Quotes of the Day:

"To be yourself in a world that is doing its best, day and night to make you like everybody else - is to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight; and never stop fighting." - E.E. Cummings

"We must protect our minds by an elaborate system of abstractions, ambiguities, metaphors and similes from the reality we do not wish to know too clearly, we lie to ourselves, in order that we may still have the excuse of ignorance, the alibi of stupidity and incomprehension, possessing which we can continue with a good conscience to commit and tolerate the most monstrous crimes."

– Aldous Huxley

"One's life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation and compassion." - Simone de Beauvoir

1. Inside America’s next information war

2. Trump Says the U.S. Attacked Venezuelan Docks Where Drugs Are Loaded Onto Boats

3. Trump Threatens New Military Action With Israel on Iran’s Missiles, Nuclear Program

4. See How a Chinese Attack on Taiwan Would Be Japan’s Problem

5. Assumptions – A Fatal Oversight

6. China stages military drills around Taiwan to warn ‘external forces’

7. A Shield Made up of Well-directed Blows: Clausewitz and the New Logic of America’s Counter-Narcotics Campaign

8. The Innovator’s Burden: Why the Military Must Find, Protect, and Unleash Its True Visionaries

9. Chemical and Biological Warfare during the Rhodesian Bush War

10. Russia Threatens to Toughen Its Stance on Ending the War in Ukraine

11. For Zelensky, Just Keeping Trump Talking Counts as a Win

12. Grim Evidence of Trump’s Airstrikes Washes Ashore on a Colombian Peninsula

13. U.S. Pledges $2 Billion for U.N. Aid but Tells Agencies to ‘Adapt, Shrink, or Die’

14. New Pentagon report on China’s military notes Beijing's progress on LLMs

15. Why Is the United States Drawn to War?

16. China hiding missiles on merchant ships for a Taiwan war

17. How Deepfakes Could Lead to Doomsday

1. Inside America’s next information war

Summary:

The article argues the United States is entering a more complex information war as AI makes influence operations faster, cheaper, and harder to attribute. It opens with a case study in which a private firm, Black Iceberg Holdings, allegedly used adult content creators to seed everyday-life cues that resonated with north Korean troops deployed with Russia, suggesting measurable narrative effects. It then describes how the Trump administration has scaled back or reorganized federal offices that tracked foreign influence on Americans, citing free speech and anti-censorship concerns, even as adversaries and private contractors expand capability. Experts warn this is now a “brand breach” and societal trust problem that requires a whole-of-nation response, not government alone.

Comment: A war we must win. The Army's new Information Warfare Branch (IWar) is the right first step. As is the National Center for Narrative intelligence. (https://nationalcenterfornarrativeintelligence.org/)

I sent this out previously but it also popped up again in one of my news feeds (probably because of the north Korea connectIon as well as one of our star former Georgetown SSP students). But I think it is very much worth re-examining in light of the language in the NDAA. Congress gets that we must win this information war (IWar). The question is whether DOD/W is taking this tasker from Congress for action? Who has the rose pin on them for this at DOD/W? We should all be paying close attention to the language below from the NDAA.

 https://www.congress.gov/committee-report/119th-congress/senate-report/39/1

See p. 200: 

Narrative intelligence and cognitive warfare

  The committee recognizes that the rapidly evolving global 

security landscape and the increasing sophistication of 

information-centric threats pose significant strategic 

challenges, particularly as peer and near-peer competitors 

increasingly prioritize efforts and investments in this domain 

of warfare. The committee notes that the People's Republic of 

China, for example, is actively engaged in developing what it 

terms ``informatized warfare'' and ``intelligentized warfare,'' 

with a strong emphasis on cognitive domain operations, 

involving the integration of information warfare across 

military and civilian sectors and viewing information as a 

critical domain for achieving strategic advantage in great 

power competition. The committee believes there is an urgent 

need for a coherent understanding of and investment in 

cognitive warfare to address these challenges.

  The committee notes that despite multiple congressional 

actions, there remain ambiguities and challenges in core 

definitions relating to information warfare, with frequent 

conflation of terms such as information warfare, information 

operations, cyberwarfare, cognitive warfare, and influence 

operations. The committee believes this definitional ambiguity 

contributes to a lack of strategic clarity.

  Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense 

to provide a report on cognitive warfare and narrative 

intelligence to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 

and the House of Representatives, not later than March 31, 

2026. In this report, the Secretary of Defense shall define 

cognitive warfare as it relates to the Department of Defense 

and assess how this definition aligns with or relates to 

existing doctrinal elements, including information warfare, 

psychological operations, and military information support 

operations. Additionally, the committee directs the report to 

include an assessment of which Department of Defense 

organizations contribute to and have functional responsibility 

for cognitive warfare efforts. Finally, the report must include 

an examination of the relative value of narrative intelligence, 

defined as intelligence of the story or narrative an adversary 

is attempting to build, to cognitive warfare and related 

disciplines. The committee expects this evaluation to consider 

how narrative intelligence can enhance military operations, 

including information operations and irregular warfare.

Inside America’s next information war

nextgov.com · $(function() { GEMG.HoverGroup.init({}); });

October 14, 2025

Washington is paring back its defenses against influence operations, even as adversaries supercharge them with AI. Much of the fight is shifting to the private sector.

https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/10/inside-americas-next-information-war/408796/

Earlier this year, as North Korea began sending more soldiers to Russia to assist in its war against Ukraine, Maggie Feldman-Piltch turned to a group of adult content creators for their help.

The creators had noticed an uptick in subscribers from the DPRK who suddenly had access to a less restrictive internet environment than they were used to back home, including adult content recommended by their Russian counterparts.

Feldman-Piltch requested that the creators do things such as open a refrigerator on camera or casually mention needing to go to a doctor’s appointment while filming.

A short time later, a North Korean soldier was interviewed by Ukrainian media, where he talked about wanting to experience ordinary activities like going to a grocery store and pushing a shopping cart. Several of the creators recognized the soldier’s voice as one of their clients. It was mission success.

The DPRK is deemed one of the most restrictive and oppressive nations on the planet.

“This is a group of people who probably haven’t seen a full-size refrigerator, let alone one filled with food,” Feldman-Piltch said. Black Iceberg Holdings, her company that helped steer this narrative effort, has been operating in stealth for more than a year. Nextgov/FCW is the first to report its existence.

Such an effort is known as an influence operation — a coordinated attempt to sway public opinion and decision-making. It’s a tactic that has existed for quite a while.

During World War II, William Joyce, known widely as Lord Haw-Haw, was a Nazi propagandist, delivering English-language broadcasts to the United Kingdom and other allied nations to sow fear and dismay. In the United States, the Treasury Department’s Writers' War Board sought to counter those efforts with their own pro-American content.

Years later, consumer electronics and social media have made influence campaigns more covert and scalable. U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Russia exploited those tools in an attempt to sway the 2016 election in Donald Trump’s favor. Trump and his allies have rejected that finding, branding it the “Russia hoax.” His administration, and now Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, have advanced the claim that spy agencies and law enforcement were weaponized against him to discredit his campaign and undermine his presidency.

Upon Trump’s return to the White House, the government has scaled back many of the nation’s offices used to track and counter influence operations targeting Americans at home, on grounds that they were ultimately used as political tools to censor Americans’ free speech.

Those offices include the Foreign Malign Influence Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force. They were built to identify and disrupt covert campaigns by foreign governments that spread disinformation, amplify divisions and undermine confidence in U.S. elections and institutions.

Scaling back those offices comes amid a time when advanced AI tools have fueled enormous capabilities to produce and disseminate content faster than ever before. Black Iceberg is just one part of a growing digital ecosystem of private-sector firms working to tip the balance of views about the United States and democracy around the world. But foreign adversaries are doing the same.

China, namely, has engaged at least one private company that uses advanced AI tools to carry out influence schemes, building data profiles on American lawmakers and other major figures, a recent Vanderbilt University analysis found. And a year ago, U.S. assessments concluded that Russia conducted sustained efforts with companies to launch disinformation campaigns leading up to the 2024 election.

Now, new opportunities are presenting themselves for foreign rivals: A slew of major gubernatorial elections is around the corner, midterm elections are set for next year and a presidential election is coming in 2028.

U.S. offices that keep their eyes on these matters have been reduced and restructured, and the age of advanced AI tools is just beginning.

The U.S. is not doomed, experts in cyber and influence campaigns said, but it will now take a whole-of-nation approach — government, cybersecurity companies, creators, artists, brand experts and more — to combat what they see as a major upgrade in information warfare capabilities in the years to come.

“It’s one of the biggest challenges we have in the world right now,” said Dave DeWalt, CEO of cybersecurity venture capital firm NightDragon, whose portfolio companies include firms that track influence efforts. “Where do I go for the truth? How do I figure out the truth? What is AI-generated? What’s real?”

Individual companies, big or small, will have to contend with these issues and tap into diverse streams of data from social media platforms and other online sources to keep pace with these threats, he said. Viral trends fueled by social media influencers and betting platforms could be hijacked to help covertly exacerbate claims that aren’t real.

“You can see one example after another where … you have this hyperlocal influencer that can get magnified in scale with bots and networks, and suddenly you have a risk to your brand and a risk to your value. And there is no hack, not at least a digital hack,” he said. “This is a brand breach problem, it’s coming to a theater near you in a big way, and we’re just seeing the beginning of this.”

AI tools have indeed drastically increased the scalability, reach and quality of influence operations targeting the United States and its allies, said Deric Palmer, the former assistant special agent in charge for the cyber field office of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division and now managing director of Asc3nd Tech’s open-source and human intelligence portfolio. While in service, Palmer developed the Digital Persona Protection Program that provides defense cyber measures to key personnel like the defense secretary and the Army’s chief of staff.

He often dealt with social media accounts that impersonate officials. Last year, his team identified and mitigated 242,000 of them. His shop was only a group of three people. Often, they would rely on private-sector contractors to automate the search and identification process of the sham accounts.

“I wouldn’t have been able to do it on my own,” he said. “So I don’t think just one government entity can do it.”

Social media platforms largely rely on users to report fake accounts, which also made the job challenging, he added. Agencies like the FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency had worked with social platforms to facilitate takedowns of content deemed false. Those agencies have largely pulled back from coordinating content takedowns since around mid-2023, in part under the pressure of conservative lawsuits alleging their communications with social platforms amounted to censorship of free speech.

Palmer estimates that hundreds of millions of impersonation accounts are present on social media sites right now. Some could theoretically be engineered to influence populations and large-scale decision-making, depending on who owns and controls them. They’re easy to stand up with generative AI tools, which can also be used to craft more realistic-sounding materials for social feeds.

“The first thing between the private sector and the public sector and what leaders need to do is admit that there’s an information operation problem,” he said.

Inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a recent overhaul has shifted the Foreign Malign Influence Center’s functions under the agency’s National Counterintelligence and Security Center and National Intelligence Council. An ODNI release argues that a previous version of FMIC was redundant and infringed on Americans’ constitutional rights when it coordinated with social media firms.

Not much else has been made public about the dissolving of the center, listed as part of a broader “ODNI 2.0” plan announced by Gabbard in August. It’s also not clear if ODNI has named an election threats executive responsible for leading the intelligence community on election security for major races like the 2026 midterms.

Asked about this, an ODNI official said in an email that, under the Biden administration, “the Election Threats Executive was replaced by the Foreign Malign Influence Center” and that “the function changed names from ETE to FMIC and then grew in size.”

ODNI opened the Foreign Malign Influence Center in 2022 and placed the election threats executive — created in 2019 under Trump’s first term — within that center. The executive is typically an individual assigned to coordinate spy agencies’ election threat responses and to oversee an experts group that analyzes intelligence on foreign interference efforts.

ODNI did not respond to a request for clarification on the status of the executive.

“Our country’s ability to counter foreign influence operations has never been stronger, and that is thanks to President Trump’s leadership and DNI Gabbard’s historic efforts to transform ODNI into the most actionable and efficient version,” ODNI Press Secretary Olivia Coleman said in a statement. “As we’ve said publicly on numerous occasions and as Congress has been told directly, core functions and expertise to ensure the safety, security and freedom of the American people have not been affected.”

Tracking information operations is a delicate balance, said one former U.S. official, who requested anonymity to speak freely. Intelligence analysts often struggle to balance weighing the potential harm of suspected propaganda against the principle that Americans should be free to see and judge information for themselves.

Reassessments of U.S. work on influence operations are normal and tend to swing back and forth in emphasis, the ex-official said. But regardless of those shifts, foreign adversaries will keep using information warfare as a daily tool — especially to create distrust at home — and those dynamics can’t be ignored.

It’s not just a U.S. problem, as cyber tools are borderless threats.

A blog post from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies warned that Russia, China and Iran have already exploited global protests, resource supply chains and U.S. elections through coordinated disinformation and hack-and-leak campaigns.

“America is letting its adversaries win the information war. The latest blow to U.S. efforts to fight this war came in August, when the U.S. intelligence community learned of the reduction in size and reorganization of the Foreign Malign Influence Center,” it says. “This ill-advised action comes on the heels of similar reductions within the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI.”

Solving today’s information operations problem “requires a meaningful place for creatives, for musicians [and] for people outside of government,” Feldman-Piltch said. “It requires the citizenry to be engaged and supportive of their own nation. The best way to keep that from happening is to divide them and degrade them.”

“So you could have all the people and all the money in the world in government focused on this, and it wouldn’t be enough, because that’s not how this works,” she added. “We have to tell the truth better than they lie.”

nextgov.com · $(function() { GEMG.HoverGroup.init({}); });

2. Trump Says the U.S. Attacked Venezuelan Docks Where Drugs Are Loaded Onto Boats

Summary:

POTUS said the U.S. attacked a Venezuelan dock area used to load drugs onto boats, claiming a “major explosion” and destruction of the “implementation area.” He offered no operational details, declined to identify whether DoD, an intelligence agency, or another capability executed the strike, and no U.S. agency has publicly corroborated it. Venezuela has not confirmed an attack. U.S. officials reportedly expressed surprise, though a clandestine action is possible. The remarks align with an ongoing pressure campaign against Nicolás Maduro alongside a U.S. Caribbean military buildup. Open-source speculation linked the claim to a Dec. 24 Maracaibo industrial fire, which the company denied.

Comment: Did it happen or not? Did POTUS reveal a covert action? (which of course he has the absolute authority to do). Is the revelation part of a deliberate influence campaign? If so, what is the desired effect we are trying to achieve? Pressure on Maduro is not the only effect - what effect do we want that pressure to cause?

What comes next from both the US and Venezuela? And the famous quote: "tell me how this ends."

Trump Says the U.S. Attacked Venezuelan Docks Where Drugs Are Loaded Onto Boats

WSJ

It is the second time Trump has referred to the strike, after last week telling a radio host that the U.S. had attacked a ‘big facility’

By Dustin Volz

Follow, Juan Forero

Follow and Kejal Vyas

Follow

Updated Dec. 29, 2025 3:31 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/venezuela-attack-trump-claims-c8b01351?mod=hp_lead_pos4

President Trump with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth last week. Jessica Koscielniak/Reuters

• President Trump stated the U.S. attacked a Venezuelan dock area used for drug loading, claiming a “major explosion” occurred.
• Trump didn’t provide details or identify the responsible agency for the alleged attack, which lacks independent confirmation.
• The alleged strike is part of a U.S. pressure campaign against Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, amid a military buildup.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• President Trump stated the U.S. attacked a Venezuelan dock area used for drug loading, claiming a “major explosion” occurred.

President Trump said Monday that the U.S. recently carried out an attack on a dock area in Venezuela where drugs are loaded onto boats and trafficked across international waters, claiming that a “major explosion” had occurred.

“They load the boats up with drugs. So we hit all the boats, and now we hit the area,” Trump said at his Mar-a-Lago resort in response to a question from a reporter. “It’s the implementation area. That’s where they implement and that is no longer around.”

Trump didn’t provide details of the alleged attack, which would represent a major escalation of the U.S. pressure campaign against Venezuela, but it was the second time in the past few days he had referred to such an operation in vague terms. He also declined to say whether the military or a U.S. intelligence agency was responsible for the attack.

“I know exactly who it was but I don’t want to say who it was,” Trump said. “But it was along the shore.”

Last week Trump said that the U.S. carried out an attack on what he called “a big facility,” suggesting the strike took place in Venezuela. Days later, there has been no independent confirmation from his administration or Venezuela that such an attack took place.

Trump publicly announced the strike during a radio interview that aired Friday, though his comments were imprecise and didn’t attract much immediate attention. In the days since, the White House, Pentagon and other government agencies haven’t offered any public details or corroboration that a strike took place.

“They have a big plant or a big facility where the ships come from,” Trump said during the Friday interview with John Catsimatidis, a billionaire Republican donor who hosts a show on a New York radio station. Trump didn’t say where the alleged attack took place and didn’t explicitly identify Venezuela as the target, but the remark came amid a discussion about the Trump administration’s campaign against the country. “Two nights ago we knocked that out,” Trump said, adding that “we hit them very hard.”

In August, the U.S. began a military buildup in the Caribbean to exert pressure on Venezuela’s strongman leader, Nicolás Maduro.

Trump’s campaign against Maduro has relied on a mixture of ambiguity, public threats and insinuation to topple a regime the Trump administration has blamed for funneling deadly drugs into the U.S. It departs from the White House’s strategy over the last several months to publish videos of boat strikes on alleged Venezuelan drug traffickers.

It remains unclear what site Trump was referring to, how extensive the damage was or if there were any casualties. Whether the attack was one carried out by traditional military assets or through some other means, such as a destructive cyber operation or a covert action led by the Central Intelligence Agency, is also uncertain.

The White House National Security Council didn’t respond to requests for comment about Trump’s remarks. The CIA declined to comment. U.S. Southern Command, which oversees U.S. forces in Latin America, also declined to comment, and the Pentagon referred questions to the White House. Venezuela’s regime, which over the years has frequently warned of impending U.S. attacks and criticized Washington’s policies toward the country, hasn’t publicly announced that any attack took place. It didn’t respond to requests seeking comment.

Several U.S. officials privately expressed surprise and confusion about Trump’s comments, though they acknowledged that it was possible that a clandestine attack had occurred without the knowledge of most officials.

Over the weekend, some Venezuelan open-source analysts speculated that Trump’s comments may have been in reference to a fire that broke out on Dec. 24 at an industrial park in the western city of Maracaibo. The private petrochemicals company that runs the facility, Primazol, however, denied any connection.

“We categorically reject the versions circulating on social media,” Primazol said early Monday. The company, which distributes chemicals and feed for the agriculture industry, attributed the fire at one of its warehouses to an unspecified accident. The blaze, it added, was controlled by firefighters and didn’t result in any injuries.

The U.S. hasn’t articulated a detailed explanation of its actions toward Venezuela, though Trump and other officials have asserted that the regime has sent drugs and migrants to the U.S. in an effort to directly hurt Americans. Venezuela isn’t a major producer of narcotics, though cocaine made in Colombia—the world’s biggest source of the drug—is transported by smuggling gangs through Venezuela en route to the U.S. and Europe. Other countries in the region—from Ecuador to Argentina, Mexico to Honduras—also serve as platforms for Colombian cocaine.

Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com, Juan Forero at juan.forero@wsj.com and Kejal Vyas at kejal.vyas@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

3. Trump Threatens New Military Action With Israel on Iran’s Missiles, Nuclear Program

Summary:

POTUS publicly aligned with Prime Minister Netanyahu on coercing Iran, saying he would support an Israeli strike to prevent Tehran from rebuilding its missile arsenal and that the U.S. would act “immediately” if Iran sought to reconstitute its nuclear program. The statements raise deterrence signaling while leaving execution authorities, thresholds, and escalation controls undefined. The meeting occurs as Washington pushes to move a fragile Gaza cease-fire into a second phase that would require Hamas disarmament and an international stabilization force, while Israel signals it may prioritize renewed operations against Iran and additional pressure on Hezbollah. POTUS also said he is pressing for a pardon for Netanyahu in Israel’s ongoing corruption case.

Comment: As they say, "it ain't over til it's over." The last capability to make nuclear weapons will need to be destroyed to prevent their future development. And of course things are certainly complicated as POTUS weighs in on Israeli domestic politics (e.g. pardon for corruption). But what happens to the PM has strategic effects for the US.

Trump Threatens New Military Action With Israel on Iran’s Missiles, Nuclear Program

WSJ

The comments signal public alignment with Netanyahu on Iran but leave unclear whether they are in agreement on next steps in Gaza

By Alex Leary

Follow, Dov Lieber

Follow and Vera Bergengruen

Follow

Updated Dec. 29, 2025 3:24 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-to-meet-netanyahu-to-hash-out-their-different-middle-east-visions-3ca243ba?mod=hp_lead_pos1

President Trump greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his Mar-a-Lago club on Monday. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

WEST PALM BEACH, Fla.—President Trump said he would support an Israeli attack to halt Iran from restocking its missile arsenal and would take U.S. action if Tehran sought to rebuild its nuclear program.

Trump made the comments Monday afternoon at the start of a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “If they will continue with the missiles, yes,” Trump said. He was more emphatic about the nuclear program, saying the U.S. would take action “immediately” if necessary.

“I hear that Iran is trying to build up again, and if they are, we’re going to have to knock them down,” Trump said, standing outside his Mar-a-Lago club with Netanyahu before they began a private meeting. “We’ll knock the hell out of them. But hopefully that is not happening.”

Trump told reporters he was pressing for a pardon for Netanyahu, who is facing a continuing corruption trial on charges that include fraud and bribery. He has pleaded not guilty. Trump, who last month sent a pardon request to Israeli President Isaac Herzog, said Herzog “tells me it is on its way.”

“He’s a wartime prime minister who’s a hero,” Trump said about Netanyahu. “How do you not give a pardon?”

A Trump “representative” who spoke to Herzog about the pardon several weeks ago was told that “any decision on the matter will be made in accordance with the established procedures,” the Israeli president’s office said in a statement. Herzog and Trump haven’t spoken about the pardon since Trump’s letter requesting one, the statement said.

Netanyahu arrived in Florida as the U.S. seeks to advance to the next phase of its Gaza cease-fire plan, and amid signs the two leaders appear to be diverging in their visions for the Middle East after two years of conflict across the region.

Trump is expected to press to keep Israel’s focus on implementing the next stage of the U.S.-brokered Gaza agreement. Netanyahu has signaled he’s open to going along with Trump on Gaza for now, while eyeing a resumption of military operations against Iran and new moves against Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.

Trump has occasionally shown frustration with his Israeli counterpart, including after recent Israeli strikes in Gaza that U.S. officials warned could jeopardize the cease-fire, but the two leaders have largely papered over their differences in public.

The president brushed aside the norms of international diplomacy when he targeted narcoterrorists, fought with European allies and bombed Iran. As part of our video series on Trump’s second term, The Wall Street Journal’s Alexander Ward sets out to learn whether this made America safer. Photo: Annie Zhao

Trump and Netanyahu greeted each other warmly at the start of their session Monday, and the Israeli leader signaled his pleasure with Trump’s comments about Iran. “I don’t think it can be better,” Trump said of the relationship.

Asked about moving to the next phase of the U.S.-brokered Gaza cease-fire, Trump said it would commence “as quickly as we can,” but acknowledged the challenges in reaching that point. “There has to be a disarming of Hamas,” he said, referring to the militant group in Gaza.

Trump has held up the Gaza cease-fire as evidence of his administration’s dealmaking, arguing earlier this month that ending the war was “an impossibility” until his team stepped in. Netanyahu’s willingness to use force around the region often risks straining relations with the U.S., but it has at times moved Trump and his aides closer to Israel’s approach.

“I think that this meeting is crucial because the level of disagreement between the two leaders is at the highest level since Trump got into office,” said Avner Golov, a former Israeli national-security official and now vice president at MIND Israel, an advisory group.

On Iran, Israeli officials and independent analysts say the country is reconstituting its ballistic missile program after Israel blew up its factories and launchers during a 12-day war in June.

Israel wants to destroy Tehran’s rebuilding efforts before the country can improve its air defenses that were battered by Israel in the previous war, analysts say.

Tents in Gaza, where a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas remains fragile. Omar Ashtawy/Zuma Press

“Israel needs to deal with Iran and Hezbollah and it is coming to accept the fact that the situation in Gaza will remain unresolved,” said Jonathan Conricus, a former Israeli military spokesman and a fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank.

Ahead of his meeting with Trump, Netanyahu met in Palm Beach with Itzik and Talik Gvili, the parents of the last remaining deceased hostage in Gaza, Ran Gvili. He reassured them “that every effort is being made to return their son, a brave hero, for burial in Israel,” his office said in a statement.

Netanyahu has insisted that the next phase of the Gaza cease-fire cannot begin until Hamas returns Gvili’s remains. He met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Monday morning ahead of his talks with Trump.

Under the first phase of the U.S.-brokered Gaza agreement, which went into effect on Oct. 10, both sides agreed to a cease-fire and Israel started a partial troop withdrawal to agreed lines within Gaza. Hamas also released 20 living hostages and returned the bodies of 27 others. But the two sides have resisted moving beyond the initial phase, which has left Israel controlling roughly half of the enclave and Hamas the rest. While the cease-fire has largely held, it remains fragile, and both sides have accused each other of violations.

The next phase calls for Hamas to disarm and give up any governing role in Gaza, while transferring security control to an international stabilization force. The process, which is intended to pave the way for eventually rebuilding the bombed-out strip, would be overseen by a Board of Peace chaired by Trump.

Israeli officials are skeptical the Trump plan will work and aren’t ruling out a new operation in Gaza. But publicly they say it is too early for Israel to disrupt the U.S.-led process.

“We are willing to give a chance to the implementation and support the ideas of disarmament,” said Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations. “I don’t think now is the stage for us to step in.”

Israel has signaled it won’t withdraw from the enclave until Hamas disarms. Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to contribute troops to the proposed stabilization force have made little headway so far.

In Lebanon, Israeli officials have been threatening a new operation aimed at Hezbollah.

Lebanese officials say they are on pace to demilitarize southern Lebanon as part of the agreement that halted hostility between Israel and Hezbollah in late 2024. Israeli military officials, however, say the Lebanese military isn’t near finishing that task and that the institution isn’t strong enough to disarm the much more powerful Hezbollah.

Any new Israeli operation would likely be limited to an air campaign, Israeli security analysts said, and would be aimed at further weakening Hezbollah to the point that the Lebanese military could effectively disarm the group.

Netanyahu is also expected to meet with evangelical leaders and attend an event with lawmakers and Jewish community leaders in Miami later in the week, as he seeks to shore up political support for Israel among key U.S. constituencies.

Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com, Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com and Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

4. See How a Chinese Attack on Taiwan Would Be Japan’s Problem

Summary:

The article argues that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would quickly become Japan’s problem because Taiwan sits astride critical sea lanes and chokepoints that underpin regional trade and military mobility. A PRC seizure of Taiwan would weaken the First Island Chain and enable wider Chinese power projection, sharpening pressure on Japan’s nearby Ryukyu islands and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Operationally, any U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan would depend heavily on access to Japan’s bases, logistics, and airfields, especially for fighter operations and naval rearmament. That dependency also increases Japan’s exposure to Chinese missile strikes aimed at blunting U.S. forces and deterring Tokyo.

comment: Geography matters. Geography counts. Please go to the link to view the multiple maps.

As an aside, why do we describe the terrain as the "First Island China?" Aren't we legitimizing China's claims? China is the one that claims the First Island Chain and talk about regional geography in terms of the 1st, and 2d Island chains. Do we want to continue the narrative that will allow the sovereign nations and our allies who live in the region to be "chained" to China either under its coercive influence or worse, physical control. Maybe our focus should be on breaking those chains, politically, economically, and militarily.

As an aside I seem to recall the actual island chain concept and the 9 dash line may have been coined by a member of a consulting firm in DC who put together a concept brief for DOD/W many years ago. But I could be wrong so I won't name the consulting firm that is in my mind.

See How a Chinese Attack on Taiwan Would Be Japan’s Problem

In a conflict, Taipei’s fate would become quickly intertwined with the U.S.-Japan security alliance

Niharika Mandhana

Follow and Daniel Kiss

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Dec. 28, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-taiwan-attack-japan-maps-2608bdbf?st=sgw926&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi David Mareuil/Press Pool

Last month, after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested her country could mobilize a military response if China tried to seize Taiwan, Beijing responded with angry statements and warplane sorties. Its message: That is none of your business.

But the economic and geopolitical reality is that a Chinese invasion across the Taiwan Strait would pose a significant threat to the interests of Japan and its biggest ally, the U.S. Taiwan, a democratically governed island, sits at a crucial maritime crossroads.

Japan

China

East China

Sea

Taiwan Strait

First Island Chain

Taiwan

Bashi Channel

Pacific Ocean

South

China

Sea

Philippines

Malaysia

500 miles

500 km

A large portion of global trade passes through the South and East China Seas. Chokepoints like the Bashi Channel sweep Taiwan’s edges.

A successful Chinese conquest of Taiwan would enable Beijing to dominate the region’s strategic waterways, project military power widely into the Pacific and more aggressively pursue its contested maritime and territorial claims.

“The balance of power in Asia would be tipped quite decisively in favor of China should Taiwan fall into China’s hands,” said Robert Ward, Japan chair at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Looking seaward, China is “sort of hemmed in” right now, he said, referring to the First Island Chain—a string of archipelagoes off the country’s east coast made up largely of a trio of U.S. partners: Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. China “clearly wants to break out of that,” Ward said. 

In a conflict, Taiwan’s fate would become quickly intertwined with the U.S.-Japan security alliance. To repel a full-scale attack, Taipei would need America—its main defense partner—to join the fight. To fight effectively, American forces would need Japan. 

Whether the U.S. would intervene directly in a clash is an open question. Washington maintains a policy of what it calls “strategic ambiguity” to keep China guessing.

Geography presents particular challenges for Japan. A sweep of Japanese islands called the Ryukyus arcs southwest, stopping just short of Taiwan. The island of Yonaguni, more than 1,200 miles from Tokyo, is less than 70 miles from Taiwan.

Japan

China

Amami Island

Area of

detail

East China

Sea

495 miles

China

Okinawa Island

Taiwan Strait

375

Taipei

210

Miyako Island

140

67

Ishigaki Island

Yonaguni Island

Taiwan

Some of these islands would be right next to the war zone—or even in it—if China sent missiles and warships to blockade, batter and encircle Taiwan, putting Japanese citizens and territory at risk. Hostilities across otherwise busy shipping lanes would disrupt essential trade Japan relies on.

In recent years, as Tokyo has retooled its security posture in response to China’s rapid military rise, it has sent a flurry of investments to these southwestern islands. That includes new bases, radar facilities, electronic-warfare capabilities and missile systems. 

Japan’s Type 12 antiship missile batteries with a 125-mile range are now positioned on a number of islands in the Ryukyus, and longer-range variants are being developed. Japanese officials say Yonaguni will receive surface-to-air missiles. 

If Japan decided to participate in a conflict over Taiwan, these missiles—and others it is making to hit targets further out—would play an important role, as would Japan’s submarines and warships.

Japan

East China

Sea

China

Amami Island

Taiwan Strait

Okinawa Island

Miyako Island

Ishigaki Island

Taiwan

125 miles

Pacific Ocean

Type 12 anti-ship

missile range

South China

Sea

560 miles

Notional deployment of

extended-range Type 12 systems

Japan has its own territorial dispute with China over a cluster of uninhabited islands called the Senkakus. Controlled by Japan and claimed by China and Taiwan, these specks of land lie just over 100 miles northeast of Taiwan. China, which calls them the Diaoyu islands, routinely sends coast-guard ships into the waters around them to assert its claim, a source of friction with Tokyo.

A Chinese takeover of Taiwan would make the threat to Japanese territory more acute, said Yuki Tatsumi, senior director at the U.S.-based Institute for Indo-Pacific Security. “Japan will no longer have a buffer, if you will,” she said, adding that it would face direct pressure from the Chinese navy.

Amami Island

China

East China

Sea

205 miles

Okinawa Island

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

105 miles

Taiwan Strait

Taipei

Miyako Island

Ishigaki Island

Yonaguni Island

Taiwan

Whether or not Japan joins a war over Taiwan, to what degree it fights and what it does if the U.S. stays out depend on a mix of military, legal and political factors. If Washington decided to militarily defend Taiwan, decisions made in Tokyo would shape the U.S. intervention. 

Japan hosts a network of strategically positioned American bases, sustained by robust infrastructure. U.S. forces fighting a long way from home would need to activate them, involving discussions between Washington and Tokyo. That includes Kadena Air Base, a hub of U.S. air power in the Pacific, and the U.S. Navy base at Yokosuka, home to the Seventh Fleet and a forward-deployed aircraft carrier.

“The U.S. doesn’t really have anything like the bases that it has in Japan elsewhere in Asia,” said Eric Heginbotham, a principal research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s security studies program. “You can’t replicate what you have in Japan.”

Shariki Communications Site

Misawa Air Base

Sea of Japan

(East Sea)

Japan

Tokyo

Kyogamisaki Communications Site

Yokota Air Base

Camp Zama

Naval Air Facility Atsugi

Fleet Activities Yokosuka

Marine Corps Base Camp Iwakuni

Fleet Activities Sasebo

China

East China

Sea

Pacific Ocean

U.S. Army Garrison Okinawa

Kadena Air Base

Marine Corps Base Camp Butler

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma

A 2023 report on a Taiwan wargame by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, co-written by Heginbotham, described Japan as the linchpin. “The United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations,” it said. 

One island in particular, Okinawa, is blanketed with military facilities and training areas. Kadena Air Base, located on it, houses a range of aircraft at any given time, including jet fighters that would be needed to sink Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait and fight Chinese warplanes in the air. A new missile-toting Marine Corps unit designed for an island-hopping fight is also based on Okinawa.

Select U.S. military installations

Japan

China

Area of detail

Taiwan

Guam

Okinawa Island

Camp Schwab

Camp Hansen

Kadena Ammunition Storage Area

Marine Corps

Army

Air Force

Kadena Air Base

370 miles to Taiwan

Camp Foster

Futenma Air Station

10 miles

10 km

Okinawa’s proximity to China, however, makes it vulnerable to attack. Beijing has amassed such a formidable arsenal of missiles that concentrating combat planes in one or two well-known locations almost anywhere in the region would put them in danger of being wiped out. To make it harder for China to target them, the U.S. Air Force would, in a conflict, seek to scatter its aircraft not just across various American bases but beyond: to Japanese military installations, civilian or dual-use airfields in Japan, and sites elsewhere in the region. 

That means U.S. air operations could expand Japan’s involvement, if Tokyo acquiesced.

Japan would be especially critical for fighter aircraft, which have limited range and burn a lot of fuel. From runways in Japan, pilots could get to Taiwan and back quickly, giving them more time in the fight rather than the commute. 

Without Japan, the U.S. would be heavily reliant on Guam, an American territory in the West Pacific around 1,700 miles from Taiwan. Bombers, which fly long distances, could use Guam, but fighter operations would be much harder to sustain, even with aerial refueling. Air-superiority missions, for instance, would require them to sortie and remain “on station” in Taiwan’s vicinity for a time before returning, which isn’t viable from Guam, Heginbotham said. 

Aircraft carriers would be an option, but those warships are big, expensive targets and the U.S. is unlikely to put too many of them forward in the early days of a conflict, he said. 

Naval bases on Japan, meanwhile, would help rearm warships. The farther vessels have to go to pick up new missiles, the longer they would be out of the fight. 

Japan could also be dragged in by China’s wartime decisions. If Beijing calculated that the U.S. was likely to join the conflict, it could pre-emptively seek to blunt that threat by sending missile barrages at American bases in Japan, and potentially at Japanese targets as well. It has hundreds of missiles in each category—short, medium and intermediate range.

Misawa Air Base

Japan

Yokota Air Base

East

China

Sea

China

Kadena Air Base

Pacific Ocean

Taiwan

620 miles

Short-range ballistic missile

South China

Sea

Guam

Philippines

1,865 miles

Medium-range ballistic missile

3,420 miles

Intermediate-range

ballistic missile

Malaysia

Indonesia

Missiles are proliferating on all sides. This year, the U.S. for the first time brought its Typhon system to Japan—it has since left the country—placing it in the south from where it could hit targets on mainland China. The new ship-killing Nmesis missile battery used by the U.S. Marine Corps was also taken to Okinawa for exercises.

Graphics sources: IISS (Type 12 antiship missiles), Congressional Research Service (U.S. military sites in Japan); Okinawa Prefectural Govt. (U.S. military sites on Okinawa); U.S. Dept. of War (missile ranges)

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com and Daniel Kiss at daniel.kiss@wsj.com

5. Assumptions – A Fatal Oversight

Summary:

T.X. Hammes argues that most Afghanistan “strategy” debate confused goals with strategy. Using Eliot Cohen’s framework, real strategy requires explicit assumptions, ends-ways-means, prioritization, sequencing, and a theory of victory. Recent U.S. public strategy documents listed broad ends and vague ways but largely skipped assumptions, means, and prioritization, making them aspirational rather than strategic. The core warning is operational plans hinge on assumptions about unknowns, and unexamined assumptions can drive force sizing, postwar governance expectations, and risk acceptance, as seen in Iraq. In Afghanistan, key assumptions were unstated, weakly tested, and not paired with branch plans if wrong, inviting strategic failure.

Comment: Perhaps this is a good time to send out T.X. Hammes' essay that just happened to pop in one of my feeds. (it is undated on the web site but it is in Volume 1, Issue 1 so I think this is more than a decade old since Volume 10 is this past fall).  Although this Afghanistan (with a little Iraq) focused it is applicable to every strategic problem. One of the things that our professors and my many mentors drilled into our thinking was that we have to get the assumptions right. We must continuously test and challenge assumptions and either find evidence to turn them into facts or if they prove erroneous then we must revise our strategy and plans. But we cannot study the past enough to learn lessons for the future.

Assumptions – A Fatal Oversight - Military Strategy Magazine

militarystrategymagazine.com

T. X. Hammes - Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington D.C.

https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/assumptions-a-fatal-oversight/

There has been a lively discussion in the open press concerning the appropriate strategy for Afghanistan. Stimulated by repeated top level administration reviews (Bush 2008, Obama 2009, proposed Obama Dec 2010) the chattering classes have spilled barrels of ink discussing what an effective strategy might look like. In fact, “Afghanistan strategy” results in over 28 million hits on Google. Yet most commentators – and to be fair, most administration personnel – are not really speaking about strategy but rather about what goals are appropriate for Afghanistan. This means that most of the discussion is simply wasted. A discussion of goals avoids the difficult task of developing a genuine strategy.

Professor Eliot Cohen has provided a thoughtful outline for strategy. He starts with the requirement to make assumptions about the environment and the problem. Once the strategist has stated his assumptions, then he can consider the ends (goals), ways (the how) and means (resources) triangle. This is where most discussion of strategy stops. However, Cohen states an effective strategy must also include prioritization of goals, sequencing of actions (since a state will rarely have sufficient resources to pursue all its goals simultaneously) and finally, a theory of victory (“How does this end?”)

Unfortunately, recent U.S. “strategic” documents and the strategic discussions concerning ongoing conflicts have failed to meet Cohen’s standards. The United States National Security Strategy May 2010 lists a series of important goals (ends) and declares that the nation will use a multi-lateral approach (ways) when possible.[i] Unfortunately, the strategy does not go on to outline the means the United States will apply to each goal nor does it prioritize those goals. The section titled “The World as It Is” provides a very broad brush overview of the environment, but addresses none of the key assumptions critical to developing a strategy. In essence, the National Security Strategy is an aspirational document that provides a good overview of the administration’s goals for strengthening America both domestically and internationally. It also indicates the Administration prefers to use multi-lateral approaches whenever possible. However, it is not a strategy.

In a similar fashion, the United States National Defense Strategy, June 2008 provides a succinct list of five broad objectives.[ii] However, it does not list assumptions, prioritize goals or discuss the ways the United States will use to achieve those objectives. Further, the goals themselves are so broad as to provide little guidance for the execution. The document states:

“We will achieve our objectives by shaping the choices of key states, preventing adversaries from acquiring or using WMD, strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships, securing U.S. strategic access and retaining freedom of action, and integrating and unifying our efforts.”[iii]

Unfortunately, it remains silent about how we will achieve these objectives. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a little better, in that it does identify some of the ways the administration plans to use, but never addresses the means. Thus, although sometimes called a strategy document, the QDR is really a statement of goals.

In fact, no one really expects these documents to be genuine strategy documents. Instead, they serve to outline the goals an administration considers important – even if unachievable. While this does no harm in the glossy public documents each administration produces, the approach has infected the broader discussions of strategy within the administration, media, Congress and academia. Most often strategic discussions in these areas are simply arguments about goals (ends) with little discussion of the other aspects of a strategy.

Assumptions

Perhaps what has caused the United States the most trouble recently has been the utter failure to discuss the assumptions behind recent major strategic decisions to take military action. The Department of Defense defines an assumption as:

“A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.”[iv]

In short, in every plan there will be key factors that are unknown to the planners. For instance, we can’t know for certain how a population will react to a U.S. invasion or how much of the international development assistance promised at a conference will actually be delivered. However, to continue planning, the planners must make an educated guess – an assumption – about such key unknowns. While some may see this as a bureaucratic process of little value, recent events show assumptions are central to all planning. For instance, General Tommy Franks assumed the Iraqi government would remain in place after we removed Saddam. Thus Iraqis would deal with the problems of getting their nation back on its feet after the war. And because they would, the United States could invade with a much smaller force than that recommended by the previous CentCom Commander, General Anthony Zinni. In contrast, Zinni assumed the government would collapse and he would need large number of U.S. forces (380,000) to provide security and services.[v] This single, unexamined assumption dramatically altered the war plan.

Even when it became clear the Iraqi government had collapsed, U.S. decision makers did not react promptly. As Gordon and Trainor noted in Cobra II, their history of the planning for the invasion of Iraq, “The plan approved by the president heavily relied on existing Iraqi police and military forces to guarantee security post-Saddam. There was no discussion of a fallback plan.”[vi] This highlights one of the critical factors in planning – questioning what happens if your assumptions are wrong and planning how to respond. If the assumptions are unexamined, the planners will not evaluate the impact of being wrong and prepare accordingly.

Primary Assumption: These are wicked problems

Since almost all conflicts are wicked problems, experts will disagree about the definition of the problem and planning assumptions. Further, there is a high probability the first understanding of the problem and its subsequent solution will be wrong.[vii] Thus, it is critical that planners think through the implications if their assumptions prove false. Of course, not all assumptions have the same risk. For instance, the risk of assuming the Iraqi force of ex-patriots would assist in providing security was insignificant. Although the assumption proved untrue, it was largely irrelevant since there were fewer than 1,000 of them. On the other hand, assuming the Iraqi bureaucrats and police would remain in place had enormous downside risk, since the Coalition would have to fill 100,000s of billets essential to the operation of the Iraqi state.

In Afghanistan, neither the Bush nor the Obama Administration stated their strategic assumptions. Even after the Obama Administration completed its 2009 review and General McChystal’s evaluation was leaked, there was no clear statement of assumptions. In this case, the proof was left to the reader.

Based on the public statement of goals and the documents leaked in the fall, the Obama administration’s 2009 strategy seemed to be based on seven assumptions.

A democratic, centralized Afghan government is desirable and feasible.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai can form a government that most Afghans recognize as legitimate.

Public opinion in the U.S. will approve the commitment of sizable U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan for several more years.

Current counterinsurgency practices will win the hearts and minds of most Afghan people.

The International Security Assistance Force will provide the resources necessary to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.

Afghanistan is significantly more important to American security than Pakistan.[viii]

Pakistan will see the Taliban and AL Qaeda as a threat and fully cooperate in U.S. efforts to defeat them.

Even a casual examination of these assumptions would call into question the feasibility of the 2009 strategy. The much harsher examination of the political and military struggle in Afghanistan that has begun to take place in public and governmental forums has revealed the fallacy behind several of these assumptions.

During this article’s gestation, the Washington Post printed excerpts from Bob Woodward’s new book and, if his reporting is accurate, the actual key assumptions the Administration used were somewhat different.

“The new timetable relied on four ‘key assumptions,’ none of which the strategy review had suggested was likely. The assumptions were that Taliban insurgents would be ‘degraded’ enough to be ‘manageable’ by the Afghans; that the Afghan national army and police would be able to secure the U.S. gains; that the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan would be ‘eliminated or severely degraded’; and that the Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai could stabilize the country.”[ix]

Woodward’s account actually highlights the fact our strategists do not use assumptions effectively. Three of four assumptions framed the operational environment rather than the strategic one. All four focused purely on the Afghanistan fight without considering the broader regional strategy or even the position of the U.S.A’s International Security Assistance Force allies. The result is a mismatch between the strategic goals and the probable outcomes. Of particular concern, the plan was initiated even though “the review suggested” that the assumptions were not true.

Summary

Assumptions are critical to defining your understanding of the problem. Only by stating the assumptions can you insure all participants understand how you see the situation. Failure to do so precludes a coherent, thoughtful discussion of the plan, since the participants are like the proverbial blind men touching the elephant. Each has a mental image of the problem he is discussing that has little or no relation to the vision of the others. They are literally not talking about the same thing. Further, even if the assumptions are stated, the discussion must continue to understand which are critical to the plan and which are not.

Unfortunately, assumptions have rarely been part of the recent discussions concerning strategy, either in the media or government decision making circles. The few exceptions — such as when Vice President Cheney assured Americans that our troops would be greeted with flowers by the Iraqis (Cheney to Tim Russert on Meet the Press, 14 Sep 2003) — were done more as part of public relations than as part of a serious strategic discussion.

A critical element of any discussion of strategy is to derive assumptions and then propose them. This ensures everyone in the discussion is trying to solve the same problem. This is the first step in dealing with assumptions. However, the process does not end there. Assumptions must be constantly re-examined to see if they remain valid. In addition, planners must think through the impact if a specific assumption proves invalid. Depending on the severity of the impact, it may be essential to develop branch plans to deal with the potential negative outcomes. In fact, if the assumptions used for planning turn out to be too far from fact, it will be necessary to admit the understanding of the problem was fundamentally wrong and therefore a completely different course of action is required. In short, as amply demonstrated in recent conflicts, an incorrect assumption can completely overturn a plan. A series of incorrect assumptions can lead to strategic failure.

References

[i] National Security Strategy, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed 20 Sep 2010.

[ii] National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p.6, http://www.defense.gov/news/2008 national defense strategy.pdf, accessed 20 Sep 2010.

[iii] National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 13, http://www.defense.gov/news/2008 national defense strategy.pdf, accessed 20 Sep 2010.

[iv] DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001 as amended through April 2010, p. 39, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/?zoom_query=Assumption&zoom_sort=0&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_and=1, accessed 20 Sep 2010.

[v] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, Pantheon Books, NY, 2006, p. 26.

[vi] Ibid, p. 162.

[vii] For a concise and very useful discussion of wicked problems, see Tradoc Pamphlet 525-5-500 Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 5-12, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf, accessed 4 Oct 2010.

[viii] These six assumptions were derived by John Collins, William McCallister and this author for a November 2009 article in Naval Institute Proceedings titled “Afghanistan: Connecting Strategy and Assumptions.”

[ix] Bob Woodward, “Military thwarted president seeking choice in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 27 Sep 2010, p. 1.

militarystrategymagazine.com

6. China stages military drills around Taiwan to warn ‘external forces’

Summary:

China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command executed joint live-fire drills around Taiwan using air, naval, and missile forces, framing them as a “stern warning” to “Taiwan independence” and “external interference.” Beijing signaled a blockade and escalation template, including sea air patrols, “joint seizure of comprehensive superiority,” and port interdiction, while highlighting “all-dimensional deterrence outside the island chain.” Taiwan put forces on high alert and condemned Beijing as an aggressor. Operationally, Taiwan reported 89 aircraft and drones, 14 PLA Navy ships, and extensive coast guard presence near the Strait. The drills disrupted civil aviation, forcing diversions and cancellations affecting over 100,000 international travelers, and were set to continue Tuesday with declared rocket-firing danger zones.

Comet: This begs the proverbial question: What do you do now Lieutenant?

China stages military drills around Taiwan to warn ‘external forces’

Defense News · Kanis Leung, The Associated Press · December 29, 2025

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/12/29/china-stages-military-drills-around-taiwan-to-warn-external-forces/?utm

China’s military on Monday dispatched air, navy and missile units to conduct joint live-fire drills around the island of Taiwan, which Beijing called a “stern warning” against separatist and “external interference” forces. Taiwan said it was placing its forces on alert and called the Chinese government “the biggest destroyer of peace.”

Taiwan’s aviation authority said more than 100,000 international air travelers would be affected by flight cancellations or diversions.

The drills came after Beijing expressed anger at what could be the largest-ever U.S. arms sale to the self-ruled territory and at a statement by Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, saying its military could get involved if China were to take action against Taiwan. China says Taiwan must come under its rule.

The Chinese military did not mention the United States and Japan in its statement on Monday, but Beijing’s foreign ministry accused the Taiwanese ruling party of trying to seek independence through requesting U.S. support.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said rapid response exercises were underway, with forces on high alert.

“The Chinese Communist Party’s targeted military exercises further confirm its nature as an aggressor and the biggest destroyer of peace,” it said.

Beijing sends warplanes and navy vessels toward the island on a near-daily basis, and in recent years it has stepped up the scope and scale of these exercises.

Senior Col. Shi Yi, spokesperson of China’s People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command, said the drills would be conducted in the Taiwan Strait and areas to the north, southwest, southeast and east of the island.

Shi said the activities would focus on sea-air combat readiness patrol, “joint seizure of comprehensive superiority” and blockades on key ports. It was also the first large-scale military drill where the command publicly mentioned one goal was “all-dimensional deterrence outside the island chain.”

“It is a stern warning against ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and external interference forces, and it is a legitimate and necessary action to safeguard China’s sovereignty and national unity,” Shi said.

China and Taiwan have been governed separately since 1949, when a civil war brought the Communist Party to power in Beijing. Defeated Nationalist Party forces fled to Taiwan. The island has operated since then with its own government, though the mainland’s government claims it as sovereign territory.

Drills will continue on Tuesday

The command on Monday deployed destroyers, frigates, fighters, bombers and unmanned aerial vehicles, alongside long-range rockets, to the north and southwest of the Taiwan Strait.

It carried out live-fire exercises against targets in the waters as well. Among other training, drills to test the capabilities of sea-air coordination and precise target hunting were conducted in the waters and airspace to the east of the strait.

Hsieh Jih-sheng, deputy chief of the general staff for intelligence of the Taiwanese Defense Ministry, said that as of 3 p.m. Monday, 89 aircraft and drones were operating around the strait, with 67 of them entering the “response zone” — airspace under the force’s monitoring and response.

In the sea, the ministry detected 14 navy ships around the strait and four other warships in the Western Pacific, in addition to 14 coast guard vessels.

“Conducting live-fire exercises around the Taiwan Strait ... does not only mean military pressure on us. It may bring more complex impact and challenges to the international community and neighboring countries,” Hsieh told reporters.

Military drills are set to continue Tuesday. Taiwan’s Civil Aviation Administration said Chinese authorities had issued a notice saying seven temporary dangerous zones would be set up around the strait to carry out rocket-firing exercises from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Tuesday, barring aircraft from entering them.

The Taiwanese aviation authority said more than 850 international flights were initially scheduled during that period and the drills would affect over 100,000 travelers. Over 80 domestic flights, involving around 6,000 passengers, were also canceled, it added.

The Chinese command released themed posters about the drills online accompanied by provocative wording. One poster depicted two shields with the Great Wall alongside three military aircraft and two ships.

Its social media post said the drills were about the “Shield of Justice, Smashing Illusion,” adding that any foreign interlopers or separatists touching the shields would be eliminated.

Last week, Beijing imposed sanctions against 20 U.S. defense-related companies and 10 executives, a week after Washington announced large-scale arms sales to Taiwan valued at more than $10 billion. It still requires approval by the U.S. Congress.

Under U.S. federal law in place for many years, Washington is obligated to assist Taipei with its defense, a point that has become increasingly contentious with China. The U.S. and Taiwan had formal diplomatic relations until 1979, when President Jimmy Carter’s administration recognized and established relations with Beijing.

Asked about the drills, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has attempted “to seek independence by soliciting U.S. support and even risk turning Taiwan into a powder keg and ammunition depot.”

“External forces’ attempts to use Taiwan to contain China and to arm Taiwan will only embolden the Taiwan independence forces and push the Taiwan Strait toward a dangerous situation of military confrontation and war,” he said.

There was no immediate U.S. statement on the drills.

Taiwanese army on high alert

Karen Kuo, spokesperson for the Taiwanese president’s office, said the drills were undermining the stability and security of the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific region and openly challenging international law and order.

“Our country strongly condemns the Chinese authorities for disregarding international norms and using military intimidation to threaten neighboring countries.” she said.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry released a video that featured its weapons and forces in a show of resilience. Multiple French Mirage-2000 aircraft conducted landings at an air force base.

In October, the Taiwanese government said it would accelerate the building of a “Taiwan Shield” or “T-Dome” air defense system in the face of the military threat from China.

The military tensions came a day after Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an said he hoped the Taiwan Strait would be associated with peace and prosperity, instead of “crashing waves and howling winds,” during a trip to Shanghai.

7. A Shield Made up of Well-directed Blows: Clausewitz and the New Logic of America’s Counter-Narcotics Campaign

Summary:

Narcotics, especially fentanyl, now function as a strategic threat, not merely a crime problem, and that U.S. counter-narcotics operations increasingly resemble Clausewitzian “active defense.” Using Clausewitz’s idea of “a shield made up of well-directed blows,” it frames lethal interdiction strikes on trafficking vessels as defensive counterstrokes designed to disrupt mass-casualty flows before they reach the homeland. It traces the legal and policy evolution from Posse Comitatus limits, through expanded military support to law enforcement, to post 1980s treatment of drug trafficking as a national-security issue and DoD/W as lead for detection and monitoring. It highlights deterrence logic, but flags legal, legitimacy, and escalation concerns.

Excerpts:

Conclusion

America’s evolving counter-narcotics campaign suggests that defense can no longer be understood as a passive stance but as an ongoing process of preservation defined by active defense. Each interdicted vessel, each disrupted network, forms an additional layer in a shield by blunting the enemy and striking him first. The U.S. did not stumble onto active defense. It was pushed in that direction by the character of the threat itself, including its lethality, its transnational networks, and its ability to inflict mass harm once inside the country, pressures that steadily expanded the military’s role in counter-narcotics since the 1970s. The destructiveness of drugs, such as fentanyl, can be compared to a weapon of mass destruction. Against such a threat, passive defense falls short. Clausewitz warned that the strength of defense lies not in passivity but in the freedom it creates for counterattack. In Prussian strategist’s terms, the nation is building a shield made of well-directed blows.

Clausewitz reminds readers that the purpose of defense is to gain time and to preserve one’s strength until the threat itself loses momentum. The question that remains is whether America can sustain such a shield of well-directed blows without mistaking perpetual defense for endless war. As Hegseth’s declaration implied, the U.S. is no longer waiting for the next shipment to arrive. It is meeting the threat where it begins (or at least in transit). Yet, this raises a deeper question, one Clausewitz himself might ask. If the purpose of defense is to regain the capacity to strike, then what comes next? The answer will shape whether America’s active defense continues as targeted blows meant to blunt specific threats or evolves into a broader, more enduring posture that reshapes America’s role in the Western Hemisphere. America may indeed be building a shield made of well-directed blows, but to end in pure defense, Clausewitz warned, would be to contradict the very nature of war itself.

A Shield Made up of Well-directed Blows: Clausewitz and the New Logic of America’s Counter-Narcotics Campaign

by Clay Johnson

12.29.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/29/a-shield-made-up-of-well-directed-blows-clausewitz-and-the-new-logic-of-americas-counter-narcotics-campaign/

ABSTRACT

Given the scale of death and disruption drugs now cause, narcotics increasingly function as a strategic threat rather than a conventional crime problem. This article suggests that America’s modern counter-narcotics campaign reflects a new form of active defense inspired by Clausewitz’s theory that protection can require offensive action. It traces how U.S. policy evolved from the limits of the Posse Comitatus Act to current military operations, targeting drug-trafficking boats. By viewing narcotics, such as fentanyl, as a strategic threat, the paper explains how the U.S. now seeks to defend the homeland through preemptive, outward-focused actions.

On November 10, 2025, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced on X that U.S. forces had conducted another lethal strike on two drug-trafficking boats in the Pacific. According to Hegseth, the two vessels were operated by a designated terrorist organization. “Under President Trump, we are protecting the homeland and killing these cartel terrorists who wish to harm our country and its people,” he wrote. In another post, he affirmed that the United States, “would continue to track them, map them, hunt them, and kill them.” Beyond the headlines, these operations appear to reflect a deeper strategic logic. These strikes preserve the defender’s interests by disrupting traffickers’ ability to deliver mass-casualty producing narcotics before the threat fully forms. This illustrates what Carl von Clausewitz called “a shield made up of well-directed blows.” His idea is that true defense is not passive but composed of offensive actions that seize initiative. By striking drug traffickers beyond its borders, the U.S. appears to be implementing the Prussian strategist’s idea of active defense. As he reminds readers, “for we may find it advantageous to await the charge against our bayonets and the attack on our position… but if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy’s blows; Thus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles…” Today, the enemy’s blows take the form of fentanyl, whose lethality and foreign sourcing produce effects akin to a sustained strategic attack on the American population. Yet applying this logic to counter-narcotics operations strains the legal frameworks that long separated military and law-enforcement roles. Translating this modern interpretation of active defense into strategy has required a rethinking of those boundaries. This evolution has unfolded mostly over the past few decades but traces its roots back to the Posse Comitatus Act.

Strikes on drug-trafficking boats like this one, posted by Secretary Hegseth on October 10, 2025, are becoming more frequent. Pentagon Image

From Posse Comitatus to Active Defense

The American aversion to military involvement in domestic law enforcement has deep historical roots. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was enacted in response to public backlash against the use of federal troops to enforce laws, particularly in the Reconstruction-South and on the western frontier. The Act established a strict divide between civil and military authority, prohibiting the use of federal armed forces to execute domestic law unless expressly authorized by Congress or other exceptions, such as an insurrection. Because counter-narcotics was historically viewed as a law-enforcement issue, this principle constrained the military’s role for nearly a century. These early restrictions made an active defense impossible. Narcotics were treated as criminal problems, and the military was legally confined to a supporting role rather than permitted to conduct the kind of forward, offensive actions that an active defense requires.

The escalating drug problem of the late twentieth century began to blur those distinctions. When President Richard Nixon declared drugs “public enemy number one” in 1971, the “war on drugs” began as a law-enforcement and public-health campaign. The military’s role was limited to logistics, surveillance, and intelligence support. It also lacked authority to detect, pursue, or interdict traffickers, actions that would later become central to a strategy of active defense.

That began to change with the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981, which amended Posse Comitatus to allow the armed forces to share information, equipment, and training with civilian agencies. This change laid the groundwork for integrating military capabilities into counter-narcotics operations. By enabling military assets to support drug-interdiction missions, the Act introduced surveillance and detection capabilities that civilian agencies lacked and expanded the range at which traffickers could be identified and targeted. A General Accounting Office report, for example, later credited this act with dramatically increasing military involvement in interdiction missions, including the use of Navy E-2C radar aircraft, Army Cobra helicopters, and Air Force aerostat sensors. This growing fusion of law enforcement and defense created a foundation for a modern application of Clausewitz’s active defense, in which well-directed blows are delivered early against threats.

By the mid-1980s, the shift was unmistakable. President Ronald Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 221 defined international drug trafficking as a national-security threat, not merely a law-enforcement issue. In fact, every president since Reagan has identified drugs as a national security issue in their administration’s National Security Strategy. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 went further, designating the Department of Defense as the lead agency for detecting and monitoring drug trafficking into the United States. The creation of Joint Task Force-6 under U.S. Northern Command institutionalized this support role, embedding military assets into counter-narcotics efforts along the southern border. This institutional change established an enduring structure through which the U.S. could operationalize a more active form of defense. Though initially covering domestic territory, it eventually expanded and included a broader mission beyond the continental U.S.

Early manifestations of Clausewitz’s active defense can be observed during this expansion era of the 1980s and 1990s. Operations such as Blast Furnace in Bolivia and Plan Colombia extended the mission into source and transit zones, pushing U.S. involvement from surveillance and training toward limited operational support. These initiatives marked the first sustained attempt to preempt threats abroad rather than merely react to them at home. Though their success in reducing overall drug flow was limited, they laid the conceptual groundwork for the defense model witnessed today; a strategy that treats narcotics not merely as a law enforcement issue, but as a national security threat requiring depth.

Drugs as Weapons and the Strategic Logic of Defense-in-Depth

If the legitimacy of an active defense strategy depends on the severity of the threat, the current drug crisis more than qualifies. American life expectancy has declined in recent years, largely due to opioids, which are the deadliest category of drugs in terms of deaths. Between 2019 and 2022, for example, life expectancy fell each year. In 2023 alone, over 105,000 Americans died from overdoses with 76% involving synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. The surge in drug overdose deaths in the last 25 years has risen to more than 100 times their 1999 levels. These numbers capture only direct deaths, not the broader social and economic toll that compounds their impact, such as the costs of addiction treatment and incarceration, and long-term health care issues resulting from addiction.

The scale of lethality is staggering. Conceptually, the U.S. now suffers the equivalent of a Halabja-scale chemical attack every two weeks. Saddam Hussein’s 1988 chemical assault on Halabja killed roughly 5,000 Kurdish civilians; the U.S. loses that many to fentanyl every couple of weeks. At this scale, drug lethality and its effects on U.S. national interests elevate narcotics beyond a matter of crime or public health. Their magnitude raises them to the level of a strategic threat. With only two milligrams capable of killing an adult and one kilogram enough to kill half a million, fentanyl’s destructive potential rivals that of battlefield chemical agents.

Given this combination of lethality, deliberate distribution, and foreign sourcing, the comparison to chemical weapons is not just metaphorical. Joint Publication 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, defines a chemical weapon as “a munition or device designed to cause death or harm through chemical agents.” While fentanyl is not militarized in form, its mass employment by transnational actors against U.S. civilians satisfies the functional criteria of a weapon of mass destruction. In 2003, General James Hill, then Commander of U.S. Southern Command, warned that the drug trade already constituted a destructive force on the scale of such weapons.

This framing is crucial to understanding the strategic shift. Consider a hypothetical scenario: a U.S. intelligence asset detects an inbound small vessel known to be carrying a crude radiological “dirty bomb” toward an American port. Its detonation would kill numerous citizens, poison the surrounding area, damage infrastructure, and wreak havoc. The consequences of such a threat are comparable to the effects of fentanyl. For example, both cause mass death, inflict significant societal costs, and produce cascading secondary problems. While the mechanisms are different, the value of this analogy lies in the shared strategic problem both threats present: preventing a mass-casualty event before it is absorbed at the point of impact. Faced with such a threat, the critical question is posed: Would we wait for that vessel to detonate its bomb at an American port, or act by striking the threat before it arrives? The answer seems clear: the threat’s lethality and imminence would justify an immediate, preemptive defensive counterstroke. The same logic applies to the threat of fentanyl.

This framing as a form of chemical warfare has increasingly influenced U.S. policy. The current administration has characterized the fentanyl epidemic as a deliberate attack on the American people. That interpretation remains contested: international critics, such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have described lethal maritime strikes against traffickers as potential extrajudicial actions. Yet from a strategic standpoint, understanding narcotics as a destructive chemical weapon aids in clarifying why such forward operations are justified under an active defense paradigm.

If narcotics function as a weapon, then the strategic logic of active defense becomes more comprehensible. Striking traffickers’ vessels, labs, and logistics chains before their chemical payloads reach U.S. shores can be viewed not as merely interdiction, but as an effort to defend. This understanding aligns with Clausewitz’s “shield made up of well-directed blows” metaphor.

Clausewitz and the Logic of Active Defense

Clausewitz’s On War offers a lens through which this interpretation makes sense. “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive,” he wrote, but it must not be confused with mere passivity. True defense, for Clausewitz, is a dynamic equilibrium of restraint and counterstroke. By stopping narcotics before they enter the U.S., interdiction becomes the defender’s counterstroke, neutralizing the threat at its weakest point. The defender must strike where the enemy is most exposed, not to conquer, but to preserve.

In this sense, America’s counter-narcotics campaign at sea and abroad may reflect a modern adaptation of that principle. When U.S. forces strike high-speed boats ferrying fentanyl precursors across the Caribbean, they are not necessarily waging an offensive war; they are executing a defensive counterstroke that prevents a chemical weapon’s delivery system from reaching the homeland. Each action, or each “well-directed blow,” reinforces the shield that guards the nation. The defense, then, is not absorbed by a blow, but by delivering one that preempted a threat. Clausewitz likened this to a shield that strikes as it guards.

Critics might argue that such actions, lethal strikes, stretch the definition of defense. Yet Clausewitz anticipated this tension. “The object of defense,” he wrote, “is preservation.” The destruction of narco-terrorist vessels achieves precisely that purpose; it is a well-directed blow meant to prevent further harm to the American people.

That insight has renewed relevance today. America’s counter-narcotics campaign reflects the principles of active defense; a campaign that relies on offensive execution. Understood this way, then, targeted maritime strikes can be viewed not as acts of aggression or even extrajudicial killing but as components of a layered defense designed to protect the homeland by striking threats before they reach our shores.

Taken together, these elements, including the logic of active defense, timely counterstrokes, and forward interdiction, show that America’s approach to counter-narcotics is increasingly defined by a strategy of active defense. This shift also reflects a broader change in how the United States views defense in response to an evolving threat.

Conclusion

America’s evolving counter-narcotics campaign suggests that defense can no longer be understood as a passive stance but as an ongoing process of preservation defined by active defense. Each interdicted vessel, each disrupted network, forms an additional layer in a shield by blunting the enemy and striking him first. The U.S. did not stumble onto active defense. It was pushed in that direction by the character of the threat itself, including its lethality, its transnational networks, and its ability to inflict mass harm once inside the country, pressures that steadily expanded the military’s role in counter-narcotics since the 1970s. The destructiveness of drugs, such as fentanyl, can be compared to a weapon of mass destruction. Against such a threat, passive defense falls short. Clausewitz warned that the strength of defense lies not in passivity but in the freedom it creates for counterattack. In Prussian strategist’s terms, the nation is building a shield made of well-directed blows.

Clausewitz reminds readers that the purpose of defense is to gain time and to preserve one’s strength until the threat itself loses momentum. The question that remains is whether America can sustain such a shield of well-directed blows without mistaking perpetual defense for endless war. As Hegseth’s declaration implied, the U.S. is no longer waiting for the next shipment to arrive. It is meeting the threat where it begins (or at least in transit). Yet, this raises a deeper question, one Clausewitz himself might ask. If the purpose of defense is to regain the capacity to strike, then what comes next? The answer will shape whether America’s active defense continues as targeted blows meant to blunt specific threats or evolves into a broader, more enduring posture that reshapes America’s role in the Western Hemisphere. America may indeed be building a shield made of well-directed blows, but to end in pure defense, Clausewitz warned, would be to contradict the very nature of war itself.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Defense Department, or the U.S. government.

Tags: Carl von Clausewitz, Counter-narcotics operations, drones, Homeland Defense, Logic of War, Maritime security operations, United States

About The Author

• 
  
• Clay Johnson
• Lieutenant Colonel Clay Johnson is an Army strategist and assistant professor at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. He previously served as a strategist for joint concepts and wargaming at the Army Futures and Concepts Center. His 23-year career includes extensive experience in operational planning and deployments to Afghanistan and Senegal.
• 
  

8. The Innovator’s Burden: Why the Military Must Find, Protect, and Unleash Its True Visionaries

Summary:

Military advantage increasingly depends on identifying and empowering genuine innovators, not merely managing incremental improvement. It contends that hierarchical cultures, risk aversion, and compliance driven personnel systems often suppress the officers, NCOs, and civilians who see emerging problems early and propose disruptive solutions. The “innovator’s burden” is that visionaries must fight institutions as much as adversaries, navigating bureaucracy, career risk, and skepticism while building coalitions and prototypes. The piece calls for leaders to actively find these outliers, protect them from punitive setbacks, resource rapid experimentation, and scale successful ideas through acquisition, doctrine, and education. Without deliberate mechanisms, the services will lose talent and cede initiative to adaptive competitors.

The Innovator’s Burden: Why the Military Must Find, Protect, and Unleash Its True Visionaries

by Bill Murray

12.26.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/26/military-innovation-resistance/

Introduction: The Performance of Progress

Step inside any military presentation today, and you’ll encounter a meticulously staged production. The language of the future is everywhere: “transformation,” “disruption,” “innovation.” It’s a well-rehearsed performance, complete with “Shark Tank” committees, gleaming “innovation labs,” and new commands planted in tech-centric hubs like Austin. Tech start-up salesmen, flush with venture capitalist dollars, roam the halls, peddling software they promise will win the next war. The presentations are polished, the rhetoric inspiring, all designed to project an image of relentless forward progress.

But here’s the unvarnished truth: the military is deficient in the innovative ideas needed to guide future technological development. There’s a vast chasm between the language of innovation and the arduous, often painful, act of it. The military has mastered the vocabulary of innovation, launching countless initiatives, yet this flurry of activity often masks a deeper challenge: a deep-seated, institutional resistance to and mistrust of the very people who generate truly groundbreaking ideas.

True innovation must be tied to innovative ideas, and those ideas come from real thinkers. This creates the ultimate paradox: many organizations love the concept of innovation but, in practice, they hate their innovators. The military, an institution built on order and discipline and the perpetuation of what it sees as its inherent wisdom and correctness, is a prime example of this phenomenon.

This isn’t an attack on the individuals with the military. The ranks are filled with sharp, dedicated people capable of extraordinary thought. The problem is systemic. A hierarchical structure, by its design, prioritizes conformity over ingenuity. It’s a machine that can unintentionally sideline and push out those who think differently. The institution recognizes the critical need for innovation, but its culture often recoils from the disruptive reality that entails. We have an army of administrators, when what we desperately need are legions of iconoclasts. This is not just an internal management issue; it is a matter of urgent strategic necessity. If the military cannot learn to find, nurture, and most importantly, protect its true innovators, it risks a catastrophic disadvantage in future conflicts. In war, there is no reset button. Irrelevance is the final defeat.

Historical Echoes: A Legacy of Overlooked Visionaries

Military history provides a stark, repeating lesson: the establishment often dismisses its own most brilliant minds. This is a behavioral pattern as old as warfare itself. The ghosts of these spurned prophets haunt the archives, their vindication often coming at the cost of lives.

B.H. Liddell Hart: The Prophet of Mechanized Warfare

Consider Captain B.H. Liddell Hart. This British theorist, writing with fierce urgency between the World Wars, was a prescient champion of mechanized warfare. He argued the future belonged to tanks and aircraft working in concert, rendering the static slaughter of World War I obsolete. The British high command, intellectually trapped in the trenches, approached his ideas with skepticism. While Hart gained some influence, his revolutionary reforms were never fully implemented. As a result, British mechanization lagged behind, a weakness that contributed to defeats in the early years of World War II.

Pete Ellis: The Marine Who Drew the Map to Victory

Then there is Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete” Ellis, a man who foresaw the challenges of the Pacific with near-clairvoyant clarity. In the 1920s, this visionary Marine developed exhaustive plans for amphibious warfare in the Pacific, anticipating the island-hopping strategy and its immense logistical demands. His work, “Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia,” became the blueprint for winning the war against Japan. He knew that logistics would be everything. Despite his brilliance, Ellis battled bureaucratic inertia, fighting for recognition of ideas that would later save countless lives. He died under suspicious circumstances in 1923, his work largely unrecognized until it was desperately needed two decades later. His story raises an uncomfortable question: does the system have an autoimmune response to its most creative thinkers?

Billy Mitchell: The Martyr of Airpower

And who could forget Billy Mitchell? This firebrand officer grasped the transformative power of airpower with a zealot’s conviction. He proved aircraft could sink battleships, signaling the end of an era of naval dominance. His argument was an existential threat to the budgets, traditions, and identity of the naval hierarchy. For his heresy, he was met with punitive institutional resistance. He was court-martialed for being right too early. History, of course, vindicated him in the wreckage of Pearl Harbor.

David Hackworth: The Heretic of Counter-Insurgency

David Hackworth must also be considered here too. This warrior-scholar, America’s most decorated living soldier, saw with brutal clarity the strategic bankruptcy of the Vietnam War. He understood that the obsession with body counts and overwhelming firepower was a careerist-driven folly, completely detached from the on-the-ground reality of counter-insurgency. His argument wasn’t just a critique; it was a public indictment of the entire general officer corps, exposing the war as a mismanaged disaster and threatening the reputations of its most powerful leaders. For his heresy, delivered in a bombshell 1971 television interview, he was effectively exiled, ending a storied career and becoming a pariah for decades. History, of course, vindicated him in the painful soul-searching that followed America’s defeat, as the very counter-insurgency doctrines that became central to modern warfare are a direct echo of the uncomfortable truths.

The Modern Prophets and the Anatomy of Resistance

This pattern of rejecting the prescient is not a dusty relic of the past; it continues today with a relentless consistency. Consider the work of Dr. Amos Fox, whose research on attrition warfare serves as a vital corrective to the preferred narrative of clean, rapid maneuver. His data-driven work shows that modern battlefields are still largely defined by brutal, grinding attrition often outweigh tactical brilliance. The Russo-Ukraine War is a real-world validation of his theories, yet his insights meet resistance because they challenge the military’s sleek, high-tech image and suggest that our Army’s current design and our industrial base, optimized for short conflicts, is woefully unprepared.

This resistance to inconvenient data echoes the reception given to Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, whose quantitative analysis of combat effectiveness was a direct assault on the romantic notion of war as purely an art form. For an establishment that lionizes the “gut feelings” of great commanders, Dupuy’s cold, hard numbers were often dismissed in favor of heroic narratives. In both cases, Fox and Dupuy were not just presenting new ideas; they were challenging the very identity of the institution. The resistance they faced was not because their data was wrong, but because their conclusions were profoundly uncomfortable, forcing a level of self-reflection the culture is conditioned to avoid.

The underlying point is that challenging core assumptions carries a steep professional price. Why? The reasons lie in a toxic stew of institutional pathologies. As theorist Jeff DeGraff notes, large institutions are masters at creating systems that appear to promote innovation while subtly punishing the true disruptors. This manifests in several ways:

• Careerism and Conformity: The promotion system favors conformity. The path to senior rank is a series of “ticket-punching” assignments. It is safer to manage a program perfectly than to champion a risky idea that might fail. Officers learn that bold thinking can derail a career, while cautious stewardship guarantees advancement.
• Bureaucratic Inertia: Military organizations are designed for order and scale, not speed. This structure, essential for managing a global force, tends to crush innovative ideas under the weight of process. A good idea can die a thousand deaths in committees and funding cycles.
• The Fear of Diluted Authority: To a senior leader who has spent 30 years mastering a specific way of warfare, an innovator isn’t just suggesting a new idea; they are implicitly stating that the leader’s experience may be obsolete. Innovation can feel less like a helpful suggestion and more like an indictment of their entire career.
• Entrenched Beliefs and Sacred Cows: Every institution develops sacred cows—beliefs or platforms immune to criticism. Whether it’s the primacy of the aircraft carrier. How the Marine Corps should fight, or the main battle tank, these ideas are protected with religious fervor. Innovators, by their nature, are heretics who threaten the established order.

Theater, Complacency, and the Crisis of Courage

In response to criticism, the military engages in “innovation theater.” This involves creating the visible trappings of innovation without making substantive cultural changes. It includes labs that are more like tech petting zoos than engines of change, and shark tank competitions that generate excitement but little fielded transformation. These initiatives prioritize appearances over outcomes, creating the illusion of progress while the underlying, risk-averse culture remains entrenched. The military has become expert at looking innovative while remaining fundamentally conservative.

This theater is a symptom of a deeper leadership problem. It requires a rare form of courage to embrace novel ideas, protect the subordinates who propose them, and accept the personal risk that comes with championing change. We select leaders for physical courage, but not necessarily for the intellectual courage to value bold thinking over comfortable conformity. We need leaders willing to let messy, inconvenient voices challenge the sacred cows, because those are the voices that might prevent the next strategic surprise.

This complacency has a cost. While our military performs innovation theater, our adversaries are studying its weaknesses with intensity. China’s military modernization is focused on exploiting the vulnerabilities of a slow-moving force. Russia’s use of hybrid warfare caught NATO off-guard because Western military thinking remained trapped in conventional frameworks. The war in Ukraine has been a brutal, daily lesson that many of our long-held assumptions were dangerously wrong.

Conclusion: A Choice Between Transformation and Irrelevance

The time for self-congratulatory innovation theater is over. The military needs a moment of brutal self-honesty. It must stop paying lip service to change and commit to the genuine, painful work of cultural transformation, or it must accept a slow, inexorable slide into strategic irrelevance. The problem isn’t a lack of technology; it’s a crisis of courage, stemming from a leadership culture often unwilling to set aside egos.

Real change demands a fundamental restructuring of how the military identifies, develops, and promotes talent. It means creating alternative career paths for disruptors and contrarians, ensuring they are just as likely to advance as officers with perfect maintenance records and gunnery scores. If the Army can promote four tech executives with no military experience to Lieutenant Colonel, then the Army and other services can surely find creative career paths for its innovators. The recipe for transformation is as difficult as it is clear: we must find, reward, and nurture our true innovators.

• Empower and Protect Career Paths for Disruptors: Create and shield advancement opportunities for those who take intelligent risks, even when those risks lead to the instructive failures that are the lifeblood of learning.
• Wage War on Bureaucratic Inertia: Radically streamline processes, empower experimentation at lower levels, and accept that real innovation requires embracing failure as part of the learning process.
• Mandate Dissent, Don’t Silence It: Make hearing dissenting opinions a mandatory part of any major decision, rewarding leaders who listen and adapt, not those who punish the messengers.
• Unleash Innovation by Challenging Convention: Encourage and demand that subordinates question conventional wisdom. Make it clear that challenging established methods is not insubordination, it is a core professional responsibility.

As General Eric Shinseki so pointedly observed, “If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less.” Our greatest strategic asset is not our technology or our budget. It is our people. It is the latent creativity and intellectual courage residing within our ranks. By finally creating a culture that fosters their creativity and rewards their courage, we can ensure the military remains a potent, strategically relevant force rather than a brittle, historical curiosity. The time for superficial gestures has passed. The consequences of continued complacency will be measured in more than just professional embarrassment; they will be measured in blood and defeat.

Check out all the great things Small Wars Journal has to offer on military innovation.

Tags: innovation, institutional change, military innovation, Transformation, transformation in contact

About The Author

• 
  
• Bill Murray
• Lt. Col. William Murray is the deputy engineer for U.S. European Command, in Stuttgart, Germany. He graduated in 2005 from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York and he is a 2017 graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also hosts of the Lessons Lost in Time podcast.
• https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/lessons-lost-in-time/id1762473030

9. Chemical and Biological Warfare during the Rhodesian Bush War

Summary:

CPT (Dr.) Turner examines Rhodesia’s covert chemical and biological warfare program in the late stages of the Rhodesian Bush War, arguing it delivered tactical effect but could not offset strategic failure. Run through Rhodesian intelligence and implemented largely by the Selous Scouts, the effort used commercially available toxins and rudimentary production to poison water sources, food, medicine, and clothing, causing significant guerrilla casualties and substantial civilian deaths. Tactics included cholera-based area denial along the Mozambique border, “contact men” seeding contaminated supplies into insurgent networks, and poisoned garments designed for rapid absorption. Guerrillas adapted through screening, suspicion, and countermeasures, while the program further eroded regime legitimacy and fueled insurgent propaganda. The central lesson is classic COIN: brutality and tactical ingenuity do not substitute for political strategy and popular support.

Excerpt:

The Rhodesian case offers critical lessons for contemporary counterinsurgency operations and international security frameworks. The program’s tactical achievements masked its strategic bankruptcy—a pattern that remains relevant as modern conflicts increasingly blur the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare. While tactically innovative, the Rhodesian CBW program was ultimately defeated through a number of factors, including rapid guerrilla adaptation, further loss of regime legitimacy, and its failure to compensate for a fundamental political failure in winning popular support.

Comment: So much to learn from history, ours as well as others. Could this possibly be resurrected by adversaries ("guerrillas" not governments perhaps) in the gray zone?

Chemical and Biological Warfare during the Rhodesian Bush War

by Matthew Turner

12.29.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/29/rhodesian-bush-war/

Abstract

The Rhodesian use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) during the Rhodesian Bush War remains a little-studied aspect of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. While the program provided initial tactical advantages and caused thousands of guerrilla casualties, it ultimately failed to be militarily decisive.

Introduction

Chemical weapons have been employed as part of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations multiple times over the history of warfare. Examples include the Italian use of blister agents in the 1935-1936 invasion of Ethiopia, the use of German chemical weapons stocks by the Spanish and French during the Rif War in Morocco, and the rumored deployment of chemical weapons by the Soviets during the invasion of Afghanistan. However, the use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) by the embattled Rhodesian government during the 15-year Rhodesian Bush War remains little known.

On 11 November 1965, the apartheid colony of Rhodesia declared independence from the United Kingdom. What followed is now known as the Rhodesian Bush War, a prolonged and bloody guerrilla conflict. The struggle between the Rhodesian regime and the multiple guerrilla factions was complex and ever-shifting. A full description of this complex war is outside the scope of this article. However, the Rhodesian use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations remains unparalleled in both its effectiveness and brutality.

Rhodesian COIN Strategy

The Rhodesian COIN strategy is a textbook example of tactical success paired with strategic failure. By the end of the conflict, Rhodesian special forces – focused on rapid mobility, raids, and small-unit tactics – were considered some of the best COIN units in the world. Despite the overwhelming tactical advantage Rhodesian forces held on the battlefield, their COIN strategy culminated in a complete loss, as the regime refused to consider the possibility of compromise or winning the support of the majority African population until it was far too late.

By 1975, the Rhodesian regime’s initial successes in the war were rapidly eroding. As local support for the guerrillas grew, a new government sympathetic to the guerrilla cause arose in Mozambique, opening a second 1200-kilometer front. Forced to adapt due to an extreme lack of resources and manpower, Rhodesian forces adopted unconventional COIN tactics during the war’s final stage from 1976 to 1979. Chief among them was the deployment of CBW.

Dirty Tricks

The Rhodesian CBW project was proposed by Professor Robert Symington, a professor at the University of Rhodesia’s medical school. The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) of the Rhodesian intelligence apparatus took over the project, which was implemented by a specialized branch of the Selous Scouts.

From its very beginning, between mid-1975 and mid-1976, the Rhodesian CBW program was “amateurish”, hindered by a significant lack of time, resources, and scientific competence. Most of the day-to-day processing typically only required two workers, typically medical or veterinary students.

The majority of Rhodesia’s CBW program was developed from cheap, readily available sources. Agricultural products, including pesticides and organophosphates, were purchased from commercial sources, as were products that were later found to be poisoned, such as clothing and food. The apartheid South African regime secretly provided funding and resources, but the full extent of South African involvement remains unclear.

The facilities for the program consisted of a laboratory built into Symington’s residence, as well as primitive facilities at 2 Selous Scouts forts, located in Bindura and Mount Darwin, respectively.

Production of CBW agents was as rudimentary as the available resources, facilities, and expertise would suggest. None of the chemicals used by the Rhodesians were produced on-site; instead, commercial pesticides and industrial supplies were adapted into rudimentary chemical weapons. Production was typically conducted on an as-needed basis, usually with specific guerrilla groups in mind.

Tactics – Area Denial

The overextended Rhodesian forces had previously attempted area denial tactics, the most notable being an extensive cordon sanitaire along the border with Mozambique. These efforts were ultimately inefficient and a waste of critically low resources.

The arid regions of Mozambique offered an opportunity for the CBW program. The Rhodesians employed a number of CBW agents to fill the gaps in the defenses, predominantly in the dry Gaza Province. Selous Scouts were reported to have dumped cholera in the Ruya River along the Mozambique border, and within Mozambique itself. Large areas of the border became “frozen zones” forbidden to all Rhodesian forces not part of the Selous Scouts, and the RSF were warned to stay a minimum of 4000 meters away from the Ruya River. Wells, slow-moving streams, stagnant water, and other potential water sources were contaminated by cholera and other poisons.

This strategy of area denial was initially effective; there were reports of hundreds of guerrilla deaths, and several guerrilla bases had to be evacuated due to cholera outbreaks. The logistical strain that this placed on guerrillas – now forced to carry their own water– also became a significant drain on guerrilla mobility and resources. Civilian casualties were also high; in one instance, 200 civilians near the Mozambique border died after the region’s sole water supply was poisoned.

Tactics – Local Poisonings

Guerrilla forces operating within Rhodesia were often highly dependent on support from the local African population, particularly in foodstuffs. Rhodesian intelligence targeted this logistical support, often providing villagers with supplies to secretly poison visiting guerrillas. Anecdotal reports of villagers with relatives in the Rhodesian army or police deliberately poisoning food spread through the ranks of the guerrillas. In one notable incident, 11 out of 32 guerrillas died from poisoned food after visiting a single village.

Villages suspected of poisoning guerrillas often faced violent reprisals. These violent reprisals often led to mistrust and suspicion between guerrillas and the local population, alienating the insurgency from a vital group of potential supporters.

Tactics – Poisoned Food

Beyond local poisonings within the villages, the Rhodesian CBW efforts also focused on the industrial poisonings of large amounts of canned beverages and canned meats. Thallium was used to poison foodstuffs such as canned meat, beans, and mealie meal.

Medicines were also often targeted – in one notable incident, a Special Branch officer recalled a group of 30 guerrillas that took several “vitamin pills” after a long night of drinking. Within several days, many of the guerrillas had gone blind, experienced gangrenous sores, and had even died – all symptoms of thallium poisoning. A number of outbreaks of thallium poisoning occurred in the civilian sphere, as well – in December 1977, nearly a dozen civilians died after purchasing thallium-poisoned canned meat at a local store. The local African population correctly assumed that the poisoning of the canned meat had been done intentionally.

Warfarin, a common chemical used as a rat poison, was also often used. In one April 1978 incident, over 200 guerrillas at a training camp had to be treated for severe warfarin poisoning, likely the result of warfarin mixed in with foodstuffs.

Tactics – Poisoned Clothes

The Rhodesian use of poisoned clothes was widely judged by the guerrillas as one of the most effective COIN strategies the regime employed.

Parathion was the primary chemical employed by the Rhodesian CBW program. A yellowish-brown organophosphate employed in pesticides, it may cause cholinergic poisoning within minutes to hours. At facilities such as the Bindura Fort, drums of parathion were poured out onto “large sheets of tin and dried in the sun. When the liquid had dried, the resulting flakes were scooped up and pounded into a mortar with a pestle. The powder was then brushed onto clothes…” The production process was crude, and protective equipment so rudimentary that Symington was hospitalized due to an accidental poisoning in 1979.

By drying the parathion into a powder, the Rhodesians eliminated any telltale chemical odor. It was then applied, sometimes with a mix of dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) to accelerate dermal absorption, to a number of clothes, including underwear, t-shirts, socks, and jackets. The blue denim trousers and khaki felt hats that guerrillas favored were also often deliberately impregnated with parathion in this manner. However, the Rhodesians preferred underwear and t-shirts, as they had the fastest rate of parathion absorption into the body. By the end of the war, over 2500 articles of clothing were poisoned in this manner. Reports of organophosphate poisonings across Rhodesia skyrocketed during this time.

Dissemination

The true effectiveness of the CBW program was in its dissemination. “Contact men” were especially effective at injecting poisoned food and clothing into the guerrillas’ supply system. Oftentimes, these contact men would be contacted by guerrilla groups with lists of requested supplies; these lists would then be forwarded to the CBW team. The CBW team would produce the poisoned supplies, which were then sent along to the contact men and from there to the guerrilla group in question. Contact men would receive Rh $1,000 for each confirmed guerrilla death. One November 1977 report claims that 79 guerrillas had been killed from contaminated supplies in a single month.

One of the most infamous collaborators with the Rhodesian CBW effort was Reverend Arthur Kanodareka. Kanodareka specialized in targeting guerrilla recruits, often supplying them “…with poisoned uniforms. The men would be sent on their way to the guerrilla training camps, but before reaching their destination, would die a slow death in the African bush. Many hundreds of recruits became victims of this operation.”

Further dissemination was conducted through local stores. Rhodesian operatives would supply local storeowners with contaminated food, medicine, and poisoned clothing. The storeowners were sometimes willing collaborators; sometimes, stores in areas with a high concentration of guerrillas were unknowingly seeded with contaminated supplies. Civilian casualties did not appear to be a concern. In his autobiography, Major John Cronin of the Selous Scouts recalls questioning a Special Branch officer, “‘But how can you be sure that the [guerrillas] and not some other African civilians will get these things?’ He smiled indulgently. ‘You’re new here, aren’t you?’

As a final means of disseminating poisoned supplies within the guerrilla logistical network, identified guerrilla caches would often be cunningly poisoned with contaminated material.

Military Effectiveness

Despite the hundreds of civilian deaths, the Rhodesians deemed the CBW program a success, estimating a guerrilla death toll in the thousands. Some estimates claim that up to 15% of guerrilla casualties during the war were due to the CBW program, a significantly higher percentage than even the First World War. Along with this, former guerrillas admitted that the CBW program caused a “significant… disruption in civilian/guerrilla relations in the affected areas, causing increased accusations of collaboration and witchcraft.”

Just as alarmingly, the Rhodesian CBW program, despite multiple warning signs in the medical literature and public accusations from guerrilla groups, remained completely unknown to Western intelligence agencies until years later.

Insurgency Adaptation

However, despite initial military successes, the CBW program was not enough for Rhodesian forces to achieve a COIN victory. The Rhodesian regime remained unable to achieve its political objectives, and guerrilla forces successfully won over more and more of the rural population’s support as the war dragged on. Any disruption the poisonings may have had between guerrilla and civilian relations may have been significant, but more ultimately “not decisive.”

On a tactical level, guerilla forces quickly adapted to the CBW threat. Teenager auxiliaries were used to test suspicious sources of food, and a culture of suspicion against unknown substances took root – when Depo-Provera was introduced to Rhodesia in the 1970s, it was widely believed to be a form of chemical sterilization against the African populace, so much that it would be banned by Zimbabwe in 1981. Guerillas carefully policed any new sources of clothing as well. New recruits arriving at training camps had to strip and then hop for half a kilometer to boost their metabolism and ensure they had not been inadvertently wearing any poisoned clothing.

The Rhodesian CBW program also offered a propaganda opportunity to the guerrillas. Using sources such as the Zambian Daily News, the ZANU-controlled Zimbabwe News, and other books and newsletters, guerrilla forces were also quick to publicize reported accounts of the Rhodesian government’s deliberate poisoning of water sources and foodstuffs. The Rhodesian regime, already suffering from its utter disinterest in winning local support, only bled further legitimacy because of this.

Conclusion

Despite its crude and rudimentary nature, the Rhodesian CBW program initially provided the regime with a number of novel COIN tactics. However, hamstrung by the Rhodesian government’s political inflexibility and by guerrilla adaptation, the CBW program ultimately failed to become a decisive factor in the Rhodesian Bush War.

The Rhodesian case offers critical lessons for contemporary counterinsurgency operations and international security frameworks. The program’s tactical achievements masked its strategic bankruptcy—a pattern that remains relevant as modern conflicts increasingly blur the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare. While tactically innovative, the Rhodesian CBW program was ultimately defeated through a number of factors, including rapid guerrilla adaptation, further loss of regime legitimacy, and its failure to compensate for a fundamental political failure in winning popular support.

Check out all the great things Small Wars Journal has to offer.

Tags: Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, counterinsurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, Rhodesia, Rhodesian Bush War, Selous Scouts

About The Author

• 
  
• Matthew Turner
• Captain Matthew David Turner is an active-duty Army physician working as a PGY-3 EM resident at Penn State Milton S. Hershey Hospital in Hershey, Pennsylvania. He has long been interested in the intersection of medicine and history.

10. Russia Threatens to Toughen Its Stance on Ending the War in Ukraine

Summary:

Russia signaled it may harden its negotiating position on ending the Ukraine war after claiming Ukraine launched a large drone attack on a rural residence used by Vladimir Putin in the Novgorod region. Kyiv denied the allegation and accused Moscow of fabricating a pretext to undermine talks being pushed by the Trump administration. POTUS said Putin raised the incident in a phone call and that he had no independent confirmation, while suggesting he had blocked Tomahawk transfers to avoid escalation. The Kremlin warned it would revise previously discussed “agreements and emerging solutions,” as Russia continues pressing for major territorial concessions and sustaining offensives, including toward Zaporizhzhia.

Comment: How do you deal with Putin now? If he is unwilling to negotiate in "good faith" (assuming that is somehow possible) What does Ukraine, the US and EU/NATO do? No one should advocate for concessions to him because the demand for more will not stop. I think we should be clear about Putin's desired end state. (And ensure he is unable to achieve it).  

Have reassessed our assumptions lately?

Russia Threatens to Toughen Its Stance on Ending the War in Ukraine

NY Times · Ivan Nechepurenko · December 29, 2025

Moscow said a Ukrainian drone attack targeted a residence of President Vladimir V. Putin, which Ukraine denied, accusing the Kremlin of fabricating an excuse not to make peace.

By Neil MacFarquhar and Ivan Nechepurenko

Dec. 29, 2025

Updated 4:28 p.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/world/europe/russia-claims-ukraine-attack-putin.html

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia meeting with military officers in Moscow on Monday, in a photo released by Russian state media.Credit...Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik

With talks on ending the Ukraine war making little progress on the toughest issues, Russia issued a dramatic threat on Monday to harden its stance, linking the potential change to what the Kremlin called a failed Ukrainian drone attack overnight targeting a rural residence of President Vladimir V. Putin.

Ukraine immediately denied any such attack, accusing the Kremlin of inventing a pretext to undermine the peace talks being orchestrated by the Trump administration. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, who met with President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in Florida on Sunday to discuss a possible deal, called the Russian allegation a “complete fabrication.”

Although both Mr. Trump and Mr. Zelensky gave an upbeat assessment of their talks, no concrete progress was reported on the two thorniest issues — Russia’s demands that Ukraine cede significant territory in the country’s southeast, and security guarantees that would protect Ukraine against future Russian aggression.

Mr. Trump said that he heard about the alleged attack from Mr. Putin himself during a previously scheduled phone call early Monday to discuss the peace talks. “I was very angry about it,” he told reporters at Mar-a-Lago, though he conceded that he had no independent confirmation that it had occurred.

“It’s a delicate period of time,” Mr. Trump said, noting that although both sides were on the offensive, “It’s another thing to attack his house.” He suggested that he had blocked the sale of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine to prevent just this kind of attack.

In a statement from the Kremlin summarizing the call, Yuri Ushakov, Mr. Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said that “Russia’s position regarding a number of previously reached agreements and emerging solutions will be revised” in light of the attack. He added, “The Americans must treat this with understanding.”

Russia did not present any clear-cut evidence of the claimed attack, which it said was aimed at a residence of Mr. Putin’s in the Novgorod region. The accusation was first made by Sergey V. Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, in a statement from the ministry.

The fact that both Mr. Lavrov — generally outspoken in presenting hard-line positions that might annoy the White House — and the Kremlin made similar statements suggested that Russia was both eager to paint Kyiv as the obstacle to peace, and primed to swing back to the maximalist position espoused by Mr. Putin in terms of demands on Ukraine.

Georgi Bovt, an analyst of Russian politics, said in a post on Telegram that the Kremlin might expand its territorial claims to “the entirety of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions,” referring to two Ukrainian regions currently under partial occupation by Russian troops.

Meeting with senior commanders in the Kremlin on Monday, Mr. Putin said that Russian troops were only about nine miles from the city of Zaporizhzhia, the provincial capital and a major industrial center. He ordered the offensive to continue to capture the city “in the near future.”

Mr. Zelensky, in his post on X, said that Russia was trying “to justify additional attacks against Ukraine, including Kyiv, as well as Russia’s own refusal to take necessary steps to end the war.”

Ukrainian soldiers at an antiaircraft defense unit in the Donetsk region earlier this month.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Since invading in 2022, Russia has seized most of the area known as the Donbas, consisting of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Over the past weeks, Russia has been vocal in its demands for Ukraine to withdraw completely from the Donbas, threatening to toughen its stance should Ukraine remain intransigent.

Mr. Lavrov claimed that 91 drones attempted to attack Mr. Putin’s residence in the Novgorod region, northwest of Moscow, overnight on Monday, but that all of them were shot down by air defense systems. The Russian military has designated targets for “retaliatory strikes,” he said.

The provincial governor, Aleksandr Dronov, said in a series of statements on Monday morning that 41 drones had been shot down over the region, but did not specify their target.

The Russian statements did not name the residence, but the Novgorod region is the site of one of Mr. Putin’s most secretive hide-outs. Located deep in a forest on the shore of a lake, the residence — commonly known as the Valdai, after a nearby town — is a private retreat where Mr. Putin never hosts public events.

In 2021, a team of Russian investigators led by Aleksei A. Navalny, Mr. Putin’s main political opponent until his death in a Russian prison in February 2024, published a report about the residence. It depicted a lavish, highly private estate consisting of multiple buildings, including a Chinese-themed pavilion, a private church and a giant spa.

Another investigative report claimed that the site included a special station for an armored train used by the Russian leader.

In May 2023, two drones exploded over Mr. Putin’s main official residence in the Kremlin in what Russia called an unsuccessful “attempt on the life of the president” by Ukraine. At the time, Kyiv denied any involvement in the incident, but American officials said that it was likely orchestrated by one of Ukraine’s special military or intelligence units.

Constant Méheut and Tyler Pager contributed reporting.

Neil MacFarquhar has been a Times reporter since 1995, writing about a range of topics from war to politics to the arts, both internationally and in the United States.

Ivan Nechepurenko covers Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the countries of the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Kyiv Targeted a Putin Estate, Moscow Says

NY Times · Ivan Nechepurenko · December 29, 2025

11. For Zelensky, Just Keeping Trump Talking Counts as a Win

Summary:

For Zelensky, the primary gain from his Dec. 29 Mar-a-Lago meeting with POTUS was keeping U.S. engagement alive, not clinching new terms. Talks yielded little beyond a plan to meet again next month, but POTUS avoided repeating Russia’s maximalist demands and dropped prior self-imposed deadlines, reducing near-term pressure on Kyiv to concede quickly. Zelensky framed that as progress after earlier meetings that cut against Ukrainian interests. Key gaps remain on territory, including Donetsk, and on durable security guarantees. Zelensky said POTUS floated guarantees of roughly 15 years, shorter than Kyiv seeks. Ukraine is pushing a sequenced process that brings European leaders into the next round, aiming to strengthen leverage before any direct talks with Moscow.

Comment: I think we are seeing a game of three (or multi) dimensional chess.

For Zelensky, Just Keeping Trump Talking Counts as a Win

NY Times · Constant Méheut · December 29, 2025

Though discussions produced little tangible progress, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at least avoided the type of setbacks that have blighted earlier meetings.

By Constant Méheut

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Dec. 29, 2025

Updated 4:12 p.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/world/europe/zelensky-trump-ukraine-peace-talks.html

A Ukrainian soldier monitoring the sky for Russian drones in the Donetsk region this past week. Russia has stuck firmly to its view that Ukraine must relinquish the entire region.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Dec. 29, 2025Updated 4:12 p.m. ET

A new round of peace talks between President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine and President Trump on Sunday seems to have produced little beyond a promise to meet again next month and a reminder of how distant a peace deal remains.

Yet for Mr. Zelensky, even a stalemate in the discussions counts as a measure of success.

Following setbacks in U.S. support for Ukraine this year, one of Mr. Zelensky’s main priorities when meeting Mr. Trump has been to prevent talks from derailing. After the meeting, Mr. Trump signaled that he would remain engaged in the negotiations — a win for Ukraine given his repeated threats to walk away. Mr. Trump also backed away from setting another deadline to reach a peace deal, after having previously floated Thanksgiving and Christmas as target dates.

“I don’t have deadlines,” Mr. Trump told reporters as he greeted Mr. Zelensky at Mar-a-Lago in Florida for the talks. “You know what my deadline is? Getting the war ended.”

Most important for Ukraine, Mr. Trump did not echo Russia’s maximalist demands to stop the fighting, a departure from earlier in his term when he often appeared to side with the Kremlin. The change was also notable because Mr. Trump had spoken with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia just before meeting Mr. Zelensky, the type of last-minute Russian intervention that has derailed Ukrainian hopes before.

Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump spoke again early Monday, when the Russian leader said that Ukraine had fired a barrage of drones at his country residence — a claim that Ukraine said was fabricated to undermine peace talks. Speaking to reporters later, Mr. Trump appeared to accept the allegation at face value and said he was angry about it, but conceded that he had seen no evidence to back it up, and that it was “possible, too, I guess,” that the claim was false.

Mr. Zelensky’s meeting with Mr. Trump may give the Ukrainian leader hope that Kyiv and Washington have become more closely aligned in the peace negotiations. Several European leaders also joined the talks by phone, and Mr. Zelensky said that the United States might host a new round of negotiations next month that could include them.

“The fact that they’re talking is a victory in and of itself,” Harry Nedelcu, a senior director at Rasmussen Global, a research organization, said of the American and Ukrainian presidents.

Still, Mr. Zelensky acknowledged some division between them on Monday, noting that while Mr. Trump has agreed to help secure Ukraine, he offered such guarantees for only 15 years, short of the several decades that Mr. Zelensky and Ukrainians seek.

“The challenge for Zelensky is to demonstrate to Trump that he’s doing his best to deal with Trump’s version of the peace plan while making it digestible for the Ukrainian society,” Mr. Nedelcu said.

At the heart of that challenge are key sticking points, chiefly the fate of Ukrainian-held territory in the eastern Donetsk region. Russia wants Ukraine to cede the land, something Mr. Trump has encouraged Kyiv to do, but opinion polls show that a majority of Ukrainians oppose territorial concessions.

President Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at Mar-a-Lago in Florida on Sunday. Mr. Zelensky acknowledged that several sticking points remained in a draft peace deal.Credit...Tierney L. Cross/The New York Times

After the meeting, Mr. Zelensky struck a hopeful tone. “We had a really great discussion on all the topics, and we appreciate the progress that was made by American and Ukrainian teams in recent weeks,” Mr. Zelensky said. Still, he acknowledged that several proposals remained unresolved in a draft peace deal, including Donetsk and control of a Russian-occupied nuclear power plant.

As Mr. Zelensky arrived in Florida, some Ukrainians were concerned that he might walk into another meeting where Mr. Trump would pressure him to strike a quick peace deal on Moscow’s terms. The concern grew when Mr. Trump unexpectedly announced that he had held a “good and very productive telephone call” with Mr. Putin.

In October, Mr. Trump held a similar unannounced call with Mr. Putin shortly before meeting with Mr. Zelensky to discuss supplying Kyiv with powerful U.S. cruise missiles. In that call, Mr. Putin appeared to have steered Mr. Trump away from selling the missiles. Mr. Trump later told Mr. Zelensky that Ukraine would not get the weapons during a meeting described as tense by European officials.

Sunday’s call did not appear to have the same influence on Mr. Trump. After meeting Mr. Zelensky, the American president refrained from echoing the Kremlin’s demands and did not publicly pressure Ukraine to cede land and strike a deal quickly. “This is not a one-day-process deal,” Mr. Trump told reporters. “This is very complicated stuff.”

On Monday, the Kremlin said it would harden its stance on ending the war, in light of the alleged drone attack on one of Mr. Putin’s residences. The Russian leader also ordered his generals to continue advancing to capture the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, in an apparent effort to increase pressure on Mr. Zelensky. A regional capital of about 700,000 people, Zaporizhzhia has been relatively far from the scene of the most-active fighting in Ukraine’s east, but Russian troops have recently made gains toward it.

Mr. Putin issued the order while meeting Monday with senior commanders who delivered reports on the situation at the front lines. This was the third time in two weeks that Mr. Putin publicly discussed the state of fighting in Ukraine with his top brass, highlighting the Kremlin effort to project strength and demonstrate to Washington that it had a battlefield advantage.

After meeting with Mr. Trump, Mr. Zelensky said that the peace plan was “90 percent” complete, the same progress he reported before flying to Florida. He added that Ukraine and its American and European allies were very close to agreement on the security guarantees Kyiv is seeking to prevent further Russian aggression.

The current draft peace plan says the United States, NATO and Europe will provide Ukraine with so-called Article 5-like guarantees — a reference to NATO’s mutual defense clause requiring members of the military alliance to come to one another’s aid in the event of an attack.

Mr. Zelensky said Mr. Trump had agreed to provide Ukraine with guarantees only for 15 years. “We would very much like the guarantees to be longer,” he told reporters. “And I told him that we would really like to consider the possibility of 30, 40 or 50 years.”

A damaged neighborhood in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in Ukraine on Christmas Eve.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Mr. Nedelcu, the analyst, was more cautious regarding progress on security guarantees. He said European allies had yet to agree on what they could realistically provide Ukraine to deter another Russian attack, with discussions continuing on whether to deploy European troops to Ukraine — a red line for Moscow in any negotiations. An Article 5-like commitment to defend Ukraine might also prove too vague to be an effective deterrent.

On the territorial issue, Ukraine has offered as a compromise the creation of a demilitarized zone from which both Ukrainian and Russian troops would pull back. Mr. Zelensky said Ukrainians should vote on the proposal through a referendum held before a peace deal is finalized — a step that would first require a cease-fire.

Russia has rejected the idea of a cease-fire, and has shown no indication that it is willing to accept anything short of Ukraine relinquishing the Donetsk region, including areas that Ukraine still controls.

Asked about progress in resolving the territorial issue, Mr. Trump said: “I would not say ‘agreed,’ but we’re getting closer to an agreement on that.”

Perhaps the most promising development for Ukraine was Mr. Trump’s apparent willingness to hold another round of talks next month in the United States, potentially with European leaders at the table.

In past negotiations, European leaders were brought in to salvage talks after disagreements between Mr. Zelensky and Mr. Trump. Their presence as full participants rather than belated troubleshooters could help Ukraine strengthen its position.

On Monday, Mr. Zelensky outlined “a course of action” to keep the talks on track and bolster that alignment. He said he hoped that American, European and Ukrainian advisers would meet in the coming days, followed by a meeting of European and Ukrainian leaders. Then, another round of talks would take place with the United States, this time including Europe.

“And after that, if everything proceeds step by step, there will then be a meeting in one format or another with the Russians,” Mr. Zelensky said.

Ségolène Le Stradic and Ivan Nechepurenko contributed reporting.

Constant Méheut reports on the war in Ukraine, including battlefield developments, attacks on civilian centers and how the war is affecting its people.

NY Times · Constant Méheut · December 29, 2025

12. Grim Evidence of Trump’s Airstrikes Washes Ashore on a Colombian Peninsula

Summary:

On Colombia’s remote Guajira Peninsula, fishermen found rare physical evidence linked to the Trump administration’s maritime airstrike campaign against alleged “narco-terrorists.” After a Nov. 6 blast offshore, a scorched speedboat, charred gear, two mangled bodies, and burned packets with traces resembling marijuana washed ashore. The New York Times verified independent video of the smoke plume and matched the wreckage to SECDEF/SECWAR's strike footage, placing the event in the disputed Gulf of Venezuela. The campaign reportedly has destroyed 29 vessels and killed more than 100 people, but the U.S. military has released no public evidence the boats carried drugs. Locals report fear, disrupted fishing, and economic fallout.

Comment: I do not mean to be flippant but we now have a public report of BDA/effects of a strike. Not everything sinks to the bottom of the sea.

Grim Evidence of Trump’s Airstrikes Washes Ashore on a Colombian Peninsula

NY Times · Christiaan Triebert · December 29, 2025

By Max BearakSimón Posada and Christiaan TriebertVisuals by Federico Rios

Max Bearak, Simón Posada and Federico Rios traveled to the Guajira Peninsula, shared by Colombia and Venezuela, and spoke with locals, officials and experts on the drug trade.

• Dec. 29, 2025Updated 3:49 p.m. ET

First came the scorched boat. Then the mangled bodies. Then the packets with traces of marijuana. Now, fishermen fear the ocean that feeds them.

First came the scorched boat. Then the mangled bodies. Then the packets with traces of marijuana. Now, fishermen fear the ocean that feeds them.

Credit...

A thunderous boom rang out through the windless late-afternoon air. Seconds later, smoke began rising out of the sea as if the horizon were on fire.

Watching from the shore on Nov. 6, Erika Palacio Fernández whipped out her phone, she said, unwittingly recording the only verified and independent video known to date of the aftermath of an airstrike in the Trump administration’s campaign against what it calls “narco-terrorists.”

Two days later, on that same shore, a scorched 30-foot-long boat itself would wash up. Then, two mangled bodies. Then charred jerrycans, life jackets and dozens of packets that were observed by The New York Times and were similar to others that have been found after anti-narcotics operations in the region. Most packets were empty, though traces of a substance that looked and smelled like marijuana were found in the lining of a few.

The assortment of singed flotsam appears to be the first physical evidence of the U.S. campaign, which has destroyed 29 vessels and killed more than 100 people in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. Every other struck boat is presumed to have sunk along with its crew and cargo. The U.S. military has offered no evidence that the boats it has destroyed were transporting illicit substances or belong to criminal networks.

Remains of a burned boat on the beach near Puerto López on the Guajira Peninsula in Colombia.

Erika Palacio Fernández said she recorded video of smoke over the water that turned out to be emanating from a boat that was on fire.

A Times analysis matched the wreckage of the boat to the one in a video posted by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on the night of Nov. 6, hours after Ms. Palacio took her video. Mr. Hegseth described the strike as having targeted a vessel in the Caribbean operated by an unnamed “designated terrorist organization.” He said the strike killed three people and took place in international waters.

Map locates Puerto López on the Guijira Peninsula in Colombia and the Gulf of Venezuela.

The New York Times

The Times analysis of Ms. Palacio’s video indicates the strike took place in the Gulf of Venezuela, where Colombia and Venezuela have long disputed their maritime boundary. The analysis could not determine the exact location of the strike.

Video Captures Aftermath of U.S. Airstrike on Boat Off Venezuela

A resident on the Guajira Peninsula in Colombia captured a large plume of black smoke rising from the Gulf of Venezuela. The video, in which a ringtone plays in the background, is the only known independent footage of the aftermath of U.S. military strikes on boats the Trump administration says are smuggling drugs.Credit...Erika Palacios Fernández

The shape of the wreckage, a slender design typical of speedboats, matches that of the boat targeted in the video shared by the Defense Department, the Times analysis found, and shows, damage to the boat’s hull and interior structure consistent with the impact of an airstrike. The military video shows the boat exploding and on fire beneath a large plume of smoke.

That such rare, tangible evidence is coming to light nearly two months after the early November strike is a testament both to the remoteness of the Guajira Peninsula, where the wreckage was found, and the lack of a sizable presence of the Colombian state in the area. The region is governed semiautonomously by an Indigenous community, the Wayuu, whose more than half a million people straddle the border between Colombia and Venezuela.

The U.S. military’s campaign against boats that the Trump administration claims are smuggling drugs has shifted largely to the Pacific since November. The Nov. 6 strike off the Guajira Peninsula took place during an earlier phase, when the campaign seemed to be aimed at Venezuelan, rather than Colombian, vessels.

A wide range of legal experts say the U.S. strikes are illegal because the military is prohibited from deliberately targeting civilians, even if they are believed to have committed a crime, unless they pose an immediate threat. Venezuela plays a smaller role in the global drug trade than other countries in the region. In private, Trump administration officials say their main goal is to drive Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, from power.

The arid Guajira Peninsula is South America’s northernmost jut of land, and has long been known as a smuggler’s launchpad for various contraband, from coffee to electronics to illicit drugs. Reaching it by land requires traversing a labyrinth of rutted dirt tracks that are entirely unmarked, making passage without a local guide impossible. Vultures prowl the sky and rattlesnakes hide in the scrub.

The speedboat’s wreckage and then the two bodies were found on Nov. 8 by fishermen who called Aristótele Palmar García, a Wayuu police inspector responsible for that stretch of beach. Mr. Palmar said he has little training or tools and when he arrived on the beach he had medical gloves only because his sister worked at a local clinic.

Aristótele Palmar García, a Wayuu police inspector, said he took part in the burial of the two bodies that had washed up on the beach.

The spot in the sand where local Wayuu residents said they buried one of the bodies found by local fishermen.

“The boat itself smelled like burned meat,” Mr. Palmar, 31, recalled. “And the bodies — we had to bury them because the vultures and stray dogs were beginning to eat them.”

He said he called the regional police, “but nothing happened for days, or even weeks.”

One body had been reduced to skin and bones, Mr. Palmar said. He described the other as bloated, sun bleached and significantly burned, with no ears and one arm severed at the elbow.

Mr. Palmar said he and local fishermen used sticks to push the remains toward five-foot-deep graves they had dug on the beach. In keeping with Wayuu tradition, they sprinkled chirrinchi, a local liquor distilled from cane, over the graves. Then they laid thorny cactus over them to keep dogs from digging them up.

The regional director of Medicina Legal, which is Colombia’s national government-run network of forensic laboratories, Erika Patricia Vargas Sánchez, told The Times that the remains of two people had been disinterred from the same area described by Mr. Palmar and were transferred into Medicina Legal’s custody in the city of Barranquilla on Dec. 16 and 17, five weeks after they washed ashore. She said an autopsy had not yet been performed on either body.

The plastic packets that washed up in Castilletes, a beach community a few miles south of the wreckage that sits right on the Venezuelan border, left locals confused. Most of those seen by Times journalists who traveled to the area had been partly burned or melted and were empty except for sand. They were reinforced with packing tape and appeared to have had labels that had faded.

Several packets had traces of marijuana inside their lining, including a packet that was lodged inside a burned life vest. An official with Colombia’s anti-narcotics police in the capital, Bogotá, who asked to remain anonymous because she was not authorized to speak with the press, said neither she nor counterparts in La Guajira whom she had spoken to had any knowledge of the packets.

Experts on the local drug trade said smuggling marijuana and cocaine together was common on the Guajira Peninsula and in other areas along Colombia’s coastline. Transporting the two drugs together, they said, often indicated that the smugglers were operating on a smaller scale, rather than as part of large cartels. At least half a dozen interdictions of smuggling boats by the Colombian authorities in the past year have found both drugs, according to local news reports.

“The cocaine and marijuana market in La Guajira is operated by small community-based ventures as much as it is by armed groups,” said Estefanía Ciro, who leads a Colombian research institute studying narcotics trafficking. “This narrative of cartels, of Pablo Escobar, doesn’t allow us to see that in many places this is everyday life. One day they carry marijuana, another cocaine, another fish.”

Finding what looks like the remains a burned life vest and packets containing traces of marijuana.

Vicente Fernández, a local fisherman, said he was scared to fish too far out into the ocean.

Most people in La Guajira, however, are not tied to the drug trade, but instead fish and herd livestock for a living. Mexi Misael Rincón, a fisherman, uses a boat nearly identical to the vessel struck on Nov. 6 that was anchored just a few yards from where the wreckage lay on the beach. Since the attack, he has dared to venture only into shallow waters, where he traps lobster.

Mr. Rincón’s mother, Carmelena González, 76, said that since the boat strike four of her other sons, who also fish, had left Guajira for distant urban centers to find other ways to make money. That’s in part because fish essential to making a living are farther out.

“In normal times we’d go out eight, 10, 12 miles for the tuna that fetches a better price,” said Vicente Fernández, another fisherman from the area, and uncle to Ms. Palacio, who took the video of the strike’s aftermath. “We’ve left our nets out there for weeks because we’re too afraid to retrieve them.”

Mr. Fernández said the price of seafood in the local markets had plummeted because locals, owing to superstitions, were afraid of consuming any animal that might have eaten human flesh.

Nor, he added, was he going to risk sailing farther than a few miles from shore. He said that in the weeks since the November strike, he’d occasionally seen drones flying above his boat.

“They look like avioncitos,” he said, using a colloquial term for little airplanes. “They look like birds tracking down prey.”

Remains of a burned boat on the beach near Puerto López on the Guajira Peninsula in Colombia.Credit...

Max Bearak is a reporter for The Times based in Bogotá, Colombia.

Christiaan Triebert is a Times reporter working on the Visual Investigations team, a group that combines traditional reporting with digital sleuthing and analysis of visual evidence to verify and source facts from around the world.

See more on: U.S. Department of Defense, Nicolás Maduro

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NY Times · Christiaan Triebert · December 29, 2025

13.  U.S. Pledges $2 Billion for U.N. Aid but Tells Agencies to ‘Adapt, Shrink, or Die’

Summary:

The Trump administration pledged an initial $2 billion for 2026 to U.N.-coordinated humanitarian relief, positioning the U.S. to remain the largest donor even as broader U.S. foreign assistance is sharply reduced. Washington tied the money to a reform agenda, urging U.N. agencies to consolidate functions, cut overhead and duplication, and strengthen accountability, warning they must “adapt, shrink, or die.” Funds will be routed through an OCHA-run umbrella mechanism with country-specific MOUs for 17 priority states, including Sudan, Syria, Haiti, Ukraine, Myanmar, Chad, and DRC, while omitting some acute-need cases such as Afghanistan and Yemen; Gaza will be funded separately. U.S. officials said consolidation could save roughly $2 billion but overall global shortfalls remain severe.

Comment: Unconventional diplomacy. Could POTUS do for the UN what he has done with allies: make them reflect on their defense spending. But rather than increase (defense) spending the UN needs to end corruption and use its donated funds more wisely and efficiently. Although it is counterintuitive for some, what if POTUS' unconventional diplomacy could "make the UN great again?" Wouldn't it be in US interests for the UN to return to first principles and operate as it was nevisions at its founding in San Francisco in 1945? Imagine POTUS' legacy as the president who revitalized the UN as a 21st century force for good.

U.S. Pledges $2 Billion for U.N. Aid but Tells Agencies to ‘Adapt, Shrink, or Die’

NY Times · Nick Cumming-Bruce · December 29, 2025

The announcement will likely keep the United States as the biggest international aid donor next year, even as the Trump administration slashes funding for foreign assistance programs.

By Nick Cumming-Bruce

Nick Cumming-Bruce reported from Geneva.

Dec. 29, 2025

Updated 3:17 p.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/world/europe/us-un-aid-funding-foreign-assistance.html

Bags of rations being unloaded at a World Food Program distribution point last year at a temporary camp for refugees from Sudan in Adre, Chad.

By

Nick Cumming-Bruce reported from Geneva.

Dec. 29, 2025Updated 3:17 p.m. ET

The Trump administration said on Monday that it would provide an initial $2 billion next year to fund humanitarian aid coordinated by the United Nations but urged humanitarian agencies to deeply overhaul the way they deliver assistance.

The move will likely keep the United States as the biggest international aid donor in 2026, even as it drastically scales back the level of support traditionally provided by American administrations.

The announcement was a relief for underfunded agencies that provide food, shelter, medicine and other types of aid around the globe, and it was welcomed with cautious optimism by some prominent international humanitarian organizations that have been dismayed by President Trump’s push to slash aid.

But the United States also issued a stark warning: “The agreement requires the U.N. to consolidate humanitarian functions to reduce bureaucratic overhead, unnecessary duplication, and ideological creep,” the State Department said in a statement on Monday. “Individual U.N. agencies will need to adapt, shrink, or die.”

The United States was the leading funder of the U.N.’s humanitarian efforts in 2025 with about $3.38 billion, or about 14.6 percent of the global sum, according to U.N. data. That was down sharply from previous years over the past decade, when it regularly contributed a third or more of the total yearly funding.

President Trump has often criticized foreign aid as wasteful and rife with fraud. His administration has dismantled the United States Agency for International Development and cut support for foreign assistance programs — disrupting earthquake response in Myanmar, clinical trials in South Africa, malaria programs in Cameroon and more.

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American funding is especially critical for the U.N. Its refugee agency alone received $2 billion from the United States in 2024.

The agreement announced on Monday creates an arrangement under which the United States will channel money into an umbrella fund run by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA.

The United States and OCHA will sign a series of memorandums of understanding to distribute that aid to 17 priority countries grappling with the fallout from wars, famine and natural disasters, the State Department said on Monday.

Jeremy Lewin, the State Department’s senior official in charge of foreign assistance, humanitarian affairs and religious freedom, said those priority countries included Sudan, Syria and Haiti; he described the funding as “an initial anchor commitment.”

“There are other countries that we will add, as we continue to get more funding into this mechanism,” he said at a news conference at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, adding that the hope is for the $2 billion to be “only the beginning” of a new partnership and funding model for U.N. humanitarian aid.

The 17 countries include some prioritized by the U.N. as facing acute humanitarian challenges, such as Ukraine, Myanmar, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, but also some of interest mainly to the United States, such as Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. It omits several countries of particular U.N. concern, like Afghanistan and Yemen.

Gaza, which remains acutely short of aid despite the cease-fire on Oct. 10 is not covered by this agreement and will receive funding through other channels, Mr. Lewin said.

By channeling aid through a consolidated fund instead of through hundreds of sometimes overlapping project grants, the United States expects to save close to $2 billion and improve aid delivery efficiency, Mr. Lewin said.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on social media that the new model would “better share the burden of U.N. humanitarian work with other developed countries” and “require the U.N. to cut bloat, remove duplication, and commit to powerful new impact, accountability and oversight mechanisms.”

Tom Fletcher, who as OCHA’s leader had committed the U.N. to many reforms demanded by the United States,

called the U.S. announcement a “landmark contribution” that would anchor the agency’s plans to reach 87 million people with emergency assistance in 2026.

Jan Egeland, a former head of OCHA who leads the Norwegian Refugee Council, called the U.S. announcement “good news” that gave much-needed predictability to underfunded operations and that was a “big boost” toward reforming the humanitarian sector.

“I expect this to be a first signal that the Trump administration is back as a real and reliable contributor to global compassion and solidarity,” Mr. Egeland said.

Still, the U.S. contribution represents only a fraction of the $23 billion that Mr. Fletcher wants to raise for emergency relief programs next year — a figure that is roughly 50 percent less than in 2025.

That is unlikely to fix the funding crisis overshadowing international relief agencies, which face cuts by other leading Western donor governments.

In Sudan, where three years of civil war have displaced millions and left large areas gripped by famine, the World Food Program reported in December that it had raised only 12 percent of the funding requested for 2025. International relief agencies have reported similarly crippling shortfalls in anti-hunger efforts in Afghanistan and Yemen.

“The catastrophic underfunding of humanitarian work is the worst I have seen in 40 years,” Mr. Egeland said. “Never has the gap between recorded need and available funding been so severe.”

14. New Pentagon report on China’s military notes Beijing's progress on LLMs

Summary:

The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress says China narrowed the performance gap with leading U.S. large language models in 2024, aided by military-civil fusion that channels commercial and academic AI advances into PLA R and D. The report highlights military uses for LLMs and reasoning models, including software coding for cyber operations, decision support, ISR analysis, and tailored synthetic content for influence operations. It warns that improved generative AI reduces the cost and skill barriers for convincing deepfakes and narrative manipulation, including in a Taiwan contingency where Beijing would seek to control domestic and international perceptions. In parallel, DoD is fielding GenAI.mil and plans to add xAI “Grok” capabilities at IL5 for CUI workflows in early 2026.

Comment: We must compete and win here. I am not sure Gemini or Grok is a path to victory.

New Pentagon report on China’s military notes Beijing's progress on LLMs

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper

The Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China.

By

Jon Harper

December 26, 2025https://defensescoop.com/2025/12/26/dod-report-china-military-and-security-developments-prc-ai-llm/

The Defense Department’s latest report to Congress on China’s military developments stated that Beijing has been catching up with the United States in the race for new generative AI capabilities.

This year’s iteration of the annual study was quietly released by the DOD this week before the Christmas holiday.

“In 2024, China’s commercial and academic AI sectors made progress on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based reasoning models, which has narrowed the performance gap between China’s models and the U.S. models currently leading the field,” Pentagon officials wrote.

Those types of tools can generate software code, text, images, audio and other media following human prompts.

“LLMs and LLM-based reasoning models are useful for a range of military applications, including coding tasks to assist cyber operations, question-answering tasks to assist military decision-making, and synthetic content tailoring to assist influence operations. The [People’s Liberation Army, or PLA] continues to use [military-civil fusion, or MCF] mechanisms to ensure China’s academic and commercial AI communities provide robust, continuous support to military research and development projects,” the new Pentagon report noted. “These mechanisms provide the PLA with an opportunity to incorporate recent private sector AI breakthroughs into military systems.”

The Pentagon is also embracing generative AI. Earlier this month, the department rolled out a new platform called GenAI.mil to deliver commercial options directly to millions of members of its workforce. Google Cloud’s Gemini for Government products were the first to be introduced as part of the new system. The initial rollout prompted mixed reviews and many questions from users.

On Monday, officials announced that a suite of “frontier‑grade” capabilities offered by xAI for Government will soon be added to the GenAI.mil platform. Elon Musk is the founder of xAI, which makes the Grok chatbot that is widely used on Musk’s social media platform X.

“This initiative will soon embed xAI’s frontier AI systems, based on the Grok family of models, directly into GenAI.mil. Targeted for initial deployment in early 2026, this integration will allow all military and civilian personnel to use xAI’s capabilities at Impact Level 5 (IL5), enabling the secure handling of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) in daily workflows. Users will also gain access to real‑time global insights from the X platform, providing War Department personnel with a decisive information advantage,” according to a Pentagon press release.

The new DOD report on China notes that in 2024, Beijing continued to invest in AI tech for a variety of military applications, including unmanned systems; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collection and analysis; decision-making assistance; cyber operations; and “information campaigns.”

Defense officials and analysts say advances in generative AI capabilities make it easier to create fake content that could be employed in information ops.

Last year’s Pentagon report to Congress on China’s military developments noted that PLA publications have argued that LLMs can boost efficiencies for creating synthetic media, including so-called deepfakes.

“Leading generative AI technologies have greater authenticity and require less human input than previous AI technologies used for deepfake creation. PRC military researchers have complained that the PLA lacks the necessary staff with adequate foreign-language skills and cross-cultural understanding for authentic content generation. Leading generative AI technologies offer a potential technical solution to overcome this deficiency. Numerous PRC institutions, including leading technology companies, such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Huawei, are developing generative AI technologies for capabilities such as text, image, audio, and video creation,” DOD officials wrote in that document.

This year’s report, released Tuesday, noted that Beijing could use information operations to support military campaigns against Taiwan, a self-governing island which the Chinese Communist Party aims to bring under its control.

“China almost certainly has recognized the necessity of controlling the internal and external narrative in conflict and seeks to develop methods to better implement information warfare,” Pentagon officials wrote.

They added: “Beijing almost certainly considers cognitive domain operations to be a key component of its pressure campaign against Taiwan, intended to weaken Taiwan’s will to resist and heighten social divisions in the country. Beijing uses the information space to spread political narratives, influence the Taiwan populace, and emphasize PLA activity around Taiwan. In May and October 2024, China exploited the timing of military exercises around Taiwan to combine official accounts and proxy accounts impersonating Taiwan citizens to exaggerate the PLA’s capabilities and spread disinformation narratives about U.S.-Japan unwillingness to aid Taiwan’s defense.”

One military option that Chinese leaders may be considering is a “joint blockade campaign” against Taiwan, according to the DOD report. In that potential scenario, China would likely employ information operations in an attempt to “further isolate and degrade the island and to control the international narrative of the conflict,” it noted.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Editor-in-Chief of DefenseScoop. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X: @Jon_Harper_

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper

15. Why Is the United States Drawn to War?

Summary:

Emanuel Pastreich argues the United States is drawn to war less from leadership error than from structural incentives created by oligarchic political economy. He claims deindustrialization, globalized supply chains, and dependency on foreign resources recast corporate interests as “national security,” while military spending becomes a stabilizer for debt-driven finance and a key source of jobs in hollowed-out regions. He contends foreign threats are amplified to justify sustained defense outlays that transfer wealth upward and expand domestic control through militarized culture. He also argues governance has shifted from constitutional checks and balances to a de facto triad of politicians, bankers, and generals, with concentrated wealth eroding democratic constraint and making conflict more likely.

Comment: "Only the dead are safe; only the dead have seen the end of war." – George Santayana 

Why Is the United States Drawn to War? - FPIF

It’s the oligarchy, stupid.

By Emanuel Pastreich | December 29, 2025

fpif.org · December 29, 2025

https://fpif.org/why-is-the-united-states-drawn-to-war/

The United States is drawn to war on every front, like a moth to a candle. It does not matter that Americans are sick of foreign wars stretching back 25 years in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and now Venezuela, wars that have bankrupted the nation. It has no effect that the United States lacks the economic, technological, and manufacturing capacity necessary to sustain a conventional war. Nor would the United States likely win an unconventional war employing nano-technology, bio-technology, and information warfare.

The critics allowed to appear on TV like John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs attribute this war-mongering to the foolishness and the ignorance of political leaders like Donald Trump, or to the incompetence of bureaucrats. They intentionally avoid any analysis of the economic structure of the United States, or the role of multinational banks and corporations in the formulation of policy. Their only explanation for the drive for war is the foolish actions of a “few bad apples.”

No one wants war, including the rich and powerful on all sides, in Beijing and Washington, in Berlin and Moscow, in Tehran and Tel Aviv. Yet the beating of the drums of war continues, and it grows louder. The appetite for war spreads like a vermillion fungus across the entire nation, with a military culture pushed through newspapers, movies, and television broadcasts. Preparation for war is a means of controlling the “little people” in a totalitarian manner.

The U.S. government is pressuring every ally to rapidly increase defense spending, up to five percent, and to do so far more rapidly than can possibly be done in such a short time without massive corruption and waste. The military buildup is but a transfer of wealth, not an increase in security.

So, Why War?

The United States is collapsing as an economy, as a society, and as a civilization, weighed down by a massive debt, burdened by collapsing infrastructure and dying educational and research institutions, and strangled by a culture of pornography and narcissism. Above all, the extreme concentration of wealth over the last 20 years, since government was captured completely by the super-rich, has meant that a handful of conceited frauds can determine the policy for the entire nation, and decide the fate of everyone. The basic interests of the vast majority of citizens are entirely ignored. The republic, and all traces of participatory democracy, have been consigned to the trash bin of history.

The international trade system and the embrace of “free trade” ideology played a major role in pushing the United States toward war around the world. Supply chains link together factories in loops that encircle the globe. Manufactured goods and agricultural products are brought into the United States from over the world, not because doing so is good for Americans, but because the multinational banks that control the economy seek out the cheapest labor and cheapest goods. Virtually all consumer goods in the United States go through logistics and distribution systems controlled by multinational corporations. Unlike the situation in 1945, a large part of the money that citizens (rebranded as “consumers”) spend at Walmart, Best Buy, or Amazon goes to the stockholders of those corporations and offers little or no benefit for the local economy.

Until the 1950s, most of what Americans ate came from local, family-owned farm. Clothes and furniture were also produced locally. Now that production and distribution have been spread all over the globe, events far away directly impact the U.S. economy, and sometimes politicians feel pressure to use military threats, or responses, to protect American corporate interests (repackaged as “national security”).

So, too, U.S. dependency on petroleum did not exist in the 1920 or dependency on rare earth metals in the 1980s. These are problems created by the decisions of corporations to introduce technologies that offered some conveniences, but at the price of extreme dependency of citizens on technology, which has generated large corporate profits.

The relocation of American manufacturing overseas also means that the only employment available in many regions, especially rural areas, is as police officers, guards at prisons, soldiers, or other positions in the military, police, or surveillance system. These days, security and the military are the only parts of the government budget that are growing.

The last decade has seen employment in defense surge by 40 percent, reaching 1.4 percent of the total employment base. In 2022-2023 alone the workforce expanded by 4.8 percent in contrast to an average of 1.7 percent.

No politician can oppose the increase in the military budget because, although constant foreign wars do great damage to the economy as a whole, the military has become the only part of government that increases opportunities for employment locally.

The U.S. economy is increasingly controlled by a small number of rich families. The wages of American workers have been reduced and the costs of living greatly increased for the profit of the few. The unprecedented concentration of wealth in the hands of a group of oligarchs has changed everything. This restructuring of society may not seem to be military in nature, but it pushes the United States toward a military economy.

The End of the Welfare State

The disposable income of workers increased beginning in the 1940s because of the redistribution of wealth forced by the reforms of the New Deal. These reforms also allowed for corporations to make enormous profits after the 1950s by selling consumer products to working people who had the disposable income to purchase them. From the 1960s on, consumption, growth, and the stock market became the primary tools for assessing the health of the economy.

Particularly from the 1970s on, this system effectively funneled wealth from working people to the wealthiest. But today consumption by workers, the middle class, and even the upper middle class is no longer sufficient to generate profits for corporations because the people cannot spend any more. Banks have been forced to look for some other source of profit to pay off their debts. One direction they looked has been the military. Military spending creates steady demand that is not tied to market conditions, or economic booms and busts. It is funded by the people through taxes, or through the inflation created by the deficit spending that funds military expenditures.

The increase in military spending is a policy choice; it is the only way to avoid economic collapse. It must be justified by threats from China, Russia, and Iran, or terrorism. Intelligence agencies responding to the demands of banks to do everything they can to create trouble with those countries.

Companies like Oracle, Palantir, Google, and Amazon not only grow fat like ticks feeding on the military and intelligence budgets, they are merging with banks and using their control of the IT systems that power banks as a means to seize control of money itself through digitalization of the dollar, or the introduction of cryptocurrencies.

One of the most powerful billionaires, Larry Ellison, has launched a campaign to dominate media through the control of social media, entertainment and news broadcasting. The Trump administration forced TikTok’s Chinese owner ByteDance to turn over its operations in the United States to a consortium headed by Ellison’s company Oracle in December 2025. Oracle grew to global influence as a major contractor for the CIA, and Ellison is a strong Trump supporter.

Since Ellison’s son David was installed as CEO in August 2025 of the new entertainment conglomerate Paramount Skydance—the merger of Paramount Global, Skydance Media and National Amusements—father and son have been raising enormous funds for a hostile takeover of Warner Brothers that would give them unprecedented control over entertainment and journalism in the United States. Already CBS, under Ellison rule, has cancelled at the last minute a 60 Minutes report on the notorious El Salvadorian prison CECOT.

These IT firms made those billions by taking out massive loans that they then used to buy back their own stock. They have nothing but debt and money in digital form. War, the threat of war, the build-up for war, is what keeps them going.

Impact on Governance

The United States government is a republic consisting of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The three branches complement each other, and they also regulate and balance out each other. This system ensures that power is not concentrated in any one place.

That was a long time ago. How does politics really work today?

There are three real branches of government today, and they are quite different than those described in the Constitution. The true three branches of government are the politicians, the bankers, and the generals. They are the ultimate powers behind the government, and they balance each other out because they operate at different levels and have different strengths.

The politicians are able to form temporary alliances among interest groups in business, finance, and government and negotiate among them to determine policy. The bankers control money and have the power of financial manipulation to shut down the entire economy, or the activities of opponents. The generals possess a chain of command that cannot be easily broken by exterior forces, even by money, and they have the ability to use force directly, without relying on a third party, to achieve their goals.

In a healthy society, where citizens actually play a role in politics, the politicians rise to the top because their primary mission is serving the needs of their clients, whether they are bankers, businessmen, generals, or other interest groups in the general population. Politicians can play the central role because they reflect the needs of citizens. As long as politicians can effectively meet the needs of the bankers, the generals, and the citizens, and keep the money flowing to them, the system remains stable.

If wealth is too concentrated, however, to the degree that the bankers can pay off everyone and gain complete control of the economy, then they rise to the top because bankers need only service a small number of the super-rich to obtain absolute power. The politicians become their puppets and the generals are paid off by the bankers. That is what the political system in the United States has become today.

A political system run by bankers, however, will encounter enormous problems over time because everything will be decided on the basis of short-term profits, and no one will do anything for the sake of others, or follow an ideal greater than personal interest. As a result, the foundations of government, and of society, will crumble. Eventually the government will collapse into anarchy, or it will drift into war as a means of generating profits and enforcing the bankers’ iron-fisted rule over the people.

At that historical moment, the generals rise to the top because they have a viable chain of command that continues to function even as the government fails, and because they speak the language of force and violence, which will become the only language that has authority once the legitimacy of politicians and bankers has been destroyed.

The concentration of wealth has almost eliminated the impact of citizens on policy. The finance-driven speculative economy has brought trust in government and business to a new low. As a result, the only politicians in the Democratic Party who are able to take on the Trump administration are all former military and intelligence, and the election of a former CIA officer Abigail Spanberger as governor of Virginia suggests that the “CIA Democrats” have become the driving force in an ideologically bankrupt Democratic Party.

The financial kings, the bankers and billionaires, need make only one little mistake in order for the chain of command to be handed over to the military in the United States. Although military officers may not want war as individuals, once the order goes down, the entire process, especially in light of the massive increase in drones and robots in the military, will be literally on automatic.

fpif.org · December 29, 2025

16. China hiding missiles on merchant ships for a Taiwan war

Summary:

China may be testing a modular “arsenal ship” concept that places containerized vertical launch cells, sensors, and defenses on commercial cargo ships, allowing rapid conversion of civilian hulls into missile platforms under military-civil fusion. The operational value is not greater range, but ambiguity and surprise. Missiles could be hidden among normal freight, fired from unexpected locations, and used to create multi-axis salvos that stress defenders and complicate targeting decisions in the gray zone. A single 60-cell ship is modest versus PLA Navy combatants, but scaling across many merchant hulls could add significant opening-phase firepower, contingent on strong ISR and coordination.

Comment: Could this be more complex and dangerous than the unmanned system threats?

China hiding missiles on merchant ships for a Taiwan war - Asia Times

asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · December 29, 2025

China’s missile-armed merchant ship shows how hiding firepower in civilian hulls could reshape a Taiwan or US-China naval clash

by Gabriel Honrada

December 29, 2025

https://asiatimes.com/2025/12/china-hiding-missiles-on-merchant-ships-for-a-taiwan-war/

China appears to be experimenting with missile-armed merchant ships, probing whether commercial hulls packed with concealed firepower can deliver surprise salvos and tilt the naval balance in a Taiwan or US-China clash.

This month, multiple media sources reported that China appears to be testing the rapid militarization of commercial cargo ships as part of a broader effort to expand naval firepower at lower cost and with greater ambiguity, according to satellite imagery.

Images circulating online show a Chinese container vessel at a Shanghai shipyard – the Zhongda 79 – a 97-meter container ship equipped with containerized vertical launch missile cells with a 60-round capacity, phased-array radars, close-in weapon systems (CIWS), and electronic countermeasures, suggesting a modular “arsenal ship” concept that could quickly convert civilian hulls into combat platforms.

The Zhongda 79 may be an experimental prototype designed to verify containerized weapon systems that can be rapidly installed and removed, in line with China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy.

However, it doesn’t expand China’s missile ranges in the Western Pacific, as long-range strike is already primarily provided by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), supported by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) combatants and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) strategic bombers.

Still, its fundamental contribution may be improving how, when, and from where missiles can be delivered, in ways that can be tactically disproportionate to the number of cells added.

A containerized launcher can be hidden among ordinary freight and fired with little warning from a merchant ship, generating salvos from unexpected places. Also, adding multiple launching platforms at sea increases the chance of saturation, as defenders would have to keep track of multiple trajectories and launchers.

Weaponizing cargo ships also allows for distributed lethality and increased survivability – spreading strike capabilities over a wide range of platforms.

These ships also present a grey zone dilemma, as any civilian cargo ship could be a launcher. A defender must make difficult decisions whether to treat merchant traffic as suspect, a potentially escalatory move, or simply accept more risk.

However, a capacity of 60 missiles per container ship is relatively small. China’s Type 055 cruisers have 112 vertical launch systems (VLS), while the Type 052D destroyer has 64.

While one such ship may not make much difference, multiple hulls could add hundreds or even thousands of VLS. But, considering the element of surprise and the possibility of multi-axis attacks these ships afford, they are more plausibly suited for limited first-salvo or opening-phase operations, rather than sustained missile exchanges.

The effectiveness of China’s weaponized container ships may also be dependent on the quality of its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Adding weaponized merchant ships could further amplify China’s already decisive numerical edge. As Sam Tangredi mentions in a January 2023 Proceedings article, quantity almost always proves decisive in naval combat when professional competence between opposing forces is equal.

Tangredi points out that in 28 wars involving significant naval combat, spanning the Greek-Persian Wars to the Cold War, 25 were won by superior fleet numbers, arguing that technological advantages were short-lived. Notably, he states that in terms of firepower, having twice as many shooters beats half as many shooters firing fast, as fleet attrition, not holding territory, is the goal of naval warfare.

Putting those principles into perspective, the US Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR) mentions that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the world’s largest naval force in terms of hull numbers, at 370 ships and submarines. That fleet strength is backed by a shipbuilding capacity 232 times that of the US, according to a leaked US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) slide.

In contrast, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) mentions in an April 2025 report that the US has 296 battle force ships as of September 2024, while noting that US ships generally carry more fuel and munitions given the US Navy’s global mission.

However, the US Navy may still have a firepower advantage over China, as Johannes mentions in a December 2024 article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Fischbach points out that while the US Navy has 8,400 VLS on its warships, China, at the time of his writing, has 4,300 – a little over half of US capacity.

Still, Pete Pedrozo points out in an August 2025 Lawfire article that China’s large merchant marine fleet – around 5,600 ships – plus tens of thousands of fishing ships, provides it with virtually unlimited launch platforms.

Although merchant ships may lack the deep survivability design features of warships, Thomas Shugart argues in an August 2021 War on the Rocks article that well-prepared civilian vessels may be harder to destroy than often assumed, noting that during the Iran-Iraq “Tanker Wars” of the 1980s, more than 400 merchant ships were hit but only about a quarter were destroyed.

However, Shugart cites analyst Ian Easton’s warning that a lack of standardization, specialization, and coordination could hinder China’s use of merchant shipping for military purposes, while noting that China has taken steps to address these shortcomings.

He adds that although China’s merchant fleet can significantly boost naval hull numbers, it relies on civilian infrastructure not designed for high-intensity naval combat.

The US Navy has also taken steps to bolster fleet numbers. In July 2025, the US Navy released a solicitation seeking industry input in support of the Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program.

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Similar to China’s MCF strategy, the project utilizes existing commercial designs and production capabilities to enable the US Navy to field an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) force rapidly. The MASC could be armed with Lockheed Martin’s Mark 70 Mod 1 Palletized Delivery System (PDS), enabling rapid deployment of long-range offensive strike capabilities on unconventional platforms.

In the wake of the Constellation-class frigate project failure, the US Navy has unveiled a new FF(X) design based on the US Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC) ships. The US intends to acquire 73 of these ships, which follow a modular payload design similar to the short-lived Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and could carry the Mark 70 Typhon VLS as its main armament.

Still, the US may have no easy way out of its naval shipbuilding woes. In a report this month for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Seamus Daniels and other writers argue that US naval shipbuilding is crippled by systemic, interlocking problems that prevent ships from being delivered at scale, on time, or at cost.

Seamus and others argue that despite bipartisan support and rising budgets, US ship construction timelines have lengthened, with nearly every major program suffering delays and chronic cost overruns driven by inconsistent demand, volatile requirements, immature designs, workforce shortages, aging infrastructure, and a brittle, single-source-heavy industrial base.

In this naval shipbuilding race, China’s ability to weaponize what it already owns may prove faster than the US’s ability to build what it does not.

asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · December 29, 2025

17. How Deepfakes Could Lead to Doomsday

Summary:

AI-enabled deepfakes and “hallucinations” could destabilize nuclear deterrence by injecting convincing false signals into early warning and crisis decision-making. Even with stated U.S. safeguards keeping humans “in the loop,” the author argues leaders and staffs could be misled by synthetic audio, video, or AI-fused intelligence that mimics an incoming strike, mobilization, or provocation, compressing decision time in “launch on warning” postures. As DoD expands AI adoption, the piece urges clear red lines: no AI-driven automation in nuclear early warning or command and control, and stronger verification and disclosure standards for AI-augmented intelligence. It calls for training to resist automation bias, improved crisis communications (including Washington–Beijing channels), and policy reforms that privilege accuracy over speed given U.S. second-strike survivability.

Comment: It is more than a brave new world. It is a more dangerous brave new world than we might ever have imagined.

How Deepfakes Could Lead to Doomsday

Foreign Affairs · More by Erin D. Dumbacher · December 29, 2025

America’s Nuclear Warning Systems Aren’t Ready for AI

Erin D. Dumbacher

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-deepfakes-could-lead-doomsday

Nuclear missiles at a military parade in Beijing, September 2025 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

ERIN D. DUMBACHER is Stanton Nuclear Security Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Since the dawn of the nuclear age, policymakers and strategists have tried to prevent a country from deploying nuclear weapons by mistake. But the potential for accidents remains as high as it was during the Cold War. In 1983, a Soviet early warning system erroneously indicated that a U.S. nuclear strike on the Soviet Union was underway; such a warning could have triggered a catastrophic Soviet counterattack. The fate was avoided only because the on-duty supervisor, Stanislav Petrov, determined that the alarm was false. Had he not, Soviet leadership would have had reason to fire the world’s most destructive weapons at the United States.

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence has exacerbated threats to nuclear stability. One fear is that a nuclear weapons state might delegate the decision to use nuclear weapons to machines. The United States, however, has introduced safeguards to ensure that humans continue to make the final call over whether to launch a strike. According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy, a human will remain “in the loop” for any decisions to use, or stop using, a nuclear weapon. And U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed in twin statements that “there should be human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons.”

Yet AI poses another insidious risk to nuclear security. It makes it easier to create and spread deepfakes—convincingly altered videos, images, or audio that are used to generate false information about people or events. And these techniques are becoming ever more sophisticated. A few weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a widely shared deepfake showed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky telling Ukrainians to set down their weapons; in 2023, a deepfake led people to falsely believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin interrupted state television to declare a full-scale mobilization. In a more extreme scenario, a deepfake could convince the leader of a nuclear weapons state that a first strike from an adversary was underway or an AI-supported intelligence platform could raise false alarms of a mobilization, or even a dirty bomb attack, by an adversary.

The Trump administration wants to harness AI for national security. In July, it released an action plan calling for AI to be used “aggressively” across the Department of Defense. In December, the department unveiled GenAI.mil, a platform with AI tools for employees. But as the administration embeds AI in national security infrastructure, it will be crucial for policymakers and systems designers to be careful about the role machines play in the early phases of nuclear decision-making. Until engineers can prevent problems inherent to AI, such as hallucinations and spoofing—in which large language models predict inaccurate patterns or facts—the U.S. government must ensure that humans continue to control nuclear early warning systems. Other nuclear weapons states should do the same.

CASCADING CRISES

Today, President Donald Trump uses a phone to access deepfakes; he sometimes reposts them on social media, as do many of his close advisers. As the lines become blurred between real and fake information, there is a growing possibility that such deepfakes could infect high-stakes national security decisions, including on nuclear weapons.

If misinformation can deceive the U.S. president for even a few minutes, it could spell disaster for the world. According to U.S. law, a president does not need to confer with anyone to order the use of nuclear weapons for either a retaliatory attack or a first strike. U.S. military officials stand at the ready to deploy the planes, submarines, and ground-based missiles that carry nuclear warheads. A U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile can reach its target within a half hour—and once such a missile is launched, no one can recall it.

Deepfakes could help create pretexts for war.

Both U.S. and Russian nuclear forces are prepared to “launch on warning,” meaning that they can be deployed as soon as enemy missiles are detected heading their way. That leaves just minutes for a leader to evaluate whether an adversary’s nuclear attack has begun. (Under current U.S. policy, the president has the option to delay a decision until after an adversary’s nuclear weapon strikes the United States.) If the U.S. early warning system detects a threat to the United States, U.S. officials will try to verify the attack using both classified and unclassified sources. They might look at satellite data for activity at known military facilities, monitor recent statements from foreign leaders, and check social media and foreign news sources for context and on-the-ground accounts. Military officers, civil servants, and political appointees must then decide which information to communicate up the chain and how it is presented.

AI-driven misinformation could spur cascading crises. If AI systems are used to interpret early warning data, they could hallucinate an attack that isn’t real—putting U.S. officials in a similar position to the one Petrov was in four decades ago. Because the internal logic of AI systems is opaque, humans are often left in the dark as to why AI came to a particular conclusion. Research shows that people with an average level of familiarity with AI tend to defer to machine outputs rather than checking for bias or false positives, even when it comes to national security. Without extensive training, tools, and operating processes that account for AI’s weaknesses, advisers to White House decision-makers might default to assuming—or at least to entertaining—the possibility that AI-generated content is accurate.

Deepfakes that are transmitted on open-source media are nearly as dangerous. After watching a deepfake video, an American leader might, for example, misinterpret Russian missile tests as the beginning of offensive strikes or mistake Chinese live-fire exercises as an attack on U.S. allies. Deepfakes could help create pretexts for war, gin up public support for a conflict, or sow confusion.

A CRITICAL EYE

In July, the Trump administration released an AI action plan that called for aggressive deployment of AI tools across the Department of Defense, the world’s largest bureaucracy. AI has proved useful in making parts of the military more efficient. Machine learning makes it easier to schedule maintenance of navy destroyers. AI technology embedded in autonomous munitions, such as drones, can allow soldiers to stand back from the frontlines. And AI translation tools help intelligence officers parse data on foreign countries. AI could even be helpful in some other standard intelligence collection tasks, such as identifying distinctions between pictures of bombers parked in airfields from one day to the next.

Implementing AI across military systems does not need to be all or nothing. There are areas that should be off-limits for AI, including nuclear early warning systems and command and control, in which the risks of hallucination and spoofing outweigh the benefits that AI-powered software could bring. The best AI systems are built on cross-checked and comprehensive datasets. Nuclear early warning systems lack both because there have not been any nuclear attacks since the ones on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Any AI nuclear detection system would likely have to train on existing missile test and space tracking data plus synthetic data. Engineers would need to program defenses against hallucinations or inaccurate confidence assessments—significant technical hurdles.

It may be tempting to replace checks from highly trained staff with AI tools or to use AI to fuse various data sources to speed up analysis, but removing critical human eyes can lead to errors, bias, and misunderstandings. Just as the Department of Defense requires meaningful human control of autonomous drones, it should also require that each element of nuclear early warning and intelligence technology meet an even higher standard. AI data integration tools should not replace human operators who report on incoming ballistic missiles. Efforts to confirm early warning of a nuclear launch from satellite or radar data should remain only partially automated. And participants in critical national security conference calls should consider only verified and unaltered data.

In July 2025, the Department of Defense requested funds from Congress to add novel technologies to nuclear command, control, and communications. The U.S. government would be best served by limiting AI and automation integration to cybersecurity, business processes and analytics, and simple tasks, such as ensuring backup power turns on when needed.

A VINTAGE STRATEGY

Today, the danger of nuclear war is greater than it has been in decades. Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China is rapidly expanding its arsenal, North Korea now has the ability to send ICBMs to the United States, and policies preventing proliferation are wavering. Against this backdrop, it is even more important to ensure that humans, not machines trained on poor or incomplete data, are judging the actions, intent, and aims of an adversary.

Intelligence agencies need to get better at tracking the provenance of AI-derived information and standardize how they relay to policymakers when data is augmented or synthetic. For example, when the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency uses AI to generate intelligence, it adds a disclosure to the report if the content is machine-generated. Intelligence analysts, policymakers, and their staffs should be trained to bring additional skepticism and fact-checking to content that is not immediately verifiable, just as many businesses are now vigilant against cyber spear phishing. And intelligence agencies need the trust of policymakers, who might be more inclined to believe what their own eyes and devices tell them—true or false—than what an intelligence assessment renders.

Experts and technologists should keep working to find ways to label and slow fraudulent information, images, and videos flowing through social media, which can influence policymakers. But given the difficulty of policing open-source information, it is all the more important for classified information to be accurate.

AI can already deceive leaders into seeing an attack that isn’t there.

The Trump administration’s updates to U.S. nuclear posture in the National Defense Strategy ought to guard against the likely and unwieldy AI information risks to nuclear weapons by reaffirming that a machine will never make a nuclear launch decision without human control. As a first step, all nuclear weapons states should agree that only humans will make nuclear use decisions. Then they should improve channels for crisis communications. A hotline for dialogue exists between Washington and Moscow but not between Washington and Beijing.

U.S. nuclear policy and posture have changed little since the 1980s, when leaders worried the Soviet Union would attack out of the blue. Policymakers then could not have wrapped their heads around how much misinformation would be delivered to the personal devices of the people in charge of nuclear weapons today. Both the legislative and executive branches should reevaluate nuclear weapons posture policies built for the Cold War. Policymakers might, for example, require future presidents to confer with congressional leaders before they launch a nuclear first strike or require a period of time for intelligence professionals to validate the information on which the decision is being based. Because the United States has capable second-strike options, accuracy should take precedence over speed.

AI already has the potential to deceive key decision-makers and members of the nuclear chain of command into seeing an attack that isn’t there. In the past, only authentic dialogue and diplomacy averted misunderstandings among nuclear armed states. Policies and practices should protect against the pernicious information risks that could ultimately lead to doomsday.

Foreign Affairs · More by Erin D. Dumbacher · December 29, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com