Quotes of the Day:

"The best way to predict the future is to create it."

– Abraham Lincoln

“There are far better things ahead than any we leave behind.” 

– C.S. Lewis

“What is at the heart of the matter is how we look at the world around us. There are those who believe that it is not worthwhile to try – that life just is and you float along with it, that human nature never changes and human beings are unable to improve the conditions of mankind, that it is futile to set any goals for ourselves or our nation.

I could not disagree more strongly. I believe that the very essence of a worthwhile life is in the striving. I do not fear the possibility of failure so much as the resigned acceptance of what is mediocre or wrong.” 

– President Jimmy Carter.

1. Pentagon Releases Detainee Held at Guantánamo Since Day 1

2. Top US generals warned the 'golden hour' for saving injured soldiers could disappear. That future has come.

3. Ipsos Predictions Survey 2025: Positivity about how this year has gone highest since before the pandemic

4. Nick Rowe Rescued in Vietnam (31 DEC 1968)

5. Africa Has Entered a New Era of War

6. Treasury Department Says Systems Hacked by China-Backed Actor

7. TSMC Arizona chip plant still has 50% Taiwanese workers in the run-up to production

8. Taking back Panama Canal would require war: Former ambassador

9. Indian Women Hold 11% Global Gold, More Than USA, Germany, Italy, France, And Russia Combined: Report

10. How Shen Yun Tapped Religious Fervor to Make $266 Million

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2024

12. Iran Update, December 30, 2024

13. Lesson №1 for Putin: Never Mess with Finland

14. China’s military buildup and psychological warfare threat to US

15. US military presence in Somalia likely to be scrutinized by incoming Trump administration

16. US Army unit in Poland the first to field new rocket system

17. Where Is Russia Finding New Soldiers? Wherever It Can.

18. 2024: Year of the Drone

19. The top five foreign influence fails of 2024 (from the Quincy Institute)

20. DOD Announces Additional Aid for Ukraine, Assesses 1,000 North Korean Casualties in Russia's Kursk Region

21. Below the Threshold: China’s Strategy of Armed Coercion (IWI Podcast)

22. America Needs a Maximum Pressure Strategy in Ukraine

23. The Obstacles to China’s AI Power

24. Opinion | With South Korea in crisis, what black swans lurk for East Asia in 2025?

25. Analysis: Biden spent four years building up US alliances in Asia. Will they survive Trump’s next term?

26. Medal of Honor Monday: Army Col. Robert L. Howard

1. Pentagon Releases Detainee Held at Guantánamo Since Day 1

Pentagon Releases Detainee Held at Guantánamo Since Day 1

The prisoner, who was repatriated to Tunisia, was never charged. His transfer is part of a Biden administration push to further reduce the dwindling detainee population at the wartime prison.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/30/us/politics/guantanamo-detainee-released-tunisia.html

An image taken by the U.S. military on Jan. 11, 2002, showing the first prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, soon after their arrival.Credit...Petty Officer First Class Shane T. McCoy/U.S. Navy

By Carol Rosenberg

Carol Rosenberg has been covering the detention and court operations at Guantánamo Bay since before the prison opened in January 2002.

Dec. 30, 2024, 

10:00 p.m. ET

The Pentagon on Monday repatriated a Tunisian detainee who was brought to the U.S. military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the day it opened, was never charged at the war court and was approved for transfer more than a decade ago.

Ridah Bin Saleh al Yazidi, 59, spent years languishing at the wartime prison because deals could not be made to repatriate or resettle him.

He was airlifted from the base in a secret operation that was completed 11 months after the Defense Department notified Congress that it had reached an agreement to return him to Tunisian custody, the Pentagon said. It offered no details on the security arrangements surrounding his return.

Mr. Yazidi’s transfer was the fourth in two weeks in a late Biden administration push to reduce the detainee population at the prison, which held 40 prisoners when President Biden took office. His departure left 26 detainees, 14 of them approved for transfer to other countries with diplomatic and security arrangements.

Another nine are in pretrial proceedings or convicted of war crimes, meaning the White House will once again fail to achieve President Barack Obama’s ambition of closing the prison. As the prison enters its 24th year in January, its mission has become more focused on discrete military trials than the prisoner-of-war-style operation that held and interrogated hundreds of wartime detainees in the early years.

What to Know: The Sept. 11 Case at Guantánamo Bay

Card 1 of 7The crime. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the accused mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, and four other defendants are facing charges in a U.S. military tribunal at Guantánamo Bay of aiding the hijackings that killed nearly 3,000 people. The charges carry the death penalty.

The trial. The defendants were arraigned in 2012, but the case has been mired in pretrial proceedings, much of them focused on the C.I.A.’s torture of the defendants. Learn more about why the trial hasn’t started.

The role of torture. In 2021, a military judge in Guantánamo's other capital case threw out key evidence because that prisoner was tortured. Defense lawyers in the Sept. 11 case are challenging the same type of evidence, and seeking to have either the case or possibility of a death penalty dismissed because of torture.

The plea deal. Susan Escallier, a retired general and former Army lawyer, authorized a plea agreement in July meant to resolve the case with life sentences for Mohammed and two other defendants. But Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin abruptly canceled the deal, reviving the possibility that they could someday face a death penalty trial.

The power to approve plea deals. After defense lawyers challenged Austin’s cancellation, a different judge, Col. Matthew McCall, ruled that the original deal could go forward. At the end of November, Austin stripped Escallier of her authority to reach settlements in any cases at Guantánamo Bay, giving himself the sole power to approve plea deals in terrorism cases there in the final months of the Biden administration.

The defendants in the plea deal. Along with Mohammed, Walid bin Attash is accused of training two of the hijackers, researching flights and timetables and testing the ability of a passenger to hide a razor knife on flights. Mustafa al-Hawsawi is accused of helping some of the hijackers with finances and travel arrangements.

The other defendants. Ammar al-Baluchi is accused of transferring money from the United Arab Emirates to some of the hijackers in the United States. He chose not to join the plea agreement and could face trial alone. Ramzi bin al-Shibh was accused of helping to organize a cell of hijackers in Germany. In 2023, he was found medically incompetent to stand trial and removed from the case. He could someday face trial if his mental health is restored.

Mr. Yazidi was the last of a dozen Tunisians once held at the prison, most of whom were captured in Afghanistan or Pakistan after the Sept. 11 attacks and brought to Guantánamo Bay as terrorism suspects.

He was sent to the wartime prison the day it opened, Jan. 11, 2002, and so was photographed kneeling anonymously in a crude open-air compound at Guantánamo’s Camp X-Ray in one of the detention operation’s most iconic photos.

With his transfer, only one other person among those original 20 detainees is still held at the prison: Ali Hamza al-Bahlul, who is serving a life sentence for conspiring to commit war crimes as a media adviser to Osama bin Laden.

According to a leaked 2007 prison assessment, Pakistani forces captured Mr. Yazidi near the border with Afghanistan in December 2001 in a group of about 30 men who were believed to have fled the battle of Tora Bora. Some of them were suspected of being Bin Laden bodyguards and so were of particular interest in the early efforts to locate the Qaeda leader.

It described him as a dangerous detainee who was hostile to the Guantánamo guard force and was written up for defacing a library book and throwing a cup of tea at a U.S. soldier.

But by 2010, an Obama administration task force listed him among dozens of prisoners who could not be prosecuted for war crimes and were eligible for release to the custody of another country, with security assurances.

Mr. Yazidi’s case defied U.S. diplomats’ efforts to transfer him for years. Ian Moss, who spent a decade at the State Department arranging prisoner and detainee transfers, said Mr. Yazidi did not leave earlier because Tunisia was deemed too dangerous or uninterested in taking him and Mr. Yazidi was unwilling to meet with other countries that might have resettled him.

“He could have been gone a while ago but for Tunisian foot-dragging,” Mr. Moss said on Monday.

Little is known about Mr. Yazidi beyond information contained in leaked U.S. intelligence documents, which say he spent time in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s and was arrested and imprisoned for involvement with illegal drugs. From Italy he found his way to Afghanistan in 1999, where, an intelligence profile said, he attended a training camp for jihadists.

It also is not known what family awaits him in Tunisia, and he has apparently not seen a lawyer in nearly 20 years.

Carol Rosenberg reports on the wartime prison and court at Guantánamo Bay. She has been covering the topic since the first detainees were brought to the U.S. base in 2002. More about Carol Rosenberg

2. Top US generals warned the 'golden hour' for saving injured soldiers could disappear. That future has come.

Anyone with military experience and an understanding of the threat posed by large scale combat operations (LSCO) can tell you the two decades of the GWOT and the golden hour were an anomaly or aberration. It is imperative that political leaders, the press, the pundits, and the people understand this and are prepared to deal with the high casualty rate we will certainly suffer in a future LSCO. Can we inoculate the American public before the next war so that they are prepared for this?

Top US generals warned the 'golden hour' for saving injured soldiers could disappear. That future has come.

Sinéad Baker,Ryan Pickrell

Updated Mon, December 30, 2024 at 9:15 PM EST8 min read

Yahoo

• The US military has warned that lifesaving "golden hour" care may not exist in future wars.
• The experiences of Ukrainian soldiers reflect those warnings.
• Getting treatment can take hours, if not days, leading to lasting injuries, amputations, and deaths.

American generals predicted years ago that the intensity of future wars could upend lifesaving evacuations and medical care for injured troops.

That prediction is now a reality in Ukraine, where soldiers often can't get proper medical care within the "golden hour" — the critical first 60 minutes after severe injuries when treatment can increase chances of survival.

"Until there's a real concrete answer for drones, it's going to continue to be pretty hectic when it comes to that type of care," a combat medic with a foreign volunteer unit in Ukraine told Business Insider.

The medic, who uses the call sign Tango, has front-line experience with Chosen Company, including an ill-fated fight in the village of Pervomaiske where his team was devastated by Russian indirect fire in July 2023. Despite his own injuries, he helped provide first aid to a handful of wounded men, but they had to wait hours for more extensive care. Two men didn't survive.

In Ukraine, swarms of drones and constant artillery strikes complicate timely evacuations, contributing to the war's soaring death toll and the severity of survivors' injuries.

Ukrainian soldiers taking part in medical training on the front line in Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.Ignacio Marin/Anadolu via Getty Images

Asked in 2019 by Congress whether the US military would be able to evacuate wounded troops during the golden hour in future conflicts, Gen. Mark Milley, then the Army's chief of staff and later the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a grim response.

"Probably not," he said.

"We'll try," he added, "but I'm not guaranteeing."

Other military leaders have expressed similar concerns. "You may have previously heard a discussion of the 'golden hour,'" Maj. Gen. Anthony McQueen, now the Army's deputy surgeon general but formerly the head of its Medical Research and Development Command, said last year. "We're moving more to a 'golden window of opportunity.'"

On any given day in Ukraine, wounded soldiers may be stuck near the front lines for hours or days and can be evacuated only during a break in the fighting or in the dim light of dawn and dusk.

"Here in Ukraine," a US Army veteran fighting in Ukraine who goes by the call sign Jackie told BI, "we have a golden three days."

A struggle to evacuate

A Ukrainian combat medic who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the work she does told BI the struggle to quickly evacuate was "a big problem" that had only worsened with drones becoming more prolific. "Two years ago," she said, "it was a totally different war from what is going on now."

The Ukrainian military operating a Punisher drone.Libkos via Getty Images

An estimated 1 million people have been killed or injured in the Ukraine war, with casualties stemming heavily from drones and artillery.

Cheap drones swarming the skies over Ukraine's battlefields can severely delay medical evacuations. The drones serve as aerial eyes for artillery, bombers that can drop grenades, and precision-strike munitions.

The Ukrainian medic said Russian troops target vehicles known to be carrying out evacuations, a war crime. Other Ukrainian troops have made similar accusations in this conflict. Russia's defense ministry did not respond to BI's request for comment on the allegations.

They aim for the combat medics, she said, because "if you kill a medic, it means that you killed thousands of soldiers," or all the people they might have saved otherwise.

"If you look special or different, you are going to attract a drone," Tango said. "That goes especially for evac, and they specifically target medical vehicles or anybody with a backpack. You never wear a medic patch on the front line. That's a guaranteed drone strike."

Drones are only one of the war's many causes of bodily harm and death. A 2023 medical study found that 70% of Ukrainian war injuries were caused by shelling or rocket fire.

Graves at the Lychakiv cemetery in Lviv, Ukraine, of Ukrainian soldiers killed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion.AP Photo/Mykola Tys

The Ukrainian medic said first responders sometimes reach injured soldiers quickly but can't evacuate if nearby roads are controlled by Russians or exposed to drones.

That can mean waiting hours or even days.

Extended delays in crucial care could lead to complications, such as amputations, or even fatalities that faster clinical care might have avoided. Leaving a tourniquet on too long, for example, can cause lasting nerve damage.

Jackie said a friend of his was wounded by shrapnel but couldn't leave his trench near the eastern city of Bakhmut for four days. His wounded leg became infected and ultimately had to be cut off.

Jackie thought the injury would have been an "easy fix" if the friend had received care in the golden hour. "We don't have a field medic up there pushing antibiotics through IVs, right under direct fire in a trench," he said.

Separately, a Ukrainian drone operator said that when he and his fellow soldiers were attacked by drones, one of his friends had to wait 12 hours before he could get proper medical treatment. One of the friend's legs later had to be amputated.

Drones give rise to 'magic hour' evacuations

In the cult-classic sci-fi film "Reign of Fire," "magic hour" occurs at dusk and dawn; it's the time of day when the dragons, deadly airborne dangers, are vulnerable. Tango said medics operating in Ukraine could find a similar respite at those times.

"That's when they're switching out their surveillance drones from normal analog video to either thermal or night vision," he said. "You have that limited window to move people."

Tango said, "You can't move during the daytime, or you'll get wrecked by drones." And the night has its own drone terrors.

Fighting typically slows at dawn and dusk as soldiers rest and swap equipment, though the Russians sometimes use artillery to suppress the Ukrainians during this period. A soldier hit outside this time typically must wait hours for an evacuation.

Once they can be moved, injured soldiers are typically taken back to a casualty collection point, like an underground bunker or concealed position, to be stabilized until it is safe for a truck or armored vehicle to take them to a field hospital.

What it means for the West

Ukrainian troops near Bakhmut.AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky

Drones have been used more in the war in Ukraine than in any other conflict in history, limiting battlefield movement. And the proliferation of sophisticated air defenses has prevented either side — Ukraine or Russia — from achieving air supremacy or even superiority. That makes it too risky for helicopters to rapidly pick up the wounded, as was standard in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recalling his Iraq deployment a decade ago, Tango said, "I knew even if I got really messed up, there is a pretty good chance I'm going to survive." He said that he "could get wrecked and probably be at a hospital within an hour or two."

In Ukraine, he said, "it's a gamble every time you step off on a mission."

The US could face similar obstacles in the event of a large-scale conflict against an adversary like China or Russia.

Military medics giving first aid to a wounded Ukrainian soldier at a medical stabilization point near Chasiv Yar in Ukraine's Donetsk region.Oleg Petrasiuk/Ukraine's 24th Mechanised Brigade via AP

US Army Col. Matthew Fandre, then the senior medical officer for the Mission Command Training Program, wrote in 2020 that in a future large-scale war involving the US, the "golden hour will become a goal, not an expectation."

"This is not a paradigm shift; instead, it would be a return to the patterns and expectations of World War II operations and Cold War planning, exacerbated by current technology and lethality," Fandre wrote.

He said that without air superiority, aerial evacuations could become limited, leaving ground evacuations as the primary method. But ground evacuations would most likely also have limits, he wrote, which could "dramatically increase died-of-wounds rates."

George Barros, a conflict analyst at the US-based Institute for the Study of War, told BI that America and its allies needed a "tremendous amount of learning" to help "prepare to deter and, if necessary, defeat modern state peer adversaries like China and Russia." But there are also lessons from US experiences for Ukraine.

A Russian soldier firing a howitzer toward Ukrainian positions.Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP

The US special-operations community has experience in prolonged battlefield combat care, something medics like Tango are increasingly studying and applying in Ukraine. Expanding that to the military on a large scale could be challenging, though. Troops are also considering drone deliveries of supplies into contested battlespaces, but that capability is still in the early stages.

Until then, many soldiers will continue to fight the clock after injuries, hoping for breaks in the fighting that make lifesaving treatments more accessible.

Read the original article on Business Insider

Yahoo

3. Ipsos Predictions Survey 2025: Positivity about how this year has gone highest since before the pandemic

Some very interesting data here. Seven in ten of us throughout the world are optimistic about 2025.

Excerpt:

Global optimism for 2025 is showing positive trends across several key areas. A majority of people surveyed (71%) believe that 2025 will be a better year than 2024, a slight 1-percentage point increase from the previous year's outlook for 2024. Historically, optimism levels have fluctuated between 75% and 80% over the past decade, suggesting a potential return towards these higher levels.

Download the entire 77 page report at this link: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-12/ipsos-predictions-2025-survey-report.pdf

Ipsos Predictions Survey 2025: Positivity about how this year has gone highest since before the pandemic

https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/ipsos-predictions-2025

ipsos.com

Key findings

• Despite the cost of living crisis and conflicts around the world, fewer people say this year was bad. Two-thirds (65%) say 2024 was a bad year for my country, the lowest figure since 2019.
• However, positivity for the new year yet to return to pre-COVID levels. Seven in ten (71%) say they are optimistic 2025 will be better than this year, below the level of positivity seen before the pandemic.
• Europeans pessimistic the global economy will improve. While on a global level people are most positive the economy will stronger than in recent years, in Europe a number of countries are less positive in their outlook than last year.
• People expect greater regulation of tech industry. Back in 2021, when we last asked this question, 38% expected their government to introduce strict rules for large tech companies, in 2024 this has risen to 47%.
• Fewer think stronger laws to fight climate change will be introduced. The proportion who think their government will introduce stronger targets to reduce carbon emissions is down 3pp compared to last year (now 52%).

How was it for you? 2024 in retrospect

2024, a year marked by both global unity and escalating tensions, has left the world in a state of cautious optimism. The Paris Olympics provided a fleeting moment of shared celebration, yet the backdrop of ongoing conflicts, including the escalating Israel-Palestine war spilling into Lebanon and the persistent war in Ukraine, contributed to a sense of unease. Political upheaval further fuelled this uncertainty, with a significant 80% of incumbents in democracies losing their seats in elections worldwide. These political shifts, alongside the economic fragility caused by inflation, have undoubtedly influenced public sentiment.

Despite these challenges, the global economy showed its first signs of stabilisation in three years, with Southern Asia experiencing particularly robust growth. Technological developments, such as the EU's foremost comprehensive legal framework for generative AI and the first commercial spacewalk, offered glimmers of hope, while natural disasters, like the Noto earthquake in Japan and widespread flooding and wildfires, served as stark reminders of the ongoing climate crisis.

Amidst this complex landscape, public sentiment reflects a cautious hope for the future. While 65% still considered 2024 a bad year for their country, this represents a 5-percentage point drop from 2023, returning to pre-pandemic levels of optimism. This shift in sentiment is particularly notable in Argentina (71%) and Poland (53%), which saw improvements of 17 and 16 percentage points respectively. Conversely, negative sentiment rose in countries like India (+6pp), highlighting the uneven distribution of global recovery. Furthermore, while people are generally more upbeat about their personal lives than their national context, we also saw a rise in individual positivity with almost half of respondents (49%) reporting a good year for themselves and their families. The greatest improvements were seen in China (16pp), Poland (9pp), and Belgium (11pp). However, rising negative sentiment in Peru (6pp) underscores the complex interplay of global and personal circumstances.

Looking Towards 2025

Global optimism for 2025 is showing positive trends across several key areas. A majority of people surveyed (71%) believe that 2025 will be a better year than 2024, a slight 1-percentage point increase from the previous year's outlook for 2024. Historically, optimism levels have fluctuated between 75% and 80% over the past decade, suggesting a potential return towards these higher levels.

Economic optimism also saw a modest rise. 51% of respondents anticipate a stronger global economy in 2025. While this is up from the decade-long low of 46% seen in 2022, there is still plenty of scope for improvement compared to the end of the last decade when optimism in the global economy fluctuated around the mid-50% mark and peaked at 61% in 2021. Emerging markets like Indonesia (82%), China (79%), and Thailand (67%) continue to express strong confidence in their global economic outlook, perhaps reflecting their more robust growth in 2024.

Personal well-being may contribute to this positive outlook, with 75% planning personal resolutions for 2025 and a majority expecting improvements in mental (69%) and physical (69%) health in the coming year. This focus on self-improvement may be a response to the challenges and uncertainties of recent years, including the pandemic and ongoing global instability.

Looking at long-term optimism, 52% of those surveyed believe people in their respective countries will feel more optimistic about the future in 2025. Indonesia (88%) and China (86%) lead in this category.

While the overall global averages reflect slight improvements in optimism, significant country-level variations exist. For instance, optimism about a better year in 2025 is highest in Indonesia (90%) and lowest in Japan (38%). Similarly, confidence in a stronger global economy varies widely, ranging from 82% in Indonesia to 25% in France. These variations highlight the diverse economic and social contexts influencing individual outlooks.

The Economy in 2025

Global economic anxiety persists despite calming inflationary pressures

Globally, people's economic outlook remains relatively unchanged on most measures for 2025 compared to what we saw last year. Concerns persist with a majority anticipating higher prices, taxes, and unemployment in their country. A significant 79% of respondents across 33 countries believe that prices will increase faster than incomes in 2025, a figure unchanged since 2022. Similarly, expectations for higher taxes remain substantial at 74%, which is consistent with the findings of the previous year.

Globally, 70% of respondents expect inflation to be higher in 2025 than in 2024, a figure identical to last year. However, this global average masks some significant country-level variations. Several countries have witnessed double-digit shifts in sentiment regarding inflation compared to 2023. Argentina (-26 percentage points) and Sweden (-12 percentage points) show considerably fewer people expecting higher inflation in 2025. Conversely, Hungary (+21 percentage points) and Poland (+16 percentage points) have seen a notable increase in the proportion of respondents anticipating higher inflation. Indians are particularly optimistic in their outlook with 61% expecting rising inflation, despite higher forecasts.

The one major exception to these relatively static perceptions of the economy is regarding interest rates. Expectations for higher interest rates in 2025 have decreased globally, with 61% of respondents anticipating a rise compared to 70% in 2023. This nine-percentage point drop suggests a growing belief that interest rate hikes may be nearing their peak.

However, like inflation, country-level data reveals a more nuanced picture. Brazil (11 percentage points), Hungary (8 percentage points), and Romania (7 percentage points) stand out with increased expectations of higher interest rates, while significant drops are observed in Sweden (-30 percentage points), South Korea (-21 percentage points), and the United States (-21 percentage points).

Technology in 2025

Navigating a world of technological dualities

The global public continues to hold a complex and often contradictory view of technology's future, marked by both anticipation and apprehension. Globally, the fear of AI-driven job losses (65%) continues to outweigh the expectation of AI-driven job creation (43%). This trend echoes previous years, but the gap appears to be slightly narrowing. Optimism shines in China, where 77% foresee AI creating jobs, while concerns dominate in Japan, with 65% predicting job losses.

The perceived allure of virtual worlds is growing, with 59% globally expecting increased engagement with such platforms, up 3 percentage points since the last time we asked this question in 2022. Western countries like the USA (45%), Sweden (46%) and Great Britain (46%) tend to be more sceptical whereas emerging economies like Indonesia (94%), Türkiye (79%) and Brazil (74%) are confident in their views on such a reality.

Interestingly, the intent to reduce social media usage (37% globally) has slightly dipped from last year's 41% despite a backlash against such forums reflected in proposed smartphone bans in schools - predicted by 44% globally, led by the Netherlands (74%). Globally 47% anticipate stricter regulations for large tech companies, a significant increase from 38% in 2021. Yet, limited optimism remains regarding matters such as personal data – 57% globally expect personal data leaks in 2025.

This year's data reveals a nuanced global perspective on technology, balancing hope with apprehension as we navigate an increasingly digital future.

World Security Issues in 2025

A sense of unease permeates as people grapple with a complex and uncertain future

A prevailing sense of unease characterises global expectations for world security in 2025. While pandemic fears have slightly subsided (47% globally, down 1 percentage point from 2023), the threat of nuclear conflict (49% likely) looms large, with Indonesians (79%) and Malaysians (67%) feeling particularly worried. Anxiety around rogue AI remains unchanged from last year with 35% globally fearing significant disruption – a surprising response given this year's CrowdStike global outage event. This suggests a potential link between technological advancement and perceived security risks.

On the topic of war, Western nations tend to be more pessimistic about the resolution of ongoing conflicts in comparison to emerging economies. Hopes for resolving the war in Ukraine have diminished to 27% globally (down 4 percentage points), with Colombia (-11 percentage points) and Australia (-10 percentage points) expressing increasing pessimism. Conversely, Malaysia shows growing optimism (+7 percentage points). Similarly, expectations for peace in the Middle East during 2025 are even lower (22% globally), with India (55% likely) most hopeful and Sweden (81% unlikely) the least.

Overall, this outlook reveals a world grappling with both evolving technological threats and persistent geopolitical conflicts, shaping a complex and uncertain future.

Environment in 2025

Environmental concerns persist while faith in government action and technological solutions wane

Global anxieties surrounding climate change persist, with 80% expecting rising global temperatures, (-1 percentage point from 2023), this is significantly more than the 71% who agreed with this statement in 2017 when we first asked this question. 72% globally also anticipate more extreme weather events (+1 percentage point from 2023). This unease is reflected in the 42% who believe parts of their country will become uninhabitable due to extreme weather. Regional disparities are stark. Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines (78%), Indonesia (66%) and Malaysia (58%) express the highest concern in this respect – likely reflecting the reality of their significant populations living on low-lying islands and coastal deltas. In contrast, European countries like the Netherlands (23%) and Sweden (21%) are less worried.

While climate fears grow, faith in government action or that science will provide a game-changing solution is low and/or declining. Only 52% globally believe their governments will introduce more demanding emissions targets, a 3-percentage point drop from 2023. This decline is particularly pronounced in the Netherlands (-20pp) and Chile (-11pp), while Argentina - the most sceptical country - shows a 6-percentage point increase. China, despite high expectations of extreme weather, maintains a strong belief (84%) in government action and technological breakthroughs (65%) to find solutions. In contrast, only 32% globally believe a breakthrough will halt climate change, unchanged from the last time we asked in 2022, which is interesting given the proliferation of Gen AI advancements in that timeframe.

2025 predictions reveal a world increasingly anxious about climate change but less confident in government and technological solutions. This growing unease underscores the urgent need for global cooperation and innovative approaches.

Society in 2025

Societal anxieties persist, with low hopes for progress

Global anxieties around immigration, persistent gender inequality, and evolving work patterns dominate public expectations for 2025, while optimism for increased societal tolerance remains muted.

Globally, 67% of people anticipate increased immigration, down 4 percentage points from last year, despite this perception often diverging from actual migration trends. Countries like Türkiye (84%) and Spain (80%) express higher expectations than nations with historically higher immigration levels like the US (56%) and Canada (55%). This suggests anxieties, rather than empirical data, may be driving these perceptions.

Hopes for gender pay equality remain tempered, with 49% globally believing it will be achieved by 2025. Southeast Asian nations express the highest confidence, while European countries show significantly lower expectations. This disparity doesn't correlate directly with existing gender gaps, suggesting cultural factors influence these perceptions.

Only 33% globally believe people in their countries will become more tolerant of one another in 2025, a 2-percentage point drop from last year, reversing the positive progress we have seen on this issue since its lowest point in 2021 (28%). Singapore (-15pp), Türkiye (-12pp) and the Philippines (-12pp) all saw significant declines.

Expectations for a four-day working week are low, with only 32% globally predicting its widespread adoption. Asian countries show the highest expectations, while European countries express less optimism.

About the Study

These are the results of a 33-country survey conducted by Ipsos on its Global Advisor online platform and, in India, on its IndiaBus platform, between Friday, October 25 and Friday, November 8, 2024. For this survey, Ipsos interviewed a total of 23,721 adults aged 18 years and older in India, 18-74 in Canada, Republic of Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Türkiye, and the United States, 20-74 in Thailand, 21-74 in Indonesia and Singapore, and 16-74 in all other countries. Full methodology is explained in the report.

ipsos.com

4. Nick Rowe Rescued in Vietnam (31 DEC 1968)

All of us who have attended SERE school should be grateful that we could learn the lessons of COL Rowe (and Roque Versace). I was fortunate to hear stories directly from Dan Pitzer when I attended.

Nick Rowe Rescued in Vietnam (31 DEC 1968)

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/488308/nick-rowe-rescued-vietnam-31-dec-1968

Photo By Lori Stewart | After being rescued from his VC captors, Nick Rowe arrives at Camau still wearing his black pajamas (Army Special Operations Forces photo)

12.26.2024

Story by Lori Stewart 

U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

NICK ROWE RESCUED IN VIETNAM

On Dec. 31, 1968, American prisoner of war James “Nick” Rowe was rescued from his Viet Cong (VC) captors in the Mekong Delta. The rescue marked his fourth escape attempt and the end to more than five years of isolation, deprivation, and torture. Rowe documented his experiences in "Five Years to Freedom" and used it to develop programs to assist potential future American POWs.

A native of McAllen, Texas, Nick Rowe graduated from West Point in 1960 and received his commission as a field artillery second lieutenant. After joining Special Forces in 1961, Lieutenant Rowe was assigned to the newly activated 5th Special Forces Group. In July 1963, he deployed to South Vietnam as executive officer and S-2 of the twelve-man Operational Detachment A-23. The detachment advised the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces in the VC infested area of Tan Phu, approximately 130 miles southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta.

On Oct. 29, 1963, Lieutenant Rowe, Capt. Humbert “Roque” Versace, and medic M. Sgt. Daniel L. Pitzer accompanied a 120-man CIDG unit on a routine combat patrol to clear VC soldiers out of the nearby village of La Coeur. Finding the enemy had recently vacated the village, the CIDG forces pursued and were ambushed. By the time the fighting ended, the three Americans had been captured by the VC.

Rowe endured the next sixty-two months in the U Minh Forest as a POW, subjected to indoctrination, torture, food deprivation, and medical neglect. His first three escape attempts only led to more difficult and inhumane conditions. Meanwhile, his friend and fellow POW Captain Versace was reportedly executed. When Sergeant Pitzer was released to American custody in November 1967, Rowe spent the last year of his captivity in total isolation. Although he had successfully hidden his special forces service and officer rank from his captors for years, U.S. antiwar protestors had leaked those details to North Vietnam. Rowe was convinced he would soon be executed.

The morning of Dec. 22, 1968, when B-52s began bombing runs close to the camp in which he was being held, his captors forced him to move. For ten days, they remained mobile, hiding from South Vietnamese infantry and American observation helicopters and hoping not to be hit by the following Cobra gunships. On Dec. 31, Rowe was able to separate himself and his full-time guard from the rest of the group and then succeeded in disarming and disabling his guard. Although dressed in the same black pajamas worn by his captors, Rowe broke into open ground and waved his white mosquito netting at a passing helicopter. Fortunately, the flight commander, Maj. David E. Thompson of the 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Division, suppressed his crew’s impulse to shoot on sight and instead landed to capture this surrendering “enemy” soldier. Not until he saw Rowe’s beard did he realize he was rescuing an American.

After his return from Vietnam, Rowe transferred to Military Intelligence and graduated from the MI Officer Advance Course in 1971. He worked on Operation HOMECOMING to bring home 591 American POWs from Vietnam. After a seven-year break in service, in 1981, then Lt. Col. Rowe was recalled to active duty to help create the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Course for personnel serving in duty positions with a high risk of capture. Then after commanding the1st Special Warfare Training Battalion at the John F. Kennedy Warfare Center and School from 1986−1989, Col. Rowe was assigned as the ground forces director for the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in the Philippines. On Apr. 21, 1989, while being driven to work, his vehicle was ambushed, and he was killed by terrorists of the communist New People’s Army. Colonel Rowe was posthumously inducted into the MI Hall of Fame in 1989.

5. Africa Has Entered a New Era of War

Please go to the link to view the interactive graphics and maps.

Africa Has Entered a New Era of War

A surge in conflicts has gone largely unnoticed amid higher-profile wars in Ukraine and the Middle East

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/africa-has-entered-a-new-era-of-war-c6171d8e?st=eisTsC&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Gabriele Steinhauser

Follow, Andrew Barnett

Follow and Emma Brown

Follow

Dec. 30, 2024 11:00 pm ET

Conflict incidents and fatalities

2,000

1,000

250

Note: Incidents include battles, explosions, remote violence, protests, riots, strategic developments, and violence against civilians. Data as of Dec. 13, 2024.

Source: Acled via José Luengo-Cabrera, The George Washington University

An unprecedented explosion of conflicts has carved a trail of death and destruction across the breadth of Africa—from Mali near the continent’s western edge all the way to Somalia on its eastern Horn.

Older wars, such as the Islamist uprisings in northern Nigeria and Somalia and the militia warfare in eastern Congo, have intensified dramatically. New power contests between militarized elites in Ethiopia and Sudan are convulsing two of Africa’s largest and most populous nations. The countries of the western Sahel are now the heart of global jihadism, where regional offshoots of al Qaeda and Islamic State are battling both each other and a group of wobbly military governments.

This corridor of conflict stretches across approximately 4,000 miles and encompasses about 10% of the total land mass of sub-Saharan Africa, an area that has doubled in just three years and today is about 10 times the size of the U.K., according to an analysis by political risk consulting firm Verisk Maplecroft. In its wake lies incalculable human suffering—mass displacement, atrocities against civilians and extreme hunger—on a continent that is already by far the poorest on the planet. 

Yet, these extraordinary geopolitical shifts in sub-Saharan Africa have been overshadowed by higher-profile conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. That has led to less attention from global policymakers—especially in the West—grossly underfunded humanitarian-aid programs and fundamental questions over the futures of hundreds of millions of people.

Conflicts in Africa have surged dramatically since 2010

Africa is now experiencing more conflicts than at any point since at least 1946, according to data collected by Uppsala University in Sweden and analyzed by Norway’s Peace Research Institute Oslo. This year alone, experts at the two institutes have identified 28 state-based conflicts across 16 of the continent’s 54 countries, more than in any other region in the world and double the count just a decade and a half ago. That tally doesn’t include conflicts that don’t involve government forces, for instance between different communities, and whose number has also doubled since 2010. 

There is no single driver for the emergence and escalation of so many different conflicts across a huge and diverse geography. But, experts say, many of the most-affected states were left vulnerable after failing to settle on a strong mode of governance after independence—whether as functioning democracies or established authoritarian systems—or were destabilized during moments of once-in-a-generation political transitions.  

The former French colonies in the Sahel—Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger—for decades were democracies in name only, regularly disrupted by military coups. Congo’s central government in Kinshasa, like Nigeria’s in Abuja, never managed to exert control over vast territories, opening the door for local and foreign leaders to compete for resources and power, often through violence. 

In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to centralize power after ending decades of dominance by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 2018 have sparked a series of rebellions and clashes between regional militias. In Sudan, two powerful generals turned into rivals after ousting longtime strongman Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and, two years later, a civilian government that was supposed to move the country to democracy.

Smoke rises following an attack that targeted a fuel station in Khartoum, Sudan. Photo: South Khartoum Emergency Room/Zuma Press

One inflection point was the year 2011, when, amid the pro-democracy uprisings of the Arab Spring, militaries from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervened in Libya to support rebel forces fighting the country’s dictator Moammar Gadhafi. With Gadhafi’s death and Libya’s descent into chaos, thousands of armed men moved south into Mali, reigniting a Tuareg rebellion against the government in Bamako that coincided with the global expansion of extremist ideologies promoted by al Qaeda and Islamic State. 

“With the Sahel, it’s clearly a problem of Libya’s collapse and the highway of arms and ideology that that creates,” says Ken Opalo, a Kenyan academic and associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. “So you get weak states, lots of guns and young men leaving Libya and ideologies coming all the way from Pakistan. Then everything is on fire.”

From Mali, the jihadist insurgency spread across porous borders into Burkina Faso and Niger, where new military juntas frustrated with the failure to defeat the militants have kicked out French and other Western troops. It now threatens coastal West African states such as Benin and Ghana. Today, 86% of the territory of Burkina Faso is affected by fighting between jihadists and state forces, according to Verisk Maplecroft’s analysis of incidents collected by the U.S.-based nonprofit monitoring service Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. For Nigeria, that number is 44%.

Civilians are coming under fire

Counting the dead in African conflicts is notoriously difficult. Access to the front lines for journalists and aid groups is often restricted. Phone-service and internet shutdowns that accompanied the wars in Sudan and Ethiopia’s Tigray region complicate efforts to track specific events and their death tolls. Many people don’t die in the fighting itself but from hunger and the breakdown of medical services. 

For Ethiopia, for instance, experts at the University of Ghent in Belgium have estimated that the two-year war between the government and the TPLF caused the deaths of between 162,000 and 378,000 civilians. Acled, whose analysts scour local news sources and contacts for real-time conflict data, counted fewer than 20,000 war fatalities from the fighting itself. 

What is clear from the data is that civilians are much more likely to be deliberately targeted in conflicts in Africa than in many wars elsewhere. In Ukraine, for instance, fewer than 7% of violent events Acled has recorded since February 2024 targeted civilians—compared with more than a third for African conflicts.

“More people are living with violence than ever before, and more people are continuously exposed to armed groups than ever before,” says Clionadh Raleigh, the founder of Acled and a professor of Political Violence and Geography at the University of Sussex in the U.K. 

The consequences go beyond the immediate loss of life. Stalled development, delayed elections and a broader sense of impunity are all reinforced by protracted conflict, Raleigh says.

Mass displacement

The intensifying conflicts have displaced a record number of Africans—most of them inside their own countries. The continent is now home to nearly half of the world’s internally displaced people, some 32.5 million at the end of 2023. That figure has tripled in just 15 years.

Displacement makes civilians, especially women and children, more vulnerable to the collateral effects of war. In the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, local officials and health workers estimate that 80% of the women in displacement camps around Goma have been raped—many of them multiple times. In Sudan, home to the world’s first confirmed famine since 2017, the most hungry are people who have been ripped from their home communities and the jobs or fields that sustained their livelihoods. 

Not a priority

Africa’s current conflicts haven’t prompted the outpouring of sympathy in the West that accompanied Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or the outrage ignited by Israel’s war in Gaza. There has been no equivalent to the Live Aid concerts motivated by the Ethiopian famine in the 1980s, the protest marches over the genocide in Darfur in the early 2000s or even the #BringBackOurGirls campaign linked to the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from the Nigerian town of Chibok 10 years ago.

That lack of popular attention has translated into a dearth of political action to resolve wars in Africa or alleviate the suffering. Africa’s share of official development aid from rich, mostly Western countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is at its lowest level since at least 2000, according to an analysis by the nonprofit One Campaign. 

And while funding for humanitarian aid, which makes up just a small slice of overall development aid, has increased, it hasn’t kept pace with expanding needs. The United Nations received just half of the $2.6 billion it said it needed in 2024 to provide humanitarian aid in Congo. Its appeals for Sudan were 64% funded, while Nigeria has received just 57% of its target. 

It has also meant that diplomatic pressure on the United Arab Emirates, which, according to Wall Street Journal reporting, is supplying weapons and fighters to one of Sudan’s rival generals, has consistently taken a back seat to America’s desire to maintain the country’s support in the Middle East. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has visited Africa just four times since 2021—compared with 43 trips to Europe and 22 to the Middle East.

Other powers move in

In the absence of the U.S. and other Western governments, other powers have doubled down—and often to the detriment of local populations. 

Russia has sent mercenaries to fight in Mali and the Central African Republic, deployments that, according to rights groups, have resulted in more violence against civilians. While the U.A.E. is supporting Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, the country’s military is backed by Egypt, Iran and, most recently, Russia, allowing each side to keep on fighting. In Congo, Rwanda’s military is fighting alongside the insurgent March 23 Movement in a campaign that has displaced more than two million people.

Data from Uppsala University shows a sharp surge in internationalized civil wars in Africa and that those wars with foreign meddling are deadlier than civil conflicts without outside interference. 

What next?

The U.S. remains the leading funder of humanitarian aid in Africa despite the distractions in Europe and the Middle East. Washington contributed 47% to the U.N.’s Sudan emergency response plan in 2024 and nearly 70% of that for Congo. 

Other traditionally large donors, including Germany and the U.K., have already cut their aid budgets amid the crisis in Ukraine and economic problems at home. And many experts expect substantial changes to U.S. foreign and aid policy under the incoming Trump administration, especially toward U.N. agencies—and a further waning of American influence. 

The U.S. and the U.N. “were able to hold a line about what would be considered beyond acceptable for some cases,” says Acled’s Raleigh. “With the Trump administration coming in, that line will disappear. And so the self-interested conflicts that we’re seeing and the people creating violence across the continent will not be checked.” 

Displaced people, local residents and a Congolese soldier set off on a handmade wooden boat in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Photo: Alexis Huguet/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com, Andrew Barnett at andrew.barnett@wsj.com and Emma Brown at Emma.Brown@wsj.com

6. Treasury Department Says Systems Hacked by China-Backed Actor

Unrestricted warfare.

Treasury Department Says Systems Hacked by China-Backed Actor

Several workstations and certain unclassified documents were accessed, the agency said

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/treasury-department-says-systems-hacked-by-china-backed-actor-1bf1445c?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Connor Hart

Follow and Dustin Volz

Follow

Updated Dec. 30, 2024 6:38 pm ET

The treasury was informed in early December that a stolen key was used to remotely access certain workstations. Photo: Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg News

The Treasury Department told lawmakers Monday that a state-sponsored actor in China hacked its systems, accessing several user workstations and certain unclassified documents.

The treasury was informed on Dec. 8 by a third-party software service provider, BeyondTrust, that a threat actor used a stolen key to remotely access certain workstations and unclassified documents, according to a letter reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Once alerted, the department said it immediately contacted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and has since worked with law enforcement partners across the government to assess the incident.

“The compromised BeyondTrust service has been taken offline and there is no evidence indicating the threat actor has continued access to Treasury systems or information,” a spokesperson said.

In response, the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., denied the Treasury Department’s allegations, and said that its government opposes what it described as U.S. smear tactics without any factual basis.

China has for years been blamed by the U.S. and its allies for hacking into a vast range of government computer networks to further its espionage goals. Last year, Chinese state-sponsored hackers were accused of breaching email accounts belonging to Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and senior State Department officials, including the U.S. ambassador to China, in a wide-reaching attack that also compromised more than two dozen organizations globally.

More recently, U.S. officials have been alarmed by a series of deep intrusions at major U.S. telecom companies that they said were also carried about by Chinese hackers. In those attacks, the hackers were able to secretly listen into some calls that involved select high-profile political figures, including President-elect Donald Trump, as well as senior national security officials, according to people familiar with the matter.

The Treasury Department has long been seen as a lucrative target for state-backed hackers because of its work involving international financial issues, including sanctions. In 2020, Russian hackers compromised dozens of department email accounts and breached the office that houses its top officials, as part of a broad campaign that compromised several critical federal government agencies.

Write to Connor Hart at Connor.Hart@wsj.com and Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 31, 2024, print edition as 'Hack of Treasury Traced To China'.

7. TSMC Arizona chip plant still has 50% Taiwanese workers in the run-up to production

What the article does not seem to address is that this may be because we do not have enough sufficiently trained and educated Americans to fill the jobs.

TSMC Arizona chip plant still has 50% Taiwanese workers in the run-up to production

9to5Mac · by Ben Lovejoy · December 30, 2024

A full half of the jobs created by the first TSMC Arizona chip plant have been filled by workers from Taiwan, despite the company receiving up to $11.6B worth of grants intended in large part to generate US jobs.

The original headline news of Apple chips being made in the US by American workers has seemed less and less impressive over time …

Backgrounder on TSMC’s Arizona chip plants

TSMC’s announcement that it was building a chip fabrication plant in Arizona was hailed as a major success for the US CHIPS Act – intended to free the US from dependence on China for advanced chip supplies, and to generate jobs for US workers. Apple proudly announced that it would be buying American-made chips for some of its devices.

The gloss soon began to wear off, however. The first plant will only be able to make larger process chips, only suitable for older Apple devices, and it wasn’t long before TSMC demanded bigger subsidies and fewer rules.

The project fell behind schedule, and over budget, with production already pushed into 2025, from 2024. There is talk of US-made chips costing more than those made in Taiwan, which could mean Apple would buy fewer of them than originally expected.

There were claims that the first plant would be a paperweight, as output would need to be sent back to Taiwan for what’s known as the ‘packaging’ process of encapsulating different circuit boards into a single chip. Apple later announced that it would commission another US-based facility to package the chips.

Most recently, a further delay was announced for 2nm chip production, as a lawsuit accused the company of “anti-American discrimination.”

Half the workers are from Taiwan

TSMC originally said that the prevalence of Taiwanese hires was simply a temporary measure during the construction phase. However, this claim was questioned as the situation remained unchanged last year.

US job creation was first thrown into doubt when TSMC decided to bring in around 500 Taiwanese workers to speed up construction work. The battle over this quickly turned ugly.

But while this was described as a short-term measure, used only for the construction phase, a new report today paints a different picture. The Financial Times says that with almost half the production workforce already recruited, around 50% of them are actually from Taiwan.

A New York Times report says it’s still the case at the end of 2024, with the same claim still being made today, just a few months before production is scheduled to start.

About half of the approximately 2,200 employees have been brought in from Taiwan. Some other Taiwanese workers have come to Arizona on temporary contracts for constructing the factories. The company expects the proportion of American workers to increase as it builds out its plants […]

TSMC said its first factory in Phoenix was expected to begin commercial production in the first half of 2025.

Photo: Bravo Prince on Unsplash.

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9to5Mac · by Ben Lovejoy · December 30, 2024

8. Taking back Panama Canal would require war: Former ambassador

Hyperbole?

Taking back Panama Canal would require war: Former ambassador

by Sarah Fortinsky - 12/30/24 11:22 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/international/5059900-us-panama-canal-reclamation/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/politics

Former U.S. Ambassador to Panama John Feeley on Sunday said it would take a war for the United States to take back the Panama Canal.

“To attempt to take it back today, I’d like to ask you, go find the MAGA constituency that’s going to support another foreign war because that is what it would take to get the canal back,” Feeley said during an interview on CNN.

President-elect Trump has broached the subject of the U.S. taking back the canal.

A week ago, Trump suggested to a conference of his supporters that the Panama Canal be returned to U.S. control, vowing swift action over the matter after he takes office in less than one month.

“It was given to Panama and to the people of Panama, but it has provisions. You got to treat us fairly, and they haven’t treated us fairly,” Trump said at Turning Point USA’s “American Fest.”

“If the principles, both moral and legal, of this magnanimous gesture of giving are not followed, then we will demand that the Panama Canal be returned to the United States of America in full, quickly and without question,” Trump added.

When an audience member yelled, “Take it back,” Trump replied, “That’s a good idea.”

Feeley, who was ambassador under former President Obama and Trump, said the late President Carter was not alone in thinking it was wise to turn over the canal to Panama in the 1970s, noting even conservative leaders had similar instincts.

“Let’s not forget, Jimmy Carter wasn’t the only one who thought it was a good idea. No one less than Henry Kissinger in 1975 told then-President Nixon, if we don’t return this canal, we’re going to lose in every international forum, and we’re going to have riots all over Latin America,” Feeley said in an interview conducted shortly after Carter died on Sunday.

“Carter simply read correctly the decolonization moment, capitalized on it, and then … he paid the political price for that. But it was a principled move,” Feeley continued.

9. Indian Women Hold 11% Global Gold, More Than USA, Germany, Italy, France, And Russia Combined: Report

I do not know what to make of this. How should we assess this?

There are a lot of social media responses to this at the link.

Indian Women Hold 11% Global Gold, More Than USA, Germany, Italy, France, And Russia Combined: Report

Wait till they find out the unaccounted gold

https://in.mashable.com/tech/87375/indian-women-hold-11-global-gold-more-than-usa-germany-italy-france-and-russia-combined-report?utm

• By James Paul   Dec. 30, 2024  

 > Tech

Indian women hold 11% of the world’s gold at 24,000 metric tons, which is several times more than the USA (8,133 tons), Germany (3,362 tons), Italy (2,451 tons), France (2,436 tons), and Russia (2,298 tons). South India takes the major slice of this reserve at 40% of the total share. At 28%, Tamil Nadu has the highest share in South India. The Indian household’s gold reserves make up 40% of the country’s GDP. The report was released by the Oxford Gold Group. Per the Indian Income Tax regulations, married women are permitted a reserve of 500 grams of gold without levying taxes on the same.

Reactions poured in on the report, with social media users taking a jibe at the status as several invoked the name of FM Sithraman. One user remarked, “Mat batao nahi toh tai is par bhi tax lga degi.” “Please don’t give ideas to FM,” requested another user. “If Indian women were a country, its GDP would be higher than many countries,” commented an elated netizen. Several users dubbed the soft gold power of Indian women as ‘Nari Shakti.’

10. How Shen Yun Tapped Religious Fervor to Make $266 Million

I often pass a billboard on Richmond Highway in Alexandria advertising this upcoming event at the Kennedy Center in February. I have always wondered about this since I have seen it advertised for years.

How Shen Yun Tapped Religious Fervor to Make $266 Million

The dance group has accumulated enormous wealth, in large part by getting followers of the Falun Gong religious movement to work for free and pay its bills.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/nyregion/shen-yun-money-falun-gong.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

Shen Yun Performing Arts, which stages hundreds of shows around the world each year, features dance pieces that spread the religious message of Falun Gong.Credit...The New York Times

By Michael Rothfeld and Nicole Hong

The reporters examined thousands of pages of records, including internal communications, and interviewed dozens of people about the finances of the dance group Shen Yun and the Falun Gong religious movement.

Dec. 29, 2024

Over the past decade, the dance group Shen Yun Performing Arts has made money at a staggering rate.

The group had $60 million in 2015.

It had $144 million by 2019.

And by the end of last year, tax records show, it had more than a quarter of a billion dollars, stockpiling wealth at a pace that would be extraordinary for any company, let alone a nonprofit dance group from Orange County, N.Y.

Operated by Falun Gong, the persecuted Chinese religious movement, Shen Yun’s success flows in part from its ability to pack venues worldwide — while exploiting young, low-paid performers with little regard for their health or well-being.

But it also is a token of the power that Falun Gong’s founder, Li Hongzhi, has wielded over his followers. In the name of fighting communism, and obeying Mr. Li’s mystical teachings, they have created a global network to glorify him and enrich his movement.

Under Mr. Li’s direct leadership, Shen Yun has become a repository of vast wealth for Falun Gong, often accumulating money at the expense of its loyal adherents, a New York Times investigation has found.

It has raked in funds through ticket sales — nearly $39 million in 2023 alone — but also by using religious fealty to command the free labor of its followers. It has received tens of millions of dollars more in ways that may have crossed legal or ethical lines, The Times found.

In one case, Shen Yun and a school that trains its dancers received $16 million from The Epoch Times, a newspaper run by Falun Gong followers, during a period when federal prosecutors said the publication’s accounts were inflated in a money-laundering conspiracy.

Shen Yun and a network of satellite organizations added more wealth by skirting rules to tap tens of millions of dollars in pandemic-era relief money.

And three former Shen Yun performers told The Times that they were used to ferry large amounts of cash into the United States, a possible attempt to circumvent laws about reporting U.S. currency transactions.

Shen Yun has kept its own costs down by wringing countless volunteer hours, and sometimes personal savings, from followers of Mr. Li, who has suggested he created the universe and instructed believers that Shen Yun performances can save people from a coming apocalypse by exposing them to his teachings.

Eager to heed Mr. Li, the followers have borne most of the financial burden for staging hundreds of Shen Yun shows around the world, including paying out of their own pockets to book venues, print fliers, buy advertising and sell tickets — even going into debt to cover upfront costs.

Image

Simone Gao, a former Falun Gong practitioner, said followers were influenced by the teachings of Li Hongzhi into giving generously to the movement.Credit...The New York Times

“They all think — including me before — we all think it is an important part of the path to godhood,” said Simone Gao, a former practitioner and Falun Gong media personality. “If you devote time, energy and money to this cause, the reward is incomparable to what you get in this world.”

It was not clear why Shen Yun has amassed so much money, or why nearly all of its assets — $249 million in 2023 — were kept in cash and other liquid instruments. Experts said it was unusual for a nonprofit not to invest such sums unless they were needed for significant short-term expenses, which Shen Yun has not seemed to have incurred.

Shen Yun’s representatives declined to answer questions about its finances. In the past, Mr. Li has said large sums of money were needed to battle the Chinese Communist Party, which has banned the movement and repressed its followers since the 1990s.

“For over 25 years, Falun Gong practitioners have struggled to peacefully resist persecution from the largest totalitarian regime on earth, and Shen Yun is a key part of that effort,” a Shen Yun spokeswoman, Ying Chen, said in a statement to The Times. “Your attempts to brand Shen Yun as a grand moneymaking scheme are shocking and deeply offensive.”

Ms. Chen accused The Times of making “gross distortions or blatant factual errors,” but she declined to elaborate.

As Shen Yun has amassed wealth, its supporters have purchased real estate for Mr. Li’s movement, including Falun Gong’s 400-acre headquarters, known as Dragon Springs, which is about 60 miles northwest of New York City.

They have also subsidized the lifestyle of Mr. Li, now in his early 70s, and his wife, Li Rui, a top manager in Shen Yun.

One follower gave the movement her life savings before dying of cancer, virtually penniless.

In recent years, Mr. Li and his aides have found yet another way to make money through Shen Yun. They have created companies that market products directly to Falun Gong followers, like a Tang Elegance necklace with a spessartite garnet for $3,850, Heavenly Phoenix earrings for $925, a $35 ornament of the Shen Yun tour bus and Shen Yun-branded athleisure clothing.

Practitioners have been told they should purchase the most up-to-date Falun Gong clothing for public events, including a reversible blue-and-yellow jacket for $120.

Business records show that Mr. Li personally started an online video platform that charges $199.99 a year for a subscription to watch Shen Yun performances. His associates also created another video platform, Gan Jing World, which was accused by YouTube in a lawsuit this month of stealing content. The platform has not filed a response to the suit.

Practitioners were urged to subscribe to help “Master” — as Mr. Li is known — save more souls, emails show. Many did just that, former followers said.

Image

Rob Gray, a former Falun Gong practitioner, spent years helping with Shen Yun’s promotions and marketing, which practitioners see as part of a divine mission.Credit...The New York Times

“People gave up their life’s savings, and this happened so often,” said Rob Gray, a former practitioner in London who spent 15 years working on Falun Gong projects. “There’s a constant theme now to fleece practitioners, to take money. Where is this profit going to?”

A Winning Strategy

From the start, Shen Yun has pursued a winning strategy for reaping huge profits: It has gotten other people to shoulder the costs of putting on its shows.

Although the group has a stated mission of reviving traditional Chinese culture while “providing audiences everywhere with an experience of beauty,” it does not routinely pay for the billboards, television ads or fliers depicting Shen Yun’s dancers leaping through the air that are ubiquitous in cities around the world. Nor does it generally cover the costs of venues, ticket sales or hotels and meals for performers.

That burden has fallen on a network of smaller satellite organizations that Mr. Li and his aides have encouraged followers to form around the world.

Image

Shen Yun’s latest world tour began again this month. Last season, the group performed more than 800 shows on five continents.Credit...The New York Times

Known as presenters, the organizations were incorporated as nonprofits in the United States, operating in Atlanta, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and other cities.

The nonprofits are staffed by practitioners who work as unpaid volunteers and have agreed to “bear the responsibility for all costs incurred” and be liable for losses, claims “and expenses of every kind and description” related to staging Shen Yun shows in their areas, according to a contract reviewed by The Times.

Every year, the groups collectively spend millions of dollars and keep only enough in ticket sales to cover their expenses, sending every penny of profit back to Shen Yun.

In 2018, a satellite organization in Georgia, the Falun Dafa Association of Atlanta, spent $1,621,011 on advertising, hotel rooms, food, transportation, venue fees and other expenses, tax records show. The group earned $2,077,507, mostly from seven Shen Yun performances in Atlanta. The Atlanta nonprofit kept $1,621,011 and sent the remaining money — $456,496 — to Shen Yun.

If a satellite organization should spend more money than it earns, it still sends money to Shen Yun — and it falls on the people who run the groups to make up the difference.

At the Indiana Falun Dafa Association, local followers made loans to the satellite organization for a decade. In 2018, eight of them lent a combined $375,000 without any loan agreements and at zero percent interest, tax filings show. One of the lenders, the group’s president, handed over $130,000 on his own.

The satellite organization paid Shen Yun $169,233.39 to put on three shows that February, records show, but did not make enough to repay the loans. They appear to have been settled only years later, using government grants.

Inside the local organizations, practitioners can feel immense pressure to deliver for Mr. Li, who has taught that success in selling Shen Yun tickets is an indicator of how devoted they are to his teachings.

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Shen Yun’s ubiquitous marketing is funded by local practitioners who work as volunteers to promote the show.Credit...The San Francisco Chronicle via Getty Images

He has also urged followers to advertise only in “well-to-do” areas and to set high prices for Falun Gong dance shows.

“Getting things for nothing,” Mr. Li said, “wouldn’t conform to this dimension’s principles.”

Ahead of shows in the San Francisco area, followers would gather on Saturday nights to study Mr. Li’s writings and share how many Shen Yun tickets they had sold, according to a former practitioner who asked to be identified only by her last name, Wang.

Selling as many tickets as possible was seen as a way to accumulate more virtue, she said.

And in London in March 2023, a note of panic crept into an “urgent” email sent by a practitioner named Sharon Xu to other followers in the area. She was seeking their help with leafleting, she wrote, because the show was approaching and thousands of tickets were still unsold.

“We are at a crucial stage in Shen Yun promotion,” she wrote. “Thousands of predestined people whom Master wants to save have yet to connect with us, and there are only literally days remaining this year.”

‘All Her Money Is Gone’

For all the time and money that the operators of the satellite organizations provided, some gave much more to the movement — and to Mr. Li himself.

In 2006, one of Shen Yun’s first performers began traveling from his home in Maryland to Falun Gong’s headquarters along with his sister, also a performer, and their mother, a devoted practitioner. Soon, they all moved to Dragon Springs, known among followers as the mountain, to focus on dancing.

The man, whom The Times is identifying by his first name, Liang, and his sister eventually left Shen Yun and moved away. But their mother remained on the mountain, working unpaid for years as a top aide to Mr. and Ms. Li and as a bookkeeper for the dance group.

She left the area only rarely, such as for Liang’s wedding in 2014, he would later write in an email to friends. That same year, she and her husband sold the house they had owned in Maryland since the 1980s for $485,000, records show.

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Shen Yun’s performers train at Falun Gong’s headquarters in Cuddebackville, N.Y.Credit...The New York Times

Soon after, she began spending money for Shen Yun, her family would later learn. After Mr. Li remarked that Shen Yun’s orchestra should use only the best pianos, Liang’s mother arranged for the purchase of $260,000 in premium models, according to another email her son sent and other records reviewed by The Times.

Other gifts and donations followed, including thousands of dollars in payments for Wi-Fi hot spots and domain names and monthly payments for Mr. and Ms. Li’s cellphone bills to Verizon, according to the records, Liang’s emails and people familiar with the events.

Mr. Li teaches that diligently practicing his meditation exercises and reading his texts keeps the body healthy by purging the bad karma that causes illness. So Liang’s mother did not see a doctor when she began losing weight and becoming increasingly haggard around 2018.

By the fall of 2019, she was 66 years old and down to 70 pounds. Shocked at her appearance during a video call, her family finally persuaded her to get medical care.

The diagnosis was dire: kidney cancer that had spread through her body, leaving her with small odds of survival and tens of thousands of dollars in expected medical costs. She told Liang and his sister that she would not be able to pay for any of it.

“My mom revealed that all her money is gone, donated to the mountain,” Liang emailed his friends on Oct. 15, 2019. “Hundreds of thousands of dollars.”

As their mother was slipping away, Liang and his sister got another shock. An employee in the Shen Yun office accidentally mailed them a statement for their mother’s credit card, which showed charges from Saks Fifth Avenue and other shops. They reviewed more statements and discovered that her accounts had been used to buy tens of thousands of dollars in luxury items, apparently for Mr. Li and his wife.

The statements showed a $13,029.70 charge from the Watch Gallery in London and $10,000 for virgin wool suits and other clothing from Hugo Boss. They showed $2,045.31 in purchases at the luxury retailer Hermès in Austria and another $1,091.99 at the jewelry house Van Cleef & Arpels in Switzerland.

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Statements from a Falun Gong practitioner’s credit cards show tens of thousands of dollars in purchases that had apparently been made for Falun Gong’s leader, his wife and Shen Yun.

They showed thousands more spent on seafood and custom billiard cues — Mr. Li is an avid pool player — and assorted charges from high-end brands including Ferragamo and Tiffany & Company. Ms. Li appeared to have personally used his mother’s credit card, Liang wrote to his friends in an email.

Many of the charges were made in 2018 and 2019, as Liang’s mother’s health was failing, records show.

Within weeks of seeing a doctor, Liang’s mother was dead.

Afterward, a portion of the money was repaid to her family, people familiar with the events said, though the source of the repayment was not clear.

Shen Yun’s spokeswoman, Ms. Chen, said The Times’s account of these events was “inaccurate and misleading in numerous respects.” She said the details were subject to a confidentiality agreement, which she called “a carefully negotiated resolution of a misunderstanding.”

The experience left Liang convinced that the movement was preying on people like his mother, who gave willingly in hopes of receiving a heavenly reward.

“For the first time in my life, I’m seeing things as how they truly are,” he wrote in one of his emails. “I’m not going to let this happen to anyone that I care about ever again.”

Envelopes of Cash

To track the flow of money into Shen Yun, The Times reviewed more than 15 years’ worth of tax filings for the main nonprofit and dozens of its satellite organizations.

Reporters also examined hundreds of pages of internal Shen Yun-related records and communications and interviewed people with knowledge of the organization’s financial dealings, including some who were directly involved in organizing shows.

The dance group and a school that trains its performers received about $16 million from The Epoch Times, the right-leaning news organization founded by followers of Mr. Li, during a period when federal prosecutors said the news outlet’s accounts were inflated by the proceeds of a money-laundering scheme.

Prosecutors charged The Epoch Times’s chief financial officer, Bill Guan, and an employee in Vietnam with conspiracy to launder at least $67 million using cryptocurrency in a scheme that involved identity theft and prepaid bank cards. Mr. Guan has pleaded not guilty.

The Epoch Times has said in public statements that it would cooperate with the investigation and that Mr. Guan had been suspended. It has also said that the accusations against Mr. Guan run counter to the publisher’s standards and to the principles of Falun Gong.

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The Epoch Times, a newspaper founded by Falun Gong followers, is a sponsor of Shen Yun.Credit...Alamy

Shen Yun’s supporters found another source of income when the pandemic swept the world in 2020, causing venues to close and putting a strain on the performing arts industry.

They did it in part by exploiting a loophole in a federal pandemic relief program launched to keep struggling arts programs afloat. The program was designed to award no more than $10 million in grant funding either to any one group or up to five “affiliated” organizations, with rules that were meant to ensure no single entity got a disproportionate share of the aid.

Shen Yun’s satellite nonprofits were all run by ardent followers of Mr. Li, many of whom had staged Shen Yun shows in their cities and sent money back to the dance group for years. But on paper, none of the groups shared board members or were formally related to Shen Yun or to one another, and so they were allowed to tap the federal well without limitation, The Times found.

In all, at least 25 of the satellite groups applied to the so-called Shuttered Venue Operations Grant program and received a combined $48 million, records show. Shen Yun, despite not performing for most of 2020 and 2021, reported a surge in assets in those years of $50 million.

Meredith Lynsey Schade, a theatrical producer who worked with other applicants that sometimes struggled to get aid, called Shen Yun’s approach unethical.

“There are so many organizations that went under because they couldn’t pass the threshold,” she said. “Instead, one organization is hoarding all of this money.”

And then there were the practitioners who sneaked wads of cash into the United States at the dance group’s direction.

Three former Shen Yun performers told The Times that they ferried money through customs without disclosing it. Their accounts bore some similarities to a 2009 incident in which a practitioner was charged by federal prosecutors with smuggling more than $100,000 in cash, some wrapped in tinfoil, through customs at Kennedy International Airport. (A lawyer for Falun Gong later convinced prosecutors to drop the case.)

In 2015, the night before flying back to New York from Barcelona, the performers were each handed a white envelope stuffed with $100 bills.

They were instructed to keep it in their carry-on bags but to separate it. One performer, then a teenager, recalled getting $10,000 — the maximum a person can carry in without reporting it under laws meant to combat money laundering and other crimes. The performer put some of the money in a diary and recalled feeling like a character in a spy movie.

“They said it was very important money,” said the performer, who spoke on condition of anonymity. A manager instructed: “Don’t let other people know that you have this.”

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Sun Zan, a former Shen Yun dancer, said he was directed by his supervisors to carry money back into the U.S. from Barcelona while on tour with the group.Credit...The New York Times

Sun Zan, another performer who carried cash, said he had to surrender his envelope to Shen Yun staff on the bus after the flight. One performer was chastised for leaving the money in a bag that could not be reached right away, he said.

Mr. Sun did not think much of the episode because he had often been paid in cash for dancing, he said, though there was one key difference.

The envelope he brought home from Barcelona held about half of what he earned from Shen Yun in an entire year.

Susan C. Beachy and Sheelagh McNeill contributed research. Peiyue Wu contributed reporting.

Michael Rothfeld is an investigative reporter in New York, writing in-depth stories focused on the city’s government, business and personalities. More about Michael Rothfeld

Nicole Hong is an investigative reporter, focused on covering New York and its surrounding regions. More about Nicole Hong

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 30, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Chinese Troupe A Cash Engine For Its Leader. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine renounce its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition to start peace talks, indicating that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations. Lavrov stated in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on December 30 that Russia will not participate in any negotiations to end its war in Ukraine unless Ukraine renounces its right and objective of liberating its territory up to its internationally recognized 1991 borders. Lavrov added that Russia considers Ukraine's objective of liberating its territory to its internationally recognized 1991 borders an "ultimatum." The Kremlin is likely attempting to impose unrealistic demands on Ukraine that violate international law to stymie legitimate good faith negotiations. Russia is also likely attempting to force the West into coercing Ukraine into acknowledging and accepting territorial concessions that will benefit Russia in the long term. Lavrov and other Russian officials have previously dismissed Ukraine's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a legitimate negotiating position. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and will continue to pursue Ukraine's total capitulation.

US President Joe Biden announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $2.5 billion on December 30. The package is funded by a combined $1.25 billion from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) and $1.22 billion from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and will include thousands of artillery rounds, thousands of rockets, and hundreds of armored vehicles. The US Department of Defense (DoD) reported that the package also includes: munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); HAWK air defense munitions; Stinger missiles; counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions; ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; Tube-launched, Optically-guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles; and other materiel.

Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs — some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on December 30 that Ukraine returned 189 Ukrainians, some of whom defended Ukrainian positions at the Azovstal Steel Plant, Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and Snake Island in early 2022. Zelensky added that Ukraine also returned two civilians whom Russian forces captured during the siege of Mariupol. Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that this POW exchange was one of the largest POWs exchanges since the January 3, 2024, and that Ukraine returned 173 privates and sergeants and 14 officers: 87 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 43 of Ukraine's National Guard, 33 of Ukraine's Border Guards Service, and 24 of the Ukrainian Navy. The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs added that some of the servicemen also participated in combat operations in Kursk, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs noted that in total 3,956 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine, of which 1,358 returned in 2024. The Russian MoD announced on December 30 that Russia exchanged 150 Ukrainian POWs for 150 Russian POWs.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine renounce its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition to start peace talks, indicating that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations.

• The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing Russia's force generation requirements and domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages going into 2025.

• US President Joe Biden announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $2.5 billion on December 30.

• Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs - some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022.

• Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs - some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022.

• Russian border guards withdrew from the Agarak border checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border on December 30 after controlling the checkpoint for over 30 years.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka.

• A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian veteran issues claimed that Russian forces have significantly strengthened the Russian international border with Ukraine since 2022 and no longer overwhelmingly rely on conscripts and alleged deserters as border security.

12. Iran Update, December 30, 2024

Iran Update, December 30, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2024

Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there. Outlets affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Armed Forces General Staff published reports on December 30 to this end. One outlet reported on HTS-affiliated elements committing violence against Syrian Alawites. Another outlet reported that armed “resistance” has formed against the HTS-led interim government in response to its offenses against the Syrian people. CTP-ISW has independently observed anti-HTS elements appearing in predominantly Alawite areas in recent days. That the Iranian outlet framed these elements as “resistance” is noteworthy given that the term has an overwhelmingly positive connotation in Iranian regime discourse. Other Iranian outlets that have no obvious affiliation with the Iranian security establishment have published reports emphasizing sectarian tensions in recent days as well. For instance, one outlet reported on purported HTS efforts to achieve the “de-Shia-ization of Syria.” A Middle Eastern source separately told a Western analyst that regional countries have shared intelligence with HTS in recent days that the IRGC is planning to “foster, direct, and support an insurgency” in Syria, presumably by exploiting the sectarian tension that Iran is currently trying to stoke. Another source told the Western analyst that HTS-led forces detained two former Syrian regime operatives with IRGC identification cards and at least three Lebanese nationals. CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports, but it is consistent with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, suggesting in recent days that Syrian youth should arm and mobilize against the interim government.

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with senior Ukranian officials in Damascus on December 30. A delegation led by Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrii Sybiha met with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani and Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab. Shaibani said that there will be a “strategic partnership” between Ukraine and Syria during a press conference after the meeting.

HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with Kuwaiti Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Ali al Yahya and Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Jassam Mohammed al Badawi in Damascus on December 30. Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani and Syrian Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab attended the meeting as well. Shaibani said that Kuwait and Syria will establish political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation during a press conference after the meeting.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued operations within the Israel-Syria disengagement zone on December 30. Syrian media reported that the IDF advanced into al Baath and entered government buildings to search for weapons. The IDF previously entered al Baath and met with local officials to negotiate weapons collection efforts in the area on December 22. Local media reported on December 30 that the IDF remain near Maariyah and Jamleh villages, Daraa Province. The IDF first began operations within the disengagement zone on December 8.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran appears increasingly as though it seeks to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, which it could then exploit to establish proxy and partner militias there.

• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to the senior levels of the new Syrian security establishment that he is currently forming.

• Syria: HTS-interim government officials have continued to meet with military commanders affiliated with the Turkish-backed SNA.

• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large attack targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.

13. Lesson №1 for Putin: Never Mess with Finland

Today, we urgently appeal to your generosity and compassion.

Your support is crucial to our mission of advancing strategic advocacy for Ukraine.

Alerted to Shankar Narayan by Friends of Ukraine Network’s Ambassador Sandy Vershbow I believe his latest two articles are worth calling to your attention.

Lesson №1 for Putin: Never Mess with Finland

https://mailchi.mp/usukraine/online-webinar-what-is-the-goal-of-assistance-to-ukraine-10339869?e=216e79c6ab

Shankar Narayan

Finland. Finland. Finland.

You beauty.

That was some of the boldest action I’ve seen in recent times. I’ll place Finland’s resolve over the past 100 hours right alongside Britain and Poland tearing up diplomatic playbooks in January 2023 to push the Western alliance into delivering tanks to Ukraine.

Yes, nearly two years ago. After a long lull, we now have a European nation daring Putin and emerging decisively on top.

Stunning details have emerged following the seizure of the Eagle S by Finnish authorities. The tanker, which departed Russia’s port of Ust-Luga loaded with oil, was en route to Port Said, Egypt. While passing through the Gulf of Finland, it dropped its anchor and dragged it along the seabed, severing multiple undersea cables, including a power cable linking Finland and Estonia.

The Eagle S then made a suspicious U-turn, retracing its path as it continued damaging cables, before veering back to its original route. The maneuvering suggests they were seeking confirmation — possibly from someone outside the ship — that their sabotage was successful. The vessel was also carrying sophisticated spying equipment.

Finland’s Coast Guard intercepted the tanker just before it could target another critical submarine power line, Estlink 1, while Estonia deployed naval forces to protect the infrastructure. There’s little doubt that Russian commanders in Kaliningrad were aware of the ship’s mission — and of the possibility it might be caught.

If the Russians had patrol vessels in the area and still failed to intervene to protect a cargo ship loaded with their spy equipment, they are absolute fools. If they didn’t have any patrol vessels or warships nearby, they are grossly incompetent. Either way, they’ve been caught red-handed, and their options to escape this predicament are almost nonexistent.

Finland, on the other hand, knew the risks involved in seizing the ship and bringing it to a Finnish port. Russian warships could have been deployed to block the seizure, potentially igniting a major confrontation. Despite this, Finland pressed ahead, boarding the ship and taking control. It was likely all over before the regional Russian commander could even issue orders to respond.

The Russians had every reason to stop this ship from being seized — it was packed with spy equipment.

According to Lloyd’s List, a global maritime and shipping industry publication, the Eagle S “had transmitting and receiving devices installed that effectively allowed it to become a spy ship for Russia.”

Lloyd’s List reported that an unauthorized individual, not a seafarer, was found aboard the 20-year-old tanker Eagle S. The individual brought listening and recording equipment onboard in large portable suitcases, along with laptops equipped with Turkish and Russian keyboards, during port calls in Türkiye and Russia. The equipment, placed on the bridge and the “monkey island” (the ship’s highest point), was used to record NATO naval and aircraft radio frequencies.

The recordings were later offloaded in Russia for analysis. Sources claimed that Russian, Turkish, and Indian radio officers operated the equipment. Additionally, Eagle S allegedly dropped sensor-like devices in the English Channel during transit.

Now, all that spying equipment is in Finland’s possession. Russia, heavily reliant on its shadow tanker fleet — of which the Eagle S was a part — to move oil and bypass the €60-per-barrel price cap imposed by the West, has been exposed. The Russians should have done everything possible to keep this espionage operation under wraps.

Instead, the world now knows these oil tankers aren’t just transporting crude — they’re doubling as spy ships for Russia. This revelation leaves NATO and Europe with no choice but to ramp up interceptions of these vessels to check for spying activities. Patrols in the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Finland, and the Danish Straits will undoubtedly increase, and every movement by the shadow fleet will be scrutinized.

Putin now faces a monumental struggle to circumvent sanctions. Every intercepted tanker will be questioned for its insurance documents. Without proper insurance, the vessel can be seized. If insured, the oil must be sold at or below €60 per barrel — further choking Russia’s revenues.

This string of events has left Putin in dire straits. To regain any momentum in the Western world for negotiations, he’ll need a significant shift in fortunes. But everything over the past week has further eroded his standing.

Russian troops already faced global condemnation for blowing up a passenger plane. Reports suggest Russia denied the plane emergency landing rights at their airports, forcing the pilots to fly over the Caspian Sea toward Kazakhstan. In a heroic act, the pilots lost their lives but still managed to save 29 passengers.

The world now knows that cargo ships leaving Russian ports are doubling as spy ships and even tripling as infrastructure sabotage vessels. What kind of momentum does that give Putin in negotiations? None — it only amplifies his negative profile. Finland and Estonia now have even more reasons, backed by solid evidence, to derail any peace talks that might swing in Putin’s favor.

For Putin, a bad month has only grown worse. NATO’s newest member has shown that courage still carries weight. When a reporter asked Finland’s Police Chief if he planned to contact Russia about the incident, his response was curt: “No. We will not.”

Putin should have never messed with Finland. Ever.

They gave Stalin a bloody nose. Now they’ve done the same to Putin. And with this, the path to dismantling Russia’s shadow fleet has opened up at the perfect time.

14. China’s military buildup and psychological warfare threat to US

Excerpts:

China’s rapid military buildup and its focus on cognitive warfare are clear signals of its intentions to challenge the US and its allies for global supremacy. The US must respond with a clear, focused strategy that combines fiscal responsibility with military readiness. By streamlining defense spending, prioritizing modernization, and investing in critical technologies, the US can maintain its competitive edge.

President-elect Donald Trump’s national security team, with its understanding of the threat posed by China, must move swiftly to rebuild the US military’s capacity to counter this emerging challenge. With the right strategy and reforms, the US can ensure that it remains the dominant global power and can deter any adversary, including China, from destabilizing the international order.

China’s military buildup and psychological warfare threat to US

weeklyblitz.net · by Sonjib Chandra Das · December 29, 2024

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has embarked on a relentless military buildup that has not only challenged the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific but also posed a growing national security threat to the United States. What’s more alarming is that China’s military expansion is not limited to the conventional arms race; it is coupled with an increasingly sophisticated psychological warfare campaign, including cognitive warfare tactics aimed at undermining the very foundations of American society and political decision-making. This complex blend of military modernization and information warfare, combined with questionable strategic timelines, represents a significant threat to the US and its allies.

The 2024 Department of Defense (DoD) China Military Power Report, as well as recent analyses from prominent sources such as Bill Gertz in the Washington Times, reveals a chilling picture of China’s rapid military expansion. This buildup goes beyond traditional military strategy and seeks to position China as a global superpower capable of challenging the United States for global dominance.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has undergone an extraordinary expansion in its missile capabilities. Some of the most concerning developments include:

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): The PLARF now possesses 400 ICBMs capable of striking the continental US This increase includes the addition of 50 new ICBMs, which significantly enhance China’s long-range strike capabilities.

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles: More than 300 medium-range ballistic missiles and 100 long-range cruise missiles are now part of China’s arsenal, expanding its reach within the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Nuclear Warheads: China’s nuclear arsenal currently comprises over 600 warheads, a number that is projected to exceed 1,000 by 2030. This nuclear buildup aims to establish China’s strategic deterrence capacity against any potential US or allied intervention.

Hypersonic Missiles: China’s investment in hypersonic technology, such as the DF-27 missile, presents a significant challenge to US missile defense systems. These missiles can evade detection and intercept systems, posing a direct threat to critical US territories such as Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska.

Naval Expansion: China’s naval force is already the largest in the world, with over 370 ships and submarines. By 2030, this number is expected to grow to 435, further solidifying China’s maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.

This buildup represents not just an expansion of military power but a strategic move to challenge the US military’s ability to project force globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific. China’s growing capabilities in missile technology, naval power, and nuclear weapons signal a shift toward a more confrontational posture with the West.

Beyond the expansion of conventional military forces, China’s most insidious form of aggression is its focus on cognitive warfare. This emerging doctrine aims not to directly engage military forces in battle, but instead to manipulate the information and decision-making processes of its adversaries. The goal is to weaken the resolve of enemies without ever firing a shot. Cognitive warfare includes the use of AI, deepfakes, and other technological advancements to distort reality and demoralize opponents.

China’s cognitive warfare strategy involves using advanced AI tools to carry out psychological operations that impact both military personnel and civilian populations. Key elements of this approach include:

Deepfake Technology: China has been experimenting with deepfake videos and audio to manipulate perceptions during international crises, deceiving military and political leaders. This technology can be used to create fake communications from political figures or military commanders, leading to confusion and poor decision-making.

Influence Operations via Social Media: Platforms like TikTok, which are popular among younger populations, have been used by China to promote anti-US narratives. These operations target not just adversary populations, but also US allies in the region, eroding trust in US leadership and sowing discord among allies.

Psychological Warfare to Demoralize US Troops: China is also working to undermine the morale of US military personnel by spreading disinformation designed to create division and confusion within the ranks. These tactics are intended to weaken US resolve and fracture alliances.

This psychological manipulation campaign is a testament to China’s strategic shift toward unconventional warfare. As Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military strategist, advised, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” China’s cognitive warfare operations are an embodiment of this principle, relying on the manipulation of perceptions and emotions rather than conventional military engagement.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has outlined ambitious goals for its military modernization. Officially, the CCP aims to achieve military readiness for an action against Taiwan by 2027, establish strategic dominance by 2035, and build a world-class military by 2049, the centenary of the CCP’s victory in China’s civil war.

However, these timelines should be viewed with skepticism. Many analysts believe these dates are deliberately set to mislead potential adversaries into underestimating China’s true capabilities. The accelerated pace of China’s missile development, naval expansion, and cognitive warfare preparations suggests that the CCP may already possess more advanced capabilities than it publicly acknowledges. China’s strategy may well be designed to lull adversaries into complacency while it quietly accelerates its military and technological progress.

While China aggressively pursues its military goals, the United States is grappling with a dire fiscal situation. The federal deficit and national debt continue to grow, straining military budgets. The US has invested $5.4 trillion in the global war on terror, yet much of this spending has been inefficient and misdirected, leaving the US strategically vulnerable in the face of the rising Chinese threat.

The US must now confront a fundamental challenge: how to rebuild its military power while managing a ballooning national debt. To counter China’s growing military capabilities, the US must prioritize investments in:

Naval Power: Rebuilding the US Navy with additional surface combatants, submarines, and support vessels is critical to countering China’s naval ambitions.

Nuclear Deterrence: Modernizing the US nuclear arsenal to ensure a credible deterrence against China’s rapidly expanding nuclear stockpile.

Missile Defense Systems: Investing in next-generation missile defense technology to protect critical US assets in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Maritime Lift Capability: Expanding strategic sealift capacity to ensure the rapid deployment of US forces in any potential conflict.

However, this necessary military modernization cannot come at the cost of unchecked spending. The Pentagon’s bloated bureaucracy, inefficiencies in procurement, and outdated programs must be reformed to free up resources for the critical investments required to counter China’s rise.

To achieve the necessary military modernization, the Pentagon must undergo significant reforms. This includes eliminating redundant programs, streamlining procurement processes, and reducing bureaucratic overhead. The aim should be to create a more agile, efficient, and cost-effective military apparatus capable of responding swiftly to emerging threats.

At the same time, Congress must prioritize defense spending that directly counters China’s growing military power. This will require difficult decisions, but it is essential for ensuring that the US remains prepared for the challenges of the coming decades.

China’s rapid military buildup and its focus on cognitive warfare are clear signals of its intentions to challenge the US and its allies for global supremacy. The US must respond with a clear, focused strategy that combines fiscal responsibility with military readiness. By streamlining defense spending, prioritizing modernization, and investing in critical technologies, the US can maintain its competitive edge.

President-elect Donald Trump’s national security team, with its understanding of the threat posed by China, must move swiftly to rebuild the US military’s capacity to counter this emerging challenge. With the right strategy and reforms, the US can ensure that it remains the dominant global power and can deter any adversary, including China, from destabilizing the international order.

Please follow Blitz on Google News Channel

weeklyblitz.net · by Sonjib Chandra Das · December 29, 2024

15. US military presence in Somalia likely to be scrutinized by incoming Trump administration

China, China, China. Are we going to be a one trick pony? What is China doing in Africa?  That said, a blank slate policy review is not a bad thing. But just as we should not continue failed or failing policies, we should not make blanket pronouncements that we have to shift focus to China at the expense of everything else. There have to be some sweet spots in between.

Excerpts:

The Pentagon under Trump is expected to make China more of a focal point, which means that resources could be pulled from lower-priority missions and sent toward Asia.

Elbridge Colby, whom Trump has nominated to serve as the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for policy, has argued that the military is spread too thin and must pivot more sharply to the Pacific.

...

Concerns about China’s growing influence and large trade advantage in Africa also could influence Trump’s actions.

As for Somalia, Pham said the current U.S. approach needs an overhaul.

“At the very least, a complete blank slate review of U.S. policy toward the Somali failed state should be undertaken before investing any more American resources,” Pham said.

US military presence in Somalia likely to be scrutinized by incoming Trump administration

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · December 30, 2024

Marine Corps Gen. Michael Langley, head of U.S. Africa Command, talks with Somali troops in Mogadishu on Sept. 10, 2024. U.S. troops returned to Somalia in 2022 in an advisory capacity, two years after then-President Donald Trump pulled hundreds of U.S. service members out of the country. (Bobby Dixon/U.S. Navy)

STUTTGART, Germany — One of President-elect Donald Trump’s last actions during his first term was pulling all U.S. forces out of Somalia, a move that could be back on the table in a second term that carries the potential for a broader scaling-back of military activities on the continent.

Of all of U.S. Africa Command’s missions, its campaign in Somalia is likely to come under a microscope soonest, said J. Peter Pham, who served as special envoy to Africa’s volatile Sahel region during Trump’s first term.

“I would expect that President Trump will want to reverse course and restore things to where he intended at the end of 2020,” Pham said Sunday.

Pham said current conditions in Somalia, where a decades-long conflict between Islamic militants and a weak central government continues to play out, justify pulling out U.S. forces once again.

“Quite frankly, as the corruption of even allegedly elite units like Danab has underscored, we do not have an effective partner in Mogadishu, and there are no U.S. national security interests that justify risking American treasure — much less American blood — in Somalia that cannot be handled offshore or from nearby bases,” Pham said.

Somali soldiers in the elite Danab unit stand in formation during a graduation ceremony on Oct. 9, 2024. American forces in Somalia have prioritized advising the unit in their fight against the Islamic militant group al-Shabab. (Darryl Padgett/Special Operations Command Africa)

Headquartered in Stuttgart, AFRICOM has several hundred troops positioned in Somalia, where they serve as advisers to local forces. There’s a special focus on the Danab unit, which the U.S. military has touted as one of Somalia’s most capable forces.

President Joe Biden in 2022 directed U.S. personnel back to Somalia on a continuous basis, reversing Trump’s order in late 2020 that resulted in some 700 troops being moved out of the country.

Biden’s decision came in the wake of criticism from then-AFRICOM commander Gen. Stephen Townsend, who said the rotational approach that replaced the full-time presence in Somalia amounted to “commuting to work” and allowed insurgents to gain ground.

Trump’s move out of Somalia was something he had sought to do earlier in his term. Former Defense Secretary Mark Esper, in his memoir about his time in the Trump administration, said Trump was skeptical about the AFRICOM mission as a whole.

Trump “didn’t see much value in having any Americans, whether they be military personnel or diplomats, based anywhere on the continent,” Esper wrote in his book, “A Sacred Oath.” “The bottom line was that Trump wanted out of Africa completely, and Somalia now seemed to be the start point.”

The Pentagon under Trump is expected to make China more of a focal point, which means that resources could be pulled from lower-priority missions and sent toward Asia.

Elbridge Colby, whom Trump has nominated to serve as the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for policy, has argued that the military is spread too thin and must pivot more sharply to the Pacific.

In the case of Africa, al-Shabab has proved resilient despite an international effort to help Somalia’s government counter it. Meanwhile, AFRICOM has raised concern about other militants expanding their reach in parts of western Africa.

So far, however, such groups have not demonstrated an ability to strike outside the African continent, raising questions about how significant of a threat they pose to the U.S. homeland.

Esper, writing about security in Africa, said some combatant commands during his tenure were prone to inflate threats to get more military assets.

“Some couldn’t accept their priority in the bigger scheme of things, and a few would stretch the risk assessment to justify their demands,” Esper wrote.

How such threat assessments could factor into Trump’s approach to AFRICOM, formed nearly 20 years ago when countering Islamic militant groups around the world was a Pentagon focal point, isn’t yet clear.

Concerns about China’s growing influence and large trade advantage in Africa also could influence Trump’s actions.

As for Somalia, Pham said the current U.S. approach needs an overhaul.

“At the very least, a complete blank slate review of U.S. policy toward the Somali failed state should be undertaken before investing any more American resources,” Pham said.

Soldiers from Somalia's Danab unit train in Kismayo, Somalia, on April 24, 2024. American forces in the country have prioritized advising the Danab in their fight against the Islamic militant group al-Shabab. (Joshua DeGuzman/Special Operations Command Africa)

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · December 30, 2024

16. US Army unit in Poland the first to field new rocket system

US Army unit in Poland the first to field new rocket system

militarytimes.com · by Todd South · December 30, 2024

A Germany-based artillery brigade is now the first Army unit fully equipped with the service’s next-generation Multiple Launch Rocket System.

In November, soldiers with the 41st Field Artillery Brigade in Grafenwoehr, Germany, completed the replacement of their legacy M270A1 MLRS platforms with the A2 variant, according to an Army release.

“The major difference we have seen with the M270A2 is that they are a little bit faster and more mobile,” said Capt. Kendal Peter, commander of Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment, 41st FA Brigade. “They have an improved cab that protects the soldiers which the M270A1 did not have, as well as a myriad of system upgrades that allow us to shoot faster and process missions more efficiently.”

RELATED

Army eyes autonomous missile launcher and 1,000-kilometer strikes

The capabilities are still in the research stages but are showing promise.

The M270, which has been in service since the early 1980s, is a tracked system built on the chassis of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle that can fire up to 12 guided rockets, four precision strike missiles or two ATACMS missiles, which have a 140-mile range.

Other improvements with the new variant include a new engine, improved armored cabs, an upgraded transmission and a new common fire control system, according to manufacturer Lockheed Martin.

The A2 variant was first used in November during Exercise Dynamic Front 25. According to the release, the new equipment improved the soldiers’ live-fire artillery missions during the NATO exercise.

Soldiers with the 41st Field Artillery Brigade occupy an M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket System after a successful fire during exercise Dynamic Front 25 at Ravajarvi Training Area, Rovaniemi, Finland, Nov. 18, 2024. (Spc. Elijah Magaña/Army)

“I am really looking forward to us being able to get in with our allies and execute long-range munition fires and seeing what we can do with them,” Staff Sgt. Zariah Fernandez, a platoon sergeant with Charlie Battery, said in the release.

The brigade is one of V Corps’ three permanently forward-deployed brigades.

“Being the only field artillery brigade that supports the European theater, we are the number one call when it comes to a conflict,” Peter said.

In April 2023, the Army awarded Lockheed Martin a $194 million contract for the A2 variant, as well as a $4.8 billion deal for the guided rockets.

The company is also working on an extended-range version of the guided rocket, which would more than double the rocket’s roughly 40-mile range to more than 100 miles, Defense News reported.

The M270A2 first arrived at the Army’s Red River Depot in 2022 prior to unit fielding. Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom plan to adopt the new platform, according to the release.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

17. Where Is Russia Finding New Soldiers? Wherever It Can.

Where Is Russia Finding New Soldiers? Wherever It Can.

From murder suspects to immigrants to a former Olympic gold medalist, Russia pressures those it thinks should fight in Ukraine.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/30/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-soldiers.html?utm

Russian troops boarding a military aircraft last year in Grozny, Russia.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

By Neil MacFarquhar and Milana Mazaeva

Dec. 30, 2024

Leer en español

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia and Ukraine? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Russia has ground through repeated waves of soldiers in Ukraine. It lost some of its most experienced troops at the very start of the invasion, then shipped off tens of thousands of convicts without seeming to care whether they survived.

Now, still desperately seeking sufficient manpower to maintain pressure on Ukraine, Russia has expanded recruitment even more. Men (and women) no longer have to be convicted of a crime — under new laws, any suspects detained by the police are informed that pending charges will disappear if they volunteer. The military also is taking anyone with large, unpaid debts; recent immigrants caught in repeated dragnets; and even corrupt officials.

In one recent example from St. Petersburg, two men were arrested on charges of smuggling about 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of cocaine from Peru, worth roughly $30 million, in the roof of a container filled with more than 5,000 cases of mangoes, according to the press service of the St. Petersburg court system. The charges were dropped after the two signed contracts to serve as riflemen in an assault company, the court said.

Local papers nationwide are full of cases of suspected murderers, rapists and thieves who are headed off to war after signing contracts instead of facing trial.

“They can kill people or rob a bank or commit any other crime and then go to the front,” said Ruslan Leviev, a Russian military analyst. The government is “desperate for a lot of people,” he said. “There is a huge rate of casualties on the front line.”

Trying to avoid a draft, the Kremlin has pushed through a series of legal measures in recent months to widen the pool of potential soldiers. The effort has become especially important as Russia seeks to push back Ukrainian lines in advance of an anticipated move by President-elect Donald J. Trump to end the war when he takes office Jan. 20.

Image

The IK-3 penal colony in Kharp settlement, Yamal-Nenets Region, Russia, in February. “Russian prisons are one of the most horrible places in the world,” said Olga Romanova, the head of Russia Behind Bars.Credit...Anatoly Maltsev/EPA, via Shutterstock

Under a law signed by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia this October, the process of joining the military can start from the moment a criminal case is opened. The recruitment of criminals that started in 2022 was limited to those already sentenced to penal colonies.

Chronic debtors across Russia have been the focus of a concentrated campaign from the Federal Bailiff Service. A new law that went into effect on Dec. 1 forgives up to 10 million rubles (nearly $100,000) in debts and suspends enforcement proceedings if they agree to fight. That includes countless men with hefty arrears on alimony payments.

The authorities have also been raiding markets, warehouses and railroad stations, or anyplace where they might catch immigrants who recently received Russian citizenship but have not registered for military service. Ordered to provide paperwork at their local draft office, some find themselves whisked off to war.

It is difficult to know the scale of recruitment through these various means because no national tally is available. The military had been recruiting through more traditional avenues — what outside intelligence agencies estimated at 30,000 people monthly — by paying ever larger bonuses to civilian volunteers, but analysts believe the numbers are waning. Offering amnesty is also a cheaper alternative.

“Volunteers from civilian life are quite expensive given all the payments that they have been promised,” Mr. Leviev said. “Criminals do not get the same incentives.”

Olga Romanova, the head of Russia Behind Bars, a nongovernmental organization that defends prisoners’ rights, said that the Russian state was severing the connection between crime and punishment, which could have dire long-term consequences on crime rates.

Were the writer Dostoyevsky alive today, she said, he might have to revise the plot of his novel “Crime and Punishment.” Even if the police found Rodion Raskolnikov holding an ax dripping blood, all he would have to say is “I want to go to the front,” she imagined, and the police would respond, “OK!”

Image

Olga Romanova, the head of Russia Behind Bars.

Image

Ruslan Leviev, a Russian military analyst.

Debates about the consequences of signing contracts instead of facing trial unspool at length online.

When one woman asked whether her husband should sign a military contract, another participant in a discussion group on Vkontakte, Russia’s equivalent of Facebook, noted that her man would earn money and scrub his criminal record clean. Then the person added, “But I recommend you look for a new husband immediately, it is unlikely to end well.”

An opposition activist and former prosecutor signed a contract because he rated his chances of being killed at the front lower than in prison, given his past work locking up criminals, according to Ms. Romanova.

“Russian prisons are one of the most horrible places in the world,” she said in an interview. “The conditions are terrible. Usually, people chose the war because in prison you are no one, you have no rights. In the war, you can at least do something, make some decisions.”

Another source of volunteers has been politicians and state employees jailed on corruption charges. In Vladivostok, the largest Russian city on the Pacific Ocean, two former mayors as well as the director of municipal funeral services, plus several regional officials, have all announced that they want to serve in exchange for getting out of jail.

Oleg Gumenyuk, the mayor from 2018 to 2021, was convicted on bribery charges, as was his predecessor, Igor Pushkarev, mayor from 2008 to 2017. Igor Babynin, identified in the Vladivostok news media as “the king of the funeral business,” was found guilty of bribery and embezzlement.

Some politicians end up in Cascade, nicknamed the “luxury” battalion, which allows the well-connected and well-heeled to avoid combat, analysts said. “All their pictures show them eating lunch, or posing with rifles,” Mr. Leviev said. “Their uniforms are clean and new, like they just came from the shower.”

Some politicians have died at the front, especially if they ended up in the Storm Z assault units made up of former prisoners, but they tend to be the exception.

Using the war as a “laundry” to clean reputations has been criticized. “A thief who stole from the state should be in prison,” wrote Aleksander Kartavykh, a military blogger on Telegram. Murderers and rapists might atone for their sins with blood, he said, but not corrupt officials: “With a murderer there is confidence that he will really fight, but with an official, without oversight, there is no such confidence.”

Image

Recruitment advertising for the Russian Army featuring the slogan, “People are not born heroes — they are self-made,” in 2023 in Ivolginsk, Russia.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Immigrants who recently acquired Russian citizenship, usually laborers from former Soviet republics in Central Asia, have also been targeted for recruitment. Local newspaper reports nationwide describe enforcement raids that sweep up scores of potential immigrant soldiers.

In the Sverdlovsk region, a man from Tajikistan who recently had acquired a Russian passport said a rumor ran through his community that it would be revoked if he did not register. At the draft office, he said that he and some colleagues received a list of needed documents.

When he returned a couple of weeks later with the paperwork, every immigrant there was handed a summons for military training. He was only let go later because three buses proved insufficient to take all the men, said the man, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for safety reasons.

Police officers in many regions earn an incentive bonus of about $100 for every suspect they sign up, Ms. Romanova said, while in wealthier Moscow the amount is $500.

Court records indicate that one suspect in five being arraigned becomes a soldier, she said, but they can sign up any time during the judicial process. Overall, Russia has about 106,000 spots in its penal colonies, and although previous recruitment drives reduced the prison population by about half, she said, the authorities are now trying to rapidly fill the vacant spots in hopes that suspects would rather fight.

Image

The body of a dead Russian soldier in a body bag at the destroyed Russian border post at the Sudzha border crossing in August.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Those who refuse, however, often face investigators who vow to let them rot in jail.

Years ago, Andrey Perlov could walk faster than any man on earth, winning the gold medal for Russia in the 50-kilometer race walk at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics.

Mr. Perlov, 62, does not walk much these days, stuck in a prison cell in Novosibirsk, in Siberia, since March, charged with embezzling about $30,000 from the soccer club where he was general manager.

Investigators have not presented any evidence publicly, said Alina Perlova, his daughter, instead repeatedly prolonging his detention while pressuring him to go to Ukraine. The Novosibirsk Regional Court could not be reached for comment.

“For them, the best option is for him to go to war,” Ms. Perlova said in an interview. “The case would be closed, and nobody would be responsible for making the mistake of putting him in jail.”

Investigators have threatened to keep him locked up for a year or two as the case crawls along, she said, adding that their basic attitude is, “Let him go to the front at age 62 — no matter, he is an athlete.”

Image

Andrey Perlov, center, of the Unified Team from the 15 former Soviet republics, won the gold medal in the men’s 50-kilometer race walk in 1992 at the Olympic Games in Barcelona.Credit...Mike Powell/Allsport, via Getty Images

If the Kremlin showers current medalists with cash and gifts like foreign luxury cars, in those early days of the Russian Federation, President Boris Yeltsin gave Mr. Perlov a watch and the money to buy a local Lada car, Ms. Perlova said. His family, including his wife and a son, subsisted on his $1,000 monthly pension, plus the small fees that his daughter earns translating Chinese literature. Now his accounts are frozen.

Occasionally, her father wavers, thinking that he should go to war so his family can get money, despite the danger and that signing would be tantamount to admitting guilt.

“I keep saying, ‘Dad, no, please, we will find a way,’ ” Ms. Perlova said.

Neil MacFarquhar has been a Times reporter since 1995, writing about a range of topics from war to politics to the arts, both internationally and in the United States. More about Neil MacFarquhar

Milana Mazaeva is a reporter and researcher, helping to cover Russian society. More about Milana Mazaeva

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 31, 2024, Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: Where Is Russia Finding Fresh Soldiers? Wherever It Can.. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

18. 2024: Year of the Drone

Excerpt:

From drones that can soar through the stratosphere, to rotor drones that hover a few feet above the ground, and submersible drones that glide 50 feet underwater, drones have transformed our lives and modern warfare.

The author did not use my favorite drone metaphors from Plato's Republic:

"Do you wish us," I said, "to say of him that, as a drone growing up in a cell is a disease of a hive, such a man growing up in a house is a drone and a disease of a city?

...

"Hasn't the god made all drones with wings stingless, Adeimantus, but only some drones with feet stingless while others have terrible stings? From the stingless ones come those who end up as beggars in old age, while from those who have stings come all who are called wrongdoers."

...

"And these people [drones] sit idle in the city, I suppose, with their stings and weapons—some in debt, some disenfranchised, some both—hating those who've acquired their property, plotting against them and others, and longing for a revolution"

2024: Year of the Drone

By Patrick Drennan

December 31, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/31/2024_year_of_the_drone_1081697.html?mc_cid=7e1aee09c7

2024: Year of the Drone. Remarkable Drone Innovations in Ukraine.

Drone boats, drone planes, trolly drones, drone traffic lights and more…

The 2024 word of the year was controversially proposed as either Brat (Collins dictionary), Polarization (Miriam Webster dictionary), or Brain-Rot (Oxford University Press) - however no word has more impact on the modern psych than the word Drone.

The weird and extravagant reactions to drones spotted in the night sky of New Jersey recently reflects that fascination. One member of Congress speculated that they came from outer space.

From drones that can soar through the stratosphere, to rotor drones that hover a few feet above the ground, and submersible drones that glide 50 feet underwater, drones have transformed our lives and modern warfare.

Their impact mainly comes from daily news and internet video images of war footage - particularly the fiery, innovative, and futuristic use of drones in Ukraine.

Cost effective FPV (First Person View), and kamikaze drones excel in reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and direct strikes, proving highly effective at targeting enemy positions…but they have been upgraded for much more than that -

Sea Drones

Ukraine use their Magura V5 and Sea Baby drones to sink Russian barges, attack oil rigs and devastatingly, sink billion-dollar Russian warships. In February 2024, a video depicted a Ukraine sea drone sinking a Russian battleship. Later, Ukraine used a sea drone with a mounted remote-controlled machine gun to shoot at Russia helicopters. The Russians called in jet fighters to sink these drones, but it is only a matter of time when the sea drones will be mounted with MANPAD ground-to-air missiles.

Trolly Drones

The Palianytsia drone is actually a converted heavy missile powered by a turbojet engine and guided by GPS. It motors down a runway on a wheeled trolley, abandoning the trolley as it gains lift. 

Plane Drones

The Ukrainians have adapted small kitset sports planes into combat drones - flying them by remote control, loaded with explosives. They extend the range of normal drones and increase the payload. On December 15, a video was released showing a Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat drone aircraft damaging a Chechen/Russian military facility 500 miles from the Ukrainian border.

Drone Swarms

Both sides in the Russian/Ukraine conflict use cheap plastic, polystyrene and wooden drone swarms to confuse and confound sophisticated radar systems, like the Russian TombStone system. The drones are often used in conjunction with more sophisticated drones and ballistic missiles. The Russians combine swarms of Iranian HESA Shahed 136 drones with Kalibr cruise missiles, and 9K720 Iskander ballistic missiles to attack Ukrainian infrastructure and civilians.

Both sides effectively use electronic jamming equipment to counter drones. In response both sides are increasingly reverting to algorithm trained drones that fly by visual navigation without ground signals. Ukraine also cheekily diverted some attacking drones into the territory of Russian ally Belarus.

Drones Operated by Long Fiber Cables

In response Russia developed drones that were operated by attached thin fiber-optic cables that were over 6 miles long. With no radio signal the drone was impossible to detect, and impossible to jam. However, when former U.S. Marine Troy Smothers saw this, he built similar drones for Ukraine with an incredible range of 15 miles.

Ground Combat Drones

Robot ground drones are being used for a variety of purposes including delivering equipment such as landmines, and astonishingly Ukraine has developed a tracked drone armed with a Browning 12.7 mm machine gun - the Droid TW 12.7. It has a range of eight miles and is also equipped with hi-tech cameras for reconnaissance. They are limited in number but have great potential.

Drone Traffic Lights

A telegram user posted a video of a Russian military traffic light system. It flashes a yellow light when a distant hostile drone is detected. The light turns red when there is a high-level threat, and green when there are no nearby threats at all.

Drone Detection From Space

The Chairperson of the Russian Center for Unmanned Systems, Andrei Bezrukov claimed on December 14 that the center developed the "Kalinka" monitoring system to detect drones that connect to satellite systems, including Starlink. Bezrukov claimed that the system can detect Ukrainian aerial and maritime drones up to 10 miles away.

Specialized Military Drone Branches

Ukraine and Russia have both established large, dedicated military drone branches.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ordered the establishment of a separate branch within the Ukrainian Armed Forces on February 6, 2024, called the Unmanned System Forces (USF). The USF is responsible for interactions with already existing unmanned systems units and with supporting these units. The USF is also responsible for supplying units with drones, training specialists, planning military operations involving unmanned systems, and cooperating with domestic unmanned systems manufacturers.

In response the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) launched a coordinated effort in August 2024 to create a centralized separate branch for unmanned systems, likely to reorganize informal specialized drone detachments and centralize procurement of unmanned systems. The Russian MoD is mainly trying to consolidate the state’s control over Russian drone operators and developers, some of whom had enjoyed relative semi-independence from the Russian military bureaucracy.D

While Russia seeks centralized control, Western armies are offering different tactics. Every British and American army platoon will now have a drone operator. The 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning is being trained in using the RQ-28A short-range reconnaissance (SRR) quadcopter drone. “The SRR RQ-28A capability will provide game-changing technology to Army platoons, enhancing both soldier lethality and survivability,” said Carson L. Wakefield.

Peaceful Drones 

Drones have incredible value in the civilian world. They assist in humanitarian and disaster response, engineering, construction, crop monitoring, weather forecasting, and search and rescue. They even have drones that can clean high-rise windows.

Despite all the remarkable innovations above, drones are not as destructively effective on the battlefield as artillery, missiles and landmines. However, drones are what captures the public imagination. Now imagine drones that are not operated by humans at all, but by AI programmed robots. Are you ready for that?

Patrick Drennan is a journalist based in New Zealand, with a degree in American history and economics.

19. The top five foreign influence fails of 2024 (from the Quincy Institute)

From the Quincy Institute.

As an aside, here are its funding sources:

The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a non-interventionist foreign policy think tank founded in 2019, receives funding from a diverse range of sources:

 Major Donors

- George Soros' Open Society Foundations: Provided $500,000 in initial funding[1][3].

- Charles Koch's Koch Foundation: Also contributed $500,000 in initial funding[1][3].

 Other Significant Supporters

- Rockefeller Brothers Fund: Donated $350,000[3].

- Ford Foundation: Awarded grants of $200,000 in 2021 and $510,000 in 2023[2][8].

- Carnegie Corporation of New York[4].

- Schumann Center for Media and Democracy[4].

 Additional Funding Sources

- Individual Donors: The institute accepts donations from individuals, including through methods such as credit card payments, donor-advised funds, and stock transfers[6].

- Other Foundations: Various foundations have contributed amounts between $50,000 and $99,000, including the Ploughshares Fund[3].

 Funding Policies

The Quincy Institute distinguishes itself by refusing to accept money from foreign governments[4]. It also commits to transparency by acknowledging all donations of $5,000 or more on its website[6].

The institute's diverse funding sources, ranging from liberal to conservative donors, reflect its self-described "transpartisan" approach to foreign policy advocacy[4].

Citations:

[1] https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/quincy-institute-for-responsible-statecraft/

[2] https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/our-grants/awarded-grants/grants-database/quincy-institute-for-responsible-statecraft-139187/

[3] https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/quincy-trita-parsi-soros-koch-armin-rosen

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quincy_Institute_for_Responsible_Statecraft

[5] https://quincyinst.org/research/defense-contractor-funded-think-tanks-dominate-ukraine-debate/

[6] https://quincyinst.org/donations/

[7] https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/quincy-institute-cirincione-eaton-resignations-nato-ukraine/

The top five foreign influence fails of 2024

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Ben Freeman · December 30, 2024

quincyinst.org

Military Industrial Complex

Washington Politics

Media

Global Crises

EuropeMiddle EastAfricaAsia-PacificLatin AmericaNorth America

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From bribes to handbags, the US saw unprecedented levels of overt and covert ops that the media barely noticed

1. washington politics
2. foreign influence

Dec 30, 2024

2024 was a big year for foreign influence in the U.S., in all the worst ways.

Hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the nation’s top lobbying and public relations firms from foreign powers in 2024. The final numbers aren’t in yet, but we’re already seeing 8-figure spending from America’s allies (like Japan and Australia), adversaries (like China), and whatever Turkey and Saudi Arabia are these days.

Though my colleagues and I at the Quincy Institute continued to write story after story about all this foreign lobbying, most mainstream media outlets paid little heed to this perfectly legal system that allows foreign powers to mold U.S. foreign policy as they see fit.

Illicit foreign influence operations, however, really had a banner year (congratulations corruption, you did it!) and garnered immense media attention. There was rampant evidence of attempted foreign meddling in the 2024 elections and at least a dozen people were either convicted, indicted, or reached prosecution agreements related to violating the U.S.’s preeminent law for regulating foreign influence in America, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

In the biggest stories of all, several prominent political figures faced accusations of covertly doing the bidding of foreign governments. Plus, we’re still waiting to see if former Fugees star Pras Michél, who was convicted in 2023 of engaging in an illicit foreign influence campaign on behalf of Chinese interests, will face the maximum 22-year sentence or if it will get reduced to something shorter and perhaps he’ll just be “Gone till November.”

Needless to say, there was heavy competition to make it into the top 5 foreign influence fails of 2024, but here they are:

5. A think-tanker got some expensive handbags and the Justice Department was NOT having it.

In July, DOJ indicted long-time think tanker and Korean Peninsula expert, Sue Mi Terry, for acting as an unregistered foreign agent for South Korea. Terry’s alleged transgressions included doing favors for South Korean spies in exchange for $37,000 in a think tank “gift” account she controlled and some pretty swanky handbags from Bottega Veneta and Louis Vuitton that cost around $3,000 each.

Greg Craig — who served as White House counsel during the Obama administration, is a prominent FARA critic, and was also previously accused of violating FARA — raised objections to Terry’s indictment, referring to the handbags as “trinkets,” without explaining exactly how much foreign corruption he would be okay with. But, if he’s willing to excuse gold bars, piles of cash, and luxury cars from foreign governments, some of our other top 5 contenders might be off the hook too. Stay tuned!

The lesson: buy your own $3,000 “trinkets.”

4. The Israeli government ran big, illicit foreign influence campaigns in the U.S … and nobody cared.

The New York Times and The Guardian reported this summer that Israel attempted to covertly silence critics and influence key members of the U.S. Congress on issues related to the war in Gaza. What was the U.S. government's response to these $10 million+ illicit influence ops? Nothing. Well, next to nothing.

A couple members of Congress raised concerns, most notably, Rep. Mark Pocan (D-Wis.), who sarcastically wondered what prominent pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC thought of the whole ordeal (“Not something allies should do, right? Right, ⁦@AIPAC? ⁦@AIPAC?”) Despite Pocan’s protests, the Israeli government got exactly what it wanted from the U.S. — namely $17.9 billion in military aid. So, the fail here isn’t Israel’s, it’s that the DOJ hasn’t announced any investigation into Israel’s illicit influence ops and, in fact, no Biden administration official has even bothered to wave a finger at Israel for this brazen attempt to meddle in America.

The lesson: Apparently, it’s perfectly fine for America’s friends to meddle in its democracy.

3. A sitting member of Congress was indicted for allegedly taking bribes from Azerbaijan.

“Bribery, unlawful foreign influence, and money laundering,” are words probably no elected official wants mentioned in the same sentence as their name, but those were exactly the charges levied by the DOJ against the sitting Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas) on May 3, 2024. Cuellar allegedly accepted bribes from a state-owned Azerbaijani oil company and a Mexican bank to push U.S. foreign policy in their favor. Cuellar — referred to as “boss” by his Azerbaijani handler — is still in Congress and just won re-election.

The lesson: if you’re a member of Congress and you’re going to take bribes from a foreign government, well, don’t. But, if you must, maybe don’t make it so obvious by co-chairing the congressional caucus that focuses on the bribing government.

2. Mayor introduces trash cans … and unprecedented foreign bribery scandal to New York City.

In the summer of 2024, New York City Mayor Eric Adams nearly broke the internet when he introduced the next step in the Big Apple’s “Trash Revolution” — a trash can. The mayor was eviscerated by internet trolls for seemingly discovering trash cans in 2024. But Adams' year would get much, much worse just two months later, when the Justice Department indicted him for illicit ties to the government of Turkey and Turkish companies. The indictment includes allegations of wire fraud, bribery, and receiving illegal campaign contributions from foreign nationals. Adams now holds the ignominious title of being the only NYC mayor to be charged with a crime while in office. And, Adams' legal woes may not be over, as he is also allegedly under investigation for illicit ties to five other countries: China, Israel, Qatar, South Korea, and Uzbekistan.

The lesson: trash cans are pretty awesome! For the low cost of $1.6 million, McKinsey agrees.

1. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman is convicted of foreign bribery.

Gold bars, piles of cash, a Mercedes — the conviction this summer of Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) truly had it all. “This case has always been about shocking levels of corruption…This wasn’t politics as usual; this was politics for profit,” U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said following Menendez’s conviction.

That conviction ended up being something of a slam-dunk for the U.S. attorneys due in no small part to Menendez himself seemingly bumbling through the whole corruption scheme (he literally googled, “kilo of gold price,” after receiving a gold bar as a bribe). And, Menendez wasn’t just any senator — he was the most powerful person in the Senate when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which oversees war powers, treaties, troop deployments, military aid, and many other foreign policy issues.

Lesson: if you accept a gold bar as a bribe — again, please don’t accept bribes — but if you must, DO NOT immediately google the value of a gold bar. It’s not a good look…and it can land you in jail.

Thanks to our readers and supporters, Responsible Statecraft has had a tremendous year. A complete website overhaul made possible in part by generous contributions to RS, along with amazing writing by staff and outside contributors, has helped to increase our monthly page views by 133%! In continuing to provide independent and sharp analysis on the major conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the tumult of Washington politics, RS has become a go-to for readers looking for alternatives and change in the foreign policy conversation.

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Ben Freeman

Ben Freeman is Director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute. He investigates money in politics, defense spending, and foreign influence in America. He is the author of The Foreign Policy Auction, which was the first book to systematically analyze the foreign influence industry in the United States.

Top image credit: U.S. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), arrives at Federal Court, for his bribery trial in connection with an alleged corrupt relationship with three New Jersey businessmen, in New York City, U.S., May 16, 2024. REUTERS/Andrew Kelly

Dec 30, 2024

20. DOD Announces Additional Aid for Ukraine, Assesses 1,000 North Korean Casualties in Russia's Kursk Region

So perhaps approximately 10 percent casualties for the nKPA forces deployed to Russia.

We have the White House and DOD assessments. What is the IC assessing?

Excerpts:

Also, during the briefing, Singh remarked that DOD concurs with a recent White House assessment of how many North Korean casualties there have been as a result of fighting against Ukraine in Russia's Kursk region. 

"The White House recently announced that approximately 1,000 [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] soldiers have either been killed or wounded in the Kursk region. That's our assessment as well," Singh said. 

She added that the assaults the North Korean soldiers are launching in the region are not proving significantly effective, and that the North Koreans are taking on a "significant amount" of casualties. 

DOD Announces Additional Aid for Ukraine, Assesses 1,000 North Korean Casualties in Russia's Kursk Region

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4018068/dod-announces-additional-aid-for-ukraine-assesses-1000-north-korean-casualties/

Dec. 30, 2024 | By Matthew Olay, DOD News |   

The Defense Department today announced it will be providing close to $2.5 billion in additional new security assistance support to Ukraine intended to reaffirm the department's commitment to supporting Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression.

The latest aid package includes a $1.25 billion presidential drawdown authority package, as well as $1.22 billion in additional funds through the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told members of the media this morning. 

"Together, these packages deliver critical capabilities such as air defense systems, munitions for artillery and rocket systems, anti-tank weapons, unmanned aerial systems and more," Singh said. 

She added that the aid packages mark the current administration's 73rd drawdown package and the 23rd package provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

"[This assistance reflects] our continued efforts with our over 50 allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to ensure Ukraine has what it needs to be successful on the battlefield and to defend its sovereignty," Singh said. 

Founded under the direction of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III in response to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the UDCG is a coalition of some 50 nations that meet regularly to discuss Ukraine's security needs. 

Austin intends to convene the 25th meeting of the UDCG alongside Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov in the new year where the capability coalitions will lay out their roadmaps toward "efficient and sustainable support for Ukraine," a senior defense official said earlier this month. 

When asked as to whether Austin intends to brief whomever the next administration's incoming defense secretary is regarding the value of assistance the UDCG provides to Ukraine, Singh said that — while she can't speak for the incoming secretary and whether that person might request a conversation on the UDCG — there are many people working within DOD who understand the importance of the group.

"The UDCG continues to be a convening forum to work with allies and partners in finding and providing Ukraine with what it needs, and [who are] working together as multiple countries literally come around the table," Singh said. 

Also, during the briefing, Singh remarked that DOD concurs with a recent White House assessment of how many North Korean casualties there have been as a result of fighting against Ukraine in Russia's Kursk region. 

"The White House recently announced that approximately 1,000 [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] soldiers have either been killed or wounded in the Kursk region. That's our assessment as well," Singh said. 

She added that the assaults the North Korean soldiers are launching in the region are not proving significantly effective, and that the North Koreans are taking on a "significant amount" of casualties. 

21. Below the Threshold: China’s Strategy of Armed Coercion

A thoughtful discussion in this podcast that is worth listening to. I think this provides some very useful insights into Chinese activities and strategy and the use of the PLAN versus the maritime militia, the Chinese Coast Guard and the civilian fishing fleets.

The one point I take some slight exception to is the continued description of irregular warfare (IW) as consisting of UW, FID, CT, COIN, and stability operations. It is such narrow thinking.

James Siebens provides a very useful description of China's military operations other than war (MOOTW) (called "non-war military operations" by China) – comparing it to our description of it during the 1990s - though I think his description gives us a lot more credit for MOOTW and its intent than was really the case because most thought of MOOTW as a collection of activities much in the way of how some describe IW since 2007. Siebans gives it a lot more strategic intent that I do not think was really warranted in the 1990s but it is a useful comparison with the PLA's "non-war military operations" which I think is a useful description as well as another term for the much beloved "gray zone operations."

It is worth 46 minutes to listen to this.

Below the Threshold: China’s Strategy of Armed Coercion

https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/below-the-threshold-chinas-strategy-of-armed-coercion/

December 27, 2024 by Don Edwards Leave a Comment

Episode 121 explores China’s use of armed coercion and its implications for irregular warfare with James Siebens and Jimmy Wang.

Our guests begin by examining how China employs both military and paramilitary forces to advance its territorial claims in disputed areas. They then discuss how psychological warfare, lawfare, and maritime operations intersect in the Indo-Pacific region, highlighting China’s sophisticated approach to coercion below the threshold of armed conflict. Finally, our guests offer insights into effective deterrence strategies and policy recommendations for addressing China’s coercive activities in the region.

James Siebens is a Fellow at the Stimson Center and author of “China’s Use of Armed Coercion.” His research focuses on international security, with particular emphasis on analyzing gray zone conflicts and military coercion. Through his work, he examines how nations employ armed forces to advance political objectives without engaging in sustained conflict, providing valuable insights into modern strategic competition.

Jimmy Wang is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Stimson Center and former Navy Foreign Area Officer. During his distinguished military career, he served as Northeast Asia Desk Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations and advised U.S. Pacific Fleet on Chinese naval affairs. His firsthand experience in planning and executing Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks with China provides unique perspectives on maritime security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Don Edwards and Katherine Michaelson are the hosts for Episode 121. Please reach out to them with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

22. America Needs a Maximum Pressure Strategy in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Maximum pressure can get the Russians to the table, but that is just the first step toward a sustainable peace in Ukraine—and across Europe. Once the Russians are at the table and willing to engage, the United States will have to lay out its terms, just as the Russians have, to establish parameters for the discussion. To that end, Washington should insist on representatives from Ukraine and Europe more broadly being part of the negotiations, as the success of the deal will hinge on both Ukraine and its European partners accepting and implementing the terms of the agreement.

The United States should also set the question of NATO membership for Ukraine aside when it comes to reaching a deal to end the war. NATO is and should be a separate issue that can be discussed down the line and under different circumstances. The United States used this approach to much success when negotiating German reunification, with Washington ultimately leaving the question of East Germany’s NATO status out of the reunification agreements with the Soviet Union. And finally, the United States should refuse to officially recognize any Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine.

For now, the most urgent task is for the United States to establish a position of strength vis-à-vis Russia, which will ultimately force Moscow to compromise and also send a clear message to China, Iran, and North Korea. The Trump administration will have to drive a hard bargain that will require a long-term commitment and a conviction that preventing Russia from winning on Moscow’s terms will be of real value to the United States. A positive outcome, moreover, will reverberate far beyond Europe: amid mounting geopolitical instability, achieving lasting peace in Ukraine will send a strong signal not only to U.S. adversaries but also to the world that the United States is back.

America Needs a Maximum Pressure Strategy in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs · by More by Alina Polyakova · December 31, 2024

Trump Must Gain More Leverage to Bring Putin to the Negotiating Table

Alina Polyakova

December 31, 2024

Ukrainian servicemembers firing a rocket toward Russian troops in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, December 2024 Stringer / Reuters

Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis and Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

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Save Sign in and save to read later

In June 2024, Keith Kellogg, a retired lieutenant general and national security adviser to former President Donald Trump, presented a plan he co-authored with the former CIA analyst Fred Fleitz that proposed halting the delivery of U.S. weapons to Ukraine if Kyiv didn’t enter into peace talks with Moscow—but also warning Moscow that if it refused to negotiate with Kyiv, Washington would increase its support for Ukraine. About five months later, President-elect Trump named Kellogg as his special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. “The makeup of the war has expanded,” Kellogg said in an interview, “and it’s time to put it back in a box.”

In response to Kellogg’s nomination, Konstantin Malofeyev, a Russian oligarch with ties to the Kremlin, told a reporter for the Financial Times what he thought the likely Russian response would be. “Kellogg comes to Moscow with his plan, we take it and then tell him to screw himself, because we don’t like any of it,” Malofeyev said. “That’d be the whole negotiation.”

As Malofeyev’s blustery message makes clear, Russian President Vladimir Putin has no interest in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine—which would require Moscow to compromise—because he believes Russia is winning the war. Nonetheless, if only to underscore its end goal, Russia has laid out a maximalist set of demands for Kyiv and its partners: permanent neutrality for Ukraine with no future option for NATO or EU membership, Western recognition of the Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the removal of all Western sanctions, and broader agreement from the West to recognize Russia’s self-defined “sphere of influence.” A deal of this kind is, of course, a nonstarter for Ukraine and its allies in Europe. It would similarly be rejected by partners in the Indo-Pacific, where countries such as Japan are well aware that allowing Putin to claim a victory in Ukraine could directly embolden China to take action regarding Taiwan. And many in the United States, including many in the Republican party, would spurn such a deal, fearing it would boost the growing authoritarian axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia at the cost of U.S. global credibility and leadership.

Trump has said that he aims to pursue a deal with Putin, and he is right to want to bring a lasting and sustainable peace to a war that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and has destabilized geopolitics around the globe. But to achieve that aim, his administration will first need to get the Russians to the table with a willingness to negotiate and make meaningful compromises that will lead to more than a short-term cease-fire.

To do so and to negotiate with Moscow from a position of strength, the president will need to establish far more leverage over Russia than the United States currently has. The second Trump White House is well prepared to execute a strategy that will accomplish exactly that: a maximum pressure campaign. In his first term, Trump pursued this kind of approach against Iran. And now, to achieve peace and reestablish U.S. global leadership in the face of mounting authoritarian aggression, he should apply the same strategy to Russia.

A maximum pressure plan would force the Russians to the negotiating table—something they currently have little incentive to do—while allowing the Trump administration to set the agenda. It would also correct the Biden administration’s approach, which was overly cautious, did not have a clear strategy, and delivered too little, too late for Ukraine. Moreover, by taking advantage of Russia’s economic, political, and military vulnerabilities, the United States would be able to impose costs on U.S. adversaries such as China and Iran, which supply many of Russia’s war needs. Only through maximum pressure can the new administration turn today’s grinding war of attrition into a stable peace.

TRIED AND TRUE

Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran significantly weakened the regime in Tehran when it was first implemented in 2018. That policy used an aggressive array of economic sanctions to constrain Tehran’s ability to fund proxy groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, grow its military, and develop its nuclear program. These sanctions efforts succeeded in rapidly depleting Iran’s state coffers, forcing Iran from a trade surplus of $6.1 billion in 2019 into a trade deficit of around $3.5 billion by 2020.

Although the Biden administration did not remove the Trump-era sanctions, it also did not effectively enforce them—a failure that has allowed Iran to significantly ramp up its oil revenues over the past four years. The effects of these revenues have rippled throughout the region: using these funds, Iran has been able to provide financial support for Hamas, which attacked Israel last year, and for Hezbollah, which had attacked Israel from its base in Lebanon prior to November’s cease-fire deal. And in part because of diminishing U.S. pressure, Iran is now closer than ever to acquiring nuclear weapons.

Putin has no interest in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.

What has succeeded in constraining Iran’s belligerent regional ambitions is a combination of aggressive, U.S.-orchestrated economic pressure and Israeli military and covert action to counter Iran’s regional proxies. It was partially as a result of this approach, which weakened and preoccupied Tehran, that rebel factions were able to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria—Iran’s largest regional ally—after over a decade of a grueling civil war. Russia is not Iran: among other important differences, its economy is bigger and it has a large stockpile of nuclear weapons. But the Iranian case offers a lesson: economic pressure combined with robust military action and coordination with allies can work.

Moscow, moreover, is especially vulnerable at this moment, with Russia’s military becoming increasingly overextended. The Kremlin has already deployed approximately 50 percent of its armed forces to fight in Ukraine and is losing an average of 1,500 soldiers a day to the conflict. In Syria, Putin had vowed to support Assad, carrying out airstrikes as rebel forces were encroaching on Damascus. But in the end, Russia simply abandoned its ally, granting Assad asylum as he fled the besieged capital. As Trump aptly put it, the Russians were simply too weak and overextended to help the regime in Syria “because they are so tied up in Ukraine.”

On top of its military constraints, the Russian economy is reaching a breaking point after almost three years of runaway government spending on the war effort. The country’s central bank has hiked interest rates to over 20 percent in an effort to slow inflation as the ruble has tumbled to its weakest level in years. The Russian economy is now projected to grow only 0.5 to 1.5 percent in 2025, down from 3.6 percent in 2024. Much of this economic strain has to do with the government’s increased spending on defense, which has depleted state spending on other domestic industries such as healthcare and education, as well as ballooning recruitment payments to new army volunteers. But pressure is also coming from U.S. and other Western sanctions—which, as in the case of military support for Ukraine, the Biden administration has not deployed or enforced to full effect. Without further action on Washington’s part, it is likely that Russia will weather its economic headwinds through a combination of monetary policies and targeted state subsidies. The Trump administration should not let Moscow’s moment of weakness go to waste.

HIT THEM WHERE IT HURTS

The United States has many readily available policy tools at its disposal that it should use in its maximum pressure campaign against Russia. First, Washington should beef up economic sanctions—starting with Russia’s banking and financial sector. Earlier this year, the Biden administration belatedly sanctioned Gazprombank, the country’s largest bank, along with over 50 smaller financial institutions. It also sanctioned the System for Transfer of Financial Messages, which Russia uses as an alternative to SWIFT, the global payment infrastructure many Russian banks have lost access to. These types of measures hit Russia’s ability to carry out large transactions, striking at the core of Russia’s financial and banking system, and should be expanded to cover all Russian banks.

Washington should also do more to extend the scope of secondary sanctions, which cover third parties that do business with sanctioned entities. The Trump administration, for example, could use secondary sanctions to impose costs on Chinese companies directly supplying Russia’s war effort, such as military gear manufacturers that are currently not on the sanctions list and Chinese financial institutions that provide credit to Russian banks. Such restrictions are particularly effective because they force companies outside Russia or other countries that do business with Russia to choose between Washington and Moscow—most will choose to retain access to the large U.S. market over the shrinking Russian one.

Financial sector sanctions, though, are not enough. The core of Russia’s budget revenue, used to fuel the country’s war economy, comes from oil and gas exports. Before the war in Ukraine, Europe was Russia’s largest gas export market, with Russia accounting for almost half of all European gas imports in 2019. And although that figure declined significantly in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in 2022, hitting a low of 12 percent in the second half of 2023, it has since rebounded slightly to 18 percent. In 2024, the EU was also the largest importer of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Russian oil providers have for the most part not been subject to U.S. sanctions due to concerns over price increases for Washington’s European allies. This must change; the Trump administration should expand sanctions to cover Russian oil providers and their subsidiaries, as it did in 2020 with measures targeting subsidiaries of the state oil firm Rosneft that did business in Venezuela. The United States will have to take the lead in pushing its European allies to make a difficult choice because of the likely increases in energy costs that Europeans would be forced to pay. This measure is especially crucial given that the EU’s policy of imposing a cap on Russian oil imports has failed to prevent Russian oil from entering the European market, with Moscow having simply switched to using black market “shadow fleets” that continue to deliver oil to European countries.

As a result of these policy failures, Europe has ended up financing the very war it has claimed to be against. The solution is obvious: Europe must stop buying Russian gas or thinly veiled versions of it coming from third parties such as Azerbaijan and instead invest in building out its infrastructure to be able to buy more LNG from the United States, in particular.

The Trump administration should not let Moscow’s moment of weakness go to waste.

As the United States deploys tougher economic sanctions to squeeze the Russian economy, it should take advantage of the Russian military’s overextension to raise the costs of the war in Ukraine. In the short term, the Trump administration should use any remaining funding from the most recent congressional supplemental legislation for Ukraine to provide Kyiv with air defense systems and long-range missile systems, such as Patriot interceptors, Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), and High Mobility Rocket Systems (HIMARS), which Ukraine can use to defend itself against Russia’s airstrikes and to go on the offensive should the opportunity present itself. Washington should also pressure European countries to provide similar capabilities; Germany, most notably, has refused to provide Ukraine with its long-range system, the Taurus, citing concerns over escalation. These types of measures will send a clear message to Moscow that any nuclear saber rattling will not work to deter the United States from raising the costs of the war. In addition, the Trump administration should signal that further Russian escalation could trigger measures that would ultimately go against Russian interests—such as an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.

In concert with an economic and military pressure campaign, the United States should exert political pressure on European allies to bolster their support for Ukraine’s security and economic needs. Europe holds the majority of the frozen Russian assets that were immobilized in 2022 ($260 billion out of approximately $300 billion). Washington has already passed legislation that allows it to repurpose U.S.-held Russian assets to support Ukraine. But Europe has moved only to provide Ukraine with loans that use frozen Russian assets as collateral and has so far refused to pass a law that would allow the spending of the assets, pointing to concerns about the legal basis for such a move.

The Biden administration has consistently blocked efforts by some European allies to do more for Ukraine, fearing Russian escalation. This was a mistake that ultimately projected U.S. weakness. Poland, for example, has stated its willingness to shoot down Russian missiles and drones that get near Polish territory and to defend certain parts of Ukrainian airspace to create safe zones in western sections of the country. The Biden administration has refused to allow these plans to move forward. It also reacted harshly to the suggestion by French President Emmanuel Macron that Europe should send soldiers to Ukraine. Here, Trump has an opportunity to address the Biden administration’s policy shortfalls. He can do so by supporting the plan spearheaded by France and Poland for a European-led “coalition of the willing” to send a peacekeeping force to Ukraine to ensure that any negotiated deal could ultimately be enforced.

Finally, working with allies and partners across the globe, the United States should move to choke off Russia’s defense industrial sector. Russia alone cannot produce all the components it needs to build and transport its military equipment and has deep dependencies on third-party providers in key sectors. Industrial lubricants, for instance, are critical for a variety of functions including the manufacturing and transportation of heavy machinery. After the exit of large Western companies such as Shell from the Russian market, Russian companies have had to find alternative sources of the necessary chemicals, leading to market and supply disruptions. The United States can leverage incentives or threaten sanctions on countries and companies that are stepping in to fill Russian war demands. U.S. policymakers should also work to identify additional specific vulnerabilities and dependencies in Russia’s war machine and aim to close off key supply lines in order to disrupt the Kremlin’s ability to carry out its war.

In his second term, Trump has vowed to drastically alter the global trade system and impose wide-ranging tariffs on imports to the United States. Many observers have assumed that Trump, as an adherent of the quid pro quo school of international relations, will use his tariff threat to extract concessions from friends and foes alike, betting on the idea that regaining preferential access to the U.S. market is so important that countries will be willing to cut deals with Washington on other issues. If there is genuine political will in the new Trump administration to attain a sustainable peace in Ukraine, Washington can selectively apply the carrots and sticks of global trade to maximize pressure on U.S. allies and strategic foes to do more to curtail Russia.

MAXIMUM PRESSURE, MAXIMUM SUCCESS

Maximum pressure can get the Russians to the table, but that is just the first step toward a sustainable peace in Ukraine—and across Europe. Once the Russians are at the table and willing to engage, the United States will have to lay out its terms, just as the Russians have, to establish parameters for the discussion. To that end, Washington should insist on representatives from Ukraine and Europe more broadly being part of the negotiations, as the success of the deal will hinge on both Ukraine and its European partners accepting and implementing the terms of the agreement.

The United States should also set the question of NATO membership for Ukraine aside when it comes to reaching a deal to end the war. NATO is and should be a separate issue that can be discussed down the line and under different circumstances. The United States used this approach to much success when negotiating German reunification, with Washington ultimately leaving the question of East Germany’s NATO status out of the reunification agreements with the Soviet Union. And finally, the United States should refuse to officially recognize any Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine.

For now, the most urgent task is for the United States to establish a position of strength vis-à-vis Russia, which will ultimately force Moscow to compromise and also send a clear message to China, Iran, and North Korea. The Trump administration will have to drive a hard bargain that will require a long-term commitment and a conviction that preventing Russia from winning on Moscow’s terms will be of real value to the United States. A positive outcome, moreover, will reverberate far beyond Europe: amid mounting geopolitical instability, achieving lasting peace in Ukraine will send a strong signal not only to U.S. adversaries but also to the world that the United States is back.

Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis and Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Alina Polyakova · December 31, 2024

23. The Obstacles to China’s AI Power

Conclusion:

To outcompete Beijing in military AI, the United States will have to not only push forward the technological frontier but also focus on developing best practices and concepts that will enable the technology’s effective use. To that end, while Silicon Valley focuses on innovation, Washington must pay close attention to the challenges of adoption. The successful deployment of AI will require finding ways to adapt existing processes and warfighting concepts to existing technological realities, as well as establishing the infrastructure necessary for sustained, broad-based deployment of AI tools.

The Obstacles to China’s AI Power

Foreign Affairs · by More by Sam Bresnick · December 31, 2024

Why the Chinese Military Struggles to Take Advantage of New Technology

Sam Bresnick

December 31, 2024

Commemorating Martyrs’ Day in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, September 2024 Florence Lo / Reuters

Sam Bresnick is a Research Fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

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China is betting big on military artificial intelligence. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made the technology a strategic priority, and the People’s Liberation Army is pouring resources into the development of state-of-the-art AI-enabled military capabilities. Chinese defense experts believe that these technologies will offer the PLA the best chance to equal, or surpass, the warfighting capacity of the U.S. armed forces.

Beijing’s plans and actions have unsettled many observers in Washington, some of whom worry that China is catching up to the United States, or even leaping ahead. There is evidence, however, that China still faces significant obstacles that may slow its implementation of military AI. These challenges include the PLA’s lack of militarily relevant training data, difficulties associated with testing and evaluating AI systems, and stringent U.S. export controls on the semiconductors that power the most advanced AI models.

But even if China figures out how to overcome these technical roadblocks, it will still face several organizational and political hurdles that could keep it from taking full advantage of AI-enabled military technologies in tomorrow’s conflicts. There is, for instance, a looming tension between relying on AI to guide battlefield operations and decision-making, on the one hand, and the PLA’s highly hierarchical, centralized bureaucratic processes, on the other. Xi’s ongoing consolidation of power might also limit the effective application of AI-enabled tools. Though Beijing clearly hopes that AI will allow its soldiers to automate their way around thorny political choices in future wars, it is unlikely that the technology, even if exquisitely developed, will fully ameliorate the Chinese military’s decision-making difficulties.

Decision Trouble

The ability of AI models to make rapid, data-informed decisions is attracting much attention from military leaders around the world. Some of these leaders are already looking to AI tools to help their militaries allocate resources more efficiently and use lethal force with more precision. Speed is another potential benefit: by accelerating militaries’ decision-making, these systems could provide operational benefits that tip the balance of future conflicts. As these technologies evolve, they may even be able to forecast enemy behavior and predict tactical maneuvers, thus allowing a country’s armed forces to stay a few steps ahead of its adversaries.

Yet the October 2024 White House Memorandum on AI offers a useful reminder that the successful deployment of AI in military applications will depend not only on the development of cutting-edge technologies but also on establishing superior concepts and practices for using these systems. One critical aspect of AI deployment will be the pace at which militaries are able to act on the recommendations offered by AI tools. The United States appears to hold an edge here: whereas the U.S. military provides lower-level officers considerable autonomy to make quick, adaptive decisions on the battlefield, the PLA maintains a highly bureaucratic culture and deeply hierarchical command structure. Instead of empowering junior officers to make independent decisions, the PLA has long had a penchant for centralizing decision-making authority among senior commanders.

Chinese military publications, for example, have reported on complaints about the tendency of senior officers in the Chinese armed forces to micromanage their subordinates’ activities, which PLA officers have called the “nanny command style.” What’s more, some Chinese command centers appear to have live video feeds of various platforms under their purview, potentially limiting the autonomy of more junior officers and creating a sense that their every move is under the microscope. Finally, senior officers are sometimes required to command small tactical units.

Some Chinese defense scholars have suggested that the PLA must devolve decision-making power down the chain of command in order to take full advantage of emerging technologies. The bureaucratic morass of the PLA’s culture, they argue, will likely put it at a disadvantage when using AI in the complex, fast-paced wars of the future. To address this challenge, Chinese defense experts have proposed that China’s military culture must become comfortable with decentralized and flexible operations. Other experts, worried that the PLA’s command system is too rigid for the demands of future wars, have advocated for “mission control,” which involves giving lower-level commanders the authority to make battlefield decisions.

Increasing Centralization

Since assuming power in 2013, Xi has concentrated more and more power in his hands. To solidify his authority, he prosecuted an extensive anticorruption campaign that, while rooting out graft, also ensnared many of his political enemies. He has also promoted a cult of personality, transferred power from the State Council to organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party—many of which he personally heads—and abolished term limits, perhaps opening the door for him to rule for life.

Xi’s campaign for centralized power has extended to the military. Although exerting absolute control over the PLA may not be possible, Xi has tried. He has consolidated command structures to ensure the PLA’s loyalty and has purged, suspended, or placed under investigation several senior military officials, including Miao Hua, who was the director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, the group that oversees the PLA and the People’s Armed Police. In 2013, Xi created the National Security Commission, which had the effect of centralizing decision-making regarding military issues. Two years later, he restructured the CMC, paved the way for his allies to play a greater role in military decision-making. He also reorganized the PLA’s seven military regions into five theater commands, whose leaders report directly to the CMC. By installing his allies in key positions and consolidating control over the CMC, Xi aimed to ensure that he and the party would hold greater influence over the armed forces.

Xi justified these military reforms, which included the elimination of bureaucratic layers, as an attempt to streamline decision-making. Yet the further concentration of already centralized command-and-control processes, as well as China’s hierarchical military culture, could weaken or even obviate the supposed advantages of AI tools in future conflicts.

Xi’s consolidation of power might limit China’s effective use of AI.

Xi’s craving for control, for example, may mean that he or his closest subordinates will try to lead military operations from afar. Such arrangements would not be unique to China; according to some reports, Russian President Vladimir Putin has directed tactical military decisions from Moscow during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Advanced AI tools are already beginning to allow senior officials to make decisions from thousands of miles away, and Xi might welcome such a capability. That approach, however, would come with real costs, as commanders on the front will likely continue to have a better sense of battlefield dynamics for at least some time.

Even if Xi delegates warfighting decisions to PLA officers, however, it stands to reason that they may be reluctant to delegate their own decisions to AI. The Chinese system punishes PLA officers who fail to carry out their duties to certain standards. It is easy to imagine commanders being disciplined if AI-enabled systems lead them to make militarily or politically disastrous choices. The unpredictability and unreliability of current-generation AI might also make it difficult for the PLA’s decision-makers to fully trust these new tools.

Further complicating PLA decision-making is the fact that Xi has strengthened the party’s control over the military. In Xi’s China, politics come first, and thus he has built up the system of political commissars, party committees, and inspection cadres who are tasked with ensuring that military decisions align with party objectives, creating a dual-command structure that could slow decision-making in future conflicts. Although party representatives are meant to cede responsibility to the military brass during conflicts, their prominence could complicate the use of AI tools, especially if those technologies recommend politically risky or otherwise unacceptable operations. Differences between Xi’s view of the correct political decision in a conflict and the recommendation of an AI tool, or even concern among military officers that there might be a difference, could lead to operational paralysis.

At the same time, U.S. policymakers should not neglect the possibility that the combination of Beijing’s complex politics and the Chinese military’s low-trust culture could lead the PLA to rely too much and too uncritically on AI-enabled tools. Although the risk of excessive dependence on AI is a concern for all technologically advanced militaries, the PLA’s particular mix of limited autonomy and centralized command authority, as well as Xi’s insistence on political control, could render lower-level Chinese officers particularly prone to automation bias.

Politics, Ideology, Culture

It would be unwise, of course, to definitively conclude that China will fail to effectively use AI-enabled military tools in future conflicts. But as China’s military continues to modernize, and as it focuses on exploiting information and technology to gain military advantage, the PLA will have difficulty squaring the need for quick, AI-fueled decisions with the reality of its command structure and decision bottlenecks. Despite military reforms that were meant to streamline decision-making authority, Chinese political dynamics and the PLA’s bureaucratic culture might weaken the advantages of AI-enabled technologies for battlefield operations.

Although the Chinese leadership appears to believe that it can use technology to improve the effectiveness of its hierarchical command style, it will be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to design technologies that can account for the vicissitudes of Chinese politics and the military’s sclerotic decision-making structures. The politically expedient choice one moment may become toxic the next. In its zeal to catch up to the United States in the development of AI technologies, Beijing may be underestimating the challenges it will face in putting those technologies to use.

These challenges help demonstrate why there is more to the U.S.-Chinese AI race than the technology itself. Each country’s political and military culture will shape the use of emerging tools that could define military advantage in tomorrow’s conflicts, and U.S. officials should take into account not just China’s investments in AI but also the specific factors that will influence the PLA’s use of emerging technologies.

Beijing may be underestimating the challenges it will face in putting AI to use.

A useful first step would be to resist the tendency to automatically assume that China’s adoption of AI will be analogous to that of the United States. Although U.S. and Chinese writings on the role of AI in future warfare appear similar in many areas, Washington’s and Beijing’s different political, ideological, and military cultures will condition each side’s use of the technology. Distinct uses will lead to discrete risks.

Policymakers in Washington should also consider the circumstances that might cause Beijing’s unique strategic culture to use AI tools irresponsibly or erratically. The United States cannot control how China may deploy AI-enabled military technologies on tomorrow’s battlefields, but it may be able to engage Beijing in circumscribing the technology’s application in especially risky scenarios. The recent bilateral agreement to limit the use of AI in nuclear command and control is a positive development in this regard.

To outcompete Beijing in military AI, the United States will have to not only push forward the technological frontier but also focus on developing best practices and concepts that will enable the technology’s effective use. To that end, while Silicon Valley focuses on innovation, Washington must pay close attention to the challenges of adoption. The successful deployment of AI will require finding ways to adapt existing processes and warfighting concepts to existing technological realities, as well as establishing the infrastructure necessary for sustained, broad-based deployment of AI tools.

Sam Bresnick is a Research Fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Sam Bresnick · December 31, 2024

24. Opinion | With South Korea in crisis, what black swans lurk for East Asia in 2025?

For me this illustrates why we cannot be a one trick pony and make everything about China. This illustrates how all these countries and security and economic issues are interrelated/interconnected and that we must take a broader approach than only China, China, China. And if we want to be effective in addressing security and prosperity issues with China we need to address them with our friends, partners, and allies in the region – If we want to be successful and win, which is the sole criteria of the incoming administration.

And who knows what will happen? To me uncertainty means that we need to keep all our options open and not cut away our friends, partners, and allies.

Conclusion:

Perhaps, the greatest black swan of 2025 might not be a single event but a cascade of disruptions fundamentally reshaping East Asia’s power dynamics.

The situations in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan underscore a critical reality: domestic instability has far-reaching implications in an era of global interdependence. East Asia’s security hinges not only on military alliances but also on the resilience of its internal institutions. If these internal fissures go unaddressed, the region risks becoming more vulnerable to external dynamics and less capable of navigating its most pressing challenges.

Diplomacy

OpinionAsia Opinion

Hao Nan

Opinion | With South Korea in crisis, what black swans lurk for East Asia in 2025?

Signs of upheaval and uncertainty in Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines will be compounded as the US recalibrates its East Asia policy

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3292041/south-korea-crisis-what-black-swans-lurk-east-asia-2025?utm_source=rss_feed

Hao Nan

Published: 5:30am, 28 Dec 2024Updated: 8:35am, 28 Dec 2024

On December 14, South Korea’s National Assembly successfully impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol on its second attempt. The impeachment has headed to the Constitutional Court, which has up to six months to review it. On Friday, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo who had assumed the role of acting president was also impeached.

If Yoon’s impeachment is upheld, opposition leader Lee Jae-myung could become the new president and recalibrate Yoon’s domestic and foreign policy directions with the backing of a legislative majority. If Yoon’s impeachment is overturned and he resumes office, his unpopularity would make it unlikely that any meaningful agenda would be advanced. Legal battles and political paralysis are expected to drag on until mid-2025, adding an unsettling layer of uncertainty to the region.

This unfolding saga is a textbook example of a black swan: a low-probability, high-impact occurrence that shocks a system and prompts recalibration. Although there were subtle signs in retrospect, the scale and timing of the crisis blindsided many. For a democracy as robust and economically powerful as South Korea, its descent into such turmoil is difficult to fathom.

As East Asia enters a 2025 in which Donald Trump returns for a second term as US president, South Korea’s crisis raises a pressing question: are there other black swan events lurking for the region?

Taiwan, another pillar of regional stability, offers early warning signs of an upheaval. Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in a legislative deadlock with the opposition Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party coalition, and grappling with mounting polarisation over cross-strait relations. With key elections in 2026 and 2028 looming, Lai faces growing pressure to unify a fractured electorate.

Earlier this month, a social media post swiftly deleted by the DPP appeared to show support for Yoon’s decision to declare martial law, sparking fears that Lai might consider a similar measure under the guise of countering mainland threats.

Taiwanese lawmakers brawl in parliament over controversial bills

Adding to the tension, ahead of Lai’s diplomatic trip to Pacific nations with a stopover in Hawaii, Taiwan’s security establishment warned of a large-scale People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercise. Despite the absence of such an exercise, Taipei amplified claims of imminent action, creating public anxiety.

Commentators have noted that the airspace restrictions imposed by the mainland authorities were routine civil aviation notices and not related to military manoeuvres. Reports from US officials also contradicted Taiwan’s narrative, describing no abnormal military activity in the East or South China seas.

This incident reveals a worrisome trend: Taiwan’s leadership risks exacerbating regional tensions by framing routine developments as existential threats. With Taiwan still haunted by memories of martial law, these missteps could erode public trust, intensify polarisation and create fertile ground for political instability.

Taiwan leader William Lai says Beijing has no authority over island in Double Tenth speech

The Philippines is another potential flashpoint. While its territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea dominate headlines, its domestic political fissures may pose a more immediate threat.

Vice-President Sara Duterte-Carpio is under investigation for purportedly threatening in November to assassinate President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, his wife and his cousin. Despite subpoenas, she has refused to attend the hearings, fuelling speculation about bias in the investigation.

Once political allies who swept the 2022 presidential election in a strategic partnership, the Marcos and Duterte families have seen their alliance unravel.

Marcos has distanced himself from former president Rodrigo Duterte’s controversial policies, such as the violent war on drugs, and even signalled willingness to cooperate with the International Criminal Court’s investigations into Duterte-era human rights abuses. Meanwhile, Duterte’s camp accuses Marcos of marginalising Duterte-Carpio, resulting in her resigning as education secretary and from other roles.

With midterm elections in 2025 and a presidential race in 2028, the divide between the pro-US Marcos family and the pro-China Duterte faction could intensify. A deepening rivalry could destabilise governance and fracture foreign policy alignments.

‘No joke’: Philippine vice-president says she hired an assassin in case she was killed

Meanwhile Japan, too, may encounter turbulence in 2025. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba leads a coalition government that has lost its legislative majority, recording the worst election result in over a decade. Public dissatisfaction with Ishiba’s administration is growing, with approval ratings dropping to 36.5 per cent in December from 50.7 per cent just two months earlier.

The opposition has the leverage to block Ishiba’s agenda, raising the prospect of government paralysis. A no-confidence vote against Ishiba’s cabinet during budget deliberations next March is a distinct possibility. Japan’s internal struggles risk delaying critical reforms and undermining its regional leadership role when geopolitical tension with China and Trump’s return demand stability and cohesion.

Divisions in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party pose barrier to PM Ishiba’s policy plans

In each of these cases, regional instability is compounded by the recalibration of US policy in East Asia. The Biden administration has grown reliant on regional allies and partners in its so-called minilateralism, with initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the “Squad” and trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.

But the growing fragility of Washington’s key regional allies, coupled with the return of Trump’s transactional approach to alliances and partnerships, threatens to erode these gains.

Perhaps, the greatest black swan of 2025 might not be a single event but a cascade of disruptions fundamentally reshaping East Asia’s power dynamics.

The situations in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan underscore a critical reality: domestic instability has far-reaching implications in an era of global interdependence. East Asia’s security hinges not only on military alliances but also on the resilience of its internal institutions. If these internal fissures go unaddressed, the region risks becoming more vulnerable to external dynamics and less capable of navigating its most pressing challenges.

Hao Nan

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Hao Nan is a research fellow with the Charhar Institute, and a fellow (2024-2025) with the Arms Control Negotiation Academy.

25. Analysis: Biden spent four years building up US alliances in Asia. Will they survive Trump’s next term?

This should be Biden's gift to Trump and Trump would be wise to accept it and use it for the benefit of the US. If there is anything that Trump should sustain from the Biden administration it should be the strengths of the relationships with US friends, partners, and allies.  

The irony is that all US friends, partners, and allies are ready to cooperate with the Trump administration. There will be less resistance to Trump demands than there was in his first administration and certainly less resistance than will be put up by the Democrats in Congress. The conditions and knowledge and understanding are vastly different than during the first Trump administration. Allies know they must cooperate and they are willing to do so especially due to the rising threats from the revisionist and rogue powers of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea.

But the question is will Trump officials realize that they no longer need to vilify alliances for political purposes and to charge up the MAGA base. They are now about to be in power and they can employ alliance relationships for the benefit of American First. Will they have the strategic maturity to build on the existing alliance relationships or is everything only going partisan politics and nothing else?

Analysis: Biden spent four years building up US alliances in Asia. Will they survive Trump’s next term? | CNN

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · December 30, 2024

Hong Kong CNN —

For America’s friends in Asia, the uncertainty brought by the impending return of Donald Trump to the White House is coming at a bad time.

China has been modernizing its military and nuclear arsenal while becoming increasingly aggressive in asserting territorial claims in the South China Sea and over Taiwan. North Korea has ramped up its belligerent rhetoric and calls to develop its illegal nuclear program. Both countries have expanded their alignment with Russia as it wages war on Ukraine, linking Asia to the shattered peace in Europe.

For decades, the US has backed the security of its allies in the region, which has more overseas active-duty American troops than anywhere else in the world. Tens of thousands of soldiers are stationed on sprawling bases in treaty allies South Korea and Japan, countries that, like the Philippines and Australia, the US is bound to aid if they come under attack.

Marines of South Korea, right, and the US, aim their weapons near amphibious assault vehicles during a US and South Korea joint landing military exercise in Pohang, South Korea, on March 30, 2015.

Lee Jin-man/AP

Those countries are now preparing for the return of an American leader who has railed against what he sees as free-riding US allies who don’t pay enough for defense, sidled up to autocrats, and called for an “America first” approach to global obligations.

Many questions about Trump are on the minds of US-aligned leaders in Asia, observers across the region say.

Will Trump ask for more defense spending than allies can afford? Could he take an extreme step to withdraw US forces if any such demands aren’t met? Will the businessman-turned-leader cut deals with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un or Russia’s Vladimir Putin that undermine the interests of US allies?

Alternatively, could he perhaps strengthen US alliances and be a tougher opponent for America’s enemies?

In the shadow of this uncertainty, leaders across the region have been scrambling to forge strong ties with the notoriously mercurial incoming US commander-in-chief, who’s known to link foreign policy to personal rapport.

Many are warily eyeing President-elect Trump’s threat to ringfence the world’s largest economy with 10% tariffs on all imports and upwards of 60% tariffs on goods from China, moves that could have significant economic knock-on effects across Asia.

But as Trump’s January inauguration draws closer, governments across Asia are also facing potentially more existential questions about how Trump will manage US security relationships with friends and rivals – and stand by its allies if tested.

‘Indispensable power?’

After World War II, a network of US alliances was established across the world to serve as a powerful deterrent against another global war. A major aim was to prevent more countries from becoming nuclear powers by placing them under the umbrella of the US arsenal.

In the eyes of many in Washington and across Asia, those alliances in Asia-Pacific have only become more critical as relationships in the region become more contentious.

China has expanded its security ties with NATO-adversary Russia and been accused of enabling Moscow’s war by buying up Russian exports and providing the dual-use goods needed for its defense base. Beijing has also ramped up its intimidation of Taiwan, the self-ruling democracy it claims and has vowed to take control of, by force if necessary.

In the South China Sea, the China Coast Guard has in recent months attacked Philippine ships with water cannons and even axes, despite a major international ruling years ago denying its claim to the bulk of the strategically critical waterway.

China Coast Guard vessels fire water cannons toward a Philippine resupply vessel at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea on March 5.

Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

North Korea, meanwhile, has ramped up its threats toward South Korea and the US as it carries out illegal weapons testing. It’s also aiding Russia’s war with ammunition, missiles, and – in a major, recent escalation – soldiers, US officials say.

But as Trump steps onto a more fraught and complex global stage than at the start of his first term eight years ago, observers in Asia say his focus appears to be on ratcheting up economic pressure on China rather than regional security.

Footage circulated online on Oct 18, 2024 shows North Korean troops training in Russia. Open source intelligence (OSINT) researchers have located that this was filmed at a training range in Sergeyevka, Primorsky Krai, Russia. In the video, a Russian soldier in uniform ñ with an insignia on his shoulder ñ commented on the troops marching before him and called them foreign reinforcements, claiming that millions of them would come to reinforce the troops, according to Kyiv Post. The matching insignia on the soldierís shoulder and the gate indicate that the video was likely taken at a Russian military facility. North Korea has started sending troops to fight with Russia in Ukraine, South Korea\'s spy agency has said as Seoul warned of a grave security threat. The allegation comes a day after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he believed 10,000 North Korean soldiers could join the war, based on intelligence information. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol called for a security meeting on Friday. According to South Korea spy agency, 1,500 troops have already arrived in Russia - with anonymous sources telling South Korean media the final figure could be closer to 12,000.

EyePress News/Reuters

Related article Indoctrinated, loyal and well trained: Don’t underestimate North Korean soldiers in Russia, some experts say

Trump’s “priority is overwhelmingly on the economic relationship and on the United States not losing to China economically,” but there’s little sign “that he is deeply interested in the military or strategic balance in East Asia,” said Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program in Sydney.

“Everything points in the opposite direction,” Roggeveen said. “He’s interested in – sure – having a strong military and defending the United States … but not in this idea of America as an indispensable power which has a unique global security role.”

The incoming leader and his strategists have instead repeatedly questioned whether the US was getting enough out of its alliances and whether American lives should be lost and dollars spent fighting foreign wars.

Trump shocked European leaders earlier this year by saying he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member country that doesn’t meet the US-led alliance’s defense spending guidelines.

Preparing for Trump 2.0

Weeks before election day, Trump turned that spotlight toward Asia, claiming during an interview with Bloomberg News that were he president, South Korea would pay $10 billion a year to host US troops — about eight times more than Seoul and Washington recently agreed on.

South Korea already spends well over 2% of its gross domestic product on defense, considered by the US to be a benchmark for its allies. Over the past decade, the country has also paid 90% of the cost for expanding Camp Humphreys, the US’ largest overseas base.

Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, is photographed in 2019. It is the US' largest overseas military base.

Jung Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Images

US soldiers participate in a 'Best Squad Competition' at Camp Humphreys in 2023 in Pyeongtaek, South Korea.

Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

But Trump’s comments have sparked fears in Seoul that he could seek to renegotiate cost-sharing for US troops, despite a five-year agreement reached earlier this year that will raise Seoul’s spending to 8.3% more in 2026 than the previous year. A failed renegotiation – in a worst case posed by some observers – could result in a Trump decision to downsize or withdraw US forces meant to counter the threat from its belligerent northern neighbor.

Such a scenario, or broader feelings that US commitment is waning, could also push Seoul toward developing its own nuclear arsenal – a potential first step on a slippery slope that could lead more middle powers to proliferate such weapons, experts say.

But dealings with Trump have become a lot more complicated for South Korea. Lawmakers there voted to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol earlier this month after his shock declaration of martial law, and then weeks later voted to impeach acting president Han Duck-soo. The country now faces months of political uncertainty at a time when observers have said building a strong leader-to-leader relationship is key.

US Army Sgt. Terry Cook and his wife, Tyrese, pose with their five children at Camp Humphreys, July 4, 2024.

Yoonjung Seo/CNN

Related article It’s Texas 60 miles from North Korea: the US military’s largest overseas base

“The biggest challenge is whether Seoul and Washington will be able to communicate properly,” said Duyeon Kim, a Seoul-based adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Such communication is key to “avert devastating consequences and surprises in the US-South Korea alliance that we currently assume would happen based on Trump’s harsh rhetoric against allies,” she added.

In Japan, pundits have lamented the perceived deficiencies of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba compared with the late Shinzo Abe, known as Asia’s “Trump whisperer” for his finesse in getting close to the president-elect during his first term.

The key American ally in Asia is likely to stress its own sweeping changes to its defense posture since Trump was last in power.

Tokyo has veered away from the pacifist constitution imposed by the US in the aftermath of World War II, in 2022 moving to boost defense spending to about 2% of its GDP by 2027 and buy up American cruise missiles.

Countries throughout the region are also watching whether the Trump administration picks up the mantle of a key piece of Biden’s legacy: efforts to build across Asia what State Department officials have called a “lattice work” of interwoven US partnerships, part of the administration’s “invest, align, compete” strategy to counter Beijing.

From left, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stand for a Quadrilateral Summit family photo in Wilmington, Delaware, on September 21.

Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

Biden bolstered the Quad (India, Japan, Australia and the US) security group and founded the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom and the US) partnership that aims to equip Canberra with nuclear-powered submarines. He also brokered significant increases in Japan’s security coordination with South Korea, the Philippines and Australia.

Trump – as an unpredictable force in the White House – could drop, maintain or even deepen these relationships. But in the meantime, America’s Asian allies will look to hedge against any decline in US support.

“The United States is now not the constant of international affairs, but rather the variable,” said Murata Koji, a professor of political science at Japan’s Doshisha University.

“That’s why we have to expand our security (outside) the United States,” he said, pointing also to Tokyo’s need to deepen its partnership with Europe over shared concerns.

China watching closely

That said, experts across the region broadly feel it’s unlikely there will be seismic changes in the US security presence under Trump, in terms of drawing down troops or tearing up alliance agreements, especially given American focus on the challenge posed by China.

“Geopolitical realities and circumstances will oblige him to try to maintain forces in the region. The scenario that I’m thinking of is more of renegotiating, more than outright withdrawal,” said Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

US President-elect Donald Trump gestures to China's President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China, on November 9, 2017.

Damir Sagolj/Reuters

And countries will not just be considering potential downsides to Trump’s return, Koh added, pointing to perceptions in Asia that Biden has hesitated in some of his decisions on Ukraine, complicating the situation for the besieged country.

“With Trump coming in, there could be some renewed hope that (he) will not be like Biden in terms of crisis – maybe Trump will be more decisive,” he said.

There are concerns, however, that an expected aggressive economic policy toward China could lead to a further breakdown in communication between the US and Chinese militaries, raising the risk of confrontation between the two. And if US allies are hurt by new American tariffs, they may have no choice but to rely more on the world’s second-largest economy.

On the other hand, Trump also signaled some interest in working with China, implying in recent comments to CNBC that he saw at least certain aspects of his post-pandemic policy on China as “a step too far.”

Then there is the question of how Trump deals with Taiwan – a potential flashpoint long seen as among the most likely triggers for a US-China conflict.

An ‘insurance company’

Biden repeatedly broke with purposeful American ambiguity to say that the US would defend Taiwan if China invaded the island. He also approved funding for the first-ever military aid to the island as Beijing ramped up its military pressure.

In contrast, the president-elect earlier this year appeared to undercut US relations with Taipei, claiming in a Bloomberg interview that Washington was “no different than an insurance company” for the island and said Taiwan should pay the US for defense. In October, he told the Wall Street Journal he would impose 150% to 200% tariffs if China went “into Taiwan.”

A Chinese fighter jet is refueled during military exercises around Taiwan on April 9, 2023.

Xinhua/AP

But how the Trump administration would react in the event of a contingency remains unknown. Trump’s choice for secretary of state, Sen. Marco Rubio, is a staunch advocate for the island, and his vice presidential pick JD Vance has argued that the US supplying Ukraine with air defense systems could hurt its ability to aid Taiwan’s defense if China were to attack.

That argument, however, has observers in Asia concerned.

Many in the region believe how Trump handles the war in Ukraine will send a critical message to Russia’s partners like China, Iran and North Korea – a set of nations some in Washington fear could harden into a dangerous axis. Those concerns may be particularly acute when it comes to China, which has likely been watching closely as it looks to its own intentions in Taiwan.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping attend a welcoming ceremony in Beijing's Tiananmen Square during Putin's state visit this past May.

Sergei Bobylov/Pool/Sputnik/AFP/Getty Images

Related article As North Korea, Iran and China support Russia’s war, is a ‘new axis’ emerging?

Trump has suggested he would end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours” and called for an “immediate ceasefire and negotiations” – a position that jives with Beijing’s stated stance on the war, which the US and its allies have criticized as being beneficial to Russia.

“I know Vladimir well. This is his time to act. China can help. The World is waiting!” Trump said in a post on his social media platform Truth Social earlier this month.

And what that rhetoric means in practice could have significant ramifications for Asia.

“If Russia is allowed to walk away with looking like it’s got a win from this … that then cements this relationship (between Russia and China),” said Robert Ward, director of geo-economics and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the UK.

“And Xi Jinping will be watching this very closely, watching – how credible is Western deterrence? How credible is NATO? How willing is the West to actually put skin in the game in a conflict – and that of course relates back to Taiwan.”

CNN’s Yoonjung Seo, Mike Valerio, and Hanako Montgomery contributed to this report.

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · December 30, 2024

26. Medal of Honor Monday: Army Col. Robert L. Howard

It was an honor to know him. I first met him in Korea in 1989 when he was the commander of Special Operations Command Korea and the privilege of hearing him speak at many events in the 1990s and 2000s in Korea when he was working for the VA.

Medal of Honor Monday: Army Col. Robert L. Howard

defense.gov · by Katie Lange

Army Col. Robert Lewis Howard was a legend for his service in the Special Forces during the Vietnam War. Having deployed there five times, he's the most decorated soldier to have served in the conflict and is the only soldier to have been nominated three times for the Medal of Honor.

Medal of Honor

Army 1st Lt. Robert Lewis Howard, Medal of Honor recipient.

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Howard was born July 11, 1939, in Opelika, Alabama, to Charles and Martha Howard. His father was drafted into World War II when he was very young, and his mother worked in a textile mill to aid in the war effort, so he and his sister were largely raised by their grandmother for the first several years of his life.

Howard's father and one of his uncles were paratroopers in the famed 101st Airborne Division, so he grew up hearing their stories, which inspired him to serve. On July 20, 1956, the 17-year-old enlisted in the Army a month after graduating high school.

For several years, Howard worked his way up the ranks and even earned an associate degree in business administration from the University of Maryland in 1962.

Howard was sent on his first deployment to Vietnam with the 101st, his father's former unit, in 1965. After being injured in battle, he was recruited to the Special Forces, which he did missions for until his yearlong deployment was finished, and he returned home for Special Forces training. Howard earned the Ranger tab and eventually become a Green Beret.

All Smiles

Army Sgt. 1st Class Robert L. Howard, front left, poses for a photo during a deployment to Vietnam. Howard is a Medal of Honor recipient and one of America's most decorated soldiers.

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Howard returned to Vietnam four more times, mostly doing Special Forces work with the top-secret Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group, which ran cross-border operations in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam.

On Dec. 30, 1968, Howard, then a sergeant first class, was in charge of a platoon made up of Americans and Vietnamese soldiers who were on a mission to rescue another team of soldiers who were missing in enemy-controlled territory in Laos.

Once a helicopter inserted the platoon at its specified landing zone, the team moved out, only to quickly be attacked by a much larger enemy force. During the initial firefight, Howard was wounded and his weapon was destroyed.

"My hands were all blown up and burned," Howard said in a 2003 Library of Congress Veterans History Project interview. "And I couldn't stand up."

Howard couldn't walk, but when he saw his platoon leader, 1st Lt. James Jerson, lying seriously wounded in an exposed area, he didn't hesitate to crawl through a hail of gunfire to get him. As he was trying to help Jerson, an enemy bullet hit one of Howard's pouches, which detonated several magazines of ammunition and blew him several feet away.

After a few minutes, Howard realized he wasn't too injured, so, with the help of a fellow sergeant, he continued his mission to drag Jerson back toward the platoon, which was in disarray because of the attack. Howard then rallied the remaining men into a more organized defense.

"I said, ‘We're going to establish a perimeter right here, and we're going to fight or die,'" Howard said of what he told the men who remained.

Group Photo

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group was activated, Jan. 24, 1964, to function as a joint special operations task force in Vietnam. The 5th Special Forces Group was the largest source of volunteers for the unit.

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He said he had the platoon put out strobe lights to identify where they were and call in air support, which arrived to help suppress the enemy around them so the team could make it through the night.

"There was a tributary running off a creek …. and so [the enemy] had to come across that little tributary to get to our position and fight," Howard said, explaining that the waterway helped them to better defend their hastily made position.

For the next few hours, Howard ignored his own wounds and crawled from position to position, helping the wounded and encouraging the other members of the platoon to keep fighting. With the help of air support, they successfully repulsed several enemy attacks and were finally in sufficient control enough to allow a quick landing of rescue helicopters before sunrise.

Howard personally made sure all the men, dead and alive, were loaded onto the helicopters before he got into one himself to leave the bullet-swept landing zone. Sadly, Jerson, who Howard fought hard to save, died on the ride to safety.

"That hurt me worse than being shot up, seeing that lieutenant die," Howard told the Veterans History Project.

According to Army Special Operations Command, only six of the 37 platoon members survived the battle. If it weren't for Howard's bravery, it's likely no one would have come home.

On the Move

Army Sgt. 1st Class Robert L. Howard, a Green Beret, carries a North Vietnamese Army prisoner of war during an incident in Vietnam. Howard is a Medal of Honor recipient and one of America's most decorated soldiers.

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Howard was evacuated to a field hospital for recovery. He said that's where he learned that he'd been recommended for the Medal of Honor.

"In a way, I felt bad because I didn't feel that I was worthy of the Medal of Honor for that action because I was not successful in doing what the colonel had directed me to do, and that was to find the team that had been surrounded and captured or killed by the enemy," Howard told the Veterans History Project. He said he later learned some of those men survived and were taken as prisoners of war.

Howard remained in Vietnam and, in December 1969, commissioned as an officer after receiving a direct appointment from the rank of master sergeant to first lieutenant. He'd reached the rank of captain by February 1971 when he learned he was finally being sent home from Vietnam to receive the Medal of Honor.

Medal of Honor

Army 1st Lt. Robert Lewis Howard receives the Medal of Honor from President Richard M. Nixon during a White House ceremony, March 2, 1971.

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In late February 1971, Howard was flown to Washington, D.C., where his wife, Tina, and two daughters, Melissa and Denicia, joined him. On March 2, President Richard M. Nixon presented him with the nation's highest honor for valor during a White House ceremony.

"When I received that honor, I felt that I was sharing it with members of my family that had sacrificed their lives in the Second World War," Howard said, referring to three of his uncles who died in the conflict. "I try to always maintain the dignity and the honor of having it bestowed upon me."

Howard's five tours in Vietnam totaled 55 months in combat, which led to him being wounded 14 times. Between 1968 and 1969, during a 13-month period, Howard was recommended for the Medal of Honor two other times. Those recommendations, however, were downgraded. Instead, he received the Distinguished Service Cross and the Silver Star — the second- and third-highest military awards, respectively. Howard earned eight Purple Hearts during his career, along with numerous other honors. According to Army Special Operations Command, he is the most decorated soldier to have served in Vietnam.

Sharing Stories

Army Staff Sgt. Robert Harris listens to retired Col. Robert L. Howard, a Medal of Honor recipient, as he shares military service stories at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, April 7, 2009. Harris, a 5th Special Forces Group soldier, was in the same unit Howard was assigned to when he earned his Medal of Honor in Vietnam in December 1968.

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Over the next two decades, Howard continued with his impressive career. He received a bachelor's degree from Texas Christian University in 1973 before earning two master's degrees from Central Michigan University in the early 1980s.

His years of airborne expertise were also put to good use when he took part in two John Wayne movies, making a parachute jump in the 1962 film "The Longest Day," and as an airborne instructor in 1968's "The Green Berets," according to his Alabama Department of Veterans Affairs biography.

Howard eventually divorced, got remarried and had two more children, Roslyn and Robert Jr., the latter of whom went on to serve in the Army.

Howard retired on Sept. 30, 1992, after 36 years of service. For 14 years after that, he worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs. He also often spoke with students and troops about the importance of service and the fight for freedom. In the 2000s, he was inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame and the Army Aviation Association of America Hall of Fame.

Honoring a Hero

Army leaders unveil a plaque dedicating the Special Operations Command Korea campus in honor of Army Col. Robert L. Howard at a ceremony outside the SOCKOR headquarters building on Camp Humphreys, South Korea, April 16, 2021.

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Howard spent his last few years living in San Antonio. He died on Dec. 23, 2009, at a hospice in Waco, Texas, after suffering from pancreatic cancer. Howard is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Howard's name is remembered in various ways throughout the Special Forces community. In 2013, the 5th Special Forces Group headquarters building at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was named Howard Hall in his honor, and a plaque dedicating the Special Operations Command Korea campus to him was unveiled at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, in 2021.

An overpass along I-85 near Auburn University in Alabama was also named for Howard. In December 2024, a book about his life, "Beyond the Call of Duty: The Life of Colonel Robert Howard," was published.

This article is part of a weekly series called "Medal of Honor Monday" in which we highlight one of the more than 3,500 Medal of Honor recipients who have received the U.S. military's highest medal for valor.

More Stories of Valor

Experience: The Highest Awards for Valor

Spotlight: Commemorating the Vietnam War

Experience: Vietnam Veterans Memorial

defense.gov · by Katie Lange

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com