Quotes of the Day:
"A new year is a gift, a small piece of infinity, to do with as we will."
-Jean Hersey
"Tomorrow is the first blank page of a 365 page book.
Write a good one."
- Brad Paisley
"Paymasters come in only two sizes: one sort shows you where the book says that you can't have what you've got coming to you; he second sort digs through the book until he finds a paragraph that lets you have what you need even if you don't rate it."
- Robert Heinlein - The Door into Summer
1. U.S. declines comment on Chung's remarks about end of war declaration agreement
2. UNC says it passed 86 messages to N.K. through direct communication line in 2021
3. Ex-U.N. chief says 'end goal' of inter-Korean cooperation efforts should be N.K. denuclearization
4. N. Korea has final review on draft resolution for year-end party plenary
5. Top N. Korean officials join discussions on major policies for 2022 at party plenary
6. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Spotlights Himself as He Marks a Decade in Power
7. South Korea’s Taiwan Conundrum
8. Students at N. Korean tank training school produce compost
9. Yoon stresses corruption probe of ex-president Park was not personal
10. Yoon stresses corruption probe of ex-president Park was not personal
11. Ex-President Park says she did nothing "ugly" for personal gain
12. Kim Jong Un firmly in control of North Korea after 10 years despite economic record
13. US Army demos underground operations with autonomous robots
14. Pragmatic foreign policy (South Korean presidential candidates)
1. U.S. declines comment on Chung's remarks about end of war declaration agreement
Public diplomacy is one thing. But conducting alliance diplomacy in public is not always a good thing. It is possible FM Chung is trying to force the US hand so that an EOW declaration can be made to support President Moon's peace agenda and his legacy as the "peace president." He may have miscalculated.
U.S. declines comment on Chung's remarks about end of war declaration agreement | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Dec. 29 (Yonhap) -- The United States declined to directly comment on any progress made on a draft for an end to the Korean War declaration professed by the South Korean foreign minister on Wednesday, only saying the U.S. remains committed to dialogue with North Korea.
South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong on Wednesday (Seoul time) said South Korea and the U.S. have already reached a de facto agreement on the draft of a declaration to formally end the Korean War.
A state department spokesperson offered no direct response when asked if the U.S. agreed with Chung's assessment, only reiterating U.S. commitment to diplomacy.
"The United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK," the department official told Yonhap News Agency in an email, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"To this end, we will continue to seek engagement with the DPRK as part of a calibrated, practical approach in order to make tangible progress that increases the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed forces," the official added.
The remarks are a repeat of what the U.S. has frequently said ever since, and even before, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan hinted at possible differences between Seoul and Washington over when an end of war declaration could or should be made.
"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps. but we are fundamentally aligned on the core strategic initiative here and on the belief that only through diplomacy are we going to really, truly be able to effectively make progress," Sullivan said on Oct. 26.
Sullivan had also declined to publicly discuss whether the U.S. supported declaring a formal end to the 1950-53 war as a way to bring North Korea back to the dialogue table.
Pyongyang has stayed away from denuclearization negotiations since 2019. It also remains unresponsive to numerous overtures made by the Joe Biden administration since it took office in January.
South Korea believes declaring the war's end could work as a catalyst to resume dialogue with North Korea.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. UNC says it passed 86 messages to N.K. through direct communication line in 2021
SITREP via Facebook.
Excerpt:
"UNC maintained a 24/7/365 line-of-communication with #KPA counterparts throughout the year. Using the storied 'pink phone,' we passed 86 messages and held twice-daily line checks for timely & meaningful information exchange," the command wrote on Facebook.
UNC says it passed 86 messages to N.K. through direct communication line in 2021 | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- The United Nations Command (UNC) has passed a total of 86 messages to North Korea through a round-the-clock communication line throughout this year, the U.S.-led command said Friday.
In Facebook posts, the command catalogued a series of activities it has carried out this year, including the processing of over 10,000 requests for access to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. The UNC oversees activities in the southern portion of the DMZ.
"UNC maintained a 24/7/365 line-of-communication with #KPA counterparts throughout the year. Using the storied 'pink phone,' we passed 86 messages and held twice-daily line checks for timely & meaningful information exchange," the command wrote on Facebook.
KPA refers to the North's Korean People's Army.
On the processing of access requests, the UNC said that it approved 98.57 percent of them.
"This review process is essential for validating the safety & security of personnel and for ensuring adherence to standing agreements with the #KoreanPeoplesArmy," it said.
The command also said that it conducted 36 armistice compliance inspections of front-line units across the DMZ and northwestern border islands this year.
The command is currently led by Gen. Paul LaCamera who also leads the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the U.S. Forces Korea.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Ex-U.N. chief says 'end goal' of inter-Korean cooperation efforts should be N.K. denuclearization
Wise words from perhaps the most well known Korean elder statesman.
Excerpts:
"But we should not forget that the firm South Korea-U.S. alliance is at its heart," he said.
In addition, Ban called for the new government's efforts to promote "harmony and unity" in "too polarized" a society.
"In fact, division and confrontation are not something that can be resolved all at once," he said. "But for national development, that is a matter that should be dealt with first and foremost."
Ex-U.N. chief says 'end goal' of inter-Korean cooperation efforts should be N.K. denuclearization | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- Former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Friday that North Korea's denuclearization should be the "end goal" of South Korea's efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, in a message for Seoul's next administration set to be launched in May.
Ban made the remarks in a New Year's message, as the incumbent Seoul government's efforts for cross-border rapprochement have remained stalled with little headway in the endeavors to denuclearize the North.
"While tenaciously pushing to develop inter-Korean relations based on national pride and self-enhancement, (the next government) should ensure the end goal lies in North Korea's denuclearization," Ban said in the message.
South Korea is scheduled to hold the next presidential election on March 9 and the presidential nominees of the rival parties have offered divergent policy views on the North.
Lee Jae-myung, the ruling Democratic Party presidential nominee, seeks a North Korea policy based on what he calls "realism and pragmatism," while Yoon Suk-yeol, the nominee for the conservative main opposition People Power Party, has stressed stronger deterrence against the North's nuclear threats.
Ban also stressed the importance of the "firm" South Korea-U.S. alliance, as Seoul faces an increasingly tricky balancing act amid an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry.
"(We) should strongly pursue mutual benefits and cooperation with neighboring countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula, such as the U.S., Japan, China and Russia," he said.
"But we should not forget that the firm South Korea-U.S. alliance is at its heart," he said.
In addition, Ban called for the new government's efforts to promote "harmony and unity" in "too polarized" a society.
"In fact, division and confrontation are not something that can be resolved all at once," he said. "But for national development, that is a matter that should be dealt with first and foremost."
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. N. Korea has final review on draft resolution for year-end party plenary
A 5th day - What will be in the statement )or New year's address)?
(LEAD) N. Korea has final review on draft resolution for year-end party plenary | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with unification ministry's comment in last 2 paras)
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has discussed a draft resolution expected to be adopted at the close of an ongoing key party meeting, its state media reported Friday, amid expectations the document could include its foreign policy line for the new year.
The North convened a fourth day of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the ruling Workers' Party's 8th Central Committee on Thursday, during which participants "concluded sectional workshops and consultative sessions," according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The participants launched sectional workshops Tuesday to "map out plans according to the fighting policies set forth" by leader Kim Jong-un under his report "on the orientation of the work of the party and state in 2022."
"The meeting put together constructive opinions to be added to a draft resolution and had final examination of them," it said.
The KCNA did not provide details, but the resolution is likely to include the North's stance on the deadlocked inter-Korean relations and its nuclear talks with the United States as top officials in charge of the issues were spotted partaking in the discussion sessions.
The resolution is expected to be unveiled at the end of the plenary.
The KCNA said a fifth-day session was to be held, though it's unclear for how many days the gathering will continue. Previous plenary meetings were held between one and four days.
This week's meeting has drawn keen attention as it could replace Kim's annual New Year's Day address, which is closely watched by the outside world for clues on the country's domestic and foreign policy directions for the new year.
Kim has skipped such speeches in the past two years, opting instead to unveil key messages via major party sessions around the turn of the calendar.
Seoul's unification ministry has been closely watching the party gathering, apparently hoping for a positive sign of Pyongyang warming to its repeated calls for a return to dialogue.
"We will continue monitoring the situation for a comprehensive analysis and assessment," Cha Duck-chul, deputy ministry spokesman, told a regular press briefing.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Top N. Korean officials join discussions on major policies for 2022 at party plenary
Or perhaps they are meeting to discuss their strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion. We should keep in mind that the United Front Department's primary mission is subversion of South Korea.
Excerpts:
The KCNA did not provide details, but it released photos of a workshop led by Kim Yong-chol, head of the United Front Department and the North's Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon, suggesting that inter-Korean relations and nuclear negotiations could have been among the agenda items.
"It's the first time the formation of a separate panel on South Korea or foreign relations was confirmed at a major party event by the North's state media report," an official at Seoul's unification ministry said.
(3rd LD) Top N. Korean officials join discussions on major policies for 2022 at party plenary | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS Seoul official's quote in para 5)
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Dec. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea had high-profile discussions on key policy issues for 2022 during a year-end plenary session of the Workers' Party, with senior officials, including those in charge of inter-Korean relations and foreign affairs in attendance, according to its state media Thursday.
The North convened a third day of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the party's 8th Central Committee on Wednesday, during which "sectional workshops" continued from the previous day to "map out plans according to the fighting policies set forth" by leader Kim Jong-un, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.
Kim presided over the first- and second-day sessions of the plenary and made a report "on the orientation of the work of the party and state in 2022."
The KCNA did not provide details, but it released photos of a workshop led by Kim Yong-chol, head of the United Front Department and the North's Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon, suggesting that inter-Korean relations and nuclear negotiations could have been among the agenda items.
"It's the first time the formation of a separate panel on South Korea or foreign relations was confirmed at a major party event by the North's state media report," an official at Seoul's unification ministry said.
Pak Jong-chon, the North's top military official, also led a separate consultative session apparently to discuss plans for the country's weapons development and defense strategies.
Details of the discussions are likely to be unveiled at the end of the plenary through a resolution, though it's unclear for how long the party gathering will continue. Previous plenary meetings were held between one and four days.
The participants also discussed the country's budget for the new year, which will be approved at its rubber-stamp legislature in February.
This week's meeting has drawn keen attention from the outside world, as it may offer a clue to the reclusive regime's next step amid a prolonged stalemate in its nuclear negotiations with the United States.
The North has remained unresponsive to U.S. overtures for talks after their no-deal Hanoi summit in 2019, demanding Washington first retract what it calls "double standards" and "hostile policy" against its regime.
The plenary also comes as North Korea marks the 10th anniversary of Kim's rise to power.
Kim officially took the helm of the North on Dec. 30, 2011, with the "supreme commandership of the Korean People's Army," 13 days after his father and former leader Kim Jong-il died.
In an editorial Thursday, the North's main newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, touted Kim for developing its military into "the world's strongest," and called for further boosting the country's defense capabilities.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Spotlights Himself as He Marks a Decade in Power
The first reports of Kimjongunism began surfacing this fall. But this is a logical step forward. Recall that Kim Yo Jong and the Propaganda and Agitation department has as their primary mission enhancing the reputation of Kim Jong-un they must have decided that it is time for Kim Jong-un to step completely out of the shadow of his father and grandfather. Kimjongunism will replace Kimilsungism but it is likely this is in name only. We should not expect any significant policy changes with this name change.
Excerpt:
He hasn’t publicly explained “Kimjongunism.” But its emergence signals Mr. Kim’s desire to differentiate his ideology from those of his father and grandfather—even if in substance, the policies don’t stray drastically from the past.
North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Spotlights Himself as He Marks a Decade in Power
The dictator is stepping out of the shadow of his father and grandfather as Pyongyang faces deep economic woes
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
North Korea’s 37-year-old, third-generation dictator has also introduced a new, personally-branded ideological doctrine, “Kimjongunism,” the agency has said. The new dogma hasn’t been fully articulated publicly, but Mr. Kim has adopted populist rhetoric and cast blame on technocrats.
He has staked his more self-centered leadership claim as his country of more than 25 million grapples with long-running problems: food shortages and a sputtering economy, both worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Diplomacy aimed at normalizing relations with the West has also stalled.
The push-and-pull between Mr. Kim’s newly envisioned North Korea and these legacy issues is among the chief topics for a year-end Workers’ Party plenary session unfolding this week. The meeting coincides with the 10-year anniversary Thursday of Mr. Kim’s formal ascension to power.
It is expected that Mr. Kim will deliver a policy speech, outlining North Korea’s 2022 plans, either at the plenary session or potentially in a Jan. 1 address.
“Previously, there was trading on the memories of his father and grandfather,” said Christopher Green, a senior consultant on Korean issues for the International Crisis Group. “But after 10 years, this has become more like Kim Jong Un’s North Korea rather than just legacy politics.”
Portraits of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s grandfather and father, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, in Pyongyang this month.
Photo: str/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The pandemic has posed a serious test for Mr. Kim. He tightened his country’s border controls nearly two years ago, causing trade with China to plummet. North Korea, which claims to have zero Covid-19 cases, has refused millions of donated vaccines. That leaves the population vulnerable to widespread transmission if borders are reopened.
This year, Mr. Kim has warned of food shortages and said the country is facing its worst-ever crisis. Prices are volatile for food and other staples, with some rising rapidly, South Korea’s Unification Ministry said earlier this month.
Amid the pandemic and sanctions, Mr. Kim has stayed away from reforms and opted for more centralization. Mr. Kim has also blasted the country’s youth for ideological slip-ups, while shaking up his leadership ranks—including demoting his top military official—over disloyalty and what he characterized as outdated ways of thinking.
“Kim Jong Un is in a terrible bind,” said Kongdan Oh, a Washington-based North Korea expert who has written several books on the Kim regime. “His first priority must be how to deal with the economic problems.”
The economic pain is unlikely to move how Pyongyang approaches gridlocked nuclear talks with Washington, given that the regime still seemingly has enough funds to keep conducting weapons tests and apparently to pacify the country’s elites, said Soo Kim, a North Korean expert at Rand Corp., a policy think tank.
The U.S. and North Korea haven’t held formal talks in more than two years. There are no indications Mr. Kim’s government would “consider modifying its policy for the sake of economic recovery and the betterment of North Korean lives,” said Ms. Kim, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst.
A rally in January in Pyongyang to celebrate the election of Kim Jong Un as general secretary of the country’s Workers’ Party.
Photo: Jon Chol Jin/Associated Press
The country has a continued poor record on human rights, with the United Nations last month adopting a resolution that condemned North Korea’s “systematic, widespread and gross” violations that “may amount to crimes against humanity.” It was the 17th straight year the U.N. adopted such a resolution.
Mr. Kim has tried to humanize himself, in contrast with the deification of his father and grandfather in official propaganda. He shed tears in public at a military parade last year and even let his recent weight loss become national news.
He hasn’t publicly explained “Kimjongunism.” But its emergence signals Mr. Kim’s desire to differentiate his ideology from those of his father and grandfather—even if in substance, the policies don’t stray drastically from the past.
Over the past decade, Mr. Kim has achieved major weapons advances, while also managing to get two face-to-face meetings with President Donald Trump and tightening his grip on the country. North Korea has used technology to boost surveillance on citizens and prop up the regime’s finances with illicit hacking.
One sign of Mr. Kim’s sense of self-accomplishment is the promoted title he gave himself at a rare Workers’ Party Congress meeting early this year. He went from the ruling party chairman to general secretary, giving himself the lofty position much faster than his father and grandfather, who each got the title in their mid-50s.
With the title choice, he in effect usurped the posthumous distinction given to his father as the party’s eternal general secretary, said Fyodor Tertitskiy, a North Korea specialist at Kookmin University in Seoul.
“I have no other explanation than it was his ego,” Mr. Tertitskiy said. “He seems to be saying, ‘I’m doing it because I can.’”
Pyongyang, which has spent years under sanctions pressure, has found ways to outmaneuver the economic restrictions, keeping workers stashed overseas, using shell companies to obscure financial transactions and masking the identities of their cargo-smuggling ships, according to U.N. reports.
There were signs this year that North Korean hackers were laundering stolen cryptocurrency through nonfungible tokens, or NFTs, said Aaron Arnold, a former finance and economics expert for the U.N. panel of experts group that monitors North Korea sanctions enforcement, who left earlier this year.
“North Korea is exceptionally innovative and entrepreneurial at sanctions evasion,” said Mr. Arnold, now at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank.
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
7. South Korea’s Taiwan Conundrum
Very important and useful analysis from Professor Cho. It is useful to recall the history of 1950 as well as the importance of table top exercises to work through various scenarios and contingencies.
Excepts:
The challenge is that the contingency in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on South Korea’s national security as well. South Korea’s analytic community appears to have mixed assessments on the possibility of war across the Taiwan Strait. South Korean scholars notice that the Chinese leaders’ aggressive remarks on Taiwan have visibly increased under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s watch. But they also interpret that such a rhetoric is developed for domestic consumption: Xi attempts to strengthen popular support by appealing to the Chinese people’s aspiration for national unification. Even if Xi has a genuine desire to pursue unification by force, the disparity with U.S. military forces still remains large, which will become even larger with the addition of U.S. allies like Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Xi therefore has to take into account the political, economic, and diplomatic consequences before making a decision on China’s invasion of Taiwan. Therefore, South Korean scholars seem to conclude that China is not likely to invade Taiwan anytime soon and will focus on maintaining the status quo instead.
...
What South Korea needs to worry about, however, is not the low possibility of a rapid and all-out invasion, but the likelihood of limited attack or low-intensity provocation in slow motion. For example, the unclassified tabletop exercise — funded by Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation and joined by experienced military experts from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States in 2020 — started with a hypothetical situation that China occupies two Taiwan-controlled features in the South China Sea. The permanent garrisons on the islands of Taiping (Itu Aba) and the Dongsha (Pratas) are small and lightly armed. The Chinese military can quickly occupy them, justifying the actions with its “One China” policy. Since the occupation does not involve any American casualties with the number of Taiwanese casualties kept low, it will be hard for Washington to make a rapid decision for military intervention. While holding hostage the Taiwanese people on the islands, Beijing can pressure Taipei and Washington to refrain from taking any actions to retake the islands. The 2021 report published by the Center for a New American Security also reached a similar conclusion that China’s limited attacks will put the United States in a very difficult position to react. Both the Sasakawa exercise and the Center for a New American Security report urge Washington to discuss with U.S. allies about their potential assistance in such scenarios, which means that Seoul needs to be ready to have such a conversation.
Conclusion:
When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, American leaders rapidly decided to support South Korea’s defense. It should not be forgotten that President Harry Truman also directed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent conflicts between China and Taiwan. The United States could easily deter China’s invasion of Taiwan in 1950, but this may not be the case anymore in 2021. The debate over when, whether, and how China might attack Taiwan — and what such an attack might lead to — has taken on a new sense of urgency in the last two years. As such, Seoul needs to communicate more actively with Washington on Taiwan-related issues, including how to respond to China’s possible retaliations. In the case of all-out war, South Korea would be surely expected to fight with the U.S. forces as a treaty ally. In the case that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait expands to the Korean Peninsula with North Korea’s provocation in support of China, South Korea and the United States need to discuss whether and how to distribute U.S. forces assigned to Korea and South Korean forces between the two front lines. And in the case of low-intensity provocations or limited attack, Seoul needs to explain and seek mutual understanding with Washington if it is unwilling to be involved militarily. Then they can explore other ways for South Korea to make contributions for the stability of the region.
The Senate hearing of the U.S. Forces Korea commander in May was revealing about the growing expectation of South Korea’s role in Northeast Asia. As the 10th-largest economy with the sixth most powerful military, South Korea is well expected to make contributions for peace and stability in the region. That is why Gen. LaCamera said during the hearing that, “given…the international reach of the South Korean military, opportunities are emerging for alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula.” Too much expectation, however, may end up with a deeper disappointment if not managed properly. Seoul needs to take the Taiwan issue more seriously and review its policy options. It should communicate with Washington more actively to explain its concerns and possible range of policy options. Washington also needs to better understand South Korea’s view to have a productive dialogue. Regardless of a real possibility of a Taiwan contingency, the trust level of the U.S.-South Korean alliance is already being tested.
South Korea’s Taiwan Conundrum - War on the Rocks
What would South Korea do if China attacked Taiwan? Many people in Washington, Taipei, and Tokyo are wondering. South Korea’s position remains much more ambivalent than Japan’s. Seoul is understandably more worried about the possibility of retaliation from China, akin to Beijing’s fury over the basing of a U.S. defensive missile system in South Korea several years ago. Seoul also has a unique concern that Beijing would turn even more non-cooperative in the future process of Korean unification, if it ever occurs, as a result of South Korean involvement in a war over Taiwan. However, there is a variety of scenarios for a Taiwan contingency that will impact South Korea’s security policies, especially the one involving a two-pronged war in both the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. Seoul should more actively engage in strategic dialogue with Washington on Taiwan issues. In turn, Washington should better appreciate Seoul’s concerns and the possible range of South Korea’s role in the Taiwan Strait. Both parties are urged to include a Taiwan contingency as part of the agenda for the bilateral alliance.
So, What Does South Korea Think?
As the possibility of war across the Taiwan Strait looms large, the analytic community in Washington has begun to ask questions about South Korea’s position. Experts have called for Washington to reinforce security cooperation with allies and like-minded countries to deter China’s invasion of Taiwan. They especially emphasize that Japan’s backing is indispensable. In turn, Tokyo has shown an unprecedented level of support for Japan’s involvement in a Taiwan contingency. During the U.S.-Japanese summit in April 2021, President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga demonstrated a united front on the Taiwan matter. Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro also remarked that a Taiwan contingency is linked to Japan’s survival. As Tokyo clarifies its position, a growing attention is paid to South Korea.
The United States has military and political interests in South Korea’s position for the possibility of U.S. Forces Korea’s involvement in a Taiwan contingency and South Korean military forces’s potential support. General Paul LaCamera, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated during the confirmation hearing in May that he would seek to integrate U.S. forces based in South Korea into “operational plans supporting U.S. interests and objectives in the region [emphasis mine].” Any U.S. military operation from the peninsula to intervene in order to defend or retake Taiwan would require close coordination with the South Korean government. This observation begs a set of questions regarding South Korea’s internal view of the Taiwan issue. Why does South Korea seem to prefer ambiguity? How does China view South Korea’s involvement in the Taiwan contingency? How do members of South Korea’s policy community assess the possibility of a war over Taiwan and what South Korea ought to do?
Why Take a Cautious Approach?
During the summit in May 2021, Presidents Biden and Moon Jae-in agreed on the importance of “preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.” It was the first time that the Taiwan issue was ever included in a joint statement between South Korea and the United States. During the press conference, Moon reiterated that South Korea would work more closely with Washington on this issue. In the domestic briefing on the outcome of the summit, however, South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong remarked, “We are fully aware of the unique relations between China and Taiwan. Our government’s stance has not changed. We’d like to reiterate that regional peace and stability is the common wish shared by everyone in the region.” Chung practically toned down the significance of the inclusion of Taiwan in the joint summit statement. As such, South Korea’s commitment to the defense of Taiwan largely remains ambiguous.
The possibility that China might attack Taiwan emerged as a thorny issue in the alliance for the first time during the Roh administration. Due to the increasing demands of military commitments in the Middle East, the Bush administration developed the concept of “strategic flexibility” and applied it to U.S. Forces Korea. Washington intended to rapidly move select U.S. military assets out of the Korean Peninsula to wherever these forces were needed. South Korean policymakers worried that these forces might be dispatched to Taiwan in the event of military conflict. That could threaten to entrap South Korea in a war between the United States and China. President Roh Moo-hyun publicly expressed his strong opposition against such a scenario. On Jan. 19, 2006, however, the South Korean government agreed to acknowledge the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. Forces Korea under the condition of consultation. In the joint statement, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon affirmed that South Korea respected the “necessity for strategic flexibility” while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice affirmed that “the U.S. respects the [Republic of Korea] position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”
No doubt, South Korea’s cautious approach is related to China’s potential retaliation. During a bilateral summit in May, China’s Global Times editorial warned that Seoul’s discussion of Taiwan with Washington is equal to South Korea drinking poison under U.S. coercion. After the summit, the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also warned that the “relevant countries” should not “play with fire.” Chinese analysts interpreted the inclusion of the Taiwan issue in the joint statement as Washington’s ploy to expand the role of the U.S.-South Korean alliance to “contain China.” A report published by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, for example, argues that the Biden administration agreed to scrap the ballistic missile range limits for South Korea precisely to balance China’s missile capabilities. The authors claim that China should take necessary measures to raise the cost of South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on Taiwan. With China’s economic retaliation over the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in 2017 still in fresh memory, it is not surprising that Seoul needs to take into account China’s likely retaliation when formulating its position on Taiwan.
From a longer-term perspective, Seoul also needs to consider Beijing’s policy toward Korean unification. After the end of the Vietnam War, China and Korea remain the only divided countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese officials and scholars emphasize that the unification of Korea is an international issue, whereas Chinese-Taiwanese unification is an internal affair. The two Koreas joined the United Nations as two sovereign states in 1991. Despite the difference in legal status, Chinese experts tend to positively perceive that Korean unification, if it happens first, would stimulate the Chinese people’s aspiration for national unification. They even expect that Beijing may learn some lessons from the Korean experiences of integrating two different systems. In short, Chinese analysts see a linkage between Korean unification and Chinese unification. This implies that China will surely accuse South Korea of obstructing China’s national unification if the country gets involved in a Taiwan contingency. Then, Beijing will become even more non-cooperative in the process of Korean unification in the future.
China’s cooperation is crucial to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula if the unification of the two Koreas ever occurs in the future. From the U.S. perspective, securing North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure and arsenal would be the top priority in the event of Korean unification. As I argued elsewhere, Washington and Seoul can coordinate efforts to shape Beijing’s policy toward Korean unification once they have a comprehensive understanding of China’s cost-benefit calculus in association with Korean unification. However, if South Korea is involved in contingency planning for Taiwan affairs, such a move would surely diminish Beijing’s willingness to cooperate for Korean unification. The linkage of unification issues is therefore a unique concern to South Korea that other U.S. allies do not have to worry about.
A Dangerous Linkage
The challenge is that the contingency in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on South Korea’s national security as well. South Korea’s analytic community appears to have mixed assessments on the possibility of war across the Taiwan Strait. South Korean scholars notice that the Chinese leaders’ aggressive remarks on Taiwan have visibly increased under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s watch. But they also interpret that such a rhetoric is developed for domestic consumption: Xi attempts to strengthen popular support by appealing to the Chinese people’s aspiration for national unification. Even if Xi has a genuine desire to pursue unification by force, the disparity with U.S. military forces still remains large, which will become even larger with the addition of U.S. allies like Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Xi therefore has to take into account the political, economic, and diplomatic consequences before making a decision on China’s invasion of Taiwan. Therefore, South Korean scholars seem to conclude that China is not likely to invade Taiwan anytime soon and will focus on maintaining the status quo instead.
What South Korea needs to worry about, however, is not the low possibility of a rapid and all-out invasion, but the likelihood of limited attack or low-intensity provocation in slow motion. For example, the unclassified tabletop exercise — funded by Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation and joined by experienced military experts from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States in 2020 — started with a hypothetical situation that China occupies two Taiwan-controlled features in the South China Sea. The permanent garrisons on the islands of Taiping (Itu Aba) and the Dongsha (Pratas) are small and lightly armed. The Chinese military can quickly occupy them, justifying the actions with its “One China” policy. Since the occupation does not involve any American casualties with the number of Taiwanese casualties kept low, it will be hard for Washington to make a rapid decision for military intervention. While holding hostage the Taiwanese people on the islands, Beijing can pressure Taipei and Washington to refrain from taking any actions to retake the islands. The 2021 report published by the Center for a New American Security also reached a similar conclusion that China’s limited attacks will put the United States in a very difficult position to react. Both the Sasakawa exercise and the Center for a New American Security report urge Washington to discuss with U.S. allies about their potential assistance in such scenarios, which means that Seoul needs to be ready to have such a conversation.
The worst-case scenario for South Korea would be that the Taiwan contingency expands to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. If the tension rapidly escalates to the verge of military conflict with the United States in the Taiwan Strait, China would certainly want to prevent the U.S. forces based in Japan and Korea respectively from repositioning themselves to intervene in and around Taiwan. Therefore, if Pyongyang intends to do so, Beijing will not oppose North Korea’s concurrent provocations to pin down U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan from moving to the Taiwan Strait. From Pyongyang’s perspective as well, the contingency in Taiwan Strait means that the U.S. focus is distracted from the Korean Peninsula, which creates an opportunity for major provocation such as nuclear or long-range missile tests. By doing so, Pyongyang can pressure Seoul and Washington to make concessions on the denuclearization negotiation. As U.S. Navy officer Ki-suh Jung persuasively argues, China and North Korea, as treaty allies, may well discuss, plan, and execute a two-pronged attack to split the U.S. forces. With or without such a conspiracy, Pyongyang can send a signal to Beijing for simultaneous attacks at any phase of crisis. Indeed, in October 2021, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho threatened that “The huge forces of the U.S. and its satellite states, which are being concentrated near Taiwan,” can be “committed to a military operation targeting [North Korea] at any time,” and that “The U.S. should bear in mind that its reckless interference in internal affairs…would only invite tragic consequences.”
A Test of the Alliance
When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, American leaders rapidly decided to support South Korea’s defense. It should not be forgotten that President Harry Truman also directed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent conflicts between China and Taiwan. The United States could easily deter China’s invasion of Taiwan in 1950, but this may not be the case anymore in 2021. The debate over when, whether, and how China might attack Taiwan — and what such an attack might lead to — has taken on a new sense of urgency in the last two years. As such, Seoul needs to communicate more actively with Washington on Taiwan-related issues, including how to respond to China’s possible retaliations. In the case of all-out war, South Korea would be surely expected to fight with the U.S. forces as a treaty ally. In the case that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait expands to the Korean Peninsula with North Korea’s provocation in support of China, South Korea and the United States need to discuss whether and how to distribute U.S. forces assigned to Korea and South Korean forces between the two front lines. And in the case of low-intensity provocations or limited attack, Seoul needs to explain and seek mutual understanding with Washington if it is unwilling to be involved militarily. Then they can explore other ways for South Korea to make contributions for the stability of the region.
The Senate hearing of the U.S. Forces Korea commander in May was revealing about the growing expectation of South Korea’s role in Northeast Asia. As the 10th-largest economy with the sixth most powerful military, South Korea is well expected to make contributions for peace and stability in the region. That is why Gen. LaCamera said during the hearing that, “given…the international reach of the South Korean military, opportunities are emerging for alliance cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula.” Too much expectation, however, may end up with a deeper disappointment if not managed properly. Seoul needs to take the Taiwan issue more seriously and review its policy options. It should communicate with Washington more actively to explain its concerns and possible range of policy options. Washington also needs to better understand South Korea’s view to have a productive dialogue. Regardless of a real possibility of a Taiwan contingency, the trust level of the U.S.-South Korean alliance is already being tested.
Image: U.S. Navy (Photo by Seaman Apprentice Cale Hatch)
8. Students at N. Korean tank training school produce compost
I am reminded of Patton when I think of the tank school in north Korea having to produce "compost" and other attempts to produce "organic fertilizer."
Patton:
Thirty years from now when you're sitting by your fireside with your grandson on your knee and he asks, 'What did you do in the great World War Two?' You won't have to cough and say, 'Well, your granddaddy shoveled shit in Louisiana."
I think in the future many nKPA soldiers may have to tell their grandchildren how they supported Kimjongunism while at the tank training school.
Students at N. Korean tank training school produce compost
The school owns over 397,000 square meters of land
With North Korean authorities already preparing for farming next year to expand food production, even students at a military tank training school are producing compost.
A Daily NK source in North Korea said Monday that students at Unit 2734, a Korean People’s Army tank training school, have been producing compost since Dec. 14. Each cadet is tasked with producing 10 kilograms of compost a day from 2 PM to 7 PM, with mornings dedicated to training and cleaning weapons.
Despite criticism that students cannot focus on their training, the school has responded that it has little choice since it owns over 397,000 square meters of land.
Located in Yonghung-ri, Kaechon, South Pyongan Province, Unit 2734 is a military training body tasked with training tank drivers. The unit operates directly under the General Staff Department.
Some 600 to 700 students graduate from the center a year. They undergo three months of basic training, followed by a year of learning tank and armored vehicle theory and field training before they are deployed to mechanized and armored units.
Thus, many young soldiers are basically wasting their time doing agricultural work such as producing compost instead of learning how to drive tanks.
This undated file photo shows a North Korean compost tractor / Image: Daily NK
According to the source, this phenomenon has been going on for a while.
Late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly gave the unit high grades for farming, livestock raising, and mushroom cultivation when he visited in October of 2004. This means the unit responded to Kim’s praise by focusing on its side projects instead of training.
This focus has continued to the present day. Current North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reportedly praised the unit as a model of self-reliant production for harvesting dozens of tons of soybeans and corn this year and last.
The situation is growing increasingly excessive. After evening inspection, soldiers who were unable to fulfill their daily quota of compost reportedly steal compost from local farms and homes.
The source said because of this, when local residents see soldiers from the tank school, they openly tell them, “Don’t touch my compost.”
Locals and soldiers alike are criticizing the government’s policies.
The source said the soldiers came to the school to learn how to drive tanks, but feel like they are learning how to steal human feces and animal manure instead. Meanwhile, locals sarcastically say the base trains agricultural experts rather than soldiers for mechanized units.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
9. Defense minister reiterates political neutrality ahead of March presidential poll
One of the ROK and US military shared values.
I did notice the Korean film, "Spy Gone North"is available for rent on Amazon Prime. The movie took place in the 1990s during the nuclear crisis up through the election of Kim Dae Jung in 1997 and included discussion of a "northern wind" that has occured at election time (but did not in 1997).
Defense minister reiterates political neutrality ahead of March presidential poll | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Defense Minister Suh Wook reiterated calls Friday for military personnel to maintain political neutrality as rival parties are revving up preparations for the March 9 presidential election.
Suh made the calls in his New Year's message that highlighted the Moon Jae-in administration's resolve to strengthen "across-the-board" national defense while trying to reduce cross-border tensions.
"As the presidential election and local elections are slated for March and June, respectively, I direct the military to strictly maintain political neutrality as stipulated in the Constitution," Suh said in the message.
"I call on you to focus on the true obligations you are in charge of rather than clouding the true nature of the military by raising political issues or controversy through careless words and deeds and social media activities," the minister added.
Touching on the security environment on the Korean Peninsula, Suh said uncertainties could continue in the new year given that the North continues to push for the development of new weapons systems like submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
"I call on you to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture based on the establishment of the across-the-board defense stance and build military trust by continuing to implement the Sept. 19 military accord," he said.
The minister was referring to the 2018 inter-Korean military accord aimed at reducing cross-border tensions and preventing accidental clashes. It includes various measures, including disarming the Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone.
The minister also reaffirmed Seoul's resolve to accelerate efforts for the envisioned transfer of wartime operational control from the U.S. to South Korea.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. Yoon stresses corruption probe of ex-president Park was not personal
Complex South Korean politics. But the conservative party is not the same one that President Park led.
Yoon stresses corruption probe of ex-president Park was not personal | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- Main opposition presidential nominee Yoon Suk-yeol stressed Friday that his investigation of former President Park Geun-hye was carried out in the line of duty as a senior prosecutor amid speculation her release from prison could hurt his election chances.
Park became a free woman at midnight under a presidential pardon after serving nearly five years in prison. Her release puts Yoon of the People Power Party (PPP) in an awkward position as he headed the investigation of Park's corruption scandal that eventually led to her impeachment, ouster from office and imprisonment in 2017.
In a book that was published on Thursday, which was based on Park's letters from prison, Park did not directly mention Yoon, but claimed that an additional arrest warrant issued on her in October 2017 was unreasonable. Yoon was head of the Seoul Central District Office at the time.
"I have not read the book yet, but now I am a politician," Yoon said of Park's claim in the book. "I had to enforce laws as a public servant, but now as a politician, I am in a position to think about things like the national unity and evaluation of those who made big contributions to the country."
Park's pardon is widely expected to have a big impact on the March 9 presidential election as she has commanded strong support of voters in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, a stronghold of the PPP.
In recent days, Yoon has been trying to sort out their troubled past relationship to consolidate conservative voters for the presidential election.
Analysts said Park's support for Yoon may bring the conservative bloc together, but also could turn away moderate supporters.
Yoon earlier said he is sorry for the corruption probe on Park.
"I just wish for Park to make a quick recovery of her health," he said.
kdon@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. Ex-President Park says she did nothing "ugly" for personal gain
I expect when she recovers her health that she will find a co-author and write a book that explains her side of the story of the impeachment and charges that put her in jail.
Ex-President Park says she did nothing "ugly" for personal gain | Yonhap News Agency
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- Ousted former President Park Geun-hye defended herself in a series of letters written after she was imprisoned for corruption in 2017, saying she never did anything as "ugly" as abusing her office to help others for personal gain.
Park published the letters in a book titled "Not everybody feels a longing," which was published Thursday just hours before she was set free under a presidential pardon.
The notes are her responses to missives she received from supporters during her four years and nine months in prison following her impeachment, removal from office and conviction on charges of corruption.
"What I can say with certainty is that I never did anything as ugly as helping another's interests with a personal motive in mind," the 69-year-old former leader wrote.
Park was accused of letting her close friend, Choi Soon-sil, run state affairs from behind the scenes and colluding with her to extort money from big businesses including Samsung.
Park denied the charges but was sentenced to 22 years in prison following months of nationwide candlelight rallies demanding her ouster.
Her letters made clear she stood by her claims of innocence and there was no explicit expression of regret or apology for the turmoil she caused.
"Even if it takes time, the truth will be revealed without fail, and I believe even a tangled ball of thread will unravel itself strand by strand," she wrote. "Even if something appears legitimate from the outside, if there is no justification for it in reality, we cannot call that the rule of law."
Park shared her thoughts on her trial and the many news reports and rumors that swirled around the time of her impeachment, saying that was a time when "no matter what I said, (people) would shut their ears and eyes."
"I was greatly disappointed to see certain news outlets irresponsibly carrying fake news and unconfirmed reports mainly on gossip and yet not once expressing remorse for their false reports," she wrote, adding that she believes the news media will one day have to take responsibility for such "irresponsible reporting."
Park described her dismay following the prosecution's issuance of an additional warrant for her arrest in October 2017, saying the decision led to her refusal to attend future court proceedings.
"The reason I endured the murderous court schedule four times a week despite the enormous humiliation was because of the slightest faith I had in our judiciary to determine right from wrong on the side of truth," she wrote.
"When I saw the additional arrest warrant issued for reasons that made no sense, it occurred to me that it was a formality for a decision that had already been made."
Park's release has drawn attention for its potential impact on the March 9 presidential election amid speculation it could split the conservative vote between supporters of conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol of the main opposition People Power Party and detractors who blame him for Park's imprisonment.
Yoon is a former prosecutor who played a key role in the investigation into the corruption scandal and was chief of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors Office when the prosecution issued the additional arrest warrant for Park.
In the letters, Park broke her silence on her whereabouts during the first seven hours of a deadly ferry sinking in April 2014, when she was in office.
Critics have lambasted her for her apparent absence from duty at the time, arguing many more lives could have been saved had she responded properly.
"What happened on the day the Sewol sank was so shocking that it is very difficult for me to recall it now," she wrote, referring to the name of the ferry. "I was not feeling well that day and was briefed (on the sinking) at the official residence."
"Regarding the situation at the time of Sewol's sinking, there were bizarre rumors about me and malicious slander, but I believed in the power of the truth and kept silent," she continued. "I did not try to hide anything, nor was there any reason to. After much time passes, I believe it will become clear which was the truth."
Park is a daughter of former authoritarian President Park Chung-hee, and in her letters, she spoke of her longing for her parents, both of whom were assassinated.
"I miss my father more with the passing of time," she wrote. "A month from now is the anniversary of my father's death, but once again, I don't think I'll be able to visit his grave."
She wrote that although there was a time she envied an "ordinary life," she later resolved to live her life in the service of her country and the people.
"Judicial judgment of me will eventually come to an end, but a different and new journey will then begin," she wrote.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
12. Kim Jong Un firmly in control of North Korea after 10 years despite economic record
Good review from Radio Free Asia. It goes without saying that he has consolidated power by prioritizing his nuclear and missile programs, advanced military development, and support of the elite over the welfare of the Korean people living in the north.
Kim Jong Un firmly in control of North Korea after 10 years despite economic record
His brutal consolidation of power has sustained a dictatorial dynasty while poverty and hunger deepen.
By Jung Woo Park and Eugene Whong
2021.12.29
When the leather-jacket-clad Kim Jong Un opened the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021, he sat firmly entrenched as the unquestioned authority in North Korea, just as his father and grandfather had before him.
One decade into his rule, Kim’s power is absolute. But when his father, Kim Jong Il, died in December 2011, few knew what to expect from the Swiss-educated NBA fan who had been designated as the “Great Successor” in the last days of his father’s rule.
Some thought that Kim Jong Un’s western education might lead him to reform the decaying isolationist country that he was to inherit.
Others thought that at 27, Kim Jong Un was ill-fitted to lead a dynasty and would be reduced to a mere puppet backed by more powerful and experienced officials.
Still others viewed the elder Kim’s death as a precursor to North Korea’s collapse.
“North Korea as we know it is over,” wrote former White House Asian Affairs Adviser Victor Cha only days after Kim Jong Il’s death in an Op-Ed for the New York Times.
“Whether it comes apart in the next few weeks or over several months, the regime will not be able to hold together,” said Cha, who even suggested that North Korea could be reduced to a de-facto province of the People’s Republic of China in the aftermath.
Schoolchildren stand beside Kim Jong Un as he arrives to attend "We Are the Happiest in the World," a performance by schoolchildren to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Children's Union, in this photo released June 8, 2016. (Reuters/KCNA)
A decade later, Kim Jong Un appears to have proven his detractors wrong.
In his 10-years at the helm, the country has seen both new highs and familiar lows. He made historic diplomatic overtures both with South Korea and the U.S., and his nuclear and missile programs made major advances in capability.
Economy in tatters
But the North Korean economy lies in shambles, worse off than when he took over, due to the double squeeze of international nuclear sanctions and a closed border with China to stop the spread of coronavirus. Still, few talk about regime collapse like they did 10 years ago.
“When he took over, he had to really show the rest of the leadership, especially the old guards that he was able to really enforce his will on the leadership,” Ken Gause, research program director at the Virginia-based CNA think tank, told RFA’s Korean Service.
Kim Jong Un poses with members of the Air and Anti-Aircraft Force in North Korea in this picture released Nov. 17, 2019. (KCNA via Reuters)
Very early on in his rule, Kim began a bloody purge of hundreds of government officials, including his own uncle Jang Song Thaek, who many had thought was the de-facto leader of the country in the final days of Kim Jong Il’s rule.
Jang was executed for “attempting to overthrow the state,” but observers at the time believed it was his desire for economic reform, as well as his disagreements with Kim Jong Un on foreign policy that did him in.
The deadly moves to consolidate his power spilled outside of North Korea in 2017, when Kim Jong Un’s brother Kim Jong Nam was assassinated at an airport in Malaysia by two women claiming they were tricked into smearing nerve agent onto the disgraced older brother’s face, believing they were participating in a prank for a television show.
Kim Jong Un inspects a female company in Unit 5492 of the Korean People’s Army in this picture released Nov. 25, 2019. (KCNA via Reuters)
Kim Jong Nam had at one time appeared to have been next in line after his father, but some believe he fell out of favor after an embarrassing run-in with Japanese immigration officials as he attempted to take a family trip to Tokyo Disneyland.
“If [Kim Jong Un] had not engaged in the very bloody aspects of politics inside North Korea, there is a chance that he could have been maybe not toppled but turned into a figurehead,” Gause said.
“I'm sure that Kim Jong Il educated his son … [on] what it means and what the Kim’s family rule is. Rule number one, ‘You have to do whatever is necessary. Because if you give this system a chance, the system does not like the perpetuation of generational turnover from one Kim to the next,’” he said.
Kim Jong Un poses for a photograph after conferring "Paektusan" commemorative pistols to leading commanding officers of the armed forces on the 67th anniversary of the "Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War," which marks the signing of the Korean War armistice, in this photo released July 27, 2020. (KCNA via Reuters)
The elite politics of the communist world’s only hereditary dynasty are playing out as many in the impoverished country struggle to find their next meal. Two years into the coronavirus pandemic, food is in short supply, imports aren’t keeping pace with demand, and starvation deaths have been reported.
In 2012, three months into his rule, Kim promised the people during a high-profile event that they would never feel hungry again like they had during the Arduous March, the 1994-1998 North Korean famine that killed millions, or as much as 10% of the population by some estimates.
Tighten your belts
In a New Year’s Address in 2013, he promised economic stability and an improvement in living standards.
Now authorities are telling the people that they should prepare for another Arduous March, and Kim has publicly called on the people to tighten their belts again.
“Right now, North Korea is trying to take and become self-sufficient, but the challenge with that is that North Korea doesn't have the resources to be self-sufficient,” Troy Stangarone, senior director and fellow at the Korea Economic Institute, told RFA.
“It lacks the technology, energy and agricultural basis to do so. This is why we see large portions of the population’s food are insecure and why you see outside of Pyongyang cities largely underdeveloped,” he said.
Despite the economic crisis, Kim has declared victory, earlier this month proclaiming at a meeting of the political bureau that “the national economy is managed and stable.”
Kim Jong Un visits long-range artillery units of the Korean People's Army in this image released March 2, 2020. (KCNA via Reuters)
Mun Song Hui, editor-in-chief of the Japan-based Shukan Kinyobi weekly magazine, told RFA that Kim’s assessment of the economic situation was difficult to accept.
“While border closures are still ongoing and international sanctions have not been eased, it is hard to believe that there are achievements. It is not convincing to say that the achievements of self-reliance and self-sufficiency are so simple,” Mun said.
“Conversely, I think the seriousness of the problem lies in the fact that the two sectors of agriculture and construction are still at the center of economic policy,” Mun said.
He noted that Kim has, since the earliest days of his rule, attempted to implement policies to bolster both sectors, but remains unable to resolve problems in either.
Kim Jong Un arrives at the railway station before his departure in Vladivostok, Russia on April 26, 2019. (Reuters)
Fashionable couple
Though Kim Jong Un has had his ups and downs running the country of 25 million, much of the discourse and speculation surrounding the young leader has been about his weight, his health and his fashion choices.
Last year, the South Korean National Intelligence Service described Kim as “extremely obese.”
At a stature of 170 cm (5 feet 8 inches), he was estimated to weigh about 90 kg (about 200 lbs.) shortly after he took office in 2012. He has gained around 6 or 7 kg each year since then, to reach 140 kg (more than 300 pounds) in 2020.
Kim also disappeared from the public eye in mid-2020, leading observers to speculate that his health was deteriorating. As rumors of his death circulated, interest in the Kim Dynasty’s line of succession after Kim Jong Un began to brew among North Korea watchers.
Some suggested that he would be replaced by his sister Kim Yo Jong, known for her undiplomatic rants published in state media about the South Korean and U.S. governments. But Kim Jong Un resurfaced, and Kim Yo Jong was demoted after the 8th Party Congress in January 2021.
After another lengthy absence in mid 2021, Kim reappeared having lost a considerable amount of weight. Looking visibly thinner, but still heavier than the vast majority of North Koreans, state media reported that even the “Highest Dignity” as he is colloquially referred to, had been “suffering” alongside his people during the economic crisis and food shortages.
In a modern update of the cult worship cultivated around his predecessors, Kim and his wife’s fashion trends are copied in the country of 25 million people.
When his wife, singer Ri Sol Ju, appeared in a dress made by French luxury brand Chanel in 2013, a whole knockoff industry emerged, allowing North Korean women to dress like Ri but at more affordable prices.
Kim Jong Un (C) and his wife Ri Sol-Ju (front 2nd R) visit the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School in Pyongyang to plant trees with its students on Tree Planting Day, March 2, 2017. (AFP/KCNA via KNS)
Young men this year decided that leather was in, after Kim and other high-ranking officials began sporting black leather trench coats at high-profile events.
No deals with Trump
Quite possibly Kim Jong Un’s greatest success has been simultaneously his greatest failure.
The two meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore in 2018 and Vietnam in 2019, as well as Trump’s brief visit 2019 to North Korea in Panmunjom, which straddles the inter-Korean border, were the first direct interactions between a North Korean leader and a sitting U.S. president.
U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un walk together during their summit at the Capella Hotel on the resort island of Sentosa, Singapore, June 12, 2018. (Reuters)
While the two visits were seen as a public relations win for Pyongyang, they failed to produce an agreement to reduce the sanctions that have crippled North Korea’s economy.’
“If the North Korea-U.S. summit had gone well, the economic sanctions problems might have been resolved and the direction might have changed toward reform and opening,” Park Won Gon, of Ewha Womans University in Seoul told RFA. “But that didn't happen.”
Following the failed summits, North Korea returned to its tried-and-true strategy of brinkmanship 2021, unveiling new weapons capabilities in a series of test launches this year.
Of North Korea’s six nuclear weapons tests so far, four took place during Kim Jong Un’s reign.
The first, in 2013, likely yielded a 14 kiloton explosion. Pyongyang claimed the second, in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb, and in September 2016, Pyongyang announced that it successfully tested a nuclear warhead that could be mounted onto a rocket.
North Korea’s most recent nuclear test, in 2017, was also claimed to be a hydrogen bomb, with South Korea’s Korea Meteorological Association estimating that the explosion was between 50 and 60 kilotons.
North Korea also conducted 43 missile tests since 2012, four of which flew over Japanese territory. Pyongyang’s first ICBM test occurred in 2017, potentially giving North Korea the ability to hit cities as far away as the northeastern U.S.
Kim Jong Un visits battle sites in areas of Mount Paektu, Ryanggang, North Korea, in this picture released Dec. 4, 2019. (KCNA via Reuters)
Strongman with a weak economy
Other examples of a return to brinkmanship included the destruction of a South Korea-built inter-Korean liaison office in the North Korean city of Kaesong in 2020 and a complete shutdown of hotlines between Pyongyang and Seoul.
North Korea blamed the South Korean government for failing to prevent activists in the South, many of whom had escaped in North Korea, from launching anti-regime leaflets on hot air balloons across the border.
The hotlines remained down until October 2021.
Analysts believe that public support for Kim, never easy to gauge in a closed dictatorship, is waning as a result of the current economic crisis.
Kim Jong Un waves during a ceremony for the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Jan. 14, 2021. (KCNA via Reuters)
Though many had high expectations for the new leader when he took office and appeared to show that he was in favor of economic reforms, the closure of the border with China, the food shortages, and a strengthening of the cult of personality around Kim have dismayed a populace that struggles to make ends meet.
Kim’s attempts at “deifying himself” are not working, according to Kim Min Jung, the deputy director of the South Korea-based SaveNK NGO.
“Despite the suppression of human rights, the thinking of North Koreans is changing. They have access to external information through markets and are starting to open their eyes to the outside world,” she said.
“Although Kim Jong Un has laid the foundation for power through a rule of fear, he has limitations,” she said.
With a decade under his firmly tightened belt, Kim Jong Un has also a tightened grip on the country’s power structure despite all North Korea’s problems, Gause said.
“He has consolidated his power. Now there is really no opposition to him inside the regime. He seems to be in a fairly stable position, but he has completely failed on trying to turn the economy around, which I think is the kind of the centerpiece of his vision.”
With translation by RFA's Korea Service.
13. US Army demos underground operations with autonomous robots
An estimated 5000 underground facilities in north Korea. A very much needed capability.
US Army demos underground operations with autonomous robots
Posted December. 31, 2021 09:41,
Updated December. 31, 2021 09:41
US Army demos underground operations with autonomous robots. December. 31, 2021 09:41. by Sang-Ho Yun ysh1005@donga.com.
It has been reported that the U.S. Army conducted a test earlier this month to deploy the ATE (Autonomous Tunnel Exploitation) robots that are being jointly developed by Seoul and Washington for subterranean reconnaissance patrol into the virtual enemy states. While the enemy states remain anonymous, some speculate that the test is aimed at North Korea as it is keeping its nuclear and biochemical weapons as well as the command facilities underground in a massive scale.
The U.S. Army announced Wednesday that it conducted a “demo” to deploy its multi-sensor ATE robots into the Missouri training ground. The military disclosed pictures of U.S. soldiers carrying out reconnaissance patrols underground in caterpillars and four-legged robots.
The U.S. Army explained that the robots can draw up 3D maps of the underground structures and making real-time reports on the existence of the weapons of mass destruction by using its nuclear and biochemical sensors. It added that the robot system has been under a joint development between the Pentagon’s DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency) and the ADD (Agency for Defense Development) in Seoul since 2019.
“The enemies are increasingly using tunnels and underground facilities for the protection of troops and weapons and covert operations,” said an official from the U.S. Army. “The autonomous robot system will make huge contributions to protecting the soldiers deployed underground and offering a strategic advantage.” He added that their goal is to replace foot soldiers with autonomous robots for underground patrol missions in the future.
Pundits say that Seoul and Washington are taking a step to weaponized its autonomous robots in a bid to eliminate the storages of nuclear and biochemical weapons in the North and its command facility hidden underground under contingency. Since 2017, the U.S. Forces in Korea have been regularly conducting drills both in Korea and mainland America to occupy Pyongyang’s underground facilities. A military official from South Korea predicted that the use of cutting-edge technologies including autonomous robots will only increase to comb through the underground facilities near the demarcation line of the Korean Peninsula.
14. Pragmatic foreign policy (South Korean presidential candidates)
Pragmatic foreign policy
Assertive and independent approaches needed in dealing with US, China
Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), emphasized the need for South Korea to employ a pragmatic diplomacy based on its national interests, describing it as the backbone of his foreign policy platform for the March 9 presidential election. He unveiled such a stance during a joint interview with The Korea Times, Reuters and South China Morning Post at the party's headquarters, Wednesday.
Elaborating on his policies toward major diplomatic partners such as the United States and China, Lee opposed the concept of so-called "strategic ambiguity," or refraining from making overt actions of taking sides. Rather, he stressed the importance of more assertive and independent approaches in dealing with the superpowers.
Lee's statement is proper and timely as it highlights that the nation does not have to choose between the two giants. As Lee put it in the interview, there is no reason for the Republic of Korea to assume a "disgraceful" attitude in carrying out foreign affairs policies, given its status as the 10th largest economy with the world's sixth most powerful military, for instance.
This more "assertive and independent" foreign policy stands in stark contrast with the one employed by Yoon Suk-yeol, the presidential nominee of the main opposition People Power Party. Yoon has come under criticism for his seemingly reckless remarks on China, in particular. During an event hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, Tuesday, Yoon said, "Most Koreans, especially young people, dislike China, and most young Chinese hate Korea."
This statement by Yoon is very inappropriate despite the need for him to make precise and prudent remarks when touching upon highly sensitive diplomatic issues. Yoon should have considered the need to fortify the alliance with the U.S. while sustaining an amicable partnership with China. The DPK in a statement described Yoon's remark as being "absurd."
Regarding North Korea, Lee also said he will, if he wins the election, candidly tell Pyongyang what it needs to do in the process of finding a solution to the knotty issue of denuclearization and other peace process measures on the Korean Peninsula. His remark is also encouraging, as the Moon Jae-in administration has largely failed to make progress in inter-Korean relations despite its much-touted and low-profile approaches toward the North.
Touching upon the Japan issue, Lee called for a sincere apology for Japan's past wrongdoings during its colonial rule of Korea. Yet, he also cited the need for the two neighboring countries to combine efforts to march forward toward the future, based on pragmatic approaches on diverse pending issues such as forced wartime labor and sex slavery. Expectations are growing over Lee's realistic and self-reliant approaches in foreign policy. Adding to those, we urge him to maintain such a balanced and well-coordinated perspective in dealing with crucial external affairs policies.
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V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
