Quotes of the Day:

"Memories of our lives, of our works and our deeds will continue in others." 

– Rosa Parks

“Perhaps I know best why it is man alone who laughs: he alone suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter.” 

– Friedrich Nietzsche

“The cost of liberty is less than the price of repression.”

 – W.E.B. Du Bois

1. From Hybrid to Conventional Warfare: Three Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

2. A push to cut veterans' disability benefits is gaining traction, experts warn

3. Russia will use ‘even stronger military means’ if Western pressure continues, warns deputy foreign minister

4. Eighteen ways Palantir wants the Pentagon to change

5. Palantir: It's Unlikely To End Well

6. To defend Taiwan tomorrow, we must prepare to sanction China today

7. Russia and the west are entering the ‘grey zone’ of warfare – and the oceans are a key battleground

8. The Wagner Group’s Use of Chinese Space Intelligence

9. America is Not Prepared for a Protracted War

10. FBI arrests man allegedly helping prepare ‘surprise attack’ on South Korea

11. Opinion The U.S. stakes in Syria following the fall of Aleppo

12. The Irregular Warfare Center & Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Host Inaugural Intelligence Support to IW Symposium

13. War and appeasement: why a deal with Putin will backfire

14. The Okinawa Conundrum: Rethinking Regional Security

15. A Last Chance to Prevent Nuclear Anarchy

16. To counter China and support national security, Congress must empower NIST

17. Trump taps Driscoll as Army secretary, Navarro as trade advisor

18. All bow before the almighty US dollar

19. Beijing sharpens tone over US missile launcher in the Philippines

20. Special Forces Robin Sage exercise returns to Cumberland County area this month

1. From Hybrid to Conventional Warfare: Three Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

​Excerpts:

Lesson 1: Greater Threat Perception Leads to Escalation

Lesson 2: Military Confidence Fuels Aggression

Lesson 3: Weak Deterrence Encourages Escalation

From Hybrid to Conventional Warfare: Three Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/04/hybrid-to-conventional-warfare/

by Tarik Solmaz

|

12.04.2024 at 07:00am

Amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty, many defense analysts are questioning if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is now closer than ever. There is little doubt that Beijing has long sought control of Taiwan. This desire has only become more tangible since the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016. Since then, China has waged a prolonged and comprehensive hybrid warfare campaign against Taiwan. To put it briefly, this campaign has included isolating Taiwan diplomatically, spreading disinformation to undermine public trust, launching cyber-attacks on government systems, and exerting economic pressure to discourage public support for the Taiwanese government. Simultaneously, China has conducted frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and large-scale military drills, aiming to intimidate both the public and political leadership. Russia’s shift from a lengthy hybrid warfare campaign against Ukraine to a full-scale military invasion on February 24, 2022, highlights that hybrid warfare is not the sole approach available to revisionist states. This escalation suggests that Taiwan could face a similar escalation in the future. So, analyzing the factors behind Russia’s escalation in Ukraine is crucial to draw lessons that Taiwan and its allies might apply to prepare for potential threats. Three critical insights emerge from this analysis.

Lesson 1: Greater Threat Perception Leads to Escalation

With the overthrow of Ukraine’s Moscow-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, in February 2014, the Kremlin concluded that diplomacy alone was insufficient to curb pro-Western sentiments in Ukraine. Hence, it decided to intervene covertly in Crimea and the Donbas region, where a significant ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking population resided. Nevertheless, Moscow still held out hope for restoring relations, prompting it to refrain from direct and high-intensity military actions against Ukraine at the time. Despite Moscow’s hybrid warfare efforts, Ukrainian policymakers remained committed to pursuing NATO and EU membership. This deepened Russia’s threat perception regarding a Western-leaning Ukraine. Consequently, on February 24, 2022, Russian armed forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by land, air, and sea. Arguably, the Kremlin would not have opted for a large-scale military intervention in early 2022 if it had perceived the threat as still manageable. Beijing has long warned that any de jure declaration of independence by Taiwan would mean war. Whereas Taiwanese policymakers have regularly stated that Taiwan is already a sovereign and independent country, they have refrained from making a formal declaration in order not to provoke China. This cautious stance has kept Chinese threat perception from reaching a critical level. With this threat perceived as significant but not vital, Beijing has preferred a hybrid warfare model, which lies between diplomacy and conventional warfare. However, if Taiwan were to pursue de jure independence, China’s threat perception could escalate, potentially prompting Beijing to shift from hybrid warfare to a conventional military operation.

Lesson 2: Military Confidence Fuels Aggression

As pro-Western unrest erupted in Ukraine in late 2013, Russia was in the midst of a large-scale modernization of its military that began after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War owing to the profound shortcomings that the Russian armed forces experienced during that war. For this reason, it would not have been the ideal choice to wage an all-out conflict with Ukraine at that time. Because the hybrid form of warfare is fundamentally fought in the shadows, it provided Moscow with opportunities to minimize its drawbacks had it launched more overt campaign against its neighbors. After an extensive modernization process, Russia grew more confident by 2022, making it more inclined to engage in a full-scale war. China’s military is far superior to Taiwan’s military. Currently, China has the world’s largest military force by active-duty military personnel, with 2,035,000 active troops along with 500,000 gendarmerie and paramilitary forces. Taiwan, in comparison, has 169,000 active soldiers along with 11,800 gendarmerie and paramilitary forces. Moreover, Beijing’s defense expenditure is $224 billion, which is almost 12 times greater than Taiwan’s defense budget. Nevertheless, invading Taiwan may not be straightforward in military terms. Beijing faces two significant challenges in any potential offensive. First, China has not fought a conventional war since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, meaning it has not had the opportunity to test its military doctrine or capabilities. Second, a direct Chinese invasion of Taiwan would necessitate large-scale amphibious warfare, which is fundamentally one of the most complex military operations. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that China would succeed in a military invasion of Taiwan. As with Russia’s shift from hybrid warfare to conventional conflict in Ukraine, the dynamics of military readiness and preparation will be pivotal in shaping the course of any future military engagements in the Taiwan Strait. Should Beijing become more confident in its military capabilities, it may be inclined to shift from hybrid warfare to a conventional military operation.

Lesson 3: Weak Deterrence Encourages Escalation

When NATO refrained from a military response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, covert occupation of Donbas, and military build-up near Ukraine, Putin likely concluded that avoiding superpower conflict was a higher priority for the US and its allies than countering Moscow’s influence in Ukraine. From 2014 to 2022, despite Russia’s continued aggression, Western leaders consistently signaled reluctance for direct confrontation, relying instead on sanctions and diplomacy. This stance ultimately weakened the West’s deterrence, paving the way for Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The US views Taiwan as a crucial strategic partner and has consistently pledged to defend the island in the event of a direct Chinese invasion. Thus, a Chinese military attack on Taiwan could trigger a conventional or even nuclear conflict between China and the US. This catastrophic risk has so far led China to favor a hybrid warfare approach against Taiwan. However, if the US lose its deterrence over China for whatever reason, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would become more likely.

Conclusion

The fact that Moscow turned its protracted hybrid warfare campaign into a full-scale invasion in 2022 highlights that the hybrid model of warfare can act as a precursor to conventional warfare, especially as a nation’s perceived threats intensify, its military confidence grows, and external deterrence weakens. Taiwan, in a position similar to Ukraine’s pre-2022, could face escalated aggression if China’s threat perception changes, military confidence increases or if it feels emboldened by a perceived decline in US resolve. To mitigate this risk, Taiwan and its allies should prioritize strengthening deterrence, enhancing military readiness, and closely monitoring shifts in China’s strategic calculations. These lessons from Ukraine serve as essential guideposts for Taiwan in navigating an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.

Tags: China, Deterrence, Hybrid Warfare, Putin's War, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine

About The Author

• 
  
• Tarik Solmaz
• Tarik Solmaz holds a PhD in Strategy and Security from the University of Exeter. His PhD thesis, “Rethinking the Concept of Hybrid Warfare: A Revisionist Perspective” provides a critical re-evaluation of hybrid warfare, examining both the concept and its practical applications. From 2014 to 2018, he served as a security analyst in the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (Turkey). Dr Solmaz has written on security issues for RealClear Defense, Wavell Room, Lowy Institute, and the Institute for Regional Security.

2. A push to cut veterans' disability benefits is gaining traction, experts warn

Disturbing, I am sure the DOGE will pick up on this.

"In times of war and not before, God and the soldier we adore. But in times of peace and all things righted, God is forgotten and the soldier slighted."

 “Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected and handed on for them to do the same, or one day we will spend our sunset telling our children and our children’s children what it was like in the United States where men were free.” – Ronald Reagan

Will we have another bonus march? Will veterans assemble on the National Mall.

Recall the history here:

The 1932 Bonus Army

National Mall and Memorial Parks

https://www.nps.gov/articles/the-1932-bonus-army.htm

A push to cut veterans' disability benefits is gaining traction, experts warn

Many civilians don’t understand how difficult it is for military veterans to prove that their health conditions stem from their military service.

Jeff Schogol

Posted 16 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

A growing chorus is calling for cuts to Veteran Affairs disability benefits as a way to save federal dollars — a move that ignores the very real costs of two decades of war, and could cause irreparable harm to generations of veterans, experts warn.

The most recent call for cuts is a widely-criticized opinion article in The Economist on Nov. 28 that described veterans’ disability benefits as “absurdly generous.” Experts told Task & Purpose that the essay is representative of widespread public misperceptions that threaten to reduce veterans’ compensation for service-connected health conditions.

The Economist piece echoes an argument made by the Washington Post’s editorial board last year that limiting disability payments to veterans would help get America’s financial house in order.

These arguments may now have a real chance of becoming law.

Policies laid out in Project 2025, touted as a blueprint for a second Donald Trump term, would revamp the Department of Veterans of Affairs with proposals to increase privatization, narrow the eligibility criteria for health benefits and replace civil service-style employees with political appointees in its ranks. Produced by the Heritage Foundation think tank in Washington, D.C., the policy guide states that a growing number of health conditions that qualify for VA disability are “tenuously related or wholly unrelated to military service.”

In mid-November, President-elect Donald Trump has tappedRussell T. Vought, one of the key players in Project 2025, to lead the Office of Management and Budget, a powerful federal post that oversees government spending.

Patrick Murray, national legislative service director for the Veterans of Foreign Wars office in Washington, D.C., views the The Economist editorial as the latest example of an ongoing push to cut veterans’ disability benefits, said

“More and more, it’s becoming a trend that, for some reason, we need to go after disabled veterans and the ‘absurdly generous’ benefits that we get, which I think is flat-out bulls—t,” said Murray, a Marine veteran who lost his right leg in a September 2006 roadside bomb attack in Fallujah, Iraq. “I can’t get out of bed without the use of a prosthetic or a wheelchair. What the hell is absurd about my medical care and benefits?”

As President-elect Donald Trump prepares to take office again, reducing the size of government has been a leading theme. His top ally Elon Musk has vowed to cut government spending by as much as $2 trillion.

“I think we have a new administration coming in saying everything is on the table,” said David Shulkin, who served as VA Secretary from 2017 to 2018 under Trump. “We’re going to relook at the definition of how government operates. We’re going to focus on efficiency,” “I think that it’s natural in a period where you’re in a transition – you don’t yet know the position of the political leaders coming in – for these questions to be coming up.”

However, any attempt to reduce disability compensation would likely be met with a strong pushback from the American public, said Shulkin, who is now on the advisory board of Burn Pits 360, a nonprofit organization that helps veterans dealing with ailments stemming from toxic exposure.

Shulkin noted that Senate Republicans came under intense criticism in 2022 when they initially blocked the PACT Act, which established 23 health conditions linked to toxic substance exposure during military service and expanded care for Vietnam veterans who are ill due to Agent Orange.

Rep. Mark Takano, the ranking Democrat on the House Veterans Affairs Committee, said he has heard arguments in favor of cutting veterans disability benefits many times. He argues that Republican lawmakers now want to reduce benefits and privatize VA healthcare “under the guise of saving money.”

“I can think of no greater responsibility as a nation than to care for those who have put their lives on the line to defend our freedoms,” Takano said in a statement to Task & Purpose.

‘It’s not just getting cash for the sake of cash’

Disability compensation is a monthly tax-free payment that veterans can receive depending on whether they were injured, harmed or became ill as a result of their service. Disability ratings are based on a percentage scale from 0% to 100%, which is designed to indicate the severity of one’s disability.

But advocates say they fight the misperception that disability compensation is a free handout for veterans, many of whom have been exposed to toxins from burn pits and other sources and are dealing with the physical and mental toll of more than two decades of war, constant deployments, and physically demanding and often dangerous training.

“VA disability compensation benefits are hard earned — and deserved — by Veterans for their service and sacrifice for our country,” said VA Under Secretary for Benefits Josh Jacobs, who added that VA services have been proven to keep veterans healthy, in a good financial shape, and at a lower risk of death by suicide.

Many Americans don’t understand that disability compensation helps offset the financial burden that veterans face because of their injuries, Murray told Task & Purpose. For example, Murray often has to take a taxi or Uber to travel short distances that would just be a brisk walk for people who have use of both of their legs. He also has a co-pay for his wheelchair.

“It’s not just getting cash for the sake of cash,” Murray said.

Disability compensation covers more than combat wounds, he noted. Veterans can receive chronic injuries and ailments from their service.

Murray also took issue with an argument made in The Economist story that disability benefits make veterans not want to get better, saying “I’d love to get my right leg back. Tell me how getting benefits incentivizes me not to get better?”

Cuts would be devastating

The consequences of any reduction in veterans disability benefits would be “a lot of suffering,” said Dan Clare, a spokesman for DAV (Disabled American Veterans).

DAV is very concerned about calls to cut disability compensation because the veterans’ healthcare needs are “tremendous” after two decades of war, said DAV spokesman Dan Clare.

“We’ve seen the VA budget increase, like everyone else has, and we fought for that because we’ve been at war for 20 years,” Clare told Task & Purpose. “We’ve had tons of people sacrifice tremendously for their country in that period of time. Some of the illnesses and injuries don’t come to surface right away.”

“We’re talking about veterans who aren’t able to work at their full capacity because of service-connected disabilities,” Clare said. “The inability to take care of your family is a huge issue. A lot of these people are counting on these benefits. That’s how they are able to keep their homes, to keep their lives stable. Taking away those benefits or making arbitrary cuts in benefits would be devastating for our community.”

If the U.S. government ultimately decided to reduce disability compensation, it would exacerbate the already serious problems of veterans homelessness and suicide, Shulkin said.

“I think there’s way too much at stake to be treating this as a fiscal exercise,” Shulkin told Task & Purpose. “Clearly, I think, that the veterans are 100% service disabled, the veterans that have come to rely on these benefits would not be able to continue to get the type of care and services that they need. We would see more veterans who are homeless. We would see more veterans who are having to rely on charity. I think everybody understands how serious that’s going to be.”

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American Legion National Commander James A. LaCoursiere described The Economist story and other arguments in favor of cutting veterans benefits as “abhorrent.”

“We don’t put a price tag on freedom, and we should not put a price tag on the health of those who risked their lives to protect our freedoms,” LaCoursiere said.

While the overall number of American veterans has declined, the cost of healthcare has dramatically increased, LaCoursiere said in a statement to Task & Purpose.

Since the PACT Act was signed into law more than 1.2 million veterans have received care for health conditions caused by toxic exposure, LaCoursiere said.

“Cut those PACT Act benefits, and that potentially means 1.2 million American families grieving the preventable loss of their veteran spouse or child or parent,” LaCoursiere said.

A growing civilian-military divide

Arguments in favor of cutting veterans’ disability compensation have been growing since the PACT Act was signed into law in August 2022, said former Marine Maj. Kyleanne Hunter, of the RAND Corporation.

Critics of disability compensation tend to focus on the total amount of money that the VA spends on benefits without considering how many veterans have served during more than 20 years of war, Hunter told Task & Purpose.

“People are just looking at a number that is coming out and saying, “Oh, that just seems like a lot of money,’” Hunter said.

A widespread misperception held by many of those who have not served is that veterans often game the system to get as many benefits as they can, even if they don’t qualify for them, Hunter said. The reality is that service-connected injuries get worse as veterans age, and health conditions stemming from military service can start to appear when veterans get older, all of which require more medical care over time.

The general public’s lack of understanding about veterans’ injuries as well as the benefits they’re eligible to receive underscores that fewer and fewer Americans are connected to the military and veterans community, Hunter said.

“This [civilian-military] divide is part of the problem: The fact that it’s very easy to create caricatures out of veterans and not actually dig in and do the hard work to support them,” Hunter said. “I think some of this really is a symptom of how divided we are.”

Veterans are entitled to benefits by law

It’s not widely understood outside the veterans community just how difficult applying for disability compensation is, said Army veteran Kayla Williams, who ran the VA’s Center for Women Veterans from 2016 to 2018 and later served as the VA’s assistant secretary of public and intergovernmental affairs from 2021 to 2022.

Veterans must not only prove that they have an injury or ailment, but they must also prove that it was caused by their military service before they can receive compensation, Williams told Task & Purpose.

“It’s not just a simple thing: you fill out a form, you’re granted compensation,” Williams said. “I do hope that if folks understood that a little better, they might be less inclined to want to trim those benefits.”

Williams also argued that the increase in VA spending for disability compensation is not a sign that the government is getting too big. Rather, she argued, it shows that veterans are finally getting the benefits they are entitled to.

Those who argue in favor of curtailing veterans benefits would also have to change existing laws to remove certain health conditions, she said, adding that giving veterans the benefits they’ve earned costs less than treating them when they are in poor health.

“It is cheaper to pay for a veteran to get a flu vaccine than to pay for treating the flu in a 75-year-old person,” Williams said. “Giving people top-notch healthcare is going to be more cost-effective than denying healthcare until they are sicker.”

While it is essential to look at ways to improve how the VA provides services to veterans, cutting disability benefits is not the solution, said retired Army Lt. Gen. Walt Piatt, CEO of the Wounded Warrior Project.

“Unlike other federal benefits, veterans earn disability compensation through the injuries and illnesses they sustained while serving our country,” Piatt told Task & Purpose. “The price these heroes pay to protect our freedoms can mean a lifetime of physical and emotional scars. Our nation has a solemn obligation to care for those who have made these sacrifices. We must keep our promise to those who have served and protected our American way of life.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

3. Russia will use ‘even stronger military means’ if Western pressure continues, warns deputy foreign minister

Russia will use ‘even stronger military means’ if Western pressure continues, warns deputy foreign minister | CNN

CNN · by Frederik Pleitgen, Edward Szekeres · December 4, 2024

Sergei Ryabkov told Fred Pleitgen in an exclusive interview that there was “no magic solution” to the conflict in Ukraine

CNN

Moscow CNN —

Russia will resort to “even stronger military means” in its war with Ukraine if the US and its allies fail to recognize it cannot be tested indefinitely, Moscow’s deputy foreign minister told CNN’s Fred Pleitgen in an exclusive interview on Wednesday.

“Risks are high and they are growing, and that’s quite disturbing,” Sergei Ryabkov said during a sit-down interview in Moscow, adding that the current geopolitical tensions were unheard of even “at the height of the Cold War.”

Ryabkov said there was “no magic solution” to the conflict. He claimed there is a lack of common sense and “restraint in the West, in particular the US, where people seemingly underestimate our resolve to defend our core national security interests.”

US President Joe Biden’s administration on Tuesday announced a $725 million security assistance package for Ukraine. It called the package an attempt to put Kyiv “in the strongest possible position” as Russia steps up its attacks and Biden prepares to leave office in less than two months.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during his press conference after the SCTO Summit at the Palace of Independence, November 28, 2024, in Astana, Kazakhstan. Putin is meeting with Kazakh counterpart Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the capital, a day before he is expected to attend the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Astana.

Contributor/Getty Images

Related article Putin approves record defense spending — a third of Russia’s budget

The administration has a matter of weeks to use up nearly $7 billion, part of a larger package authorized by Congress earlier this year to help Ukraine in the war, which began in February 2022.

The risk of military escalation shouldn’t be underestimated and depends on decisions in Washington, Ryabkov said, while citing the US government’s “very obvious inability to truly appreciate that Moscow cannot be pressurized indefinitely.”

“There will come a moment when we will see no other choice but to resort to even stronger military means,” the minister said, adding an escalation is unlikely to happen “right away.”

“But the trend is there,” he said.

Referring to the outgoing Biden administration, Ryabkov said Russia will respond to any provocation and “find a way to assert our strong will.”

Russia has also threatened to strike Ukraine again with the nuclear-capable “Oreshnik” ballistic missile that Moscow used in its widespread attack on critical energy infrastructure in late November.

Ryabkov said Oreshnik “is not a strategic ballistic missile, it’s an intermediate-range missile tested in combat.”

Former US President Donald Trump’s 2019 decision to withdraw the US from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a decades-old arms control agreement between the US and Russia, paved the way for Moscow developing its new ballistic arsenal, Ryabkov said.

‘Zero’ chance of compromise

Had it not been for Trump’s decision, “there would be no Oreshnik in our hands and we would be restrained in our capability to develop such weapons,” Ryabkov added.

Russia has not had direct contact with Trump or his team regarding the president-elect’s earlier comments on ending the Ukraine war in one day, according to Ryabkov. “We will be there when they come with ideas … but not at the expense of our national interest,” the minister said.

Addressing the possibility of peace talks with Ukraine, Ryabkov said the two countries’ positions are incompatible.

“Chances for a compromise at the moment are zero. The moment people in Kyiv begin to understand there’s no way Russia will go the way they suggested – there might be openings and opportunities.”

Katharina Krebs contributed reporting.

CNN · by Frederik Pleitgen, Edward Szekeres · December 4, 2024

4. Eighteen ways Palantir wants the Pentagon to change

​Excerpts:

Anything else?

The most important thing is: “How did we get here?” We are in this state of undeclared emergency. We've lost deterrence as the West in the world, we've spent trillions of dollars. And how did we get here?

My argument to you is really this: we went from spending 94% of our money on dual-purpose companies to creating a unique class of defense specialists that we put on the Galapagos Islands, and we created a great schism between commercial innovation and defense. And that has made our country much less safe, much less innovative. It's created many of these problems, and we did that because of the nature of monopsony. And the answer is to fix that. That's where it starts.

Eighteen ways Palantir wants the Pentagon to change

A conversation with the CTO of the self-described software prime contractor.

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

December 3, 2024 03:07 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

The Defense Department is a sclerotic monopsony whose communist approach to acquisition has the United States on a precipice, writes Palantir’s chief technology officer, who prescribes a “painful” but “necessary” reformation based on competition and software.

“I think we're just scratching the surface,” said Shyam Sankar, whose company calls itself the first software prime contractor. “The other huge opportunity is really on using AI to drive efficiencies,” including using technology to supplant human workers and processes that slow innovation and adoption.

Sankar recently penned 18 theses that could reform how the Pentagon does business, in explicit comparison to Martin Luther’s criticisms of the Catholic Church. He highlights several well-documented problems often studied by congressionally mandated commissions—such as a belabored budgeting-and-planning process, the perils of requirements, and how cost-plus contracts remove incentives to innovate.

The 18-page document also manages to say the quiet part out loud, demanding the Pentagon and Congress to change its practices with colorful curtness. One of Sankar’s main themes is the need for competition—whether it’s companies vying for Pentagon contracts or customers in the Defense Department looking for solutions.

He also criticizes a system whose major suppliers sell only to the Pentagon and other militaries.

“Chinese primes only earn 30-40% of their revenue from the PLA; the remainder is commercial. Those cheap products your neighbor is buying on Amazon are subsidizing lethality which could be used against our men and women in uniform, much the same way that during the Cold War your purchase of an American car, camera, and cereal subsidized America’s lethality against her enemies,” he wrote.

Instead, Sankar writes, the Pentagon should vastly accelerate its purchases from largely commercial companies—like SpaceX, whose CEO Elon Musk has been tapped to lead a Trump administration government-efficiency drive.

In September, Palantir’s stock joined the S&P 500, increasing software and tech companies’ share of the index. In recent weeks, Palantir’s market value of $137 billion edged out Lockheed Martin’s.

Defense One spoke with Sankar.

What are Palantir’s goals for 2025, especially amid a new administration?

Our government business has re-accelerated dramatically. We're pretty excited about the product road maps that we've built. [Maven Smart System has] become the [Joint All Domain Command and Control] MVP. It's getting a huge amount of adoption, so we're pretty excited about that, and continue to invest in that.

What defense areas will you expand into?

I think we're just scratching the surface. So I mean, a big focus, obviously, Maven is at the pointy end of integrating AI into the kill chain. So how do you do that across all the services? It's coming down from OSD right now. The Army has started to adopt it…and the opportunities for that to happen with the [maritime operations centers] with the Navy and with the [air operations centers] with the Air Force, that are definitely top of mind. [We’re] continuing to push into space…we're at the very beginning of that.

And then the other huge opportunity is really on using AI to drive efficiencies. There's more civilians in the DOD than there are uniformed service members. There are more acquisition professionals than there are Marines. And so have we just crushed ourselves with process? And I'm sure most of that process is needed, but can we use AI agents instead of humans to drive efficiency and speed through that?

We've been able to automate the foreign-disclosure process, where it used to take humans three days to collect intelligence and then rewrite it to be releasable to partners, taking that down to three minutes. So the obvious benefit there is lethality and being able to share with allies and partners. But I think the other part of it is it just makes for a much leaner force.

If you look at [Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology] report on Maven. With Maven, you can perform targeting operations with 20 people that used to take us 2,000 people in Iraq. So that sort of efficiency really drives the ability to hide in a pure conflict. You're much smaller, [there’s a] much smaller footprint, less support infrastructure, and [that] drives lethality.

Would shrinking the Pentagon workforce, particularly on the civilian side, actually drive efficiency?

It does in the U.S. commercial market every single day. We automated [an] insurance underwriting process where one of America's largest insurers, with 78 AI agents, took a process that used to take three weeks down to hours. We have this challenge in government, generally—it's not just the Department of Defense—where we view people as abundant, and technology is unaffordable and expensive. But that's the exact opposite of how the commercial world looks at technology. They view people as very expensive, and technology as cheap as the way of achieving efficiency and effectiveness.

I think a lot of that is because of the monopsony. That's what really speaks to the heart of the “Defense Reformation.” Like, why do we have the system we have? Well, I don't envy the position of being the department; being the sole buyer for a thing is very hard. At some very fundamental level, you believe in free markets or you don't. And what we have is a centrally, unplanned process. So it's like the worst of communism, really: a central planning process is not actually planned. We have a [Future Years Defense Program] that takes five years, two years to do [program objection memorandum]—you can't really change your mind anywhere along there. You're gonna have unitary efforts: we have one F-35 for three services. I'm not sure we should have 30 years on $2 trillion.

When we were building submarine-launched ballistic missiles under [Vice Adm. William] Raborn in the [1960s], we had four competing programs running concurrently. Today, we look at that and we say, ‘Oh, isn't that wasteful?’ But actually, CBO zone analysis shows that it was cheaper and faster because we had competition. And we've gotten too fixated, since the end of the Cold War, on how much competition is there in the industrial base. That's not actually the problem. The problem is there's not enough competition inside of government.

Will Congress go along?

Absolutely. I mean, I don't want to be too Pollyannaish about it, but I think Congress recognizes it’s part of the problem. I think what makes it really hard is they do have an actual oversight function to perform. So how do you balance the need for oversight with the necessary maneuver room that you're going to need when you're doing something innovative? That's just reality.

If I think about all the projects in the company that I'm overseeing, I have to give folks the room to pivot, to change, to move. I think some of the recommendations coming out of the PPBE Commission are exactly right, like a capability element approach. Rather than a program-element approach, we're going to resource counter-UAS as a category and you're going to have the freedom and flexibility to move and adapt within that.

If making a change, if changing your mind, if reacting to new data is major brain damage and requires things to go up and down the building up and down the Capitol Hill, you're not going to make changes, which means you're just going to accumulate error. Because the only thing you know for sure is that whatever plan you came up with yesterday is wrong today. The question is: can you fix it every single day as you observe that error, or can you just let all that error accumulate? And our five-year FYDP, our two-year POM—how we oversee these things is not fit for the moment.

What do you most want the Pentagon and Congress to hear?

The first one is that monopsony is the problem. You can look at your industrial base as a monopsonist. You get the industrial base you deserve. It really is all your fault. So you have to change your behaviors, what you're incentivizing and how you're organizing yourself to get what you need. Stop blaming the prime, stop thinking like some process is going to fix this. We need to approximate market forces as much as possible. “We need more competition inside of government” would be the pithy way of saying it.

The second one is that cost-plus makes us dumber, poorer, and slower. The only two industries that do cost-plus are general contractors on remodels and the government. I don't know if you've done a remodel before, but are you happy with how that went and the price predictability and the timelines and stuff? It's just not the way to do these things. You've already lost by thinking about requirements to begin with. Share the problems with a competitive American market and let them come to you with solutions and then buy the best ones you like. Buy multiple if you want, but you're going to have to rely on the American industrial base, not the defense industrial base to provide compounding price performance. And you see that with the SpaceX example. It used to cost $50,000 per kilogram to get to orbit with the shuttle program. With Starship Heavy reuse, it's $10 to $20 per kilogram—not missing any zeros there. You can't get that with cost-plus, you can only get that because Elon [Musk] cares about getting to Mars.

But ​​the DoD is kind of a unique customer. It has specific needs, like lethality and security.

But that's really a response from our present world. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, only 6 percent of [Pentagon spending on major weapons] went to defense primes. The rest went to dual-purpose companies. Chrysler built cars and missiles. Ford built satellites. Until 1990, General Mills, the cereal company, built torpedoes and artillery. So we had a very different American economy, where people were invested not only in economic prosperity, but also in freedom. And this is important, because commercial innovation drives price-performance improvements. You just can't see anywhere else. If you work at a car company in America and you're not able to decrease price for 4% a year, you're gonna get fired, you know. iIn the industrial base and the defense industrial base, if prices aren't increasing all the time, people would be shocked. So, like, the fundamental mechanisms are missing. And I think the reason we have what we have is that when we lost competition; when the Berlin Wall fell down, we didn't have a pure competitor anymore. The Soviets were basically done, and we went from 6 percent spending on unique defense primes to 86 percent today.

It's not that I'm saying the products are dual-use, like missiles are single-use, but the companies are dual-purpose. I built the Operation Warp Speed supply chain for the U.S. government in two weeks because two years earlier, I had solved a structurally similar problem for BP and oil and gas production.

Anything else?

The most important thing is: “How did we get here?” We are in this state of undeclared emergency. We've lost deterrence as the West in the world, we've spent trillions of dollars. And how did we get here?

My argument to you is really this: we went from spending 94% of our money on dual-purpose companies to creating a unique class of defense specialists that we put on the Galapagos Islands, and we created a great schism between commercial innovation and defense. And that has made our country much less safe, much less innovative. It's created many of these problems, and we did that because of the nature of monopsony. And the answer is to fix that. That's where it starts.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

5. Palantir: It's Unlikely To End Well

​Graphics and charts at the link: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4741477-palantir-its-unlikely-to-end-well?utm

Palantir: It's Unlikely To End Well

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4741477-palantir-its-unlikely-to-end-well?utm

Dec. 02, 2024 8:14 AM ETPalantir Technologies Inc. (PLTR) Stock139 Comments2 Likes

Danil Sereda

Investing Group Leader

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Summary

• Palantir's stock is driven by unrealistic expectations rather than fundamentals, despite impressive growth in AI-driven government and commercial segments.
• Indeed, the company's Q3 performance was strong, with a 30% YoY revenue increase and an 8th consecutive quarter of margin growth.
• Despite robust financials and AI advancements, excessive share dilution and insider selling raise concerns about long-term sustainability.
• The last time I looked at PLTR in early September this year, the stock was trading at 86.7x forwarding P/E. Now, it's trading at 177.2x - 104% higher.
• I maintain my "Hold" rating on Palantir this time as I believe that the current overvaluation might not end well for today's buyers in 2-3 years.
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Intro & Thesis

I've been covering Palantir Technologies Inc. (NASDAQ:PLTR) here on Seeking Alpha since October 2021, initially rating the stock as a "Sell" due to its overvaluation and seemingly limited growth at the time. My bearish calls were successful for about a year - until market expectations shifted towards rapid growth through artificial intelligence, allowing PLTR stock to recover quickly. Due to the persistent overvaluation, I couldn't upgrade PLTR to "Buy," although the positive impact of the then-new AIP boot camp program seemed quite obvious. So I upgraded the stock to "Hold" in February 2023 and have written about the company once a quarter since then, coming to mostly neutral conclusions.

Seeking Alpha, the author's coverage of PLTR stock

Last time, I argued that the inclusion of PLTR into the S&P 500 Index (SPX) (SPY) could give bulls another catalyst to enjoy. However, I still thought that PLTR's glowing overvaluation at the time suggested limited returns for investors in the years ahead. As you might see from the above screenshot, my assumption and cautious stance didn't age well, as the stock managed to more than double since my last neutral call.

Today we see the company is growing by bounds and leaps indeed. But I believe that the current PLTR's valuation is primarily driven by unrealistic hope and overextended expectations, rather than tangible fundamentals. The market seems willing to overpay for Palantir based on this optimism, assigning an excessive premium that, in my view, is unsustainable. For these reasons, I maintain my neutral rating unchanged.

Why Do I Think So?

Palantir Technologies exhibited exceptional performance during fiscal Q3 2024 and experienced robust growth across its government (+33% YoY in sales) and commercial business (+54% YoY) segments with increasing use of its AI-based solutions. The consolidated Q3 revenue increased 30% year-over-year to $726 million, topping guidance by $24 million (the market consensus was beaten by almost $22 million as well). This represented a dramatic increase from the 17% YoY growth rate in Q3 2023, which clearly shows the company's readiness to take advantage of the AI revolution.

The adjusted operating margin for the quarter was 38%, from 29% in Q3 2023, making this the 8th consecutive quarter of margin growth. As a result, the beat of consensus on the bottom line amounted to about 10%. So the strong dynamics of earnings surprises since last year kept going well, leading to unambiguous positive earnings revisions for Q4 EPS and sales expectations:

Seeking Alpha, notes added

As was the case in the last few quarters, the solid expansion of the commercial segment was driven by the use of Palantir's Artificial Intelligence Platform (AIP), a critical component of the company's strategy. In case you haven't heard of it, simply put, AIP allows organizations to make AI work by embedding it in workflows, this way basically offering an edge over peers. As a prime example of how AIP may be essential for businesses, during the Q3 earnings call, Palantir featured cases including automating underwriting processes for a large insurance company, reducing response time from 2 weeks to just 3 hours, and creating a $30 million bottom-line impact for Trinity Rail within 3 months. The company's success in turning boot camp students into value customers looks impressive indeed, with a handful of clients making seven-figure ACV commitments within 2 months of their first sign-on, according to the company. Total commercial customers in the US rose 77% over the prior year to 321, demonstrating strong demand for the company's offering.

The government segment saw strong performance as well, with revenue up 33% YoY to $408 million. U.S. government revenues, in particular, rose to $320 million, a 40% YoY and 15% QoQ increase. That increase came primarily through robust program execution, new contract signings, and good deal timing. The management said their Maven Smart System has helped the U.S. military shrink the number of targeting cells from 2,000 to 20 while maintaining effectiveness. Palantir also announced a new 5-year agreement to further leverage Maven's AI/ML platform for all branches of the US military, further consolidating its position as a premier defense partner, so I think the growth in this segment is likely to be sustained in the next few years. On the other hand, I think there is one risk factor here that suggests no acceleration in growth: U.S. military support for Ukraine could potentially decrease under a Trump administration. A potential de-escalation or pause in military actions between Russia and Ukraine may also negatively impact future growth rates for PLTR's government segment.

I like the fact that PLTR's adjusted free cash flow totaled $435 million, a 60% margin, and trailing 12-month FCF was above $1 billion for the first time in the company's history. Palantir ended the quarter with $4.6 billion in cash and no debt. When we see no debt, we shall keep in mind that there's likely another form of financing - otherwise, the rapid growth in financials PLTR managed to boast of couldn't be real. And so we find that PLTR's diluted shares outstanding increased by 1.8% and 5.76% QoQ and YoY, respectively and that's although the firm repurchased ~1.8 million shares during the quarter, with $954 million under the current authorization. That's a lot of dilution, in my view, and the heavy sales of insiders don't help brighten this picture at all.

TrendSpider Software, PLTR, notes added

As it is, share-based compensation (a quarter in which it accounted for 22% of revenue) continues to be an issue as it effectively promises more dilution. I'm not against increasing the number of shares in circulation if it helps accelerate growth and the net-net impact is positive for expansion. But to be honest, it's also concerning that insiders seem to be selling off their positions at every opportunity (as far as I can see it).

Anyway, looking ahead, Palantir's executives have boosted their full-year 2024 revenue guidance to a midpoint of $2.807 billion (up 26% YoY). The firm also raised adjusted EBIT guidance to more than $1 billion and adjusted FCF guidance for the year to over $1 billion. For Q4 2024, Palantir expects revenues of $767-771 million and adjusted operating income of $298-302 million as they seem to be confident in AIP's long-term growth and that it's going to be driving customer acquisition and growth further.

PLTR's IR materials

Let's take a realistic look at how a strong company like Palantir can grow in the future and assess whether its current valuation is justified. According to Grand View Research, the global enterprise AI market size was estimated at $23.95 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow at a CAGR of 37.6% from 2025 to 2030. Similarly, the U.S. aerospace and defense AI market is estimated at $7.82 billion in 2024 and is expected to reach approximately $20.50 billion by 2034, growing at a CAGR of 10.09%, according to Precedence Research.

In an optimistic scenario, the total market volume (TAM) for AI in companies could reach $150 to 200 billion annually by 2030. However, the market's projected revenue for Palantir by FY2030 is estimated at just $8.5 billion. This means that the implied price-to-sales ratio for FY2030 would be around 18x based on the company's current market cap of approximately $150 billion - an extremely high multiple.

Seeking Alpha, PLTR, notes added

Clearly, the market is pricing in the expectation that Palantir will remain a key market leader in the AI space. However, even according to analysts' optimistic forecasts, the company is unlikely to capture more than 10% of the overall market. A more realistic estimate assumes that Palantir's market share will be closer to 4-6% under favorable conditions. So given this, the current market cap of $150 billion appears to be significantly overvalued even with today's optimistic growth assumptions.

The company needs to exceed current forecasts for revenue and net income per share growth by approximately 25-30% annually to justify the market's high level of optimism. However, in reality, we see that, at best, this year's performance might exceed expectations by only 9-11%. This indicates that, despite its impressive growth, the company is already falling significantly short of the lofty expectations placed upon it. At least, this is how the situation appears to me from an outside perspective.

Seeking Alpha, PLTR, notes added

Analysts from Argus Research (proprietary source) share my view that Palantir is extremely overvalued: Compared to its peers, PLTR's key valuation multiples are several times higher:

Palantir's lagging EV/revenue multiple of 42.4 is more than double the four year historical average of 20. On a forward basis, Palantir's EV/revenue multiple of 33.6 is a multiple of the peer average of 7.1.

Source: Argus Research (proprietary source)

I know that many bulls justify Palantir's current valuation by arguing that the market doesn't fully grasp its high potential for future profit growth. However, let's be realistic: Even if we consider the PEG ratio, which compares the price-to-earnings ratio to the EPS growth rate, on a forward-looking basis Palantir's PEG stands at 6.4x. This is nearly 3.5 times higher than the IT sector median. It's worth noting that the IT sector as a whole is already trading near peak valuation levels. In this context, Palantir isn't only overvalued but is trading at a significant premium - 3.5 times higher - relative to an already overvalued sector.

Seeking Alpha, PLTR, notes added

Analysts from Morningstar Premium confirm that a potential overvaluation of PLTR could amount to tens of percentages:

Morningstar Premium, PLTR's fair value model (proprietary source)

Based on all that, I wouldn't take the risk today, as buying into this strong rally in PLTR stock seems irrational.

The Verdict

Palantir's commitment to deploying AI, growing its commercial and government enterprise operations in the United States, and strong financial controls will likely make it an excellent candidate for business growth. As management reiterates its guidance for Q4 and FY2025, the company expects to remain in growth mode with additional investments in AIP and strategic alliances. On the other hand, all that potential growth seems to be already reflected in the stock price. So investors have to be wary of the high price and possible downside risk from the firm's dependency on massive, difficult contracts and global expansion - maybe it's finally time to follow the insiders and keep trimming.

While Palantir continues to evolve and penetrate different end markets, its high valuation multiples seem to be irrational. The last time I looked at PLTR in early September this year, the stock was trading at 86.7x forwarding P/E. Now it's trading at 177.2x, 104% higher, which explains the explosive growth in the quotes. The upside from here seems to be irrational, in my view.

I maintain my "Hold" rating on Palantir this time, as I believe that the current overvaluation might not end well for today's buyers in 2-3 years.

Thank you for reading!

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This article was written by

Danil Sereda

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Daniel Sereda is chief investment analyst at a family office whose investments span continents and diverse asset classes. This requires him to navigate through a plethora of information on a daily basis. His expertise is in filtering this wealth of data to extract the most critical ideas.

He runs the investing group Beyond the Wall Investing in which he provides access to the same information that institutional market participants prioritize in their analysis. Learn more.

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Analyst’s Disclosure: I/we have no stock, option or similar derivative position in any of the companies mentioned, and no plans to initiate any such positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Seeking Alpha's Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. No recommendation or advice is being given as to whether any investment is suitable for a particular investor. Any views or opinions expressed above may not reflect those of Seeking Alpha as a whole. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank. Our analysts are third party authors that include both professional investors and individual investors who may not be licensed or certified by any institute or regulatory body.

6. To defend Taiwan tomorrow, we must prepare to sanction China today

To defend Taiwan tomorrow, we must prepare to sanction China today 

by Max Meizlish and Elaine Dezenski, opinion contributors - 12/03/24 1:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/5018289-taiwan-china-economic-statecraft/?mc_cid=3e30451171

Taiwan is reportedly considering a $15 billion military package as an overture to President-elect Donald Trump. This comes just as the island nation agreed to spend over $2 billion in American weapons purchases next year. While such agreements may serve to warm relations with an incoming Trump administration and strengthen Taiwan’s military against an increasingly belligerent China, they will do little to address Beijing’s biggest vulnerability in a potential conflict with Taiwan — its “soft economic underbelly.”

This provides Trump a historic opportunity to not just support Taiwan militarily, but to capitalize on the deepening cracks in China’s economy that make it vulnerable to powerful, proactively developed American economic statecraft. 

Slow growth, an unraveling real estate market, significant youth unemployment and plummeting foreign direct investment reveal deep vulnerabilities that threaten the Chinese Communist Party. These economic fissures give the United States and its allies a strategic opportunity: by publicly outlining the severe sanctions, export controls and investment restrictions China would face if it invades Taiwan, we can slow the pace of Chinese hostilities toward Taiwan — or even prevent them altogether. However, to ensure this approach succeeds, we must learn from recent history and act before it’s too late. 

The war in Ukraine serves as a stark reminder of the costs of delayed action. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion more than two-and-a-half years ago, the United States and a coalition of allied governments united to impose significant sanctions on Moscow. Since then, the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan and others have collectively imposed nearly 20,000 sanctions on Russia. Yet, these measures were — and continue to be — too late to deter aggression. 

It didn’t have to unfold this way. 

Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the international community could have publicly committed to impose significantly more drastic economic measures on Russia if it made further incursions into Ukrainian territory. By clearly outlining the severe economic consequences of further aggression, the deterrent effect might have altered the Kremlin’s calculus.

Deterrence relies on the credible threat of significant repercussions, and pre-announced sanctions could have increased the perceived costs of invasion beyond acceptable levels for Russia. Nearly a decade later, approximately 1 million people have been killed or injured  in the Russia-Ukraine war — and the conflict rages on. We must learn from that grave oversight and proactively plan to sanction key sectors of the Chinese economy if China invades Taiwan. 

To the detriment of our national security, targets of economic statecraft are often identified only after a conflict has erupted. This reactive approach places incredible pressure on already under-resourced federal agencies responsible for executing this critical function. Planning for these eventualities must be done as early as possible. Our military forces regularly wargame scenarios for potential conflict and identify targets of attack; our economic security apparatus should do the same. 

Some of these targets should be publicly identified to exert pressure on Beijing. Specific industries and major firms central to the Chinese Communist Party’s control can be spotlighted now, overtly increasing the potential cost of any action China may take against Taiwan. Third-country firms operating in China will also take note. The threat of possible secondary sanctions may compel them to reconsider doing business as usual if the United States communicates such intentions before a conflict arises. This proactive approach would represent a profound shift in our application of economic statecraft. 

Legislation like the Sanctions Targeting Aggressors of Neighboring Democracies (STAND) with Taiwan Act is a significant step in the right direction. By proposing substantial sanctions on China in the event of a military invasion of Taiwan, the STAND Act sends a clear and credible message. It lays the groundwork for a deterrent strategy that could dissuade Beijing from taking aggressive actions by making the consequences unmistakably clear. 

Historically, we have lacked a coherent strategy for deploying the disparate set of economic tools at our disposal. More critically, our government has not fully embraced economic statecraft as an effective deterrent. Many question the effectiveness of sanctions, but few consider how they could be more impactful if target states and market actors understood the conditions under which sanctions would be imposed before a conflict begins. Publicly stating these conditions and, importantly, preparing for the possibility that they are met should at the very least demonstrate a credible threat to our adversaries and prompt considerable market derisking from the private sector. 

For an adversary like China, which faces significant economic headwinds, this is precisely the path the United States should pursue. While imposing severe sanctions on China would have substantial repercussions for the United States and its allies given the deep interconnections in global supply chains and trade, these costs may be a necessary price to prevent a catastrophic conflict over Taiwan. Such a conflict could destabilize the entire Indo-Pacific region and disrupt global markets far more severely than any sanctions regime. 

We must also anticipate and prepare for potential countermeasures from China, such as restricting access to critical rare earth minerals or disrupting global supply chains. By investing in alternative sources, building strategic reserves, and ally-shoring with international partners to enhance economic resilience, we can reduce our vulnerability and demonstrate our readiness to withstand retaliatory actions. 

While it’s true that sanctions alone may not always compel an aggressor to change course, they can strain a nation’s economy and limit its ability to sustain prolonged conflict. In China’s case, where economic stability is paramount for the regime’s domestic legitimacy, the threat of substantial sanctions could serve as a powerful deterrent and increase the likelihood that cooler heads will prevail within the Chinese Communist Party leadership.  

Alongside economic sanctions, the United States should continue to increase economic support for Taiwan, enhance our military presence in the region, and engage in diplomatic efforts to create a multifaceted deterrent. By taking these proactive steps, we can send an unequivocal message to Beijing: Aggression against Taiwan will come at an unbearable cost. 

Max Meizlish is a senior research analyst for the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously worked as a sanctions enforcement officer at the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Elaine Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. She previously served as deputy and acting assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security.  

7. Russia and the west are entering the ‘grey zone’ of warfare – and the oceans are a key battleground

And dilemmas. Gray Zone activities create dilemmas for national security and impact national prosperity.

Excerpt:

Grey zone activities create uncertainties and fears. And because of this they can disrupt the global economy, weaken societal cohesion and degrade the west’s ability to respond to security threats in a decisive way. This is why below-the-threshold activities at sea must be addressed in the swiftest and strongest possible way – to prevent deniability.

Russia and the west are entering the ‘grey zone’ of warfare – and the oceans are a key battleground

theconversation.com · by Basil Germond

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has claimed that Russia now has the right to target assets of nations that supply Ukraine with tactical missiles, after the US authorised the use of such weapons against targets deep into Russian territory.

So far Putin’s warning feel like a rhetorical escalation, which might not yet result in a direct military confrontation. But short of a “real” war, Moscow can destabilize western economies and societies with operations in what is called the “grey zone”.

The grey zone is not defined geographically. It is a functional space between war and peace, where jurisdictions are blurred, contested or left unclear and where responsibilities and accountability are vague and deniable. It’s where hybrid warfare and below-the-threshold operations flourish, because it is more difficult to tell whether an attack has occured and who might be responsible.

Hybrid warfare comes in myriad different forms. It can be disinformation campaigns designed to create uncertainty or even panic in a population. Or cyberattacks against transport infrastructure intended to seriously disrupt a competitor or adversary.

The maritime domain is often an important theatre for this kind of warfare. The sea is vast and uninhabitable (and in part unmapped) which makes it hard to survey, monitor and control.

Contested and overlapping jurisdictions – for example in the Arctic or South China Sea – make it hard to clearly identify responsibilities. “Fish cross borders”, as do those who fish, and coastguards.

The same is true of people smugglers, drug traffickers and spy ships. What’s more, a multitude of actors are involved in the governance of complex maritime supply chains, from naval forces to shipping companies, from maritime insurers to communication cable operators.

This complexity is particularly salient in the shipping sector. Ships can fly the flag of one country and at the same time be owned and insured by a company from another country. They can have a multinational crew, and transport a cargo whose origin is hardly traceable to any specific state.

So the maritime domain is a perfect playground for a country whose objective is to undermine the prosperity, cohesion or security of an adversary without risking a direct confrontation.

Vulnerabilities at sea

The maritime supply chains and infrastructures on which most nations are dependent for their security and prosperity are under threat.

To take the UK as an example, 90% of its trade by volume is seaborne. Yet relatively unsophisticated non-state groups such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen have managed to disrupt freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, generating a disproportionate costs to the global economy.

About 97% of the UK’s internet communication transits via undersea cables, which are increasingly targeted by hostile players.

On November 15, the Yantar, described by Russia as an “oceanographic research vessel”, was escorted away from critical undersea cables in the Irish Sea. It is very unlikely that the ship was directly involved in sabotage since it operated in plain sight.

Instead, its likely functions are to map important western maritime infrastructures and – crucially – to send the message that Russia is ready to take risks and operate in the west’s backyard.

On November 17, the suspected sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea created suspicion over a cargo ship registered in China and owned by a Chinese company. It started its journey near St Petersburg in Russia and apparently sailed in the area when the incident occured.

The Danish authorities reacted quickly to stop the ship before it left the Baltic Sea. While a chain of accountability has not yet been established, there might be a better chance to trace back responsibilities this time around.

Establishing responsibility

This incident demonstrates two things: the limits of hybrid warfare and the fact that western countries are ramping up their ability to respond in a timely manner to such incidents.

Being able to establish responsibility is key to this. Maritime surveillance as well as navies maintaining active presence at sea as well as the capacity to respond to incidents in the fastest possible way all play a role in making it harder to conduct hybrid warfare in a deniable way.

Another notable example was the rapid German response to a suspicious drone following the UK aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth into the port of Hamburg on November 24. All these incidents suggest the extent to which tensions are steadily rising between Russia and the west in the grey zone. The direction and firmness of Nato’s response to hybrid warfare and sabotage will be decisive.

Hybrid war at sea entails many uncertainties about jurisdictions and responsibilities as well as the identity, motives, way of operating and capabilities of actual and potential perpetrators.

Grey zone activities create uncertainties and fears. And because of this they can disrupt the global economy, weaken societal cohesion and degrade the west’s ability to respond to security threats in a decisive way. This is why below-the-threshold activities at sea must be addressed in the swiftest and strongest possible way – to prevent deniability.

theconversation.com · by Basil Germond

8. The Wagner Group’s Use of Chinese Space Intelligence

​Conclusion:

The evolution of the Wagner Group from a Kremlin-controlled proxy to a rogue actor underscores the alarming ability of such entities to independently acquire and operationalize technologies once reserved for powerful states. The democratization of cutting-edge technology, exemplified by the Wagner group procurement and use of earth observation data, invalidates the assumption that only states possess the means to access or utilize space assets for military means. State proxies, hybrid actors, and non-state actors are increasingly empowered in this arena. As a result, the landscape of operational, tactical, and strategic use of space assets is becoming more accessible, allowing non-state actors to play a role in the space ecosystem. Access to space technologies significantly strengthens traditionally weak actors, making them more dangerous to states. The role that the Wagner group pioneered can be a lesson to the next rogue proxy who can replicate the same effects to the detriment of global security.

The Wagner Group’s Use of Chinese Space Intelligence - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Pawel Bernat, Cyprian A. Kozera · December 3, 2024

Editor’s note: This article is part of Project Air & Space Power, which explores and advocates for the totality of air, aviation, and space power in irregular, hybrid, and gray-zone environments. We invite you to contribute to the discussion, explore the difficult questions, and help influence the future of air and space power. Please contact us if you would like to propose an article, podcast, or event.

The war in Ukraine has shattered expectations about how modern conflicts unfold. It has emerged as a technological patchwork—a theater where Cold War relics like the T-54 tank operate alongside modern systems like the British Challenger 2s. Soviet-era PM M1910 machine guns share the battlefield with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), while 1940s artillery coexists with advanced air defense systems. Amid this blend of old and new, the Wagner Group—a shadowy Russian mercenary organization—represents the unexpected convergence of antiquated weaponry and cutting-edge satellite intelligence.

Wagner’s ability to leverage Chinese-sourced satellite data highlights a disturbing reality: even non-state actors now possess access to space-based intelligence once available only to powerful nations. This democratization of space technology has expanded the capabilities of rogue actors, raising profound implications for global security. It also puts the space domain at the forefront of contemporary warfare and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The lessons from this unprecedented instance of two-sided space warfare are plentiful, but three key points stand out. First, the operational and tactical significance of using space assets in modern conflict has reached a critical threshold, directly shaping outcomes on the battlefield. Second, access to transformative satellite data no longer necessitates owning satellites, as commercial and third-party providers have lowered the entry barrier. Third, even non-state actors can now exploit these capabilities, demonstrating the growing democratization of space technology and its far-reaching implications for global security.

The Wagner Group and Space

The Wagner Group is an infamous quasi-non-state actor that requires no further introduction. Yet few have heard of Nika-Fruit, a company that was supposedly a grocery trading business. Interestingly enough, this establishment was part of former Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s commercial empire. In this capacity, Nika-Fruit CEO Ivan Mechetin, Prigozhin’s associate, signed a contract in November 2022 with Beijing Yunze Technology Co. Ltd. to acquire two high-resolution observation satellites operated by the Chinese space giant Chang Guang Satellite Technology (CGST). A deal which must have earned the stamp of approval of the political elites in Beijing since no dual-use business runs without the Communist Party’s supervision or patronage. As the satellite imagery acquisition obtained by the Wagner Group demonstrated, not only did they watch the fruit fields, but they also were tasked to monitor the battlefields of Ukraine, Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mali. Furthermore, by the end of May 2023, Wagner forces became very interested in the Russian army HQ in Rostov-on-Don and the routes leading to Moscow. Already in bed with the Chinese and their dual-use technology, the Kremlin proxy was planning a coup.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) rely heavily on various types of satellites flying thousands of miles above the Earth to support contemporary battlefield decisions. Earth observation satellites, including synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites, provide surveillance and reconnaissance; navigational constellations, like GPS, provide not only drone and ground navigation but also target acquisition and weapon guidance systems; and communication satellites provide a means to communicate via a highly reliable redundant communication path by directly accessing satellites. In addition, non-encrypted GNSS services, i.e., global navigation, are free for all, and commercial satellite communication is accessible to practically everybody.

The second point refers to the fact that, for example, Ukraine currently has zero satellites in orbit. Yet, thanks to the assistance of the allied states and private satellite companies, it has access to data from a few dozen Earth observation satellites and the ability to communicate with the Starlink constellation. Due to the democratization of space technologies and services, capabilities and data once reserved for space powers are, in today’s market, available to practically everybody with enough cash, including rogue states, terrorist groups, and private military companies (PMC). This was the case with the Wagner Group, which purchased ISR satellite data (satellite imagery products) from China and used it for combat and other military purposes. The most famous example happened just over a year ago when they attempted a coup d’état in Russia. Much of the initial success of the rebellion could be attributed to having access to and relying on satellite reconnaissance data.

The Wagner Group: From a Kremlin-run Agent to a Rogue Proxy back to State Control

The Wagner Group operated under the shadowy influence of the Kremlin, particularly through Russian intelligence services and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Initially, the group served as a tool for Russia’s foreign policy, providing Moscow with plausible deniability in various foreign operations. The Wagner Group’s paramilitary wing, most associated with its mercenary activities, played a crucial role in conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and across Africa. In Ukraine, the group shifted tactics by using convicts as unskilled fighters, a stark contrast to its more elite overseas operations. The Wagner Group should be viewed as a brand name for the entire network of Kremlin-dependent Prigozhin-related entities rather than a singular, private military company, as it pictured itself. Ultimately, the Wagner Group was never a private entity but a deniable extension of Russia’s GRU, functioning as a hybrid proxy for the Kremlin’s interests.

By late May 2023, the Russians, with significant help from the Wagner Group—largely comprised of freed convicts (around 70 percent)—secured victory in the battle of Bakhmut. Wagner paid a heavy price, losing an estimated 19,547 personnel, of whom 17,175 were prisoners. Russia’s overall losses ranged between 32,000 and 43,000 killed. Wagner’s role and high casualty rate bolstered Prigozhin’s influence and ambitions.

To curb Wagner’s growing power, on June 10, 2023, the Russian MoD ordered Wagner troops to sign contracts with the Russian Army, aiming to bring them under MoD control, a move Prigozhin and his soldiers largely rejected. Around this time, Wagner began amassing forces near the Russian border, possibly preparing for rebellion.

On June 23, 2023, Prigozhin accused Russian authorities of false motives behind the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, declared war on the MoD, and initiated a “March for Justice” towards Moscow, which was nothing less than an open revolt. Despite initial successes, including the downing of several Russian aircraft, the rebellion ended abruptly on June 24 when Prigozhin halted his forces just 125 miles from Moscow. The short-lived uprising concluded with Prigozhin and his fighters seeking refuge in Belarus.

Chinese Assistance from Space

What stands out in the Wagner revolt is its ability to acquire and successfully operationalize satellite imagery from Chinese ISR satellites. Interestingly, by securing access in February 2022 to Chinese private reconnaissance satellites (although it should be stressed that in China, nothing of strategic importance is truly privately owned), Wagner obtained the ability to leverage space imagery for operations in Africa and Ukraine. However, at some point in spring 2023, the Wagner Group ordered imagery of the headquarters of Russian operations for Ukraine in Rostov-on-Don, the city Wagner seized in the mutiny, and other towns en route to Moscow. This makes for interesting bedfellows as China has silently supported Russia in its invasion of Ukraine.

In January 2023, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Joint Stock Company Terra Tech (Terra Tech), a Russian technology company that sourced space imagery from commercial satellites and aerial images from unmanned systems. Terra Tech obtained ISR satellite images of Ukraine from Spacety China (Changsha Tianyi Space Science and Technology Research Institute Co. LTD) and its Luxembourg-based subsidiary. Spacety China, a pioneering private space company and a key producer of Chinese SAR imagery, provided the data to bolster Wagner’s combat operations in Ukraine.

However, Prigozhin denied the purchase in a statement in March 2023, claiming that Wagner had almost 20 Earth observation satellites, including SAR, for a year and a half. This, he argued, eliminated the need to acquire satellite images from external sources. Similarly, Spacety also distanced itself from any association with the Wagner Group.

Verifying Prigozhin’s claim of having close to 20 satellites in 2023 is difficult. We can only speculate that it is quite possible that the Wagner Group had access to Russian and Chinese Earth observation satellites, alongside all the other resources provided by Russia’s military and intelligence community. However, at the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the Russians’ space sensory assets were quite limited in number and quality – they had 19 military and dual-use optical and SAR satellites, with only some at the proper orbital inclination to provide data on Ukrainian territory. Russia subsequently launched more earth observation satellites, but undoubtedly, the Russian MoD and the Wagner Group needed more ISR satellite data than they had direct access to, thereby needing to make additional purchases.

Wagner paid Nika-Fruit over $30 million (235 million yuan) for two high-resolution earth observation satellites already in orbit. This included the Jilin-1 Gaofen 03D 12 and Jilin-1 Gaofen 03D 13 ISR satellites and additional services, namely on-demand tasking (probably provided by other satellites from the Jilin-1 Gaofen constellation). These satellites offer high-resolution panchromatic and multispectral imagery capable of capturing detailed images of the Earth’s surface, which are invaluable for military reconnaissance and strategic planning.

The photos of the contract are displayed below:

Wagner

Source: Nothing to see @WagnersFamily, 6 Oct 2023, via Twitter

Wagner

Source: Nothing to see @WagnersFamily, 6 Oct 2023, via Twitter

Wagner

Source: Nothing to see @WagnersFamily, 6 Oct 2023, via Twitter

The first satellites of the constellation were launched in October 2015. Originally envisioning a 138-satellite constellation, the program was updated to 300 satellites to be operational by 2025. Jilin-1 Gaofen was designed for various remote sensing applications, including agriculture, forestry, environmental monitoring, and disaster management. They were launched on the Long March 8 rocket on February 27, 2022, and placed on a 535 km altitude sun-synchronous circular, north-to-south orbit, with an orbital period of 95 minutes and a 97.6° inclination. Swath width exceeds 17 km, and the image resolution, according to the manufacturer, is better than 0.75 m.

The constellation offers high revisit rates, meaning it can frequently capture images of the same area, essential for monitoring dynamic and rapidly changing environments. The photo below depicts a test of the constellation’s nine satellites, which took pictures of the Abu Dhabi International Airport within 10 minutes. It exemplifies the detail of the imagery that the Wagner Group was obtaining from the Chinese satellite company.

Wagner

Source: eoPortal. (2024, February 28). Jilin Constellation. European Space Agency. https://www.eoportal.org/satellite-missions/jilin-con#eop-quick-facts-section

According to the US Treasury Department, the satellites the Wagner Group purchased were used for ISR in Ukraine. The Wagner satellites enhanced the group’s ability to monitor vast and remote areas, track the movements of their adversaries, and safeguard their interests and personnel. The observation satellites provided a significant tactical advantage in austere environments where ground-based ISR was limited or unreliable.

Prigozhin and the Wagner Group also used satellite intelligence data against the Russian Federation authorities. The “March for Justice” of June 23, 2023, was well prepared. Although the contract with Beijing Yunze Technology did not include the coverage of Russian territory, it ordered and received these images. They included ISR data of the route from Bakhmut to Rostov-on-Don and Moscow. As AFP reports, the satellite images obtained by Wagner covered critical military and strategic sites, including the headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, other towns along the route to Moscow, and locations of military interest such as Grozny, the stronghold of pro-Kremlin Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Rostov-on-Don was likely captured so swiftly partially because of good intelligence.

Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that such a contract and product delivery would be possible without at least a silent nod from the Chinese authorities. In the authoritarian state the party closely monitors research, development, and operations of all dual-use technologies, it would be naive to consider Beijing oblivious at least to the existence of the “Wagner satellite” contract.

Conclusion

The evolution of the Wagner Group from a Kremlin-controlled proxy to a rogue actor underscores the alarming ability of such entities to independently acquire and operationalize technologies once reserved for powerful states. The democratization of cutting-edge technology, exemplified by the Wagner group procurement and use of earth observation data, invalidates the assumption that only states possess the means to access or utilize space assets for military means. State proxies, hybrid actors, and non-state actors are increasingly empowered in this arena. As a result, the landscape of operational, tactical, and strategic use of space assets is becoming more accessible, allowing non-state actors to play a role in the space ecosystem. Access to space technologies significantly strengthens traditionally weak actors, making them more dangerous to states. The role that the Wagner group pioneered can be a lesson to the next rogue proxy who can replicate the same effects to the detriment of global security.

Paweł Bernat, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer at the Polish Air Force University, where he teaches space security. His research interests focus on militarization of outer space, tactical and strategic use of space assets, and irregular, hybrid, and proxy warfare. His latest book, Proxy Wars From a Global Perspective: Non-State Actors and Armed Conflicts, coedited with C. Gürer and C.A. Kozera (London: Bloomsbury, 2023), depicts current proxy wars and analyzes the evolution of that way of waging war in the last two decades.

Cyprian Aleksander Kozera, PhD, is a visiting fellow at the University of South Wales with a military background. His research focuses on non-conventional warfare, irregular and proxy warfare—including the space domain. His recent publications include: “Space Terrorism: A Historical Study,” (co-authored with P. Bernat) Safety & Defense, 9 (2): 80–88, 2023, and Proxy Wars from a Global Perspective: Non-State Actors and Armed Conflicts (co-edited with P. Bernat, and C. Gürer), London: Bloomsbury, 2023.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Members of the Wagner group training Belarusian troops. (Photo via Wikimedia)

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irregularwarfare.org · by Pawel Bernat, Cyprian A. Kozera · December 3, 2024

9. America is Not Prepared for a Protracted War

​You may not be interested in protracted war, but protracted war is interested in you.

America may not be interested in irregular, unconventional, and political warfare but IW/UW/PW are being practiced around the world by those who are interested in them

With no apologies to Trotsky

"There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited." Sun Tzu

Conclusion:

These four challenges are all wicked problems that policymakers often avoid addressing, because they are too hard, too unpopular, or too politically risky. But they ought to be addressed now — in order to help deter a future protracted war and, if necessary, to fight and win one. As Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall ruefully remarked in July 1940 on the cusp of America’s entry into World War II, “For almost twenty years we had all of the time and almost none of the money; today we have all of the money and no time.” The U.S. military should use the time it has now, before a protracted war erupts, to better prepare for the challenges posed by mobilization, contested logistics, the defense-industrial base, and protecting the homeland during wartime — to ensure it can fight as long as its adversaries can.’

America is Not Prepared for a Protracted War - War on the Rocks

David Barno and Nora Bensahel

warontherocks.com · by David Barno · December 4, 2024

The gruesome ongoing war in Ukraine should have shattered any remaining illusions that the U.S. military can count on swiftly and decisively defeating any capable adversary in a future war. History is filled with examples of states that planned to fight a short, sharp war, only to become ensnared in conflicts that dragged on inconclusively for weeks or months or years — and which consumed vast quantities of munitions, equipment, and lives in the process.

Since 2018, the Department of Defense has focused primarily on a possible future war with China. Some analyses suggest that such a war would end relatively quickly (though at high cost), while others are far more pessimistic and believe that it could last for several years or more. Such a wide range of uncertainty alone would make it prudent for the U.S. military to plan for the possibility of a protracted war. But as China, Russia, North Korea, and even Iran increasingly cooperate with each other, a future war against one of them could rapidly evolve into war against some or all of them. Indeed, the recent report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy clearly warned that that there is a “high probability that the next war would be fought across multiple theaters, would involve multiple adversaries, and likely would not be concluded quickly.”

Since the end of the Cold War, neither the military nor the nation as a whole has given much thought to how we would fight, endure, and prevail in a protracted war. What would such a war require, whether against a single adversary or some nefarious alliance of hostile states? We believe that a comprehensive U.S. plan to fight and win such a war should include four critical elements: mobilization, contested logistics, the limits of the defense-industrial base, and protecting the homeland during wartime. Each of these challenges is enormous, and volumes could be written on each one. Yet the rapidly changing strategic environment means the United States does not have the luxury of time to address them individually or sequentially. Here we offer some broad thoughts on each one.

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Mobilization

Today’s all-volunteer force would almost certainly remain too small for a protracted war even after the reserves have been activated. U.S. Army doctrine assumes that a major theater war would incur 24,000 casualties each month. In a war with China for Taiwan, a recent series of unclassified wargames found that thousands of U.S. and allied personnel would be lost in the first few weeks of a conflict. Steep aircraft losses mean that many replacement pilots would be needed quickly. On land, the increasing vulnerability of deployed land forces would require the Army and Marine Corps to provide large numbers of individual replacements and to regenerate combat-ineffective units. And the longer the war lasts, the more casualties would need to be replaced. Heavy casualties, such as those seen in the Ukraine war, are something that the U.S. military has not faced in decades. The resilience demonstrated by the Ukrainian military is closely tied to its robust training pipeline that has adjusted to a constant need to fill depleted units. As we note below, such a pipeline does not exist for the U.S. military today.

In a protracted global war against multiple adversaries, the fact that the U.S. military has been sized to fight a single war means that it may need to expand by hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. This would be especially true for the forces that fight on the ground — the Army, the Marine Corps, and most special operations forces — because land would likely be the primary domain in one or more theaters of conflict, such as Europe, Korea, or the Middle East. And if China were one of the adversaries, the Army would still have to provide enabling support for the joint force in the Pacific while fighting on land against adversaries like Russia, Iran, or North Korea. It would be profoundly undersized to fight two major ground adversaries simultaneously.

The first step in any major wartime mobilization would be fully activating all part-time military forces — the one million people who serve in the individual service reserves and the National Guard. Yet integrating the reserve component into active operations during a major war presents numerous challenges, from cross-leveling understrength units to bringing training levels up to wartime readiness before deployment. And even that boost of manpower probably would not be enough for the military to effectively fight against one or more major-power adversaries over a prolonged period of time.

The idea of enacting a draft has been anathema to the American public and the military since the end of the Vietnam War, but the prospect of a protracted war against one or more capable adversaries requires that it be seriously considered. In fact, some in the U.S. military have argued that they would need to request authorization for the draft “almost immediately” after a war begins, in order to ensure enough manpower for the duration of the conflict.

A draft would also require congressional approval and the support of the American people, neither of which is assured. But there would also be many technical challenges to implementing a draft, which can and should be addressed now. Congress is debating requiring the automatic registration of all men between 18 and 26 living in America to improve the current haphazard system, but that only begins to address a much larger problem. In 2019, the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command found that “there are currently no valid DOD-level documents establishing requirements, responsibilities, and roles to implement the induction of draftees into military service in support of mobilization.” A new report by Katherine L. Kuzminski and Taren Sylvester found that it could take more than six months to generate 100,000 recruits under the best-case assumptions, and more than three and a half years to do so under more pessimistic assumptions.

Conscripting people into service is just the first step, however. Those people then need to be trained and integrated into units, which would be another monumental challenge. The Military Selective Service Act requires new inductees to have a minimum of 12 weeks of training before being sent overseas, but the U.S. military lacks the facilities that would be necessary to do so. The Army, for example, only maintains two installations for mobilization and force generation, down from the eight it kept running to support the relatively limited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These facilities would be woefully insufficient for mobilizing the service reserves and the National Guard, much less for mobilizing the conscripts who could be needed for a prolonged great-power conflict.

Kuzminski and Sylvester offer many helpful ideas that would improve future mobilization. In particular, they recommend updating the Master Mobilization Plan (last released to the public in 1988, and which covers both conscription and training) to address the rapidly changing strategic environment and to include lessons from full-scale mobilization exercises. Their many wide-ranging recommendations should be urgently implemented by lawmakers and Pentagon officials alike for, as they argue, a draft won’t necessarily help the U.S military win the first battle of the next war — but it would help “ensure that it can win the last battle of a protracted war.”

Contested Logistics

Unlike any of its potential adversaries, the United States will have to commute over long distances to get to the next war. Simply getting to the fight will be difficult, as smart and capable adversaries will seek to disrupt U.S. power projection efforts as much as possible. But in a protracted war, continuing to sustain U.S. forces over long periods of time may be as much of a challenge as winning frontline battles.

Threats to the U.S. logistics pipeline, which would begin in the United States and stretch over thousands of miles to the combat zone, are multiplying and are becoming more complex. These threats start at home, where most military supplies and equipment begin their long journey. These supplies often travel on commercial rail and civilian traffic networks, which would be highly vulnerable to adversary cyber espionage and attack. The military would also rely upon major commercial companies to ship much of its heavy equipment and supplies overseas, but these companies lack the ability to conceal, much less protect, their cargoes from enemy action while in port or along the way. And the military today has far too few warships and airplanes to be able to fight effectively and simultaneously escort unprotected commercial cargo ships and transport planes over thousands of miles of sea and airspace to their destinations.

Some policy measures could help alleviate this problem, including prepositioning more equipment and munitions overseas and enabling more units to 3D-print their own replacement parts and supplies. But the scale of this problem is so vast that it will never be completely solved. In our experience, senior U.S. military leaders readily acknowledge the challenge of contested logistics. But they still spend far more time and energy preparing for future warfighting challenges rather than developing effective concepts and capabilities to address these daunting logistics obstacles. They ought to heed the increasingly dire warnings coming from the logistics community, since U.S. forces simply will not be able to fight (or keep fighting) if their logistics pipelines remain vulnerable and unprotected.

The Limits of the Defense-Industrial Base

One critical lesson from the war in Ukraine is that major wars devour enormous amounts of ammunition, weapons systems, and other materiel. The insatiable Ukrainian demand for 155-millimeter artillery shells has clearly revealed the stark limits of the U.S. defense-industrial base. Before the 2022 invasion, the United States produced 14,000 of these rounds each month. But once the war began, Ukraine began expending as many as 8,000 each day, and would likely have consumed far more if they had been available. Since early 2022, the U.S. Army has spent several billion dollars to increase 155-millimeter round production, which is expected to soon reach 70,000 to 80,000 rounds per month. But that has taken almost three years to achieve — and the stark reality is that artillery expenditures by the U.S. military and its allies in any major war could quickly dwarf that amount. And that is just a single munition. Any major conflict would devour vast numbers of artillery and tank shells, smart bombs, and air defense missiles — and would also cause considerable losses of tanks, ships, and warplanes. These entirely predictable losses in a protracted U.S. war would trigger enormous demands on the defense-industrial base that it simply will not be able to absorb.

The Department of Defense is well aware of this problem. It released the first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy last year, and just published an implementation plan for the strategy at the end of October. These documents provide much-needed guidance and structure for revitalizing key elements of the defense-industrial base, from improving production and supply chains to ramping up industrial collaboration with allies and partners.

Several innovative efforts to address the structural problems of the U.S. defense industrial base are already underway. U.S. Navy shipbuilding capacity has now shrunk to only four shipyards, ensuring replacements for sunk warships will take years, if not decades. A recent initiative to leverage South Korea’s massive shipyard industry to repair U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific offers prospects for in-theater repair for war-damaged U.S. vessels. These same yards could also offer potential options for building some future U.S. warships more quickly and cheaply than in the United States. However, doing so would be politically fraught, and would require congressional approval or a presidential emergency exception. A less politically contentious initiative involves sharing munitions production with allies such as Australia to serve as a backstop to U.S. production — which could also ease logistics problems by increasing production closer to potential wartime theaters.

Though the incoming administration will set its own strategic priorities, Donald Trump did focus on strengthening the defense-industrial base during his first term, and seems likely to do so during his second term as well. But time is of the essence here. The longer it takes to revitalize the defense-industrial base, the less likely it is that the United States will have the materiel it needs to fight a protracted war.

Protecting the Homeland During Wartime

Since 2014, the Department of Defense has warned that the U.S. homeland is no longer a sanctuary. Yet, despite this acknowledgement, the department has not sufficiently thought about how homeland attacks during a war will force tradeoffs with overseas warfighting plans.

Any protracted war will require mobilizing and deploying the National Guard, to reinforce Army and Air Force combat units and to replace capabilities and units that have been destroyed. When at home, the Guard normally operates under the command of state governors, and is the first military responder to civil disturbances that exhaust the capacity of state and local authorities. They regularly support state and local authorities by providing water, power generation, medical support, food distribution, and security during and after hurricanes, wildfires, and other natural disasters.

However, the president has the authority to federalize Guard units at any time, which brings them under his command. U.S. presidents have regularly done so to support overseas military operations throughout the nation’s history, and the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simply could not have been fought without extensive contributions from federalized Guard units. A future protracted war against a capable adversary would undoubtedly cause the military to rely on the Guard even more heavily than in the recent wars, given the extensive losses that the United States would surely suffer in the early weeks, months, and perhaps even years of such a conflict.

In past wars, these dual domestic and overseas missions have never really clashed with each other, since the U.S. homeland has always been well protected by the two large oceans and two friendly neighbors that surround it. But the vulnerability of the homeland today means that this is no longer the case. North Korea just tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that would be able to hit anywhere in the United States, for example. And some hypersonic missiles carrying conventional weapons can already reach the U.S. mainland, against which there are few defenses.

Yet the starkest threat to the homeland comes from the cyber realm, which enables adversaries to alter, disable, and even destroy targets anywhere in the United States without ever encountering the formidable U.S. military. Groups affiliated with potential U.S. adversaries already pose a significant threat to the homeland. In a time of war, any smart adversary would likely target the mobilization and sustainment pipelines upon which U.S. military forces would rely — including the beginnings of those conduits in the United States, as well as other parts of the nation’s critical infrastructure. That would inevitably require the Guard to help secure ports, airports, and railways from enemy disruptions, as well as provide humanitarian support to civil authorities and help to maintain order if critical infrastructures are temporarily disabled or even destroyed.

The National Guard, unfortunately, cannot be in two places at once. Though the president clearly has the power to prioritize the overseas battle, it is not at all clear that he or she would choose to do so. If one of the three major regions of the U.S. power grid goes down, for example, the governors of those states would probably demand that the president stop federalizing their Guard units so they can respond to the ensuing crisis. It is hard to imagine that a president would decide to keep sending Guard forces overseas instead of helping American citizens suffering at home.

Some of the same logic applies to the service reserve forces as well. Though they have no state role and are always under the command of the president, they contain vital support capabilities that could be needed simultaneously at home and abroad. In May 2020, for example, more than 6,700 members of the Army, Air Force, and Navy Reserves were activated to help respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Today, the Army Reserve contains 56 percent of the Army’s medical, transportation, and quartermaster capabilities — a figure that rises to 67 percent for medical capabilities alone. Defense Department war planners and the combatant commanders should therefore prepare for scenarios where they do not receive some or all of their expected Guard or reserve forces and determine the best ways to mitigate those shortfalls.

These four challenges are all wicked problems that policymakers often avoid addressing, because they are too hard, too unpopular, or too politically risky. But they ought to be addressed now — in order to help deter a future protracted war and, if necessary, to fight and win one. As Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall ruefully remarked in July 1940 on the cusp of America’s entry into World War II, “For almost twenty years we had all of the time and almost none of the money; today we have all of the money and no time.” The U.S. military should use the time it has now, before a protracted war erupts, to better prepare for the challenges posed by mobilization, contested logistics, the defense-industrial base, and protecting the homeland during wartime — to ensure it can fight as long as its adversaries can.’

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Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, U.S. Army (ret.), and Dr. Nora Bensahel are Professors of Practice at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and are also contributing editors at War on the Rocks, where their column appears periodically. Sign up for Barno and Bensahel’s Strategic Outpost newsletter to track their articles as well as their public events.

Image: Master Sgt. John Hughel via DVIDS.

Special Series, Strategic Outpost

warontherocks.com · by David Barno · December 4, 2024

10. FBI arrests man allegedly helping prepare ‘surprise attack’ on South Korea

​Again, very curious.

FBI arrests man allegedly helping prepare ‘surprise attack’ on South Korea | CNN

CNN · by Josh Campbell · December 3, 2024

Photo: Karen Bleier/AFP/Getty Images/FILE

CNN —

A California man confessed to helping the North Korean regime prepare for an attack in a “sophisticated scheme” to illegally obtain restricted weapons and military grade technology, federal prosecutors announced Tuesday.

Shenghua Wen, a Chinese national residing unlawfully in Ontario, California, conspired with North Korean officials to obtain prohibited items before traveling to the US as a student in 2012, the Justice Department alleged in a criminal complaint. Wen, who allegedly overstayed his visa and remained in the US illegally, was arrested Tuesday by the FBI.

During interviews with the FBI, Wen said “he believed the North Korean government wanted the weapons, ammunition, and other military-related equipment to prepare for an attack against South Korea,” according to the complaint, which adds the North Korean government paid Wen $2 million to obtain the items.

In addition to weapons and equipment, Wen told investigators the North Korean regime also tasked him with obtaining military uniforms in the US, which “would subsequently be used by the North Korean military to disguise their soldiers to conduct a surprise attack on South Korea,” the complaint states.

Thousands of US military personnel are stationed in South Korea to help bolster security and stability in the region. Justice Department officials said the arrest was unrelated to Tuesday’s internal political turmoil amid a declaration of martial law and clashes outside South Korean parliament.

Prosecutors allege Wen established an export company in Texas, where firearms and ammunition were procured and transported to the Los Angeles area, then ultimately packed in cargo containers bearing fake inventory manifests for shipment to North Korea as recently as 2023.

While executing a search warrant at Wen’s home, authorities seized 50,000 rounds of ammunition, sophisticated chemical detection equipment, and a tool used for detecting listening devices, which Wen allegedly said he intended to also ship to North Korea.

Restricted weapons and military grade technology pictured on Wen's cell phone and seized from his home

US Department of Justice

During a search of his cell phone, the FBI discovered numerous messages “between Wen and several (North Korean) co-conspirators with images of firearms and electronic devices,” the complaint states.

“There is no telling what additional damage Mr. Wen could have committed if not for the intervention of law enforcement,” said US Attorney Martin Estrada during a news conference Tuesday.

CNN is attempting to locate attorney information for Wen. If convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, he faces up to 20 years in prison, Estrada said.

“The consequences of these actions cannot be overstated when technology and sensitive items fall into the wrong hands, especially those of hostile nations,” said Shawn Gibson, special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations.

Akil Davis, head of the FBI’s Los Angeles division, said: “Not only did the investigative team prevent additional restricted items going to the North Korean regime, but they gathered valuable intelligence for the United States and our allies.”

CNN · by Josh Campbell · December 3, 2024

11. Opinion The U.S. stakes in Syria following the fall of Aleppo

Opinion  The U.S. stakes in Syria following the fall of Aleppo

The United States can’t overthrow Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but it shouldn’t prop him up.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/12/04/syria-aleppo-civil-war-assad/?utm

By Max Boot

The Syrian civil war began in 2011 and never really ended. The fighting has claimed about half a million lives and forcibly displaced more than half of Syria’s inhabitants. But, following a ceasefire agreement negotiated in 2020 by Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, combat subsided and Syria fell off the front pages. Bashar al-Assad, the Russian- and Iranian-backed strongman, was left in control of all of the major cities and roughly 70 percent of the country. A variety of opposition groups ran the rest — including Kurdish forces in the northeast assisted by the U.S. military.

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In recent years, moderate Arab regimes, with quiet Israeli and U.S. support, have been trying to bring Assad back into the fold — to “normalize” him as just another Arab despot and thereby to try to wean him away from his Iranian sponsors. This fall, the Biden administration reportedly had been discussing, with the encouragement of the United Arab Emirates, the possibility of not renewing the toughest U.S. sanctions on Syria when they expire on Dec. 20.

Now the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically following the news that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist rebel group, has captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, which Assad had reclaimed in 2016. The Syrian government is desperately trying, along with its backers in Tehran and Moscow, to stanch the rebel onslaught. The front lines have already shifted south of Aleppo. The Syrian regime is now in a battle to hold onto the city of Hama (site of a notorious massacre carried out by Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, in 1982).

There is no indication that rebel forces will march on Damascus, more than 200 miles from Aleppo. But the speed with which the Syrian army collapsed in and around Aleppo — reminiscent of the collapse of Afghan forces fighting the Taliban in 2021 and of Iraqi forces fighting Islamic State in 2014 — is a reminder of just how unpopular and illegitimate the Assad regime remains and how little loyalty it commands even from its own soldiers.

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Assad has long counted on foreign support to survive, but all of his foreign backers have been weakened in recent months. Russia, the provider of Assad’s air force, is taking heavy losses in Ukraine. Hezbollah, the source of Assad’s most effective ground forces, has suffered heavy losses in its war with Israel. And Iran, Assad’s financial supporter and strategic partner, is struggling with a weak economy and the rising costs of waging a multifront battle against Israel that has not been going in its favor.

All of this has created vulnerabilities that HTS, after years of training and equipping its own forces, has been able to exploit. It has been assisted in this advance by the more secular Syrian National Army, a rebel group backed by Turkey, which has also taken the opportunity to push back the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish group backed by the United States as part of its battle against Islamic State (ISIS).

From an outsider’s perspective, the multisided Syrian civil war can seem too complex to comprehend. One regional analyst posted on Bluesky a “beginner’s guide to what’s going on in Syria.” It’s a photo of seven people — labeled SDF, ISIS, Assad, Rebels, Turkey, Kurds and Russia — all pointing guns at each other. There are no clear-cut divisions, as in the Russia-Ukraine war, between “bad guys” and “good guys.” It’s more like different shades of bad, as in the Iran-Iraq war. The current fighting, after all, pits a U.S.-designated terrorist group (HTS) against a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism (the Assad regime).

That said, the Syria experts I’ve talked to in recent days argue that HTS, from the U.S. perspective, is preferable to the Assad regime. Although HTS began as an offshoot of al-Qaeda, it broke ties with that terrorist group more than a decade ago and has, in fact, battled both al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters. HTS is still an illiberal, Islamist movement with a history of human rights violations, but it is not known to have carried out crimes against humanity, unlike the regime it is fighting. Assad has used chemical and conventional weapons to slaughter civilians and employed torture and unlawful detention on a mass scale.

“HTS is making an effort to demonstrate it can be a viable alternative to the Assad regime,” Steven Heydemann, a professor of Middle East studies at Smith College, told me. “It is no longer the kind of Salafist movement it was when affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda more than a decade ago. HTS is trying very hard to distance itself from the radical form of Islamism we see in the Taliban.” Heydemann suggested the United States explore delisting HTS as a terrorist organization, provided it meets certain requirements, such as protecting Christians, Kurds and other minority groups in the areas under its control.

U.S. ambitions in Syria have been radically downsized over the past 13-plus years. In 2011, at the start of the uprising, President Barack Obama demanded that Assad leave office but ruled out the use of U.S. military force. The following year, Obama threatened that he might resort to force if Assad used chemical weapons. But in 2013, Assad crossed that “red line,” and Obama refused to order airstrikes. Since that embarrassing climbdown, the United States has largely confined its approach in Syria to fighting ISIS and trying to bring about a diplomatic settlement.

“The United States no longer has a really big strategic interest in Syria,” Robert S. Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria, told me. “Given the totality of what’s going on worldwide, it’s hard to say Syria is a big priority. It’s different from the Persian Gulf or Israel.”

He suggested that the best Washington could do under the current circumstances is to support Turkey, a member of NATO, in negotiating with Russia to impose a new ceasefire and thereby try to avert a brutal regime assault to retake Aleppo. That wasn’t possible in 2016 but might be doable today because Russia and Iran don’t have as many resources to expend on behalf of the Assad regime as they once did. If peace can be reestablished in and around Aleppo, that could draw home many Syrian refugees who are currently in Lebanon and Turkey — where they are straining local resources. (Indeed, the desire to repatriate refugees may be one of Erdogan’s motives in backing the HTS offensive.)

Whatever happens, the United States must be clear-eyed about the stark realities revealed by Aleppo’s sudden fall: namely, that Assad’s horrific rule perpetuates the civil war, and that Syria is unlikely to know peace as long as he remains in power. The United States can’t overthrow Assad, but it certainly shouldn’t prop him up, either, by relaxing sanctions or extending to him international recognition. He is, and should remain, a pariah for having perpetrated some of the worst war crimes of the 21st century.

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Opinion by Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend.”follow on X MaxBoot

12.  The Irregular Warfare Center & Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Host Inaugural Intelligence Support to IW Symposium

December 3, 2024

The Irregular Warfare Center & Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Host Inaugural Intelligence Support to IW Symposium

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/news/the-irregular-warfare-center-office-of-the-under-secretary-of-defense-for-intelligence-and-security-host-inaugural-intelligence-support-to-iw-symposium/?utm

The Department of Defense (DoD)’s Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), in partnership with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)), recently hosted the first Intelligence Support to Irregular Warfare Symposium. Held from October 29-31, 2024 at the U.S. Naval Institute Jack C. Taylor Conference Center in Annapolis, Md., the symposium marked the beginning of an initiative to examine the U.S. Intelligence Community’s capability to address emerging global threats with a particular focus on adversarial activities in the gray zone.

The inaugural symposium provided a platform for government, industry, and academic leaders to engage on the role of intelligence in supporting irregular warfare activities, with a focus on collaboration across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. The IWC and OUSD (I&S) drew participants from outside of the U.S., including South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Italy, Romania and Canada.

Dr. Dennis Walters, IWC Director, provided opening remarks at the first Intelligence

Support to Irregular Warfare Symposium hosted by the Department of Defense’s Irregular

Warfare Center (IWC) and The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

and Security (OUSD(I&S)). The event took place Oct. 29-31, 2024, at the U.S. Naval

Institute Jack C. Taylor Conference Center in Annapolis, Md.

Erik Herr, IWC’s Chief of Operations, highlighted the advantage of an intelligence-specialized event, stating, “As our adversaries continue to push into the gray zone, our intelligence capabilities not only keep pace but are specifically aligned with the needs of our operators in the field. This symposium enabled us to focus on enhancing intelligence that supports irregular warfare directly, ensuring operators have access to the information and tools needed to gain advantage in contested environments.”

Day 1 examined China as a global competitor and featured prominent speakers well-versed in both irregular warfare and intelligence. Ms. Theresa Whelan, Director for Defense Intelligence Collections and Special Programs, delivered an address on the integral role of intelligence in support of irregular warfare, emphasizing that the intelligence community needs to be able to detect and deter ahead of a crisis. The Honorable Christopher Maier, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, addressed irregular warfare as a strategic deterrent, explaining how irregular warfare is not exclusively a special operations problem, but needs all aspects of DoD and the interagency.

“For over twenty years, we have trained and deployed intelligence professionals to work against a non-technical adversary in a semi-permissive environment. We have developed an entire generation of professionals who are accustomed to the U.S. exercising domain dominance in every facet of the battlefield. This new operating environment will be global in nature and categorized as contested and even denied territory,” said Anthony Gilgis, CEO Gray Zone Consulting, LLC, Principal Consultant to OUSD(I&S), Sensitive Activities & Special Programs, HUMINT & Sensitive Activities. “In this competition we no longer enjoy domain dominance, and many of the tools and capabilities we have come to rely on are either obsolete or vulnerable in this current environment. We must evolve.”

The second day of the event focused on examining China as a global challenge and featured keynote addresses and speakers from various backgrounds and disciplines. The Honorable Dr. Kevin Rudd, Australian Ambassador to the U.S., spoke on Chinese ideology and policy from an international perspective.

Day 2 keynote Speaker Dr. Zenel Garcia, Army War College, answered attendee questions

at the first Intelligence Support to Irregular Warfare Symposium hosted by the Irregular

Warfare Center (IWC) and The Department of Defense’s Office of the Under Secretary for

Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)). The event took place Oct. 29-31, 2024, at the

U.S. Naval Institute Jack C. Taylor Conference Center in Annapolis, Md.

Participants also heard from General (Ret.) Hibat Alizai, former Afghan Army Chief of Staff, on China’s influence in Central Asia. Dr. Zenel Garcia, an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College, gave a keynote address on day two, centered on China’s political shaping. He stressed the significance of the symposium, “Value comes from multiple perspectives. You are bringing in people with expertise and interest, so you are able to share your findings. No matter how deep in the weeds you are in your research areas, you will always be able to learn something new from someone else.”

Along with keynote addresses, the range of panel speakers and topics proved to be beneficial in highlighting multiple perspectives. “Moderated sessions are especially helpful and provide a diversity of thought,” explained panelist Herm Hasken, Founder and CEO at High Ground Advisors. “There are experts in HUMINT, OSINT, and Cyber that are leveraging the diplomatic and military channels of DIME. From a high-level perspective, this approach allows for collecting information from various sources to advise senior policymakers on critical issues, such as those related to China.”

The final day of the symposium highlighted strategies to counter adversarial activities in the gray zone, emphasizing intelligence tools and capabilities that can support and shape the global operating environment. Participants from organizations within the intelligence community attended to exchange knowledge on the implications of industry support, intelligence gaps and opportunities, and vulnerabilities and access vectors.

Panelist Frank Miller, Vice President of EXOVERA, underscored the significance of collaboration. “We do best when we do it together. Too often, we try to do things in stove pipes, but the value of what we’re bringing together here is to look at a problem set, this one happens to be China Gray Zone, and look at it with a whole-of-society approach.”

The Center, in alignment with our key partners, continues to hold engagements across a range of issues and environments. “The Symposium has been instrumental in bringing together military, industry, and academia to build cross-functional solutions to irregular warfare in our strategic environment,” said participant Jason Heeg, Command Chief Warrant Officer, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne). “Along with other IWC engagements like the University Colloquium, this event is helping to build a network of irregular warfare scholars and practitioners.”

The inaugural Intelligence Support to Irregular Warfare Symposium successfully laid the groundwork for ongoing collaboration and innovation in addressing strategic competition. “We are proud to have partnered with OUSD(I&S) for the inaugural Intelligence Support to Irregular Warfare Symposium,” said Lori Leffler, IWC Deputy Director and Chief of Staff. “This event marks a significant milestone in advancing our understanding of the intelligence capabilities necessary to counter our adversaries.”

The IWC serves as the central mechanism for developing the Department of Defense’s (DoD) irregular warfare knowledge and advancing the Department’s understanding of irregular warfare concepts and doctrine in collaboration with key allies and partners.

The Center’s foundation is built upon three Lines of Effort:

• AMPLIFY and collaborate to build an innovative and adaptable global networked IW community of interest.
• Strategically ILLUMINATE current and future irregular threats, crises, and obstacles.
• ADDRESS current and future irregular threats to the US, allies, and partners by providing optionality to leaders.

Through these LOEs, the Irregular Warfare Center addresses current and emerging security concerns and challenges with world-class research, rigorous analysis, top-tier strategic education and training for U.S. and international partners.

13. War and appeasement: why a deal with Putin will backfire

​Excerpts:

Now we face a situation with an America that is decidedly turning inwards in focus. As Charles Kupchan (who was special assistant to the US president on the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017) argues in his book Isolationism: A history of America’s efforts to shield itself from the world, the central question is not whether the US retrenches but whether it does so by design or by default. He considers that the likelier outcome is retrenchment by default—an unplanned and perilous American retreat from global affairs.

In other words, a disruptive inward turn is now a real possibility for today’s America—more so than when Kupchan’s book was written four years ago. Trump’s clarion call of making America great again may mark ‘an unplanned and perilous American retreat from global affairs’. And there can be little doubt that Putin is about to test Trump’s mettle in this regard over Ukraine.

After congratulating Trump on his election, Putin implied he would have discussions only if the US initiated talks (he will not talk directly with Zelensky), dropped its economic sanctions and refused to offer any further support for Ukraine. In other words, Putin demands a Russian victory and the complete and utter destruction of Ukraine as a separate country.

And let’s not pretend that Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s past empire in the ‘near abroad’—especially the Baltic countries and Poland—would be satiated if he wins in Ukraine. Far from it: this war in Ukraine is not just some distant territorial dispute, as some members of Trump’s inner circle assert. If things go horribly wrong in Ukraine, we could see a wider war in Europe.

Trump’s idea of negotiating a swift end to the war is unrealistic while Ukraine is fighting an outright invasion for its existence, not just a territorial dispute. Stopping the war now on Moscow’s terms will only further encourage Putin’s highly dangerous adventurism.

War and appeasement: why a deal with Putin will backfire | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Paul Dibb · December 2, 2024

US president-elect Donald Trump’s boast that he will quickly negotiate a deal with Vladimir Putin about Russia’s war with Ukraine is likely to fail. This will be the case even though Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed last month that the war ‘will end sooner’ under Trump.

The question is: in whose favour will it end?

My central concern here is that all this is occurring as the military outlook for Ukraine is grim. How long Ukraine can keep going militarily is uncertain and Kyiv may be unable to resist a demand for a Trump deal. This uncertainty is made worse by nobody knowing what Trump will actually do.

Trump grievously underrates Putin’s determination to win his war at all costs. And Putin will not allow peace talks to get in the way of eliminating Ukraine as a nation-state. He continues to assert that there is no such country as Ukraine. He also makes it brutally clear that Ukraine can never be allowed to be a member of NATO.

Last month, in reaction to the United States allowing Ukraine to use longer-range missiles (such as the 300km-range Army Tactical Missile System) to strike deeper into Russia, Putin has promised ‘an appropriate and palpable response’. But this is not the first time Putin has promised, in effect, a nuclear response.

As NATO’s former secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg has noted, if Putin wants to escalate with the use of weapons of mass destruction, he can create all the excuses he needs but ‘so far, we have called his bluff’. And the Pentagon has just announced there are no increased signs of a higher level of Russian nuclear alert.

There are, however, different opinions on this contingency. Kim Darroch, Britain’s former national security adviser, warned that allowing Britain’s long-range Storm Shadow missiles to be fired by Ukraine into Russia ‘risks a major escalation of the conflict’.

So, after almost three years of war, Putin’s views are in fact even more—not less—expansive. According to Anne Applebaum, a leading Russia expert, Putin is fighting not only to destroy Ukraine as a nation but he also wants to show that America, NATO and the West are weak and indecisive, regardless of who is the US president.

Putin believes he and his ‘closest friend’, Chinese President Xi Jinping, are the world’s leading authoritarian powers, increasingly powerful militarily and attractive not only to North Korea and Iran but also to many of the so-called global south countries.

More than 70 percent of Russians now are apparently of the view that the West, led by NATO and the US, is seeking to fundamentally destroy Russia. A large majority of Russians allegedly now see the West as an existential threat to the Russian motherland. So, Putin is about winning much more than a war with Ukraine.

Then there is the question of Putin’s personality. Unlike Trump, Putin has been Russia’s dominant authoritarian leader for practically a quarter of a century now. And there is no sign—at least foreseeable—of any credible opposition to him. He recently has implied that China and Russia have created a new geopolitical concept for world order that is stronger than a confused and inward-looking US.

As a former KGB officer, Putin was trained to believe the ‘correlation of world forces’ is logically moving towards Russia’s national interests because of the collective weakness of the West.

According to Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin, ‘The sad truth is that the fight against the West has become the organising principle of Putin’s regime and has created too many beneficiaries to be abandoned any time soon. Trump or no Trump, Russia’s foreign policy will be guided by anti-Americanism for at least as long as Putin is in the Kremlin.’

Gabuev goes on to argue that mistrust between Russia and the West will outlast the Trump era. He also argues that while the Kremlin remains guarded in its official expectations of the new US administration, the hope in Moscow is that Trump’s presidency will be ‘a gift that keeps on giving’.

This is because Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine quickly and the main fear in Western capitals is that he will drastically reduce military support for an embattled Ukraine—greatly to Russia’s advantage.

But Trump’s anxiety to reach some form of a deal on Ukraine next year will not eliminate the root causes of the Kremlin’s confrontation with the West.

Rather, it will only confirm in Putin’s mind the lurch of the US to be inward-looking with Trump’s preoccupation to ‘make America great again’.

This brings us to what form such a Trump deal might involve. Trump’s vice-president, JD Vance, appears to be toying with the idea of an exchange of Ukrainian territory for a ceasefire. This might involve acknowledging Russia’s current occupation of 18 percent of the territory of Ukraine—which includes not only Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk but also Kherson and Zaporizhzhia—in exchange for a ceasefire that will be internationally supervised. By whom? Presumably, Putin will categorically reject the presence of any NATO troops on Russia’s border with Ukraine.

In my view, such a ceasefire and territorial settlement would leave Putin with the freedom to rearm the Russian military with a view to a massive attack when he is ready, which might be aimed at occupying the entire eastern half of Ukraine along the Dnipro River from Kyiv to Odesa.

But as Gabuev’s colleague Tatiana Stanovaya observes, no Western leader—including Trump—has a plan for ending the war that would be remotely acceptable to Putin. She says none of the mooted solutions comes close to meeting Russian demands for a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and a NATO that will never admit Ukraine to its membership. There are also many in Moscow who argue that Russia should not squander its current battlefield advantage for the empty promise of talks with Washington.

There are other options being toyed with in Europe. For example, there is the model of West and East Germany after World War II. The latter was a Soviet-occupied puppet regime called the German Democratic Republic, which few countries in Western Europe recognised. It existed cheek by jowl with an independent Federal Republic of Germany, which—unlike the GDR—was internationally recognised and was a key member of NATO. That model existed for more than 40 years until the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The problem with extrapolating that model to today’s Europe is that at that time the US continued to support NATO through its large Cold War military presence in West Germany for more than a half-century and the US was also undoubtedly the strongest military power in the world. Arguably, neither of these facts exist right now.

Now we face a situation with an America that is decidedly turning inwards in focus. As Charles Kupchan (who was special assistant to the US president on the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017) argues in his book Isolationism: A history of America’s efforts to shield itself from the world, the central question is not whether the US retrenches but whether it does so by design or by default. He considers that the likelier outcome is retrenchment by default—an unplanned and perilous American retreat from global affairs.

In other words, a disruptive inward turn is now a real possibility for today’s America—more so than when Kupchan’s book was written four years ago. Trump’s clarion call of making America great again may mark ‘an unplanned and perilous American retreat from global affairs’. And there can be little doubt that Putin is about to test Trump’s mettle in this regard over Ukraine.

After congratulating Trump on his election, Putin implied he would have discussions only if the US initiated talks (he will not talk directly with Zelensky), dropped its economic sanctions and refused to offer any further support for Ukraine. In other words, Putin demands a Russian victory and the complete and utter destruction of Ukraine as a separate country.

And let’s not pretend that Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s past empire in the ‘near abroad’—especially the Baltic countries and Poland—would be satiated if he wins in Ukraine. Far from it: this war in Ukraine is not just some distant territorial dispute, as some members of Trump’s inner circle assert. If things go horribly wrong in Ukraine, we could see a wider war in Europe.

Trump’s idea of negotiating a swift end to the war is unrealistic while Ukraine is fighting an outright invasion for its existence, not just a territorial dispute. Stopping the war now on Moscow’s terms will only further encourage Putin’s highly dangerous adventurism.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Paul Dibb · December 2, 2024

14. The Okinawa Conundrum: Rethinking Regional Security

​Excerpts:

China’s recent actions regarding Okinawa, particularly its establishment of the Ryukyu Research Center in September, signal a calculated move to exploit historical grievances. By emphasizing the Ryukyu Islands’ ambiguous status and engaging local leaders, Beijing aims to widen the rift between Okinawa and the Japanese central government. This “divide-and-conquer” approach serves a dual purpose: undermining Japan’s security stance and positioning China as a potential ally for Okinawans disenchanted with Tokyo’s policies.

However, this strategy is not without risks. Despite ongoing debates about the Ryukyu issue, the international community largely accepts Okinawa’s current status as part of Japan. China’s overtures might backfire, potentially strengthening Japan’s security alliance with the United States. Beijing will need to tread carefully as it navigates the complex interplay of local sentiments, historical grievances, and international law.

As regional dynamics evolve, a nuanced dialogue acknowledging the complexities of the Okinawa issue is imperative. Policymakers must move beyond simplistic binary classifications that fail to capture Okinawa’s multifaceted reality. Understanding the unique cultural, historical, and socioeconomic contexts shaping Okinawan perspectives is key to fostering sustainable security solutions.

For Taiwan, which shares cultural and historical ties with Okinawa, grasping the intricacies of Okinawan sentiment is especially important. Mischaracterizing the Okinawa issue could strain relationships and hinder collective efforts to address regional security challenges. A collaborative dialogue that respects Okinawan voices while promoting mutual understanding between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States is vital for securing the first island chain. Only through a holistic approach can we achieve lasting peace and stability in this critical region.

The Okinawa Conundrum: Rethinking Regional Security 

thediplomat.com

As regional tensions escalate, particularly concerning the Taiwan Strait, discussions of Okinawa often fall prey to reductionist narratives.

By Cathy Fang

December 05, 2024

Anti-U.S. base protesters sit outside the gate of Camp Schwab as a military vehicle passes by in Okinawa, Japan, Mar. 21, 2016.

Credit: Depositphotos

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Okinawa, strategically located in the East China Sea, is much more than a military asset. This archipelago blends rich cultural heritage, intricate socio-political dynamics, and pivotal geopolitical importance. As regional tensions escalate, particularly concerning the Taiwan Strait, discourse surrounding Okinawa often falls prey to reductionist narratives. Such oversimplifications not only fail to capture the nuanced realities faced by Okinawans but also risk destabilizing the delicate power equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region. A comprehensive analysis of Okinawa’s geopolitical relevance, historical context, and its asymmetrical relationship with Tokyo is crucial for a nuanced understanding of its implications for regional security.

Okinawa stands as a cornerstone of military strategy, serving as a critical bulwark for United States and Japanese defense initiatives in an increasingly volatile region. Home to approximately 32 U.S. military installations, Okinawa plays a pivotal role in deterrence against potential aggressors, particularly China. These bases enable rapid military responses, provide logistical support, and conduct intelligence operations – essential for potential conflicts involving Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula.

Yet, Okinawa’s importance extends beyond its military value. Strategically positioned along vital maritime trade routes, it is crucial for Japan’s economic stability and energy security. Given that nearly 90 percent of Japan’s energy resources are imported, any disruption in these sea lanes could have catastrophic economic repercussions.

Okinawa’s role in global connectivity is paramount as well. The undersea cables traversing its waters form the backbone of international data transfers linking Japan to the global community. These cables, which facilitate everything from global communications to financial transactions, underscore Okinawa’s importance in today’s geopolitical landscape. In an era where digital security is increasingly critical, the chain of islands’ strategic position makes it a linchpin for both military and economic stability in the region. The presence of U.S. forces, alongside the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), not only secures these routes but also protects the critical undersea infrastructure supporting global communications.

Amid the geopolitical calculations, the “All Okinawa” movement represents diverse local voices advocating for Okinawan interests. This movement, often misunderstood as simply anti-U.S. or pro-China, unites Okinawans across the political spectrum. It is driven by legitimate concerns over the social, environmental, and economic burdens of a heavy military presence – not by ideological allegiance to foreign powers.

The ongoing debate about relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma illustrates this complexity. While there is agreement from all sides on closing MCAS Futenma, locals have objected to the base’s relocation to Henoko. The disagreement reflects deeper worries about the cumulative impact of military installations on Okinawa’s society and environment. Dismissing these sentiments as merely anti-U.S. or pro-China ignores the historical context shaping Okinawan identity and attitudes toward governance.

World War II’s legacy and the subsequent U.S. occupation – which lasted until 1972 – left lasting marks in Okinawa, fostering a sense of disenfranchisement within Japan’s political landscape. Okinawans frequently feel their voices are overshadowed by centralized decision-making that prioritizes national security over local needs.

The emotional disconnect between Okinawa and mainland Japan is complex, rooted in historical traumas and ongoing political dynamics. Okinawa’s unique history as the Ryukyu Kingdom – with its distinct language, culture, and governance – complicates its relationship with Japan. Memories of invasion, occupation, and World War II’s devastation continue to influence current attitudes toward both national and local governance. This historical backdrop nurtures a cultural identity that diverges from the Japanese narrative, further exacerbating feelings of alienation.

The relationship between Okinawa and Tokyo’s central government is marked by a stark power imbalance. Although constitutional frameworks supposedly support local autonomy, Okinawa often finds itself subject to a centralized system that makes policy decisions with minimal local input. Japan’s local governance has gradually shifted toward decentralization, but this process remains unfinished, leaving local entities with little sway in national affairs.

Okinawan referendums – like the one where over 70 percent of voters rejected the Henoko base plan – have consistently failed to influence the central government, highlighting the futility of local dissent against entrenched bureaucracy. This central-local dynamic sidelines local concerns in favor of national security priorities. Okinawans’ inability to shape decisions about their own land breeds resentment and opposition to military installations, complicating Japan’s security stance.

Despite evolving local governance structures, major hurdles remain. Ideological clashes between local leaders and the national government often result in policy deadlock. Furthermore, weak local party structures can lead elected officials to prioritize personal interests over regional needs. This fragmentation hinders effective policymaking and further estranges Okinawa from the central government.

China’s recent actions regarding Okinawa, particularly its establishment of the Ryukyu Research Center in September, signal a calculated move to exploit historical grievances. By emphasizing the Ryukyu Islands’ ambiguous status and engaging local leaders, Beijing aims to widen the rift between Okinawa and the Japanese central government. This “divide-and-conquer” approach serves a dual purpose: undermining Japan’s security stance and positioning China as a potential ally for Okinawans disenchanted with Tokyo’s policies.

However, this strategy is not without risks. Despite ongoing debates about the Ryukyu issue, the international community largely accepts Okinawa’s current status as part of Japan. China’s overtures might backfire, potentially strengthening Japan’s security alliance with the United States. Beijing will need to tread carefully as it navigates the complex interplay of local sentiments, historical grievances, and international law.

As regional dynamics evolve, a nuanced dialogue acknowledging the complexities of the Okinawa issue is imperative. Policymakers must move beyond simplistic binary classifications that fail to capture Okinawa’s multifaceted reality. Understanding the unique cultural, historical, and socioeconomic contexts shaping Okinawan perspectives is key to fostering sustainable security solutions.

For Taiwan, which shares cultural and historical ties with Okinawa, grasping the intricacies of Okinawan sentiment is especially important. Mischaracterizing the Okinawa issue could strain relationships and hinder collective efforts to address regional security challenges. A collaborative dialogue that respects Okinawan voices while promoting mutual understanding between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States is vital for securing the first island chain. Only through a holistic approach can we achieve lasting peace and stability in this critical region.

Authors

Guest Author

Cathy Fang

Cathy Fang is a contributor at the think tank U.S. Taiwan Watch, and an analyst at PLA Tracker and Safe Space. She was a policy analyst at the Project 2049 Institute and served as legislative assistant at Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan.

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thediplomat.com

15. A Last Chance to Prevent Nuclear Anarchy

As an aside, why is it the US who has to lead? How come others do not lead efforts to control nuclear weapons? Does any other country want to control nuclear weapons use and proliferation as much as the US? And if not, why not?

Excerpts:

Both leaders also know that a refusal to engage on nuclear issues would result in the United States intensifying its own nuclear deterrence posture in ways that could increase the dangers and uncertainties for their countries. Conservative members of the U.S. defense community have long advocated such moves, and many of them are likely to return to positions of influence in the new Trump administration. For Putin and Xi, agreeing to join the joint assessment and cooling-off period would be a way to start their renewed relationships with Trump off on the right foot. The president, after all, will be the person most able to counter their ambitions or offer compromises that balance Chinese, Russian, and U.S. interests.

Ukraine and Taiwan are wild cards. Because the United States has been providing military support to Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly refused to engage with the United States on nuclear arms control. But Trump, during his campaign, vowed to end the war swiftly; were he to change U.S. policy on Ukraine and launch efforts for a diplomatic settlement, it would make it considerably easier for Putin to respond positively to a presidential proposal calling for nuclear cooperation. The United States and its allies’ support of Taiwan could similarly inhibit China’s willingness to engage. Xi might condition Beijing’s participation in a joint assessment on the cessation of such support, which could kill the process before it even begins. But making the proposal is the only way to find out if Xi is prepared to take the long view and separate the nuclear discussion from the confrontation over Taiwan.

If Trump were to pursue cooperative engagement and find no takers, he would likely have greater support at home and abroad to take more confrontational unilateral and multilateral actions, because he could point to Chinese and Russian rejections as indication that raising the temperature might be the only way to protect U.S. security and manage nuclear risks. These measures might include efforts that Horschig and Williams proposed, such as building coalitions to defend beleaguered norms by reaching out to the global South to muster calls for nuclear restraint. But Trump’s actions should also include even greater efforts to sustain, strengthen, and adapt the U.S. and allied capabilities that have been essential over the past several decades to reducing nuclear risk and preventing proliferation. Washington should make it known to both Beijing and Moscow that it is ready to compete in a nuclear race if its adversaries give it no alternative—that a deferral of new U.S. nuclear initiatives is tied to their restraint, as well.

The choice for Trump in his second term is clear: either try to avoid nuclear anarchy by helping to bring about needed cooperation among the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT, or preside over the nuclear order’s continued unraveling and rely on expensive, politically controversial, and uncertain deterrence measures to defend the United States, its allies, and the rest of the world against the threat of nuclear conflagration. As more and more pillars of nuclear order crack or crumble, time is of the essence. The start of Trump’s presidency presents a fleeting opportunity to follow through on his campaign promise to take bold action and propose a new way forward. He should take it.

A Last Chance to Prevent Nuclear Anarchy

Can Trump Engage China and Russia Before It’s Too Late?

By Lewis A. Dunn

December 4, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Lewis A. Dunn · December 4, 2024

As Donald Trump prepares to begin his second term as U.S. president, he is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy. Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising: China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control; U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear matters, already in a dire state, has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent reports based on information from senior U.S. officials indicate that the United States, too, could modify its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence of coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of the nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968, is the only remaining major, legally binding mechanism to uphold that order. But the actions of nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty, the disillusionment of many nonnuclear parties, and the consideration by other countries to build their own nuclear programs have placed the NPT’s future in doubt.

Responding to this continuing breakdown in a recent Foreign Affairs article, Doreen Horschig and Heather Williams called for the United States to “uphold existing nuclear norms” by establishing closer relationships with countries in the global South, fortifying partnerships with allies, and creating regional engagement between nuclear and nonnuclear countries. But such efforts are insufficient on their own. At this point, the United States must instead try again to directly engage China and Russia not only as nuclear adversaries to be deterred but also as potential collaborators in a final attempt to head off nuclear anarchy.

Trump, who prides himself on being a daring leader, should use his inaugural address to energize coordinated action by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT—to prevent the collapse of the nuclear order. He should call on these countries’ leaders to join him in launching a frank and fast-paced assessment of the current dangers and to agree to a six-month “cooling off” period of nuclear restraint while the assessment is underway. Today, amid ever-greater nuclear arms racing and threat making, there is a concrete danger of these weapons being used for the first time in more than three-quarters of a century. The window for collective action is rapidly closing. The security of the United States and its allies is at stake. For Trump, the room for boldness at the start of a new presidential term and his preexisting relationships with Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping give him a distinct opportunity for global leadership.

A CLOSING WINDOW

Restrictions on nuclear arms buildups are falling away. Absent dramatic action, it is all but certain that the New START treaty, which limits the size of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces and provides predictability through its verification measures, will not be replaced when it expires in February 2026. Although both countries remain within the treaty’s numerical limits, Moscow has already stopped allowing on-site inspections and providing notifications as required by the treaty.If no replacement is created, there will be no regulation of the nuclear competition between the two most powerful nuclear weapons states for the first time since the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed in 1972. An intensified nuclear arms race between the United States and China also looks likely: China is projected to grow its nuclear arsenal to more than 1,000 deployed nuclear weapons by 2030, and in response, the United States has changed its nuclear doctrine and is preparing to increase both the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads and their readiness.

Of even greater concern is that experts and government officials in the United States and many other countries no longer assume that nuclear weapons will never be used in conflict. Officials are taking Putin’s threats seriously and paying increased attention to how to respond to nuclear use in the war in Ukraine. Any reaction would need to balance different objectives: deterring follow-on nuclear use; restoring the so-called nuclear taboo, a norm against nuclear weapons use; and avoiding escalation to a global nuclear war. There is no clear answer for how to do so.

Partly because of these looming dangers, many countries no longer believe that the NPT is a credible means to end nuclear arms racing, reduce the risk of nuclear war, and advance disarmament. Some have already demonstrated their disillusionment with the NPT by creating, in 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which bans not only the use of such weapons but also their testing, production, and possession. Any further steps backward—the collapse of bilateral nuclear arms controls or the resumption of nuclear weapons testing as part of intensified arms racing—could compel a number of nonnuclear countries to threaten to withdraw, or even formally withdraw, from the NPT.

On the other end of the spectrum, some countries are rethinking the principle of nonproliferation that the NPT protects. Iran continues advancing toward a capability to make nuclear weapons, though its leaders apparently believe that their regional ambitions are so far better served by not weaponizing the country’s nuclear latency. Heightened regional insecurities are making other countries, most prominently Japan and South Korea in Asia and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, weigh the payoffs and risks of acquiring nuclear weapons themselves. Even among European countries, the war in Ukraine and fears of U.S. disengagement have reopened discussion of some type of bloc-wide nuclear deterrent, if not individual national programs. Here, too, the ultimate result is likely to be spiraling withdrawals from the NPT.

Together, these developments will fundamentally transform global nuclear relationships, all for the worse. They will decisively undermine the security of not only the United States but all countries, including U.S. nuclear adversaries. That prospect should be sufficient motivation for the world’s nuclear great powers to engage directly with one another in a joint assessment and cooling-off period.

A HARD LOOK

The joint assessment should be carried out by a small group of former cabinet-level officials or deputies, with two representatives from each of the NPT nuclear weapons states: one from foreign ministries, presidential offices, or intelligence agencies and another from the defense or military departments. The use of former officials would allow each government to incorporate into the discussion their and their allies’ concerns while officially remaining on the sidelines. Crucially, each government could agree to participate without having to step back from their positions on current political-military confrontations. The group should share its findings with the countries’ leaders within six months.

To coincide with the assessment, Washington should also call for a six-month nuclear cooling-off period, during which all five countries would exercise nuclear restraint. Although this would be defined differently by country, the point would be for each to avoid actions that its principal adversaries would clearly regard as threatening. (Diplomatic and back-channel exchanges could help address the inevitable disagreements about which actions are or are not consistent with restraint.) For example, during the cooling-off period, the United States could go forward with previously established activities for the modernization of its nuclear forces but defer any decision to increase the number of nuclear warheads on its existing missile-delivery systems. China could keep building additional missile silos but refrain from filling them. Russia could deploy its nuclear-powered cruise missile but avoid rhetorical saber-rattling and freeze new nuclear exercises in Belarus. Of particular importance for preserving the NPT, no country would resume nuclear weapons testing—understood to mean large-scale tests generating nuclear yields.

If the assessment results in a sufficient acknowledgment of shared dangers ahead, then the cooling-off period should be extended for another six months. In parallel with this extension, two tracks of talks should get underway: one between the United States, its NATO allies, and Russia, another involving the United States, its allies in the Asia-Pacific, and China. In the short term, the goal of these dialogues would be to agree on coordinated but unilateral actions to reduce bilateral nuclear risks, buttress the NPT regime, and slow the slide to nuclear anarchy. Such talks should be overseen by a twice-yearly secretary-level meeting of all five countries, which could coordinate the separate tracks and identify opportunities for multilateral action. The meetings could furthermore provide the rest of the world a window into the decision-making of these nuclear powers, and thus help to restore the legitimacy of the NPT and support for it among nonnuclear states.

There are many possible opportunities worth exploring. Each track of dialogues could first explore rules of the road that would help avoid an escalation to nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Even in the absence of agreements on specific risk-avoidance actions, the very discussions would help clarify thinking among key adversaries. China, Russia, and the United States could also commit not to adopt launch-on-warning postures, in which a retaliatory nuclear strike is launched as soon as satellite warning systems detect a possible first strike from an adversary. Moscow and Washington could release a statement of intent that they will continue to abide by the numerical limits on strategic nuclear warheads and launchers in New START after the treaty’s expiration. Building on the cooling-off period, China could state that it would continue its restraint in filling new silos as long as the United States refrains from expanding its nuclear arsenal to enhance deterrence of China.

Initial agreements on more limited restraints could open the door for the five NPT nuclear weapons states to tackle even tougher issues down the road, including engaging North Korea to prevent nuclear adventurism and heading off a nuclear arms race between Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the Middle East. In the medium term, the nuclear powers’ reenergized cooperation could become a steppingstone to better managing their broader relationships with one another.

CALCULATING RISKS

There are some potential sticking points. As his first administration came to a close, Trump refused to agree to a simple, five-year extension of New START in favor of presenting to Moscow new conditions to continue the treaty. And some of his appointees in his second administration will prioritize taking highly visible steps to strengthen the United States’ nuclear deterrence. Trump may not want to take a chance on a major initiative that could fail to get Putin and Xi on board or break down in the middle of the process. U.S. allies that rely on American nuclear protection may also be uneasy about what the two-track discussions that would occur during an extension of the cooling-off period could mean for their security interests.

Yet a dramatic initiative that would lessen existential nuclear risks to the United States would flow naturally from Trump’s repeated references to the threat of nuclear war during the 2024 campaign, as well as from his promises of bold leadership at home and abroad. And Trump could quell any concerns by launching this effort at the very start of his administration, when extending an invitation for a nuclear assessment and cooling-off period, even if it is rejected, is unlikely to be seen as a sign of weakness or timidity. Washington should also assure U.S. allies that the process is intended to reduce the nuclear risk for everyone and that those in Europe and Asia would be parties to the dialogues that affect their regions.

Securing Moscow’s and Beijing’s participation could be a challenge. But like the United States, China and Russia also have an existential interest in cooling proliferation, preventing a total breakdown of the NPT, and avoiding nuclear war. Japan or South Korea becoming nuclear powers, for instance, would directly threaten China. And any new national nuclear programs in Europe, or the establishment of a continental nuclear deterrence arrangement, would bring new dangers for Moscow. Even absent these developments, both Putin and Xi seem to recognize the uncertainties and risks inherent in any use of nuclear weapons: Xi has urged Putin not to escalate the war in Ukraine to a nuclear level, and Putin has refrained from doing so, despite his repeated threats.

As more and more pillars of nuclear order crack or crumble, time is of the essence.

Both leaders also know that a refusal to engage on nuclear issues would result in the United States intensifying its own nuclear deterrence posture in ways that could increase the dangers and uncertainties for their countries. Conservative members of the U.S. defense community have long advocated such moves, and many of them are likely to return to positions of influence in the new Trump administration. For Putin and Xi, agreeing to join the joint assessment and cooling-off period would be a way to start their renewed relationships with Trump off on the right foot. The president, after all, will be the person most able to counter their ambitions or offer compromises that balance Chinese, Russian, and U.S. interests.

Ukraine and Taiwan are wild cards. Because the United States has been providing military support to Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly refused to engage with the United States on nuclear arms control. But Trump, during his campaign, vowed to end the war swiftly; were he to change U.S. policy on Ukraine and launch efforts for a diplomatic settlement, it would make it considerably easier for Putin to respond positively to a presidential proposal calling for nuclear cooperation. The United States and its allies’ support of Taiwan could similarly inhibit China’s willingness to engage. Xi might condition Beijing’s participation in a joint assessment on the cessation of such support, which could kill the process before it even begins. But making the proposal is the only way to find out if Xi is prepared to take the long view and separate the nuclear discussion from the confrontation over Taiwan.

If Trump were to pursue cooperative engagement and find no takers, he would likely have greater support at home and abroad to take more confrontational unilateral and multilateral actions, because he could point to Chinese and Russian rejections as indication that raising the temperature might be the only way to protect U.S. security and manage nuclear risks. These measures might include efforts that Horschig and Williams proposed, such as building coalitions to defend beleaguered norms by reaching out to the global South to muster calls for nuclear restraint. But Trump’s actions should also include even greater efforts to sustain, strengthen, and adapt the U.S. and allied capabilities that have been essential over the past several decades to reducing nuclear risk and preventing proliferation. Washington should make it known to both Beijing and Moscow that it is ready to compete in a nuclear race if its adversaries give it no alternative—that a deferral of new U.S. nuclear initiatives is tied to their restraint, as well.

The choice for Trump in his second term is clear: either try to avoid nuclear anarchy by helping to bring about needed cooperation among the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT, or preside over the nuclear order’s continued unraveling and rely on expensive, politically controversial, and uncertain deterrence measures to defend the United States, its allies, and the rest of the world against the threat of nuclear conflagration. As more and more pillars of nuclear order crack or crumble, time is of the essence. The start of Trump’s presidency presents a fleeting opportunity to follow through on his campaign promise to take bold action and propose a new way forward. He should take it.

• LEWIS A. DUNN is an independent consultant focused on nuclear risk reduction, arms control, and nonproliferation. He was U.S. Ambassador to the 1985 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Foreign Affairs · by Lewis A. Dunn · December 4, 2024

16. To counter China and support national security, Congress must empower NIST

To counter China and support national security, Congress must empower NIST - Breaking Defense

In this op-ed, Walter Copan and Tim Fist argue that in order to counter threats from China, Congress must prioritize NIST.

breakingdefense.com · by Walter G. Copan, Tim Fist · December 4, 2024

The US Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) building is seen October 9, 2012 in Boulder, Colorado. (Photo by Dana Romanoff/Getty Images)

America’s future competitiveness will be driven by our ability to capture the economic and national security benefits of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing. Within government, these efforts are underpinned by the research and standards development done at the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency with a remarkable track record of success supporting American innovation.

Given this success, it’s no surprise that China is seeking to manipulate international standards organizations to its own benefit. In fact, global standards leadership is a stated aim of the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi’s Jinping’s China Standards 2035 plan, specifically to lessen American influence.

In contrast, NIST is being underprioritized. The agency has crumbling buildings and leaking ceilings. The rapid growth of industry salaries for emerging technology jobs means that NIST finds it increasingly hard to compete with the private sector for top talent. Federal agency limitations further currently constrain NIST from bringing the results of its research into commercial practice to benefit the US economy. And during an era of rapid progress in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, the agency is limited in its ability to respond due to the slow pace of new funding and hiring.

NIST’s legacy is at risk, and we are not equipping the agency to meet this challenge. But if it is willing to grasp it, the outgoing Congress has an opportunity to reverse these trends and poke a thumb in China’s eye.

A solution lies with the bipartisan Expanding Partnerships for Innovation and Competitiveness Act (EPIC) Act, endorsed by more than forty American companies, universities, and think tanks, as well as by heads of NIST that have served under Presidents Trump, Obama, and Bush. EPIC would equip NIST with a non-profit foundation, enabling it to harness philanthropic investment to complement its mission.

While NIST will always answer to Congress and operate within its authorized mission, a foundation can help connect this important work to the private sector where the market can accelerate the best ideas forward. For NIST, a foundation could help further basic R&D and support innovation in critical technologies like AI, while countering China’s manipulation of international standards for new technologies.

As we enter a world where US leadership in emerging technologies is inextricably linked to national security, Congress should support NIST’s important work by prioritizing the full passage of EPIC as part of this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

As an agency, NIST is not the sexiest of items to be argued about in the NDAA. It doesn’t blow things up, nor does it fly at hypersonic speeds. To understand its importance, one needs to understand how NIST actually works.

NIST’s role among federal agencies is unique. It is not a regulator, and it doesn’t focus on a particular set of applied scientific or technical domains. Rather, its focus is at a higher level: advancing the leading edge of measurement science — and using that science to help push the boundaries of research and create standards for technologies, opening new domains of innovation.

Why are measurements and standards useful for pushing the frontier of innovation? Once it’s possible to measure something, it then becomes possible to test it and make it better. Technical standards provide American industries with a common language to facilitate trade and enable scientists and engineers to work on common goals that cut across technical disciplines. NIST’s mission is thus tightly linked with American innovation and technological competitiveness — making sure everyone is on the same page allows the full force of American industrial might to be brought on a particular problem.

In pursuit of its mission, NIST has punched far above its weight: Agency scientists have been awarded 15 percent of the Nobel Prizes in Physics awarded to Americans since 2000, with two further prizes directly enabled by measurement work done at NIST. These achievements have come despite NIST receiving less than half a percent of federal R&D funding.

Cutting edge defense technologies stand to benefit going forward. In biotechnology, NIST has developed reference molecules that labs across the United States use to develop new tools. In quantum computing, NIST has run a successful program to identify new encryption algorithms that are resistant to powerful quantum computers. In AI, NIST developed the “MNIST” database, which has been one of the most important benchmarks used to help develop neural networks, the technology behind today’s most powerful AI models.

However, NIST faces challenges in its future capacity to deliver on its mission: the recent rapid pace of progress in emerging technologies has made it hard for the agency to flexibly scale its projects in response. Many agencies have in the past found a similar mismatch between their basic structure as a federal body and the rapidly changing science and innovation landscape they are expected to respond to, and there exists a proven solution for addressing them.

Congress has long used “agency foundations” as a solution, complementing agencies’ missions by enabling the deployment of philanthropic investment. The Foundation for the National Institutes of Health runs fellowships to attract top scientists to the agency. The Center for Disease Control’s foundation hosts an emergency response fund, which raised nearly $600 million in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic to distribute 8.5 million pieces of PPE and hire more than 3,000 surge health workers. The Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research supports the Department of Agriculture by hosting ambitious prize competitions, and innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives.

These and other agency foundations have been an efficient mechanism for amplifying their agency’s work, averaging a return of $67 for every $1 in federal contributions. And compared to more ad hoc solutions like the use of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act to allow an agency to employ technical experts funded by external organizations, an agency foundation provides a more transparent and well-governed alternative.

One key area where a non-profit foundation could be especially useful for NIST’s work is in international standards. American businesses do better when they have a voice in international standard-setting. Today, the Chinese government is manipulating the global standards-setting processes by paying its experts to participate, and incentivizing them to all vote in the same direction.

Because the US approach is industry-led by design, NIST cannot directly support US experts to counter China’s efforts. A NIST foundation could fill this gap by supporting US experts (especially from small and medium-sized enterprises) to participate in international standard-setting, ensuring a level playing field for American enterprises.

Congress should act now to give NIST the necessary tools it needs to deliver on its core mission — promoting US leadership in technical standards, and accelerating the development and adoption of critical emerging technologies, in a voluntary process involving both large and small firms.

To do this, NIST should be equipped with its own Foundation, a proven, effective tool that other federal R&D agencies already enjoy.

Walter G. Copan, PhD, is vice president for research and technology transfer at Colorado School of Mines, and senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and co-founder of its Renewing American Innovation project. He previously served as 16th director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Tim Fist is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Progress, a science and innovation policy think tank based in Washington D.C.

17. Trump taps Driscoll as Army secretary, Navarro as trade advisor

​I have never heard of Mr. Driscoll.

Trump taps Driscoll as Army secretary, Navarro as trade advisor - Breaking Defense

Driscoll, now named to be the 26th Army Secretary, is a former Army soldier and Yale graduate.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque, Aaron Mehta · December 4, 2024

Seal of the Pentagon on display at the Pentagon visitor center. (Trevor Raney/

Digital Media Division)

WASHINGTON — President-elect Donald Trump announced two notable nominations for the defense world today: Daniel Driscoll, an adviser to Vice President-elect JD Vance, to lead the US Army in its top civilian spot and Peter Navarro to serve as the senior counselor for trade and manufacturing.

“As a former soldier, investor, and political advisor, Dan brings a powerful combination of experiences to serve as a disruptor and change agent,” Trump announced on Truth Social.

According to the statement, Driscoll is a graduate of Yale Law School and former Army soldier. Trump praised Driscoll’s work in the private equity arena and said he will be a “fearless and relentless fighter for America’s soldiers and the America First agenda.”

The Pentagon’s video repository features an interview with a young officer, Daniel Driscoll, whose deployment to Iraq matches that noted in Trump’s description.

If confirmed by the Senate to be the 26th Army secretary, Driscoll will take over a service in the throes of modernizing its weapon portfolio, ramping up the defense industrial base and grappling with recruiting.

In Navarro, Trump is bringing in a loyalist who served roughly four months in jail for refusing to comply with a Congressional subpoena investigating the events of Jan. 6, 2021 — something Trump, in his announcement today, described as Navarro being “treated horribly by the Deep State, or whatever else you would like to call it.”

In his new role, Navarro, 75, will be asked to “help successfully advance and communicate the Trump Manufacturing, Tariff, and Trade Agendas,” per the announcement.

During the first Trump administration, Navarro was a key voice pushing the theme of “economic security is national security,” which manifested in advocating for greater defense exports. He also helped shepherd through a review of the defense industrial base to identify weak points in the supply chain.

The announcements come amidst reporting that the nomination of Pete Hegseth to be Defense Secretary has hit some rocks, with Florida governor Ron DeSantis reportedly emerging as a backup should Hegseth fail to find support in the senate.

18. All bow before the almighty US dollar

All bow before the almighty US dollar - Asia Times

Trump wants low rates and a weak dollar but, if his policies are inflationary, high Fed rates will tend to keep the dollar strong

asiatimes.com · by Urban C. Lehner · December 2, 2024

Back in 1971, the world was suffering from a vast overabundance of dollars. American foreign investment and foreign aid coupled with inflationary US government policies had flooded the world with greenbacks.

At the same time, the world – especially the United States – had too little gold. That was a problem because, unlike today, exchange rates didn’t float freely on markets. The United States was committed to redeeming dollars for gold at $35 an ounce. (Other nations’ currencies were pegged to the dollar at fixed rates.)

Foreigners were desperately trying to redeem dollars for gold or convert them to other currencies. With the US increasingly unable to meet its commitment, speculators anticipated devaluation.

In August of that year, President Richard Nixon addressed the dollar crisis by suspending the dollar’s convertibility into gold.

Despite a subsequent negotiated devaluation, speculators continued to attack the dollar. By 1973, the gold standard and fixed exchange rates were history.

It was during the 1971 devaluation negotiations that Nixon’s Treasury Secretary John Connally made a deliciously cynical comment that is oft-quoted even today. Connally told foreign counterparts that the dollar is “our currency but it’s your problem.”

In an odd way, the dollar was also my problem. In 1971, I was the 24-year-old minesweeping and supply officer on the USS Pivot. In light of the dollar crisis, the Nixon administration decided to give Pivot and several other US Navy minesweepers to Spain as payment for base rights there in lieu of dollars.

In preparation, the Pivot’s captain tasked me with teaching our crew Spanish – a language that I didn’t know and that the crew turned out to be uninterested in learning. I made a desperate call to the Pentagon and found someone there who helped me put together a long list of minesweeper terms with Spanish translations. The crews overcame the language barrier – sort of – by pointing at their mimeographed copies of the list.

These days a strong dollar is, in many ways, everybody’s problem. It’s especially problematic for foreign countries.

International Monetary Fund research last year concluded that for emerging-market economies, “a 10% U.S. dollar appreciation, linked to global financial market forces, decreases economic output by 1.9% after one year, and this drag lingers for two and a half years.” Worst hit are developing countries that have borrowed in dollars: Their local-currency principal and interest obligations balloon.

If one of the reasons for a stronger dollar is higher interest rates, then it’s also a potential problem for the Federal Reserve Board and Fed Chair Jerome Powell. President-elect Donald Trump wants low rates and a weak dollar – and more control over the Federal Reserve. But if – as many economists and investors predict – his policies prove inflationary, the Fed will be keeping rates high, which will tend to keep the dollar strong. Powell would find himself in Trump’s crosshairs again.

A stronger dollar would be no fun for US exporting industries, very much including agriculture. It’s hard enough to compete with Brazil and other ag-exporting countries without the dollar further dulling American competitiveness.

Yet stronger is where the dollar seems headed. The US Dollar Index has been in strong territory – above 100 – since April 2022 and has been rising since late September. The betting on Wall Street is that it will rise further in a Trump administration despite the president’s preferences.

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By choosing hedge-fund manager Scott Bessent as treasury secretary, Trump has somewhat reassured markets: Upward pressure on long-term interest rates and the dollar has eased a bit in recent days. The prospect of gigantic tariffs has been one of the triggers for Wall Street’s inflation fears. Bessent has spoken of tariffs less gigantically, saying they can be a negotiating tool and calling for coordinating them with US allies.

Bessent also, however, has promised to maintain the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. That’s a good thing for any treasury secretary to do; reserve-currency status affords the US many benefits. Keep in mind, though, that it is one of the reasons the dollar is so often strong. With so much of the world’s trade and investments denominated in dollars, there’s almost always demand for the almighty buck.

Connally was half-right; the dollar is indeed our currency. But it’s not just their problem. It’s almost everybody’s.

Former longtime Wall Street Journal Asia correspondent and editor Urban Lehner is editor emeritus of DTN/The Progressive Farmer.

This article, originally published on December 2 by the latter news organization and now republished by Asia Times with permission, is © Copyright 2024 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow Urban Lehner on X @urbanize

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asiatimes.com · by Urban C. Lehner · December 2, 2024

19. Beijing sharpens tone over US missile launcher in the Philippines

Beijing sharpens tone over US missile launcher in the Philippines

By Leilani Chavez search.app3 min

December 3, 2024

View Original

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/12/03/beijing-sharpens-tone-over-us-missile-launcher-in-the-philippines/

MANILA, Philippines — China rebuked anew the presence of a U.S. Typhon missile system in the Philippines, the latest in a series of verbal rows between Manila and Beijing over the deployment of the medium-range weapon in the Philippines.

Chinese defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian reiterated in a press conference in Beijing last week that the deployment had “intensified geopolitical confrontation and escalated tensions in the region,” as he renewed calls for its withdrawal from Philippine shores.

Since April, the missile system has stayed in one of the military bases in the country’s north after annual joint military drills between the Philippines and the U.S. culminated as part of a long-held tradition as treaty allies.

In August, Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner told reporters he would prefer the mid-range missile systems to stay in the country permanently to bolster deterrence.

This comes after Chinese Coast Guard personnel armed with axes and knives attacked a contingent of Philippine coast guard and Navy vessels in June while on a monthly resupply mission to a naval outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. A Philippine Navy sailor lost a thumb during the confrontation.

Following this incident, Manila and Beijing reached a “provisional agreement” on July 21 which allows Philippine vessels to deliver supplies to Filipino troops in the outpost.

China voiced concerns over the ongoing deployment of the missile system here in Sept. 19 after defense secretary Gilberto Teodoro told reporters that the department has plans to acquire “similar capabilities” to the Typhon system.

The Philippines has an ongoing bid to buy High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) rocket launchers from American firm Lockheed Martin as part of its three-phase modernization buildup.

While the HIMARS acquisition has yet to be cleared by the U.S. State Department, the military here has nonetheless continued to beef up its missile arsenal.

The Philippines received its first set of BrahMos hypersonic anti-ship cruise missiles in April and last month placed orders for testing 12 AT-1K Raybolt anti-tank missiles from South Korea’s LIGNex1 to be delivered in 2025.

Future frigates, corvettes, and patrol vessels will also arrive fitted with weapon systems upon delivery, the military said.

Acquiring more varieties of missiles for different platforms is a logical follow-up after expanding the country’s radar network for spotting threats, according to Benjamin Blandin, an associate researcher for the Sealight Project of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation of Stanford University.

“The Philippines is creating naval and air radar bubbles so to speak—a network,” Blandin told Defense News. “The Philippines is building both a coast and air shield. Now with this kind of capacity for radars, it makes sense for the Philippines to acquire missiles because it goes in pairs, it needs to go side-by-side,” he explained.

Since 2017, the Philippines has received radars capable of detecting fighter jets, ballistic missiles and vessels, with technology hailing from Japan, the United States, Germany, and Canada. This year, Manila received the last set of SPYDER air defense systems from Israel’s Rafael Systems.

Infrastructure upgrades on bases here have enabled the military to house and maintain missiles in compliance with NATO standards.

“Now is the right moment for the Philippines to start developing an expertise and a mastery in the acquisition, use, and maintenance of missiles,” Blandin said, adding that the acquisitions would give the Philippines a more credible defense posture.

​20. Special Forces Robin Sage exercise returns to Cumberland County area this month

​The regularly scheduled routine culmination exercise for Special Forces qualification and unconventional warfare training.

Special Forces Robin Sage exercise returns to Cumberland County area this month

fayobserver.com

Aspiring Special Forces candidates will take the last step toward earning their Green Berets this month during the quarterly exercise known as Robin Sage.

The two-week exercise, which is the final test for candidates in the Special Forces Qualification Course, starts Friday and continues through Dec. 19, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School announced Monday.

The unconventional warfare exercise, which spans multiple North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee counties, is overseen by the Fort Liberty-based Special Warfare Center and School.

Upon successful completion, the soldiers are assigned to one of the Army's Special Forces units.

What is Robin Sage?

Robin Sage is held four times a year and involves veterans, volunteers and law enforcement from the communities where the training is held.

The first exercise was held in Robbins in 1952 under various names before becoming Robin Sage in 1974, according to the Army.

It is named in part after Col. Jerry Sage, who spent time in the Office of Strategic Services and was held by Nazis as a prisoner of war in World War II.

“Candidates are placed in (a simulated) environment of political instability characterized by armed conflict, forcing soldiers to analyze and solve problems to meet the challenges of this ‘real-world’ training,” the news release stated.

Throughout the exercise, community volunteers and military and civilian personnel serve as support and role players “to provide realism to the exercise,” the release stated.

Service members from units across Fort Liberty will also act as opposing forces and guerrilla freedom fighters.

“We appreciate the support and consideration the citizens of North Carolina extend to the soldiers participating in the exercise and thank them for their understanding of any inconveniences the training may cause,” the news release stated.

Where the exercise will be held

The news release stated that in addition to Cumberland County, the exercise will be held in nearby Bladen, Harnett, Hoke, Lee, Moore and Robeson counties.

Other North Carolina counties in which the training is to be held are Avery, Alamance, Anson, Brunswick, Cabarrus, Chatham, Columbus, Davidson, Duplin, Guilford, Montgomery, Randolph, Richmond, Rowan, Sampson, Scotland, Stanly, Union and Wake.

The South Carolina counties are Chesterfield, Dillon and Marlboro. Carter County in Tennessee is another location.

Safety

Residents may hear blank gunfire and see occasional flares, the release stated.

The exercise’s movements are coordinated with public safety officials within the towns and counties hosting the training, according to the release.

The precaution of contacting local law enforcement is the result of a deadly mishap. On Feb. 23, 2002, a Moore County deputy who said he was not notified about the exercise shot two Green Beret candidates participating in the exercise in civilian clothing.

Army First Lt. Tallas Tomeny was killed, and Sgt. Stephen Phelps was injured.

Tomeny’s estate settled a lawsuit against the Moore County Sheriff's Office in October 2009. The terms of the settlement were not disclosed.

According to the suit, the soldiers believed the deputy was an actor taking part in the Robin Sage exercise, and the deputy, unaware of the exercise, shot Tomeny during a struggle and shot Phelps as he tried to flee.

Organizers of the latest exercise said controls are in place to ensure there is no risk to people or property.

The safety protocols include notifying local law enforcement agencies, clearly marking training areas and vehicles, and any students dressed in civilian clothes will wear “distinctive orange or brown armbands.”

“For the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, safety is always the command's top priority during all training events,” the release stated.

Staff writer Rachael Riley can be reached at rriley@fayobserver.com or 910-486-3528.

fayobserver.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com