking sources close to the VKS, that all Su-57s entering service with the VKS in 2024 will receive second stage (fifth generation) engines.[93] TASS also reported that the VKS received more than 10 Su-57s with first stage engines in 2023, and these aircraft have reportedly been involved in aviation missions in Ukraine over the course of the year.[94]

 Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical necessity, despite an apparently growing number of cases of highly infectious diseases being transmitted among Ukrainian children en route to Russia. Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova stated on December 28 that 50 children from occupied Kherson Oblast went on "vacation" to a seaside sanatorium-resort in Krasnodar Krai for medical and psychological rehabilitation.[95] Lvova-Belova thanked Russian Railways for transporting the children and noted that over 150 Ukrainian children underwent treatment and rehabilitation at sanatorium resorts in Russia as part of the "A Country for Children" program in 2023. Kherson Oblast occupation health minister Artysh Sat notably admitted on December 28 that eight children from occupied Kherson Oblast, who were traveling by train from Moscow to Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea likely as part of a similar Russian-controlled vacation-scheme, were hospitalized in Tambov Oblast with symptoms of acute respiratory viral infection (AFVI) and high fever.[96] ISW previously reported that one 12-year-old girl from occupied Luhansk Oblast died while traveling on a Russian Railways train from a children's camp in Tyumen Oblast on December 21.[97] Recent cases of infectious illnesses amongst Ukrainian children who were under Russian guardianship at the time of their deportation to Russia further suggest that Russia is violating its obligations under international law to ensure the health and safety of “protected persons” who are part of a removed or deported population.[98]

Russia continues efforts to integrate the education system in occupied Ukraine into the Russian system. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a State Council meeting on December 27 on the topic of “increasing the role and prestige of the teacher and mentor,” during which Russian authorities discussed the implementation of Russian teaching standards and educational curricula in occupied areas of Ukraine.[99] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev told Putin about the development of educational programs and Russian-approved textbooks in schools in occupied Crimea and particularly highlighted the “nationalization of history education,” suggesting that Russian occupation officials are focusing on instituting Russian history curricula that aim to erase Ukrainian historical identity and instill the pro-Kremlin pseudo-historical version of history in schools.[100] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) occupation head Leonid Pasechnik stated that he talked with Putin about various measures his administration is undertaking to switch schools in occupied Luhansk Oblast to "Russian operating standards."[101] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin thanked Putin for various Russian projects to reconstruct schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[102] Russian integration efforts targeting schools in occupied areas of Ukraine help the Kremlin further its ideological goals in Ukraine by propagating false Kremlin narratives on Ukrainian history and identity and will likely have multi-generational impacts as young Ukrainian children are forced to grow up within the bounds of the Russian education system.

An investigation by the Associated Press (AP) exposed systemic failures within the Russian Kherson Oblast occupation administration to properly account for deaths following the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam explosion in June of 2023.[103] AP published a story on December 28 detailing how Russian occupation authorities “vastly and deliberately undercounted the dead” after flooding in Kherson Oblast resulting from the Russian destruction of the KHPP dam on June 6.[104] AP found that Russian occupation authorities controlled the issuance of death certificates, immediately removed the bodies of the dead who were unclaimed by family members, and threatened health workers, all in order to obfuscate the actual scale of deaths in the flood. AP concluded that the total number of deaths is likely much higher than official numbers released by Russian occupation officials, which suggests that Russian authorities were engaged in a wider campaign to obscure the cost of the dam explosion.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin officials continued to amplify a narrative aimed at discouraging further military aid provisions to Ukraine by claiming that the US and the West are killing more Ukrainians by sending them additional military aid. Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov claimed on December 28 that the latest US military aid package to Ukraine is a “bloody New Year’s gift” and claimed that the US remains loyal to “fighting to the last Ukrainian” because Washington fears Russian military successes such as the capture of Marinka—a town with a prewar population of roughly 9,000 that Russian forces had been trying to capture since 2014.[105]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attempted to frame Armenia’s recent efforts to distance itself from Russia as Armenia falling victim to Western promises in an effort to deflect from Russia’s failure to defend Armenia’s interests during the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis in September 2023.[106] Lavrov claimed that Yerevan is “succumbing to the persuasion of Westerners” and is trying to reform its foreign policy line by exchanging its alliance with Moscow for “vague promises” from the West. Lavrov claimed that Armenia is trying to justify this strategic turn by blaming Russia for “all the troubles of the republic, including the loss of Karabakh.” Lavrov added that he is confident that such difficulties in the Russian-Armenian relations are temporary and can be resolved with “political will.” Lavrov noted that Armenia is facing several challenges that the United States or the European Union cannot help with, and that Russia seeks to bring peace and stability to Armenia and the South Caucasus. Lavrov’s discussion of strains in Russian-Armenian relations follows recent Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s meetings in St. Petersburg on December 25 and December 26.[107]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, December 28, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq during a press conference on December 28, likely due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq .
2. Hamas and its Palestinian allies are trying to shape peace negotiations in a way that is incompatible with the stated Israeli war aims. Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is likely using Israeli hostages he holds as leverage to keep Hamas’ Gaza Strip leaders at the table during these negotiations—rather than delegating such negotiations exclusively to Hamas’ external leadership.
3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF destroyed three tunnel shafts while searching a hospital and school.
4. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attempted to defend against Israeli advances in Bureij.
5. Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis.
6. Palestinian fighters conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
7. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in 11 locations across the West Bank.
8. Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
9. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed attacks on several new locations across the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for a rocket attack targeting US forces at US Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria.
10. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki met with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.
11. The Iranian regime held a funeral ceremony for killed IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi in Tehran.

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 28, 2023

Dec 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, December 28, 2023

Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq during a press conference on December 28, likely due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq .
2. Hamas and its Palestinian allies are trying to shape peace negotiations in a way that is incompatible with the stated Israeli war aims. Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is likely using Israeli hostages he holds as leverage to keep Hamas’ Gaza Strip leaders at the table during these negotiations—rather than delegating such negotiations exclusively to Hamas’ external leadership.
3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF destroyed three tunnel shafts while searching a hospital and school.
4. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attempted to defend against Israeli advances in Bureij.
5. Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis.
6. Palestinian fighters conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
7. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in 11 locations across the West Bank.
8. Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
9. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed attacks on several new locations across the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for a rocket attack targeting US forces at US Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria.
10. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki met with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.
11. The Iranian regime held a funeral ceremony for killed IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi in Tehran.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq during a press conference on December 28, likely due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. These militias have used legal, military, and political pressure in recent weeks to expel US forces, as CTP-ISW previously assessed. This pressure, particularly the Iranian-backed attacks on US forces, creates an escalation cycle that triggers US self-defense strikes to protect US servicemembers. The Iranian-backed factions and militias then misrepresent these self-defense strikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty, which generates domestic pressure on Sudani to remove US forces. This pressure appears to have succeeded at least partly in that Sudani repeated Iranian-backed militia talking points about the United States. Sudani said that that the self-defense strikes are violations of Iraqi sovereignty and were inconsistent with the advisory role of the International Coalition.[1] These claims ignore the fact that the US forces have a right to self-defense and that the Iranian use of client militias and proxies in Iraq to attack US forces in line with Tehran’s regional agenda is itself a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. US advisory forces are currently deployed in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi [2]government. Sudani did not provide a timeline for removing International Coalition forces or describe the mechanism by which they would be removed.[3]

An Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq. The US military mission in these countries is to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and through cooperation with local partners.[4] The US support to its counter-ISIS partners in both Iraq and Syria is instrumental to successfully defeating ISIS.[5] US forces and infrastructure in Iraq provide the logistical support that enables the presence of US forces in Syria. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would necessitate a withdrawal from Syria, where ISIS is reconstituting itself in Syrian regime-held territory.[6] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partner in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that the US withdrawal from Syria will very likely cause a rapid resurgence in Syria within 12 to 24 months.[7] A resurgent ISIS would then be able to threaten Iraq again. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significant deficiencies in logistics, intelligence, and fire support that inhibit their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[8]

Hamas and its Palestinian allies are trying to shape peace negotiations in a way that is incompatible with the stated Israeli war aims. Hamas representatives met with other Palestinian factions in Beirut on December 27 to discuss the war and a possible ceasefire.[9] The other factions included Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the leftist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC). These groups called collectively for establishing a national dialogue among all Palestinian factions, a unity government that includes all Palestinian factions, an end to the Israel-Hamas war, and free elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[10] The groups also called for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. The groups said that the October 7 attack was a “historic turning point” and reaffirmed the importance of the Palestinian issue.[11] They blamed the Oslo Accords for the “decline” of the importance of the Palestinian cause in the Middle East.[12] These principles articulated by the Palestinian factions conflict with Israeli war aims, which Israeli officials have said are to “destroy Hamas, demilitarize Gaza, and deradicalize Palestinian society.”[13] The participation of Hamas and other radical groups, such as PIJ, that seek the destruction of Israel in a future Gazan or Palestinian government is tantamount to an Israeli defeat in this war.

Hamas and its Palestinian allies are using multiple, overlapping negotiations with different external parties to embed themselves in a postwar “unity government” and thereby undermining Israel’s ability to accomplish its war aims. Hamas is engaging in at least four sets of separate negotiations to counter any Israeli and Western efforts to form a governing authority that excludes Hamas. The negotiations in which Hamas representatives are involved include one with Egypt regarding the war itself, a second with its wartime allies in the Palestinian Allied Factions, a third with former Fatah and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, and a fourth with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).[14] Hamas political leaders met with Fatah and PA officials, including a deputy to Mohammed Dahlan and a former PA foreign affairs minister, to discuss integrating Hamas into the PLO after the war.[15] These negotiations will limit Israel’s ability to build a viable postwar governing authority in the form of a “reformed PA” by associating many of a reformed PA’s possible leaders with Hamas.[16]

Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is likely using Israeli hostages he holds as leverage to keep Hamas’ Gaza Strip leaders at the table during these negotiations—rather than delegating such negotiations exclusively to Hamas’ external leadership. CTP-ISW still assesses that Hamas writ large is also using the Israeli hostages as leverage to ensure its continued relevance in postwar negotiations.[17] Sinwar is opposed to negotiations with the PLO because these talks sideline Sinwar. Sinwar asked Hamas leaders outside the Gaza Strip to cease talks with the PLO and PA.[18] Sinwar’s refusal to release hostages is in part to use them as leverage to maintain his influence in the negotiations. Hamas has also repeatedly refused to release its hostages prior to a comprehensive ceasefire, including in the December 28 joint statement after the meeting in Beirut.[19] Sinwar’s ability to agree to or refuse a hostage exchange allows him to maintain his influence within the movement writ large.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods in the northern Gaza Strip on December 28. The IDF said that the 401st and 460th brigade combat teams (BCT) have “eliminated” Palestinian fighters on the ground and used air support since December 26.[20] The Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, and PIJ’s military wing, the al Quds Brigades, are attempting to defend against these operations. The al Qassem Brigades detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting IDF vehicles in Daraj and Tuffah.[21] The al Quds Brigades also fired RPGs at Israeli vehicles in the neighborhood.[22]

The IDF destroyed three tunnel shafts while searching a hospital and school in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF said that it “investigated” three tunnels near al Rantisi hospital on December 27.[23] The IDF Yahalom Unit—a special operations engineering unit—searched the tunnel as part of the IDF effort to map the tunnel network under the strip. The IDF said that the Yahalom unit discovered that the tunnel is several kilometers long and leads deep into Gaza City. It added that the tunnel is close to a school and that the tunnel was used for military operations.

Hamas and PIJ attempted to defend against Israeli advances in Bureij in the central Gaza Srip on December 28. The New York Times released satellite imagery that showed Israeli forces advancing from two crossings into the Gaza Strip toward Bureij.[24] The IDF said on December 28 that its operations in Bureij were in their “final stages.”[25] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades continued their efforts to defend against Israeli operations, however. The al Qassem brigades fired multiple RPGs and detonated one EFP targeting Israeli forces east of Bureij on December 28.[26] The al Quds Brigades added that it mortared Israeli forces east of the town.[27]

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on December 28. The al Qassem Brigades attacked Israeli forces at least four times using anti-personnel devices and RPGs in northern and eastern Khan Younis.[28] The al Quds Brigades conducted rocket and mortar attacks on two Israeli positions north of Khan Younis.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah—mortared a concentration of Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis City.[30] The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades fighters and ”special combat units” conducted a complex attack on Israeli forces operating near 5th Street in Khan Younis City using mortars, small arms, and RPGs.[31] The IDF confirmed that reserve forces have been destroying militia infrastructure in Bani Suheila, northeast of Khan Younis[32]

Palestinian fighters conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on December 28.[33] The al Quds Brigades claimed one rocket attack on Ein Hashlosha.[34]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in 11 locations across the West Bank on December 28.[35] The IDF conducted raids on money transfer locations suspected of providing financial services to Hamas.[36] Palestinian fighters threw Molotov cocktails and detonated IEDs during fighting in Ramallah and Jenin.[37] Israeli forces conducted an airstrike on fighters that Israel said were throwing explosives and firing on its forces.[38]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 28.[39] LH claimed five attacks targeting Israeli military facilities along the border.[40] Unidentified Iranian-backed fighters fired over 50 rockets into the Galilee region.[41] Palestinian media posted footage claiming that a drone was shot down near Acre, north of Haifa.[42] Israeli air defense systems last intercepted a “suspicious target“ over Acre on November 14.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed attacks on several new locations across the Middle East on December 27.

• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it conducted an unspecified attack on a “vital target” south of Eliad in the Golan Heights.[44] Israeli media reported that it was a one-way drone attack and marked the first time that such a drone landed in the Golan Heights since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[45] Israeli media also reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq may have launched the drone, which caused minor damage but no injuries, from Syria.[46]
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed that it attacked an Israeli “spy center” northeast of Erbil, Iraq.[47] Iranian state media claimed without evidence that the attack killed and injured several individuals.[48] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran. Iranian media previously claimed that the IRGC targeted an Israeli “spy den” when the IRGC conducted a missile attack on Erbil in March 2022.[49] The IRGC conducted attacks using artillery, missiles, and drones on Kurdish opposition groups, which Iran accused of supporting Mahsa Amini protesters in late 2022.[50] Iranian state media accused Kurdish opposition groups of helping Israel smuggle military equipment into Iran that Israel used in its January 2023 drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan.[51]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for a rocket attack targeting US forces at US Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria on December 28.[52]

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki met with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi actors on December 27 and 28. Maliki met separately with Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Secretary General Qais al Khazali and Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.[53] Maliki heads the State of Law coalition, and Ameri heads the We Build coalition. These political parties have respectively won the second highest and highest number of seats in the December 18 provincial council elections thus far. AAH’s media office reported that Maliki and Khazali agreed that US forces in Iraq are “exceeding their advisory capacity” and threatening regional countries.[54] The media office also reported that Maliki and Khazali discussed accelerating the formation of local governments following the elections. Maliki and Ameri similarly emphasized the need for the Independent High Electoral Commission to announce the final provincial council election results.[55] Maliki and Ameri condemned the December 25 US airstrikes on Kataib Hezbollah (KH) facilities.

KH spokesperson Mohammad Mohi emphasized on December 27 that KH’s commitment to “resistance” against the United States and Israel is “irreversible.”[56] Mohi vowed that KH will not allow the United States or Israel to "tamper with” Iraqi internal affairs and sovereignty.

The Iranian regime held a funeral ceremony for killed IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi in Tehran on December 28.[57] Iranian officials have accused Israel of killing Mousavi in an airstrike near Sayyidah Zeinab in Syria on December 25. Western and anti-regime media have reported that Mousavi headed IRGC Quds Force Unit 2250, which manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and Iranian-backed militias in Syria.[58] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led prayers and met with Mousavi’s family during the funeral.[59] Khamenei praised Mousavi for his “tireless jihad” and wished for his “companionship with the guardians of God.” Many individuals at the funeral carried flags with the text “I am your opponent” written in Persian and Hebrew.[60] Some attendees carried images of Mousavi together with former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani.[61] Many current and former high-ranking IRGC officials attended the funeral, including:

• IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami;
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani;
• IRGC Quds Force Commander for the Levant Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi; and
• IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh.

Other notable attendees included Khamenei’s son, Mostafa Khamenei, and Qassem Soleimani’s daughter, Zeynab Soleimani.[62] Zeinab’s husband, Reza Safieddine, is involved in weapons transfers from Iran to LH.[63] The presence of such senior Iranian political and military officials at Mousavi’s funeral highlights his prominence in the regime and its regional project.

IRGC spokesperson Ramazan Sharif promised that on December 28 Iran’s response for the killing of Razi Mousavi will be a combination of “direct action” and indirect action.[64] Sharif vowed that Iran or the Axis of Resistance would avenge the killing of Mousavi.

Iranian hardline Parliamentarian Mojtaba Tavangar claimed that Razi Mousavi was one of the “facilitators” of Hamas’ October 7 attack against Israel.[65] IRGC Commander Hossein Salami said that Mousavi was the ”central pillar” of the IRGC efforts in the Levant, especially in Lebanon and Syria.[66]

Iranian officials made statements countering the claim by IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Ramazan Sharif that Hamas committed the October 7 attack against Israel to avenge the death of Qassem Soleimani.[67] Sharif walked back his comment on December 28 by stating that the motivations for the October 7 attack were purely related to the struggle of Palestinians rather than Iranian interests.[68] Sharif said that the efforts of Soleimani contributed to the alleged success of the attack but were not the reason for the attack. IRGC Commander Hossein Salami officially declared that October 7 was “completely a Palestinian operation” at the funeral for Razi Mousavi on December 28.[69] Salami stated that the October 7 attack was designed and implemented by Palestinians. Chief of Staff of the Office of the Supreme Leader Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani stated that the story of the Gaza Strip is about the Palestinians—not about Iran.[70] He said that Iran was not involved in the October 7 attack but that the Axis of Resistance” has followed Iran’s example in defending their rights”. He further emphasized that US President Joe Biden should be held accountable for alleged Israeli war crimes in the Gaza Strip.

4. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 28, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-28-2023

Key Takeaways   

1. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te remains first in the polls.
2. Two Chinese high-altitude balloons have moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 20.
3. The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to accuse the Philippines of “colluding with external forces” and deliberately provoking confrontations after a series of maritime confrontations in the South China Sea in December.
4. A PRC-brokered ceasefire agreement has failed to stop the fighting between the government of Myanmar and three rebel groups in Myanmar.
5. A loss of Compacts of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its leverage points over these countries.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, DECEMBER 28, 2023

Dec 28, 2023 - ISW Press

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 28, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Ian Jones, and Frank Hoffman of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 28, 2023 at 5pm EST

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways   

1. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te remains first in the polls.
2. Two Chinese high-altitude balloons have moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 20.
3. The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to accuse the Philippines of “colluding with external forces” and deliberately provoking confrontations after a series of maritime confrontations in the South China Sea in December.
4. A PRC-brokered ceasefire agreement has failed to stop the fighting between the government of Myanmar and three rebel groups in Myanmar.
5. A loss of Compacts of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its leverage points over these countries.

Taiwan

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te continues to lead in the polls. The polls that Formosa and ETtoday released between December 20 through December 24 showed that Lai has a roughly 5% lead over Kuomintang (KMT) presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih.[1] The Poll of Polls, which is a weighted average of public election polls over the past 15 days that Taiwan News publishes, showed a similar lead for Lai as of December 25. Lai received 34.91% support, Hou received 30.49% support, and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je received 20.90% support, according to the aggregated polling numbers.[2] The support levels do not reflect significant change since last week.

Two Formosa polls from December 25 and 26 indicate that Lai’s lead over Hou is steadily increasing. The December 25 poll showed Lai at 37.5% support compared to Hou’s 30.49%.[3] The December 26 poll showed Lai at 38.9% support compared to Hou’s 29.4%.[4] This is the largest gap between the candidates since the November 15 Formosa polling. It is also the first time that Hou has fallen below 30% support since then.[5]

The increase in support for Lai may be due to a shift in young voters from Ko. Support for Lai among the 20-29 and 30-39 age groups in the December 26 Formosa poll was 34.8% and 31.0%, respectively.[6] Lai’s polling among the 20-29 age group increased from 20.8% in Formosa’s December 21 poll and has held steady between 34-35% through Formosa’s December 22-26 polling. Lai’s polling among the 30-39 age group decreased slightly between December 22 and 25 from 34.7% to 27.6% before increasing back to 31% on December 26.[7] Support for Ko among the same demographics was 29.9% and 30.4% on December 26.[8] Ko’s support among the 20-29 age group fell from a high of 38.2% on December 22 and support within the 30-39 age group has remained steady at 30-31%.[9]

Hou’s decline in polling could be partly attributed to a decrease in support among the KMT voter base. Support for Hou within the KMT base fell from 91.9% on December 20 to 87.5% on December 26, according to the latest Formosa poll. Support among his base had been above 90% since candidate registration on November 24.[10]

Taiwan’s three presidential candidates gave televised policy presentations on December 20, 26, and 28. Cross-strait issues featured heavily in all three presentations. Taiwan’s political status, sovereignty, and trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were some of the most in-focus topics. Candidates also discussed a wide range of domestic political issues, such as public security, housing, and energy policy.

DPP candidate Lai Ching-te used his time to highlight the looming threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and emphasize the importance of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty. Lai related domestic governance to cross-strait issues, asserting that equitable development and economic prosperity hinged on preserving Taiwan’s democracy in the face of authoritarian expansion.[11] Lai likened economic treaties between Taiwan and the PRC as conforming to the One-China principle and urged for separate economic development initiatives to counteract the PRC’s weaponization of trade for political leverage.[12] The One-China principle describes the PRC's position that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Neither Taiwan nor the United States recognize the One-China principle.

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih mostly focused on promoting domestic governance proposals while criticizing Lai and the DPP administration for encouraging formal Taiwanese independence.[13] Hou defended the KMT’s cross-strait policy against claims of alignment with unification, stressing his fundamental support for Taiwan’s democracy and freedom.[14] Hou disparaged the DPP for what the KMT perceives as independence-minded policies that are directly harmful to the livelihoods of Taiwan’s citizens. Hou pointed to the PRC’s December 21 suspension of tariff reductions under the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) as a consequence of the DPP’s inflammatory approach to cross-strait relations.[15] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua blamed the DPP’s “separatist stance” for the tariff reduction suspension on December 27.[16] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) consistently points to the DPP’s alleged secessionism as the source of tension in cross-strait relations.[17]

TPP candidate Ko Wen-je emphasized domestic governance issues, keeping with his appeal to voters who are weary of cross-strait issues dominating the political discourse. Ko addressed issues such as Taiwan’s aging population, housing policy, and government reforms.[18] Ko presented his cross-strait policy as an alternative to the polarizing extremes of an independence-focused DPP and unification-focused KMT. Ko accused his opponents of promoting cross-strait policies that disrupt the status quo and are unacceptable to both the Taiwanese public and the international community.[19] Ko asserted Taiwan’s status as a sovereign and independent nation while advocating for pragmatic diplomacy that balances cross-strait engagement with strong international partnerships and national defense capabilities. [20]

The three vice-presidential candidates also gave a televised policy presentation on December 22. The candidates’ messaging reflected that of their running mates. DPP vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim criticized the KMT for proposing a trade policy that would increase Taiwan’s economic reliance on the PRC at a time when other countries were reducing their economic exposure to the PRC.[21] KMT vice-presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong used strong language to criticize the DPP and Lai’s independence stance, referring to the latter as a “terrorist” endangering cross-strait relations.[22] TPP vice-presidential candidate Cynthia Wu did not discuss cross-strait issues and instead emphasized economic issues.[23] The vice-presidential candidates maintain a relatively strong presence in the public eye thanks to their high-profile positions in government and media, making their policy presentation potentially more consequential to the race.

The format of the presidential and vice-presidential presentations was similar to that of a debate. The candidates shared the stage to articulate policy stances and often used their allotted time to criticize each other. The presidential candidates will participate in a formal televised debate on December 30. The vice-presidential candidates will participate in a debate on January 1.

Two Chinese high-altitude balloons have moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 20. One balloon crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait on December 22 and the other crossed the median line on December 24.[24] Five other balloons previously crossed the median line between December 7 and 19.[25] The balloons floated at altitudes between 12,000 and 26,000 feet. [26] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported a similar balloon above Taipei on February 10.[27] The MND and the director-general of Taiwan’s Central Weather Service have also reported at least seven balloon sightings over Taiwan between 2021 and 2022. The Financial Times quoted unnamed Taiwanese officials as stating Chinese balloons “come very frequently” and “on average once a month” in a February 12 report.[28] The unnamed officials stated that the February balloons’ dimensions and payload “put them outside the scope of ordinary weather balloons.”[29]

The PRC sending the balloons across the median line of the Taiwan Strait is likely part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and response capabilities. The PRC has normalized daily air and naval activities around Taiwan, including near-daily aerial crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, since 2020. The MND publicly stated that the balloons were weather balloons but has started including them among its daily reports of PRC ADIZ incursions since December 8.[30] MND’s unprecedented inclusion of balloon flights in its daily updates and maps of ADIZ violations in December shows that Taiwan is increasingly concerned about these balloons and may consider them part of the PRC’s broader coercion campaign.

South China Sea

The PRC continued to accuse the Philippines of “colluding with external forces” and deliberately provoking confrontations after a series of maritime confrontations in the South China Sea in December. On December 9 and 10, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels attempted to thwart Philippine supply missions near Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals by firing water cannons and acoustic weapons at Philippine government ships delivering supplies. A CCG vessel rammed a Philippine ship near Second Thomas Shoal.[31] Both countries claim both maritime features. The PRC administers Scarborough Shoal since seizing control of it in 2012, while the Philippines administers Second Thomas Shoal.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attributed the recent “difficulties” to the Philippines' “altered policy stance, failure to uphold commitments, and provocative actions in disputed waters” during a December 20 phone call with Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo. Wang said that Beijing wished to resolve the disputes through consultation but warned of “resolute responses” if the Philippines continued its “disruptive actions.”[32] The MFA spokesperson said on December 25 that the Philippines had “repeatedly violated and provocatively violated relevant waters in the South China Sea, spread false information, and colluded with external forces to undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.”[33] PRC state media, such as People’s Daily, also wrote that the Philippines relied on US support to “provoke” the PRC.[34] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also harshly criticized and warned the Philippines through December 26. The Philippines denied on December 26 that it had acted provocatively and instead blamed the PRC for escalating its tactics.[35]

The United States and Japan have shown support for the Philippines during the recent disputes with the PRC. The US, Japanese, and Filipino national security advisors participated in a trilateral call on December 13 in which they denounced the PRC’s aggression against the Philippines and expressed their commitment to closer security cooperation.[36] Japan also provided the Philippine Air Force with an advanced air surveillance radar system on December 20. The provision was part of a $110 million deal for four units that Japan and the Philippines signed in 2020. The radar system will help the Philippines detect intrusions around any part of the country and its claimed territories. This transfer marks Japan’s first export of a complete defense product since it eased its arms trade ban in 2014.[37]

Myanmar

A PRC-brokered ceasefire agreement has failed to stop the fighting between the government of Myanmar and three rebel groups in Myanmar. Three ethnic rebel groups formed a “brotherhood alliance” and began an offensive in northern Myanmar against the ruling junta on October 27. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on December 14 that it had brokered a temporary ceasefire between the Myanmar military government and the three allied rebel groups.[38] Fighting between the rebel factions and the government has continued throughout Myanmar, however. A rebel group captured the border town of Namhsan one day after the alleged ceasefire on December 15.[40] Rebels also carried out attacks on military bases and bombings in the major cities of Yangon and Mandalay.[41] The PRC MFA spokesperson confirmed on December 19 and 20 that the PRC had hosted ceasefire negotiations in Kunming that resulted in an agreement on December 14. He said the PRC was working to get the warring parties to implement the terms of the agreement, exercise “maximum restraint,” and “properly manage occasional frictions during the ceasefire process.”[42]

The MFA has repeatedly urged the belligerent parties to maintain the security and stability of the PRC-Myanmar border and safeguard the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Myanmar.[43] The fighting has resulted in the deaths of an unspecified number of PRC nationals. One such incident was possibly due to an artillery shell that the junta forces fired which landed in the PRC. [44] The fighting has also blocked PRC–Myanmar cross-border trade and sent thousands of Myanmar nationals to briefly seek safety in the PRC.[45] [46] The CCP may also seek to negotiate a ceasefire to bolster its diplomatic reputation. The PRC has often portrayed itself as a promoter of global peace, security, and stability, for example through its Global Security Initiative.[47]

The PRC has also been using the fighting to crack down on cyber scam centers based in northern Myanmar, which defraud Chinese nationals and have kidnapped thousands of Chinese to work for them.[48] The PRC has offered rewards for the capture of criminal leaders and carried out joint policing with Myanmar authorities, which culminated in Myanmar authorities handing over 31,000 cybercrime suspects to the PRC as of November 21.[49] The junta has since said it is limited in its ability to do more because the scam centers are in areas held by rebel groups.[50] The allied rebel groups have also targeted cyber scam centers and announced eradicating such centers as a major goal of their offensive.[51]

Israel-Hamas War

Chinese state media portrayed the U.S.-proposed “Guardian Shield” multinational Red Sea naval task force as a self-serving and ineffective move that will worsen the situation in the Red Sea and the Middle East. Chinese state media questioned the effectiveness of the initiative and accused the U.S. of being biased and hegemonic in its approach.[52] Chinese media analysis of the situation acknowledged the global implications of the Red Sea crisis, such as the disruption of shipping routes, the increase in costs and prices, and the pressure on the supply chain, but dismissed Guardian Shield as a "band-aid.”[53] State-controlled media outlets emphasized that the “root cause of a series of problems in the Middle East … lies in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” and stressed the need for a ceasefire.[54] The PRC has not signaled any willingness or interest to support the U.S.-led regional security initiatives to protect maritime shipping through the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea.[55]

The reaction from Chinese state media aligns with the PRC’s diplomatic and information lines of effort that aim to supplant U.S. influence with Arab states by proposing what it claims to be a more inclusive and cooperative regional security framework.[56] This involves portraying Washington as a self-interested and destabilizing influence in the region while simultaneously positioning Beijing as an altruistic and unbiased actor.[57]

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[58] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[59] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[60] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[61] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[62] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[63] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[64]

These three island countries control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are 2 of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[65]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would exacerbate Palau’s existing deficit, which amounts to $37 million as of its 2021 budget of $150 million.[66] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[67] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [68] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[69] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[70] The associated fiscal cliff that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[71] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[72] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[73] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.

5. How Librarian Spies Helped Win World War II

Excerpts:

“If you look at postwar scholarship, there is debate about how much of what they took was valuable,” McBride Moench adds.

But their efforts had some long-term impacts. When the war ended, some of these same agents documented and preserved collections of looted papers and books acquired by the Nazis. The collecting missions set up U.S. research libraries to become renowned repositories of international materials.

“One of the things that's really interesting that comes out of this whole effort is it gives a rise in the status of American research universities in terms of their holdings of European manuscripts or other primary source documents,” McBride Moench says.

How Librarian Spies Helped Win World War II

December 27, 2023 8:28 AM

• Dora Mekouar

voanews.com · December 27, 2023

All About America explores American culture, politics, trends, history, ideals and places of interest.

Librarians-turned-spies helped fight the Nazis by deploying their information gathering and organizing skills as weapons during World War II.

These secret agents collected everything from local newspapers and trade journals to underground resistance pamphlets, technological manuals, economic reports and land surveys.

“They weren't the James Bond type of spy but more of the low key, under-the-radar spy,” says Kathy Peiss, author of “Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers, and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe.”

"They were there to collect what today we would call open-source materials. So magazines, newspapers, materials like industrial directories, and anything that might give some insight into the planning and strength of the enemy.”

The Offenbach Archival Depot, where books, manuscripts and archival materials taken by the Nazis during World War II were sorted and returned to their country of origin or maintained in new collections, 1946.

The librarians possessed skills that made them well-suited for the job.

“Librarians, and specifically research librarians, are taught to be managers of information,” says Katie McBride Moench, a library media specialist who has researched these librarian field agents.

“It is not so much like these librarians were trying to steer the course of the war… they were trying to take the information that was coming out of these occupied territories and organize it in a way that would be useful to military commanders and other people involved in making those decisions.”

Peiss, a retired professor of American history at the University of Pennsylvania, became interested in the topic after learning that her father’s eldest brother was one of these spies.

Reuben Peiss, a Harvard University librarian, was recruited by the Office of Strategic Services — the first U.S. intelligence agency — at the start of World War II, which lasted from 1939 to 1945. Like many of the librarians and academics recruited for the war effort, Peiss spoke several languages.

“My uncle Ruben Peiss knew German, French, Italian. He picked up Portuguese instantly. … So, being able to look at a newspaper or a magazine or a book and know what it is saying was extremely important, and to be able to make a quick judgment about that,” Peiss says. “Nobody suspects librarians of doing anything threatening, so they make really good intelligence agents. They're kind of hidden in plain sight.”

Agent Reuben Peiss in Portugal.

Although there were many female librarians in the United States at the time, the librarians who helped the war effort were mostly men, according to Peiss. The federal government mostly recruited librarians at colleges and universities, jobs that were difficult for women to obtain.

But at least one female recruit who was denied a job in the highest echelons of academia excelled in her role as a spy.

Adele Kibre, who had a Ph.D. in medieval linguistics, was among the first of these academic spies to use microphotography — taking pictures of documents and sending the film back to her bosses for analysis.

“Sometimes being a woman gave them a little more plausible deniability, and they were able to get access to places that men might not have been able to,” McBride Moench says. “And so, in her case, for example, she developed really strong memberships with the Danish resistance and their underground press, and she used those channels to smuggle books and articles out of territories occupied by the Nazis.”

Agent Adele Kibre headed the Anglo-American Microfilm Unit in Stockholm, Sweden.

The spies were mostly stationed in neutral cities, where they collected publications produced by the enemy. They subscribed to German periodicals containing articles about military rockets and atomic weapons. Some contend the information gathered by these academics contributed to the U.S. Manhattan Project, helping speed development of the world’s first atomic bomb.

But Peiss and McBride Moench are skeptical.

“I don't think the librarians found much that would have been useful to the Manhattan Project,” Peiss says.

“If you look at postwar scholarship, there is debate about how much of what they took was valuable,” McBride Moench adds.

But their efforts had some long-term impacts. When the war ended, some of these same agents documented and preserved collections of looted papers and books acquired by the Nazis. The collecting missions set up U.S. research libraries to become renowned repositories of international materials.

“One of the things that's really interesting that comes out of this whole effort is it gives a rise in the status of American research universities in terms of their holdings of European manuscripts or other primary source documents,” McBride Moench says.

voanews.com · December 27, 2023

6. In One Brutal Tank Battle Outside Avdiivka, The Russians Lost As Many As 21 Tanks. The Ukrainians Lost Two.

In One Brutal Tank Battle Outside Avdiivka, The Russians Lost As Many As 21 Tanks. The Ukrainians Lost Two.

Forbes · by David Axe · December 28, 2023

A 47th Brigade Leopard 2A6 outside Avdiivka.

Via social media

Starting on Oct. 10, a powerful Russian force—a dozen regiments and brigades with around 40,000 people—attacked toward Avdiivka, a key Ukrainian stronghold just northwest of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian garrison, anchored by the 110th Brigade and later reinforced by the 47th and 57th Brigades, was ready for the Russians. In 10 weeks of costly attacks, the Russian force advanced a mile or so north and south of Avdiivka. In the north, the Russians captured the village of Stepove.

But then, this week, the Ukrainians counterattacked. It’s possible they’ve liberated Stepove. At the very least, neither side controls the village. And in pushing back, the Ukrainians provoked a hasty countercounterattack that ended in disaster for the Russians.

In just a day or so, the Ukrainian 47th Brigade dismantled the lead Russian formation, reportedly a reinforced battalion with dozens of tanks and fighting vehicles and probably more than 500 people. “Preliminary reports are indicating that over half the Russian force failed to return to its starting positions,” analyst Donald Hill wrote in fellow analyst Tom Cooper’s newsletter.

Open-source intelligence analyst Andrew Perpetua’s rolling tally of Russian losses seems to confirm the disaster. On Wednesday alone, Perpetua verified the destruction of 21 Russian tanks as well as 14 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Given current production rates for new vehicles, the entire Russian force in Ukraine can afford to lose just 50 tanks a month without depleting the Russian armed forces’ overall inventory of around 3,000 tanks. The regiments and brigades attacking Avdiivka lost nearly half that number in a single day.

It’s apparent how the Ukrainians won. Ukrainian scouts sneaked out at night to lay mines along the likely approaches between Russian positions and Stepove. Ukrainian drones targeted the attackers, even striking one BTR fighting vehicle laden with ammunition, triggering a massive explosion.

Any Russian vehicles that got past the mines and drones met the American-made M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles belonging to the 47th Brigade.

“Bradleys of the 47th Mech were scything the Russians to the left and right like there was no tomorrow,” Hill wrote. Against the M-2’s powerful 25-millimeter autocannons, the Russian fighting vehicles “stood not much chance.”

The battle cost the Ukrainians, too. The 47th Brigade probably had just a dozen or so German-made Leopard 2A6 tanks left out of the 18 it got as donations early this year. The brigade abandoned two more Leopard 2s outside Stepove this week. The only consolation is that the tanks might be recoverable and fixable.

But even if the Leopards are write-offs, it was a good trade. At the cost of two tanks, the Ukrainians destroyed dozens of Russian vehicles and killed potentially hundreds of Russian troops, adding to the 13,000 casualties Russia has suffered trying, and so far failing, to capture Avdiivka.

Forbes · by David Axe · December 28, 2023

7. The Ghost of GWOT Haunting the Military Recruiting Crisis

Another key insight into the recruiting crisis: "the ghost of GWOT."

Excerpts:

Among the most common answers to the riddle are lack of competitive pay compared to private and commercial opportunities, substandard living conditions for entry-level servicemembers, and abysmal healthcare for both active duty and veterans. The politicization of diversity in the ranks is another key factor cited as a shortcoming in recruiting and failures to meet recruitment goals. The COVID pandemic made service even more volatile after the blowback of forcefully separating servicemembers over vaccine mandates during a chaotic time in our nation’s history. The widespread problems with sexual assault reporting and victim support are yet another detractor for new recruits.

Each of those factors has contributed to the recruiting crisis, but they are not the fundamental reasons the Defense Department is short of recruitment goals. There is an elephant in the room that must be acknowledged.

...

Therein lies the ghost of GWOT: the difficult withdrawal from a war that policymakers failed to understand yet sustained across decades and generations. That ghost takes the form of the stark loss of faith in the military as an institution. How could the burden of the outcome not weigh heavily, even if unspoken, in the minds of American citizens deciding whether or not to join an all-volunteer force as the American war machine looks ahead to an increasingly complex world of threats?

...

The ghost of GWOT haunts the recruitment offices across the cities and towns of the United States. The failure to effect change with the most powerful machine that human history has ever assembled looms over the decision to volunteer. These are the long-term consequences of the choice to send our forces overseas absent clear, articulate, and realistic objectives against which to align resources and hard power, to a war that was winnable but spent lives in the endeavor anyway.

The Ghost of GWOT Haunting the Military Recruiting Crisis - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ethan Brown · December 28, 2023

Societal fatigue is difficult to quantify, but lurking beneath the US military’s struggle to persuade enough young Americans to join its ranks is the exhaustion felt by the American people who just witnessed a generation of servicemembers deploy again and again to a war without bounds. A nation going to war possesses a limited budget in social capital—support for the war by the population. The Global War on Terrorism—with its major troop contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the associated, far-flung set of counterterrorism operations elsewhere—spent this capital early, borrowed on credit, and abused the resource to extremes after two decades. The American people (to include future viable service candidates) are exhausted at the cost of these years of war.

It is significant that multiple theaters of war, drone strikes in a range of countries, and smaller deployments, especially of special operations forces, around the world were lumped together under the label of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT. The term’s nebulousness did little to convey achievable strategic objectives. Even after President Barack Obama retired the term from official use in 2013, it has endured as the catchall of military operations, ranging by type and location, all justified by the attacks on September 11, 2001. It also is poignant that there was no overt declaration of the end of America’s longest war; rather, servicemember eligibility for the National Defense Service Medal—the ubiquitous award received by all servicemembers since September 11, 2001—ended on December 31, 2022 with nary a whisper. Unceremoniously, the next generation of recruits entered the queue for the American military’s next era haunted by the ghost of GWOT.

Much has been written about the Defense Department’s flagging efforts to address the growing challenge of military recruitment in recent years. Since 2021—GWOT’s apparent end, bannered by the ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan—DoD has consistently missed its recruiting goals across its service branches, resulting in the lowest recruiting numbers seen since 1999. It should be noted that, in every era of America’s emergence from conflict, recruiting numbers always shrink amid demobilization. The post-GWOT era, however, carries greater risk than before because of the ghost that hangs over the enterprise.

The Army missed its recruitment goal for 2022 by more than ten thousand, while the Air Force fell short of its goals across active and reserve components by just over two thousand. The Navy was approximately seven thousand recruits short. The Marines and Space Force are by far the smallest service branches with the lowest targets, but the Corps barely met its goal in 2022 while incoming Space Force guardians were short on new officers despite crossover from other services to specific roles and positions. For 2023, signs indicate it will be worse yet in terms of meeting recruitment goals.

Among the most common answers to the riddle are lack of competitive pay compared to private and commercial opportunities, substandard living conditions for entry-level servicemembers, and abysmal healthcare for both active duty and veterans. The politicization of diversity in the ranks is another key factor cited as a shortcoming in recruiting and failures to meet recruitment goals. The COVID pandemic made service even more volatile after the blowback of forcefully separating servicemembers over vaccine mandates during a chaotic time in our nation’s history. The widespread problems with sexual assault reporting and victim support are yet another detractor for new recruits.

Each of those factors has contributed to the recruiting crisis, but they are not the fundamental reasons the Defense Department is short of recruitment goals. There is an elephant in the room that must be acknowledged.

A Gallup poll conducted in July 2023 unveiled the harsh reality: Americans’ confidence in the military is at its lowest mark since 1988, with the average rating hovering around 60 percent. This is predictable based on the stark drops often seen in postwar environments, after confidence remained at or near 70 percent throughout GWOT’s duration. At wider glance, this is reflective of the startling decline in institutional faith across American democracy and society; only the military and small businesses rate at or above the 60 percent threshold, while law enforcement, banks, schools, big tech/businesses, and the medical system range from 20 to 50 percent confidence. Congress rates in the single digits.

The American people have lost faith in the military as an institution—if not entirely at least to a worrying degree that must be addressed. And it needs to happen before the next crisis—potentially a conflict with a peer adversary—to rebuild the social capital that has been overdrawn.

History indicates that recruitment will abruptly reverse course should that next war break out. It happened in 2001 after the terror attacks on the American homeland, which saw an 8 percent increase over the year prior. And it happened in the early 1960s with the advent of the war in Vietnam. It also remained relatively stable throughout the 1970s and 1980s with the threat of the Cold War in full swing.

But after twenty years of war, a failure to commit to a clear strategy, or even specify a feasible strategic military goal, and the eventual decline of public support for a military effort that defied outlining a realistic or achievable outcome, the current recruiting crisis is far deeper and more complicated than previous postwar eras. While the American military certainly did not lose the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, achieving overwhelming tactical success against overmatched adversaries, they still ended or transitioned without achieving identifiably positive strategic outcomes.

Therein lies the ghost of GWOT: the difficult withdrawal from a war that policymakers failed to understand yet sustained across decades and generations. That ghost takes the form of the stark loss of faith in the military as an institution. How could the burden of the outcome not weigh heavily, even if unspoken, in the minds of American citizens deciding whether or not to join an all-volunteer force as the American war machine looks ahead to an increasingly complex world of threats?

It was easy to sell young American men and women on the ideal of protecting the homeland from terrorist groups and violent extremists during the GWOT generation. These were relevant and valid threats, to be sure, but deterring and defeating those genuine threats was undermined by the endlessly expansive scope of the war. It was easy for policymakers to package patriotism and love for country into recruitment slogans with the ever-expanding Overseas Contingency Operations pool of funds to sustain a war with few discernible bounds.

During that war, servicemen and women returned to the same sands and mountains of GWOT again and again, with no end in sight to the war that could claim their lives at any time. Veterans might naturally struggle with the question of their service’s purpose: “Blood, sweat, tears and treasure, and those of us who made it through the other side ask ‘why’? What was that precious human capital spent for? . . . We were all caught up in the notion that maybe we’d be able to effect a change. Maybe, after all these years of being away from home . . . we could look back in a generation and tell our grandchildren that we did some good in the world that lasted.” Those same questions take on an even wider meaning when framed in the subject of recruitment. Many Americans today—especially the younger ones who the armed services need to recruit—have GWOT as the only reference of what their blood and treasure can buy. There is little to point to as an answer.

The ghost of GWOT haunts the recruitment offices across the cities and towns of the United States. The failure to effect change with the most powerful machine that human history has ever assembled looms over the decision to volunteer. These are the long-term consequences of the choice to send our forces overseas absent clear, articulate, and realistic objectives against which to align resources and hard power, to a war that was winnable but spent lives in the endeavor anyway.

Ethan Brown is a senior fellow at the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence and Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. He is an eleven-year veteran of the US Air Force, serving as a special operations joint terminal attack controller with six deployments to multiple combat zones. He can be followed on twitter @LibertyStoic.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Matthew Moeller, US Army

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ethan Brown · December 28, 2023

8. Small Drones Are Helping Israel Navigate the Urban Battlefield in Gaza

Excerpts:

A senior Israeli military official said an effort had been made to standardize what kind of drones soldiers could use on the battlefield. 

“One of the [Israel Defense Force’s] top acquisition priorities right now is indoor drones for use in hostage rescue operations in the Hamas tunnels and subterranean environments,” said Blake Resnick, CEO of the U.S. drone company BRINC.

Resnick said he was in Israel earlier in December and the Israeli military purchased some of the company’s LEMUR 2 drones, which are designed for search and rescue operations. The drones are being used primarily for hostage-rescue operations in the Hamas tunnels and subterranean environments, according to Resnick.

The Israeli military declined to comment on what type of drones it is using inside Gaza.

Aviv Shapira, the Israeli co-founder and CEO of drone company XTEND, first began working with Israel’s military several years ago to use quadcopters to take down incendiary balloons that Gazans, some at the behest of Hamas or other militant groups, were sending into nearby Israeli farms to start large fires. 

Now, he said, the Israeli military is using the company’s drones for a variety of purposes inside Gaza. Some go into the tunnels. Some can break through windows and explore inside buildings. Others are equipped with robotic arms carrying a small payload, such as a small adhesive explosive that can blow a door open, fly in and drop grenades. 

He said the military’s Yahalom, or diamond in Hebrew, which specializes in finding and destroying Hamas’s tunnels, uses the drones to drop things onto mines or booby traps usually found around the tunnel exits. 

Small Drones Are Helping Israel Navigate the Urban Battlefield in Gaza

Cheap, agile devices can explore tunnels, break through windows and carry explosives

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/small-drones-are-helping-israel-navigate-the-urban-battlefield-in-gaza-293b1de4?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Dov Lieber

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Updated Dec. 29, 2023 12:05 am ET

A handout image generated from a virtual-reality headset worn by an Israeli soldier operating an Xtender drone. PHOTO: COURTESY XTEND

The Israeli military has tried a variety of methods to explore Hamas’s tunnels in Gaza: robots, robot dogs and real dogs. But what it has quickly learned is that the cheapest and most effective option for exploring the underground labyrinths—which are a potential death trap for soldiers—is a small quadcopter drone. 

It isn’t just tunnels. In the dense urban battlefield of Gaza, the Israeli military has been flying these quadcopters—essentially small helicopters with four rotors—into buildings before sending in soldiers. The devices are also providing smaller units with aerial reconnaissance and being used as guided munitions.

The small drones are just one new piece of Israel’s unmanned aerial arsenal, which military officials say has played an essential role in minimizing their casualties as they rapidly advance through a densely populated, well-fortified and extensively booby-trapped battlefield.

Israel also operates a large fleet of fixed-wing unmanned aircraft, some as large as F-16s and others small enough to be carried on a soldier’s back, that carry out a mix of surveillance, reconnaissance and airstrikes—an ability it admitted it had for the first time last year. The largest aircraft can fly up to altitudes of 45,000 feet and stay airborne for nearly a day and a half, while the smallest flies at 5,000 feet and can stay aloft for a few hours. 

Israeli military officials say those drones are still a critical backbone of support for the military. But it turns out that small, cheap quadcopter drones are in many ways more useful on some parts of the battlefield—like in tunnels.

An Israeli soldier holds a drone at an undisclosed location in southern Israel. PHOTO: ATEF SAFADI/SHUTTERSTOCK

About a decade ago, Israel’s National Security Council had deliberated whether quadcopter drones would have an impact on the battlefield and concluded they wouldn’t, said Jacob Nagel, a former Israeli national security adviser. 

Now he said, “The air in Gaza is full of them.”

The increasing adoption of small, commercial drones is evident in conflicts around the world. Both Russia and Ukraine have relied heavily on quadcopters for surveillance and attacks, while Hamas used small drones as part of its Oct. 7 assault. Since then, thousands of commercial drones have made their way into the hands of Israeli soldiers on the battlefield and civilians looking to defend themselves.

The quadcopter has become a lifeline for Israel’s smaller, less-equipped units, such as those made up of reservists called into battle after the Hamas attacks. 

The drones, however, weren’t expected to be used to explore tunnels. Israel originally used heavy robots connected to the surface through a cable to search the hundreds of miles of passages that Hamas has dug beneath Gaza. But the tunnel floors are often filled with trash, tripping up the robots, while some passageways proved to be too narrow for them to be operated.

Israel also tried using robotic dogs, but they are expensive and heavy. 

Israeli Military Finds Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack

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Israeli Military Finds Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack

Play video: Israeli Military Finds Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack

The Israeli military said it is the largest underground passageway, about 2½ miles long, that they have found so far built by Hamas in Gaza. WSJ’s Dov Lieber reports from the Israel-Gaza border, giving an inside look at the tunnel. Photo: Alexander Lowe/The Wall Street Journal

The small drones can create 3-D maps of the tunnels, are completely untethered and can fit through small spaces. They can also create their own communications networks underground, with each small drone flying as far as it can before becoming a new relay node that will allow the next drone to fly further. 

It wasn’t just Israel that failed to originally foresee how important quadcopters would become in war zones. The U.S. military had for years focused on building larger, more expensive drones before realizing only too late that it had ceded the small drone market to China.

Today, China’s SZ DJI Technology is the world’s largest maker of consumer drones, and its inexpensive quadcopters have become popular on the battlefield.

At the outset of the war in Gaza, when there was a rush to get small drones into the hands of Israelis, many of those sent were Chinese-made DJI drones, said employees at private drone companies working with the Israeli military.

In one video released by the Israeli military, soldiers could be seen lowering a DJI Mavic 3 drone into a tunnel below a hospital compound in Gaza City. 

Israel soon cracked down on the use of DJI’s drones inside Gaza, said the employees at the private drone companies. The operators of the Chinese-made drones, which aren’t designed for the battlefield, can be located using off-the-shelf hardware that Hamas could likely acquire. 

China’s SZ DJI Technology is the world’s largest maker of consumer drones, and its inexpensive quadcopters are also on the battlefield.  PHOTO: CARLOS GARCIA RAWLINS/REUTERS

A senior Israeli military official said an effort had been made to standardize what kind of drones soldiers could use on the battlefield. 

“One of the [Israel Defense Force’s] top acquisition priorities right now is indoor drones for use in hostage rescue operations in the Hamas tunnels and subterranean environments,” said Blake Resnick, CEO of the U.S. drone company BRINC.

Resnick said he was in Israel earlier in December and the Israeli military purchased some of the company’s LEMUR 2 drones, which are designed for search and rescue operations. The drones are being used primarily for hostage-rescue operations in the Hamas tunnels and subterranean environments, according to Resnick.

The Israeli military declined to comment on what type of drones it is using inside Gaza.

Aviv Shapira, the Israeli co-founder and CEO of drone company XTEND, first began working with Israel’s military several years ago to use quadcopters to take down incendiary balloons that Gazans, some at the behest of Hamas or other militant groups, were sending into nearby Israeli farms to start large fires. 

Now, he said, the Israeli military is using the company’s drones for a variety of purposes inside Gaza. Some go into the tunnels. Some can break through windows and explore inside buildings. Others are equipped with robotic arms carrying a small payload, such as a small adhesive explosive that can blow a door open, fly in and drop grenades. 

He said the military’s Yahalom, or diamond in Hebrew, which specializes in finding and destroying Hamas’s tunnels, uses the drones to drop things onto mines or booby traps usually found around the tunnel exits. 

XTEND’s small Xtender drones, which can carry about 5 ounces, are equipped with cameras that can create real-time 3-D mapping, helping them fly indoors and underground in tunnels. The drones can work underground by operating as radio relays, helping the operator reach the furthest drone. 

These functions, initially designed for indoor use, have now become essential for outdoor use in Gaza, said Shapira, because both Hamas and Israel are jamming Global Positioning Systems for navigation and radio signals for communications.

Multiple drones—sometimes called a swarm—can also be directed by one operator. Using a virtual-reality headset with picture-in-picture feeds, the operator can use one drone to break into a building through a window or a door, and land a second one at the entrance for additional surveillance. Meanwhile, a third can search the building for the target.

“We found that three is the magic number,” said Shapira. 

Heather Somerville contributed to this article.

Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com

9. World's Largest Reserve Of REE Lithium Discovered Beneath California's Salton Sea: $540 Billion Motherlode Could Meet America's Supply Demands For Decades

A game changer?

World's Largest Reserve Of REE Lithium Discovered Beneath California's Salton Sea: $540 Billion Motherlode Could Meet America's Supply Demands For Decades

• https://finance.yahoo.com/news/worlds-largest-ree-lithium-discovered-160012987.html

Eric McConnell

Tue, December 26, 2023 at 11:00 AM EST·4 min read

When it comes to rare-earth elements (REEs), lithium stands out because of its usefulness and potential value. That's why the Department of Energy (DOE) was jumping for joy when it discovered what is believed to be the world's largest supply of lithium beneath California's Salton Sea. The estimated 18 million-ton motherlode could be worth up to $540 billion and meet America's demand for decades to come.

In the 1990s, lithium was perhaps most famous for being the title of a hit song by the band Nirvana. Fast forward 30 years, and Lithium has become famous as an indispensable element in the multibillion-dollar renewable energy industry. Lithium is a key component of the rechargeable batteries that power things like electric cars. Production of other important consumer products like cellular phones and solar energy panels also requires large amounts of lithium.

Without enough Lithium to power those batteries and other innovations, the world's effort to fight climate change through renewable energy will be hampered. In a recent report, high-ranking DOE official Jeff Marootian said, "Lithium is vital to decarbonizing the economy and meeting President Biden's goals of 50% electric vehicle adoption by 2030." The problem with that is China currently dominates the global production of lithium.

A global rival such as China controlling the world's supply of lithium runs counter to America's strategic and economic interests. That's why the DOE has been funding the exploration of lithium sources inside the United States. As part of that effort, it gave a $14.9 million grant to Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Energy to study the area surrounding the Salton Sea, which straddles Riverside and Imperial counties in the California desert.

California Gov. Gavin Newsome was touring the Salton Sea with President Joe Biden to tout America's renewable energy industry when he referred to the area as "t "the Saudi Arabia of lithium." If that sounds like an exaggeration, consider that the DOE estimates there is enough lithium beneath the Salton Sea to provide batteries for more than 375 million electric vehicles (EVs).

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The estimated 18 million tons of lithium would put America firmly in the lead in terms of supplying the global market. It could turbocharge EV and solar production and has the potential to give the United States an unprecedented level of energy independence.

If the lithium beneath the Salton Sea can be harvested and brought to market, America would no longer have to rely on nations like Saudi Arabia and China for its energy or automaking needs. America would also be much richer because lithium is worth an estimated $29,000 per ton. That would make the Salton Sea's estimated 18 million gallons worth $540 billion.

A partnership between the U.S. government and Buffett has the potential to increase America's production of lithium and profitability for the industry. That's why Berkshire Hathaway Energy is hard at work. The company operates 10 of the Salton Sea's geothermal power plants.

It is not alone. EnergySource and Controlled Thermal Resources are also operating in the area. If America becomes the global leader in lithium production, it could lead to a boom of lithium-based businesses that could add billions or trillions of dollars per year to the U.S. economy.

10. The New Star on the Political Scene: The Chip Industry

Excerpts:

The era of chip diplomacy for the U.S. and its allies follows a global semiconductor shortage that revealed the central role the components play in many industries. An aggressive U.S. campaign to block China’s access to high-end chips, and the machines that can make them, added more prominence to the industry. And the boom in generative artificial intelligence has presented a new promise for semiconductors.

...

Hinting at the chip focus of the South Korean state visit, Samsung Chairman Lee Jae-yong, who accompanied Yoon to the Netherlands, said “around 90%” of the trip had dealt with semiconductors.

As they lobby for more funding, chip makers have also become more familiar with the complexities and sometimes plodding pace of the political sphere. TSMC’s Arizona project has been slowed by a labor spat that it wouldn’t have faced at home in Taiwan. The U.S. enacted its $53 billion Chips Act in 2022, but the Commerce Department, which is overseeing it, has only made a $35 million grant so far.

“I joke that the Commerce Department is like the dog that caught the bus,” Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger said in an interview. “This was way bigger than anything that they had ever done before.”

The idea of state governments locking arms with a specific industry isn’t unprecedented, policy experts said, whether it was during the competition over oil in the 1970s or the rush to procure vaccines during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The New Star on the Political Scene: The Chip Industry

Increased attention from politicians poses opportunities and challenges for the semiconductor industry

https://www.wsj.com/tech/the-new-star-on-the-political-scene-the-chip-industry-36740aed?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By Jiyoung Sohn

Follow

 in Seoul and Asa Fitch

Follow

 in New York

Updated Dec. 29, 2023 12:06 am ET

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, center, in Malaysia. He has been in talks with Asian governments about the company’s products. PHOTO: VINCENT THIAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Semiconductors have played the starring role in state visits. 

Nvidia’s chief executive was feted by heads of state like a visiting dignitary. Government delegations have shuttled around the globe hobnobbing with chip makers. For an industry that suddenly finds itself as a geopolitical showpiece, the attention is a mixed bag.

The spotlight has translated to offers of government-provided funding that helps reduce the vast costs of designing, engineering and manufacturing the tech components. But companies face more trade regulations than ever, with increasing attention from policy makers and the public. Governments are still learning the intricacies of the semiconductor industry, one of the tech world’s most complex arenas. 

“It cuts both ways for companies,” said Chris Miller, of Tufts University, the author of a book about the global chip war. “They don’t want to be facing new regulations and restrictions, but if there are going to be incentives on offer, they want to make the most of it.”

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The era of chip diplomacy for the U.S. and its allies follows a global semiconductor shortage that revealed the central role the components play in many industries. An aggressive U.S. campaign to block China’s access to high-end chips, and the machines that can make them, added more prominence to the industry. And the boom in generative artificial intelligence has presented a new promise for semiconductors.

In December, Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang crisscrossed Asia, meeting with top government officials who covet the firm’s AI processor chips or the technology that makes them. The exchanges included one with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who in May asked top executives from 

Intel, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Samsung and elsewhere to help boost his country’s chip production.Nvidia officials have spoken of a global desire among individual countries to build up their sovereign AI infrastructure. Countries “have the skills, and surely with us in combination, we can help them do that,” Huang said on the company’s most recent earnings call. Nvidia declined to comment further. 

By holding such meetings, governments can demonstrate to their citizens and local industry that they understand the semiconductor supply chain and are giving priority to innovation, said Jan-Peter Kleinhans, of Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, a German think tank that recently published a report on chip diplomacy between governments. “It also typically feels good for heads of state or for high-ranking officials to be associated with highly innovative companies,” Kleinhans said.

The marquee stop for a South Korean state visit to the Netherlands this month was the headquarters of ASML—the world’s only producer of advanced lithography machines that are critical for making cutting-edge chips. Joining the South Korean delegation were the heads of Samsung and 

SK Hynix, two ASML customers.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, center, visited ASML in the Netherlands this month, where he met King Willem-Alexander, second from left. PHOTO: YONHAP NEWS/ZUMA PRESS

ASML has a yearslong backlog for its machines. Samsung, TSMC and Intel are the only three companies positioned to manufacture the world’s most-advanced semiconductors—and each is vying to get the earliest access to ASML’s next-generation lithography equipment.

During the four-day trip, South Korean officials said the country’s chip cooperation with the Netherlands had been transformed into a full-fledged chip alliance. The country’s trade minister said a new joint ASML-Samsung investment into a research center in South Korea would give it the upper hand over rivals in high-end chip making.

ASML’s departing CEO, Peter Wennink, in a September speech to university students, said the emergence of government subsidies was helpful. But few countries have outlined a clear, long-term vision for their chip ambitions. Wennink cited South Korea—and President Yoon Suk Yeol—as an exception because of their focus on semiconductors as the cornerstone of the country’s innovations. “Currently, we’re at a disadvantage because governments and politics are fragmented,” Wennink said. 

Hinting at the chip focus of the South Korean state visit, Samsung Chairman Lee Jae-yong, who accompanied Yoon to the Netherlands, said “around 90%” of the trip had dealt with semiconductors.

As they lobby for more funding, chip makers have also become more familiar with the complexities and sometimes plodding pace of the political sphere. TSMC’s Arizona project has been slowed by a labor spat that it wouldn’t have faced at home in Taiwan. The U.S. enacted its $53 billion Chips Act in 2022, but the Commerce Department, which is overseeing it, has only made a $35 million grant so far.

“I joke that the Commerce Department is like the dog that caught the bus,” Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger said in an interview. “This was way bigger than anything that they had ever done before.”

The idea of state governments locking arms with a specific industry isn’t unprecedented, policy experts said, whether it was during the competition over oil in the 1970s or the rush to procure vaccines during the Covid-19 pandemic.

As semiconductors have become more important to national security and economic competitiveness, dozens of partnerships between governments relating to chips have been created since 2021, focusing on policy coordination, workforce development, supply-chain monitoring and other topics, according to the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung report. Virtually none existed before.

Chip makers have had to quickly adjust to the insertion of their industry into the geopolitical conversation. Even some of the larger chip companies, including Nvidia, had no lobbying presence in Washington until recently. Nvidia hired several people to press its case in the capital in 2023 as U.S. government export controls tightened around its chips in China.

Until recent years, it was unusual for such high-ranking government officials to take part in trade delegations, according to industry insiders. Many see it as the unfolding of a new global business order where allies such as the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and European countries help build up each other’s chip industries while excluding China.

Chris Camacho, the chief executive of the Greater Phoenix Economic Council, recently hosted a Dutch delegation led by the country’s prime minister—the first time in his career that he had seen a head of state involved. Arizona has become a hotbed of semiconductor investment in recent years, led by Intel, which has long had a presence there, and TSMC, which is building a factory near Phoenix. 

“Post-World War II, we went through an era of significant global expansion, and I think the next era is going to be allies coming together to assess how to meet the growth of the digital economy,” Camacho said. “Adversaries are probably going to be left out of that equation.”

During the visit, 

ASM International, a chip-manufacturing equipment maker based in the Netherlands, said it would spend $300 million expanding its research-and-development operations in Arizona. Benjamin Loh, the CEO of ASM International, was part of the Dutch delegation.“These days it’s difficult to completely decouple business and politics given all the attention semiconductors are getting,” Loh said. 

Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com and Asa Fitch at asa.fitch@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 29, 2023, print edition as 'Governments Put Spotlight on Chip Makers, With Mixed Result'.

11. Locked out of local government: Residents decry increased secrecy among towns, counties, schools

This is a new challenge for our democracy. It cannot function under a veil of secrecy.

Locked out of local government: Residents decry increased secrecy among towns, counties, schools

BY ERIC SCICCHITANO/CNHI NEWS AND JOSH KELETY/AP

Updated 2:18 PM EST, December 21, 2023

AP · 

Cheryl Geidner figured council members in Volant, a tiny borough north of Pittsburgh, would adopt a preliminary year-end budget despite no discussions at public meetings on the proposed financials.

She never figured they’d raise property taxes by 57%.

“There had never been a mention of that,” said Geidner, a property owner who helps oversee a business with her husband, John, in the town of 126 residents. “You didn’t see the budget. You didn’t see the ordinance. I think everybody was somewhat taken aback.”

The plan, given final approval last week, will steeply increase tax bills: A property assessed at $100,000, for example, would have been billed $700 in 2023. In 2024, that bill will rise to $1,100.

The council’s silence leading up to the decision highlights what some observers say is a striking trend toward secrecy among local governments across the U.S. From school districts to townships and county boards, public access to records and meetings in many states is worsening over time, open government advocates and experts say.

“It’s been going on for decades, really, but it’s accelerated the past 10 years,” said David Cuillier, director of the Joseph L. Brechner Freedom of Information Project at the University of Florida.

Few states compile data on public records requests, and laws governing open records differ by state, making a comprehensive analysis difficult. However, a review by Cuillier of data provided by MuckRock — a nonprofit news site that files and shares public records requests – found that between 2010 and 2021, local governments’ compliance with records requests dropped from 63% to 42%.

High fees, delays and outright refusals from local governments to release information are among the common complaints.

Examples are plentiful.

Earlier this year, officials in a suburban Chicago community ticketed a local journalist for what they said were repeated attempts to contact city officials seeking comment on treacherous fall flooding. Officials reversed and dropped the citations days later.

In November, open government advocates in California sued the city of Fresno for allegedly conducting secret budget negotiations for years.

In October, residents of Sapelo Island in Georgia, who largely rely on a ferry to get to the mainland, accused county officials of making it difficult for residents to attend important public meetings by scheduling them after the last ferry was slated to depart.

___

RIGHT TO KNOW

Volant, Pennsylvania, measures slightly larger than 0.1 square miles, and the latest Census shows it has 46 households in total. The borough’s small-town charm and small-business merchants have made its Main Street a day-trip destination.

The unexpected tax hike could be a burden for the community, where half the population is over age 65 and the median salary is $64,375 – below the statewide median of $71,798. It’s their first tax increase in seven years.

After the council approved the preliminary budget in November, a local reporter requested a copy of it and was denied. Told to schedule a meeting with the borough’s secretary, the reporter was met by a closed office.

Taped to the door was a five-paragraph explainer from Council President Howard Moss. It included brief anecdotes about rising expenses but no fiscal data to explain the tax increase.

Neither Moss nor the council’s vice president, Glenn Smith, replied to messages seeking comment. At a meeting Tuesday, when the council gave the increase final approval, Smith said the borough has been operating at a deficit for years but avoided raising taxes previously because of COVID and high unemployment.

The state of public access in Volant?

“There is none,” said Bridget Fry, a resident who launched an unsuccessful write-in campaign this fall to join the council. “It’s definitely disturbing, and it’s extremely uncomfortable living there.”

Paula Knudsen Burke, attorney for the Pennsylvania chapter of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, said too many government officials in Pennsylvania operate under the presumption that the onus is on the requester to prove a record is public. That’s not the case. Records are presumed to be accessible, and the government is tasked to prove otherwise, according to the state’s Right to Know Law.

“While it can make more work for local officials, the Legislature has said these records are available and accessible,” Burke said.

___

DIVISIVE LANDSCAPE

Incidents of governments suing journalists and residents for making records requests also have become more common, said Jonathan Peters, a media law professor at the University of Georgia.

Accessing local government meetings is getting more difficult, too. Elected officials are discussing significant public business in closed sessions, observers say. In some regions, they’re engaging in more combative behavior with constituents.

Researchers have several theories about the new landscape. Local agencies generally lack sufficient staff and infrastructure to efficiently process records requests. Then there is the decline of local media institutions, which have limited resources to wage costly legal battles over access to meetings and records.

Compounding the issue is the increased polarization gripping communities nationwide. Election offices across the country have been flooded with records requests from activists motivated by election falsehoods, piling on work. And school boards, for instance, have become political battlegrounds over COVID-19 policies and curriculum, prompting flurries of records requests, accusations of public meeting violations and intense scrutiny. In some areas, school boards have become dominated by highly divisive members.

“Governments feel emboldened to basically flout democracy (and) say, ‘We’re in charge. Don’t question us. We’re not telling you what’s up,’” Cuillier said.

___

TROUBLING TRENDS

A 2023 state auditor’s report revealed multiple problems with transparency in the small town of Rural Hall, North Carolina.

The town failed to produce 38% of records requested by members of the public between November 2021 and June 2022, the report found. The requests included employment history for two town employees, copies of resignation letters and the former town manager’s employment contract.

Long-time resident Carol Newsome was among those who submitted requests. She said the town government “blew up” with turnover in 2021, and she was trying to figure out why.

In denying one resident’s requests, a town official cited the resident’s “demonstrated malice towards Rural Hall,” which was in direct conflict with state public records law, the report asserts.

The report also determined the town council violated state open meetings law by discussing certain matters in closed session.

Ron Niland, interim Rural Hall town manager since January, noted in emails that the individual who oversaw records requests at the time no longer works for the town. He added that during his tenure, the town council has “conducted themselves in accordance with applicable state statutes.”

Newsome, meanwhile, recalled the ease of accessing Rural Hall records just a few years ago.

“You could just walk in or call to the Town Hall and say, ‘I’m wanting to know such and such.’ And they’d say, ‘Well, do you need it printed, or do you just want the information?’” she said.

Now, she views her hometown as “kind of a microcosm” of troubling trends in government overall.

“We see it up and down, and just poor behavior in general,” Newsome said. “The arguments and the pushback from staff and the council became just more hostile and disrespectful than I’ve ever seen. I just hadn’t experienced it in town before.”

___

Scicchitano reported from Shamokin, Pennsylvania. Kelety reported from Phoenix. New Castle News reporter Gwen Albers contributed from Volant, Pennsylvania.

___

This story is a collaboration between CNHI News and The Associated Press. The AP’s support of local democracy coverage receives funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. See more about AP’s democracy initiative here.

AP · 

12. Peering Into the Crystal Ball: 10 National Security Predictions for 2024

​For the list "put on your radar" they overlooked the South Korean general elections in April. They will likely foretell whether there will be a progressive shift in the following presidential election.

However, they do forecast a 7th nuclear test in north Korea.

Peering Into the Crystal Ball: 10 National Security Predictions for 2024

What we think will happen, for better or worse, in 2024.

By Robbie Gramer, a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy, and Jack Detsch, a Pentagon and national security reporter at Foreign Policy.

Foreign Policy · by Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch · 

December 28, 2023, 5:00 PM

Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s SitRep! Robbie and Jack here. Hope everyone got a nice holiday break and spent time with their family, friends, and loved ones relaxing and, more importantly, nagging them all to subscribe to Foreign Policy. (Hey, the best things in life aren’t free.)

Alright, here’s what’s on tap for the day: A look ahead at some of the biggest national security headaches of 2024 and our predictions on what the new year could bring in the world of foreign policy. (Spoiler alert: There’s some doom and gloom to come.)

So, What Comes Next?

By all accounts, 2023 was an absolutely insane year. There was the spy balloon incident; Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s untimely demise; the Israel-Hamas war, which shook the foundations of an already shaky Middle East; Russia’s war in Ukraine, which continued to rage; a fast-unraveling conflict in Sudan; Azerbaijan’s lightning offensive against Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory. We could go on, but let’s not.

Looking ahead to 2024 and there are plenty of things in the world to keep national security wonks up at night. Then there are elections in Taiwan, India, the European Union, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia, and, oh, we almost forgot, the United States as well.

Here at SitRep, we’ve decided to make some predictions about what’s to come in 2024, big and small, based on interviews over the past few weeks and months with dozens of government officials, lawmakers, and foreign-policy experts. (We’d also like to stress that, in many instances, we hope our predictions are wrong.)

Some may come true, some may not, and either way our readers can call us out on how off the mark we were in about a year. (So mark your calendars.)

But nothing ventured, nothing gained, right? So, without further ado, here is the “SitRep: Crystal Ball” edition of what we think awaits us in the scary near-future.

1. U.S. elections results. Let’s start with the easy one: What will happen in the U.S. presidential election? Political pundits are famously very bad at predicting election results, and then getting paid to do more of it in the next cycle, so we decided we’re going to join in on the fun. We predict that after a grueling and exhausting Biden-Trump rematch, U.S. President Joe Biden will narrowly eke out a win for a second term, in yet another election cycle marred by disinformation that will muddy the waters on what’s fact and what’s not, with more shouts about “stolen votes.” Meanwhile, we predict that Republicans will regain control of the Senate by two or three seats, and Democrats will gain narrow control of the House by under 10 seats, setting the stage for another complex, messy, political headache of a divided government.

2. North Korea will conduct its seventh nuclear test. U.S. efforts to restart any real dialogue with North Korea have failed, and all the while North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is slowly but surely expanding his country’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities despite punishing international sanctions. North Korea conducted six explosive nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017, and we predict that 2024 is the year that it notches a seventh, in what will constitute another major diplomatic crisis on the Korean Peninsula and a reminder that decades of U.S. pressure to get Pyongyang to abandon its quest for the bomb have all failed.

3. More coups in Africa’s “Coup Belt.” There have been six coups in West Africa in recent years as ailing and fragile democracies succumb to military takeovers amid a war against Islamist terrorist groups, which are gaining ground across the Sahel. The United States and Western allies, namely France, banked most of their hopes on Niger as their last best hope for a bastion of democracy and stability to partner with on counterterrorism operations … until Niger fell to a coup in July. We predict that the next domino to fall will be Chad, the West’s next “last best hope” counterterrorism partner in the region. Chad’s leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, son of the late Chadian leader Idriss Déby, seized power after his father’s death in 2021 in something that resembled a coup itself. Now, his grip on power is shaky, and it’s unclear if he can beat the odds of escaping yet another coup in Africa’s Coup Belt.

4. Sudan’s military leader will get ousted. And speaking of coups… The conflict in Sudan has taken a grim turn in recent weeks, even if attention on the dire crisis there is being eclipsed by the Israel-Hamas war. We predict that Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and de facto head of the country, will be ousted by elements of his own military after embarrassing setbacks and defeats against the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Most recently, the Sudanese city of Wad Madani, once a relatively stable bastion of peace and humanitarian operations, fell swiftly to the RSF in a major blow to the SAF. Regardless of Burhan’s prospects for staying in power, Sudan has become one of the world’s worst (and most tragically overlooked) humanitarian crises, and that isn’t likely to change in 2024.

5. A stalemate in Ukraine. Thanks in part to sluggish support and political impasse from the United States and other Western allies, Ukraine didn’t have enough guns, equipment, or ammo to punch a hole in Russia’s well-fortified defensive lines in eastern Ukraine during its 2023 counteroffensive. But neither do Russian forces have the capability, morale, training, or effective fighting prowess to make significant gains in any counter-counteroffensives of their own. We predict that 2024 will look a lot like the bloody but static World War I battles of 1915 and 1916, with heavy artillery bashing entrenched positions, more deadly battles that yield little territorial gains, and little to show for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ill-fated war besides a higher death toll on both sides.

Construction workers climb onto the roof of a destroyed church in the village of Bohorodychne in the Donetsk region on Jan. 4, after Ukraine recaptured control of the town amid the Russia-Ukraine war.

Construction workers climb onto the roof of a destroyed church in the village of Bohorodychne in the Donetsk region on Jan. 4, after Ukraine recaptured control of the town amid the Russia-Ukraine war. Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

6. More funds unlocked for Ukraine. Ever since Russia launched its latest invasion of Ukraine, Western officials have been grappling with what to do about the $300 billion in assets from Russian oligarchs that regulators have frozen. Some countries have long called for seizing those funds and sending them to Ukraine, while others worry about the precedent that sets in protecting sovereign assets in the eyes of international law, even when it comes to Russia. We predict that 2024 is the year there’s a breakthrough on this roughly two-year debate and the United States and European allies find a legal pathway to siphon all those frozen funds to Ukraine (especially after U.S. funds for Ukraine got ensnared in a thorny political battle in Congress and more European Union funds were blocked by Putin’s most reliable ally in the EU, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.)

7. The Israel-Hamas war won’t expand to a (full) second front. One of the biggest fears in the ongoing Israel-Hamas war is that Hamas’s better-equipped, more battle-hardened ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah, will fully dive into the war against Israel. We predict that even as Israel and Hezbollah trade limited pot shots on the northern border, this won’t happen, thanks in part to the deterrent effect of the ongoing U.S. aircraft carrier presence in the Mediterranean, and all the overwhelming firepower that comes with it, which will make Hezbollah and its backers in Iran hold off from diving headfirst into the fight.

8. More dangerous maneuvers in the South China Sea. With the Taiwan Strait at a lower simmer since then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, which prompted (or perhaps coincided with) a bevy of Chinese exercises, the main military tit-for-tat in the Indo-Pacific has moved to the South China Sea. There, China has spent a decade building up artificial islands, very real airfields, and a fright for all in the region.

Lately, Chinese vessels have repeatedly harassed Philippine resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal, a disputed area off the west coast of the archipelago. The Philippines, which has taken an increasingly hawkish tack on China since Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took over as president in 2022, grounded a U.S. World War II-era ship on the shoal in 1999 in an effort to claim it. And China has harassed resupply vessels with dangerous maneuvers and water cannons in an effort to scare Manila away. SitRep expects the trend to continue in 2024, as the U.S. Defense Department has also complained of increasing recklessness by Chinese ships and planes, not just at the Second Thomas Shoal but throughout the whole area of operations.

9. Sweden actually finally joins NATO. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Finland and Sweden rushed to shrug off their history of nonalignment and join NATO. NATO countries welcomed both with open arms—or at least most of them did. Finland got in, but Sweden has not yet, thanks to an 18-month filibuster by Turkey. (All NATO countries need to greenlight a new member before it can happen.) Hungary, run by Russia’s ally, has dragged its heels on Sweden’s NATO accession, too. This has become a massive diplomatic headache for the alliance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan linked Sweden’s accession to a U.S. deal to approve sales of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. Congress has blocked that deal over anger at Erdogan but also wants Sweden in NATO ASAP. We predict that U.S. and Turkish negotiators will work with Sweden to overcome that impasse in 2024 and NATO will finally expand from 31 to 32 members.

10. Global health community goes on the offensive against malaria. Let’s end on a happy note. Malaria remains a top cause of child mortality worldwide, but recent scientific breakthroughs have led for the first time ever to malaria vaccines. There are now two malaria vaccines being slowly rolled out across disease-vulnerable countries in Africa. (An estimated 619,000 people died of malaria in Africa in 2021, many of them children.) While supply shortages made rolling out these vaccines on a massive scale difficult in 2022 and 2023, we predict that the global health community can overcome those bottlenecks in 2024 and make real, tangible, verifiable progress toward achieving the World Health Organization’s goal of eliminating malaria by 2030.

Snapshot

An Israel Defense Forces artillery unit, using a self-propelled artillery howitzer, fires toward Gaza near the border in southern Israel on Dec. 11.

An Israel Defense Forces artillery unit, using a self-propelled artillery howitzer, fires toward Gaza near the border in southern Israel on Dec. 11. Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images

Put on Your Radar

Here’s a rundown of some big events coming up in 2024 to plan for.

Jan. 13: Taiwan holds its presidential election in a cycle that will have outsized importance for the self-governing island’s future relationship with China.

Jan. 15-19: Global elites gather for the world’s premiere gabfest at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Feb. 14: Indonesia holds its presidential election in what will be the world’s largest single-day elections.

Feb. 16-18: World leaders and national security experts gather in Munich for the annual Munich Security Conference.

April-May: India, the world’s largest democracy, holds general elections over the course of several weeks.

July 9-11: NATO leaders will convene in Washington for a major NATO summit.

Sept. 24: World leaders will begin convening in New York for the U.N. General Assembly high-level week, as part of the General Assembly’s 79th session.

Nov. 5: Election Day in the United States. Need we say more?

Foreign Policy · by Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch · 

13. Mongolia’s mining partnerships extract foreign policy gold

I think it is useful to compare Mongolia and north Korea. Both countries have significant natural resources. One transitioned from communism to democracy and capitalism. One remains mired in the Juche ideology and KimIlSungism.

Mongolia’s mining partnerships extract foreign policy gold | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Bolor Lkhaajav · December 29, 2023

Author: Bolor Lkhaajav, Washington DC

Mongolia’s exports are 90 per cent dependent on natural resource extraction. In October 2023, during a state visit to France, Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh signed a landmark agreement that paved the way for a US$1.7 billion investment by French government-owned Orano Mining.

The agreement allows Orano to establish Mongolia’s first uranium mining and processing venture. For Mongolia’s landlocked economy, mining partnerships are strategic tools for foreign policy endeavours. Uranium has long been a critical mineral for the global energy system, fuelling vast amounts of reliable and low-carbon nuclear energy. As the world strives towards net-zero emissions targets, uranium is poised to enable unprecedented expansion of nuclear generation.

It is this global transition that is driving Mongolia’s ambition to emerge as a new leader in the uranium market, adding diversity to its already prosperous copper export capabilities. With deep and relatively untapped uranium reserves, Mongolia is attracting global investment interest and it has chosen the French nuclear industry as its first preferred partner to support its breaking into the market.

The World Nuclear Association notes that Mongolia’s uranium reserves are approximately 60,500 tonnes. Since the closure of the uranium mining town, Mardai, Mongolia has established uranium exploration agreements with China, Russia and the Czech Republic. But France will be the first to exploit and extract uranium from Mongolia.

To Mongolia, unlocking the potential of Mongolia’s substantial uranium resources bestows major benefits. It is diversification within the mining sector and its investors. Diversifying foreign investors is beneficial as a strategic tool to expand Mongolia’s third-neighbour foreign policy, where Mongolia seeks to develop its relations with countries other than China and Russia.

The economic benefits of the Orano agreement are substantial. According to the government, Ulaanbaatar is estimated to earn a total of US$1 billion in tax revenue across the forecasted 30-year lifetime of the mine. A significant portion of the revenue, approximately US$47 million, will be designated as payment for Orano’s use of Mongolia’s mineral resources. As per the Environmental Protection Law of Mongolia, the state assumes ownership of natural resources and requires payment from non-government entities to use natural resources.

The project has been established by Badrakh Energy — a collaborative effort between Orano and the Mongolian state-owned enterprise MonAtom — and is expected to span a total of 47 years. Preparatory work is scheduled from 2024 to 2027, uranium production from 2028 to 2060, and subsequent rehabilitation activities from 2061 to 2070.

The Chairman of Orano Group, Claude Imavuen, argued that ‘the position of Mongolia —geopolitically situated between Russia and China — and its rich natural resources’ make Mongolia an important partner for France.

For France, uranium from Mongolia represents more than just a diversification of resources — it is a vital fresh reservoir that could fulfill forthcoming domestic and European Union demand for uranium. France derives about 70 per cent of its electricity from nuclear energy and it has been active in pursuit of uranium in Mongolia and Central Asia, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

According to the World Nuclear Association’s 2021 Nuclear Fuel Report, demand for uranium is forecasted to increase by 27 per cent by 2030. Anticipating an increase in global uranium demand, Mongolia is strategically positioning itself as a significant contributor to global climate efforts.

With global competition for critical minerals compounding the already tense geopolitics of the region, Mongolia continues to navigate a delicate path as it looks for partners to support its ambitious plans for economic growth. Mongolia’s foreign policy looks to become a vital link between Europe and Asia, especially during the global transition to renewable energy.

Bolor Lkhaajav is a Researcher specialising in Mongolia, China, Russia, Japan, East Asia and the Americas.

eastasiaforum.org · by Bolor Lkhaajav · December 29, 2023

14. The U.S. and Israel Need to Take Iran On Directly

Excerpts:

There are many ways to weaken Iran: empower domestic opposition, ensure internet continuity during riots against the regime, strengthen its enemies, increase sanctions and economic pressures. But Israel can’t and shouldn’t do this alone. The U.S. should be leading the effort. This doesn’t require a full-scale war, just as the demise of the Soviet Union didn’t result from total war. Rather, the Soviet Union collapsed from internal rot coupled with external pressure applied by the U.S.

As prime minister, I made another decision regarding Iran. I directed Israel’s security forces to make Tehran pay for its decision to sponsor terror. Enough impunity. After Iran launched two failed UAV attacks on Israel in February 2022, Israel destroyed a UAV base on Iranian soil. In March 2022, Iran’s terror unit attempted to kill Israeli tourists in Turkey and failed. Shortly thereafter, the commander of that very unit was assassinated in the center of Tehran.

It turns out that Iran’s tyrants are softer than one might expect. They gleefully send others to die for them. But when they’re hit at home, suddenly they become timid.

The U.S. and Israel must set the clear goal of bringing down Iran’s evil regime. Not only is this possible. It is vital for the safety and security of the Middle East—and the entire civilized world.

The U.S. and Israel Need to Take Iran On Directly

Make the ayatollahs pay for sowing chaos through their Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi proxies.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-us-and-israel-need-to-take-iran-on-directly-proxies-hamas-threat-7f67a238?st=je4655joe0nafmx&utm

By Naftali Bennett

Dec. 28, 2023 6:05 pm ET

Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carry the flags of Iran, Hamas, and Lebanon's Hezbollah in a military rally in Tehran, Iran, Nov. 24. PHOTO: MORTEZA NIKOUBAZL/ZUMA PRESS

Hamas and Islamic Jihad, backed by Iran, massacred 1,200 Israelis on Oct. 7, resulting in full-scale war in Gaza. Hezbollah, also backed by Iran, has launched more than 1,000 rockets at northern Israeli communities since then, risking regional conflagration. Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen are attacking and hijacking ships in the Suez canal, threatening one of the world’s most vital waterways. Militias in Syria and Iraq, with support from Iran, are attacking U.S. bases and—as always—threatening moderate Arab nations.

Notice a pattern? The Iranian regime is at the center of most of the Middle East’s problems and much of global terror. Yet inexplicably, almost nobody is touching it. For the past 45 years, the regime has been the source of endless war, terror and suffering throughout the world. I’ve come to realize that enough is enough. The evil empire of Iran must be brought down.

As a young officer in Israel’s special forces, I spent a great deal of time fighting Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy. I studied its methods and vulnerabilities. I targeted its commanders and fighters. In 2006, as a reservist, I commanded a special search and destroy team in the second Lebanon War.

Only after that war, in which I lost my best friend, did I begin to realize our great folly. We were fighting the wrong battle, and that is exactly what Iran wants us to do.

In the late 1980s, Iran embarked on a simple yet brilliant strategy: Set up terrorist proxies across the Middle East. Fund them, train them and arm them. Let them do the dirty work of fighting and dying.

Iran executed this plan well. There is little direct war taking place between Iran and Israel. Instead, Iran constantly attacks Israel via its proxies in such places as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza and Yemen. Its brutal Quds unit exported terror around the globe. Iran’s terrorist proxies have waged war on every moderate element in the Middle East. They’ve attacked the Saudi oil company Aramco, the United Arab Emirates, the Kurds and Israel on many occasions. The most amazing part: Iran has largely gotten away with it.

There is a new cold war taking place in the Middle East. On one side, there is a corrupt, incompetent and hollow empire—the Islamic Republic of Iran—similar to the Soviet Union in the 1980s. On the other side, there is a thriving, free and strong democracy—Israel (and its allies)—reminiscent of the U.S. in the original Cold War.

When I became prime minister in June 2021, I decided to change this. I told my three security chiefs—the heads of the Israel Defense Forces, Mossad and Shin Bet—that my goal was to avoid, if reasonably possible, local clashes with Hezbollah and Hamas. Rather, Israel’s national-security resources must be focused on weakening our primary enemy—Iran.

There are many ways to weaken Iran: empower domestic opposition, ensure internet continuity during riots against the regime, strengthen its enemies, increase sanctions and economic pressures. But Israel can’t and shouldn’t do this alone. The U.S. should be leading the effort. This doesn’t require a full-scale war, just as the demise of the Soviet Union didn’t result from total war. Rather, the Soviet Union collapsed from internal rot coupled with external pressure applied by the U.S.

As prime minister, I made another decision regarding Iran. I directed Israel’s security forces to make Tehran pay for its decision to sponsor terror. Enough impunity. After Iran launched two failed UAV attacks on Israel in February 2022, Israel destroyed a UAV base on Iranian soil. In March 2022, Iran’s terror unit attempted to kill Israeli tourists in Turkey and failed. Shortly thereafter, the commander of that very unit was assassinated in the center of Tehran.

It turns out that Iran’s tyrants are softer than one might expect. They gleefully send others to die for them. But when they’re hit at home, suddenly they become timid.

The U.S. and Israel must set the clear goal of bringing down Iran’s evil regime. Not only is this possible. It is vital for the safety and security of the Middle East—and the entire civilized world.

Mr. Bennett served as Israel’s prime minister, 2021-22.

The Iran-Backed Houthi Rebels Attacking Israeli and U.S. Targets

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The Iran-backed Houthi rebel group in Yemen has been ramping up attacks on Israeli and U.S. targets in retaliation for Israel’s strikes in Gaza. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday reports on the group’s rise in Yemen, and the threats it’s currently posing in the Middle East. Photo: Mohammed Huwais/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 29, 2023, print edition as 'The U.S. and Israel Need to Take Iran On Directly'.

​15. Iran Threatens to Take Red Sea Disruption to New Waters

How much success are we going to allow? Iran to have

Iran Threatens to Take Red Sea Disruption to New Waters

Targeting shipping has been disturbingly successful.

Braw-Elisabeth-foreign-policy-columnist3

Elisabeth Braw

By Elisabeth Braw, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior associate fellow at the European Leadership Network.

Foreign Policy · by Elisabeth Braw · 

December 28, 2023, 12:13 PM

So risky has the Red Sea become since Houthi militants started their attacks on shipping that, since late November, over 350 container ships—plus all manner of tankers, bulk carriers, car carriers, and other merchant vessels—have diverted to other routes. That means massive logistical challenges that involve not just new charts and more fuel but getting crews and cargo to alternative staging posts. Because shipping is extraordinarily efficient, most won’t notice a thing. But if the attacks on shipping continue, we’ll start paying for the service. And we would do well to anticipate Houthi-like campaigns in other waters.

Not a day passes without more turbulence in the Red Sea. Since Christmas Eve, the inlet that links countries including Egypt and Saudi Arabia has seen multiple Houthi attacks, including against a Swiss-owned container ship and a Norwegian tanker.

Drama in the Red Sea is, of course, nothing new, going all the way back to the biblical book of Exodus. Yet today’s users of the Red Sea can’t hope for divine intervention. To be sure, the U.S. military has launched Operation Sea Guardian to protect Red Sea shipping, and since Christmas Eve the force has, among other things, shot down 12 attack drones and five missiles launched by the Yemen-based, Iran-backed Houthis. But counterfire from Western navies in response to Houthi attacks doesn’t yield the sort of chartable sailing environment shipping lines need. It may help solve the problem in the long-term, but it does little right now.

What’s more, it’s unclear which ships can expect escort. The French Navy seems to prioritize French-flagged vessels, but—as I have often discussed in Foreign Policy’s pages—most vessels sail under a flag of convenience, are owned in one country and managed in another, have foreign crew members, and carry cargo between altogether other places.

What qualifies as a U.S., or French, or Norwegian vessel in the Red Sea can be deeply uncertain. And shipping—and most importantly, the insurers—is all about reducing risk. That means the largest shipping lines have instead begun diverting their ships to other routes. By Dec. 24, some 280 box ships had already been rerouted, as had lots of tankers, bulk carriers, car carriers, and other merchant vessels. (By Dec. 27, Maersk and CMA CGM had announced they would gradually returning to the Red Sea—but if the situation continues to deteriorate they can divert again.)

That means a sudden procession of ships taking the much longer route via the Cape of Good Hope on South Africa’s southwestern coast. “Shipping companies are extremely busy right now,” Cormac McGarry, a maritime analyst at consultancy Control Risks, told Foreign Policy. “They’ve been working over Christmas, changing routes. The first thing that happens when you divert is the legal aspect—a clause in shipping contracts allows shipping lines to divert if there’s a war risk. And then you have to decide where to divert your ships to.” The Cape of Good Hope route, which the Suez Canal’s construction once made redundant for long-distance cargo, is suddenly en vogue again.

As large parts of the global public now know, traveling via the Cape of Good Hope rather than the Suez Canal adds an additional 10 to 12 days of sailing—and a completely different route for captains and their top lieutenants to chart. But that’s perhaps the easiest part. “Planning a new route doesn’t take much time when working with electronic charts, but rounding the Cape does bring new considerations,” a senior officer who works on the largest types of container ships told Foreign Policy.

Those new, and thorny, considerations include getting crews and cargo to where they need to be—because, in many cases, ships’ current crews are scheduled to finish their rotations and other seafarers are waiting to take over. “If you’re going around South Africa, you may need to stop somewhere during the journey for bunkering and change of crews,” McGarry pointed out. “And if you’re changing a crew out of somewhere in southern Africa rather [than] somewhere around Suez, you need to change where they fly to and from.”

McGarry said ordinarily ships might change crews and cargo near the canal; now, the changes will need to occur in places such as Mombasa, Kenya; Durban, South Africa; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; or Gran Canaria, one of Spain’s Canary Islands. Just before Christmas, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam were reporting a massive spike in ship arrivals; in the case of Dar es Salaam, the sudden rush had resulted in a 16-day wait to refuel. “ [Diversion] can be done, and the shipping lines are doing,” McGarry said. “But it brings additional costs.”

Those costs are there whatever route the ships take: Journeys through the Red Sea bring hefty war risk premiums, and the Cape of Good Hope route brings additional fuel costs, not to mention the costs of rerouting crews and cargo. Several shipping lines have already imposed surcharges for their services. The delays and extra costs may, in fact, merely be the first chapter in the geopolitically connected turbulence facing global shipping and, as a result, the globalized economy.

The Red Sea turbulence is also bringing trouble to nearby countries. With ships spending as little time as possible in the Red Sea, countries such as Sudan and Eritrea—whose only ports are located on the Red Sea—will struggle to get ships to call at their ports. Egypt, the custodian of the Suez Canal, is already suffering. And with less traffic through the canal, shipping to Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy, and Turkey will become especially cumbersome.

Iran, in fact, seems to have concluded that the Houthis’ experiment in the Red Sea has been so successful that it bears repeating in the Mediterranean. “They shall soon await the closure of the Mediterranean Sea, [the Strait of] Gibraltar and other waterways,” Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the coordinating commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, told Iranian media on Dec. 23, apparently referring to the international community.

Spare a thought for the world’s seafarers and shipping logisticians—there’s no holiday break for 2024’s troubled waters.

Foreign Policy · by Elisabeth Braw · 

16. Officials say the Chinese spy balloon used a US internet provider

Officials say the Chinese spy balloon used a US internet provider

US intelligence officials determined the Chinese spy balloon used a US internet provider to communicate

• Intelligence officials have revealed that a Chinese spy balloon that flew across the US reportedly used an American internet service provider to communicate
• A new report stated that the balloon was connected to a US-based company and communicating with China about its navigation 
• The unidentified internet service provider company has denied all such claims  

By ISHITA SRIVASTAVA FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

PUBLISHED: 01:49 EST, 29 December 2023 | UPDATED: 03:25 EST, 29 December 2023

Daily Mail · by Ishita Srivastava For Dailymail.Com · December 29, 2023

Intelligence officials have revealed a Chinese spy balloon that flew across the US for a week in February used an American internet service provider to communicate.

The balloon had drifted east and entered US airspace over Alaska on 28 January and was tracked as it flew over Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana, where nuclear assets are stored.

On 4 February, the Air Force sent an F-22 fighter jet armed with an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile to take the balloon down over water.

In a new report from NBC, the outlet cited two current and one former U.S. official familiar with the report as its source.

The report stated that the balloon was connected to a US-based company and communicating with China about its navigation.

The spy balloon is seen drifting above the Atlantic Ocean, just off the coast of South Carolina, on Saturday - with a fighter jet and its contrail seen below it

The Chinese spy balloon after it was shot down by an F-22 on Saturday over South Carolina's coastline

It further stated that the connection 'allowed the balloon to send burst transmissions or high-bandwidth collections of data over short periods of time' to its home base in China.

The channel has not released the name of the company.

Liu Pengyu, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said it was a weather balloon that accidentally drifted into American airspace.

They told NBC in a statement: 'As we had made it clear before, the airship, used for meteorological research, unintentionally drifted into US because of the westerlies and its limited self-steering capability. The facts are clear.'

The unidentified internet service provider company has denied all such claims.

This comes days after it was revealed that officials in the Biden administration had planned to keep the Chinese spy balloon secret, with a top Air Force commander admitting the balloon exposed gaps in their intelligence gathering.

A source told NBC: 'Before it was spotted publicly, there was the intention to study it and let it pass over and not ever tell anyone about it.'

Biden's administration has been adamant that the balloon Beijing previously denied was a government vessel did not collect and transmit data.

The F-22 Raptor is seen taking off from Joint Base Langley-Eustis to take down the balloon

President Joe Biden downplayed the recent Chinese spy balloon that drifted across the US, saying he thinks Chinese leaders may have been unaware of it

A U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot looks down at the Chinese surveillance balloon as it hovers over central America

A senior Biden administration official denied that there was an attempt to keep the balloon secret to the outlet.

They said: 'To the extent any of this was kept quiet at all, that was in large part to protect intel equities related to finding and tracking. There was no intention to keep this from Congress at any point.'

NBC also revealed that during a phone call on January 27, General Mark Milley and NORAD Chief Gen. Glen VanHerck said the Pentagon planned to send up 5-22 jets to gauge its characteristics.

Soon after that call, jets used targeting pods to determine that the object was indeed a balloon that was roughly the size of three school buses and equipped with a surveillance payload.

President Biden was not briefed on the balloon until February 1, with the public later hearing about it after NBC broke the story.

VanHerck has since said that the balloon exposed gaps in the intelligence agencies and warned the Chinese balloon program remains ongoing.

Daily Mail · by Ishita Srivastava For Dailymail.Com · December 29, 2023

17. Twelve Days of WEX-mas: New round of nuclear proliferation looms over unstable world order

Excerpts:

“People have seen what happened to Ukraine when they gave up their nukes,” Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL), who sits on the House committees that oversee the Pentagon, the State Department, and the intelligence community, said. “People saw what happened [to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein], people saw what happened to Libya, they see the threat that South Korea is under, completely reliant on the U.S for their deterrent. So I think you're gonna continue to see — sadly, scarily — you’re gonna see proliferation.”

​...

Russia’s war in Ukraine has been enabled in part by Kremlin cooperation with Iran and North Korea, two regimes that have the potential to spark nuclear crises on their own. North Korea's Kim Jong Un began 2023 with a warning that his regime’s nuclear force is not tasked with the defense of the regime alone — “the second mission is not defense,” he said — and he has overseen a flurry of short-range missile launches and five intercontinental ballistic missile tests in 2024.

“North Korea continues to perfect its long-range missile and nuclear capabilities in ways that are antithetical not only to the region but to the United States as well,” Kurt Campbell, the lead White House official for the Indo-Pacific and Biden’s nominee for deputy secretary of state, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his Dec. 7 nomination hearing. “I am worried that North Korea in the current environment has decided that they are no longer interested in diplomacy with the United States. And that means that we are going to have to focus even more on deterrence.”

Twelve Days of WEX-mas: New round of nuclear proliferation looms over unstable world order

by Joel Gehrke, Foreign Affairs Reporter December 28, 2023 06:00 AM

Washington Examiner · December 28, 2023

In the spirit of the season, the Washington Examiner has identified 12 issues we believe will shape 2024 — and beyond. These close-up examinations of agenda-setting issues cover everything from the ongoing battle between the Biden family's business deals and Republican Oversight, the emergence of a "new world order," and fights over redistricting and new election maps. Part Four is about said "new world order."

President Joe Biden and other Western leaders could soon face a world upended by the spread of nuclear weapons, current and former Western officials fear, as a wide range of threats spur more governments to grab for the bomb.

“Nuclear proliferation is now much, much more dangerous than it has been since 1945,” said Janis Kazocins, whose seven-year tenure as national security adviser to the president of Latvia, a NATO ally, ended in 2023. “It’s much more likely, on a larger scale, and is one of the three or four existential threats to humanity, which our children and grandchildren will have to face during this century.”

TRUMP LEGAL WOES COME BARRELING TOWARD SUPREME COURT ON THREE KEY FRONTS

The security pressures driving that ominous forecast have been accumulating for three decades, with rogue states such as North Korea relying on their nuclear weapons arsenal to foreclose the possibility of regime change at foreign hands. Yet 2024 could be the year that the strategic argument in favor of nuclear proliferation outweighs the diplomatic costs, even if democracies long faithful to the international ban on the acquisition of nuclear weapons continue to postpone a policy change.

“People have seen what happened to Ukraine when they gave up their nukes,” Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL), who sits on the House committees that oversee the Pentagon, the State Department, and the intelligence community, said. “People saw what happened [to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein], people saw what happened to Libya, they see the threat that South Korea is under, completely reliant on the U.S for their deterrent. So I think you're gonna continue to see — sadly, scarily — you’re gonna see proliferation.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, delivers his speech as he attends a flag-raising ceremony for newly-built nuclear submarines at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk in Russia's Archangelsk region, Monday, Dec. 11, 2023.

Kirill Iodas/AP

U.S. leaders since the Second World War have managed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by persuading less powerful allies that they can shelter secure under the protection of an American nuclear umbrella. That project included a negotiation to persuade Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear weapons in 1994, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in exchange for so-called security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, which also signed a 1997 treaty affirming the inviolability of Ukrainian borders.

With Ukraine now at war and U.S. policymakers in both parties debating the prudence of backing an attempt to expel Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, the American umbrella looks leakier than ever.

“Yes, but I would just make the point that we sent that signal around the world in 2014,” Waltz said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial maneuver to annex Crimea. “Not now with this debate, where we're saying, 'Well, wait a minute: We stopped the sucking chest wound, you know, we kept the patient alive, but now we need to have a real debate on what kind of what the long term wellness plan is.'”

Russia’s war in Ukraine has been enabled in part by Kremlin cooperation with Iran and North Korea, two regimes that have the potential to spark nuclear crises on their own. North Korea's Kim Jong Un began 2023 with a warning that his regime’s nuclear force is not tasked with the defense of the regime alone — “the second mission is not defense,” he said — and he has overseen a flurry of short-range missile launches and five intercontinental ballistic missile tests in 2024.

“North Korea continues to perfect its long-range missile and nuclear capabilities in ways that are antithetical not only to the region but to the United States as well,” Kurt Campbell, the lead White House official for the Indo-Pacific and Biden’s nominee for deputy secretary of state, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his Dec. 7 nomination hearing. “I am worried that North Korea in the current environment has decided that they are no longer interested in diplomacy with the United States. And that means that we are going to have to focus even more on deterrence.”

To that end, Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol affirmed that South Korean defense is “backed by the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear,” as the so-called Washington Declaration put it. That language was designed to leave South Koreans “feel[ing] that they are sharing nuclear weapons with the United States,” as one of Yoon’s top advisers put it, but that sensation might fade if Ukraine is perceived as losing the war.

“I think the fate of Ukraine is really going to be the deciding factor here,” a Pentagon strategist told the Washington Examiner in reference to South Korea’s potential interest in nuclear weapons. “If Ukraine goes south, that really will become a real point of contention.”

While the possession of nuclear weapons by a U.S. ally might not seem like a terrible outcome, at first glance, it means more "countries having the ability to destroy the world,” as Waltz put it, and fewer resources invested in conventional defense.

"For example, Japan is increasing its defense budget to 2% of its GDP,” Waltz said. "But if they're going to spend the vast majority of that of developing a nuclear triad from scratch, then there's an opportunity cost of having real capabilities in the western Pacific, where the U.S. has struggled from a logistics standpoint.”

U.S. efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East also face a severe strain. Campbell, in his Senate testimony, conceded that he doesn’t “think anyone sees that there’s any chance in the current environment to go back” to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which former President Donald Trump exited in 2018. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in September that “if they get one, we have to get one.” That blunt declaration underscored the Biden administration’s interest in a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, underpinned by "some form of security guarantee” and military assistance, as a Washington Institute analyst put it in September.

Those negotiations were interrupted on Oct. 7, when Iran-backed Hamas terrorists rampaged across southern Israel, igniting the war in Gaza. The eruption of violence raised U.S. and Israeli fears that the conflict would widen into a war with Iran’s larger terrorist proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. That hasn’t come to pass, to the relief of many, but Iran’s seeming decision to keep Hezbollah on the sidelines points to a desire for those forces to remain intact and available to deter an Israeli strike on their nuclear forces.

“They're holding the Hezbollah ace card [because] they’re continuing to march towards weaponization and testing a nuclear device,” Waltz said. "So if that happens, then we have a full-blown nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Nobody in the Middle East believes we're going to [risk] a full-blown nuclear conflagration [to protect] a city in the Gulf.”

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

There’s no sure way to predict when such a crisis might emerge, whether in 2024 or further down the line, analysts agree. And yet the components of such a crisis seem to loom larger on the horizon, leaving officials and observers to wonder what event will demonstrate that the world has been on the threshold of a new era in the nuclear age.

“Now, if you add to all of this, the fact that, of the countries we're talking about which possess nuclear weapons, some are very unstable … we have serious problems,” Kazocins, the former Latvian national security adviser and a retired general in the British army, said. “We're starting to lose our grip on nuclear proliferation. And that's really, really dangerous.”

Washington Examiner · December 28, 2023

18. Sexual assault prosecutions officially out of the chain of command

Excerpts:

While Wednesday marked the official cutoff for new cases to be sent to special trial counsels, policy does allow some overlap.

For example, officials said, crimes committed before Dec. 28 but reported afterward can be handled by the new prosecutors. Or, in a case where a single perpetrator commits multiple crimes before and after Dec. 28, that case would go to the special trial counsel.

Each service’s organization is headed up by an O-7 judge advocate, save for the Army, which is in the process of finding a replacement for Brig. Gen. Warren Wells, who was fired earlier this month for past comments about sexual assaults.

Sexual assault prosecutions officially out of the chain of command

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · December 28, 2023

Military commanders are no longer in charge of deciding whether to prosecute a dozen major crimes, including sexual assault and domestic violence, as each of the services officially opened their offices of special trial counsel on Thursday.

The move upends the traditional chain-of-command-centric military justice system, where commanders have had the authority to make decisions on whether to proceed with criminal cases.

Standing up of these special trial counsels means that, going forward, only trained, designated attorneys will decide whether to press charges or send a case to trial.

The move is the culmination of more than a dozen years of effort by members of Congress, who in late 2021 voted to install independent prosecutors to make decisions about not only sexual assault cases, but murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse and more, 14 crimes in all.

“This shift should assure a sexual assault victim that if they choose to make an unrestricted report, the case will be handled professionally and consistently with the best practices and procedures of civilian prosecution offices,” a senior defense official, who was not authorized to speak on the record, told reporters on Dec. 21.

RELATED

New military justice rules set to go into effect with Biden order

The president will codify reforms establishing independent prosecutors for serious military crimes.

It also represents the first time the Defense Department and Congress have been on the same page about independent prosecutions. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in 2021 approved a multi-year plan to implement more than 80 recommendations from an independent review commission on sexual assault, including special trial counsels.

That original plan gave the services until 2027 to transfer those authorities, but the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act moved that timeline up to no later than December 29 of this year.

As of Thursday, each of the services has multiple regional special trial counsel offices up and running, which dozens of specialized prosecutors, as well as uniformed and civilian support staff.

“The sort of key difference here for us, going forward, is going to be that we are making decisions based on the facts on the evidence ... unencumbered by perhaps some of the pressures or concerns that the senior commanders might feel,” a senior Army official told reporters.

“So I think that’s where, you know, you’re going to see a difference in the in the number or quality of cases getting referred,” the official added, because those decisions no longer lie with commanders who might be concerned about how sexual assault within their units might affect their careers.

While Wednesday marked the official cutoff for new cases to be sent to special trial counsels, policy does allow some overlap.

For example, officials said, crimes committed before Dec. 28 but reported afterward can be handled by the new prosecutors. Or, in a case where a single perpetrator commits multiple crimes before and after Dec. 28, that case would go to the special trial counsel.

Each service’s organization is headed up by an O-7 judge advocate, save for the Army, which is in the process of finding a replacement for Brig. Gen. Warren Wells, who was fired earlier this month for past comments about sexual assaults.

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Lawyer picked as Army’s first top sexual assault prosecutor fired

Brig. Gen. Warren Wells was removed from the job because of an email he sent 10 years ago appearing to belittle victims’ assault allegations.

By Lolita C. Baldor, The Associated Press

And the prosecutors working in the regional offices have undergone special training to handle these sensitive cases. Policy calls for them to spend at least three years in their positions, both to have consistency in the new offices but also to give each judge advocate corps time to select and train their replacements.

“So in an ideal world, we’d be rotating the office one third every year so that we’re bringing in new people and training them as we come,” a senior Navy official told reporters.

Neither the Pentagon nor the services have made any promises about how many more cases will or won’t go to trial under the new system.

Trained special prosecutors have been advising commanders for years, though they haven’t before had the decision-making power. And in the civilian world, sexual assault prosecution and conviction rates are low, despite the oversight of independent experts: just 16% of rape reports result in an arrest, with 9% leading to a felony conviction, according to the Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network.

But the hope is that independent prosecutions will encourage service members, who as of 2021 are estimated to report sexual assaults only 20% of the time, to report their assaults and have faith that they will be prosecuted properly.

RELATED

The military’s sexual assault problem is only getting worse

Not only is unwanted sexual contact rising, but fewer people are opting to report it and fewer perpetrators are being legally punished.

That figure is down from 30% just a few years earlier. At the same time, though instances of sexual assault have continued to rise, rates of prosecution and conviction have fallen.

“So we’re hopeful that in the long run, there may be more cases coming in to the system to to promote greater accountability,” the senior defense official said.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

​19. Billion-dollar scam: A sophisticated, criminal network is using modern day slaves to con thousands of Americans out of their life savings

Chinese crime syndicates out of war-torn Myanmar and other countries in Southeast Asia.

https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2023/12/asia/chinese-scam-operations-american-victims-intl-hnk-dst/

Billion-dollar scam 

A sophisticated, criminal network is using modern day slaves to con thousands of Americans out of their life savings 

By Teele Rebane CNN12 min

December 27, 2023

View Original

CY’s phone lit up with a Whatsapp message. It was Jessica, a beautiful Chinese-American woman who introduced herself as an old colleague. CY didn’t remember meeting her but she seemed kind and he responded anyway.

They began chatting in October 2021 and over the next few weeks built a close friendship. Jessica shared photos of her luxurious lifestyle in New York and CY talked about the pain of caring for his dying father in the San Francisco Bay Area where he lives. “She was always there to provide comfort, compassion,” he told CNN.

A few weeks into their friendship, Jessica taught CY how to invest in cryptocurrency to help pay for his father’s care. The initial profits were astonishing, and CY believed he was making hundreds of thousands of dollars. So, he kept investing until one day he got locked out of his account. More than a million dollars was gone.

“What the heck happened? What did I do?” he recalled thinking.

Panicking, he called Jessica for help. But Jessica had disappeared.

CY's scammer "Jessica" often shared photos with him, giving a glimpse of her luxurious lifestyle in New York.Source: CY

CY, 54, is one of tens of thousands of American victims of a new form of financial fraud run by Chinese crime syndicates out of war-torn Myanmar and other countries in Southeast Asia.

In three short years, according to UN and FBI investigators, transnational crime organizations have exploited developments in technology and the civil war in Myanmar to build a billion-dollar industry to scam people across the world out of their life savings.

This huge scam operation relies on army of modern-day slaves, assembled by what the UN has called one of the largest human trafficking events in Asia in recent history.

It’s known as a “pig butchering” scam -- a type of confidence fraud in which victims are lured by scammers often impersonating young women on the internet. The scammers then spend weeks building a relationship with their victim, introducing them to cryptocurrency and encouraging them to invest on a fake platform.

Victims are shown startling returns and coaxed to keep pumping in more money — like a pig slowly fattened for the slaughter — until one day their scammer disappears along with the money.

Over the last six months CNN has spoken to fraud victims, investigators and even the scammers themselves to piece together the inner workings of the global scam industry.

“This is the professionalization of fraud services,” said FBI special agent James Barnacle, who warned that more and more Americans, and people all around the world, are falling for it.

In 2020 reported losses connected to pig butchering scams amounted to $907million, according to the FBI. By November 2023 that number had shot up to $2.9 billion for the year.

“The bad guys are getting good, and they’re getting better” -- James Barnacle, FBI, November 22, 2023.

From across the river, Gate 25, where Rakesh was held, appears to be a modern apartment complex, but the 10-foot-high fence and guard tower suggest otherwise.Source: CNN

It is in one of these compounds that Indian national Rakesh, 33, worked for 11 months as a scammer stealing thousands of dollars from unsuspecting victims like CY.

From San Francisco, someone like Rakesh may look like the bad guy. But he was also the victim of a brutal scam. Lured to Thailand with promises of white-collar jobs, thousands of people from across the world are trafficked to criminal hubs in Myanmar where they are held against their will and forced to steal millions in cryptocurrency.

TheUN estimates that up to 120,000 people could be heldin compounds across Myanmar, with another 100,000 people held in Cambodia and elsewhere in conditions that amount to modern slavery.

In December 2022 Rakesh, who asked CNN not to use his full name to protect his family’s privacy, landed in Bangkok, Thailand, where he thought he was due to start a new job in IT.

He was educated as a chemical engineer in India but had been unemployed for over six months and was desperate to find work,even if that meant leaving his family and moving abroad.

A driver sent by the company picked him up at the airport, but instead of taking Rakesh to an office in Bangkok they drove seven hours to Mae Sot, a Thai town near the Myanmar border. Rakesh grew alarmed; he called the agent who had offered him the job but was told not to worry, he would be working in Mae Sot.

“In this situation, I get a blank in my mind,” Rakesh said of the helplessness he felt, unable to do anything except follow the agent’s instructions.

After spending a night in a hotel in Mae Sot, a second driver picked him up. A short drive later they crossed a river and arrived at a gated compound guarded by armed soldiers, he said. Without realizing it, Rakesh had been trafficked into Myanmar, to a compound named Gate 25.

Surrounded by the Moei river like a moat, Gate 25 stands eerily quiet during the day. From across the river, it appears to be a modern apartment complex, but the 10-foot-high fence and guard tower suggest otherwise.

Upon entering the compound, Rakesh said his passport was confiscated and he was presented with a contract — he was to become a professional scammer, stealing money from people across the world. “This you need to do... otherwise I will kill you,” Rakesh recalled a Chinese man telling him.

He refused to sign the contract and was thrown into what he describes as a jail cell, where he was kept with no food or water. Three days later he’d made up his mind -- he’d do whatever it took to survive.

His managers set him up with a fake persona and taught him how to scam. Posing as Salt Lake City investor “Klara Semonov,” Rakesh spent 16-hour days chatting with potential victims as a beautiful blonde, earning their trust and building a relationship.

“Seventy to eighty percent fall for fake love,” Rakesh told CNN.

His job was to make contact and get the victim hooked, working through the night to target Americans, Brits, Brazilians and Mexicans during their waking hours. Once they were ready to invest, they were handed up the chain to a manager or team leader who would secure the investment.

Modern slavery under our nose

Standing on a hilltop in Mae Sot overlooking Myanmar’s Myawaddy region, Mechelle Moore, founder of the NGO Global Alms that combats human trafficking and gender-based violence, points out scam compounds dotting the hillside. What used to be a quiet farming area has now been transformed by special economic zones and casino towns that light up the night sky.

Multiple countries in the Mekong region have established special economic zones with favorable economic policies to attract trade and foreign investment both at home and abroad. But they are loosely regulated and often situated in border regions with a long history of transnational crime.

"Special economic zones, particularly in the Mekong, have become magnets for organized crime syndicates, at first for casinos, trafficking and related money laundering, and recently for online fraud,” said Jeremy Douglas, Regional representative for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Southeast Asia.

“They're almost like free zones for criminals where the rule of law doesn't apply."

In the shadow of Myanmar’s civil war and the Covid pandemic, these projects branched out into scam operations. Meters away from Thailand the compounds use Thai telecommunication services, the essential infrastructure needed to run transnational crime on the cloud.

The scam

Behind the messaging apps on the computer screens were people like CY, who put their faith in a new friend online with the promise of money and an escape from the pressures of everyday life.

Jessica first introduced CY, who works in finance, to the idea of investing in cryptocurrency a few weeks into their friendship. She told him she’d made millions trading gold using cryptocurrency with the help of insider information from her uncle in Hong Kong.

Jessica taught CY how to invest first instructing him to download trading app that he says looked legitimate, and then walking him through the investment process step by step.Source: CY

Jessica taught CY how to invest first instructing him to download trading app that he says looked legitimate, and then walking him through the investment process step by step.Source: CY

In the following weeks every day for CY began and ended with a message from Jessica. Soon she taught him how to invest, first instructing him to install a trading app. It looked legitimate, but was in fact a clone of a real trading app. He started small by investing a few thousand dollars.

A playground for criminals

The border regions of Southeast Asian countries like Myanmar, Laos, Thailand have long been a fertile breeding ground for organized crime. The so-called “Golden Triangle” between the three has been one of the world’s most successful drug producing regions for decades.

Cambodia saw a spate of pig butchering scam centers run by Chinese organized crime crop up in 2021 and 2022 until the government eventually started to crack down.

But it is Myanmar, which has been beset with unrest and a deepening bloody civil war since the 2021 military coup, that has proven to be a lucrative base for scam operations. Out of reach and unaccountable, there is little the international community can do to help their citizens.

The Thai government has launched a campaign to raise awareness among the Thai public and prevent people from falling victim to scams, but hundreds of people are still being trafficked through Asia each week to serve the demands of the scam centers, according to UNODC’s Douglas.

Thai Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong told CNN he plans to set up a task force to investigate what can be done to stop scam operations from using Thai telecommunications services. He also wants to target corrupt civil servants accused of aiding human trafficking rings, or of obstructing efforts to dismantle them.

While countries around the world are coming together to help both fraud and trafficking victims, Myanmar's military government appears to have done little to stop the lucrative trade.

"The militias offer territory and protection in return for a cut of the profits. It's symbiotic - the lines are blurred between the criminals and those they rent to," he said. CNN has reached out to the Myanmar military junta for comment but has yet to receive a reply.In recent weeks state media has announced a crackdown on illegal gambling and scam centers.

And in October a powerful alliance of militias opposed to the juntalaunched a new and highly effective offensive in Myanmar’s northeast,partly motivated by the desire to stamp out scam centers, capturing the town of Laukkai and returning multiple alleged gang members to China for prosecution.

Months into his confinement, Rakesh called the Indian embassy in Yangon for help. With a group of friends clamoring around the phone they told an officer at the embassy that they are being held against their will and tortured. In a phone call verified by CNN, the official told them: “You people have landed in trouble by your decision, so you have to wait.”

Rakesh pleaded with him. The fighting in Myanmar had gotten close to Gate 25 and they could hear shelling nearby. “There is one guy there who can help you, but he will charge something,” the official said finally, giving Rakesh the number of an alleged smuggler.

CNN reached out to the Indian embassy in Yangon and Indian foreign ministry but did not hear back.

Rakesh was eventually released when his contract finished in November 2023. He believes he was let go because he simply wasn’t good enough at scamming. With a steady flow of workers to be tricked and trafficked, it’s often easier to simply replace bad scammers than to force them to work, Rakesh believes.

After paying a 20,000 baht ($566) “transportation fee,” Rakesh crossed the Moei river back into Thailand where a driver was waiting for him. He had been put in touch with Tana by a journalist he had contacted to help him escape the compound. Now Tana and a colleague were waiting for him in a mall parking lot, tracking his GPS as he inched towards them.

After 11 months of confinement, he was left with nothing but a backpack with his personal belongings. He wasn’t paid for any of his work.

In a video of Rakesh’s rescue shared with CNN, he gets in Tana’s car and begins telling them about everything he endured in the compound, but there’s one question on his mind.

“One thing I don’t understand,” he says. “Why they are not raiding the campus?”

“Why doesn’t anyone rescue you? Because it’s the largest organized crime unit in the world,” Tana responds.

A drop in the ocean

A few days after his release from Gate 25 Rakesh sits on the edge of his bed in a dark hotel room showing photos of his friends still stuck inside.

“These bastards don't care about and don't have any feelings for other persons,” he says.

Rakesh is out, but hundreds of thousands of people remain trapped in scam compounds across Asia, and more are popping up all around the globe.

Hundreds of thousands of people still remain trapped in scam compounds across Asia, and more are popping up all around the globe.

“It's terrifying to think what the scale of this is like, and then how much we can't do to help them. We can do our bit, but that's a drop in the ocean compared to what they need,” says Moore, who’s working day and night to save Rakesh’s friends and the dozens of people that reach out every day begging for help.

On the other side of the world in the San Francisco Bay Area, CY is still piecing his life back together two years after the scam. Ridden with debt and grieving the death of his father, he is taking it day by day and hoping to send his daughter to college in the fall.

“The bigger victims are out there as slaves working for them. They don’t want to do this, but they don’t have a choice if they want to survive.”-- CY, November 18, 2023.

CNN spoke to a victim of trafficking who is currently being held in a scam compound in Myawaddy, where he has been for over a year. Javed says speaking to CNN could put his life in danger, so he asked to use a pseudonym to conceal his identity.

Javed, who previously worked as a mechanical engineer and studied in China, accepted what he thought was an IT job in Bangkok only to be trafficked to Myanmar. He tells CNN that new victims are arriving at the compound all the time to replace those who have been freed.

For a few months, Javed says he has been secretly warning people who reply to his texts not to fall for the scam. His managers know, he says, because he’s not making them any money.

“I don’t want to destroy someone’s life because my life, my life is almost finished,” he tells CNN.

But his rebellion against the system comes at a great personal cost. He says his bosses beat him, threaten to trade his organs, or sell him to another compound, unless he starts bringing in money again.

Though his contract is nearing its end, Javed does not know if or when he will be released. “If you can, please help us,” he pleads. “Take us from this hell.”

​20. IDF’s Subterranean Challenge: Profiling Gaza Metro, Hamas’s Centre Of Gravity – Analysis

A view from India. Not only center of gravity analysis but Warden's Five Rings, Tony Echevarria, and more.

(no mention of north Korea - apologies for my bias).

Israeli soldier at entrance of Hamas tunnel in Gaza. Photo Credit: IDF

IDF’s Subterranean Challenge: Profiling Gaza Metro, Hamas’s Centre Of Gravity – Analysis

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29122023-idfs-subterranean-challenge-profiling-gaza-metro-hamass-centre-of-gravity-analysis/

 December 29, 2023  0 Comments

By Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

By Rajneesh Singh

Hamas has developed a complex subterranean infrastructure consisting of tunnels, command and control centres, living accommodation, stores and contingency fighting positions. The tunnels also have designated spaces for rocket-assembly lines, explosive stores, and warhead fabrication workshops.1 This infrastructure is famously known as the ‘Gaza Metro’. The Metro is reinforced by concrete and other building material and protected by blast doors, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps.

The tunnels have been in use since at least the early 1980s, and members of various Palestinian insurgent organisations have been known to use them since the first Intifada, beginning in 1987.2 In the aftermath of the 2021 Israel–Hamas conflict, Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar claimed that Hamas has 500 kilometres of tunnel system and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has damaged only 5 per cent of it.3 There is no way to verify Sinwar’s claim but is indicative of the magnitude of challenge the IDF faces in the ongoing war.

Tunnel warfare is not new and dates to the ancient times. Jews used them against Romans in Judea in the first century.4 In the more recent times, the tunnels have been used in the battles of the Vimy Ridge, Messines and Somme of World War I, by the Viet Congs in Vietnam and in Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Soledar during the ongoing war in Ukraine.5 

The Brief delves into the multifaced dimensions of the Gaza Metro and seeks to flag its origins, development, and the strategic implications on the ongoing war. It also focusses on the IDF’s concerted efforts in developing technologies and deploying specialised forces to detect and dismantle this clandestine infrastructure.

Gaza Metro is more than a just any military infrastructure. It is the centre of gravity (COG) of Hamas’s military wing.6 The Brief also attempts to analyse various aspects of operational significance of Gaza Metro using certain facets of the theoretical construct of COG advanced by Colonel John A. Warden of the US Air Force, Professor Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, and Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, retired US Army officer. 

History of Gaza Metro

The tunnels in Gaza predate Hamas. It is believed that they have been in use since the early 1980s7 after the city of Rafah was divided by the new border recognised in the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.8 It was initially used by the divided families to communicate among themselves and by smugglers to transport goods. Hamas was raised in 1987 and soon it realised the military importance of the tunnels. It began digging tunnels in the mid-1990s, when Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted some degree of self-rule in Gaza by Israel. The group began tunnelling in earnest since 2005, when Israel withdrew from Gaza, and later when Hamas assumed power in 2006 election.9   

Among the early success of Hamas, using the tunnels, was abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and killing of soldiers Hanan Barak and Pavel Slutzker in a cross-border raid on 25 June 2006. Later Israel freed 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in return for Shalit’s release in October 2011.10

As per the reports, the tunnels in 1990s were approximately one meter wide and smugglers used winch motors to haul goods along the sandy tunnel floors in hollowed-out petrol barrels.11 Hamas has since gained considerable expertise in tunnelling and construction of underground infrastructure which has advanced security features, sewage disposal and air-conditioning systems, etc.   

Hamas and Gaza Metro

The Gaza Strip has an approximate area of 365 square kilometres. If Yahya Sinwar’s claim of 2021 of Hamas having built 500 kilometres of tunnel system is true, then it would be equivalent of having 10 parallel north to south tunnel systems and eight parallel interconnecting tunnels running east to west.12 The Gaza Metro is so designed that there may be dozens of shafts leading to a tunnel at depths of between 20 and 80 meters. As per some accounts, the density of tunnels is so high that some crisscross at different depths.13 To create a subterranean system of this magnitude requires a dedicated organisation, high level of technological expertise, and resources in terms of trained manpower, equipment and money.

Israeli officials have reported that Mohammad Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, is heading the tunnel building project.14 Gaza has been under land, sea and air blockade by Israel and Egypt since 2007 and it was not expected to possess capability or resources to dig such an infrastructure. It was appreciated that Hamas has employed diggers using basic tools, used basic electrical fittings, and diverted concrete meant for civilian and humanitarian purposes towards tunnel building project. However, two of the tunnel systems discovered during the ongoing war, viz. near al Shifa Hospital and other close to the Erez crossing belies this assessment. The details of these tunnels have been discussed later in the Brief.  

During its operation in the house of Yahya Sinwar in Khan Yunis, the IDF collected significant amount of Hamas intelligence including Hamas’s report of financial transactions that gives details of more than a million dollars spent to construct tunnels in 2022.15   

Tunnel under al-Shifa Hospital

In the second week of November 2023, IDF’s 162nd Division was operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City, adjacent to al-Shifa Hospital. The troops of Givati Infantry Brigade reportedly found intelligence materials, weapons manufacturing plants, anti-tank missile launch positions and tunnels.16

On 17 November, the IDF located one of the shafts which led to the entrance of a bigger tunnel. This tunnel led to a blast door leading to a complex which had multiple rooms and one of them “was a spacious bedroom with two large beds and a large modern air conditioning unit, a kitchenette, a bathroom, and other facilities, as well as extensive plumbing and electrical wiring to enable all of the infrastructure”.17 The tunnel shaft leading to the main tunnel was approximately 2 metres high, lined with stones and concrete. The complex under the hospital was reportedly being used by Hamas as a command and control centre.18   

Tunnel near Erez Crossing 

The IDF reported on 17 December that it had discovered largest tunnel ever—four kilometre long and 50 metres deep—near the Erez crossing. The tunnel reinforced with concrete had electrical fitments and was wide enough to allow a vehicle to pass through. The IDF also released a video of Mohammad Sinwar driving a car through a tunnel. In another video released by the IDF, Hamas fighters were seen using a large drill. In the tunnel near the Erez crossing, the IDF reportedly found “unspecified digging machines” not reported earlier.19 One section of the tunnel was approximately 400 metres from the Israeli border.  

The IDF has informed that the Combat Engineering Corps’ elite Yahaom unit and Gaza Division’s Northern Brigade used “advanced intelligence and technological means” to uncover the tunnel network.20

Operational Employment of Subterranean Infrastructure

The infrastructure is the pivot of Hamas’s irregular warfare strategy and allows it to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. It offers Hamas asymmetric advantage, negating some of the technological advantages available to the IDF. The fact that Hamas has constructed the subterranean system under one of the world’s densest urban locations complicates the matter further for IDF.    

The system is designed to withstand IDF’s aerial and ground bombardment. The design and construction enable Hamas to locate its leadership, combat units, headquarters, command and control centres, weapons and supplies inside the complex. It also enables various military echelons to move freely between various prepared contingency positions. Hamas has located power generation and air-conditioning systems, plumbing and sewage disposal arrangements and food supplies within the infrastructure. This is helping its fighters to better withstand the siege laid by the IDF in the ongoing war. The tunnels also allow the fighters to escape the combat zone when they are decisively surrounded by the IDF, as was the case in battle near the al-Shifa Hospital.    

Hamas fighters are using tunnels to undertake offensive operations by infiltrating behind IDF positions and launching surprise attacks using snipers, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and other weapon systems. It enables small teams to appear undetected behind IDF lines, strike and withdraw.   

It is also assessed that Hamas has booby trapped the tunnels and will initiate the devices causing the tunnels to collapse over the advancing IDF troops. 

Gaza Metro as Centre of Gravity 

Clausewitz originated the concept of attacking the enemy’s centre of grav­ity which he described as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our ener­gies should be directed.”21 A fighting force can have multiple centres of gravity and each centre will have an effect of some kind on the others. Hamas too has multiple centres22 and some analysts have described Gaza Metro as one of them.23   

Warden’s Five-Ring Model

Warden has conceptualised “Five-Ring Model” related to COG, of which infrastructure is the third critical ring. The infrastructure relates to enemy’s transportation system—that moves civil and military goods and services in the combat zone. Gaza Metro is essential to move troops, warlike stores, command instructions and intelligence around the battlefield and if the IDF can disrupt the movement, Hamas will have lesser ability to resist it. Although Warden agrees with Clausewitz’s description of COG as “the hub of all power and movement”, he goes further to describe it as “that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive”.24 Warden’s first ring and the “most critical” ring is the command ring, which refers to the leadership and communication resources.25 It is assessed that Hamas’s leadership,26 including Yahya Sinwar, leader of the Hamas movement within the Gaza Strip, Mohammed Deif, commander-in-chief of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Marwan Issa, the deputy commander are hiding in the subterranean complex.

Neutralisation of Hamas leadership is likely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of war. It is also expected that Hamas leadership would have constructed multiple safe hideouts inside the subterranean infrastructure, from where they can direct their subordinate commanders and units. It is also likely that only the most trusted Hamas members would be aware of these locations. It would require sustained intelligence operations by Israel to generate actionable intelligence. However, once the Hamas leadership is cordoned inside the tunnels, they would be extremely vulnerable to IDF operations.

For the moment, the IDF is unaware of the exact location of the leadership and is destroying as much of this subterranean complex, as is possible to cause “strategic paralysis—by destroying one or more of the outer strategic rings or centers of gravity”27 —the infrastructure ring—the Gaza Metro.      

Strange and Iron’s Theory

The Strange and Iron’s theory is helpful to identify the location of COG and the impact of operations against it. The theory aligns with the J.J. Graham’s translation of On War, published in 1874 which postulates that: “As a centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war.”28

Hamas is cognizant of the incredible capability and resources of Mossad and Shin Bet to generate actionable intelligence and doctrinal, technological, and material superiority of the IDF to undertake combat operations. To counter Israel’s operational superiority, Hamas relies on low-tech solution in the form of subterranean infrastructure. The nature of infrastructure provides Hamas inherent physical protection, ease of movement and concealment to command and control elements and, combat, and logistic units.

The Gaza Strip is one of the densest urban locations anywhere in the world. Tunnels in conjunction with urban infrastructure helps to create extremely potent defensive localities and killing grounds. The IDF hopes to find the leadership and fighters of the al-Qassam Brigades inside the Gaza Metro.

Hamas has claimed that Gaza Metro is spread over 500 kilometres. Hamas is expected to dissipate its forces all along the Metro to avoid presenting a concentrated target to the IDF. However, once located, and fixed, the IDF will be able to neutralise Hamas forces with relative ease inside the tunnel system. 

The Strange and Iron’s theory also introduces a model of COG analysis with three additional sub-concepts29 :

• Critical Capabilities (CC): CC is the primary ability of the COG within a given context.
• Critical Requirements (CR): CR relate to conditions, resources and means essential for the COG to achieve its CC.
• Critical Vulnerabilities (CV): CV refers to those CRs or components that are vulnerable to neutralisation in a way that will contribute to a COG failing to achieve its CC. 

In the context of Gaza Metro, the subterranean nature of the infrastructure reinforced with concrete and other building material and further hardened using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and booby traps are the CCs. The camouflage and concealment arrangement to prevent detection of tunnels are the CRs while entry and exit points, ventilation and sewage arrangements, and communication infrastructure to enable command of Hamas fighters are the CVs.    

Echevarria’s Theory

Echevarria postulates COG is identified to achieve total collapse of the enemy—which is considered both as an effect and an objective.30 He further elaborates on the construct to suggest that the COG helps in identifying “way”—course of action—within an “ends-ways-means” construct to achieve annihilation of the enemy.31

This aspect may not be true when fighting an ideologically motivated and radical organisation like Hamas. It is possible that the IDF may identify and destroy Hamas’s tunnel system and thereby achieve destruction of Hamas’s military leadership and fighting units, however, in all probability the organisation will survive and grow, perhaps even more radical. “Terrorist groups are known to survive the loss of their leaders and members. It is quite likely that even if Israel destroys Hamas’s military wing, the idea of Hamas may survive.”32

IDF’s Tunnel Warfare Capability

Development of Technological Capabilities

The IDF has been aware of Hamas’s underground infrastructure and has been working towards new technologies and doctrinal concepts. When the first tunnel was discovered, the IDF established a laboratory, manned by engineers, physicists, geologists and intelligence operatives under the Gaza Division. The laboratory employed innovative soil research techniques, including scanning and decoding signals, and developed new detection techniques.  In 2018, a review of then IDF’s underground combat capability was undertaken and a new training manual was published.33

The Israeli scientists and engineers have developed several new innovations, most of them are classified. The IDF’s specialised units have been equipped with special conical penetrators, drills, robotic systems that can inject special ‘emulsions’ either to seal or destroy the tunnels.34 IDF also makes innovative use of technologies such as ground and aerial sensors, ground penetrating radars, geophones, fibre optics, microphones, special drilling equipment and others.   

The Israeli scientists have developed radio and navigation equipment which can work underground, night vision devices that work in complete darkness and remote and wire-controlled robots that can see and map tunnels without risking the lives of the soldiers. The IDF has training simulators to train soldiers in near realistic situations. Israel has also developed variety of explosives and ground penetrating munitions, like the GBU-28 which can penetrate 20 feet of concrete or 100 feet of earth.35   

Israel, over the years, has used satellite imageries, aerostat cameras and radars to map the tunnel system. These assets cannot reveal the layout of the tunnels but have been used to monitor location where cement-mixture trucks have halted over the years. The general area around these locations are possible entrances of the tunnels and may be probed using low-frequency, earth-penetrating radars, or basic probes.36    

US and Israel have also been collaborating to develop newer technologies. Since 2016, Congress has appropriated US$ 320 million towards the project.37

IDF’s Special Units

Fighting enemy inside subterranean system requires specialised units. The Gazan tunnels were first discovered during the first Intifada and the IDF recognised the need to raise specialised units. It raised ‘Yahalom’, specialist commandos from Israel’s Combat Engineering Corps. Yahalom specialises in discovering, clearing, and destroying tunnels and has the “Yael” Company to undertake engineering reconnaissance, “Sayfan” to neutralise the threat of non-conventional weapons (weapons of mass destruction). In addition, there are two explosive ordinance disposal units, and “Samur”, which specialises in tunnel warfare.38

The IDF has a specialised canine unit, “Oketz”, whose dogs are trained in special tasks such as attack, search and rescue, explosive detection, and weapon location.39 In addition, police and intelligence services too have specialist units—“like Sayeret Matkal, the Yamam, and others—who share best practices for dealing with terrorists and combatants underground.”40

IDF’s Subterranean Operations 

The IDF’s doctrine of subterranean warfare has evolved with the development of newer technologies to counter Hamas’s underground infrastructure, which too has become increasingly sophisticated and more potent with the passage of time. 

Hamas fighters have advantage in narrow, dark, collapsible tunnels with which they are familiar. The IDF protocol demands that soldiers do not enter the underground structures unless it has been cleared of Hamas presence.41 It uses many of the newly developed technologies including tracker robots and explosives to map and clear the tunnels.   

During the ongoing war, Hamas prisoners have also provided intelligence about the tunnels. These prisoners do not have the complete picture of the Gaza Strip but have excellent knowledge of the underground system under their villages and localities.42

Namer Establishes Cordon      

Israel has one of the world’s best protected armoured vehicles, 70-ton Namer, to assist in tunnel demolition. It is armed with active defence system to intercept incoming rockets and missiles and machine guns to fight enemy on ground. The vehicle is equipped with cameras which allows the crew to operate in the safe environment from within the vehicle. The IDF employs Namer to provide protection by establishing a security cordon around the combat engineers who undertake the task of demolishing underground infrastructure.43       

Having secured the area of operation, the IDF maps the structure either by using ‘exploding gel’ or other technologies. Thereafter, it has an option of either demolish the underground infrastructure using explosives or flood it with sea water. 

IDF uses ‘Exploding Gel’ to Map Underground Infrastructure

The ‘exploding gel’ is used to map the underground structure. Having located the entrance to the tunnels, the army engineers fill the passage with ‘exploding gel’ and fire it using detonators. The smoke travels the passage way and is used to map the underground infrastructure and also cause casualties to anyone inside the tunnels. The composition of the gel is classified and is brought in trucks because the scale in which it is used is huge. Several tons of gel are required every few hundred metres.44 

The tunnel system runs for hundreds of kilometres. It is unclear how cost and resource effective this technology is.

IDF Deploys Pumps to Flood the Tunnels

The IDF maintains a tunnel flooding plan. In the middle of November 2023, it deployed five very large capacity pumps, approximately three kilometres north of Al-Shati refugee camp. Each of these pumps is reported to have capacity to draw thousands of cubic meters of water per hour from the Mediterranean Sea and flood the tunnels within weeks.45 On 12 December, The Wall Street Journal reported “Israel’s military has begun pumping seawater into Hamas’s vast complex of tunnels in Gaza.”46

It is still unclear how effective this tactic will be to achieve its intended objective of demolishing the underground infrastructure. The plan, however, has a downside since it is likely to contaminate Gaza’s fresh water supply.47

Conclusion

Hamas has expended a large percentage of its resources—money, material, and man-hours —to develop the subterranean infrastructure as a counter to technological and resource superiority of the IDF. It is the pivot around which Hamas’s defensive and offensive operations are planned and executed. The IDF, on the other hand, has been working to develop newer and more effective counters, however, there are yet to achieve the desired result. The ongoing Israel–Hamas war will bring out several new lessons of interest to Indian Army. 

The concept of COG originally advanced by Clausewitz applied to conventional wars fought by regular armies. The world today faces challenge from religious and ideologically motivated non-state actors and the concept does not provide adequate explanation when planning operations against such organisations. This aspect requires greater deliberation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• About the author: Rajneesh Singh is Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
• Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrrikar IDSA
• 1.Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, UnHerd, 17 October 2023.
• 2.Jacob Knutson, “What to Know About Hamas’ Tunnel System Beneath Gaza”, Axios, 19 October 2023.
• 3.Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas’s Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged”, The Jerusalem Post, 27 May 2021. 
• 4.Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Hamas’s Asymmetric Advantage: What Does It Mean to Defeat a Terrorist Group?”, Foreign Affairs, 22 November 2023.
• 5.John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, Modern War Institute, 17 October 2023.
• 6.“ “What’s the Endgame of an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza?”, NPR, 17 October 2023.
• 7.Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations”, CSR Report for Congress, 1 February 2008.
• 8.Jacob Knutson, “What to Know About Hamas’ Tunnel System Beneath Gaza”, no. 2.
• 9.“The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza – A Hidden Frontline for Israel”, The Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2023.
• 10.Raoul Wootliff and Stuart Wine, “Hamas Airs Video of Captive Gilad Shalit, Hours After Releasing Photo”, The Times of Israel, 30 December 2015.
• 11.“The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza – A Hidden Frontline for Israel”, no. 9.
• 12.Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas’s Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged”, no. 3.
• 13.Marco Hernandez and Josh Holder, “The Tunnels of Gaza”, The New York Times, 10 November 2023.
• 14.Dov Lieber, “Israeli Military Reveals Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack”, The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2023.
• 15.Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IDF Turns Yahya Sinwar’s Home to Dust in Gaza’s Khan Yunis”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 December 2023.
• 16.Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, “IDF says the 162nd Division is operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City…”, X (formerly Twitter), 9 November 2023.
• 17.Yonah Jeremy Bob, “‘Post’ Joins Israeli Forces in Hamas’s Gaza Tunnel Underworld”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 November 2023.
• 18.“Watch: Israeli Army Displays Hamas Tunnel Under Gaza Hospital”, NDTV, 23 November 2023.
• 19.Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson and Nicholas Carl, “Iran Update, December 17, 2023”, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 17 December 2023.
• 20.Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, “IDF says the 162nd Division is operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City…”, no. 16.
• 21.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited/translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, pp. 595–596.
• 22.U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has described civilians in Gaza, the center of gravity. See Phil Stewart, “Civilians are ‘Center of Gravity’ in Gaza War: US Defense Secretary”, Reuters, 3 December 2023.
• 23.“What’s the Endgame of an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza?”, NPR, no. 6. 
• 24.John A. Warden, The Air Campaign (revised edn), Excel Press, Lincoln, 2000.
• 25.John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal,Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 40–55, 1995.
• 26. Lina Alshawabkeh, “Hamas: Who are the Group’s Most Prominent Leaders?”, BBC News, 17 October 2023.
• 27.John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal, no. 25, p. 50.
• 28.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by J.J. Graham, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London, 1908, Volume I, Book Six, p. 354.
• 29.Eystein L. Meyer, “The Centre of Gravity Concept: contemporary Theories, Comparison, and Implications”, Defence Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 332–333, 2022.
• 30.Antulio Echevarria II,Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine– again!, Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 12–13.
• 31.Ibid., p. 15.
• 32.Daniel R. DePetris, “Israel’s Gaza Problem”, RUSI, 1 November 2023.
• 33.Arie Egozi, “Israelis Test Classified Tunnel Tech To Stymie Terrorists; US Watches”, Breaking Defense, 13 August 2019.
• 34.Ibid.
• 35.John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, Modern War Institute, 17 October 2023.
• 36.Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, no. 1.
• 37.Michael Biesecker and Sarah El Deeb, “Hamas Practiced in Plain Sight, Posting Video of Mock Attack Weeks Before Border Breach”, AP, 14 October 2023.
• 38.“This is the IDF’s Plan to Combat Hamas Terror Tunnels”, The Israel Defence Forces, 27 November 2016.
• 39.Sneha Swaminathan, “Israeli Canine Unit ‘Oketz’ Helped Rescue 200 lives, Neutralise 10 Hamas Terrorists”, WION, 15 October 2023.
• 40.John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, no. 35.
• 41.“Ex-IDF Deputy Chief: Soldiers Won’t Enter the Tunnels, Will Turn them into Hamas Death Traps Without Going In”, The Times of Israel, 3 November 2023.
• 42.With Mapping Robots and Blast Gel, Israel Wages War on Hamas Tunnels”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 November 2023.
• 43.Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, no. 1.
• 44.“With Mapping Robots and Blast Gel, Israel Wages War on Hamas Tunnels”, no. 42.
• 45.Nancy A. Youssef, Warren P. Strobel and Gordon Lubold, “Israel Weighs Plan to Flood Gaza Tunnels With Seawater”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2023.
• 46.Nancy A. Youssef, Carrie Keller-Lynn, Michael R. Gordon and Dov Lieber, “Israel Begins Pumping Seawater Into Hamas’s Gaza Tunnels”, The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2023.
• 47.In 2015, Egypt had flooded 10 tunnels dug beneath the Gaza–Egypt border. See “Steinitz: ‘Egypt Floods Hamas Tunnels, in part due to Israel’s Request’”, The Jerusalem Post, 6 February 2016.

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Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

21. Best way to avoid war is to not be phased by Xi

Conclusion:

The best way to avoid war is for Taiwan not to be intimidated by Xi, and deepen and strengthen relations with other like-minded countries, so it could be accepted as a full and equal member in the international community.

Fri, Dec 29, 2023 page8

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/12/29/2003811301

Best way to avoid war is to not be phased by Xi

• By Gerrit van der Wees
• 
  
•  
•  
• For Taiwan, the threat of a conflict with China is a major issue in the run-up to the Jan. 13 elections. Over the past few years, Beijing has stirred up tensions, made threatening military moves and has continued increasingly offensive incursions with fighter jets and ships across the median line of the Taiwan Strait and into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.
• The threatening posture was made clear when on Tuesday, during a speech to commemorate the 130th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) birth, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) said he would “resolutely prevent anyone from splitting Taiwan from China in any way,” and that “the motherland must be reunified, and inevitably will be reunified.”
• Xi forgets to mention that Mao earlier in life had advocated for Taiwan’s independence. In Red Star Over China, US writer Edgar Snow quoted Mao in 1937 as saying: “We will extend them [the Koreans] our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan.”
• Xi also seems to forget that Taiwan has not been a part of China for more than a century and prior to that, China’s claim was dubious at best. While the ancestors of most of Taiwan’s current inhabitants came from coastal provinces of China, they intermarried with indigenous inhabitants and gradually developed their own identity.
• Most importantly, Taiwanese have worked hard to achieve their democracy and are not willing to let that be taken away. Through their words and actions, they must make clear to Xi that Taiwan’s future is to be decided by Taiwanese alone, based on principles of self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter.
• So, what choices could and should Taiwanese make to avoid a conflict and work toward peaceful coexistence with China?
• History shows that appeasing repressive regimes never works: It only grows the tyrant’s appetite for more concessions.
• On the contrary, it is essential to maintain a steady course, remain firm on principles of democracy and human rights, and build alliances with like-minded countries.
• President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has kept a cool head, built up Taiwan’s own deterrence by developing defensive capabilities and significantly strengthened Taiwan’s ties with the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and European countries.
• Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate, Vice President William Lai (賴清德), together with former representative to the US, Hsiao Bikhim (蕭美琴), are be expected to continue this policy. Their presidential ticket represents the best guarantee of stability. Xi might not like it and might make waves, but putting up with elevated tension in the short term might be necessary to ensure long-term peace.
• In another aspect: Many young Taiwanese do not seem to care much for the “ideological” debates between the DPP and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). They would prefer it if more attention were given to daily life issues such as adequate wages and affordable housing.
• Those issues can and should be resolved under a democratic system of governance.
• However, if China gains irreversible control of the political system, those issues become moot — as we have seen in Hong Kong, where Beijing is now in full control via local proxies.
• The best way to avoid war is for Taiwan not to be intimidated by Xi, and deepen and strengthen relations with other like-minded countries, so it could be accepted as a full and equal member in the international community.
• Gerrit van der Wees is a former Dutch diplomat who teaches Taiwan history and US relations with East Asia at George Mason University, and previously taught at the George Washington University Elliott School for International Affairs in Washington.

22. From force structure to lethality, Army poised to unveil key decisions: 2024 preview

What is curious is that no political leaders in the Administration seem to be phased by the size of the Army (e.g., the smallest that it has been since WWII). I have heard some talk that there are some who are pleased with the declining size due to recruiting shortfalls because no political leaders have to make a decision about cuts to the size of the Army and the military writ large. Something they want to happen but do not want to be responsible for the decisions to make it so and; therefore, are pleased that the "decision" is being "made" by the American people (who do not want to volunteer for military service).  While I am sure those feelings exist among some, I find it hard to believe that any national security professional of any political persuasion could actually think this is good given the global security challenges we face.

Excerpts:

When it comes to sheer numbers though, those coming 12 months will continue testing the service’s ability to recruit new soldiers to fill its ranks. As of mid-December, the Army had not yet disclosed just how many recruits it’s aiming to bring in the door for fiscal 2024, but the past couple of years have proven challenging. For FY23, for example, the service met its end-strength of goal of 452,000 for active-duty soldiers thanks to stronger retention numbers. However, it was 10,000 recruits short of its 65,000 goal.

Army leaders, including George, have unveiled recruitment strategy changes that could begin bearing fruit in the new year, but they aren’t banking on a quick turnaround. Instead, they anticipated to unveil force structure cuts in 2024 that may include reducing the number of special forces, a group that has grown over the past two decades due to the ballooning of demand for counter-terrorism and anti-insurgent capabilities.

From force structure to lethality, Army poised to unveil key decisions: 2024 preview - Breaking Defense

A trio of new longer range missiles could also be in soldiers’ hands over the next dozen months.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · December 27, 2023

Army soldiers fire an M777 howitzer during a training exercise at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington. (US Army/ Sidney Lee)

WASHINGTON – When the clock strikes midnight ushering in 2024, it does so with a new US Army chief in place honing in publicly on lethality, and several looming aviation and artillery decisions.

Army Chief Gen. Randy George will be just over three months into his official tenure as the service uniformed head when January 2024 kicks off, and the year could provide insights into his vow to focus on warfighting, from how it organizes to the weapons mix.

When it comes to sheer numbers though, those coming 12 months will continue testing the service’s ability to recruit new soldiers to fill its ranks. As of mid-December, the Army had not yet disclosed just how many recruits it’s aiming to bring in the door for fiscal 2024, but the past couple of years have proven challenging. For FY23, for example, the service met its end-strength of goal of 452,000 for active-duty soldiers thanks to stronger retention numbers. However, it was 10,000 recruits short of its 65,000 goal.

Army leaders, including George, have unveiled recruitment strategy changes that could begin bearing fruit in the new year, but they aren’t banking on a quick turnaround. Instead, they anticipated to unveil force structure cuts in 2024 that may include reducing the number of special forces, a group that has grown over the past two decades due to the ballooning of demand for counter-terrorism and anti-insurgent capabilities.

[This article is one of many in a series in which Breaking Defense reporters look back on the most significant (and entertaining) news stories of 2023 and look forward to what 2024 may hold.]

The coming year will also mean the return of the Army’s Project Convergence capstone demonstration with its sister services and foreign militaries. The 2024 event is expected to be filled with new foreign participants, weapons and technologies, and also include ballistic missile defense tests.

A trio of new longer range missiles could also be in soldiers’ hands over the next dozen months.

In the deployment category, US Army Pacific commander Gen. Charles Flynn told reporters in November the service plans to send its first Mid-Range Capability (MRC) long-range launcher to the Indo-Pacific region next year.

Also known as Typhon, the land-based system is designed to launch Raytheon’s existing SM-6 missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles to hit targets between the Precision Strike Missile’s (PrSM’s) planned 500-kilometer range and the 2,776 kilometer reach of the future Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW).

The four-star general did not disclose if this new launcher would be heading to foreign soil or if it was bound for Guam, a US territory.

Flynn’s area of responsibility could also be receiving the Army’s new PrSM next year. The service began accepting delivery of PrSM Increment 1 this month in anticipation of an upcoming fielding.

In addition to the Typhon deployment and PrSM fielding, 2024 might be the year the Army fields a hypersonic missile, that is if it can fix a mechanical engineering problem with the launcher and the missile works as planned.

After a series of testing setbacks in recent years, the Army conceded it would not be able to get the weapon into soldiers’ hands in 2023. The new plan is to decouple launcher and missile testing so delays with one won’t slow down the other, Doug Bush, the head of Army acquisition, told Breaking Defense on Dec. 2.

It will also focus on smaller scale, subcomponent testing in order to “build confidence over time” and ensure that the Army has fixed its launcher problem, he added. In tandem, the Army and Navy have tentative plans for concurrent missile testing.

If testing proceeds as planned, by April or May 2024 the service may be ready to attempt another full-up test, and a successful one could lead to declaring the weapon operational.

The new year also means yet another budget request and the one for FY25 is anticipated to shed some light on a few Army decisions, including just what to do about the CH–47F Chinook Block II. It’s been more than four years since the Army put the brakes on buying that configuration, which seeks to improve speed and cargo capacity over the Block I. Army aviation leaders are exploring just what they want and need from a future heavy-lift helicopter and a Block II decision is expected to be reflected in that FY25 budget request.

Those budget documents are also expected to reflect findings from a new tactical fires study, and drive changes to the service’s entire artillery portfolio from towed and wheeled cannons, to the munitions they fire.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · December 27, 2023

23. Army numbers smallest since WWII — what units face cuts in 2024?

Army numbers smallest since WWII — what units face cuts in 2024?

Defense News · by Davis Winkie · December 28, 2023

The new year will likely prove to be one of significant force structure changes for the Army, according to its senior leaders.

Although the service has maintained for years that embracing multidomain operations will require it to “transform” its force structure into one leaders believe is suited to tomorrow’s battlefield, back-to-back recruiting shortfalls led top officials to admit by mid-to-late 2023 that some pending cuts are influenced by a deepening numbers shortfall. The Army finished fiscal year 2023 with only 452,000 active duty soldiers, its smallest force since 1940.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told Army Times in June that the service will see reductions to “close-combat forces” that were purpose-built for the War on Terror, in addition to other organizations based on their purpose or other factors like deployment rates.

RELATED

Exclusive: Army secretary talks force structure cuts, SOF ‘reform’

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth spoke with Army Times about how and where the service will make its cuts.

Controversy erupted in October following a Wall Street Journal report suggesting that 3,000 Army special operations troops could be cut. According to other media reports, the special operations community and Army leadership disagreed about the potential reductions, ultimately requiring mediation from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Although details on the cuts are scarce, service and special operations officials briefed Congress on the matter in October. The briefing included “Army structure changes, to include [special operations forces],” according to a congressional staffer, who spoke on condition their name not be used in order to discuss the private briefing. A significant portion of the special operations cuts are expected to fall on hard-to-fill empty billets, a defense official told Army Times in October.

The cuts are intended to ensure the Army doesn’t become “hollow,” says Wormuth, deploying a term coined during the post-Vietnam era when some units existed on paper rather than in real life.

Military Times Deputy Editor Leo Shane III contributed to this report.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie covers the Army for Military Times. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill, and served five years in the Army Guard. His investigations earned the Society of Professional Journalists' 2023 Sunshine Award and consecutive Military Reporters and Editors honors, among others. Davis was also a 2022 Livingston Awards finalist.

24. How Israel Could Lose America

Excerpts:

Israel desperately needs to prioritize national security over politics.

Finally, and most urgently, Israel needs to formulate a clear position on the Palestinian issue. When the state of Israel was created 75 years ago, it had to fight off threats to its survival; today, Israel’s stewards must articulate a coherent vision of its ultimate destination. Otherwise, they will struggle to convince the United States and other countries to remain by Israel’s side. Netanyahu must lift his embargo on genuine discussion—within his government and with the Biden administration—of what will come after the Gaza conflict, and define not only what Israel will not countenance but also what outcomes it will accept. The prime minister has rebuffed attempts to have this conversation for fear of destabilizing his ruling coalition. Biden has expressed his frustration with this situation, commenting on December 12 that Netanyahu “has to change,” but the “government in Israel is making it very difficult.”

Whether Israel wants one state, two states, or something else, its leaders and citizens need to decide on a course soon. They should recognize also that, no matter what their decision—and it is their decision alone to make—it will have consequences not only for Israel itself but also for its essential relationship with the United States. If the United States were to become sufficiently disenchanted with Israeli policies that Washington imposed conditions on the provision of U.S. military assistance, Israel could find its operating environment drastically restricted. The Biden administration’s recent delay of the export of more than 20,000 M-16 rifles intended for Israeli civil defense teams because of U.S. concerns about settler violence in the West Bank could be a harbinger of further impediments.

With Hamas vowing to replicate the savagery of October 7 until Israel is “annihilated,” Hezbollah escalating its attacks across Israel’s border with Lebanon, Yemen’s Houthis disrupting Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia still dangling the prospect of normalization, Israel’s next moves could be the difference between deepening violence and progress toward peace.

How Israel Could Lose America

Netanyahu Risks Letting the War in Gaza Jeopardize an Essential Alliance

By Shalom Lipner

December 29, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Shalom Lipner · December 29, 2023

Israelis are still reeling from the devastating effects of the most colossal intelligence and operational failure in their country’s 75-year history. Israel’s long-held assumption that “smart fences” and the generous flow of foreign money would keep Hamas contained has unraveled. The October 7 raid on southern Israel left staggering numbers of victims—almost 1,200 dead, thousands wounded, more than 240 abducted and taken to the Gaza Strip as hostages, and hundreds of thousands displaced. Israel’s national trauma will endure for the foreseeable future.

In the immediate aftermath of the assault, the Israeli government declared an emergency mobilization of the Israel Defense Forces, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu committing to “finish” a war that Israelis “didn’t want.” Now approaching its three-month mark, Operation Swords of Iron—as the Israeli military action in Gaza was initially dubbed—continues unabated, after a brief hiatus in late November during which 105 civilians were freed from Hamas captivity. Netanyahu has announced that the campaign’s aims are to eliminate Hamas, recover all the kidnapped Israeli citizens, and ensure that no element in Gaza can threaten Israel again. But the timetable for the completion of the ambitious IDF offensive remains nebulous, as do the contours of a feasible endgame for Gaza.

What is abundantly clear, however, is that Israel’s latitude to pursue its stated war objectives would be vastly constrained were it not for the emphatic support of the United States. As the fighting persists and gaps emerge between the U.S. and Israeli positions, Israel has strong reasons to invest in keeping its primary alliance intact. To ensure that its bond with the United States survives this war, Israel must not only manage the current military campaign judiciously but also tackle domestic political problems and determine once and for all how it plans to settle its conflict with the Palestinians.

SWITCHING GEARS

The present chapter in the decades-long relationship between Netanyahu, who returned for his latest stint as Israel’s prime minister last December, and U.S. President Joe Biden got off to a rocky start. Biden—who has often recalled signing a photo for Netanyahu with the words “I don’t agree with a damn thing you say but I love you”—waited four conspicuous weeks after his inauguration before calling the Israeli leader. Many viewed the delay as payback for Netanyahu’s procrastination in congratulating Biden for defeating President Donald Trump in 2020. (When Netanyahu finally called Biden, Trump blasted the prime minister for exhibiting a lack of loyalty.)

The Biden administration made no secret of its dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s choice of coalition partners from Israel’s extreme right—most notably, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—promising to hold the prime minister personally accountable for the actions of his government. It was not long before Washington acted on that pledge. In January 2023, when Ben-Gvir ascended the Temple Mount, a sensitive religious site that houses the al Aqsa mosque, during his first days in office, U.S. officials sharply condemned the move and eschewed direct engagement with Ben-Gvir. Tensions escalated later that same week, after Justice Minister Yariv Levin unveiled controversial plans for a drastic overhaul of Israel’s judicial system.

Fallout from the apparent disconnect between the U.S. and Israeli governments was particularly embarrassing to Netanyahu, a politician who prides himself on a superior understanding of American politics. The premier was left waiting by his mailbox for a coveted invitation to the White House; he is the first Israeli prime minister in more than 50 years to have been denied an Oval Office meeting during the first year of his term. Smotrich, for his part, was treated as persona non grata when he visited Washington in March. He and Ben-Gvir have been shunned by bipartisan congressional delegations to Israel and, together with other members of their factions, excluded from the guest list for the annual Fourth of July reception hosted by the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem.

Clashes between the Netanyahu government and the Biden administration over the intended transformation of Israel’s judiciary also spilled regularly into public view. In January 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken—on his first trip to Israel since the country’s November 2022 election—added quality time with civil society representatives to his itinerary, giving a morale boost to critics of Netanyahu’s agenda and delivering a not-so-subtle hint of U.S. concern about the fate of Israeli democracy.

Israel’s latitude would be constrained were it not for emphatic U.S. support.

The White House expressed similar misgivings. Speaking in June at a celebration of Israel’s 75 years of independence, Vice President Kamala Harris pointedly highlighted “strong institutions, checks and balances, and . . . an independent judiciary” as pillars of democracy in both the United States and Israel. Eli Cohen, Israel’s foreign minister, retorted hours later that Harris probably had not even read the proposed law and that she would not be able to identify a single component of the reform that “bothers her.”

The brutal events of October 7 reset this caustic cycle. Animosities between Biden and Netanyahu did not disappear, but sympathy for Israel’s predicament overrode lingering disagreements. Biden, arriving in Israel on October 18 as the first-ever U.S. president to visit the country amid a war, promised the people of Israel that the United States would “stand with” them. “We’ll walk beside you in those dark days, and we’ll walk beside you in the good days to come,” Biden vowed.

On the whole, U.S. officials have maintained their backing of IDF operations in Gaza, deferring often to Israeli prerogatives. Blinken, asked on December 10 when he expected the IDF to conclude its military campaign, responded bluntly, “these are decisions for Israel to make.” On December 8, casting a veto of a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, the U.S. deputy ambassador reasoned that such a halt would “only plant the seeds for the next war, because Hamas has no desire to see a durable peace.” Washington has issued periodic admonitions, such as Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s assertion on December 2 that “protecting Palestinian civilians in Gaza is both a moral duty and a strategic imperative.” But such comments have not diluted the overall impact of a U.S. policy that—as Austin also confirmed—upholds “Israel’s bedrock right to defend itself.”

Biden has preferred to embrace Israel in public and convey U.S. reservations in private conversations with Israeli leaders, evidently reckoning that this strategy grants him more influence over Israel’s calculus than a confrontational approach would. The president’s personal appeals have yielded some results by, for example, helping persuade Israel to abort plans for a preemptive strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon in the days after Hamas’s initial attack. Skeptics of Biden’s methods point to the scale of the destruction the IDF has inflicted in Gaza, despite the efforts of U.S. backroom diplomacy—but the United States is also acting on its vested interest in Israel’s success at routing Hamas, which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization. Either way, Israel has benefited significantly from its ally’s friendship.

FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

The United States’ attachment to Israel has evolved gradually since President Harry Truman’s recognition of the Jewish state on May 14, 1948. It was not until the 1960s, under President John F. Kennedy, that Washington began to provide military hardware to Israel. Shipments of Hawk antimissile batteries were soon followed, under Kennedy’s successor, President Lyndon Johnson, by M-48 Patton battle tanks, A-4 Skyhawk light attack aircraft, and F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers. The first explicit U.S. pledge to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge—an assurance of Israel’s military superiority over its rivals—came in a 1982 letter from President Ronald Reagan to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

U.S.-Israeli cooperation has been turbulent at times, but it has maintained a steady upward trajectory. U.S. security, diplomatic, and economic assistance has bolstered Israel’s position in a volatile region. Having a “big brother” over its shoulder has enabled Israel to punch above its demographic weight and geographic size, projecting strength well beyond its borders. And the United States’ commitment to Israel has endured through both Democratic and Republican presidents, including the most recent holders of that office.

As president, Trump formally acknowledged Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Golan Heights as sovereign Israeli territory. His actions affirmed a broad consensus among Israelis and sent a formidable message to neighboring countries about U.S. support for Israel. Trump’s “Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and a Brighter Future for Israel and the Palestinian People”—a plan that most Israelis expected to fail—never led to U.S. acceptance of the Netanyahu government’s aspiration to extend Israeli sovereignty throughout the West Bank, but it became the catalyst for the Abraham Accords, which brought Israel’s surreptitious ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain into the open. Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE’s ambassador to the United States and an engineer of the deal, explained the logic in 2021: “The reason it happened, the way it happened, at the time it happened was to prevent annexation.”

Pro-Palestine demonstrators at a protest in Washington, D.C., December 2023

Tom Brenner / REUTERS

This is not to say U.S.-Israeli relations were without problems. In 2017, Trump divulged Israeli intelligence to Russia, possibly revealing sensitive collection methods. He repeatedly accused American Jews who vote for Democratic candidates of being “disloyal to Jewish people and very disloyal to Israel,” not only entrenching Israel as a wedge issue and jeopardizing bipartisan sponsorship of close U.S.-Israeli ties but also stoking anti-Semitism. And his unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal without an alternative plan to stymie Iran’s race to acquire nuclear weapons only accelerated Tehran’s progress. Netanyahu encouraged Trump’s decision at the time, but that move has, arguably, made Israel less secure today.

Despite early frictions, the Biden administration’s support for Israel since October 7—expressed in words and deeds—has been uncontestable. U.S. civilian and military officials have been constant fixtures in Israel, often participating in consultations with Israel’s war cabinet. The United States has sent Israel multiple airlifts of bombs and other munitions to replace its depleted inventories. Washington has also intervened to block UN Security Council resolutions that would sanction Israel or insist that the IDF end its mission in Gaza, called attention to the plight of the hostages being held by Hamas, and worked to secure their freedom. It has demanded that other countries condemn the acts of sexual violence that Hamas’s fighters committed against Israeli girls and women.

Speaking at the White House on October 10, Biden warned Israel’s enemies not to join forces with Hamas. “To any country, any organization, anyone thinking of taking advantage of this situation,” he said, “I have one word: Don’t.” Among the chorus of world leaders who have urged similar caution, Biden was the only one who deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups and other military assets to reinforce the warning. The president’s steadfast support has been all the more remarkable as the United States enters an election year, given the vocal criticism of Biden’s Israel policy in some quarters of his own party.

Biden has preferred to embrace Israel in public and convey U.S. reservations in private.

On the other hand, differences have begun to emerge between U.S. perspectives and Israel’s operational priorities. As the fighting in Gaza continues, the United States has lobbied on behalf of “tactical humanitarian pauses,” which—as happened during the truce from November 24 to December 1—would give Hamas time to reestablish internal lines of communication and reposition its forces for additional attacks on IDF troops and missile launches on Israeli cities. (Israel’s government has been amenable to these pauses, another of which is now under negotiation, only for the sake of facilitating hostage releases.) Hamas has also exploited U.S. appeals for Israel to allow more food, fuel, and other aid into Gaza. Although civilian needs are pressing, the terrorist group has been caught commandeering this aid to sustain its hold on power. Biden’s objections to “indiscriminate bombing” by the Israeli Air Force and to the high numbers of civilian casualties in Gaza have compelled Israel to recalibrate the IDF offensive, which some Israeli leaders allege has prolonged its duration and exposed Israeli soldiers to heightened danger.

Overall, however, Israel has gained much from its partnership with the United States. The Abraham Accords advanced the formal integration of Israel into the Middle East, altering the regional map in ways that enhance Israel’s security. Although combat in Gaza has slowed the pace of normalization, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE have all indicated that they do not intend to abandon their connections with Israel. And Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, in a meeting with U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on December 13, expressed interest in the idea of eventually joining their ranks.

The United States’ material and political cover has also been essential to Israel’s ability to restore its lost deterrence after the disaster of October 7. “You may be strong enough on your own to defend yourself—but as long as America exists, you will never, ever have to,” Blinken said in a message to the Israeli people on October 12. The secretary’s precise balance between validating Israel’s independent capabilities and reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its welfare illustrates why Israel cannot afford to lose its best friend.

NO GUARANTEES

Israelis have always attributed staunch U.S. support for their country to a set of shared values—including freedom, pluralism, and democracy—and interests, such as the promotion of peace and stability. That ground is shifting now, especially as younger Americans express dramatically less affinity for Israel than older generations. Joe Biden, who has asserted often that “you don’t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist,” may well be the last Democratic president with impeccable pro-Israeli credentials.

This trend should, and does, worry Israel. The stark reality is that the country has no viable alternative to the succor of the United States. Hedging its bets, as other Middle Eastern countries have done, by building relationships with China and Russia—permanent members of the UN Security Council that have both taken the side of Hamas—is not an option for Israel. And lately, even Biden himself has begun to qualify his statements about the war in Gaza. In a speech on December 12, he affirmed that “Israel’s security can rest on the United States,” but he added that Israel is “starting to lose” its support in other parts of the world. Harris, meanwhile, has advocated a “tougher” line in Washington’s dealings with Netanyahu.

Rather than trying to close this distance from the United States, Netanyahu might actually be seeking to spark a row with Washington in order to improve his own job prospects as his approval ratings plummet. “A prime minister who cannot withstand American pressure should not enter the prime minister’s office,” Netanyahu announced to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on December 11. But engaging in public brawls with the United States is the last thing Israel needs right now. To avoid a future in which Israel is forced to resist existential perils without recourse to U.S. military arsenals or UN Security Council vetoes, Israeli policymakers must change tack.

Israel has no viable alternative to the succor of the United States.

First, they must take care in prosecuting the Gaza campaign. The inclusion of opposition party members in the war cabinet was a responsible step in that direction. As the war proceeds, the IDF should pursue its aims—which Israelis overwhelmingly endorse—as quickly as possible while minimizing collateral damage and the injury of innocents. To that end, the IDF chain of command should be meticulous in identifying legitimate operational targets, authorizing attacks only when those standards are met. It should also continue to implement ethical protocols for combat. Demonstrating professionalism and integrity will help Israel avoid a repeat of the 2006 war in Lebanon, when the absence of an unambiguous Israeli victory prompted U.S. President George W. Bush to conclude that Israel “mishandled [its] opportunity” to land a decisive blow against Hezbollah and its masters in Iran and Syria.

Israel desperately needs to prioritize national security over politics. A supplementary 2023 budget passed on December 14, which was meant to cover the unanticipated expense of the war in Gaza, diverted precious funds to unrelated bureaucracies—including the Ministry of Jerusalem and Heritage and the Ministry of Settlement and National Missions—to satisfy key constituencies of the Netanyahu coalition instead. There is widespread concern that the 2024 budget will follow the same pattern of allocating resources for political patronage to religious parties at the same time that the United States is being called upon to help offset the costs of the war.

Netanyahu also canceled cabinet votes to approve the transfer of tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority and to allow Palestinian laborers from the West Bank to return to work in Israel—the IDF; the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency; and the National Security Council all favor the employment measure, under certain stipulations—in order to avoid tangling with hard-line ministers whose incendiary statements and actions he generally tolerates. The prime minister’s own use of inflammatory rhetoric to shore up his lagging poll numbers, moreover, is sowing divisiveness while Israelis mourn their dead. Repairing Israel’s broken social contract, which had previously enabled its diverse society to coalesce around shared Jewish and democratic principles, and holding new parliamentary elections as soon as the security situation permits are two obvious ways to restore confidence in the country’s elected leadership among both Israeli citizens and Israel’s external backers.

Israel desperately needs to prioritize national security over politics.

Finally, and most urgently, Israel needs to formulate a clear position on the Palestinian issue. When the state of Israel was created 75 years ago, it had to fight off threats to its survival; today, Israel’s stewards must articulate a coherent vision of its ultimate destination. Otherwise, they will struggle to convince the United States and other countries to remain by Israel’s side. Netanyahu must lift his embargo on genuine discussion—within his government and with the Biden administration—of what will come after the Gaza conflict, and define not only what Israel will not countenance but also what outcomes it will accept. The prime minister has rebuffed attempts to have this conversation for fear of destabilizing his ruling coalition. Biden has expressed his frustration with this situation, commenting on December 12 that Netanyahu “has to change,” but the “government in Israel is making it very difficult.”

Whether Israel wants one state, two states, or something else, its leaders and citizens need to decide on a course soon. They should recognize also that, no matter what their decision—and it is their decision alone to make—it will have consequences not only for Israel itself but also for its essential relationship with the United States. If the United States were to become sufficiently disenchanted with Israeli policies that Washington imposed conditions on the provision of U.S. military assistance, Israel could find its operating environment drastically restricted. The Biden administration’s recent delay of the export of more than 20,000 M-16 rifles intended for Israeli civil defense teams because of U.S. concerns about settler violence in the West Bank could be a harbinger of further impediments.

With Hamas vowing to replicate the savagery of October 7 until Israel is “annihilated,” Hezbollah escalating its attacks across Israel’s border with Lebanon, Yemen’s Houthis disrupting Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia still dangling the prospect of normalization, Israel’s next moves could be the difference between deepening violence and progress toward peace.

• SHALOM LIPNER is Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive Premiers at the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.

Foreign Affairs · by Shalom Lipner · December 29, 2023

25. In 2024, will the Navy again reassess increasing demands on the surface force?

In 2024, will the Navy again reassess increasing demands on the surface force? - Breaking Defense

The conflict in Gaza has drawn the US Navy's surface forces into an extended missile and drone defense mission to support the Israeli Defense Forces.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · December 28, 2023

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) defeats a combination of Houthi missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aaron Lau)

WASHINGTON — In 2017, the US Navy was forced to reckon with the demands put on its surface ship crews following the tragic and fatal collisions involving the destroyers John S. McCain (DDG-56) and Fitzgerald (DDG-62). Seven years later, I think the Navy in 2024 may once again have to confront its operational tempo requirements.

The impetus for that examination could come from the unexpected obligations the fleet now faces in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The crews of the Carney (DDG-64), Mason (DDG-87) and Thomas Hudner (DDG-116), all of which are being supported by other American ships in the region, in recent weeks have shot down or intercepted dozens of drones and missiles suspected of being deployed by enemies of Israel, which finds itself in a vicious ground conflict with Hamas.

[This article is one of many in a series in which Breaking Defense reporters look back on the most significant (and entertaining) news stories of 2023 and look forward to what 2024 may hold.]

Whether the United States is officially a party to the war in Gaza is a question best left to others. But here’s what is plainly clear: US Navy warships are actively protecting Israeli forces by being on station, and if the service can’t maintain its presence in the region’s waters, for readiness reasons or otherwise, it will only stand to benefit Israel’s adversaries.

This pressure, in turn, could serve as a catalyst to test whether the Navy truly embraced the lessons from the 2017 ship collisions, both in terms of individual sailor readiness and more broadly, ship maintenance.

One of the root causes for the 2017 collisions was the Navy’s surface force being regularly worked to exhaustion, which in turn led to numerous errors on the crews’ parts that cascaded into tragedy. That so many sailors lost their lives as a result was nothing short of tragic. And those were ships that weren’t in active combat zones.

Now, in Mediterranean and Red Seas, US Navy ships have engaged at least five drones or missiles thought to be deployed by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in a single day. In other words, these ships and their crews are not just present, but very much in harm’s way. And it’s not just the crews’ well-being that will be cause for concern as the conflict drags on.

Steve Wills, of the Center for Maritime Strategy, told me if the Navy hopes to stay on station in the Middle East to continue fending off missiles and drones bound for Israel, that mission will require “regular rotations of ships.”

“Those missions have an impact on overall Navy readiness for other potential zones of conflict like the Indo-Pacific,” he added.

The Navy’s issues with timely ship maintenance are well documented by organizations such as the Government Accountability Office. But the need to help protect the country’s biggest ally in the Middle East will bring new urgency to ensuring new ships and crews are ready to depart the US when the time comes for Ford, Carney, Mason and others to return home.

As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, it is nearly impossible to predict how long conflicts like these will last. Prior to Russia’s invasion, the lion’s share of defense analysts seemed convinced Kyiv would not withstand a Russian onslaught for more than a few days. Now, here we are, more than two years later with no clear end to that war in sight.

How the Navy copes with the normal demands of ship maintenance, the extended deployments that the conflict in Gaza brings while the Navy maintains its presence in the Indo-Pacific will all be on this reporter’s watch list for the new year.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · December 28, 2023

26. New planes, budget constraints and great power competition: 2024 air preview

New planes, budget constraints and great power competition: 2024 air preview - Breaking Defense

The Air Force has big plans for 2024, but lawmakers could throw a wrench into them.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · December 28, 2023

Frank Kendall, Air For secretary, speaks at the annual Air Force Association conference in Sept. 2021. (AFA)

WASHINGTON — Whether it’s a new sixth-generation fighter or uncrewed wingmen that could join a jet in battle, 2024 is shaping up to be a vital year for the future airpower of the Air Force — an evolution service Secretary Frank Kendall has emphasized is critical in a peer competition with China.

A key part of the Air Force’s rush to modernize consists of fielding several new technologies, but a crucial part of its strategy also requires divesting several old platforms. Junking old tech that in many cases isn’t suitable for modern combat, Air Force leaders argue, will free up dollars and manpower for other priorities.

Many of the Air Force’s objectives will be at a critical juncture in 2024, and congressional action — or inaction — will play a big role in deciding the service’s future. Lawmakers are on board with many of the Air Force’s efforts, but are poised to block the service’s attempts to offload several platforms. An impasse on the fiscal 2024 budget that has resulted in a renewed continuing resolution (CR) is also destined to stretch into the new year, much to military leaders’ chagrin.

Out With The Old

The Air Force’s plans to retire several platforms are a leading area of disagreement with lawmakers. Though Congress would grant some of the Air Force’s desired divestments of platforms like the A-10, they would shield others — such as Block 20 F-22 Raptors and RQ-4 Global Hawks — from being sent to the boneyard in the version of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that President Joe Biden signed into law Dec. 22.

Congress’s opposition to the Air Force’s cuts could result in significant impacts to the service’s procurement and research and development accounts. The Air Force in many cases structures its budgets around planned divestments, and in the case of the F-22 retirements tied those planned dollars saved directly into R&D money for the secretive Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter program.

It’s not clear how the service might move money around in response, particularly under constraints set by lawmakers in the debt ceiling deal reached earlier this year. Known as the Fiscal Responsibility Act, the legislation set a cap for defense spending at $886 billion in FY24 and mandates a 1 percent budget cut to FY23 levels if a CR is still in place by the end of April.

Lawmakers could bypass those limits with supplemental defense spending legislation like the over $100 billion dollar package championed by the White House, which many supporters emphasize would be a boon to domestic industry. But it’s not clear how or when the House and Senate could reach an agreement on a package.

In With The New

Several buzzy new platforms will hit key inflection points in 2024. One of the most high-profile is NGAD, where a winning design will almost certainly be awarded next year to either Boeing or Lockheed Martin after Northrop Grumman announced earlier this year it was bowing out. Notably, Boeing is planning to plow billions into future combat aircraft efforts as programs like NGAD approach a formal award.

Alongside NGAD, the Air Force is also set to make awards for programs like the replacement for the E-4B “Doomsday plane,” where Sierra Nevada Corp. is assumed to be the only remaining candidate after Boeing was eliminated. The Air Force could also make a decision on an air refueling tanker program for KC-135 recapitalizations — where a competition could be held between Boeing and Airbus or result in a sole-source contract to Boeing’s KC-46A.

Aircraft like NGAD are expected to be able to link with future uncrewed wingmen known as collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) — another program for the Air Force that’s set to make significant headway in 2024. As Breaking Defense previously reported, five companies are currently in the running to build CCA, and a down select could eliminate some of the contenders by the summer.

As for the F-35, its long-delayed full rate production decision could finally come by early next year, officials have said. But it may not matter for the stealth fighter’s actual production volume, which is already humming at about its max capacity of 156 jets per year.

However, an FY24 budget is imperative for the Air Force to realize many of the above objectives. The budget would permit new starts for marquee programs like CCA, as well as ramp up funding for existing ones. Officials have warned modernization efforts across the Pentagon would face a major setback if lawmakers fail to pass the FY24 budget in a timely way, with Kendall stressing some like CCA could lose a full year of time.

‘Reoptimizing’ For ‘Great Power Competition’

The Air Force is not only looking to field new tech and dump old stuff. Officials are examining significant organizational changes across the Air Force and Space Force, vowing to make any overhauls necessary to “reoptimize” and compete with China.

The “great power competition,” as Kendall has described it, will reportedly result in some 10 to 20 changes officials will look to start carrying out around February of next year. One of those choices, a top Space Force official recently said — before walking his comments back — could result in significant changes to the current major command structure.

Backtracking to reporters, Space Force Lt. Gen. Michael Guetlein said that while he accidentally went too far with his comments, big changes aren’t off the table. “Right now, nothing is sacred,” he said.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · December 28, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com