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Quotes of the Day:
“for PEOPLE to rule themselves in a REPUBLIC, they must have virtue; for a TYRANT to rule in a TYRANNY, he must use FEAR.”
– William J Federer, Change to Chains-The 6,000 Year Quest for Control -Volume I-Rise of the Republic
"Could we change our attitude, we should not only see life differently, but life itself would come to be different. Life would undergo a change of appearance because we ourselves had undergone a change in attitude."
– Katherine Mansfield
"Ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny."
– Carl Schurz
1. Army’s elite special forces unit to be overhauled in major revamp
2. Russia’s Mass Air Attack: The Objectives and Implications of the 29 December Attacks by Mick Ryan
3. New in SpyWeek: That Mysterious CIA School and More
4. Statement from President Joe Biden on Russia’s Aerial Assault on Ukraine | The White House
5. How Surprise Attack is Possible
6. The fight for the Marine Corps continues.
7. Why China’s rulers fear Genghis Khan
8. America is unprepared to fight a war on three fronts
9. Who’s Hu, the New PLAN Commander
10. Are China’s actions in the South China Sea a harbinger of things to come for Taiwan as election looms?
11. Israel at war: What you need to know – day 85
12. Theories of Victory: Israel, Hamas, and the Meaning of Victory in Irregular Warfare
13. Biden warns US military may get pulled into direct conflict with Russia
14. Patriot missile exports don't make Japan serious
15. When Killing the Enemy Wasn't Enough
1. Army’s elite special forces unit to be overhauled in major revamp
Irish SOF not US. IRL SOF.
Excerpt:
But behind the scenes it is understood that there will be dramatic changes to its command-and-control structure, making it a central part of military decision making and, as a result, more likely to be deployed on missions on and off island.
The changes mirror those in other western militaries which have increased the size of their special operations forces while also granting them more autonomy and status.
Excerpt for US SOF. If US SOF was going to be a central part of military decision making the Commander of USSOCOM would be redesignated as the Chief of Special Operations would be made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( "It’s time for a third special operations revolution" https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/01/its-time-for-a-third-special-operations-revolution/)
Army’s elite special forces unit to be overhauled in major revamp
Secretive Army Ranger Wing is getting a new name, more personnel and a revamped command structure
irishtimes.com · by Conor Gallagher
The Army Ranger Wing (ARW), the most elite and secretive unit of the Defence Forces, is to undertake its largest expansion and restructuring in its 43-year history.
The most visible change will be a new name: Ireland Special Operations Force or IRL-SOF for short.
But behind the scenes it is understood that there will be dramatic changes to its command-and-control structure, making it a central part of military decision making and, as a result, more likely to be deployed on missions on and off island.
The changes mirror those in other western militaries which have increased the size of their special operations forces while also granting them more autonomy and status.
This is in response to the increased terror threat caused by conflict in the Middle East and a belief that, in the future, overseas military operations will require smaller and more specialised forces.
One of the first steps for the Defence Forces will be restructuring the ARW into three separate units dedicated to specific tasks. The land unit, which will be known as Special Operations Land Task Group (SOLTG), will be the direct successor to the ARW and, as the name suggests, will be focused on land-based operations such as special reconnaissance and hostage rescue.
Despite the rebrand, SOLTG is likely to retain the same ethos and traditions as the ARW, including the distinctive green beret worn by members and the Fianóglach, meaning Ranger, shoulder flash insignia.
A dedicated unit specialising in parachuting and fast roping will be known the Air Task Group (ATG) and will be permanently based in Air Corps headquarters in Baldonnel in west Dublin for rapid deployment.
Similarly, a maritime unit which will focus on missions similar to last September’s interception of the MV Matthew bulk cargo ship that was found to be carrying a record 2.2 tonnes of cocaine.
Members of the Naval Service, Irish Air Corps, Army Ranger Wing, Revenue Customs Service and An Garda Síochána implemented a co-ordinated operation at sea to intercept the MV Matthew bulk cargo ship.
The complex interception, officially know Operation Piano, saw ARW personnel fast rope from a helicopter on to the moving ship before seizing control of the bridge and subduing the crew.
The unit, which will be known as the Maritime Task Group, will also focus on combat diving and will be permanently posted at the Naval Service base in Haulbowline, Co Cork.
This will formalise and reinforce the current arrangement that sees the ARW divided in small subgroups which specialise in specific tasks.
The three units will be collectively known as IRL-SOF and will report to a Directorate of Special Operations, likely led by a Colonel, which will be based in Defence Forces headquarters. The creation of the directorate will mean, unlike the current situation, special forces officers will have a direct input into military planning.
On the ground, the revamped ARW will be commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. It is currently commanded by a commandant, a more junior rank.
One of the most pressing tasks is expanding the size of the ARW without dropping the standards it sets for members.
The 2015 White Paper on Defence committed to significantly increasing the unit’s size. Eight years later that process is now motion. Legislative changes are expected to be drafted soon to allow the unit to increase in size and to make it easier to deploy abroad on missions.
It is understood military management is satisfied there are enough ARW “operators”, the term for the unit’s frontline troops who undergo the most rigorous selection and training courses.
Army Ranger Wing in 2010 demonstrating skills and equipment at the Curragh Camp to mark the 30th anniversary of its establishment. Photograph: Alan Betson
The exact numbers are a closely guarded secret, but it is believed there are several dozen operators at any one time. Each year, no more than a handful pass selection.
There is a more pressing need for support personnel such as drivers, communications specialists and fire support teams. Known as “supporters and enablers”, these are personnel who have demonstrated extremely high standards in their area of expertise but who do not need to be trained up to the standard of an operator.
Western military doctrine states there should be up to three “supporters and enablers” for every operator. Work is now under way to devise a new selection course for these personnel to allow them be permanently attached to the special forces unit.
It is hoped in time, these personnel will rotate back to their old units, bringing their new special operations skills with them and raising the standard of the Defence Forces in general. This was one of the main objectives of the ARW when it was established in 1982.
Recruitment will be helped by an adjudication earlier this year significantly raising allowances for ARW personnel following a lengthy dispute with the Department of Defence.
It will be aided by plans for new infrastructure and equipment, including a dedicated ARW headquarters in the Curragh Camp in Kildare planned for 2024. In recent years, a new selection regime – devised and supervised by sports scientists – has been rolled out which has dramatically reduced injury rates.
All of these reforms are part of the broader goal of revitalising and expanding the Defence Forces which is undergoing one of the worst manpower crises in its 100-year history. It has less than 8,000 personnel across all three branches, 1,500 below its establishment strength.
The goal is to get it to 11,500 by 2028. Military management sees the expansion of the ARW as key to this goal because, as well as providing a special operations capability, the unit is a valuable recruiting tool for soldiers given the elite nature of the unit.
irishtimes.com · by Conor Gallagher
2. Russia’s Mass Air Attack: The Objectives and Implications of the 29 December Attacks by Mick Ryan
Graphics at the link.
Excerpts:
The massed Russian attacks yesterday are not just a demonstration of Ukrainian resilience or Russian barbarity. They should provide a driver for more assistance to Ukraine, for their air defence, and for their strategic strikes against Russia’s missile launch and production capacity.
And, rather than succumb to ‘war fatigue’ (although I am not sure what the citizens in the West have to be fatigued about), it should drive a reinvigoration among Western polities of support for Ukraine.
But these Russian strikes against Ukraine are also a lesson for the West (again) on the importance of robust air, missile and drone defence systems. These systems are important to protect battlefield operations. But they are also vital to deny authoritarians the wherewithal to use their air, missile and drone attack capabilities for political and diplomatic coercion.
Russia’s Mass Air Attack
https://mickryan.substack.com/p/russias-mass-air-attack?r=7i07&utm
The Objectives and Implications of the 29 December Attacks
MICK RYAN
DEC 30, 2023
Source: @JayinKyiv Twitter / X
(Earlier today, I published a Twitter thread on the Russian 29 December air, missile and drone attacks against Ukraine. This is an expanded version of that thread).
A shocking series of Russian massed missile and drone attacks occurred across Ukraine in the past 48 hours. According to Ukrainian government reports, 158 Russian missiles and drones attacked targets in multiple Ukrainian cities including Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Lviv and other locations. Over 30 people were killed and at least 150 injured.
According to the tally of air and missile strikes maintained by Rochan Consulting since the beginning of the Russian large-scale invasion in 2022, this is the largest series of attacks that has taken place. While it has been clear for some time (see graph below) that the Russians have been hording missiles for their winter campaign, it is uncertain whether the 29 December attacks were a one-off surge, or the start of an enhanced Russian winter strike campaign.
Source: Rochan Consulting
What does Putin & Russia aim to achieve by continuing to conduct such attacks, and what do the attacks tell us about the coercive power of strategic air, missile, and drone attacks?
Russian Objectives
The Russian attacks, which have occurred throughout the war, have multiple objectives.
At its most simple, these Russian air, missile and drone attacks are a bigger and more complex version of the attacks on civilian infrastructure that Russia appears to have mastered during this war. The attacks are conducted to terrorize civilians and to degrade civilian morale.
But these attacks are also aimed at responding to the last couple of weeks successes by the Ukrainians. Russian fighter bombers have been shot down in air defence ambushes. Russian naval vessels have been attacked, with the most spectacular being the destruction of the Ropucha class Landing Ship Tank (LST) Novocherkassk. The ship, berthed alongside in the port of Feodosia on the southern coast of Russian-occupied Crimea, was destroyed by a Ukrainian missile strike.
The secondary explosions indicate that the ship was carrying explosive ordnance (possibly armed drones). Russian commander, General Gerasimov, knows this hurts Russian prestige and would have been keen to strike back at the Ukrainians.
Another Russian objective for the 29 December air, missile and drone attacks will have been to test the limits of the air defence system developed by Ukraine over the past 18 months. This air defence network, a mesh of Western, Soviet-era and commercial launchers, missiles, C2, sensors and reporting systems is now much more capable than it was this time in 2022. The Russians will have been testing to see if this air defence network could be overwhelmed, or at least, where there are exploitable weaknesses. The adaptation battle continues.
Source: The Kyiv Independent
But the Russians will not only be testing the capacity of this evolving air, missile and drone defence system. They will be testing Ukraine’s ‘magazine depth’ and hoping that Ukraine runs out of interceptors before Russia runs out of missiles and drones. The announcement by the British Government that it would provide more air defence missiles to Ukraine will be very welcome, as is the latest U.S. military assistance package which also included air defence missiles.
Perhaps the most important Russian objective of this attack, and other air and missile strikes, is to create additional leverage for Russia to freeze the conflict. This would provide time and space for Russian forces, particularly ground forces, to reconstitute before continuing his campaign to destroy Ukraine. And it would also draw out the conflict, something that Putin clearly believes is in his interest to do.
Putin has made clear again recently that he has not changed his overall objective to subjugate Ukraine. At his recent 2023 press conference, he described how:
Almost along the entire front line, our armed forces, let's put it modestly, are improving their position. There will be peace when we achieve our goals.
To do this, he requires a pause to rebuild the combat power of the Russian Army. He will not do this if the Russian Army continues its current investment in multiple offensives, which are generating large Russian casualties but seizing minimal territory. But, given the March 2024 Russian elections, it is likely Putin will continue these attacks until after the election and only then permit some kind of pause to reconstitute Russian forces.
For the Russians, the attacks are also a key part of their domestic and global influence operations. The attacks demonstrate Russian ‘strength’ to the Russian people in the lead up to the March elections. They are also designed to show to an international audience, particularly Western politicians and citizens, that a Russian victory is inevitable. This aims to (hopefully) convince Ukraine and the West to negotiate.
But we have not reached this point. The resilience of Ukrainian people, and the efforts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (in cooperation with NATO and their Western supporters) to create a world-class air, missile and drone defence network, has provided political and military foundations to resist Russia’s strategic coercion and terrorism.
But the West needs to step up its support in 2024. And, the US and NATO must evolve their strategy from helping Ukraine defend itself, to helping Ukraine defeat Russia.
Lessons for Other Theatres
There are lessons from these Russia air, missile, and drone attacks for other theatres.
In particular, the possession of an advanced precision strike system, including large missile and drone stocks and a sophisticated supporting ISR network, provides an incredible tool for strategic and political coercion. It permits nations to be able to apply a balance of destruction and influence operations in order to achieve their national objectives.
Currently, the bar to developing such a capacity is lower than ever. Meshed civ-mil sensor networks are relatively cheap. Lethal autonomous systems, in the air and maritime domains, with long range have proliferated globally and are available to both government and non-government entities.
The Houthis, with their ongoing campaign of long-range missile launches towards Israel, and drone and missile strikes against ships in the Red Seas are demonstrating how non-state actors can assemble and use precision, long-range strike complexes. In 2024, we may also see Hezbollah use its long-range strike capability against Israel (although I hope this does not eventuate).
China also understands well the capability provided by a long-range sensor and strike complex. They have spent decades building a huge missile force that is, first and foremost, designed to project an air of inevitable destruction of its adversaries in the event of a conflict. A quick comparison of Chinese conventional missile capabilities, compared to Russia and the U.S. capabilities, is shown below. It is taken from a recent report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments that explores theatre conventional missiles in the Indo-Pacific.
Source: Rings of Fire, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2022.
While ultimately a military tool of both tactical and theatre utility, this missile force is also one that can be used to coerce neighbours - and even the U.S. - into accepting Chinese goals and denying interference in what they view as ‘their region’ (the Western Pacific). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile arsenal is part of China’s ‘win without fighting’ approach. This also complements some of their other strategic coercion tools: economic coercion, misinformation, and paying off politicians and officials across the Indo-Pacific.
Thus, there is an imperative to continue learning from how Ukraine has constructed their air, missile and drone defence network. It is a sophisticated mash up of different systems with high interception rates. Countries in Asia, Oceania and Europe will need to improve their air, missile and drone defences in the coming years, and the lessons from Ukraine should at least inform these developments.
The better these nations are at air, missile, and drone defence, the less coercive power that is handed to Authoritarian Quad of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. These nations have been developing their capabilities for decades, and it will take time to develop counters.
It bears stating too that air, missile, and drone defence isn’t just about defence through ‘defensive’ capacity. Long range precision strike to degrade enemy ISR, launch and production capacity is also required to deprive the Authoritarian Quad their strategic coercion capacity and warfighting capabilities.
Ukraine, which had a limited ability to strike back last winter, is now demonstrating both the will and capacity to do so. Within 24 hours of Russia’s large scale strikes across Ukraine, strikes were apparently conducted against military and industrial targets in the Bryansk, Orel, Kursk, and Moscow regions.
One Off or Beginning of a Surge: The Russian Strikes are Part of Modern War
The massed Russian attacks yesterday are not just a demonstration of Ukrainian resilience or Russian barbarity. They should provide a driver for more assistance to Ukraine, for their air defence, and for their strategic strikes against Russia’s missile launch and production capacity.
And, rather than succumb to ‘war fatigue’ (although I am not sure what the citizens in the West have to be fatigued about), it should drive a reinvigoration among Western polities of support for Ukraine.
But these Russian strikes against Ukraine are also a lesson for the West (again) on the importance of robust air, missile and drone defence systems. These systems are important to protect battlefield operations. But they are also vital to deny authoritarians the wherewithal to use their air, missile and drone attack capabilities for political and diplomatic coercion.
3. New in SpyWeek: That Mysterious CIA School and More
See the last entry:
A School For Spycatchers: One item in the Fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by President Biden the day after Christmas, caught our eye.
New in SpyWeek: That Mysterious CIA School and More
https://substack.com/inbox/post/140177120
Double agents, assassinations, Iranian and Chinese spies also lead the intel news
JONATHAN BRODER
DEC 29, 2023
∙ PAID
Welcome to our new weekly newsletter, where we look at the latest news from the intersection of intelligence, foreign policy and military operations.
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Revolutionary War spymaster Benjamin Tallmadge, as painted in 1800 by Ezra Ames (Wikipedia)
Double Agent Deal? Back in June, SpyTalk revealed that the Biden administration had spurned a previously unreported offer by Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to release nine jailed Americans, as a well as a fugitive defense contractor and a group of imprisoned opposition figures, all in exchange for one man —Colombian businessman Alex Saab, Maduro’s top financial fixer who was awaiting trial in Miami on money-laundering charges. “This wouldn’t constitute a real, let alone good faith offer, because it includes Saab, whom we had already made very clear is off limits,” a White House source familiar with Maduro’s proposal told us. Well, it turns out that Maduro’s offer wasn’t the nonstarter that the White House had claimed. On Dec. 20, following six months of quiet negotiations mediated by Qatar, President Joe Biden granted clemency to Saab, who returned to Venezuela the same day. It also turns out that Saab was more than Maduro’s fixer. According to court papers, he had worked as a spy for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, providing intelligence about the inner workings of the Maduro regime. Some experts suspect Saab was a double agent who kept Maduro fully informed of his work for the DEA and may have even helped the Venezuelan leader foil a U.S.-backed coup attempt against him in 2019.
Saab grafitti in Venezuela (Miguel Gutierrez/EPA vía Shutterstock)
In any event, on Dec. 20, ten Americans, six of whom the U.S. State Department had classified as wrongfully detained, were flown back to the United States, and some 20 opposition figures were released from prison in Venezuela. Separately, Venezuela also handed over Leonard Glenn Francis, better known as “Fat Leonard,” the central figure in the U.S. Navy’s largest ever corruption scandal. In 2015, the Malaysian fugitive was convicted here of bribing dozens of uniformed officers of the Navy’s Pacific-based Seventh fleet with cash, prostitutes and other favors in exchange for classified information on fleet movements that helped him win lucrative U.S. Navy service contracts for his Singapore-based ship servicing company. Last year, he fled house arrest in San Diego and made his way via Mexico and Cuba to Venezuela, where he was detained. Biden said he okayed the swap after Maduro agreed to meet U.S. demands for fair elections in Venezuela in 2024.
Israel’s Forever War: Much of the past week’s intelligence news came out of the Middle East, where Christmas brought no let-up to the three-month war between Israel and Hamas. The Biden administration’s fears of a wider regional war prompted intense diplomacy to find moderate Palestinians who will govern Gaza and the West Bank once the fighting ends, presumably with Hamas’ defeat. This got us musing last week about previous efforts in history to find a so-called “third force” and their ultimate failures.
Meanwhile, the fighting only intensified throughout the region, with Lebanon’s Hezbollah stepping up its missile attacks on northern Israel, Yemen’s Houthi rebels opening fire on Israel-bound shipping in the Red Sea, and Iranian-supported Shiite militias in Iraq continuing their attacks on U.S. forces there, all in a show of solidarity with Hamas. In response, U.S. warplanes on Christmas Day carried out airstrikes in Iraq, destroying three bases used by Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, and killing several of its members. On the same day, Israeli warplanes struck a suburb outside the Syrian capital Damascus, killing Brig. Gen. Sayed Razi Mousavi, the senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander who oversaw the military alliance between Iran and Syria. In a statement read on Iranian state TV, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said that the “usurper and savage Zionist regime will pay for this crime.” The following day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant responded: “We are in a multi-front war and are coming under attack from seven arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria (West Bank), Iraq, Yemen, and Iran,” he said, adding: “We have already responded and acted in six of these areas.” Gallant declined to specify which six he was referring to.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the mourning for the killing of IRGC commander, Sayed Razi Mousavi, by an Israeli airstrike in Syria (Iran media)
Iranian Spy Ship: The Houthis’ drone and missile attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea have prompted many of the world’s biggest shipping companies and oil exporters who utilize the Suez Canal at the northern end of the waterway to reroute their vessels around the southern tip of Africa, adding days in transit time and dollars to insurance rates and oil prices. Late last week, as the Pentagon announced the formation of a multinational naval force to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the White House declassified intelligence that showed Iran was operating a surveillance vessel in the Red Sea that was providing the Houthis with real-time intelligence on merchant shipping that facilitated their attacks, the Wall Street Journal reported. The paper said the release of the intelligence could lay the groundwork for military action against the Houthis by the multinational force.
Cyber Attacks: It now appears that Israel is widening the war into the digital sphere, targeting Iran itself in response to its support for Hamas and its other Arab proxy forces. On Dec. 18, a group of pro-Israel hackers calling themselves “Predatory Sparrow” launched a cyber attack that knocked more than two thirds of Iran’s gasoline stations out of commission, according to the English-language Israeli daily Haaretz. “This cyberattack comes in response to the aggression of the Islamic Republic and its proxies in the region," Predatory Sparrow wrote on its Persian-language Telegram channel. The message ended with a warning addressed personally to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: "Playing with fire has a price. This is just a taste of what we have in store." So far, Palestinian cyber attacks have temporarily shut down some Israeli news sites, but Haaretz cites the global cybersecurity firm CheckPoint as saying these attacks have failed to cause any lasting damage. The same can’t be said for Iran’s more sophisticated cyber warriors, who hacked the cellphone of the wife of Mossad chief David Barnea last year and distributed its photos and documents on an anonymous Telegram channel. Since the war in Gaza began in October, Hezbollah-linked hackers have targeted Israeli hospitals, disrupting their operations in response to the Israeli army’s attacks on Gaza hospitals.
Turkey-Israel intelligence war: Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, or MIT), has established a special new unit to target Mossad operations, according to the Sabah daily, a media outlet owned by the family of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and widely regarded as a government mouthpiece. The Christmas Eve claim was made by Sabah journalist Abdurrahman Şimşek, described by the Middle East Forum, a conservative foreign policy think tank based in Philadelphia, as a MIT propagandist and trusted recipient of the spy agency’s leaks. "Within the organization [MIT] is a highly active and experienced unit engaged in the fight against Mossad,” Şimşek said in an interview posted by Sabah on YouTube. “There are teams that are quite skilled. . . . They are aware of every step Mossad takes." Last month, Sabah reported that the MIT was instrumental in foiling a Mossad operation in Malaysia to capture a Palestinian hacker who had developed software capable of penetrating Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system. In May, Sabah reported that the MIT had rolled up 11 members of an alleged Mossad ring who were charged with spying on Iranian targets in Turkey. Earlier this month, Erdogan, an outspoken supporter of Hamas, publicly warned Israel against plans to assassinate Hamas members in Turkey. "If they dare to take such a step against Turkey and the Turkish people, they will be doomed to pay a price from which they cannot recover," Erdogan told reporters. He was responding to Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency, who said Israel was determined to kill Hamas's leaders "in every location" in the world, including Qatar, Turkey and Lebanon, even if it takes many years.
The Continuing U.S.-China Spy War: While the wars in Gaza and Ukraine gobble up much of the U.S. intelligence community’s attention these days, China still remains the IC’s top priority. Not surprisingly, the feeling is mutual in China, where the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the country’s main intelligence agency, continues to be focused primarily on the United States. Ellen Nakashima, a veteran national security reporter at The Washington Post, said on SpyTalk’s Dec. 15 podcast that the MSS is not only continuing to conduct “massive espionage, cyber espionage and commercial espionage” in the United States and other countries, but China’s military hackers also have wormed their way inside cyber systems of a major port on the West Coast, a water utility in Hawaii and at least one U.S. oil and gas pipeline. The idea, Nakashima and co-author Joseph Menn reported in the Post, is to lay low inside such critical elements of America’s civilian infrastructure and then, in the event a war erupts between China and the United States, take them out of commission, sowing chaos and panic. The addition of cyber sleeper agents to China’s intelligence playbook is just one of the many challenges America’s intelligence community faces as it works to bolster its ability to penetrate China’s government, military and high-tech industries. Washington suffered a massive intelligence setback a decade ago, when China’s spycatchers rounded up a network of Chinese agents working for the CIA and executed or imprisoned as many as two dozen, all but blinding U.S. China watchers.. According to the The Wall Street Journal, the CIA is still struggling to rebuild its human intelligence capabilities in China, a difficult task in the best of times but an even greater challenge today, when China has an artificial intelligence program that can pump out instant dossiers on suspected spies, as well as scores of cameras that record car license plate and software that steals cell phone data. The New York Times quoted U.S. officials as saying the intelligence community still needs to recruit people with a deeper knowledge of China’s technological and commercial ambitions if it is to blunt Beijing’s drive to rival Washington as the world’s preeminent military and economic power. SpyTalk’s China hand, Matt Brazil, adds that “abroad they’re seeking a sharper focus on American and allied nation targets, including the so-called "chokepoint" technologies, such as microchips, that Washington strives to deny them. Back in the motherland, they’re massively applying cutting-edge surveillance technology to a wide range of people, particularly foreign diplomats. The reader also learns what the CIA is up to in response — and of a yawning gap that may remain unaddressed.” Speaking of (air) gaps, NBC News reports that “U.S. intelligence officials have determined that the Chinese spy balloon that flew across the U.S. this year used an American internet service provider” to send and receive “messages to and from China.” Clever, that.
Balloon down. (Randall Hill via Reuters)
A School For Spycatchers: One item in the Fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by President Biden the day after Christmas, caught our eye. It instructs the CIA Director to “maintain the Benjamin Tallmadge Institute as the primary entity within the Central Intelligence Agency for education and training related to all aspects of counterintelligence,” but it doesn’t say where it is or why it’s necessary. A CIA spokesperson also declined to provide the institute’s location. And there’s this: In addition to developing courses to certify agency personnel in counterintelligence, insider threats and investigations—normally the province of the FBI— the law also instructs the CIA director to make these courses available to federal agencies that are not part of the intelligence community, as well as state, local and Tribal governments, private sector entities, and “such other personnel and entities as appropriate.” This provision suggests some confusion on Congress’ part in distinguishing between counterintelligence, a highly specialized mission focused on thwarting foreign adversary intelligence activities , and security, which is a defensive responsibility broadly distributed among federal, state and local authorities. Also unclear is why the CIA is being given this tutoring responsibility when the National Intelligence University exists for this purpose. And why did Congress find it necessary to write the CIA’s counterintelligence training course, named a few years ago after Revolutionary War spymaster Benjamin Tallmadge, into law, anyway? The House Intelligence Committee, which authored the provision, did not respond to SpyTalk’s request for clarification.
4. Statement from President Joe Biden on Russia’s Aerial Assault on Ukraine | The White House
Statement from President Joe Biden on Russia’s Aerial Assault on Ukraine | The White House
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · December 29, 2023
Overnight, Russia launched its largest aerial assault on Ukraine since this war began. This massive bombardment used drones and missiles, including missiles with hypersonic capability, to strike cities and civilian infrastructure all across Ukraine. Strikes reportedly hit a maternity hospital, a shopping mall, and residential areas—killing innocent people and injuring dozens more. It is a stark reminder to the world that, after nearly two years of this devastating war, Putin’s objective remains unchanged. He seeks to obliterate Ukraine and subjugate its people. He must be stopped.
In the face of this brutal attack, Ukraine deployed the air defense systems that the United States and our Allies and partners have delivered to Ukraine over the past year to successfully intercept and destroy many of the missiles and drones. The American people can be proud of the lives we have helped to save and the support we have given Ukraine as it defends its people, its freedom, and its independence. But unless Congress takes urgent action in the new year, we will not be able to continue sending the weapons and vital air defense systems Ukraine needs to protect its people. Congress must step up and act without any further delay.
The stakes of this fight extend far beyond Ukraine. They affect the entirety of the NATO Alliance, the security of Europe, and the future of the Transatlantic relationship. Putin has not just attempted to destroy Ukraine; he has threatened some of our NATO Allies as well. When dictators and autocrats are allowed to run roughshod in Europe, the risk rises that the United States gets pulled in directly. And the consequences reverberate around the world. That’s why the United States has rallied a coalition of more than 50 countries to support the defense of Ukraine. We cannot let our allies and partners down. We cannot let Ukraine down. History will judge harshly those who fail to answer freedom’s call.
###
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · December 29, 2023
5. How Surprise Attack is Possible
Excellent rundown of surprise. In addition to Chinese in 1950 I would add Kim Il Sung in June 1950. We were caught flat footed then as well because we did not understand the nature fo the Kim family regime nor its objectives and strategy and we were lulled into complacency when Kim stopped all anti-South propaganda and called for negotiations in Kaesong a month before the attack.
This is really the key point. I agree that most intelligence failures are decision maker failures because decisions makers fail to heed the intelligence.
Excerpt:
Finally, “intelligence failures” often result not from a failure of intelligence professionals to warn leaders but instead from a failure to persuade them that a threat is real. For example, because General MacArthur believed that he knew Asia better than anyone else in the U.S. government, he dismissed all warnings in 1950 that China would enter the war in Korea.
How Surprise Attack is Possible
By Phil Wasielewski
December 27, 2023
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/12/27/how_surprise_attack_is_possible_1001403.html
Hamas’ surprise terrorist attack against Israel on October 7, and the subsequent fighting in Gaza has again plunged the Middle East into a situation bordering on apocalyptic. The horrors of the attack are compounded by the shock that Israel’s vaunted intelligence services were seemingly caught unawares after decades of exceptional performance. Recently, a rather damning report claims that Israeli intelligence intercepted Hamas’ attack plan but that the plan was considered “aspirational” and incapable of being implemented.
How could this happen?
The truth will probably not be fully known until an impartial and dispassionate investigation can be conducted, similar to the Agranat Commission that reviewed Israeli intelligence and defense shortcomings prior to the October War of 1973. When an investigation of the Hamas surprise attack is completed, it will likely provide not lessons learned but lessons relearned regarding not only intelligence collection and analysis, but also military and political judgements. These judgements will likely have been clouded by four attributes of human nature that are a common factor in surprise attacks. If the four horsemen of the Apocalypse are Death, Famine, War, and Pestilence, then the four horsemen of surprise attack are Ambiguity, Misperception, Deception, and Preconception.
Ambiguity, information open to more than one interpretation, is the constant companion of intelligence work. Rarely, if ever, do sources provide a clear view of enemy capabilities, plans, and intentions. Instead, they offer partial views, and sometimes even erroneous ones, either on purpose or by human error. Studies of past surprise attacks show that victims often had indications of the attack (signals) but were unable to recognize them because of the ambiguous nature of the reporting, as well as the plethora of competing and contradictory reports (noise). In November 1941, most in Washington and Hawaii assumed that war with Japan was coming, but also assumed that Japan would strike only the mineral rich colonies of Southeast Asia and not also Pearl Harbor.
Errors like this occur because the greater the ambiguity, the greater the chance of misperception or wishful thinking. Misperceptions can result from honest mistakes in interpreting ambiguous information such as when Israeli intelligence misperceived the buildup of Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal in the fall of 1973 as training maneuvers instead of attack preparations.
Misperceptions are heightened by deception operations. Attackers misdirect victims from signals of an impending attack by contradictory signals as when Egypt sent numerous officers to participate in the Hajj just before the October War of 1973. Israeli intelligence therefore believed that Egypt was not preparing to attack since it was allowing its officers to take leave. A similar deception operation might have been Hamas’ ongoing negotiations with Israel to accept a greater number of guest workers, which would contradict possible reporting of plans for an attack. Along with deception, good counterintelligence and operational security operations by an attacker also help blind or misdirect a victim’s intelligence apparatus.
Misperceptions are incorrect ideas; preconceptions are opinions formed before obtaining adequate evidence and are often based on bias or prejudice. Both are misunderstandings, but preconceptions are more dangerous because they often harden into unalterable beliefs. Despite warnings of Nazi preparations to attack the Soviet Union, Stalin had a preconception that Hitler would not attack without first making political demands. He refused suggested countermeasures and was truly surprised when Nazi Germany attacked without warning. Since most warnings will have a degree of ambiguity, policy makers with preconceived views may not accept warnings if they do not fit those views. Preconceptions can become the lenses through which all other information is processed. Unfortunately, most people do not change lenses until they are broken.
These factors can also influence military preparations and policy making. Japanese success at Pearl Harbor was facilitated not just by intelligence shortcomings but also by the Army’s preconception that the real threat was from sabotage and not air attack causing it to park its aircraft wingtip-to-wingtip. Misperceptions of Japanese torpedo capabilities in shallow waters led the Navy to not deploy anti-torpedo nets around its ships.
Finally, “intelligence failures” often result not from a failure of intelligence professionals to warn leaders but instead from a failure to persuade them that a threat is real. For example, because General MacArthur believed that he knew Asia better than anyone else in the U.S. government, he dismissed all warnings in 1950 that China would enter the war in Korea.
Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel is an opportune reminder for the U.S. government to scrutinize its own susceptibility to surprise attack. It should reexamine preparedness for surprise attacks against not just military targets, but also against America’s domestic infrastructure and military-industrial base. A 21st century Pearl Harbor may try to destroy both U.S. military targets in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East and simultaneously targets at home to prevent the United States from responding in the short and long term. As Roberta Wohlstetter and Thomas Schelling wrote after researching Pearl Harbor, the United States cannot count on strategic warning, partly because of the difficulties described above; therefore, American defenses must be designed to function without it.
Furthermore, the savagery of Hamas on 10/7 should warn that the ideology behind 9/11 and many other terrorist outrages is still alive. Despite today’s focus on peer competitors, the U.S. government should not forget the threat posed by terrorism. The United States remains the “far enemy” for violent Salafist terrorists just as Israel remains their “near enemy.” While Russia and China may predominate American security horizons, there are deadly threats below that horizon still willing to do in the United States what was done in the kibbutz of Kfar Aza.
Philip Wasielewski is the Director of FPRI's Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare and a 2023 Templeton Fellow. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. The fight for the Marine Corps continues.
I do not think they are giving the Commandant a fair shake here.
Excerpts:
Congress has grown so concerned about the state of the Marine Corps that in the latest National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress requires an independent agency to conduct a thorough and independent review of the Marine Corps' misguided plan.
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Even the current Commandant Eric Smith admits the island plan needs "bottom-up refinement." General Smith is not currently serving as Commandant, however, because he suffered a recent cardiac arrest. While the WSJ authors quote an unnamed Marine Corps officer saying, "Smith, who suffered cardiac arrest in October, plans to return to work in the coming weeks," but the authors apparently did no investigation of their own. There are a variety of heart ailments and treatments including a stent, a valve replacement, and quadruple bypass. What type of surgery is General Smith having? When is the surgery scheduled? Will he really be back at work soon? Anyone concerned about the future of the Marine Corps needs more facts about when or if the current Commandant is coming back to work. We have more information on the injury status of NFL quarterbacks than on the health of the leader of what is supposed to be the world's premier expeditionary crisis response force.
Compass Points - Welcome to the Party
The fight for the Marine Corps continues.
December 28, 2023
Broader Thinking, Deeper Understanding, and Better Decisions, for a Stronger Marine Corps
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Early in that great Christmas movie, “Die Hard”, Bruce Willis has been trying to get some help with the life and death emergency at Nakatomi Plaza. Finally, one police officer arrives to investigate, but he sees nothing wrong and prepares to leave. Willis throws a body out the window that lands on the officer’s squad car and yells down to the officer, "Welcome to the party, pal!"
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Welcome to the party Wall Street Journal. Glad you arrived to investigate. The serious concerns about the Marine Corps’ lost capabilities have been growing for at least two years.
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Wall St. Journal reporters Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef have posted today a very fine article, "The Marines Transformed to Take On China. Will They Be Ready for Everything Else? -- A plan to redesign the Corps stirred warnings that it might have gone too far."
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"Gone too far?" You think?
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The destruction of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities began in the summer of 2019 with a misguided plan to put small units of Marines on isolated islands in the Pacific. Have the passing years borne out the idea that the Marine Corps should make itself smaller, weaker, and less capable? Hardly.
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Gone too far?
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The fighting in Ukraine and in Gaza shows the ongoing importance of combined arms infantry where commanders use armor, air, and artillery to continually press the fight. Whatever the thinking was back in 2019, world events have moved on. The misguided island plan has left the Marine Corps shorn of too much armor, air, and artillery that are needed today and tomorrow.
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Gone too far?
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Combat bridging and breaching is more important than ever. The ability to cross a river, surmount an obstacle, or clear a mine field are still critical capabilities. But the Marine Corps is left today with virtually no ability for combat bridging and breaching.
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Gone too far?
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The Marine tilt rotor MV22 Osprey has been grounded. Every Osprey in the US inventory has been grounded. How long will the Osprey be out of service? No one knows. The return to operational status is completely indefinite. This leaves the Marine Corps with a dangerous aviation gap. How could problems with one aircraft leave the Marine Corps so short of air assets? It all goes back to 2019 when the Marine Corps began to divest itself of perfectly usable airframes like the UH-1 and CH-53. Both helicopters could be used today to fill in for the Osprey, but too many of the helicopters are slated for divestment and the Marine Corps is weaker for it.
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Gone too far?
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As related in the WSJ article, an experienced Marine Corps General, commanding nearly one-half of all Marine combat power and, at the time, reportedly, a leading candidate for Commandant, instead put his career on the line.
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At Camp Pendleton, Calif., the commanding general of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Lt. Gen. George Smith, sent a classified assessment in April 2022 warning that reducing aircraft, artillery and logistics capabilities would lead to the “fraying of the fabric” of the nearly 50,000-strong task force, according to people familiar with the document. This, he wrote, would hamper the force’s ability to train for and execute large-scale, combined-arms operations against potential adversaries around the globe.
-- Wall Street Journal
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As a reward for standing up and warning of the folly of making the Marine Corps smaller, weaker, and less capable, the Marine Corps sent Lt. General George Smith into retirement.
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Gone too far?
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The entire flawed idea of putting small Marine missile units on isolated islands on the Pacific in a neo-Maginot line, depends on the Landing Ship Medium (LSM). The Marine Corps says it needs 35 LSMs to transport, supply, and evacuate the island Marines. But any Marines on those islands would be completely stranded because not one LSM has been built. There is not even an approved blueprint for an LSM. And there are zero production dollars for the LSM in the Navy ship building budget.
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Gone too far?
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Congress has grown so concerned about the state of the Marine Corps that in the latest National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress requires an independent agency to conduct a thorough and independent review of the Marine Corps' misguided plan.
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Even the current Commandant Eric Smith admits the island plan needs "bottom-up refinement." General Smith is not currently serving as Commandant, however, because he suffered a recent cardiac arrest. While the WSJ authors quote an unnamed Marine Corps officer saying, "Smith, who suffered cardiac arrest in October, plans to return to work in the coming weeks," but the authors apparently did no investigation of their own. There are a variety of heart ailments and treatments including a stent, a valve replacement, and quadruple bypass. What type of surgery is General Smith having? When is the surgery scheduled? Will he really be back at work soon? Anyone concerned about the future of the Marine Corps needs more facts about when or if the current Commandant is coming back to work. We have more information on the injury status of NFL quarterbacks than on the health of the leader of what is supposed to be the world's premier expeditionary crisis response force.
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There is an old saying in the Marine Corps, "we have done so much with so little for so long, that we can do anything with nothing." That fighting spirit is still very much alive in the Marine Corps, but even the fiercest Devil Dog needs to be properly organized, trained, and equipped for the fight.
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Like Bruce Willis running around bare foot on the upper floors of Nakatomi Plaza, the readers of Compass Points are always eager and grateful for any help drawing attention to the Marine Corps and what needs to be done to make the Corps strong today and stronger tomorrow. Many thanks to the authors Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef. If readers want to contact the authors (Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com) one approach might be to first thank them for their fine article and their interest in the Marine Corps and then add, "Welcome to the party, pal!"
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Wall Street Journal (wsj.com) 12/28/2023
The Marines Transformed to Take On China. Will They Be Ready for Everything Else?
A plan to redesign the Corps stirred warnings that it might have gone too far
By Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/the-marines-transformed-to-take-on-china-will-they-be-ready-for-everything-else-d4ea24c6
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/the-marines-transformed-to-take-on-china-will-they-be-ready-for-everything-else/ar-AA1m81Qt
Subscribe to Marine Corps Compass Points
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Broader Thinking, Deeper Understanding, and Better Decisions, for a Stronger Marine Corps
7. Why China’s rulers fear Genghis Khan
Excerpts:
Not this year. No worship of Genghis Khan was allowed as the latest Naadam began in Xingmeng on December 15th (though early that morning some locals quietly slipped into the temple to light incense before the Khans’ impassive statues). At the opening ceremony, a parade featured cloth and bamboo models of fishing boats, shrimp, clams, dragons and a large, dancing white elephant. Missing was a cloth and bamboo model of Genghis Khan on horseback, which appeared at the last Naadam in 2017.
A few years ago Xingmeng’s schools stopped offering Mongolian language lessons. The state has also reduced the number of bonus points given to ethnic-Mongolian students taking university-entrance exams. Pointedly, at the Naadam opening ceremony local leaders hailed Xi Jinping Thought and the ethnic unity of the Chinese nation. In Xingmeng’s cobbled back alleys, your columnist heard wistfulness and fatalism about the new Naadam, rather than revolt. Asked about the changes, an old man said: “All nationalities should unite, and all Chinese should listen to what the party says. Isn’t that how it works with political issues in China?”
It takes an implacable regime to hear such words and still detect a need for stricter controls. China has such a regime.
Why China’s rulers fear Genghis Khan
Repression reaches one of China’s quirkiest ethnic communities
Dec 20th 2023
The Economist
HARSHNESS IS A crude metric for judging an unelected regime. To keep power, lots of rulers will crush dissent with an iron fist. A more subtle measure involves thoroughness. Dedicated autocrats use cold, patient repression to bring even the meek and unthreatening into line. Their aim is to snuff out any belief—no matter how harmless—that might divide subjects’ loyalties.
This grim trend may be seen in the Communist Party’s handling of China’s ethnic minorities, a diverse bunch who between them make up around 9% of the overall population. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, such groups have lost many of the limited privileges granted to them and faced aggressive campaigns to assimilate into mainstream Chinese culture.
Apologists present Xi-era policies as tough but rational responses to threats. The government’s actions in Xinjiang are indicative. To defend China’s cruelties in the region—including mosque demolitions, re-education campaigns, the jailing of poets and the surveillance of millions of Uyghurs and other minorities—officials play up the dangers of Islamic extremism.
National security is also used to justify an intensifying campaign to assimilate ethnic Mongolians who live in China’s northern region of Inner Mongolia. New laws mandating the use of the Chinese language over Mongolian in schools and public institutions aim to “safeguard national sovereignty”. When protests greeted similar changes in 2020, the local government responded by making the rules stricter. Citing Mr Xi’s calls for “ethnic solidarity”, the authorities have banned some history books and closed memorials to Genghis Khan, the founder of a dynasty that conquered tracts of Eurasia and ruled China between 1271 and 1368. Defenders of such hardline policies note that Inner Mongolia is a border region, sharing ties of language, religion and history with an independent, democratic country next door, Mongolia.
Revealingly, though, the Xi era has seen moves to smother traditions that pose no conceivable challenge to national security. Chaguan recently travelled to one of the oddest places on China’s ethnic map, the Xingmeng Mongolian Township of Yunnan province. This rural township of about 6,000 people lies in the lush, tobacco-growing hills of southern China near the border with Vietnam—about 2,500km from the grasslands and deserts of Inner Mongolia. Locals claim descent from Mongolian armies, initially led by Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis, that conquered the region in the 13th and 14th centuries. In their telling, some soldiers stayed on after their Mongol overlords were defeated and driven back north by Ming-dynasty emperors. After an early flurry of intermarriage with local women, these “Yunnan Mongolians” reputedly settled down as fishermen and carpenters in five villages.
Today locals praise their ancestors for stubbornly declining to marry outsiders, thereby—they insist—preserving traces of Mongolian language and dress for over seven centuries. Declaring himself a descendant of Genghis Khan, a village elder admits that he married a woman from China’s Han majority, “so my daughter is only half Mongolian”. To the elder, a longtime party member, his child is fully Mongolian nonetheless, because she “inherited the spirit of the Mongolian nation”.
Xingmeng’s history was rediscovered in the 1950s, a time of Sino-Soviet amity, by party officials and ethnographers, as well as by envoys from the Soviet-controlled Mongolian People’s Republic. Alas, as Mao Zedong led China deeper into paranoid isolation, ethnic minorities with ancient traditions and links to foreign lands became the target of attacks. After China broke with the Soviet Union and sank into the frenzies of the Cultural Revolution, terrible violence reached Inner Mongolia. Tens of thousands of ethnic Mongolians were killed, accused of treason and feudal thought. Far to the south in Yunnan, minorities were attacked in a “Political Frontier Defence” campaign aimed at border counties. Xingmeng avoided the worst violence, older locals relate, though a temple and ancestral clan halls were damaged. Some temples survived because they had been turned into schools.
After Mao’s death in 1976 Xingmeng enjoyed something of a golden age, as history was harnessed for economic development. Teachers visited from Inner Mongolia to give language lessons at the primary school. Cement replicas of nomads’ tents, horse sculptures and other Mongolian touches appeared. A damaged temple was restored in 1985 as the “Three Saints Temple”, housing statues of Genghis and Kublai, as well as Mongke (Kublai’s brother). A Mongolian folk festival, called Naadam, was held every three years. It began with ceremonies honouring those royal ancestors.
No stately pleasure-domes here
Not this year. No worship of Genghis Khan was allowed as the latest Naadam began in Xingmeng on December 15th (though early that morning some locals quietly slipped into the temple to light incense before the Khans’ impassive statues). At the opening ceremony, a parade featured cloth and bamboo models of fishing boats, shrimp, clams, dragons and a large, dancing white elephant. Missing was a cloth and bamboo model of Genghis Khan on horseback, which appeared at the last Naadam in 2017.
A few years ago Xingmeng’s schools stopped offering Mongolian language lessons. The state has also reduced the number of bonus points given to ethnic-Mongolian students taking university-entrance exams. Pointedly, at the Naadam opening ceremony local leaders hailed Xi Jinping Thought and the ethnic unity of the Chinese nation. In Xingmeng’s cobbled back alleys, your columnist heard wistfulness and fatalism about the new Naadam, rather than revolt. Asked about the changes, an old man said: “All nationalities should unite, and all Chinese should listen to what the party says. Isn’t that how it works with political issues in China?”
It takes an implacable regime to hear such words and still detect a need for stricter controls. China has such a regime. ■
Read more from Chaguan, our columnist on China:
China’s cities compete for kids (Dec 14th)
China and the EU risk a trade war (Dec 7th)
Also: How the Chaguan column got its name
The Economist
8. America is unprepared to fight a war on three fronts
Sober warning.
Excerpts:
China is well on its way towards becoming the leading global superpower by 2050, regardless of internal challenges like youth unemployment and a distended demographic pyramid. Since the 1960s, the US and the EU have seen their share of value-added manufacturing drop from 65 per cent to barely half that today. Climate policies are a gift that keeps giving as Westerners struggle with unreliable renewables, while China goes on a coal-plant building spree and emits more greenhouse gases than all developed countries put together.
Western defenses are an even greater concern. The humiliating retreat of the US from Afghanistan emboldened both China and Russia. Europe’s militaries are pathetic and becoming even more so. The UK, with Europe’s strongest military, has only 150 tanks while Germany has enough ammunition for two days of battle. Even the US is having trouble keeping its allies supplied. A recent study by Cynthia Cook of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies found that even before the Hamas attack, the need to supply Ukraine with weapons “triggered concerns as to whether there are sufficient residual inventories for training and to execute war plans”.
Many US military goods are now produced in China. This dependence could worsen if China chooses to invade Taiwan, a country many American industries count on for key components. One Taiwanese company, TSMC, supplies Apple, Intel, Qualcomm, AMD and Nvidia, among other “Big Tech” corporations. It also produces the semiconductors used in F-35 fighter jets.
The Western world’s material issues provide enough of a challenge. But our spiritual degradation may prove fatal. Many young people in Europe and America have been primed, sometimes from grade school, to follow the essentially anti-Western “oppressor” and “colonialist” narrative. A recent report from the Future of Democracy at the University of Cambridge, found support for democracy in the West falling most among 18–34-year-olds.
The democratic world is sleepwalking towards disaster yet again. Just as we need them most, it’s nigh-on impossible to find anyone in the West who resembles Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman or even Nixon or Reagan. The EU bureaucracy certainly is no substitute for De Gaulle. The West cannot win, or even stay relevant, in the “clash of civilisations” if it does not believe in itself, and continues to neglect the physical means to protect its interests.
America is unprepared to fight a war on three fronts
The democratic world is sleepwalking once again towards military disaster
Joel Kotkin 28 December 2023 • 3:57pm
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/comment/2023/12/28/america-iran-houthi-antony-blinken-china-red-sea-shipping/
In our short-attention-span world, we seem to only be able to comprehend one war at a time. But our moment has thrown up conflicts across the globe: Israel versus Hamas, Russians versus Ukrainians, or Chinese democrats versus the Communist Party. But these disparate battles are in fact part of one whole – a struggle to dominate the future.
The new wider war includes attempts by great powers, notably China, to secure natural resources by securing alliances with authoritarian regimes around the world. In exchange, China provides goods, including military items, to authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.
This de-facto alliance, a modern version of the World War Two “pact of steel”, is truly global in scope. It extends from Ukraine to the shutting off of the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis, and even Venezuelan plans to conquer much of oil-rich Guyana. Rather than Francis Fukuyama’s end of history, we are seeing Samuel Huntington’s bleak vision in his 2011 book, “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”.
The wider war pits on one side the revanchist powers – China, Russia, Islamist, Latin American and African countries – who feel they have been wronged by the West and liberal capitalism. On the other side are the West and non-European allies like Japan, South Korea and perhaps most importantly Modi-led India.
The West’s leaders, as in the 1930s, seem more interested in diplomatic maneuvering than confronting a real and present danger. They view the appeasement of Iran as pragmatic, but the creation of a trade deal with Great Britain as marginal. It’s not far from the mark to describe US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, as Tablet recently did, as “Neville Chamberlain with an iPad.”
The historical parallels are troubling. One has to doubt the West’s resolve not only in the Ukrainian and Israel-Hamas hot wars, but also in future conflicts: watch the US Navy respond to the Houthi attempts to shut down Red Sea shipping with meager half-measures. I shudder to think how pusillanimous the likely response to a potential future Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or further Russian steps to recover other parts of its lost empire, may be.
Winning the wider war depends on three things – a strong industrial base, military preparedness, and internal morale. Right now, the West seems determined to weaken its manufacturing industries, for example through electric vehicle mandates which will help Beijing. The Middle Kingdom retains an almost monopoly position on the EV battery supply chain – 80 per cent of the world’s raw material refining, 77 per cent of the world’s cell capacity and 60 per cent of the world’s component manufacturing. They produce more than four times the batteries as the United States, and control critical raw materials required for manufacture. China is also cultivating emerging vassal states in Africa and Central Asia as well as Latin America to meet their resource demand.
China is well on its way towards becoming the leading global superpower by 2050, regardless of internal challenges like youth unemployment and a distended demographic pyramid. Since the 1960s, the US and the EU have seen their share of value-added manufacturing drop from 65 per cent to barely half that today. Climate policies are a gift that keeps giving as Westerners struggle with unreliable renewables, while China goes on a coal-plant building spree and emits more greenhouse gases than all developed countries put together.
Western defenses are an even greater concern. The humiliating retreat of the US from Afghanistan emboldened both China and Russia. Europe’s militaries are pathetic and becoming even more so. The UK, with Europe’s strongest military, has only 150 tanks while Germany has enough ammunition for two days of battle. Even the US is having trouble keeping its allies supplied. A recent study by Cynthia Cook of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies found that even before the Hamas attack, the need to supply Ukraine with weapons “triggered concerns as to whether there are sufficient residual inventories for training and to execute war plans”.
Many US military goods are now produced in China. This dependence could worsen if China chooses to invade Taiwan, a country many American industries count on for key components. One Taiwanese company, TSMC, supplies Apple, Intel, Qualcomm, AMD and Nvidia, among other “Big Tech” corporations. It also produces the semiconductors used in F-35 fighter jets.
The Western world’s material issues provide enough of a challenge. But our spiritual degradation may prove fatal. Many young people in Europe and America have been primed, sometimes from grade school, to follow the essentially anti-Western “oppressor” and “colonialist” narrative. A recent report from the Future of Democracy at the University of Cambridge, found support for democracy in the West falling most among 18–34-year-olds.
The democratic world is sleepwalking towards disaster yet again. Just as we need them most, it’s nigh-on impossible to find anyone in the West who resembles Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman or even Nixon or Reagan. The EU bureaucracy certainly is no substitute for De Gaulle. The West cannot win, or even stay relevant, in the “clash of civilisations” if it does not believe in itself, and continues to neglect the physical means to protect its interests.
9. Who’s Hu, the New PLAN Commander
Who's on first? (I could not resist).
Who’s Hu, the New PLAN Commander
Questions raised by an unexpected change of command at the top of the PLA Navy are answered.
By Commander Mike Dahm, U.S. Navy (Retired)
December 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/12/1,450
usni.org · December 28, 2023
Update: This article was published on 28 December 2023. A few hours later, Chinese state media reported on the appointment of former PLA Navy Chief Dong Jun as China's new defense minister, the first possible explanation listed below, under the heading "Why Hu Now?"
A career submarine officer, Admiral Hu Zhongming, has assumed command of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This unexpected move may be an indication of future PLAN priorities, part of an ongoing PLA leadership crisis, or an indication of unacknowledged issues in the PLAN.
On 25 December 2023, Admiral Hu was identified as the new Commander of the PLAN. Hu replaces Admiral Dong Jun, who had been commander for only two years of what is normally a five-year tour. There are currently no outward indications of a loss of confidence in Admiral Dong or a crisis in the PLAN. Admiral Hu’s ascent may indicate that Dong will soon assume a new position. Still, the opacity surrounding PLA decision-making holds out the possibility that Hu was given command to take the PLAN in a different direction.
Hu Zhongming’s elevation to leader of the world’s largest navy may have come as a surprise to the PLAN itself. As of this writing, there has been no public change-of-command ceremony nor has there been a formal announcement explaining Admiral Dong’s replacement. Instead, China’s official military newspaper, the PLA Daily, published a very short article stating matter-of-factly that “Navy Commander Hu Zhongming” had been promoted to Admiral by Chairman Xi Jinping. Admiral Dong was not mentioned in the PLA Daily article at all, but Dong was seen on state television attending Hu’s promotion ceremony, suggesting he has not fallen from grace and that the change to Hu’s leadership will be orderly.
Chinese military politics have always been a black box to Western PLA analysts. The lack of transparency about senior officer placement has been exacerbated recently by an ongoing leadership crisis infecting the Chinese military. In July 2023, the commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and several other senior PLARF officers were abruptly removed from their posts. The PLARF is responsible for China’s land-based nuclear weapons as well as its substantial conventional missile arsenal. When asked about the shake-up, a PLA spokesman responded, “We will investigate every case and crack down on every corrupt official.” The former PLARF commander, General Li Yuchao, was replaced by a PLAN Deputy Commander, Admiral Wang Houbin. Curiously, Admiral Wang has no apparent experience with nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. Wang’s most desirable quality seems to be that he is not a senior PLARF officer, raising questions about how deep the rot may go within the Rocket Force.
The PLARF purge likely presaged the disappearance from public view of China’s Defense Minister, General Li Shangfu, in August 2023. There was widespread speculation that Li had come under investigation for corruption linked to his 2017–22 position as head of the PLA Equipment Development Department, which is responsible for weapons procurement. In a potentially related disappearance, General Ju Qiansheng, the commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force, which is responsible for space and information warfare capabilities, has also not been seen in public since August. In October, the PLA finally announced that Li had been removed as Defense Minister. Since Admiral Hu Zhongming’s promotion to PLAN Commander, there is speculation bubbling across the Chinese internet that his predecessor, Admiral Dong, could be named as Defense Minister. If that comes to pass, it would be the first time a PLAN officer has served in the role.
Based on limited available information, Admiral Hu Zhongming brings a wealth of operational, command, and administrative experience to command the PLAN. Hu is the tenth PLAN Commander in the service’s 74-year history but is not the first submarine officer to hold the job. PLAN commanders Admirals Zhang Lianzhong (1988–96) and Zhang Dingfa (2003–06) were submarine officers. Hu’s three immediate predecessors, serving between 2006 and 2023, were surface warfare officers.
About Hu
Hu Zhongming was born in 1964 in the port city of Qingdao, China, home of the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet, now called the Northern Theater Navy. Hu joined the PLAN as a submarine officer in 1979. Little is known of his early career. In 1996, Hu reportedly commanded “Great Wall 11” also known as Great Wall 311, a Type 035 Ming-class submarine in the South Sea Fleet. The diesel-electric Mings were built by China in the 1990s and early 2000s based on a 1960s-era Soviet Romeo-class design. In 2002, Hu Zhongming—probably a captain at that point—participated in the PLAN’s first around-the-world cruise, though not on a submarine. Hu may have qualified as a surface warfare officer on either the destroyer or its accompanying auxiliary during the cruise, but there are no indications he led the formation. Hu’s selection to participate in such a historic international event was the first indication that Hu was being groomed for senior leadership.
Some Chinese language articles indicate that, in 2004, Hu Zhongming may have commanded the first Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN). By 2008, Senior Captain Hu likely commanded an SSBN crew, the 41st crew team identified by the military unit cover designator (MUCD) 92730 Unit, 90th Detachment (92730 部队 90 分队). In 2012, Hu’s SSBN crew probably participated in a series of successful missile tests for the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. At the time, the JL-2 program was troubled and years behind schedule. In 2013, Hu’s unit received a rare PLA first-class collective merit award, probably for the successful JL-2 tests. In 2013, Hu assumed command of the Southern Fleet’s Yalong submarine base, home port to all the Jin-class SSBNs. He was promoted to rear admiral in 2014.
In 2015, then Rear Admiral Hu was assigned to the PLAN Staff in Beijing. As Deputy Chief of Staff, Hu Zhongming served as the executive director for a high-profile China-Russia exercise “Joint Maritime–2017.” Hu received additional international exposure at the 2019 Galle Dialogue, a Sri Lankan–hosted maritime forum, where he presented an interesting paper calling for greater maritime security cooperation in South Asia. In late 2019, Hu was promoted to vice admiral and given command of the PLA’s Northern Theater Navy. In 2021, he became the PLAN Chief of Staff. Hu returned to the international stage recently when he led a PLAN delegation to South Africa in September 2023.
Why Hu Now?
Admiral Hu’s operational and leadership experience, especially his international exposure, make him a highly qualified candidate for PLAN Commander—the question is merely, “Why now?” There are three possibilities:
First, the possibility of a new job for Hu’s predecessor, former PLAN Commander Admiral Dong, as Defense Minister. Of concern to the United States and its allies, this possibility portends increased ties between the PLA and Russian military. Dong has long been engaged with Russia. He has led previous China-Russia exercises in the Mediterranean and the western Pacific. Most recently, in July 2023, Dong hosted the Russian Navy chief, Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov, to discuss possible cooperation in naval training and shipbuilding.
Second, a focus on submarine development. Hu Zhongming may simply be the flag officer that Xi Jinping wants leading the PLAN at this time. There are myriad indications that the PLAN is building infrastructure and shipbuilding capacity to expand its nuclear submarine inventory. Admiral Hu appears to have the requisite experience, accomplishments, and focus to lead PLA improvements in undersea warfare, including the integration of uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), and the development of new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines and SSBNs. Here too, Hu’s experience with the Russian Navy may be a cause for concern.
The most likely rationale for Hu’s promotion is some combination of these first two possibilities.
There is, however, a third possibility. This, admittedly, is a rumor-fueled, media-hyped outlier, but it still merits attention: Something has gone terribly wrong in the PLAN.
In August 2023, reports appeared in dark corners of the Chinese internet that the PLAN had suffered a serious submarine casualty. Then, a British tabloid, citing intelligence sources, revived the story in October, stating that the August incident had resulted in the loss of 55 submarine sailors to hypoxia following an underwater collision. These reports have been questioned—and largely dismissed—for lack of any corroborating evidence. That said, there is a possibility, however remote, that the PLAN did indeed suffer a significant submarine casualty, even if it did not result in the reported loss of life.
For historical context, in 2003, a mechanical malfunction on board a Chinese Ming-class submarine resulted in the death of all 70 crew members. As a result of that accident, PLAN Commander Admiral Shi Yunsheng was relieved and replaced with a submarine officer, Admiral Zhang Dingfa. Another recent incident was a November 2023 social media video of massive plumes of black smoke billowing from a PLAN amphibious ship. The video was summarily dismissed as a test of an onboard smoke-screen system. Occasionally, however, where there is smoke, there is fire.
If Hu Zhongming’s predecessor, Admiral Dong, reappears in the PLA ranks, the third possibility of an unacknowledged catastrophic PLAN incident can likely be dismissed. If Dong does not reappear, there is a possibility that Xi Jinping did, in fact, lose confidence in his navy commander for an actual incident or other perceived shortcomings. Regardless, the black box that surrounds senior PLA appointments means that only time, scrutiny, and analysis will reveal why Admiral Hu Zhongming was selected to lead the PLAN—and what course he will chart to develop and employ his force.
usni.org · December 28, 2023
10. Are China’s actions in the South China Sea a harbinger of things to come for Taiwan as election looms?
Are China’s actions in the South China Sea a harbinger of things to come for Taiwan as election looms? | CNN
Analysis by Mike Chinoy and Peter Enav, CNN
5 minute read
Updated 10:32 PM EST, Thu December 28, 2023
CNN · December 29, 2023
A Philippine Coast Guard sailor looks out at a China Coast Guard ship during a resupply mission for the BRP Sierra Madre, in the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea, on Friday, Nov. 10, 2023.
Lisa Marie David/Bloomberg/Getty Images
Taipei, Taiwan CNN —
One hundred and twenty miles off the coast of Palawan in the Philippines sits the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era landing vessel that hosts a small contingent of Philippine marines and serves as the infrastructural backbone of an atoll called the Second Thomas Shoal.
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague declared that the shoal belonged to the Philippines and that China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to the bulk of the South China Sea.
Beijing subsequently moved aggressively to underscore its public rejection of the court’s ruling, ramping up construction on numerous man-made islands with military facilities to buttress its assertion of control over almost all the South China Sea.
China’s key tool in all of this has been its huge coast guard – the largest such force in the world.
China Coast Guard ships have rammed, attacked with water cannons, or otherwise forcefully confronted Philippine vessels seeking to resupply or repair the Sierra Madre, and so keep it from breaking up in heavy weather and rough seas – a development that would severely undermine Manila’s continuing hold on the Second Thomas Shoal.
This desperate Filipino race against time has attracted the keen attention of the United States, whose increasingly close ties to Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines new pro-American leader, have included plans for an expansion of American access to military bases on the Philippine mainland.
China-Philippines maritime standoff escalating on path that could drag US into conflict, analysts warn
As President Biden declared on October 26, “The US defense commitment to the Philippines is ironclad. Any attack on Filipino aircraft, vessels, or armed forces” would automatically trigger Washington’s mutual defense treaty with Manila.
But Chinese behavior contains a deeper threat.
As the Philippine case illustrates, Beijing has long used its massive coast guard as a force to project power, not only in the South China Sea but elsewhere, ignoring international norms, creating facts on the ground (or the sea,) pushing the envelope while daring others to push back.
And some analysts believe that China could soon start to deploy the coast guard to ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan, the democratic island that Beijing has vowed to bring under its control, by persuasion if possible, and force if necessary.
This is especially true with the forthcoming January 13 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan.
If the island’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which views Taiwan as a de facto sovereign nation and not part of China, should for the third consecutive time win the island’s presidential poll – it enjoys a small lead in public opinion surveys – the odds of a tough Chinese response will increase significantly.
Supporters of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) presidential candidate, attend an election campaign event in Kaohsiung, Taiwan December 22, 2023.
Ann Wang/Reuters
And even if the more China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) pulls out an upset and prevails on January 13, it is highly unlikely to meet Chinese expectations for rapid movement towards eventual unification with the mainland – heightening the chances for further Chinese muscle-flexing.
This kind of pressure would create an extraordinarily difficult challenge for Taiwan and the US Navy, especially since the coast guard now has the backing of a Chinese law allowing it to use lethal force in waters which China claims.
Taiwan faces flood of disinformation from China ahead of election
03:38 - Source: CNN
“If one day Chinese coast guard ships appear around Taiwan – and they can range up to 10,000 tons – what do the US or Taiwan do?” asks former Taiwan Defense Minister Andrew Yang. “They are coast guard, not navy. They aren’t firing a shot. Do the US or Taiwan fire first?”
The coast guard also makes it easier for the Chinese Communist Party to deploy other tools of coercion it has so far not chosen to use, including moves that could directly threaten foreign companies doing business in Taiwan.
HMCS Ottawa fires its main gun towards the Hammerhead remote training target as USS Rafael Peralta and HMAS Brisbane sail in formation during a Surface Fire Exercise during a joint deployment in the South China Sea on 26 October 2023.
Aviator Gregory Cole/Canadian Armed Forces Photo
CNN took an 11-day cruise through some of the most-contested waters on Earth. Here’s what we learned
Such steps might include insisting that foreign vessels sailing to the island first undergo customs inspections in nearby Chinese ports or demanding that foreign air carriers serving Taiwanese airports first file flight plans with Chinese authorities.
The possibility that Chinese vessels might at some point inspect foreign commercial ships on the high seas to underscore its Taiwan claims could well lead to international insurers linking maritime insurance rates to compliance with evolving Chinese requirements, creating additional legal, political, and financial pressures on foreign companies doing business in Taiwan — all the while steadily undermining Taiwan’s effort to retain political separation from China.
Beijing has already been conducting almost daily air and naval operations in Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone. In September, a record 103 sorties were staged in a single day.
More recent incursions have included Chinese aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan, as well as increasingly crossing an informal Taiwan Strait “median line” designed to keep the two sides apart and so reduce the danger of an accidental clash.
This photo taken on April 23, 2023 shows the grounded Philippine navy ship BRP Sierra Madre where marines are stationed to assert Manila's territorial claims at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands in the disputed South China Sea. - AFP was one of several media outlets invited to join two Philippine Coast Guard boats on a 1,670-kilometre (1,040-mile) patrol of the South China Sea, visiting a dozen islands and reefs. Beijing claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, ignoring an international ruling that the assertion has no legal basis. (Photo by Ted ALJIBE / AFP) / To go with AFP SPECIAL REPORT by Cecil MORELLA (Photo by TED ALJIBE/AFP via Getty Images)
Ted Aljibe/AFP/Getty Images
‘Little blue men’: Is a militia Beijing says doesn’t exist causing trouble in the South China Sea?
Beijing has also challenged US ships in the strait, including an incident in June in which a People’s Liberation Army warship cut across the bow and came within 150 yards of a US guided-missile destroyer as it was transiting the strait with a Canadian frigate. In September, China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, the Shandong, conducted operations south and then north of Taiwan.
These so-called “gray zone activities” have so far succeeded in giving China the upper hand in the South China Sea. The situation may soon reach a point where Taiwan’s friends and allies will have to confront the challenge of whether they will prove equally effective in and around the democratic island.
Peter Enav is the editor of the Taiwan Strait Risk Report and a former Associated Press Taipei bureau chief. Mike Chinoy is a consulting editor at the Taiwan Strait Risk Report and CNN’s former senior Asia correspondent.
CNN · December 29, 2023
11. Israel at war: What you need to know – day 85
Israel at war: What you need to know – day 85
https://us18.campaign-archive.com/?e=971a356b63&u=d3bceadb340d6af4daf1de00d&id=c396054a80
Israel News, Saturday, 30.12.2023 View in browser Senior Biden adviser Amos Hochstein is expected to visit Lebanon as part of a U.S. attempt to secure a cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon-based militias, the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar reported. Overnight, six Iran-backed militants were killed in airstrikes in eastern Syria, and on Saturday, at least seven were killed in an airstrike near Aleppo, according to Syrian opposition sources; both strikes are attributed to Israel.
Here's what you need to know 85 days into the war What happened today ■ GAZA: The IDF reported that it has deepened its ground operation in southern Gaza and raided Hamas military posts in the heart of the city of Khan Yunis, including the organization's intelligence war room.
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The Hamas-run Health Ministry in Gaza said 21,672 Palestinians have been killed and 56,165 were wounded since the war began.
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The Under-Secretary-General for the UN's humanitarian affairs agency said that the ongoing war "is an impossible situation for the people of Gaza and for those trying to help them," and that aid was "woefully inadequate" after 81 trucks entered the Strip on Saturday.
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Approximately 70% of the homes in Gaza and half of its buildings have been damaged or destroyed by Israeli airstrikes, according to the Wall Street Journal.
"Israel may not be troubled by the moral aspects of its means of combat, including starvation, but as a party waging a war that is expected to last for a long while yet, it should constantly examine the degree of legitimacy the war enjoys in the international arena" - Zvi Bar'el
■ ISRAEL: Protests calling to oust PM Netanyahu are taking place on Saturday night across Israel, including a Tel Aviv solidarity rally with the families of Israeli hostages held by Hamas.
■ IDF: The IDF announced the names of two soldiers killed fighting in Gaza.
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The IDF said 2,180 soldiers have been wounded since the start of the war, and reported that 431 soldiers are currently hospitalized.
■ LEBANON: In response to aerial intrusions from Lebanon, the IDF said that fighter jets attacked Hezbollah infrastructure and terrorist units in Lebanon earlier on Saturday.
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Amos Hochstein, a senior adviser to U.S. President Biden, is expected to visit Lebanon as part of the U.S.' attempt to achieve a cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon-based militias, according to the Hezbollah-affiliated newspaper Al-Akhbar.
■ SYRIA: At least seven were killed in an airstrike attributed to Israel near Aleppo in northwest Syria, a human's rights organization affiliated with the Syrian opposition reported.
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The Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese news agency Al Mayadeen reported four airstrikes in a south-east suburb of Aleppo.
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According to Syrian state media, Israel attacked from the sea, west of Latakia. Syrian opposition claims the strike targeted a military airport.
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Three overnight airstrikes in eastern Syria near a strategic border crossing with Iraq killed six militants from Iran-backed militias, two members of Iraqi militia groups told AP.
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Two projectiles fired from Syria into Israel landed in open areas Saturday, according to the IDF, which said it responded by attacking the source of the launches.
■ WEST BANK: An Israeli man was hospitalized after being struck by a car at a military post near the Al Fawr refugee camp south of Hebron. According to the IDF, reserve soldiers shot and killed the driver. Context Israel declared war after Hamas killed at least 1,200 Israelis and wounded more than 3,300 in a merciless assault. In Gaza, the Hamas-controlled health ministry reports that at least 21,672 Palestinians have been killed. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad hold hostage more than 129 soldiers and civilians, dead and alive, including foreign nationals.
The war comes after ten months of the most significant domestic political and social crisis in decades, due to the Netanyahu-led government's judicial coup – legislation aimed at dramatically weakening Israel's judiciary and potentially rescuing Netanyahu from the three corruption trials he faces – and amid an escalation of violence between West Bank Palestinians and Israeli settlers, the latter empowered by Israel's most right-wing government ever.
12. Theories of Victory: Israel, Hamas, and the Meaning of Victory in Irregular Warfare
Few scholars and military practitioners are viewing recents conflicts from an irregular warfare perspective, except for people like Professor Ucko. Like Ukraine (and even Taiwan) I fear most want to pigeon hole it to suit their various agendas.
And this is still a key (and enduring) point that we might acknowledge but never effectively deal with.
Military might will always matter, but as Joseph Nye warned almost two decades ago, “victory also depends upon whose story wins.” That Hamas, an internationally reviled terrorist organization, can succeed in this contest should be as shocking as it is instructive.
When will we (the royal "we" as in like minded democracies and those who value freedom) learn to lead with influence as effectively as we do any kinetic weapon.
It is irregular warfare in Gaza and it just illustrates the point that irregular warfare requires the application of a wide range of joint forces plus diplomatic and the other instruments of national power as well a support of allies.
Conclusion:
The ongoing conflict in Gaza epitomizes the complex nature of irregular warfare. The Department of Defense once defined irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence,” which captures well the conundrum at the heart of modern conflict. The key takeaway emerging from the current situation in the Middle East is that for violence to be strategically effective, it must be both underpinned and bolstered by persuasive narratives and sufficient support. Military strength can yet be decisive, but its power and sustainability are enhanced when it is aligned with, rather than corrosive to, public opinion. As illustrated by the Middle East today, in winning this battle for legitimacy, there can be no room for complacency.
Theories of Victory: Israel, Hamas, and the Meaning of Victory in Irregular Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by David Ucko · December 30, 2023
Two months in, what does the war between Israel and Hamas tell us about victory and defeat in irregular warfare? There is no difficulty in identifying those who have lost the most through this conflict: the civilian victims, caught up in a hellish devastation not of their making. In contrast, assessing which of the two combatants is winning is a far more bewildering task. In this war as in so many others, success and failure are polymorphous, unfolding tactically and strategically, locally and internationally, directly and indirectly, and across different timescales. As warfare, with its destruction and loss, is ostensibly justified by the political purpose it is meant to attain, this lack of clarity should be concerning.
Using Israel’s war on Hamas along with past precedents as case studies, this piece seeks to shed light on the question of victory in irregular warfare. It is certainly too early to make definitive statements on the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, but much can be learned by studying what has unfolded to date. With this caveat, the question remains: is anyone winning this war and, if so, how and why? The discussion relates not only to the fighting in Gaza, or to its broader regional politics, but to the future of irregular-warfare strategy and to our continued theorization of what it may achieve. War colleges rightly teach theories of victory as a crucial component of strategy, but do we even know what we’re looking for?
The Case for Hamas
Since its brazen attack on Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas has faced a furious Israeli counterattack. Israel has pummeled Hamas positions across Gaza, devastating its base of operations and seeking thereby to fulfill its war objective of eliminating the group. After just weeks of fighting, casualties in Gaza are some 20,000, the vast majority of whom are civilians. The scale of the offensive indicates that Israel will not be deterred by Hamas’ use of human shields or civilian infrastructure. Hamas, in other words, would appear lost.
To be sure, this is not the mainstream narrative. On the contrary, there is no real confidence today that sheer military strength will win the war. As it might be put, if we learned anything from Iraq, and from the two decades of battling various asymmetric threats, it is that victory means not only military success but also achieving a lasting peace. Through this lens, despite its military setbacks Hamas is succeeding politically and benefiting, paradoxically, from Israel’s military onslaught. In invading Gaza, goes the argument, Israel has fallen victim to the strategic fallacy typical of Western armed forces: that military superiority can be used to defeat insurgencies.
This case of a Hamas victory rests on three pillars.
First, through its brazen attack, Hamas was able to demonstrate Israeli vulnerability and outflank its Palestinian rivals, principally the Palestinian Authority (PA). In Israel, the attacks are widely viewed as representing an existential threat, hence the celerity and severity of its response. As Hezbollah increases its rocket attacks, violence escalates on the West Bank, and the Houthis continue their missile strikes on Israeli and US targets, Israel finds itself in a potential multi-front war, underscoring its precarious position. Meanwhile, the image of Israel’s much-vaunted military and intelligence machinery has been diminished. Through the attack, therefore, Hamas has evinced a new balance of power.
Second, destroying Hamas, as Israel seeks to do, is a tall order. Even if the organization is irrevocably weakened, ideologies are harder to kill. Much will therefore depend on whether, in pummeling Hamas, Israel can also undercut the appeal of its message and cause. Beyond what it can (and cannot) achieve militarily, this would require addressing the aggravation of Palestinian anger toward Israel as well as the desperate conditions in Gaza, even prior to the offensive. It is difficult to see how Israel might achieve progress on either front. The “two-state solution” has become an obsolete mantra with minimal purchase. Meanwhile, none of the proposed alternatives to Hamas for governing Gaza appear viable, with the PA being particularly unpromising due to its perceived inactivity and diminished legitimacy in the wake of Hamas’ attacks.
With continued political uncertainty in Gaza, and old grievances inflamed by fresh wounds, Hamas may just survive, if not organizationally then ideologically. If so, this self-proclaimed resistance movement will be able to claim tremendous legitimacy for having hurt Israel as never before, for gaining concessions through the release of hostages, and for withstanding the ensuing onslaught. These achievements will reverberate not just across the Palestinian world, where polling suggests increased support of Hamas since the Israeli offensive, but also regionally and internationally.
Third, whatever happens to Hamas, it can rightly claim to have put the Palestinian cause back on the map. Clausewitz tells us that warfare is a continuation of politics by other means. On that front, the current cycle of conflict has convinced many that the Israeli policy toward Palestine is unsustainable and that a different political solution is needed. Compare this attitude with the relative neglect of the Palestinian cause prior to Oct. 7, when Israel was managing the conflict against a backdrop of global oblivion. Hamas will, with some credibility, claim credit for having tarnished Israel’s reputation both regionally and beyond, returned Gaza to international headlines, and caused dilemmas also for Israel’s chief sponsor, the United States.
Indeed, Israel is now more isolated than it has been for a long time, and this following a period of successful international engagement. Several countries have recalled their ambassadors, and deals made have been annulled. Even the United States displays signs of hesitation. Though difficult to detect, given America’s consistent military assistance and tendency to back Israel to the hilt, President Biden has been putting pressure on Israel in ways uncharacteristic of a US president. The delay in sending Israel new rifles (for fear of their usage against Palestinian civilians on the West Bank) and the creative methods needed to send artillery shells (to bypass potential congressional opposition) indicate just how US opinion on Israel is shifting. Polling reveals a growing tendency among Americans to blame Israel for the war and to sympathize with the Palestinian population. For the Biden administration, supporting Israel has become a riskier proposition, costing it possible votes domestically and legitimacy internationally.
Given this logic, it is plausible to argue that Hamas’ attacks have yielded some level of success beyond the apparent military imbalance in the ongoing conflict. The severe violence carried out on Oct. 7 disrupted entrenched political dynamics and reshaped psychological and strategic perceptions in unexpected ways. Such flux can prove helpful.
Parallels can be found in history. North Vietnamese forces were badly mauled in their Tet offensive of 1968, but the show of force changed the strategic calculus surrounding the war, leading eventually to an American withdrawal and the collapse of South Vietnam. In 1995, the Zapatistas in Mexico launched a daring attack that was soon rebuffed, yet the group was then able to present itself internationally as the beleaguered victim of an abusive state. The resulting “net-war,” in the terms of Arquilla and Ronfeldt, leveraged globally distributed networks in such manner as to paralyze the state, so that, to this day, the Zapatistas still govern autonomous rebel zones separately from and in opposition to the state.
In these instances and others, the military balance was undone by intangibles. While it is uncertain if Hamas anticipated this type of outcome, it is evident that the organization has derived perverse benefits from its Oct. 7 attacks, especially in terms of influencing public perceptions. Recognizing this fact is not a defense of mass violence but rather an attempt to explain its occurrence. Such terroristic action can create a cognitive shock, capturing global attention and potentially altering the narrative. Accordingly, any reaction to such events must itself be crucially concerned with the framing, narrative, and perceptions that follow. Military might will always matter, but as Joseph Nye warned almost two decades ago, “victory also depends upon whose story wins.” That Hamas, an internationally reviled terrorist organization, can succeed in this contest should be as shocking as it is instructive.
The Case for Israel
So, is Israel doomed, yet another state victim of “net-war”? It would seem a puzzling conclusion, given the country’s military power, the asymmetry in casualties through fighting, and its growing control over a devastated Gaza. Israel remains a nation-state recognized by most of the international community and certainly by its main players; it benefits from legal standing, backing, and resources in a way that Hamas could never match.
The Israeli aim in this war is to destroy Hamas. As discussed, this will be difficult, but certainly Hamas stands to lose more tangibly than Israel in the current battle. Each day, Israel is striking more targets, weakening Hamas and making a return to its former position of power increasingly unlikely. Hamas seeks to win this war in the realm of optics and perception, but, in the words of Lt. Gen. George Miller (of In the Loop), “At the end of a war you need some soldiers left, really, or else it looks like you’ve lost.”
But what of the intangibles? Hamas’ sponsors may rejoice at the group having soured Israel’s relations with some Arab states, principally Saudi Arabia, but none of these sponsors are coming to the rescue against the Israeli onslaught. For several weeks, Hezbollah remained largely passive in the face of the Israeli attack; only recently has it escalated, but without yet opening up second front in aid of Hamas. Iran, long-time sponsor of Hamas, quickly proclaimed it had no hand in or foreknowledge of the Oct. 7 attack, reflecting its reluctance to be drawn into a regional war (all while it uses its influence over the Houthi insurgency in Yemen to strategic advantage). Hamas may have gained some sympathy for compelling Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, and perversely from Israel’s heavy bombardment of Gaza, but most observers nonetheless spurn the group as a terrorist organization, particularly as gruesome details of its massacre emerge.
Facing Israel alone in Gaza, Hamas is now the victim of an age-old insurgent’s dilemma: “between taking actions which have a high probability of bringing on a violent response (but which have some chance of reaching the group’s goals) and taking no action at all (thereby assuring the defeat of the group’s goals).” Hamas chose to act, and to do so with unprecedented savagery and malice. In so doing, Hamas also gave Israel the impetus and justification to pursue it militarily and at an unprecedented intensity. As Hamas is after all fixed in Gaza, a territory smaller in size than Rhode Island and on Israel’s doorstep, the military task of suppressing the group would seem within Israel’s reach.
If this is Hamas’ future, it would not be the first insurgency that is undone by military might. Consider the mighty Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), author of a protracted and sophisticated insurgency, but eliminated by sheer force from 2006 to 2009 at the hands of the Sri Lankan military. The destruction was significant and civilian casualties high, but such losses did not reverse the strategic outcome. In a similar vein, the Islamic State claimed extensive territory across both Syria and Iraq in 2014 and became one of the most notorious insurgent groups ever seen. Yet despite (or precisely because of) such successes, ISIS exposed itself to a military counterattack that demolished its overall plan in less than three years. ISIS still plots its resurgence and launches occasional attacks, but it is unclear how its vaunted “caliphate” can be created without the group facing the same fate as it did in Mosul or Raqqa.
Despite the generally low faith in conventional military power in irregular warfare, such outcomes are hardly aberrational. In most recent insurgent struggles, it has been the state that wins, either decisively as in Sri Lanka or by pushing its opponent below an acceptable threshold, as in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, since 2000, only six insurgencies can be said to have been “victorious,” though most of these produced only further conflict, and all required significant external support (most notably in Libya and in Afghanistan, both in 2001 and 2021). Absent such backing, insurgent efforts have largely failed.
The states that emerge on top in these contests do not do so by adhering closely to counterinsurgency best practices: winning hearts and minds, separating insurgents from the people, and following a political plan. Instead, states reapply military force as necessary to suppress rather than ever quite resolve the matter. ‘Mowing the grass,’ as the approach is termed, is deemed a suboptimal response to political violence, as it does not address the root causes of the conflict. Even so, for the insurgent, the grass is mowed, and the armed struggle must start over—often with great effort. Neither side shines, but the insurgent suffers more, and the state gets to survive.
This history establishes a clear asymmetry: a contrast between the state’s military strength and the insurgent’s ability to rally support. For Israel, the challenge lies in whether it can apply enough of the former to counteract Hamas’ application of the latter. In the past, Israel has succeeded in mowing the grass, setting its adversaries back and deflecting the international opprobrium resulting from its military actions. The irony today is that, more than anything, it has been the speed, scale, and intensity of Israel’s own response that is making the difference, fueling support for Hamas, opposition to Israel, and sympathy for the Palestinian cause. If Israel had adopted a more measured, precise, and diplomatically savvy approach in its efforts to neutralize Hamas, the group’s assertions of victory, whether actual or perceived, would likely appear less credible. In that sense, Israel’s own strategy has been its greatest enemy. This unforced error need not derail Israel’s objectives, but they may come at a far higher cost, if they come at all.
Conclusion: Power, Legitimacy, and Politics
“Winning or losing is all one organic globule, from which one extracts what one needs.” These insightful words, not from Sun Tzu but spoken by Rosie Perez’s character in the movie, White Men Can’t Jump, resonate curiously well with the nuances of irregular warfare. In these conflicts, the act of winning and losing occurs both tangibly and intangibly, making the balance of advantage in any given situation difficult to see.
In such contexts, what is a suitable theory of victory? One method of approaching the question is to assess the respective asymmetries and vulnerabilities of each side and to query to what degree they are being effectively exploited. These vulnerabilities, it should be stated, are not just military in nature, but also political, social, and informational. Thus, for insurgents, working from the ground up, victory has always required applying their strengths against the government’s weaknesses and avoiding the application of government strength against their own vulnerabilities. A corollary, for states, is to prevent insurgents from dictating this correlation of forces.
How do Israel and Hamas fare? Both appear to have committed cardinal errors. States are typically militarily superior, yet they suffer when they lose legitimacy and can no longer resist the mobilizing powers of their insurgent foe. Israel has applied its strength (military force) but in such a way as to reveal a weakness (a lack of international and regional legitimacy) that Hamas is now exploiting. It may be that the world anyway moves on, and that continued American support allows Israel to prevail. However, at worst for Israel, its military gains will be pyrrhic, as international, regional, and local opinion turns on the country and generates fresh attacks and resistance.
For Hamas, the brutality of the Oct. 7 attacks provided Israel with a reason to unleash its strength (military force) against Hamas’ comparative weakness (its inability to stand up and fight), and the group therefore risks severe degradation or even complete destruction. Hamas’s strengths lie in asymmetry and ambiguity. Using human shields and the population of Gaza as hostages, it has long been able to threaten moral outrage should Israel truly pursue it where it lives. These advantages are however difficult to maintain when it is committed to territorial defense of a controlled area and engaged in head-on clashes against the military forces of the state.
The ongoing conflict in Gaza epitomizes the complex nature of irregular warfare. The Department of Defense once defined irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence,” which captures well the conundrum at the heart of modern conflict. The key takeaway emerging from the current situation in the Middle East is that for violence to be strategically effective, it must be both underpinned and bolstered by persuasive narratives and sufficient support. Military strength can yet be decisive, but its power and sustainability are enhanced when it is aligned with, rather than corrosive to, public opinion. As illustrated by the Middle East today, in winning this battle for legitimacy, there can be no room for complacency.
David H. Ucko (@daviducko) is professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. He is a 2023 Irregular Warfare Fellow and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. This article is loosely based on his latest book, The Insurgent’s Dilemma: A Struggle to Prevail (Oxford University Press, 2022).
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, National Defense University, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or United States government.
Main Image: Israeli Defense Forces Soldiers prepare for ground activity in Gaza (IDF via Wikimedia Commons)
irregularwarfare.org · by David Ucko · December 30, 2023
13. Biden warns US military may get pulled into direct conflict with Russia
Biden warns US military may get pulled into direct conflict with Russia
Newsweek · by Kaitlin Lewis · December 29, 2023
President Joe Biden warned that the United States is at risk of being pulled into a direct conflict with Russia if the Kremlin succeeds in its war against Ukraine.
Biden's statement follows Russia's massive aerial attack across Ukraine on Friday. Kyiv air force officials said that about 110 missiles struck Ukraine, hitting hospitals, residential buildings and a shopping center. At least 31 citizens were killed in the attack and another 120 wounded, according to Ukraine officials cited by Reuters.
"Overnight, Russia launched its largest aerial assault on Ukraine since this war began," Biden said in a statement released Friday. "It is a stark reminder to the world that, after nearly two years of this devastating war, Putin's objective remains unchanged. He seeks to obliterate Ukraine and subjugate its people. He must be stopped."
The 22-month-long war has raised tensions between Russia and members of the NATO alliance, who have supported Ukraine's fight through billions of dollars in military aid and weaponry. Support for Kyiv, however, has started to waver in countries like the U.S., where Republican lawmakers have blocked sending additional funding to Ukraine unless a deal can be reached that also boosts aid for America's immigration system.
President Joe Biden waves as he departs Marine One while returning to the White House on December 19, 2023, in Washington, D.C. Biden warned in a statement on December 29, 2023, that the U.S. risks being pulled into a direct conflict with Russia if Moscow is successful in the Ukraine war. Drew Angerer/Getty Images
Biden said Friday that Ukraine's forces successfully intercepted a number of the missiles and drones launched by Russia thanks to the American-provided air defense systems at Kyiv's disposable. He added, however, that unless congressional lawmakers take "urgent action in the new year," the U.S. will not be able to continue to provide Ukraine with "weapons and vital air defense systems."
Biden previously warned Republicans that withholding aid for Ukraine could pose a security threat for the NATO alliance and, subsequently, the U.S. The White House's final aid package for Kyiv, which totaled $250 million, was announced this week.
"The stakes of this fight extend far beyond Ukraine," Biden reiterated Friday. "They affect the entirety of the NATO alliance, the security of Europe, and the future of the transatlantic relationship.
"When dictators and autocrats are allowed to run roughshod in Europe, the risk rises that the United States gets pulled in directly. And the consequences reverberate around the world. We cannot let our allies and partners down. We cannot let Ukraine down. History will judge harshly those who fail to answer freedom's call."
Biden has asked Congress to pass a $110 billion aid package that would go toward Ukraine, support for Israel and other national security needs. The request has been repeatedly struck down by GOP lawmakers.
House Speaker Mike Johnson said at a news conference this month that Republicans' "hill to die on" in negotiations with Democrats over providing additional aid to Ukraine is to establish sweeping changes to U.S. border policy. Johnson has indicated that providing additional funding to Ukraine is still a priority.
When reached for comment, Johnson's office directed Newsweek to a statement following the speaker's meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky earlier this month, during which the speaker told Zelensky "that we stand with him and against Putin's brutal invasion. The American people stand for freedom and they're on the right side of this fight."
"I have asked the White House since the day that I was handed the gavel as Speaker for clarity. We need a clear articulation of the strategy to allow Ukraine to win," Johnson added. "What the Biden Administration seems to be asking for is billions of additional dollars with no appropriate oversight, no clear strategy to win, and none of the answers that I think the American people are owed."
Update 12/29/23, 2:32 p.m. ET: This article has been updated with additional comment and background from House Speaker Mike Johnson.
Newsweek · by Kaitlin Lewis · December 29, 2023
14. Patriot missile exports don't make Japan serious
Grant Newsham shapes a little cold water over the Patriot deal.
Patriot missile exports don't make Japan serious
Sending the US missiles made under US license shows Japan getting over defense allergy, but it’s just a start
asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · December 29, 2023
Japan recently announced that it will transfer some number – reportedly “dozens”– of license-built Patriot missiles to the United States. This is to bolster American missile stocks depleted by two years of supplying Ukraine in its defense against the Russian invasion.
It is the first time Japan will export military weaponry owing to longstanding – though informal – policy restrictions.
The announcement makes for a good headline. And some analysts view it as a significant step and a sign Japan is stepping up to its global security responsibilities.
But, on closer look, it seems more smoke-and-mirrors, intended to keep the Americans in the Asia-Pacific and on the hook to defend Japan (and Taiwan). And from shifting more resources and attention to Europe and the Middle East. I’ll explain.
The missiles
The news Japan would hand over Patriot missiles raised some eyebrows among people who follow Japan’s defense.
One wasn’t aware that the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was flush with extra Patriot missiles for its own batteries.
In fact, JSDF arsenals and magazines are believed to have inadequate stocks of missiles, artillery shells, bombs, and ammunition – not anywhere near enough of what’s needed to fight a war.
So it’s puzzling that Japan will provide the Americans with Patriot missiles when they don’t have enough for themselves.
The reports mention “dozens” of missiles to be transferred to the US.
Dozens? The number will probably turn out to be even fewer. Say, 30 or 40 missiles?
Unless these missiles have magic properties, this isn’t enough to make up for the American missile shortfall.
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It’s mentioned that Japan will step up missile production. But this will take some time and one fairly doubts the output will be sufficient to make a difference for the Americans – or even the JSDF.
A Surface-to-air guided missile Patriot (PAC3) is shown deployed at the Air Self-Defense Force Miyakojima in preparation for North Korea’s launch of a military reconnaissance satellite on May 5 . Photo: ©Kyodo
A political move?
This all seems like a political move. One observer calls it “virtue signaling.” It’s intended to demonstrate Japan’s support for the overstretched United States which is heavily engaged with Ukraine while at the same time also supplying Israel with armaments.
In return, the American commitment to defend Japan is “solidified.”
Viewed this way, it’s a strategic investment. Japan supplies a small number of missiles – and gets potentially the full weight of available US military support in return when the time comes to deal with China. And possibly with North Korea and Russia.
Meanwhile, Team Biden can point to Japanese backing for the administration’s policy toward Ukraine at a time when a number of European and some other countries – not to mention US legislators – are hesitant or opposed to future support for Kiev.
Members of the Ground Self-Defense Force fire a 155mm howitzer FH70 during the Fuji General Firepower Exercise, August 25, 2019, in Shizuoka Prefecture. Japan has just sent the UK 155 mm shells. Photo: / ©Sankei / Yosuke Hayasaka
Really a sea change for Japan?
An optimist might point out that Japan’s willingness to export missiles (lethal weapons) made under US license to the United States shows that Japan is getting over its allergy to national defense.
Yes, it is progress in the sense that it has never been done before.
But one has the feeling Tokyo is looking to do just enough – or even a little less.
Despite plans to double defense spending, having revised key defense guidelines, and ordering some longish-range attack missiles, Japan still isn’t taking enough of the concrete steps necessary to improve its defenses. And sending along a handful of missiles to the United States doesn’t change this reality.
The Japan Self-Defense Forces, the Japanese government and the public are not ready to fight a war.
Indeed, Tokyo’s agreement on Patriot missiles brings to mind then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe giving President-elect Donald Trump an expensive golf club as a gift. One needn’t be a total cynic to suggest the Japanese wanted to put Trump in a good mood so he wouldn’t ask or demand that Japan do more defense-wise. By and large, it worked.
A small number of Patriot missiles may be intended to have the same effect as the Abe-Trump golf club.
Isao Aoki (left) and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe watch US President Donald Trump hit a tee shot on May 26, 2019, at Mobara Country Club in Chiba. Photo: public domain
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Aren’t you being overly harsh, Newsham?
After all, Japan is making progress and finally exporting lethal weapons (sort of).
That”s true. But it needed to do this – and start other defense improvements ten years ago.
Japan doesn’t have time to dither. And it isn’t moving anywhere near fast enough.
Excuses are easier and still the coin of the realm in Tokyo. “Too hard,” “too expensive,” “politically difficult,” “the Constitution won’t allow it.”
But Japan has always been willing to reinterpret laws and the Constitution and modify unwritten policies restricting defense activities. and do what is necessary when it thinks it must.
The Americans haven’t given them a reason to think they must. And it appears Japan’s enemies still haven’t either.
When it comes to defense, Japan is “serious about getting serious.” But not much beyond that.
Sending a few Patriot missiles is not serious.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America.
This article was first published by JAPAN Forward and is republished with permission.
asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · December 29, 2023
15. When Killing the Enemy Wasn't Enough
When Killing the Enemy Wasn't Enough
By John J. Waters
December 29, 2023
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/12/29/when_killing_the_enemy_wasnt_enough_1001401.html
I wrote earlier this month about the “final class” of Marine Corps Scout Snipers. The Marine Corps is in process of discontinuing its infantry Scout Sniper platoons in favor of something called “scout platoons.” Undoubtedly, many meetings and opinions went into the final decision, including consideration of an incident that occurred in Afghanistan in 2011, when a few Scout Snipers from Third Battalion, Second Marines (3/2) were videotaped urinating on Taliban corpses in Helmand Province. The Marines identified in that video were swiftly condemned, punished and made outcasts by the press, politicians and senior military officers. Among the foot soldiers, however, those same Marines were highly regarded for courage demonstrated on many, many combat missions. I pick up my conversation about the Iliad with classicist Emily Wilson on this particular episode from the War on Terror. You can find part one of our conversation here.
"The Iliad"
Homer
After the video became public, one of the Marines who participated was questioned about why he did it. “[Because] killing these assholes was not enough,” he said. Can you situate this story of the 3/2 Scout Snipers into an ancient context?
There is a focus on honoring the dead. It’s a clear line that is constantly crossed even in the first lines of the poem, when we find that, after their death, men become food for dogs and birds, and are eaten off the battlefield. Later, Hector begs Achilles that if he is killed, Hector’s body will at least be returned to his parents, but Achilles says “no,” that Hector is an idiot to think he will return the body. Achilles wants only to punish Hector more and more and even more. I can see how you can be in that mindset, how you want not to treat the enemy as human and not allow for these rituals or humane treatments across boundaries. What happens at the end of The Iliad, when Priam crosses over to the camp of Achilles and both men grieve, is that we recognize we need the common rituals, that we all lose something in war.
Those Scout Snipers believed they had killed Taliban fighters who laid IEDs against their brothers. They sought vengeance, in other words. Once, in the months and years after 9/11, we all had sought vengeance. A combat veteran who won the Medal of Honor told me “Nothing flips a man’s dial back to ready like telling him, ‘This one took our boy.’” Why do we need vengeance?
Vengeance, in a way, is proof that people love each other. People love each other so much that they become so close, like second selves, and when your person dies, it's understandable to want payback for that terrible loss. We see that kind of intimate love most obviously between Achilles and Patroclus. They’ve been fighting together for almost 10 years. Achilles refuses to fight, when his honor is violated by Agamemnon, but all that changes when Hector takes Achilles’ boy, so to speak. That flips his switch. Achilles mutates and no longer cares about his grievance against Agamemnon; he cares only about obliterating Hector and obliterating the whole city because he has infinite rage and grief. The most special person in the world has been killed.
Michael Monsoor was killed in Ramadi in 2006. He was given the Medal of Honor for sacrificing himself when he smothered a grenade and saved the lives of his teammates. His father wanted only the truth about his death. He wanted to know the facts. Many parents want to know if we killed the one who did it to their boy. Michael’s father only wanted to know the truth. Can you reconcile those interests?
Michael A. Monsoor
Navy SEAL
That’s such a difficult story. I don’t know exactly where to go in The Iliad. It’s making me think about particular characters who want to be the subject of song, the subject of a song by a person who sings about glory and heroics. Is The Iliad focused on telling everything that happened or just the heroic things that happened? Clearly, it’s not a literal telling. And yet it is focused on telling you more than just Achilles was great and this is why he was great.
When Hector is dead, we have three different laments. One comes from his mother, Hecuba. She wants that version of him that many people want, which is how glorious Hector had been. She wants people to tell her the story about how her son never flinched in combat, even though the reader of the poem knows that’s not true and in fact, he ran from Achilles. Her grief inspires her need to idealize her son in death. Hector’s wife, Andromache, thinks of his courage but also his rashness, how his decision to leave the city has caused her son to be killed. She sees his sacrifice as debatable. Finally, there is Helen. She gives a narrative about how Hector was a kind man when nobody else was kind to her. The poem gives us all these alternative ways of grieving and remembering.
I have read Homer’s poems at different points in my life, and my reading has raised a personal question that I explore in a novel called River City One. The question is whether a soldier ever comes home from war. What do you think?
"River City One"
Simon and Schuster
Yes, whether the nostos (home-coming journey) is ever fully complete. Both The Iliad and The Odyssey show soldiers coming home from war. Odysseus comes home geographically but is he home just because he is in that same physical space? No -- that happens halfway through the poem and the story isn't over. Is he home once he reestablishes relationships with Telemachus and Penelope? Many people including in antiquity thought the story should end right there in Book 23, after he kills the suitors and makes love to his wife – but the poem continues, and the story actually ends when Odysseus keeps slaughtering people before he is stopped by Athena. So, has he really come home? The poem seems to show that he has several selves and several homes to come back to – and one of them, paradoxically, is the battlefield, and the warrior self that he might seem to have left behind. In The Iliad, Hector feels compelled to leave home. Family members are repeatedly begging him not to leave the city, but he leaves and comes home only when he's dead, to be wept over by the women. We know Achilles will never go home geographically; he knows he'll die if he stays to fight at Troy, so once he rejoins the battle, we know that's a choice not to go home again. One can say there is a kind of homecoming in the moment he has with Priam at the end of the poem, such that there is a moment to mourn and eat and not perform in his role as killer and avenger. Is that a kind of temporary “home”? I don't know. Both of the Homeric poems wrestle with the question, whether warriors ever go home again. The answer is uncertain.
John J. Waters is the author of the postwar novel River City One (Simon and Schuster), and a former deputy assistant secretary of homeland security.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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