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Quotes of the Day:
"One's life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation and compassion."
– Simone de Beauvoir
"Only fools and dead men don't change their minds. Fools won't and dead men can't."
– John Patterson
"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. "
– Leonardo da Vinci
1. How to Deter North Korea while Pursuing America First Policy
2. Lee Jae-myung’s Latest Policy Signals to North Korea
3. South Korean president weighs apology to North Korea over allegations of leafleting and drone use
4. South Korea’s Fractured Democracy: One Year After Martial Law
5. Recognizing Separation, Creating Peace: Rethinking ROK Constitutional Assumptions
6. Presidential office confirms 6 citizens detained in N. Korea, vows efforts to release them
7. Seoul raises military budget 7.5% for ‘self-reliant defense’ against North Korea
8. 'Bull of peace' laid to rest on border hill after drifting from N. Korea in 1996 flood
9. S. Korea to provide US$1.5 mln in humanitarian aid to flood-hit Vietnam, Thailand, Sri Lanka
10. Lee considering visit to Japan next month for talks with Takaichi: report
11. Top diplomats of S. Korea, Pacific island nations to hold talks in Seoul next week
12. Seoul praises legal change banning activist balloon launches toward North Korea
1. How to Deter North Korea while Pursuing America First Policy
Summary:
Denuclearization of North Korea is effectively impossible, so U.S.–ROK strategy should pivot from denuclearization to deterrence through a nuclear-armed South Korea and withdrawal of roughly 28,000 U.S. troops. This would save billions, realign with America First, and remove a key North Korean justification for nuclear weapons while preserving deterrence through ROK nuclear parity. The author cites high South Korean public support for indigenous nukes, declining faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and U.S. global overextension. He downplays proliferation risks and contends a nuclear ROK would also help deter China with minimal direct U.S. military exposure.
Comment: America First. Allies Always.
I of course concur that denuclearization of north Korea is impossible, as long as the Kim family regime is in power.
With all due respect to Capt Kim, I think we have vastly different views on our assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of Kim Jong Un. And I have to say that we have never seen appeasement work. It is my belief that the surest way to conflict on the Korean peninsula is to remove US troops. Furthermore, if we are going to discuss deterrence of north Korea and China we should address the question of what actions by the ROK and the US deter both Kim and Xi.
However, if I were conducting an information warfare (IWar) campaign I would welcome this article. This provides the opportunity for those who disagree to write rebuttals that will likely make the strong case for why it is in US national security interests to continue to permanently station troops on the Korean peninsula (number one being to prevent war on the peninsula and in the region). It will also identify all those in favor and those opposed so we will have a clear picture of the human terrain in support of US objectives in Korea and the region and who is not.
I hope to read strong rebuttals to this article as well as learn who is in favor of this misguided course of action.
How to Deter North Korea while Pursuing America First Policy
by Sean Kim
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12.04.2025 at 06:00am
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/04/how-to-deter-north-korea-while-pursuing-america-first-policy/
Introduction
Unlike what many believe, denuclearization of North Korea is extremely unlikely.
Therefore, instead of continuing unsuccessful strategies such as diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions, the U.S. and South Korea should take a new approach, establishing South Korea as the 10th nuclear power and subsequently withdrawing the U.S. troops from Korea. This new strategy benefits the U.S., South Korea, and ultimately the world in multiple ways. Most importantly for the U.S., withdrawing and reallocating roughly 28,000 troops from Korea will save billions of taxpayer dollars. Moreover, it enhances America’s homeland security as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea will remove or nullify one of North Korea’s justifications for possessing a nuclear capability: that Americans in the region are a national security threat to the North. South Korea also benefits by becoming a nuclear power, with its security no longer dependent upon the funded presence of the U.S. military.
Background
Upon Japan’s surrender in 1945, Korea was split in half at the 38th parallel with the U.S. in the south and the Soviet Union in the north. Consequently, the Republic of Korea (ROK), was established in the south, backed by the U.S., while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) supported by the Soviet Union emerged in the north. Eventually, political tensions between the two states resulted in the Korean War (1950-53) which ended in an armistice. Despite the ceasefire between the two Koreas, tensions persist to this day. North Korea still seeks to unify the peninsula by force and considers the South its main adversary. However, North Korea’s efforts to communize South Korea failed, leaving its economy impoverished, while the South’s market economy surpassed the North’s stagnating command economy. North Korea, realizing its precarious fate based on its severe economic and diplomatic disadvantages against the South, chose nuclear armament.
Today, North Korea’s nuclear weapons may be the most significant threat to East Asia’s peace which became operational in 2006 following its first nuclear test. By the 2020s, the DPRK’s nuclear power has advanced to an extent where its ballistic missiles are capable of reaching the U.S. homeland according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. The DPRK, by leveraging its nuclear weapons, aims to prevent conventional military attacks or invasions from its perceived adversaries, specifically the U.S. The U.S. has invaded multiple countries such as Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that none of the countries invaded by the U.S. had a nuclear deterrent capability.
Thus, North Korea understands that its national security concerns, specifically from the threat of a U.S.-led military attack or invasion, can only be dealt with through the development of a credible nuclear deterrence capability. The recent U.S. raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities would have solidified North Korea’s existing beliefs that nuclear weapons are imperative for deterrence purposes. The DPRK knows that it can deter any military threats from the U.S. and South Korea as nuclear wars are not worth the risk. Hence North Korea can assure its own survival by possessing a nuclear weapon.
Unlikelihood of Denuclearization
North Korea’s denuclearization remains an unrealistic outcome. Benjamin Young, a Stanton Foundation Nuclear Security Fellow at RAND states, “the denuclearization of the DPRK is a pipedream at this point and it is not consistent with reality on the Korean peninsula”. As the DPRK became more isolated, a consequence of Juche (self-reliance) ideology combined with its communist economy, it set a pathway to exacerbate North Korea’s human rights issue. North Korea keeps itself distant from international interventions, thus repeatedly suppressing its own population through crimes against humanity. Kim’s atrocities have brought up global level human rights concerns that have even entailed targeted sanctions on North Korea, further jeopardizing the country’s economy. Amidst its precariousness, North Korea will likely pursue stronger deterrence to shield itself from what it perceives as potential military interventions by the West. Therefore, for Kim Jong Un, denuclearization implies surrendering the regime’s sovereignty, given the fate of non-nuclear states that faced U.S. intervention. In fact, Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s supreme leader and a dictator, knows what has happened to countries that surrendered their nuclear capabilities in exchange for security guarantees. Ukraine is an ongoing example. As national security correspondent Greg Myre states, “Ukraine possessed nukes when the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991 and then gave them up”. The Budapest memorandum, signed by the U.S., the United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine, sought to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s non-aggression. Nevertheless, Russia, having no concerns of being threatened by Ukraine with nuclear weapons, invaded it in 2022. Similarly, Russia’s nuclear weapons worked in favor of Putin as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not result in the west’s military intervention. This again proves the deterrence theory.
Even before the Russo-Ukraine war, Dr. David Lai pointed out in his 2012 article, Busting the Myths About the North Korea Problem, that it is unlikely that the U.S. can either negotiate or pressure its way to North Korea’s denuclearization. Dr. Lai argues that because the “United States does not have any effective means to influence North Korea”, pressures using every aspect of [the] DIME model had minimal effect on Kim’s regime. Given the patterns that nuclear-capable countries have shown, it is extremely unlikely that North Korea will give into western demands of denuclearization. Without nuclear capabilities, North Korea will be left with no effective method of deterrence against its adversaries, meaning its regime will likely collapse. Given this reality, U.S. policy should pivot from pursuing denuclearization to managing stability on the peninsula.
Declining Operational Effectiveness of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)
The U.S. and the ROK have been maintaining an alliance ever since the mutual defense treaty of October 1953. Certainly prior to North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, USFK troops stationed in South Korea alongside a sizable ROK military deterred North Korea’s military aggressions.
However, such a conventional approach is now outdated for two reasons. The first is due to the declining merit of the USFK. Given America’s new stance on the DPRK’s nuclear power due to the infeasibility of denuclearization, the value of USFK may diminish. Historically, both the U.S. and ROK forces held various joint military exercises in efforts to pressure North Korea’s way to denuclearize. They clearly have not been effective given North Korea’s ongoing nuclear tests and will be even less so in the future given the U.S.’ new stance on the North’s nuclear power.
The second reason is the South Korean government’s changing stances on the North. South Korea holds a presidential election every five years, meaning its administrations’ political leanings may change from right wing to left wing in less than a decade. Contrasting South Korea’s right wing party that is generally pro-U.S. and anti-PRC/North Korea, the left wing has been relatively sympathetic to the North. Hence changes in South Korea’s administrations are reflected in the ROK military’s varying degree of cooperation during joint exercises. Therefore, due to inconsistencies of the level of military pressure on the DPRK, the conventional approach was already ineffective.
Accordingly, the ROK public has been losing confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Unsurprisingly, according to a RAND article, “there is growing public demand in South Korea for the indigenous development of nuclear weapons”. Foreign data also support RAND. For instance, according to the Korea Institute for National Unification, a South Korean governmental agency, the ROK public opinion supporting South Korea’s indigenous nuclear weapons ranged from 60~71% from 2021 to 2024. This implies that even the ROK public recognizes the shortcomings of conventional deterrence amidst ongoing nuclear threats from the North and recent American non-interventionist stances. Hence, it is necessary for both the U.S. and the ROK to consider an alternative method that is far more effective, not only in terms of enemy deterrence, but also for the sake of its respective national interests.
USFK’s presence has not been effective enough to denuclearize the North. Given the U.S.’ changed stance on viewing the DPRK as a nuclear power, the USFK’s merit will likely decline even further. The North, having been used to USFK’s presence for decades and virtually recognized by the U.S. as a nuclear power, may no longer consider USFK as a threat. Under such conditions, maintaining USFK could result in a serious profligation of limited U.S. defense resources.
The presence of the U.S. military in South Korea cost the U.S. a staggering $13.4 billion from 2016 to 2019, more than $3 billion per year.
The Ideal Course of Action
In efforts to counter North Korea’s nuclear threats, the most viable option for South Korea is to develop its own nuclear capabilities, thereby achieving credible parity. Subsequently, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea will mitigate the risk of confrontation. As realists would argue, peace is maintained through strength. Wars occur when aggressors believe they could gain power using force of arms against weaker states. Therefore, once South Korea is nuclear-capable, North Korea will be considerably deterred from aggressive behaviors, let alone invasion. This is consistent with the nuclear deterrence theory that nuclear weapons prevent conventional wars as established above.
The ROK already overwhelms the DPRK in every category of DIME. North Korea is internationally isolated, contrasting globally engaged South Korea. Economically, South Korea’s nominal GDP is almost $1.8 trillion while the North staggers at roughly $18 billion. Finally, the ROK military consistently ranks in the top ten while the DPRK ranks below thirtieth. Therefore, from a realist approach, the chances of war in Korea will significantly decrease once South Korea becomes a nuclear power and USFK withdraws from Korea. In fact, in an Asia-Pacific analysis article, Why the U.S. should withdraw its troops from Korea, the author claims that “Pyongyang naturally sees [ROK and the U.S.] with which it is still at war rehearsing for invasion”. This means that the presence of the USFK in South Korea is aiding the DPRK propaganda and its justification behind its aggressions towards the south.
By removing the USFK that aggravates North Korea, “Washington could allow Pyongyang to take real steps toward normalized relations and even long-term peace with South Korea and the United States, removing threats to U.S. safety and prosperity”. It will also significantly weaken North Korea’s justification behind its aggressions, thereby naturally reducing the chance of a kinetic war.
This benefits both the U.S. and South Korea. First, the U.S. can reallocate the defense budget of more than $3 billion per year in Korea to other vital sectors such as border security while being freed from unnecessary conflicts with North Korea. This is consistent with President Trump’s America First Priorities and America First Policy Directive to the Secretary of State that prioritize core American interests above foreign countries. The U.S. already is overstretched globally. The great-power competition with the PRC, the Middle East, and the war in Ukraine is pushing America’s bandwidth. Just because the U.S. has the strongest military in the world does not mean it should be used as a global police force. Financial burdens and diplomatic costs of maintaining a global coalition, coupled with the stag hunt problem among allies with differing interests, make this approach suboptimal for the U.S.
Furthermore, multilateral security policy does not align with the current Trump administration’s objectives of non-interventionist diplomacy. Through the delegation of diplomatic and security concerns surrounding North Korea to South Korea, by supporting its nuclear armament, the U.S. could reallocate its military resources and efforts to more crucial areas.
Potential options include promoting further investments towards military space capabilities to achieve space superiority over adversaries, bolstering strategic maritime chokepoints in the South China Sea for PRC deterrence, and stationing military units along the southern border. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. will also become free from the unnecessary risks of the DPRK nuclear attack upon the USFK withdrawal. With no U.S. military presence in the South, North Korea now has no justification to attack the U.S. After all, the Korean conflict is ultimately an issue for the two Koreas with the U.S. only involved to support its ally ROK. There is no reason for the U.S. to sacrifice its human and capital resources on behalf of its ally from an America First approach. Through prioritization of own interests and non-interventionist stances, the U.S. can mitigate the risks of armed conflicts in East Asia.
South Korea also benefits by achieving true self defense while freeing itself from an expenditure of $1.13 billion to the U.S. for its military presence in Korea. Although the risks of regional nuclear proliferation may rise following South Korea’s nuclear armament, the benefits of the U.S. terminating its expensive involvement with a prolonged foreign conflict will outweigh the downsides of such risks. Furthermore, it is difficult to assert that South Korea’s nuclear armament will likely lead to a nuclear proliferation given its international standing and alignment with Western powers. Many countries that are comparable to South Korea’s degree of economic development are already nuclear powers. South Korea’s nuclear armament may even reinforce America’s agenda of the PRC deterrence. Historically, the tensions between the PRC and the ROK have always been high. There is even rhetoric in South Korea which argues that China is seeking to threaten its sovereignty through election interference and online propaganda. Therefore, South Korea’s anti-PRC sentiments coupled with its nuclear capacity can completely revolutionize geopolitical balancing in East Asia. As a reliable U.S. ally, nuclear-capable South Korea will deter China’s conventional aggressions which satisfies U.S. objectives with no direct American involvement, minimizing economic and diplomatic risks for the U.S.
Others may voice concerns as Japan and Germany’s pursuit of nuclear armament following that of the ROK. However, such an outcome is unlikely. Both countries’ constitutions forbid their nuclear armament. Furthermore, with the presence of U.S. troops in Japan and Germany unchanged, the two countries are unable to use the ‘weakened national defense’ as their reasons for nuclear armament.
Conclusion
Over the past two decades, the U.S. and the ROK have employed various methods such as diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, and combined military exercises to force Kim Jong Un to surrender his nuclear power which all came short of making significant progress. Experts point out that the DPRK’s denuclearization is an unrealistic outcome, and the Trump administration acknowledges the situation. Therefore, the U.S. is now trending in a way that recognizes North Korea as a nuclear power.
Hence the best course of action to mitigate armed conflict in East Asia is to employ non-interventionist deterrence methods. If South Korea becomes nuclear-capable, it will effectively deter future aggressions from the North. Simultaneously, the USFK withdrawal from South Korea will nullify the North’s justifications behind its nuclear threats and may even provide an improved framework for U.S.-DPRK diplomacy long term. Meanwhile, South Korea’s nuclear power will be more than enough to deter China, coupled with its strong military.
Overall, the U.S. will benefit by getting a step closer to achieving the America First policy. Reallocation of America’s resources from the ROK to U.S. national security could result in enhanced military space capabilities, improved naval deterrence against the PRC, and a more secure southern border. America will better promote its interests while freeing itself from risks of North Korea’s nuclear threats.
Tags: America First, American Foreign Policy, Korean Peninsula, North Korea, nuclear deterrence, nuclear umbrella, South Korea
About The Author
- Sean Kim
- Sean Kim graduated and commissioned from the United States Air Force Academy where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics. He is serving as a Medical Service Corps officer in the United States Air Force.
2. Lee Jae-myung’s Latest Policy Signals to North Korea
Summary:
POTROK has signaled a softer, engagement-first North Korea policy, quietly downgrading “denuclearization” from top priority to a third goal behind peaceful coexistence and joint growth. He reaffirms three principles: respect for the regime, no absorption unification, no hostile acts, and adds unilateral steps to lower tensions near the MDL, restore hotlines, and propose practical cooperation on climate, disaster relief, and health. The timing aims to shape Pyongyang’s year-end WPK plenum and 9th Party Congress. Yet Seoul has not resolved the clash between its constitutional unification mandate and the North’s rejection of unification, so near-term engagement prospects remain minimal.
Comment: What happened after 10 years of the unseen Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy? IN 2006 nK detonated its first nuclear device. Does appeasement work?
Lee Jae-myung’s Latest Policy Signals to North Korea
thediplomat.com
Lee has downgraded “denuclearization” as a goal. Will it be enough to attract interest from Pyongyang?
By Michael MacArthur Bosack
December 03, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/lee-jae-myungs-latest-policy-signals-to-north-korea/
Credit: Facebook/ Lee Jae-myung
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At a convocation ceremony for the 22nd Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung delivered his latest policy signals to North Korea. In particular, he highlighted his “three major goals” for North Korea policy, which included a downgrading of “denuclearization” among his other explanations of how his administration intends to rekindle inter-Korean engagement.
It was not the first time Lee had delivered policy signals to North Korea since taking office. He had already done so with his inauguration address in June, Liberation Day speech in August, and the launch of his “END Initiative” during the United Nations General Assembly. None elicited positive reactions from the North Korean side.
Lee’s most recent remarks are unlikely to generate any different kind of response from the North, but they do offer observers insight into the situation for the Lee administration’s inter-Korean policies: namely, where they stand, and where they may go.
The timing of the speech – on December 2 – was certainly of interest. While it happened at a scheduled event with the convocation of the long-standing presidential advisory council, it is important to note that the term of the council began a month ago on November 1. While the delay in holding the convocation ceremony until December may have been purely programmatic in nature owing to other major events (e.g., the APEC Summit in Gyeongju), it is worth noting that the administration elected to hold it prior to the one-year anniversary of Yoon Suk-yeol’s martial law declaration on December 3 while avoiding having it coincide with the anniversary of the signing of the 1991 inter-Korean “Basic Agreement” on December 13.
This is notable for three reasons. First, delivering these policy signals ahead of the martial law declaration anniversary is important because it keeps them from getting lost in the reporting that the anniversary will draw in the media. Second, avoiding a tie-in with the Basic Agreement signing prevents them from irking a Kim Jong Un regime that has publicly eschewed past inter-Korean agreements.
Third, and most important: these policy signals come ahead of major party meetings for North Korea. The Kim regime will preside over an end-of-year plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea in mid-December and the pivotal 9th Party Congress sometime around the New Year’s period. In the party plenum, North Korean officials will review the results of policy implementation for 2025, and in the 9th Party Congress, they will put forth their policy designs for the next five years – including those for foreign policy and security. Therefore, Lee’s speech on inter-Korean policy was likely intended to deliver key messages to North Korean counterparts in an effort to shape outcomes from these key Workers’ Party meetings.
The signals that Lee delivered this week build upon those he laid out in his previous policy speeches. In his August 15 Liberation Day speech, Lee already declared his “Three Principles” for inter-Korean engagement: (1) respect the North Korean regime; (2) no pursuit of unification through absorption; and (3) no hostile acts of any kind. In his most recent speech, he added “Three Goals” to expound upon this: goal one is institutionalization of a peaceful coexistence; goal two is establishing a foundation for joint growth; and goal three is a Korean Peninsula free of war and nuclear weapons.
These three goals alone are nothing groundbreaking. Previous administrations in South Korea have called for a one-nation, two system approach to unification, for advancement of economic interdependence, for the establishment of a “peace regime,” and for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. For the Kim regime, the three major goals will likely appear as a re-branding of the same policies they have seen before.
As for the downgrading of “denuclearization” – which used to be first on prior administrations’ lists related to inter-Korean policies – North Korea is likely to dismiss it outright given the government’s repeated position that the topic of denuclearization is completely off the table.
There may have been some expectations for the Lee administration to pursue something more evocative in its inter-Korean policy, particularly since North-South contact has remained essentially cut off since April 2023. The reality is that the South Korean government has not reconciled the Kim regime’s paradigm-changing announcement in December 2023, when North Korea abandoned unification as a policy objective and recognized South Korea as a sovereign state for the first time in its history. This kicked off an internal debate that is still ongoing in the South, the central question being: how does South Korea reconcile its constitutional requirement to pursue unification with its desire to rekindle engagement with a North Korea that rejects unification outright?
While Lee could not offer North Korea any substantive policy changes in his December 2 remarks, he did signal a few unilateral decisions and offers. First, he stated that South Korea will take preemptive measures to lower military tensions in boundary areas and reduce the risk of accidental clashes. While he did not specify how, the practical answer is that South Korea will look to reduce or eliminate exercises within 5 kilometers of the Military Demarcation Line (the administrative boundary line separating the two Koreas) and in the area around the Northwest Islands (five South Korean island groups that are geographically close to North Korea). While Lee is unlikely to have meant a reduction of combined South Korean-U.S. military exercises, his maverick Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young will continue to push for this ahead of the next Freedom Shield exercise, which usually happens in spring.
Lee also called for restoration of inter-Korean hotlines, none of which has been functioning since April 2023. There are numerous phone lines and a designated radio frequency that the two Koreas have used for communications in the past, but the South Korean government’s decision to use the hotline for protest and politicization prompted North Korea to stop answering the calls altogether.
Specifically, on the morning of April 6, 2023, the Ministry of Unification delivered a message of protest related to North Korea’s use of South Korean-provided facilities and vehicles in Kaesong and then publicized that they had delivered the protest across the hotline. That afternoon, the North Koreans ceased communication. The Lee administration is now hoping to reverse that decision.
Finally, Lee proposed inter-Korean exchanges on matters such as climate change, disaster relief, and healthcare. These are low risk areas that avoid sanctions issues, and they align with some of North Korea’s persistent needs. This type of proposal is nothing new, but it is immediately actionable for the South Korean government if the North were to show any signs of interest.
As for what to observe going forward, there are two things to watch. First is whether the Lee administration publishes something more comprehensive along with its new talking points. They may opt to do so before the 9th Party Congress in hopes of shaping North Korean perceptions and policies a little further.
The second is whether Pyongyang responds, and if so, how they do. They could opt for a public statement – perhaps attributed to Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong – as they have done in the past. Or they may opt to remain silent and allow the reporting from the end-of-year Party Plenum and 9th Party Congress deliver the messages for them.
Either way, the likelihood of renewed inter-Korean engagement based on the Lee administration’s latest policy signals remains slim to nil.
Authors
Guest Author
Michael MacArthur Bosack
Michael MacArthur Bosack is the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative and the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served as the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the Deputy Chief of Government Relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. You can follow him on X (Twitter) @MikeBosack.
thediplomat.com
3. South Korean president weighs apology to North Korea over allegations of leafleting and drone use
Summary:
POTROK signaled further conciliatory intent toward Pyongyang, saying he is considering an apology for alleged Yoon-era drone flights and leaflet launches aimed at stoking tensions before the December 2024 martial law bid. Since June, Lee has halted loudspeaker broadcasts and banned private leaflet balloons, and he floated suspending some ROK–US drills to induce dialogue, inviting conservative backlash. Pyongyang has ignored his overtures, while Lee’s claim of ignorance about six South Koreans long detained in the North drew sharp criticism from families and experts. The episode highlights his engagement-first posture, but also political and moral vulnerabilities.
Comment: Appeasement does not work. It is naive to think that an overture like this will cause Kim to act responsibly. POTROK should be demanding that Kim comply with the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry and stop isolating the Korean people in the north and allow them freedom to access information from around the world.
South Korean president weighs apology to North Korea over allegations of leafleting and drone use
AP · KIM TONG-HYUNG · December 3, 2025
By KIM TONG-HYUNG and HYUNG-JIN KIM
Updated 10:03 PM EST, December 3, 2025
https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-lee-jae-myung-north-leafleting-d72a309533540a21a47468f07b321c97
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said Wednesday he’s weighing a possible apology to North Korea over suspicions that his ousted conservative predecessor intentionally sought to raise military tensions between the war-divided rivals in the buildup to his brief martial law declaration in December 2024.
Speaking to reporters on the first anniversary of imprisoned former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s ill-fated power grab, Lee — a liberal who won a snap presidential election following Yoon’s removal from office in April — stressed his desire to repair ties with North Korea. But asked about North Korea’s yearslong detentions of several South Korean nationals, Lee said he wasn’t aware of the issue, drawing criticism from relatives who call for their safe return.
A special prosecutor last month indicted Yoon and two of his top defense officials over allegations that he ordered drone flights over North Korea to stoke tensions. South Korean media also reported Monday that South Korea’s military under Yoon’s presidency flew balloons carrying propaganda leaflets across the border.
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Lee considers an apology to North Korea
While the drone and leafleting allegations have yet to be proven in court, Lee still said he personally wishes to apologize to North Korea.
“I do think we need to apologize, but I haven’t been able to say so because I worry it could be used to smear (me) as pro-North Korean or spark political ideological battles” in South Korea, Lee said. “That’s all I will say for the time being.”
The main conservative opposition People Power Party criticized Lee’s comments as politically divisive and urged him to safeguard the military’s honor.
North Korea publicly accused Yoon’s government of flying drones over Pyongyang to drop anti-North Korean propaganda leaflets three times in October 2024. South Korea’s military has declined to confirm the claims.
Since taking office in June, Lee has taken proactive steps to ease inter-Korean tensions, including turning off frontline loudspeakers that blared K-pop and world news and banning activists from flying balloons carrying propaganda leaflets toward North Korea. Pyongyang has so far ignored Lee’s overtures, with leader Kim Jong Un stating his government has no interest in dialogue with Seoul.
Lee lamented North Korea’s stance but promised to continue to make peace gestures. He said the suspension of regular South Korea-U.S. military drills, which North Korea views as invasion rehearsals, could be an option to consider to convince Pyongyang to return to talks. That comments could invite criticism from conservatives who believe South Korea and the U.S. must maintain a firm readiness unless North Korea abandons its nuclear program.
Lee fails to answer on detainees in North Korea
When asked about how his government would bring back South Korean nationals detained in North Korea in the past decade or so, Lee baffled many when he said had never heard of those cases and asked his national security director, “Is it correct that (South) Korean nationals are being held?” He later said he lacked “specific information since this happened a long time ago” and would need more details before commenting.
At least six South Korean nationals have been detained in North Korea, three of whom were Christian missionaries involved in covert efforts to spread Christianity in the North. They were arrested in 2013 or 2014 before being convicted of plotting to overthrow North Korea’s government and spying for Seoul, and sentenced to hard labor for life. The other three are North Korean-born defectors who had resettled in the South, and little is known about their arrests.
“My heart is aching. I think President Lee has little interests” in the detainees, said Kim Jeong-sam, the brother of one of the jailed missionaries, Kim Jung Wook. “I still pray for my brother’s safe return at least three times a day.”
Choi Jin-young, the son of jailed missionary Choi Chun-kil, said he remains perplexed and disappointed. He said he feels so sad when he thinks about his father, who is likely in a prison with extremely poor conditions.
Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst at the Seoul-based Transitional Justice Working Group, said it’s “unbelievable” for Lee to say he doesn’t know the issue. “As president of our country, he should have known this and agonized how to resolve it, though it would be difficult to resolve it anytime soon,” he said.
South Korea’s Unification Ministry said Thursday the government has been striving to bring back its detained nationals in North Korea via dialogue. The ministry said that South Korea raised the issue of detainees during high-level talks with North Korea in 2018 — a period of temporary détente between the rivals.
All forms of talks between the Koreas have been stalled since 2019 amid tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program. Kim and Choi, the relatives of the jailed missionaries, said that Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told them in a recent meeting the government was pushing to restart talks with North Korea to bring back the detainees. The ministry said Chung met them in September.
Lee recalls the martial law crisis
During the news conference, Lee credited the South Korean people for “suppressing a self-coup” orchestrated by Yoon, pointing to how thousands gathered around the National Assembly and helped lawmakers get inside to vote down Yoon’s martial law decree unanimously.
Lee recalled how he began livestreaming his journey to the National Assembly in a car, pleading for South Koreans to converge on the legislature, as hundreds of troops were surrounding the Assembly building. Near the end of the livestream, he was seen getting out of his car and climbing over a fence to enter the Assembly grounds.
“I started broadcasting with the belief that only the people have the strength to stop” the military takeover, Lee said.
Yoon was impeached by lawmakers later in December before he was formally removed from office following a Constitutional Court decision to dismiss him on April 4. Yoon is now jailed and standing trial on rebellion charges and other suspected crimes.
In a statement released Wednesday, Yoon repeated his earlier claim that martial law was a necessary move against the liberals who “sought to paralyze state affairs and undermine the free constitutional order.”
AP · KIM TONG-HYUNG · December 3, 2025
4. South Korea’s Fractured Democracy: One Year After Martial Law
Summary:
One year after Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed martial law and impeachment, South Korea’s democracy has survived but is badly fractured. Polarization now runs across region, class, generation, and gender, fueled by inequality and a zero-sum, winner-take-all presidency. Right and left wage digital culture wars on YouTube, where outrage and conspiracy drive mobilization and erode trust in institutions. Protest politics has morphed from democratizing force to rival fandoms. The authors urge structural remedies: stronger social safety nets, youth and housing policy, reframed gender equality, electoral and constitutional reform, and depoliticized courts and prosecutors to restore deliberation and reduce incentives for populist confrontation.
Comment: Nietsczhe: That which does not kill me (my democracy) makes me (my democracy) stronger. But still a long way to go to be strong..
South Korea’s Fractured Democracy: One Year After Martial Law
The country’s political polarization has metastasized. What can be done?
By Gi-Wook Shin and Kerstin Norris
December 03, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/south-koreas-fractured-democracy-one-year-after-martial-law/
Legislators with the Democratic Party hold up banners demanding Yoon Suk-yeol’s resignation outside the National Assembly on Dec. 4, 2024, the day after Yoon’s shocking declaration of martial law.
Credit: Screenshot/ Democratic Party of Korea
In March 2025, one of the authors vividly observed hundreds of thousands of people filling downtown Seoul over President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment. Reminiscent of the “candlelight protests” of 2017 but with greater intensity, these rallies began after the short-lived martial law declaration of last December, with some demanding Yoon’s immediate removal from office and others denouncing it as illegitimate. Even after the Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision to impeach him on April 4, rival protests continued through the June 3 snap elections.
Such rallies were hardly unprecedented in South Korea, given its rich history of civic engagement in politics. However, in the context of Yoon’s martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment, the protests illustrated a fragile democracy divided against itself. In fact, Yoon had justified his action as a necessary measure to remove “anti-state forces” in the face of the intensifying political fight with opposition forces, which controlled South Korea’s legislature throughout Yoon’s presidency.
Public opinion polls and election outcomes show how deeply divided the nation has been. A 2022 Pew survey found that 83 percent of South Koreans believed there were strong partisan conflicts, the highest among all 19 countries surveyed. Recent election results reflected such societal and political division. Yoon’s razor-thin 2022 victory over Lee Jae-myung and Lee’s narrow win in the 2025 snap election revealed a nation split down the middle.
In addition, mass protests, largely associated with progressives, have become common for conservatives too and spilled from plazas to online platforms. Politics has turned into “culture wars” and competing claims to be representative of “the people,” provoking moral charges and emotional responses. Polarization now cuts across gender and generational lines beyond political and ideological divisions of the past, standing alongside illiberalism and populism as a core threat to Korean democracy.
Historical Context
While South Korea’s political polarization has received a great deal of attention in recent years, it needs to be understood in the larger historical context. Korea witnessed an ideological split under Japanese rule (1910-45) between socialist revolutionaries and conservative nationalists. This bifurcation continued after independence, and the post-1945 territorial division only deepened it, with both sides claiming to represent the “real” Korea.
In the South, anti-communist autocratic regimes were established in the name of national security, but repression also bred resistance. Students, workers, and clergy challenged these authoritarian regimes, leading to “a strong state, contentious society.” Despite the tragic outcome of the 1980 Gwangju Uprisings, civic protests eventually pushed the regime to accept democratic reforms in 1987.
During the authoritarian era, regional disparity also became salient as developmental policies favored the Yeongnam region, home to the military-authoritarian leaders, while marginalizing Honam, home to dissident figures like Kim Dae-jung. The divide became a major political cleavage, shaping voting behavior and partisan identity among Koreans. In addition, South Korea’s rapid, chaebol-led industrialization created both national prosperity and deep inequality. Although South Korea democratized, old hierarchies persisted beneath the surface of political change.
President Roh Tae-woo, elected in the new democratic system of 1987, was a former general who had supported Chun Doo-whan in leading a military coup only a decade ago. The next President, Kim Young-sam, once a democratic fighter, joined Roh and Kim Jong-pil (the right-hand man for Park Chung-hee) for a conservative coalition similar to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Even President Kim Dae-jung’s 1997 victory that established the first peaceful transfer of power in almost four decades relied on an alliance with Kim Jong-pil.
It was not until 2002 that South Korea elected the first progressive president, Roh Moo-hyun, without conservative backing. A former human rights lawyer, Roh pursued “participatory democracy” with former activists as key advisers, challenging the conservative establishment. However, he failed on his reform measures and faced criminal charges after leaving office, leading him to take his own life in 2009.
That tragic incident left a deep scar among liberals, hardening mistrust and resentment toward the conservative camp. The conservative governments that followed, led by Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, were met with massive street “candlelight” protests from the progressive camp (first over U.S. beef imports in 2008, then over Park’s corruption scandals in 2016) that ended with the impeachment of Park in 2017.
Winning the ensuing snap election, President Moon Jae-in entered office amid widespread expectations for national reconciliation and democratic renewal. However, he instead carried out sweeping investigations into conservative figures, including former presidents Lee and Park, under the banner of “eradicating deep-rooted evils.” Both went to prison on charges of corruption, which were seen by conservatives as political revenge.
The Cho Kuk affair in 2019 brought this tension to the surface at the societal level. Moon’s appointment of his confidant as justice minister, despite allegations of corruption, set off massive rival rallies that packed both sides of the Han River for weeks. Yoon Suk-yeol, then the prosecutor general who led the investigation into Cho, emerged as a conservative hero who was framed as a defender of “fairness and common sense” against social and political injustice committed by the Moon administration.
By the end of Moon’s tenure, South Korean society was already deeply divided and emotionally charged.
New Frontlines
South Korea’s polarization has also expanded across new fronts. Regional and class-based divisions still run deep, while newer divisions of generation, gender, and digital populism have redefined what it means to belong to the political left or right.
The Yeongnam-Honam divide remains one of South Korea’s most persistent political cleavages. The ruling Democratic Party holds all 28 seats from the Homan region, while the main opposition People’s Power Party holds 59 out of 65 seats from the Yongnam area.
Meanwhile, however, economic inequality has become a major dividing line as well. The income gap between rich and poor has widened and wealth inequality has increased as owning property has become “a marker of inherited privilege.” These class lines increasingly map onto partisan preferences. Working class and economically insecure Koreans have leaned toward the Democratic Party, which has supported policies that expand social welfare, while asset-owning middle- and upper-middle class voters gravitate toward the People Power Party’s emphasis on deregulation and tax cuts.
Class division has also led to generational conflicts. Compared with their parents, who lived through the high economic growth period, the so-called “MZ generation” (millennials and Gen Z) came of age in a world of precarious employment, unaffordable housing, and stagnant social mobility. Many feel pushed out of the opportunities that their parents took for granted. Moreover, while older cohorts were socialized in an era where collectivism, sacrifice, and family formation were essential to national survival, Gen MZ came of age after democratization and globalization with expectations centered on autonomy, rights, and quality of life. Many younger Koreans have abandoned the traditional milestones their parents valued (marriage, children, homeownership) and instead channel their priorities into personal stability and issue-driven consumption.
Now, the generations are pitted against one another with older generations characterized as kkondae (an expression similar to the American “Boomer”) and the younger generations considered individualistic and self-centered.
Economic precarity has also fueled gender conflict. Young men, burdened by mandatory military service and with fears of falling behind, argue that gender-equity initiatives such as the Five-Year Basic Plan for Gender Equality, first introduced in 2006 and revised every five years, now put them at a disadvantage, casting themselves as victims of “reverse discrimination.”
On the other hand, young women, though more educated and financially independent than ever, face similar economic pressures while contending with inequality and traditional expectations at home. While their education and labor force participation has increased, so has the gender pay gap, the worst in the OECD. Feminist movements such as #MeToo and “4Bs” mobilized women in response, reframing gender equality as a struggle for autonomy and dignity in daily life. To them, the male backlash only exposes how deeply structural inequality remains.
To make it worse, political leaders have exploited this gendered anger for their election campaigns. In the 2025 snap election, only 24 percent of men in their 20s supported the liberal candidate, Lee Jae-myung, while nearly three-quarters backed conservative ones. By contrast, 58 percent of women in their 20s voted for Lee.
These socioeconomic resentments have migrated online, where grievance drives mobilization and outrage becomes the dominant political language. Once niche forums, like Ilbe for disaffected young men and Megalia for radical feminists, have grown into digital echo chambers where confrontation replaces dialogue. Algorithmic polarization has given rise to a variety of right and left-wing populism.
Borrowing the language of Trumpism, for instance, the far right fuses populist nationalism, especially anti-China sentiments, with anti-elitism and anti-feminism, channeling frustrations and resentment over fairness and inequality. Conservative influencers have adopted MAGA-style slogans, invited U.S. far-right figures, and framed politics as a moral battle against “corrupt elites” and “woke progressives.”
On the other hand, the left has also generated its own moralized digital politics. Pro-Democratic Party channels and progressive influencers frequently demonize conservatives as threats to democracy and police dissent within their own ranks, portraying critics as naïve or insufficiently committed. Moral judgment often substitutes for deliberation, and political opponents are rendered not just wrong but dangerous.
YouTube, now the country’s most influential news source, serves as the main arena of this digital populism. Channels such as “God’s Move,” “Ko Sung-kuk TV,” and “Pen & Mike TV” on the right, and “Kim Ou Joon’s News Factory” and “Cat News” on the left, broadcast shows that blend political commentary with sensationalist coverage. Their hybrid format translates global populist tropes into local idioms of anti-communism, anti-feminism, anti-establishment, and cultural resentment. Algorithms reward emotional intensity, amplifying conspiracy theories and accusatory narratives across the spectrum – from claims of “rigged elections,” “pro-North sympathizers,” and “Chinese interference” on the right to charges of “prosecutorial coups” and “forces of insurrection” on the left.
Digital populism only aggravated the existing divisive social and political landscape in the aftermath of martial law through the impeachment process until today. Political messaging increasingly hinges on performative cues crafted for clicks and outrage and draws power from insular communities built around shared resentment.
In a vibrant democracy, these conflicts should be managed through institutions. But South Korea’s political system is far from containing societal tensions. Its powerful presidency is a winner-take-all office that encourages parties to treat elections as existential struggles rather than fair competition for power. Each administration, conservative or progressive, has sought to control the bureaucracy, media, and prosecutors, while opposition forces have returned to the streets. Protest, once a force for inclusion, now mobilizes for exclusion. The civic activism has splintered into rival fandoms: gaeddal (“daughters of reform”) of the left and “Yoon-again” supporters of the right, each claiming to defend the “true people.” Politicians now join the spectacle, livestreaming rallies, staging YouTube appearances, and chasing viral validation.
Moving Forward
South Korea’s democracy withstood political storms precipitated by martial law and the highly contentious impeachment process, with a peaceful transfer of power. Yet, mistrust in political elites, a divided society, and a polarized media environment often dominated by digital sensationalism reveal its fragility, threatening civic dialogue and cooperation.
There is no easy fix to the problems, but the remedy can start from addressing what “the 1987 system” has left unfinished: building not just an electoral democracy but a social and deliberative one. Expanding affordable housing, improving youth employment, and reinforcing the social safety net would help restore a sense of fairness that procedural democracy alone cannot guarantee. Gender equality, too, must be reframed as a collective good rather than a zero-sum contest. Civic education that emphasizes pluralism, coexistence, and democratic restraint is undoubtedly critical to rebuilding the social fabric of Korean democracy.
Seoul also must carry out reforms to strengthen political institutions that can mediate rather than magnify societal conflict. A more proportional or mixed-member electoral system could foster coalition and shared governance and reduce the desire for populist politics. Reconsidering the single five-year presidency, or even moving toward a parliamentary model, would further lower the stakes of zero-sum competition. Judicial and prosecutorial independence must be reinforced to depoliticize accountability and restore trust.
After all, South Korea’s polarization was not inevitable; it is the culmination of unaddressed inequalities, winner-take-all institutions, and a political culture that rewards confrontation over compromise. The challenge is to rebuild democratic confidence through visible improvements in fairness, representation, and dignity in everyday life. Koreans cannot afford to fight against each other in the increasingly turbulent world. The country must strive for democratic renewal through strengthening social protections, easing generational and gendered pressures, reforming the outdated electoral systems, and restraining the urge to fuel populist nationalism.
Authors
Guest Author
Gi-Wook Shin
Gi-Wook Shin is William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Korea Program at Stanford University, and coeditor of “South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis: The Threats of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization” (2022).
Guest Author
Kerstin Norris
Kerstin Norris is a research associate at Stanford University’s Korea Program. She holds an M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford and specializes in Korean politics and U.S.-Korea relations.
5. Recognizing Separation, Creating Peace: Rethinking ROK Constitutional Assumptions
Summary:
POTROK's outreach to Pyongyang is failing because Seoul still clings to constitutional claims over all Korean territory and system based unification. With Kim Jong Un now defining the relationship as between two hostile states, he contends that South Korea must reconsider Articles 3 and 4 and formally recognize the DPRK as a separate political entity. Younger South Koreans are apathetic about unification, the North has proven resilient, and nuclear asymmetry makes deterrence fragile. Constitutional reform toward a two state peace framework could reduce existential fears in Pyongyang and create space for genuine, long term coexistence.
Comment: I could not disagree more. Again, I think we must align our assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Now is the time to double down on unification, not challenge constitutional "assumptions."
Unification first, then decentralization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.
Recognizing Separation, Creating Peace: Rethinking ROK Constitutional Assumptions - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · Dan Gudgeon
By: Dan Gudgeon
December 2, 2025
https://www.38north.org/2025/12/recognizing-separation-creating-peace-rethinking-rok-constitutional-assumptions/
Lee Jae Myung’s government has vowed to pursue dialogue with Pyongyang. It has stated that it respects North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) system, it will not pursue unification by absorption, and that it has no intention of engaging in hostile acts. However, this appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Pyongyang has denounced Seoul’s continued participation in joint military drills, discussion of denuclearization, and investment in military spending, particularly its pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine. North Korea presents these as reaffirming their conviction that South Korea does not change and that progressive and conservatives ultimately read from the same hostile script, whatever Lee says to the contrary.
With the two Koreas seemingly speaking a different language, now is the time for peace advocating politicians in the South to attempt bold policy changes regarding inter-Korean relations. Seoul has adhered to successive iterations of its ‘Three-Stage National Community Unification Formula’ since 1989. As President Lee suggests more of the same, Kim Jong Un’s 2023 declaration redefining inter-Korean relations as that between two-hostile states requires South Korea, if serious about peace, to consider recalibrating how they define inter-Korean relations. As such, debate has begun about whether the Southern constitution, which claims all Northern territory in article 3 and enshrines the goal of unification based on the Southern system in article 4, needs to be changed. Naturally, this calls into question what exactly ‘Korea’ represents and how that has changed after more than 70 years of division. However, officially disentangling the identities of the two Koreas may create the foundations for a sustainable peace in the long-term.
Rumblings of Debate Invoking Legitimacy and Identity
South Korea’s Minister of Unification, Chung Dong-young’s, hinting at the embrace of a ‘peaceful’ two-state system has attracted criticism for supposedly undermining South Korea’s long held definition of the inter-Korean relationship as being a ‘special relationship’. Chung clarified by claiming that any peaceful ‘two-state system’ would be one step, or a transitional stage, within a broader process ultimately moving towards unification. This is a tense issue in South Korea with conservatives quick to decry overtures to Pyongyang as undermining the South’s national security and legitimizing the government in North Korea. The conflict is a remnant of past dichotomous identity discourses that still influence the political divide in South Korea and shape what people regard as an acceptable future vision for the Peninsula.
Boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in sovereignty along with conceptualizations of what is ‘Korean’ lie at the heart of the inter-Korean relationship. During the Cold War, Southern and Northern governments built their authority by positing themselves as providers of safety and order for ‘us,’ juxtaposed against the prospect of danger and disorder, as represented by ‘them.’ In other words, one state’s identity was at least partially built on its opposition to the other. From the Korean War onwards through decades of authoritarianism on both sides of the Peninsula, the other was dehumanized as an existential threat that needed to be defeated.
Over time, both North and South began to conceptualize Korean identity around their respective political values to define what is authentically ‘Korean’ in more absolute rather than relative terms. In the Republic of Korea (ROK), professing loyalty to liberalism and freedom became a key criterion for belonging as a ‘Korean’. In the DPRK, ideological fidelity to socialism functioned as a central basis for recognizing someone as a true ‘Korean.’ As a result, the very idea of shared ‘Korean ethnicity,’ which could presumably serve as common ground, was instead appropriated by both states to reinforce their political boundaries and delegitimize the other.
Precedent of Recognition
Even so, voices challenging this absolutism have long existed within South Korean society. The democracy movement unsettled the discourse that branded dissenters to authoritarianism as ‘communists’ and called into question language that demanded the North be defined as an enemy. Later, South Korean civic groups partnered directly with the North to pursue cooperation projects that demonstrated the possibility of mutual respect and recognition. Those engaging in these initiatives would eventually move beyond abstract rhetoric about peace, revealing that it was possible to transcend prior delineations of ‘us’ and ‘them.’
Hong Sang-young, of the Korean Sharing Movement, reflected on this during his 2019 inauguration as Secretary General of the NGO:
Even though we are one people, our life trajectories have been very different, so we think differently and act differently. At first, I tried to change them unilaterally, but I realized that only when I was willing to change, would they change. Transformation is never one-sided, it has to be mutual. Now I believe in the possibility of change, that together we can move in a better direction for everyone.
This is more than a personal anecdote. It is an insight into why peace cannot emerge through the absorption of one side by the other, and why future forms of inter-Korean relationship must transcend boundaries imposed by the insistence that there is a single, authentic way to be Korean.
Beyond Unification, Beyond the Status-quo
The situation today is different from when the two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement and defined their relationship as a special interim relationship stemming from the process toward reunification in 1991. As the Cold War structure was collapsing, the changing strategic environment in East Asia seemed to provide a rare window in which the two Korean governments could move toward a transitional framework for inter-Korean engagement. Both Koreas have undergone significant changes since then, and the fundamental nature of inter-Korean relations has changed. Post 2000s ruptures—a nuclear capability instead of a nuclear program, halted inter-Korean economic cooperation, enduring UN sanctions, and UN human rights enquiries, alongside North Korea’s recent strategic realignment with key allies—cast a structural shadow over inter-Korean relations today. As Heraclitus proclaimed, you can’t step in the same river twice.
The path forward for inter-Korean relations today need not be restricted to the goal of unification. Indeed, for many younger South Koreans in 2025, unification is not a pressing concern. In a fiercely competitive society, where energies are focused on striving to succeed, ‘unification’ often degenerates into an empty political slogan rather than a lived, immediate concern. Moreover, political discussions regarding the DPRK often deteriorate into bitter partisan strife, discouraging youngsters from expressing their views and being labelled as being on one side or the other. If the answer—unification—is already predetermined, it becomes difficult to explore genuine alternatives. In the meantime apathy increases with 68% of South Koreans polled by the Korea Institute for National Unification in 2025 stating that they were ‘not interested’ in North Korea.
Furthermore, endlessly speculating about regime collapse and Southern led unification is unrealistic. Since 1991, the DPRK has outlasted the collapse of the socialist world, its neighbors developing deep economic ties with South Korea, famine, leadership change, and more recently UN sanctions and self-imposed isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic. For all its institutional failings, its ability to survive the most trying of conditions has proven over and over its ability and determination to persevere.
The status quo based on the assumption of deterrence has become more dangerous. The DPRK is a nuclear armed state that has adjusted its nuclear doctrine to include ‘taking the initiative in war.’ Impeached former ROK President Yoon sought to provoke a military response from North Korea to justify declaring martial law. Even without unexpected provocations, experts state that in extremely asymmetric deterrence relationships such as the one between US/ROK and the DPRK, stability is inherently low. Reducing tensions and looking to create space for coexistence is a pressing task at hand.
As divided states possess ‘incomplete’ and ‘overlapping’ sovereignty, peace must begin with recognition of the other. A context previously existed where recognition could take an indeterminate form, the very ambiguity of the ‘special relationship’ being its strength in the 2000s, heralding a yet unknown future. However, the petering out of the Sunshine Policy, ten years of ineffective pressure and isolation, and more recently the failure of Moon Jae-in’s peace and engagement policy to get off the ground in any meaningful way, has fueled disinterest and disengagement in the South, and official disdain in the North.
Beyond Constitutional Possession
With the lessons of these failures in mind, South Korea unambiguously recognizing the North as an equal political subject presents the possibility of an exit ramp from deadlock. However, the ROK’s constitutional claim over the entire Peninsula remains, obstinately insisting that there is one legitimate Korean state, and therefore that the ‘other’ Korea is either illegal, or deficient in its Koreanness.
Reviewing the constitution and the imperative of unification, opening them up to real debate, would further efforts within the ROK to move on from the past and define national identity in terms that embrace changes within South Korea and the corresponding diminished significance of regime competition. While South Korean identity was long defined in connection to the North, whether through rivalry or as a sort of benevolent older sibling during the Sunshine Policy, in recent years it has started evolving independently of it. This is a change that could, if guided constructively, facilitate acceptance of separate, coexisting forms of Koreanness. Of course, this process will be up to South Koreans. Calling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the name it has chosen for itself reflects a significant development within a debate already underway in South Korea.
Reframing Peace on the Korean Peninsula
To suggest that a two-state solution is a case of progressives abruptly abandoning ideals in reaction to Kim Jong Un’s policy shift, misses the point. It overlooks the agency of South Korean civil society and academia and the pivotal role they have repeatedly played in both defining how the inter-Korean relationship is understood, and in influencing how South Korean politicians approach the North. Indeed, the foremost pan-civil society movement regarding inter-Korean relations in the South, including 370 civil society organizations, has been espousing the need for peace rather than unification, as its clarion call since 2020, several years before Kim Jong Un’s declaration.
Peaceful coexistence is impossible under South Korea’s current definition of the inter-Korean relationship because peace-undermining threats of absorption, which pose an existential threat to the North Korean state, remain embedded within it. Furthermore, Article 4 of the ROK Constitution, which mandates the pursuit of unification under the Southern system, impedes the establishment of equal status, an essential starting point for sustainable peace, because it carries an implicit hierarchy that presumes Southern superiority. Recognizing the DPRK as a separate state does not forever foreclose all possibility of some future unification, even if the ‘special relationship’ between the two Koreas ceases. Rather, it opens space for reconciliation unbound by the teleology of unification—a future not dictated by inherited binaries but shaped through an ongoing negotiation of identity. Peace, in this sense, is not merely the cessation of systemic rivalry, but a creative platform upon which new relationships can be built. While constitutional reform and recalibrating the relationship will not be welcomed by everyone in South Korea, they provide the opportunity for a new trajectory in which both states on the Peninsula can redefine how they relate to each other.
38north.org · Dan Gudgeon
6. Presidential office confirms 6 citizens detained in N. Korea, vows efforts to release them
Summary:
South Korea’s presidential office confirmed Thursday that six citizens, including three missionaries and three North Korean defectors, remain detained in the North on espionage charges. It pledged to seek their release by resuming inter Korean talks, after POTROK drew criticism for saying he was unaware of the cases.
Comment: Leave no one behind. Demand their return.
Presidential office confirms 6 citizens detained in N. Korea, vows efforts to release them - UPI.com
upi.com
By Yi Wonju, Yonhap News Agency
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/03/South-Korea-detainees-six-citizens-presidential-office-confirmed/9451764819025/
The presidential office on Thursday confirmed that six South Korean nationals have been detained in North Korea and vowed to make efforts to secure the release of them by swiftly resuming talks with Pyongyang.
The six citizens, including three North Koreans who had defected to South Korea, have been held in the North on charges of espionage and others since between 2013 and 2016.
They include three missionaries arrested by the North Korean authorities from 2013 and 2014, namely Kim Jung-wook, Kim Kook-kie and Choi Chun-gil. The presidential office did not disclose the identities of the three North Korean defectors to protect the safety of their families in the North.
"As inter-Korean talks and exchanges were long suspended, the suffering of our people continues and the issue needs to be urgently addressed," the presidential office said in a statement.
The confirmation came after President Lee Jae Myung was asked during a press conference the previous day whether he was seeking efforts to bring back the detained South Koreans.
Lee said his office will look into the matter, noting that he had never heard of the cases and that he lacks information on individual cases.
The unification ministry has called for the immediate and unconditional release of the missionaries, most recently in March following the United Nations' adoption of a report demanding their release.
Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.
upi.com
7. Seoul raises military budget 7.5% for ‘self-reliant defense’ against North Korea
Summary:
South Korea’s National Assembly approved a 7.5% defense budget increase for 2026 to 65.86 trillion won, the sharpest rise in seven years, to build “self-reliant defense” against North Korea. Operations spending will grow to 45.89 trillion won and force improvement to 19.97 trillion, with major investments in the three-axis system, KF-21 fighters, missile defense, KMPR strike assets, ISR, and defense R&D. Drone and AI programs, space and recon satellites, and civil-military AI cooperation centers gain new funding. The plan supports Seoul’s pledge to reach 3.5% of GDP on defense and purchase large volumes of U.S. equipment.
Comment: The "Juche budget?" snark aside - self reliance is a good thing.
Seoul raises military budget 7.5% for ‘self-reliant defense’ against North Korea
Parliamentary approval of budget comes as the US pressures South Korea to increase defense spending to 3.5% of GDP
Joon Ha Park December 3, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/seoul-boosts-military-budget-7-5-for-self-reliant-defense-against-north-korea/
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung salutes personnel during a military review on ROK Armed Forces Day and Seoul’s defense budget for fiscal year 2026 | Image: ROK Presidential Office (Oct. 1, 2025), Ministry of National Defense (Dec. 3, 2025), edited by NK News
South Korea has finalized a 7.5% increase in its defense budget to 65.86 trillion won ($44.8 billion) for the next fiscal year, according to the defense ministry, as Seoul looks to take greater responsibility for defending against North Korea under pressure from the U.S.
The National Assembly approved the spending plan late Tuesday, cutting 430.5 billion won ($293 million) from the Lee Jae Myung administration’s original request following a bipartisan agreement between the ruling Democratic Party and the main opposition People Power Party.
The final rate is lower than the 8.2% increase initially sought by the government, but still marks the sharpest rise in seven years, surpassing the 7.4% uptick recorded in 2020 under the Moon Jae-in administration.
Under the new budget, 45.89 trillion won ($31.2 billion) will go toward force operations — personnel, readiness and maintenance costs — up 5.8% from this year. Another 19.97 trillion won ($13.6 billion) will be allocated for force improvement programs, an 11.9% increase that covers major weapons procurement and modernization initiatives, according to a defense ministry press release.
The budget surge aligns with President Lee’s repeated pledges to strengthen South Korea’s “self-reliant defense” capabilities.
In August, he emphasized South Korea’s aim to “take on a more leading role in safeguarding its own security” through advanced technologies. During October’s Armed Forces Day parade, Lee reiterated the push for a “smart, elite force” that integrates autonomous drones, AI-enabled weapons and precision-guided missiles, noting that next year’s budget would underpin these initiatives.
The defense ministry said it would “ensure meticulous preparation” to execute the 2026 spending plan efficiently and guarantee that the expanded budget “directly supports the realization of a robust self-reliant defense posture.”
According to a U.S.-ROK joint fact sheet, Seoul will spend $25 billion on U.S. equipment by 2030 and provide $33 billion in support for U.S. Forces Korea over an unspecified period.
The agreement reaffirmed commitments made during meetings between Presidents Lee and Trump in Gyeongju and Washington, including Seoul’s pledge to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP “as soon as possible” and enhance its conventional capabilities.
South Korean soldiers prepare to launch the Cheongung-II surface-to-air missile during a drill | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Nov. 6, 2024)
While the defense ministry’s 2026 budget summary did not specify how those funds would be spent, it noted that spending on South Korea’s three-axis defense system will rise 21.3% to 8.84 trillion won ($6 billion) from 2025.
Seoul’s three-axis architecture — aimed at countering North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities — includes the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, the Korea Air and Missile Defense network (KAMD) and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strike plan.
Major procurement lines for the architecture include:
- 5.26 trillion won ($3.5 billion) for systems supporting Kill Chain missions such as initial mass production of the KF-21 fighter jet
- 1.81 trillion won ($1.2 billion) for KAMD assets including the Gwanggaeto-III Batch-II destroyer program
- 712.1 billion won ($485 million) for KMPR capabilities such as C-130H upgrades
- 1.05 trillion won ($715 million) for surveillance, reconnaissance and command-and-control platforms that underpin the three-axis system.
The government also boosted defense research and development funding by 19.4% to 5.84 trillion won ($3.9 billion).
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back’s signature initiative that calls for training “500,000 drone warriors” also received a larger appropriation during the parliamentary review. Lawmakers approved 33 billion won ($22.4 million), up from the initial 20.5 billion won ($13 million), for procuring more than 11,000 commercial drones for training.
The budget also includes 2.16 billion won ($1.4 million) for AI-enabled manned-unmanned teaming systems, 349.4 billion won ($238 million) for next-generation defense technologies and new funding for a Defense Space Certification Center to establish standards for space weapons testing.
Lawmakers also increased appropriations for the “425 project” for Seoul’s military reconnaissance satellites and the Military Satellite Communication System-III.
Defense spending in support of whole-of-government AI initiatives was newly added, including 35 billion won ($23 million) for applying the Artificial Intelligence Transformation (AX) Sprint program to defense operations and 19.5 billion won ($13.2 million) for establishing a civil-military AI collaboration center.
Edited by David Choi
8. 'Bull of peace' laid to rest on border hill after drifting from N. Korea in 1996 flood
Summary:
A bull that drifted from North Korea to the South during devastating 1996 floods has been reinterred on Aegibong hill near the border, almost 20 years after its death. Rescued by South Korean Marines from Yudo island in neutral waters in 1997 after stepping on a mine, the “bull of peace” recovered, was ceremonially “married” to a Jeju cow in 1998, and sired seven calves before dying in 2006. Its descendants now live on farms across South Korea. The remains, moved to Aegibong Peace Ecopark, are intended as a symbol of division, longing for homeland, and hope for Korean peace.
Comment: Why can't we all just get along? On a more serious note I wonder if this news will reach the Korean people in the north. What will they think about this? How will they interpret the South's actions?
(LEAD) 'Bull of peace' laid to rest on border hill after drifting from N. Korea in 1996 flood | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · December 3, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251203003951315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: ADDS more remarks in 3rd para, minor edits throughout)
By Chae Yun-hwan
GIMPO, South Korea, Dec. 3 (Yonhap) -- A bull that drifted south from North Korea during a major flood in 1996 and became a symbol of inter-Korean peace has been laid to rest on a border hill overlooking its homeland nearly 20 years after its death.
The animal's remains were moved to an exhibition hall in Aegibong Peace Ecopark on Aegibong hill, just 1.4 kilometers from North Korea's border county of Kaepung, on Saturday, according to the Gimpo Cultural Foundation.
"(We) had long pushed for the relocation of the remains to Aegibong so that the bull of peace could see its homeland," Kang Kyung-ku, a former mayor of the western border city of Gimpo, said. "We were able to do so after space finally opened up."
Members of the Tongjin Dure Nori Association hold a memorial ritual for the relocation of the remains of a bull that drifted south from North Korea near Aegibong hill in Gimpo, northwest of Seoul, on Nov. 27, 2025, in this photo provided by the group on Dec. 3, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
South Korean authorities first discovered the animal on the uninhabited island of Yudo in Gimpo in July 1996 after it drifted from the North and survived a deadly flood that swept through central parts of the Korean Peninsula.
Due to the island's location inside neutral waters between the Koreas, South Korean Marines were deployed to rescue it in January the next year after authorization by the U.N. Command overseeing the armistice of the 1950-53 Korean War.
The bull had a broken ankle after stepping on a mine among those strewn across the heavily fortified border but later recovered after treatment.
In 1998, it was married off to a cow from the southern island of Jeju in a wedding ceremony, and the couple went on to have seven offspring before the bull died of natural causes in 2006 at the presumed age of 16.
This file photo, taken Jan. 17, 1997, shows a bull rescued by South Korean Marines from an uninhabited island off Gimpo, northwest of Seoul. (Yonhap)
After its death, the bull's descendants over eight generations have been raised in farms across South Korea, including Jeju and the western city of Incheon.
The bull's remains had been stored in a culture center in Gimpo before their relocation to the border hill, where fierce fighting took place during the Korean War.
The island where the animal was discovered can be seen from the exhibition hall containing the remains, which is now open to the public.
Ahead of the relocation, a memorial ritual also took place near Aegibong on Thursday, wishing for peace on the peninsula.
"Although the bull of peace, considered a symbol of the pain of division as well as peace, did not see the unification (of the Koreas), I hope it becomes a big star above Aegibong and a messenger of peace," Kang said.
A urn containing the remains of a bull that drifted from North Korea in 1996 is stored at an exhibition hall at Aegibong Peace Ecopark on Aegibong hill, just 1.4 kilometers from North Korea's border county of Kaepung, in this undated photo provided by the Gimpo Cultural Foundation. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
A descendant of a bull that drifted south from North Korea during a flood in 1996 is seen in this file photo provided by the Tongjin Dure Nori Association. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · December 3, 2025
9. S. Korea to provide US$1.5 mln in humanitarian aid to flood-hit Vietnam, Thailand, Sri Lanka
Comment: South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, that is a partner in the arsenal of democracies and seeks to uphold the rules based order by being a responsible member of the international community.
S. Korea to provide US$1.5 mln in humanitarian aid to flood-hit Vietnam, Thailand, Sri Lanka | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · December 4, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251204010800315
SEOUL, Dec. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will provide a total of US$1.5 million worth of humanitarian aid to Vietnam, Thailand and Sri Lanka to support recovery efforts following deadly floods and landslides that struck the three countries, the foreign ministry said Thursday.
The government will provide $500,000 to each country to help restore the affected areas and support local residents' early return to their daily lives, the ministry said in a release.
The floods struck the three South and Southeast Asian countries late last month, killing more than 1,300 people and destroying homes, roads and crops across the regions.
This EPA photo shows rescue personnel on a flooded road in a suburb of Colombo, Sri Lanka, on Dec. 3, 2025. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · December 4, 2025
10. Lee considering visit to Japan next month for talks with Takaichi: report
Comment: Good. We need good bilateral cooperation to have strong trilateral cooperation.
Lee considering visit to Japan next month for talks with Takaichi: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · December 4, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251204010600315
SEOUL, Dec. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Japan are in talks to arrange a visit to Japan by President Lee Jae Myung next month for summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a report said Thursday.
The two sides are looking to hold the summit in Nara Prefecture, Takaichi's home region, in mid-January, Kyodo News reported, citing diplomatic sources.
The trip, if realized, will mark Lee's second visit to the neighboring country after he visited Tokyo in August and held summit talks with Takaichi's predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba.
It would also reflect commitments made by the leaders of the two countries to continue the positive momentum in bilateral ties through "shuttle diplomacy," or reciprocal visits.
Ishiba visited South Korea's southern city of Busan for talks with Lee in September before he stepped down as prime minister.
Relations between Seoul and Tokyo have improved since the previous Yoon Suk Yeol government.
Lee has said he intends to advance ties with Japan in a future-oriented manner, while not overlooking longstanding wartime history issues stemming from the time when Korea was under Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.
Lee and Takaichi last held summit talks on Oct. 30 on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Gyeongju and briefly met on the margins of the Group of 20 leaders' gathering in South Africa last week.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) poses with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ahead of their meeting on the sidelines of the Group of 20 leaders' summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Nov. 24, 2025, in this file photo provided by Lee's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · December 4, 2025
11. Top diplomats of S. Korea, Pacific island nations to hold talks in Seoul next week
Comment: Good. We need help with our friends in the South Pacific in the strategic competition with China. I will continue to be a broken record on this descrotion of the ROK.
South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, that is a partner in the arsenal of democracies and seeks to uphold the rules based order by being a responsible member of the international community.
Top diplomats of S. Korea, Pacific island nations to hold talks in Seoul next week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · December 4, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251204009300315
SEOUL, Dec. 4 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea and Pacific Island Countries (PICs) will hold talks next week in Seoul to discuss ways to promote cooperation in various fields, including climate change, the foreign ministry said Thursday.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun will co-host the sixth Korea-Pacific Islands foreign ministers' meeting on Tuesday with Peter Shannel Agovaka, the top diplomat of Solomon Islands, according to the ministry.
This year's meeting will involve all 18 member countries and territories of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), including 14 PICs, Australia and New Zealand. The PIF is an intergovernmental body aimed at enhancing cooperation among 18 island countries in the region.
Participants plan to discuss ways to bolster development cooperation between South Korea and Pacific island countries and expand cooperation in diverse areas, such as climate change, fishery and personnel exchanges.
On the margins of the meeting, Cho will hold separate talks with his counterparts from some PICs, including Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands and Palau, the ministry added.
This photo, taken Dec. 4, 2025, shows Park Il, spokesperson at Seoul's foreign ministry, speaking at a regular press briefing in Seoul. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · December 4, 2025
12. Seoul praises legal change banning activist balloon launches toward North Korea
Summary:
Seoul has closed a key loophole on activist balloon launches toward North Korea by revising the Aviation Safety Act to ban all unmanned balloons in no-fly zones, regardless of weight. The unification ministry praised the change as supporting Lee Jae Myung’s efforts to ease tensions and rebuild trust. Activists and defectors have used balloons to send leaflets, food, radios and religious materials, arguing they spread information and hope. Border residents and Pyongyang see them as dangerous provocations. After the Constitutional Court struck down Moon’s anti-leaflet law in 2023, authorities turned to aviation rules to curb launches and related incidents.
Comment. Again a terrible and disappointing decision by the ROK.
Seoul praises legal change banning activist balloon launches toward North Korea
Unification ministry says amendment to aviation law no longer allows launches under 2 kg, amid crackdown on leafleting
Jooheon Kim December 4, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/seoul-praises-legal-change-banning-activist-balloon-launches-toward-north-korea/
A civic group prepares to launch balloons carrying leaflets. | Image: Abductees’ Family Union (June 2, 2025)
South Korea’s unification ministry has welcomed a new amendment to the Aviation Safety Act banning all unmanned balloon flights in no-fly zones, saying the revision closes a loophole that allowed activists to launch balloons toward North Korea amid Seoul’s crackdown on leafleting.
“Since its launch, the Lee Jae Myung administration has taken proactive measures to ease military tensions and restore trust between the two Koreas …,” the ministry stated in a news release. “The revised Aviation Safety Act is expected to support these efforts.”
Prior to the National Assembly’s passage of the amendment on Tuesday, balloons carrying objects weighing less than two kilograms could be flown in restricted areas without approval from the ROK land ministry.
South Korean human rights activists and defectors have regularly launched balloons carrying small amounts of food, radios, household items and anti-North Korea propaganda leaflets toward the north from near the inter-Korean border, saying the items aided and spread democratic values to impoverished North Koreans.
Some North Korean defectors have said the leaflets influenced their decision to flee from the regime, but ROK residents living near the border have reported feeling threatened due to the balloon launches.
On Wednesday, the unification ministry also called on parliament to provide law enforcement with a clear legal basis to actively prevent balloon leaflet launches along the border. South Korean police previously said they had no authority to intervene.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has criticized leaflet campaigns, describing them as provocations that heighten tensions with Pyongyang, which views the campaign as a threat to its rule.
North Korea has long been sensitive to these balloon launches from South Korean activists and repeatedly condemns the practice in state media. During the pandemic, Pyongyang claimed without evidence that balloons had carried the coronavirus into the country.
In June 2020, North Korea destroyed the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong, reportedly in protest of Seoul’s refusal to halt the leaflet campaigns.
The previous Moon administration subsequently pushed for the passage of the so-called anti-leaflet law banning balloon launches toward North Korea, but South Korea’s Constitutional Court struck down the law in 2023, finding that it restricted freedom of expression.
Since then, local ROK authorities have sought alternative ways to crack down on leafleting, imposing new restrictions after Pyongyang began retaliating against leaflets by launching trash balloons.
The Lee administration has taken these efforts further by exploring ways to use existing laws like the Aviation Safety Act to stop activist leafleting.
Seventeen South Koreans were referred to prosecutors in November for allegedly sending at least 1,000 balloons carrying propaganda leaflets and Bibles toward the DPRK in 2024.
In August, police also referred six U.S. nationals to prosecutors for allegedly attempting to send bottles containing rice, cash and religious materials to North Korea from a restricted area in Ganghwa County.
The DPRK has not sent trash balloons across its southern border since Nov. 2024.
Edited by David Choi
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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