|
Quotes of the Day:
"To be yourself in a world that is doing its best, day and night to make you like everybody else - is to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight; and never stop fighting." - E.E. Cummings
"We must protect our minds by an elaborate system of abstractions, ambiguities, metaphors and similes from the reality we do not wish to know too clearly, we lie to ourselves, in order that we may still have the excuse of ignorance, the alibi of stupidity and incomprehension, possessing which we can continue with a good conscience to commit and tolerate the most monstrous crimes."
– Aldous Huxley
"One's life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation and compassion." - Simone de Beauvoir
1. USFK Commander: Alliance Modernization Beyond North Korea
2. CFC commander stresses South Korea's expanding regional security role
3. Report: North Korean Money Launderer Transfers Funds to IRGC
4. Kim Jong-un Stresses Nuclear Artillery Revolution at Facility
5. Is Russian technology behind North Korea’s new nuclear submarine?
6. Full text of President Yoon Seok-yeol ‘final statement’
7. 5 senior military officers receive 'severe' disciplinary action over martial law involvement
8. Hanwha Aerospace to sign 5.6 tln-won Chunmoo export contract with Poland
9. US, ROK forces finish field training for summer drills, 4 months behind schedule
10. North Korean escapee group objects to Seoul’s proposal to ditch term ‘defector’
11. U.S. Forces Korea Commander: “South Korea is not merely a responder to threats on the Korean Peninsula… a central axis of peace in Northeast Asia”
12. Keynote Address to the Korea-U.S. Joint Policy Forum
1. USFK Commander: Alliance Modernization Beyond North Korea
Summary:
At a ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Forum in Seoul on Dec. 29, USFK and Combined Forces Command commander Gen. Xavier Brunson argued that “alliance modernization” must be operational, and that the ROK is an anchor for stability across Northeast Asia, not only a peninsula contingency partner. He warned that north Korea’s abandonment of peaceful unification, designation of the ROK as the main enemy, and expanding military cooperation with Russia could accelerate missile and nuclear risks.
Comment: Note below: I proposed a Northeast Asia Combatant Command, based in Seoul with a fusion node in Tokyo, to improve multi-theater responsiveness, manage third-party influence, and support nuclear consultative mechanisms.
USFK Commander: Alliance Modernization Beyond North Korea
Proposes Northeast Asia Combat Command to bolster regional stability, alliance modernization
By Yang Ji-ho
Published 2025.12.29. 16:39
Updated 2025.12.29. 17:48https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/12/29/WKZFPREK5RFWBP7QI52NMJQ55E/?utm
Xavier Brunson, Commander of the United States Forces Korea and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, said on the 29th, “Alliance modernization should not merely remain a slogan,” adding, “South Korea is not simply an entity responding to threats on the Korean Peninsula.”
Xavier Brunson, Commander of US Forces Korea and ROK-US Combined Forces Command, delivers a keynote speech at the ROK-US Combined Forces Command-hosted 'ROK-US Alliance Policy Forum' held at the Royal Park Convention Royal Hall in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, on the 29th. /ROK-US Combined Forces Command
During his keynote speech at the “ROK-U.S. Combined Policy Forum” hosted by the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command at the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan-gu that day, Brunson stated, “The Korean Peninsula is situated at the intersection of broader regional dynamics that shape the balance of power across Northeast Asia,” and emphasized this point.
Brunson continued, “South Korea’s capabilities, geographical location, and readiness serve as the anchor in any effort to maintain peace in Northeast Asia.”
It was interpreted that the U.S. Forces Korea, as well as the ROK military, should play a broader role beyond countering North Korea, including deterring regional powers, and that this constitutes the modernization of the ROK-U.S. alliance as envisioned by the U.S.
Regarding North Korea, Brunson noted, “It has officially rejected peaceful unification, revised its constitution to designate South Korea as the main enemy, and dismantled symbols of inter-Korean dialogue.” He added, “Deepening military cooperation with Russia, such as exchanging ammunition and advanced technology, risks accelerating North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs in a dangerous manner.”
Meanwhile, David Maxwell, Vice Chairman of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy Center and former U.S. Army colonel, stated in his presentation that day, “South Korea’s next war will not remain confined to the Korean Peninsula and may not even begin there.” This was interpreted as suggesting that regional crises involving China and Russia could escalate into war on the Korean Peninsula.
Maxwell then proposed the establishment of a “Northeast Asia Combat Command.” He explained, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command struggles to respond to two or more wars simultaneously,” and suggested, “A Northeast Asia Combat Command should be based in Seoul, with a ‘fusion node’ in Tokyo, Japan, to ensure appropriate forces are deployed at the right time.”
He added that the Northeast Asia Combat Command would integrate the roles of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the U.S. Northeast Asia Combat Commander, and could also manage third-country influence and activate the Nuclear Consultative Group, NCG.
In his opening remarks, Kim Sung-min, Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (Army General), pledged, “The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command will continue to serve as the heart of the ROK-U.S. alliance. While maintaining a robust combined defense posture, we promise to lead efforts to develop the alliance into a stronger, future-oriented partnership.”
2. CFC commander stresses South Korea's expanding regional security role
Summary:
Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), emphasized South Korea’s expanding security role beyond the peninsula at the 2nd ROK-U.S. Combined Policy Forum in Seoul. He said South Korea “sits at the crossroads” of broader Northeast Asian dynamics and its capabilities and readiness make it central to regional stability, reflecting themes in the new U.S. National Security Strategy. Brunson urged that alliance modernization go beyond rhetoric, requiring integrated, multi-domain planning and operations across UNC, CFC, and USFK. He framed Seoul’s role as an anchor for deterrence and peace in the Indo-Pacific amid evolving threats.
Comment: This is one of the few times I have seen the Korean press lead with Gen Brunson as the CFC Commander versus the USFK commander. While I am hopeful that maybe the Korean media will start recognizing the importance of CFC, I fear they are only using the title because he was speaking at the ROK/US Combined Policy Forum which is hosted by the Deputy Commander of the ROK/US CFC
CFC commander stresses South Korea's expanding regional security role
Button Label
Listen
Text Size
Print
By Lee Hyo-jin
- Published Dec 29, 2025 4:41 pm KST
Gen. Xavier Brunson highlights growing relevance of US-led UN Command
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20251229/cfc-commander-stresses-south-koreas-expanding-regional-security-role
Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), speaks during the 2nd ROK-US Combined Policy Forum in Seoul, Monday. Courtesy of CFC
Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), reiterated the need to expand South Korea's role in regional security as the allies modernize their alliance to address evolving threats.
Brunson, who also heads the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the United Nations Command (UNC), made the remarks at the 2nd ROK-US Combined Policy Forum in Seoul, Monday. The forum was organized by the CFC. ROK is an acronym for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official full name.
"Korea is not simply responding to threats on the peninsula," Brunson said in his keynote speech. "Korea sits at the crossroads of broader regional dynamics that shape the balance of power across Northeast Asia."
He cited the recently published U.S. National Security Strategy, saying the document reflects South Korea's growing importance in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Brunson also said alliance modernization "should be more than a slogan," adding that the allies should actively adjust how they plan and operate across multiple domains.
"Across the UNC, CFC and USFK, we're approaching scenarios here as complex, multi-domain problems that require faster decision-making and tighter integration," he said.
The alliance modernization concept, first proposed after President Donald Trump took office in January, seeks to reshape the bilateral security alliance to address the broader security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.
Efforts have included discussions over a revised role for USFK and greater defense cost-sharing by Seoul, as Washington explores ways to expand USFK's mission beyond deterring North Korea to include countering China.
Dignitaries including Gen. Kim Sung-min, front row fifth from left, deputy commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and Gen. Xavier Brunson, front row sixth from left, CFC commander, pose during the 2nd ROK-US Combined Policy Forum in Seoul, Monday. Courtesy of CFC
"Korea’s role is central. Its capabilities, geography and readiness make it a core anchor of any effort to preserve peace in Northeast Asia. That influence is already being felt today as we look forward," Brunson said. "The task for all of us is to continue approaching this alliance and its modernization as a dynamic, evolving process, one that reflects the region we live in, not the region we once imagined.”
The CFC commander has previously emphasized South Korea’s geographic position as a strategic advantage. In an essay published in November, he introduced the so-called "east-up map of the Korean Peninsula," rotating the traditional orientation to highlight South Korea's ability to exert influence across multiple axes of competition, including North Korea, China and Russia.
At the forum, Brunson also highlighted UNC's growing importance, describing the U.S.-led multinational force as a "unique asset" in maintaining the allies’ deterrence posture.
“Far from being a historical remnant, UNC provides a living framework for multinational support … This is a unique asset, and one that strengthens deterrence when it is integrated thoughtfully into all our planning," he said.
Brunson's UNC comments follow a recent clash with South Korean ruling politicians over the control of civilian access to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Since 1953, the UNC has held that authority, but some ruling Democratic Party of Korea members are pushing legislation to give the South Korean government control over nonmilitary activities in the area. In response, the UNC issued a rare statement opposing it.
The general said Seoul and Washington should maintain a credible deterrence posture against Pyongyang's intensifying nuclear threats.
"When we talk about credible deterrence or maintaining stability across the region, the choices made in Seoul echo much farther than many recognize. This matters even more because of the DPRK which we face today,” he said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Brunson said North Korea's military threats have increased in recent years, noting that the reclusive regime formally rejected peaceful unification, rewrote its constitution to designate South Korea as its primary adversary and dismantled symbols of inter-Korean dialogue.
3. Report: North Korean Money Launderer Transfers Funds to IRGC
Summary:
A report citing South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo and blockchain investigators (including TRM Labs) alleges cryptocurrency-linked transactions between a wallet attributed to Sim Hyon-sop, described as a north Korean money launderer wanted by the FBI, and a wallet tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The reporting frames the transfers as evidence that two heavily sanctioned regimes are using crypto rails, brokers, and layered wallets to evade banking restrictions, convert funds into dollars, and support procurement. It also describes a broader laundering pipeline fed by hacked crypto and overseas worker earnings, with proceeds used for goods and equipment, including examples of dual-use purchases.
Comment: collusion among the CRInK junior partners. It is good that the media is highlighting the north Korea-Iran connection here.
Report: North Korean Money Launderer Transfers Funds to IRGC
english.aawsat.com
Report: North Korean Money Launderer Transfers Funds to IRGC https://english.aawsat.com/world/5223834-report-north-korean-money-launderer-transfers-funds-irgc
World
Revolutionary Guard commanders during a meeting with Iranian Supreme leader (Khamenei’s website)
07:08-28 December 2025 AD ـ 08 Rajab 1447 AH
TT
07:08-28 December 2025 AD ـ 08 Rajab 1447 AH
TT
Revolutionary Guard commanders during a meeting with Iranian Supreme leader (Khamenei’s website)
A media report published in South Korea has revealed traces of financial transactions between Iran’s regime and North Korea, both US-sanctioned states, signaling the two countries’ increasing use of non-traditional financial tools to circumvent restrictions on their banking systems.
According to blockchain tracking sources, transactions between both countries were carried out through the money-laundering network of a North Korean operative using cryptocurrencies, with part of the funds transferred to entities affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the South Korean Chosun Ilbo newspaper said in an article published last Friday.
It said investigations by TRM Labs show that dollars were transferred this year from a cryptocurrency wallet belonging to Sim Hyon-sop, a North Korean money launderer, to a wallet linked to the Revolutionary Guard.
According to the newspaper, Iran’s regime may have exchanged cryptocurrency to evade sanctions, convert funds into US dollars, or even pay for oil.
It said Iran and North Korea, both under severe US sanctions, have increasingly turned in recent years to opaque financial tools, mainly cryptocurrencies.
Analysts told the newspaper that these transactions are a sign of overlapping financial networks between the two countries aimed at circumventing the sanctions system.
Sim Hyon-sop, who is wanted by the FBI on charges of money laundering and sanctions evasion, has played a key role in this network.
According to the newspaper, Sim saw his bounty rise from $5 million to $7 million (approximately 10 billion Korean won) in July.
Born in Pyongyang in 1983, he is affiliated with North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank, which has been on US sanctions lists.
He used aliases such as “Sim Ali” and “Sim Hajim” and posed as a representative of Kwangson Bank.
Chosun Ilbo said Sim’s laundering process was meticulous: North Korean “IT workers” sent him cryptocurrency stolen through hacking or received as wages, routing it through multiple digital wallets to obscure traces.
Sim then transferred the funds to pre-selected brokers in an Arab country or China, who converted them into US dollars.
Also, foreign currency earned by North Korean laborers in Russia, China, and Africa flowed into Sim’s accounts via similar laundering routes.
The newspaper showed that part of the earnings were not sent directly to North Korea but were instead spent on purchasing goods, equipment, and even weapons needed by Kim Jong Un’s regime.
Among the examples cited is the use of a company in Zimbabwe to purchase a $300,000 helicopter in Russia and deliver it to North Korea.
Additionally, the newspaper said about $800,000 were spent to procure raw materials for producing counterfeit cigarettes, one of Pyongyang’s main sources of income.
The Chosun Ilbo report stated that US banks, including Citibank, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo, failed to detect Sim’s money-laundering activities. It said at least 310 transactions totaling $74 million were processed through the US financial system.
Referring to data from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Chainalysis, the report said dozens of North Korean “shadow bankers” are active outside the country. Over several years, they have laundered more than $6 billion in stolen cryptocurrency for the regime.
Chosun Ilbo said that although the US federal court had issued an arrest warrant for Sim in March 2023, his capture remains nearly impossible.
4. Kim Jong-un Stresses Nuclear Artillery Revolution at Facility
Summary:
Kim Jong-un inspected a major military-industrial plant producing self-propelled artillery and called for a “revolution” in modernizing artillery systems, state media reported. He said the new self-propelled gun would become a principal strike weapon, reshaping the composition of north Korea’s artillery forces and advancing the Workers’ Party’s long-range fires modernization plan. Kim praised the system’s precision and destructive power, claiming it can deliver concentrated surprise strikes and serve as a “strategic attack weapon,” language widely read as implying nuclear capability. He lauded domestic production and urged expanded capacity and technological upgrades ahead of 2026 and the 9th Party Congress.
Comment: There is nothing more important to Kim than his treasured sword.
Kim Jong-un Stresses Nuclear Artillery Revolution at Facility
North Korean Leader Highlights Self-Propelled Artillery's Strategic Nuclear Capability During Inspection
By Oh Gwi-hwan(ChosunBiz)
Published 2025.12.30. 09:31
Updated 2025.12.30. 09:51https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/12/30/RNELW6JYA5CKDECLWPLL6HJIMU/
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited a production facility for self-propelled artillery, a main strike weapon capable of nuclear arming, and stated, “A revolution must be sparked even in the renewal of artillery weapon systems,” according to a report by Korean Central News Agency on the 30th.
North Korea's ruling party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported on the 30th that 'Comrade Kim Jong-un visited an important military-industrial enterprise on December 28 and inspected, checks the production status of weapon combat technical equipment.' /Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun. News1
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un leads a joint long-range artillery and missile system strike drill conducted on May 8 last year. The drill mobilized a '600mm multiple rocket launcher' and tactical ballistic missile 'Hwasongpo-11ga-type.' [For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. Redistribution Prohibited. Database Prohibited] rodongphoto@news1.kr
The news agency reported that Kim, during an on-site guidance at a key military-industrial enterprise on the 28th, “grasp, understand the actual conditions of self-propelled artillery vehicle production to be equipped in major units of our military.”
Kim stated at the site, “This self-propelled artillery weapon system, which will become the main strike weapon of our military, will completely renew the composition of our artillery forces,” and evaluated that the factory is playing a pivotal role in fulfilling “the Party’s military-strategic policy regarding the modernization and augmentation of long-range artillery.”
In particular, Kim highlighted the capabilities of the self-propelled artillery system, mentioning, “This weapon system, which is intensively used in military operations, possesses high precision and formidable destructive power,” and “It can annihilate the enemy with concentrated and surprise strikes and can also be utilized as a strategic attack weapon.”
He added, “It is truly a super-powerful weapon system.” The expression “strategic attack weapon” is interpreted as suggesting that the self-propelled artillery can be equipped with nuclear warheads.
Kim expressed satisfaction with the factory’s production capabilities, stating, “It is truly a matter of pride that we are producing, with our own strength and technology, an operational-tactical weapon system with the world’s most unique and greatest military effectiveness as needed.” He then urged that “solid production capabilities” must be ensured to achieve the military production goals to be presented at the 9th Workers' Party Congress.
Additionally, Kim emphasized that the entire military-industrial sector should advance “the establishment of a developed industrial structure capable of producing more weapon combat-technical equipment, continuous expansion of production capabilities, and innovative technological renewal projects” in line with modernization goals. He then encouraged, “Let us achieve even greater leap-forward results through persistent efforts in the struggle to strengthen national defense in 2026.”
This inspection was attended by a large number of officials, including Jo Chun-ryong, Party Secretary; No Kwang-chol, Defense Minister; Kim Jong-sik, First Deputy Director of the Party’s Military Industry Department; and Jang Chang-ha, Director of the Missile General Bureau. North Korea is observed to be planning to formalize the Nuclear-Conventional Integration (CNI) strategy, which integrates the operation of nuclear and conventional weapons, at the 9th Party Congress early next year.
Recently, Kim has continued his military activities, including guiding the construction site of a nuclear-powered submarine and observing the test launch of a new-type missile, even at the end of the year. This is interpreted as both showcasing the achievement of the national defense goals set at the 8th Party Congress and clearly demonstrating the will to pursue the strengthening of national defense capabilities as the top priority next year.
5. Is Russian technology behind North Korea’s new nuclear submarine?
Summary:
north Korea unveiled what it calls an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered strategic guided-missile submarine, prompting debate over possible Russian help with naval reactor technology. Seoul analysts cite the sudden appearance of a near-complete hull and deepening Moscow Pyongyang cooperation tied to munitions and troop support in Ukraine as reasons for suspicion. Others argue installing a Russian reactor in a new north Korean hull is technically and politically unlikely, though limited know-how or personnel aid is plausible. Independent confirmation of a working reactor or combat systems is absent, suggesting the display may be political signaling rather than near-term deployment in the few years.
Comment: Probably? Most likely? Why not? Or is it even real? All warfare is based on deception - and that includes political warfare.
Is Russian technology behind North Korea’s new nuclear submarine?
flip.it · December 29, 2025
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/is-russian-technology-behind-north-koreas-new-nuclear-submarine?utm
SEOUL – A major question is emerging over North Korea’s unveiling of what it claims to be an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered strategic guided-missile submarine – whether Russia has assisted Pyongyang in securing the naval reactor technology that would make such a leap possible.
The submarine under construction, revealed during
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s on-site inspection
and reported by the North’s state media, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), on Dec 25, is significantly larger than the US Navy’s Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine.KCNA said it represents an “epoch-making” upgrade in the North’s nuclear war deterrent. Mr Kim reiterated that the ongoing development of the nuclear-armed fleet would serve as a “reliable shield” against perceived threats from the US-South Korea alliance.
With the rapid timeline and scale of progress Pyongyang claims, analysts in Seoul say suspicions of Russian assistance are difficult to dismiss.
“North Korea’s nuclear submarine development had long seen little visible progress, but suddenly a nearly completed platform appears,” said Mr Shin Jong-woo, a senior analyst at the Korea Defence and Security Forum in Seoul. “This strongly suggests the possibility of Russian support.”
South Korea’s military previously warned that strengthening Russia-North Korea military ties – driven by Pyongyang’s supply of munitions and troops to Russia for its war in Ukraine – could expand into naval reactor technology transfers, a step that would have far-reaching implications for North-east Asian security.
Professor at the University of North Korean Studies Yang Moo-jin said that the submarine programme fits into a broader pattern of military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.
“North Korea has been developing and test-launching new missile systems based on Russian technologies, and naval modernisation has become a central part of Kim Jong Un’s strategy to extend nuclear armaments to the navy,” he said.
“Even if Russia does not supply a complete reactor, targeted support could accelerate progress in submarine deployment and advanced weapons testing.”
Yet experts are far from unified.
Mr Choi Il, director of the Submarine Research Institute and a retired Navy captain, pushed back on speculation that a Russian reactor may have been installed outright.
“Technically, mounting a second-hand Russian reactor into a new North Korean hull is almost impossible,” he said.
“Politically as well, Moscow is not in a position to openly back North Korea’s construction of a ballistic missile submarine.”
Mr Choi added that the design and construction likely began before Russia invaded Ukraine, making it inconsistent with the theory that Pyongyang received a reactor as compensation for wartime support.
Still, he did not rule out more limited involvement.
“Russia may have provided technical know-how or expert manpower, but the reactor itself should be viewed as a North Korean product,” he said.
Despite Pyongyang’s show of progress, questions persist over whether the submarine is genuinely near deployment. The vessel has not yet undergone a formal launch ceremony, and no independent confirmation exists that internal combat systems and a functioning reactor are installed.
Mr Choi described the submarine’s presentation as theatre more than readiness.
“North Korea remains focused on demonstration effects,” he said. “There is no indication this submarine is close to operational deployment.”
Other analysts echoed that assessment, saying the roll-out may be timed to fulfil political goals, like meeting milestones in Pyongyang’s five-year defence plan.
Professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies Im Eul-chul said that the key challenge is safely miniaturising a naval reactor – expertise that even advanced nuclear navies take decades to master.
“Securing reactor stability is the decisive hurdle,” he said. “How fast Russian assistance is provided – and at what scale – will determine when the submarine can truly enter service.”
Meanwhile, Mr Kim Jong Un has blamed Seoul’s own exploration of nuclear-powered submarine capabilities for “worsening instability” and vowed to accelerate naval nuclear weaponisation in return.
South Korea’s defence authorities warn that Pyongyang’s growing military alignment with Moscow – underscored by its
deployment of an estimated 15,000 North Korean troops to Russia
since late 2024 – could lead to expanded technology transfers in return.Officials in Seoul believe North Korea may be seeking Russian assistance on intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear-propelled submarine technology, raising concerns that the wartime partnership could directly accelerate the North’s strategic weapons programmes. THE KOREA HERALD/ASIA NEWS NETWORK
flip.it · December 29, 2025
6.
Summary:
In his final statement to the Constitutional Court, Yoon Seok-yeol argues that the December 3, 2024 emergency martial law was a brief, tightly limited “appeal to the people,” not a bid for dictatorship. He cites the small, unarmed troop presence, the rapid withdrawal after the Assembly vote, and the absence of civilian harm as proof. He frames the country’s crisis as systemic, driven by anti state forces, espionage, budget cuts, and legislative “sabotage” by a dominant opposition. He defends the State Council process, rejects arrest allegations as implausible, and says the episode awakened citizens.
Some key excerpts:
“external forces threatening sovereignty, including north Korea,” are working with “internal anti-state forces”
“The 2023 labor union spy ring case alone reveals their true nature.” He then claims those involved “met north Korean agents, received direct orders, leaked military facility information, organized general strikes, opposed Biden’s visit and joint ROK-U.S. drills, and fueled anti-government protests over the Itaewon tragedy, all under north Korean directives.”
“Evidence even shows election interference under north Korean orders,” adding that “right after the last presidential election, orders came to ‘ignite impeachment.’”
[the prior administration] “stripped the National Intelligence Service of counter-espionage authority effective January 2024,” and he cites delays in spy trials involving “KCTU spy ring, Changwon, Cheongju, Jeju.”
“As known, 2023 state institutions including Election Commission suffered severe north Korean hacking.”
He describes an alleged directive tied to the Itaewon tragedy: “A north Korean directive to the spy ring: ‘Use this massive tragedy to create a situation like the Sewol ferry protests, maximizing public anger.’”
Comment: I have been avoiding spending too much time on the martial law trials. However, this is the most comprehensive statement in his defense in his own words and provides his explanation for the Martial Law action. But I am not sure if "waking up the people" to the threats is a sufficient defense. The question I have is whether these allegations will ever be sufficiently investigated? Where there's smoke there's fire. And of course the current opposition (Yoon's supporters) will seize on these issues to defend him and create further political and social divides in South Korea. (which I am sure China and north Korea will seek to continue to exploit).
Below is an AI translation of the KBS News report.
Full text of President Yoon Seok-yeol ‘final statement’
https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8185571
Full English Translation
Respected Constitutional Court Justices, and dear citizens of the Republic of Korea who have followed this trial with concern,
Eighty-four days have passed since I declared emergency martial law on December 3 last year.
These have been the most difficult days of my life, but they have also been a time of gratitude and reflection.
Looking back on myself, I realized how much undeserved love I have received from our people.
While feeling grateful, I was deeply sorry and heartbroken that I could not perform the duties the people entrusted to me.
At the same time, seeing so many citizens still believing in me filled me with a heavy sense of responsibility.
To the citizens, I first want to say I am sorry and thank you.
When I declared and then lifted martial law just hours later, many did not understand. Some may still be confused.
The word "martial law" evokes negative memories of the past, which the giant opposition party and insurrectionary forces have exploited to incite the public by invoking that trauma.
However, the December 3 martial law was completely different from past martial laws. It was not martial law that oppresses the people with force, but an appeal to the nation borrowing the form of martial law.
Declaring the December 3 martial law was a declaration that this country is in a dire, nation-destroying crisis, and a desperate appeal to the sovereign people to face the situation and join in overcoming it.
Above all, I can clearly state that this was never a choice made for myself, Yoon Suk-yeol, personally.
I was already at the pinnacle of power as President. The easiest and most comfortable path for a president is to avoid difficult and risky tasks, compromise moderately with various societal forces, say only pleasant things, and peacefully complete a five-year term.
If one abandons the desire to work, there is no need to fight fiercely or make difficult choices. Living moderately for five years would allow one to enjoy post-presidency privileges and a comfortable retirement.
If I thought only of my personal life, there would have been no reason to choose emergency martial law, which would invite fierce attacks from political opponents.
When I decided on martial law, I naturally anticipated enormous difficulties for myself. The giant opposition claims I declared it for dictatorship or to extend my rule—an insurrection frame.
If that were true, would I have deployed only 280 unarmed personnel? Declared it on a weekday rather than a weekend and moved troops afterward?
According to the court's evidence review, only 106 troops entered the National Assembly grounds before the resolution demanding lifting, and just 15 reached the main building. Those 15 broke a window only because citizens blocked their assigned entrance, so they entered through an unlit window to avoid conflict.
All troops were immediately withdrawn after the lifting resolution. Due to the small number, police were asked to maintain outer security and order.
Soldiers were injured, but not a single civilian was harmed. From the start, I clearly told the Defense Minister the purpose was "an appeal to the people" and that it would not last long since the Assembly would quickly demand lifting.
I could not disclose this fully to military commanders in advance. By deploying minimal, unarmed, experienced troops, I strictly limited their role to security and order maintenance.
Large armed forces could easily clash with crowds despite orders to restrain. I prevented that possibility at the source, and the outcome matched expectations. That is why I explicitly instructed the Defense Minister: few troops, unarmed, experienced personnel.
Yet the giant opposition calls this insurrection.
Was there ever a "two-hour insurrection"? An insurrection announced on broadcast to the world, then immediately ended with troop withdrawal when the Assembly says stop?
The opposition's claim that the President sought to seize the Assembly is mere political agitation to remove the President.
Public officials who carried out lawful martial law duties under presidential authority are now suffering because of this insurrection smear—it tears my heart apart.
Would they have worked for a long-term dictatorship? They know long-term dictatorship is impossible in Korea and are already at the top of their fields with nothing more to desire.
They simply performed their duties under lawful presidential authority.
Respected Justices and citizens, from the presidential office with access to vast information, one sees problems invisible to others—issues that seem fine now but will soon become major crises. I saw this country heading toward a cliff, like a frog in slowly boiling water unaware of the danger.
Some may think there has never been a time without crisis.
But past crises were sudden issues; today's crisis is existential, a total systemic crisis—fundamentally different.
U.S. President Trump declared a national emergency on his first day and deployed troops. Opinions differ on whether the U.S. faced such an emergency, but his decision clearly aimed to protect Americans from illegal immigration, drug cartels, and energy shortages.
Then, can we confidently say Korea faces no national emergency? External forces threatening sovereignty, including North Korea, collude with internal anti-state forces to gravely endanger national security and continuity.
They sow division and chaos through fake news, opinion manipulation, and propaganda. The 2023 labor union spy ring case alone reveals their true nature.
They met North Korean agents, received direct orders, leaked military facility information, organized general strikes, opposed Biden's visit and joint ROK-U.S. drills, and fueled anti-government protests over the Itaewon tragedy—all under North Korean directives.
Evidence even shows election interference under North Korean orders. Right after the last presidential election, orders came to "ignite impeachment." Indeed, the "preemptive Yoon Suk-yeol impeachment" rally occurred on March 26, 2022, followed by 178 rallies demanding presidential resignation/impeachment through early December 2024, involving construction and media unions under the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, with opposition lawmakers speaking.
Is this not following North Korean orders?
Some say spies no longer exist today. But they have evolved into regime-subversion activities to destroy liberal democracy. Yet our societal defenses are weakening, full of holes.
The previous Democratic Party administration stripped the National Intelligence Service of counter-espionage authority effective January 2024. Spy cases require long-term, meticulous investigation by experienced agencies, but authority was abruptly transferred to an unprepared police force—creating an environment where spies thrive.
Trials are also indefinitely delayed. Four ongoing cases: KCTU spy ring, Changwon, Cheongju, Jeju. Cheongju took over 29 months for first verdict; KCTU took 1 year 6 months. Defendants were released upon custody expiration and roamed freely until convicted.
Changwon has been stalled nearly 2 years; Jeju disrupted for 1 year 10 months—all defendants released. Failing to catch or properly punish spies—is this normal?
Yet the giant opposition defends the KCTU, pushes to abolish the National Security Act after stripping NIS authority, and cut all special activity funds for police counter-espionage to zero—essentially telling spies not to be caught.
Last year, Chinese nationals were repeatedly caught flying drones over military bases, NIS, airports, and U.S. bases. Amending laws to charge them as spies requires opposition consent, which they staunchly refuse.
Industrial espionage leaking core technology—tens of trillions in damages, two-thirds to China—has surged. China enforces a harsh anti-espionage law, yet the opposition blocks amendments to punish industrial spies.
They also push a Defense Acquisition Program Act requiring Assembly consent for arms exports—submitting classified data to the Assembly, where opposition could block exports.
Who can guarantee those secrets stay secure and do not reach adversaries? Blocked exports harm strategic alliances and defense cooperation with free-world nations—effectively what North Korea, China, and Russia want.
Arms exports are not just profit; they strengthen strategic ties and national security. Obstructing them helps whom?
The giant opposition leads in weakening defense: North Korea deploys troops to Ukraine and deepens military ties with Russia—a grave threat.
Yet when we tried sending an observation team, they threatened to impeach then-Defense Minister Shin Won-sik and blocked it. They even called legitimate security actions—Ukraine observation, loudspeaker broadcasts, balloon countermeasures—"crimes of foreign aggression."
They branded the President a "warmonger" for protecting citizens and denounced ROK-U.S.-Japan drills against North Korean nuclear threats as "extreme pro-Japan."
The first impeachment motion listed "hostility toward North Korea, China, Russia" as grounds.
With 190 seats, this omnipotent opposition stands not with Korea and its people, but with North Korea, China, Russia. If this is not a national crisis, what is?
More: they gut core defense budgets—claiming only 0.65% cut overall, but targeting vital areas, like removing a person's eyes and saying "just two eyeballs from the whole body."
They slashed reconnaissance assets critical for "kill chain" preemptive strikes: ground surveillance by 485.2 billion won from 2024, tactical data link upgrades by 78%.
Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) development risks halt. Long-range ship-to-air missile budget of 11.959 billion won cut 96% to 500 million; precision-guided munitions R&D cut 84%.
Without eyes, even strong fists are useless—surveillance assets render good weapons worthless.
With drone attacks now North Korea's biggest threat, they cut 9.954 billion of 10 billion drone defense budget, halting the program entirely.
One wonders whose orders they follow to precisely target such critical items.
The previous administration halved military counterintelligence personnel and appointed figures linked to past spy cases to key NIS posts—turning it into a leakage rather than counterintelligence agency.
Those responsible remain core opposition forces undermining security.
Our government worked to restore NIS and military counterintelligence, but deep roots remain.
Destruction is easy; building takes time.
Outwardly stable, I judged this a crisis comparable to wartime.
The opposition should show responsible national posture before criticizing the President's perception.
I am ready to dialogue and compromise with any political force sharing liberal democratic principles, national security, and core interests.
Where is left or right in serving nation and people?
But we must block communism, one-party dictatorship, and materialist totalitarianism infiltrating under various guises.
We cannot compromise with such forces. We can trade and cooperate for mutual benefit with nations not sharing our values, but we must prevent influence on our political system—that is political security as vital as defense security, the way to protect liberal democracy.
A legitimate party in a liberal democracy must never defend or ally with such forces.
Justices and citizens, the giant opposition began preemptive impeachment calls before my inauguration, paralyzing government through serial impeachments, legislative overreach, and budget sabotage—claiming it legitimate Assembly authority.
But Assembly powers are granted to serve the people. Abusing them to paralyze government is constitutional disruption.
They claim I sought to paralyze Assembly functions through martial law—continuing insurrection accusations.
Yet they persistently paralyzed government functions since my inauguration, wielding Assembly power as if paralysis were their sole goal.
They blocked neither lawmakers' nor staff access nor Assembly votes in a 2.5-hour martial law.
Which truly paralyzed and infringed the other's functions: 2.5 hours of martial law or 2.5 years of serial impeachments and legislative/budget sabotage?
They impeached ministers, broadcasting chairman, prosecutors, Audit and Inspection Board chairman—grounds irrelevant. Even a minister for "glaring" at their party leader. They suspended duties first, then changed grounds in court—repeatedly.
You Justices recently handled prosecutor impeachments yourselves: false press conference claims (they never attended), false testimony in oversight (never attended).
Suspending duties despite baseless grounds—is this normal?
Their serial public official impeachments go beyond paralyzing government to collapsing constitutional order.
After Itaewon tragedy, they exploited it politically while demanding truth—impeaching the Interior Minister.
A North Korean directive to the spy ring: "Use this massive tragedy to create a situation like the Sewol ferry protests, maximizing public anger."
The opposition effectively did the same as North Korean-directed spies—incitement impeachment.
They serially impeached prosecutors investigating their leader, including Seoul Central District chief—obstructing investigation and intimidating judges: shield impeachment.
They even impeached the Audit Board chairman investigating previous administration treason—listing a case where four high officials leaked THAAD deployment secrets to China's military attaché as grounds.
Covering treason with impeachment.
Impeaching a constitutional institution head is grave constitutional destruction; covering treason makes this a nation-destroying crisis.
Massive budgets and agencies under ministries—suspending ministers paralyzes functions, causing enormous national damage in opportunity and fiscal costs.
They fund their impeachment lawyers with taxpayer money, while unjustly impeached officials pay personally while suspended.
Public servants inevitably shrink in fear.
Through incitement, shield, and treason impeachments, they destroy Korea.
Presidential elections are longest and most watched—direct presidential legitimacy weighs heaviest. Democratization was essentially securing direct election.
Yet right after the election, they allied with sympathizers for preemptive impeachment and resignation campaigns, then 2.5 years solely aiming to oust the President through serial impeachments and legislative/budget sabotage.
Not legitimate checks and balances, but relentless campaign against directly elected legitimacy—that is constitutional disruption.
Their actions stem from views alien to liberal democratic identity and foreign relations.
Serial impeachments and sabotage destroy liberal democratic order.
We speak of imperial presidency due to presidential system.
But today is the era of imperial giant opposition—whose runaway is bringing existential crisis.
Post-martial law events prove it.
If I were imperial, could public prosecutors, police, and High-ranking Officials Corruption Investigation Office—lacking insurrection jurisdiction—rush to investigate and arrest me, even forging documents?
Only 570 troops for martial law, yet 3-4,000 police illegally mobilized to arrest one president.
Who wields imperial power destroying order: President or giant opposition?
My martial law decision stemmed from desperation—I could no longer tolerate this existential crisis. I sought to inform sovereign citizens of the opposition's anti-state tyranny and appeal for their vigilant criticism to stop it.
Declared in desperation to halt state paralysis and constitutional collapse, restore normal functions.
December 3 martial law declared national emergency—not to oppress rights but desperate appeal for sovereign people to overcome it.
Yet the opposition launched impeachment the day I lifted it per Assembly demand.
But martial law is not crime—lawful presidential authority to address crisis.
I declared via emergency State Council broadcast, deployed minimal troops for order, immediately withdrew upon Assembly resolution, convened Council, and lifted.
As known, 2023 state institutions including Election Commission suffered severe North Korean hacking. Unlike others, the Commission resisted checks; limited checks revealed grave vulnerabilities—so minimal troops sent to secure systems.
Election system security is core public asset of liberal democracy. Persistent calls for transparent checks due to lawsuit-revealed fake ballots and statistically implausible results.
Which part is insurrection or crime? If martial law itself illegal, why does the law and Joint Chiefs martial law division exist?
Justices and citizens, I declared political entry June 29, 2021, knowing presidency is a path of hardship, not glory.
One close observer called it a cursed path and tried to dissuade me.
But seeing liberal democratic order crumbling, I entered politics to protect the nation.
My pledge: a nation where youth bearing the future, those sacrificing for country, industrialization contributors, quiet democratizers, honest taxpayers—no longer feel anger.
A dynamic nation for youth, innovative with freedom and creativity, warm for the weak, responsible sharing values internationally.
I vowed to reclaim sovereignty hijacked by giant seats and interest cartels.
I have never forgotten that promise. Elected, I worked tirelessly to fulfill it.
Nothing was easy. Global crises persisted; previous administration's failed policies hampered economy and livelihoods.
But believing effort solves problems, we addressed them one by one with businesses and citizens.
Many rewarding moments, some regrets. Improving treatment for uniformed public servants was fulfilling.
Previous administration obsessed with anti-Japan incitement; under us, per capita GDP surpassed Japan, export gap with twice-our-population economic giant narrowed to billions—from 1/100 twenty years ago, fractions of previous administration.
Last year's 30 nationwide livelihood debates: hearing difficulties directly, solving on-site, laughing and crying together.
Visited every region for balanced development and true national unity.
I ache wondering if I can work that way again.
The four-day U.S. trip yielding Camp David trilateral declaration was deeply rewarding.
Opening arms exports, Team Korea selected preferred bidder for Czech nuclear plant—ecstatic.
Frustrations: vital bills endlessly delayed, unconstitutional or anti-national interest laws passed unilaterally forcing vetoes.
Critical defense, security, livelihood budgets gutted—despairing.
Though paused now, many citizens—especially youth—are awakening, reclaiming sovereignty, protecting the nation.
Martial law's purpose—to alert to nation-destroying crisis and appeal to sovereign people—was substantially achieved.
I sincerely thank citizens and youth who understand my sincerity.
Claims I would declare martial law again if reinstated are absurd.
With many already awakened through this appeal-form martial law, why would I? It will never happen.
Justices, briefly on two issues:
First, alleged orders to arrest or drag lawmakers—absurd.
Common sense: to what end? Even delaying lifting, with world watching, then what?
As Assembly Speaker said, they could convene anywhere.
Movies/novels feature such, but reality requires full state seizure plan and political program—none existed.
Key commanders were on leave, dinners when declared—revealed in evidence.
No detailed plan caused confusion—because it was appeal-form martial law, different from past.
Our 500,000 troops, steeped in decades of democracy, would not act as private army for a single-term president.
Purpose: appeal to sovereign people against Assembly's nation-destroying dictatorship.
Arrest claims contradict planning only 280 order-maintenance troops on weekday session—not weekend empty Assembly.
300 lawmakers plus thousands staff/aides; thousands already inside post-declaration per live broadcast.
Troops arrived 1.5 hours later: 106 grounds, 15 building—impossible to arrest/drag with that.
Alleged "drag out since quorum unmet"—nonsensical; if unmet, block entry, not drag.
Soldiers did not even know plenary hall location.
No one dragged or arrested; soldiers assaulted, no civilians harmed.
Claiming impossible events is chasing moon reflection on water.
Opposition framed lawful martial law as illegal insurrection for impeachment success, then removed insurrection from trial grounds—unprecedented fraud impeachment.
Insurrection is judged by actual events and outcomes, obvious to all—not complex deliberation.
They removed it because no substance existed.
December 3 martial law—shortest in history; no command structure or investigation units formed—peacefully ended in hours. Cannot be insurrection.
Second, State Council meeting validity.
If not a meeting, why gather ministers that night? Not casual chat atmosphere.
Waited for quorum—why if informal?
From 8:30 PM, ministers arrived; I explained, Defense Minister distributed declaration outline.
Ministers worried economic/diplomatic impact; I explained presidential view of emergency necessitating action, addressed concerns.
Pre-quorum discussion sufficient; formal session 5 minutes.
Lifting next dawn: 1 minute.
Regular meetings last hours for many agenda, but individual items brief.
Emergency martial law meetings cannot be like regular—security critical, minimizes confusion and troops.
Former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min testified: "Of 100+ meetings, none had such substantial heated discussion and communication."
Included chief of staff, national security advisor, NIS director for security reasons.
1993 Kim Young-sam financial real-name emergency order: ministers unaware until moment, records post-facto—deemed constitutional.
I leave other issues to counsel.
Justices and citizens, I served thinking: "If something must be done someday by someone, I will do it now."
Thus early term focused bold reforms—education, labor, pension—previous administrations avoided for votes.
Launched childcare integration after 30 years stagnation, frameworks for all-day schools, converged higher education, regional industry-linked decentralization.
Established rule-of-law labor framework, opened labor flexibility/protection for 4th industrial revolution.
First administration to conduct massive actuarial analysis and deep surveys for pension reform, submitting acceptable plan.
Early term prioritizes campaign pledges and major social reforms—political reform lacks bandwidth initially.
Previous presidents' terms ended quickly; outdated 1987 system persists, hindering development and burdening citizens.
Youth must participate more in future-deciding matters—lower political/administrative thresholds.
If reinstated, latter term will focus on constitutional amendment and political reform to fit our body and bequeath proper nation to future generations.
Planned mid-term onward for constitutional amendment and electoral reform—requiring incumbent sacrifice, which I resolved to provide.
Fulfilled campaign promise to return Blue House to people immediately upon election.
Not attached to remaining term; regard constitutional/political reform as final mission for 1987 system improvement.
Will devote all to swift amendment gathering public will for fitting constitution and political structure.
Effort for national unity through process—true unity via shared constitutional values.
Then no attachment to remaining term under current constitution—rather great honor.
For state affairs, considering rapid international changes and global crises, President will focus on foreign relations, delegating broad domestic authority to Prime Minister.
Our export-dependent economy highly vulnerable to shifts, especially post-Trump U.S. administration.
Choice of national course now can turn crisis to opportunity or irreversible disaster.
With experience building strongest ROK-U.S. alliance and leading ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation under global pivotal diplomacy, I will devote to protecting national interests abroad.
Respected Justices,
Despite tight schedule, thank you deeply for thorough review.
Trial focused on prosecution-led issues after removing insurrection—insufficient time to fully explain reasons and inevitability of December 3 martial law.
Submitted materials faithfully; please deeply consider presidential anguished decision.
As president handling many secrets, trust your wisdom reaches even undiscussable parts.
Thank you again for your efforts.
Dear citizens of Korea,
Though martial law for nation and people, I sincerely regret causing confusion and inconvenience.
My arrest process hurt youth in difficult situations—heartbreaking and sorry, beyond right or wrong.
Running for president, I resolved to give my life for the country.
Post-December 3 martial law and impeachment, I saw citizens braving winter cold to protect me.
Heard voices criticizing me.
Different claims, but all love for Korea.
Sincerely thank citizens believing and supporting insufficient me.
Will engrave criticisms of my faults deeply.
Will exert all efforts to become stepping stone for new leap forward Korea.
Thank you.
7. 5 senior military officers receive 'severe' disciplinary action over martial law involvement
Summary:
South Korea’s defense ministry said it will impose “severe” discipline on five senior Army officers tied to former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed Dec. 3, 2024 martial law bid. The decision followed a committee review of eight officers, seven generals and one colonel. The ministry targeted Yeo In-hyung (Defense Counterintelligence Command), Lee Jin-woo (Capital Defense Command), and Kwak Jong-keun (Army Special Warfare Command), all on trial for alleged insurrection roles in deploying troops to the National Assembly and National Election Commission. Yeo and Lee reportedly face removal, while Kwak may be dismissed. A former vice chief of staff also faces harsh punishment, and a counterintelligence colonel received a two-month suspension.
Comment: My questions to each of them would be what was your understanding of the desired end state? What effects was the POTROK trying to achieve. Did this action pass the FAS test (feasible, acceptable, suitable) in support of ROK national security? Did you assess that these actions could be successful and what was your definition of success?
My punishment would be to allow them to retire but in return they have to lecture at KMA and War College on military ethics and provide a detailed dissection of the martial law orders and execution for the remainder of their years.
5 senior military officers receive 'severe' disciplinary action over martial law involvement | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 29, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251229010000315
SEOUL, Dec. 29 (Yonhap) —- The defense ministry said Monday it has decided to take "severe" disciplinary action against five senior Army officers for their involvement in former President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed bid to impose martial law last year.
The decision came after the ministry held a committee meeting earlier this month to decide on disciplinary action against eight senior Army officers -- seven generals and one colonel -- involved in the martial law bid on Dec. 3 last year.
The ministry said it imposed serious disciplinary action on Yeo In-hyung, former head of the Defense Counterintelligence Command; Lee Jin-woo, former chief of the Capital Defense Command; and Kwak Jong-keun, former commander of the Army Special Warfare Command.
The three are currently on trial on charges of playing key roles in an insurrection for allegedly deploying troops to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission on the night martial law was declared.
Yeo and Lee are believed to face removal from office, the toughest level of disciplinary action.
Kwak is said to face dismissal, the second-highest level of punishment imposed, in consideration of his efforts to help restore constitutional order and uncover the truth behind the martial law through testimonies at Yoon's trials.
Meanwhile, a former Army vice chief of staff was also reportedly handed the second-highest level of disciplinary action, while a colonel with the Defense Counterintelligence Command was given a two-month suspension.
This composite image shows (from L to R) Yeo In-hyung, former head of the Defense Counterintelligence Command; Lee Jin-woo, former chief of the Capital Defense Command; Ko Hyun-seok, former Army vice chief of staff; and Kwak Jong-keun, former commander of the Army Special Warfare Command. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 29, 2025
8. Hanwha Aerospace to sign 5.6 tln-won Chunmoo export contract with Poland
Comment: I hate to keep beating the dead horse but I have to keep emphasizing the importance of the ROK as a partner in the Arsenal of Democracies.
(LEAD) Hanwha Aerospace to sign 5.6 tln-won Chunmoo export contract with Poland | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · December 29, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251229010351315
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout; RECASTS headline)
SEOUL, Dec. 29 (Yonhap) -- Hanwha Aerospace Co. said Monday it will sign a third-stage contract with the Polish arms procurement agency to export its Chunmoo multiple launch rocket systems to the European nation.
The 5.6 trillion-won (US$3.9 billion) deal to provide the 80-kilometer-range guided missile, known as the CGR-080, will be signed in Warsaw between Poland's Armament Agency and a consortium consisting of Hanwha Aerospace and Hanwha WB Advanced System (HWB), according to Hanwha Aerospace.
HWB is a joint venture between Hanwha Aerospace and WB Group, Poland's largest defense company.
The latest contract builds on two previous deals in 2022 and 2024. The first-stage deal in 2022 was valued at 5.03 trillion won, while the second-stage deal in 2024 was valued at 2.2 trillion won.
President Lee Jae Myung's chief of staff, Kang Hoon-sik, will attend the signing ceremony, along with senior government officials from both countries, including South Korea's Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Hyun-jong; Lee Yong-cheol, minister of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration; and Poland's Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz.
This file photo, provided by the Korea Defense Industry Association, shows officials from Hanwha Aerospace Co. and Poland's armament firm WB Group signing an agreement to create a joint venture aimed at manufacturing guided missiles for the Homar-K multiple launch rocket system in Poland on Sept. 2, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · December 29, 2025
9. US, ROK forces finish field training for summer drills, 4 months behind schedule
Summary:
U.S. and ROK forces completed all delayed field training tied to the August Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) summer drills, finishing more than four months late. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff said 22 outdoor events, part of over 40 UFS training activities, were rescheduled to balance readiness across the year and improve training conditions. The make-up package included airborne operations, personnel recovery, logistics and maintenance training, waterborne insertions, and live-fire, including M777 howitzer shoots and special operations drops from a U.S. Marine KC-130. Officials earlier cited extreme heat for postponements, though some linked delays to diplomacy with Pyongyang. Separately, South Korea ran fewer large-scale field exercises in 2025 than in 2024, while live-fire events increased.
Comment: I believe at the request of the ROK government. But the question is did postponement achieve any positive response from north Korea? Of course the military commanders will support the direction of political leaders. But the military leaders know that postponement (and worse cancellation) does have a negative effect on readiness. The concept that political leaders must deal with is whether the reduction in readiness is worth the risk when compared to the historical record that postponing or cancelling exercises does not achieve anything of value for the ROK or the ROK/US alliance.
US, ROK forces finish field training for summer drills, 4 months behind schedule
Allies postponed exercises on countering North Korea in August, possibly to support diplomacy with Pyongyang
Joon Ha Park December 29, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/us-rok-forces-finish-field-training-for-summer-drills-4-months-behind-schedule/
U.S. soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment fire an M777 towed howitzer during a combined artillery live-fire exercise at Rodriguez Live Fire Complex from Dec. 8 to 19, 2025. | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Dec. 29, 2025)
The U.S. and South Korea have completed all their combined field training for Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint drills aimed at strengthening readiness against North Korean threats, over four months after they were originally scheduled to take place.
The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced on Monday that the 22 outdoor exercises were part of more than 40 U.S.-ROK training events planned for UFS, the allies’ large-scale summer drills in August, but were rescheduled to “maintain a balanced combined defense posture throughout the year and ensure stable training conditions.”
The rescheduled exercises included combined tactical airborne operations, personnel recovery drills, equipment maintenance and logistics support training and live-fire exercises.
Photos released by the South Korean military showed U.S. and ROK troops firing an M777 towed howitzer, as well as combined special operations forces conducting tactical airborne drops from a U.S. Marine Corps KC-130 aircraft in North Jeolla Province.
Other images showed U.S. and South Korean special forces carrying out waterborne insertion training at Gunwi Lake in Daegu, recovering paratroopers and retrieving parachutes using boats following a joint drop.
South Korean troops carried out two missions of their own, including an airfield damage repair drill, JCS added.
JCS said the ROK military “will maintain all-domain readiness and overwhelming capabilities to protect the lives and property of the public under any circumstances.”
The UFS multi-domain exercise, held from Aug. 18 to 28, combined large-scale computer-simulated training with field training aimed at strengthening interoperability and joint operational readiness against North Korea.
At the time, Seoul and Washington said about half of the roughly 40 planned outdoor maneuvers would be delayed until September because of “extreme heat,” though some speculated that the ROK sought to postpone the drills to support diplomacy with Pyongyang.
President Lee Jae Myung has signaled he may consider scaling back or postponing drills as part of broader efforts to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Unification minister Chung Dong-young has also raised the possibility of reassessing the scope and timing of the exercises.
But National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac dismissed the possibility earlier this month, stating that Seoul is not considering scaling back or suspending joint drills with U.S. forces to restart inter-Korean dialogue.
The completion of the much-delayed UFS drills also comes after JCS Chairman Gen. Jin Yong Sung told the National Assembly’s Defense Committee that “all but one” of about 20 postponed drills were underway as of Oct. 14.
“We were unable to complete all postponed exercises within September as initially planned,” Jin said, citing the readiness of participating units and local training conditions.
He added at the time that “all remaining exercises will be carried out by the end of the year.”
South Korean and U.S. special operations forces conduct a tactical airborne jump from a U.S. Marine Corps KC-130 aerial refueling aircraft over Gakdong drop zone in Iksan, North Jeolla Province, on Dec. 4, 2025. | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Dec. 29, 2025)
1
2
3
FIELD TRAINING DECREASES
Despite the completion of UFS drills, the ROK army still conducted fewer large-scale field exercises this year than in 2024.
Army data submitted to People Power Party lawmaker Yu Yong-weon shows that division-level and higher field training exercises totaled 78 in 2025. The figure is unchanged from 2023 but down from 93 last year.
The biggest declines were in training by the Ground Operations Command, which oversees front-line units deployed along the inter-Korean border and in forward defense areas, and the 2nd Operations Command responsible for rear-area defense.
Brigade-level training also declined to 15 events from 18 last year, but live-fire training actually increased to 12 exercises, the highest in 12 years, according to the data.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. North Korean escapee group objects to Seoul’s proposal to ditch term ‘defector’
Summary:
A South Korean proposal to replace “North Korean defector” (talbukmin) with “people from the north” (bukhyangmin) has exposed a split among escapees. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young says many dislike “tal,” which can imply flight or defection and carries Cold War baggage, and the Lee administration has used the alternative term. The National Association of North Korean Defectors, representing about 60 NGOs, rejects the change, arguing many embrace “defector” as a badge of survival and freedom. It also warns “bukhyangmin” could be misread as “people heading north,” implying sympathy for Pyongyang. The ministry says it is consulting experts and collecting escapee views before deciding, while critics say labels do not fix prejudice.
Comment: I routinely use Korean people in the north rather than north Koreans as a way to help us think about one free Korea.. Koreans on both sides of the DMZ are just that: Koreans. Some Koreans are in the north and some are in the South. When all Koreans, whether they are "from the north" or "from the South," are simply Koreans. But I see the argument about Koreans from the north. This is why I tend to use "escapees" (rather than the pejorative term "defectors"), to describe them.
But there is a lesson here. We are describing the use of English words to describe the situation. We overlook the different usage, translations, and nuisance of the Korean language.
The discussion here from Ms. Jiyun Park that I previously sent is useful (Ms, Park is herself an escapee).
https://blog.naver.com/freedom88-/224124783827
North Korean escapee group objects to Seoul’s proposal to ditch term ‘defector’
Association slams unification minister for considering change to ‘people from the north,’ exposing divide over labels
Jooheon Kim December 29, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/north-korean-escapee-group-objects-to-seouls-proposal-to-ditch-term-defector/
North Korean defectors marching in Seoul to raise awareness about human rights in the DPRK | Image: Jang Se-yul
A North Korean defector organization has objected to an ROK government proposal to stop using the label “defector” to refer to those from the DPRK, highlighting a divide over the alleged negative connotations of the term.
The National Association of North Korean Defectors (NANKD) in a statement Monday criticized Unification Minister Chung Dong-young for considering changing the term defector (talbukmin, 탈북민) to bukhyangmin (북향민), meaning those whose hometowns are in the north.
Chung said during a policy briefing earlier this month that all defectors have expressed strong resistance to the original term and that he was gathering opinions on changing the designation.
President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Kim Min-seok also referred to defectors as bukhyangmin during the meeting.
In September, Chung said that many North Korean escapees disliked the character “tal” (탈) — meaning escape or defection — in the term defector because it carries negative connotations. Experts have noted that the term “North Korean defector” has roots in the Cold War.
But the NANKD, which represents roughly 60 nongovernmental organizations, argued that the defector community is not a monolithic group. While some view the defector label as hurtful, many proudly embrace it as representing their “determination for freedom and history of survival,” it said.
The association also suggested that “hyang” (향) could be misunderstood as deriving from a different Chinese character, changing the meaning of bukhyangmin to “people heading north” and implying ideological alignment with Pyongyang.
NANKD demanded that Chung immediately apologize, cease consideration of adopting the new term and hold public forums with defectors on potential changes to the terminology.
The unification ministry told NK News on Monday that it is seeking advice from experts and collecting opinions from defectors, adding that it plans to announce a decision on the terminology in the near future.
According to local media, Chung visited the main defector resettlement center in Anseong, where around 60 escapees supported changing the term.
A survey conducted by the government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification in July 2024 found that 59% of North Korean escapees supported adopting the term “bukhan-yital-jumin,” which translates to defecting North Korean residents and often used interchangeably with talbukmin.
Park Ye-yeong, a defector and member of the Korea Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, told NK News that bukhyangmin was coined before 2015.
She acknowledged the term could cause confusion since it could also refer to separated families displaced from their hometowns in the North during the Korean War. However, she added that these individuals could be referred to as silhyangmin (실향민), or people who have lost their hometown.
Jo Kyeong-il, another escapee who previously served as an aide to a Democratic Party lawmaker, told NK News that those who prefer being labeled as a defector tend to be involved in human rights groups, whereas most others desired to be identified as bukhyangmin.
However, Park Choong-kwon, a defector-turned-lawmaker in the conservative People Power Party, said in interview last week that bukhyangmin does not necessarily refer to DPRK defectors who sought freedom, arguing that changing the terminology does not solve the root problem of social prejudice and defectors’ feelings of marginalization.
Edited by David Choi
11. U.S. Forces Korea Commander: “South Korea is not merely a responder to threats on the Korean Peninsula… a central axis of peace in Northeast Asia”
Comment: More reporting on the ROK/US Combeind Policy Forum
U.S. Forces Korea Commander: “South Korea is not merely a responder to threats on the Korean Peninsula… a central axis of peace in Northeast Asia”
입력 2025.12.29 21:53
This article was translated by an AI tool. Feedback Here.
Combined Forces Commander Xavier Brunson delivers a keynote address at the ‘2nd ROK-U.S. Combined Policy Forum’ held at the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, on the 29th. Provided by the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command
On the 29th, Xavier Brunson, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Commander, stated, “South Korea is not merely an entity that responds to threats on the Korean Peninsula,” and that it “sits at a broader intersection in the Northeast Asian region.” This is interpreted as a call for South Korea to play a broader role, not only regarding North Korea but also in counterbalancing China.
At a keynote address at the ‘2nd ROK-U.S. Combined Policy Forum’ hosted by the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command at the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, Commander Brunson said, “The Korean Peninsula sits at the intersection of broader regional dynamics that shape the balance of power across Northeast Asia.” He added, “The threats (to the Peninsula) are modernizing,” and that “we must ensure alliance modernization evolves dynamically.”
Brunson said, “A crisis in Northeast Asia can unfold rapidly, and the strategic choices made by the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and partners in the region will inevitably determine whether this region moves toward conflict or toward stability,” adding, “In such an environment, the role of South Korea is vital.” He continued, “South Korea has capabilities, a geographic position, and readiness that form the central axis of any effort to uphold peace in Northeast Asia.”
He said, “Pyongyang has officially rejected peaceful unification, revised its constitution to designate the South as the primary enemy, and dismantled symbols of inter-Korean dialogue,” adding, “Coupled with an increasingly aggressive cyber posture, this indicates that the North Korean regime has made a long-term strategic decision rather than a temporary bargaining ploy.”
On November 17, Commander Brunson unveiled an inverted world map and emphasized, “From Beijing’s (China’s) viewpoint, U.S. forces based at Osan Air Base are not a distant force for long-range strategy but an adjacent force capable of producing immediate effects around China.”
At the forum, David Maxwell, Vice President of the U.S. Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy and a former U.S. Special Operations colonel, proposed establishing a Northeast Asia Combatant Command. Maxwell said, “INDOPACOM (Indo-Pacific Command) is in a situation where it is difficult to respond to more than one war,” and, “We should place a Northeast Asia Combatant Command in Seoul and a ‘fusion node’ in Tokyo, Japan, so that the right forces are deployed at the right time.”
한글기사 원본(Original Korean Story)
12. Keynote Address to the Korea-U.S. Joint Policy Forum
Comment: More reporting. Redundent (or circular). But I am including this one just to show the butchered translation of General Brunson's given name: "J. Beer" and "J. Bier" (versus Xavier). I bet if he had J.Beer as the translation his college days might have been even more fun.
Keynote Address to the Korea-U.S. Joint Policy Forum
Sangjun Kim kim.sangjun@mk.co.kr
Input : 2025-12-29 17:11:25
https://www.mk.co.kr/en/politics/11916665?utm
언어 변경하기
Change font
print
share
Keynote Address to the Korea-U.S. Joint Policy Forum
Reaffirms the Direction of 'Modernizing the Alliance
Revisiting South Korea's Strategic Values
Referring to Changes in the Situation in Northeast Asia
사진 확대
J.Beer Brunson, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, holds a press conference at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province in August.. [Photo = Provided by the U.S. Forces Korea Command]
J. Beir Brunson, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea and commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, said on the 29th that "South Korea is not simply responding to threats on the Korean Peninsula." It has been reaffirmed that the second U.S. administration of Donald Trump expects South Korea to play an active role in the new Indo-Pacific security strategy.
In a keynote speech at the 2nd Korea-U.S. Joint Policy Forum hosted by the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command at the War Memorial Hall in Yongsan-gu, Commander Brunson suggested the direction the U.S. is drawing, saying, "The modernization of the alliance should not be just a slogan."
He emphasized South Korea's strategic value in the Asia-Pacific security structure. "The Korean Peninsula is located at the intersection of wider regional dynamics that shape the balance of power across Northeast Asia," Brunson said. "The geographical location of the Korean Peninsula, the sophistication of the Korean military, and the maturity of our combined command structure give this country strategic weight that goes far beyond its borders."
The crisis in Northeast Asia can develop quickly, and the strategic choices made by the United States, South Korea, Japan and regional partners inevitably determine whether the region is headed for conflict or stability. South Korea's capacity, geographic location and preparedness are central to any effort to maintain peace in Northeast Asia," he said.
Meanwhile, David Maxwell, vice chairman of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center (former U.S. Special Warfare Colonel), who presented at the forum, proposed the establishment of the Northeast Asia Combat Command. Vice Chairman Maxwell said, "It is difficult for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to respond to more than one war," adding, "We need to establish a Northeast Asia Combat Command in Seoul and a Convergence Node in Tokyo, Japan to ensure that appropriate forces are deployed at the right time."
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
