Quotes of the Day:
“Any book worth banning is a book worth reading.”
- Isaac Asimov
“And how we burned in the camps later, thinking: What would things have been like if every Security operative, when he went out at night to make an arrest, had been uncertain whether he would return alive and had to say good-bye to his family? Or if, during periods of mass arrests, as for example in Leningrad, when they arrested a quarter of the entire city, people had not simply sat there in their lairs, paling with terror at every bang of the downstairs door and at every step on the staircase, but had understood they had nothing left to lose and had boldly set up in the downstairs hall an ambush of half a dozen people with axes, hammers, pokers, or whatever else was at hand?... The Organs would very quickly have suffered a shortage of officers and transport and, notwithstanding all of Stalin's thirst, the cursed machine would have ground to a halt! If...if...We didn't love freedom enough. And even more – we had no awareness of the real situation.... We purely and simply deserved everything that happened afterward. - Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
"Here’s the wicked paradox about terrorism. Long-term responses do nothing about short-term dangers. Short-term reactions feed extremism over long term."
- Carmen Medina former DDI, CIA, 19 NOV 2015
1. North Korea heads into ‘tense’ winter: Closed borders and food supplies in question
2. The Politics and Strategy of an End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula
3. China, South Korea to further deepen bilateral cooperative partnership: high-ranking officials meeting in Tianjin
4. Wartime strategy update: ROK, US agree to fortify alliance against NK threats
5. South Korea temporarily reverses course in exiting Covid restrictions.
6. Korea's Battery Industry Over-Dependent on Chinese Materials
7. Russian 'help' to ability to hit US – truth about North Korea's nuclear arsenal
8. Defending against nukes (ROK and beyond)
1. North Korea heads into ‘tense’ winter: Closed borders and food supplies in question
Could this be worse than the famine and Arduous March of 1994-1996? We must continue to observe for the indicators of instability and collapse. What is different now is that the two "safety valves" no longer exists for the regime. First there is no Sunshine Policy to transfer funds to the regime and there cannot be one with the sanctions in place. The second is the "safety valve" from the first great famine when the party's public distribution system collapsed were the rise of local markets of which there are now more than 400. However, because of the paradox of COVID north Korea has shut down cross border trade and smuggling as a defense against COVID but it also took the opportunity of COVID to crack down on what little "freedoms" the people were able to develop because of their market activity.
Now more than ever we need to be paying attention to Robert Collins' seven phases of north Korean regime collapse. See Kaplan's article at the link.
“When North Korea Falls
The furor over Kim Jong Il’s missile tests and nuclear brinksmanship obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea’s catastrophic collapse. How the regime ends could determine the balance of power in Asia for decades. The likely winner? China”
ROBERT D. KAPLAN
OCTOBER 2006 ISSUE
North Korea heads into ‘tense’ winter: Closed borders and food supplies in question
SEOUL — North Korea’s self-imposed border lockdown during the pandemic has exacerbated a shortage of food, supplies and cash, hurting the country’s most vulnerable people as they hunker down for the winter ahead.
Winter is typically a volatile time in North Korea, which struggles with chronic food shortages. What makes this year especially concerning, say analysts who follow North Korea, is the country’s closure of its borders since early 2020, even with critical trading partner China.
It is impossible to know the full scope of issues affecting North Korea, a totalitarian state that issues carefully controlled and choreographed propaganda.
But according to statements in state media, limited trade data and accounts of informants and defectors, which cannot be independently confirmed, the pandemic lockdown has devastated the domestic economy and access to food.
Kim has emphasized self-reliance during the prolonged food crisis as the country retreats further inward. That posture also creates challenges for those seeking to reengage North Korea in denuclearization talks that have stalled for nearly three years.
There are signs that North Korea may be looking to reopen its border with China. But the prospects for bringing Kim back to negotiations remain slim, especially as the Biden administration has shown no signs that it is willing to grant the sanctions relief that Kim demands.
Urging North Korea to reopen its economy gradually, U.N. Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana wrote in an October report: “People’s access to food is a serious concern and the most vulnerable children and elderly are at risk of starvation.”
Despite some flood damage this summer, analysts anticipate that the crop yield this fall was not severely affected by bad weather. Still, the overall food shortage persists, and even international aid groups have left the country during the lockdown.
The lack of imported fertilizers and farming materials, such as vinyl to cover the crops, has led to a lesser-than-anticipated harvest, according to Lee Sang-yong, editor in chief of Daily NK, a Seoul-based news service with informants inside North Korea.
The price of corn has been rising in the pandemic, a sign that more people are mixing corn with rice, or eating corn in lieu of rice, which is more difficult to obtain, Lee said.
“There are all sorts of effects because of this massive reduction of trade,” said Sokeel Park, South Korea country director of the nongovernmental organization Liberty in North Korea, which helps North Koreans resettle in the South.
In June, Kim called the country’s food situation “tense.” In late October, North Korea announced its plans to breed black swan as a way to make up for its inefficient farming sector and food shortage, saying the meat “is delicious and has medicinal value.” A senior official of the Workers’ Party of Korea led a ceremony opening a black swan center at a duck farm.
Swans are not known to be particular delicacies, and some analysts say that such efforts are shortsighted solutions being tried in place of systemic improvements to the economy. North Korea has a history of promoting exotic animals as innovative food solutions. Ostrich farms were built after the deadly famine of the 1990s, an ordeal known as the “arduous march.”
Low levels of trade have persisted, and there are some signs that North Korea is taking steps to resume land-based trade with China, according to South Korean intelligence officials. For decades, Beijing has been an economic lifeline for North Korea.
North Korea imported about 1 million tons of grains, wheat and rice in the past year to supplement its production, according to a quarterly report by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization issued Dec. 2.
“North Korea went out of the way to stabilize food prices amid the disastrous economy. The rice price was stable on the surface because of heavy state interventions … and unofficial receipt of Chinese aids. However, we do not know for how much longer it can hold,” said Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded think tank in Seoul.
With the concerns over new coronavirus variants and lack of vaccines, North Korea may not fully resume trade until after the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing in February, Cho said, calling the possible delay “a hopeless scenario for the North Korean people.”
How much the coronavirus has affected North Korea is unclear. The country maintains that it has had no positive cases, but it has taken more drastic measures than were adopted during previous epidemic outbreaks.
North Koreans developed their own ways to endure long periods of difficulty after the 1990s famine. Since then, local markets called “jangmadang” have opened and operate under state watch, with citizens being allowed to sell and trade goods and food.
But the shortage of imports and supplies has in turn limited the availability of food and other necessities such as medicines and batteries at the markets.
Urban residents are reliant on the markets and have hit worse by the lockdown than have those in rural areas, who can farm their own food and sell and barter agricultural products, said Jiro Ishimaru, the founder of the Japan-based news service Asia Press Rimjingang, which has informants inside North Korea.
“Those who are having the most difficult time and dying of starvation are dying because they have no money, not because there is no rice growing inside the country,” Ishimaru said.
The trade blockade is likely also to have caused price inflation in the markets and a shortage of domestic and foreign currency for buying goods, said Peter Ward, a Seoul-based specialist on the North Korean economy.
“They will have more-volatile prices, food prices will be more inflated there, people may be struggling to acquire [goods] and lost purchasing power as a result of covid and anti-market measures, and they might be struggling to feed themselves,” Ward said.
The lack of access to medication at the markets has made it difficult to treat pneumonia and other cold-weather ailments as winter approaches, Ishimaru said, adding that the shortage has hurt the elderly and caretakers who have lost jobs and now cannot provide care.
Intensifying crackdowns on people moving between provinces and the illegal use of cellphones have severely limited people’s ability to trade food and goods. Even defectors who have regularly sent remittances back into North Korea are finding it difficult to reach their families or are running into more scam brokers who pocket the money themselves.
“The North Koreans who are here [in the South], a lot of them have lost contact with family members, or it’s more difficult for them to … send money,” said Park, of Liberty in North Korea, the group helping defectors.
The halted trade and ban on travel between provinces also led to unemployment for the workers who relied on the shipment of goods from the North Korea-China border to other parts of the country, including operators of trucks and hand wagons, and those who cooked food for the workers and delivered goods to markets.
“It’s not a simple food shortage issue, but an economic issue,” Ishimaru said.
Min Joo Kim contributed to this report.
2. The Politics and Strategy of an End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula
I have pasted the commentaries below from the 3 experts who participated in the round table.
The Politics and Strategy of an End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula
Chung Sun-Jung/Getty Images
Roundtable with Frank Aum, Jung-Yeop Woo, and Shin-wha Lee
December 3, 2021
NBR reached out to several experts in its network to gather perspectives on the politics and strategy of an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula. The concept of an end-of-war declaration has become a polarizing topic in both Washington and Seoul. This roundtable aims to clarify the key issues in the debate and offer policy options for congressional action.
Frank Aum is the senior expert on Northeast Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace. From 2010 to 2017, he worked at the Department of Defense. During this time, he advised four secretaries of defense on issues related to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Mr. Aum also served as head of delegation for working-level negotiations with the Republic of Korea on U.S.-ROK alliance matters and received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.
Jung-yeop Woo is a Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. He studied at Seoul National University, Georgetown University and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Previously, he was a research fellow and director of the Center for Security Policy at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He was also a postdoctoral fellow at the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California.
Shin-wha Lee is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations and the Director of the Peace and Democracy Institute at Korea University. She is also President of the Korean Academic Council on the United Nations System. Previously, she was a special adviser of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s independent inquiry into Rwandan genocide, a board member of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and a chair’s adviser of the East Asia Vision Group.
Events
Event Summary | Dec 2, 2021
An End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula: A Risk Worth Taking
Interview with Frank Aum
December 3, 2021
NBR reached out to several experts in its network to gather perspectives on the politics and strategy of an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula. The concept of an end-of-war declaration has become a polarizing topic in both Washington and Seoul. This Q&A with Frank Aum is part of the roundtable “The Politics and Strategy of an End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula” that aims to clarify the key issues in the debate and offer policy options for congressional action.
Under what circumstances would an end-of-war declaration be in the interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK)?
An end-of-war declaration would be in the interests of the United States if it helps advance the goals of denuclearizing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), enhancing our relationship with the ROK, and strengthening our regional security posture. Right now, I think the Biden administration views a declaration as only advancing the second goal. The current Moon Jae-in administration strongly supports it, while North Korea has expressed ambivalence. Many critics have voiced concern that a declaration, while not binding, could heighten calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula.
An end-of-war declaration would work best if it is carefully coordinated among all three parties and helps launch a new peace process that includes immediate confidence-building measures on both sides. If it doesn’t include DPRK buy-in and is not accompanied by a process and immediate bilateral concessions, it would fizzle out quickly.
How might a declaration advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula? How should parties sequence an end-of-war declaration with components of a peace regime (including the issue of denuclearization)?
The Moon administration envisions an end-of-war declaration as a paradigm-shifting catalyst that could reframe U.S.-DPRK relations, inter-Korean relations, and the environment on the Korean Peninsula from war, hostility, deterrence, and risk aversion to peace, cooperation, engagement, and risk taking. Since a declaration is simply a nonbinding political statement with no legal impact on the Armistice Agreement, the UN Command, or the U.S.-ROK alliance, Seoul believes it could kick-start a more comprehensive peace process that ends with a formal peace agreement.
An end-of-war declaration could come immediately or as part of an interim agreement that includes some denuclearization and sanctions-relief measures. But given its purpose as a catalyst, it needs to come on the early side. Everyone recognizes that a declaration is, without action, just words on paper. But Moon is betting that even words can instill the environment with momentum.
What are the primary risks and opportunities surrounding a declaration?
An immediate concern is that people have different understandings of its significance. Some see a declaration as a nonbinding political statement, while others conflate it with a formal peace treaty that would dissolve the Armistice Agreement. This exact confusion led to an awkward moment between Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and George W. Bush during an APEC press conference in 2007. Roh tried to get Bush to publicly express support for an end-of-war declaration, while Bush insisted that a peace treaty could only come after denuclearization.
Even if everyone is on the same page about an end-of-war declaration as a simple statement, there are still people who believe it has either limited value or, even worse, the potential to undermine U.S. interests. Some analysts argue that a nonbinding document has no value, which ironically aligns directly with North Korea’s position. Others assert that while a declaration has no tangible benefit for the United States, it could have negative implications for the Armistice Agreement (including related issues such as sovereignty of the Northwest Islands and the location of the Northern Limit Line), the UN Command, rear bases in Japan, and sanctions on North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act. They also worry that it might invite bipartisan condemnation from the U.S. Senate, where several senators maintain a hard-line position on North Korea.
On the optimistic side, if Washington assumes some of the aforementioned risks, while guarding against others, then a declaration could actually help improve U.S.-ROK relations, give Seoul a stronger sense of agency over its future, and even advance U.S. denuclearization goals. For example, the declaration could be drafted so that it has no binding effect on the Armistice Agreement or the UN Command until a formal peace settlement is achieved. Given the failed track record of other previous risk-averse policies that rely on deterrence, pressure, isolation, and strategic patience, an end-of-war declaration could be a risk worth taking.
How might the U.S. Congress play a meaningful role in shaping the terms of a declaration or driving a peace process during the Biden administration?
If reports are accurate, the United States is doing the right thing by working with South Korea on the text of a draft end-of-war declaration. Of course, this measure might be more alliance management and throwing Seoul a bone than a sincere intent to make such a declaration in the near future. But even the process of thinking through the language and the legal implications and preparing a draft declaration puts Washington in a stronger negotiating position.
The president has the authority to drive foreign policy and doesn’t need congressional approval for an end-of-war declaration, which is not a treaty. However, Congress can exercise its oversight function and use public hearings and private briefings to seek updates and assessments from the State Department on the declaration and the overall peace process.
Frank Aum is the senior expert on Northeast Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace. From 2010 to 2017, he worked at the Department of Defense. During this time, he advised four secretaries of defense on issues related to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Mr. Aum also served as head of delegation for working-level negotiations with the Republic of Korea on U.S.-ROK alliance matters and received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.
This interview was conducted by Joshua Nezam, who is director of congressional affairs at NBR.
An End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula: The Danger of Separating an End-of-War Declaration from the Wider Peace Process
Interview with Jung-Yeop Woo
December 3, 2021
NBR reached out to several experts in its network to gather perspectives on the politics and strategy of an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula. The concept of an end-of-war declaration has become a polarizing topic in both Washington and Seoul. This Q&A with Jung-Yeop Woo is part of the roundtable “The Politics and Strategy of an End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula” that aims to clarify the key issues in the debate and offer policy options for congressional action.
Under what circumstances would an end-of-war declaration be in the interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK)?
The ROK government has argued that an “end-of-war declaration” would not change the current state of the armistice. That in the first place confuses many observers on this issue. The ROK government has argued that a declaration is only symbolic and does not have any legal implications. However, it will be very difficult to separate the symbolic part of the end-of-war declaration from its legal or substantive meaning.
Why do we want to have a separate end-of-war declaration when there already exists a ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula? It is because we want not only to have a ceasefire but also to establish a new order after the war is settled. The end-of-war declaration is part of that process, which should be about a desired new order after the war. Of course, we do not shoot against each other—except for the provocations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—as a part of war, but the situation is very different from 1953. The DPRK has developed nuclear weapons, and that fact should be addressed in a desired new order.
An end-of-war declaration should affirm that all parties are ready and prepared to settle the new order incorporating the peaceful relations between the ROK and DPRK. Without being ready for this—in other words, without making meaningful progress on the denuclearization front—changing the status quo on the current security configuration will be detrimental to the deterrence posture on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, for the United States and for some in South Korea, any discussion about an end-of-war declaration should be closely related to the denuclearization process of the DPRK.
How might an end-of-war declaration advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula? How should parties sequence a declaration with components of a peace regime (including the issue of denuclearization)?
In mid-2018, there was a discussion about a “declaration for declaration.” At that time, this meant that an end-of-war declaration could be exchanged for a full declaration of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and programs. The rationale was that with the end-of-war declaration, Kim Jong-un could tell his people that the DPRK does not need to keep or develop any of its nuclear weapons because there does not exist any hostility from outside, mainly from the United States, if a declaration is agreed on by all parties.
This time, the ROK argued that with an end-of-war declaration we can hope to lure the DPRK back to negotiations. The DPRK has not yet responded positively to this proposal. Thus, there is no guarantee that offering an end-of-war declaration would lead to meaningful negotiations with the DPRK. A declaration only can have meaning if it is part of a peace accord between relevant parties.
What are the primary risks and opportunities surrounding a declaration?
At this stage, an end-of-war declaration does not promise anything. Even though the ROK government has argued that a declaration could be only symbolic, there is no possible way that it can be separated from its legal or political implications.
Without all parties’ being prepared to engage in peace talks, separating an end-of-war declaration from the wider process of a peace accord would be dangerous. Though it does not have any impact on the legal status of the armistice, the DPRK (or China) would take advantage of a declaration. They could argue that the UN command is no longer necessary or legitimate after an end of the war has been declared. They could even argue that the U.S. Forces Korea are no longer needed on the Korean Peninsula.
How might the U.S. Congress play a meaningful role in shaping the terms of a declaration or driving a peace process during the Biden administration?
As the content of the end-of-war statement is not public, it would be difficult to expect any member of the U.S. Congress to comment on the content (or text). I do not think either the ROK or U.S. government is considering revealing the content while it is still being discussed between the two governments. Thus, it would be important for the U.S. Congress to note if the status quo on the Korean Peninsula changes without meaningful progress in the denuclearization of the DPRK.
Jung-Yeop Woo is a Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. He studied at Seoul National University, Georgetown University and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Previously, he was a research fellow and director of the Center for Security Policy at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He was also a postdoctoral fellow at the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California.
This interview was conducted by Joshua Nezam, who is director of congressional affairs at NBR.
An End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula: Pursuing a Phased Agreement with the Goal of Complete Denuclearization
Interview with Shin-wha Lee
December 3, 2021
NBR reached out to several experts in its network to gather perspectives on the politics and strategy of an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula. The concept of an end-of-war declaration has become a polarizing topic in both Washington and Seoul. This Q&A with Shin-wha Lee is part of the roundtable “The Politics and Strategy of an End-of-War Declaration on the Korean Peninsula” that aims to clarify the key issues in the debate and offer policy options for congressional action.
Under what circumstances would an end-of-war declaration be in the interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK)?
The recent debate over the end-or-war declaration started with the April 17, 2018, Panmunjom Declaration, which outlined that such a declaration would be concluded by the end of that year. The biggest obstacle is that denuclearization, the most important precondition for the declaration of an end to the war that the current Moon administration intends to pursue, has disappeared. In addition, it is unclear whether an agreement has been reached between South Korea and the United States on the implementation of the declaration.
Recently, Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-gun said that there is no disagreement with the United States and that the declaration document is being finalized between the two countries. However, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan has stated that South Korea and the United States disagree about the order, timing, and conditions related to the declaration. This suggests that practical implementation will be difficult.
From the United States’ perspective, it is an important prerequisite for an end-of-war declaration for the Kim Jung-un regime to present a clear denuclearization roadmap to the international community in a form that it can take responsibility for later. However, in the 8th Party Congress speech in January 2021, Kim indicated a change in the country’s strategy (as a nuclear state) that would separate denuclearization from negotiations with Washington and Seoul.
Thus, it seems almost impossible to justify the declaration as a path to denuclearization through steps such as a joint statement with North Korea or certain technical disarmament steps. Only unified, consistent, and strong sanctions from the international community, including the United Nations, can lead to actual denuclearization of North Korea, not a declaration of an end to the war.
How might an end-of-war declaration advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula? How should parties sequence a declaration with components of a peace regime (including the issue of denuclearization)?
Currently Korean society remains divided on whether to pursue the end-of-war declaration. While proponents of the “entry theory” claim that such a declaration will catalyze denuclearization, supporters of the “exit theory” highlight the importance of verifiable denuclearization over the declaration in ending the long-standing war. The claims of the president, ruling party, and scholars rushing to declare an end to the war underscore how the declaration is viewed as a catalyst for peace on the Korean Peninsula, an inducer for denuclearization, and a facilitator between the two Koreas. They also claim that the declaration would not interfere with the future of the U.S. Forces Korea, the UN command, and the ROK-U.S. alliance because it is a “political” declaration to end the Korean War.
Meanwhile, those critics of the end-of-war declaration condemn the current administration for dichotomously framing proponents of their agenda as “peace forces” and opponents as “peace-breakers.” They emphasize that denuclearization should precede the declaration.
As the declaration became politicized, discussions on denuclearization were set aside and lost priority. President Roh Moo-hyun defined denuclearization as a prerequisite, and President Moon Jae-in also shared such sentiment in 2018. However, the Moon administration altered its posture by characterizing the declaration as a “gateway to denuclearization.” Although the government has an obligation to justify its changed policy stance on important national issues, President Moon has not provided any sufficient explanation.
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to reach a complete agreement between the relevant countries on what the end of the war should be. Through the declaration, military confidence-building measures that go beyond the September 19 Military Agreement must be followed. The meaning of the declaration will fade if military measures are not followed to substantially resolve the military confrontation as well as complete demilitarization of the DMZ through the full-fledged operation of the inter-Korean joint military committee.
Furthermore, if a declaration is to be made, the Moon administration should present a specific direction and consultation structure for the transition to a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
What are the primary risks and opportunities surrounding a declaration?
Even if Seoul and Washington reach a diplomatic consensus on the declaration, they must wait for North Korea’s response. Practical implementation may be very difficult given Pyongyang’s uncooperative attitude. North Korea has repeatedly promoted the following preconditions for the declaration: not defining their military actions as provocations, lifting the UN sanctions, and suspending the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise. Indeed, during the 2019 Hanoi summit, North Korea’s interest was focused on lifting sanctions and not on ending the war. Pyongyang’s policy stance thus contradicts the expected effect of “peace” promoted by the proponents of the end-of-war declaration.
President Moon’s willingness to establish a legacy on the Korean Peninsula during his tenure has been guiding South Korea in the wrong direction. While South Korea should be the most important stakeholder in the denuclearization issue, President Moon has shrugged off the problem for the United States and North Korea to resolve. As a result, South Korea has lost its leverage with North Korea, as described by the recently coined term “Korea passing.”
How might the U.S. Congress play a meaningful role in shaping the terms of a declaration or driving a peace process during the Biden administration?
South Korea, North Korea, and the United States should coordinate within a more comprehensive framework. If North Korea–U.S. relations are prioritized, then the inter-Korean relations and ROK-U.S. alliance will become secondary, and South Korea will further lose its place in the discourse. In order to avoid such a diplomatic blunder, the Moon administration must stop making unreasonable attempts to cling on to the end-of-war declaration in a limited time frame and rather prepare to hand over its work to its successors.
If the declaration is eventually agreed to, the U.S. Congress should issue a statement and call for policy action. Specifically, in order to enforce Pyongyang’s faithful implementation of the agreement once reached, it is necessary for the U.S. Congress to urge North Korea to promote internationally credible documentation and legislation.
Of course, the Korean National Assembly should play a leading role in all these processes in cooperation with the U.S. Congress. Unfortunately, however, it cannot be expected to play a proper role in debating the declaration, which is a national priority promoted by President Moon. The Korean National Assembly currently has an overwhelming majority of lawmakers from the ruling party.
In this regard, it is important that the U.S. Congress clearly express its position. After completing its policy review last May, the Biden administration announced that it would pursue a “phased agreement” with the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. North Korea has maintained an attitude of prioritizing the improvement of relations with the United States, and selectively using South Korea, an “easy target,” as a means to achieve that goal.
Therefore, the U.S. Congress should fully endorse the Biden administration’s North Korea policy, and at the same time strongly urge that North Korea’s sincerity about denuclearization must be reaffirmed before President Moon’s hasty declaration attempt at the end of his term. And it would be necessary to deliver a clear message to the Korean National Assembly through a bipartisan statement of the U.S. Congress that a rough roadmap, including a phased agreement on denuclearization and corresponding measures, should be established before the declaration.
Shin-wha Lee is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations and the Director of the Peace and Democracy Institute at Korea University. She is also President of the Korean Academic Council on the United Nations System. Previously, she was a special adviser of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s independent inquiry into Rwandan genocide, a board member of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and a chair’s adviser of the East Asia Vision Group.
This interview was conducted by Joshua Nezam, who is director of congressional affairs at NBR.
3. China, South Korea to further deepen bilateral cooperative partnership: high-ranking officials meeting in Tianjin
The Chinese Communist Party interpretation of the ROK-PRC meeting last week.
China, South Korea to further deepen bilateral cooperative partnership: high-ranking officials meeting in Tianjin - Global Times
Yang Jiechi (right), member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, meets with South Korean National Security Adviser Suh Hoon in Tianjin on December 2, 2021. Photo: fmprc.gov.cn
China is ready to work with South Korea to uphold the spirit of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation to jointly build a more mature and stable bilateral strategic cooperative partnership, China's top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, said on Thursday during a meeting with South Korean National Security Adviser Suh Hoon.
Yang, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, held consultations with Suh Hoon in Tianjin where they exchanged their views on bilateral relations and international and regional issues of common concern.
China always supports the two parties of the Korean Peninsula to improve their relations. China supports a "dual-track approach" and the principle of following phased and synchronized actions to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue. China stands ready to work with the relevant parties to play a constructive role in maintaining long-term peace and stability of the Peninsula, Yang said.
South Korea attaches great importance to developing relations with China, looks forward to closer high-level exchanges with China and deepening practical cooperation in economy, trade, culture and anti-pandemic sector, Suh Hoon said. South Korea is ready to work with China to make joint efforts for permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula, promote regional cooperation and safeguard multilateralism.
China and South Korea are important neighbors and partners. Since China and South Korea established diplomatic ties, bilateral relations have developed rapidly in an all-round way, Yang said, noting that this conforms to the trend of the times and serves bilateral common interests.
2021 is the Year of Cultural Exchange between China and South Korea and next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties. China is ready to work with South Korea to take this opportunity to uphold the spirit of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation, strengthen high-level exchanges and strategic communication, and deepen practical cooperation and integrated development to jointly build a more mature and stable bilateral strategic cooperative partnership, according to Yang.
As major economies and firm supporters of multilateralism and free trade, China and South Korea should continue to play complementary advantages, jointly guarantee bilateral, regional and global supply chain stability, Yang said. China and South Korea will strengthen communication and coordination in regional cooperation, multilateral framework and the global issues, and promote a fair and reasonable global governance system.
Suh Hoon also congratulated on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the successful convening of sixth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC. He also said South Korea actively supports China in hosting of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games.
4. Wartime strategy update: ROK, US agree to fortify alliance against NK threats
Concerns in Korea:
The two defense chiefs described the ROK-U.S. alliance as "the linchpin of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region" as well as on the Korean Peninsula. "Both sides pledged to continue to develop the alliance in a mutually reinforcing and future-oriented manner," they said in a joint communique adopted at the end of the 53rd SCM. What is worrying is the possibility that the U.S., now engaged in a severe hegemonic competition with China, might ask for the South Korean military's cooperation in the event of escalating disputes in the Indo-Pacific region.
We also worry because the defense chiefs touched on the issue of Taiwan for the first time at the SCM. "The minister and the secretary acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as reflected in the May 2021 Joint Statement between President Joe Biden and President Moon Jae-in," according to the communique.
Wartime strategy update
ROK, US agree to fortify alliance against NK threats
South Korea and the United States have agreed to update their joint wartime strategy against possible nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. During an annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul, Thursday, the two allies concurred on the need to draw up a new strategic planning guidance (SPG) reflecting the changed security situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The planned update of the military operational plans against possible North Korean provocations is welcome, albeit belated, given the North has continued attempts to bolster its nuclear arsenal and wartime capabilities coupled with the changed strategic circumstance surrounding the peninsula. There have been continued calls to update the current OPLAN 5027 and OPLAN 5015 as both are focused on deterring North Korea's conventional weapons.
The SPG was last revised in 2010. Since then, Pyongyang has strengthened its nuclear capabilities through four nuclear-capable missile test launches, even including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and hypersonic missiles. We hope the new wartime strategy will be fully updated to reflect the changed war scenarios on the peninsula beyond the level of revising and updating the existing one.
South Korea's Defense Minister Suh Wook and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III also agreed to verify the full operational capability (FOC) of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command next year as part of endeavors toward the envisaged transfer of wartime operation control (OPCON). The OPCON transfer has remained stalled over the past two years although the two sides originally planned to carry out the second-stage verification of the FOC via ROK-U.S. joint military exercises.
The two defense chiefs described the ROK-U.S. alliance as "the linchpin of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region" as well as on the Korean Peninsula. "Both sides pledged to continue to develop the alliance in a mutually reinforcing and future-oriented manner," they said in a joint communique adopted at the end of the 53rd SCM. What is worrying is the possibility that the U.S., now engaged in a severe hegemonic competition with China, might ask for the South Korean military's cooperation in the event of escalating disputes in the Indo-Pacific region.
We also worry because the defense chiefs touched on the issue of Taiwan for the first time at the SCM. "The minister and the secretary acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as reflected in the May 2021 Joint Statement between President Joe Biden and President Moon Jae-in," according to the communique.
It seems to be inappropriate for the two allies to refer to the Taiwan issue at the SCM. Besides, it is feared to trigger a strong repercussion from China. The U.S. should remember that the ROK's interests in Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific regions can be different from its own. The Korean government, for its part, should make its stance clear so that it does not get entangled in possible rows between the two countries regardless of its intention.
5. South Korea temporarily reverses course in exiting Covid restrictions.
South Korea temporarily reverses course in exiting Covid restrictions.
The country also confirmed its first cluster of the Omicron variant, in a church where two locally transmitted cases were found and 800 were being tested.
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Lining up to get coronavirus tests at a temporary screening facility next to Seoul City Hall, in November.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
By
Dec. 3, 2021
South Korean officials said on Friday that they would temporarily reverse the phased reopening they began last month, lowering the cap on group sizes for social gatherings and requiring proof of vaccination or a negative coronavirus test for entry to restaurants, cafes and other facilities starting next week.
The announcement by Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum came as nearly 80 percent of the country’s hospital beds for patients with severe illness were in use, and days after six cases of the Omicron variant were confirmed among inbound travelers.
On Friday, officials said that they had confirmed South Korea’s first Omicron cluster, one associated with a church.
At least two members of a church in the city of Incheon were confirmed to have the variant. They had worshiped alongside two travelers who tested positive after a trip to Nigeria, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency said in a statement. Another 800 people who were potentially exposed are being tested.
Churches have been the site of previous major coronavirus outbreaks in South Korea, including one identified last month at a religious facility with 500 members in the city of Cheonan in which 445 cases have now been confirmed, more than 400 of them among unvaccinated people, the local authorities said.
In his announcement on Friday, Mr. Kim said that the government would limit private gatherings for four weeks. In and around Seoul, where gatherings have had a 10-person cap, the limit will be six; other areas had a limit of 12, which will be cut to eight.
Officials said they would also require everyone entering restaurants, cafes, cram schools, movie theaters, sports stadiums, museums and libraries to be fully vaccinated.
New daily cases in South Korea have surged steadily for the past two months, jumping from around 1,500 in mid-October to 5,266 on Thursday, the country’s highest level since the pandemic began.
“Our gradual recovery of daily life is now facing its most serious threat yet,” Mr. Kim said. “All pandemic indicators across the country are sending danger signals.”
Source: Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University. The daily average is calculated with data that was reported in the last seven days.
Most of those hospitalized were unvaccinated, over the age of 60 or had pre-existing conditions, health officials have said. While 80 percent of the population has been fully vaccinated, rates for children have remained low, with only about 20 percent of those ages 12 to 17 fully inoculated, according to official statistics.
To encourage vaccinations among children, Mr. Kim said, South Korean officials will begin requiring vaccine passes for them starting in February.
South Korean officials have also tightened curbs at the border since they confirmed the first cases of the Omicron variant on Wednesday. On Friday, the government began halting quarantine exemptions for inbound travelers from all countries, and started requiring visitors to observe a 10-day quarantine period and take three rounds of P.C.R. tests after arrival.
6. Korea's Battery Industry Over-Dependent on Chinese Materials
Korea's Battery Industry Over-Dependent on Chinese Materials
December 03, 2021 13:03
Korea's burgeoning rechargeable-battery industry is alarmingly dependent on China for four core materials, raising concerns of potential supply shortages and hostage-taking by the increasingly assertive superpower.
The acute shortage of diesel exhaust fuel Korea suffered when China curbed exports of urea recently was a stark warning of what could lie in store. Already battery prices are expected to rise next year for the first time after cracks began to appear in the supply chains dominated by China, and China's low-tech industries could easily bring Korea's high-tech sector to its knees.
China dominates the market for the four main materials that are used to manufacture rechargeable batteries -- cathodes, anodes, membranes and electrolytes. The materials account for 50 percent of battery manufacturing costs and cathodes for 44 percent, and China controls 58 percent of the global cathode market, while Korea accounts for only nine percent.
And even then for that small proportion Korea must import from China almost all of the nickel, cobalt and manganese powder that are used to make cathodes. The Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for 78 percent of the cobalt mined around the world, which is the most expensive ingredient, and China controls the mines in that country and processes 72 percent of the mined mineral.
Some 61 percent of the lithium mines in Australia and Chile are also Chinese-owned. One battery industry insider said, "Utility costs are cheap in China, which enables it to dominate the processing of core raw materials. Although that process does not require a high level of technology, battery production is impossible without China."
Kim Kwang-ju of SNE Research said, "The price of Chinese-made lithium that goes into electrolytes rose from $15 per kg early this year to $80 recently. Unless we lower our dependence on China, we won't be able to deal with price volatility risks."
China also accounts for 66 percent of the global market for graphite anodes and recently succeeded in mass producing artificial graphite to supply to Korean manufacturers. POSCO Chemical manufactures natural graphite, but Chinese rivals boast unrivaled cost competitiveness.
Japan's Asahi Kasei used to dominate the global market for membranes, but now China's Shanghai Energy New Materials Technology began selling them at low prices and rose to the top.
According to Bloomberg last month, global battery prices are expected to rise 2.3 percent next year. Battery prices stood at $1,200 per 1kWh but dropped sharply to $140 last year and fell a further six percent this year. The car industry expects electric cars to become as affordable as combustion-engine cars if battery prices drop to $100 per 1kWh, but Bloomberg said that now sees unlikely to happen until 2026.
Park Chul-wan at Seojeong College said, "Under the current supply structure, Korea's battery industry is unsustainable. We need to diversify suppliers of raw materials and nurture our own industry."
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
7. Russian 'help' to ability to hit US – truth about North Korea's nuclear arsenal
Excerpts:
And Kim Jong-un’s scientists seem to be getting secret help from sanction-busting missile designers in Russia or Ukraine.
While North Korea’s primary goal is to conquer its neighbour in the south, continued American backing for Seoul has made invasion impossible.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sworn to expand his country's nuclear arsenal, insisting that the deterrent is necessary to deter American aggression.
Russian 'help' to ability to hit US – truth about North Korea's nuclear arsenal
On October 9, 2006, North Korea demonstrated its first nuclear weapon, shattering the 1994 “agreed framework” that limited the country’s nuclear ambitions and dramatically changing the balance of power in the region.
For the past 15 years, the secretive nation has slowly made progress towards the development of a nuclear warhead small enough to be used in a missile and an intercontinental delivery system that could strike targets in the US.
And Kim Jong-un’s scientists seem to be getting secret help from sanction-busting missile designers in Russia or Ukraine.
While North Korea’s primary goal is to conquer its neighbour in the south, continued American backing for Seoul has made invasion impossible.
North Korean scientists have developed a nuclear warhead small enough to be delivered by a missile (Image: Getty Images/iStockphoto)
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sworn to expand his country's nuclear arsenal, insisting that the deterrent is necessary to deter American aggression.
In January, at a huge military parade to mark mark the end of the ruling party's eighth congress, four huge new submarine-launched Pukguksong-5 missiles were shown for the first time.
State news agency KCNA reported that “the world’s most powerful weapon, submarine-launch ballistic missiles, entered the square one after another, powerfully demonstrating the might of the revolutionary armed forces”.
The Pukguksong-5 has not officially been tested as yet and its exact range and destructive potential remain unknown.
Pyongyang showed off 'the world’s most powerful weapon' in a night-time military parade (Image: via REUTERS)
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However, North Korea’s hugely powerful land-based Hwasong-14 missile was demonstrated in 2017. It was thought to be the country’s first truly intercontinental weapon, with reported range of over 6,000 miles, putting New York within striking range.
Michael Elleman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies says North Korea’s progress in missile-building is suspiciously fast and the Hwasong-14 could be adapted from a Ukrainian design.
“It’s likely that these engines came from Ukraine, probably illicitly,” he told the New York Times. “The big question is how many they have and whether the Ukrainians are helping them now. I’m very worried.”
Submarine-fired missiles can vert very hard to intercept (Image: REUTERS)
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Oleg Turchynov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, denied Elleman's claims and said the allegations were “most likely provoked by Russian secret services to cover their own crimes”.
Commenting on North Korea’s ultra-accurate Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, which can target any location in South Korea to within just a few yards, a Japanese security official told Nikkei Asia: "The accuracy of North Korea's missiles improved all at once.That wouldn't have been possible without Russia's help."
Whether they are being helped from outside or not, the North Koreans are undeniably making rapid progress.
The Hwasong-14’s bigger brother, the Hwasong-15, test-launched just two months after the 14, is capable of flying even further.
Tests show the liquid-fuelled two-stage can reach an altitude of almost 2,800 miles – many times higher than the International Space Station. The Hwasong-15 could potentially hit any city in the US.
The newly-developed hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile was test-fired by North Korea's Academy of Defence Science (Image: via REUTERS)
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In August this year, the UN atomic agency said North Korea appeared to have restarted a reactor which could produce weapons-grade plutonium, describing it as a "deeply troubling" development.
And last month saw the test of another new North Korean weapons system, the Hwasong-8 hypersonic weapon. A Pyongyang press release described it as a "strategic weapon", which is a clear implication that it’s capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
North Korean state news agency KCNA said the weapon, which can be kept fuelled and fired at very short notice, had increased the nation's “capabilities for self-defence in every way”.
North Korea almost certainly has an arsenal of powerful nuclear warheads, and has shown that it has the potential to deliver those weapons almost anywhere on Earth.
In June 2020, North Korean foreign minister Ri Son-gwon said that prospects for peace between North and South Korea, and the US had "faded away into a dark nightmare".
Whether North Korea’s nuclear weapons are ever used in anger depends largely on Kim Jong-un’s relationship with the US President.
While former US leader Donald Trump said he "fell in love" with Kim, Biden has described the North Korean leader as "a murderous dictator" and "a thug."
With the risk of a military face-off between the US and China over Taiwan, could Kim Jong-un use the ensuing chaos to make his long-awaited move on South Korea?
8. Defending against nukes (ROK and beyond)
Excerpts:
North Korea’s nuclear threats are not confined to the Korean Peninsula as they are extended to Japan and the U.S. mainland after its development of ICBMs. In that sense, we appreciate Seoul and Washington’s consensus on the significance of security cooperation among the three countries in the SCM.
But actions speak louder. The government must quickly restore the General Security of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia) between Seoul and Tokyo and establish a system to prevent a nuclear attack by North Korea by sharing intelligence among the three countries. North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to not only the present but also the future of the peninsula. Peace can arrive only after North Korea is completely denuclearized.
Thursday
December 2, 2021
Defending against nukes
South Korea and the United States decided to draw up an aggressive military action plan to cope with nuclear threats from North Korea. In an annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Thursday at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul, defense chiefs of the two countries agreed to a new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). Both sides will reflect the new guidelines in their joint Operation Plan 5015 to effectively deal with the North Korean nuclear threat.
After its sixth nuclear test in September 2017, North Korea began to make nuclear weapons in a full-fledged way, including tactical nukes. The two allies’ move to devise concrete measures to tackle the growing nuclear threat came much later than expected. But we welcome the development. Because Defense Minister Suk Wook said that the plan has nothing to do with the government’s pursuit of a declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War, we hope the Moon Jae-in administration revises the operation plan in a desirable direction.
Despite the constant nuclear threats from North Korea, the pro-North administration has been pushing for an end-of-war declaration without any abatement in the North Korean nuclear programs. In fact, the government did not have any substantial meetings to discuss specific ways to take advantage of the U.S.’s extended deterrence. For instance, no meetings were held between the two allies’ ministers of defense or foreign affairs to deal with the issue even though the U.S. extended deterrence included not only the U.S. nuclear umbrella but also the mobilization of missile defense systems and conventional weapons. The Moon administration went so far as to suspend the Table Top Exercise (TTX) — which is related to the extended deterrence — over the last two years.
It is important to frame a new operation plan. But first, the Moon administration must review basic requirements for the extended deterrence in the SCM to help raise the credibility of the extended deterrence. The recent primary of the opposition People Power Party (PPP) was heated with a debate on the redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons in South Korea and NATO-style nuclear sharing from Uncle Sam. Both sides must candidly discuss such sensitive issues to help protect the South Korean people and the U.S. forces stationed here.
North Korea’s nuclear threats are not confined to the Korean Peninsula as they are extended to Japan and the U.S. mainland after its development of ICBMs. In that sense, we appreciate Seoul and Washington’s consensus on the significance of security cooperation among the three countries in the SCM.
But actions speak louder. The government must quickly restore the General Security of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia) between Seoul and Tokyo and establish a system to prevent a nuclear attack by North Korea by sharing intelligence among the three countries. North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to not only the present but also the future of the peninsula. Peace can arrive only after North Korea is completely denuclearized.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
