Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Revolution can never be forecast; it cannot be foretold; it comes of itself. Revolution is brewing and is bound to flare up."

– Vladimir Lenin, 1918

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."

– John F. Kennedy, 1962

"The brutalities of progress are called revolutions. When they are over we realize this: that the human has been roughly handled, but that it has advanced."

– Victor Hugo, 1862

1. Is World War III Already Here?

2. Americans favor more international engagement, military spending: survey

3. Could Trump’s pick for Pentagon No. 2 accelerate DOD’s hypersonic efforts?

4. Ukraine Opens Talks With Trump Team on Halting War With Russia

5. The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: A Missed Opportunity

6. Turning West, Across the Gulf of Aden: The Houthis and al-Shabaab

7. Military Planners Fear China Threat to Undersea Cables

8. How Trump Is Rethinking Economic Power

9. Beijing Has Picked Off Taiwan’s Remaining Allies. Taiwan Is Fighting Back.

10. Syria’s Civil War Puts Israel in a Bind: ‘Devil We Know’ or Islamist Rebels

11. DOGE’s Big Ideas Include Ending Remote Work and Daylight Saving Changes

12. The Lonely “I” In DIME: How the U.S. Can Address the Information Challenge of Our Time

13. Dinesh D’Souza Says Sorry for ‘2000 Mules’

14. VFW bashes The Economist for taking 'turkey-sized dump' on disabled vets

15. Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of Syria's shock insurgency?

16. Romanian election unsettles NATO allies

17. Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific

18. DOGE Needs to Tackle The Department of Defense's CR Nightmare

19. East Asia Homework for the Trump Administration

20. China's Digital Strategy: Cyber-Espionage and Biometric Surveillance in Global Technological Expansion

21. A-10s are being spotted in Syria. Here’s how they’re being used.

22. Austin endorses women in combat jobs and exhorts West Point cadets to defend the Constitution

23. Maximizing Defense Innovation While Holding the Line on Export Controls: What the Defense Sector Can Learn from Global Banks

24. NATO readies countermeasures to combat Russian, Chinese hybrid warfare, bloc chief says

25. The Berlin Wall Would Soon Tumble, Divided States Would Reunite. My Work Was Done.

26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024

27. Iran Update, December 4, 2024

1. Is World War III Already Here?

Excerpts:

“I think we’re on the cusp of a world war,” McMaster told The Free Press. “There’s an economic war going on. There are real wars going on in Europe and across the Middle East, and there’s a looming war in the Pacific. And I think the only way to prevent these wars from cascading further is to convince these adversaries they can’t accomplish their objectives through the use of force.”

…

These wars, rebellions, and spy tales may appear disconnected. But in reality, they all point to a widening global conflict that is pitting the U.S. and its allies against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—nations all fixated on toppling the West. Strategists have even come up with catchy nicknames for this anti-American coalition, dubbing the bloc the “Axis of Aggressors” or the “Axis of Upheaval.”

Philip Zelikow, who served as executive director of the 9/11 Commission and counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from 2005 to 2007, is among those who think these conflicts are related. “I think there is a serious possibility of what I call worldwide warfare”—meaning a world war that is not as coordinated as past global conflagrations. “It’s not hard to see one of these conflicts crossing over into another.”

…

“What he’s gonna need is some agenda to bring the world back together after he pulls things apart,” said David Asher, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, who oversaw U.S. government operations against Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran in the George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations.

The threat of a widening global conflict is being driven by factors reminiscent of events before the start of World War I, sources told me. This includes the breakdown in alliances and trading systems and the arrival of disruptive technologies like airplanes, telephones, and mechanized weapons. Today, there is no longer a consensus that free trade will bring countries closer together and forestall future wars. And the Covid-19 pandemic revealed the dangers of reliance on China for medical supplies. Trump’s threats to slap high tariffs on China and other countries also raise the specter of greater conflict.

...

On the opposing side is an isolationist wing reflected in the public musings of Trump’s eldest son, Don Jr., who tweeted on November 17 about the Biden administration’s decision to provide long-range missiles to Ukraine:

The Military Industrial Complex seems to want to make sure they get World War 3 going before my father has a chance to create peace and save lives. Gotta lock in those $Trillions. Life be damned!!! Imbeciles!

Trump’s vice president J.D. Vance, and his advisers, including Tucker Carlson to Tulsi Gabbard, also believe U.S. military overreach led to catastrophic U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and needless Western provocations of Putin that sparked his invasion of Ukraine. They argue that stepping back, rather than expanding, is the key to global peace.

Some Trump confidantes told The Free Press they’ve been studying U.S. policies that led up to the past two world worlds as guidance for today. They have concluded that Washington was too lenient on Hitler’s Germany leading into World War II, but too committed to European allies in the early 1900s ahead of World War I. And they believe Trump will need to strike a balance between these two postures.

Is World War III Already Here?

The ‘Axis of Upheaval’ is on the march—and the U.S. must figure out how to respond.

By Jay Solomon

December 4, 2024

https://www.thefp.com/p/world-war-iii-syria-israel-south-korea-ukrains

If it feels like the world is on fire right now, that’s because it is. From Ukraine to Syria to the Korean Peninsula, a widening array of conflicts is raising questions among defense experts: Is it 1914 again? 1939? Has World War III already started and we’re just now figuring it out?

For retired Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, who served as Donald Trump’s second national security adviser from 2017–2018, the answer is clear.

That won’t be easy. Consider the facts:

In Ukraine, thousands of North Korean soldiers have recently joined Russian ground troops to bolster President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of the country. Meanwhile, Russia has opened up a new front in the war by entering the northeast Kharkiv region, as it continues to assault Ukraine’s cities and block its ports.
A U.S.-brokered ceasefire in Lebanon that forced terror group Hezbollah to retreat from Israel’s northern border is showing signs of unraveling. Meanwhile, the Jewish state is still fighting a war in the Gaza Strip, where around 60 Israeli and U.S. hostages remain. And last month, Israel’s air force destroyed much of Iran’s air defense systems, leaving Tehran’s nuclear facilities exposed to future attacks.
Rebels in Syria have recently seized key areas of the country that had been controlled for years by dictator Bashar al-Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. Now that these insurgents have taken Aleppo, they are vowing to march on Damascus.
In the Baltic Sea, investigators suspect a Chinese ship of sabotaging critical underwater data cables that linked NATO states. Concerns about CCP aggression are mounting amid an emerging consensus in Washington that China would defeat the U.S. in a Pacific war, largely due to Beijing’s naval superiority.
And on Tuesday, South Korea’s president briefly declared martial law, alleging he needed to fend off a North Korean–backed coup led by the opposition party. Massive protests caused him to back down, and he is now facing impeachment proceedings.

As Trump prepares to enter office next month, his primary foreign policy task should be to prevent an actual full-blown World War III, sources told The Free Press—or to stop it from metastasizing if it’s already here.

To do this, the president-elect will have to fortify alliances with NATO, South Korea, and Japan—partnerships Trump has already shown he’s skeptical of. And he will need to stare down a number of American adversaries, including Putin, Chinese president Xi Jinping, and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un—a despot for whom Trump has expressed both scorn and admiration.

Police guard the National Assembly building in Seoul, South Korea, on December 4, 2024. (Jintak Han via Getty Images)

At the same time, Trump benefits from his willingness to break from past U.S. policies and institutions that have helped foment these current conflicts. This includes a defense industry that doesn’t produce the right weapons to compete with China or enough munitions to arm Ukraine. Defense strategists in previous U.S. administrations have been blind to the Axis of Aggressors’ moves to expand their global power, sources told me—placing too much faith in global institutions, such as the United Nations, that were incapable of checking them.

Trump, with his nontraditional advisers such as Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, could potentially revolutionize the way the U.S. builds and projects power, sources told me. SpaceX CEO Musk, in particular, could marry America’s military establishment with Silicon Valley’s start-up culture to produce, at scale, the types of smart airplanes, drones, and submarines needed to deter Washington’s enemies, they said.

But Trump’s desire to shake up Washington and dismantle many of its national security institutions comes with enormous risk. The disruption of the Pentagon, State Department, and FBI could make the U.S. and its allies more vulnerable if these institutions become inoperable or less efficient, current and former officials told The Free Press.

“What he’s gonna need is some agenda to bring the world back together after he pulls things apart,” said David Asher, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, who oversaw U.S. government operations against Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran in the George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations.

The threat of a widening global conflict is being driven by factors reminiscent of events before the start of World War I, sources told me. This includes the breakdown in alliances and trading systems and the arrival of disruptive technologies like airplanes, telephones, and mechanized weapons. Today, there is no longer a consensus that free trade will bring countries closer together and forestall future wars. And the Covid-19 pandemic revealed the dangers of reliance on China for medical supplies. Trump’s threats to slap high tariffs on China and other countries also raise the specter of greater conflict.

“What you learn when you study economic history is that long cycles do end and when they do, they end with war,” said Asher, who’s worked on Wall Street and said he has recently briefed financial institutions on the threat of a global conflict.

A rocket launcher fires against Syrian regime forces in Hama, Syria, on December 4, 2024. (Bakr Al Kassem via Getty Images)

Both McMaster and Zelikow said that the Syrian civil war that started nearly 15 years ago should have been a major wake-up call to the U.S., Europe, and NATO. The Obama administration tried to oust al-Assad through diplomacy and talks that included Russia and Iran, the strongman’s primary patrons. But then the U.S. and Europe were blindsided in 2015 when Moscow and Tehran propped up al-Assad with both air and ground troops.

“We started talking about great power rivalry and all of that, but we didn’t really do anything to arrest these trends,” said Zelikow, who’s now a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

This Syrian playbook can now be seen in Ukraine. Iran, North Korea, and China have all been supplying weaponry or technologies to Russia, while Iranian-backed Houthi fighters are now reported to be on the Ukrainian battlefield alongside North Korean troops.

The war in the Middle East, sparked by Hamas’s invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, has also attracted this broader axis. The Houthis, in support of Hamas, have been attacking international ships in a critical transit strait of the Red Sea. And they’ve been getting guidance from both Tehran and Moscow, according to current and former U.S. officials.

On the north side of the strait, an Iranian general is “directing the Houthis using Russian intelligence,” McMaster told The Free Press. On the south side, “you have an Iranian surveillance ship. And you have a Chinese [naval] port, you know? I mean, that’s not by mistake.”

How will the Trump administration confront this emboldened axis? A significant divide among foreign policy strategists may prove difficult to bridge. In one corner are hawks and traditional Republican conservatives—such as incoming National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio, and UN Ambassador designee Elise Stefanik—who have called for a muscular defense of Pax Americana. They’re expected to press Trump to continue arming Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, and even amp up our military support to preserve the Western order.

A Ukrainian soldier fires a machine gun at Russian drones on November 29, 2024, in Chernihiv Oblast, Ukraine. (Maksym Kishka via Getty Images)

“I think you have to learn the lessons of both wars,” Peter Thiel, the tech investor and close Trump ally, told The Free Press last month. “You can’t have excessive appeasement, and you also can’t go sleepwalking into Armageddon. In a way, they’re opposite lessons.”

Jay Solomon is an investigative reporter for The Free Press and author of The Iran Wars. Follow him on X at @FPJaySolomon and read his piece, “Inside the Battle over Trump’s Foreign Policy.”

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2. Americans favor more international engagement, military spending: survey

Some very interesting data. Listen to the American people.

Americans favor more international engagement, military spending: survey

The 2024 Reagan National Defense Survey found optimism in the wake of Trump’s reelection.

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

December 5, 2024 12:05 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers | December 5, 2024 12:05 AM ET

Americans are feeling more confident in the U.S. military than they have in years, with record-high support for U.S. leadership abroad and increasing defense spending, according to results released Thursday from the annual Reagan National Defense Survey from the Ronald Reagan Institute.

At the same time, support for sending weapons to foreign partners is down, researchers found after surveying a bipartisan group of more than 2,500 U.S. citizens who answered questions from Nov. 8 to 14, in the days immediately following Donald Trump’s re-election.

“Fifty percent of Americans overall—61 percent of Trump voters—they prefer more of an engaged, internationalist American leadership approach on the international stage,” Rachel Hoff, the institute’s policy director, told reporters Tuesday.

Both figures are all-time highs in the survey’s six years. Time will tell how this desire for leadership squares with President-elect Trump’s more transactional, “America-first” foreign-policy style.

Along those same lines, respondents favored a bump in defense spending, as well as continued U.S. military basing around the world.

Seventy-nine percent said that they strongly or somewhat supported an increase in spending, the highest level ever recorded by the survey, and up from a historic low of 71 percent from the institute’s summer 2023 polling.

That is on top of Americans’ already inflated sense of how much money the U.S. pours into the Pentagon’s budget, according to the survey results, which in reality is around 13 percent of the federal budget.

“Now, Americans overestimate the amount that we are currently spending on the military, and so the fact that there's an appetite for even more defense spending when Americans already … believe we spend a quarter or even half of the federal budget on defense … really puts a kind of a finer point on the desire for increased military spending,” Hoff said.

Results were less enthusiastic for continued spending when it comes to sending weapons to allies. Forty-three percent supported foreign spending, down 5 percent from last year.

Within that group, 54 percent support sending weapons to Israel and 55 percent support sending weapons to Ukraine, both slightly down from previous surveys.

But respondents were more confident than they’ve been in years that spending will go to good use, according to the results.

Fifty-one percent said they have a great deal of confidence in the military, with another 31 percent stating they have at least some. That’s up from a historic low of 45 percent high confidence after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in late 2021, but not nearly rebounded from the 70 percent rate when the survey began in 2018.

“One thing we did see during those years of decline, and I think this gets at some of the initial data we're starting to see on the rebound, is that to a large degree, confidence in the military does have to do with questions of politics,” Hoff said.

Support for the military fell in both parties throughout Trump’s first term, the data shows, dropping to 56 percent just after he left the White House in 2021. Republican confidence plummeted yet more during the early Biden administration, as survey responses showed that Americans of both parties were concerned about politicization of the military and its leaders.

During and after his first presidency, Trump derided the military, including his hand-picked Joint Chiefs chairman, while right-wing commentators hammered away at what they called leaders’ dangerous “wokeness.” Democrats, meanwhile, were more concerned with extremists in the ranks.

A bump can also be seen in confidence that the U.S. can fight a war against China, Hoff said.

“There's a real optimism among Trump voters about the U.S. military extending its edge in terms of superiority against China,” she said.

With that in mind, 27 percent of respondents said the U.S. should focus its forces on the Indo-Pacific region. Another 25 percent ranked the Middle East as the highest priority, while 18 percent pointed to Europe.

Trump has vowed to reinvigorate his crusade against NATO in his second term, decrying the organization as “dead” and deriding the U.S. obligation to protect its partner nations in the face of an attack.

Reagan National Defense Survey data shows 60 percent support for NATO as an alliance, with about three-quarters of respondents supporting the mandate to intervene in its defense.

The question of continued U.S. military presence abroad has stayed relatively steady since the first survey in 2018. This year, 62 percent favored permanent basing overseas, while 33 percent opposed it. Last year’s figure on the same question was split 66 percent to 28 percent.

In 2020, Trump ordered 12,000 of roughly 80,000 U.S. troops from permanent basing and rotational deployments in Germany, though it was an undertaking so large that it couldn’t get off the ground before President Joe Biden took office in early 2021, when he quickly reversed his predecessor’s decision.

That total presence now sits at around 100,000, following a surge of troops sent to support countries on NATO’s eastern front after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Trump did manage to pull 700 troops out of Somalia in his final days as president, a contingent of mostly special operations forces who helped Somalian forces fight back against al-Shabab, al-Qaida’s biggest and most well-funded affiliate.

A year later, those troops were back in place, after persistent private and public lobbying from Defense Department officials.

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers | December 5, 2024 12:05 AM ET

3. Could Trump’s pick for Pentagon No. 2 accelerate DOD’s hypersonic efforts?

Excerpts:

Numerous media outlets reported on Tuesday that President-elect Trump has said he will nominate Stephen Feinberg, co-founder of Cerberus Capital Management, to be U.S. deputy defense secretary.

Feinberg has played a role in building a variety of technology companies that work with the Pentagon and other defense contractors, and observers and watchdogs have raised concerns that Feinberg’s current role presents a serious conflict of interest.

But his background may also make him well suited to challenge the notoriously slow and difficult Defense Department acquisition process.

At Cerberus, Feinberg directed the firm's investments toward the defense sector across a range of areas, from armored vehicles to aviation services to undersea cables.

Could Trump’s pick for Pentagon No. 2 accelerate DOD’s hypersonic efforts?

Stephen Feinberg has an impressive business record and deep industry ties.

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

December 4, 2024 05:33 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

The Pentagon’s next No. 2 may be a billionaire investor with deep ties to the defense industry that suggest potential conflicts of interest but also a familiarity with the military acquisition system.

Numerous media outlets reported on Tuesday that President-elect Trump has said he will nominate Stephen Feinberg, co-founder of Cerberus Capital Management, to be U.S. deputy defense secretary.

Feinberg has played a role in building a variety of technology companies that work with the Pentagon and other defense contractors, and observers and watchdogs have raised concerns that Feinberg’s current role presents a serious conflict of interest.

But his background may also make him well suited to challenge the notoriously slow and difficult Defense Department acquisition process.

At Cerberus, Feinberg directed the firm's investments toward the defense sector across a range of areas, from armored vehicles to aviation services to undersea cables.

He has taken a particular interest in aerospace, through positions in companies like Vivace—a producer of specialty propulsion tanks—and investments in hypersonic missile testing businesses The company’s acquisition of CalSpan led to the creation of a business called North Wind, which aims to “drive the expansion and modernization of our nation’s valuable test infrastructure with a focus on hypersonics,” according to a company release from May.

The U.S. military services are also investing in advanced highly-maneuverable hypersonics, though many of those efforts have met with setbacks and delays. A GAO report from July noted, “DOD’s hypersonic weapon development efforts are not fully implementing leading practices for product development, which we have found enable leading commercial companies to deliver products quickly.”

The military also lacks testing ranges and facilities for the advanced weapons—another area in which Feinberg could have unique insight.

As a successful investor, he may be in a position to conquer bureaucratic and management-practice hurdles that have long slowed acquisition reform.

But his experience also includes possible conflicts of interest. In 2017, when Feinberg was nominated to serve on Donald Trump’s Presidential Advisory Board on Intelligence, the Project on Government Oversight noted that military logistics company DynCorp, which Cerberus acquired in 2010, posed a potential ethics problem.

“Mr. Feinberg owns a financial stake in a companies with national security-related contracts, notably DynCorp International, which could benefit from Mr. Feinberg’s recommendations and actions. Lobbying disclosures show that defense contracting is a federal legislative and policy priority for Cerberus and DynCorp. The White House can prevent foreseeable ethics scandals,” POGO noted in a letter.

Cerberus sold DynCorp off in 2020.

Additionally, a person familiar with the nomination told The Washington Post on Tuesday, “Steve’s obviously very aware of the Office of Government Ethics rules, and, of course, he went through the full assessment for his role with the intelligence advisory board. And so he knows exactly what he would need to do and will be prepared to be in full compliance with OGE rules and directions.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

4. Ukraine Opens Talks With Trump Team on Halting War With Russia

One President at a time?

Ukraine Opens Talks With Trump Team on Halting War With Russia

Top Zelensky aide arrives in Washington amid uncertainty about the president-elect’s intentions

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-to-open-talks-with-trump-team-on-halting-war-ad2194ed?mod=hp_lead_pos10

By Brett Forrest

, Vivian Salama

and Lara Seligman

Updated Dec. 4, 2024 10:23 pm ET

Andriy Yermak is a senior adviser to Ukraine’s president. Photo: Julia Kochetova/Bloomberg

WASHINGTON—Ukrainian officials are holding high-level talks with the incoming Trump administration, seeking to narrow wide differences on achieving a settlement of Kyiv’s war with Russia even before President-elect Donald Trump takes office.

A top aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met Wednesday with Keith Kellogg, Trump’s choice as special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, and Mike Waltz, the incoming national-security adviser, according to a Trump transition official and several people familiar with the discussions.

Vice president-elect JD Vance joined in the discussions.

Kellogg has signaled support for the Biden administration’s efforts to rush weapons to Ukraine, saying it will give Trump leverage with Moscow in negotiating a settlement. But the Trump team has shown little interest in offering Ukraine membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Zelensky has said he considers a vital security guarantee against future Russian aggression.

Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s closest adviser, is visiting Washington to forge relationships with Trump aides, according to people familiar with the planning. He met with the incoming White House chief of staff, Susie Wiles, in Florida earlier Wednesday. Worn down by waging the nearly three-year war against Russia, Ukraine plans to communicate its readiness for peace.

“But that needs to be a sustainable peace,” said a person familiar with Kyiv’s thinking. “An unstable, temporary peace doesn’t serve U.S. or Ukrainian interests.”

Zelensky has recently signaled Ukraine could agree to a cease-fire if Ukraine were permitted to join NATO. Kyiv would seek to win back Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia through diplomatic pressure, he said, rather than force, as he has long insisted.

The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: A Missed Opportunity

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/04/the-2022-invasion-of-ukraine-a-missed-opportunity/

by Tom Zaja

12.04.2024 at 06:01am

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by the Russian Armed Forces was an undertaking not seen in Europe since WWII. It proceeded from three directions, several axes, and created a frontline more than 1,000km long. The invasion failed to achieve most of its strategic goals, the principal of which was the capture of Kyiv and overthrow of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While much commentary has explicated the reasons for the failure of Russia’s northern incursion into Ukraine, there has been little discussion of the hypothetical alternatives that might have brought the Russians success.

The Battle of Kyiv, led by General Aleksandr Chaiko, attempted a coup de main fixed on the Ukrainian capital. The two main vectors proceeded from Gomel (Belarus) and Bryansk (Russia) toward the western and eastern outskirts of Kyiv, respectively. Russian forces from the Sumy axis joined the effort from the east.

Though succeeding with the element of surprise, Russian forces were soon hampered by unpreparedness, logistical breakdown, and poor motivation. After just 42 days, the Russians made a full retreat from northern Ukraine, ostensibly as a good-will gesture pursuant to the Istanbul Peace Initiative. President Putin would later say: “Russian troops were near Kyiv in March 2022 [however] …There was no political decision to storm the three-million-strong city; it was a coercive operation to establish peace.” Such a face-saving statement was a deflection from what was the intended goal of encircling Kyiv and placing it under siege.

In reviewing the failure of the northern incursion, various hypotheticals can only begin to speculate on what may have become of the campaign had it not been so wide-ranging and ambitious as to become overstretched. Though initially achieving a 12:1 force ratio advantage, the Russians did not anticipate strong resistance from locals and such rapid mobilization of Ukrainian conscripts. In fact, they had envisioned an invasion period of ten days, followed by an occupation lasting six months, and finally annexation in August of 2022.

Besides biting off more than could be chewed, a critical error of the northern campaign was the failure to consolidate around much easier targets in more compact tracts of land that were still of great strategic value. Specifically, had Russian forces avoided the megapolises of Kyiv and Kharkiv to instead concentrate on capturing smaller cities in the eastern Kyiv hinterland, such as Chernihiv, this could have given them a sturdy foothold and launching pad to reach the Dnieper or at least setup an intense chokepoint.

Failing to utilize Ukraine’s geography against its defensive interests is a central theme in the post-mortem of Russia’s northern incursion. In particular, the Dnieper River is an immense natural barrier that divides the country in two roughly equal parts, making it a potential liability for the defense of the eastern half. Had the Russians seized the territory to the east of Kyiv and proceeded southward toward Pereyaslav, this would have set up a scenario in which the river bridges could be destroyed – effectively stranding eastern Ukraine and hindering its ability to receive critical weaponry and supplies. The same principle was in play against the Russians at Kherson, such that they were forced to evacuate from the large territory that they controlled west of the Dnieper. The reverse scenario writ large could have left all of eastern Ukraine at the mercy of a slow but steady advance of Russian forces from both directions.

In a war of existential threat Ukraine has managed to mobilize just 1,050,000 men – a sign that its sole advantage, morale, has just about run dry. Not even Ukraine’s home-field advantage managed to inspire defenses to be constructed around Pokrovsk on time. In an attempt to shift the momentum, Ukraine has embarked on speculative and unsustainable forays that have inevitably backfired or led to the strange engagement in Kursk – fighting North Koreans for Potemkin village value. Corruption is not new to the Ukrainian military, but while Western aid has afforded this dependency, Russia’s lean war machine has experienced a dose of brutalism at all ranks and purged a number of top brass on account of incompetency. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s most notable change was to oust the highly popular and capable commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhny.

As the war now approaches its fourth year, the pace of Russian advancement on the eastern front is steady but comes at a large cost. Given that the overarching goals and long-term vision of the special military operation have evolved in concert with the political backdrop, so too may the ambit of tactics and maneuvers that the Russians are willing to employ in order to capitalize on developing weaknesses. The Ukrainians already demonstrated in Kursk that rapid and large territorial gains can be achieved in short order thanks to the element of surprise. With momentum firmly on the Russian side and Western support for Ukraine potentially waning, it’s feasible that Russian leadership may decide to go beyond the four oblasts.

Russia’s initial policy of only attacking command and control infrastructure was predicated on the notion that civilian infrastructure like railways and the power grid would be needed once Russia occupied Ukraine. It’s not clear why the course of the war and departure from this policy has exempted a few river bridges from being neutralized. Questions will also be asked about the improvident expenditure of troops to capture Bakhmut and Avdiivka by force, rather than bypassing them with an elongated frontline in which Russians enjoy a numerical advantage and eventual encirclement is possible. If a comprehensive Russian victory is the result that is reached by the end of the conflict, it will be because their command rediscovered the doctrine that Russian military history is renowned for more than any other: soldiers win battles, but logistics wins wars.

Tags: Russo-Ukrainian War

About The Author

Tom Zaja
Tom Zaja is a graduate of Macquarie University, Sydney, and a Research Fellow at the Ulster Institute for Social Research, London. He visited Russia in 2022 and Ukraine in 2024.

6. Turning West, Across the Gulf of Aden: The Houthis and al-Shabaab

Excerpts:

The systems al-Shabaab would most likely want are the systems that the Houthis have seemed least willing to deploy. We believe that a reduction of Iranian support, the constraining of supply chains for domestic drone manufacturing via sanctions, increased military pressure on manufacturing facilities, and a renewed distancing between the Houthi agenda and Iran’s, have lessened the ability of the Houthis to supply al-Shabaab with UAVs.

More broadly, the Houthis’ growing comfort in creating new alliances across regional and ideological divides mirrors some of Tehran’s previous policies of strategic support previously provided to the Houthis themselves. Whether this will in the long term foster a new network of militant groups centered around growing Houthi capabilities remains to be seen.

Turning West, Across the Gulf of Aden: The Houthis and al-Shabaab

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/05/turning-west-across-the-gulf-of-aden/

by Daniel Allen, by Marco Volpitta

12.05.2024 at 06:01am

Houthis’ own goals:

In June 2024, US intelligence claimed that the Houthis were discussing a deal that would involve weapon transfers to the al-Shabaab group. The nature of these negotiations suggested the transfer of advanced systems such as drones and surface-to-air-missiles. These would present a significant development when compared to the typical weapons (firearms, IEDs, and mortars) usually found in the Yemen-Somalia smuggling network. Considering the difference in capabilities between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, these trades could significantly strengthen al-Shabaab – though strategic considerations remain.

Illicit smuggling networks between Yemen and the Horn have been steadily growing for the last seven years, with a continuous increase in the quality and quantity of weapons smuggled. Work done by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) in 2020 showed that some of al-Shabaab’s weaponry acquired through the Yemen-Somalia network came directly through Iranian shipments meant for the Houthis. As the Institute for the Study of War notes, however, this is unlikely to be sanctioned trade, and instead a function of profit-seeking. Considering al-Shabaab’s and the Houthi’s sectarian differences this alliance is unlikely to be an ideological one, but rather a marriage of convenience against a common enemy: the United States.

What differentiates these recent agreements from those of the past is the explicitly referenced customer. Historically, weapons have flowed from Yemen to Somalia and then proliferated more broadly across the African continent. Iran has in turn profited from the illegal trade of weaponry, and the IRGC’s Quds Force has even supported “extremist groups and criminal networks” in the Horn directly through the selling of cheap Iranian oil. However, a formalized agreement such as the one being sketched in June of 2024 between the Houthis and al-Shabaab would open a new chapter of cooperation.

How much Iran might approve of the Houthis’ more independent extended smuggling networks is unclear. Iran provided al-Shabaab’s parent organization, al-Qaeda, with “sanctuary, training, weapons, and funds” throughout the early 2000s. Though we have generally conceived of the Sunni and Shia divide as diametrically opposed, the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” principle may apply. Iran’s own influence in the Horn of Africa implies they are more willing to cross over this ideological divide than previously thought. However, Tehran may not be so sanguine regarding the Houthis’ use of its transferred resources to achieve similar ends in the Horn of Africa.

To cast the Houthis as mere proxies of Iran fails to see the larger picture. The Houthis have increasingly attempted to distance their actions from their sponsors in Tehran. During the drone attack on Tel Aviv on July 19th, the Houthis insisted that “Iran had no part in the decision to attack Tel Aviv. We informed them afterward.” Brookings Institute also notes that the Houthis have at times undermined Iran’s own regional interests, such as when they declared a unilateral ceasefire with Saudi Arabia in 2019. The Houthis’ relationship with al-Shabaab might simply be another facet of this same pattern. An exclusive agent-receptor understanding of the Houthis’ relationship with Iran would be limiting and increasingly inaccurate; it is nonetheless important to note real material constraints binding the Houthis to Tehran.

What can the Houthis deliver?

By and large, the Houthis rely on Iran for many of its most sophisticated weaponry. As a result, the Houthi’s ability to transfer its weapons to al-Shabaab will likely be intertwined with its own domestic manufacturing capability or Iranian material assurances. Following Israel’s most recent strikes in Iran, questions have been raised over Iran’s ability to continue producing its solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Whatever missiles it can still produce might not be transferred toward the Houthis given Iran’s growing concerns over waning regional deterrence and a newly perceived vulnerability. The decreasing rate of Houthi strikes within the Red Sea since October might be a symptom of Iran’s diminishing material support for the group.

Previous escalations between Iran and Israel, such as those witnessed in April, had been met by an intensification of attacks on ships by the Houthis. All systems including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones were used at an increased clip between April and June.

Despite more recent direct attacks between Iran and Israel in September and October, the fall saw an overall diminishing of attacks that continued to steadily decline between August and November. This suggests that Tehran’s foreign policy calculus has changed and may suggest weakening support for the Houthis. Alternatively, this decrease in strikes might also represent a further decoupling between the Houthis’ and Tehran’s agenda. Iran’s previous feelings of relative comfort might have allowed it more freedom in its distribution of resources to more independent groups, but renewed vulnerability to Israeli strikes might require a foreign policy that is more closely aligned with Tehran’s core goals. What systems the Houthis have been using since September might better indicate their own production capacity, as well as their strategic rationale.

Recent attacks have been characterized by the increasing use of missile systems compared to drones, with drones increasingly being used as single systems instead of swarms. Between May and August, the average number of drones in each attack fluctuated between 2.5 and 2.9; in September and October, this number dropped to 1.2 and 2.0 respectively. Any value of above 3 is in a month with very few drone-based attacks; therefore, we believe the difference between the summer and fall represents a meaningful drop.

This suggests that the Houthis’ supply of drones is considerably more constrained when compared to the summer. We propose that the number of drones used between May and July may have been supplemented by Iranian shipments. Once these ceased due to Iran’s increasing domestic concerns, the number of drones launched more closely resembled Yemen’s domestic manufacturing capabilities. According to the US Treasury Department, the Houthis cooperate with Chinese-based companies for critical components required in the manufacturing of its drone programs which are in turn smuggled through Oman. A report by Conflict Armament Research has also shown a longer trend of growing Houthi autonomy in the construction of its UAVs. The decrease in attacks might not just represent its production capability but the Houthis’ own strategic calculations of decoupling from Tehran’s agenda. Still, the complexity of the drone manufacturing process should not be understated; even very simple drones rely on a complex web of often cutting-edge Western components, and we believe that material concerns outweigh strategic ones in this case.

While the Houthis continue to report manufacturing their own weapons systems, doubts have been cast. These critiques are generally directed at its advanced technologies such as the Hatem and Palestine-2 missiles which would likely have to be produced and delivered by Iran. Most ballistic missiles in the Houthis’ arsenal use comparatively simpler systems. The Houthis have also proven an interest in more diversified supply chains, having recently pursued ties with Russia to acquire anti-ship missiles. It should also be noted that the Houthis are likely in possession of independent motor construction capacity. Given the success of groups such as Hamas in the construction of basic ballistic systems under extraneous conditions, it is likely that the Houthis are able to form some domestic production. How scalable it is, and which systems this domestic production is used for, however, are both unknown.

Al-Shabaab’s Shopping List:

Though the Houthis might be able to produce ballistic missiles, there exist several strategic hurdles that make their transfer to al-Shabaab unlikely. Associated lead time, training, and costs, would render such a transfer vulnerable to adversarial strikes. Furthermore, the Houthis will likely have reservations about how effectively these systems would be employed by al-Shabaab. Considering the extensive infrastructure required to effectively deploy these assets, and al-Shabaab’s shaky hold on the northern Somali territory where strikes against American assets would be most feasible, the missile systems might be rendered a liability above all else.

Less complex systems such as the domestically produced Waid and Qasef drones might present a more attractive option. However, the environment that the Houthis and al-Shabaab find themselves in today is fundamentally different from the environment in which they were negotiating in June. The continuing use of these drones indicates that they still possess at least some ability to procure systems that al-Shabaab wants, but whether they consider the transfer of these systems to be worthwhile will depend on what al-Shabaab is willing to offer in return. This price will likely be steeper today than it would have been in June.

Conclusion:

The systems al-Shabaab would most likely want are the systems that the Houthis have seemed least willing to deploy. We believe that a reduction of Iranian support, the constraining of supply chains for domestic drone manufacturing via sanctions, increased military pressure on manufacturing facilities, and a renewed distancing between the Houthi agenda and Iran’s, have lessened the ability of the Houthis to supply al-Shabaab with UAVs.

More broadly, the Houthis’ growing comfort in creating new alliances across regional and ideological divides mirrors some of Tehran’s previous policies of strategic support previously provided to the Houthis themselves. Whether this will in the long term foster a new network of militant groups centered around growing Houthi capabilities remains to be seen.

Tags: drone warfare, drones, Houthi, proxy strategy, Red Sea

About The Authors

Daniel Allen
Daniel Allen is in his final semester at Middlebury College studying Political Science and Cultural Anthropology. He is a research assistant at the Monterey Institute for International Studies where he works on nonproliferation and arms control through open-source intelligence with a focus on the Middle East. His work has been cited by POLITICO, 38North, and RUSI.
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Marco Volpitta
Marco Volpitta is in his last semester at Middlebury College, where he is studying biochemistry and international politics and economics. His research interests focus on military supply chains and defense economics. In his free time he can be found enjoying the local wilderness in Vermont or flying above the Champlain Valley.
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7. Military Planners Fear China Threat to Undersea Cables

Excerpt:

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, disruptions to undersea cables in the Asia-Pacific are likely to increase as internet demand continues to see high demand growth alongside rising geopolitical competition and persistent (potentially weaponized) delays in granting permits for repair vessels to enter the region’s contested and congested waters. While many Asia-Pacific maritime states are beginning to take seriously the prospect of Chinese clandestine sabotage against undersea cables providing internet connectivity with the rest of the world, only one country has taken firm steps in building up its undersea military capability to proactively police and protect its cable network. Singapore recently commissioned two German-built advanced submarines in September 2024 with two more being worked up for commissioning into service. The addition of these new boats significantly improves Singapore’s ability not just to protect its maritime trade links but also to range farther into the South China Sea to patrol its dense network of undersea cables, many of which route through the island-state as a key data node in the global data network.

Military Planners Fear China Threat to Undersea Cables

Were Baltic incidents a rehearsal for action against Taiwan’s undersea communications?

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/military-planners-china-threat-undersea-cables?utm

Dec 05, 2024

∙ Paid

By: Andy Wong Ming Jun

Suspected Chinese embroilment in a mid-November Baltic undersea cable-cutting incident has set off increasingly urgent discussions behind the closed doors of multiple defense ministries in the Asia-Pacific region. The threat that China could deliberately damage or destroy undersea fiber-optic cables in the South China Sea or Western Pacific as a prelude to a potential invasion of Taiwan is now considered a clear and present danger, a far cry from less than a decade ago when undersea communications infrastructure was deemed to be protected by their deep-sea nature as well as a “common good” mentality during an era of unfettered globalization and the dawn of the internet age.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis’s Twitter posted that “If I had a nickel for every time a Chinese ship was dragging its anchor on the bottom of the Baltic Sea in the vicinity of important cables, I would have two nickels, which isn’t much, but it’s weird that it happened twice,” laying bare China’s involvement in what is increasingly recognized as a taboo-breaking expansion of “grey-zone/hybrid warfare” tactics in the global maritime commons. The latest incident involving a Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3, which allegedly cut two subsea communications cables connecting four NATO countries (Germany, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden) across the Baltic Sea comes just over a year after an eerily similar incident in the same region, with China admitting the involvement of one of its registered ships the New Polar Bear in the damaging of two subsea data cables and a gas pipeline.

Undersea fiber-optic cables are but the latest iteration of a technology that has existed since the 19^th century with the laying of the first transoceanic submarine telegraph cable in 1866. From the outset, such continent-connecting underwater communications infrastructure was recognized and accorded significant collective importance by the international community to the extent that they were allowed protection by courtesy even beyond strict territorial limits. Despite their critical importance to global connectivity and serving as the bedrock of the modern international economic system, undersea cables are effectively still the “orphans of international law” according to Robert C. Beckman, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law. This is due more than anything else today to the impossibility of ever defining the concept of a “neutral cable” given the manner of modern undersea cable usage, with layers of interconnectivity, fragmented and opaque ownership jurisdictions, and most importantly the dual-use nature of these cables for both civilian/commercial and military traffic, rendering them legitimate war targets for sabotage or destruction.

China is hardly the first major power in the Asia-Pacific to be viewed with suspicion when it comes to conducting clandestine underwater hostile actions with plausible deniability to further its own interests. During the Cold War, the US pulled off a major espionage coup with Operation Ivy Bells in which wiretaps were placed on a Soviet undersea communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk used for communications between the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s mainland headquarters at Vladivostok with one of its major naval bases at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

However, the perception of China’s threat towards undersea communications cables in the waters of the Western Pacific Ocean and South China Sea is of a magnitude much more serious than that towards potential American espionage efforts. Among many politicians and naval leaders, China is perceived as displaying no interest in abiding by international maritime law, duplicitous in its rhetoric, refusing to engage with regional maritime countries over longstanding territorial disputes beyond bilateral “divide and conquer” tactics, and increasingly pushing the envelope for what is deemed permissible or tolerable in terms of “grey-zone” militarization or bullying tactics on the high seas.

For these politicians and naval leaders, American espionage via tapping undersea cables is something that can be lived with, but Chinese willingness to outright damage or cut undersea cables with Chinese-registered commercial vessels providing plausible deniability cover whenever it pleases is a prospect that is progressively real and intolerable. In February 2019, Asia Sentinel quoted Tzeng Yi-suo of the Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research that “The likelihood of the PRC damaging or corrupting submarine cables and related infrastructure that connect Taiwan to the outside world should not be underestimated nor overlooked by the international community.” In 2021, Indonesia discovered underwater drones equipped with cameras and sensors strongly suspected of being operated by remote control from Chinese ships plying waters in the Natuna area.

Some naval officers have privately expressed concerns that China could even use long-range underwater drones to conduct such sabotage operations, given that such military drones have been discovered far from the Chinese mainland. Should this scenario come to pass, the burden of proof in establishing intentional Chinese involvement in causing such damage and disruption to undersea cables in the region would become ever more impossibly high.

In October, the Washington Post reported that due to China’s increasingly truculent pressing of its claims over the South China Sea and all maritime traffic passing through it, repair and construction of undersea cables has been severely hampered. The report also described a previously undisclosed show of force by the Chinese with its heavily militarized coast guard that occurred in April in which a Chinese Coast Guard vessel entered Vietnam’s offshore 200-mile exclusive economic zone to confront and intimidate a private subsea cable ship conducting repairs under escort from a Vietnamese Navy ship.

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, disruptions to undersea cables in the Asia-Pacific are likely to increase as internet demand continues to see high demand growth alongside rising geopolitical competition and persistent (potentially weaponized) delays in granting permits for repair vessels to enter the region’s contested and congested waters. While many Asia-Pacific maritime states are beginning to take seriously the prospect of Chinese clandestine sabotage against undersea cables providing internet connectivity with the rest of the world, only one country has taken firm steps in building up its undersea military capability to proactively police and protect its cable network. Singapore recently commissioned two German-built advanced submarines in September 2024 with two more being worked up for commissioning into service. The addition of these new boats significantly improves Singapore’s ability not just to protect its maritime trade links but also to range farther into the South China Sea to patrol its dense network of undersea cables, many of which route through the island-state as a key data node in the global data network.

Andy Wong Ming Jun holds a Master’s in International Security from the University of Bath and specializes in defense issues

8. How Trump Is Rethinking Economic Power

Excerpts:

The dollar became the preferred vehicle for foreigners to trade and invest across borders because of the size, depth and stability of the U.S. economy and financial system. Network effects—the tendency to use the dollar because everyone else does—makes it hard for a competitor to get traction.

Reserve status enables the U.S. to borrow more, and at lower interest rates, than otherwise. It means a lot of international business flows through financial channels over which the U.S. has jurisdiction. The U.S. can cripple a foreign actor by cutting off their access to this system.

And it exercises that power with growing frequency. Almost every day the U.S. adds another entity to its sanctions list for criminal activity, terrorism, human-rights violations or association with a sanctioned regime. The U.S. currently has more than 17,000 designated sanctions targets.

But some worry the volume of sanctions could make them self-defeating. “The more that we use sanctions, we run the risk of degrading the use of the dollar as a national security tool,” said Kimberly Donovan, who formerly served in the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and is now at the Atlantic Council.

How Trump Is Rethinking Economic Power

His defense of the dollar reflects a belief that tariffs are better than sanctions

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trump-international-economic-policy-dollar-tariffs-b5076f65?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Greg Ip

Dec. 5, 2024 5:30 am ET

Donald Trump thinks tariffs are a more flexible way of achieving American foreign policy goals. Photo: Rebecca Noble/Getty Images

In September, Donald Trump made an impassioned defense of the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency: “If we lost the dollar as the world currency, I think that would be the equivalent of losing a war.”

That status is so important to Trump that this past weekend he threatened to impose tariffs of 100% on the Brics—a group of emerging economies led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—if they created an alternative to the dollar.

The warning might be a bit premature; a Brics currency has yet to go beyond the discussion stage.

Yet Trump’s defense of the dollar is a window into how he thinks the U.S. should exercise its economic power. That power, he argues, has been undercut by its excessive use of financial sanctions that encourage other countries to avoid using the dollar. He thinks tariffs are a more flexible, less harmful way of achieving American foreign policy goals.

The theory remains untested. Yet Trump’s approach merits serious study, because the current approach is hardly a shining success. Sanctions haven’t yet forced Russia to leave Ukraine, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to cede power, or Iran to give up its nuclear program.

The dollar became the preferred vehicle for foreigners to trade and invest across borders because of the size, depth and stability of the U.S. economy and financial system. Network effects—the tendency to use the dollar because everyone else does—makes it hard for a competitor to get traction.

Reserve status enables the U.S. to borrow more, and at lower interest rates, than otherwise. It means a lot of international business flows through financial channels over which the U.S. has jurisdiction. The U.S. can cripple a foreign actor by cutting off their access to this system.

And it exercises that power with growing frequency. Almost every day the U.S. adds another entity to its sanctions list for criminal activity, terrorism, human-rights violations or association with a sanctioned regime. The U.S. currently has more than 17,000 designated sanctions targets.

But some worry the volume of sanctions could make them self-defeating. “The more that we use sanctions, we run the risk of degrading the use of the dollar as a national security tool,” said Kimberly Donovan, who formerly served in the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and is now at the Atlantic Council.

In his September speech Trump attacked the ubiquity of sanctions: “Ultimately, it kills your dollar and it kills everything the dollar represents,” he said. “I want to use sanctions as little as possible.” He said he would hit any country that ditched the dollar with tariffs.

China’s President Xi Jinping and Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva meeting in Brasilia last month. Photo: adriano machado/Reuters

His weekend threat to do just that might be linked to the interest of some Brics leaders—in particular Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—in creating an alternative to the dollar. But the South African government said this week the Brics aren’t planning a new currency.

“It’s hot air,” said Mark Sobel, a former Treasury official. “The unity isn’t there, the economic heft isn’t there, and the Brics are way too divided by geopolitical tensions.”

The dollar still accounts for 58% of global foreign exchange reserves, 54% of export invoicing, and 88% of foreign exchange transactions, according to the Atlantic Council.

But other countries, especially the Brics, have stepped up efforts to break the dollar’s dominance. Those efforts gathered force after the U.S. and European Union froze the Russian central bank’s foreign assets and barred several Russian banks from using Swift, the Belgium-based messaging system banks use to settle international payments, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since then, Russia and China have boosted usage of their own, alternative, payment systems. Brics countries are issuing more debt to foreigners in their own currencies. Several emerging market central banks are working on a platform to settle payments in their digital currencies.

The surging price of gold and bitcoin may reflect the search for dollar alternatives. (Trump embraces the cryptocurrency, and on Wednesday night bitcoin soared past $100,000 for the first time). Central banks have bought more gold since 2022 than in the prior six years combined, according to the World Gold Council.

Tariffs are less likely than sanctions to discourage use of the dollar. They can be calibrated, whereas sanctions are usually all or nothing. Western nations imposed sanctions barring the purchase, transport or insurance of Russian oil above a price cap. But the cap has been “very difficult to enforce,” Donovan said. “Tariffs probably would have been a more strategic and sophisticated approach.”

Tariffs can be used against friendly nations while sanctions generally cannot. Trump has threatened tariffs against Mexico and Canada over fentanyl and illegal immigration. In an October opinion column, hedge-fund manager Scott Bessent, now Trump’s nominee to be Treasury secretary, described tariffs as a useful tool for “getting allies to spend more on their own defense, opening foreign markets to U.S. exports, securing cooperation on ending illegal immigration and interdicting fentanyl trafficking, or deterring military aggression.”

But tariffs have disadvantages. Like sanctions, if overused, they can drive down trade so much the U.S. has no leverage left. Tariffs can hurt the U.S., not just the target, by raising prices, disrupting production and inviting retaliation—which may raise doubts about whether the U.S. would really act.

A different complication is that maintaining the dollar’s reserve status requires the U.S. to supply the rest of the world with dollar-based assets such as bonds. In other words, it must be a net borrower, which means it has to run a current-account deficit (the broadest measure of trade, covering goods, services and income).

Trump wants to reduce the trade deficit, which he blames on other countries, among other things, keeping their currencies low against the dollar. In the 1980s, a joint effort by advanced countries to drive down the dollar did for a time shrink the deficit.

So long as the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, some trade deficit might be the unavoidable trade-off.

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com

9. Beijing Has Picked Off Taiwan’s Remaining Allies. Taiwan Is Fighting Back.

Strategic competition.

Excerpts:

If China managed to gain dominance over the Pacific, that would impede U.S. forces from reaching Taiwan for support in a conflict and “become a stronghold for China to attack the United States,” said Chang Jung-ming, a research fellow at Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a Taipei-based think tank backed by Taiwan’s military.

China’s Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan but considers the island part of its territory and has vowed to eventually bring it under its control—by force if necessary. Before Lai’s trip began, China’s military vowed to “resolutely crush any ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists,” a label that China has applied to the Taiwanese president. Taiwanese security officials also warned of China possibly conducting military drills after his return.

Notably, Lai’s trip included stopovers in Hawaii and the U.S. territory of Guam. Those two transits, which come during a presidential transition in Washington, have prompted protests from Beijing, which opposes any links between Washington and Taipei.

Beijing Has Picked Off Taiwan’s Remaining Allies. Taiwan Is Fighting Back.

In Guam, Lai Ching-te talks with House Speaker Mike Johnson while en route to Palau, the last of Taiwan’s three Pacific-nation allies

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/beijing-has-picked-off-taiwans-remaining-allies-taiwan-is-fighting-back-f392915a?mod=latest_headlines

By Joyu Wang

and

Dec. 5, 2024 5:43 am ET

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te in Majuro in the Marshall Islands on Tuesday. Photo: handout/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

PALAU—For Taiwan, an island democracy isolated and intimidated by its far larger rival regime in Beijing, a key to its fight for security and recognition lies in a handful of even smaller island democracies in the Pacific.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has been traveling across the region this week to shore up support from those countries—three of Taipei’s dozen remaining official allies—while stopping in Taiwan’s biggest, albeit unofficial, ally, the U.S.

On Thursday, the Taiwanese president arrived in Palau, the final stop of his first overseas trip since taking office this year. Lai’s seven-day long trip saw him making stops in the three Pacific nations with which Taiwan maintains formal diplomatic ties—the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, in addition to Palau.

The Pacific is a crucial diplomatic front for Taiwan, where it is hoping to prevent Beijing from poaching more of its diplomatic allies. The tiny island nations, analysts say, could also play a strategic role in a potential Taiwan conflict involving the U.S. and China.

A Taiwanese coast guard ship patrols near the maritime boundary between Taiwan and China. Photo: daniel ceng/Shutterstock

If China managed to gain dominance over the Pacific, that would impede U.S. forces from reaching Taiwan for support in a conflict and “become a stronghold for China to attack the United States,” said Chang Jung-ming, a research fellow at Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a Taipei-based think tank backed by Taiwan’s military.

China’s Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan but considers the island part of its territory and has vowed to eventually bring it under its control—by force if necessary. Before Lai’s trip began, China’s military vowed to “resolutely crush any ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists,” a label that China has applied to the Taiwanese president. Taiwanese security officials also warned of China possibly conducting military drills after his return.

Notably, Lai’s trip included stopovers in Hawaii and the U.S. territory of Guam. Those two transits, which come during a presidential transition in Washington, have prompted protests from Beijing, which opposes any links between Washington and Taipei.

On Thursday, Lai—during a brief stopover in Guam—held phone and video calls with members of Congress, including House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.), House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D., NY) and Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.), the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

During their phone call, Johnson reassured Lai that supporting Taiwan, and facing up to challenges from China, has bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, according to Karen Kuo, Lai’s spokeswoman.

Taiwan’s President William Lai, center, with the Marshall Islands’ President Hilda Heine and the speaker of the Marshallese legislature, Brenson Wase. Photo: taiwan presidential office hando/Shutterstock

China has been working hard to woo Taiwan’s remaining official allies, seeking to undermine the island’s international prestige and limit its room to maneuver.

“That kind of trend is alarming, certainly for Taiwan and also for the United States,” said Eric Harwit, an Asian studies professor at the University of Hawaii and adjunct senior fellow at the Honolulu-based East-West Center think tank. “We see China using their economic power to win over those island states and also potentially expand their military influence in the region.”

Nauru, a tiny Pacific island nation of 12,000 people, severed its relationship with Taiwan in January, just as Taiwanese voters elected Lai. Two months later, Nauru’s president traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In 2019, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, two nations in the Pacific, broke off their respective ties with Taipei within a week of one another.

Caught in the crossfire is Palau, a nation of roughly 18,000 people and more than 500 islands, a prime target in Beijing’s quest to isolate Taiwan. Palau’s location in the so-called second-island chain, which extends south from Japan through Guam to New Guinea, makes it a potential chokepoint in any regional conflict.

While in Palau, Lai delivered a speech at its legislature and plans to open a government building complex that Taiwan helped to build. On Friday, Taiwan and Palau are set to conduct a joint maritime rescue drill, with Taiwan’s coast guard sending one of its newest domestically-made vessels from its southern port of Kaohsiung, in a possible rehearsal for showdowns with Chinese coast guard vessels in disputed regional waters.

Palau, the site of fierce combat between the U.S. and Japan during World War II, was administered by the U.S. after the war and gained independence in 1994. Along with the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau has a wide-ranging arrangement with the U.S. known as a compact. Under such an arrangement, the U.S. provides those countries with a combined $7.1 billion in aid over the next two decades.

As part of the compact, which was renewed this year, the U.S. provides for the islands’ defense. U.S. Marines completed restoration of a World War II-era Japanese airstrip on Palau’s island of Peleliu in June, part of an effort to upgrade airfields across the region for use in a conflict. The U.S. is also building an advanced radar facility on Palau to increase early-warning capacity.

Pulau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr. was re-elected in November. Photo: david dee delgado/Reuters

In 2017, with Taiwanese voters having elected a government skeptical of China a year earlier, Beijing began squeezing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies. Beijing blocked Chinese tour companies from arranging group travel to Palau. Tourists from mainland China, who had accounted for about half of all visitors to Palau, plummeted.

The loss of Chinese visitors, followed by the Covid-19 pandemic, led to a painful contraction in the local economy. But Palau has maintained its Taiwan ties. Local officials said they appreciated the support of a like-minded democracy, and sought to build up tourism from Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the U.S.

Still, pressure from Beijing has continued. Palau was hit by a cyberattack targeting government records in March. Local officials said the attackers were believed to have links to China.

President Surangel Whipps Jr., who was re-elected in November, expressed concerns during the campaign about Chinese efforts to influence the vote. Recently, he has complained about Chinese survey ships operating in Palau’s exclusive economic zone.

For countries weighing a shift in recognition to Beijing, the possibility of aid and investment beckons. After Xi made the first visit by a Chinese leader to Fiji in 2014, China’s aid to the Pacific region soared. While that assistance declined after 2016, it has increased again in recent years, reaching $256 million in 2022, according to research by the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank.

China has continued to emphasize its appeal to Pacific island nations. Last week, Xi hosted the prime minister of Samoa, one of Beijing’s most longstanding allies in the region. Xi told Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa that China would “tap the potential of economy, trade, investment, agriculture and fisheries to achieve common development.”

To counter China’s efforts, the Taiwanese president has rolled out new offers during his trip in hopes of keeping allies on side.

In the Marshall Islands, Lai attended the opening of an artificial intelligence-powered medical center where Taiwan has helped train surgeons. He also told a banquet that he would boost a scholarship fund.

“We’re both ocean nations, people of the sea, sharing Austronesian culture. We’re one big family, united by our love for democracy and freedom,” Lai said.

While in Tuvalu, Taiwanese officials signed a memorandum pledging to help build an undersea cable for the country and underwrite 10 years of operational costs.

Even so, analysts said Taiwan’s approach may not be effective in the long run, since China can offer far more financial assistance.

“The trend is really going against them,” said Harwit of the University of Hawaii, referring to Taiwan. “Still, maybe there is enough goodwill from those countries that they don’t, for example, allow China military influence in the region.”

Write to Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com and Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com

10. Syria’s Civil War Puts Israel in a Bind: ‘Devil We Know’ or Islamist Rebels

Syria’s Civil War Puts Israel in a Bind: ‘Devil We Know’ or Islamist Rebels

Middle East watchers say the best hope for Israel is that two of its enemies weaken but don’t destroy each other

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-israel-middle-east-conflicts-a3348d43?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Carrie Keller-Lynn

Updated Dec. 5, 2024 12:18 am ET

An antigovernment fighter tears down a poster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo. Photo: mohammed al-rifai/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

TEL AVIV—The surprising advance by opposition forces in Syria’s civil war poses a conundrum for Israel and the West: Victory by either side presents risks.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is allied with Israel’s enemy, Iran. The resurgence of the war threatens to invigorate that relationship, undermining Israel’s effort to weaken Iran’s web of allied countries and militias throughout the region.

The rebel group now challenging Assad’s rule, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that Israel sees as dangerous to its interests.

“The best option for Israel now is a mutual weakening of those forces, not a decisive victory of any of them,” said Harel Chorev, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University.

Rebel forces from HTS are holding Aleppo after a lightning offensive to reclaim Syria’s second city late last month, a move that exploited the distraction among Assad’s allies—Iran, Russia and Hezbollah—while they engage in other conflicts.

Forces at work in Syria

Areas under Turkish control

TURKEY

Aleppo

Raqqa

Idlib

Latakia

Deir ez-Zor

Hama

Tartus

IRAQ

Homs

SYRIA

Abu Kamal

Khmeimim Air Base

(Russian base)

Med. Sea

U.S. declared exclusion zone

Damascus

LEBANON

al-Tanf

(U.S. base)

ISRAEL

GOLAN

HEIGHTS

JORDAN

50 miles

(Under Israeli

control)

50 km

Government and allies

(Russia, Iran)

FSA groups and Turkish troops in northern Syria

Kurds

Rebels

Note: As of Dec. 4

Source: LiveUAmap

Camille Bressange and Roque Ruiz/WSJ

In recent years, Israel has preferred “the devil we know” in Assad, over instability and insecurity created by the Islamist rebel groups, said Eyal Zisser, who follows Syria at Tel Aviv University.

Indeed, before the rebel offensive, Israel had nurtured hopes that Assad could be lured away from Iran through funding and closer ties to more Western-friendly Gulf states, according to Israeli and Arab officials. The Arab league had readmitted Syria after expelling it from the group for its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. Assad’s forces were lukewarm in support for Hezbollah in its war with Israel, permitting weapons transfers but not committing troops.

With Assad’s regime now facing its greatest challenge in years, Israel worries that those gains are at risk. The rapid rebel advance has also created fresh instability and threatens to upend the regional order. Also, U.S. officials fear that America, which has roughly 900 troops in eastern Syria, might get dragged deeper into the conflict.

For over a decade, Syria has been a crucible for a great-power contest that has drawn in an array of state actors. On Assad’s side, Iran and Russia, along with Hezbollah, have propped up the regime with weapons and fighters. Turkey supports some Syrian opposition groups, as part of its own fight against Kurdish separatists. The U.S. partners with Kurdish-led militias in Syria’s northeast in a campaign against Islamic State extremists.

Slash government spending

Cut regulations

Reduce the federal workforce

End remote work

Eliminate daylight-saving time changes

Scrutinize spending on Biden’s priorities

DOGE’s Big Ideas Include Ending Remote Work and Daylight Saving Changes

Here are six ways Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy have suggested trimming the federal government

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/doge-government-efficiency-ideas-musk-ramaswamy-3b554b97?mod=latest_headlines

By Ken Thomas

and Richard Rubin

Dec. 5, 2024 5:00 am ET

Illustration: Cam Pollack/WSJ; Getty (2), AP, EPA/Shutterstock

The Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, begins its work in earnest Thursday when Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy meet with House and Senate Republicans to discuss the incoming Trump administration’s effort to cut federal spending and regulations.

Musk, the world’s richest man and chief executive officer of Tesla and SpaceX, and Ramaswamy, a biotech entrepreneur who sought the 2024 GOP presidential nomination, have offered a range of ideas as “outside volunteers,” some granular and others sweeping, to constrain the government’s reach.

Even as an outside adviser, Musk’s role raises questions about conflicts of interest given his vast business interests. President-elect Donald Trump on Dec. 4 named Bill McGinley, White House cabinet secretary in the first Trump administration, to serve as counsel to DOGE. Trump said on social media that McGinley would work with the White House’s Office of Management and Budget “to provide advice and guidance to end the bloated Federal Bureaucracy.”

Here are some of DOGE’s top intended pursuits:

Slash government spending

Musk has said he could cut $2 trillion from the federal budget but hasn’t specified how or in what time frame. It is an audacious goal, representing about 30% of the $6.8 trillion the government spent during the fiscal year ended Sept. 30.

Any massive reductions in spending would need to be done through Congress. It would require politically challenging moves such as less military spending and reductions to Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. Those benefits are paid without an annual vote by Congress. Trump has promised not to cut Social Security or Medicare benefits.

He campaigned on abolishing the Education Department, which many members of Congress could oppose. Musk recently wrote on X, the social-media platform he owns, that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the independent financial agency established by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to protect consumers, should be eliminated.

Trump allies have said he could cut spending without Congress through “impoundment,” when a president refuses to spend money Congress has appropriated. That would be a controversial expansion of executive-branch powers, likely to be challenged in court.

Cut regulations

Musk and Ramaswamy wrote in an opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal in November that regulations are promulgated “by unelected bureaucrats—tens of thousands of them each year.” They cited two recent Supreme Court rulings that federal agencies can’t impose some regulations unless Congress specifically authorized them to do so and that federal courts shouldn’t defer to agency interpretations of the law or their own rule-making authority.

Musk and Ramaswamy have suggested they could present Trump with a list of regulations he could use executive authority to suspend and begin review processes to remove them. Legal challenges would remain. Agencies that create regulations can repeal or revise them, but not immediately. Agencies typically must provide notice of their intent, allow public comments and respond to those comments before final action.

Reduce the federal workforce

DOGE wants to shrink a workforce of more than two million federal employees, many of them civilians working for the Defense Department. An early push could involve determining the fewest federal employees needed at a particular agency. One complication is that many federal agencies already rely heavily on outside contractors. Removing federal employees could shift even more power to contractors.

The administration could embrace a proposal called Schedule F that it started toward the end of Trump’s first term but that President Biden stopped. That would reclassify some federal workers with more decision-making or policymaking authority into a category with fewer civil-service protections and make it easier for the administration to fire or remove them.

End remote work

Musk and Ramaswamy have suggested their effort will order the federal workforce to return to the office five days a week, which could lead to voluntary resignations across the workforce. A 2023 Government Accountability Office report found that 17 agencies had less than a quarter utilization of their headquarters buildings early that year. Even before the pandemic, many federal employees were eligible for remote work. DOGE could get some support for this concept from the government of Washington, D.C., which has been worried about half-empty federal buildings and their effect on the local commercial real-estate market.

Eliminate daylight-saving time changes

Both men have said the U.S. should stop changing its clocks twice a year, calling it inefficient and annoying for many Americans. The Senate passed a bill in 2022 that would make daylight-saving time permanent. The approach would mean later sunsets and darker mornings in the winter months. The House declined to vote on the legislation.

Scrutinize spending on Biden’s priorities

Musk and Ramaswamy are also focused on the Biden administration’s moves to distribute money from a $400 billion clean-energy lending program inside the Energy Department and manufacturing grants to companies such as Intel through legislation aimed at reviving U.S. chip production.

One clean-energy loan will help EV startup Rivian Automotive fund a plant in Georgia. Ramaswamy recently posted on X that the loan appeared to be a “political shot across the bow” at Musk and Tesla. Congress would have to change any tax credits companies and people are using to get subsidies for wind and solar power, battery production and electric vehicles. The Treasury Department could tighten some rules for the tax credits to make them harder to claim.

This explanatory article may be periodically updated.

Write to Ken Thomas at ken.thomas@wsj.com and Richard Rubin at richard.rubin@wsj.com

12. The Lonely “I” In DIME: How the U.S. Can Address the Information Challenge of Our Time

I know Matt Armstrong will have some strong views, especially on the revival of the USIA (note his work is referenced in the bibliography). I am sure we will soon read commentary on his Mountainrunner subtack: "Arming for the War We're In" https://mountainrunner.substack.com/

14 hours ago12 min read

The Lonely “I” In DIME

How the U.S. Can Address the Information Challenge of Our Time

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-lonely-i-in-dime

Strategy Central

For And By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth - December 4, 2024

Introduction

In the realm of national power, the United States has traditionally excelled in diplomacy, military strength, and economic influence, as encapsulated in the DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy) framework. However, the often undervalued and underutilized "I" or informational element now represents a critical vulnerability. The digital age has amplified the potency of information as a tool for shaping perceptions, influencing public opinion, and advancing strategic goals. Yet, this democratization of information has also exposed new weaknesses, with adversaries exploiting open societies through disinformation and propaganda. Perhaps even more importantly, the totality of information in all its various forms is even more important to see as a diverse whole found in academia, science, military, industry, government, and personal spheres. This article examines the United States' neglect of its informational power and argues for a revitalized approach that prioritizes education, strategic coordination, and the creation of an empowered institution capable of addressing the multifaceted challenges of the information age.

The Underrated Weapon & Weakness

Throughout history, governments have used information as a powerful tool to shape public perception, control populations, and undermine rivals. For example, information control is a pillar of regime security in totalitarian regimes, with North Korea as an oft-cited example of a successful totalitarian regime. However, by its sheer scale and technological skill, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the modern-day master of this strategy. Its propaganda machine and internal security systems maintain an iron grip on what its 1.4 billion citizens know and think. By carefully curating what information is disseminated—whether through state-run media or its sophisticated internet censorship network known as the Great Firewall—the CCP effectively inoculates its population against dissent. The informational instrument in China is not about public enlightenment but about ensuring the population is fed what the regime deems acceptable to prevent rebellion.

The use of information to defeat a rival is a well-documented strategy. During World War II, the Allied forces successfully used deception operations—such as Operation Bodyguard—to mislead Nazi Germany about the location of the D-Day invasion. This informational tactic sowed confusion among the German leadership and ultimately contributed to the success of Operation Overlord. This form of information advantage is an archetype of how information can be wielded to misdirect and defeat an adversary. The Allies understood that controlling what their enemy thought and believed was as important as winning on the battlefield.

Conversely, the free flow of information has sometimes led to instability in democratic societies. Consider Hungary under Viktor Orbán transitioned from a robust democracy to an essentially authoritarian regime. Initially benefiting from the free flow of information, Orbán and his Fidesz Party systematically co-opted independent media while spreading populist and nationalist messages through state-aligned outlets. Disinformation and fear-based narratives regarding immigration and "foreign influence" undermined trust in democratic institutions. Despite there being almost no immigration into the country. Once in power, Orbán consolidated executive power and curtailed press freedoms. With the media under state control, effectively curtailing the free flow of information and using the bully pulpit as a tool for entrenching authoritarian rule. A trend toward this kind of authoritarianism in other Western countries, such as Germany, France, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, demonstrates the dangerous nature of information and its control in a democratic context.

Types of Information

In the modern “information age” it is thought of in a media and medium context. However, Information is a vital and complex element of national power, extending beyond mere messages, facts, and figures. Benign American information stored online is available on just about every subject imaginable. It is transmitted through various channels, including books, academic journals, the internet, media, and art. When studied carefully by an adversary, information like classified materials, scientific discoveries, infrastructure operations, personnel files, billing information, polling information, or anything one can imagine can be aggregated and used against the United States. With the new power of AI to synthesize large amounts of data, almost any form of information can be used to attack or manipulate our foundations of power.

Dividing information into categories that impact national security versus those that do not can be complex, and seemingly mundane information can be used for nefarious purposes in much the same ways as classified material. Probably the best way to think of national security information is in forms of information like intelligence, secrets, controlled technical data, infrastructure systems, sensitive technologies, corporate information, sensitive government data, personal information on individuals, and any forms of information on theories, markets, infrastructure, personnel, economics, technology, military, health, that the U.S. government or corporate entities must deny access to safeguard operations, techniques, and procedures. Classified material has elevated levels of harm to national security if accessed by rivals. Again, that does not mean unclassified material is harmless. It should be separated when working through what may or may not be information requiring some level of protection from prying eyes.

Messaging and information operations would be a separate category. Governmental messaging, information operations, and public diplomacy are interconnected yet distinct tools used to influence audiences and shape perceptions to advance national interests. Governmental messaging refers to official communications from a government aimed at conveying policies, values, or positions to domestic or international audiences, often through statements, press releases, or digital platforms. Information operations (IO) encompass a broader spectrum of activities, including strategically using information to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial decision-making while safeguarding one’s own information systems. IO is frequently employed in military and intelligence contexts to gain a strategic advantage. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, focuses on building relationships and understanding between governments and foreign publics through cultural exchanges, international broadcasting, and educational initiatives. These practices form a comprehensive approach to shaping the global information environment and advancing a nation’s strategic objectives. The domain where this information is passed should not be confused with the

The government’s relationship to information is fundamentally related to controlling what people know. Creating an open enough information flow enables a productive, enterprising society capable of supporting a sufficiently dynamic economy. A democracy views less intrusive information suppression as the best path, with authoritarians controlling as much as possible.

U.S. Stability and the Informational Element of Power

Information operations, public diplomacy, messaging, and enabling open source flows of information are often the focus for the “I” in DIME, with good reason. The government, universities, companies, and people routinely provide information to the public. Transparency in communication and clarity on topics is often (not always) the goal of the Western tendency to push information out publicly. It is seen as a common good.

The U.S. values democracy and believes that easily accessible information benefits the public. However, the digital age has made America vulnerable, as the information overflow can be manipulated, undermining democratic stability. Historical examples like the Weimar Republic, 1970s Chile, and Austria under Orban illustrate how information can be weaponized to support authoritarian regimes. The digital age acts like an accelerant for dis and misinformation campaigns. Recent disinformation campaigns by countries such as China, Russia, and Iran during U.S. presidential elections exploited American information openness, fostering division and mistrust among citizens.

The attacks are not restricted to elections. The following is a small sample of disinformation operations by U.S. rivals:

Russian Propaganda Exploits Black Lives Matter Protests (2020): Russian-backed operatives used social media platforms to stoke division during the Black Lives Matter protests, creating fake accounts to amplify both pro- and anti-BLM narratives. By exploiting racial tensions, these efforts sought to deepen polarization and undermine public trust in U.S. institutions.

Chinese Disinformation Targets COVID-19 Origins (2020-2021): Chinese state-affiliated media disseminated unfounded claims that COVID-19 originated in U.S. military labs. This disinformation campaign aimed to deflect blame for the pandemic spread confusion, and diminish confidence in American public health responses.

Iranian Influence Campaign Exploits U.S. Social Divides (2020): Iranian cyber actors launched operations to exploit contentious issues like immigration and policing, spreading divisive content via fake accounts on platforms like Facebook and Instagram. The goal was to deepen societal fractures and portray the United States as a nation in disarray.

Russian Energy Misinformation Undermines U.S. Policy (2016-Present): Russian media outlets, including RT and Sputnik, pushed misleading narratives about U.S. energy practices, such as fracking causing severe environmental harm. These campaigns aimed to weaken U.S. energy independence and bolster European reliance on Russian natural gas.

North Korean Disinformation Targets U.S. Military in South Korea (Ongoing): North Korean propagandists circulated conspiracy theories about U.S. military bases in South Korea, accusing them of human rights abuses and environmental damage. The disinformation sought to erode support for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and fuel anti-American sentiment in the region.

While democratic ideals emphasize transparency and access, these principles can be weaponized by actors who understand the weaknesses inherent in an open information environment. The mass availability of information and a lack of media literacy among the populace creates fertile ground for disinformation. When a democracy’s social norms reject the truth or become unable to discern and accept factual information, it is in danger. As Malcolm Gladwell argues in his book Revenge of the Tipping Point, once around 25% of a population adopts a countervailing view of democratic norms, the rest of society becomes susceptible to rapid change—potentially towards authoritarianism.

The Challenge of Democracy in the Information Age

Unlike authoritarian regimes, where information flow is tightly controlled to maintain regime stability, democracies face the challenge of balancing openness with resilience. In autocratic systems, leaders like those in China or North Korea tightly control information because they understand that uncontrolled information can spark rebellion. Monarchs and autocrats have feared the power of an informed populace—and rightly so. Information, when wielded by those who understand its value, is a potent weapon against tyranny. Yet, in a democracy, the approach to information is fundamentally different. Rather than restrict access, the emphasis is on maximizing availability. This is where the United States finds itself in a precarious position.

The U.S. has embraced the idea that more information is always better without adequately preparing its citizens to navigate the complexities of the information age. In a world where anyone can publish anything anytime, distinguishing fact from fiction has become increasingly difficult. Without proper education and media literacy, citizens are left vulnerable to manipulation by foreign and domestic actors. This internal vulnerability represents a significant national security risk. An educated and analytical citizenry is necessary to sustain democracy in the information age. Yet, the U.S. has lagged in ensuring its citizens are equipped with the tools needed to critically evaluate the information they consume, particularly about democracy, the role of institutions, and how the economy and justice system work. The U.S. government as a whole has seen a decline in informing the public and controlling the international narrative in ways beneficial to the U.S. Society and the government need a better toolkit to maintain democracy and the things that have made this a successful and prosperous nation.

Reimagining the Role of Information in National Security

The United States allocates only five cents of every dollar to civics education in K-12 schools, a figure that has seen slight increases but remains inadequate for preparing future voters. Additionally, many high schools fail to teach essential subjects like how capitalism works, basic business skills, and entrepreneurship. This lack of education leaves graduates unprepared to engage in the economy and civic life. By integrating these skills with lessons on identifying and combating misinformation, schools can better equip young Americans to navigate today’s complex information landscape. While not a complete solution, it is a basic requirement. Adults will also require some form of remedial information on these subjects, but this is easier said than done in the land of the free.

To address this challenge, the United States must rethink its approach to the informational element of national power. First, the U.S. government should invest in education initiatives to improve media literacy among the public. The U.S. government can help teach adult Americans civics, capitalism, and media literacy through a combination of accessible community education programs, public broadcasting, and digital tools like interactive apps and online courses. Nationwide awareness campaigns and workplace initiatives could further integrate these lessons into daily life, while partnerships with libraries, civic groups, and cultural hubs can bring resources directly to communities.

By promoting fact-checking platforms and offering reliable information through public channels, the government can empower adults to combat misinformation, understand economic systems, and take on their responsibilities as informed citizens. Teaching citizens how to evaluate sources, identify biases, and differentiate facts from misinformation will help the nation build resilience against information manipulation. This approach is not just an educational imperative but a necessity for national security.

Second, the U.S. must take steps to regulate the spread of disinformation and misinformation. While this is a contentious issue, particularly given the constitutional protections on free speech, there are ways to approach regulation without infringing individual rights. Encouraging transparency in social media algorithms, holding platforms accountable for spreading false information using algorithms designed to spread it, and promoting responsible journalism are all measures that can help mitigate the impact of disinformation. Trust between the government and the American people has been a casualty of spreading true, dis, and misinformation.

Third, the next administration should consider reestablishing the United States Information Agency (USIA). In this iteration, it should be more than just a messaging hub. Not familiar with the USIA? There is a reason for that. The USIA was created in 1953 and was tasked with "telling America’s story to the world" by coordinating public diplomacy efforts during the Cold War. It used mediums such as Voice of America, educational exchanges, and cultural programming to counter Soviet propaganda and promote U.S. values. However, by the late 20th century, the collapse of the USSR and shifts in global power dynamics eroded USIA’s perceived relevance. In 1999, it was dissolved, with many of its functions absorbed by the State Department under a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Opponents of reviving the USIA argue that the agency’s design was flawed, its ability to influence policy was limited, and it could not adapt to post-Cold War challenges. Critics suggest that nostalgia for the agency overlooks its inefficiencies, such as its isolation from broader U.S. foreign policy and struggles to secure domestic support. They also highlight the effectiveness of decentralized approaches, which allow multiple agencies to adapt independently to diverse global information challenges.

Proponents, however, emphasize the need for a centralized body to combat modern disinformation threats and coordinate whole-of-government efforts. They argue that global messaging today requires more than sporadic public diplomacy efforts. Reviving the USIA with expanded capabilities could address academic, scientific, cultural, and infrastructure-related aspects of information that shape international perceptions of the U.S. and how the U.S. protects these valuable assets. A reimagined USIA could enhance America’s credibility by integrating diverse tools and addressing the complex information environment of the digital age.

The revival of the United States Information Agency (USIA) is imperative in the modern era, not as a simple messaging manager but as a guardian and promoter of the multifaceted flows of information that underpin American society and as the defender of information available to the public. Unlike the narrow public diplomacy efforts managed by the State Department, the USIA should oversee the academic, industrial, scientific, cultural, and infrastructural dimensions of information critical to sustaining national prosperity and global influence. Information today is a vital asset, spanning beyond mere narratives to include intellectual property, technological innovation, and the resilience of critical systems. While global messaging remains essential, a reimagined USIA must also protect and advance the broader ecosystem of knowledge and ideas that drive America's competitiveness. The Voice of America and media statements alone are insufficient in the information age. The U.S. must actively defend its informational foundations while fostering innovation and trust across global audiences, ensuring the nation’s voice is amplified and its way of life preserved.

Conclusion: The Lonely I In DIME

The informational element of national power has long been the "lonely I" of the DIME construct—undervalued, underutilized, and often misunderstood. Yet, in an age where information shapes perceptions, drives decision-making, and influences the course of nations, the ability to create, exploit, and disrupt knowledge is more important than ever. Democracies are uniquely vulnerable to information exploitation because of their openness. Still, this vulnerability can be mitigated through education, regulation, and a strategic approach to the use of information as a tool of national power.

The United States faces an urgent need to bolster its informational defenses. National security improvements must include robust civics and media literacy education to prepare citizens for the complexities of the digital age, targeted regulations to combat disinformation while respecting constitutional freedoms, and the revival of a modernized United States Information Agency (USIA). This agency should not merely manage public diplomacy but act as a comprehensive information steward, guarding academic, industrial, and cultural dimensions to protect and promote the nation's interests. The U.S. must recognize that information is not a passive asset but an active tool of power that requires strategic oversight and investment. By addressing these challenges head-on, the United States can ensure that its democratic ideals and global leadership remain resilient in the face of evolving threats.

Bibliography

Gladwell, Malcolm. Revenge of the Tipping Point. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2024.
U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. "Deception and Information Warfare in World War II." Journal of Military History 78, no. 3 (2014): 715-738.
Zhao, Yuezhi. Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow. “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 211–36. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211.
Hobbs, Renee. Mind Over Media: Propaganda Education for a Digital Age. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2020.
Levinson, Meira. No Citizen Left Behind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Luntz, Frank. What Americans Really Want...Really. New York: Hyperion, 2009.
Lyengar, Shanto, and Kyu Hahn. “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Polarization in Media Use.” Journal of Communication 59, no. 1 (March 2009): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x.
Osberg, Lars, and Timothy Smeeding. “Fair Inequality? Attitudes toward Pay Differentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective.” American Sociological Review 71, no. 3 (June 2006): 450–73.
“The Future of Civic Education.” The Brookings Institution. Last modified May 21, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu.
Wineburg, Sam, and Sarah McGrew. “Lateral Reading and the Nature of Expertise: Reading Less and Learning More When Evaluating Digital Information.” Teachers College Record 121, no. 11 (November 2019): 1–40.
Will DuVal and Adam Maisel, "Bring Back the United States Information Agency," RealClearDefense, August 15, 2017.
Christopher Paul and Matt Armstrong, "The Irony of Misinformation: USIA Myths Block Enduring Solutions," RAND Corporation, July 7, 2022.
Matthew Armstrong, "No, We Do Not Need to Revive the U.S. Information Agency," War on the Rocks, November 12, 2015.
Nicholas Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.

13. Dinesh D’Souza Says Sorry for ‘2000 Mules’

Speaking of information. Or disinformation. Dinesh is a purveyor of disinformation. That is apparently what the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board believes.

Misinformation occurs when someone inadvertently spreads false information. Unlike disinformation, people who share misinformation do not intend to lie or deceive. Misinformation is simply false or inaccurate information — nothing more, nothing less.

In other words, it’s just someone getting their facts wrong, which we do all the time. For example, my friend tells me the grocery store opens at 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, when it really opens at 8:00 a.m. That may inconvenience me if I drive to the store and find it closed, but my friend didn’t give me bad information on purpose to hurt me or benefit himself.

Disinformation, however, is false or misleading information peddled deliberately to deceive, often in pursuit of an objective.

The largest and most destructive purveyors of disinformation in the world are governments, which engage in propaganda to ensure regime stability or create instability in their adversaries.

https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/misinformation-versus-disinformation-explained?=fldf%20search%20campaign&utm

Conclusion:

True the Vote and Mr. D’Souza are both still standing by the “premise” of “2000 Mules.” But the shame is that so many people believed their false tale for political reasons.

Dinesh D’Souza Says Sorry for ‘2000 Mules’

That video of alleged illegal ballot harvesting? Nothing of the sort.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/dinesh-dsouza-apologizes-2000-mules-film-2020-election-mark-andrews-donald-trump-d521033e?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

Dec. 4, 2024 6:02 pm ET

Dinesh D'souza Photo: Zach D Roberts/Zuma Press

Indulging Donald Trump’s claims that the 2020 election was stolen has ruined many reputations. The latest is the unraveling of the MAGA mockumentary “2000 Mules.” This week the movie’s narrator, Dinesh D’Souza, issued an apology for misleading viewers.

“I now understand that the surveillance videos used in the film were characterized on the basis of inaccurate information provided to me and my team,” Mr. D’Souza says on his website. “If I had known then that the videos were not linked to geolocation data, I would have clarified this and produced and edited the film differently.”

The thesis of “2000 Mules” was that an analysis of cellphone location data showed suspicious patterns near ballot drop boxes in several states. Much of the movie consists of surveillance footage of voters putting ballots into drop boxes, as scary music plays in the background. “What you are seeing,” Mr. D’Souza intones, “is a crime.” In reality, what viewers were seeing might have been a libel.

“We recently learned,” Mr. D’Souza’s apology says, “that surveillance videos used in the film may not have actually been correlated with the geolocation data.” So the movie purported to prove illegality using cellphone data . . . but then it showed videos of innocent people dropping off ballots, while presenting them as criminals?

One voter featured by the movie, a Georgia man named Mark Andrews, was cleared of wrongdoing by state investigators more than two years ago, before “2000 Mules” hit movie theaters. He has sued for defamation, and motions for summary judgment are due shortly. “I owe this individual, Mark Andrews, an apology,” Mr. D’Souza now says.

He might soon owe more than that. Six months ago the movie’s distributor, Salem Media, settled its liability “for a significant [confidential] amount,” court filings say. Mr. D’Souza claims he relied on information from True the Vote, the activist outfit he depicted as heroic. In a reply, True the Vote says it “had no editorial control over the ‘2000 Mules’ movie.” Also, Mr. Andrews “was not part of the geospatial study,” a fact that “was communicated to Mr. D’Souza’s team.”

True the Vote and Mr. D’Souza are both still standing by the “premise” of “2000 Mules.” But the shame is that so many people believed their false tale for political reasons.

VFW bashes The Economist for taking 'turkey-sized dump' on disabled vets

Patrick Murray of the Veterans of Foreign Wars has produced a rebuttal to a recent article calling for reducing veteran’s disability benefits that only a combat veteran could write.

Jeff Schogol

Posted 18 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

Amid the outcry over a recent article in The Economist that called for a reduction in what it described as “absurdly generous” veterans benefits, one voice has stood out from the rest.

Patrick Murray, national legislative service director for the Veterans of Foreign Wars office in Washington, D.C., has issued a rebuttal that reflects the frustrations of a generation of veterans who served in the Global War on Terrorism and now face growing efforts to balance the federal budget on the backs of wounded veterans.

Not only did Murray, a Marine veteran who lost his right leg in Iraq, describe the piece as a “turd sundae,” but he also wrote that The Economist had taken “a turkey-sized dump on disabled veterans” by running the story on Thanksgiving.

“The last paragraph of this loosely compiled puddle of garbage juice included the statement, ‘Reducing payments to former soldiers will never be popular, but it would be wise.”

Murray goes on to say in the statement that the editorial reads like it was written by “The guy or girl who ‘totally would’ve joined…but I didn’t because I would’ve told-off a Drill Instructor if they got in my face.’”

Veterans everywhere will understand exactly what Murray is arguing, but what makes his rebuttal unique is that it comes from one of the largest veterans service organizations in the country — one which you might expect to take a more formal and buttoned-down tone.

Most big organizations based in Washington, D.C., tend to stick with the stale language of officialdom and avoid drama in their statements. But in his response to The Economist article, Murray has morphed from battalion XO to “kill hat” drill instructor.

What’s more, is that the organization’s response is written in a style that many veterans can appreciate. There are echoes of Sylvester Stallone’s famous speech at the end of the second “Rambo” movie when he is asked what he wants: “I want what they want, and every other guy who came over here and spilled his guts and gave everything he had wants — for our country to love us as much as we love it.”

You can read the VFW’s entire response here:

Normally, Thanksgiving is synonymous with food, family, friends, and giving thanks. For @TheEconomist, Thanksgiving apparently means taking a turkey-sized dump on disabled veterans. The other day I had the unfortunate opportunity to read an unattributed article on The Economist titled, “American veterans now receive absurdly generous benefits” and it left me with a lot of thoughts. (You can read it for yourself here: https://econ.st/3D0Nk87, just be ready to sign up for a subscription.)

The piece on The Economist has no author and reads like it was poorly run through ChatGPT. And the title of the piece is insultingly stupid. The definition of absurd is “wildly unreasonable, illogical, or inappropriate.” I’d challenge the anonymous cowards at The Economist to illuminate us on which parts of veterans’ healthcare and benefits are inappropriate, illogical, or wildly unreasonable?

I am a disabled veteran. I had my right leg blown to pieces on September 4, 2006, in Fallujah, Iraq. Since that time, I have had to walk with an above the knee prosthetic and I have not had an easy day physically for as long as I can remember. Hey, The Economist, which portion of my healthcare or benefits are wildly unreasonable?

Service to our country can be an incredibly uplifting and positive experience for many who wore the uniform, but that service can also involve hazards. Some disabled veterans struggle physically or mentally with the effects of their service. Bullet wounds, Traumatic Brain Injuries, Post Traumatic Stress, and other effects of a service can sometimes cause chronic issues for veterans, and providing care and benefits for those issues is certainly not inappropriate or illogical.

While the AI assisted “journalists” at The Economist boldly chose not to put their name on this piece, they did attribute a quote to another non-expert in veteran benefits, Mark Duggan from Stanford University. Mark foolishly stated about VA Disability and Compensation, “Once you qualify you have an incentive not to get better.” An incentive not to get better?!?!? Hey Mark, any clue how I can get my right leg back? I’d gladly give back the money I’ve received so I can get up out of bed without the assistance of a wheelchair or a prosthetic.

The meandering poorly structured article in The Economist highlighted a lot of increased numbers and statistics, many of these figures quoted began back in 2001. It highlighted the increased number of veterans with high disability ratings beginning to increase in 2001. However, nowhere in the article does it state what else began back in 2001. These dopes conveniently left out the Global War on Terror that began in 2001 lasted for TWENTY YEARS! A full 20 years of the same all-volunteer force serving over and over, and over again in the same toxic hellholes fighting the same brutal terrorists. Gee, I wonder why today’s veterans are presenting with more chronic ailments than generations that came before us.

Ivy League elitists like Mark Duggan and the pretentious wankers at the Economist clearly didn’t bother to do much research on veteran disability or bother to speak to one of the millions of disabled veterans like me. We would have told these arrogant snobs that certain injuries and illnesses are with us for life, and no disability rating is worth the difficulties that come with some of the aftereffects of service.

The real cherry on top of this turd sundae was the lazy suggestion (possibly lifted from the fools at the @washingtonpost Editorial Board) that VA should means test veterans before receiving benefits. As in, if you make enough money after service, you won’t be taken care of for the costs of war. If The Economist had bothered to attribute a name to this drivel, I would ask that idiot, “how would you means test my inability to teach my son to ride a bike?” It’s a pretty routine joy that most parents get the privilege of taking part in. However, my prosthetic leg doesn’t really function in a way that allows normal bike riding. So that is a simple joy I won’t get. How exactly do buffoons like Mark Duggan and the dollar store journalists at The Economist suggest factoring in that loss?

The last paragraph of this loosely compiled puddle of garbage juice included the statement, “Reducing payments to former soldiers will never be popular, but it would be wise. America’s veteran obsession has gone too far.” — TOO FAR?!?!? Holy hell, this sounds like it was written by a jealous also-ran who every veteran has probably met. The guy or girl who “totally would’ve joined…but I didn’t because I would’ve told-off a Drill Instructor if they got in my face”. Losers…

In the future, if any major publication wants to embarrass themselves by anonymously taking shots at disabled veterans, I’d like to offer my services. I can start by helping you research this subject to learn about the actual effects of service-connected injuries and illness. I can also connect you with other disabled veterans so you can hear first-hand accounts of some of the difficulties veterans face. I could even help google image search pictures of actual veterans, instead of the stock photo of firefighters The Economist used at the top of its trash piece on veterans. Then finally, if you are still intent on disparaging disabled veterans, I can assist you in removing your head from your ass…free of charge.

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15. Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of Syria's shock insurgency?

Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of Syria's shock insurgency?

AP · by KAREEM CHEHAYEB · December 4, 2024

1 of 4 |FILE - This undated photo released by a militant group in 2016, shows Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of Syria’s al-Qaida affiliate, second from right, discussing battlefield details with commanders in Aleppo, Syria. (Militant UGC via AP, File)

BEIRUT (AP) — Over the past dozen years, Syrian militant leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani has worked to remake his public image and the insurgency he commands, renouncing longtime ties to al-Qaida and consolidating power before emerging from the shadows.

Now al-Golani, 42, seeks to seize the moment yet again, leading his fighters in a stunning offensive that has put them in control of Syria’s largest city, reigniting the country’s long civil war and raising new questions about President Bashar Assad’s hold on power.

The surge and al-Golani’s place at the head of it are evidence of a remarkable transformation. Al-Golani’s success on the battlefield follows years of maneuvering among extremist organizations while eliminating competitors and former allies.

Along the way he moved to distance himself from al-Qaida, polishing his image and his extremist group’s de-facto “salvation government” in an attempt to win over international governments and the country’s religious and ethnic minorities.

Putting himself forward as a champion of pluralism and tolerance, al-Golani’s rebranding efforts sought to broaden his group’s public support and legitimacy.

Still, it had been years since Syria’s opposition forces, based in the country’s northwest, made any substantial military progress against Assad. The Syrian president’s government, with backing from Iran and Russia, has maintained its control of about 70 percent of the country in a stalemate that had left al-Golani and his jihadi group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, out of the spotlight.

But the rebels’ descent on Aleppo and nearby towns, alongside a coalition of Turkish-backed armed groups dubbed the Syrian National Army, has shaken up Syria’s tense detente and left the war-torn country’s neighbors in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon worried about this flareup spilling over.

Al-Golani’s beginnings in Iraq

Al-Golani’s ties to al-Qaida stretch back to 2003 when he joined extremists battling U.S. troops in Iraq. The native of Syria was detained several times by the U.S. military, but remained in Iraq. During that time, al-Qaida usurped likeminded groups and formed the extremist Islamic State of Iraq, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In 2011, a popular uprising against Syria’s Assad triggered a brutal government crackdown and led to all-out war. Al-Golani’s prominence grew when al-Baghdadi sent him to Syria to establish a branch of al-Qaida called the Nusra Front. The United States labeled the new group as a terrorist organization. That designation still remains in place and the U.S. government has put a $10 million bounty on him.

The Nusra Front and the Syrian conflict

As Syria’s civil war intensified in 2013, so did al-Golani’s ambitions. He defied al-Baghdadi’s calls to dissolve the Nusra Front and merge it with al-Qaida’s operation in Iraq, to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS.

Al-Golani nonetheless pledged his allegiance to al-Qaida, which later disassociated itself from ISIS. The Nusra Front battled ISIS and eliminated much of its competition among the Syrian armed opposition to Assad. In his first interview in 2014, al-Golani kept his face covered, telling a reporter for Qatari network Al-Jazeera that he rejected political talks in Geneva to end the conflict. He said his goal was to see Syria ruled under Islamic law and made clear that there was no room for the country’s Alawite, Shiite, Druze, and Christian minorities.

Consolidating power and rebranding

In 2016, al-Golani revealed his face to the public for the first time in a video message that announced his group was renaming itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and cutting its ties to al-Qaida.

“This new organization has no affiliation to any external entity,” he said in the video, filmed wearing military garb and a turban.

The move paved the way for al-Golani to assert full control over fracturing militant groups. A year later, his alliance rebranded again as HTS as the groups merged, consolidating al-Golani’s power in northwest Syria’s Idlib province.

Afterward HTS clashed with independent Islamist militants who opposed the merger, further emboldening al-Golani and and his group as the leading power in northwestern Syria, able to rule with an iron fist.

With his power consolidated, al-Golani set in motion a transformation that few could have imagined. Replacing his military garb with shirt and trousers, he began calling for religious tolerance and pluralism. He appealed to the Druze community in Idlib, which the Nusra Front had previously targeted, and visited the families of Kurds who were killed by Turkish-backed militias.

In 2021, al-Golani had his first interview with an American journalist on PBS. Wearing a blazer, with his short hair gelled back, the now more soft-spoken HTS leader said that his group posed no threat to the West and that sanctions imposed against it were unjust.

“Yes, we have criticized Western policies,” he said. “But to wage a war against the United States or Europe from Syria, that’s not true. We didn’t say we wanted to fight.”

KAREEM CHEHAYEB

Chehayeb is an Associated Press reporter in Beirut.

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AP · by KAREEM CHEHAYEB · December 4, 2024

16. Romanian election unsettles NATO allies

Romanian election unsettles NATO allies

By ROBBIE GRAMER and ERIC BAZAIL-EIMIL 12/04/2024 04:05 PM EST

Politico · by Robbie Gramer · December 4, 2024

With help from Phelim Kine, Daniel Lippman and Jack Detsch

An ultranationalist and pro-Russia politician is favored to win Romania’s presidency in upcoming elections, amounting to a potential nightmare scenario for NATO, according to interviews with seven current and former U.S. and European officials.

Romania is important to the alliance both for its military strength and strategic location on the Black Sea.

CĂLIN GEORGESCU, the far-right and openly pro-Kremlin Romanian candidate who vaulted to the top of the country’s polls in its first round of presidential elections, doesn’t look good for Romania’s future in that role. His campaign from relative obscurity to presidential frontrunner was fueled by a massive surge in following on TikTok, in a campaign that Romanian security officials now say bears the hallmarks of a Russian influence operation. Georgescu appears likely to win a runoff election on Dec. 8.

U.S. and other NATO officials are paying close attention. Romania is viewed as a critically important NATO ally, gaining high marks from Washington for spending more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense and providing military support to Ukraine. It sits in a strategically important location for both Ukraine and the NATO alliance bordering Ukraine and the Black Sea and hosts a major military airbase and high-end U.S. Aegis missile defense system.

If elected, Georgescu could roll all of Romania’s NATO commitments back at an uncertain time for the alliance: DONALD TRUMP is preparing to take office in the United States and Russian forces are slowly trying to grind down Kyiv’s military frontlines in eastern Ukraine.

Georgescu has in various interviews and social media posts called the hosting of the U.S. missile defense system a “diplomatic disgrace,” praised Russian President VLADIMIR PUTIN and said the war in Ukraine is being “manipulated in the interest of starting a conflict that will financially help the U.S. military-industrial complex.”

JOHN HERBST, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine now with the Atlantic Council think tank, said “Romania has been the NATO pillar on the Black Sea and therefore the impact of even a slightly pro-Russian policy in Bucharest would weaken notably the NATO position” in the region.

A senior Romanian official, who like others was granted anonymity to speak about sensitive matters candidly, put the matter more bluntly: “A pro-Russian president in the sixth-largest EU country would mark a triumph for Vladimir Putin.”

U.S. Secretary of State ANTONY BLINKEN met with the Romanian foreign minister, LUMINIȚA ODOBESCU, on Wednesday in Brussels on the sidelines of a NATO foreign ministers meeting, a U.S. official told NatSec Daily.

Their meeting came within hours of Romania’s top security council declassifying a report on how “aggressive hybrid Russian attacks” influenced the elections. Still, it remains unclear how many votes were swayed by foreign-linked social media influence campaigns and general backlash and resentment against establishment parties among voters and whether Georgescu could get above 50 percent of the vote.

If Georgescu wins, “it would be more evidence — as if we needed any — of rising anti-establishment tides in the West,” said another senior official from a NATO country.

Biden administration officials have been in close contact with the Romanian government on the matter. “We have been very active on this behind the scenes and waiting until we had the strongest possible argument before going public,” said the U.S. official.

17. Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific

Excerpts:

Even with the analysis of lessons from Ukraine to ensure they are relevant in the Pacific, and the identification of the seven key challenges I describe above, there remains other aspects of geopolitical context that will impact on how insights from Ukraine might be employed in the Pacific by countries like Indonesia, Japan, Australia and others. For example, will the hedging strategies that many nations in the region use to balance their economic and security relationships between China and America remain viable?

With the forthcoming inauguration of the Trump administration, and the incoming president’s recent comments about Pacific nations ‘paying insurance policies’, there remains doubt in Pacific nations about just how committed the United States is to the region. And, if these doubts grow, will some nations in the region feel compelled to develop their own nuclear deterrent capabilities to match those of the weapons deployed in the western Pacific by Russia, North Korea and China?

The growing dialog and collaboration between the ‘bad quad’ nations of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran also provides a significant challenge for nations in the Pacific, and for our implementation of relevant lessons from the war in Ukraine. This new alignment is also the subject of a new project at CNAS, which you can read about here.

A new learning community that has been set up within the bad quad, and which is likely to intensify, will complicate the learning and adaptation of nations in the Pacific in security, diplomatic, informational, and economic affairs. This adaptation battle, which extends from the battlefields of Ukraine through to the geopolitical environment, will be a critical determinant of security affairs in the Pacific for some time to come.

This remains a live assessment of the relevance of lessons from Ukraine for the Pacific region. I will continue to provide detailed examinations of many of the subjects covered here, as well as topics beyond the lessons I described earlier in this piece.

Pacific Theatre

Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific

My latest assessment of lessons, difference in context and key challenges for military and national security planners in the Pacific

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/translating-ukraine-lessons-for-the?utm

Mick Ryan

Dec 05, 2024

∙ Paid

Source: Australian Department of Defence

This week I have returned to Indonesia for the second time in 2024. I don’t know how many times I have been to this amazing country since my first visit in 1992, but it has been a lot. I have had the opportunity to visit many of Indonesia’s different islands, from Sumatra to Makassar to Ambon, and to work with Indonesia military and academic institutions. In 1995, I spent a year at the Australian Defence Force School of Languages learning Bahasa Indonesia, which I used as a translator in the late 1990s during visits to Indonesia with senior military officers.

Therefore, it was a great pleasure to be invited back to Indonesia this week by the Indonesian Ministry of Defence. My mission was to present to a seminar attended by senior Indonesian military officers, as well as some of the local staff from foreign embassies (including the awesome team from the Australian embassy in Jakarta).

The topic of my talk was the relevance of lessons from Ukraine for the Pacific theatre, and for Indonesia in particular. This provided me with an opportunity to update and expand my previous assessments about the relevance of the lessons from Ukraine for application in the western Pacific. The majority of this article therefore covers the Ukraine lessons, differences in context between Eastern Europe and the Pacific, and the major challenges that emerge for countries that might seek to challenge Chinese military coercion and aggression in the western Pacific.

However, before I do, it is worth highlighting some context about Indonesia for those of you who may not know a lot about the country

Indonesia

Indonesia is a nation made up of many different ethic groups that live on more than 6000 of the 17,000 islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia is a mainly Muslim nation, and with a population of nearly 280 million, it is the largest Islamic nation in the world. It is also vibrant democracy, having shed the dictatorships that guided the nation in its first half century after independence in 1945.

Sitting astride the Pacific and Indian oceans, the archipelagic sea lanes through Indonesia are some of the most important in the world, including the Malacca Strait.

Map showing density of maritime trade through South East Asia and Indonesia. Source: Logcluster.org

Indonesia is a non-aligned state, having hosted the first conference of the non-aligned movement in Bandung in 1955. It is however an important member of ASEAN and was one of its founding members in 1967.

Indonesia has a large military. Its largest service, the Army, comprises about three quarters of the overall strength of the 400 thousand strong Indonesian military. The armed forces of Indonesia and Australia collaborate at multiple levels and maintain many training and education exchanges and conduct a range of bilateral exercises in the air, sea, land, cyber, special forces areas on an annual basis.

The leadership of the Indonesian military have a keen interest in learning about developments in contemporary warfare, including the lessons from the war in Ukraine. This is why I found myself speaking in Jakarta this week.

Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific – and Indonesia

The primary focus of the assessment I provided in Jakarta was how we might translate the lessons of the war in Ukraine, be they tactical, strategic, or political, for application in the nations of the western Pacific region. There were three key elements of my presentation.

First, I provided some of the key insights and lessons that could be gleaned from the first three years of the war in Ukraine. This was by no means a comprehensive list and many of my readers here will be familiar with my views on how we can learn, and the key lessons, from the way. However, for clarity, I covered the following key lessons on modern war in my Jakarta presentation:

Lesson 1. A new era of mass and mobilisation. Deterrence and conflict in the Pacific may require planning for (and possibly conduct of) national mobilization I highlighted here how 21st century mobilization is a trinity of national (not military) endeavours: industry; people; and ideas (which you can read about in more detail here).

Lesson 2. The signature battle and meshed civil-military sensor networks. While I have written about this trend in detail both here and in reports for the Special Competitive Studies Project, I highlighted that the implication of meshing civil and military collection and analysis means that more investment will be needed in open-source information and assessment, including AI capabilities, for integration in military intelligence and operations. It would also require a greater focus on military deception operations.

Lesson 3. Cheaper and more precise deep strike capabilities. This has been an interesting development during the war in Ukraine, with Ukraine having developed a strategic strike complex from almost a standing start on 2022. This means that nations will need to invest in sovereign, lower cost strike weapons while also obtaining some of the more exquisite foreign systems. At the same time, we can't take our eye off close combat capabilities; each nation will need to achieve their own balance of close- and long-range combat systems depending on their particular circumstances.

Lesson 4. The evolving fight for influence. Both Russian and Ukraine have made significant investments in this area during the war. Nations need to deter war, and if they cannot, be capable of winning their wars and winning the narrative of their wars. At the same time, modern nations must counter misinformation and disinformation and educate their populace about trusted and compromised information sources.

Lesson 5. Ubiquitous air, land, and sea uncrewed systems. Even though remotely operated systems were developed and employed during the Second World War, and there has been development of newer systems since, the past three years has been the most intense, large-scale development and use of uncrewed systems in human history. Some of the implications of this include the ability of many nations to develop their own low-cost drones, as well as the need for military organisations to evolve their organisational, doctrinal and leadership models to better exploit the teaming of human and uncrewed systems.

Lesson 6. More integrated adaptation battle. Both Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted during the war. Their forces have engaged in tactical learning (the Russians have been slower but have improved) as well as strategic learning and adaptation (which is learning that supports improving a nations war effort and ability to win wars). The crucial point is that both systems are necessary, and they must be linked to reinforce each other.

Lesson 7. The enduring importance of good leadership and strategy. The war in Ukraine has provided a plethora of lessons about national and tactical leadership (the good and the bad) as well as nations investing in the ability to develop good strategy, based on tested assumptions, and the ability to continuously assess and evolve that strategy. But, part of this is also democratic nations being able to have tough, honest decisions with their citizens about investing in defence and strategic resilience capabilities.

Optimizing Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific

But, given the profound differences in culture, geography, politics, infrastructure and weather between Eastern Europe and the western Pacific, a degree of translation is needed to ensure that the observations gathered from the war in Ukraine are optimised for application in this region of the world. There are five key ‘Pacific filters’ that can be applied in this optimization process, and these are examined below.

Geography and distance. When people think of the Pacific, they think of the vast distances between places such as Hawaii and Guam or Australia and Japan. This is a relevant consideration. But there are many parts of the region where the distances over which military campaigns might be conducted are much shorter: the Korean peninsula, China-Taiwan and on some of the large islands such as New Guinea. Both strategic distances, and the regional distances, need to be considered in the translation of Ukraine lessons for the Pacific.

In particular, the strategic distances over which logistic support might need to be conducted in a future contingency are very different to those that apply in Ukraine. And, it might be necessary to not only support countries like Taiwan, Japan and Australia from Hawaii and the west cost of America, the U.S. navy might have to fight its way forward from these locations.

It took two and a half years to fight across the Pacific to the Marianas in the Pacific War. Source: Westpoint Atlases of American Wars.

Terrain, vegetation, and weather. It goes without saying that the terrain, vegetation and climatic conditions in the Pacific are quite different from those that are present in Ukraine. For example, the vegetation cover in many parts of the Pacific can be up to 90% while in Ukraine it is around 30%. Many parts of the Pacific region receive significantly more precipitation on an annual basis and have far higher humidity and temperatures. This will have an impact on many elements of military campaigns including communications, fires, medical support and the use of autonomous weapons - especially aerial and ground systems.

Civil infrastructure capability and density. The impact of distance and the island nature of many Pacific nations means that there is a quite different lay down of infrastructure, particularly ports, airfields, logistics nodes and telecommunications / data transmission. And, the Pacific area is the location of seven of the world’s top ten megacities (by population). All these considerations matter for military activities and need to be considered when translating Ukraine lessons for application in the Pacific.

Political environment. The western Pacific region is very different to that which exists in Europe. There is no European Union (EU) and there is no Asian version of NATO (nor is there likely to be). Chinese strategy includes efforts to corrode any regional multilateral arrangements and alliances which it sees as impacting on its interests. The military and economic relationships between different Asian nations, and countries outside the region, is quite different from those that exist in Eastern Europe. This is an important consideration for the translation of strategic lessons from Ukraine because different alliance constructs will influence different methods of deterrence, and different ways of fighting, and supporting fighting, in the Pacific region.

Capability of potential adversaries. While Russia poses an existential threat to Ukraine and a very severe threat to the rest of Europe, its military capacity and size pales into insignificance when one examines China. China has the largest navy in the world and has significant capabilities across all domains. And, in the western Pacific, it will be fighting a home campaign.

We should not forget the capabilities of North Korea (which is also a co-belligerent in the Ukraine War), and must also consider the reality that Russia has a significant presence in the Pacific as well. Russia and China have so far conducted nine joint strategic bomber patrols in the Pacific, and have also been undertaking joint naval exercises in the Pacific in 2024. This is a more complex, dangerous, and complicated arrangement of adversaries than is faced by nations in Europe.

China-Russia join naval exercise in 2024. Source: ISW

By using these filters and laying them over the key lessons from Ukraine, useful insights emerge for military and national security planners in the western Pacific. As I discussed in Jakarta, these insights can also inform seven major challenges in the Pacific for military and national security planners. This is the third and final element of my expanded assessment of Ukraine lessons and their application for the Pacific.

Seven Big Challenges

Challenge 1. The right balance of long-range and short-range combat. Long range strike has become an important capability in Ukraine’s arsenal. But important as it is, long-range strike is not a silver bullet in modern war. The planning, conduct, assessment, and adaptation of long-range strike across the domains must be carefully balanced with investment in close combat capabilities. A key operational problem, therefore, is the proper balance in the deep battle and the close fight (with the right support mechanisms for both). Not only must the balance of investment be mostly right, but there should also be an effective operational synchronicity between these two military endeavours.

U.S. Army Typhon missile battery, of the type deployed to The Philippines in 2024. Source: Defense Magazine

Challenge 2. Mass versus dispersion. New-era meshed civil-military sensor framework, developed over the course of the Ukraine war, has produced an environment where all the signatures of military equipment, personnel, and collective forces can be detected more accurately and rapidly. When linked to an array of precision munitions, this closes the detection to destruction gap in military operations to just minutes. Massing military forces for ground combat operations, large-scale aerial attacks, or naval operations, therefore, becomes a high tactical and operational risk.

Even if an array of hard and soft kill measures can protect massed forces, they are almost assured of detection, which makes achieving surprise difficult. Modern military forces in the Pacific must be equally capable of operating in dispersed and massed forms, but they must be able to minimise their detection when they do mass in a way that offers an improved chance of surprise and landing a decisive blow against an adversary.

Challenge 3. Closing tactical and operational distances. Modern combat forces require new-era techniques that are quicker, lower signature, and more survivable at crossing operational and tactical spaces between them and their objectives. The failings of current Western military doctrine were exemplified by Ukraine’s struggle in 2023 to penetrate Russian minefields and defensive belts in southern Ukraine. Meshed sensor nets, electronic warfare (EW) and multi-layered and multi-domain drone frameworks make this a difficult problem. Chinese satellite and underwater surveillance add to this challenge in the Pacific theatre.

But this is not just a tactical challenge. It presents as an operational one in places like the western Pacific where allied forces will have to fight their way forward. A key problem for the Pacific is to develop, test and implement new warfighting concepts so military forces can survivably cross operational distances (see earlier map from Pacific War above) before engaging in combat, penetrate and fight the way through defensive schemes, and ensure they have sufficient combat power to exploit such breaches.

Challenge 4. Lowering the cost of defending against missiles and drones. Enormous investment has been made in development of remotely controlled, autonomous, and semiautonomous uncrewed systems. A massive gap between the capabilities of uncrewed systems and those that counter them. There is a big disparity in the current costs of these systems. This achieves a cost imposition strategy against the defender. Attack drones and missiles are an effective cost-imposition strategy for the Russians and will for the PLA.

The aim should be not only to reduce the cost of hard and soft kill systems, but to entirely flip the cost equation. A key operating challenge to be solved for operations in the Pacific is to develop a variety of very low-cost hard and soft kill systems to be used against uncrewed vehicles and missiles. This should also impose cost on those who use drones, not on those who defend against them.

Challenge 5. Integrating old and new technology. Contemporary military institutes must be able to integrate modern technology more effectively and rapidly (meshed civil-military sensor networks, drones, and democratised access to digital command systems) with old technology (tanks, helicopters, artillery, humans). Great strides have been made in this in Israel and Ukraine. But even in these nations at war, progress can be unevenly distributed throughout a military force, and security of the communications linkages between different systems is still an ongoing challenge. New tactics for the organizations that emerge from the integration of latest technologies can also lag.

This challenge has tactical, operational, strategic, and institutional aspects, but addressing it will also be founded on better relationships between the military and industry, and faster sharing of battlefield lessons. Therefore, a key challenge in the Pacific theatre is the absorption of new technologies to team with older technologies, while achieving the right mix of exquisite, crewed, and expensive with capabilities that are cheap, uncrewed, and massed.

Challenge 6. Over-focus on Taiwan. While the focus on contingencies related to Taiwan, including blockades, large-scale missile bombardments and the physical invasion of the island are important to prepare for, Taiwan contingencies cannot be the only future scenarios that military organisations prepare for. China is almost certain to surprise Western nations with any significant military campaign, including those beyond Taiwan, and therefore we need to be able to conceive many different forms of military activities in many different parts of the western Pacific.

Additionally, an exclusive focus on Taiwan scenarios will skew force design in military organisations, making them potentially less adaptable for other scenarios. Other contingencies which should be considered include the following:

China base in South Pacific?
China influence over PNG/Manus Island or an attempted military operation to seize Manus.
Operations in the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean approaches to Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes.
An India-China conflict.
Conflict over the Senkaku Islands and support for Japan.
Major natural disasters.

Challenge 7. Production for deterrence and war. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that defence industrial capacity, particularly sovereign capacity, is again an important element of deterrence as well as fighting and winning wars. The shortfalls in European and American defence industrial production are now well known and have been well-described in a range of reports, including this excellent assessment by CSIS expert Seth Jones. One difference between Europe and the Pacific however is that two large nations, South Korea and Japan, have sustained a well-developed defence industrial base, and are able to produce a range of ships, submarines, aircraft, and munitions that are relevant to conflict in the Pacific. However, whether this is enough to close that gap between Chinese production (and that of Russia and North Korea) and the nations that might form a fighting coalition to defend Taiwan, remains to be seen. We must assume that more will require to be done to increase production of all kinds of military platforms and consumables as quickly as possible.

Analysing the Right Lessons from Ukraine for the Pacific Theatre

Even with the analysis of lessons from Ukraine to ensure they are relevant in the Pacific, and the identification of the seven key challenges I describe above, there remains other aspects of geopolitical context that will impact on how insights from Ukraine might be employed in the Pacific by countries like Indonesia, Japan, Australia and others. For example, will the hedging strategies that many nations in the region use to balance their economic and security relationships between China and America remain viable?

With the forthcoming inauguration of the Trump administration, and the incoming president’s recent comments about Pacific nations ‘paying insurance policies’, there remains doubt in Pacific nations about just how committed the United States is to the region. And, if these doubts grow, will some nations in the region feel compelled to develop their own nuclear deterrent capabilities to match those of the weapons deployed in the western Pacific by Russia, North Korea and China?

The growing dialog and collaboration between the ‘bad quad’ nations of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran also provides a significant challenge for nations in the Pacific, and for our implementation of relevant lessons from the war in Ukraine. This new alignment is also the subject of a new project at CNAS, which you can read about here.

A new learning community that has been set up within the bad quad, and which is likely to intensify, will complicate the learning and adaptation of nations in the Pacific in security, diplomatic, informational, and economic affairs. This adaptation battle, which extends from the battlefields of Ukraine through to the geopolitical environment, will be a critical determinant of security affairs in the Pacific for some time to come.

This remains a live assessment of the relevance of lessons from Ukraine for the Pacific region. I will continue to provide detailed examinations of many of the subjects covered here, as well as topics beyond the lessons I described earlier in this piece.

18. DOGE Needs to Tackle The Department of Defense's CR Nightmare

DOGE Needs to Tackle The Department of Defense's CR Nightmare

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · December 3, 2024

MEMORANDUM

TO: Elon and Vivek,

FROM: Mackenzie Eaglen, AEI

DATE: ASAP

SUBJECT: Defense DOGE-ing

Scouring the federal budget for efficiencies and smart rightsizing must not overlook the legislative branch of government.

Specifically, that exorbitant taxpayer-funded waste Congress creates when it cannot fund the work of the feds on time through annual appropriations provided by the start of the fiscal year on October 1.

Spending freezes known as continuing resolutions (CRs) simply kick the can of hard choices and waste money—particularly funds for the U.S. Department of Defense. The Pentagon budget is a beast, but know that just about half of it goes back out the door in contracted goods (equipment), services/labor (think: space launch, for example), and IT/software. Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said continuing resolutions act as a “straight-jacket” for the department, forcing it to live in stasis at the previous year’s funding levels.

How Does this Waste Occur?

1) CRs freeze individual appropriations accounts at last year’s levels, causing tens of billions of dollars to be misaligned—and often at a lower level. This misalignment negatively affects all accounts, but particularly creates problems for troop training and maintenance of equipment and facilities: the core of military readiness.

Near-term readiness is perishable and must be constantly maintained for the “fight tonight” or it is lost. It takes longer and costs far more to rebuild readiness than to maintain it.

2) Continuing resolutions do not allow the military to start new weapons programs or increase the production of existing equipment. This includes hundreds of new programs necessary for regaining the military’s edge against Russia and China that simply stall out unable to advance until the CR is lifted. Examples include hypersonic strike weapons, missile defense, and shipbuilding in particular.

Aerial drone image of an M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank crew, from the 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, conducting Table VI Gunnery at Fort Stewart, Ga. December 6, 2016.

CRs also delay the progression of established programs. The Pentagon depends on a steady flow of funding for production increases that keep its many weapons, services, and technological programs on track for development and delivery to the warfighter. By willfully injecting uncertainty into that funding profile, spending freezes create inefficiencies and cost overruns, as industry leaders cannot depend on the stability needed to advance. Workforces and vendors cannot adequately staff up when funds do not arrive on time.

3) By injecting uncertainty into every process, Congress generates significant sums of financial and personnel waste through duplication of work, higher prices, and contracting delays. The military awards hundreds of thousands of contracts every year.

Missed deadlines for contract awards cause negotiations to reopen and contractors to add in a premium for the cost of doing business with such a fickle customer. In 2017, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer likened the inefficiencies of CRs to putting billions of dollars of taxpayer money in trash cans and setting it on fire.

Big Ideas—and Consequences—Needed to Change Incentives

Budget stability and predictability of finances through on-time appropriations to the U.S. military would save tens of billions of dollars now. Former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis summarized the result of this self-imposed waste, noting “No enemy in the field has done as much to harm the readiness of the U.S. military than the combined impact of the Budget Control Act’s defense spending caps, worsened by operating for 10 of the last 11 years under continuing resolutions of varied and unpredictable duration.”

The longer a continuing resolution drags on, the higher the likelihood of inadvertent staff reductions, insufficient operating budgets, and underfunded existing programs that the military needs to stay on schedule or accelerate.

M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

In an attempt to both incentivize the passing of appropriations bills on time and punish lawmakers for failing to do so, members of Congress should have their paychecks sequestered until appropriations are passed, starting October 1 every year. This automatic action would be designed to avoid the scores of problems that continuing resolutions cause for the military and industry.

As continuing resolutions pause spending increases (or decreases) and lock in the previous year’s funding levels, appropriations accounts become skewed, work stalls, readiness takes a hit, and time is wasted waiting on the system to work as intended and, often, for funding increases to arrive for strategic priorities. Garnishing politicians’ pay until they do the basic job of keeping government functioning through on-time funding would help ensure that continuing resolutions are a worst-case solution instead of a tool for Congress to routinely rely on.

About the Author: Mackenzie Eaglen

Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · December 3, 2024

19. East Asia Homework for the Trump Administration

More than assessing the risks, you must take actions to reduce or mitigate the risks.

Excerpts:

A catastrophic war over Taiwan can be prevented, in part, by exhaustively assessing the risks.

Net assessments constitute a principal framework for analyzing the national security strategy of the United States and they were indispensable to Cold War strategic planning.

To inform strategic planning in the Western Pacific, President Trump should direct his National Security Council to undertake a comprehensive net assessment of both the PRC and Taiwan. All assumptions must be stress tested and all strategic interactions -- economic, military, political -- must be gamed out. The stakeholders should be subject matter experts from across the government.

And it must be iterative. Net assessment is a "practice" in which various stakeholders possessing particular perspectives and independent information will, on an ongoing basis, reveal a rich variety of advantageous courses of action.

Critical structural deficiencies are part of both Russia’s and China’s military DNA. And note, Israel did not believe war would occur until 1975.

Nearly every utterance and instance of American support prompts Chinese protests; yet, in seventy-five years, no invasion has ever been attempted. According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, strategic clarity only imperiled Ukraine.

Ultimately, miscalculated military capabilities and untested commitments will only further conflate capabilities with intentions, misdirect scarce resources, and spawn strategies of desperation.

East Asia Homework for the Trump Administration

By R. Jordan Prescott

December 05, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/05/east_asia_homework_for_the_trump_administration_1076546.html?mc_cid=44f65dee3f

The incoming Trump Administration will immediately contend with a world on fire upon taking office. In Europe, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in its third year, and in the Middle East, Israel invaded Lebanon for the third time.

The unimpressive Russian military performance in Ukraine and the risk that Israel's increasingly wider war with Iran and its proxies would ensnare the United States should prompt the next administration to undertake a more rigorous assessment as to whether war in East Asia is inevitable.

Russia Underwhelms

Before February 2022, the West assumed Russia would rapidly defeat Ukraine. Successive administrations had identified Russia as a significant threat to American interests and multiple senior officials characterized Russia as a near peer adversary.

After February 2022, the West learned how wrong it had been. In a very short period of time, the Russian military exhibited significant shortcomings in maneuver, communications, and logistics, whereas Ukraine mounted a far more robust defense than expected. Two months later, the Director of National Intelligence acknowledged previous assessments had been mistaken.

Several factors contributed to the overestimate.

In 2008, Russia barely succeeded in invading Georgia. The inferior performance reassured the West, but it also prompted Russia to initiate a multi-year modernization program.

Six years later, Russia stealthily infiltrated Ukraine and annexed the Crimea. The Russian gambit prompted a reappraisal that, in retrospect, was an over-correction.

First, Western estimates focused on tangible elements -- the number of personnel and weapon systems. To the extent the West focused on non-tangible features, estimates focused more on upper-level administrative and command reorganization and less on the quality of the non-commissioned officer corps or the degree to which corruption undermined procurement.

Second, the absence of qualitative measures permitted Western estimates to explore worst-case scenarios that overstated Russian capabilities.

Lastly, the West concurrently underestimated Ukraine. The West had been transferring weapons since 2014, but did not thoroughly evaluate the potential efficacy of its defense plans, which included territorial defense and local militia.

An inevitable question arises -- has the United States also overestimated the PRC military?

PRC's "Pacing Challenge"

In 2022, the National Defense Strategy identified the PRC as the "pacing challenge" for the Department of Defense.

Two years later, the Commission on National Defense Strategy concluded that "China is outpacing the US and has largely negated the US military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of forward military investment."

More significantly, the Commission concurred with the increasingly prevalent prediction that the PRC aims to take Taiwan by 2027.

Possessing the capability, however, does not amount to intent.

Accepting the premise precipitates a false sense of security -- the PRC could always act before 2027. Or equally hazardous -- a false sense of inevitability; the PRC might wait another decade. Overall, accepting an arbitrary timeline undermines designing a force optimized to deterring or reversing PRC military action.

More broadly, elements of the Russian overestimate are similarly present in the PRC estimate.

The evaluation of PRC military capabilities also emphasizes quantitative over qualitative measures. The PRC possesses the largest navy in the world -- whether its officer corps is capable of executing complex fleet operations is unknown.

The PRC is also an autocracy, one more bureaucratically pervasive than the personalist regime in Russia. Autocracies intrinsically suppress competition and innovation, and in few areas are such qualities integral to success as warfighting.

The corollary is pervasive corruption. In mid-2023, President Xi dismissed his ministers of foreign affairs and defense for corruption. The following winter, the National People's Congress removed a number of generals and commanders from its membership for the same.

Even though corruption has been a systemic problem for some time, the scope of the purge was unprecedented, as it may underscore problematic civil-military relations. The party is undoubtedly in firm control, but the latter's reliability in a crisis might be questionable.

Israel Entangles

According to the Department of State's website, "Israel’s security is a long-standing cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy." Indeed, successive administrations have sought peace in the Middle East to help ensure Israel's security.

On October 7, 2023, Israel experienced the deadliest attack since its founding. Thereafter, Israel began a series of retaliatory operations against Hamas. In the intervening twelve months, the war has widened to include Hamas's fellow Iranian proxies - Hezbollah and the Houthis.

On October 25th, Israel undertook a long-anticipated attack on Iran, striking Teheran and military sites throughout the country.

Alliances are a singularly elegant solution to multiple security problems -- they enhance deterrence, prevent arms races, and simplify diplomacy during a crisis.

However, one major risk entails entanglement, or more perilously, entrapment.

Entanglement constitutes a situation in which the US enters a conflict because of a formal security commitment established on the basis of mutual interests. In contrast, entrapment entails the same, except the US enters a conflict in contravention of its national interest.

Entrapment is recurring concern in the US-Israel alliance. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the US only airlifted equipment to Israel. After the war, the retaliatory Arab oil embargo denoted one substantial risk among many arising from the alliance.

In the current crisis, the US has helped defend Israel against Iranian missiles and has transferred the THAAD missile defense system to Israel. American servicemembers will operate the system, putting them directly in harm's way in the event of sustained Iranian attacks.

As of December, four Americans hostages remain in the hands of Hamas.

The death of thirteen Marines at the Kabul airport during the withdrawal from Afghanistan subjected the Biden Administration to substantial criticism.

The death of any hostage at the hands of Hamas or any American soldiers resulting from an Iranian strike would inflame an already combustible crisis.

Again, an inevitable question follows -- does the commitment to Taiwan represent the same risk?

The Taiwan Tether

The US agreed to a formal treaty alliance with Taiwan in 1954 on the condition the latter would obtain American approval before proceeding with any military operation on the Chinese mainland. After the US established diplomatic relations with the PRC, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 which only committed the US to ensuring Taiwan had sufficient defensive resources.

The ensuing "strategic ambiguity" has successfully deterred the PRC from using force against Taiwan ever since.

In 1979, ambiguity was sustainable though; neither the PRC nor Taiwan possessed the capability to re-unify China on its own terms.

Presently, however, the PRC is an economic and military power, and the concern entails Taiwan declaring its independence.

Consequently, the PRC has increased its intimidation of Taiwan; military aircraft routinely venture close to the island and exercises are increasingly coercive in nature.

Former Ambassador Richard Haass made the argument for strategic clarity by which the PRC patently understands using force against Taiwan will entail war with America.

Two Asia scholars, Nien-chung Chang-Liao and Chi Fang, have countered the shift would embolden pro-independence constituencies and ensure a war the shift is supposed to avert. Moreover, they asserted ambiguity restrains pro-independence forces and, more importantly, underscores that the commitment is conditional and that Taiwan needs the commitment more than the US.

However, ambiguity also introduces the following risk -- if Taiwan fears abandonment, it might restart its abandoned nuclear weapon program.

Such "nuclear anxiety" is dangerous because, even if the security commitment is made clearer, Taiwan may conclude the optimal path still entails developing nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

A catastrophic war over Taiwan can be prevented, in part, by exhaustively assessing the risks.

Net assessments constitute a principal framework for analyzing the national security strategy of the United States and they were indispensable to Cold War strategic planning.

To inform strategic planning in the Western Pacific, President Trump should direct his National Security Council to undertake a comprehensive net assessment of both the PRC and Taiwan. All assumptions must be stress tested and all strategic interactions -- economic, military, political -- must be gamed out. The stakeholders should be subject matter experts from across the government.

And it must be iterative. Net assessment is a "practice" in which various stakeholders possessing particular perspectives and independent information will, on an ongoing basis, reveal a rich variety of advantageous courses of action.

Critical structural deficiencies are part of both Russia’s and China’s military DNA. And note, Israel did not believe war would occur until 1975.

Nearly every utterance and instance of American support prompts Chinese protests; yet, in seventy-five years, no invasion has ever been attempted. According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, strategic clarity only imperiled Ukraine.

Ultimately, miscalculated military capabilities and untested commitments will only further conflate capabilities with intentions, misdirect scarce resources, and spawn strategies of desperation.

R. Jordan Prescott is a private contractor working in defense and national security since 2002. He has been published in The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, Modern War Institute, 19fortyfive, and RealClearDefense.

20. China's Digital Strategy: Cyber-Espionage and Biometric Surveillance in Global Technological Expansion

Excerpts:

Integration of Strategies and Global Implications

China's strategic integration of cyber-espionage in agricultural IoT networks and the global export of advanced biometric surveillance systems is more than a pursuit of technological advancement—it is a deliberate effort to reshape geopolitical influence through digital means. By embedding its technology into the critical infrastructures of emerging economies, Beijing gains unparalleled access to vast datasets that serve both economic and political objectives.

One emerging scenario is the potential intersection of these datasets in influencing food aid decisions during political unrest. Agricultural IoT systems could identify regions at risk of famine, while biometric data profiles assess local populations to gauge levels of dissent or compliance. By aligning aid distribution with behavioral trends, China could selectively stabilize or destabilize regions to further its strategic goals, deepening reliance on its technological and economic infrastructure.

Through proprietary standards and AI-driven insights, China embeds global dependencies that not only reduce partner nations' autonomy but also enhance Beijing's ability to shape international norms. This data-driven approach cements China's influence in a new era of geopolitical power defined by digital dependencies.

China's Digital Strategy – Cyber Espionage ...

By Carlo J.V. Caro

December 05, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/05/chinas_digital_strategy__cyber_espionage_1076548.html?mc_cid=44f65dee3f

China's Digital Strategy: Cyber-Espionage and Biometric Surveillance in Global Technological Expansion

Cyber-Espionage Through IoT Standardization in Agriculture

China's infiltration into agricultural IoT (Internet of Things) networks represents a critical yet underexplored dimension of its global technological strategy. Through key players such as Huawei and Alibaba Cloud, Beijing has embedded IoT technologies into agricultural systems in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. These initiatives, often framed as development partnerships aimed at improving food production and supply chain resilience, concurrently enable the collection of extensive agricultural and environmental data with profound strategic and geopolitical implications.

Agricultural IoT systems are revolutionizing farming practices by collecting real-time, high-resolution data on variables such as soil moisture, nutrient levels, weather conditions, pest infestations, irrigation patterns, crop growth rates, and logistical movements. Chinese companies like Huawei and Alibaba are at the forefront of this technological advancement, designing platforms that support precision agriculture through the integration of advanced sensors, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence to optimize farm management.

In Kenya, Huawei has actively collaborated with local partners and the Kenya Agricultural and Livestock Research Organization to implement smart farming solutions aimed at enhancing agricultural productivity and sustainability. By deploying IoT sensors that monitor critical agricultural parameters and transmitting this data to cloud platforms where AI algorithms provide actionable insights, farmers have reportedly increased crop yields. These initiatives not only boost local agricultural productivity but also strengthen China's presence in the region's agricultural sector.

Similarly, in 2020, the Malaysian government entered into a strategic partnership with Alibaba Cloud to advance its Smart Agriculture Agenda, reflecting a commitment to leveraging digital technologies for agricultural transformation. For instance, in 2019, Malaysian agritech company Regaltech partnered with Alibaba Cloud to develop a smart farming platform for durian plantations. Utilizing Alibaba's ET Agricultural Brain, an AI-powered platform that analyzes vast amounts of agricultural data, IoT devices and drones monitor crop health, optimize resource usage, and automate farming processes. These systems have shown promising results in improving yield quality and consistency while reducing labor costs due to automation.

The strategic implications of this data aggregation are profound. In Argentina—a key supplier of soybeans to China—IOT systems provide granular insights into the production of vital commodities such as soybeans and maize. In 2022, Argentina exported 4.8 million metric tons of soybeans to China, largely for use as animal feed in its burgeoning livestock industry. By analyzing longitudinal data on crop yields, climatic conditions, and supply chain dynamics, Chinese entities can gain the ability to forecast agricultural outputs, identify vulnerabilities to droughts or pest outbreaks, and strategize imports with precision. These insights not only inform economic decisions but also equip Beijing with leverage in trade negotiations with critical partners.

The geopolitical utility of such data is striking. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, IoT systems monitoring declining yields of staple crops due to drought could enable China to secure imports before market disruptions occur. In 2022, China’s agricultural machinery market was valued at over $24 billion, with significant exports to African nations incorporating IoT-enabled "smart farming" solutions underpinned by Chinese cloud infrastructure. These systems, while marketed as tools for development, create dependencies that enhance China's influence. Data access, often governed by opaque agreements, allows Beijing to maintain strategic leverage over countries that adopt these technologies, especially in scenarios involving climate shocks or food crises.

Moreover, agricultural IoT data could be weaponized to manipulate trade dynamics. A pertinent case is Kazakhstan, where Chinese investments in agricultural infrastructure have integrated IoT systems for monitoring key crops such as wheat and soybeans. With precise yield data, Beijing can forecast shortages or surpluses, negotiate trade terms to its advantage, and adjust import strategies accordingly. Historical parallels, such as China's imposition of tariffs on Australian barley and wine in 2020 following diplomatic tensions, underscore its willingness to leverage trade relationships for geopolitical objectives. While these actions did not involve IoT, they highlight a pattern of exploiting economic dependencies as instruments of influence.

The situation in Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) provides another revealing example. China has introduced advanced irrigation systems and IoT-based crop management technologies to modernize Pakistani agriculture. Although data-sharing agreements remain unclear, the integration of IoT systems grants China a window into wheat and cotton production trends, enabling preemptive adjustments to imports or policy recommendations that align with its broader geopolitical goals. Similarly, in Laos and Cambodia, Chinese IoT technologies embedded in agricultural systems raise concerns about data sovereignty. These systems potentially allow Beijing to identify food security vulnerabilities, influencing domestic policies and reinforcing economic reliance on Chinese infrastructure.

China’s push for global IoT standardization through initiatives like China Standards 2035 is central to its ambitions in technology and data governance. By embedding proprietary IoT protocols into international frameworks, Beijing ensures that its technologies remain indispensable to global IoT networks. Huawei and ZTE are at the forefront of exporting IoT solutions, particularly to Latin America, where Huawei's smart agriculture platforms have gained traction. The integration of Chinese-developed encryption technologies ensures compatibility with domestic platforms, consolidating China's control over these ecosystems and enhancing its capacity to collect and process strategic data.

This influence extends to the control of information flows. Under China's Data Security Law, companies must share data with state authorities under specific conditions, raising the potential for Beijing to access sensitive information from regions dependent on Chinese technologies. Cross-referencing IoT agricultural data with trade and infrastructure insights could yield comprehensive, multi-layered intelligence on partner nations. Although no concrete evidence has emerged to confirm systematic exploitation of IoT data, such capabilities align with China’s data-driven strategy to extend its influence globally.

The cybersecurity risks associated with agricultural IoT also warrant attention. The 2021 cyberattack on Brazil’s JBS Foods, which disrupted global supply chains for weeks, illustrates the vulnerabilities inherent in digitized agricultural systems. If IoT networks established by Chinese companies were similarly targeted, recovery efforts could be hindered by Beijing's potential control over critical data, complicating mitigation and policy responses. Such scenarios highlight the dual-use nature of IoT technologies as tools for both development and strategic leverage.

Despite the growing significance of agricultural IoT in China's digital strategy, it remains an underexplored topic. Analysts and policymakers often focus on areas like telecommunications and AI, neglecting intersections with food security, climate vulnerability, and geopolitical stability. For instance, the USDA's 2021 report on agricultural innovation failed to address strategic risks posed by foreign-controlled IoT systems. Meanwhile, Huawei continues to expand its presence in Latin America, embedding IoT technologies in a region that plays a pivotal role in global agricultural exports.

Advanced Biometric Surveillance and Behavioral Data Exploitation

Complementing its cyber-espionage activities in agriculture, China has significantly advanced its capabilities in biometric surveillance and behavioral data exploitation. This represents a critical axis of its global digital strategy, intertwining technological innovation with its broader geopolitical ambitions. State-backed enterprises such as Hikvision and Dahua, alongside AI pioneers like SenseTime and Megvii, have spearheaded the development of technologies that extend far beyond traditional facial recognition. Innovations such as gait recognition, voiceprint identification, and emotion detection systems enable unprecedented behavioral monitoring, offering granular insights that elevate surveillance capabilities to new levels.

By 2023, Chinese firms had exported biometric surveillance systems to more than 80 countries across Africa, South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. For instance, the Safe City initiative in Kenya, involving approximately 1,800 Hikvision cameras integrated into centralized police monitoring networks in Nairobi, underscores the depth of Chinese involvement. Similarly, in Lahore, Pakistan, Huawei’s surveillance infrastructure merges biometric data with urban management systems under the aegis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Beyond hardware installations, Chinese firms embed proprietary software ecosystems and advanced machine learning algorithms into these projects, consolidating control over data pipelines and fostering dependencies on Chinese-managed platforms.

The implications of these systems extend well beyond surface-level monitoring. In Zimbabwe, Chinese surveillance cameras equipped with AI analytics have reportedly been deployed to profile political dissidents. In Serbia, a Chinese-developed Safe City system sparked controversy when facial recognition technology was used to track anti-government protesters. These deployments often come with opaque licensing agreements, debt-financed installations, and extensive service contracts, creating long-term technological and financial dependencies.

Chinese biometric surveillance technologies have achieved levels of precision previously considered theoretical. For example, Watrix, a global leader in gait recognition, claims its systems can identify individuals with 96% accuracy from distances exceeding 50 meters, even in crowded environments or when faces are obscured. Such technologies have been deployed in sensitive regions like Xinjiang, where authorities use them to monitor Uighur populations and flag "abnormal behavior." Meanwhile, in Shanghai, hospitals employ gait recognition systems to restrict unauthorized access, highlighting the technology’s versatility across both security and civilian applications.

Emotion recognition, another frontier in Chinese AI, adds further depth to the surveillance arsenal. By analyzing micro-expressions, vocal intonations, and physiological cues, these systems can infer emotional states with applications ranging from education to law enforcement. For example, in Hangzhou's Smart Schools initiative, cameras reportedly monitor students’ emotions to optimize classroom management—a practice raising ethical concerns about privacy and mental health. In Xinjiang, similar systems are allegedly employed to evaluate detainees’ stress levels during interrogations. These tools serve China’s broader strategy of "stability maintenance," embedding surveillance into everyday life to ensure societal control.

Domestically, biometric surveillance underpins China's Social Credit System, which fuses big data analytics with behavior monitoring to regulate individual and corporate conduct. In cities like Shenzhen, facial recognition cameras identify jaywalkers, publicly displaying their images to shame violators. Some systems go further, sending offenders text messages and linking penalties to their social accounts. While the system’s broader claims—such as restricting access to education or healthcare—remain contentious, its documented impacts include travel restrictions. By 2018, millions of citizens with low social credit scores were barred from purchasing airline and high-speed rail tickets, illustrating how the system enforces compliance through access limitations.

Internationally, the export of Chinese surveillance technology poses profound risks, especially in nations with weak regulatory frameworks. These countries effectively import not just the hardware but also a governance model that facilitates authoritarian practices. In Uganda, Huawei’s $126 million CCTV system, ostensibly designed for crime prevention in Kampala, has been criticized for its use in monitoring opposition figures. In Ethiopia, allegations of misuse have been compounded by reports of data breaches linked to Chinese-built infrastructure, such as the African Union headquarters. These examples illustrate the dual vulnerabilities of technological dependency and political exploitation.

The integration of Chinese standards into emerging markets’ governance infrastructures represents a strategic entrenchment of Beijing’s influence. These systems often come with opaque agreements, proprietary protocols, and maintenance requirements that bind adopters to Chinese firms, embedding surveillance into the operational fabric of public administration. Beyond operational functionality, such exports normalize invasive practices, undermining democratic norms and fostering climates of fear. For nations lacking stringent safeguards, this erosion of civil liberties not only suppresses opposition but also undermines sovereignty, creating a governance model that aligns more closely with authoritarian principles than with democratic ideals.

Integration of Strategies and Global Implications

China's strategic integration of cyber-espionage in agricultural IoT networks and the global export of advanced biometric surveillance systems is more than a pursuit of technological advancement—it is a deliberate effort to reshape geopolitical influence through digital means. By embedding its technology into the critical infrastructures of emerging economies, Beijing gains unparalleled access to vast datasets that serve both economic and political objectives.

One emerging scenario is the potential intersection of these datasets in influencing food aid decisions during political unrest. Agricultural IoT systems could identify regions at risk of famine, while biometric data profiles assess local populations to gauge levels of dissent or compliance. By aligning aid distribution with behavioral trends, China could selectively stabilize or destabilize regions to further its strategic goals, deepening reliance on its technological and economic infrastructure.

Through proprietary standards and AI-driven insights, China embeds global dependencies that not only reduce partner nations' autonomy but also enhance Beijing's ability to shape international norms. This data-driven approach cements China's influence in a new era of geopolitical power defined by digital dependencies.

Carlo J.V. Caro has a master's degree from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst.

21. A-10s are being spotted in Syria. Here’s how they’re being used.

How could we ever get rid of our utility infielder that can play every position in every situation?

A-10s are being spotted in Syria. Here’s how they’re being used.

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · December 4, 2024

A-10 Warthog attack planes have been spotted flying over eastern Syria in recent days.

And as Syrian rebel forces advance, posing the greatest threat to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in years, rumors have swirled online about the aircraft’s possible role in strikes against his allied forces.

A video of an A-10 flying low over a village, reportedly in eastern Syria near the Iraq border and one highlighted by The Aviationist, fueled rumors that U.S. forces were supporting Syrian rebel advances with the A-10′s renowned firepower.

But an official source with knowledge of the event told Defense News Wednesday that the A-10′s involvement in Syrian airspace has been far more limited, with flights largely conducted as shows of force in the east.

Some videos circulating are also older clips, the source added.

One video making the rounds, meanwhile, was taken the morning of Dec. 3, around the time U.S. Central Command forces carried out a strike near Military Support Site Euphrates.

The source told Defense News on Wednesday that A-10s flew in the area as a “show of force,” but were not directly involved in the strike.

That particular operation destroyed several weapon systems, including three truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers, a T-64 tank, an armored personnel carrier and mortars, CENTCOM said in a release.

Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon’s press secretary, told reporters Tuesday that the targets, which were not directly hit by A-10s, “presented a clear and imminent threat to U.S. and coalition forces.”

The U.S. is still assessing what forces operated those weapons, Ryder said, but noted Iran-backed militia groups in that area have previously attacked MSS Euphrates.

CENTCOM forces struck those targets after the rocket launchers, APC and mortars were fired toward U.S. personnel, officials said. Ryder told reporters at the Pentagon Monday that no U.S. personnel were injured and no infrastructure was damaged.

In a separate incident on Nov. 29, however, A-10 aircraft struck a “hostile target” — specifically, individuals seen preparing a rocket rail — that posed a threat to forces at MSS Euphrates, Ryder said.

Ryder emphasized that the strikes were solely meant to defend U.S. and coalition troops and to eliminate threats to personnel at MSS Euphrates.

He added that they had no connection to rebel movements against the Assad regime, stressing instead that U.S. forces are there to defeat the remnants of the Islamic State militant group, or ISIS.

“The self-defense actions … were in no way related to ongoing operations in and around Aleppo or northwest Syria,” Ryder said. “The U.S. mission in Syria remains unchanged as U.S. and coalition forces continue to focus on the enduring defeat of ISIS. However, we remain fully prepared to defend and protect our personnel and assets deployed in the region to include our forces deployed to Syria.”

The Air Force deployed additional A-10s to the Middle East in October 2023, as part of the Pentagon’s larger effort to move more troops and aircraft there shortly after the eruption of the war between Israel and Hamas.

More A-10s have arrived since.

On Nov. 5, U.S. Air Forces Central Command posted a series of photographs online under the header, “Additional A-10s arrive in the Middle East.”

Those A-10s are part of the 107th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, deployed from the 127th Wing at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan. The photographs were from Oct. 6, but AFCENT did not say where they were taken.

A-10 Warthogs were heavily used during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and against ISIS. They are rugged, heavily armored planes armed with a devastating 30mm rotary cannon that can shoot up to 3,900 rounds per minute.

They were originally designed during the Cold War as Soviet tank killers, and in the 2000s were used as close air support aircraft, flying low and slow to assist troops on the ground.

The Air Force is now moving to retire the A-10, which the service says would not be survivable against an advanced adversary such as China.

About Stephen Losey

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

22. Austin endorses women in combat jobs and exhorts West Point cadets to defend the Constitution

I think it is always instructive to review and reflect upon our oaths of office when we talk about supporting and defending the Constitution.

I will never forget meeting a PLA Brigadier General at the Kunming Military Academy who thought I was the political officer for the delegation that was visiting. When I informed him that the US military does not have political officers he was incredulous and asked how we ensure the ideological purity of our soldiers, I informed him that the single ideological focus of the members of the US military was simply to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

(He also asked how we ensure the welfare of our soldiers and I informed him that is what we have an NCO corps for. I told him that it is our senior NCOs who advise commanders about the health and welfare of soldiers and that we do not need political officers who could never meet the high standards of the American NCO).

Oath of Commissioned Officers

I ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God. (Title 5 U.S. Code 3331, an individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services).

https://www.army.mil/values/officers.html

Oath of Enlistment

I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God. (Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962).

https://www.army.mil/values/oath.html

Austin endorses women in combat jobs and exhorts West Point cadets to defend the Constitution

By LOLITA C. BALDOR

Updated 7:00 PM EST, December 4, 2024

AP · December 5, 2024

Politics

WASHINGTON (AP) — Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin used a speech at West Point Wednesday to forcefully endorse having women in combat roles and emphasize the military’s obligation to defend the U.S. Constitution — ideals some fear may come under fire in the upcoming Trump administration.

Speaking to cadets at the U.S. Military Academy in New York, he recalled commanding troops during the early days of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He said he wanted to keep his command post at the front where he could see the fight, but he told his soldiers that the risks were serious and any of them could stay back and no one would think less of them.

It was one of the women, he said, that was first to challenge him on it.

“In no uncertain terms, they were telling me to stop talking and get to the fight. And that is who the women of the United States military are,” said Austin.

His remarks are in contrast to some made by the man Trump has tapped to be Austin’s successor to lead the Pentagon. Pete Hegseth, a Fox News co-host and former Army National Guard soldier, has made it clear that he believes men and women should not serve together in combat units.

A month ago, he told podcast host Shawn Ryan that, “I’m straight up just saying we should not have women in combat roles. It hasn’t made us more effective. Hasn’t made us more lethal. Has made fighting more complicated.”

Austin, a retired four-star general who has spent more than 40 years in the Army and commanded at every level, pushed back, saying he’s seen incredibly capable and brave women fighting for their country in battle.

“So look, if I get a little fired up about this, it’s just because this isn’t 1950. It isn’t 1948. It is 2024,” said Austin. “And any military that turns away tough, talented patriots — women or men — is just making itself weaker and smaller. So enough already.”

While never mentioning President-elect Donald Trump, Hegseth or the incoming administration, Austin also admonished the cadets to remember their sworn duty to defend the Constitution.

His remarks echoed others who have warned about the potential for Trump to try and use active-duty military troops to police the southern border, deport immigrants who don’t have legal permanent status, and even on city streets to combat urban crime. And through his campaign, Trump has renewed his pledge to deploy troops within the U.S. when he deems necessary.

During his first term, as riots against police brutality roiled the nation, Trump pushed to deploy military personnel on Washington, D.C. street. Top military officers, such as then-Gen. Mark Milley, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, resisted those plans, including issuing a memo that stressed that every member of the military “swears an oath to support and defend the Constitution and the values embedded within it.”

“We defend government of the people, by the people, and for the people — and we do not bend on matters of honor, integrity, or law,” Austin said at West Point. “We are here to protect our people, to defend our country, and to uphold our Constitution. And that is not negotiable.”

___

AP · December 5, 2024

23. Maximizing Defense Innovation While Holding the Line on Export Controls: What the Defense Sector Can Learn from Global Banks

Excerpts:

To mitigate these risks, some global correspondent banks provide capacity-building training to their client banks on how to improve their financial crime controls, such as how to conduct effective due diligence on different types of clients, how to recognize indicators of money laundering, or how to screen transactions for sanctions red flags.

Global correspondent banks have extensive resources and, by the nature of their business, broad experience on these threats and mitigations. By helping develop capacity in their client banks, they strengthen the client banks’ ability to protect themselves and as a result it is less likely that the correspondent will be exposed to illicit financial flows.

There are additional benefits: the global correspondent bank’s commercial relationship with its client banks is strengthened by providing this support—and by removing weak points, the integrity of the financial system overall is better protected.

Adapting this model, larger defense companies could provide training on export controls to their smaller suppliers and partners, or they could establish outreach initiatives to support capacity building in the wider defense sector. By sharing the knowledge and resource advantages that come from scale, defense primes can strengthen relationships between larger and smaller defense businesses, provide a more favorable environment for innovation, and strengthen the defense industrial base. In this way, innovation will be accelerated and our collective perimeter will be strengthened against our adversaries.

Maximizing Defense Innovation While Holding the Line on Export Controls: What the Defense Sector Can Learn from Global Banks - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Catherine Woods · December 5, 2024

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An investigation conducted since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago identified 450 components of Russian weapon systems that were made by foreign manufacturers. An alarmingly large number of these—318, according to the Royal United Services Institute researchers who conducted the examination—were made by US companies. Even more striking is that 18 percent of these items are subject to export controls.

One objective of export controls is to ensure that US-made components are not used in Russian weapons. Of course, some may have been purchased before export controls were put in place. But Russia very likely managed to procure others by circumventing measures specifically designed to stop it from doing so. How? And more importantly, what can be done to resolve this and issues like it?

The contribution made by the private sector to the defense mission is widely recognized, with initiatives such as the Defense Innovation Unit focused on the adoption of commercial technology to tap into private sector innovation. And that innovation comes not only from large and well-established defense companies, known as primes, but from start-ups and small businesses. These nontraditional defense businesses comprise 73 percent of the US industrial base and, as the US National Defense Industrial Strategy acknowledges, “improve DoD’s technology edge and capabilities.” They offer new thinking, agility, and diversification of the industrial base. Their important role, however, also sheds light on the challenges of implementing export controls.

Western Innovation: A Target for Adversaries

In the same way as the United States and its allies see the advantages of innovation, so do their adversaries. Western technology is highly sought after for its quality and reliability. The number of US-made parts in the weapon systems Russia is using in Ukraine offers a case in point.

The United States’ Disruptive Technology Strike Force was established by the Justice and Commerce Departments in early 2023 to respond to this threat and prevent advanced technology from being acquired by adversaries. It pursues action on export control violations and related offenses with the objective of protecting military and dual-use items from misuse by our adversaries.

Military items are simple to define, for the most part. Classifying items as dual-use, by contrast, can be more complicated. These items can have both military and civilian applications, and they include software and technology as well as physical goods. An example of a dual-use item is a triggered spark gap, which is a key component in medical devices used to break up kidney stones—but can also be used in the firing sequence of a nuclear weapon.

Verifying whether an export is permitted requires consideration of the end user, end use, destination, and other factors. These requirements are particularly complex to apply to dual-use items because illicit procurement networks may misrepresent acquisitions as being for a legitimate civilian purpose to obscure that the item will be diverted for a prohibited use.

Navigating the Regulatory Labyrinth: Parallels between Defense and Banks

While start-ups and smaller businesses are critical to innovation and a key component of the defense industrial base, they also face unique challenges. They have less reliable cash flows and limited financial reserves, and are described by the National Defense Industrial Strategy as more “fragile” than larger, established companies. This characterization not only applies to their financial positions but may also apply to the resources available to meet stringent Department of Defense standards and regulatory requirements including export controls. Smaller and specialist companies are also often targeted by adversaries who perceive them as being more vulnerable, according to the Royal United Services Institute report.

The defense sector—both its military and government stakeholders as well as those from industry—must work together to gain the innovation advantages that start-ups and smaller businesses can provide, while also ensuring they do not provide a chink in the amor of our collective defense. The way that large financial institutions work closely with financial startups, called fintechs, provides one model for success.

Export controls are complex and require significant resources to apply effectively. While a defense prime may understand its obligations and have the resources to implement an effective export control compliance program, this may not always apply to smaller or newer companies. These businesses may be product led, without an embedded understanding of regulatory requirements from the start. They may not have the same resources or experience to identify the potential misuse of their products or technology. For example, a manufacturer of a small unmanned aircraft system may intend it to be used to deliver medical supplies for disaster relief—a worthy humanitarian purpose—but it could also be easily used to deliver other payloads.

The adversaries of these export controls are sophisticated illicit procurement networks that adopt many of the techniques and methodologies honed by transnational criminal groups. These include use of front companies and shell companies to obscure the real buyer; transshipments through countries less likely to raise alarm to obscure the ultimate destination; and knowledge of how to misrepresent the end-user or intended use to avoid prompting concerns.

The challenges and opportunities faced by smaller defense businesses, particularly start-ups, relative to larger and well-established companies have parallels with the financial sector. Large financial institutions have many similarities with defense primes. They operate in an environment where regulatory requirements are stringent, and their size and financial resources mean that they have large and experienced compliance teams to ensure their obligations are fulfilled. They have a depth of experience in identifying threats—for banks, examples include money laundering, sanctions evasion, or financing of terrorism—and implementing controls to manage them effectively.

Fintechs—technology-centric start-ups or smaller businesses in financial services—do not share these advantages and have similarities with their equivalents in defense. Firstly, they may be product led, meaning the founders establish a business with a product and the potential market opportunity (rather than compliance) in mind. When compliance requirements are identified subsequently as a business grows, it becomes more complex and costly for them to be retrofitted. Secondly, these smaller fintechs may not have access to the same resources or experience to implement effective programs to prevent, detect, and respond to threats. And thirdly, they may be more actively targeted by adversaries who seek potential vulnerabilities, whether in the financial system to launder money or in the defense sector to acquire controlled items.

Banking: A Potential Blueprint

For smaller defense businesses, it may not be necessary nor realistic to have a large in-house export control compliance team. What is necessary is for all staff to be capable of identifying the red flags of illicit procurement and to understand the actions they must take—which may include sourcing external experts. The value of training is recognized by regulators: the US Bureau of Industry and Security, which administers the US dual-use export control regime, may require staff training by noncompliant organizations as part of its enforcement settlements.

However, proactive training can be more effective than mandating it after a violation. In financial services, all staff within a financial institution are provided with training on financial crime risks as part of their new-joiner process, along with regular refreshers. Staff with critical responsibilities receive in-depth training adapted to their specific roles.

In defense, proactive training could provide staff with the knowledge to prevent items being procured by adversaries—a better outcome than enforcement action for failures. In addition, provision of training demonstrates the company’s intent and commitment to fulfill its regulatory obligations, which may be viewed positively should a breach still occur despite its diligence.

In the financial sector, some global banks, called correspondents, shoulder the responsibility of protecting the integrity of the financial system by building capacity beyond their own institutions. Defense primes could consider a similar approach.

A correspondent bank is a global bank that has other banks as its clients. These client banks may be small, they may operate in countries with weak financial crime regulatory regimes, or they may have less experience taking effective action against sophisticated transnational criminal networks. However, if the client bank has weaknesses in its controls and it processes illicit transactions—such as the proceeds of crime or funds being raised for terrorism—they will be processed through the global bank’s systems. The global bank can be subject to regulatory enforcement action, even if the transactions originated with the client bank.

To mitigate these risks, some global correspondent banks provide capacity-building training to their client banks on how to improve their financial crime controls, such as how to conduct effective due diligence on different types of clients, how to recognize indicators of money laundering, or how to screen transactions for sanctions red flags.

Global correspondent banks have extensive resources and, by the nature of their business, broad experience on these threats and mitigations. By helping develop capacity in their client banks, they strengthen the client banks’ ability to protect themselves and as a result it is less likely that the correspondent will be exposed to illicit financial flows.

There are additional benefits: the global correspondent bank’s commercial relationship with its client banks is strengthened by providing this support—and by removing weak points, the integrity of the financial system overall is better protected.

Adapting this model, larger defense companies could provide training on export controls to their smaller suppliers and partners, or they could establish outreach initiatives to support capacity building in the wider defense sector. By sharing the knowledge and resource advantages that come from scale, defense primes can strengthen relationships between larger and smaller defense businesses, provide a more favorable environment for innovation, and strengthen the defense industrial base. In this way, innovation will be accelerated and our collective perimeter will be strengthened against our adversaries.

Catherine Woods is an experienced global financial services professional who has held senior and specialist positions in financial intelligence, external liaison, and export controls. She also serves in the Royal Air Force Reserves where she is a specialist in military-industry partnerships and coalitions, particularly those focused on innovation and emerging technologies.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the United Kingdom Royal Air Force and Ministry of Defence.

Image credit: US Air Force

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Catherine Woods · December 5, 2024

24. NATO readies countermeasures to combat Russian, Chinese hybrid warfare, bloc chief says

NATO readies countermeasures to combat Russian, Chinese hybrid warfare, bloc chief says

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · December 4, 2024

A U.S. airman analyzes a network during a cyber exercise at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, in 2022. Cybercrime is among the tactics being used by Russia and China in a stepped-up campaign of hybrid warfare against Western allies, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said Dec. 4, 2024, during a meeting of the bloc's foreign ministers. (Jared Lovett/U.S. Air Force)

Countries in the U.S.-led NATO alliance must find new ways of countering the stepped-up efforts by Russia and China to destabilize Europe with sabotage campaigns, the bloc’s top official said Wednesday.

Cybercrime, attacks on infrastructure and the weaponization of energy are among their tactics, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said during a meeting of allied foreign ministers.

“We have to discuss how we will defend ourselves,” Rutte said. “And that means that you will look at ways to have better intelligence sharing, but also making sure that we can protect our critical infrastructure.”

Foreign ministers agreed Wednesday to a set of “proactive measures,” including more exercises, Rutte said. Allies also will get tough on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil-exporting ships, said Rutte, who did not offer specifics on the various plans in the works.

Rutte, who hosted the two-day meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, emphasized that increased cooperation between China and Russia poses challenges on a variety of fronts.

The military and financial support Russia has received from Beijing for Moscow’s war effort point to the increasingly global nature of the battle in Ukraine, Rutte said.

Iran and North Korea’s separate contributions to Russia’s military campaign also raises broader security risks for the West, he said.

Meanwhile, U.S. and European military officials for months have been alarmed by increasingly brazen acts of sabotage that are believed to have been carried out by Russian agents. China also has been suspected of recent mischief.

“Both Russia and China have tried to destabilize our countries and divide our societies with acts of sabotage, cyberattacks and energy blackmail,” he said.

Two weeks ago, Swedish officials launched an investigation into a Chinese cargo ship that was navigating in the vicinity of two Baltic Sea communications cables connecting Germany and Finland and Lithuania and Sweden, respectively, that were severed.

The vessel is suspected of having dragged its anchor over the cables, severing them. In the U.S., corporations were urged to strengthen communication networks following news of a sprawling hacking campaign that authorities say gave China access to private phone conversations of an unknown number of Americans.

Allies also have complained about acts of arson, an assassination attempt on an industrial leader in Germany and instances of sabotage at various logistics centers.

In June, U.S. military bases in Europe were put on heightened alert in connection with potential threats to installations across the Continent.

While the Pentagon never specified the nature of the threat, CNN reported in July that the move came in response to information that Russia-backed actors were considering sabotage attacks against American military personnel and facilities.

Gen. Darryl Williams, the U.S. Army’s top commander in Europe, said during an October meeting in Washington that the risks of broader military escalation are growing.

John Vandiver

John covers U.S. military activities across Europe and Africa. Based in Stuttgart, Germany, he previously worked for newspapers in New Jersey, North Carolina and Maryland. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · December 4, 2024

25. The Berlin Wall Would Soon Tumble, Divided States Would Reunite. My Work Was Done.

An interesting personal historical perspective.

The author has a very interesting background. I assume from the editor's note that this former Air Force officer who served in "Strategic Air Command’s ICBM operations" was incarcerated when he wrote this.

The Berlin Wall Would Soon Tumble, Divided States Would Reunite. My Work Was Done.

thewarhorse.org · by Raymond Melberg · December 4, 2024

Editor’s Note: This story was published in partnership with San Quentin News and was written during a writing seminar for incarcerated veterans in April hosted by The War Horse at California’s San Quentin Rehabilitation Center. Tens of thousands of military veterans are incarcerated across the United States, and these stories are intended to shine a light on their unique needs, challenges, and experiences. Learn about the seminar here.

I’d cautiously moved forward some 30 feet in the gloom of salt vapor lights and hulking shapes of tractor trailers and stacks of camouflage when the hair on my neck started to tingle and rise.

The party behind me represented my worst nightmare for the last two decades—avowed enemies who’d lived in my crosshairs and who regarded me just the same. First was the Russian translator. Ten inspectors followed, including four in bearskin caps and three KGB members in polo shirts and faded blue jeans with fat rolls of American money stuffed in their pockets like rebellious teenagers.

A high-ranking member of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces in a campaign uniform and hat acted as team leader, but the real power was with the four political members, two of them women.

The group comprised the first inspection team of the NATO/Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. Signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on Dec. 8, 1987, the nuclear arms-control accord would eliminate the countries’ stocks of mobile land-based missiles that could carry nuclear warheads.

I was chief of safety for the U.S. Air Force at the 501st Tactical Missile Wing at RAF Greenham Common in Berkshire, United Kingdom.

Leg Irons, Memories of Service, and What Might Have Been Echo From Behind Bars

The slow march continued, its purpose to count the nuclear arsenals—verifying their presence in an operational posture.

That morning, I’d grabbed my briefcase, patted the head of my five-year-old son, Derek, who was dressed in a jumper and shorts for the local infant school, kissed his mother, and said I would be late that evening. I had a busy day ahead.

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signing the INF Treaty in the East Room in December 1987. (Photo courtesy of White House Photographic Collection)

I drove from Kingsclere, seven kilometers north to RAF Greenham Common in Berkshire, where the ground-launched cruise missile system was installed in partnership with the Royal Air Force to provide NATO a heavy response to SS-20 IRBMS and 17 divisions of closely positioned armor tanks. Planners speculated Soviet forces, without heavy opposition, were just seven days from the English Channel. Fully deployed, the ground-launched cruise missile system was the heavy opposition.

The walk continued slowly past the transporter erector launchers that faced us to the rear and their impressive, eight-wheel-drive MAN tractors.

The exhaust doors at the rocket discharge end were propped open so the team could count each of the four mounted missiles and keep tabs on the number of transporter erector launchers they observed. On a far wall was a line of X-shaped nuclear weapon warhead shipping containers soon to be put to work. They were light blue in color but of no interest to the inspectors since the treaty only addressed reductions in launchers and missiles. Of course, I knew the KGB was taking account of everything.

Arriving at RAFGC, I squeezed past the women of Greenham Common who lived crowded around the main gate in a tent city, protesting the presence of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom. They’d been here since before the ground was broken for the ground-launched cruise missile system installation, getting up early every morning to make life interesting as the airmen coming to work ran the gauntlet.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty was about to give them everything they asked for, but I don’t think they knew it yet. The gate rolled shut behind me, disappointing the women.

A long day lay ahead of me: a final briefing, drilling on what-ifs, and protracted after-action reports. The visitors were slated to depart on their Soviet transport the next morning.

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The walk continued, passing the first flight of four transporter erector launchers. We’d cleared the entrance by 50 feet, and the door opened again to admit the trailing first aid team who’d shadowed us through all the barns. Thereafter, the security team—four of our intrepid flight security personnel—kept a respectable rearguard as we advanced flight by flight until all six were surveyed.

As the count came to a close, I reflected on my own career, first as a young lieutenant in Strategic Air Command’s ICBM operations where I’d spent hours, days 30 feet underground in a Titan II launch control center in the desert of Arizona. We spent days ready to execute the 58-second countdown of the nation’s most powerful weapon, capable of responding with lethality to an attack by Russia or China’s nuclear forces. The threat of counterforce proved its effect during the Cold War.

A view from above the silo housing a Titan II missile at the Titan Missile Museum in Green Valley, Arizona. (Photo courtesy of the US Air Force.)

Later, I watched from the rocky shores of Sheyma as RC-135s plowed their way through fog and slough to arrive over Kamchatka where Soviet ballistic missile tests told the tale of Russian power.

In the 1980s, the tanks and nuclear missiles of the USSR crowded against the Iron Curtain needed a counterforce. The ground-launched cruise missile was that counterforce; it had done the trick. The Soviet SS-20 would draw down, the tank divisions would back off the line, and the ground-launched cruise missile system would stand down. For a time, at least, the world would be a safer place.

As these thoughts ran through my mind, I realized my work was done. The Berlin Wall was soon to tumble, border wire in Romania would no longer contain refugees from the Soviet hegemony, and divided states like Germany would soon reunite. I was just one of thousands who had made this happen, but my part was done. I confirmed in my mind my decision to retire and seek work in the civilian world.

But the count was not finished. We cleared the last flight equipment and made our way, still in line, fur caps intact, through the last door, climbed back on the yellow school bus transportation had assigned to us, cleared the last security check, negotiated the double fence topped by razor wire, and drove slowly to the visitors lodging.

It concluded in all of 45 minutes. The debriefing completed, I walked across the deserted main base, cleared for the convenience of the inspection party’s freedom of movement. To my surprise, I saw the Soviet team’s military chief and his interpreter on a walkaround of the deserted Base Exchange. As our paths crossed, the interpreter suggested we stop to talk.

I agreed, knowing I would be required to report the contact.

The Soviet colonel began talking in a formal way, as if making a banquet speech. His soliloquy seemed memorized and apparently well-practiced, as well as the interpreter’s translation. The event puzzled me. I wondered if this was a rehearsal for a more formal occasion or the frustrated regurgitation of the prepared remarks that would not have the chance to be heard. The speech opened with the standard welcome and accommodation but deteriorated into mild recrimination of the West for antagonism against the Soviet Union that had necessitated the Iron Curtain and buildup of Soviet forces.

Wasn’t it too bad, he said, that America had to go to all the expense of building the ground-launched cruise missile system and installing it to the dismay of the NATO countries. Wouldn’t it be better, he said, if we all just got along?

My blood was up.

One of two keys that would be turned by a crew commander if a missile had been launched from the launch control center inside Missile Site 8. The indicators to its right would have lit up as the launch sequence began. (Photo by Katie Lange, courtesy of the Department of Defense)

His matter-of-fact description of a world sharply divergent from the one I knew unsettled me. I looked around; no one was in sight. In as pleasant a tone as possible, I suggested that missiles and tanks arrayed against the West were sure indications that the fault did not belong entirely with the West. Also, I continued, we certainly would have spared the cost of the deployment had the obvious antagonism allowed a different approach.

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I pointed out that we were relieved that the nuclear standoff had ended, allowing me to go home and live the life that America affords. I could have mentioned, but didn’t, that I hoped the bounty his comrades had purchased from the exchange would satisfy the lust for things that Western productivity had afforded.

He blinked in surprise at my unanticipated rebuttal.

After more small talk, we departed friends. It was the last I saw of him and his team, except in the distance the next morning as the crew of their airline transport struggled to load the sea of shopping bags flooded around the aircraft. Eventually, it all disappeared on board along with the team, and we all waved a send-off as the liner accelerated down the runway and retracted the gear.

I wished them well. The count was done.

Back at home, Derek was happily playing with this Tonka toy on the living room floor, counting the blocks he could load in the bucket.

This War Horse reflection was written by Ray Melberg, edited by Kristin Davis, fact-checked by Jess Rohan, and copy-edited by Mitchell Hansen-Dewar. Abbie Bennett wrote the headlines.

thewarhorse.org · by Raymond Melberg · December 4, 2024

26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024

Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia. The US Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3 detailing the role of Putin, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, members of Russia's ruling United Russia party, Russia's Ministry of Education, and occupation officials in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in at least 314 confirmed cases of child deportation from occupied Ukraine. The report states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's deportation program and that Lvova-Belova acts as Putin's executive officer who oversees the implementation of the program. The report notes that Russian authorities have used military transport aircraft and aircraft under Putin's personal control to deport children from occupied Ukraine to intermediary holding facilities in Russia. The report states that Russian and occupation authorities have primarily deported to Russia children whom Russian authorities claim to be orphans or children without parental care and that Russian authorities have placed most of the children in Russian foster or adoptive families. The report assesses that it is highly likely that most, if not all, deported Ukrainian children have been naturalized as Russian citizens and that Russian authorities force the children to participate in a patriotic re-education program intended to Russify, militarize, and indoctrinate them into Russian cultural and historical narratives and forcibly separate them from their Ukrainian heritage. The report notes that the true number of Ukrainian children that Russia has forcibly deported to Russia remains unclear and that the number is significantly higher than the 314 children identified in the report. ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian youth to Russia. The Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.

Key Takeaways:

Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached "the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Toretsk and near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.

The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian government and major state companies.

27. Iran Update, December 4, 2024

Iran Update, December 4, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-4-2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)–aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS—is conducting a campaign that appears to have several different subordinate objectives. Fateh Mubin's main effort is focused around the city itself. The main effort aims to isolate Hama City, presumably before assaulting it. The group is supporting its main effort by interdicting regime reinforcements coming from eastern Syria in order to prevent any relief force from reaching the city.

The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. A second force to the west may be seeking to capture Hama Military Airport. A commander directs their unit to bypass an obstacle in order to maintain the momentum of an operation. The regime has positioned forces on Zain al Abidin Hill, north of the city, and Qomhana town, a key town northwest of the city. The hill is a tactically advantageous position from which a defender has sweeping views northwards up the M5 Highway. Some opposition forces likely fixed these forces while the main western Hama and eastern Hama advances proceeded southwards. Opposition forces east of Hama had proceeded directly south along the M5 Highway before swinging east, bypassing the hill. Opposition forces in the west attacked Qomhana while the remainder continued towards the Hama Military Airport. An unspecified Fateh Mubin military source cited by al Quds al Araby stated that opposition forces plan to "encircle” the city of Hama, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that opposition forces cut two major roads connecting Hama City to areas east of it.[5] Hama is not fully isolated, given major roads moving south.

Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east. Interdict is defined as a tactical mission task that “prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route ... [to] impact ... an enemy force’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions.” Opposition forces have captured SAA bases northeast of Hama and cut multiple roads far east of Hama to prevent or delay regime forces from reaching the battlefield in time to support regime forces in Hama. Pro-Syrian regime sources claimed that the SAA has continued to send reinforcements to Hama City from Raqqa and Rusafa, which are connected to Hama by these roads, to counter the expected attack on the city. Opposition forces’ advance into towns surrounding Hama with little SAA resistance suggests that the supporting line of effort has had some success.

Key Takeaways:

Hama Campaign: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key GLOCs connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east.

Eastern Syria: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.

Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah and Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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