T

Quotes of the Day:​

"When stupidity is considered patriotism, it is unsafe to be intelligent."

- Isaac Asizmov

It's a dangerous conception of mental hygiene to assume that what a man needs ...is equilibrium... . What man actually needs is not a tensionless state but rather a striving and struggling for a worthwhile goal..."

- Viktor Frankl

"There is but one thing of real value – to cultivate truth and justice, and to live without anger in the midst of lying and unjust men."

- Marcus Aurelius

1. Discord in China may be good news for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un

2. North Korea's aim to be nuclear superpower risks regional arms race

3. North Korea Showcases Two Types of ICBMs In November 2022 Tests

4. North Korea pokes the polarization bear

5. Kim Jong-un’s daughter, 10, leads fashion wave in North Korea

6.  U.S. designates N. Korea as state violator of religious freedom for 21st consecutive year

7. A Statement of U.S. policy on North Korea

8. U.S., S. Korea, Japan will use all available tools to limit N. Korea's weapons programs: NSC

9. Nuclear envoys of U.S., S. Korea hold meeting over N. Korean provocations

10. Trilateral cooperation strengthens regarding N. Korean provocations

11. South Korea needs its own nuclear deterrent

12. Korea sends 2nd official feedback to US on Inflation Reduction Act

13. Biden acknowledges ‘glitches’ with IRA, hinting at possible revision

14. South Korea in delirium - thanks to the World Cup's best ever nutmeg

1. Discord in China may be good news for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un

Excerpts:

But maybe China’s problems are good news for Kim Jong Un. Xi and Kim have exchanged messages pledging to work more closely than ever for their mutual benefit. Xi may be less likely to pressure Kim into holding off on another nuclear test while worrying about rebellion at home. Maybe he’ll throw in more shipments of oil, food and other vital supplies and totally forget about United Nations sanctions against the North for its nuclear and missile tests.

For sure, Kim will be anxious to stop any hint of protest from spreading into North Korea. Just as he closed his borders with China at the first sign of the pandemic nearly three years ago, so too he’ll keep his fiefdom more tightly shielded than ever from the dread disease of civil disobedience.

Discord in China may be good news for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un

BY DONALD KIRK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 12/02/22 2:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3758326-discord-in-china-may-be-good-news-for-north-koreas-kim-jong-un/

AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

In Seoul, South Korea, a demonstrator sympathetic to protesters in China holds up a blank paper during a rally to denounce the Chinese government’s continued “zero-COVID” on Nov. 30, 2022. Despite protests in China and Iran, North Korea, however, makes those two countries seem almost free by comparison.

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, may have visions of serving as president for life, but first he must get rid of thousands of dissidents eager to overthrow him after lockdowns mandated by his “zero-COVID” policy. 

Xi is deploying every instrument he has to repress an uprising in danger of spreading before he gets it totally under control. While the police pounce on protesters, Xi’s technical wizards do their best to shut down every conceivable opening on the internet. Try to find what’s happening in major cities via Twitter by punching in the Chinese characters for the capital, Beijing, and the business and industrial port of Shanghai, and you come up with hundreds of images advertising pretty women for sale. 

No, they’re not pornographic, as some have reported in the West. The women are all wearing something, however scanty, as mandated in a country where naked ladies online are off-limits, but the ruse cuts off the flow of images of demonstrations that anyone outside China can see. All those elsewhere need do is punch in the names of Chinese cities in English, which is banned on Twitter in China along with a lot of other material the authorities don’t want Chinese citizens to see. Inside China, you can’t even communicate via gmail.

Like Iran, another bastion of authoritarian rule, China should have been almost the last place on earth where dissidents would dare defy the systems in which they exist. The dictators at the top of the ruling structures of these countries count on their security forces to round up the miscreants and on their courts to mete out drastic sentences, including death. The fact that Xi has had to repress demonstrations in Beijing, Shanghai, the huge southern port city of Guangzhou and a score of other centers would have seemed unimaginable as he began a third five-year term in October as general secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, the wellspring of power. 

Now images of the bloody crackdown on protests in Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing, in which more than 10,000 were killed in June 1989 when the army finally moved in, come to mind.

Could Xi face the kind of protest that’s boiling in Iran? The forces upholding the rule of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have killed several hundred mostly young people in an uprising that’s been going on for months. 

Ostensibly, the protest in Tehran was triggered by the fatal beating of a young woman caught for violating the strict Islamic dress code. Now protesters are demanding the end of the Islamic regime, which, if anything, is more harsh than that of the late U.S.-backed Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, overthrown in 1979.

In China, outrage against restraints to stop the spread of COVID-19 has escalated to opposition to dictatorship, period. It wasn’t just that entire communities were quarantined in the ongoing response to the disease, which broke out in Wuhan in 2019. As in Iran, a single episode sparked the protests — the death of 10 people in a fire in the remote city of Urumqi, in Xinjiang Province, after fire engines were delayed getting to the scene by barriers set up to combat COVID.

In China, as in Iran, the protests have to be welcomed by Washington, even though President Biden is refraining from paroxysms of joy. He may be confident the Chinese aren’t going to go beyond rhetoric in their claims to the independent island province of Taiwan while unrest simmers on the mainland. Obviously Xi, orchestrating a campaign to repress the protesters, has to focus on his homefront. Signs calling for his ouster show the weakness of his rule beneath external displays of bravado. The police may force overt dissent out of sight — not out of mind.

But what about North Korea? How is it that Kim Jong Un has been able to maintain such tight control over his people, many of them hungry, living in poverty as they face another harsh winter? Is there absolutely no chance of unrest finally flaring up against his brutal rule?

The answer is almost certainly “no,” as it has been for the entire history of the Kim dynasty, going back to the installation of Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, by the Soviet Union after the Japanese surrender in 1945. No one’s perceiving overt hints of opposition to Kim’s rule, even though some of his impoverished citizens must be unhappy. He has been so successful at tightening his northern borders along the Yalu and Tumen rivers with China that we’re not even hearing much from the few defectors who somehow make it to the South.

In comparison to North Korea, China and Iran seem almost like free countries. It’s virtually inconceivable, given the depth of domestic espionage in North Korea, of colleagues informing on colleagues, of neighbors spying on neighbors, to imagine anyone risking death by breathing a word of protest against the regime.

But aren’t people in North Korea at all aware of what’s happening in China? Don’t they get the news by tuning into illicit broadcasts, or via highly risky mobile phone connections? Thousands of North Koreans live and work legally, with full authorization, in the Chinese city of Dandong across the Yalu from Sinuiju, the major North Korea city facing China. Although Chinese authorities are stifling the news, some people in Dandong must have gotten wind of trouble.

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But maybe China’s problems are good news for Kim Jong Un. Xi and Kim have exchanged messages pledging to work more closely than ever for their mutual benefit. Xi may be less likely to pressure Kim into holding off on another nuclear test while worrying about rebellion at home. Maybe he’ll throw in more shipments of oil, food and other vital supplies and totally forget about United Nations sanctions against the North for its nuclear and missile tests.

For sure, Kim will be anxious to stop any hint of protest from spreading into North Korea. Just as he closed his borders with China at the first sign of the pandemic nearly three years ago, so too he’ll keep his fiefdom more tightly shielded than ever from the dread disease of civil disobedience.

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He currently is a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea. He is the author of several books about Asian affairs.

2. North Korea's aim to be nuclear superpower risks regional arms race

Perhaps more like Pakistan than a superpower, but that does not lessen the threat.

But is the critical question whether sanctions should be dropped? REally? The author wants to give Kim a political warfare and blackmail diplomacy victory? Does he really think that will lead to a better security situation?

Excerpts:

All this raises a critical question: Should the existing, ineffective sanctions be dropped in an effort to calm relations with North Korea and find a way forward? After all, there are precedents for eventual acceptance that countries have joined the nuclear club.

The United States relented and dropped sanctions against India and Pakistan in 1999, despite both having never accepted the NPT. Nor has Israel, which has never even faced sanctions.

But for such a strategy to work, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel would need to become signatories to the NPT and its associated protocols. History suggests this isn't a plausible option.

Three decades of non-compliance with international obligations by North Korea have not engendered trust or a willingness by surrounding countries to submit to a nuclear neighbor. More likely is a regional nuclear arms race, as happened when India got the bomb and Pakistan had to keep up, or when Israel triggered Iran's nuclear ambitions.

South Korea, Japan and possibly even Taiwan are likely to follow suit, either asking to host U.S. ballistic missiles or pursuing independent nuclear strategies -- especially if they feel the United States won't defend them after the next presidential election.

North Korea's aim to be nuclear superpower risks regional arms race

By Alexander Gillespie, University of Waikato

upi.com

This photo released on November 19 by the North Korean government shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting what it says a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile at Pyongyang International Airport. Photo courtesy of Office of the North Korean government press service | License Photo

Dec. 2 (UPI) -- The recent claim by Kim Jong Un that North Korea plans to develop the world's most powerful nuclear force may well have been more bravado than credible threat. But that doesn't mean it can be ignored.

The best guess is that North Korea now has sufficient fissile material to build 45 to 55 nuclear weapons, three decades after beginning its program. The warheads would mostly have yields of around 10 to 20 kilotons, similar to the 15-kiloton bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.

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But North Korea has the capacity to make devices 10 times bigger. Its missile delivery systems are also advancing in leaps and bounds. The technological advance is matched in rhetoric and increasingly reckless acts, including test-firing missiles over Japan in violation of all international norms, provoking terror and risking accidental war.

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The question now is how best to bring the pariah nation into the orbit of arms control negotiations and international dialogue. However remote the chances of that, the alternative risks a regional nuclear arms race.

A history of failure

The current impasse can be traced back to 1991 and the end of the Cold War. As part of its efforts to create a viable arms control treaty with the Soviet Union, the United States removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea.

This seemed sensible at the time, especially since North Korea had pledged itself to the cornerstone Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985. This commits member states to arms control and reduction, with independent observers to monitor compliance.

The faith was misplaced. From 1993, North Korea went on to trick or fool every U.S. president and most of the international community for the next 30 years, quitting the NPT in 2003 and detonating its first nuclear explosion in 2006.

This so upset the global balance of power that all members of the U.N. Security Council agreed that North Korea had to stop developing nuclear warheads and associated missile delivery systems. Nine rounds of sanctions since 2006 have attempted to enforce this, to no avail.

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Former U.S. President Donald Trump was the last to try, inviting Kim to open the North Korean economy and even pledging to end the joint military exercises in the south that aggravated him so much. Kim promised to "denuclearize" and then did nothing.

Influence of Russia, China

By the end of this decade, North Korea could have 200 devices, en route to Kim's vision of becoming a nuclear superpower. This would still be a lot fewer than those stockpiled by the United States and Russia, which possess 90% of all nuclear weapons. But it would put North Korea on or above current estimates for Israel (90), India (160) or Pakistan (165), and into the middle league with Britain (225), France ("under 300") and China (350).

The ideal solution would be for North Korea to sign the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons -- but we need to realistic. None of the other existing nuclear powers are signatories, and we now live in an age of nuclear upgrades and expansion.

The war in Ukraine has changed everything, its main lesson seemingly being that weapons of mass destruction are still strategically useful. Indeed, the Ukrainians are paying a price for having given up their nuclear stockpile in 1994 after Russia promised not to threaten or use force against Ukraine's territorial integrity or political independence.

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Even if additional sanctions might work, Russia and China have only recently vetoed an attempt to impose tighter sanctions on North Korea over its missile launches. To underline their position, they also recently conducted military exercises inside the South Korean air defense zone.

Regional arms race

All this raises a critical question: Should the existing, ineffective sanctions be dropped in an effort to calm relations with North Korea and find a way forward? After all, there are precedents for eventual acceptance that countries have joined the nuclear club.

The United States relented and dropped sanctions against India and Pakistan in 1999, despite both having never accepted the NPT. Nor has Israel, which has never even faced sanctions.

But for such a strategy to work, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel would need to become signatories to the NPT and its associated protocols. History suggests this isn't a plausible option.

Three decades of non-compliance with international obligations by North Korea have not engendered trust or a willingness by surrounding countries to submit to a nuclear neighbor. More likely is a regional nuclear arms race, as happened when India got the bomb and Pakistan had to keep up, or when Israel triggered Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Advertisement

South Korea, Japan and possibly even Taiwan are likely to follow suit, either asking to host U.S. ballistic missiles or pursuing independent nuclear strategies -- especially if they feel the United States won't defend them after the next presidential election.

None of this makes the world safer.

Alexander Gillespie is a professor of law at the University of Waikato.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

upi.com

3. North Korea Showcases Two Types of ICBMs In November 2022 Tests

North Korea Showcases Two Types of ICBMs In November 2022 Tests

• BY: VANN H. VAN DIEPEN
• DECEMBER 2, 2022

https://www.38north.org/2022/12/north-korea-showcases-two-types-of-icbms-in-november-2022-tests/?utm_source=pocket_saves

• North Korea conducted two intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches in November: an apparent Hwasong-15 on November 3, which failed, and the larger Hwasong-17 on November 18, which succeeded. Both missiles had modified boosters; the Hwasong-15 also had a modified payload section, but the failure of its test flight obscured the true impact of those changes.
• These tests show that North Korea is continuing to improve its capability to deliver nuclear warheads against the continental United States and underscore the political and deterrent importance of that capability to Pyongyang. The nature of the modifications to both missiles suggests the North recognizes the need to improve their reliability, and thus bolster the credibility of its ICBM capabilities. We can expect Pyongyang to continue testing both modified systems, although it claimed the November 18 test was the final developmental launch, and expect continued launches of the original Hwasong-15 if it is to remain deployed.
• Mid-size Hwasong-15 Clearly Reemerges
• North Korea launched an ICBM on November 3 to an altitude of about 1,920 km and a range of about 760 km, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first stage reportedly operated and separated normally, but the missile failed during second stage flight.
• On November 7, North Korea released a statement commenting on an extensive series of missile launches conducted from November 2 to 5.[1] The statement did not acknowledge the ICBM test explicitly, but referred to an “important test-fire of ballistic missile to verify the movement reliability of a special functional warhead paralyzing the operation command system of the enemy.” One of the accompanying photographs showed the early flight of what appeared to be a modified version of the Hwasong-15 ICBM.[2]
• This was the first launch of the Hwasong-15 North Korea has acknowledged conducting since the system’s initial flight test in November 2017. Earlier this year, on March 24, North Korea reported it had conducted a launch of its Hwasong-17 ICBM, but South Korean intelligence claimed it was actually a Hwasong-15. Neither claim has been confirmed, but there are aspects of the latest Hwasong-17 launch that lend support to the North Korean claim. (A failed Hwasong-17 launch was also conducted on March 16.)
• The Hwasong-15 has probably been operationally deployed since 2017, consistent with Kim Jong Un’s 2018 claims of an ICBM capability against the US,[3] the apparent assessment of ICBM deployment by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in October 2021, and the Foreign Ministry’s February 2022 claim that the Hwasong-15 has the “ability to strike the US mainland.”[4] (As noted below, the November 18 North Korean statement on the Hwasong-17 launch also referred in passing to “ICBM units,” and a statement on November 27 noted that the armed forces had been “equipped with” Hwasong-15s.[5]) From an operational standpoint, testing the reliability of an already deployed system should have been a priority for the North Koreans once they made the political decision to resume ICBM testing.
• Interestingly, the missile shown in the November 7 photo had some significant modifications: a shorter first stage, an apparently shorter second stage, and a longer and more tapered payload section.[6] Because the test flight failed, the effect of these modifications on the Hwasong-15’s range and payload capability is unclear. The North’s reference to “a special functional warhead paralyzing the operation command system of the enemy” also is unclear. Possibilities include a North Korean threat to use nuclear weapons to generate electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects to damage command, control, and other electronics; another hint at developing multiple warheads; or a smokescreen to obfuscate a failed ICBM launch.[7]
• Without understanding the differences between the original and modified missiles, we cannot assess the implications of this failed test for the reliability of currently deployed Hwasong-15 ICBMs. The apparent success of the first stage (particularly if the engines in the two versions are basically the same), staging, and second stage ignition all would appear to be good news for the currently-deployed force. But the failure of the second stage after ignition would be an obvious concern, and the failure also foreclosed any ability to test the payload.
• It is highly likely that North Korea will conduct additional tests of the modified Hwasong-15 until it is satisfied with its performance. If the original version is intended to remain in the deployed inventory, we can expect additional launches of it as well.
• First (or Second?) Successful Test of the Hwasong-17
• On November 18, North Korea launched an ICBM into a highly lofted trajectory with an altitude of about 6,000 km to a range of about 1,000 km, according to the South Korean and Japanese governments. That same day, North Korea released a statement reporting a successful test launch of the “new-type” Hwasong-17 ICBM.[8] According to the statement, “The test-fire clearly proved the reliability of the new major strategic weapon system to be representative of the DPRK’s strategic forces and its powerful combat performance as the strongest strategic weapon in the world.” Kim Jong Un reportedly “urged the national defense scientific research sector to put more vigorous spurs to the development of Juche-based strategic weapons of Korean-style and the ICBM units…to intensify their training with high vigilance so as to perfectly discharge their important strategic duty in any situation and at any moment.”
• Accompanying photos and a video showed the launch of a Hwasong-17 from an 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)—consistent with what was seen in a video claiming to be from the March 24 launch, but more likely was from the failed March 16 test of the Hwasong-17. The latest images also reveal that the missile had a number of modifications compared to the March launch(es):
• A shorter first stage;
• A longer cable raceway along the second stage (which may mean the second stage propellant tanks have been lengthened);
• A wider interstage section between the two stages (which may mean the second stage rocket engine nozzles have been lengthened);
• Amall solid-propellant rocket motors apparently added to the second stage (probably to facilitate stage separation); and
• A rearrangement of the small motors on the payload fairing (probably to improve fairing separation).[9]
• In light of the original Hwasong-17’s substantial range and payload capability, these changes will probably not have a substantial effect on the missile’s performance. They likely reflect lessons learned from previous launches and may be more geared toward improving the system’s overall reliability.
• A number of analysts noted the similarities in flight time and trajectory between the November 18 Hwasong-17 launch and the successful March 24 ICBM launch.[10] This adds weight to (but does not prove) the case that the latter launch was a Hwasong-17, despite South Korean claims otherwise.[11] If the March 24 launch was a Hwasong-17, then the November launch represents the second—rather than the first—successful launch of the system.
• By North Korean standards, one or two successful tests could be enough testing to permit operational deployment of the system. Although the North Korean statement on November 18 did not mention the new ICBM’s operational status, it did refer in passing to “ICBM units,” and the November 27 statement characterized the November 18 launch as “the final test-fire for the development of [the] new-type ICBM.”[12] If the modifications to the missile since March were extensive enough, additional testing may occur prior to deployment.
• The real significance of the Hwasong-17 results from the potential its large diameter and propulsion capability provide to accommodate multiple warheads, especially multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This potential has been recognized since the missile was first in October 2020, and underscored when Kim Jong Un claimed in January 2021 that the North was in the final stage of “perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket.”[13] There is still no direct evidence, however, that North Korea is developing or testing multiple warheads[14]—despite frequent press claims that the Hwasong-17 “is designed to carry” them.[15] The missile may well end up carrying multiple warheads, but the technology (especially for MIRVs) is challenging and probably requires more than North Korea’s usual amount of testing. If the North intends to deploy the Hwasong-17 with multiple warheads, additional Hwasong-17 launches should be expected.
• The Bottom Line
• The November tests show that North Korea is continuing to improve its capability to deliver nuclear warheads against the continental United States and underscore the political and deterrent importance of that capability to Pyongyang. We still do not know how many ICBMs it has deployed, although it probably has fielded some Hwasong-15s since 2017, or how many more it will deploy in the future. We also do not know if it will deploy the Hwasong-17 with multiple warheads, although such deployments are the most sensible reason to have developed that large of an ICBM in the first place, or if any such warheads will be shotgun-style multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) or the more technically demanding and capable MIRVs. The nature of the modifications to both the Hwasong-15 and -17 seen in the November tests suggests the North recognizes the need to improve their reliability, and thus overall credibility of its ICBMs. We can expect Pyongyang to continue tests of both modified systems and launches of the original Hwasong-15 if it is to remain deployed. As of now, it would not appear that Pyongyang sees any substantial political impediments to further launches.

1. [1]
2. “Report of General Staff of KPA on Its Military Operations Corresponding to U.S.-South Korea Combined Air Drill,” KCNA, November 7, 2022.
3. [2]
4. Ibid., photos: https://www.kcna.kp/en/media/photo/q/f4bf17a4b55717beb51b479bf73484f4e73212e708098c2c1dd27ac3b8f60650.kcmsf.
5. [3]
6. “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” KCNA, January 1, 2018. According to Kim, “In no way would the United States dare to ignite a war against me and our country. The whole of its mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time; the United States needs to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality.”
7. [4]
8. “North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional and Global Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, October 15, 2021, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf. For example, page 20 of the report refers to “ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory”; page 22 states that “The Strategic Force includes units operating…ICBMs…” and that “This force also is responsible for the…Hwasong-14 ICBM, capable of reaching the continental United States”; and page 41 states that “North Korea’s ballistic missile units control a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs.”
9. [5]
10. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Receives Letter of Pledge from Academy of Defence Science,” KCNA, November 27, 2022.
11. [6]
12. See Ankit Panda, Twitter Post, November 6, 2022, 6:05 p.m., https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1589393599883796480; Nathan J Hunt Twitter Post, November 6, 2022, 11:47 p.m., https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1589479581698117634; and the comparison drawings at Nathan J Hunt, Twitter Post, November 8, 2022, 7:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1589962948424130560.
13. [7]
14. See Joseph Dempsey, Twitter Post, November 6, 2022, 7:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1589407305027964928 and Ankit Panda, Twitter Post, November 6, 2022, 6:05 p.m., https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1589393599883796480.
15. [8]
16. “WPK Solemnly Declares Its Immutable Will to React to Enemy’s Nuke and Full-frontal Confrontation in Kind; Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New-type ICBM of DPRK’s Strategic Forces,” Rodong Sinmun, November 18, 2022.
17. [9]
18. See Nathan J Hunt, Twitter Post, November 19, 2022, 1:16 p.m., https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1594032003196022784; and Tianran Xu, “Brief on DPRK ICBM launch on 18 November 2022 – Updates, 21 November 2022,” Open Nuclear Network, November 21, 2022, https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-dprk-icbm-launch-18-november-2022-updates-21-november-2022?language_content_entity=en.
19. [10]
20. See Jeffrey Lewis, Twitter Post, November 17, 2022, 10:40 p.m., https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1593449060932804608 on the flight time. See Jeongmin Kim and Shreyas Reddy, “North Korea fires intercontinental ballistic missile ‘eastward’: Seoul,” November 18, 2022, NK News, https://www.nknews.org/2022/11/north-korea-fires-suspected-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-eastward-seoul/; Marco Langbroek, Twitter Post. November 18, 2022, 4:54 p.m., https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1593724237256470528; and Jonathan McDowell, Twitter Post. November 17, 2022, 10:49 p.m., https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1593451256764583940 regarding the trajectory.
21. [11]
22. For additional factors weighing in favor of the Hwasong-17 case, see Vann H. Van Diepen, “Revisiting the Hwasong-17/15 Controversy: What if North Korea Had Launched a Hwasong-15?,” 38 North, April 27, 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/04/revisiting-the-hwasong-17-15-controversy-what-if-north-korea-had-launched-a-hwasong-15.
23. [12]
24. That statement also referred to the “preparation of underground launching pad” while lauding Kim Jong Un’s purported personal decision to make the Hwasong-17’s launching vehicle “self-propelled.” This could suggest the missile also will be deployed in silos, or at least that silo deployment had been contemplated. Unless successfully concealed, however, Hwasong-17 silos would be extremely vulnerable to conventional and nuclear attacks.
25. [13]
26. See Vann H. Van Diepen and Michael Elleman, “North Korea Unveils Two New Strategic Missiles in October 10 Parade,” 38 North, October 10, 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/10/vdiepenmelleman101020; and “On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Party Congress of WPK,” KCNA, January 9, 2021.
27. [14]
28. The US has revealed that North Korea conducted launches in February and March 2022 that “involved” the Hwasong-17, probably to test unspecified “elements” of the system. These tests (which apparently succeeded), as well as two apparently similar tests in May 2022 (one of which failed), probably used the first stage of the ICBM. Although North Korea claimed the first two launches were testing reconnaissance satellite components, one possibility is that these launches are related to the development of post boost vehicles (PBVs) to dispense MIRVs. See Vann H. Van Diepen, “Burying the Lede: North Korea Conceals That “Spy Satellite” Tests Are First Launches of New Large ICBM,” 38 North, March 16, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2022/03/burying-the-lead-north-korea-conceals-that-spy-satellite-tests-are-first-launches-of-new-large-icbm; Joseph Dempsey. Twitter Post, May 4, 2022, 6:37 a.m., https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1521801097685438464; Jonathan McDowell, Twitter Post, May 4, 2022, 1:32 a.m., https://mobile.twitter.com/planet4589/status/1521724313182871552; Yoonjung Seo, Gawon Bae, Junko Ogura and Barbara Starr, “North Korea tests presumed ICBM and two other missiles, South Korea says,” CNN, May 25, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/24/asia/north-korea-missile-intl/index.html; and Open Nuclear Network, Twitter Post, May 25, 2022, 12:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/OpenNuclear/status/1529503300797726722.
29. [15]
30. For example, see Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “North Korea’s leader showed off his daughter. What could it mean?,” The Washington Post, November 21, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/21/north-korea-kim-daughter-succession.

4. North Korea pokes the polarization bear

north Korea is just a pawn or stone in the larger Chess or Go (paduk) match.

Conclusion:

Neither Russia nor China is likely to support the imposition of further sanctions on North Korea, even if a long-speculated seventh nuclear test materializes. Keeping Pyongyang “on side” allows Beijing and Moscow to cement their opposition to the US-led liberal international order and garner the support of another “rogue” state.

North Korea pokes the polarization bear

Pyongyang’s recent overtures to Moscow and Beijing are clearly more opportunistic than ideological or strategic

asiatimes.com · by Francesca Frassineti · December 3, 2022

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea capitalized upon China’s and Russia’s tense relationship with the United States by reviving ties with its Cold War partners. Such rapprochement is anything but a strategic realignment.

It is transactional – a way for North Korea to benefit economically while accelerating the scope and sophistication of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Since the start of 2022, Pyongyang has intensified its missile testing to an unprecedented degree, most recently witnessed in a spate of missile launches in early November. These actions can be attributed to Kim Jong Un seeking to fulfill his five-year military plan — unveiled at the 8th Workers’ Party Congress in January 2021. North Korea is also becoming increasingly impatient at a lack of sanctions relief from the United States.

North Korea has never been a priority for US President Joe Biden, and the state of relations is a far cry from when an improved dialogue with the United States was sustained during Donald Trump’s presidency, largely thanks to the facilitation of former South Korean president Moon Jae-in.

After failing to obtain any easing of sanctions from Washington following the collapse of talks in October 2019, Kim is now turning to Russia and China. North Korea remains eager to take advantage of the current paralysis in the UN Security Council, especially given how the Chinese leadership seems increasingly unable or unwilling to restrain its neighbor.

Kim Jong Un holds up a signed version of his ‘special order’ as reported by North Korean state media on June 18, 2021. The state media accounts did not say he was ordering the military’s rice stores opened for distribution to hungry civilians, but Seoul-based DailyNK reported it learned that was indeed the case. Photo: AFP / Rodong Sinmun / KCNA via KNS

Rather than any concerted ideological or strategic realignment, North Korea’s recent overtures to Russia and China are opportunistic. On July 14, Pyongyang recognized Russia-controlled breakaway republics in Eastern Ukraine.

On October 12, North Korea was among the four countries that voted against the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russian “attempted illegal annexation” of four Ukrainian regions. In early August, North Korea also denounced US “interference” in Taiwan.

These actions cannot be detached from North Korea’s domestic economic crisis. Pyongyang will use every avenue to gain financial remittances, whether from workers in China and Russia — in violation of multilateral sanctions — or vocal support from Russia and China, in vetoing the imposition of further multilateral sanctions.

Since 2013, Kim has sought to strengthen domestic legitimacy by bolstering North Korea’s military and nuclear capabilities while accelerating economic development.

In 2018, having declared the completion of the state nuclear force, Kim outlined a “new strategic line”, directing all energy to domestic economic development. But this has not borne fruit due to Covid-19, meteorological catastrophes, sluggish industrial output and a failure to meet construction targets.

Against the backdrop of decades-old sanctions, the self-imposed border closure of January 2020 was a key factor contributing to North Korea’s worst economic downturn in over 25 years. From late 2020, Kim publicly criticized government officials for failing to implement his guidelines.

On August 10, 2022, Kim announced victory over Covid-19 and a re-examination of border controls. Trade with China has slowly resumed, although at a limited level, due to North Korea’s ongoing controls at disinfection and quarantine stations.

Relations between Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow have not always been fruitful. Ties were disrupted at the end of the Cold War with the establishment of Soviet and Chinese relations with South Korea in 1990 and 1992. Pyongyang’s rapprochement with Moscow is a continuation of improved relations over the past decade, as Russia has become increasingly authoritarian.

In 2014, the Russian parliament wrote off 90% of North Korea’s Soviet-era debt, worth over US$10 billion. The Russian Minister for Far Eastern Development also visited North Korea, pledging to increase trade. In 2019, Kim met Russian President Vladimir Putin and committed to strengthening ties.

Bilateral cooperation between Pyongyang and Beijing has also recently grown amid North Korea’s support for Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong and improved personal ties between Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping, marked by Xi’s state visit to North Korea in 2019.

There was also a reaffirmation of ties following the 60th anniversary of the Sino–DPRK Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in July 2021.

Questions are swirling around whether China, Russia and North Korea coordinated their acts of provocation around South Korea earlier this week. Image: Getty / Twitter / Newsweek

Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided fertile ground for North Korea to engage in low-cost, high-reward gestures of cooperation, North Korea’s declarations of support for Russia have been non-committal.

Pyongyang hopes that in making pledges, whether to dispatch North Korean workers or sell ammunition — recently refuted by the government — Moscow will offer diplomatic support and financial investment, even if North Korea remains heavily economically reliant on China.

Neither Russia nor China is likely to support the imposition of further sanctions on North Korea, even if a long-speculated seventh nuclear test materializes. Keeping Pyongyang “on side” allows Beijing and Moscow to cement their opposition to the US-led liberal international order and garner the support of another “rogue” state.

Francesca Frassineti is Associate Research Fellow at ISPI Asia Center, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of History of Contemporary East Asia at Ca’ Foscari University, Venice.

Edward Howell is a Lecturer in Politics at New College, University of Oxford.

Ria Roy is a Gates Cambridge Scholar and PhD candidate in the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge.

The authors are members of the 2022 cohort of the Chatham House-Korea Foundation Next Generation Expert Network.

asiatimes.com · by Francesca Frassineti · December 3, 2022

5. Kim Jong-un’s daughter, 10, leads fashion wave in North Korea

Kim Jong Un has to be loving all this attention he is generating just by bringing his daughter to a missile launch.

[Newsmaker] Kim Jong-un’s daughter, 10, leads fashion wave in North Korea

koreaherald.com · by Park Jun-hee · December 1, 2022

Published : Dec 1, 2022 - 15:06 Updated : Dec 1, 2022 - 15:37

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This file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (right) and his daughter Kim Ju-ae. (KCNA-Yonhap)

Since weeks ago when Kim Jong-un revealed his 10-year-old daughter Kim Ju-ae to the world openly for the first time, her fashion style has proven to be an instant hit in North Korea, and her styling seems to be sending young North Koreans abuzz.

The Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, published pictures of North Korean women in white and pink padding jackets similar to that previously worn by Kim’s daughter when they inspected the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, on the sixth page of its newspapers on Thursday.

According to Joung Eun-lee, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, Ju-ae is believed to be following in the footsteps of her mother, Ri Sol-ju, in terms of how she influenced women in the North to fill their wardrobes with voguish dresses after being seen in similar outfits when she accompanied her husband.

The newspaper also highlighted the importance of dressing “beautifully” and “diversely” according to the season with distinct characteristics, saying it would add vibrancy and emotion to the lives of North Koreans.

This file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (front right) and his daughter Kim Ju-ae (front left). (KCNA-Yonhap)

The 10-year-old styled herself like her mother when she inspected the testing site with her father. Like Ri, Ju-ae was photographed alternatively wearing a white coat with white fur and black with black alongside her father, reminiscent of her mother’s fashion style in the 2010s.

Ri infused a new wave of change after being photographed in modern Western-style dresses and clothes, including short skirts with high heels while carrying handbags from high-end brands like Christian Dior, in a country where dress codes are stiffly enforced.

Meanwhile in late October, North Korea held the Women’s Clothes Exhibition-2022 to target women in their 30s and 40s, showcasing garments like padding jackets and fur coats. Apart from parading quality modern attire, the fair also shed light on the design technology process.

By Park Jun-hee ([email protected])

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koreaherald.com · by Park Jun-hee · December 1, 2022

6. U.S. designates N. Korea as state violator of religious freedom for 21st consecutive year

Although this seems por forma since the regime is such a human rights abuser, we need to keep the pressure on. This is just one way of doing this. This is good but we need to do more. We must sustain a human rights upfront approach.

U.S. designates N. Korea as state violator of religious freedom for 21st consecutive year | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 3, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Friday designated North Korea along with 11 other countries as countries of particular concern for violations of religious freedom.

It marks the 21st consecutive year the U.S. has designated North Korea as a state violator of religious freedom.

"I am announcing designations against Burma, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, the DPRK, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan as Countries of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom," Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a released statement.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

Blinken also placed four countries -- Algeria, the Central African Republic, Comoros and Vietnam -- on the Special Watch List for "engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom," while designating nine non-state actors, including Boko Haram and the Houthis, as Entities of Particular Concern.

"Our announcement of these designations is in keeping with our values and interests to protect national security and to advance human rights around the globe," said Blinken.

"We will continue to carefully monitor the status of freedom of religion or belief in every country around the world and advocate for those facing religious persecution or discrimination," he added.

[email protected]

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 3, 2022

7. A Statement of U.S. policy on North Korea

A very useful summary from Jake Sullivan brought to us by Dr. Victor Cha. Note that you can watch the CSIS-Joongang Ilbo forum here: https://www.csis.org/events/joongang-csis-forum-2022-alliance-turbulent-times

Last January I tried to provide a synthesis of all the policy statements to summarize the Biden Korea policy. Here it is for a comparison (and with my recommendations to address the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy).

The policy consists of five parts or lines of effort that are rarely addressed comprehensively:

This is the focus of the press and pundits. What the Biden administration is doing in this line of effort is offering Kim the chance to act as a responsible member of the international community. However, the administration is not banking on that as it is employing the other four lines of effort that are too often overlooked by the press and pundits.

The U.S. also recognizes the importance of trilateral cooperation among both U.S. Northeast Asia alliances with the ROK and Japan.

This is about revitalizing the ROK/U.S. military alliance and strengthening defense capabilities to include returning exercises to a level that will sustain readiness (and support OPCON transition) and reverse the dangerous trend established by the previous administration that was welcomed by the current Moon administration. The ROK/U.S. alliance cannot back down in the face of North Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.

Unfortunately, so far this has only been words with no significant action. The administration has failed to nominate an ambassador for North Korean human rights. Much more work needs to be done on human rights. Kim Jong-un must deny the human rights of the Korean power in the North to remain in power.

Full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions: This provides the “end state” objectives for an end to the North’s nuclear and missile programs, human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, the proliferation of weapons to conflict areas around the world, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities. It also underscores one element that the current administration has in common with the previous one and that is sanctions will not be lifted until there is substantive progress toward compliance with the UNSCRs. Both Trump and Biden deserve credit for not giving in to the pressure in Seoul and among some in Washington who believe we need to lift sanctions to bring Kim to the negotiating table.

One thing that engagers overlook is that the President does not have the authority to make a unilateral decision to lift UN sanctions or stop enforcing U.S. laws as they pertain to North Korea. However, as noted, both presidents should have done more and hopefully, the Biden administration will do more in the future specifically by expending more effort on sanctions enforcement. The recent designation of the five Koreans from the North operating in Russia and China is a good start. However, due to Chinese and Russian complicity in sanctions evasion and preventing any further UN action the U.S. cannot count on U.N sanctions. It must act against not only North Korean entities by using U.S. laws but also implement secondary sanctions against Chinese and Russian banks and businesses.

When we discuss the administration policy, we should consider all five lines of effort. The administration also needs a pithy name to describe the policy otherwise the press and pundits will make one up or lazily continue to call it strategic patience. This needs to come from the administration so that it can control the narrative of its own policy.

These five lines of effort need to be synthesized into a comprehensive ROK/U.S. alliance political warfare strategy. To defeat the regime’s political warfare strategy the alliance must execute a superior form of political warfare. What is necessary is the sixth line of effort to tie the other five lines together. The alliance must develop and execute a comprehensive information and influence activities campaign as the foundation of the political warfare strategy.

To review, there are likely multiple reasons for the recent missile tests. First and foremost, the military requires them to advance these missile programs. These missile systems are designed for warfighting so we should interpret from this that Kim Jong-un continues to develop capabilities that can support his campaign plan to dominate the Korean peninsula.

Another reason is to send messages to the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. These are likely to support the regime’s blackmail diplomacy, which is the use of threats, increased tension, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. The most important concession the regime demands is lifting of sanctions. However, to do so would allow Kim to assess that his strategy is a success and rather than come to the negotiating table in good faith he will likely double down with continued provocations.

Kim may also be conducting these tests to drive a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance. Given President Moon’s effort to have an end of war declaration and the apparent U.S. reluctance to do so, Kim senses that he can use provocations to weaken the ROK/U.S. alliance and undermine trilateral ROK, Japan, and U.S. cooperation.

The bottom line is Kim is executing a political warfare strategy and developing the capabilities to fight and win a war. These lines of effort are mutually supporting and reinforcing. Another way to describe the regime’s strategy is that is based on subversion, coercion/extortion, and when conditions are right, the use of force to dominate the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime.

It is against this context that the comprehensive Biden Korean policy must be executed. Ultimately, what the Biden administration and the ROK/U.S. alliance must determine is the acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula that will protect, sustain, and advance U.S. and alliance national security interests. Denuclearization is a step forward, but it is not sufficient and likely not achievable as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The Korea question (per paragraph 60 of the Armistice) must be resolved. The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear and missile programs and military threats, as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the North by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime, is through the achievement of unification. That means the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people.

In short, a United Republic of Korea or UROK.

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/how-joe-biden-can-push-back-against-north-koreas-political-warfare-strategy/

A Statement of U.S. policy on North Korea

Victor Cha

Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair

csis.org · by Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair · December 1, 2022

December 1, 2022

North Korea's testing and development of its ballistic missile and nuclear programs appear at the end of 2022 to be unstoppable. During the calendar year, the regime has conducted ​34 tests, the highest number in the history of the programs and many analysts believe a seventh nuclear test is in the offing. The fact that this accelerated testing campaign -- costing at least $650 million according to some estimates -- continues during North Korea 23-months long COVID lockdown suggest at least three observations. First, the regime's resilience in the face of severe economic hardship is more robust than any anticipated. Second, the "theory" that Chinese material pressure on the regime could make it more pliable to denuclearization negotiations appears in doubt. The COVID lockdown has led to a drop of ​90 percent in Sino-North Korean trade and this has not coincided with a willingness to enter denuclearization talks (trade with China constitutes 90 percent of North Korea's external trade). Third, North Korea is willing to countenance extremely high costs to its population to build its nuclear weapons state, and apparently views talks with the United States or South Korea as unnecessary and distracting from its goals.

It is in this context that CSIS and JoongAng Ilbo hosted a keynote discussion with Mr. Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In a wide-ranging conversation, Dr. Victor Cha asked Mr. Sullivan to provide a statement of the Biden administration's current policy principles regarding North Korea. The key points emerging from the discussion and the transcript follow:

• The U.S. remains steadfast in the objective of complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
• It pursues a combination of pressure and diplomacy to achieve this goal.
• It will respond to the threat with closer U.S.-Korea-Japan bilateral and trilateral security, military and intelligence cooperation, as well as cooperations on sanctions.
• It maintains that the U.S. bears no hostile intent to DPRK.
• The U.S. remains open to serious and sustained dialogue with DPRK and is prepared to meet without preconditions.
• The U.S. is prepared to take practical steps to address regional security and concerns of both sides.

Transcript follows:

Victor Cha: I’d like to start with North Korea. Their missile testing campaign really seems to be quite unstoppable at the moment. As you know well, they tested the Hwasong-17. Everybody expects a seventh nuclear test. The National Defense Strategy describes North Korea as a persistent threat, but this threat continues to grow every day.

I wonder if you could sort of tell us how you’re thinking about it. What is the administration’s policy on North Korea? We’ve had very full statements with regard to policy on China, but any thoughts that you could offer on where we are on North Korea would be – would be greatly appreciated.

Jake Sullivan: It's a very important question, where are we and where are we going with respect to our approach to North Korea, particularly in light of the actions that they have been taking over the past many months. And we’ve really took the first few months of this administration to run a rigorous and systematic policy review on our DPRK policy, and we have essentially been following the core elements of that policy as we move forward. And we’ve tried to be steadfast in what our ultimate objectives are and then flexible in how we work together with our closest allies, starting with the ROK and Japan, on dealing with this growing and expanding missile and nuclear threat from North Korea.

So, the North Star of our policy remains as it has been since day one of the administration, which is the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And that’s a goal that we share with both the ROK and Japan. It is a goal that we will continue to pursue in close coordination and alignment. And I think the recent trilateral meeting and statement in Cambodia is a reflection of the ways in which we’ve been able to work together quite effectively – more effectively, I would argue, than at any point at least in memory on a trilateral basis.

We’ve also made clear all along that, even as we continue to respond to these missile tests with closer trilateral security and military cooperation, closer intelligence cooperation, and closer cooperation around the implementation of sanctions measures – and we have a new set of sanctions measures coming forward as we speak – that we also are open to serious and sustained dialogue with the DPRK.

We’ve made clear in both public and private communications that we bear no hostile intent towards the DPRK. We are prepared to meet without any preconditions. And yet, Pyongyang has to date completely rejected this sincere outreach. In the event that they chose to take a different tack and to engage, we’re prepared to explore practical steps that would increase regional security and address the interests of both sides.

We, obviously, have no illusions about the challenge we’re up against, about the pace and intensity of testing, and about the difficulty in achieving the ultimate objective that we share with our closest allies. But at the same time, we are not going to cease our consistent and persistent efforts to push back

against the provocative activities that we’re seeing from the North, to coordinate closely with likeminded partners to take actions in multiple different formats to be able to increase the costs and increase the robustness of our response to what we are seeing. And we will also at the same time

continue to work with partners around the world on enforcing the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

So that’s our approach. That’s how we’re pursuing things. That’s how we will continue a policy of deterrence and, ultimately, a policy through a combination of pressure and diplomacy to arrive at the ultimate objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

csis.org · by Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair · December 1, 2022

8.  U.S., S. Korea, Japan will use all available tools to limit N. Korea's weapons programs: NSC

I hope that includes a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive influence campaign, and support for the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

I have been spending the last few days at Clark Global City (formerly Clark Air Forces Base - it sure has developed into quite a new city since the last time I was here in 2007 - 135,000 Filipinos employed on the former base across all economic sectors from tech and manufacturing to services) in the Philippines. I have been engaging with many members of the international community throughout Asia - from India to Southeast and to Northeast Asia nations. I have been pleasantly surprised to hear how many people believe that it is time to focus on a free and unified Korea as the path to denuclearization and security in Northeast Asia. Nearly everyone I talked to believes that Kim Jong Un will never give nuclear weapons. I had extensive conversations with two former Ambassadors from India and they were both very enlightening about foreign affairs and providing an India viewpoint but also in that they do support the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. I gave a presentation on how civil society throughout the international community can provide support to the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

U.S., S. Korea, Japan will use all available tools to limit N. Korea's weapons programs: NSC | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 3, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- The United States and its allies will use all means possible to limit North Korea from further advancing its weapons programs, White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson Adrienne Watson said in a released statement Friday.

The statement came one day after the U.S., South Korea and Japan imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korean officials and entities for supporting the North's illegal weapons development programs.

"This synchronized action demonstrates the increased strength of the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and the ROK," Watson said in her statement, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

The U.S. designated three senior members of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party on Thursday. Seoul imposed sanctions on eight North Korean individuals and seven entities, while Tokyo followed suit by slapping sanctions on three North Korean institutions and one individual.

Watson noted that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on North Korea have successfully slowed the development of North Korea's unlawful weapons programs, but that Pyongyang is now turning to "increasingly desperate ways to generate revenue, like virtual currency heists and other cyberthefts."

"As the DPRK adjusts its tactics in the face of international pressure, we will continue to use all available tools to further limit the growth of these destabilizing weapons programs," she said.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

North Korea fired 63 ballistic missiles this year, an annual record that far exceeds the previous record of 25.

The U.S. had sought to impose fresh UNSC sanctions on North Korea, but all 10 UNSC meetings held on North Korea this year had ended with naught due to opposition from China and Russia, both veto power-wielding permanent members of the Security Council and friendly neighbors of Pyongyang.

"We will continue to coordinate closely with our allies and partners to address the threats posed by the DPRK and to advance our shared objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," said Watson.

The NSC spokesperson also reaffirmed U.S. commitment to engaging with North Korea.

"As we have made clear, the door has not closed on diplomacy, but Pyongyang must cease its destabilizing actions and engage diplomatically," she said.

"The DPRK's decision to ignore our outreach is not in its best interest, nor in the interest of the people of the DPRK who continue to suffer as a result of decisions made by the regime."

[email protected]

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 3, 2022

9. Nuclear envoys of U.S., S. Korea hold meeting over N. Korean provocations

Nuclear envoys of U.S., S. Korea hold meeting over N. Korean provocations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 3, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's nuclear negotiator Lee Joon-il met his U.S. counterpart here on Friday to discuss ways to deal with increasingly provocative North Korea.

The meeting between Lee and U.S. Deputy Special Representative for North Korea Jung Pak came about a week after Lee was appointed the director-general for North Korean nuclear affairs.

"The two sides agreed that the international community must clearly show its determination to denuclearize North Korea is stronger than North Korea's effort to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities as North Korea continues its provocations that clearly violate multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions," South Korea's foreign ministry said of the meeting in a press release.

"To this end, (they) agreed on the need to thoroughly implement UNSC sanctions on North Korea under close cooperation with the international community and agreed to continue working closely together, while reviewing the simultaneous announcement of unilateral sanctions by South Korea, the U.S. and Japan," it added.

Washington designated three senior members of the North's ruling Workers' Party on Thursday for directing or supporting the country's illegal weapons development programs.

Seoul slapped sanctions on eight North Korean individuals and seven entities, with Tokyo imposing its own sanctions on three North Korean institutions and one individual the same day.

Lee and Pak held in-depth discussions on ways to limit North Korea's illegal cyber activities, according to the South Korean foreign ministry.

Adrienne Watson, spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council, earlier noted Pyongyang is turning to "increasingly desperate ways" such as virtual currency heists and other cybercrimes to generate revenue for its weapons development programs.

"As the DPRK adjusts its tactics in the face of international pressure, we will continue to use all available tools to further limit the growth of these destabilizing weapons programs," Watson said in a statement released earlier Friday.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

[email protected]

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 3, 2022

10.  Trilateral cooperation strengthens regarding N. Korean provocations

This might be the only reason why China might try to moderate north Korean behavior. China does not want improved ROK, Japan, US cooperation 9recall the "Three Nos" demands of the ROK) and coordination and especially does not want to see a trilateral alliance. But it also may still hope that the ROK and Japan will eventually torpedo such cooperation over historical issues and if the leaders think that is more likely then they will not try to moderate north Korean behavior.

Trilateral cooperation strengthens regarding N. Korean provocations

donga.com

Posted December. 03, 2022 07:24,

Updated December. 03, 2022 07:24

Trilateral cooperation strengthens regarding N. Korean provocations. December. 03, 2022 07:24. by Na-Ri Shin, Jeong-Soo Hong [email protected],[email protected].

The South Korean government additionally imposed sanctions on eight individuals and seven entities related to North Korean nuclear missiles and weapons development or aversion of the U.N. sanctions against the North. The sanctions, levied for the second time by South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol administration independently, came in just 49 days since the first round of ban on October 14. The U.S. and Japan announced their lists of sanctions on the same day, showing a joint trilateral response to a series of North Korean provocations, including the latest ICBM launch.

South Korea's list includes newly added individuals such as Ri Myong Hun and Ri Jong Won. Choi Song Nam, Ko Il Hwan Ko, Baek Jong Sam, and Kim Chol, who either belong to U.N. sanctioned financial institutions or involved in illegal transport of materials via outlawed transshipment. Seven newly added entities such as Namkang Trading were involved in illegal financial activities, sending North Korean workers illegally or avoiding sanctions against the regime.

The U.S. and Japan also announced their own sanctions against the North. The U.S. Treasury Department added three individuals including Workers’ Party of Korea officials Jon Il Ho, Yoo Jin, and Kim Su Gil for their major roles in North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Those individuals are also on the list of the EU sanctions announced in April 2022. Jeon and Yu were featured on a North Korean media outlet, smoking together with Kim Jong Un at the test launching of Hwasong-Type 15 missile in 2017. Japan added one individual and three groups to the asset freeze list, including weapons dealer Haekumkang Trading and North Korean hacking group Lazarus.

The three nations announced new lists of their own that overlap with one another. The three individuals added by the U.S. Treasury Department have been on South Korea's list since 2016 and the individuals and institutions added by South Korea have already been under sanctions by the U.S.

한국어

donga.com

11. South Korea needs its own nuclear deterrent

Although I do tno think this is a good idea and I question whether it will have any significant deterrent effect and will only make South Korea feel better, I do respect the South Korean desire to consider this and make the arguments for it.

What pains me about this is that part of the rationale is that the South cannot be sure of the US commitment to extended deterrence which is an unfortunate effect of the north's political warfare campaign and its attempts to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance.

South Korea needs its own nuclear deterrent

The Korea Times · December 1, 2022

By Park Jung-won

On Nov. 18, North Korea succeeded in test-firing a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-17. If shot at a normal angle, the entire United States mainland would be within range. South Korea and the U.S. issued a limited response. With little possibility of deterring North Korea from its recent aggressive moves, the U.S. and South Korea conducted joint aerial drills and announced a strengthening of their joint defense posture.

A new Cold War order is being cemented by events such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's military threats to Taiwan and North Korea's consecutive missile provocations. Discussion of North Korea's "denuclearization" is increasingly perceived as futile, while the less desirable pursuit of "peace with nuclear power" is rapidly taking its place. Meanwhile, China, the country with the greatest influence on North Korea, has rejected South Korea's demand to make sincere efforts to curb the North's reckless provocations.

In 2018, there were many scholars and politicians who held an optimistic view towards North Korea's denuclearization in the atmosphere of reconciliation between the two Koreas and the North and the U.S. At the time, they said that North Korea's nuclear weapons program was only a bargaining tool, claiming that denuclearization could be achieved by guaranteeing regime security for the North's leader, Kim Jong-un. They explained that North Korea's nuclear weapons development was not an end itself, but just a means. Where are these optimists and why are they silent now?

The past 30 years of efforts to denuclearize North Korea have been a complete failure, and both liberal and conservative governments in South Korea are responsible. At a time when North Korea's nuclear armament has become an irreversible reality, partisan political bickering between South Korea's progressives and conservatives demonstrates a wholly inadequate response to the security challenge faced by the country.

At this point, one cannot help but ask: What on earth are South Korean politicians doing in the midst of a desperate national security crisis? Politics is an area in which priorities for national issues are set, and national capabilities and available assets are implemented and deployed. What path is South Korean politics taking the country on now that all signals on and outside the Korean Peninsula, from North Korea, China, Russia and even the ambiguously determined U.S., point to an unprecedented national security crisis for South Korea?

While the ruling party may be the greatest target for criticism, South Korea's opposition parties also cannot escape responsibility when it comes to national security issues. Lee Jae-myung, chairman of the Democratic Party, has displayed a shockingly naive understanding of security issues on the Korean Peninsula. He demonstrated this failure to comprehend the security problem when commenting on the joint naval exercises between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan in response to North Korea's nuclear threats and missile provocations.

He asked why South Korea should receive military assistance from Japan, which had in the past dominated the Korean Peninsula during decades of colonial rule. If one follows his logic, it is hard to explain why France, which had been occupied by Germany for four years during World War II, eventually became a member of NATO alongside Germany. How could he explain why the United States and Japan ― which fought so bitterly during the same war that atomic bombs were used to end ― have now formed a military alliance?

If a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan will necessarily become a base for supporting troops and military supplies for U.S.-led military operations to defend the South. Those who cannot admit this reality are stuck in the past and mired in romantic nationalism that puts the "nation" above any other value, including the survival of South Korea's democracy. They have supported providing food and other assistance to the North even as it developed nuclear weapons and launched missiles.

They have consistently insisted on a conditional easing of U.N. sanctions on the North in line with the Moon Jae-in administration's stance that North Korea's willingness to denuclearize is definite and clear. They should reflect on the fact that the result is that North Korea has only bought time to upgrade its nuclear capabilities during the process.

At the South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Washington, D.C. on Nov. 3, the defense ministers of the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to deploy strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula. But rather than envisioning the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons directly in South Korea, they argued that deploying strategic assets in a timely manner will have a similar effect.

In the event of an attack by North Korea on the South, it would take at least two hours for such strategic assets to arrive from Guam, by which time South Korea may already have been devastated. The reason why South Korea should have its own nuclear deterrence capability is that it wants to secure peace without nuclear war.

If Yoon Suk-yeol's government fails properly to exercise its right to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), in deference to the U.S. and the international community, it will continue to be a mockery of North Korea. The Yoon administration needs to make a public declaration that it will have no choice but to withdraw from the NPT if the North test-fires another ICBM or conducts a nuclear test again.

It should stress to the U.S. that if South Korea continues to rely solely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella while ruling out its own nuclear armament option, the U.S. mainland will only be further threatened by North Korea's expanding nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Better late than never.

Park Jung-won ([email protected]), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.

The Korea Times · December 1, 2022

12. Korea sends 2nd official feedback to US on Inflation Reduction Act

Korea sends 2nd official feedback to US on Inflation Reduction Act

The Korea Times · by 2022-12-02 15:22 | Foreign Affairs · December 2, 2022

This photo shows officials from the industry ministry and energy firms holding a meeting on the United States' Inflation Reduction Act in Seoul, Oct. 25.​ ​Yonhap

Korea sent another official written opinion to the United States on Friday regarding the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) that stipulates tax incentives for clean energy sectors, the industry ministry said.

The U.S. Treasury Department is requesting public input to devise guidance on the implementation of the IRA amid mounting complaints over its discriminatory nature of giving up to $7,500 in tax credits to buyers of electric vehicles assembled only in North America.

Last month, South Korea provided its first official comments on EVs and related sectors, and the latest input was on tax benefits for clean hydrogen and fuel production, carbon capture and commercial eco-friendly cars, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

The deadline for the second submission is Dec. 3.

"The government calls for comprehensive interpretation of 'commercial eco-friendly cars' and definite criteria for tax incentives in clean energy fields to minimize investment uncertainty," the ministry said in a release.

Korea, EU vow joint responses to US Inflation Reduction Act

As for earlier inputs regarding EVs, Korea, the European Union, Japan, Canada and several other nations had sent a total of 3,795 statements to the U.S., according to the ministry.

The act has sparked concerns that Hyundai Motor and Kia could lose ground in the U.S. market, as they make EVs at domestic plants for export to the U.S, and South Korea has strongly voiced the need to create exceptions for Korean-made EVs.

On Thursday, U.S. President Joe Biden acknowledged that the law may have "glitches" during a joint press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron, according to foreign media reports.

"The law partially poses challenges to our firms, but it could also offer tremendous chances in a wide range of sectors," a ministry official said. "We are working on the issue in a comprehensive and strategic manner." (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · by 2022-12-02 15:22 | Foreign Affairs · December 2, 2022

13. Biden acknowledges ‘glitches’ with IRA, hinting at possible revision

​Then let's get this fixed.

Biden acknowledges ‘glitches’ with IRA, hinting at possible revision

donga.com

Posted December. 03, 2022 07:24,

Updated December. 03, 2022 07:24

Biden acknowledges ‘glitches’ with IRA, hinting at possible revision. December. 03, 2022 07:24. [email protected],[email protected].

U.S. President Joe Biden said on Thursday (U.S. local time) that there are obviously glitches in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and that it needs to be reconciled." This is the first time President Biden personally mentioned the possibility of an IRA revision.

In the press conference after the summit meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday, President Biden said there are "tweaks that we can make that can fundamentally make it easier for European countries to participate (in American electric vehicle (EV) market)." He continued in particular that exemptions had been made for companies that had free-trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S. and that exemption "was added by a member of the United States Congress who acknowledges that he just meant allies. He didn't mean literally free trade agreement."

The IRA stipulates that starting from 2023, subsidies should be given only for the electric vehicles with batteries using more than the stated ratio of the minerals either produced or processed by the U.S. or nations that have free-trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S. President Biden remarks suggest that the FTA nations may be extended more generally to U.S allies.

Since the announcement of the IRA, Korean battery companies have been rushing to sign contracts for mineral supplies with countries such as Australia and Chile that have FTAs with the U.S. Experts anticipated that Korea's battery industry may benefit from the remarks as there are going to be more nations to get the supplies of core minerals from for EV batteries such as lithium and nickel.

한국어

donga.com​

14. South Korea in delirium - thanks to the World Cup's best ever nutmeg

Best of luck to these Tae Guk warriors going forward now that the US team has been knocked out.

South Korea in delirium - thanks to the World Cup's best ever nutmeg

The Athletic · by Daniel Taylor

They formed a circle in the centre of the pitch. Arm-in-arm, they stood there, waiting for the news. Some wept. Others went down to their knees. They waited and they waited and they waited.

These were the moments when Paulo Bento, the South Korea manager, detached himself from his players and found a place just inside the tunnel. He stood by himself, hands pressed into his pockets, and he tried his best to hide all the different emotions that must have been churning through his mind. But he was fooling nobody.

On the pitch, his players were gathering around mobile phones. They had just beaten Portugal with a late, dramatic goal, created by the nutmeg of all nutmegs from Son Heung-min. It was the 91st minute when the goal went in. But they also knew that Uruguay, leading 2-0 against Ghana, could change everything by scoring another goal. There was still the potential for one last, gut-wrenching twist.

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“There are three minutes left in the other Group H game,” the public announcer informed the Education City Stadium. “It’s all to play for.”

South Korea’s players wait for the final whistle in the Uruguay-Ghana game (Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images)

Everyone knew anyway. They had their own phones out. They were watching it live. Thank goodness for the WiFi in Doha.

And before we go any further, perhaps this is an opportune moment to spare a moment for those poor, deluded individuals who confess to disliking football. Some of these people have avoided the football bug. They are not interested, they say, in the World Cup and the drama and chaos and euphoria and sheer, bloody wonderful emotion it brings.

These people deserve our sympathy.

They will never know what it is like to experience the highs that football can conjure up.

The mobile-phone footage was showing Luis Suarez on the Uruguay bench and the former Liverpool player was crying. Time was running out and Suarez feared the worst, pulling his shirt over his face to hide — or at least try to — his anguish.

(Photo: Maja Hitij – FIFA/FIFA via Getty Images)

And then, finally, the moment.

The hardest thing is to find the words to express the scenes once the stadium, as a whole, found out that the corresponding game was over. Uruguay had not managed to find that third goal. It was over at 2-0, and the South Korean players were sprinting towards the side of the stadium that housed their shrieking, boisterous, jubilant fans.

They ran and they ran, and when they got to the penalty area they dived full-length on the floor to celebrate in an uneven line.

South Korea celebrate in front of their fans (Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP)

They laid down a banner of their national flag and they danced around it. And nobody was impertinent enough to point out they will probably face Brazil next — a team who beat them 5-1 in Seoul in June — because the truth is that in these moments they simply did not care. Nothing could possibly have tarnished their night.

It’s getting quite exciting, this World Cup.

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The previous night, it was Japan’s turn to remind us there is really nothing quite like football to play with your emotions, to leave you exhausted and exhilarated and take you up and down on a wild graph of emotions.

Japan had got through by winning 2-1 against Spain and, at the end of a fasten-your-seatbelts kind of night in Group E, that meant Germany dropping out of the competition. As the television commentator Clive Tyldesley explained late into the match: “If you’re just joining us, it’s a long story…”

At some point, though, perhaps we should take a moment to consider whether these spectacular occasions will become increasingly uncommon if FIFA goes through with its plans to impose three-team groups on the 2026 World Cup, with its expanded 48-team field, and subject us to the probability of various dead rubbers.

What a brainwave that was by Gianni Infantino and his chums in Zurich. Who wants all this excitement and drama anyway?

The latest update from FIFA is that the relevant people are, it is said, open-minded to reconsidering this plan — and hopefully that is more than hot air from the usual suspects. If these last two nights have shown us anything, it is that the current format works perfectly well, thank you very much.

South Korea’s players celebrate (Photo: Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images)

Ultimately, though, this wasn’t a night for recriminations, when the modern-day South Korea were finally getting to experience some of the joys that their predecessors had encountered when co-hosting the 2002 World Cup.

Remember those days? It was the time a nation with no real football history — 150-1 no-hopers, it was assumed — become the first nation outside Europe and South America to reach the World Cup semi-finals since the USA did it in the inaugural tournament in 1930. It was an epic and often controversial run that took in victories over Portugal, Italy and Spain and, 20 years on, the people of South Korea could probably be excused for thinking that kind of thrill belonged to the past.

Then-manager Guus Hiddink and his players were honoured with Korea’s top sporting award for their achievements. It was estimated that a tenth of the population took to the streets to celebrate the quarter-final win over Spain. The red T-shirts worn by supporters with their chants of “Dae-han Min-guk” (Republic of Korea) felt like a national uniform.

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Nothing, though, felt quite as dramatic as that moment here, in stoppage time, when Son had the ball at his feet on the edge of Portugal’s penalty area.

The Tottenham Hotspur player had nowhere to go, crowded out by opposition defenders. But he had seen a space in between Diogo Dalot’s legs that the Manchester United defender may not have known he had left.

How Son Heung-min’s delicious nutmeg set up South Korea’s winner (top photo: Liu Lu/VCG via Getty Images; other photos: BBC)

The nutmeg is always football’s most impudent pass. In this case, it was also the most decisive pass: a perfectly measured through ball that split open the Portugal defence. It may well have been the most important nutmeg there ever was in a World Cup. Certainly, for South Korea, there can be nothing close.

The score was 1-1 at that point and the Koreans, with only a point from their opening two games, were on the verge of being eliminated. They had won only one of their previous 10 matches at the World Cup and it was tempting to think they had not been able to move on from 20 years ago.

Then Son, wearing a mask to protect his damaged eye socket, delivered that little piece of magic.

Suddenly, Hwang Hee-chan was running clear. He slashed his shot into the net and all decorum and etiquette was briefly lost. Suddenly, all the South Korea substitutes were haring onto the pitch, followed by various members of the backroom staff, to join in the victory pile.

Memo to FIFA: please don’t take away these moments. Don’t spoil the fun. It’s too important, too precious, and these moments — the ones you always remember, always treasure — are rare enough as it is.

(Top photo: Glyn Kirk/AFP via Getty Images)

The Athletic · by Daniel Taylor

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]