Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"One's life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation and compassion."

– Simone de Beauvoir

"Only fools and dead men don't change their minds. Fools won't and dead men can't."

– John Patterson

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. "

– Leonardo da Vinci

1. Exclusive | Hegseth Asked Top Admiral to Resign After Months of Discords

2. Survivors of Boat Strike Were Actively Continuing Drug Mission, Admiral to Tell Lawmakers

3. Drones Fight Other Drones in the Battle for Ukraine’s Skies

4. War Department Asks Industry to Make More Than 300K Drones, Quickly, Cheaply

5. In Japan, public opinion turns against Trump’s ‘terrible, stupid’ US

6. America’s Magical Thinking About Ukraine – A Bad Deal Is Worse Than No Deal

7. Japan’s Sanae Takaichi moves to ease weeks of tensions with China over the Taiwan Strait

8. Navigating The All-Domain Battlespace: Introducing All-Terrain Planning

9. Ukraine’s SOF Redefine Recovery and Reintegration Under Fire

10. Poll finds increasing support for international engagement, Golden Dome spending

11. Pentagon Deploys New Kamikaze Drone Copied From Iranian Design

12. Strategic Disruption from Orbit: Space-Based Capabilities for Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

13. America First, Europe Fourth

14. Trump Renames Institute of Peace for Himself

1. Exclusive | Hegseth Asked Top Admiral to Resign After Months of Discord

Summary:

SECDEF/SECWAR Hegseth forced Adm. Alvin Holsey to resign as SOUTHCOM commander after months of friction over speed, loyalty, and legal concerns surrounding lethal strikes on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean. Holsey questioned the sufficiency of legal authority and fragmented command and control for the operations and Panama Canal contingency planning, which Hegseth viewed as disloyalty and delay. A DOJ Office of Legal Counsel opinion asserts strikes are lawful based on cartel “foreign terrorist” designation and protects participating servicemembers, but targeting criteria remain opaque. Holsey’s unusually early removal amid ongoing combat operations alarms Congress and raises civil-military and lawful-orders concerns.

Excerpts:

A few weeks after he took over Southern Command Holsey met with the newly confirmed Hegseth on a secure video conference, and received his marching orders.

“You’re either on the team or you’re not,” Hegseth told Holsey, according to notes from a participant. “When you get an order, you move out fast and don’t ask questions.”

Comment: This certainly provides additional perspective. It has taken quite a bit of time to bring this to light. It seems that once the Washington Post reported on the alleged second strike, journalists started putting two and two together on the Admiral's retirement announcement. But he has maintained his professional silence and the journalists had to do some more digging. And of course there are still many unanswered questions and unknowns.

Exclusive | Hegseth Asked Top Admiral to Resign After Months of Discord

WSJ

Relationship between Pentagon chief and military leader had been deteriorating since Trump’s inauguration

By Lara Seligman

, Vera Bergengruen

and Alexander Ward

Dec. 3, 2025 7:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/hegseth-asked-top-admiral-to-resign-after-months-of-discord-9e7b357f?mod=hp_lead_pos2

Adm. Alvin Holsey Tom Williams/Zuma Press

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shocked official Washington in mid-October when he announced that the four-star head of U.S. military operations in the Caribbean was retiring less than a year into his tenure.

But according to two Pentagon officials, Hegseth asked Adm. Alvin Holsey to step down, a de facto ouster that was the culmination of months of discord between Hegseth and the officer. It began days after President Trump’s inauguration in January and intensified months later when Holsey had initial concerns about the legality of lethal strikes on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean, according to former officials aware of the discussions.

Not long after, Hegseth announced that Holsey would be retiring.

Hegseth’s move, which hasn’t been previously reported, sheds new light on a brewing controversy over the legality of the military’s campaign in the Caribbean, and raises questions over whether servicemembers with concerns about the attacks are being listened to.

While Hegseth has dismissed a number of high-ranking military leaders since taking over the Pentagon, the ouster of a commander during an unfolding military operation was an extraordinary move, lawmakers and experts note.

“Having [Holsey] leave at this particular moment, at the height of what the Pentagon considers to be the central action in our hemisphere, is just shocking,” says Todd Robinson, who served as assistant secretary for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs until January.

A Pentagon spokesman declined to comment.

President Trump and Defense Secretary Hegseth during a Cabinet meeting this week. andrew caballero-reynolds/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The admiral, a 60-year-old Navy helicopter pilot nicknamed “Bull,” had seemed a good fit to carry out Trump’s military campaign against drug traffickers after the new president came into office. Holsey voiced support for stepping up interdiction of drug shipments and had experience at such missions.

“My first deployment to the Southcom area of responsibility was over 33 years ago conducting counterdrug missions,” he told lawmakers at his Senate confirmation hearing in September 2024, arguing for a more muscular approach to “dismantle the drug cartels” responsible for tens of thousands of American deaths.

Originally from rural Georgia, Holsey led a carrier strike group and, during Trump’s first term, served as the first commander of an international naval flotilla charged with protecting commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and neighboring waters after Iran began seizing oil tankers in the area.

A few weeks after he took over Southern Command Holsey met with the newly confirmed Hegseth on a secure video conference, and received his marching orders.

“You’re either on the team or you’re not,” Hegseth told Holsey, according to notes from a participant. “When you get an order, you move out fast and don’t ask questions.”

After Trump said in a March speech to Congress that he wanted to “reclaim” the Panama Canal, Hegseth ordered Holsey to develop military options to ensure unfettered American access to the strategic waterway, according to two former officials.

Hegseth felt Holsey didn’t move quickly enough to develop the plans, the people said. After media reports about those options, Hegseth was suspicious that Holsey may have been the source of the leaks, one of the people said.

After Holsey assembled plans, the two men were on good terms when they visited Panama together in April, the person said.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, center, and Adm. Alvin Holsey toured the Panama Canal's Miraflores Locks in April. Matias Delacroix/Associated Press

Late in the summer, as the military began striking alleged drug boats, Holsey was initially concerned about murky legal authority for the boat strike campaign, according to former officials. With other military units under separate chains of command also involved, including elite special operations units, Holsey objected that parts of the operations fell outside his direct control, they said.

But even before the boat strikes began, Hegseth had lost confidence in Holsey and was looking to replace him, according to a U.S. official.

Since the strikes began in September, the Pentagon has ordered a major military buildup in the region and carried out at least 21 strikes on boats allegedly carrying drugs that have killed more than 80 people.

Holsey, who declined to be interviewed, hasn’t publicly explained his decision to step down. He has continued to issue statements in broad support of the military campaign as his final day in uniform approaches on Dec. 12.

A U.S. Navy landing craft comes ashore in Ponce, Puerto Rico. Ricardo Arduengo/Reuters

A classified opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel argues that Trump’s designation of drug cartels as foreign terrorists makes the boats legitimate military targets, asserting that the groups are smuggling drugs to fund deadly and destabilizing actions against the U.S. and its allies, according to lawmakers and others who have read it.

It also asserts that U.S. military personnel involved in the strikes are acting lawfully and won’t be subject to future prosecution, according to people who have read it.

In addition to Holsey, Col. Paul Meagher, the command’s top lawyer, known as a judge advocate general, was initially concerned about the ramifications for U.S. servicemembers, because targeting the alleged drug boats stretched the boundaries of the legal definition of combatants engaging in military hostilities, according to a third U.S. official and a former senior U.S. official.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said on Dec. 2 that he watched the first strike on an alleged drug boat in the Caribbean on Sept. 2, but was not in the room for the second. Photo: Brian Snyder/Reuters

Meagher didn’t respond to requests for comment about his concerns, which were previously reported by NBC News.

Tensions between Holsey and Hegseth led to a confrontation at the Pentagon in early October. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was also at the meeting, the former officials said.

Hegseth offered no hint of the friction between the two men in an Oct. 16 post on X announcing Holsey’s departure. He said the admiral “has exemplified the highest standards of naval leadership.”

Holsey said he would step down in a separate statement that day that didn’t mention the boat strikes.

Adm. Alvin Holsey gives a farewell address to the crew of the USS Iwo Jima while under way in the Caribbean. U.S. Navy

“Never before in my over 20 years on the committee can I recall seeing a combatant commander leave their post this early and amid such turmoil,” Rep. Adam Smith (D., Wash.), the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, said last month.

In a goodbye message to sailors and Marines aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima deployed to the Caribbean, Holsey exhorted them to “sail strong, be bold, and strike. Southcom out.”

While he was there, Hegseth announced yet another attack on a vessel, killing two people.

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com, Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

Appeared in the December 4, 2025, print edition as 'Hegseth Asked Top Admiral to Resign After Months of Discord'.

WSJ

2. Survivors of Boat Strike Were Actively Continuing Drug Mission, Admiral to Tell Lawmakers

Summary:

Adm. Frank “Mitch” Bradley will tell lawmakers that two survivors of the Sept. 2 Caribbean boat strike remained on board with narcotics and were attempting to continue their drug mission, making them lawful targets for a follow-on strike. He will testify that he and his legal adviser judged the damaged vessel and survivors to be legitimate military objectives, rebutting war-crime allegations. The case highlights legal and political controversy over POTUS’s designation of drug traffickers as terrorists, the scope of lethal authority in counterdrug operations, and Hegseth’s direct role in planning and authorizing strikes that have killed more than 80 people.

Comment: If this is the commander's assessment then I would defer to him. It is a judgment call. What would a reasonable man do in his situation with the same available information.? I think if we examine the footage many of us might come to the same conclusion. I am sure he will be bringing the footage with him to brief Congress.

National Security

Survivors of Boat Strike Were Actively Continuing Drug Mission, Admiral to Tell Lawmakers

Commander of September attack to provide account of his role for the first time in closed briefing

By Shelby Holliday

and Alexander Ward

Dec. 3, 2025 8:04 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/survivors-of-boat-strike-were-actively-continuing-drug-mission-admiral-to-tell-lawmakers-b82f0ab3?mod=hp_lead_pos3

Adm. Frank Bradley Mariam Zuhaib/AP

Quick Summary

Two survivors of a September U.S. strike on an alleged drug boat were killed in follow-up attacks after being deemed legitimate targets, a commander is set to tell lawmakers.View more

WASHINGTON—Two survivors of a Sept. 2 U.S. strike on a boat in the Caribbean were killed in follow-up attacks after they were seen still aboard the damaged vessel alongside packages of illegal narcotics, a senior commander is expected to tell lawmakers Thursday.

Adm. Frank “Mitch” Bradley plans to say he and his legal adviser concluded the two survivors were attempting to continue their drug run, making them and the already-damaged vessel legitimate targets for another attack, two defense officials said.

The details of the strike have emerged as a matter of concern for members of Congress who are seeking more information about the role played by Bradley and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and whether aspects of the operation violated laws of war or Pentagon procedures.

The version of events Bradley is expected to deliver would rebut claims by legal experts that the killing of the two survivors could have constituted a war crime.

Lawmakers are likely to press Bradley, who commanded Joint Special Operations Command at the time, in the closed-door briefing on the extent of the damage to the boat, whether the men were injured, how Bradley reached his conclusions that the survivors were still legitimate targets, and whether he considered rescuing them.

Drones Fight Other Drones in the Battle for Ukraine’s Skies

WSJ

Ukraine is increasingly using interceptors to destroy Russian drones, and the best pilots are often young videogame aces

By Alistair MacDonald

and Ievgeniia Sivorka | Photography by Sasha Maslov for WSJ

Dec. 3, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/drones-fight-other-drones-in-the-battle-for-ukraines-skies-aa78dccb

POKROVSKE, Ukraine—The Russian drone hovered above the wounded Ukrainian soldier, ready to drop a bomblet to finish him off. Suddenly, a Ukrainian drone smashed into the Russian craft, blowing it up and saving the soldier.

The close call showed the latest development in the futuristic aerial war shaping the front lines of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: drone-on-drone battles.

Drone pilots—like the one from Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade who swooped in this spring—fly interceptors at high speeds close to or into Russian drones and trigger an explosion to bring them down.

Countering the enemy’s drones has become an critical challenge for both sides, as the craft have become the deadliest weapons menacing infantry and vehicles on the front lines. Soldiers use a variety of means—from nets and shotguns to electronic jammers and aging prop planes—to take out drones.

Interceptor craft have become an important part of the mix in the past year or so.

A range to train drone pilots at a base of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. Artem Boliukh, chief of staff for the brigade’s air-defense division.

“Nobody believed that it could be possible at all” 15 months ago, said Artem Boliukh, chief of the brigade’s air-defense unit. Boliukh said that drones hadn’t been used in this way before and engineers had to solve technical issues such as range, the ability to recover drones and the safety of operators. Also, pilots must learn how to find and engage the target in a very narrow window of time.

“Modern warfare changes very quickly,” he said.

In September, the brigade’s drones intercepted 886 Russian drones, up from 507 in June. Around 50% of missions result in a successful interception, Boliukh said, compared with 5% a year ago. When an interceptor doesn’t hit its target, the operator is usually able to bring it back to be used again.

Like many aspects of drone warfare introduced in this war, such interceptions will be a future component of combat, defense analysts say. Defense companies are rushing to develop their own interceptors. A company founded by Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive, provides one of Ukraine’s most popular.

Just as important as the new technology are the pilots putting it to use. Aviators and air-defense units have vied to be their side’s top air ace ever since the feats of Germany’s Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron, in World War I.

Now, top guns also fly drones.

Many of them are young, with quick reactions honed on videogames. The pilot who saved the soldier in spring was a 24-year-old former computer-game developer who goes by the call sign Kratos and plays the flute in between interceptions.

The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade said that since late January, Kratos has achieved Ukraine’s highest tally for intercepting Russian Mavics, commercial drones used by both sides for reconnaissance or dropping explosives.

Boliukh, of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, left, and the brigade’s head of interceptors, who goes by the call sign Betsyk.

Footage of successful interceptions of Russian Drones. Video: 3rd Separate Assault Brigade/Ukrainian Armed Forces

That tally includes the rescue of the wounded Ukrainian soldier, which was made possible after his team was tipped off by an intercepted Russian radio message calling for a drone to strike.

“It is the stuff that happens in movies, TV shows and books, but here we are in life and death situations every day,” said Kratos, who is named after a character from “God of War,” a popular series of videogames.

Kratos said he has made over 380 confirmed drone interceptions since Jan. 20, and says he’s achieved many more. The Wall Street Journal is unable to verify the claim, but in October, he was granted Ukraine’s prestigious Cross of Combat Merit.

Different types of drones are used for different interceptions. Russia’s long-range Shaheds pummeling Ukrainian cities can be caught by drones able to fly at the same high speeds and altitudes.

Merops, the interception system produced by Schmidt’s company, is a Ukrainian favorite for this task. When roughly a mile from its target, it uses artificial intelligence to lock on, follow the drone and detonate, according to its users. Merops can travel at speeds of over 180 miles an hour and reach an altitude of up to around 16,000 feet, according to one user. This user said each drone cost around $5,000 for his unit. A U.S. official at the Polish test quoted a cost of around $15,000, which is still a far cheaper solution than missiles.

No system is infallible. The user said his Merops intercepts between 65% and 75% of the Shaheds it chases. On a recent test in Poland, a Polish air-defense crew flew a Merops at a target that imitates Shaheds but it missed. Poland has said it would order the system.

Other Western companies are developing interceptors. Swedish startup Nordic Air Defence, for instance, is testing interceptors as light as nine ounces that can smash into drones at altitudes up to around 6,000 feet.

Yuriy Ihnat, a spokesman for Ukraine’s air force, said Ukraine is scaling up its use of interceptors, but that they have their limitations, such as when poor weather prevents operators from seeing the target. Bullets and missiles have typically been the predominant defense.

Anton Mykhailov, right, and another member of the Bulava drone unit of the 3rd Mechanized Battalion of the Presidential Brigade.

Footage of an interception of a Russian drone. Video: 3rd Separate Assault Brigade/Ukrainian Armed Forces

The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has its own laboratory where it puts together drones from imported components and 3D-printed parts. For those it buys, the brigade often switches out components for more reliable ones, such as batteries and the controller that detonates the explosive.

“I want my crew to be safe,” said the brigade’s head of interceptors, whose call sign is Betsyk.

Sgt. Mykhailo Kudliak, a pilot in the Presidential Brigade’s 3rd Mechanized Battalion, hunts Shaheds and has downed as many as three in one night.

Operators say they need more interceptors to counter the growing number of Russian craft.

Anton Mykhailov, Kudliak’s co-pilot, said they sometimes have to choose between going in for the kill or preserving the interceptor for another day.

On a recent night, they were chasing a Shahed to a distance beyond which they wouldn’t be able to return their interceptor if it missed. They decided to chase the Shahed but it soon disappeared into the clouds, wasting a drone. Soon afterward, they learned the Shahed had hit a school.

Ruslan Stakhov, from the 3rd Mechanized Battalion of Ukraine’s Presidential Brigade.

The interceptor pilots’ job is full of highs and lows.

Ruslan Stakhov, a junior sergeant in the same unit, typically uses a drone that intercepts Russian surveillance drones and has downed around 25 of them. A few months ago he gave chase to a Shahed, but as it entered its final descent, his drone couldn’t keep up. Stakhov, a father of four, watched as the Shahed destroyed a house where he had once taken his car to be fixed.

“It was very upsetting, but that is a typical situation in war,” said Stakhov, who was a commercial lawyer before the full scale invasion. “We are not magicians.”

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com

WSJ

4. War Department Asks Industry to Make More Than 300K Drones, Quickly, Cheaply

Summary:

The War Department has launched a “drone dominance” drive to buy about 340,000 cheap, lethal, American made small UAS over two years, funded with $1 billion from the “Big Beautiful Bill.” An RFI seeks industry capacity to rapidly produce one way attack drones, starting with 30,000 units at $5,000 each in early 2026, scaling to 150,000 at roughly $2,300. The phased “gauntlet” approach gives a stable demand signal to build a broader drone industrial base. Hegseth aims to integrate drone “force on force wars” into training, change doctrine, and avoid shooting down $5,000 drones with $2 million missiles.

Comment: Now let's get to work and do what America has always done best: build things.

War Department Asks Industry to Make More Than 300K Drones, Quickly, Cheaply

Dec. 2, 2025 | By C. Todd Lopez, Pentagon News |

https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4346822/war-department-asks-industry-to-make-more-than-300k-drones-quickly-cheaply/

The War Department requested information earlier this week to gauge industry's willingness and ability to make some 300,000 drones quickly and inexpensively — a concrete effort by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to directly meet the "drone dominance" goals laid out by the president.

On June 6, President Donald J. Trump signed the "Unleashing American Drone Dominance" executive order outlining how the United States would up its drone game in both the commercial and military sectors, including how it would deliver massive amounts of inexpensive, American-made, lethal drones to U.S. military units to amplify their combat capabilities.

Hegseth followed up in July with the "Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance" memorandum, in which he laid out his plan for how the department would meet the president's intent.

Part of the secretary's plan included participating with other parts of government in building up the nascent U.S. drone manufacturing base by approving hundreds of American products for purchase by the department, powering a "technological leapfrog" by arming combat units with the very best of low-cost American-made drones, and finally, training as the department expects to fight.

"Next year I expect to see [drone] capability integrated into all relevant combat training, including force-on-force drone wars," the secretary said.

At that time, Hegseth said, he had already advanced American drone dominance by stripping away regulations that hindered the military's adoption of small drones and shifting the necessary authorities away from the department's bureaucracy and into the hands of unit commanders.

"This was the first step in the urgent effort to boost lethality across the force," Hegseth said in a video posted today to social media.

Now the War Department is moving out in a new way on the drone dominance initiative, Hegseth said.

"The second step is to kickstart U.S. industrial capacity and reduce prices, so our military can adequately budget for unmanned weapons," the secretary said.

He noted that, with help from Congress, the department will initially focus on small attack drones.

"Drone dominance is a billion-dollar program funded by President Trump's Big Beautiful Bill," Hegseth said. "It is purpose-built on the pillars of the War Department's new acquisition philosophy: a stable demand signal to expand the U.S. drone industrial base by leveraging private capital, paired with flexible contracting built for commercial companies, founded by our best engineers and entrepreneurs."

A stable demand signal means the War Department will make concrete plans to buy lots of drones, on a regular schedule, over a long period of time. When that happens, American industry will step up to the plate to satisfy the department's needs, including by investing in and building out its own capacity to produce in the long term.

The request for information released to industry this week spells out a plan that'll begin early next year, when the department will, over the course of two years, and within four phases, offer $1 billion to industry to build a large number of small unmanned aerial systems capable of conducting one-way attack missions.

The first of those four phases, called "gauntlets," runs from February to July 2026. During that time, 12 vendors will be asked to collectively produce 30,000 drones at a cost of $5,000 per unit, for a total of $150 million in department outlays.

Over the course of the next three gauntlets, the number of vendors will go down from 12 to five, the number of drones ordered will increase from 30,000 to 150,000, and the price per drone will drop from $5,000 to $2,300.

"Drone dominance will do two things: drive costs down and capabilities up," Hegseth said. "We will deliver tens of thousands of small drones to our force in 2026, and hundreds of thousands of them by 2027."

Through the drone dominance program, $1 billion from the Big Beautiful Bill will fund the manufacture of approximately 340,000 small UASs for combat units over the course of two years.

After that, it's expected that American industry's interest in building drones as a result of the program will have strengthened supply chains and manufacturing capacity to the point that the military will be able to afford to buy the drones it wants, in the quantity it wants, at a price it wants, through regular budgeting.

Equipment is only part of the game, the secretary said. Doctrine — how the warfighter fights — is also critical.

"I will soon be meeting with the military services to discuss transformational changes in warfighting doctrine," Hegseth said. "We need to outfit our combat units with unmanned systems at scale. We cannot wait. The funding provided by the Big Beautiful Bill is ready to be used to mount an effective sprint to build combat power. At the Department of War, we are adopting new technologies with a 'fight tonight' philosophy — so that our warfighters have the cutting-edge tools they need to prevail."

Following the end of the Cold War, Hegseth said, U.S. defense spending dropped precipitously, and as a result, there was also a consolidation of defense contractors from hundreds to just dozens. The department, he said, budgeted for quality rather than quantity — and for 30 years got what it needed.

"However, we now find ourselves in a new era," he said. "An era of cheap, disposable battlefield drones. We cannot be left behind — we must invest in inexpensive, unmanned platforms that have proved so effective."

Drone dominance, he said, is how the U.S. will meet the drone challenge posed by other nations.

"One of my priorities is rebuilding our military," Hegseth said. "We can't do that by doing business the same way we have in the past. We cannot afford to shoot down cheap drones with $2 million missiles. And we ourselves must be able to field large quantities of capable attack drones."

5. In Japan, public opinion turns against Trump’s ‘terrible, stupid’ US

Summary:

Japanese public support for ties with the US has fallen to 70.8 percent, near a historic low, driven by POTUS tariffs on autos, transactional burden sharing demands, and polarizing domestic policies. Massive new auto tariffs, only partially eased after huge Japanese investments, are seen as “terrible, stupid decisions.” Broader global polling shows US favorability falling into the 30–40 percent range, reinforcing doubts in Tokyo about long term US reliability. Japanese still see the alliance as necessary, but respect is eroding, tourism appeal is declining, and quiet questions are growing about hedging strategies, alliance diversification, China and future regional autonomy considerations.

Comment: Quite a clickbait headline. A historic low of 70.8% support for the US? America First. Allies Always. We need our silk web of alliances for our national security and for the necessary agility to project power forward to defend the homeland.

In Japan, public opinion turns against Trump’s ‘terrible, stupid’ US

A new survey reveals approval for US ties has hit near-record lows amid political turmoil, punitive tariffs and shock at Trump’s agenda

Julian Ryall

Published: 8:00am, 4 Dec 2025Updated: 6:28pm, 4 Dec 2025

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3335031/japan-public-opinion-turns-against-trumps-terrible-stupid-us

Julian Ryall

Published: 8:00am, 4 Dec 2025Updated: 6:28pm, 4 Dec 2025

Public opinion in Japan is souring towards the United States, as US President Donald Trump’s strong-arm trade tactics and divisive domestic policies test the bonds of an alliance that has endured for eight decades.

The Cabinet Office’s latest annual survey, released on Friday, revealed that 70.8 per cent of Japanese respondents viewed Japan-US relations as “good” or “quite good”, tumbling 14.7 percentage points from a year earlier.

It marked the second-lowest reading since the question was introduced in 1998 and close to the 68.9 per cent low recorded in 2008 at the end of George W. Bush’s presidency.

US President George W. Bush speaks at an event in Kyoto, Japan, in 2005. Photo: Xinhua

For more than a decade before this year, Japanese affinity for the US had typically hovered between the mid-80s and low-90s percentile.

The postal survey on attitudes towards Japan’s key partners and regional rivals was sent to 3,000 people aged 18 and over, with around 1,600 responding. Favourable views of relations with China came in at just 13.3 per cent, down from 14.7 per cent the year before.

The data was gathered between late September and early November, before a recent diplomatic fallout triggered by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan.

‘Terrible, stupid decisions’

“We used to think that the US was the most advanced and simply the best country in the world,” Kiyoko Date, an office worker from Yokohama, told This Week in Asia.

“But then, during Trump’s first administration, people slowly started to realise that the US had a lot of problems.”

Trump’s 2024 re-election deepened the disillusionment. Date spoke of her shock at his second term, which she described as “even worse than the first”.

She expressed dismay not only at trade policies but at the ideological direction of the administration – from the Elon Musk-led mass termination of federal employees to Robert F. Kennedy’s controversial healthcare agenda and the proposed abolition of the Department of Education.

“He has made some terrible, stupid decisions,” Date said of Trump.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi walks with US President Donald Trump upon his arrival at the Akasaka State Guest House in Tokyo on October 28. Photo: AFP

Public unease has been amplified by Washington’s tariff offensive against Japan’s flagship auto industry, which supports roughly one in eight jobs nationwide once suppliers, logistics and local services that depend on car manufacturing plants are included.

A tariff on Japanese vehicles Trump imposed in April took the effective rate of tax on imports from Japan from 2.5 to 27.5 per cent, darkening the outlook for manufacturers and regional economies built around assembly plants.

Even after Tokyo agreed to invest about US$500 billion in the US, the tariff was only cut back to 12.5 per cent – and critics argue the White House retains the power to restore higher duties at any time.

A poster depicting Trump with devil horns is seen during an anti-US protest in Brazil earlier this year. Photo: AFP

Not just Japan

Global polling points to a broader erosion of America’s standing, with recent surveys in Europe and North America showing favourable views of the US often in the 30-40 per cent range.

In some countries, such as Denmark and Canada, positive sentiment has fallen steeply since Trump’s return, fuelled by disputes over tariffs and territorial demands, reinforcing the impression among Japanese observers that doubts about Washington are not confined to their own country.

Despite the shift in sentiment captured by the Cabinet Office survey, analysts say many Japanese are only dimly aware of developments inside the US and instead react mainly to high-profile headlines and social media clips.

Higher approval figures recorded in the past reflected pragmatism about the US alliance rather than affection, according to one international relations expert who advises Japan’s government on ties with Washington and Beijing.

But he said “it is inevitable that there would be a loss of respect” given Trump’s tariffs and divisive comments. “And the longer he stays in power, then the more Japan and the Japanese are going to doubt the US.”

“Personally, I am surprised it did not fall further,” he said, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

A US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer holds a weapon during a protest in the state of Illinois in September. Photo: Reuters

Date said that while stories of mass deportations and crackdowns on migrants had evoked sympathy in Japan, it was not a major concern given that many of the country’s voters had themselves backed right-wing parties promising tougher immigration controls in the last general election.

Okinawa resident Yasu Chinen, a long-time opponent of the US bases in Japan’s most southerly prefecture, said he paid little attention to day-to-day developments in the US and “really doesn’t care”.

Japanese public opinion was too strongly influenced by media portrayals that presented Trump as uniquely bad and Democrats as inherently better, he said. “But I do not understand why people are so easily swayed.”

Chinen said he supported the current US administration’s hardline approach on deporting people who were in the country illegally and argued that Japan should follow suit.

“Why should I care?” he said, describing tariffs on Japanese exporters as a problem for Tokyo rather than ordinary people like him. “It’s not my problem.”

Japanese tourists pose in front of the Statue of Liberty in New York City on October 28, 2016. Photo: Reuters

Reluctant to return

Foreign residents report that Japan’s changing views of the US are subtly affecting how Japanese people perceive outsiders more broadly.

Joe Fick, a US-born language school owner in Tokyo, says he has not faced overt hostility, but acquaintances increasingly ask him why US citizens are unable to rein in their government.

“There has definitely been a change in the atmosphere,” he said. “Japanese friends ask me what is going on in the US and they keep asking me why the American people don’t do something, so I have to tell them that right now, there is nothing that can be done.”

Fick added that his Japanese wife and children now had little interest in visiting the US, put off by reports of aggressive questioning at immigration, refusals of entry and televised images of masked officials detaining people who appear to be targeted on the basis of skin colour.

I do not think I would go back there now

Japanese tourist Kiyoko Date, on returning to the US

“I don’t think things are going to get better,” Fick said, predicting that US immigration raids and military strikes on alleged drug runners would continue, at least until the midterm elections in November next year.

“The military is going to keep killing people in the Caribbean and ICE [US immigration enforcement] will keep detaining people who look different, and those are the images that we are going to see on Japanese television and on social media.”

Even long-time admirers of American culture such as Date, who last travelled to the US in October last year, are reconsidering whether they should return.

“We were in New York and I really enjoyed myself, but I do not think I would go back there now,” she said.

Julian Ryall

Julian Ryall never expected to still be in Japan 24 years after he first arrived, but he quickly realised its advantages over his native London. He lives in Yokohama with his wife and children and writes for publications around the world.

6. America’s Magical Thinking About Ukraine – A Bad Deal Is Worse Than No Deal

Summary:

Sergey Radchenko argues POTUS is pursuing “magical thinking” on Ukraine, chasing headline peace while ignoring that Putin seeks Ukrainian capitulation, not compromise. The 28-point Alaska plan echoed Kremlin demands and undercut U.S. and allied credibility. Russia is bleeding strategically; NATO cohesion and EU defense spending are rising. Forcing Kyiv into concessions would reward aggression, weaken the rules-based order, and embolden Russia. Washington should sustain long-war support, align peace terms with grand strategy, let Russia feel the costs of imperial overreach, and push Europe to finance most aid, as Reagan did with Afghan resistance, until Moscow accepts a just settlement.

Excerpts:

Trump must recognize that despite the visceral horrors of the war, he should not be in a rush to force a bad deal. The Europeans are clearly desperate to play more of a role in the conflict. If Europe continues funding American weapons purchases for Ukraine—which, by any measure of burden sharing, they certainly should and are willing to do—then there is yet time to work out a better deal. It demands little from the United States to exercise patience and remain on the side of the Ukrainians and their European supporters. If Trump can show the American public that the costs of the war in Ukraine are borne mostly by Europe, and not the United States, then he will not be so unnecessarily pressed to surrender Ukraine to Russia.

The best thing that can happen to Russia is that it discovers the limits of its imperialism the hard way—by getting bogged down in Ukraine. By contrast, winning the war (and this is what Putin clearly hopes to accomplish, whether on the battlefield or through peace negotiations) would only further inflame Putin’s hubris and encourage more aggression. Russia should face the consequences of its misguided policies, not reap the rewards of territorial enlargement. It should be made to realize that there are better ways to achieve greatness than invading one’s neighbors. For the sake of peace, Trump should not place further obstacles in the way of this belated realization.

America’s Magical Thinking About Ukraine

Foreign Affairs · More by Sergey Radchenko · December 4, 2025

A Bad Deal Is Worse Than No Deal

Sergey Radchenko

SERGEY RADCHENKO is Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Europe.

December 4, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/americas-magical-thinking-about-ukraine

A Ukrainian serviceman fires a howitzer, near Kostiantynivka, Ukraine, November 2025 Stringer / Reuters

SERGEY RADCHENKO is Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Europe.

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In August, U.S. President Donald Trump was disappointed when a meeting in Alaska with Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to produce a breakthrough in ending the war in Ukraine. “We didn’t get there,” Trump acknowledged at the time. Putin had evinced little interest in ceding ground on his maximalist demands, making a peace deal look remote, but the entirely predictable failure of the Alaska misadventure evidently did not deter Trump from trying again. In November, a 28-point peace plan—which media reports suggest was put together by both Russian and American officials—sent Kyiv and Ukraine’s European allies into conniptions because it largely reflected Russian positions on territory and Ukraine’s future. In tough negotiations with the United States, the Ukrainians successfully pushed back against many of these Russian-leaning positions, arriving at a new plan that Putin has yet to agree to.

Amid this pageantry of proposal and negotiation, Trump remains committed to chasing a fantasy. The U.S. president is seemingly unwilling to accept that his Russian counterpart does not want to end the war without securing Ukraine’s complete surrender. Trump continues to believe that, if only provided with sufficient inducements or threatened with new sanctions, Putin will trade his long-term goals for a reasonable settlement that will preserve a truncated but basically independent Ukraine, one able to defend itself against further Russian encroachment.

Impatient for deliverables, Trump has so far failed to develop a consistent, professional process for attaining them. His approach to peacemaking has suffered from an improbable degree of improvisation, exclusion of regional expertise, and consequentially, shallowness and flights of fancy. The 28-point plan was no exception: produced without consulting European allies and delivered in haste to the weary Ukrainians, it was riddled with inconsistencies and outright errors, and had to be walked back almost at once, undermining the credibility of the entire effort. The leak of transcripts that show Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff advising the Russians about the right way to talk to the U.S. president highlights mind-boggling lapses of judgment among key officials entrusted with looking after American national interests.

Although Trump sincerely wants peace, he has not quite understood how that peace fits within U.S. grand strategy. By pursuing peace at what appears to be almost any price—including at the cost of making significant concessions to Russia—the United States risks strengthening an adversary and allowing Putin to grasp victory from the jaws of certain strategic defeat.

WHEN BOTH SIDES ARE LOSING

It should be evident to anyone who has closely followed this conflict that, nearly four years on, Russia is much worse off than it was in February 2022. Its economy, resilient as it has been, is now in dire straits. With runaway inflation and an interest rate of 16.5 percent, Russia is on a steady track to recession. It has a shortage of labor, especially highly qualified labor. There is also a shortage of manpower for Russia’s war machine (an unsurprising fact, given the astronomical casualty numbers, perhaps over a million men, that Russia has sustained). Lower oil prices make it more difficult for the Kremlin to fill the holes in its budget, leading to lower spending on those areas not directly related to the war, such as health care and education. Russia finds itself increasingly dependent on China as a source of key technologies and as a market for Russian hydrocarbons; such dependence makes Russia deeply vulnerable to the whims of Beijing.

In short, this war has made Russia poorer, accelerating its demise as would-be great power. But while Russia’s trajectory toward irrelevance is all too clear, its aggressive behavior toward its neighbors (some of it clearly a sign of desperation in the Kremlin) has played into the West’s hands. Putin’s belligerence, including his boastful and entirely unrealistic claim that he is ready for war with Europe “right now,” is helping focus the Europeans on the need for a long-term plan to contain Russia. Since 2022, NATO has grown rapidly and seamlessly, with Sweden and Finland strengthening the alliance’s northern flank. In the meantime, fear of the war in Ukraine spilling over into eastern Europe—spurred by Moscow’s mindless provocations and penchant for hybrid warfare—has driven increased defense spending and ever closer defense cooperation within the European Union. All of this is very bad for Russia, which simply cannot afford a long-term confrontation with the world’s most powerful alliance.

To be sure, Ukraine is facing tremendous difficulties of its own. These include finding men to fight and financing war operations. There is also growing resentment in the country at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s governing methods and the alleged corruption of some of his associates, such as Andriy Yermak, the president’s erstwhile chief of staff. The Russians have indeed made some gains on the battlefield, but not of the kind that would justify the optimism that Putin is so desperate to project. In reality, both countries are losing this war. The question is which one will lose first. There is no reason to believe that Russia—still mired in the Donbas after four years—will suddenly achieve the battlefield breakthroughs that will lead to Kyiv’s immediate capitulation. Instead, all the indications point toward a war of attrition that neither side can bring to a meaningful end.

THE PARAMETERS OF PEACE

Putin has repeatedly claimed that Russia wants peace in Ukraine. But as Carl von Clausewitz memorably put it, an aggressor is “always peace-loving” insofar as it would prefer to invade unopposed. In his time, Joseph Stalin spoke about the importance of grasping the “banner of peace” as a way of rallying global public opinion to the Soviet cause (which, in his case, was frequently war). Putin stands squarely within this tradition. But his peace-loving statements—conditioned as they necessarily are by the requirement that Ukraine surrender to Russia’s demands—do affect how many people in the West perceive the war in Ukraine. It is intuitively appealing to believe, as Trump does, that peace may be around the corner if only Western officials gave the Russians a chance and offered them something.

Yet the parameters of Russia’s peace have been clear well before the 28-point proposal flummoxed Western capitals in November. The draft agreement from Russian-Ukrainian talks in Belarus and Istanbul in March and April 2022, and the Kremlin’s later pronouncements (including those demands the Russians presented to Ukraine in the more recent iteration of the Istanbul talks in May and June 2025) have long shown what the Russians will and won’t accept. Putin’s conditions include Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, which would preclude the country’s possible NATO membership or the presence of foreign troops on its soil; severe restrictions on the Ukrainian military, including caps on troop numbers and the types and weapons that Kyiv would be allowed to have; and weak security guarantees that Russia can veto if and when it opts to invade Ukraine again.

Putin has even more ambitious goals. He wants Ukraine and Western countries to accept Russia’s conquest of the Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—even though significant parts of these territories are still in Ukrainian hands—and his annexation of the Crimea. He demands Ukraine’s withdrawal from the entirety of Donetsk oblast, which Russia has tried but failed to capture. He wants sanctions on Russia to be lifted, and for countries to drop any attempt to hold the Kremlin—and him personally—accountable for this war. He wants Ukraine to change its laws around language and historical remembrance to accommodate Russia’s preferences for Ukraine’s national and historical identity.

Russian diplomat Yuri Ushakov and Putin meeting with Witkoff in Moscow, December 2025 Alexander Kazakov / Reuters

Finally, Putin wants Zelensky removed from power. He justifies this point—ironically enough for an illegitimate autocrat—with references to Zelensky’s lapsed legitimacy (Kyiv has been reluctant to stage now overdue presidential elections in wartime). The real reason, unquestionably, is that Putin is indignant that Zelensky stood up to his bullying. He wants the Ukrainian president gone to send a signal to other would-be challengers in Russia’s immediate neighborhood.

Not everything in the initial 28-point plan is without merit, however. For example, there is nothing to be gained by clinging to the clearly unrealizable idea of Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. In these nearly four years of fighting, neither the United States nor its European allies have shown any indication of their willingness to go to war with Russia over Ukraine. The fantasy of Ukraine’s accession to NATO should be dispensed with. Ukraine and its allies could accommodate other Russian demands, too, including the protection of the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine, or even the reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church, which Kyiv banned in 2024.

But even if Ukraine were willing to make such concessions, Russia would offer little in return. Any premature peace settlement that undermines the prospects of Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign country and lets Russia get away with territorial aggression would fly against Western interests, to say nothing of Ukraine’s. It is for this reason that Trump’s 28-point plan triggered such a backlash among the European allies, as well as in Kyiv. It accepted most of the Kremlin’s demands as a starting point for negotiations. And it offered a so-called peace that might, in fact, be much worse for both Ukraine and the West than the continuation of war. Bloody, grinding wars are costly in human and material terms, but if the alternative to such a war is the peace of surrender to Putin’s Russia, then that peace can wait.

LITTLE TO GAIN, MUCH TO LOSE

Trump’s heart is in the right place: ending a war that has already claimed hundreds of thousands of lives appears to be a reasonable goal. And Trump’s engagement with Moscow has already brought important dividends. For example, the Kremlin has toned down its nuclear saber-rattling. At the same time, the United States should not seem too eager for peace. That is invariably a bad negotiating strategy. Being too eager for anything usually indicates weakness, and in this case, the United States is clearly in a position of strength. It is supporting the noble cause of a country that has become a de facto American ally, a country that Washington can afford to back indefinitely. Support for the Ukrainian war effort costs the United States far less than any of its recent wars in the Middle East did.

What is more, while it is true that Ukraine wants to end this war as soon as possible, it is not desperate to capitulate to the aggressor. Ukrainian public opinion polls—for example, those conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology this autumn—show overwhelming opposition to the idea of voluntarily ceding any territory to Russia that is still in Ukrainian hands. A healthy majority of Ukrainians also oppose giving up any territory at all.

A public consensus in Ukraine holds that this is a war of national survival. For as long as this consensus prevails, the United States has no valid reason to force Ukraine into making sweeping concessions to the Kremlin. If these concessions served U.S. national interests, it would certainly be another matter. But the United States gains nothing from Ukraine capitulating to Russia. It’s quite the opposite. The United States should not want to allow a revisionist, aggressive state intent on dismantling the U.S.-led international order to win a major European war. U.S. national interests are therefore best served by continuing to provide intelligence and military equipment to Ukraine, especially when U.S. allies in Europe are happy to pay for American arms. Among other benefits, such American commitment will help Moscow reach the conclusion that this war is unwinnable, which may well lead to a real desire for peace and a willingness to make necessary concessions.

BELATED REALIZATIONS

Deal-making is worthwhile only when those deals serve a clear and well-considered purpose. The United States should not be desperate to bring about a peace that benefits U.S. adversaries at the expense of U.S. allies and the United States itself. Washington will gain nothing from extending the Russians a lifeline in the form of U.S.-sponsored peace talks that coerce Ukraine into an effective surrender and meet Putin’s essential demands.

To offer an analogy, giving in to Russia now would be a little bit like President Ronald Reagan, in 1983, forcing the Afghan opposition to accept Soviet demands. To what end? And how would that have benefited the United States? Reagan never had any such intention, and he continued supporting the Afghan resistance, ultimately forcing the Soviets to reconsider their goals in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Soviet leadership almost immediately recognized the mistake of their invasion (just as today many in the Russian leadership unquestionably understand the folly of the invasion of Ukraine). But hubris and inertia kept the Soviets bogged down in the unwinnable war for a few years still. In the end, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, describing Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound,” called it quits. His decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989 is now seen as an important element in the story of Soviet retrenchment and, eventually, the Soviet Union’s imperial collapse. It would not have been possible if Reagan—guided as he certainly was by the general desire for peace—facilitated a deal that would leave the Soviets entrenched in Kabul.

Trump must recognize that despite the visceral horrors of the war, he should not be in a rush to force a bad deal. The Europeans are clearly desperate to play more of a role in the conflict. If Europe continues funding American weapons purchases for Ukraine—which, by any measure of burden sharing, they certainly should and are willing to do—then there is yet time to work out a better deal. It demands little from the United States to exercise patience and remain on the side of the Ukrainians and their European supporters. If Trump can show the American public that the costs of the war in Ukraine are borne mostly by Europe, and not the United States, then he will not be so unnecessarily pressed to surrender Ukraine to Russia.

The best thing that can happen to Russia is that it discovers the limits of its imperialism the hard way—by getting bogged down in Ukraine. By contrast, winning the war (and this is what Putin clearly hopes to accomplish, whether on the battlefield or through peace negotiations) would only further inflame Putin’s hubris and encourage more aggression. Russia should face the consequences of its misguided policies, not reap the rewards of territorial enlargement. It should be made to realize that there are better ways to achieve greatness than invading one’s neighbors. For the sake of peace, Trump should not place further obstacles in the way of this belated realization.

Foreign Affairs · More by Sergey Radchenko · December 4, 2025

7. Japan’s Sanae Takaichi moves to ease weeks of tensions with China over the Taiwan Strait

Summary:

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi moved to cool weeks of friction with Beijing by affirming that Tokyo’s Taiwan policy remains unchanged and grounded in the 1972 Japan China Joint Communique, which “understands and respects” Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. This follows her November 7 description of a PLA attack on Taiwan as a “survival threatening situation,” implying possible Japanese military involvement and triggering Chinese retaliation through seafood bans, travel and study warnings, and suspended exchanges. Her climbdown softens tone but Beijing still demands a full, explicit restatement of Japan’s adherence to the one China framework.

Comment: Not mentioned in this article is the call from POTUS to the PM asking her to reduce the rhetoric.

Japan’s Sanae Takaichi moves to ease weeks of tensions with China over the Taiwan Strait

Tokyo’s position on the island is unchanged, the Japanese prime minister says in an apparent climbdown

Liu ZhenandZhuang Pinghuiin Beijing

Published: 7:00pm, 3 Dec 2025Updated: 9:20pm, 3 Dec 2025

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3335082/japans-sanae-takaichi-reaffirms-taiwan-part-china?utm

After weeks of turmoil in relations with China, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has sought to dial down tensions with Beijing over a hypothetical conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Responding to a lawmaker’s question on Wednesday, Takaichi told the Japanese parliament that Tokyo’s position on the island remained unchanged and referred to a 1972 commitment that led to the normalisation of ties between Beijing and Tokyo.

“The Japanese government’s basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communique, and there has been no change to this position,” Takaichi said.

According to the 1972 communique, “the government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” and the Japanese government “fully understands and respects this stand”.

The communique also says Japan “firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration”. Along with the Cairo Declaration of November 1943, which stipulates that Japan return territory seized from China during war, the two documents are often cited by Beijing as legal treaties supporting Taiwan as a part of China.

Takaichi’s comments on Wednesday come nearly a month after she told the parliament that an attack on Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” – one that could allow Tokyo to engage in military action.

Her statement on November 7 was the most explicit by a sitting Japanese prime minister on how Tokyo might respond to a Taiwan contingency and marked a departure from the country’s long-held strategic ambiguity over the issue. She later said the remarks were “hypothetical”.

The statement sent ties with China into a downward spiral, and prompted repeated demands from Beijing that she retract the remarks – something she refused to do.

In response, Beijing suspended imports of Japanese seafood, advised citizens not to travel or study in Japan, and cut intergovernmental and culture exchanges.

Why have Takaichi’s Taiwan comments sent China-Japan ties into a tailspin?

Takaichi’s latest remarks also echo Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi’s statement on Friday that the Japanese government’s basic position was “exactly as stated in the 1972 Joint Communique, and it is no more, no less than that”.

Nevertheless, the Chinese foreign ministry saw Motegi’s statement as evasive and perfunctory.

“They cannot even manage to fully reiterate the Japanese side’s stance,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said on Monday.

“Japan is paying mere lip service while acting unilaterally and arbitrarily, which is completely unacceptable to the Chinese side. On matters of fundamental principle, Japan must not have any delusion that it can get away with deception or ambiguity.”

China has pressured Japan to give an “honest, accurate and complete” clarification of its “consistent position” on Taiwan.

Beijing has maintained that simply saying that the November 7 remarks “do not change the government’s consistent position” is “far from enough”.

“What China and the international community want clarified is: what exactly is Japan’s so-called consistent position? Does Japan still adhere to the one-China principle?” Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said last month.

Mao said Japan should “honestly, accurately and fully clarify” its position and that any “attempt to gloss over details or evade substance by referring only to abstract concepts in order to deceive others will not work”.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the United States and Japan, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. But Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-ruled island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

Sino-Japanese relations have long been rocked by various historical and geopolitical factors, including wartime grievances, territorial disputes, Japan’s moves to expand the role of its self-defence forces and rising nationalist sentiment on both sides.

Additional reporting by Vanessa Cai

Liu Zhen

Liu Zhen joined the Post in 2015 as a reporter on the China desk. She previously worked with Reuters in Beijing.

Zhuang Pinghui

Based in Beijing, Zhuang Pinghui joined the Post in 2004 to report on China. She covers a range of issues including policy, healthcare, culture and society.

8. Navigating The All-Domain Battlespace: Introducing All-Terrain Planning

Summary:

Joint All-Domain Operations demand “all-terrain planning,” treating air, land, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum as distinct terrain that must be deliberately ceded, contested, or dominated based on mission priorities and resource limits. The aim is not to win everywhere, but to create convergence: synchronized effects across domains at decisive times and places. This requires all-terrain planning teams with deep domain expertise, cross-domain education, and a culture of innovation, supported by JADC2 for shared situational awareness. The payoff is disciplined prioritization, smarter risk acceptance, and more efficient employment of finite joint capabilities in large scale, peer conflict.

Excerpts:

The evolving landscape of modern warfare, characterized by expansive theaters, resource constraints, and peer adversaries with multi-domain capabilities, demands a transformative shift in the US Military’s approach. JADO represents this evolution, integrating capabilities across air, land, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum to deliver decisive results. Successful implementation of JADO requires more than technology; it requires a new mindset focused on agility, adaptability, and achieving convergence – the synchronized application of combat power across multiple domains at a critical point.

Central to JADO is the all-terrain planning framework, which treats each domain as a distinct terrain feature with unique attributes, challenges, and opportunities. This framework guides decisions regarding when to cede, contest, or dominate specific domains, informed by a comprehensive analysis of domain characteristics, strategic priorities, resource constraints, and adversary capabilities. These deliberate choices streamline risk management and enable effective resource allocation, maximizing impact on overall mission success.

The effectiveness of JADO hinges on a highly skilled all-terrain planning team, composed of experts from across a joint headquarters. Through rigorous selection, cross-domain training, and a collaborative environment, this team analyzes domain characteristics, assesses adversary capabilities, develops comprehensive courses of action, and integrates all-domain considerations into the operational plan. By adopting this framework, cultivating all-terrain planning teams, and prioritizing convergence at critical junctures, the joint force can enhance resource prioritization, risk management, and achieve decisive results in future conflicts.

Navigating The All-Domain Battlespace: Introducing All-Terrain Planning

by Matthew Prescott

12.04.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/04/all-terrain-planning-joint-all-domain-operations/

Abstract

Joint All-Domain Operations necessitate a shift towards “all-terrain planning,” a framework that conceptualizes each operational domain as a distinct terrain feature with unique characteristics. This approach moves beyond simply operating in each domain, instead focusing on when and how to strategically allocate resources based on operational objectives. Crucially, all-terrain planning teams must determine when to cede, contest, or dominate a domain to optimize resource employment and achieve synergistic effects across the air, land, sea, space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. Implementing this approach is essential for achieving decisive advantage in complex twenty-first-century conflicts.

Introduction

Contemporary warfare has evolved far beyond the linear, attrition-based models of the past due to rapid technological advancements. Warfare is now multi-dimensional, extending beyond land, sea, and air to encompass space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Complicating matters further, peer adversaries possess sophisticated capabilities and tactics across all domains, that challenge the United States’ strategic objectives and exploit perceived vulnerabilities. To effectively counter threats and maintain a competitive edge, the United States (US) Military has embraced Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), a transformative warfighting concept that integrates capabilities across all domains and joint functions. JADO signifies a departure from traditional domain-centric approaches, where individual services operated largely independently within their designated spheres. Instead, JADO envisions a seamless, interconnected, and interoperable force. A force that can rapidly share information, coordinate actions, and deliver decisive effects across the air, land, sea, space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum domains.

To achieve success in the next conflict, the US Military does not need to dominate everywhere across the complex battlespace; rather, it requires a disciplined, integrated planning approach developed around JADO planning considerations. This article introduces “all-terrain planning,’ a framework that shifts from simply operating within each domain to strategically allocating resources based on operational objectives—deciding where to deliberately cede, contest, or dominate control of key domains as the situation dictates. An “all-terrain planning” framework treats each domain as a distinct terrain feature, characterized and valued by unique operational advantages, limitations, and vulnerabilities, demanding a nuanced understanding of when to cede, contest, or dominate based on resource constraints and operational objectives. Such domain prioritization, guided by a comprehensive assessment of adversary vulnerabilities and focused on achieving convergent effects at critical junctures, is paramount to optimizing resource employment, achieving synergistic effects, and attaining a decisive advantage in the complex twenty-first-century battlespace.

Central to this framework is the “all-terrain planning team,” a critical team composition capable of integrating domain expertise and applying established military principles while planning joint all-domain operations. By investing in planner development and embracing all-terrain planning, the US Military can achieve true convergence, unlocking the full potential of JADO and ensuring decisive advantage in future conflicts through smarter, not just greater, resource allocation.

Terrain Analysis & Battlespace Management in JADO

In future conflicts involving the US, military operations will likely be conducted in concert with allies and partners across expansive geographic theaters. These theaters will likely be organized into multiple joint operations areas (JOAs), each under the command of a designated joint force commander (JFC). Given the JFC’s responsibility for orchestrating JADO within their respective JOA, resource constraints are anticipated.

The successful implementation of JADO as a decisive warfighting concept requires a dynamic and adaptive operational approach, prioritizing actions in each domain to exploit advantages and manage risk across an operational environment, especially during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The inherent complexity of LSCO, characterized by vast operational areas, dispersed forces, and resource constraints, only amplifies the need for JADO’s adaptable, multi-faceted approach. Success in LSCO demands operational agility that allows the military to dynamically allocate resources, exploit opportunities, and achieve convergence at critical points.

However, the mere integration of capabilities and technological advancements does not guarantee success in JADO. A truly effective all-domain approach necessitates a fundamental shift in mindset. It requires moving beyond the traditional stove-piped planning processes to embrace an “all-terrain planning” framework. This framework requires military planners to view each operational domain as a distinct terrain feature, characterized by unique attributes, challenges, and opportunities. Just as terrain analysis informs maneuver and fire support decisions on the physical battlefield, a comprehensive understanding of each domain’s characteristics is crucial for effective resource allocation and operational effectiveness in JADO.

US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, underscores the importance of terrain analysis as a foundational element of successful military operations. Traditionally, terrain analysis focused on the physical features of the land, such as elevation, vegetation, and obstacles, and their impact on maneuver, firepower, and logistics. However, the concept of terrain must now expand to encompass the non-physical domains that are integral to modern warfare. As outlined in US Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, operations in one domain will invariably have consequences in others. Merriam-Webster defines terrain as “a geographic area,” “a piece of land,” or “the physical features of a tract of land.” Applying this definition broadly, we can conceptualize each domain—air, land, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum—as a distinct area presenting unique characteristics and challenges. All-terrain planning requires a broad perspective that applies established joint functions, like movement & maneuver, fires, and protection, to facilitate a more holistic and resource-informed understanding of the operational landscape to enable more effective planning.

Deciding when to Cede, Contest, and Dominate Domains

Effective JADO hinges on an operational approach that prioritizes domains and allocated resources based on their relative importance across the operational environment. Acknowledging the fluctuating importance of different domains across varying times and locations, a disciplined and adaptable framework enables strategic resource allocation by deliberately shifting focus between ceding, contesting, and dominating key domains based on the specific operational environment. Informed by a comprehensive analysis of domain characteristics, strategic priorities, resource constraints, and adversary capabilities, this strategy streamlines risk management and fosters convergence at decisive points, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of all-domain planning – a complex challenge, especially amplified within the scale and scope of LSCO.

The cornerstone of successful JADO lies in the ability to effectively plan the allocation of resources by knowing when to cede, contest, and dominate domains across the duration and space of an operation.

The decision to cede control in a specific domain is often the most difficult, yet strategically vital choice. Ceding is not an admission of defeat but rather a calculated choice to conserve resources, consolidate capabilities, and create opportunities for future offensive actions. It implies accepting a degree of risk in a particular area, deliberately foregoing attempts to control or influence it, and requires careful consideration of potential consequences. Resource limitations and the need to prioritize efforts in other geographic areas, where a greater impact can be achieved in this domain, often drive this decision. In a hypothetical scenario, a joint force facing a numerically superior adversary in the land domain might strategically cede less defensible terrain to consolidate forces along a more advantageous defensive line. For example, during a conflict in the South China Sea, the US Navy might temporarily cede control of certain islands to focus on maintaining sea control in the broader region and ensuring freedom of navigation for other maritime assets.

The advantage of ceding lies in the conservation of resources, the ability to concentrate efforts where they have the greatest impact, and the potential for deceiving the adversary. However, given our inherent national vulnerabilities in the cyber and space domains, completely ceding control of these domains is untenable due to major dependencies. Instead, planners should analyze and prioritize the protection requirements of identified key terrain in these domains to allow more acceptable ceding options that prevent adversaries from gaining a marked advantage. In many cases, a commander’s risk tolerance may preclude any willingness to cede terrain during military operations. To mitigate potential consequences and adversary exploitation when ceding terrain, planners must develop contingency plans. These plans should instill sufficient confidence in the commander that ceding terrain, when necessary, remains a viable and acceptable decision.

Conversely, contesting a domain involves actively challenging an adversary’s control or influence without necessarily seeking dominance. This approach is crucial when resources are insufficient for a full-scale offensive, or when the primary objective is to disrupt, degrade, or deny an adversary’s capabilities. Contesting aims to create a more favorable environment for future offensive actions or to prevent the adversary from achieving its objectives. It involves maintaining a credible threat, exploiting adversary weaknesses, and applying targeted measures to disrupt their operations, erode their morale, and force them to expend resources on defensive measures.

Examples of contesting include deploying offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure, launching electronic warfare operations to jam adversary communications, and conducting targeted strikes to degrade enemy air defenses. For instance, the US military used electronic warfare against Iraqi air defenses during Operation Desert Storm, demonstrating a strategy designed to contest the enemy’s control of the air. Similarly, Iran employs asymmetric naval tactics, including small boats and anti-ship missiles, in the Persian Gulf, as a strategy designed to contest US naval dominance in the region. Attritable and non-attritable gray-zone activities, such as China’s actions with its maritime militia, law enforcement patrols, and illegal fishing activities, demonstrate great examples of how China is contesting certain domains below the threshold of armed conflict to undermine rivals and exploit vulnerabilities.

Dominating a domain, on the other hand, implies achieving a level of control that allows the joint force to operate freely and unhindered during specific periods. This requires a significant investment in resources and capabilities and is typically prioritized in domains deemed most critical to achieving operational effects and objectives. Dominating a domain often entails establishing air superiority, achieving sea control, or securing a key landmark to establish a marked advantage over an adversary. The advantage of dominating is the creation of a secure operating environment for friendly forces, the ability to project power and influence, and the potential to achieve a marked advantage over an adversary.

The cornerstone of successful JADO lies in the ability to effectively plan the allocation of resources by knowing when to cede, contest, and dominate domains across the duration and space of an operation. This requires a highly skilled “all-terrain planning team,” capable of understanding the nuances of each domain and integrating them into a well-coordinated and synchronized plan. All-terrain planning teams must possess a deep understanding of each domain’s characteristics, including its key terrain, vulnerabilities, and potential impact on overall mission success. They must also be adept at analyzing adversary courses of action based on their capabilities and intentions, assessing the risks associated with each friendly and adversary course of action, and identifying opportunities for achieving convergence at critical points in the battlespace.

Achieving Convergence: The Decisive Application of Combat Power

When deciding to dominate domains, the goal should be centered around achieving convergence – the simultaneous application of combat power across multiple domains at a decisive time and place. This requires the synchronization of effects across multiple domains to overwhelm the adversary and achieve decisive friendly results. Convergence requires a sophisticated command and control (C2) system capable of coordinating actions across different domains, each with its own unique characteristics and timelines. To mitigate all-domain coordination challenges, the US Military’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is designed to address the C2 challenges inherent in convergence by improving information sharing, decision-making, and coordination across all domains. By creating an advanced joint common operation picture, JADC2 aims to enable commanders to make informed decisions and synchronize actions across the all-domain environment.

However, achieving convergence is not simply about coordinating actions; it is about orchestrating the achievement of effects to maximize the impact of each domain’s contribution. The all-terrain planning framework provides a structured approach for identifying the critical domains, resources, and synchronization requirements needed to achieve convergence. Effective synchronization is paramount and goes beyond simple coordination. It requires a precise timing of actions across distinct domains to maximize their cumulative effect. Joint Publication 3-0 emphasizes synchronization as a key principle of joint operations by ensuring actions of all elements are coordinated in time, space, and purpose. Planners must not only understand the capabilities of each domain but also how they can integrate and synchronize them to achieve a unified effect. This requires a deep understanding of the timelines and dependencies of each domain, as well as the potential for unintended consequences. Such considerations should be emphasized when assembling an all-terrain planning team.

By focusing on domains where achieving dominance or contesting the adversary’s actions will have the greatest impact, the joint force can maximize its limited resources to achieve objectives. In a hypothetical scenario, a joint force might seek to achieve air superiority by launching a coordinated cyberattack against the adversary’s air defense systems, simultaneously deploying electronic warfare capabilities to jam their radar networks, and launching a strike by stealth aircraft to destroy key air defense nodes. This convergent application of combat power across the cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and air domains creates a synergistic effect, overwhelming the adversary’s defenses and enabling the joint force to achieve a decisive marked advantage.

Cultivating the All-Terrain Planning Team

JADO’s success relies on the effectiveness of its all-terrain planning team. This team, comprised of individuals with diverse expertise from across the joint force, must function as a cohesive and cross-functional team. They must share information, collaborate on solutions, and develop integrated operational plans. The team must include knowledgeable representatives from all relevant domains, as well as experts across all joint functions. Creating an effective all-terrain planning team requires several key steps, such as:

Selection of Qualified Personnel—the individuals selected for the team must possess a deep understanding of their respective domains and a broad appreciation for the complexities of all-domain operations. They should also possess strong analytical, problem-solving, and communication skills.

Cross-Domain Training and Education—to foster a shared understanding of the all-domain environment, team members must receive cross-domain training and education. This could include familiarization courses on the characteristics of each domain, as well as joint exercises, simulations, and wargaming that require them to collaborate on all-domain planning problems.

Establishment of Clear Roles and Responsibilities—each team member must have a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities within the planning process. This includes defining who is responsible for analyzing the characteristics of each domain, assessing the adversary’s capabilities, developing courses of action, and integrating all-domain considerations into the operational plan.

Fostering a Culture of Collaboration and Innovation—the team must operate in an environment and establish a culture that fosters open communication, collaboration, and innovation. This requires creating a safe atmosphere where team members feel comfortable sharing their ideas, challenging assumptions, and experimenting with new approaches.

Conclusion: Towards a Future of All-Terrain Planning

The evolving landscape of modern warfare, characterized by expansive theaters, resource constraints, and peer adversaries with multi-domain capabilities, demands a transformative shift in the US Military’s approach. JADO represents this evolution, integrating capabilities across air, land, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum to deliver decisive results. Successful implementation of JADO requires more than technology; it requires a new mindset focused on agility, adaptability, and achieving convergence – the synchronized application of combat power across multiple domains at a critical point.

Central to JADO is the all-terrain planning framework, which treats each domain as a distinct terrain feature with unique attributes, challenges, and opportunities. This framework guides decisions regarding when to cede, contest, or dominate specific domains, informed by a comprehensive analysis of domain characteristics, strategic priorities, resource constraints, and adversary capabilities. These deliberate choices streamline risk management and enable effective resource allocation, maximizing impact on overall mission success.

The effectiveness of JADO hinges on a highly skilled all-terrain planning team, composed of experts from across a joint headquarters. Through rigorous selection, cross-domain training, and a collaborative environment, this team analyzes domain characteristics, assesses adversary capabilities, develops comprehensive courses of action, and integrates all-domain considerations into the operational plan. By adopting this framework, cultivating all-terrain planning teams, and prioritizing convergence at critical junctures, the joint force can enhance resource prioritization, risk management, and achieve decisive results in future conflicts.

Tags: cyberspace, electronic warfare, Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), Joint Operations, large-scale combat operations, Space Domain, Terrain Analysis

About The Author

Matthew Prescott
Matthew Prescott is a United States Army officer assigned to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command with eight years of experience in joint planning and instruction. His publications in defense journals such as Joint Force Quarterly, The Three Swords, and Military Review, combined with practical experience at operational and strategic joint and allied headquarters, demonstrate a deep and nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in planning and executing joint all-domain operations.

9. Ukraine’s SOF Redefine Recovery and Reintegration Under Fire

Summary:

Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces are sustaining combat effectiveness under near continuous deployment by building a two track system: rapid “operational resilience” at forward psychological support points and longer term reintegration led by veteran networks. Small teams conduct two to three day deep raids with little sanctuary, producing cumulative “rust” rather than collapse. Commanders now treat psychological strain like ammunition, monitored and managed in real time, with combat veteran psychologists providing one to three day stabilization and follow on care. Parallel, veteran led reintegration programs for families and careers create a whole of life arc that outpaces current NATO SOF models.

Comment: Our Army has transformation in contact. Ukraine has transformation under fire.

Ukraine’s SOF Redefine Recovery and Reintegration Under Fire

By Erin McFee, Corioli Institute.

December 3, 2025 Guest Ukraine 0

https://sof.news/ukraine/ukraine-sof-resilience/

By Erin McFee, Corioli Institute.

This article is based on field interviews with personnel from Ukrainian SOF and other elite units, veterans, and mental-health practitioners conducted in October and November 2025 in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and the Dnipropetrovsk region. Identities have been withheld for security reasons.

Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) are refining a two-track system to sustain combat effectiveness under near-continuous deployment conditions, according to field interviews conducted in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk with active operators, intelligence personnel, and veteran-led support networks.

Officials and frontline personnel describe an ever-evolving operational environment with overlapping stressors and minimal recovery windows. As a result, they have adopted new approaches for both operational resilience—designed to return operators to the fight—and reintegration, aimed at supporting the smaller but growing number of personnel transitioning out of service.

Compressed Cycles and Operational Realities

During the 2005-2008 surge in Iraq, US and Allied SOF units regularly executed 3-5+ missions per night, sometimes more than doubling that during peak periods. Typically, these missions ran for hours, received extensive air and ground logistics support, and focused on direct action, such as high-value-target raids, hostage rescues, and interdicting insurgent networks. Western forces benefited from secure, stable rear areas, significant firepower overmatch, robust MEDEVAC, and the Golden Hour (i.e., world-class trauma care within 60 minutes).

In contrast, Ukrainian SOF operate with a different OPTEMPO model. Missions typically involve small teams penetrating several kilometers behind relatively stationary front lines, conducting sabotage raids like mining supply routes, destroying equipment, ambushing logistics, and disrupting Russian rear areas. While tempo is exceptionally high in terms of consistent, ongoing sabotage assignments, Ukrainian operations often last 2–3 days in hostile territory, requiring significant periods of stealth and endurance without dedicated enabling assets on insertion or extraction.

In one interview, a SOF veteran rested a hand on the temporary prosthetic that now replaced his right leg after a mine blast and recounted his drawn-out evacuation: “I waited for two days.”

This combat rhythm compresses time and erodes traditional concepts of forward support. Furthermore, the once-assumed safety of rear areas has vanished in the panopticon of drone saturation, electronic warfare interference, and persistent indirect fire. Unlike Western campaigns of the past, Ukrainian SOF face a battlespace where safe zones are minimal or nonexistent.

Operators describe living in a constant oscillation between direct combat and “partial rest” without the benefit of predictable rotations or established force-preservation intervals standard in NATO contexts. This continuous exposure redefines the psychological equation: the mission never truly ends, and “home” itself becomes part of the frontline.

The consequences of this OPTEMPO can manifest in gradual corrosion of emotional responsiveness—a thinning of empathy and slowing reaction time. “It’s not a collapse, it’s rust,” one unit leader said. “You don’t break; you harden until you can’t bend.” In short, Ukraine’s SOF are conducting complex, high-intensity operations with minimal strategic depth. The result is a form of endurance that is less about rotation cycles and more about survival under continuous pressure.

A New Definition of Operational Resilience

To maintain force strength, SOF and the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) have established a system of forward psychological support points located mere kilometers from the front for personnel engaged in high-risk missions, covert operations, and repeated deployments. These nodes provide rapid stabilization administered by combat-experienced psychologists that lasts between one and three days. Follow-up support is available for up to 2 weeks for those deemed likely to benefit from more in-depth engagement; in some cases, counselors invite family members into the process.

A senior program director with HUR said the new approach accelerates access to care by eliminating lengthy bureaucratic approval processes, allowing operators to return to duty swiftly. The framework is designed specifically for operational resilience, meaning short-cycle recovery aimed at enabling redeployment over long-term rehabilitation.

“The psychologist’s recommendation is now enough. We removed the medical commission step so operators can move to treatment in days, not weeks.”

This adaptive response fosters a cultural shift. Historic mistrust of psychological care, partly rooted in punitive Soviet-era mental health practices, is being replaced by trust in peers with combat experience. The current system reframes it as operational maintenance, rooted in local trust.

“A soldier will not talk to a psychologist with no experience in the war,” one veteran from an elite unit in the intelligence apparatus explained, “but he will talk to [another soldier] who understands what an artillery strike feels like.”

Reintegration Needs Emergent but Expanding

Reintegration—defined as the long-term process of returning to family life, civilian environments, or post-military roles—requires structures different from those for operational resilience.

Reports from both operators and veteran associations highlight persistent challenges in addition to direct exposure to traumatic events, including difficulty reconnecting with families – both physically for those who left the country and relationally for those who remained – and civilian populations in general. Loss of operational identity and team cohesion can compound feelings of isolation and alienation.

Veteran-led programs have responded by filling gaps. The Association of Veterans of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine has become a central hub for psychological support, legal assistance, rehabilitation, and economic transition. For some transitioning operators, family-based residential programs lasting up to 21 days support psychological recovery and help re-establish non-operational identities. The Association’s Director described their long-term outlook: “We’re not building this for one conflict. We’re building what will be needed for fifty years.”

One veteran psychologist in the Kharkiv oblast described developing his own trauma-treatment protocol while recovering from traumatic brain injury. He drew from translated PTSD manuals to simplify complex clinical models into brief, repeatable exercises that soldiers could learn quickly. Over two years, he has conducted more than 2,000 sessions, teaching techniques based on Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR), mindfulness, and bilateral stimulation, stripped of jargon and therapy culture and, as a result, better suited to the Ukrainian operator’s needs and cultural context.

His ethos is pragmatic: “They don’t need to believe in psychology. They just need to do the drills.” It also frames trauma as an injury to be trained through, rather than a weakness to be confessed. The result is a uniquely hybrid system that combines military precision, peer trust, and improvisation.

Lessons from Ukraine for NATO Psychological Support

Ukraine’s recent experiences reveal distinctive approaches to combat psychology and psychological support for military-to-civilian transitions that challenge and extend current NATO doctrine and programs.

Embedded care within operations. While NATO Combat and Operational Stress Control (COSC) principles endorse rapid decompression and immediate intervention when units come off the line, Ukrainian SOF have moved towards a more flexible, less bureaucratic, and commander-driven version of forward care than is typical in most NATO units, where structures and protocols may slow or compartmentalize the delivery of support. This minimizes bureaucracy and adapts care to fluid, high OPTEMPO environments where traditional rear-area support is unavailable.
Peer-based and veteran-led networks: The Ukrainian use of appropriately trained and licensed combat veterans as peer clinicians and trusted support figures surpasses the standard NATO “peer support” model by deeply integrating ex-operators in clinical and advisory roles and leveraging lived experience for both credibility and stigma reduction. Though this is not a system-wide approach in Ukraine, various units and associations have already achieved success with this method.
Horizontal trust networks. Ukrainian psychological support for SOF, as described by those interviewed, includes sustained, horizontally connected networks (e.g., informal, formal, legal, and family systems) that initiate intervention early in the service arc, rather than only after operational separation or discharge. These networks are deeply embedded in operator communities, fostering resilience through consistent peer, family, and community engagement and facilitating rapid intervention when needed. NATO’s focus is growing in this direction, but it is often more segmented, with less immediate integration within operational units or veteran networks.
Endurance as managed strain. Treating psychological load operationally—explicitly managing and distributing it, akin to physical injuries—marks a shift from resilience as endurance (ignoring strain) to resilience as deliberate management. While NATO doctrine is evolving, it has historically relied on endurance and recovery, which makes Ukraine’s operationalization of psychological management notably more actionable and distinct.
Continuous, not episodic, reintegration. Ukraine’s model of parallel rehabilitation from the first casualty, not merely at the end of service, is a more dynamic and “whole arc” approach compared to many existing NATO models, which are less integrated across the service life cycle.

Endurance Without Rest: The Frontier of Modern Special Operations

Ukrainian SOF practice shows that resilience is not an individual trait but a dynamic resource managed at the command level. By treating psychological strain like ammunition or MEDEVAC (i.e., monitored, redistributed, and addressed in real time), units sustain performance during high-tempo operations. Forward, decentralized psychosocial support better positions commanders to blunt fatigue before it becomes irreversible, and empowers leaders to intervene early at the point of need.

At the same time, resilience forged in service does not guarantee smooth reintegration. The same early stressors that build identity and cohesion can leave operators vulnerable to loss of purpose after discharge. Ukraine’s experience underscores the value of veteran-led networks and purposeful post-service roles, such as mentorship, instruction, and counseling, to sustain belonging and continuity. When SOF units cultivate emotional intelligence early, they gain stronger leaders in combat as well as veterans who can carry that strength into whatever comes next.

**********

Author: Erin McFee, PhD, MBA, is the Founder and President of the Corioli Institute. She is a recognized leader in the scholarship and practice of ex-combatant reintegration and security stabilization. Erin has over 14 years of experience in security cooperation, institutional capacity building, and irregular warfare. Her work has taken her to South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe – including areas experiencing conflict such as Ukraine, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia. She has published numerous articles and frequently is invited as a speaker at events related to her work and research.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/erinmcfee/

https://www.corioli.org

10. Poll finds increasing support for international engagement, Golden Dome spending

Summary:

A new Ronald Reagan Institute poll shows growing bipartisan backing for “peace through strength” and active U.S. global leadership despite POTUS’s America First posture. Sixty-four percent favor greater international engagement, 68 percent view NATO favorably, and majorities support arming Ukraine, backing its victory, and distrust any deal with Russia. Strong pluralities approve defending Taiwan, striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, and using the military against drug traffickers in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sixty-eight percent support increased funding for the Golden Dome homeland air defense system, and a near-even split would shift forces from Europe and the Middle East toward the Western Hemisphere.

Comment: Listen to the American people.

Poll finds increasing support for international engagement, Golden Dome spending - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · Ashley Roque

“Majorities want the United States to take the lead in international affairs, believe American military superiority is essential, and support a force sized to deter and, if necessary, win conflicts against more than one major adversary at a time,” said a summary of the annual Ronald Reagan Institute poll.

By Ashley Roque on December 04, 2025 12:01 am

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/poll-finds-increasing-support-for-international-engagement-golden-dome-spending/

WASHINGTON — As defense leaders head to Reagan National Defense Forum to mingle with Trump administration officials, a new poll finds growing bipartisan support for NATO, sending weapons to Ukraine and Golden Dome spending.

“American people continue to favor peace through strength and active U.S. engagement in the world,” a summary of the poll said. “Majorities want the United States to take the lead in international affairs, believe American military superiority is essential, and support a force sized to deter and, if necessary, win conflicts against more than one major adversary at a time.”

Each year the Ronald Reagan Institute releases its defense and national security poll before high-level officials, lawmakers and defense contractors descend on Simi Valley, Calif., for the weekend forum. This time around, pollsters conducted the survey ahead of the release of a new National Defense Strategy and at a time when the Trump administration is withdrawing from the world stage, striking vessels in the Caribbean and deploying the National Guard to cities around the country.

A bipartisan survey of more than 2,500 people showed that participants are mixed on some of those moves. For example, 64 percent of respondents said the US should be more engaged in international events, up 7 percent from this time last year.

This year has also marked some ups and downs for US support for NATO and the ongoing war in Ukraine; including a 28-point peace plan for Kyiv that caught allies and partners by surprise.

But when pollsters asked respondents about their view of NATO, 68 percent gave a favorable opinion, up 6 percent from last year, and only 34 percent said they would support withdrawing from the treaty.

As for the military conflict in Eastern Europe, 62 percent of respondents said they want Ukraine to win the war, and 64 percent said they favor sending US weapons to Kyiv, a figure up 9 percent from last year. An overwhelming number of respondents — 70 percent — also said they would not trust Russia to honor the terms of any peace agreement with Ukraine.

As for the Middle East, the poll found that 50 percent of respondents support the US sending weapons to Israel, down 4 percent from last year, while 60 percent said they backed the US military targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities this summer.

Out in the Indo-Pacific region, 77 percent of respondents said it is important for the US military to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is expected to release a new National Defense Strategy this year that could place an enhanced focus on the homeland and Western hemisphere. The annual poll found that 49 percent of respondents favored the US government shifting a major portion of its global military presence and resources away from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and refocusing those resources on the Western Hemisphere. In comparison, roughly 40 percent of those polled said they would oppose such a decision.

Another controversial topic right now, and sure to come up during the weekend forum, is a possible US military intervention in Venezuela. As of Tuesday, there have been at least 21 strikes on vessels in the region.

When pollsters asked about using the US military against suspected drug traffickers in Latin America and the Caribbean, 62 percent of people said they were in favor, while 36 percent said they opposed the operations.

This year’s poll also asked participants about the Trump administration’s new sprawling, multilayered homeland air defense system called Golden Dome. While the details and costs of the program remain guarded, 68 percent of respondents said they support increased Golden Dome spending, while 26 percent said they were in the opposition camp.

Also on the domestic front, the Trump administration’s decision to deploy the National Guard to cities around the country has been hotly contested. When respondents were asked about decisions to use the Guard to “support local police during major civil disturbances and to address violent crime,” 55 percent of respondents said they approved while 43 percent placed themselves in the disapproval category.

“Our findings show that Americans want the United States to lead globally, maintain a military strong enough to deter authoritarian adversaries, and stand by allies who are on the front lines of defending freedom,” a summary of the poll said.

breakingdefense.com · Ashley Roque

11.Pentagon Deploys New Kamikaze Drone Copied From Iranian Design

Summary:

The Pentagon is fielding Task Force Scorpion Strike, its first one-way attack drone squadron in the Middle East, built around SpektreWorks’ FLM-136 “Lucas,” a reverse-engineered copy of Iran’s Shahed-136. Each autonomous kamikaze drone costs about $35,000, flies roughly six hours, and can be launched from multiple platforms, providing a cheap strike option compared to $16 million MQ-9s and costly interceptors. This is an early pillar of Hegseth’s Drone Dominance initiative to arm every Army squad with attack drones by FY 2026, accelerate 60-day tech fielding cycles, and match adversaries’ low cost, high volume drone tactics with U.S. massed autonomy.

Comment: Take any and all good ideas that work.

Pentagon Deploys New Kamikaze Drone Copied From Iranian Design

WSJ

An American defense company, SpektreWorks, has produced a cheap drone that is similar to Tehran’s Shahed device

Lara Seligman

and

Marcus Weisgerber

Dec. 3, 2025 9:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-deploys-new-kamikaze-drone-copied-from-iranian-design-9a42e451?mod=Searchresults&page=1&pos=4

A downed Shahed-136 drone on display on Capitol Hill. Win McNamee/Getty Images

The Pentagon is deploying to the Middle East a new kamikaze drone copied from a widely used Iranian version, turning to a crude but effective weapon.

The move mirrors an Iranian tactic of recovering crashed American drones, such as the Central Intelligence Agency’s RQ-170 Sentinel, and reverse-engineering them to build their own versions. It is also an early example of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s initiative, known as Drone Dominance, to buy cheap drones made by American companies that can quickly be moved to the field.

The Defense Department on Wednesday is announcing Task Force Scorpion Strike, a squadron of low-cost unmanned systems built by an Arizona-based defense company, SpektreWorks, as the U.S. military’s first one-way attack drone unit based in the Middle East. SpektreWorks designed the system by reverse-engineering Iran’s Shahed-136 drone, which has been used by Tehran and its associated militia groups to attack U.S. troops and commercial vessels across the Middle East, and by Russia to strike Ukrainian troops and cities.

The move to base a squadron of one-way attack drones in the Middle East comes almost two years after an Iranian attack drone killed three U.S. soldiers when it struck an outpost in northeastern Jordan called Tower 22. It is a further sign that in the Middle East, where adversaries use cheap, rudimentary systems to target American troops, the Pentagon is moving away from expensive and complex systems that take years to reach the field.

Hegseth announced the Drone Dominance initiative in July in an effort to build up quickly the Pentagon’s arsenal of cheap, small attack drones by reducing red tape in the military’s acquisition system and boosting American drone manufacturing. The goal is to have every Army squad unit be armed with small, one-way attack drones by the end of fiscal year 2026.

The FLM 136 drone closely resembles the Shahed-136, with a triangular wingspan measuring just over 8 feet, according to the company’s website. The drones can be launched by different mechanisms, including catapults, rocket-assisted takeoff, and mobile ground and vehicle systems, according to a Central Command statement.

The drone is fully autonomous, meaning it can operate with little or no human interaction, relying on sensors and artificial intelligence to navigate to its target. It can fly for about six hours, according to SpektreWorks.

Each FLM 136, also known as Lucas, costs $35,000, according to Capt. Tim Hawkins, a spokesman for Central Command. The MQ-9 Reaper drones cost an estimated $16 million, according to a spokesman for General Atomics, its manufacturer. In many cases, kamikaze drones cost far less than the interceptors used to shoot them down.

Other U.S. adversaries such as China have successfully copied American fighter-aircraft designs, but have struggled to imitate their complex propulsion technology, said Caitlin Lee, a drone expert who is director of acquisition and technology policy at Rand. But now, widely available commercial electronics have made the reverse-engineering of less-complex, small drones much easier.

Iran’s Shahed suicide drones are cost-effective and precise, marking a major shift in drone warfare. Photo Illustration: Getty Images

“In the war in Ukraine, both sides have reverse-engineered each other’s drones, drawing on commercial hardware and software,” she said. “We can expect to see much more reverse-engineering of drone technology in the future.”

In the U.S. military, reverse-engineering has largely been limited to developing targets that simulate enemy weapons, according to Lee.

The new squadron is being deployed less than three months after Central Command announced a new Rapid Employment Joint Task Force, led by Chief Technology Officer Joy Shanaberger, to fast-track the development and deployment of new technologies. The ultimate goal for the task force is to be able to field a new capability every 60 days, which should be achieved by December 2026, Shanaberger said in a September interview.

Damage in Kyiv, Ukraine, from a Russian drone and missile attack. Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

One goal for the task force is to try to offset the loss of expensive MQ-9 Reaper drones with cheap, expendable systems, she said at the time.

“Under current leadership, and a little bit to the byproduct of the war in Ukraine, I think people are really starting to understand the necessity for being able to move at a pace that both technology as well as our adversaries move,” Shanaberger said.

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

WSJ

12. Strategic Disruption from Orbit: Space-Based Capabilities for Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

Summary:

Space is now a core battlespace for irregular warfare in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, not just an enabler. The article argues the United States should push unclassified, commercial space data and analytics to frontline partners so they can see gray zone coercion at sea, on land, and online in near real time. SAR, RF geolocation, and AI analysis expose illegal fishing, maritime militia activity, and incremental construction before crises break. Shared space-based communications and training build partner insight, narrative credibility, and resilience. Architectures like PWSA and allied space domain awareness can institutionalize persistent, shared orbital ISR as a primary IW tool.

Excerpts:

Recognizing their importance is no longer enough. To compete effectively, the United States must institutionalize space-enabled capabilities, especially unclassified, commercially produced imagery and analytics, as primary tools for irregular warfare and deliver them to frontline partners. This approach will enable Indo-Pacific nations to identify malicious activities on their own terms, enhance their capacity to counter information manipulation, and maintain momentum even as U.S. teams rotate or operational demands evolve. Emerging frameworks like the Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture and allied Space Domain Awareness initiatives offer a model for how shared, low-latency space data can empower partners and strengthen regional resilience.

The future of irregular competition will belong to those who see first, understand fastest, and act asymmetrically with trusted partners. From orbit to ocean, advantage will not solely depend on presence but on the ability to democratize insight and share the truth instantly. By fully integrating space-based resources into irregular warfare strategies and providing these capabilities directly to nations most affected by gray-zone coercion, the United States can help build a more resilient Indo-Pacific while maintaining strategic stability in the priority theater.

Strategic Disruption from Orbit: Space-Based Capabilities for Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

irregularwarfare.org · Trent Keipour · December 4, 2025

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/strategic-disruption-from-orbit-space-based-capabilities-for-irregular-warfare-in-the-indo-pacific/

Editor’s Note: This article was submitted for the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s 2025 Writing Contest, which invited authors to examine how the United States and its partners can employ irregular warfare to strengthen security cooperation and resilience across the Indo-Pacific. We have edited this piece following its selection. It stood out for its clear explanation of how space-based capabilities can empower partners, expose gray-zone activity, and shape strategic competition unfolding across the region.

During World War II, U.S. forces in the Pacific faced a vast and challenging expanse. Islands were isolated, supply lines were stretched thin, and intelligence was limited to the speed of ships, aircraft, or radios. Today, although the geography and the challenges that come with it remain unchanged, technological capabilities have advanced significantly. Warfighters now look beyond the horizon for an advantage; in fact, they look to orbit, where space has become the ultimate high ground. From that vantage point, modern forces gain essential capabilities in communication, navigation, intelligence, and targeting—capabilities that increasingly influence outcomes in conflict and require new strategic approaches for future operations.

This technological evolution is unfolding as the character of competition in the Indo-Pacific continues to shift. The region is increasingly shaped by irregular forms of competition including coercive infrastructure development through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, illegal fishing, gray-zone maritime pressure from state-affiliated militias, and malign operations designed to undermine democratic institutions. Yet many frontline partners, small island states, and midsized regional powers lack the surveillance, communication, and intelligence infrastructure to compete in this space.

Space-based capabilities are powerful but underleveraged tools that can accelerate understanding, uncover coercive actions that would otherwise remain concealed, and help frontline states in the Indo-Pacific extend their vision. Amidst this backdrop, the United States should facilitate access for frontline partners to space-based capabilities, particularly unclassified and commercially derived data, as essential tools for irregular warfare that would bolster long-term deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding the Environment from Orbit

Most Indo-Pacific nations are unable to fully monitor their exclusive economic zones. Adversaries exploit these blind spots by using commercial vessels, unmarked militias, and Automatic Identification System (AIS)-dark maritime traffic to conduct surveillance, steal resources, or assert territorial claims. In the South China Sea alone, documented instances of Chinese maritime militia vessels operating in disputed waters increased by 35% between 2021 and 2023, with many utilizing sophisticated electronic countermeasures to mask their activities.

Commercial satellite capabilities, such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) for detailed imaging, radiofrequency geolocation for tracking, and high-resolution optical imagery for visual surveillance, enable persistent, non-intrusive detection and monitoring of this type of activity. Moreover, the proliferation of low-cost commercial satellite constellations has democratized access to these capabilities, with resolution now reaching sub-meter levels at costs accessible to smaller nations.

Space-based technologies are also transforming the operational environment. High-resolution imagery, combined with Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled analysis, facilitates the detection of patterns that are imperceptible to human analysts alone. For instance, advanced algorithms can identify subtle infrastructure changes that signal gray-zone activities weeks or even months before they are confirmed by conventional means. Recent industry studies have noted that high-revisit-rate commercial constellations, combined with AI and cloud processing, now provide early warnings of adversarial behavior in contested maritime regions, offering decision-makers more time to make more informed decisions. Such early detection capabilities have already revealed incremental land reclamation and radar installation activity at disputed South China Sea features well ahead of traditional verification methodologies, allowing partners to anticipate destabilizing activity rather than merely respond to it.

By integrating AI and machine learning into space-based systems, analysts can now sift through the immense volume of collected imagery, enabling partners with limited analytical capacity to derive meaningful insight that was previously out of reach. Increasingly, portions of this analysis occur “on-edge,” processed onboard satellites to reduce latency and the volume of data that must be downlinked. At the same time, analysts use higher-fidelity processing through cloud-based ground systems, which provide more detailed results than on-orbit processing alone. This hybrid approach accelerates the entire process, from data collection to transmission and ultimately to generating actionable insights with greater speed than before. This speed is crucial for getting ahead of complex influence campaigns that combine economic pressure, online propaganda, and military activities simultaneously. Faster analysis allows governments to detect these coordinated efforts earlier, understand their connections, and respond before they escalate.

Empowering Partners Through Connectivity and Insight

Many of the most strategically important partners in the Indo-Pacific operate in environments where terrestrial communications infrastructure is limited or nonexistent. Island nations, jungle interiors, and coastal riverine regions often lack the digital backbone needed for timely response or regional coordination. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue initiative involving the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan has begun addressing this challenge by coordinating the delivery of space-based data and communication applications to remote areas vulnerable to adversary influence operations.

Deploying space-based communications and low-bandwidth satellite systems can extend secure, real-time voice and data capabilities to field units, enabling them to operate effectively in challenging environments. These tools enhance not only operational coordination but also the ability to collect and share intelligence without needing permanent basing or large U.S. footprints. Recent collaboration between the United States and Japan has demonstrated how shared space-based communications infrastructure can create resilient networks that remain functional even during attempts at electronic warfare or jamming—an essential capability to neutralize the effect of sophisticated electronic countermeasures throughout the region.

As partners gain access to these new tools, the next challenge is ensuring their effective use. Training is critical, but for it to have a lasting effect, training must reflect the complexity of real-world environments. Satellite data provides an ideal tool for scenario-based training, helping partners recognize patterns and threats specific to their terrain and geopolitical context. A recent example is U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Information Sharing Framework, which has enabled partner forces to train using actual satellite data from their operational areas, improving their ability to identify and respond to emerging threats. For example, using archived imagery of illegal construction or deforestation during mobile training team engagements can teach local forces how to identify environmental changes associated with illicit activity. These training methods create intuitive familiarity with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance products and foster a mindset of persistent surveillance and sovereign defense.

However, concerns about data verification and AI-altered imagery have emerged as significant challenges, particularly as synthetic satellite images and deepfake visual data become increasingly sophisticated. These risks can erode trust in intelligence products and create openings for adversary information operations. Accordingly, training should include practical techniques for verifying the authenticity of imagery, such as metadata analysis, cross-referencing with multi-sensor data, and anomaly detection, so partners can confidently distinguish genuine intelligence from manipulated content. Embedding this verification discipline within partner education strengthens both analytic integrity and resilience against disinformation campaigns.

Shaping the Narrative

Narrative competition is a key aspect of irregular warfare, and the Indo-Pacific information environment has become increasingly contested. People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence operations have become more sophisticated, using coordinated campaigns across multiple platforms to shape regional perceptions and weaken alliance structures. Instead of countering propaganda with more propaganda, the most effective response is the truth, backed by evidence—especially when that evidence comes from space.

Commercial satellite imagery and analysis are giving Indo-Pacific partners unprecedented ability to challenge disinformation and assert their own narratives. Rather than investing in sovereign satellite constellations, most nations can access high-quality, near-real-time imagery and analytic support from commercial providers such as Planet Labs, Umbra, or Capella Space. In 2025, for example, when PRC state media claimed that no new construction was occurring on disputed South China Sea features, commercial satellite imagery published by independent analysts and media outlets provided compelling visual evidence to the contrary. In another example, the Philippines leveraged commercial data to document and publicize Chinese maritime militia encroachments near the Scarborough Shoal, providing evidence that contradicted Beijing’s public denials and strengthened Manila’s diplomatic position. This approach illuminates malign activity without escalating tensions or relying solely on external enforcement. These examples show that, when paired with partner-enabled analysis and reporting mechanisms, satellite data becomes truly actionable. Nations like Palau, the Philippines, or Timor-Leste can move from reactive posturing to proactive maritime domain awareness as a result.

Sustaining the Advantage

Irregular warfare is rarely won in a single operation; it is a cumulative process that unfolds over months or years. Success requires continuity of insight, not just presence. However, frequent rotations of U.S. advisor and liaison teams—often occurring every six to twelve months—along with siloed reporting and fragmented interagency coordination, can disrupt institutional memory and slow campaign momentum. These gaps are routinely exploited by competitors who maintain continuous, multi-domain engagement in the same operational areas.

Tools that enable persistent knowledge sharing, such as secure, cloud-native platforms that track relationship dynamics, operational history, and campaign context, are essential for sustaining irregular warfare campaigns over time. The growing strategic challenge posed by China has made the U.S.–Australia partnership central to advancing shared awareness across domains. The two countries’ recent collaboration shows how allies can combine commercial and government space data into a common operational picture—precisely the distributed, resilient information-sharing model that the U.S. Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) aims to implement at scale. The Australia–U.S. model demonstrates how this works in practice: multiple sensors, shared data standards, and synchronized access to the same information. When combined with allied Space Domain Awareness (SDA) systems that incorporate commercial and government sensors, this networked approach guarantees continuous insight even as rotations change and missions adapt.

While PWSA and SDA were conceived for broader space defense, their decentralized, persistent, and shareable data frameworks mirror the same principles that underpin effective irregular warfare: rapid sense-making, partner empowerment, and sustained tempo across a dispersed battlespace. By ensuring continuous, shared access to actionable space data, these architectures transform what was once episodic engagement into enduring influence, allowing partner networks to maintain pressure and coherence in long-term campaigns against gray-zone aggression.

Conclusion

Space-based capabilities are not simply enablers of irregular warfare in the Indo-Pacific; they are rapidly becoming a key center of gravity. Their persistence, scalability, and political viability allow the United States and its partners to detect coercive actions early, shed light on gray-zone activities that thrive in ambiguity, and share a common operational picture without requiring a large physical presence. These benefits make space tools especially suited for long-term competition in a region where terrain, distance, and access often challenge traditional security strategies.

Recognizing their importance is no longer enough. To compete effectively, the United States must institutionalize space-enabled capabilities, especially unclassified, commercially produced imagery and analytics, as primary tools for irregular warfare and deliver them to frontline partners. This approach will enable Indo-Pacific nations to identify malicious activities on their own terms, enhance their capacity to counter information manipulation, and maintain momentum even as U.S. teams rotate or operational demands evolve. Emerging frameworks like the Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture and allied Space Domain Awareness initiatives offer a model for how shared, low-latency space data can empower partners and strengthen regional resilience.

The future of irregular competition will belong to those who see first, understand fastest, and act asymmetrically with trusted partners. From orbit to ocean, advantage will not solely depend on presence but on the ability to democratize insight and share the truth instantly. By fully integrating space-based resources into irregular warfare strategies and providing these capabilities directly to nations most affected by gray-zone coercion, the United States can help build a more resilient Indo-Pacific while maintaining strategic stability in the priority theater.

Trent Keipour is a defense contractor and former U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) specialist with over twenty years of experience in both kinetic and non-kinetic fires, integrating air, space, and cyber capabilities across special operations and multi-domain missions. He previously served within the Special Operations Integration Branch at United States Space Command, where he helped coordinate space support to global operations conducted by U.S. Special Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command. His current work focuses on applying space-enabled tools to operational planning, partner engagement, and irregular warfare challenges across the Indo-Pacific. He holds a graduate degree in Environmental Policy and a graduate certificate in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction from the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Main Image: Generated by DALL-E, OpenAI (November 2025).

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The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

irregularwarfare.org · Trent Keipour · December 4, 2025

13. America First, Europe Fourth

Summary:

POTUS has downgraded Europe to fourth in U.S. priorities, after the Western Hemisphere, Asia-Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East, breaking with decades of Eurocentric strategy. POTUS questions NATO Article 5, phases out assistance to Russia’s neighbors, seeks deals with Moscow, and treats Ukraine’s fate as marginal to U.S. interests. A hemispheric turn, tolerance for spheres of influence, disinterest in leveraging Europe on China, and growing ideological divergence with MAGA all reinforce the shift. Therefore, Europe must assume it will largely face Russia and sustain Ukraine alone, build real defense industrial scale, and develop a “European way of war.”

Comment: America FIrst. Allies Always.

America First, Europe Fourth

warontherocks.com · December 4, 2025

Leonard A. Schuette

December 4, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/america-first-europe-fourth/

Patterns and strategy in current U.S. foreign policy are hard to discern given President Donald Trump’s personalistic, mercurial, and transactional style. But almost a year since the elections, the contours of the new U.S. grand strategy are crystallizing. And while European leaders knew that America’s focus would increasingly lie elsewhere, the shift is proving to be more profound than many expected. In my judgment, Europe now ranks fourth among U.S. strategic priorities, behind the Western Hemisphere, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East.

It is not surprising, per se, that Europe is playing a lesser role in U.S. strategic thinking. Historically, U.S. grand strategy has typically been Eurocentric, occupied with shifts in the balance of power on the continent. But since the turn of the millennium, the confluence of the abating risk of a hegemon dominating Europe and the ascent of other geopolitical centers of power led the United States to increasingly prioritize other regions. While President George W. Bush focused on the Middle East, every president that came after him announced (if not always fully pursued) policies of pivoting to Asia.

BECOME A MEMBER

Reinforcing these structural trends, demographic shifts underway in the United States mean that the Cold War generation of reflexive, sometimes nostalgic, transatlanticists is retiring. In its place, a younger, more diverse generation is more skeptical of the U.S. role in the world and often lacks the instinctive affinity toward Europe. Given his deep hostility toward NATO and the European Union, nobody expected Trump, in his second term, to reverse the relegation of Europe.

What is surprising, however, is how much Europe has been downgraded. For all other post-Cold War presidents, Europe still continued to play a central, albeit secondary, role in U.S. strategy. Europe was seen as a key market for U.S. (defense) goods and services, European allies could be important multipliers of U.S. power in other regions, and Russia was perceived to pose a threat to both European security and the wider U.S.-led order, including in the Pacific, where it has its own equities and is aligned with China.

For Trump, however, Europe seems increasingly irrelevant or, on a bad day, even an adversary. At the core of his views lies the rejection that European security constitutes a core U.S. national interest, thus breaking with decades of U.S. grand strategy. Since his first presidential campaign, Trump has sowed doubt about whether he would honor NATO’s Article 5 commitments, including by conditioning U.S. protection on political demands, such as higher defense spending. For example, in March 2025, he said “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them. No, I’m not going to defend them.” Three months later, when asked about this issue, he said “Depends on your definition [of Article 5]. There’s numerous definitions of Article 5. You know that, right? But I’m committed to being their friends.”

It’s true that Trump has at times made more favorable noises about America’s commitments to NATO. At the otherwise disastrous meeting with the Ukrainian president back in February, he committed to defending Poland and the Baltics. And during the NATO Summit in The Hague, following an agreement by allies to increase defense spending targets to 5 percent of GDP (up from 2 percent), Trump said, “We’re with them all the way.”

However, his administration has also phased out security assistance for states bordering Russia and declined to criticize Moscow when 19 Russian drones invaded Polish airspace in September. And at several points, he has treated NATO as a third party, as if the United States is no longer a member. For instance, the first draft of the 28-point-Ukraine-Russia peace plan (see below) states that the United States would mediate a dialogue between Russia and NATO.

Fundamentally, Trump has made it all but clear that the war in Ukraine is largely immaterial to U.S. interests because, in his words, “we have a big ocean in between” and “it doesn’t affect the United States…unless you end up in a world war.” But Ukrainian and European security are indivisible, not only because Russia’s war aims at dismantling the European security order writ large but also because no large-scale conventional Russian attack on NATO territory is likely while the war in Ukraine continues.

These sentiments will likely be reflected in strategic shifts. Per recent press reports, the forthcoming National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy will prioritize threats in the western hemisphere and from China, while downplaying the U.S. role in Europe (though we will have to wait for the next defense budget to be certain). Accordingly, the Pentagon is poised to announce the withdrawal of troops and capabilities from Europe in the forthcoming global posture review (having already decided to withdraw a rotational brigade in Romania with hardly any notice). And even if that process is properly coordinated with European allies – a big if – the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence is increasingly in doubt. In light of continued close U.S. engagement in the Middle East – from driving the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Gaza, to joining Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, to the recent security pact with Qatar and talks with Saudi Arabia to the same ends – it is thus reasonable to deduce that Europe ranks fourth among U.S. strategic priorities.

European leaders should also not mistake the occasionally constructive noise or decision on Ukraine as anything other than a momentary relief. At the time of writing, Trump has not yet abandoned Ukraine, but this seems driven by his desire to conclude a peace deal at any cost in his idiosyncratic quest to be recognized by the Nobel committee rather than a durable, genuine concern for the security of Ukraine or Europe. His erraticism testifies to that, with Washington’s Ukraine policy oscillating between blaming Ukraine and Russia for the outbreak of the war, halting and restarting military support for Kyiv, threatening Russia with sanctions and exempting it from tariffs, toying with providing tomahawks without going through with it, and habitually echoing Russian talking points. While recent sanctions against Russian oil companies impose significant costs on the Russian economy, the Trump administration seems to have backtracked again. According to some sources and allegedly the U.S. secretary of state himself, the U.S. administration, with Russian officials, drafted a 28-point peace plan which massively undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty by giving in to many Russian maximalist demands. These include limiting the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, Kyiv ceding parts of the Donbas that are currently under Ukrainian control, and placing constraints on western military support for Kyiv.

Three Factors Driving the Demotion of Europe in U.S. Grand Strategy

Three recent and mutually reinforcing developments are driving the demotion of Europe among U.S. strategic priorities beyond the aforementioned structural forces. First is the hemispheric turn in U.S. foreign policy. The unexpected and growing military focus on the Western Hemisphere – deploying troops to the southern border and U.S. cities, reinforcing the U.S. posture in the Caribbean, and threatening forcible regime change in Venezuela, to name but a few indicators – marks a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy. Even before the shift, perceptions of scarce resources had served as a central justification for retrenching from Europe. The hemispheric turn exacerbates this problem, given that the competition for resources and attention between regions is widely perceived to be in zero-sum terms among U.S. policymakers.

The hemispheric turn, together with the quest to normalize relations with Russia and doubts about U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan, also signals an openness to the idea of spheres of influences. This corroborates my interpretation that this administration does not seem to view European security as a core U.S. interest. According to the logic of spheres of influences, parts of Europe would supposedly be treated as Russia’s natural hinterland. Moreover, if the United States followed through on the claims on Greenland, the hemispheric turn would also pose a direct challenge to the sovereignty of a European state (Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark).

Second, and unlike previous administrations, the Trump administration does not view Europe as an asset it can leverage in other regions or for other priorities, hence being able to afford to pay less attention to the continent. On China, the United States is showing no interest in forging a united front with Europe to build allied scale, preferring to deal with Beijing in bilateral, G2 settings. Despite significant interdependencies between the European and Indo-Pacific theater, the Trump administration treats them as bifurcated regions that can be approached in isolation of each other. U.S.-European cooperation on China is rendered even more difficult by the fact that the Trump administration has sowed doubt about long-held views that Beijing represents the pacing threat. Trump’s China policy is less tough and more fluid than most anticipated, oscillating between threatening a full-out trade war against Beijing and pursuing a grand bargain while sending mixed signals about his resolve to defend Taiwan. The timing is tragic because European views on China are increasingly hawkish as a result of Beijing’s hostile trade policy and growing support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On the Middle East, European disunity has translated into a lack of influence during the Israel-Gaza war and the subsequent ceasefire negotiations. Meanwhile, Trump’s hostility toward global governance of, for instance, climate change and international organizations, such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, deprived the Europeans of potential value to the United States, given their traditionally significant voice in multilateral settings.

Third, the ideological divide between the MAGA movement and mainstream European politics is sharpening. The Trump administration is increasingly pursuing an authoritarian agenda at home and exporting it abroad, while the MAGA movement grows more radical. From expressions of sympathy for far-right parties such as the German Alternative für Deutschland, to fueling culture wars in Europe over immigration, to allegations that countries like Germany or the United Kingdom are limiting free speech, the administration is increasingly involving itself more openly in the domestic politics of European states.

Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference this February was emblematic, with the vice president claiming that “the threat that I worry the most about vis à-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China … what I worry about is the threat from within: the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values.” References to supposed

civilization affinities between the United States and Europe are a thinly veiled attempt to redefine the transatlantic community in white ethnic, Judeo-Christian rather than pluralistic, enlightenment terms. Unlike in the past, values are no longer a glue for the transatlantic relationship but rather driving Europe and the United States apart.

Europe should thus not be under any illusions about its place in U.S. grand strategy. Rather than clinging onto vain hopes of keeping the United States meaningfully engaged in European security, Europeans need to embrace the fact that they will have to meet their security challenges – from supporting Ukraine to deterring Russia – mostly alone.

On Ukraine, the Europeans finally need to shift gears and move from reactive to proactive mode. It is critical for Ukraine’s negotiation position that the European Union agrees on using the frozen Russian assets to fill Ukraine’s funding gap at the next European Council in December. In addition, the European coalition of the willing should urgently make own proposals of what security guarantees should look like, both with and without a U.S. backstop. Finally, Europeans need to increase their military support for Ukraine, including by donating relevant U.S. weapon systems, even if that temporarily weakens national defenses.

On European defense writ large, the Europeans will have to replace the bulk of the U.S. conventional troops and capabilities. The prerequisite to do so is much higher defense spending, which NATO allies have committed to (with the exception of Spain) at the latest summit. But many large European states will struggle to meet those commitments, given their high debt and deficit levels. Hence, E.U. member states should use the next E.U. budget to properly fund promising new E.U.-level initiatives that incentivize joint development and procurement, which however currently lack adequate financial backing. More ambitiously, E.U. member states led by Germany should design a joint debt instrument to help finance European public defense goods, including capital-intensive flagship projects such as a pan-European air defense structure.

Without a wholesale reform of Europe’s dysfunctional defense industrial system, however, additional spending will hardly translate into additional capabilities. The defense industrial landscape in Europe has long been fragmented along national borders, with the big European states mostly procuring from domestic or, to a lesser extent, American companies rather than suppliers in other European countries. This has led to costly duplications of capabilities, limited production capacities given small order sizes, interoperability issues among European armies, and dangerous dependencies on off-the-shelf orders from third parties.

Deepening defense industrial relations requires that the biggest spenders in Europe – Germany, France, and the United Kingdom – show political leadership and collaborate much more on joint development and procurement. The current petty quarrel between German and French firms over work shares of Europe’s most important joint defense project, the Future Combat Air System, is emblematic of the parochialism still dominating industrial relations. Greater E.U. fiscal incentives for cooperation on realizing NATO’s capability targets will help too. Another crucial step to overcome defense protectionism is to create an E.U. single market for defense, as it has for other industries, by imposing mandatory standards of military goods, devising rules against defense protectionism, and agreeing on common export rules.

Finally, Europeans need to take ownership of the institutional dimension of NATO, which has historically been led by the United States. Europeans will have to craft their own “European way of war” by adjusting NATO’s regional plans for Europeans (and Canadians) to provide the vast majority of force requirements and crafting new concepts of deterrence and defense. They also need to devise new forms of defense governance and Europeanize NATO’s command structure to provide the necessary political and military leadership until recently exercised by Washington.

Europeans need to dispel the myth that their rearmament efforts create a self-fulfilling prophecy of hastening U.S. withdrawal from the continent. This U.S. administration will not be swayed by displays of weakness. It is overdue that Europeans seize the mantle of leadership for European defense.

BECOME A MEMBER

Leonard A. Schuette, Ph.D., is an international security program fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and a visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He has published widely on European security, U.S. grand strategy, and German defense policy.

Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · December 4, 2025

14. Trump Renames Institute of Peace for Himself

Summary:

POTUS has unilaterally renamed the U.S. Institute of Peace building the “Donald J. Trump United States Institute of Peace,” after seizing control of the congressionally created body and gutting its staff. The move serves his personal branding and Nobel ambitions while highlighting broader efforts to dismantle or capture foreign policy institutions. The building, funded by federal and private money, is now a central asset in ongoing litigation over executive overreach and statutory independence. Hosting the Rwanda–Congo peace signing there risks legitimizing a contested takeover, deepening concerns about politicization of peace institutions and erosion of checks on presidential power.

Comment: It is probably the nicest facility built in Washington in the modern era. It is a very unique and beautiful building. I have always enjoyed attending meetings and conferences there. And many good people have worked there.

Trump Renames Institute of Peace for Himself

Workers installed the president’s name on the Washington institute, thrusting it back into the spotlight as it is set to host the signing of a peace deal between Rwanda and Congo.

By Aishvarya Kavi

Aishvarya Kavi reported from the scene in Washington in March when Trump administration officials seized the U.S. Institute of Peace headquarters.

Published Dec. 3, 2025

Updated Dec. 4, 2025, 12:17 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/03/us/politics/trump-us-institute-peace-name.html

The United States Institute of Peace on Wednesday, after President Trump’s name was added to the facade.Credit...Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

A dormant government building in the nation’s capital may seem like an unlikely setting for the signing of a peace deal. But nearly nine months after the Trump administration seized control of the U.S. Institute of Peace headquarters in an extraordinary public showdown and all but shuttered it, the center has re-emerged, newly named for President Trump.

The morning before Mr. Trump was scheduled to host a signing ceremony at the institute with the presidents of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, workers arrived at the building on the National Mall to install Mr. Trump’s name in large, silver letters to two sides of the exterior of the building, positioning his name to the left of where the institute’s name was already engraved into the facade.

The result was a re-dubbing of the building as the “Donald J. Trump United States Institute of Peace.”

The White House confirmed on Wednesday evening that the institute had been renamed for the president “as a powerful reminder of what strong leadership can accomplish for global stability,” Anna Kelly, a spokeswoman, said.

“Congratulations, world!” she added.

Renaming the decades-old institute, which had been heralded by presidents like Ronald Reagan, who signed it into law, and adhering his name to its facade appears to be a continuation of Mr. Trump’s effort to portray himself as a great diplomatic deal-maker as he campaigns for a Nobel Peace Prize.

Over the past year, Mr. Trump claimed credit for ending a host of conflicts, including the three-decade war between Rwanda and Congo. The White House has previously asserted that his work on diplomacy is more impressive than that of the Institute of Peace, which the White House has called a “bloated, useless entity.”

Nevertheless, the move has once again thrust the fierce battle over the institute into the spotlight.

The headquarters has sat vacant since the administration seized control of the building in March as part of a broader effort by the Department of Government Efficiency, formerly led by Elon Musk, to dismantle institutions that work on foreign policy. In the weeks after the building was seized, the administration fired most of the staff and gutted the organization. It even dismantled a fixture inside with the institute’s name and logo, a depiction of a dove and an olive branch.

George Foote, a former lawyer for the institute who is now part of the lawsuit against the administration, said in a statement on Wednesday that “renaming the U.S.I.P. building adds insult to injury.”

The 150,000 square-foot building is a central part of the lawsuit. The institute was created by Congress and received federal money for its programs, but former staff have argued that it is not part of the executive branch and therefore not subject to the president’s authority.

The prominent glass-roofed building, designed as a national symbol of peace, was built in 2012. It was paid for by a mix of private and federal funds, and it sits on land owned by the Navy, which transferred jurisdiction to the institute more than two decades ago.

A person with knowledge of the situation who was not authorized to speak publicly said that the administration had rehired some staff in advance of Thursday’s event.

After the institute’s former staff sued, it temporarily regained control of the building in May, after a federal judge ruled the Trump administration’s takeover was a “gross usurpation of power,” and restored both the building and the fired leadership.

But after the administration appealed that decision, a higher court returned the building to the executive branch while it considers the case. The institute’s current head, a senior State Department official who was fired from a White House post during the first Trump administration, has not publicly laid out any plans for the organization or the building.

Last month, the court turned down a last-ditch request from the institute’s former staff to regain control of the building. But former staffers, many of whom are independently continuing the institute’s international work, said that they planned to protest what they called the theft of the building on Thursday, during the signing ceremony that will be hosted by Mr. Trump.

The decision by the appeals court on the fate of the institute and the building is not expected until next year.

“The rightful owners will ultimately prevail,” Mr. Foote said on Wednesday, “and will restore the U.S. Institute of Peace and the building to their statutory purposes.”

A correction was made on Dec. 4, 2025: An earlier version of this article misstated the source of funds to build the U.S. Institute of Peace headquarters. It was paid for by a mix of private and federal money, not just private funds.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more

Aishvarya Kavi works in the Washington bureau of The Times, helping to cover a variety of political and national news.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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