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Quotes of the Day:
"Reserve your right to think, for even to think wrongly is better than not to think at all."
- Hypatia
"A body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody ought not to be trusted by anybody."
- Thomas Paine
"A nation that is afraid to let people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of is people."
- John F. Kennedy
1. North Korea fires at least three short-range ballistic missiles, South Korea says
2. South Korean rocket launch causes UFO scare: 'What is this?'
3. China’s United Front Influence Operation Agencies in Korea Revealed as Search for Chinese Police Stations Continue; Political Ties Discovered
4. It’s Time for South Korea to Acknowledge Its Atrocities in Vietnam
5. Does China Really Oppose North Korea’s Nukes?
6. Amid tough US chip chat, S Koreans turn anti-China
7. Top nuke envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan denounce N. Korea's SRBM launches
8. China handed over North Korean defector to Japan in 2020: source
9. North Korea: A Drone Powerhouse?
10. Fear of the Korean black swan
11. Man arrested on purpose in North Korea because he wanted to stay there
1. North Korea fires at least three short-range ballistic missiles, South Korea says
I am sure Kim did this just to throw off everyone;s end of year tallies for missile launches. (note sarcasm). 37 days of missile testing for 2022 with more than 90 ballistic and cruise missiles.
Was this an exclamation point for the current plenum taking place?
I will continue to say that Kim's target is failing. He has failed to achieve any of his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
North Korea fires at least three short-range ballistic missiles, South Korea says | CNN
CNN · by Gawon Bae,Jonny Hallam,Tara John,Emiko Jozuka · December 30, 2022
Seoul, South Korea CNN —
North Korea fired at least three short-range ballistic missiles from a site south of Pyongyang on Saturday, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, the latest in an unprecedented year of weapons testing.
In a text to reporters, the Joint Chiefs said the projectiles were fired from the Chunghwa area of North Hwanghae province at around 8 a.m. local time Saturday.
Japan’s Defense Ministry said three ballistic missiles – each with a maximum altitude of approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) and a flight distance of roughly 350 kilometers (217 miles) – had fallen into waters off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula, outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
This is the 37th day this year that North Korea has conducted a missile launch, according to CNN’s count.
Last week, it fired two short-range ballistic missiles, according to South Korean officials.
In 2020, North Korea conducted four missile tests. In 2021, it doubled that number. In 2022, the isolated nation has fired more missiles than any other year on record, at one point launching 23 missiles in a single day.
North Korea has fired more than 90 cruise and ballistic missiles so far this year, showing off a range of weapons as experts warn of a potential nuclear test on the horizon.
Though the tests themselves aren’t new, their sheer frequency marks a significant escalation that has put the Pacific region on edge.
CNN · by Gawon Bae,Jonny Hallam,Tara John,Emiko Jozuka · December 30, 2022
2. South Korean rocket launch causes UFO scare: 'What is this?'
South Korean rocket launch causes UFO scare: 'What is this?'
Social media users guessed the rocket launch could have been a North Korean missile or drone
foxnews.com · by Julia Musto | Fox News
Video
Upcoming govt agency report lists more than 150 UFO encounters: Josh Boswell
Daily Mail senior reporter Josh Boswell joined 'Tucker Carlson Tonight' to discuss an upcoming report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence detailing more than 150 cases of unexplained UFO encounters in 2021.
South Korea's military confirmed that it had test-fired a solid-fueled rocket on Friday after the unannounced launch led to rumors about a UFO or a North Korean missile launch.
In a statement, the Defense Ministry said that the launch was part of an initiative to build a space-based surveillance capability and fortify the country's defense posture.
The department said it did not flag the public about the launch in advance because it involved sensitive military security issues.
A light trail was captured in an image from Goyang that evening, sending social media sites into a frenzy.
FIERY HIGHWAY CRASH IN SOUTH KOREA KILLS 5, INJURES 37
"What is this? Is this a UFO? I’m scared," said one Twitter user.
The light trail is seen in Goyang, South Korea, Friday, Dec. 30, 2022. South Korea's military confirmed it test-fired a solid-fueled rocket on Friday, after its unannounced launch triggered brief public scare of a suspected UFO appearance or a North Korean missile or drone flying. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)
Others suspected a less sinister or supernatural phenomenon: a drone or light show.
According to local media emergency offices and authorities received hundreds of reports of witnessing a suspicious unidentified flying object.
In March, South Korea conducted its first successful launch of a solid-fuel rocket.
South Korea's Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup speaks at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore on June 12, 2022. (ROSLAN RAHMAN/AFP via Getty Images)
PENTAGON HAS RECEIVED 'SEVERAL HUNDREDS' OF UFO REPORTS, NONE OF EXTRATERRESTRIAL ORIGIN SO FAR
The Defense Ministry said Friday's launch was a follow-up.
An aerial view of Seoul, South Korea. (Joe Sohm/Visions of America/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)
The launch came just days after South Korea accused North Korea of flying five drones across the border on Monday for the first time in five years.
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South Korea’s military detected the drones but failed to shoot them down, forcing the military to apologize for that later.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Julia Musto is a reporter for Fox News and Fox Business Digital.
foxnews.com · by Julia Musto | Fox News
3. China’s United Front Influence Operation Agencies in Korea Revealed as Search for Chinese Police Stations Continue; Political Ties Discovered
Deep research from Dr. Tara O.
China’s United Front Influence Operation Agencies in Korea Revealed as Search for Chinese Police Stations Continue; Political Ties Discovered - East Asia Research Center
eastasiaresearch.org · by _ · December 30, 2022
2022-12-29, Tara O
The Chinese restaurant in Seoul, Korea suspected of being a Chinese police station is run by Wang Haigoon /Wang Haigun [왕하이군(王海军)], a People’s Republic of China citizen. Related to the restaurant is HanGang Cultural Media/HG Culture Media, which is also in the same office as the Korea branch of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Xinhua Network and shares office space with PRC’s CCTV in Seoul.
Han River authorities posted warning sign for no permit
Dongbang Myungjoo, the restaurant, it turns out, is operating illegally without obtaining permits (as a vessel since it floats on a river) from Seoul Metropolitan Government’s Han Gang (Han River) Development authorities, as shown by the prominent sign in front. In July 2020, it signed a 30-year lease, but has not paid rent and is involved in a lawsuit with the owner of the property.
On the 2nd floor of Dongbang Myungjoo restaurant, names plates of 3 of the CCP front organizations adorn the door to a room. These organizations will be discussed in later sections.
Name Plates on the door of 2nd floor office, Dongbang Myungjoo restaurant: China International Cultural Exchange Center (중화국제문화교류협회), National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification (한화중국화평통일촉진연합총회), General Assembly of the Chinese Citizens Association of the PRC in Korea (중국재한교민협회총회)
The restaurant is one of the first item to be uncovered, but in the course of investigation by various South Korean Youtubers (particularly Garo Sero Yeonguso) and journalists, it was discovered that there are numerous front organizations in South Korea controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that are headed by Wang Haigoon.
The U.S. State Department stated that the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) is “tasked with co-opting and neutralizing threats to the party’s rule and spreading its influence and propaganda overseas.” The UFWD has a foreign influence mission which seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China as well as to direct foreign entities conducting influence operations targeting foreign actors and states. Some of these foreign entities have clear connections to the CCP’s UFWD’s mission, while others are less obvious. The UFWD primarily seeks to influence through connections that are difficult to publicly prove.
Overseas Chinese Service Center (OCSC) registration
Overseas Chinese Service Center (OCSC) in Korea
The controversial Chinese police centers exposed in the Safeguard Defenders reports are part of the Overseas Chinese Service Center (OCSC) network. OCSC is sponsored by the CCP organ UFWD, and has a global network with branches in numerous countries around the world, including the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Canada. Wang Haigoon is the CEO of the OCSC in South Korea. (29:14)
On a Chinese website, the address for OSCS in Korea was in a posh neighborhood of Shinsa-dong, Gangnam district of Seoul, at the location of a Chinese medicine clinic. The clinic was named ShinDongHwa (신동화 한의원) and it was run by Han Sung-ho, the founder of the CCP front organizations in Korea. Wang inherited Han Sung-ho’s positions to continue conducting influence operations. The clinic receives Wang’s mail, attesting Wang’s ties to the clinic, OSCS, and other CCP influence agencies.
Interestingly, National Assemblyman Thae Yong-ho, People Power Party, had an office in the same building, when he was running to be a lawmaker, even draping a campaign banner on the building. (47:13)
The address of OCSC’s main office in the registration is different, and is at the same location as a travel agency in Guro District, Seoul, run by Wang’s wife, Bae Ji-yeon. Bae is Chosun-jok, which is a South Korean term for ethnic Koreans who went to Manchuria mostly in the late 1800s/early 1900s, and settled there, later becoming Chinese citizens, and their descendents. OCSC’s initial address on the registratry was the 9th floor of the Dongsung Building in Yoido on the street across from the National Assembly, the same building and floor where the restaurant’s office, HanGang Cultural Media / HG Culture Media and China’s state mouthpiece CCTV are located.
OCSC Registry, Wang Haigoon as CEO
The registry shows that Wang Haigoon is the CEO of OCSC as of March 2016, taking over from his wife Bae Jie-yeon, the previous CEO. (Note: For ties among Dongbang Myungjoo restaurant, HanGang Cultural Media / HG Culture Media, CCTV, and Xinhua, see here.)
National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification (한화중국화평통일촉진연합총회)
On November 21, 2016 in Yoido, Seoul, Wang was elected as the 5th General Chairman of the National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification (NACPU) [한화중국화평통일촉진연합총회 (韓華中國和平統一促進聯合總會 )], a front organizations of the PRC. NACPU is also referred to as the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China. This organization advocates “one China,” opposes Taiwan’s independence, and pursues the unification of the PRC and Taiwan under CCP rule. The U.S. State Department describes the organization as the CCP’s United Front Work Department and has designated it as a “foreign mission” of the PRC.
Wang Haigoon and Han Sungho
General Assembly of the Chinese Citizens Association of the PRC in Korea (중국재한교민협회총회)
On the same day in 2016, Wang was also elected to be the General Chairman of the General Assembly of the Chinese Citizens Association of the PRC in Korea [중국재한교민협회총회 (中国在韩侨民协会总会)]. Wang replaced Han Sung-ho [한성호 (韩晟昊)], the previous General Chairman. Sul Young-bok [설영복(薛荣福)] remained as the Inspector General. Established in February 2002, the General Assembly of the Chinese Citizens Association of the PRC in Korea operates under the guidance, supervision, and “extensive support” of the PRC Embassy in Seoul. It is a front organization of the CCP’s United Front Work Department.
Han Sung-ho created and cultivated these two front organizations, NACPU and the General Assembly of the Chinese Citizens Association. Han is considered the “godfather” of pro-CCP Chinese in Korea, who are different from the anti-communist Chinese who came to Korea before Korea’s normalization of relations with PRC.
Wang Haijoong’s other positions
Wang has numerous other key positions related to China: The General Treasurer of PRC’s Xinhua News Agency’s Xinhua Network, Korea branch; the CEO of the HanGang Cultural Media/HG Culture Media (에이치지문화미디어); the Chairman of the China International Cultural Exchange Center (CICEC) (중화국제문화교류협회), and the Overseas Committee Member of the JoongGook HwaGyo Yonhap-hoi (중국화교연합회) (Overseas Chinese Federation of PRC or All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese).
China International Cultural Exchange Center (CICEC) (중화국제문화교류협회)
The China International Culture Exchange Center (CICEC) is a front organization of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security, particularly its 12th Bureau, for foreign influence operations. (p. 24) It was created in 1984 to influence foreign research organizations, academics, and high-profile foreigners, and was key to the “China’s peaceful rise” narrative.
The HanGang Cultural Media/HG Culture Media, which shares the same address as the Xinhua’s Korea branch, also runs the Donbang Myungjoo (동방명주) Chinese restaurant suspected of being a secret Chinese police station. See here and here for details.
All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
While purporting to represent the Chinese Community overseas, the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese is controlled by the CCP, thus it is a front organization. For example, in Italy, the organization protested the Dalai Lama’s visit to Italy through demonstrations and a meeting with a Democratic Party representative in Rome. (p. 29) The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese has seats at the national committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
Wang appears to be active in the Chinese Communist Party in China. During March 3-13, 2017, Wang attended the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—one of the conferences in the largest political event in the PRC, the “Two Sessions”—the annual plenary sessions of the national or local People’s Congress and the national or local committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The latter is composed of representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Democratic Party (a satellite party of the CCP), and other organizations. These are not events that any Chinese citizen can attend, but only for active party members in good standing.
South Korean Politicians
China wanted a virus lab in South Korea; Lawmaker Kim Doo-kwan quickly responded
National Assemblyman Kim Doo-kwan (김두관), Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) (Deobureo Minjoo Party), leans heavily toward China. Kim offered land (Busan University’s Yangsan campus) to China, when China pressured Korea hard to build a virus institute similar to the one in Wuhan, China. In August 2020, soon after the WHO officials visited China (but not the Wuhan Institute of Virology), Luo Yujen, the director of the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA) [중화해외연의회 (中華海外聯誼會)], made the suggestion to build a similar virus lab in Korea at the Northern Forum (북방포럼 2020). COFA is an organization that plans and executes overseas projects together with the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD). Luo Yujen is a member of the Chinese Communist Party and the son of Feng Lida, a biological warfare expert in the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army. The South Korean public was against building such a virus lab in Korea.
From left, Wang Haigoon and Kim Doo-kwan
Kim Doo-kwan attended a meeting for “Korea-China Cultural and Economic Revitalization in the Coronavirus Era” (코로나 시대 한·중 문화 및 경제 활성화를 위한 간담회) on November 12, 2020 at Dongbang Myungjoo, the Chinese restaurant at the heart of the Chinese police station controversy. Wang Haigoon gave Xi Jinping’s biography to Kim as a gift at the event.
재한동포경제인연합회 (KDG) (literally Overseas Chinese Business Association)
China employs the model of Soviet operations targeting Western businesses with its trade-themed “people’s diplomacy” through the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT, 中国国际贸易促进会). CCPIT typically partners with foreign business associations and law firms, and establishes similarly structured front organizations. In the report “Hijacking the Main Stream,” front organizations “often named ‘China chamber of commerce,’ gather together local businesses with interest in China and representatives of large PRC state and private companies, participate in CCPIT activities and initiatives, and often overlap with other networks linked to CCP influence agencies.” (p. 18)
Fitting the description of a typical CCPIT front organization well is JaeHan Dongpo Gyeongjaein Yonhap-hoi [재한동포경제인연합회(KDG)]. It translates as Overseas Chinese Business Association, but it uses “KDG” as its abbreviation.
KDG held its inauguration ceremony on June 28, 2021 at the Echo Valley building in Mapo district, Seoul, Korea. The founding members consist of more than 100 Chosunjok business owners and business organization officials. Lee Sun-ho (이선호) was chosen as KDG’s first chairman.
Korea-China Silk Road International Exchange Association with “One Belt, One Road” on top left
Lee Sun-ho is also the Chairman of Korea-China Silk Road International Exchange Association (한중실크로드국제교류협회). Interestingly, the KDG inauguration is on the Korea-China Silk Road International Exchange Association website (www.sico-kc.org) in the “Association Activities” as if the two organizations are one and the same. “One Belt, One Road” [일대일로(一带一路)] appears prominently on top left of the website.
Due to COVID, many sent videos, rather than attend in person. South Korean politicians who sent congratulatory videos for the KDG inauguration include:
- Moon Hee-sang (문희상), former National Assembly Speaker
- Lee Hae-chan (이해찬), former Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) (Deobureo Minjoo Party) Chairman
- Lee Nak-yeon (이낙연), former DPK Chairman
- Chung Sye-kyun (정세균), former Prime Minister
- Kim Moo-sung (김무성), former National Assemblyman, Saenuri Party (now People Power Party)
- Kim Doo-kwan (김두관), National Assemblyman, DPK
Congratulatory messages were sent by:
- Song Yong-gil (송영길), Chairman of DPK (at the time of the ceremony)
- Ban Ki-moon (반기문), former UN Secretary-General
Representing the Chinese side were a list of people, including Kwon Soon-ki (권순기, 權順基), chairman of the China Aju Economic Development Association, which is under PRC’s Foreign Ministry, who sent a congratulatory video.
During the Moon Jae-in administration, Kwon Soon-ki, a 2nd generation Chosunjok, received the Camellia Medal of the National Order of Merit (국민훈장 동백장) at the Korean embassy in Beijing, the first Chosunjok to be bestowed this honor by the South Korean government. With his wide network of main figures in China, Kwon is known as the “problem solver” for Korean businesses entering and doing business in China. This requires good relations with key local and national CCP members.
Wang Haigoon, as the General Chairman of the General Assembly of the Chinese Citizens Association of the PRC in Korea, attended the ceremony in person, representing the PRC side.
Han-Joong Uiwon Yonmang (한중의원연맹, Korea-China Parliamentary Federation)
On December 2, 2022, 100 South Korean lawmakers became founding members of the Han-Joong Uiwon Yonmang (한중의원연맹, Korea-China Parliamentary Federation) at an inauguration ceremony held at the National Assembly in Yoido, Seoul. That is 100 of 300 or 1/3 of the South Korean National Assembly. The slogan on the banner read “Korea-China Co-existence and Prosperity.”
The two lawmakers in the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Korea-China Parliamentary Federation were Hong Young-pyo (홍영표), Democratic Party of Korea (DPK, Deobureo Minjoo Party) and Kim Hak-yong (김학용), People Power Party (PPP). Hong Young-pyo became the chairman and Kim Hak-yong became the Senior Vice President of the new corporation. Hong stated, “the Korea-China Parliamentary Federation will be a stepping stone for the two countries to work together with one heart and create a prosperous future.”
They chose a “corporation” as an entity in order to bypass “the limitations of parliamentary diplomacy with China,” which applies to the existing parliamentary diplomatic groups at the National Assembly. The two existing groups are the “Korea-China Parliamentary Forum on Foreign Relations” (한중의회외교포럼) and the “Regular Exchange System between the Korea-China Parliaments” (한중의회 간 정기교류체제).
The limitations could include the amount of money that a lawmaker can receive from foreign or any other entities. For instance, the anti-corruption “Kim Yong-ran Law” stipulates that government employees be punished if they receive more than ₩30,000 in a meal, ₩50,000 in gifts, ₩100,000 in cash gifts (for weddings, funerals).
The 100 lawmakers who signed up to be the members of the Korea-China Parliamentary Federation are:
Democratic Party of Korea (더불어민주당) (59):
▲ Kang Deuk-gu (강득구)
▲ Kang Byung-won (강병원)
▲ Kang Sun-woo (강선우)
▲ Ko Young-in (고영인)
▲ Kwon Chil-seung (권칠승)
▲ Kim Kyung-hyup (김경협)
▲ Kim Nam-kuk (김남국)
▲ Kim Duk-wan (김두관)
▲ Kim Min-ki (김민기)
▲ Kim Byung-wook (김병욱)
▲ Kim Sung-joo (김성주)
▲ Kim Young-bae (김영배)
▲ Kim Eui-kyeom (김의겸)
▲ Kim Ju-young (김주영)
▲ Kim Cheol-min (김철민)
▲ Kim Hang-jung (김한정)
▲ Kim Hoi-jae (김회재)
▲ Do Jong-hwan (도종환)
▲ Mang Sung-kyu (맹성규)
▲ Min Hong-chul (민홍철)
▲ Park Kwang-on (박광온)
▲ Park Yong-jin (박용진)
▲ Park Jeung (박정)
▲ Seo Sam-seok (서삼석)
▲ Sul Hoon (설훈)
▲ So Byung-chul (소병철)
▲ So Byung-hoon (소병훈)
▲ Shin Hyun-young (신현영)
▲ Ahn Gyu-back (안규백)
▲ An Ho-young (안호영)
▲ Yang Kyung-sook (양경숙)
▲ Yang Ki-dae (양기대)
▲ Eoh Kiy-ku (어기구)
▲ Oh Gi-hyoung (오기형)
▲ Wi Seong-gon (위성곤)
▲ Youn Kun-young (윤건영)
▲ Youn Kwan-suk (윤관석)
▲ Yoon Yeong-deok (윤영덕)
▲ Yoon Young-chan (윤영찬)
▲ Yoon Jae-kab (윤재갑)
▲ Yoon Joon-byeong (윤준병)
▲ Lee Kai-ho (이개호)
▲ Lee Byung-hoon (이병훈)
▲ Lee Sang-heon (이상헌)
▲ Lee Yong-sun (이용선)
▲ Lee In-young (이인영)
▲ Lee Jae-jung (이재정)
▲ Lim Jong-seong (임종성)
▲ Jang Chul-min (장철민)
▲ Jeon Hae-cheol (전해철)
▲ Jung Tae-ho (정태호)
▲ Jin Sun-mee (진선미)
▲ Choe Kang-wook (최강욱)
▲ Choi In-ho (최인호)
▲ Han Jeoung-ae (한정애)
▲ Huh Young (허영)
▲ Hong Kee-won (홍기원)
▲ Hong Sung-kook (홍성국)
▲ Hong Young-pyo (홍영표)
People Power Party (국민의힘) (35):
▲ Kang Dae-sik (강대식)
▲ Kang Min-kuk (강민국)
▲ Kwon Myung-ho (권명호)
▲ Kim Sung-won (김성원)
▲ Kim Seung-su (김승수)
▲ Kim Hak-yong (김학용)
▲ Kim Hyung-dong (김형동)
▲ Kim Hee-gon (김희곤)
▲ Rho Yong-ho (노용호)
▲ Park Duk-hyum (박덕흠)
▲ Park Sung-joong (박성중)
▲ Baek Jong-hean (백종헌)
▲ Suh Bum-soo (서범수)
▲ Suh Jung-sook (서정숙)
▲ Yu Eui-dong (유의동)
▲ Yoo Sang-bum (유상범)
▲ Yun Ju-keyng (윤주경)
▲ Lee Dal-gon (이달곤)
▲ Lee Myoung-su (이명수)
▲ Lee Jong-seong (이종성)
▲ Lee Hun-seung (이헌승)
▲ Lim Byung-heon (임병헌)
▲ Jeon Bong-min (전봉민)
▲ Jeong Dong-man (정동만)
▲ Jung Hee-yong (정희용)
▲ Cho Eun-hee (조은희)
▲ Joo Ho-young (주호영)
▲ Choi Seung-jae (최승재)
▲ Choi Youn-suk (최연숙)
▲ Choi Young-hee (최영희)
▲ Choi Chun-sik (최춘식)
▲ Choi Hyung-du (최형두)
▲ Ha Tae-keung (하태경)
▲ Her Eun-a (허은아)
▲ Hwangbo Seung-hee (황보승희)
Justice Party (정의당) (3):
▲Bae Jin-gyo (배진교)
▲Sim Sang-jeung (심상정)
▲Lee Eun-ju (이은주)
Shidae Jeonhan (시대전환) (1):
▲Cho Jung-hun (조정훈)
Non-affiliated (무소속) (2):
▲Kim Hong-gul (김홍걸)
▲Yang Jung-suk (양정숙)
The initiative to create the Korea-China Parliamentary Federation suddenly accelerated after Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (중국 전국인민대표대회), in September 2022, visited the National Assembly, meeting with Kim Jin-pyo (김진표), the National Assembly Speaker, and other lawmakers in various political parties.
Wang’s wife Bae Ji-yeon and Fantagio Corp.
Fantagio’s businesses (portion)
Wang’s wife Bae Ji-yon, an executive of H&G Culture Media, became an external CEO of Fantagio Corporation on December 2, 2016. (54:08) Fantagio was initially founded as a talent agency for the entertainment industry. It was later acquired by China. All key personnel at the company are PRC citizens, including Foo Quangzhou, the internal CEO (57:22). Fantagio, previously Edu Company Corp, has a long list of business areas that it is pursuing, and the majority listed on the registration are not related to entertainment, but extend far from that industry. Business areas includes high-tech, telecommunications, defense, aviation, chemical, biological, education, publishing, media, culture, real estate, cryptocurrency, construction, sea cable, investment, mining, oil exploration, health food, and so on: (54:42)
- Semiconductor manufacturing & sales
- LCD equipment manufacturing & sales
- Industrial air conditioning and equipment manufacturing & sales
- Semiconductor/LCD/etc.-related parts and material manufacturing & sales
- Telecommunications equipment and partially assembled copper parts manufacturing & sales
- Internet business and e-commerce business
- Export-import business and copper agency business
- Data center operations, facility construction & sales
- Database development and technology services
- E-library and book publishing
- Information processing and sales
- Telecommunications services
- Computer applications, systems, and related products, services, & maintenance
- Government contracts and military contracts
- Data networks
- Communications cable construction
- Program, software, and hardware systems development, sales, lease, & service
- Issuance of affirmation documents/certificates of sales of goods
…
54. Aircraft parts manufacturing & sales
57. Military supplies manufacturing & sales
58. Navigation, GPS manufacturing & sales
…
60. After-school learning center (Hagwon) operations
61. Language school operations
62. Infant, toddler education & child care
63. Education consulting and all related businesses
64. Education program research and operating education institutes for teachers
65. Book publishing and printing
66. Online and offline education services
67. Franchising Hagwon (after-school learning centers)
68. Interior remodeling of franchising hagwon spaces
…
70. Life-long educational facility operations
71. News Media operations
72. Cable, wifi content development & provision
73. Printing and reproduction of recorded media (audio, video, CD ROM, etc.)
…
77. Multi-use cultural center operations
78. Camping operations domestic and abroad
…
80. Study abroad business
81. Headhunting business
…
84. Biological product business
85. Biological related business and pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical supplies, chemical drugs, and veterinary medicine manufacturing & sales
86. Miacin (a type of anti-biotic) development, manufacturing & sales
…
88. Domestic/Overseas mining, rock mining & sales, oil exploration & excavation
89. Foreign natural resources development consulting business
…
93. Real estate consulting and investment
94. Venture capital
95. Cultural content production, management agency & cultural content investment
…
99. Electrical Engineering business
100. Information & communications and broadcasting related business investment domestically and abroad
…
106. Health food manufacturing & sales
…
169. Digital exchange security service and building cryptocurrency distribution-related system
…and more.
It is an extensive and impressive line of businesses, including ones that are highly sensitive and gravely dangerous to South Korean national security as well as to the security of U.S. Forces Korea, which include communications networks and underwater cables. During the pro-China Moon administration in February 2020, Korea’s public energy company KEPCO pushed to include Chinese companies for an underwater cable laying project between Jejudo and Wando islands, despite the opposition from domestic cable laying companies and to the detriment of national security. It is unclear whether a Chinese company won this contract—there needs to be an investigation.
Wang’s Statement
On December 29, 2022, journalists gathered in front the restaurant to hear Wang’s explanation, but he only made a brief statement that he’ll hold a press conference with explanation on December 31. He announced he will charge an entrance fee of ₩30,000 ($24) per person, limiting it to 100 people. There was no explanation about how to buy the “entry ticket.” He then read a statement in Chinese. He stated he is the CEO of various organizations mentioned above, and said to the journalists, “don’t you know who I am?” “You may not know me, but do the executives of your media companies, even the directors and CEOs, really not know me?” “The Journalists Social Gathering for the 30th Anniversary of Korea-China Diplomatic Relations’ (한중수교 30주년 한중 언론인 친목회) held on August 19 this year was also held in Dongbang Myungjoo with my funding, but have you already forgotten?” Perhaps he doesn’t need to give an explanation.
Conclusion
As described, Wang hai-goon is a leading figure in numerous CCP front organizations conducting influence operations in Korea. Ironically, he is asking the South Korean government for police protection. The electronic message board on the façade of the Dongbang Myungjoo restaurant flashes claims that the restaurant chairman (Wang Haigoon) and the staff are concerned for their safety and request police to protect them. Wang Haigoon is to hold a press conference before the year end.
What is more disturbing is how many CCP’s United Front Work Department organizations exists in Korea and how wide their influence in politics, media, culture, education, government contracting, and so on. The search for extraterritorial Chinese police stations in Korea has revealed CCP’s United Front Work Department agencies and other organizations designed to conduct influence operations in South Korea. What has been uncovered is probably just the tip of the iceberg. Various government agencies need to focus on reviewing, inspecting, and investigating this issue.
eastasiaresearch.org · by _ · December 30, 2022
4. It’s Time for South Korea to Acknowledge Its Atrocities in Vietnam
Yes, atrocities were committed during the Vietnam war by US and South Korea forces. But why are the atrocities of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army overlooked? Is it because they won and get to write the history?
We should not forget that there were 5,099 ROK military personnel KIA and 10,962 WIA from among 350,000 deployed between 1964 and 1973. I doubt many people know the extent of the ROK commitment to the Vietnam War.
It’s Time for South Korea to Acknowledge Its Atrocities in Vietnam
Seoul and Hanoi can no longer ignore a fraught part of their history.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/30/vietnam-war-south-korea-massacres-history-diplomacy/
By Dien Luong, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
DECEMBER 30, 2022, 1:20 PM
Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s three-day state visit to South Korea earlier this month began with a 21-gun salute and ended on a sunny note. Phuc and his South Korean counterpart, Yoon Suk Yeol, decided to elevate bilateral ties to “a comprehensive and strategic partnership”—the pinnacle of Vietnam’s diplomatic hierarchy. Before South Korea, Vietnam had forged this level of partnership with only three countries: China, India, and Russia.
Such pomp and circumstance, however, obscures how the two countries have dealt with a fraught part of their history: South Korea’s involvement in the Vietnam War, which ended in 1975. Although civilian killings by South Korean soldiers during the war are well documented, Seoul has been adamant that there is no evidence of such atrocities. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese government has never publicly pushed for an official mea culpa, much less reparations, from South Korea. A recent reminder of this reality—and how neither country has addressed this wartime baggage—came from a South Korean drama series that sparked controversy in Vietnam.
In October, Vietnamese authorities demanded that U.S. streaming giant Netflix remove Little Women, a K-drama about three sisters living in modern-day Seoul, from its lineup in Vietnam. Their rationale could be boiled down to several lines in episode eight of the 12-part series, which featured a war veteran bragging about South Korean troops’ kills. “In our best battles, the kill-to-death ratio for Korean troops was 20:1. That’s 20 Viet Cong killed for one Korean soldier dead,” the character said, referring to the communist-led army and guerrilla force supported largely by North Vietnam during the war. He added that the ratio was even higher among his country’s most skilled soldiers.
Vietnamese authorities claimed that the K-drama distorted the events of the war, but it appears that the series was axed because the lines, in Hanoi’s perspective, callously reopened the wounds of the conflict.
Between 1964 and 1973, South Korea deployed around 320,000 troops to Vietnam to fight alongside the U.S. army in exchange for U.S. aid to resuscitate the then-ailing Korean economy. On the ground, like their U.S. counterparts, South Korean soldiers quickly established themselves as a brutal fighting force. They have since been accused of committing mass killings of Vietnamese civilians and are estimated to have slaughtered as many as 9,000 innocent Vietnamese in massacres throughout the country, according to one study by a South Korean researcher who interviewed survivors and witnesses.
Yet no South Korean president has ever acknowledged any such massacre in Vietnam. On a visit to Hanoi in 2018, then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in expressed only “regrets over an unfortunate past.” Meanwhile, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense and National Intelligence Service have repeatedly stonewalled academic and activist attempts to access relevant documents, thwarting any comprehensive investigation.
In 2018, the South Korean government dismissed the ruling of a mock tribunal that found it guilty of war crimes in Vietnam. (The trial’s verdict was non-binding as it was convened by a civic movement.) This past August, two Vietnamese became the first to appear before a South Korean court to testify about the atrocities committed by South Korean troops during the war. At the trial, representatives from Seoul sought to discredit the testimony, which concerned a 1968 massacre in Phong Nhi and Phong Nhat villages. They regurgitated a narrative that accuses Vietnamese soldiers, masquerading as South Koreans, of having carried out the massacres—an argument first floated by a South Korean military commander back in 1968, when the massacre was subject to scrutiny.
Vietnamese survivors have pushed for accountability, but without much success. In a 2019 petition directed to Moon, 103 Vietnamese victims called for a thorough investigation into the massacres committed by South Korean soldiers and a sincere official apology from Seoul. The survivors lamented that no South Korean official had even bothered to ask them whether they wanted an apology.
South Korea’s default position on the war has been amplified by the Vietnamese government’s reticence. The reasons are not hard to fathom at a time when geopolitics and trade all too often take precedence in foreign policy. Besides forging one of the closest partnerships in East Asia, South Korea has remained the largest source of foreign direct investment in Vietnam. The two countries are looking to boost bilateral trade to $100 billion next year and to $150 billion by 2030, up from $80.7 billion in 2021.
South Korean multinational company Samsung is also the biggest single foreign investor in Vietnam, wielding outsized influence on the export-oriented country. Samsung has pumped some $18 billion into six factories in Vietnam, at least two of which specialize in smartphones. The electronics giant has for years churned out about half of its smartphones in Vietnam, making up nearly one-fifth of the country’s overall exports. As a corollary, Samsung’s recent scaled-back production in Vietnam has taken a toll on the country’s smartphone exports.
Granted, it might be a stretch to say that South Korea’s investment has been able to exert great influence over the way Vietnam has dealt with the war baggage that involves both countries. But Hanoi officials have, in fact, watered down their account of the war in exchange for Seoul’s largesse in the past.
In 2000, a monument was on the verge of opening in Ha My, a village in Vietnam’s central province of Quang Nam where South Korean soldiers killed 135 civilians in 1968. But before the monument to that massacre could open, the Guardian reported, local officials told villagers that some adjustments to the design had to be made at the behest of South Korean diplomats.
The South Korean officials had pushed back on a poem at the back of the memorial stone that vividly recalled what happened during the 1968 massacre. By the 2000s, South Korea had already become a major foreign investor in Vietnam, and its officials offered to fund a local hospital if the poem was hidden from public view, according to the Guardian article. Vietnamese officials yielded to that request. Without the poem, it is unclear to visitors what happened to the Vietnamese adults and children whose names are engraved in a large gravestone in the monument. Heonik Kwon, a prominent Korean anthropologist who wrote a book about the Ha My massacre, cited one villager who called that concealment “killing the memory of the killing.”
To be sure, there is nothing wrong with a forward-looking Vietnam embracing ties with South Korea despite a troubling past. Vietnam has been able to successfully navigate such a relationship with the United States. But advancing bilateral ties by sugarcoating history will fly in the face of the very “comprehensive” nature of the new strategic partnership, leaving its foundation standing on shaky ground.
Indeed, as the two countries are celebrating the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties, the time has never been riper for atonement.
For South Korea, what is long overdue is acknowledgement of its wartime atrocities, an official apology to Vietnamese victims, and reparations that include financial damages for the survivors and the erection of memorial projects at massacre sites. Granted, it has never been easy for South Korea to eat humble pie in this regard—particularly since it has viewed itself as an unacknowledged, or not properly acknowledged, victim of Japanese aggression during Japan’s colonial rule. But just as South Korea has pushed Japan to address its wartime atrocities, it should acknowledge its own victims in Vietnam.
For Vietnam—a country where many younger people have remained largely unaware of South Korea’s involvement in wartime atrocities—it is time Hanoi became more transparent about this shared history and seek justice for survivors. Absent further action from Hanoi to press Seoul harder, the façade of toughness in removing Little Women is likely to ring hollow to the Vietnamese public. At best, it could come across as a half-baked effort to demand official atonement from South Korea. At worst, it could be seen as a politically expedient ploy to paper over a skeleton in the closet that Hanoi cannot afford to confront head-on.
Dien Luong is a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. He researches the intersection of geopolitics and social media, online censorship, and journalism. Twitter: @DienLuong85
5. Does China Really Oppose North Korea’s Nukes?
Certainly they at least tolerate them because they do not want war or regime collapse but they also want the north to create dilemmas for the ROK and the US and the Alliance.
Does China Really Oppose North Korea’s Nukes?
It’s entirely plausible that rather than opposing the North’s nuclear program, China actually supports it.
The National Interest · by Joel Atkinson · December 24, 2022
Washington and Seoul are busy urging Beijing to prevent a seventh North Korean nuclear test. There’s been a flurry of meetings and statements, including U.S. president Joe Biden and South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol’s requests for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to apply pressure on Pyongyang during face-to-face meetings in Bali.
There’s an assumption behind all of this activity: Beijing doesn’t actually want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. It is argued that if the United States and its allies can just find the right mix of carrots, sticks, and rhetorical framing, they can nudge Beijing toward acting in accordance with its “own best interests.” Opponents of this approach generally agree that China would roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear program if it could, but that it’s just too costly for Beijing for the United States to shift its calculus.
But is this assumption sound? It is now nearly thirty years since the first nuclear crisis with North Korea, with Pyongyang’s nuclear program stretching back decades before that. The North now has around forty nuclear warheads and a missile that can reach the American mainland. Sure, it’s possible that across all those decades, Beijing was at the precipice of deciding to halt the program only to never do so because the cost-benefit analysis wasn’t right. However, given the various changes in leadership on all sides and the transformations within China and in the international system, it certainly shouldn’t be taken for granted.
The fact that it is taken as a given that China opposes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal says more about Washington and Seoul than Beijing. The reality is that, short of Xi calling a press conference to declare he endorses the North’s nukes, the consensus will stumble on, zombie-like. The assumption that China opposes North Korea’s nuclear weapons program underpins much of Washington’s and Seoul’s foreign policy approaches, and it would be too disruptive to overturn it simply because it’s dubious.
Still, it’s entirely plausible that rather than opposing the North’s nuclear program, China actually supports it. I will put aside evidence on both sides of the ledger, as it’s mixed and will always be inconclusive until we have access to internal archives. Instead, analysts should consider the interests of North Korea and China, which are much more aligned regarding nuclear weapons than most assume.
First, there is a broad expert consensus that China fears that South Korea and Japan will develop their own nuclear weapons in response to North Korea’s arsenal. But for there to be daylight between them on this matter, North Korea must not care whether or not the South and Japan go nuclear. That is unlikely, given that North Korea is much smaller than China and a nuclear attack against North Korea would be proportionally worse. It also has far fewer resources to spend on a retaliatory deterrent.
More probable is that both China and North Korea agree that South Korea and/or Japan acquiring nuclear weapons would be bad, but that the risk is manageable. They would be right. It is the end of 2022, North Korea has a growing nuclear arsenal, and, at least as far as we know, Japan and South Korea have not even commenced nuclear programs. That may change in the future, or it may not. But no one should expect Pyongyang to give its nuclear weapons up now after having come so far just because there is an indeterminate future risk. And given China’s far greater power, there is no reason to think it is more skittish about the future.
So why the expert consensus? One simple explanation is Chinese disinformation. North Korea is busy developing the weapons—using some Chinese parts and technology—as China vociferously opposes South Korean and Japanese nuclearization and holds out the possibility that it will pressure the North into denuclearizing.
A good illustration of this dynamic can be found in the writing of Jae Ho Chung, the current South Korean ambassador to China and a former professor:
If China had mostly sat on the fence during the first crisis [in 1993], it was mainly because Beijing had not been convinced that Pyongyang had then possessed the pertinent technologies. Not surprisingly, China even vetoed a UN condemnation of North Korea's nuclear program…[In 2002] China's calculus and response appeared somewhat different…it did not call for non-interference by other powers. Instead, Beijing took the position that North Korea's nuclear program had become an international concern.
We now know that what Chung saw as China's new "constructive role" in managing the nuclear problem did not prevent the North from attaining the formidable capabilities it has today. We should not assume, as Chung did, that Pyongyang is offended when it is rebuked by China at the United Nations. Rather, we should also consider the possibility that North Korea is pleased, as Beijing’s condemnations reduce the chance that Japan and South Korea will go nuclear.
A second widespread assumption is that China fears the instability and heightened risk of war that North Korea brings to the region. This belief was reflected in U.S. special representative for North Korea Sung Kim’s message to Beijing that “maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is an important shared goal.” Again, this assumes that North Korea is more nonchalant. This seems unlikely, since Pyongyang has even more to lose than China if war breaks out, being smaller, weaker, and the primary target. It is likely not a coincidence that whenever the North’s provocations result in an allied show of strength, China warns that the use of force is unacceptable. This serves both China’s and North Korea’s interests in deterring the United States from using force, while the North still retains its nuclear weapons. Again, it is not irrational for Beijing and Pyongyang to view the risk of conflict as tolerable. The United States hasn’t attacked North Korea in decades; it would be strange to assume the threat to the North is higher now that it also has a nuclear deterrent. Similarly, China is likely also more confident that it can, together with Pyongyang, deter the United States from using force.
But what about the impact of “instability” on China’s development? After decades of North Korean-driven crises, you won’t find any noticeable impact on China’s economy. With China engaging in military exercises to warn the United States away from Taiwan, it is farfetched to assume that it prioritizes maintaining a stable international environment, at least in a straightforward “tension-is-bad” way.
Still, one could argue that the North sees more utility in its possession of nuclear weapons than China does, so it is more willing to face the risks and pay the associated price. But again, it doesn’t make sense to simply assume that. We are told that China is reluctant to join U.S.-led efforts against the North’s nuclear program because it fears a North Korean collapse. According to this view, China worries about a flood of refugees and the loss of an important buffer against the U.S. threat. But obviously, North Korea has an even stronger interest in avoiding its own collapse. And doesn’t Pyongyang see nuclear weapons as a means to ensure regime security? Clearly, then, we shouldn’t simply assume that Beijing doesn’t share Pyongyang’s view that nuclear weapons strengthen the regime.
We should also not dismiss the possibility that the weapons are not for defense, but for offense—to pressure the United States off the peninsula so that unification with the South can happen on the North’s terms. After all, the regime itself says the weapons are a “means for securing peaceful unification and the survival of the race.” If so, there is no reason to assume that China opposes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. After all, the bigger the strategic buffer, the better, and China’s overall strategic position would improve if U.S. forces left the peninsula and South Korea exited the U.S. alliance system. While it may seem far-fetched that Pyongyang would actually be able to leverage its nuclear weapons to secure a U.S. withdrawal and unification, it’s certainly possible. And nobody—including Beijing—has a better idea of how to accomplish those goals.
We don’t know what Beijing really thinks about North Korea’s nuclear weapons. But there’s nothing so different between the two countries’ interests that we should simply assume China opposes the North’s nukes. On the contrary, given that North Korea has already developed impressive capabilities without China taking effective action to prevent it, it is safer to assume that Beijing supports Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.
Joel Atkinson is a professor in the Graduate School of International and Area Studies (GSIAS) at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, South Korea, where he researches and teaches East Asian international politics. Follow him on Twitter: @Joel_P_Atkinson
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Joel Atkinson · December 24, 2022
6. Amid tough US chip chat, S Koreans turn anti-China
Excerpts:
And while there are certainly leftist and even anti-American sentiments simmering within the Korean body politic, the survey found less than 20% of Koreans held negative or very negative views of the US.
There is more. In economic terms, more than 40% of Koreans considered the US “very strong,” while the same figure for China was less than 10%.
What is behind this massive dislike of, and disrespect for, China?
The two countries had a serious spat in 2017. When Seoul agreed to the deployment of a US-manned THAAD (terminal high altitude area defense) anti-missile battery on South Korean soil as a defense against North Korean projectiles, Beijing, insisting that the system’s radars could spy on China, went ballistic.
In retaliation, protests impacted the businesses of South Korean conglomerates in China, leading to dwindling sales by Hyundai Motor, and Lotte withdrawing its retail operations from the market. Chinese tour groups ceased visiting South Korea, dealing a heavy blow to the tourism-focused island of Jeju. Even imports of “K-culture” – pop music, TV dramas, films and computer games – were halted.
Nothing so dramatic has happened since, but the reputation of China, in Korean eyes, has continued to deteriorate.
The study authors found Koreans were angry with China over matters as diverse as transnational air pollution and environmental destruction; Covid-19’s origin; dictatorial communism; and cultural appropriation. The last one is highly visible in wars of words between netizens over aspects of traditional heritage.
Citing past business trips to South Korea, Foster expressed surprise at the apparent shift in public opinions.
“In the past, it was older Koreans who used to be worried about China and North Korea, and the younger ones, worried about their jobs, and it was, ‘US get lost,’” he said. “If that has changed, that is big deal.”
Amid tough US chip chat, S Koreans turn anti-China
Tax break calls reflect chip downturn and US trade pressure, but surge in anti-China sentiment may ease decoupling
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · December 30, 2022
SEOUL – South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol urged additional tax breaks for the domestic semiconductor industry as the nation’s flagship export sector reels from a perfect storm – one that continues to rise in intensity.
The semiconductor super-cycle, which buoyed the Korean economy through the Covid-19 pandemic, turned south this summer as chip shortages turned to gluts and prices plunged. Even more ominously, the future geography of the sector looks set for a seismic shift as the US applies increasing pressure on its allies’ chip businesses with China.
In addition to global factors such as the war in Ukraine, related commodity inflation and rising interest rates, this combination of economic pressures and unprecedented uncertainty hanging over the flagship national export is mirrored in the hideous performance of Korean stocks in 2022.
The benchmark KOSPI index opened to a bullish 2,999.75 points on December 30, 2021.. This Friday, 2022’s last trading day, it closed at 2,236.4 points.
Yet despite its massive implications, there is still no clear answer to the huge question posed by US policy toward China and semiconductors as Seoul grapples with its impossible positioning: It balances between top trade partner Beijing and leading strategic ally Washington.
But even as chip executives fret over future strategies for investment in, and sales to, China, if politicians decide to press ahead with decoupling from Chinese tech, they may be pushing on an open door.
A September global public opinion poll of 56 nations delivered the surprise news that South Koreans harbor stronger anti-China sentiment than any people on Earth.
Washington is clearly piling heavy-handed trade pressure upon Seoul, and huge anti-American riots shook South Korea in 2002 after the death of two schoolgirls in a road accident with GIs. Yet in the September survey, the United States emerged as the most popular nation among South Koreans.
South Koreans hold an American flag at a conservative political rally in a file photo. Image: Twitter
All for chips
Yoon, speaking to officials on Friday morning, reinforced the centrality of the semiconductor industry to the Korean economy.
“Strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, are a national-security asset and our industries’ core technology, so I would like the finance ministry to actively consider ways to additionally expand tax breaks for national strategic industries, including the semiconductor industry, in consultation with relevant ministries,” he said.
Corporations can currently bag an 8% break on semiconductor investments thanks to a recent revision to the previous tax code, which previously offered a 6% break. However, that 2-percentage-point rise falls far short of the whopping 20% tax break that Yoon’s conservative People Power Party had called for.
The National Assembly is controlled by the progressive Democratic Party.
South Korea is home to the world’s two leading memory chip manufacturers – respectively, Samsung Electronics and SK hynix. Facing the cyclical downturn, they are taking different approaches to their capital expenditures in 2023.
Sector leader Samsung, damning the torpedoes, is ramping up production at its new fab in the Yellow Sea port of Pyeongtaek – the world’s largest chipmaking facility – by 10%. SK hynix, on the other hand, is following other industry players in cutting back its capex for the year – by a whopping 50%.
Yet while the peaks and troughs of the chip cycle are known challenges that related businesses are experienced in managing, a darker shadow looms: the rising demands from the US that its allies, from Western Europe to East Asia, cease commercial cooperation with China on cutting-edge chips.
Backing up this demand, the weapon the US could deploy is its multiplicity of patents in high-end chip design suites and manufacturing equipment.
Exiting Chinese investments would be agonizing for South Korea. According to local media, Samsung makes some 40% of its total NAND memory in Xian, while SK hynix makes 50% of its DRAM memory in Wuxi.
So too would cutting trade. In 2021, according to data collated by bank Santander, China was South Korea’s leading trade partner: 27% of Korea’s total exports went to the mainland, with another 6.2% going to Hong Kong. The United States was in distant second place, taking some 15% of Korea’s overseas shipments.
It’s the same story in terms of supplying imports: China accounts for 24%, with Hong Kong adding 6.2%; the US, again in second place, supplies just 13%.
In Korea’s overall export portfolio, chips and chip parts accounted for 16.2% of the total, making them the leading item, Santander found. The next-largest export item, autos, took up just 7.0%.
Leading academic Moon Chung-in, who has advised three different South Korean administrations on international relations, laid out the massive reliance Korea’s chip sector has on China.
Historically, Korean chipmakers “export about 60% of their products to China (40% to the Chinese mainland, 20% to Hong Kong) while importing almost 60% of chip-related critical materials from China,” Moon wrote on these pages.
In 2021, the last year for which total data are available, mainland China was the destination for 39.7% of Korea’s semiconductor exports, a higher ratio than China’s share of Korea’s total exports, which is 25.3%.
There is some breathing space. In October, South Korean chipmakers won a one-year waiver from US authorities. But given the size of their commerce with China, a huge cloud of opacity hangs over what will happen to their China businesses, post-waiver. Absent a surprise turnaround in US policy, Korean companies look trapped.
“Requests from the US, the world’s most powerful country and Korea’s closest ally, must not be disregarded,” the left-leaning Hankyoreh Daily newspaper editorialized in July. “It is clear that anxiety is high in industrial circles.”
In October, the right-leaning Dong-A daily headlined a piece “US aims to thwart Chinese semiconductor industry on all fronts.”
Given this angst, why is more public noise noise not being aired on the conundrum? Perhaps because silence is golden.
“The Americans are saying, ‘Why don’t you sacrifice your business for our politics?’ and the Koreans don’t want to do it,” said Scott Foster, a Tokyo-based tech analyst with Lightstream Research. “But they are caught between a rock and a hard place due to the US defense alliance, so they want to avoid the question.”
US President Joe Biden and his South Korean counterpart Yoon Suk-youl leave after a joint news conference at the People’s House in Seoul, South Korea, on May 21, 2022. Photo: Pool / Screengrab / NTV
Leaning West
Signs are emerging that Korean companies have already made their choice.
Samsung has been cutting back on its China investments for years. SK hynix remains heavily invested but admitted to investors in a conference call in October that it is committed to diversifying manufacturing and could, if necessary, divest its Chinese fabs.
Meanwhile, both are hedging their bets, spending massively on new plants in the US, where Washington is not only applying political and trade pressure, it is also dangling the carrot of investment incentives.
In a July videoconference with US President Joe Biden, SK Group chairman Chey Tae-won announced $22 billion in investment plans in the USA, including $15 billion in chipmaking.
In 2021, Samsung announced $17 billion in additional investments in its Texas semiconductor manufacturing operations. In July this year, documents filed with Texas authorities showed the company was mulling building 11 more plans, with a value of $200 billion, in the US state over the next two decades.
And the Koreans are not alone. Their regional competitors are hurtling stateside too.
“The amount of investment going into the States from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan is absolutely enormous,” Foster said. “The China thing has given these companies a huge opportunity to grab a big chunk of the US market, from the inside, without the protectionism. Americans are not going to build those factories.”
This could signal one answer to the problem that South Korean – and other Asia chipmakers – face. With free trade now a dead duck, and multiple nations and blocs seeking sovereign chip-production facilities, there is a possibility of mirror sectors rising in different geographies.
“It is getting that everybody wants to build their own industry,” said Foster – a factor that presents its own downside. “There will not be a shortage of semiconductors – there will be permanent overcapacity!” he added.
The question of how much influence soft – and arguably fickle – factors like public opinion wield over hard factors like real-world economics may be debated. Nevertheless, signals indicate that South Korean CEOs have chosen a side – the US – that is in line with public sentiment.
The economic importance of densely populated, prosperous and proximate China is a fact well known to the South Korean public. It is likewise known that, increasingly, the United States is leveraging its strategic alliance with South Korea to pressure China.
Yet a range of public opinion polls in the last two years have shown that South Korean sentiments toward China are plummeting.
Transnational air pollution is one of several reasons Koreans are turning anti-China. A worker walks by the main gate of a coal-to-oil plant in Changzhi in Shanxi province. Photo: Fred Dufour / AFP
‘No thanks’ China; ‘yes please’ America
The Sinophone Borderlands project is a series of online public opinion surveys taken between 2020 and 2022, investigating global attitudes toward China and vice versa. The body comprises academics across the world, including in China itself.
The project’s September online survey of 1,363 Koreans, conducted by the Central European Institute of Asia Studies, found that 81% of South Koreans have negative or very negative views of China – more than any other of the 56 states surveyed.
The figure puts Korea well ahead of the No 2 ranked nation, Switzerland, where 72% of persons hold negative/very negative views, and No 3 ranked Japan, with 69%.
In a detailed analysis, two of the report’s authors noted that South Koreans, if asked to choose between China and the US, held very, very clear views. Some 4% of Koreans were undecided, 5% chose “China” – and a whopping 91% said they would side with the US.
Japan, customarily the most despised country among South Koreans, dropped to fourth place, behind China, Russia and North Korea.
And while there are certainly leftist and even anti-American sentiments simmering within the Korean body politic, the survey found less than 20% of Koreans held negative or very negative views of the US.
There is more. In economic terms, more than 40% of Koreans considered the US “very strong,” while the same figure for China was less than 10%.
What is behind this massive dislike of, and disrespect for, China?
The two countries had a serious spat in 2017. When Seoul agreed to the deployment of a US-manned THAAD (terminal high altitude area defense) anti-missile battery on South Korean soil as a defense against North Korean projectiles, Beijing, insisting that the system’s radars could spy on China, went ballistic.
In retaliation, protests impacted the businesses of South Korean conglomerates in China, leading to dwindling sales by Hyundai Motor, and Lotte withdrawing its retail operations from the market. Chinese tour groups ceased visiting South Korea, dealing a heavy blow to the tourism-focused island of Jeju. Even imports of “K-culture” – pop music, TV dramas, films and computer games – were halted.
Nothing so dramatic has happened since, but the reputation of China, in Korean eyes, has continued to deteriorate.
The study authors found Koreans were angry with China over matters as diverse as transnational air pollution and environmental destruction; Covid-19’s origin; dictatorial communism; and cultural appropriation. The last one is highly visible in wars of words between netizens over aspects of traditional heritage.
Citing past business trips to South Korea, Foster expressed surprise at the apparent shift in public opinions.
“In the past, it was older Koreans who used to be worried about China and North Korea, and the younger ones, worried about their jobs, and it was, ‘US get lost,’” he said. “If that has changed, that is big deal.”
Follow this writer on Twitter @ASalmonSeoul.
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · December 30, 2022
7. Top nuke envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan denounce N. Korea's SRBM launches
Another example of the importance of having a "regional ambassador" in the region (e.g., Sung Kim as the US special representative to north Korea) so that it is easy to coordinate with counterparts while in nearly the same time zones.
Top nuke envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan denounce N. Korea's SRBM launches | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · December 31, 2022
SEOUL, Dec. 31 (Yonhap) -- The top nuclear envoys of South Korea, the United States and Japan denounced North Korea's firing of three short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) Saturday morning, warning of a stern response from the international community.
Kim Gunn, Seoul's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Sung Kim and Takehiro Funakoshi, respectively, talked over the phone after Pyongyang's missile launch, according to South Korea's foreign ministry.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launches from Chunghwa County, just south of Pyongyang, from 8 a.m. and that the missiles traveled some 350 kilometers before splashing into the East Sea.
The launches came a day after South Korea conducted a test flight of a homegrown solid-propellant space rocket.
The nuclear envoys warned the North that its tactic to conduct military provocations routinely will not be successful, and the international community will sternly respond to any actions violating the United Nations Security Council resolutions, according to the ministry.
The ministry said the envoys agreed to strengthen the trilateral security cooperation against North Korea and readiness posture for additional provocations.
The envoys also agreed to increase communication with China, which plays a crucial role in containing Pyongyang's military actions.
North Korea launched around 70 ballistic missiles this year alone, marking a single-year record. Earlier this week, North Korean drones also intruded into South Korea's airspace, escalating tensions in the region.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · December 31, 2022
8. China handed over North Korean defector to Japan in 2020: source
China handed over North Korean defector to Japan in 2020: source
Kyodo
+ myNEWS
Published: 9:30pm, 30 Dec, 2022
China handed over a North Korean defector to Japan in 2020, after she was found to be the grandchild of a Japanese woman who moved to North Korea decades earlier, a source close to the matter said on Friday.
It is rare for Beijing to hand over a North Korean defector as Chinese authorities send most of the defectors they capture back to North Korea, according to the source.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry started supporting her after learning that she was the granddaughter of a Japanese woman who had accompanied her ethnically Korean husband from Japan to North Korea.
The defector, who is in her 20s, crossed into China around the spring of 2020 and was sent to Japan in December that year after the Japanese ministry negotiated for her handover.
It was around the same time that Japan and China eased border controls to resume business travel while the coronavirus pandemic ran rampant.
An official of the organisation that supported the woman said whether China handed over defectors of Japanese heritage to Japan depended on the political situation between the two countries.
The Foreign Ministry has not disclosed any information on North Korean defectors of Japanese heritage, and it declined to comment on this case.
After the defector left North Korea, she was caught by Chinese authorities when travelling towards Vietnam from the southwestern province of Yunnan.
The defector told the authorities that her mother and grandmother lived in Japan, and after a DNA examination this was proved to be the case.
North Korean defectors shown dragged back across the border from South Korea
Although she subsequently moved to Japan and was given residency status, the woman eventually moved to South Korea in July 2022.
Japanese law has provisions on granting residency status to people of Japanese heritage, including third-generation Japanese.
The Japanese government, in principle, accepts North Korean defectors on humanitarian grounds, as long as they are Koreans who previously lived in Japan and went to North Korea under a repatriation programme between 1959 and 1984.
It also accepts their Japanese spouses, their children and grandchildren, according to a support group for defectors.
The number of North Korean defectors plummeted after North Korea closed its borders in 2020 due to the pandemic. The woman was apparently able to escape into China under tight surveillance.
9. North Korea: A Drone Powerhouse?
Excerpts:
It has apparently made strides forward, with drones that are increasingly more sophisticated.
On Monday, South Korea sent its own surveillance assets, which reportedly also included unmanned drones, across the border as corresponding steps against the North Korean UAV flights.
The public confirmation of reconnaissance activities inside North Korea is seen as highly unusual, and it probably reflects a resolve by Yoon’s government to get tough on North Korean provocations.
There remains a great danger that unmanned drone incursions by each side could feed the possibility of full-blown conflict on the peninsula.
North Korea: A Drone Powerhouse?
19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · December 27, 2022
History might remember 2022 as the year of the drone. The small unmanned aerial systems aren’t new, of course, but their impact on the geopolitical stage is being felt like never before. Drones have let Ukraine target enemy airbases deep within Russia, and unmanned platforms have acted as a force multiplier for nations such as Turkey and Iran.
On Monday, an incident involving drones pushed South Korea’s president to call for stronger air defenses. His nation’s military apologized after it failed to shoot down a number of North Korean drones that crossed the DMZ into Seoul’s airspace. Warning shots were fired, and South Korea scrambled warplanes and attack helicopters to confront the North Korean unmanned aircraft. They failed to bring down a single one of the five drones over a five-hour pursuit.
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The drone incursion came just days after the North had test-launched two ballistic missiles.
As the Associated Press reported, the incident raised serious questions about the state of Seoul’s air defense network at a time when tensions remain high following a number of North Korean missile tests.
“Our military’s lack of preparedness has caused a lot of concern to the people,” said a senior official, Kang Shin-chul. He further added that the South Korean military would “actively employ detection devices to spot the enemy’s drone from an early stage and aggressively deploy strike assets.”
At a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol called for the creation of a military unit to monitor North Korea’s military facilities. That force would be equipped with cutting-edge stealth drones.
The South Korean leader further cast blame on his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, for what he suggested was a dangerous North Korea policy. Moon Jae-in’s management of relations with Pyongyang included a 2018 inter-Korean military pact banning hostile activities in the border areas.
North Korea – A Drone Powerhouse?
Monday’s drone incursion was the first time in five years that small unmanned systems had entered South Korean airspace. In 2017, a drone believed to belong to the North crashed in South Korea, where it is believed that the drone had tried to photograph a U.S. missile defense installation.
Three years earlier, several suspected North Korean drones were found south of the border, and experts dismissed the drones as “low-tech.” In recent years, though, North Korea has bragged about its drone program, and Pyongyang is now believed to have some 300 unmanned aerial vehicles in its arsenal.
It has apparently made strides forward, with drones that are increasingly more sophisticated.
On Monday, South Korea sent its own surveillance assets, which reportedly also included unmanned drones, across the border as corresponding steps against the North Korean UAV flights.
The public confirmation of reconnaissance activities inside North Korea is seen as highly unusual, and it probably reflects a resolve by Yoon’s government to get tough on North Korean provocations.
There remains a great danger that unmanned drone incursions by each side could feed the possibility of full-blown conflict on the peninsula.
Author Experience and Expertise: A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.
19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · December 27, 2022
10. Fear of the Korean black swan
Fear of the Korean black swan
The Korea Times · December 31, 2022
Courtesy of Olesya YemetsBy David Tizzard
Korean news in 2023 will be dominated by an improbable event, I just don't know what that event will be. It might be good, it might be bad. It might be an unprecedented cultural success. It might be a catastrophic national failure. It could be war.
Of course, it could be none of these but rather something completely different. That's how history seems to work, particularly here in Korea. It doesn't crawl forward slowly. It is not a country of steady progress. Rather it makes dramatic jumps, transcending the present and entering a whole new paradigm in an incredibly short period of time. In such fashion was modernity compressed and thrust unapologetically upon the country, women's rights exploded into public discourse following a tragic murder and the release of a book, and K-pop became genuinely global and capable of fronting Rolling Stone magazine.
We like to see history as a slow methodical development. Each small flap of a butterfly wing contributing to an eventual outcome. History books and post-mortem analyses certainly narrate them in such a fashion. Academics look back into the past and draw lines and associations. Experts show how all of these past events made the present little more than an inevitably. Connecting the dots. Drawing the hand of destiny.
The reality, however, is far different. The future is not necessarily implied by the past. Moreover, there are clear epistemological limitations to our knowledge and ability to predict what might happen next. These limitations are both philosophical and psychological, characterized by a lack of data and the presence of human hubris and personal bias. Such epistemic limitations bring with them large consequences.
In recent years, Korea has experienced the turbulence of COVID-19, the Sewol disaster, the rise of BTS, the defeat of the Democratic Party of Korea, a tragedy in Itaewon, Squid Game, and much more. All of these events, for better or for worse, shook the country, the people, the politics, and the economy. They dominated news headlines, became talking points around the world, and generated countless retrospectives.
The experts, tucked safely in a position of hindsight, wrote innumerable pieces about the inevitability of these phenomena. They projected backwards, drawing straight lines from the present to the Sampoong Department store collapse, the Masan riots, or the rise of Seo Tae-ji. Things are so much easier to explain after they have happened. They are explained through narrative, particularly ones that fit with our existing worldview. In that sense, they appear as if there was a sense of inevitability about them. That not only could they have been predicted, they could have also been prevented or amplified.
Quite simply, however, that is not true. There will always be a solitary example tucked away in some corner of the internet that predicted just about everything, but we should not pretend that it was part of the grand narrative or broader consciousness of the time. No-one was writing 12 months ago that a heartbreaking crush was likely to take more than 200 of the country's young souls on a single night without so much as an explosion or a bullet being fired. Few, if any, would have bet on a group of young moody Korean hip-hop wannabes with questionable language and attitudes about race and skin color taking over the internet as an androgynously positioned boy group pushing western pop music. I can also point you to countless articles and essays from some of Korea's most respected thinkers saying how detente was finally on the cards for inter-Korean relations, President Moon had finally improved things with the North, or the Democratic Party of Korea was set for decades of domination. Those opinions are all still out there. The people who wrote them are still asked for their predictions of the future. And they still speak with a great deal of confidence.
It's not so much the accuracy (or lack thereof) that is problematic. Instead it's a combination of two things. First, the confidence. The refusal to indicate that perhaps we don't really have any idea of what might happen. Second, is the fact that what does happen is far beyond the realm of any of the expert's predictions.
For the most part, we simply project yesterday into tomorrow. We take the same existing conditions and modify them slightly, either projecting them as being better or worse. These projections, rather than being an objective analysis of the existing conditions, often only give us insight into our own views instead of an understanding of the world itself. For the year ahead, the left-leaning authors among us will predict a continued series of democratic back-sliding under President Yoon Suk-yeol with fears over media control and gender issues. The conservatives among us will portray next year as being one in which South Korea's foreign policy, particularly vis-a-vis North Korea and China will be of paramount importance and see the government moving in the right direction, in lockstep with the international community.
Neither of these views is particularly useful. Again, it merely tells us about the present. Not about the future. More importantly, they do not account for the unpredictable unknown events that will take place in Korea, nor do they foresee the even more random occurrences that will happen in other parts of the world. Korea is affected, for example, just as much by its own policies and population as it is by events in Ukraine or Washington. A new president in another country, race riots abroad, or foreign invasions can all greatly influence what happens here.
Publicly confessing my inability to predict what next year's most significant event will be harms whatever credibility I might have as a "Korea expert," despite my Ph.D, university positions, and unpaid bluetick on Twitter. However, my inability to forecast next year's events is shared by many others. This is not to say we should stop predicting. Rather we should be cognizant of our limitations and be aware that in a country as extreme as Korea anything and everything is likely to happen.
Despite the cynicism, books on Korea are becoming more prevalent and, for the most part, better. There's a whole host of excellent resources from YouTube videos, podcasts, fashion magazines, and Insta reels about this country the world was once guilty of sleeping on. Many of them might not accurately predict the big events of 2023, but let's enjoy them while we can.
Dr. David A. Tizzard (datizzard@swu.ac.kr) has a Ph.D. in Korean Studies and lectures at Seoul Women's University and Hanyang University. He is a social/cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the Korea Deconstructed podcast, which can be found online. The views expressed in the article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times..
The Korea Times · December 31, 2022
11. Man arrested on purpose in North Korea because he wanted to stay there
New report on old news. The event took place in 2014.
Man arrested on purpose in North Korea because he wanted to stay there
https://www.ladbible.com/news/north-korea-man-purposefully-got-arrested-933769-20221231
Poppy Bilderbeck
Published 12:05, 31 December 2022 GMT
| Last updated 12:05, 31 December 2022 GMT
Featured Image Credit: KNCA
An American man has spoken out after purposefully getting himself arrested to remain in North Korea.
Matthew Todd Miller from Bakersfield, California travelled to North Korea on 10 April, 2014 with the purpose of getting arrested.
Reports claimed the now 33-year-old tore up his tourist visa in the airport and made clear his intentions to seek political asylum in a bid to 'try to stay in the country'.
Miller was arrested for 'unruly behaviour' however, the accusations against him soon spiralled.
Matthew Miller travelled to North Korea with the intention of getting arrested. Credit: Newscom/ Alamy Stock Photo
Miller was later accused of 'hostile acts' against the state after being found in possession of a notebook he sought to deliver to North Korea's government, which state-run Korea Central News Agency alleged contained 'confessions'.
Miller reportedly said he was a 'hacker' and knew 'military secrets,' hoping to 'remove the American military in South Korea'.
The Supreme Court of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ruled Miller had 'committed acts hostile to the DPRK while entering the territory of the DPRK under the guise of a tourist,' according to NK News.
The Californian man was charged under Article 64 of the North Korean criminal code concerning acts of espionage and certainly achieved his goal of remaining in North Korea as was sentenced to six years of hard labour.
The American was accused of 'hostile acts' against the state. Credit: Xinhua/ Alamy Stock Photo
Miller also spent nearly six months in custody prior to his conviction, having 'refused' to be flown back to the US and resultantly being 'detained'.
"This might sound strange, but I was prepared for the ‘torture’. But instead of that I was killed with kindness, and with that my mind folded and the plan fell apart," he said.
But why did Miller want to get stuck in North Korea in the first place?
Miller told NK News he wanted to see North Korea in a way which went beyond the average tourist's experience of it.
He said: "[I] just wanted to have a face-to-face with North Koreans to answer my personal questions.
Miller was charged under Article 64 of the North Korean criminal code concerning acts of espionage. Credit: Newscom/ Alamy Stock Photo
"I achieved my personal goal of seeing more of North Korea. I wanted to connect with the people - not question the government or the politics. I have no personal politics. This was not a political trip."
Miller has neither confirmed nor denied whether or not there is any truth to the espionage charges, simply explaining he 'was not there to give secret information or anything like that' but 'just wanted to speak to an ordinary North Korean person about normal things'.
"I wanted to just every day sit down with them and have conversations about everything. I would ask them one question about their country and they would have a question about mine," he said.
Miller was sentenced to six years hard labour. Credit: Newscom/ Alamy Stock Photo
Despite calling his mission to remain in North Korea 'successful,' Miller has since reflected on his journey as being a 'mistake' - Miller having called upon the US government to help with his release despite initially seeking asylum in a bid to 'prevent the US from wanting to help'.
Miller resolved: "I was in control of my situation. I knew the risks and consequences. My trip has probably resulted in no change for anyone, except for me. I do feel guilt for the crime. It was a crime. I wasted a lot of time of the North Koreans’ and the Americans’, of all of the officials who spent time with my case."
But did Miller get the answers to his personal questions he so desperately sought for? He said: "I might elaborate on that or I might just keep it as a personal experience."
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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