(note: I will try to return to my normal publish schedule tomorrow).

Quotes of the Day:

"Most people do not really want freedom, because freedom involves responsibility, and most people are frightened of responsibility."

- Sigmund Freud

:Read not to contradict and refute, nor to believe and take for granted... but to weigh and consider."

- Francis Bacon

“Charles E. Cobb, Jr., a veteran of the Movement who served for years in Mississippi, summarized it as “struggle—disciplined, thoughtful, creative struggle.” That is a summary worth exploring. Discipline in military operations is most often thought of as following one’s training and obeying legal orders, and both of those are indeed crucial. But the foundation of it all is self-discipline, most often in simply being persistent, of putting one foot in front of the other, day after day, of keeping control of one’s own emotions and fears in order to serve a greater good. In the civil rights movement, an additional form of discipline was maintaining the message that is being sent out to the world. Again”

- Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 by Thomas E. Ricks

1. Irregular warfare will win ‘strategic competition’

2. Irregular Warfare Campaigning and the Irregular Warfare Center

3. Buying time to avoid war over Taiwan

4. How Biden Can Help Zelensky

5. Dispatch from Kherson: Inside Ukraine’s battle to win the infrastructure war

6. U.S.-Australia Work to Strengthen Alliance

7. Special Operations News Update - December 5, 2022

8. U.S. Altered Himars Rocket Launchers to Keep Ukraine From Firing Missiles Into Russia

9. Would a NATO vs. Russia Conflict Really be 'World War III'?

10. Rogue Superpower: China Is A Global Pariah and Shows No Remorse

11. Defense authorization bill enters final stretch

12. Bell Textron's Valor wins Army’s FLRAA competition to replace Black Hawk

13. Major power outage after vandals sabotage multiple electrical substations

14. China’s Covid protests not as meaningful as portrayed

1. Irregular warfare will win ‘strategic competition’

I am heartened to see so much talk about irregular warfare by so many voices of late. It has been a long time since SECDEF Gates told us to fix this in 2008. But we still miss the big picture. IW is the military contribution to political warfare.

It is political warfare that is the essence of strategic competition. It is political warfare that we need to become proficient in at the national level. We need IW proficient campaign HQ within the military, but we need national leadership proficient in political warfare.

And it is all about strategy. Too often we focus on the tactical aspects of IW. Tactical proficiency is not the problem. We must be able to conduct IW campaigns to support political warfare strategy.

Until we understand this we will struggle in strategic competition. And we must not be afraid of the term warfare. To our competitors, politics is war by other means. As Mao said, “war is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed.” We need to accept this.

And as one of my IW mentors reminded me:

A DOD IW education/research center would be nested ideally with a university that studies the broader political warfare challenge.

Irregular warfare will win ‘strategic competition’

BY SEAN MCFATE, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 12/04/22 9:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3757281-irregular-warfare-will-win-strategic-competition/

Imagine a group of former Pentagon officials, retired senior military officers, and think tank experts gathered around a table and staring at a hexagonal map of Taiwan. Quietly they move pieces around the board: F-35 fighter jets, aircraft carriers, Marine units. Their mission is to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. War gaming has become a cottage industry inside the Beltway, led by the Pentagon and think tanks, to develop “evidence-based” strategies. Rightly, the Defense Department must study how to win against China and/or Russia in “strategic competition,” should it become a shooting war.  

But here’s the problem: It will not happen, at least not like this, and we may be learning the wrong lessons. As the Cold War teaches, competition between nuclear great powers risks World War III Armageddon, and why the USA and USSR avoided putting their troops into direct conflict. The nature of war is escalation, and no one wanted another 1914 Sarajevo moment with nukes. Both sides maintained large conventional forces and nuclear arsenals for deterrence, but the actual fighting was done through “irregular warfare,” such as political warfare and proxy wars. It’s why the U.S. Army Special Forces, or “Green Berets,” were founded, how Stinger missiles broke the USSR’s back in Afghanistan, and how Javelin anti-tank missiles blunted Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Today’s defense community has forgotten that strategic competition is won through irregular warfare — a dangerous mistake. Taiwan wargamers view ultimate “competition” as conventional warfare, and recreate the Battle of Midway in the Taiwan Straits with Ford-class carriers and F-35s. It proves the saying: “Generals always fight the last war, especially if they won it.” The conflict probably would go nuclear in hours or days, and the gamers’ artificially prolonged conventional war phase is fantasy. 

Policymakers are equally misguided. Of the $780 billion defense budget, the Pentagon is overwhelmingly buying conventional war weapons like fighter jets and navy ships while ignoring irregular war capabilities. The budget for U.S. Special Operations Command, which oversees all American special operators everywhere, is 75 percent the cost of an aircraft carrier, and we’re building three at $13.3 billion a ship, with two more planned. Budgets are moral documents because they do not lie. The Defense Department is preparing for a war with China that looks like World War II with better technology, an improbable scenario.

But there is a growing insurgency within the U.S. military that seeks to revitalize our nation’s irregular warfare capacity, beyond simply kicking in doors and bagging terrorists. That’s a sliver of what irregular warfare entails, and what was demanded of irregular warriors over the past 20 years. But strategic competition is a different fight, and we need strategies beyond board games to deal with it. Consequently, Congress authorized the creation of a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” in Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. The center should fill critical gaps between thought leaders, irregular warriors, and international partners. Done well, it will vastly improve our irregular warfighting capabilities and understanding.

However, there are four pitfalls the Irregular Warfare Center (or whatever it will be called) must avoid. First, it should not “reinvent the wheel.” There is a relatively small but robust infrastructure within the Defense Department that already delivers elements of the center’s mission. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) provides policy guidance. War colleges and regional centers teach aspects of irregular warfare, albeit too “stove-piped.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) brings allied nations into the mix, creating an impressive force multiplier. The Pentagon’s “J7” directorate, run by a three-star, oversees the ideas and education portion of irregular warfare. The list goes on. The center would be smart to help galvanize this cat herd, rather than making another bureaucratic layer.

Second, some think the center should be housed at a civilian university, but this would be a mistake. Most universities eschew the study of war as distasteful, and academic literature is notoriously left-wing. It’s why war colleges exist. Last year, the director of Yale University’s Grand Strategy Program resigned in controversy over her public disdain for Henry Kissinger and teaching Black Lives Matter and “Strategies of U.S. Social Change.” When Yale demurred, she caviled it had succumbed to “donor pressure.” Yale’s Faculty Senate and History Department backed her up, stating professors and programs should never be “under outside surveillance.” Not a good omen for the Defense Department. Additionally, exceedingly few professors specialize in irregular warfare strategy, and there are zero programs dedicated to the topic. Housing the center at a place full of rookies makes no sense. The Defense Department’s desire to leverage academic institutions is principled but unwise.

Third, to do its job, the center must constantly interact with warfighters, the interagency, and policymakers, and that means Washington, D.C. You cannot influence from afar. The National Defense University might be the optimal choice because it’s located in D.C. and is the Defense Department’s premiere senior service school. It houses five war colleges, three regional centers, and a research arm. It offers an accredited master’s degree in Security Studies and its students are exclusively senior leaders (15+ years of service) from across the military, interagency and allied nations, and all are moving up in their organizations. This is the exact population the center is tasked to influence.

Fourth, some in the Pentagon overlook the importance of allies and imagine the center as inherently inward gazing. We are delusional if we think we can “go it alone.” Building partnership capacity is a form of integrated deterrence and mutual strength, which is why Congress created the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program, managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). It has produced 20,000 alumni from 120 countries and maintains an active network of 7,000 alumni globally. The network supports their own nations’ and U.S. national interests.

In some ways, the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) offers a blueprint for the new center. It’s the U.S. military’s “Irregular War College” and resides at the National Defense University and Fort Bragg, home of the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. Unlike civilian colleges, its faculty are 100 percent irregular warfare specialists who are recognized thought leaders, and many serve as adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. The other two-thirds of faculty are seasoned irregular warfare practitioners drawn from the military and interagency, who teach things you can’t learn in books. No one at CISA minds “donor pressure” or “outside surveillance” (a.k.a., accountability). Per the center’s mission, CISA offers an accredited master’s in Security Studies with the focus on irregular warfare. Its student body are senior leaders from the military, interagency and allies — the “Irregular Warfare Fellows” mentioned above and managed by DSCA. The college has a full-time staffer who actively maintains a global alumni network of irregular warfighters that has helped U.S. efforts in Ukraine, Jordan, Mali and elsewhere.

Democracy is under threat; let’s protect it with smart election reform

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The Irregular Warfare Center should not be housed at CISA but the two should work symbiotically together, alongside other organizations dedicated to the irregular warfare cause. After all, irregular warfare requires more brains than firepower. Or, as T.E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) put it: Irregular warfare “is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”

Sean McFate is the author of “The New Rules of War: How America Can Win — Against Russia, China, and Other Threats.” He is a professor at the College of International Security Affairs, Georgetown University, Syracuse University, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @seanmcfate.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

2.  Irregular Warfare Campaigning and the Irregular Warfare Center

As I previously wrote I am heartened to read and hear so many voices engaging on Irregular Warfare.  

We should recall SECDEF Gates words and ask why has it taken so long?

In 2008 the National Defense Strategy recognized the requirement for the Department of Defense (DOD) to “display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”  

In 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified the lack of IW focus problem. Writing in his memoir, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, he said:

“In the spring of 2008, the vital issue of the military services’ preoccupation with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and all other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war, came to a head. It went to the heart of every other fight with the Pentagon I have described. In my four and a half years as secretary, this was one of the few issues where I had to take on the chairman and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

I am really heartened also to read in the NDS the strong emphasis on campaigning. We need to develop Irregular Warfare proficient campaign HQ.  The question is what DOD organizations, agency service, command is responsible for organizing training, equipping, educating, and optimizing headquarters from the planning and execution of irregular warfare campaigns in the support of political warfare in the gray zone in support of strategic competition?

December 1, 2022

Irregular Warfare Campaigning and the Irregular Warfare Center

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/2022/12/irregular-warfare-campaigning-and-the-irregular-warfare-center/

Kevin D. Stringer, PH.D. – Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Madison Urban – IWC Analyst

Executive Summary

The United States’ ability to conduct an effective irregular warfare campaign is hampered by political realities and Department of Defense cultural norms. While there are many overlapping deficiencies, this inaugural IWC Insights paper discusses three prominent barriers to success: 1) a quick-win culture that incentivizes short-term fixes; 2) the lack of adequate irregular warfare education throughout the interagency community; and 3) promotion and leadership selection processes that undervalue the development of necessary language, cultural, and regional expertise for irregular warfare application. Each of these problems often reinforces the others. The Irregular Warfare Center aims to empower and promote research, education, and engagement with a wide range of interagency professionals, global partners, and members of civil society to increase their awareness of irregular warfare threats, cross-fertilize often segregated activities, and develop holistic approaches to combat present and future irregular warfare challenges.

The United States (U.S.) must develop its capacity to campaign more effectively to achieve it strategic objectives, which includes how it conducts irregular warfare.[1] While often stringing together tactical victories and short-term diplomatic successes, the United States has consistently struggled to employ irregular warfare to bring about favorable political end-states. Examples of this phenomenon include Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. Directing a range of military and non-military capabilities—including diplomatic, informational, and economic elements—toward accomplishing a policy objective is crucial to combatting revisionist adversaries who are increasingly competing below the threshold of war, attempting to subvert U.S. conventional military superiority. However, there are at least three prominent barriers that stand in the way of effective IW campaigning.

First, cultural norms within military and political institutions prioritize quick victories and easy wins, which leads to an improper emphasis on metrics focused on tactical performance rather than strategic effectiveness. Second, the lack of access to professional IW education for non-military government professionals, who are nonetheless involved in the planning and execution of campaigns, further hinders a unity of effort. This situation is amplified by military professional education that often does not fully integrate IW into its curriculum. Finally, in the human domain, the selection criteria for political appointees and senior military officers often don’t prioritize the language, regional, and cultural expertise needed for IW campaigning. This Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) Insights paper aims to engender a critical conversation on these three sub-areas in order to promulgate further research and dialogue that leads to improved IW campaigning for the military, the wider interagency community, global partners, and civil society. It also offers areas where the emerging IWC can assist this effort.

The Centrality of Campaigning

The struggles of the United States to campaign effectively have led to strategic failures despite numerous tactical victories. A campaign, as defined by the military, is “[a] series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”[2] Military, diplomatic, and intelligence professionals have consistently proven their ability to successfully complete missions, eliminate terrorists, invest in allies, forge partnerships, sanction malevolent actors, seize assets, and expose threats. At the highest strategic level, there is also often bipartisan and interagency consensus about goals and the most prominent challenges facing the homeland. Over the last decade, there has been agreement that China poses a significant threat to U.S. national interests, that the United States should lead the way in technological development and innovation, and that nuclear proliferation should be halted. However, between these agreed-upon goals and the men and women tasked with implementing them is the necessity to craft a plan to leverage the complete range of power toward the goal–a campaign.

Increasing the United States’ ability to effectively campaign is central to the Biden Administration’s recently released National Defense Strategy 2022 (NDS). In his introduction, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin argues that a “business as usual” approach will not be sufficient to counter the challenges posed by China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.[3] Part of the necessary shift is a greater focus on campaigning which will enable the United States to “gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitors’ military preparations.”[4] The NDS also highlights that effective IW campaigning will rely upon the “intelligence sharing, economic measures, diplomatic actions, and activities in the information domain conducted by other U.S. departments and agencies” which “may prove more effective” than military activity.[5]

Greater synchronization needs to occur within the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as with the Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of the Treasury (USDT), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other relevant law enforcement personnel for IW campaigning to succeed. However, as currently constructed, the incentives and priorities of these departments and agencies often work against effective campaigning and necessitate change as discussed throughout this IWC Insights paper.

Congress authorized funding for the creation of the IWC in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 to address these shortcomings and synthesize U.S. government efforts on IW while advancing collaboration with partners globally.[6] The creation of the IWC has been described as potentially “a once-in-a-generation opportunity to fix a critical gap in [the United States’] national security arsenal” because it provides a much needed “dedicated home for the study” of IW.[7] The IWC aims to conduct innovative research to advocate for long-term strategic thinking, leverage research to educate practitioners to increase the effectiveness of IW campaigns, and promote consideration of structural changes that make IW campaigning a priority.

Quick Win Culture

U.S. political structures often incentivize a short-term perspective, hindering campaigns that require multi-year engagement. Turnover in Congress every two years and at the executive branch potentially every four years can disrupt or undermine IW campaigning even if the strategic objective does not change. Many political appointees in prominent leadership positions serve short stints with the goal to fix a situation or make their mark on foreign policy rather than a commitment to improving and extending campaigns that outlive their tenure.[8] This situation leads to difficulty in sustaining a campaign, even within one administration let alone when there is a shift in the White House itself.[9]

Furthermore, an overemphasis on political calculations or how to sell a campaign to the American people can eliminate effective solutions. For instance, in his reflections on U.S. failures in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus commented “when we recognized that we couldn’t “win” the war, we did not even seriously consider that we might just “manage” it.”’[10] Effectiveness is not necessarily synonymous with winning. Particularly in an IW context, the threats are not suited to a victory or defeat dichotomy. The United States is not going to defeat Russian information operations in the Balkans or reverse Chinese economic expansion in Africa. Effective management as a strategic priority rather than victory necessitates a longer-term vision than incentivized by actual political cycles.

Similarly, senior military leaders at the general and flag officer ranks are driven to short-term solutions by rigid, “up or out” career paths, short-term assignments, and the pressure to show “success” in a brief evaluation period. There are also larger cultural factors and assumptions that promote this approach including domestic political timelines and aspirations to transform societies into the American image. A cautionary example is the U.S.-led NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). While producing excellent measures of performance ranging from increased literacy among Afghan security personnel to growing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and police manning levels above 300,000 personnel, it ultimately failed as an organization in transforming the ANSF into a sustainable fighting force.[11] Among a variety of factors, the failure of NTM-A was due in part because of an inability to build a strategy that took into consideration the local power dynamics and Afghan culture. This deficit resulted in a well-trained, Americanized military that was out of sync with the local culture and power structures and that would prove to be unsustainable.[12] 

Both these political and military cultures result in the development of improper metrics, focusing on measures of performance and not measures of effectiveness. Examples include the amount of money spent on development projects in Afghanistan and the number of terrorists killed in the Counter-ISIS campaign. These types of statistics do not equate to effective outcomes. Tactical victories are highlighted as proof of success—likely because it makes the military and United States look good—rather than a metric related to how a specific tactical victory fits into the broader campaign. It is imperative that campaign plans be developed and communicated with a broad range of relevant stakeholders (e.g., Department of State, Department of the Treasury), each of which should understand and be able to frame their operations and metrics for success in light of the broader mission.

An inability by any one of the relevant stakeholders to understand how their specific mission fits into a campaign can lead to the development of a system of measurement that incentivizes ineffective or even counterproductive actions. The development and commitment to long-term solutions instead of short-term band-aids is difficult and rubs against many of the institutional political and cultural norms present in the irregular warfare context. This situation will require a shift in thinking, internal incentives, and communication with the American public.

Minimal IW Professional Education

The limited access to IW education for non-military personnel, who are nonetheless involved in the planning and execution of IW campaigns, further hinders the integration of IW campaigning efforts. The incomplete alignment of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts historically has led to IW campaigning failure, in part due to an overreliance on military power which can rarely address the underlying political, cultural, and economic drivers of conflict. In a context where each pillar provides critical resources to advancing an IW campaign, each relevant stakeholder should have access to IW education. Incentivizing IW education for officials at the DOS, USAID, NSC, USDT, FBI, and other relevant law enforcement personnel would further elevate the capabilities and understanding necessary to synthesize interagency efforts. This education should not be confined to understanding the military aspects of an IW campaign but encourage an interdisciplinary understanding of how the U.S. government should coordinate a range of efforts to compete with various threats as well as assist in further developing relationships with foreign peers and partners across multiple levels of government. The development of education must be informed by rigorous research that is willing to challenge DoD norms and concentrate efforts on advancing efforts to adapt to new strategic realities.[13]

Beyond the civilian government agencies, even within DoD and its existing institutions of professional military education (PME), a lack of access to IW education must be addressed. Expanded access to IW-specific PME for military personnel should include courses that are focused on understanding and synthesizing both the military and non-military elements of IW, the ways in which the military can bring elements of hard and soft power to bear, as well as developing cultural expertise to aid strategic and campaign planning.[14] Current efforts fall short despite recent instruction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that PME must reflect the position that “IW strategically is as important as traditional warfare and that DoD must be equally capable in both.”[15] Furthermore, increasing the range of professional expertise in teaching positions beyond the traditional defense establishment will also be central to elevating the role of diplomatic, economic, and informational tools in advancing a common strategic vision.

Human Domain

Finally, political and military leadership selection processes de-emphasize language, regional, and cultural expertise, albeit in different ways. The political appointment system often places individuals with the right connections, but little background in implementing foreign policy or the complexities of regional dynamics, in positions that oversee the development of campaigns.[16] The appointment system compounds the previously discussed issue of a quick-win culture that prioritizes speed. The combination of a desire for speed and a lack of understanding of the nuances of implementing national security policy often leads to poor decision-making. A greater emphasis should be placed on elevating career civil servants and the expertise of those who are steeped in the complexities of regional history, language, and culture and who operate on longer time horizons than an appointee who owes his position to a man or woman who will have to be re-elected and thus would like results in under four years. Regardless of the background of the policymaker, the IWC endeavors to offer executive education level courses that provide greater insights into IW for these important decision-makers and stakeholders.

The military leadership selection process suffers from the opposite problem. Military leadership has served for years, but the selection process is primarily tailored to fighting traditional warfare. The career paths that lead to positions of leadership most often do not emphasize cultural expertise but prioritize the ability to command troops. While command will remain fundamental to conducting military operations relevant in traditional or IW contexts, the United States is not just fighting traditional battles, and cultural expertise is critical in crafting realistic strategies and building a functioning IW campaign. Within the military system, non-standard career paths should be encouraged and a greater valuation placed on cultural fluency, interpersonal acumen, and language skills.[17]

These additions to leadership criteria are not altogether a radical shift as historic and modern examples show the value of these skills. The development and adaptation of U.S. military postures in Asia have been significantly helped by the leadership of men who were fluent in Mandarin, like General Joseph Stillwell in World War II and Lieutenant General Charles Hooper during the Obama Administration’s pivot to Asia.[18] The interwar business expertise of Major General William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Civilian Conservation Corps experience of Major General Robert Frederick, Commander of the 1st Special Service Force, contributed to the development of the modern Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces.[19] These examples exemplify how proficiency in language or management or other skills that might initially be deemed non-essential to military command can be crucial to the achievement of both tactical and strategic priorities in the IW context.

Although many departments are notably better at attracting and developing personnel with cultural fluency than DoD, the lack of relevant cultural and linguistic skills does extend beyond the military. In 2020, one report found that after spending nearly two decades in the Middle East and amid a strategic shift to focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, the Department of State “still has more Portuguese speakers than Arabic and Chinese combined and more Albanian speakers than Urdu, Dari, or Farsi.”[20] The lack of linguistic proficiency is a problem of education and prioritization. It is one thing for the United States to have minimal cultural fluency in the wake of a cataclysmic shock, like 9/11. However, the lack of evidence in this capacity 20 years later calls into question how the national security apparatus is educating and incentivizing its people to develop critical human domain skills.     

Role of the IWC

Political realities and long-established cultural norms will complicate the advancement of these changes as they require a shift in vision and priorities. The IWC will undertake strategic research while collaborating with leading experts to illuminate current and future irregular threats. This research will be steeped in history and cultural realities that challenge assumptions and prompt hard consideration of the business-as-usual approach while contributing to the development of new strategies and education. The Center will advocate for greater awareness and increased education on IW threats and approaches throughout the interagency community. Multi-stakeholder events will endeavor to bring together a range of interagency, international, and non-governmental partners building networks and avenues for cooperation. Engagements with a range of international partners will further increase learning, collaboration, and empowerment to increase the capacity of the United States to address irregular strategic challenges. Positioned within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the IWC has a unique ability to influence both DoD policy and education as well as increase teamwork with global partners.

Conclusion

The interplay of political and military structures, incentives, and norms in IW campaigning has led to inefficiency and undermined the United States’ ability to achieve strategic objectives. The critique of the military is not intended to devalue the importance of traditional deterrence or of military officers in developing command and tactical expertise. It is precisely because of this strength that adversaries are turning to IW. Similarly, the assessment of political culture or appointees is not intended to diminish the role of the electoral process in holding the various branches accountable to the American people. These systems are an important check on power. However, it should also be acknowledged that both an emphasis on traditional warfare and short-term policymaking can complicate good decision-making and be exploited by adversaries in an irregular context. These enemies want to use the American military and political system against itself.

Hence, the IWC will promote the development of original strategic thought and unconventional thinkers to address these challenges. It aims to bring together scholars and practitioners to study and understand novel cultural and military realities relevant to the IW space. Given that IW education is a central component of success for IW campaigning, the IWC will develop curriculum and provide educational opportunities for the U.S. government and foreign partners. Through integration and engagement, it will empower multiple stakeholders to enhance global partnerships and disseminate the best practices of IW campaigning. With applied research and envisioning different future scenarios, instead of repeating conventional wisdom, the IWC will challenge assumptions and in doing so will engender important debates and conversations. The IWC aims to advance the capabilities of the United States to successfully wage IW campaigns in a rapidly changing world. This objective contributes to the U.S. maintaining its strategic advantage in the 21st century and beyond.

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[1] The definition and scope of irregular warfare is evolving. For the purposes of this IWC Insights paper, irregular warfare is defined according to the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy as a “struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy” and which is waged by “leverag[ing] all irregular capabilities in our arsenal, including the unique abilities of our interagency and foreign partners.” As such, irregular warfare and irregular warfare campaigning are understood as a multi-agency endeavor that includes a range of military and non-military activities.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021), 29; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning, JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), I-8.

[3] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2022), iii, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

[4] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2.

[5] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 12. 

[6] Sec. 1299L of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, P.L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.

[7] Charles Cleveland et. al, “Defense Department needs to capitalize on historic opportunity,” The Hill, November 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3721929-defense-department-needs-to-capitalize-on-historic-opportunity/. 

[8] Heather Gregg, “Better Curricula, Better Strategic Outcomes: Irregular Warfare, Great Power Competition, and Professional Military Education,” Modern War Institute, March 15, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/better-curricula-better-strategic-outcomes-irregular-warfare-great-power-competition-and-professional-military-education/.

[9] David Petraeus, “Afghanistan Did Not Have to Turn Out This Way,” Atlantic, August 8, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/08/us-withdrawal-afghanistan-strategy-shortcomings/670980/. 

[10] Petraeus, “Afghanistan Did Not Have to Turn Out This Way.”

[11] Martin Loicano and Craig C. Felker, No Moment of Victory: The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, 2009-2011 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2021).

[12] Loicano and Felker, No Moment of Victory; Petraeus, “Afghanistan Did Not Have to Turn Out This Way.”

[13] Cleveland et. al, “Defense Department needs to capitalize.”  

[14] Elena Pokalova, “Teaching Irregular Warfare in the Era of Strategic Competition,” Modern War Institute, November 7, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/teaching-irregular-warfare-in-the-era-of-strategic-competition/; Gregg, “Better Curricula, Better Strategic Outcomes.”

[15] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJCSIS 1800.01 F (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi_1800_01f.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102430-580.

[16] Derek Leebaert, “How Foreign Policy Amateurs Endanger the World,” Politico, October 26, 2022, https://www.politico.com/amp/news/magazine/2022/10/24/destined-to-fail-how-political-appointees-endanger-foreign-policy-00063259.

[17] Pokalova, “Teaching Irregular Warfare.”

[18] Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Macmillan Company, 2001); U.S. Department of Defense, “Lieutenant General Charles Hooper,” accessed November 8, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220622111529/https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography/Article/1273458/lieutenant-general-charles-hooper/. 

[19] Anne Hicks, The Last Fighting General: The Biography of Robert Tryon Frederick (Schiffer Military History, 2006); James Stejskal, No Moon as Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II (Havertown: Casemate Publishers, 2021).

[20] Uzra Zeya and Jon Finer, Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020) 20, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/csr89_final.pdf. 

3. Buying time to avoid war over Taiwan

But we cannot (and must not) wish away or abandon the Taiwan challenge. Note there is an irregular warfare contribution to deterrence in Taiwan in support of concessional and nuclear deterrence.

Excerpts:

In the absence of the Taiwan issue, the US–China relationship fits the model of what former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd calls ‘managed strategic competition’. Neither country poses a threat to the other in the way that Hitler’s Germany did in the 1930s or Stalin’s Soviet Union did in the 1950s. Neither is out to conquer the other, nor could they. But a failure to manage the Taiwan issue could turn the conflict into an existential one.

The US should continue to discourage formal Taiwanese independence, while helping Taiwan become a difficult-to-swallow ‘porcupine’. Washington should also work with allies to strengthen naval deterrence in the region. But it must avoid openly provocative actions and visits that might cause China to accelerate any plans for an invasion. As Nixon and Mao recognised long ago, there is much to be said for strategies and diplomatic arrangements that buy time.

Buying time to avoid war over Taiwan | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Joseph S. Nye · December 5, 2022

Could the United States and China go to war over Taiwan? China regards the island 145 kilometres off its coast as a renegade province, and President Xi Jinping raised the issue at the recent 20th congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Though Xi said he prefers reunification by peaceful means, his objective was clear, and he did not rule out the use of force. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, the share of the population identifying as solely Taiwanese continues to exceed the share that identifies as both Chinese and Taiwanese.

The US has long tried both to dissuade Taiwan from officially declaring independence and to deter China from using force against the island. But Chinese military capabilities have been increasing and US President Joe Biden has now said on four separate occasions that the US would defend Taiwan. Each time, the White House has issued ‘clarifications’ stressing that America’s ‘one China’ policy has not changed.

China counters that recent high-level US visits to Taiwan are hollowing out that policy. Beijing responded to US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip there in August by firing missiles near the coast of Taiwan. What will happen if Representative Kevin McCarthy becomes speaker of the new Republican-controlled house and carries out his threat to lead an official delegation to the island?

When US President Richard Nixon went to China and met with Mao Zedong in 1972, both countries shared an interest in balancing Soviet power, because both saw the USSR as their largest problem. But now, China has an alignment of convenience with Russia, because both countries see the US as their largest problem.

Still, Nixon and Mao could not agree on the Taiwan issue, so they adopted a formula designed to postpone the matter. The US would accept the claim that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were Chinese, and it would recognise only ‘one China’: the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, not the Republic of China on Taiwan. The two sides bought time for what Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, called the ‘wisdom of future generations’. It recalls the fable of a medieval prisoner who delays his execution by promising to teach the king’s horse how to speak. ‘Who knows?’, he says. ‘The king may die; the horse may die; or the horse may speak.’

For five decades, both China and the US benefited from the time they had bought. After Nixon’s visit, the American strategy was to engage China in the hope that increased trade and economic growth would expand its middle class and lead to liberalisation. That goal may now sound overly optimistic, but the US policy was not totally naive. As reinsurance, President Bill Clinton reaffirmed the US security treaty with Japan in 1996, and his successor, George W. Bush, improved relations with India. There were also some signs of liberalisation in China at the beginning of this century. Xi, however, has tightened CCP control over civil society and regions like Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as signalling his ambition to regain Taiwan.

US relations with China are now at their lowest point in more than 50 years. Some blame former president Donald Trump. But, in historical terms, Trump was more like a boy who poured gasoline on an existing fire. It was Chinese leaders who built the fire with their mercantilist manipulation of the international trading system, theft and coercive transfer of Western intellectual property, and construction and militarisation of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The US reaction to these moves has been bipartisan. Not until the end of his second year in office did Biden meet face to face with Xi—at the recent G20 summit in Bali.

The American objective is still to deter China from using force against Taiwan and to deter the island’s leaders from declaring de jure independence. Some analysts refer to this policy as ‘strategic ambiguity’, but it might also be described as ‘double deterrence’. In the months before his assassination, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was urging the US to commit more clearly to defending Taiwan. Other experts, however, fear that such a policy change would provoke a Chinese response, because it would eliminate the ambiguity that allows Chinese leaders to placate nationalist sentiment.

How likely is a conflict? The US chief of naval operations warns that China’s growing naval power may tempt it to act soon in the belief that time is not on its side. Others believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s failure in Ukraine has made China more cautious, and that the country will wait until after 2030 to attempt to take Taiwan. Even if China eschews a full-scale invasion and merely tries to coerce Taiwan with a blockade or by taking an offshore island, a ship or aircraft collision could change things quickly, especially if there is loss of life. If the US reacts by freezing Chinese assets or invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act, the two countries could slip into a real (rather than a metaphorical) cold war, or even a hot one.

In the absence of the Taiwan issue, the US–China relationship fits the model of what former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd calls ‘managed strategic competition’. Neither country poses a threat to the other in the way that Hitler’s Germany did in the 1930s or Stalin’s Soviet Union did in the 1950s. Neither is out to conquer the other, nor could they. But a failure to manage the Taiwan issue could turn the conflict into an existential one.

The US should continue to discourage formal Taiwanese independence, while helping Taiwan become a difficult-to-swallow ‘porcupine’. Washington should also work with allies to strengthen naval deterrence in the region. But it must avoid openly provocative actions and visits that might cause China to accelerate any plans for an invasion. As Nixon and Mao recognised long ago, there is much to be said for strategies and diplomatic arrangements that buy time.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a professor at Harvard University and a former US assistant secretary of defence, is the author, most recently, of Do morals matter? Presidents and foreign policy from FDR to Trump. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2022. Image: CFOTO/Future Publishing/Getty Images.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Joseph S. Nye · December 5, 2022

4. How Biden Can Help Zelensky

Conclusion:

Fortunately, I am convinced that well-informed President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan are smart enough to recognize Ukraine’s democracy. They are not going to jeopardize the fate of Ukraine’s democratically-elected leader. They have told us so repeatedly: Ukraine decides about the fate of Ukraine.

How Biden Can Help Zelensky - Kyiv Post - Ukraine's Global Voice

By Anders Aslund. Published Dec. 5 at 4:02 pm

kyivpost.com

On December 4, the Washington Post published an article by Robert Wright, “Biden can help Zelensky, and Ukraine, by pushing for peace,” which illustratively gets everything wrong. Let me point out what is wrong:

“Biden can help Zelensky, and Ukraine, by pushing for peace.” No, in surveys 90% of the Ukrainians regularly state that they expect Ukraine to win. Whoever in Ukraine stops short of victory will lose political power. Wright just ignores Ukraine’s democratic politics. The Ukrainians understand that if Putin does not lose all territories that he has conquered he will just rest until he has recovered sufficient strength so that he can attack again. Wright appears unaware of this very argument.

Putin has violated all relevant international agreements and bilateral agreements with Ukraine. Wright only states that “this war has been extremely costly for Russia and for Vladimir Putin.” That does not make Putin a reliable person. He must be defeated to be checked.

“If an enduring peace can be had through negotiation…then negotiations would be in America’s interest.” We know that is not possible. Putin would not give up without victory and Zelensky would be ousted by democratic politics if he stopped before liberating the whole territory of Ukraine. Remember that Ukraine is democratic while Russia is a dictatorship!

“The war is costing America lots of money.” No US government money is better spent than the US military support to Ukraine. For 3% of the annual US defense budget, Ukraine has taken out half of the Russian military force, one of the US two international adversaries (the other one being China). In addition, so far this war has not cost the life of any US government soldier (more than a dozen of US volunteers have died).

“This spending is inflationary.” No, it is not. It is too tiny to matter $40bn out of the US $23,000bn GDP = 0.17% of US GDP. Wright proceeds by contradicting himself: “some European officials are accusing the United States of profiteering,” that is, just after having claimed that the US is suffering economically, he on the contrary claims that Europeans complain that the US benefiting economically.

The US economic benefits are palpable and obvious: more US LNG exports to Europe at good prices and more US arms exports. Furthermore, the arms not only of Russia but also China (largely Russian made) are being proven obsolete. The US military and US arms producers learn in real time which arms that are good and which are not. In terms of the number of soldiers, the volume of military hardware and ammunition, this is the biggest war at least since the Korean War and probably since World War II. The US receives all these valuable real-time tests and information without having to risk the lives of US soldiers. The US had better deliver more arms faster to make Ukraine win faster!

“Every day the war continues, more Ukrainians die, and more of Ukraine gets wrecked.”

If Wright had been democratically inclined, he would instead have asked what the Ukrainians want, which they have stated so clearly so many times: Kick out the Russians! That requires more US support faster.

The only reference that Wright cites for his not very democratic defeatism for Ukraine is Samuel Charap, who has persistently advocated that Ukraine should give up territory to Russia. In no way does he reveal any knowledge of Ukraine, and his article suggests it is minimal.

Similarly, Wright does not even mention the EU or that Ukrainians with more than two-thirds majority want to join both the EU and NATO. For the Ukrainian nation this war is existential. They have decided to survive and to join the West, which Wright ignores. Nor does he mention Russia’s war crimes or genocide in Ukraine.

Needless to say, Wright does not cite any Russian proposal for negotiated settlement, because they are all maximalist. He just mentions Putin once in passing, since the best way of defending Putin is to ignore him.

What nearly all Ukrainians understand is that there can be no lasting peace with Russia until it has been DEFEATED. A peaceful settlement with Russia requires that Ukraine regains its whole territory from February 2014, including Donbas and Crimea.

In passing, Wright mentions Russia’s “casual seizure of Crimea in 2014.” It went so easily because Ukraine had allowed Russia to lease the Sevastopol naval base on Crimea. The lesson from Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 is that Ukraine needs to seize full control also of Sevastopol.

In 1997, Ukraine leased Sevastopol to Russia for 20 years through a bilateral agreement with Russia at the same time as the two countries concluded an eternal Friendship Treaty. These treaties between the newly-reelected Russian President Boris Yeltsin and President Leonid Kuchma stood out as the high point of the friendship between Russia and Ukraine, but then Putin arrived. In 2010, his underling Dmitri Medvedev pressurized pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych to lease Sevastopol for another 25 years for dubious gas price discounts.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Putin has canceled these treaties. Therefore, no legal basis exists for Russia holding on to Sevastopol any longer, and Russia had better turn it over to Ukraine for good.

Fortunately, I am convinced that well-informed President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan are smart enough to recognize Ukraine’s democracy. They are not going to jeopardize the fate of Ukraine’s democratically-elected leader. They have told us so repeatedly: Ukraine decides about the fate of Ukraine.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: the Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

kyivpost.com

5. Dispatch from Kherson: Inside Ukraine’s battle to win the infrastructure war

​Conclusion:

“[The Russians] are just trying to harm as many people as possible,” he said. “Just bombing everything they can. If we look at the history of Russia … they can’t do it in a different way. And no one here wants them or needs them.”

​

Dispatch from Kherson: Inside Ukraine’s battle to win the infrastructure war

Russia is waging a war on infrastructure. Ukrainian civilians are working 24/7 to repair the damage.

Neil Hauer

Special Contributor

December 5, 2022

grid.news · by Neil Hauer

When Ukrainian forces swept through Kherson last month, the news ricocheted across the country and the world. It was Ukraine’s greatest success, the first major city to be retaken from the Russians. Celebrations carried into the night among those still left in the battered provincial capital and spread across the country.

Grid visited Kherson just three days after the liberation. The signs of occupation were still fresh: Half-torn Russian propaganda posters hung on billboards throughout the city, proclaiming the city’s return to “its Russian motherland” and that “Russia is here forever.” In the streets, people waved blue and yellow Ukrainian flags — flags they had kept hidden throughout the occupation — and sang the country’s national anthem. Few seemed fazed by the conditions in the city — Russian troops had damaged local water, power and heating infrastructure on their way out — and they hardly budged at the regular sounds of artillery hitting Kherson from Russian positions just a few kilometers away, on the other side of the river.

But the jubilation in Kherson masked realities about what the Russians had left behind and the damage they are still capable of inflicting from a distance. All that artillery and longer-range missile fire is now aimed almost daily at doing more damage and cutting the supply of water and power. On Wednesday, authorities in Kherson said they had restored electricity to 20 percent of the population; a day later, Russian shells once again knocked out power to the entire city. It is these basic services — and their absence — that may come to define much of the next few months of the war, especially given the challenges of winter.

“Of course, it’s going to be difficult,” Olena, a middle-aged resident of Kherson who spoke on the condition of partial anonymity, told Grid as she filled jugs of water from the Dnieper River. “Look what we have to do just to survive right now. We have no power, water, heating — and it’s only going to get colder.”

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Over the past several weeks, Grid visited Kherson and its sister city Mykolaiv and points between. The extent of the destruction was clear; so was the resolve of the local population to repair the damage — and to fight back against Russia’s war on infrastructure.

A war on electricity and water

The paradox of Ukraine’s battlefield momentum is that as Russia has lost ground, it has escalated its bombardment of Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, via drones, missiles and airstrikes. The result has been rolling blackouts in much of the country and severe shortages in certain areas, leaving hospitals in the dark and entire communities without heat and running water. Overall, more than 500 Ukrainian cities face shortages of power, and some Ukrainian officials have even raised the possibility of evacuating nonessential residents of the capital, Kyiv, if the attacks continue.

But the gravest shortages are in the east and south, where the fighting and Russian shelling have been most severe.

On a typical day in Kherson, Russians fire artillery shells from across the Dnieper River, striking residential areas, electrical transformers, power plants and other civilian targets. On Nov. 27, according to British military estimates, there was a new daily high of 54 shelling incidents in Kherson.

The U.S. and the European Union have sent high-power generators to Ukraine, but the overall repair job will likely take at least six months, according to Andriy Herus, who leads a government committee on energy. That work cannot be done, Herus said on Ukrainian TV last week, because “the Ukrainian energy system is under constant Russian fire.”

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On Thursday, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, defended his country’s attacks on civilian infrastructure, insisting — without evidence — that the targets of Russian strikes have military uses. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has referred to the tactic as “energy terror.”

Where will they find water?

Kherson has been without regular running water for more than a month. The Economist reported that residents had been given one gift, thanks to Mother Nature: “Luckily it has rained for all of November, so residents are able to collect rainwater in large plastic tanks.”

Across the city, authorities have set up “points of invincibility,” tents with electrical outlets, internet provided by the Starlink satellite network and bottled water.

Grid also visited Kherson’s sister city, Mykolaiv, which sits just north of the Black Sea on Ukraine’s southern coast. Mykolaiv was, for a time, one of Ukraine’s most strategically important cities, located between Kherson and Odessa, the Black Sea port city and a key goal in Russia’s initial advance in the south. To date, Ukrainian forces in Mykolaiv have resisted a heavy, monthslong Russian assault; the city has remained in Ukrainian hands throughout the war.

But Mykolaiv’s infrastructure has been battered, and the situation there may be even more precarious than in Kherson.

The assault on Mykolaiv began months ago. In April, Russian forces destroyed the pipes that brought water to the city from the then-occupied parts of the Kherson region, leaving residents without running water. Local authorities connected the city’s water system to the Southern Bug River — but the river’s water is brackish and salty, owing to its proximity to the Black Sea, and tainted by industrial runoff farther upstream, giving it a sickly yellow or orange color.

“On the 12th of April, we stopped getting water in the city,” Boris Dudenko, CEO of Mykolaiv’s state water company, told Grid. “There are two pipes that bring water from a reservoir in Kherson oblast, 73 kilometers from here. The Russians destroyed them deliberately and left us with nothing.”

That led to the decision to use water from the nearby river.

“It’s unsuitable for drinking, it’s unsuitable for cooking,” Dudenko said. “It’s good for cleaning and a bit of hygiene, but not much else. And the damage the salt causes to the pipes is very serious.”

Dudenko produced two sections of pipe, corroded and brown with rust. “These were taken from one section of the city’s pipelines,” he said. “Even if, by some miracle, we could switch back to clean water tomorrow, the damage has been done.”

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As a result, for months Mykolaiv’s citizens have been forced to stand in long queues to gather drinking water.

The cost of repairs to the city’s water system will be several billion hryvnias, Dudenko said, somewhere in the realm of $100 million. In the meantime, he and others work to bring potable water to distribution points across Mykolaiv.

“We have about 100 distribution points of drinking water in the city,” Dudenko said. “But a person still has to come to the station and take it themselves. It’s hard for a young, healthy person to carry enough water up several flights of stairs in an apartment building. For an elderly person, it’s almost impossible.”

As for the water coming from the river, winter will only make things harder.

“Some of the pipes are large in diameter, so the water in them can easily freeze, form big chunks of ice that block the flow and cause ruptures,” he said. “And this can happen again and again. So I expect the winter will be very difficult.”

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Staying warm

The water issues, dire as they are, are a problem primarily for Kherson and Mykolaiv and other front-line cities, and less of an issue for the rest of the country. There’s another pressing concern that affects much of Ukraine and is getting more difficult by the day: heating and power.

Mykola Lohvinov, the director of Mykolaiv’s state heating and energy concern, has grown used to long days spent near the front lines. He pointed out a sleeping bag in his office, where he has spent many nights over the last few months. “I have a Kalashnikov [automatic rifle] in the closet, too, but thankfully I haven’t had to use that yet,” he said with a laugh.

Lohvinov’s work has been no less vital than the fighting done by those in the trenches. His company is responsible for 60 percent of the region’s heating, as well as much of the power supply and a half-dozen services ranging from coordinating aid distribution to helping build barricades and other defenses. But his prime task right now is to provide heat and electricity for nearly 700,000 people in the region.

Lohvinov’s repair crews are on-call at all hours of the day. Russian missiles and drones often strike in the dead of night — meaning constant calls and frequent danger for his crew members.

“Myself, the lead engineer and the head power engineer are practically never off duty,” Lohvinov said. “Our repair brigades are in a permanent state of readiness too. As soon as the [Russian] shelling ends, damage control teams come in and start repairing as fast as possible, like ants.”

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Lohvinov and others in Mykolaiv told Grid that when it comes to the power supply, the liberation of Kherson is unlikely to bring relief. The weapons most commonly used by the Russians against Mykolaiv these days — Iranian Shahed “kamikaze drones” and S-300 long-range missiles, launched with little precision at ground targets — have more than enough range to do damage without the presence of Russian forces nearby.

“I don’t think it will make a difference,” Lohvinov said. “Kherson [city] is 60 kilometers from here — S-300 rockets fly 200 kilometers. The drones these a--holes get from Iran, over a thousand [kilometers]. What we need are modern air defense systems and a lot of them. That’s the only way to keep our cities safe.”

If the rain has helped with water collection, Mykolaiv’s climate provides some relief when it comes to staying warm: its proximity to the sea keeps temperatures a bit milder and the winters relatively short.

Lohvinov is also grateful for a World Bank program introduced several years ago that has helped Ukrainian energy entities adapt from old Soviet components to others that are more compatible with European and other foreign parts. That adaptation — and donations of equipment from the West — will help Lohvinov and his crews keep systems running.

But with an estimated 230,000 people in Mykolaiv (half its prewar population), much more will be needed if the Russian attacks continue.

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“What we need are generators,” Lohvinov said. “Hundreds of them just for our enterprise alone, not even counting the other institutions of Mykolaiv city and its administration. Electricity is the most difficult thing for us right now.”

A different solution: get civilians out

One way to mitigate the nightmares of a winter without heat, power and running water would be to empty the most affected regions of their civilian populations. Ukrainian officials recently offered to aid in the relocation of Kherson’s residents to other parts of the country as temperatures drop and the Russian assault persists.

Some Ukrainians in the area are skeptical.

“We can discuss this, but here is the question — where will they go?” Lohvinov asked. “Imagine, there are 230,000 people here in Mykolaiv right now. In Kyiv, there are more than a million. In Ukraine as a whole, there are 40 million people. Where can we send such a number? We need to be realistic and focus on providing a normal life for people who are here.”

Providing anything approaching a normal life is an almost impossible task in Ukraine these days, especially in the areas that are both near the front lines and suffering the scars of all those Russian attacks. Basic transportation can be grueling and dangerous. Many bridges across southern Ukraine have been destroyed — blown up by retreating Ukrainian troops in the spring or by Russians doing the same this fall, forcing detours across secondary roads that are often laden with mines or unexploded ordnance, assuming they’re navigable at all.

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All of which would make large-scale evacuations dangerous — and difficult. Many main roads in the east and south have been damaged repeatedly by the Russian assaults. Denis Barashkovsky, a foreman with the municipal road service ELU Avtodorih in Mykolaiv, is among those who deals with the aftermath.

“Our work makes sure that people can travel around normally,” Barashkovsky told Grid. “After Kharkiv, Mykolaiv is the most-bombed city in Ukraine by number of impacts. In October, there were more air raid sirens here than anywhere else,” he said. “It’s not a great statistic.”

Damage assessments — and the way forward

The southeastern areas of Mykolaiv have been hit hardest.

“From the first day [of the war], we were engaged in the defense of the city,” Barashkovsky said. “Building fortifications, checkpoints, anything that could help our soldiers. Everything was about giving the maximum support possible to the army. And it worked. [The Russians] surrounded Mykolaiv from three sides — we had only the bridge over the Southern Bug River, towards Odessa, as our lifeline. But the enemy never broke into the city.”

That didn’t stop the Russians from damaging Mykolaiv from a distance. Barashkovsky pointed out examples of the destruction on a kind of damage-assessment drive around the city. Buildings have been gashed open, and in many cases upper floors have caved in as the result of missile impacts. Piles of smashed concrete and broken glass mark the spots where Barashkovsky’s and other crews have gathered debris and cleared it as best as they can.

“We clean it up,” he said. “Our headquarters decides which sites are most urgent, and we head out to remove debris as the first responders, along with ambulances and emergency services. It’s gotten better since April — once [the Ukrainian army] pushed the Russians back from the city, they couldn’t bomb us as much.”

School after school shows signs of having been hit by Russian rockets. On one, every window has been blown out; another has three massive holes in the roof.

“The Russians just love to bomb universities,” Barashkovsky said. “We have three in this city, and every one of them was hit. Apparently, the Russians are very afraid that we will become educated.”

The most recent damage was done by a cruise missile strike on a 19th-century building in the city center.

“This is the main high school in the city, the oldest building in the entire town,” said Barashkovsky, pointing out where shrapnel struck the site. “It’s from 1898, Russian Empire times. That says it all about their ‘Russian world,’” he said, using the phrase used often by Russian President Vladimir Putin to describe his country’s aspirational sphere of influence. In other words, in Putin’s war to restore what he sees as Russia’s rightful place in the world, his forces are destroying symbols of the old Russian empire.

In both Mykolaiv and Kherson, the days are getting colder and darker, and the Russian strikes more devastating. But here, and all across Ukraine, there’s another constant: The challenges appear to only increase the people’s resolve, and their fury with the enemy.

Lohvinov, the heating director, probably speaks for many Ukrainians.

“[The Russians] are just trying to harm as many people as possible,” he said. “Just bombing everything they can. If we look at the history of Russia … they can’t do it in a different way. And no one here wants them or needs them.”

Thanks to Alicia Benjamin for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Neil Hauer

6. U.S.-Australia Work to Strengthen Alliance

U.S.-Australia Work to Strengthen Alliance

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III began three days of intense discussions with two of the United States' closest allies: Australia and the United Kingdom.

Bilateral Exchange

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, and Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Richard Marles stand for a photo during a bilateral exchange at the Pentagon, Dec. 5, 2022.

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Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, who also serves as defense minister, arrived at the Pentagon today for defense discussions as part of the defense ministers' meeting, which will conclude tomorrow at the U.S. State Department. On Wednesday, Marles and Austin will be joined by U.K. Defense Secretary Ben Wallace as the three leaders discuss the Australia, United Kingdom, United States security pact.

Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific

"Today, we're focused on ambitious steps to further strengthen our unbreakable alliance," Austin said to Marles at the beginning of the meeting.

He noted that Australia and the United States are closely aligned on most important strategic challenges and opportunities. "In fact, I think it's safe to say that the alliance between [the] United States and Australia is stronger than it's ever been, and it remains vital to regional security," the secretary said.

Australia and the United States stand for the international rules-based order where countries are free to chart their courses, and disputes are resolved peacefully and free from coercion, he said.

Tour Time

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III tours the Virginia-class submarine USS Mississippi (SSN 782) with Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Oct. 1, 2022. The two men are meeting at the Pentagon this week.

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Austin said the meetings come at a tense time with Russia's unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine continuing and "coercive and destabilizing military activities by the People's Republic of China," he said.

The defense leaders will discuss a range of issues including deepening bilateral security cooperation. They will also speak of the growing trilateral cooperation with Japan. Finally, they will discuss on-going cooperation with India through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that encompasses the U.S., Australia, Japan and India.

Before coming to the Pentagon, Marles visited submarine builder Electric Boat, where he viewed the complexity of building nuclear-powered submarines. The two leaders last met during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus in Cambodia 10 days ago.

Marles stressed the strategic landscape is "as complex as it has been, really, since the end of the Second World War."

Bilateral Exchange

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Richard Marles participate in a bilateral exchange at the Pentagon, Dec. 5, 2022.

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Even with that, the U.S.-Australian alliance is as strong as it has ever been, he said. "We feel there is a very strong alignment between our two governments right now," Marles said. "We're really looking forward to an ambitious agenda."

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

7. Special Operations News Update - December 5, 2022

Special Operations News Update - December 5, 2022 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · December 5, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo: Two CV-22 Ospreys, tiltrotor aircraft, assigned to the 14th Weapons Squadron, Hurlburt Field Air Force Base, Florida, take off for a U.S. Air Force Weapons School Integration (WSINT) exercise at Nellis AFB, Nevada, Nov. 21, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by William R. Lewis)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Guns of the HH-60G Pave Hawk. A new way of mounting door guns onto combat search and rescue helicopters is currently being tested by the Air Force. Dual-mounted M240 machine guns on each side of the choppers will provide an increased firing capacity for the rescue aircrews. “Check Out the New Twin M240 Door Guns for HH-60 Rescue Helicopters”, by Emma Helfrich, The WarZone, November 23, 2022.

SF Language Skills Overrated? Frank Sobchak, a retired Special Forces officer and Adjunct Professor at Tufts University and the Joint Special Operations University, has conducted some research into the need for Special Forces language skills during advisory missions. His findings are interesting . . . language skills may be more mission-enhancing than mission-essential. “How Much Do Language Skills Matter for Security Force Assistance? Not As Much As We Think”, Modern War Institute at West Point, November 30, 2022.

Marine Raiders. Mac Caltrider provides a little history and current news about the Marine Corps special operations unit. “Marine Raiders: The Corps’ Only Special Operations Unit”, Coffee of Die Magazine, November 22, 2022.

SEALs Increase Medical Protocols. In February 2022, a Navy SEAL recruit died after his Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) class had completed Hell Week. The incident got a lot of press and a couple of Navy investigations. In response to the tragedy, the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command is taking additional precautions to prevent similar events in the future. “Navy Expands Medical Protocols in Order to Improve Safety During BUD/S”, Coronado Times, November 28, 2022.

Defense Strategies Institute presents SOF & Worldwide Operations, December 7-8, 2022, Tampa, Florida. The 11th Annual SOF & Worldwide Symposium will convene senior level leaders and decision makers from across the Special Operations Community, regional combatant commands, Department of State, intelligence community, academia, and industry.

USASOC and Brain Health. Two main components make up ‘brain health’ – a clinical/research component and an integrated network of support that exists outside of the clinical setting. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has established the Human Performance and Wellness (HPW) program. This is a comprehensive and integrated team of experts and providers in the fields of sports medicine, strength and conditioning, performance nutrition, clinical social workers, and others specialties. The programs purpose is to ensure USASOC soldiers are ready for the mission and are able to overcome adversity. “USASOC: Brings a “Team Approach” to Brain Health in Army Special Operations”, Special Operations Outlook, 2022.

ARSOF CA and GPC. The shift from COIN and CT to Great Power Competition (or strategic competition) includes all of the organizations in the military services – including Civil Affairs. SGM Chris Grez argues that ARSOF needs to change its force structure to meet today’s challenges. “Modernizing Army Special Operations Civil Affairs for Strategic Competion”, Eunomia Journal, December 4, 2022.

Gunships and the ‘Green Beam’. The U.S. Air Force’s AC-130 gunship brings tremendous firepower and situational awareness to the battlefield. One example of the situational awareness capabilities is the use of two AC-130J Ghostrider crews using a little-known sensor on the aircraft to control the situation during the Kabul NEO and keep enemy forces away from U.S. forces. The ‘giant green laser pointer’ was used to point things out to friendly forces as well as to deter adversaries by letting them know the were in the gunships sights. “Caught in ‘the green beam’: How US Air Force gunship crews let a target know they have it in their sights”, Business Insider, December 2, 2022.

International SOF

Afghan Commando – Escapes Taliban, Now in U.S. Detention. An Afghan soldier spent months in hiding in Afghanistan after August 2021 – fearing for his life as the Taliban hunted down and killed former Afghan special operations personnel. He managed to fly to Brazil where he hooked up with a ‘caravan’ that would take him to the U.S. southern border. Once getting onto U.S. soil he requested asylum and was promptly put into detention. Now he faces a prison sentence. (The Texas Tribune, Nov 30, 2022).

UK’s Love Affair SAS. Max Hastings looks at how “The UK is Way Too Besotted With Its SAS”, The Washington Post, December 4, 2022.

Turkey Receives SOF Vehicles. Turkish Armed Forces will be receiving twelve PARS IV 6×6 special operations vehicles from vehicle manufacturer FNSS. (Defense Post, Nov 29, 2022).

SOF History

MACV-SOG. Members of the U.S. Army Green Berets, Navy SEALs, CIA, and other elite units took on the dangerous top secret missions of the Vietnam War. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group was established in 1964. It conducted actions deep behind enemy lines in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. “MACV-SOG: The Vietnam-Era Special Operators You’ve Probably Never Heard Of”, War History Online, November 28, 2022.

Long Range Desert Group. Founded in June 1940, the Long Range Desert Group was made up of soldiers from across the Commonwealth. They trained in communications, demolitions, and desert warfare. Each of the members of the LRDG had a specific job specialty – such as signalman, medic, or navigator. They used specially-configured vehicles suitable for traveling on desert roads. Read more in “The Long Range Desert Group was the ‘Finest of All Units’ to serve in North Africa”, War History Online, December 2, 2022.

Commentary

Irregular Warfare Campaigning. Kevin Stringer and Madison Urban have collaborated on an essay about the ability of the United States to conduct an effective irregular warfare campaign – and how it is hampered by political realities and DoD cultural norms. “Irregular Warfare Campaigning and the Irregular Warfare Center”, Irregular Warfare Center, December 1, 2022.

They discuss three barriers to the success of an IW campaign

• a quick-win culture that incentivizes short-term fixes
• the lack of adequate irregular warfare education throughout the interagency community
• promotion and leadership selection processes that undervalue language, cultural, and regional expertise for irregular warfare application

IC, Trauma, and Mental Wellness. Working in the intelligence community often means living with direct or indirect trauma. For a long time the intelligence community was not addressing the issue; but now it is taking steps to ensuring their workforce have avenues to address the state of their mental health. “Don’t Tell Your Non-Work Friends About the Decapitations”, Politico Magazine, November 30, 2022.

IW and SC. Sean McFate writes that any actual conflict with near-peer adversaries is likely to be in the shadows. “Irregular Warfare will win ‘strategic competition'”, The Hill, December 4, 2022.

Maps and District Control in Afghanistan. For years the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) looked through rose-colored glasses when gazing upon the maps they produced that tried to depict district control in Afghanistan. Establishing who had control of a district in Afghanistan was not a science; as it was an insurgent type conflict where control of territory did not necessary mean control of the people. Typically, if Afghan government forces occupied the district center then the map reflected Afghan government control of the district. This was done despite the fact that the Taliban probably had control of all the territory beyond the maximum effective range of the Afghan government forces sheltered within the district center. Read more in “The Tyranny of Color-Coded Maps: What We Get Wrong About Measuring Control During Armed Conflict”, Modern War Institute at West Point, November 28, 2022.

National Security

Report on Operation Barkhane. The French led mission in northwest Africa has been shutting down – the French President announced that the operation had come to an end on November 9, 2022. The military effort was meant to stabilize the Sahel region of Africa. A new report reviews the motivations for the initial operation, its activities, and its eventual conclusion. The End of Operation Barkhane, by Dr. David Doukhan, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), November 2022, PDF, 7 pages.

U.S. Influence Operations – More Work Needed. Paul Cobaugh argues that the United States has failed at influence for decades. He argues that influence is critical to our national security. The U.S. is at least two generations behind in both offensive and defensive influence. “On the battlefield of influence, the US is unarmed”, Truth About Threats, November 30, 2022.

Turkey Airstrikes Diminish Fight Against ISIS. The threat of another Turkish military offensive in northeast Syria against Syrian Kurds is distracting the Kurd forces from fighting the Islamic State. One consequence of fewer anti-ISIS patrols by the Kurds is that the U.S. has reduced its patrolling activities. “Turkish Airstrikes Have Slowed the Fight Against ISIS, Officials Say”, Defense One, November 29, 2022.

Great Power Competition

Maritime COIN in the Pacific. Countering China’s gray-zone tactics starts with a simple but challenging premise. The Maritime Counterinsurgency Project of the U.S. Naval Institute advances strategic, operational, tactical, and force structure recommendations on how to thwart China’s illegal efforts.

https://www.usni.org/MaritimeCOIN

Report – China’s Military and Security. The U.S. Department of Defense has published a report entitled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, November 2022. This 196-page PDF is a report to Congress; an annual requirement mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Read or download the report here.

Report – China’s Navy. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published a report entitled China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress. China’s naval modernization effort has been underway for more than 25 years. Its modern and capable naval force is a large presence in the near-seas region . . . and it is projecting its naval power into the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. It surpasses the number of battle force ships of the United States and is the largest navy in the world. Read or download the report here. CRS, December 1, 2022, PDF, 67 pages.

Upcoming Events

December 6, 2022

Afghan SOF and the SIV Program

Special Operations Association of America (SOAA)

December 7-8, 2022

SOF & Worldwide Operations

Defense Strategies Institute (DSI)

Books, Pubs, and Reports

New Blog on National Security. Paul Cobaugh has started a new blog entitled Truth About Threats. During his long career with USSOCOM he has focused on influence in modern statecraft and conflict. He is a Vice President at Narrative Strategies, as U.S. think tank.

https://www.truthaboutthreats.com/

Sentinel. The December 2022 issue of the Sentinel is now posted online. This quality online magazine is produced monthly by Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association. This issue has stories on MACV-SOG, Laos, Green Berets in Central America, and more.

sof.news · by SOF News · December 5, 2022

8. U.S. Altered Himars Rocket Launchers to Keep Ukraine From Firing Missiles Into Russia

Graphics, photos, and video at the link.

Did we tell the Urkainins about the modifications?  

Excerpt:d

The U.S. has refrained from supplying Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles. But the modifications ensure that Ukraine couldn’t use the Himars launchers the U.S. has provided to fire ATACMS missiles if Kyiv were to acquire them from other sources, such as foreign nations that have purchased the weapons from the U.S. Nor could Ukraine use those launchers to fire other types of longer-range missiles if Kyiv somehow managed to produce or acquire them, officials say.

The Pentagon declined to comment on the modifications, which U.S. officials said involve their hardware and software. 

U.S. Altered Himars Rocket Launchers to Keep Ukraine From Firing Missiles Into Russia

Experts debate whether long-range missiles for Ukraine would deter Putin or widen war

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338

By Michael R. GordonFollow

 and Gordon LuboldFollow

Updated Dec. 5, 2022 5:47 pm ET

WASHINGTON—The U.S. secretly modified the advanced Himars rocket launchers it gave Ukraine so they can’t be used to fire long-range missiles into Russia, U.S. officials said, a precaution the Biden administration says is necessary to reduce the risk of a wider war with Moscow.

The U.S. since June has supplied Ukrainian forces with 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers, or Himars, and a large inventory of satellite-guided rockets with a range of almost 50 miles. Those rockets, known as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, or GMLRS, have been used to strike Russian ammunition depots, logistics supplies and command centers on Ukrainian territory.

But the Himars launchers have a unique feature intended to prevent them from becoming even more potent battlefield systems. U.S. officials say the Pentagon has modified the launchers so they can’t fire long-range missiles, including the U.S.’s Army Tactical Missile System rockets, or ATACMS, which have a range of nearly 200 miles.

A Himars strike in October destroyed a building that was used as a local headquarters for Russian forces in Kupyansk, Ukraine.

PHOTO: CARL COURT/GETTY IMAGES

The previously undisclosed modifications show the lengths the Biden administration has gone to balance its support for Ukraine’s forces against the risk of escalation with Moscow. They also reflect apprehensions among administration officials that their Ukrainian partner might stop keeping its promise not to strike Russian territory with U.S.-provided weapons.

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On Monday, explosions struck two Russian air bases, including one that is a staging area for long-range bombers. The Russian Defense Ministry said that Ukraine had used drones to carry out the attacks, which damaged two aircraft and killed three Russian troops. There is no evidence that U.S.-provided weaponry was used in the strikes. 

Kyiv didn’t formally claim responsibility for the attack, but Ukrainian officials hinted they had the capability to strike deep into Russia. After the strikes, Russia launched missile attacks on Ukraine.

The U.S. has refrained from supplying Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles. But the modifications ensure that Ukraine couldn’t use the Himars launchers the U.S. has provided to fire ATACMS missiles if Kyiv were to acquire them from other sources, such as foreign nations that have purchased the weapons from the U.S. Nor could Ukraine use those launchers to fire other types of longer-range missiles if Kyiv somehow managed to produce or acquire them, officials say.

The Pentagon declined to comment on the modifications, which U.S. officials said involve their hardware and software. 

“Due to operational security considerations, we do not comment publicly on the configuration of systems provided to allies and partners,” said Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman. “The United States remains committed to providing Ukraine the capabilities it needs to counter Russian aggression.”

President Biden and his advisers have had to balance support for Ukraine’s forces against the risk of escalation with Moscow.

PHOTO: WIN MCNAMEE/GETTY IMAGES

The White House, which administration officials said has been involved in key weapons decisions on Ukraine, declined to comment.

The Ukrainian military declined to comment.

The Biden administration has repeatedly said that decisions about a possible diplomatic resolution with Russia are up to Kyiv and that Washington’s goal is to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position should peace talks ever unfold. But military support the U.S. and its allies have provided Kyiv has shaped what Ukraine is able to accomplish on the battlefield. 

Since Russia massed forces to invade Ukraine in February, the U.S. has gradually expanded the types of weapons it has been willing to provide to Kyiv beyond the shoulder-fired Javelin antitank missiles Ukraine first received during the Trump administration.

After months of internal discussion about how to provide Stinger antiaircraft missiles that didn’t contain classified equipment, the first Stingers from U.S. stocks arrived in Ukraine in late February shortly after the Russian invasion was under way. U.S.-made Stingers from Baltic nations began to arrive in Ukraine early that month.

By April, M777 howitzers were being shipped to Ukraine. In May, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that Denmark would provide U.S.-made Harpoon antiship missiles and a shore-based launcher to fire them.

Later that month, U.S. officials said that they would provide wheeled Himars. Those launchers, officials said, would be used to fire the GMLRS, which have roughly twice the range of the howitzers. 

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Ukrainian troops using the Himars system to attack Russian targets in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, shown in an image provided by the Ukrainian government.

PHOTO: COVER IMAGES/ZUMA PRESS

To guard against the risk of escalation, the U.S. secured a commitment from President Volodymyr Zelensky that the launchers wouldn’t be used to strike targets on Russian territory. Ukraine has honored that pledge, which Ukrainian officials say shows Kyiv can be trusted with longer-range weapons. 

The Pentagon said in August that it has provided High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles, or HARM missiles, which Ukraine fires from its Soviet-era fighters to attack Russian radars. 

But the White House has moved cautiously, weighing the military benefit to Kyiv against the risk of escalation with Moscow, in a balance that has left Ukraine without long-range U.S. missiles that can strike Russia’s naval headquarters, air-force units and logistics in Russian-occupied Crimea or military assets on Russian territory.

The U.S. has declined to provide Gray Eagle MQ-1C drones amid Pentagon concerns that they could be used to strike targets in Russia.

Ukraine’s hopes of acquiring Western aircraft in the near term have also been rebuffed by the Biden administration, though the U.S. hasn’t ruled out supplying them years from now after the Ukraine conflict is resolved.  

One major system that the Russians have warned Washington not to provide—privately as well as publicly—are long-range, surface-to-surface missiles such as the ATACMS missiles, which can be fired from Himars launchers and could strike well into Russia territory. 

HIMARS

Max speed:

Firing range:

Weight:

In service:

Origin:

52.8 mph

19.9 to 186.4 miles

10.88 tons

2005

U.S.

6 MLRS series rockets

or 1 ATACMS missile

Crew number

10.5 ft.

7.9 ft.

23 ft.

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“If Washington decides to supply longer-range missiles to Kyiv, then it will be crossing a red line and will become a direct party to the conflict,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in September.

President Biden said in May that the U.S. won’t provide Ukraine with “rocket systems that strike into Russia.” 

The Russian demand not to provide ATACMS to Kyiv comes as debate has grown among current and former U.S. and European officials about whether the Biden administration has been too cautious in providing military support to Ukraine. 

That dispute has intensified as Russia has bombarded Ukraine’s infrastructure, to deprive millions of civilians of electricity, heat and water by firing missiles from Russia territory and launching Iranian-made drones from bases in Russian-occupied Crimea with virtual impunity. 

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The U.S. and its allies have sought to help Ukraine by bolstering its patchwork of air defenses. But the allied efforts have moved slowly. While Ukrainian officials claim that about 80% of the attacking missiles are shot down, the ones that have gotten through have disabled around 50% of Ukraine’s power grid, though Ukraine’s workers are trying to restore it. 

On one side of the debate are experts such as Charles Kupchan, the top National Security Council official for Europe during the Obama administration, who argues that the U.S. should continue to limit the range and sophistication of the weapons provided to Ukraine, to contain the risk of broader conflict with Russia. 

“The United States should avoid encouraging or facilitating a Ukrainian effort to fully expel Russian forces from all of its territory, including Crimea, a war aim that would run too high a risk of prompting [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to undertake even more reckless actions, including the possible use of nuclear weapons,” Mr. Kupchan said.

WHAT’S NEWS

Why the U.S. Is Modifying Himars Rocket Launchers It’s Sending to Ukraine

P.M. Edition for Dec. 5. Since June, the U.S. has supplied Ukrainian forces with high-precision rocket launchers known as Himars. We now report that the U.S. has secretly modified Himars, to keep them from being used by Ukraine to fire long-range missiles into Russia. National security reporter Gordon Lubold joins host Annmarie Fertoli to discuss.Read Transcript

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The other side includes some former alliance officials. By denying Ukraine long-range missiles and launchers that can fire them, they say, the West has, in effect, given Russia a free hand to fire cruise and ballistic missiles into Ukraine from Crimea and its own territory and to mount drone attacks, without fear that Kyiv might strike back. 

“Since the 10th of October, Putin has changed strategy,” Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former Danish prime minister who served as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s secretary-general from 2009 to 2014, told The Wall Street Journal. “He has accelerated the war by targeting civilian infrastructure, including the energy grid. Potentially we are now facing a humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine, and we have not adapted.” 

“If you are to stop Putin then you have to deter by delivering, for instance, long-range missiles,” he added.

A Rare Look at Ukraine's Himars on the Front Lines

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A Rare Look at Ukraine's Himars on the Front Lines

Play video: A Rare Look at Ukraine's Himars on the Front Lines

U.S.-supplied Himars have played a central role in Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia. WSJ’s Stephen Kalin gained access to the mobile rocket launchers on Ukraine’s southern front, where soldiers are targeting Russian equipment and troops. Photo/Video: Stephen Kalin

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com

9. Would a NATO vs. Russia Conflict Really be 'World War III'?

Would a NATO vs. Russia Conflict Really be 'World War III'?

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · December 5, 2022

Stop Saying We’re Facing World War III: Just days after Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden cautioned that any direct NATO-Russia clash would trigger “World War III.” The hyperbole of a Third World War has continued ever since.

In recent months, tech billionaire Elon Musk has repeatedly taken to social media to warn that there is a threat of the conflict escalating into a world war.

But is it?

Really, World War III?

Though there is a very real and severe threat of nuclear war and a genuinely devastating conflict, yet, it would be incorrect to suggest that a conflict between NATO and Russia would immediately and definitfely be a “World War.”

History Lesson – World Wars

Back during the fighting that took place between August 1914 and November 1918, no one actually called it World War I or the First World War. However, contemporaries certainly did view it as a global conflict. The Germans were the first to suggest as much in late 1914, describing the conflict as “Weltkrig” or “World War,” while the French and British respectively referred to it as “La Grande Guerre” and “Great War,” only later adopting the term “World War.”

The term expressed the scale of the fear the conflict unleashed – but more importantly, the scale on which it was fought. From the opening weeks of the war, Germany was fighting not only in Belgium, France and Russia but was engaged in combat operations in Africa and China, while its warships were soon sent on commerce raiding missions around the world. When the Ottoman Empire joined the war in November 1914, the conflict spread to North Africa and throughout the Middle East, from Iraq to Palestine.

Not Really World War I

It is also important to note that despite the moniker that was only applied to the Great War after the horrors of the Second (1939-45), there had been prior global conflicts.

The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) saw fighting not only in Europe but in North America and the Caribbean, and also in India and the Philippines; while the American Revolution may have had its first shot heard ‘round the world at Lexington and Concord, but its final shot was actually fired in India.

Likewise, the Napoleonic Wars were also fought beyond Europe – to Latin America, Egypt, and Syria.

In fact, if you include the Anglo-American War of 1812 as part of the Napoleonic Wars, it involved fighting in North America, which the First World War did not.

A Horrible War – Not a World War

A conflict with Russia could rightfully be described as a truly frightening prospect, but it would be wrong to suggest it would be as global as those past conflicts.

While Russia could – and likely even would – launch nuclear weapons at America’s cities, it couldn’t possibly hope to invade North America. There should be little fear of a Red Dawn-type occupation.

Moreover, if such a conflict were somehow to remain conventional, or at least the use of nuclear weapons limited, the fighting between NATO and Russia would be confined to Ukraine and Eastern Europe, possibly even Russia. Any naval engagements would be likely limited to sub vs. sub engagements, as the Russian Navy is in no shape to sortie against the United States supported by its NATO allies.

Moreover, while NATO might face cracks in its foundation should it come to war, the alliance would likely stand together. By contrast, Russia has few, if any, allies that would join it. China isn’t about to become embroiled in a conflict where it has nothing to gain. Syria would be instantly isolated and overrun, and most of the former Soviet states in Central Asia would also likely sit it out. Belarus would perhaps be the only state to join Russia, and only because it would bow to pressure from Moscow.

History Lesson II – Russia Has Never Been Strong

Without the nukes, a NATO-Russian War would be so one-sided that Moscow could expect to be overrun as quickly as Iraq was in 2003. It would be the Russian masses that would likely be greeting the invaders with the flowers Moscow expected the Ukrainians to hand to its soldiers. Why would they want to fight?

History suggests that Russia has no heart for a serious fight.

Apart from the Great Patriotic War (World War II), when the Soviet Union and its people were fighting for their survival against a power that would have enslaved/exterminated them, Russia has rarely been on the winning side of a major war. In the past two centuries, Russia’s most significant military victories were against the Ottoman Empire, a nation in a severe state of decline and decay, or its efforts to put down a rebellion in lands it already controlled.

It saw defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and again in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). During the First World War, its centuries-old monarchy was overthrown, followed by the provisional government. At the same time, the Bolsheviks sought to withdraw from the conflict and subsequently lost their grip on Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, history has repeated itself as Russia’s victories have again only been against small regional states such as Georgia and Chechnya.

The war in Ukraine is just the latest proof that Russia is a paper tiger, a second-rate world power that has nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Its navy is in shambles, its air force relies on antiquated bombers, and it is forced to deploy tanks that were retired decades ago to bolster its numbers.

NATO tank firing. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Nukes are all Moscow has, and if it comes to war, it could cause the destruction of cities around the world and cost the lives of hundreds of millions. But mutually assured destruction is now unlikely.

Perhaps someone needs to tell Vladimir Putin he can hurt NATO, but it would be his and Russia’s destruction that is indeed assured.

Bonus: Russia’s Most Lethal Bomber – The Tu-160

Tu-160 Bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Tu-160. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Tu-160. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Tu-160 bomber about to take off. Image Credit: TASS.

Tu-160 Bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

A Tu-160 bomber launching a Kh-101 cruise missile against targets in Syria, November 2015

A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,000 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · December 5, 2022

10. Rogue Superpower: China Is A Global Pariah and Shows No Remorse

Rogue Superpower: China Is A Global Pariah and Shows No Remorse

19fortyfive.com · by James Jay Carafano · December 5, 2022

China is being wracked by popular protests on a scale not seen since Tiananmen Square. But how much have the demonstrations made the regime rethink its autocratic ways? So far, the answer seems to be: Not much.

The regime has softened its public rhetoric. For several days now, public officials and the government-controlled media have foregone talk of “dynamic clearing,” the official description of China’s zero-COVID policy. Instead, they have emphasized “optimizing” pandemic controls.

The change in tone signals that Xi’s draconian COVID lockdowns may be gradually eased. Local governments are being told to target their lockdowns more narrowly, impose them quickly, and end them as fast as they can. Some locations – such as Beijing and Guangzhou, which are both experiencing surges of infections – are tweaking their rules to allow more business as usual, letting mild cases quarantine at home rather than forcing them into centralized facilities.

But don’t assume this means Beijing is loosening its grip on the Chinese people. Nor should anybody expect a 180-degree shift in China’s COVID-19 policies. It is mostly the narrative that is shifting. If infections spike again, expect a quick return to brutal crackdowns.

Still, the widespread protests and the regime’s demonstrated confusion on how to manage them are telling. The Chinese Communist Party is not secure. In addition to struggling with its COVID policy, the regime faces the longer-term challenge of sustaining economic growth despite a looming demographic crisis.

The protests remind us that as aggressive as China has become in the last few years, a number of vulnerabilities, both within and outside of its borders, diminish the threat posed by Beijing.

The worst policies would look to accommodate China out of fear of losing access to cash and favors from Beijing. All indications are that China will be a less reliable and dependable partner in the future. Instead, it will become even more exploitive and manipulative as it struggles to sustain its global stature.

Rather than try to accommodate Beijing and hope for the best, the U.S. and its friends, allies, and partners should work to get ahead of the threat.

Authoritarian regimes are always weakest when they are pressed from without and within. External competition, isolation, and pressure will force the Chinese Communist Party to make difficult choices that pit rising expectations at home against ambitions to expand Beijing’s influence abroad.

In just the last few years, China has triggered a global pandemic, greenlit Russia’s unconscionable invasion of Ukraine, threatened the people of Taiwan, conducted a malicious global campaign of espionage, and compiled the world’s worst record on human rights and environmental protections. China must be held accountable for its atrocious behavior. It should be treated like a global pariah, not courted by governments.

A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tanks research on matters of national security and foreign affairs. He is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by James Jay Carafano · December 5, 2022

11. Defense authorization bill enters final stretch

Will they get this done?

Defense & National Security — Defense authorization bill enters final stretch

BY ELLEN MITCHELL - 12/05/22 7:59 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/overnights/3762949-defense-national-security-defense-authorization-bill-enters-final-stretch/

Lawmakers are staring down the final leg of the journey to getting the annual defense spending bill passed, but not without a few hiccups along the way, including last minute efforts to tack on unrelated bills to the legislation and a late GOP push to try to end the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for military service members. 

We’ll share where the bill is in all of this plus the secretly modified rocket systems sent to Ukraine and how the Ukraine-Russia war is affecting U.S.-Russia nuclear talks. 

White House opposes repealing mandate via NDAA 

The White House opposes using the annual defense spending bill to repeal a vaccine mandate for military service members, national security spokesperson John Kirby told reporters on Monday. 

President Biden is in agreement with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin that the mandate should remain in place, Kirby said. Republican lawmakers have threatened to delay passage of the annual defense authorization bill if the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, which was instituted last year, is not rescinded. 

“He continues to believe that all Americans, including those in the armed forces, should be vaccinated and boosted for COVID-19,” Kirby told reporters, calling it a “health and readiness issue for the force.” 

Some background: House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), who is vying for the Speaker’s gavel in the next Congress, said on Sunday that he believes the vaccine mandate for the military will be lifted through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 

“Otherwise, the bill will not move,” McCarthy said on Fox News’s “Sunday Morning Futures.” 

A possible compromise: McCarthy and other congressional leaders met with Biden last week at the White House. 

Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told Politico last week that a rollback of the vaccine mandate was possible in a compromise NDAA. 

The GOP argument: Republican officials have argued for months that a vaccine mandate for the military is an example of government overreach. Former President Trump and others have argued that members who were discharged for refusing the vaccine should be reinstated. 

Read the full story here 

Energy & Environment — Progressives push back on permitting in defense bill

Hillicon Valley — Antitrust bill unites unlikely tech forces

PROGRESSIVES PUSH BACK ON MANCHIN PERMITTING DEAL IN NDAA 

At least two progressive Democrats on Monday said they would vote against a defense spending bill if it contains elements of Sen. Joe Manchin’s (D-W.Va.) permitting reform push.  

Reps. Raúl Grijalva (D-Ariz.) and Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) tweeted that they would vote against the NDAA if it contained what they described as “giveaways to the fossil fuel industry.” 

“We can advance permitting for clean energy without taking a hatchet to environmental protections for frontline communities. This is not what @RepMcEachin would have wanted,” Grijalva said, invoking the late Rep. Donald McEachin (D-Va.).  

“I will vote against the NDAA rule if we continue with this fossil fuel giveaway,” he added.  

Optimistic: Meanwhile, Khanna expressed optimism that the legislation could be stopped. 

“I will vote against the rule for NDAA consideration if it includes giveaways to the fossil fuel industry. If even 10 House progressives vote against it, it likely can’t pass,” Khanna tweeted. 

Read the rest here 

Also from The Hill: 

• GOP seeks to play hardball on annual defense bill 

Energy & Environment — Progressives push back on permitting in defense bill

Hillicon Valley — Antitrust bill unites unlikely tech forces

US secretly modified HIMARS for Ukraine  

The Pentagon secretly modified advanced rocket systems it sent to Ukraine to make the weapons unable to fire into Russia and escalate the war. 

Since June, the U.S. has supplied Kyiv with 20 of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), but the weapons are uniquely modified so they can’t fire long-range missiles, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing U.S. officials. 

More on the weapon: The HIMARS are wheeled vehicles equipped with rocket systems, which are attached to the back. 

Along with the HIMARS, the U.S. has supplied Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) with a range of 50 miles, which have been used to strike Russian ammunition depots and command centers within Ukraine. 

Earlier: When President Biden announced the Defense Department was shipping the HIMARS and ammunition to Ukraine at the end of May, he said they would only be used for defense and the administration was “not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that strike into Russia.” 

• Ukrainian President Voldymyr Zelensky also promised at the time not to use the missile systems to strike targets inside Russia. 
• The U.S. has also resisted sending Army Tactical Missile System (ATMS) rockets, a surface-to-surface missile that can hit targets up to 186 miles away. Officials cited similar concerns about Ukraine striking targets in Russia. 

Ongoing call to arms: Calls to provide Ukraine with longer-range missile systems and more advanced weaponry to strike back have grown more urgent after Russia in October began bombarding civilian infrastructure and energy grids in Ukraine. 

A new wave of Russian rocket strikes hit cities across Ukraine on Monday. 

Read the rest here 

Energy & Environment — Progressives push back on permitting in defense bill

Hillicon Valley — Antitrust bill unites unlikely tech forces

Ukraine war bleeds into Russia-US nuclear talks   

Rock-bottom relations between the U.S. and Russia amid the Ukraine war are bleeding into one of the most high-stakes area of the relationship: strategic communication over nuclear weapons.  

Russia’s rejection of meeting U.S. officials in Egypt for nuclear talks over a soon-to-expire treaty is raising the risk that Washington is losing its ability to communicate with Moscow, even over one of the most fragile and preserved issues of mutual importance.   

Russian President Vladimir Putin has appeared to tone down rhetoric threatening the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but experts say the loose talk, coupled with a breakdown in diplomacy, has put the risk of nuclear conflict nearly on par with the Cold War.  

“Even during the worst of the Cold War, we were still talking to one another,” said Jim Townsend, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO during the Obama administration.  

“We want these things to happen because it means we’re trying to bring some sanity to the nuclear world.” 

Read that story here 

Energy & Environment — Progressives push back on permitting in defense bill

Hillicon Valley — Antitrust bill unites unlikely tech forces

ON TAP FOR TOMORROW

• The Brookings Institution will hold a conversation on “The arc of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and new breakthroughs,” at 8:30 a.m. 
• Secretary of State Antony Blinken and national security adviser Jake Sullivan will speak at the International Anti-Corruption Conference on “Uprooting Corruption, Defending Democratic Values,” at 9 a.m. 
• The House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a hearing on “Confronting Yemen’s Humanitarian and Political Crises Without a Ceasefire,” at 10 a.m. 
• The Center for Strategic and International Studies will host a discussion on “The Role of Digital Management Systems in Ukraine’s Reconstruction,” with Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandra Azarkhina, at 11:30 a.m. 
• Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison will speak at a Hudson Institute talk on “Australia’s Role in the China Struggle,” at 12:30 p.m. 
• The Atlantic Council will hold a forum on “Securing space: Preparing for future space contingencies,” with Principal Defense Department Director of Space and Missile Defense Policy Travis Langster, at 2 p.m. 

Energy & Environment — Progressives push back on permitting in defense bill

Hillicon Valley — Antitrust bill unites unlikely tech forces

WHAT WE’RE READING

• Ukraine hit by new round of missile attacks; Russian air bases report explosions 
• US intelligence chief says officials seeing ‘reduced tempo’ in Russia-Ukraine war ahead of winter 
• Zelensky says more unity and resilience needed to survive winter 
• Blinken says US pressing Russia on Griner, Whelan ‘almost every day’ 
• Chinese-linked hackers stole millions in COVID-19 relief benefits: Secret Service 
• Incoming GOP Intelligence chair expects House, Senate panels to get DNI briefing on Mar-a-Lago documents 
• The Hill: Opinion: Keep the pressure on Putin 

Energy & Environment — Progressives push back on permitting in defense bill

Hillicon Valley — Antitrust bill unites unlikely tech forces

That’s it for today! Check out The Hill’s Defense and National Security pages for the latest coverage. See you tomorrow!

12. Bell Textron's Valor wins Army’s FLRAA competition to replace Black Hawk

I have already started seeing the criticism on social media.

Everyone assumed the V-22 would replace the MH-53 - it could not and did not and early on AFSOC had to say specifically it was not a replacement for those acircart. Yet AFSOC deactivated the MH-53 units ostensibly as the budget tradeoff for the V-22.

Will this new aircraft really be a functional utility helicopter? Will it have more or less capability than the UH-60? I assume the argument will be that it has "different" capabilities.  

The question is are tilt rotor aircraft an effective tradeoff with rotary wing aircraft?

Bell Textron's Valor wins Army’s FLRAA competition to replace Black Hawk - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · December 5, 2022

The V-280 Valor, Bell’s entry for the Army’s Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, in flight. (Bell)

WASHINGTON — After years of development, prototyping and test flights, the Army today announced that Bell Textron’s Valor tiltrotor has won its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) competition to be the successor to the aging UH-60 Black Hawk and a key component of the Army’s future force.

The announcement gives Bell a massive victory not just in America but with the global community of 28 Black Hawk operators, many of whom are likely to follow the US Army’s lead when looking for a replacement in the future.

“I am excited to be part of this momentous day for our Army,” Douglas Bush, the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, said in a release. “The thoughtful and disciplined execution of the FLRAA program strategy will deliver the transformational capabilities we need to support the Joint force, strengthen deterrence and win in multi-domain operations.”

In a subsequent call with reporters, several Army officials provided additional details about the new contract. In total, they said, this current deal is worth up to $1.3 billion with the initial obligation valued at $232 million over the next 19 months.

Major General Robert Barrie, the Army’s Program Executive Officer for Aviation, said the initial dollar figure will allow Bell to continue onward with the preliminary design of the aircraft and deliver “virtual prototypes of a potentially model-based system.”

“There are zero aircraft being procured in the initial portion,” the two-star general said. If the aircraft moves into production, though, the program could soar up to $70 billion over its lifetime.

“This is an exciting time for the US Army, Bell, and Team Valor as we modernize the Army’s aviation capabilities for decades to come,” Mitch Snyder, president and CEO of Bell, said in a brief statement.

For the past several years, teams from Bell and Sikorsky-Boeing have been racing alongside each other for the high-profile contract, producing futuristic prototypes and logging flight hours. Army leaders were initially expected to announce the victor earlier this year but said they needed additional time to review the bids. Then on Nov. 21, Bush told reporters a decision would be announced by the end of the calendar year, saying the delay was simply due to the necessary “quality control” and “due diligence” associated with a contract “this big.”

The exact requirements the service laid out for the aircraft remain closely held, but allowed the companies to produce two strikingly different designs: Bell’s tiltrotor Valor aircraft against Sikorsky-Boeing’s coaxial rotor Defiant X.

Sikorsky’s Defiant X, its entry for the Army’s Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, shown in flight. (Sikorsky)

It is unclear at this time if a contract protest will be filed, although given the magnitude of the FLRAA program, it would not be a surprise. A protest could potentially delay the Army on its quest to fielding the new FLRAA fleet around 2030, but service leaders said today they have factored a potential protest delay into the schedule.

The Sikorsky-Boeing team did not disclose if it would protest the decision but issued a brief statement after the announcement.

“We remain confident DEFIANT X is the transformational aircraft the US Army requires to accomplish its complex missions today and well into the future,” the team wrote in a statement. “We will evaluate our next steps after reviewing feedback from the Army.”

Over the weekend, Breaking Defense spoke with Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., at this year’s Reagan National Defense Forum. Wittman, a contender to chair the House Armed Services Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee, said he believes the FLRAA concept is based around “sound” technology, but said he wants to make sure the aircraft’s range is suitable for the vast distance in the Indo-Pacific region.

In that region, the tactical platform will be a connector and “the question is are there enough KC-46A’s, or whatever, to tank it in theater? We’d have to fly those in,” he said.

“I do think before they make the final award, they really need to examine those operational elements of the aircraft and figure out, does it work at all theaters, or does it just work in a European theater where…we have lots of land base facilities,” Wittman explained. “It’s a big deal to put a tanker up in the [Indo-Pacific Command], and get it to a FLRAA or [Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft] and get it refueled,” he later added.

Breaking Defense’s Aaron Mehta contributed this report.

13. Major power outage after vandals sabotage multiple electrical substations

For those who know, I saw this comment on social media:

Thankfully the media hasn't jumped on the fact these attacks occurred in Pineland, and show a sophisticated CARVER analysis...

​

Major power outage after vandals sabotage multiple electrical substations

msn.com · by 2 hrs ago

Vandals wielding firearms are suspected of causing a major power outage across a North Carolina county that has plunged tens of thousands of customers into darkness amid freezing temperatures, according to authorities.

Evidence of sabotage was found at two key electrical substations following the massive blackout Saturday night, prompting the Moore County Sheriff's Office to investigate the incident as a "criminal occurrence" and call in the FBI to assist in the probe.

A state of emergency was declared in Moore County on Sunday and a countywide 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew was imposed Sunday night. Moore County Sheriff Ronnie Fields told ABC News that the curfew will be extended to Monday night.

Jeff Brooks, spokesman for Duke Energy, the local public utility, said the two electrical substations were severely damaged in the attacks and much of the equipment will have to be replaced. He said it could be until Thursday when power is completely restored.

© Jonathan Drake/Reuters Gerardo Anicero warms himself in front of a makeshift fire as he watches Duke Energy personnel work to restore power at a crippled electrical substation in Carthage, N.C., on Dec. 4, 2022.

At least 35,430 utility customers awoke for the second day Monday without electricity, officials said.

'It's been a nightmare'

Schools throughout the county have been canceled indefinitely and a shelter was opened Carthage, a central Moore County town, for residents suffering from the disruption, officials said.

The power outages began at about 7 p.m. Saturday and thousands of Duke Energy customers remained without electricity on Sunday after enduring freezing temperatures overnight.

Fields said at a news conference Sunday that the perpetrator or perpetrators of the sabotage "knew exactly what they were doing." He said multiple shots were fired at each of the damaged substations and a gate was rammed open at one of the properties to reach the target.

"We faced something (Saturday) night in Moore County that we've never faced before, but we'll get through it," Fields said. "I can promise to the perpetrators out there, we will find you."

Fields added, "this was targeted. It wasn't random."

No arrests have been announced. Fields declined to comment on a possible motive, but said the investigation has yet to uncover evidence linking the vandalism to a Downtown Divas drag show in Southern Pines that has sparked community protests. The drag show had been scheduled for Saturday night and was disrupted due to the blackout.

Fields told ABC News on Monday that law enforcement throughout the county has been dealing with a number of emergency calls in the last 48 hours, including a few robberies, one at a gun store.

"It’s been a nightmare," Fields said, adding the FBI, Homeland Security, ATF and a number of federal agencies are involved in this investigation.

Fields said this was an intentional act and if someone dies as a result of the blackout the suspect or suspects could face murder charges.

The sheriff called the attacks an "eye-opener" and said he has spoken to North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper and state senators and representatives about beefing up security around the county's infrastructure.

Vulnerable substations

Kevin Perry, retired director of critical infrastructure protection at Southwest Power Pool in Arkansas, told ABC News most electrical distribution substations across the country may be vulnerable to vandalism or copper theft, but redundancies and backup systems built into power grids prevent widespread blackouts.

"Substations tend to be out in the middle of nowhere, and that means they’re, for the most part, unattended," Perry said. "If you take out enough equipment then you lose the redundancy and when you lose the redundancy you don’t have any way of feeding power to that particular area and that’s when you end up with a regional blackout like this due to sabotage."

He said the evidence law enforcement has shared with the public so far leads him to believe it may have been a targeted attack and not the work of average vandals taking potshots at the substations.

“When you see two substations taken out, resulting in a regional outage like this, you have to start thinking that yes it’s very possible that it was a planned coordinated attack," Perry said. "The implication is that the shooters knew enough about the grid that these two substations if taken out would cause a blackout in the intended area."

He said that while some critical substations boasting 500,000 volts or higher are mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to have risk assessments conducted on them and if determined necessary could be required to have ballistic walls around them.

"To try to protect every single substation to that level would be enormously cost prohibitive," Perry said, adding that most low-voltage substations like the ones in Moore County are surrounded by chain-link fences and barbed wire outriggers.

White House briefed

Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas was briefed on the power outages and a spokesperson said the department is coordinating with the FBI. The DHS infrastructure security agency CISA is also offering resources to Duke Energy, which is working to restore power.

"DHS will continue to share information with the FBI, and state and local authorities as the investigation unfolds. CISA leadership and regional teams have offered support to Duke Energy as they work to restore service," a DHS spokesperson said Monday.

© Jonathan Drake/Reuters Duke Energy personnel work to restore power at a second crippled electrical substation after the Moore County Sheriff said that vandalism caused a mass power outage, in Carthage, N.C., on Dec. 4, 2022.

National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said Monday the White House is monitoring the incident closely, adding that shoring up infrastructure against external threats is a major priority.

"We're going to obviously let that investigation play out. I think we've heard the president talk about this many times. He's made critical infrastructure security and the resilience of that infrastructure, regardless of whether it's from natural threats or manmade threats, a priority since the very, very beginning," Kirby said. "We still have a long way to go. I think the president will be the first to admit that.

'Multiday restoration'

Brooks said utility crews are working "around the clock" to restore power, but said, "we are looking at a pretty sophisticated repair with some fairly large equipment." Several law enforcement agencies in Moore County were providing security as crews worked to repair the damage.

"We do want citizens to be prepared that this will be a multiday restoration for most customers," Brooks said.

MORE: Thousands of Colorado residents without heat after attack on gas service

Mike Cameron, Southern Pines' assistant town manager and fire chief, told the Raleigh News and Observer said several vehicle accidents were being blamed on the power outage, including a multiple car crash that injured several people at an intersection in Southern Pines.

"The car wreck was totally because the stop lights were out," Cameron told the News and Observer.

MORE: Power restored to over 1.3 million customers in Puerto Rico amid massive outage

Moore Regional Hospital in Pinehurst, North Carolina, also lost power and was forced to switch to its backup generator, officials said.

Gov. Cooper said in a Twitter post that he has spoken with Duke Energy and state law enforcement officials about the crisis.

"An attack like this on critical infrastructure is a serious, intentional crime and I expect state and federal authorities to thoroughly investigate and bring those responsible to justice," Cooper tweeted.

msn.com · by 2 hrs ago

14.  China’s Covid protests not as meaningful as portrayed

I guess this is one interpretation. 

Excerpts:

But after the protests, China’s leaders sent new messages about the virus. These were large and clear shifts, including making the virus sound less frightening and saying that local governments who are too restrictive with their prevention activities will be held accountable. They also changed the targets for vaccinations, focussing on the elderly.

What happens next remains to be seen. On policy direction, Beijing’s choice will likely be non-pharmaceutical interventions such as masking and contact reduction.

A shift to self-testing and quarantining at home, with local committees responsible for check-ups is the likely next step. Local governments will probably launch vaccination campaigns and the central government will focus on delivering more hospital beds, ramping up production of medical equipment and training more staff.

For the more complicated matters of vaccination mandates and lockdown settings, Beijing will leave policy formulation and specification to local governments. This may sound defeatist, but it actually offers China scope to back away from Covid-19-zero. Beijing can attribute things that go awry to local implementation failures rather than errors at the top.

In this way, protestors have accelerated China’s opening up.

China’s Covid protests not as meaningful as portrayed

State’s response not as harsh, repressive or coordinated as external commentary suggests and Beijing has adroitly shifted blame to the local level

asiatimes.com · by Ryan Manuel · December 5, 2022

China was wracked with unprecedented “anti-zero-Covid” protests in late November 2022. They started with a fire in Urumqi city, Xinjiang. At least 10 people perished after not being allowed to leave the building due to Covid-19 restrictions. Local street demonstrations followed this tragedy.

The next day, local authorities declared that the city had been rid of Covid-19 at the community level and issued a number of tone-deaf statements about the need for individual protection.

The demonstration in Xinjiang was followed on Saturday, November 26 by a protest on Urumqi Road in Shanghai, where residents also railed against China’s current zero-Covid policy. Unusually, protestors called for regime change. Since then, there have been reports of nearly 100 protests in different parts of China, mainly in universities.

It is easy to elevate the significance of these protests. But protests are both more common and more easily dealt with in China than commonly understood. There have been major political protests in China in the past few decades and the playbook for dealing with them is well established.

Leaders blame problems on local government implementation and crack down hard on generalized statements such as “this was the Party’s fault.” They also hit the leaders of protests hard, but usually leave the protesters themselves alone.

What is new in these Covid-19 protests is that many different issues are being refracted through the lens of the virus. Workers protesting about labor rights use the pandemic as a frame for grievances, but that is a different matter from those seeking greater freedoms of speech or political rights, or wanting to criticize China’s leaders.

Notably, the state response was not nearly as harsh, repressive or even coordinated as external commentary suggests. Instead, protests were dissipated through control of social media platforms and through relocating protesters. Following this, there have been fewer reports of activities.

The protests are unlikely to change the regime, but they may have triggered changes in China’s Covid-19 policy. Why? Because they allowed Beijing to change its policy.

China has eased ‘zero-Covid’ rules in what was seen as a first step toward reopening but cases are spreading as restrictions are loosened. Photo: Screengrab / BBC

Some background here is important — as the power to make decisions over Covid-19 restrictions had already been delegated down to local leaders, Beijing can distance itself from the public frustration about harsh Covid-19 policies. Policymaking is not completely directive. Central leaders might give signals — as success or failure will be pinned on local leaders, they monitor these messages closely.

The signals coming from Beijing prior to the protests were vague and ambiguous. The most significant recent order from the leadership was issued on November 11. It called for some restrictions to be eased and urged local officials to refrain from indiscriminate Covid-19 restrictions. That was followed by a 20-point statement detailing how the virus should be handled.

Chinese internal assessments on the virus were frank well before the protests started. They said that “at present, the local epidemic situation in China is still severe and complicated”, and that local leaders must follow the “clear requirement put forward by the Party Central Committee for prevention of the epidemic.”

In fact, the center had given no clear direction on pandemic management. Instead, it was left to the ministries, who then passed instructions down to local leaders tasked with implementing Covid-19 restrictions “according to their own characteristics and realities.”

Local governments were indeed warned not to go too far, with the central government saying that “arbitrary” restrictions should be avoided. Every day, millions of schools, factories and residential compounds must wait for testing or other instructions before starting work.

This was not being controlled by local leaders, but rather by local administrators trying to work out what to do. There is not even a national health QR code. Contrary to fears of China’s surveillance state, there is no standard protocol for tracking the virus. That is a city-wide decision.

Local governments have to choose between opening up and controlling the virus. That has led to a huge number of problems, as everything is passed down the line until rules are implemented and interpreted at a very local level. Ambiguous top-down policy messages, coupled with convoluted transmission through the chain of command, leads to policy flip-flopping. And there are constantly different messages.

The city of Shijiazhuang adopted a looser interpretation of the central government orders and tried opening up in late November, only to be faced with reports of a fearful population that largely stayed home. There are, as always, many stories in China.

But after the protests, China’s leaders sent new messages about the virus. These were large and clear shifts, including making the virus sound less frightening and saying that local governments who are too restrictive with their prevention activities will be held accountable. They also changed the targets for vaccinations, focussing on the elderly.

Covid lockdowns have taken a heavy toll on China’s economy and society but signs of loosening are becoming more apparent after public protests. Image: Screengrab / HBO

What happens next remains to be seen. On policy direction, Beijing’s choice will likely be non-pharmaceutical interventions such as masking and contact reduction.

A shift to self-testing and quarantining at home, with local committees responsible for check-ups is the likely next step. Local governments will probably launch vaccination campaigns and the central government will focus on delivering more hospital beds, ramping up production of medical equipment and training more staff.

For the more complicated matters of vaccination mandates and lockdown settings, Beijing will leave policy formulation and specification to local governments. This may sound defeatist, but it actually offers China scope to back away from Covid-19-zero. Beijing can attribute things that go awry to local implementation failures rather than errors at the top.

In this way, protestors have accelerated China’s opening up.

Dr Ryan Manuel is managing director of Bilby, a Hong Kong-based company that uses AI to analyze policy.

This article, republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.

asiatimes.com · by Ryan Manuel · December 5, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com