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Quotes of the Day:
"Action without intelligence is a form of insanity, but intelligence without action is the greatest form of stupidity in the world."
– Charles F. Kettering
"The common idea that success spoils people by making them vain, egotistic and self-complacent is erroneous; on the contrary it makes them, for the most part, humble, tolerant and kind."
– William Somerset Maugham
"Iron rusts from disuse, stagnant water loses its purity, and in cold weather becomes frozen, even so does inaction sap the vigor of the mind."
– Leonardo Da Vinci
1. Ending RFA, VOA Korean services threatens national security, AI system
2. How North Korea Is Outsourcing Espionage to American Companies
3. The six fears associated with North Korean nukes
4. American Nuclear Fuel Deal With Seoul Threatens to Raise Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
5. New U.S. strategy raises questions over S. Korea's security, its role in broader Indo-Pacific
6. China's White Paper Drops 'Korean Peninsula Denuclearization'
7. Garry Kasparov thinks the West is in denial about North Korean troops in Ukraine
8. Russia-North Korea talks likely focused on resources and energy, photos suggest
9. N. Korea cracks down on home-based restaurants to force customers into state-run establishments
10. Hyesan excludes unmarried workers from China dispatch, using families as ‘hostages’ against defection
11. Seoul’s search for stability: political turmoil underscores need for a consistent North Korea policy
12. Korea on the brink
13. Crossing borders through Korean culture
14. Warning signs in Lee's inner circle
1. Ending RFA, VOA Korean services threatens national security, AI system
Summary:
The shutdown of RFA and VOA Korean services cripples a core element of U.S. national security. These outlets served as intelligence infrastructure, not just media, sustaining deep networks of sources inside north Korea and producing daily reporting that no general newsroom can replace. Their closure creates a dangerous information void as regime propaganda floods digital platforms and shapes AI training data. Future intelligence systems may rely on models built on north Korean narratives rather than independent reporting. Policymakers, analysts, human rights groups, and escapees now lose a vital lifeline. Ending these services blinds the United States at the moment clarity matters most.
Comment: From my good friend, and colleague from north Korea, Hyunseung Lee.
Voices Dec. 4, 2025 / 9:48 AM
Ending RFA, VOA Korean services threatens national security, AI system
By Hyunseung Lee
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/12/04/perspective-Korea-broadcasts-shutdown/7781764848295/
As independent journalism about North Korea disappears, regime propaganda about leader Kim Un Jong's goals and achievements is flooding digital platforms. File Pool Photo by Ekaterina Shtukina/Sputnik/EPA
Dec. 4 (UPI) -- The recent shutdown of Radio Free Asia and Voice of America Korean language services represents a critical failure in understanding how information infrastructure shapes both current national security policy decisions and the future of artificial intelligence system.
As these essential outlets go dark, North Korea, already the world's most information-scarce regime, is becoming an even greater blind spot at precisely the moment when accurate intelligence matters most.
RFA and VOA Korean services were not merely news organizations. They were intelligence-gathering infrastructures that maintained decades-long networks of escapees, internal sources and analytical expertise focused exclusively on North Korea.
Unlike general media outlets that cover North Korea episodically, these services provided daily granular reporting on sanctions enforcement, internal policy shifts, economic conditions and human rights violations. information obtained through painstaking cultivation of sources inside one of the world's most closed societies.
The specialized nature of this coverage cannot be replicated by general assignment reporters or occasional think tank analyses. Understanding North Korea requires sustained institutional knowledge, carefully maintained source relationships and deep expertise that takes years to develop. When these outlets close, that institutional memory and those source networks vanish permanently.
Dangerous asymmetry
The timing of these closures could not be worse. As independent journalism about North Korea disappears, regime propaganda is flooding digital platforms.
TikTok, YouTube and other social media channels are experiencing a surge in North Korean state-produced content, professionally crafted videos showcasing military capabilities, idealized portraits of daily life and carefully curated leadership imagery.
This content performs exceptionally well in engagement-driven algorithms, generating millions of views without critical context or counterbalancing information. We are witnessing the creation of a profoundly lopsided information environment in which authoritarian propaganda circulates freely while independent reporting evaporates.
For policymakers, this means decisions about sanctions, diplomatic engagement and security posture will increasingly rely on incomplete or biased information. For the American public, it means understanding one of our most significant adversaries through that adversary's own carefully constructed lens.
The AI dimension: training tomorrow's intelligence tools
The implications extend beyond immediate policy concerns into the architecture of artificial intelligence systems that will shape intelligence analysis for decades to come.
Large language models and AI systems are trained on vast amounts of text scraped from the Internet. The composition of that training data directly determines what these systems "know" and how they respond to queries about North Korea.
From this point forward, the digital record of North Korea will increasingly lack independent journalism as a counterweight. RFA and VOA's archives capture history only until their shutdown. Current and future developments will be documented primarily through regime-controlled channels.
When next-generation AI models are trained, systems that intelligence agencies, military planners and policy analysts will increasingly rely upon, they will ingest this fundamentally imbalanced information environment.
This is not a theoretical problem. AI systems already demonstrate knowledge gaps for regions with limited digital representation. North Korea risks becoming even more opaque in these systems, with queries about current conditions, internal politics or leadership decision-making answered based on a corpus dominated by state propaganda simply because that is what exists in the digital sphere.
Consider the trajectory: Intelligence analysts in 2035 may be using AI tools trained on data in which North Korean regime narratives vastly outnumber independent reporting. These systems might flag uncertainty, but their baseline understanding will have shifted. The information asymmetry we create today becomes embedded in the intelligence infrastructure of tomorrow.
Immediate human costs
Beyond AI and policy implications, real people are losing access to critical information right now.
North Korean escapees and their families depend on these services for news about relatives left behind and conditions in their homeland.
Human rights organizations rely on documented evidence from these outlets to maintain international pressure for accountability.
Researchers and educators need diverse, reliable sources to teach about and analyze one of the world's most concerning regimes.
Each of these communities now faces a dramatically impoverished information environment. The consequences will ripple through diplomatic negotiations, humanitarian aid decisions, human rights advocacy, and academic understanding of the Korean Peninsula.
Broader pattern
This shutdown reflects a dangerous global trend: specialized journalism covering difficult or economically unrewarding topics faces existential pressure while well-resourced authoritarian states continue producing propaganda regardless of market forces. If independent journalism cannot match this output, information landscapes naturally tilt toward those with resources and motivation to fill the void.
For closed societies like North Korea, this imbalance is existential. The regime has every incentive to shape external perceptions and no internal free press to constrain its narrative. Without dedicated external voices providing independent reporting, the information environment inevitably degrades -- with direct consequences for human understanding and machine learning.
What's at stake
The shutdown of RFA and VOA Korean services poses a fundamental question: Are we prepared to accept a future in which understanding of one of the world's most dangerous regimes is shaped primarily by that regime itself?
This affects national security policy decisions, where incomplete information leads to flawed analysis. It affects human rights, where documentation gaps mean abuses go unreported. And it affects the AI systems that will increasingly mediate human knowledge, embedding today's information asymmetries into tomorrow's intelligence tools.
Information infrastructure is not a luxury, it is a strategic necessity. For regions in which information scarcity is itself a tool of authoritarian control, independent journalism becomes a matter of national security. The closure of these vital services suggests we have failed to grasp what is truly at stake -- not merely two radio broadcasts, but our collective ability to see clearly, decide wisely and build knowledge systems that serve truth rather than power.
Restoring and expanding independent coverage of North Korea should be treated as the strategic imperative it is. The alternative is a future in which our understanding of one of the world's most pressing security challenges is filtered through Pyongyang's carefully constructed narrative in our discourse today and in our AI systems tomorrow.
Hyunseung Lee is a North Korean escapee and lead strategist at the Global Peace Foundation, with prior experience in North Korea's shipping and mining sectors and as a sergeant in the DPRK Army Special Force. He defected in 2014 due to severe governmental purges, and he holds a bachelor's degree in economics from Dongbei University of Finance and Economics and a master's degree in public administration from Columbia University.
2. How North Korea Is Outsourcing Espionage to American Companies
Summary:
north Korea is weaponizing American remote work. DPRK operatives stole the identities of dozens of U.S. citizens to secure jobs at more than 100 firms, laundering millions to fund the regime’s weapons programs and evade sanctions. The scam exposes how weak digital identity checks and remote hiring practices have become. U.S. companies must adopt zero trust, rigorously verify workers, and treat cybersecurity as national security. Fallon argues for tighter rules for remote hiring, deeper public private cyber cooperation, and reauthorization of CISA 2015 so companies can share threat data and outlearn adversaries in a new digital Cold War.
Comment: We cannot think of the mafia-like crime family cult of the Kim family regime as operating only on the Korean peninsula ruling over the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. It is a global threat in many forms.
How North Korea Is Outsourcing Espionage to American Companies
The National Interest · Pat Fallon · December 1, 2025
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/how-north-korea-is-outsourcing-espionage-to-american-companies
Blog Brand: Korea Watch
Region: Americas, and Asia
December 1, 2025
By: Pat Fallon
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US companies must take more responsibility to work with the government and prevent cyberattacks from foreign threats.
This past June, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) stated that North Korean individuals successfully compromised the identities of 80 Americans while interviewing for remote employment opportunities at over 100 US companies, including Fortune 500 companies. The real breach is identity—assuming that identity is static—but digital identities can drift and decay, leading to an erosion of trust. The DPRK-led breach caused American companies to incur losses or damages of at least $3 million, and that figure is likely just the beginning.
Historically, the North Korean threat to the United States has revolved around their military arsenal—testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that pale in comparison to our own arsenal but could still target the US Homeland. However, today’s challenge from beyond the 38th parallel amounts to something entirely different. North Korea’s cyber warfare capabilities are now an instrument of national power; they integrate espionage, financial crime, and sanctions during an enduring campaign, rather than episodic attacks.
Strategically insidious in how it exploits our self-deception about identity and access, cyber warfare continues to grow in its sophistication. The North Korean workers manipulated employers to believe they were within the United States, when in fact, many were based out of North Korea or China, and the revenue generated was transferred to North Korean-controlled accounts. Such accounts allow North Korea to skirt US sanctions and fund the regime’s weapons programs.
North Korea’s sophisticated intrusion into numerous American companies is symptomatic of broader vulnerabilities in digital authentication. These North Korean individuals were able to bypass any measures companies had in place to authenticate their identity. American companies must verify the identities of individuals they hire and ensure they are legally authorized to work in the United States.
American companies should also follow a zero-trust model, assume their organization’s servers are always under breach, and ensure identities are verified. In response to the DPRK’s sanctions evasion, the United States must revise procedures and processes related to remote workers and vulnerabilities and find ways to mitigate the threat that North Korea’s cyber apparatus poses to the homeland.
North Korea’s intrusions into the US digital space only add to the growing list of cyberattacks our adversaries have conducted: China leverages persistence, Russia weaponizes chaos, and North Korea monetizes both. To make matters worse, as AI continues to grow and become more sophisticated, our adversaries will continue to find ways to use it to undermine American interests.
Over the course of the 43-day government shutdown this year, federal agencies and employees were subject to more than 555 million cyberattacks. Our adversaries used the shutdown as an opportunity to exploit gaps in cyber workforce readiness. One must consider what a full-scale cyber assault would look like should the United States become embroiled in an actual conflict with a near-peer adversary in the near future. Cybersecurity is national security, making it critical for the United States to undertake a concentrated effort to prepare for and deter future cyber threats.
The path to real security begins with disciplined execution. Rather than the familiar pledge to “do everything we can,” the United States should first recognize its strengths in the cyber domain. The United States has a deep bench of cybersecurity tools but a lack of rigor when it comes to implementation. Furthermore, companies must continue to collaborate and find ways to work together on cyber defense.
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015) gave the private sector the authority to share information not only with the government but also among themselves. To spur private sector innovation and flexibility in addressing cyber threats, American companies must be permitted to share data and collaborate. For this reason, reauthorizing CISA 2015 beyond January 30, 2026, becomes essential.
Our adversaries are learning faster than our bureaucratic departments and agencies, and we must reverse that equation. We can’t ignore the fact that our adversaries’ tactics and means will only grow in sophistication, which means the United States must lean into its free-market advantages to spur innovation.
The “new” Cold War the United States has found itself in will be fought with computer code as much as with conventional weapons systems, and the time has come to unleash the full potential of US cyber defense. In addition to our military, our government agencies, as well as the American private sector, are all on the frontlines of the cyber domain, whether we like it or not—all must be loaded for bear.
About the Author: Pat Fallon
Rep. Pat Fallon represents Texas’ Fourth Congressional District. He is a member of the House Armed Services, Intelligence, and Oversight committees. Prior to his time in Congress, Pat Fallon represented North Texas in the State House and Senate. He also has enjoyed a decades-long successful entrepreneurial career, having founded over a dozen successful companies. Congressman Fallon is a proud graduate of the University of Notre Dame.
Image: Tan Yan Song / Shutterstock.com.
The National Interest · Pat Fallon · December 1, 2025
3. The six fears associated with North Korean nukes
Summary:
Michael Bosack argues that policy toward DPRK nuclear weapons is hobbled because policymakers do not agree on what they actually fear. He identifies six core fears: that the DPRK will use nuclear weapons, act with greater impunity, trigger wider proliferation, sell nuclear technology, practice nuclear blackmail that fractures alliances, or lose control of its arsenal to rogues. Each fear implies different deterrence, arms control, alliance management, and negotiation strategies. Until governments explicitly choose which fear drives their interests and objectives, denuclearization diplomacy will continue its familiar cycle while north Korea steadily advances its nuclear program.
Comment: The six:
- The DPRK will use its nuclear weapons.
- A nuclear-capable DPRK will act with greater impunity.
- The DPRK’s flouting of international rules and norms will incentivize other actors to follow in its footsteps.
- The DPRK will proliferate nuclear weapons and associated technology to other state and non-state actors.
- DPRK nuclear blackmail will increase the risk of abandonment by allies.
- The Kim regime will lose control of its nuclear weapons.
The six fears associated with North Korean nukes
parleypolicy.com · December 4, 2025
Kim Jong Un inspects a uranium enrichment facility, September 2024 (photo via KCNA)
What is the biggest fear associated with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons?
This is a fundamental question, but not one that has garnered a consistent answer among policymakers and analysts despite the innumerable studies, reports, and commentaries on the matter. The absence of a common understanding of the fears associated with North Korean nuclear arms affects the ability to develop consistent policies and implement effective negotiating strategies towards denuclearization goals, whatever they may be. To gain that consistency and effectiveness, it is necessary to differentiate between the fears, because each one drives disparate policy requirements and approaches to negotiation with the Kim Jong Un regime.
In any negotiation, clarity of interests is critical. Successful negotiators base their strategies on what they are trying to achieve and what they are willing to concede to get it. If negotiators are unsure of the interests associated with either of these things, they expose themselves to suboptimal approaches, incorrect application of incentives and coercion, and missed opportunities for getting what they really need from their counterparts. In the case of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear capabilities, it comes down to the problem policymakers are trying to solve; in other words, what exactly are they trying to prevent the DPRK from doing, and, in turn, what do they need to take to stop the DPRK from doing it? Thus, the things these policymakers are trying to prevent are driven by their fears. These fears drive interests, and these interests drive policy objectives.
In the case of North Korean nuclear capabilities, there are six fundamental fears that have underpinned policymaking and approaches to negotiations. To understand them, it is useful to review the recent history of the DPRK’s nuclear program and failed attempts by international actors to achieve progress in denuclearization.
Background
The North Korean nuclear issue has concerned the international community for more than three decades, starting in earnest with the first North Korean nuclear crisis from 1993 to 1994. Troubles began with the revelation that North Korea was progressing in developing an independent nuclear program. It continued with the DPRK government’s announcement that it intended to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This kicked off a security crisis, principally between the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK), and DPRK as to how to manage the fallout from the Kim regime’s decision to walk away from the global non-proliferation regime and inter-Korean agreements on the matter.
After an extended period of tensions, the U.S. government entered into negotiations with the DPRK on denuclearization, eventually concluding the “Agreed Framework” in 1994. This agreement essentially granted food aid and support for peaceful use of nuclear power in the DPRK in exchange for freezing North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. But the Agreed Framework fell apart with DPRK non-committal and U.S. congressional funding issues for the deal, leaving a brief period in which denuclearization was off the table for dialogue.
Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung during a 1994 visit to Pyongyang in which he sought to facilitate negotiations aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis (photo via the Carter Center)
That was until the Six Party Talks began in 2003. The two Koreas had entered a period of rapprochement owing to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s so-called “Sunshine Policy” towards the North, and the DPRK agreed to enter into negotiations with the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia on its nuclear program. The Six Party Talks operated intermittently for the next few years until the DPRK conducted its first nuclear warhead test on 9 October 2006. The Kim regime would conduct another on 25 May 2009.
In 2012, the U.S. government once again attempted to negotiate some parameters related to denuclearization with the 29 February “Leap Day Deal.” That agreement collapsed almost immediately with a DPRK satellite launch event shortly thereafter–something they had stated they would not do given the agreed-upon moratorium on DPRK long range missile launches.
The DPRK would conduct four more nuclear tests. Those took place on 12 February 2013, 6 January 2016, 9 September 2016, and 3 September 2017.
In 2018, the DPRK entered another period of diplomacy with the United States and South Korea, and, again, denuclearization was on the table for discussion. There were three meetings between Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump–in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom–but none produced any substantive progress on the matter. For policymakers, the denuclearization problem persists, even if they do not agree on the fundamental fear underpinning that problem.
The six fears and how to address them
Through all these years of negotiation, there have been many calls for denuclearization, but only six basic fears that have consistently provided the impetus for negotiations. This section covers these fears, as well as the unilateral policies and negotiating objectives that are most appropriate for addressing them, because they all drive different requirements.
Fear #1: The DPRK will use its nuclear weapons.
In other words, this is the concern that the DPRK cannot be deterred the same as other actors. This fear is common among those who believe the Kim regime is irrational; that is, DPRK leadership will not demonstrate the pragmatic restraint necessary for principles such as mutually assured destruction to work. It often leads to advocacy for aggressive deterrent postures that exceed what the United States and its partners have in place elsewhere in the world to counterbalance other nuclear-capable countries.
If one believes that the DPRK is undeterrable or will eventually be desperate enough to use its nuclear weapons, the goal must be swift and complete denuclearization. The overarching principle is that the DPRK cannot be trusted to possess weapons of such devastating capability in any quantity at any time. As such, a four-pronged approach becomes necessary: (1) block the DPRK advancement of its nuclear capabilities; (2) deter the DPRK as much as possible; (3) maintain the military capabilities necessary to eliminate the DPRK's nuclear arsenal swiftly and effectively; and (4) build the capability to shoot down any missiles that could be carrying nuclear warheads. The only logical negotiating objective in dealing with a nuclear-armed counterpart that is not deterrable is complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization—essentially, the status quo approach by the United States and its partners.
Kim Jong Un engages with Korean People’s Army leaders during the “Fire and Fury” escalation cycle with the United States, August 2017 (photo via KCNA)
Fear #2: A nuclear-capable DPRK will act with greater impunity.
Some believe that even if the risk of the DPRK actually using its nuclear weapons remains low, the possession of nuclear capabilities will embolden the Kim regime in its illicit behaviors abroad and its escalatory activities in the region.
Since the concept here is that possession of nuclear weapons allows the DPRK to escalate nefarious actions, the country cannot be trusted to possess the weapons in any quantity at any time; however, it does not require the same level of urgency as the first fear detailed above. Thus, the goal for any government would be to rally support from the international community in elevating the costs associated with acquisition of nuclear capabilities through sanctions and isolation. A gradual, process-driven approach that attempts to reinforce international rules and norms is acceptable here. Within that approach, seeking DPRK accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and renewing DPRK commitment to denuclearization via lawful means is appropriate. It also includes the use of international inspectors and verifiers and the imposition of sanctions until major milestones are met.
The aftermath of the DPRK’s bombardment of Yeonpyeong-do, November 2010 (photo via Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense)
Fear #3: The DPRK’s flouting of international rules and norms will incentivize other actors to follow in its footsteps.
In other words, this is the fear that acceptance of the DPRK’s nuclear-armed status will cause the global nonproliferation regime to collapse. Essentially, the belief is that formal recognition and treatment of the DPRK as a nuclear state will inspire others to proliferate, too. Those that fear this not only worry about irresponsible state actors acquiring nuclear weapons (e.g., Iran), but countries like the ROK and Japan who, in response to the DPRK’s arsenal, may pursue commensurate capabilities in a new arms race.
Here, a dual track approach is necessary: first, one must deter other would-be nuclear powers from pursuing the same path as the DPRK; and second, one must reassure allies and partners who might otherwise vie to become nuclear powers themselves. To achieve these policy objectives, a government would have to rally support from the international community in elevating the costs associated with acquisition of nuclear capabilities. They would also need to offer reassurances to allies who are worried about their own lack of nuclear weapons. This may include amplifying extended deterrence messages or even stationing nuclear-capable forces on their soil, if so desired. In negotiations with the DPRK, the goal would be to achieve some measure of arms control that leads to reduction and/or elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal. Also, the negotiations should seek to push the DPRK towards international rules and norms, including accession to the nonproliferation treaty and use of international inspectors and verifiers.
Fear #4: The DPRK will proliferate nuclear weapons and associated technology to other state and non-state actors.
To put this fear plainly: this is the concern that the DPRK will sell its nuclear weapons and technology to “bad guys” in other parts of the world.
With this fear, the overarching principle is that the DPRK will not be responsible keepers of nuclear weapons and technology, so steps are needed to ensure they do not proliferate to other actors. Policymakers have three basic responsibilities: incentivize good faith behavior; track and control DPRK nuclear arsenals; and punish illicit activities. Naturally, the role of the international community is critical here. A broad network of countries is needed to keep track of DPRK proliferation, to engage in monitoring missions abroad, and, if necessary, to conduct interdiction operations. The international community must also impose punitive measures for any actor seeking to benefit from the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programs. Any negotiation with the DPRK should push towards process-based adherence to international rules and norms. Specific to the nuclear issue, the goals would be DPRK accession to the nonproliferation treaty; a DPRK commitment to denuclearization via lawful means; and the agreement to allow inspection and verification, whether by a third party or bilaterally such as the arrangement under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). A mix of incentives and coercion (likely via sanctions relief and enforcement) would be necessary to ensure major milestones are met.
A DPRK-produced rocket propelled grenade discovered in Hamas possession in Gaza, 2023 (photo via ROK National Intelligence Service)
Fear #5: DPRK nuclear blackmail will increase the risk of abandonment.
This fear is often tied to the U.S.-ROK alliance and the question of whether Americans would be willing to trade “Los Angeles for Seoul.” The reality is that if the DPRK has nuclear weapons capable of reaching Canberra, Tokyo, or other major metropolitan areas, it could feasibly deter any country’s involvement in a security conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
Here is an operative example: imagine the DPRK said, "Japan, if you allow allied forces to operate from or transit through your territory, we will target Tokyo with nuclear weapons. However, if you stay out of it, we will show restraint." How would the Japanese government respond? One cannot know for sure, but the existence of this option for the DPRK increases the risk and fear of allied abandonment.
With this fear, an operative assumption is that the DPRK would only pursue nuclear blackmail in dire circumstances where the regime itself is under threat. Thus, to address this fear, one must mitigate scenarios where the DPRK would blackmail an ally; that is, deter DPRK aggression and restrain others who might seek to execute hostile acts against the Kim regime. As for potential targets for blackmail, such threats are only effective when victims feel they have more to lose in a situation, so one must take steps toward ensuring the ally will not abandon obligations if that blackmail does eventually come.
A three-pronged approach is necessary here with measures aimed at reducing the DPRK nuclear arsenal, normalizing relations to eliminate the perception that the regime is under threat, and reaffirming allied support (e.g., reassurance of commitment to alliance obligations and drafting/finalization of operational plans). It is also prudent to establish contingency plans for situations where an ally does not meet its obligations. Meanwhile, negotiations with the DPRK should seek to push towards process-based adherence to international rules and norms. This could include arms control measures and reduction of nuclear capabilities which would help minimize the risk of these weapons being used for blackmail. Once again, a mix of incentives and coercion via sanctions relief and enforcement would be necessary to ensure major milestones are met.
Fear #6: The Kim regime will lose control of its nuclear weapons.
This is a scenario envisioned in many the novel and movie (for example, Doctor Strangelove, Crimson Tide, and Steel Rain II: The Summit): an irrational actor within a government or military seizes a nuclear weapon and demonstrates an intent to use it. In this scenario, it does not matter how rational Kim Jong Un may be if a hardliner, revolutionary, or separatist were to get a hold of a nuclear weapon and decide to employ it against the ROK, Japan, United States, or anyone else.
With this fear, the deterrable actor in power is safer than a rogue operator. What this means is that those who fear the DPRK government losing control of its nuclear weapons should seek to stabilize the Kim regime, because the more stable the regime, the less likely that outcome. Simultaneously, one should build contingency plans for how to find and secure the DPRK's nuclear weapons should the regime collapse or a breakdown of command and control occurs. Unilateral policies should focus on engagement with the Kim regime and provision of enough aid to supplement the regime's internal efforts. This does not mean rewarding bad behavior; rather, it is acceptable to sanction the DPRK so long as the sanctions are aimed at punishing the regime, not deposing it.
Understanding that the Kim regime may be better than the alternative, it is important to use negotiations to shape the DPRK government towards adoption of international rules and norms—particularly nuclear safeguards. The agreements should be well-crafted and focused on process-based implementation. The point is to put actionable steps in place to normalize the DPRK government. Negotiations would have to treat the Kim regime as an equal partner to legitimize the negotiations, any agreements they produce, and the government that is producing it.
General Jack Ripper from “Dr. Strangelove” (top), Russian separatist Vladimir Radchenko from “Crimson Tide” (bottom left), and coup leader General Kwak Chul Woo from “Steel Rain II” (bottom right) were all fictional characters who seized control of nuclear arms for their own designs
Charting a course forward
Conditions moving forward are complex. The DPRK government has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of denuclearizing, going so far as to inform the United States that a precondition to renewed engagement is dropping denuclearization as a negotiating objective. However, in negotiations, there is “no ‘always’ and no ‘never’,” meaning that one should not accept that another party will always do something or never do it. Rather, the question is what would it take to get the other party to accept something they are not necessarily inclined to do.
Right now, there is an internal debate within various governments as to whether it is prudent simply to drop the denuclearization topic altogether. The South Korean government under President Lee Jae Myung has already re-labeled and downgraded denuclearization as a negotiating objective. Meanwhile, some players within the U.S. government are amenable to dropping denuclearization even if others in the interagency are not.
From a negotiation perspective, the debate will continue to be ineffective until the parties responsible for managing North Korea policy reach a consensus on what it is they truly fear about the DPRK possession of nuclear arms. If there are no real fears, then dropping denuclearization as a policy and negotiating objective is easy. But if there are still fears (which there likely will be), policymakers must ask themselves: which fears are driving their interests vis-à-vis North Korea’s nuclear weapons program?
Whatever it may be, the answer to that question is what should inform policymaking because of the disparate requirements that come in response to each fear. Until policymakers come to terms with this fundamental question, engagement with the DPRK on nuclear issues will continue to play out as they have for the past thirty years–ebbs and flows in dialogue as North Korea steadily moves forward with its own nuclear policy designs.
Michael MacArthur Bosack is a seasoned international negotiator and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative. He is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. Michael is a former East-West Center Fellow, a military veteran, and the author of “Negotiate: A Primer for Practitioners.”
parleypolicy.com · December 4, 2025
4. American Nuclear Fuel Deal With Seoul Threatens to Raise Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
Summary:
A U.S.–ROK agreement to jointly reprocess spent nuclear fuel in South Korea has raised tensions across northeast Asia. President Lee Jae myung revealed that he and POTUS approved a 50 50 venture that would break a 1972 pledge barring enrichment and reprocessing. Beijing and north Korea fear Seoul will gain latent weapons capability while also fielding its first nuclear powered submarine under a separate deal. U.S. officials frame both initiatives as strengthening allied deterrence, but analysts warn China may retaliate and Pyongyang may shun diplomacy altogether. The moves expand Korean strategic autonomy while complicating any path to denuclearization talks.
Comment: Certainly KJU could try to exploit this, but there will not be any more tensions than would already exist for other issues. Rising tensions with north Korea should not be an argument not to do something especially if it is believed to be in Alliance interests.
American Nuclear Fuel Deal With Seoul Threatens to Raise Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
nysun.com
The 50-50 joint venture disclosed this week allows South Korea to reprocess nuclear fuel on its own territory for the first time.
DONALD KIRK
Dec. 4, 2025 05:51 PM ET
https://www.nysun.com/article/american-nuclear-fuel-deal-with-seoul-threatens-to-raise-tensions-on-the-korean-peninsula
The threat level on the Korean peninsula has escalated with Presidents Trump and Lee Jae-myung agreeing on joint reprocessing in South Korea of uranium and spent nuclear fuel for power plants.
China and North Korea can be expected to respond angrily to the plan, which would allow the reprocessing of nuclear fuel in the country for the first time, reducing South Korea’s reliance on Russia and other sources.
Mr. Lee disclosed Wednesday that Mr. Trump had agreed to establish a 50-50 joint venture to process the fuel when the two presidents met in October on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group summit in the Korean city of Gyeongju. The agreement coincided with a previously announced deal for Seoul to build its first nuclear-powered submarine at a Korean-owned shipyard in America.
While the agreement limits the use of the fuel to “peaceful purposes” such as nuclear power plants, it could be extended at some point to allow the fuel to be used for Korea’s new submarine. That would require changes to a so-called “123 Agreement” which prohibits the use of any American-supplied nuclear material or technology for military purposes, including submarine propulsion.
A former White House official, Victor Cha, predicted China “will use coercion on South Korea, to punish them” for having gotten Mr. Trump to help the South acquire a nuclear submarine. Mr. Cha is now a professor at Georgetown University and in charge of the Korea program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Just as bad, in the eyes of the Chinese, is the deal on the fuel, which they fear will enable Seoul to develop technology and nuclear stockpiles that could be weaponized at some point in the future.
South Korea, Mr. Cha noted at a CSIS conference, wants nuclear submarines to track North Korean as well as Chinese submarines, the latter nuclear-powered. North Korea does not yet have a nuclear sub but is rumored to be developing one with Russian assistance.
Chinese submarines patrol the Yellow Sea between North Korea and China where, Mr. Cha said, China is building up its forces just as it has done in the South China Sea.
Messrs. Trump and Lee made no mention of the nuclear fuel deal in a “fact sheet” issued two weeks after their meeting in Gyeongju. But Mr. Lee told journalists in Seoul this week that the two had agreed to override a 1972 agreement saying South Korea will not engage in enrichment or reprocessing.
The new understanding dovetails with Mr. Trump’s October 29 announcement of a deal for South Korea to build a nuclear submarine in a Philadelphia shipyard recently acquired by one of Korea’s largest shipbuilders, Hanwha Ocean.The submarine will presumably run on American nuclear reactors.
A senior State Department official, Jonathan Fritz, described the submarine deal as “a clear example of bilateral cooperation that advances our collective capabilities against regional threats” – a reference not only to North Korea but also to its huge allies, China and Russia.
As principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Fritz placed Mr. Trump’s enthusiasm for a South Korean submarine in the context of America’s role in the region. “We are evolving our traditional security alliance into a more comprehensive partnership that is integrated economically and industrially and aligned with broader Indo-Pacific priorities.”
Mr. Lee has carefully avoided the suggestion of Korean participation in any American war beyond the Korean peninsula, but Mr. Fritz, at CSIS, said the two countries were “accelerating innovation and manufacturing in technology, defense and other key fields” as they shaped “a more secure and prosperous future for the entire Indo-Pacific.”
At his Wednesday press conference, Mr. Lee said the agreements on the nuclear submarine and fuel processing marked “a highly beneficial outcome for us, from the viewpoint of strategic flexibility and autonomy.”
The deal, however, complicates efforts by the two leaders to persuade North Korea’s Kim Jong-un to talk to them. Mr. Trump has often claimed that he and Mr. Kim “fell in love” during their three meetings in 2018 and 2019.
A former deputy secretary of state, Kurt Campbell, suggested at CSIS that a fourth summit is unlikely.
“The message from North Korea,” Mr. Campbell said, is that they have “no reason to engage unless we accept North Korea as a nuclear state.” Meanwhile, he said, “President Lee wants a strong nuclear umbrella.”
Mr. Cha agreed. America’s insistence on “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization” is “nice to say,” he said, “but it’s not going to happen in the next five years – or even 10 years.”
nysun.com
5. New U.S. strategy raises questions over S. Korea's security, its role in broader Indo-Pacific
Summary:
The new U.S. National Security Strategy revives a Monroe-style focus on the Western Hemisphere while tasking Seoul and Tokyo to help defend the First Island Chain against China. It urges higher allied defense spending and expanded access for U.S. forces, raising fears in Seoul about entanglement in a Taiwan crisis and friction with Beijing. POTUS backing for ROK nuclear-powered submarines is cast as part of this regional deterrence. The NSS omits north Korea denuclearization, fueling concern over a downgraded Korea priority and alliance reliability, even as Washington pledges a hardened U.S. presence in the Western Pacific and continued USFK.
Comment: Where you stand depends on where you sit. I urge my Korean friends not to hyperventilate and be overly concerned. Despite the limited reference to Korea (transactional) and no reference to north Korea, there is goodness in some of the language about Asia-Indo-Pacom that can actually be applied strategically toward Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula. I will try to show that in my next essay analyzing the NSS from the Korean security perspective in the next few days. Of course we are still waiting for the National Defense Strategy and the Global Force Posture Review.
(3rd LD) (News Focus) New U.S. strategy raises questions over S. Korea's security, its role in broader Indo-Pacific | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · December 6, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251206000353315?section=national/diplomacy
(ATTN: RECASTS lead; ADDS more expert comments in para 24)
By Song Sang-ho and Lee Yu-mi
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (Yonhap) -- From reasserting American heft in the Western Hemisphere to prioritizing Taiwan's defense and omitting the North Korean denuclearization goal, key elements of the new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) are raising questions over what they mean for South Korea's security and its role in a regional context.
On Thursday, the White House released the NSS, declaring a plan to enforce President Donald Trump's version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, symbolic of American isolationism, and asserting the need for Seoul and Tokyo to build capabilities to defend the First Island Chain, a key perimeter for America's preeminence against China in the Pacific, while mentioning nothing about North Korea.
The 33-page document was released at a time when Seoul and Washington are pushing to "modernize" their alliance in a way that would increase South Korea's role in its own defense and its contributions to addressing "regional" threats, potentially including security challenges from an assertive China.
U.S. President Donald Trump attends the draw for the 2026 FIFA World Cup at the Kennedy Center in Washington on Dec. 5, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Pool photo)
The NSS underlined the United States' desire to see South Korea and regional allies contribute to safeguarding maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, where China's territorial claims to the South and East China seas, as well as its activities surrounding the Taiwan Strait, have been an abiding source of U.S. policy concern.
It came as South Korea navigates the increasingly convoluted geopolitical landscape under a "pragmatic" foreign policy to maintain stable relations with China -- a partner crucial for trade, as well as diplomacy for North Korea's denuclearization.
"We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone," the NSS says, referring to a string of islands, including Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. "Our allies must step up and spend -- and more importantly do -- much more for collective defense."
It goes on to say, "Given President Trump's insistence on increased burden-sharing from Japan and South Korea, we must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities -- including new capabilities -- necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain."
The document marked a clear call for the Asian allies to help defend the strategically crucial island chain, though concerns linger in Seoul that South Korea's security activities beyond its shores might complicate its focus on deterring North Korea and provoke friction with China.
"The Trump administration is calling on all its allies and partners within the first island chain to allow the U.S. military to gain greater access to their ports and facilities and also increase capabilities and defense spending ostensibly to deter aggression in the region," Andrew Yeo, SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies, told Yonhap News Agency.
"Although China is not named, it's clear that Trump expects allies, including South Korea, to support this strategy of deterrence and denial in the first island chain, including a Taiwan Strait crisis."
Observers raised speculation that Washington could put more pressure on Seoul to play a role to help prevent China from invading Taiwan -- a self-governing democracy that China regards as part of its territory.
In a recently released joint fact sheet on trade and security agreements between South Korea and the U.S., the two sides unveiled an agreement to enhance the U.S. conventional deterrence posture against "all regional threats" to the alliance, language that underscores Washington's call for Seoul to help deter China.
Along this line, Trump's approval for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines is seen by many as part of a U.S. effort to leverage allies' security contributions against the Asian superpower.
Earlier this week, Jonathan Fritz, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said Trump's approval for the submarines was a "clear" example of cooperation to enhance the allies' collective capabilities to counter "regional" threats.
This Nov. 14, 2024, file photo, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shows fighter jets parked on the USS George Washington aircraft carrier during the trilateral Freedom Edge exercise involving South Korea, the United States and Japan. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
In the latest NSS, the Trump administration made clear a plan to enforce a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, fueling concerns over its potential implications for security in the Indo-Pacific, given that any sign of isolationism could mean a diminished commitment to the region.
Apparently mindful of the concerns, the document notes that the U.S. will "harden and strengthen" its military presence in the Western Pacific.
This raised the prospects the U.S. would continue to keep its forces in South Korea, though it remains to be seen whether Washington would retain the current force level of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
The absence of a policy effort to denuclearize North Korea in the NSS raised questions over whether nuclear diplomacy with Pyongyang remains low on Washington's policy agenda.
The omission came as alliance modernization efforts between Seoul and Washington are proceeding with a focus on South Korea undertaking a primary role for conventional defense against North Korean threats. Seoul also seeks to retake wartime operational control from Washington.
Some observers said that the omission could signal the Trump administration deprioritizing the Korean Peninsula issue, but Yeo said he wouldn't necessarily interpret it that way.
"The NSS also made no reference to nuclear non-proliferation or the spread of nuclear weapons in the NSS," he said. "It's possible that the Trump administration might address nuclear threats, including that of North Korea, in its forthcoming National Defense Strategy."
Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific security at the Hudson Institute, said that the omission may have been a way of preserving diplomatic flexibility should a summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un happen in the coming months.
"Implicitly, the strategy emphasizes deterrence and the need to prevent conflict, whether conventional or nuclear," he told Yonhap News Agency. "If I were Kim Jong-un, I would feel slighted and inclined to include some bold nuclear ambitions as part of the preparation."
Rob Rapson, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, said that the NSS omission of North Korea serves to reinforce perceptions in the region and beyond of the U.S. as an increasingly "unreliable" ally.
Released during the first Trump administration, the 2017 NSS said that the U.S. would work with allies and partners to achieve "complete, verifiable and irreversible" denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The 2022 version under former President Joe Biden's administration also stated that the U.S. would seek to make progress toward the denuclearization of the peninsula.
This file photo, taken March 20, 2024, shows U.S. troops engaging in a river-crossing exercise in Yeoncheon, about 60 kilometers north of Seoul. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · December 6, 2025
6. China's White Paper Drops 'Korean Peninsula Denuclearization'
Summary:
China’s new arms control white paper, its first in 19 years, drops explicit support for “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” signaling a potential shift toward tacit acceptance of north Korea as a nuclear state. The document instead stresses “peace” and “political resolution” while criticizing pressure and threats, a change from 2005 and 2017 texts that backed a nuclear-weapon-free peninsula. Experts argue Beijing is prioritizing strategic competition with Washington and accommodating Pyongyang’s demands, effectively bracketing the nuclear issue out of bilateral ties. The shift tracks with deepening China–north Korea relations and Russia’s active support for Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
Comment: The end of the "Three nos"? No War> No instability and regime collapse. No nukes. If they go to "Two Nos" they can shift their stats back to batting 1000.
Are the ROK, US, and China synchronizing their stances and ready acquiesce to north Korea being nuclear armed?
China's White Paper Drops 'Korean Peninsula Denuclearization'
Omission signals tacit acceptance of North Korea's nuclear status
By Kim Ji-won
Published 2025.12.06. 19:17
Updated 2025.12.06. 20:37https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/12/06/YKAKAG46GVBQDOMKM3X4C3LBZU/
Kim Jong-un, left, North Korean leader, and Chinese President Xi Jinping /Newsis
China has been found to have removed the phrase "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" from its military white paper, published for the first time in 19 years. This has led to speculation that Beijing may be shifting its stance to de facto recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.
According to Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, SCMP, on the 6th, the white paper titled "New Era of China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation," released on the 27th of last month, omitted the previously stated expression of "support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
In the section on "nuclear non-proliferation," the white paper stated, "China has consistently maintained a fair and correct position on the Korean Peninsula issue, strived for peace, stability, and prosperity in the peninsula, and dedicated itself to the political resolution process of the peninsula issue." It added, "China urges relevant parties to halt threats and pressure, resume dialogue and negotiations, promote political solutions, and play a constructive role in achieving long-term stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula."
This marks a significant departure from previous white papers. In its 2005 disarmament white paper, China explicitly stated, "We support the proposal by relevant countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and other regions." The same expression was repeated in the 2017 Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation white paper.
Experts analyzed that as China prioritizes strategic competition with the U.S., it has shifted from its previous stance of not tolerating North Korea’s nuclear possession. A senior researcher at the Geotong Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted, "Over the past year and a half, China has stopped using the term 'denuclearization' in official documents," adding, "This is a tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status." He further explained, "Under repeated pressure from North Korea, it appears Beijing has decided to exclude the nuclear issue from bilateral relations."
The shift aligns with the recent deepening of North Korea-China relations. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended the military parade marking the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in Beijing last September and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The outcome statement released by China after the summit also made no mention of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
Analysts suggest that North Korea’s military support for Russia in exchange for nuclear and missile technology cooperation since the Ukraine war has also influenced this change. Timothy Heath, a researcher at the Rand Corporation, stated, "As Russia actively supports North Korea’s nuclear program, China has been forced to maintain a minimally neutral stance."
7. Garry Kasparov thinks the West is in denial about North Korean troops in Ukraine
Summary:
Garry Kasparov warns that the West is in denial about north Korean troops and ammunition supporting Russia in Ukraine, proof that the war is a global conflict, not a narrow Russia-Ukraine dispute. He criticizes Washington, Brussels and Seoul for ignoring multinational involvement by north Korean, Cuban and African forces. Kasparov is especially frustrated by South Korea’s refusal to provide lethal aid, arguing Ukrainians are weakening Kim Jong Un on the battlefield. He says democracies are retreating in the information war, citing halted broadcasts into north Korea and the growing global spread of dangerous pro Russian movements funded by Kremlin propaganda.
Comment: I have a friend and former intelligence officer who will be in 100 percent agreement with this. He will ask why aren't we helping Ukraine take any action against nKPA forces in Russia and in their deployment from north Korea to Russia?
Garry Kasparov thinks the West is in denial about North Korean troops in Ukraine
In interview, chess grandmaster calls out Europe and ROK for treating war as bilateral dispute, not a ‘global conflict’
Chad O'Carroll December 5, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/garry-kasparov-thinks-the-west-is-in-denial-about-north-korean-troops-in-ukraine/
Garry Kasparov during an interview with NK News in Halifax | Image: NK News
North Korea appears to have supplied more ammunition to Russia than all of Europe has sent to Ukraine. Garry Kasparov, the former World Chess Champion, wants the international community to sit with what this means.
“It just tells you everything you have to know about European’s readiness and willingness to take part in this war,” the grandmaster told NK News at the Halifax International Security Forum last month.
The 62-year-old Russian dissident and democracy advocate, who was a prominent opposition politician before fleeing in 2013 due to fears of government persecution, has spent the past decade warning that Vladimir Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders.
Now, with North Korean soldiers dying on European soil and a coalition of autocracies openly collaborating against a Western-backed democracy, Kasparov believes the evidence has become undeniable.
The West, he suggested, simply refuses to look.
NO NATO INTEREST
Kasparov contended that the West’s muted response to Pyongyang’s direct military involvement in the Ukraine War reveals an uncomfortable truth about allied intentions.
“If the goal is to win the war, which it is probably not, then you apply a certain strategy,” he said. “If you want to find a middle ground, then you just ignore many things, including North Korean direct involvement.”
The integration of foreign forces into Russia’s war effort has accelerated in recent months. Beyond the some 14,000 North Korean troops deployed to Kursk, and subsequent dispatch of thousands of North Korean deminers and military engineers, reports have emerged of Cuban recruits and African mercenaries bolstering Moscow’s ranks.
For Kasparov, this multinational mobilization exposes a growing flaw in Western framing of the conflict.
“The whole story of North Korea, and now, of course, more Cubans and probably some African mercenaries that are being brought to Russia and to Ukraine” shows that “you have other countries directly involved in war, helping Russia, assisting Russia, not just with ammunition and resources, but with manpower,” he said.
Yet Washington, Brussels and allied capitals continue treating the war as a bilateral dispute between Moscow and Kyiv.
“The West still pretends that it’s not a global conflict, and that it should be limited to Russia-Ukraine,” Kasparov said. “That ties hands of some Western power that would like to be more aggressively involved.”
And in the void of serious response, North Korea and Russia have become increasingly open in their cooperation, he said, leaving Kim Jong Un happy with what he can get in return for his “extra meat” — soldiers who are “useless for him in Korea now.”
“The real difference is that now they are no longer hiding,” he said. “They got very proud of it.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects weapons production at a munitions factory. | Image: KCTV (June 14, 2025)
SOUTH KOREAN AMBIGUITY
South Korea’s reluctance to provide lethal aid to Ukraine particularly frustrates Kasparov.
Despite possessing a capability to manufacture half a million 155mm artillery shells each year during emergency situations, Seoul has declined to supply weapons directly, citing concerns about regional stability and domestic political divisions.
“I understand that there’s a mixed opinion in … South Korea about any engagement (with Ukraine),” Kasparov said. “They try to separate themselves from the world’s troubles.”
He described this approach as “an element of a much bigger picture: We have a lot of countries that somehow they believe that this is not about them.”
This isolationism, Kasparov argued, reflects a misreading of the war’s stakes. “The outcome of this war will influence events from Belarus to Zimbabwe and from Venezuela to Taiwan. It’s just that somehow [countries like South Korea] don’t buy it.”
And for Kasparov, the logical case for South Korean intervention has only strengthened as North Korean troops have begun taking casualties on Ukrainian battlefields.
“Ukrainians are fighting North Korea. If they kill more North Korean soldiers, Kim Jong Un will be weaker. It seems that this is easy to understand,” he said. “In my view, even without North Korea being directly involved, South Korea had to be very helpful to Ukraine.
Now, with “North Korea actively engaged in attacking Ukraine,” South Korea should “offer a lot more,” he said.
“It’s easy to add: It’s not just South Korea: You have Europeans, we have Americans. A lot of people still don’t want to understand that we are at war, and the other side is cooperating. Russians, Chinese, North Koreans, Iranians, Venezuelans, they’re all cooperating. They’re dictators working together.”
“(Yet) we are divided not only by interest,” he said, but “sometimes divided on end goals.”
POOR PROPAGANDA
The recent decision by the U.S. and South Korea to suspend radio and TV broadcasts into North Korea drew sharp criticism from Kasparov, who sees the move as symptomatic of a broader Western retreat from ideological competition.
“While the United States, and South Korea, and other democratic countries … are reneging on propaganda, the other side has been stepping up,” he said.
Kasparov emphasized that “propaganda is a war” and said Russia is demonstrating that “in many instances, it could be more important than having tanks and drones because it attacks … core values.”
He pointed to the spread of pro-Russian political movements across Europe as evidence of Moscow’s success in the information domain.
“Putin proved to be very effective with his hybrid wars, actually more effective than his direct invasion, as a KGB guy. You look at the spread of pro-Russian sentiments among political groups … So they are gaining more political ground by investing heavily. And what we do, we retreat.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
8. Russia-North Korea talks likely focused on resources and energy, photos suggest
Summary:
Photos from a November Russia and north Korea economic commission meeting in Moscow show senior Russian energy, natural resources and construction officials, indicating talks focused on power, fossil fuels and infrastructure. Identified participants include top figures from the energy and natural resources ministries and the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources, plus businessmen tied to industrial equipment. Analysts say Moscow is shifting from small consumer trade to long term investment in rare earths, uranium, oil and grid upgrades, locking Russia into partnership with north Korea and drawing on DPRK labor for construction linked to Ukraine. High level attendees underline Kremlin priority.
Comment: Everything the regime needs. But not much makes it to the people.
Russia-North Korea talks likely focused on resources and energy, photos suggest
NK News identifies key Russian energy, resources and construction officials at recent bilateral commission meeting
Anton Sokolin December 4, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/russia-north-korea-talks-likely-focused-on-resources-and-energy-photos-suggest/
Russian officials at the Russia-DPRK commission on economic cooperation in Moscow on Nov. 27, 2025 | Image: Russian natural resources and ecology ministry
Key officials overseeing Russia’s energy and natural resources policy participated in recent intergovernmental talks with North Korea in Moscow, NK News analysis has revealed, suggesting that the meeting focused on preparing to expand cooperation in these fields.
The Russia-DPRK intergovernmental commission on bilateral cooperation held a meeting at Moscow’s President Hotel on Nov. 27, which the Russian side said covered joint education, tourism, aviation and border construction ventures.
Moscow did not provide a full list of participants or concrete details about agreements reached at the meeting, which was led by commission co-chairs Alexander Kozlov and Yun Jong Ho.
Among over a dozen senior officials, NK News analysis of photos from the session has identified several key figures and a businessman who attended the meeting, providing a more complete picture and suggesting that sensitive themes like energy and fossil fuel exploration were on the agenda.
The attendees identified by NK News are:
- Ivan Zhelokhovtsev, the head of the Russian foreign ministry’s First Asian Department;
- Vitaly Simonenko, Kozlov’s aide at the natural resources and ecology ministry;
- Ivan Kushch, heads the international cooperation department at Russia’s natural resources and ecology ministry;
- Pavel Kalmychek, the head of the bilateral cooperation department at Russia’s economic development ministry;
- Konstantin Mikhailenko, the special projects department leader at Russia’s energy ministry;
- Alexey Kiryakov, the international cooperation department head at Russia’s energy ministry;
- Aslambek Germakhanov, the deputy chief of the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources;
- Nikita Stasishin, Russia’s deputy construction minister;
- Kairat Tursunbekov, heads the Federal Road Agency’s department for highway construction and operations;
- Alexander Matsegora, Russian ambassador to the DPRK;
- Likely Sergei Glagolev, the deputy chief of the Russian health ministry;
- Andrei Grebenyuk, a man whose affiliation is unclear and may be linked to Russian vice prime minister Alexander Kozlov’s ministry or business circles;
-
Vladimir Sokolov, a businessman who runs an industrial equipment supply firm named Black Horse.
While not immediately clear from the released images, it is possible that other businessmen like Sokolov involved in exchanges with North Korea joined the session given the nature of the commission’s work.
Key Russian officials identified at the most recent Russia-DPRK intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation in Moscow on Nov. 27, 2025 | Image: Russian natural resources and ecology ministry, edited by NK News
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Russia previously unveiled plans to help North Korea modernize its energy infrastructure and repair outdated power plants, with the country’s energy ministry subsequently deleting its official announcement. Russia and the DPRK have also exchanged delegations of grid specialists in recent years.
Moscow has also set sights on North Korea’s potential oil deposits in the East Sea, factoring related deep-sea shelf exploration works into its federal budget for the next two years.
Chris Monday, a Russia expert at Dongseo University, described the Russian officials as “serious economic and political players” and characterized Zhelokhovtsev as an “experienced Asia hand.”
The expert noted that the Russia-North Korea meetings were not televised by Moscow’s broadcasters, suggesting that “some material has been edited out,” possibly due to the involvement of Russian counterintelligence agencies.
“Last year, ‘economic ties’ with North Korea amounted to trade in low-value consumer items, such as shoes and medicine,” he said. “Now the Kremlin is turning to long-term investment in rare earths, uranium, oil.”
The expert suggested these projects will require “major commitments from the Russian side and will lock Russia into a long-term partnership with North Korea,” which is the “ultimate goal” of its leader, Kim Jong Un.
Russia will require “a lot of manpower” to maintain its territorial gains from the war in Ukraine, Monday said, and a sizable portion of North Korea’s forces could be directed for construction and road work there.
Monday pointed out that high-profile officials with links to the Kremlin and the Federal Security Service appeared at the grand opening of a new North Korean restaurant in central Moscow last week. DPRK Ambassador Matsegora, who later accompanied Kozlov at the commission, was also present at the venue, according to the embassy.
Valery Nazarenko and Dmitry Petrovsky spotted at the grand opening of a new North Korean restaurant in Moscow on Nov. 26, 2025 | Images: Russian Embassy in DPRK, Russian Orthodox Church, Agentura.ru, edited by NK News
NK News also identified at the restaurant Russian priest Dmitry Petrovsky, formerly suspected by the FBI of running a spy network to recruit operatives in America, as well as Valery Nazarenko, the Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Directorate for Foreign Policy.
Nazarenko, a patron of a Russian Orthodox cathedral in France’s Strasbourg, was part of the entourage of Vladimir Medinsky, Russia’s key negotiator with Ukraine, in Istanbul in March 2022.
Minister and commission co-chair Yun Jong Ho met Russian vice prime minister Alexander Novak on Friday, according to a Russian government release.
Russian Vice Prime Minister Alexander Novak holding a meeting with DPRK external economic affairs minister Yun Jong Ho on Nov. 28, 2025 | Image: Russian government, edited by NK News
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Monday described Novak as “a key member of the Kremlin elite” and pointed to other high-level officials present at the meeting such as deputy chief of staff of the Russian government Elmir Tagirov, and Aslambek Germakhanov, who had previously attended the commission’s meeting.
“At the least this shows how seriously the Kremlin is taking the North Korean issue and who is behind the scenes doing the PR work,” he said.
North Korea and Russia have intensified exchanges across numerous industries. Sports, education, cultural and economic projects have flourished amid the allies’ military cooperation during the war in Ukraine.
Edited by David Choi
9. N. Korea cracks down on home-based restaurants to force customers into state-run establishments
Summary:
North Korea is cracking down on home based restaurants to push customers back into state run establishments as the regime tightens control over private economic activity. Authorities have ordered informal eateries to close, citing hygiene and licensing rules, but the real purpose is to restore state dominance over food sales and increase revenue. Market driven home restaurants had grown popular for better service and quality, drawing customers away from official venues. The crackdown reflects Kim Jong Un’s effort to reassert central control over a struggling economy and limit spaces where private enterprise and unsupervised social interaction have taken root.
Comment: I am more concerned about north Korean internal instability right now than nuclear weapons. That is because international instability is the most likely path to conventional attack the use of nuclear weapons. These reports are all indications and warnings.
N. Korea cracks down on home-based restaurants to force customers into state-run establishments
Sinuiju authorities target unlicensed vendors operating from private yards, aiming to bring commercial activity under state control despite public preference for cheaper options
By Seon Hwa - December 5, 2025
dailynk.com
https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-cracks-down-on-home-based-restaurants-to-force-customers-into-state-run-establishments/?tztc=1
In this picture from state-run media in July 2022, North Koreans are shown enjoying dog meat soup at a restaurant. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
Sinuiju authorities are targeting unlicensed food vendors operating from private yards, aiming to bring all commercial activity under state control despite public preference for cheaper, more convenient options.
According to a Daily NK source in North Pyongan province recently, the people’s committee of Sinuiju is conducting a sweeping crackdown on people who sell noodles, soup or other foods from stalls placed in their home yards, designating it “commercial activity without state permission.”
“With a troubled atmosphere lingering ahead of the year-end review, there was already a crackdown on the marketplace sale of foodstuffs of unknown source that were not produced at provincial factories, and now only the unlicensed businesses selling food from private homes remain,” the source said.
Crackdowns used to focus on marketplaces, but now people who make money illegally by selling food from their homes have become a major crackdown target.
“Over the last couple of years, the number of restaurants operating as commercial management centers or social dining management centers (official restaurants) has increased, but many people still prefer restaurants at private homes, which are relatively cheap and convenient,” the source said. “However, the state sees them as a problem because they operate outside of state control.”
People say move targets affordable spaces to eat and unwind
Because of this, people believe the latest crackdown on unlicensed restaurants at private homes aims to “bring all commercial activity under the administration of the state’s socialist commercial system.”
The city people’s committee says the crackdown is to determine whether restaurants at private homes comply with price and hygiene standards, but few people take the explanation seriously.
“People say all the official restaurants are too expensive, and now they complain that the state is trying to take from them even cheap, convenient places where they can have a friendly drink,” the source said.
Restaurants at private homes not only sell meals like noodles and soup, but also simple pub fare and homemade liquor, so people often visit them to unwind and unburden themselves after work.
“The move to restrict the operation of restaurants at private homes, which are cheaper than official restaurants and where people can more comfortably express their personal grievances, is making people even unhappier than they were before,” the source said. “Ordinary people will never welcome the crackdown, regardless of its justification, given that they have used restaurants at private homes as everyday spaces to eat and relax.”
Read in Korean
Seon Hwa
Seon Hwa focuses on North Korea-China trade trends and changes in the daily lives of ordinary North Koreans. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
10. Hyesan excludes unmarried workers from China dispatch, using families as ‘hostages’ against defection
Summary:
Authorities in Hyesan now restrict overseas work dispatch to China to married workers with children, excluding unmarried people and childless couples. On paper the goal is tighter vetting, but residents see a harsher logic. Family members become collateral hostages to deter defections and ideological “contamination” once workers are exposed to life outside north Korea. Traditional checks on political reliability and family background are no longer enough. Border controls since COVID have reduced crossings, yet escapes from overseas continue. By linking jobs abroad to family vulnerability, the regime closes a vital survival option and deepens young people’s sense of despair.
Comment: The Korean people are held hostage in everything they do. It is BFO that there is no freedom in north Korea. However, this does not deter all Koreans from the north. I spent Chuseok with an escapee and he planned his escape for nearly a decade. He learned English and Russian so he could get assigned overseas as a translator. Just as he was being sent to a Korean company in the logging business in Russia his wife had a baby that he did not get to see. It took him 5 years to escape from the Korean company in Russia and make it to South korea. He still has not seen his wife and child but he is working with an escpee organization to get them money so that they can hire a broker to get them out.
Hyesan excludes unmarried workers from China dispatch, using families as ‘hostages’ against defection
Ryanggang province authorities now require overseas candidates to be married with children, tightening criteria to prevent defections by holding families as leverage
By Lee Chae Eun - December 5, 2025
dailynk.com · December 4, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/hyesan-excludes-unmarried-workers-from-china-dispatch-using-families-as-hostages-against-defection/
FILE PHOTO: North Korean women leaving a customs office in Dandong, Liaoning Province, China. (Daily NK)
Ryanggang province authorities now require overseas candidates to be married with children, tightening selection criteria as regime seeks to prevent defections by holding family members as leverage.
“Activities to select workers to dispatch to China are now ongoing in Hyesan, but unlike in the past, unmarried and married candidates without children are being excluded,” a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province recently. “If you look at the people being selected for dispatch to China, most are married with children.”
The source said the selection criteria have tightened — in the past, one only needed a good background and ideological soundness to be selected for overseas work, but now, screeners also look at whether candidates are married and have children.
Because of this, unmarried or married people without children who hoped to earn a living overseas are complaining.
“Life is so hard nowadays, so many people want to go overseas to make money,” the source said. “As early as this spring, workers were sent overseas to China regardless of their marital status or whether or not they had children, but this time, candidates must be married and have children, so people who waited for the opportunity are disappointed and dejected.”
New standards aim to prevent defections by holding families hostage
North Korea has long considered dispatching workers overseas as a key means to earn foreign currency. At the same time, however, the authorities have feared that workers might become ideologically alienated or even defect as a result of direct contact with the outside world.
Accordingly, the North Korean authorities sent overseas only those who passed strict ideological vetting and background checks. However, as defections continued despite this, the authorities appear to have bolstered their selection standards.
Some people say they suspect the state “wants to keep their families as hostages.”
“Crossing the border from North Korea has gotten tougher since COVID-19, but cases continue of workers escaping after they’ve been dispatched overseas,” the source said. “In response, the state included marital status and children as selection standards to stop defections by workers dispatched overseas.”
“After successfully blocking defections across the border during COVID-19, the state is now completely blocking defections from overseas by using family members — the workers’ weak link — as hostages,” the source said. “Young people are growing more hopeless as it gets harder to be dispatched overseas, something they used to consider a survival option.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · December 4, 2025
11. Seoul’s search for stability: political turmoil underscores need for a consistent North Korea policy
Summary:
A year after Yoon’s failed martial law bid, Seoul’s politics remain polarized and entangled with north Korea policy, eroding coherence in both deterrence and diplomacy. Lee Jae Myung is trying to reset with a “Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons,” lower tensions, restored channels and support for US–north Korea talks, while avoiding the word “denuclearization” to reduce friction. Analysts argue dialogue without real inducements only invites Pyongyang’s strategic disregard. At the same time, deterrence grows through ROK–US alliance modernization, higher defense spending, nuclear powered submarines and deeper trilateral ties with Japan. The core question is whether Seoul can sustain a stable bipartisan north Korea policy.
Comment: Here is a recommendation for a consistent north Korea strategy for the ROK/US alliance:
A Two Plus Three Strategy to Solve the “Korea Question”
–– The long term “Two Plus Three strategy” of the Allaince must rest on these two traditional efforts:
(1) the foundation of military deterrence To Prevent War as the vital US national interest and;
(2) “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime.
––The radical new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea:
(1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasizing the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights);
(2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change;
3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).
In summary: Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.
Seoul’s search for stability: political turmoil underscores need for a consistent North Korea policy
koreaherald.com · Jung Min-kyung · December 4, 2025
https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10629817
Participants march in a rally marking the first anniversary of the Dec. 3 martial law declaration, held in front of the main gate of the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul, on Wednesday. (Yonhap)
One year after South Korea witnessed its first declaration of martial law since 1979, the political aftershocks continue to reverberate — stretching far beyond constitutional law and deep into North Korea policy.
On Dec. 3, 2024, then-President Yoon Suk Yeol stunned the country by declaring emergency martial law, claiming, among other things, that South Korea faced “pro-North Korea and anti-state forces” and accusing the opposition-controlled National Assembly of paralyzing the government.
His decree was rescinded after lawmakers voted overwhelmingly to overturn it hours later.
As the former president stands trial for a separate but linked scandal involving military drones flown toward Pyongyang in October 20204, a deeper question has surfaced: Has South Korea’s polarized domestic politics undermined its ability to sustain a coherent North Korea policy?
On Monday, the Seoul Central District Court opened the first preparatory hearing in the drone case, in which prosecutors allege that Yoon and senior military officials orchestrated covert unmanned aerial vehicle flights into Pyongyang on Oct. 3, 6 and 9, 2024 to provoke a North Korean military response that could justify martial law.
The drones allegedly dropped anti-regime leaflets over central Pyongyang before one crashed near the capital — an incident North Korea publicized at the time, accusing the South of violating its sovereignty.
Days later, the North resumed the "trash balloon" it started in May that year. Between May and late November, the North sent more than 260 balloons laden with garbage across the border and into the South
Observers say the ongoing courtroom battles reflect an uncomfortable truth: Domestic instability in the South has increasingly become entangled with North Korea–related decision making, often in ways that undermine both deterrence and diplomacy.
Dilemma of mixed signals
President Lee Jae Myung has tried to reset the national conversation.
At Tuesday’s event marking the launch of the 22nd National Unification Advisory Council, Lee laid out a three-pillar policy emphasizing: a “Korean Peninsula without war,” a new era of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial inter-Korean cooperation.
Lee reiterated several principles: a nuclear-free peninsula, lowered military tensions, restoration of communication channels and a willingness to act as a catalyst for potential US-North Korea talks. Notably, he avoided using the term “denuclearization,” opting instead for the softer phrase “a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons.”
This linguistic shift was deliberate.
According to Lim Eul-chul, professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Lee’s speech was “pragmatic,” designed to avoid provoking Pyongyang, which has described even the mention of “denuclearization” as hostile.
But Lim cautioned that the message, while symbolically conciliatory, lacks a strong enough incentive to shift North Korea’s current doctrine of treating the South as a “hostile separate state.” Without concrete inducements, he said, Pyongyang is likely to respond with strategic indifference rather than engagement.
attends a hearing in his insurrection trial at the Seoul Central District Court on Nov. 19. (Yonhap)
He added that a consistent, principled policy — rather than reactive oscillations — is essential if Seoul hopes to restore credibility and reduce domestic polarization over North Korea.
The North has also defined "denuclearization of the peninsula" as including the withdrawal of US troops and security guarantees.
Under Yoon, North Korea policy veered toward securitization and ideological confrontation, culminating in actions that prosecutors now say involved the manipulation of military assets for political ends.
Under Lee, the pendulum has swung back toward engagement — but without the domestic consensus needed to sustain it.
Such dramatic change in Seoul's approach to North Korea is nothing new, having been repeated time and again depending on the administration.
Former presidents Kim Dae-jung engaged with Pyongyang, and the policy was carried on in the following Roh Moo-hyun administration. The two conservative administrations that followed took a harder approach, a move sparked by North Korea's killing of a South Korean tourist in 2008. The flip-flopping has become more frequent in recent years, with the presidency passing between liberal and conservative blocs three times in nine years
Lim explained that Lee’s latest overture reflects “a reconfirmation of principles with strategic flexibility” rather than a new vision. He notes that simply repeating calls for dialogue without stronger incentives is unlikely to break Pyongyang’s current strategy of “strategic disregard.”
“Without powerful inducements, stressing dialogue alone cannot produce real results,” he said.
Lim interprets Lee’s avoidance of the term “denuclearization” as a pragmatic move meant to lower political barriers to talks:
“North Korea has treated the word itself as an obstacle. Using ‘a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ creates practical room to maneuver.”
Still, he warns the North may react negatively anyway, since the message ultimately challenges Pyongyang’s nuclear status: “Even without the word ‘denuclearization,’ the North can interpret it as denying its nuclear identity.”
For Lim, the deeper issue is South Korea’s wavering approach.
“Policy must not swing with every provocation. Consistency strengthens credibility, predictive power and domestic cohesion.”
Absent that consistency, Seoul risks sending mixed signals, complicating allied coordination and turning North Korea policy into a recurring tool of political contestation— something laid bare during the chaotic events of 2024.
And though the Lee administration has reached out, North Korea has remained indifferent, saying it has no interest pursuing dialogue with South Korea.
South Korea recently proposed military talks with the North to clarify the Military Demarcation Line after armed North Korean soldiers repeatedly crossed it while clearing land or laying mines. Although the incursions appeared unintentional, Seoul says ambiguity increases the risk of accidental clashes.
Kim Hong-cheol, deputy defense minister for policy, urged Pyongyang to respond swiftly, calling MDL clarification a first step toward restoring military trust.
So far, the North has remained silent.
Deterrence still expands with US backing
Even as President Lee takes a softer approach to North Korea, his government is simultaneously moving to deepen military deterrence — signaling that engagement and strength are not mutually exclusive, but intertwined pillars of Seoul’s strategy.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, in video remarks to a Washington forum Wednesday, underscored that diplomacy “must be paired with ironclad deterrence,” especially as North Korea accelerates missile development and strengthens ties with Russia. He noted that the newly released ROK-US fact sheet outlines the most sweeping modernization of the alliance in years.
Under the document, South Korea has committed to raising defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, one of the highest levels among advanced economies.
Washington, in turn, has formally backed Seoul’s push for nuclear-powered submarines armed with conventional weapons, domestic uranium enrichment for civilian uses, and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities.
Cho argued that these steps will reshape not only the peninsula’s security environment but also the economic foundations of the alliance, enabling cooperation in shipbuilding, next-generation energy, artificial intelligence, biotech and quantum technologies.
“This is the modernization of the alliance for a new era,” he said. “It strengthens peace while preparing for challenges ahead.”
He also emphasized that deterrence must remain responsive to a rapidly shifting regional landscape — one defined by Russia’s deepening military partnership with North Korea, China’s expanding influence and Japan’s evolving strategic posture. Trilateral cooperation with Tokyo, he added, is now “indispensable.”
Yet the broader message behind Cho’s remarks circles back to the central theme raised by experts such as Lim: A credible North Korea policy requires steadiness. Whether the approach leans toward engagement or pressure, it must be anchored in long-term national strategy — not shifted back and forth as the political pendulum swings.
As the government strengthens defensive capabilities abroad and pursues cautious diplomatic overtures at home, South Korea faces a defining challenge:
Can it maintain a coherent, bipartisan North Korea policy in an era of internal division and external volatility?
The answer will determine not only the stability of the Korean Peninsula but also Seoul’s capacity to navigate a world in which deterrence, diplomacy and domestic politics are more tightly intertwined than ever.
mkjung@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Jung Min-kyung · December 4, 2025
12. Korea on the brink
Summary:
Korea’s democracy is fraying under partisan warfare and selective justice. The National Assembly’s Judiciary Committee functions as a partisan battlefield instead of a guardian of constitutional norms. Prosecutors dropping the Daejang-dong appeal and Lee Jae Myung’s silence on the scandal show a political class that protects power, not principle. His offhand threat toward prosecutors deepens fears of interference in justice. While the economy slides toward systemic crisis, the government fixates on insurrection narratives and “internal collaborators.” On security, Lee’s naïve views on north Korea and alliance policy reveal dangerous denial. Korean democracy has survived arrogant leaders before. It can again.
Comment: I do not want to delve into domestic politics. But we must understand what is happening because they do impact the alliance.
As aside the article's title is the same as an important book:
Korea on the Brink – GEN (RET) John Wickham – although dated it is illustrative of
the complexity of the Korean situation. Probably the only memoir of a US Korea
commander in the last 40 years.
Korea on the brink - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Park Jung-won
- Published Dec 4, 2025 4:50 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20251204/korea-on-the-brink
Park Jung-won
There is a certain heaviness that descends on anyone who watches the proceedings of Korea’s National Assembly Judiciary Committee today. What should be the institutional heart of democratic deliberation increasingly resembles something far more unsettling — a chamber where constitutional norms bend to partisan strategy, and where procedural fairness has been replaced by tactical obstruction.
Under a committee chairperson from the ruling Democratic Party of Korea who repeatedly curtails opposition voices and interprets parliamentary rules in ways that consistently favor her own side, the committee has drifted far from its intended function. It no longer operates as a guardian of legislative integrity but rather as a zone of partisan combat, where political instincts for survival overshadow any sense of constitutional responsibility.
This erosion of institutional seriousness came into stark relief with the prosecutors’ decision to drop their appeal in the Daejang-dong corruption case — arguably the largest real estate corruption scheme ever uncovered in Korea. Bringing such a case to an end without higher-court scrutiny is not an administrative anomaly; it is a signal of institutional breakdown.
A judicial system that relinquishes review in a case of this magnitude signals a deeper fragility — a vulnerability that cannot easily be explained away. That enormous illicit gains may now be effectively secured by those implicated, and that the administration has demonstrated no interest in even a minimal procedural or legislative correction, lays bare a political culture where partisan interest crowds out the public good.
What heightens the unease is the president’s own inconsistency. When concerns recently arose that state-owned land had been sold at below-market prices, President Lee Jae Myung reacted immediately: Sales were suspended, reviews ordered, procedures tightened — all in the name of preventing harm to citizens. Yet this same principle evaporates in the far more serious Daejang-dong case. Silence — deep, deliberate and unbroken — has become the administration’s only response.
If the president is truly unconnected to the scandal, he should have been the first to voice public anger at the prosecutors’ decision and take immediate steps to prevent any illicit gains from flowing to those implicated in the Daejang-dong scheme. His silence instead reveals a sobering truth: In today’s political environment, appeals to justice and the public good are often exercised selectively, invoked or withheld according to political calculation.
Even more troubling was the president’s recent remark suggesting that prosecutors working on a case involving one of his former senior aides should be disciplined — a case in which allegations have also faintly touched on his own past decisions. Many legal experts warned that such a comment veers dangerously close to constitutionally prohibited interference in an ongoing trial. That a head of state would make such a statement, immediately upon returning from an overseas summit and amid deep national strain, has only reinforced the perception that personal legal anxieties are beginning to overshadow the country’s urgent priorities.
Selective principles can be corrosive. Such behavior seeps into the larger political culture, eroding trust and weakening the foundation of democratic life. The ruling camp’s ongoing campaign of insurrection accusations illustrates this distortion with particular clarity.
Former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law case is already before the courts. Special prosecutors, appointed by the National Assembly, are functioning normally. Yet the administration continues to frame the national conversation around the hunt for “internal collaborators.” This fixation is revealing, not because the details of the case remain unresolved — they are in fact progressing through the judiciary — but because it shows what the government chooses to prioritize at a time when Korea faces profound economic challenges.
Korea is not facing abstract risks. It is confronting the early contours of a systemic economic crisis. Recent developments such as the surging exchange rate, foreign capital flight, collapse in youth employment, erosion of the manufacturing base and a sharply deteriorating stock market are not routine fluctuations — they signal a breakdown of confidence at the heart of the Korean economy. In any functioning democracy, leaders facing danger of this scale would be focused on stabilization and national recovery — not on sustaining a partisan storyline.
Foreign and security policy have not escaped this logic. North Korea’s designation of the South as an “enemy state” and its explicit refusal to engage in dialogue should have prompted a sober reassessment of the security environment. Instead, the Ministry of Unification continues to cling to outdated terminology of reconciliation that no longer aligns with geopolitical reality.
Lee’s remarks about scaling back joint South Korea-U.S. military drills, combined with his claim that shortwave broadcasts to the North are unnecessary because “North Koreans already access the internet,” are not harmless slips — they are statements that could arise only from either a startling ignorance of North Korea’s basic realities or a willingness to indulge in political fantasy.
In either case, they force an unsettling question: In what world are the president and his unification minister living? Their shared, almost romanticized conception of the North reveals far more about their own political imaginations than about any actual conditions on the ground.
Where does Korea stand today? Is it still a functioning democracy, or merely the semblance of one? Koreans have pushed back against overreaching power before, by impeaching presidents, confronting corruption and reining in political excess through collective resistance.
That drift is already visible. Years of relentless factional conflict have exhausted the public and hollowed out democratic purpose. And now that the economic crisis — long evident beneath layers of political window dressing — is breaking into daily life, the old partisan divide simply collapses. When livelihoods falter, people do not rise as citizens of the left or the right; they rise as individuals confronting material threats. And once the basic calculus of survival takes hold, they can sweep aside political orders that once believed themselves secure.
Korea is a country with a long memory of resisting overreaching power — a memory that awakens slowly but, once stirred, moves with formidable force. Those who govern today would do well to remember this: Korean democracy has survived leaders who assumed themselves untouchable. It can do so again.
Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics, is a professor of international law at Dankook University.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
13. Crossing borders through Korean culture
Summary:
The article argues that Hallyu at the Gyeongju APEC Summit showed culture can be a serious diplomatic instrument, not empty spectacle. Media art, traditional music, drones and K pop performances created a shared emotional space where leaders briefly stepped outside narrow national interests. The butterfly motif framed Korea as a border crosser that translates between civilizations and technologies. The author claims this cultural experience quietly built trust that helped unlock progress in U.S. Korea tariff talks. Yet Gyeongju’s limited infrastructure reveals the gap between vision and reality, and Korea’s ongoing task of turning cultural power into durable structures over time.
Comment: No kidding - Culture is a serious diplomatic instrument. There is nothing without culture. Soft power can be ..well... powerful. Ideas and building trust among allies (and being an exemplar for those under totalitarian rule) helped us win theCold War. South Korea is wielding soft power effectively in the 21st Century.
Crossing borders through Korean culture - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Lee Kyung-hwa
- Published Dec 4, 2025 4:26 pm KST
- Updated Dec 4, 2025 4:36 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20251204/crossing-borders-through-korean-culture
The contemporary international community exists in an era marked by communicative dysfunction. Amid protectionist trade barriers, technological hegemony and geopolitical competition, the world has sunk into chronic fatigue. Discussion at the Post-APEC Global Vision Summit, held Nov. 27-28 at the InterContinental Hotel in Seoul, focused on the question of what is it that this era truly needs?
Last month’s 2025 APEC Summit was not merely an economic gathering. It functioned as a form of performative art, allowing participants to feel history and envision the future. The simultaneous appearance of U.S. and Chinese leaders on the symbolic stage of Gyeongju's APEC meetings constituted a historically significant moment. However, observers around the world have raised a number of critical concerns.
As the Guardian noted, can the spectacle of Korean culture, or Hallyu, effectively obscure the structural fractures within APEC, “a loose coalition of countries united by little more than geography”? Could a cultural showcase replace substantive diplomatic achievements such as multilateralism or trade norms? Or does it risk remaining at the level of a national showcase?
Ironically, the answer to these questions lies in Hallyu itself as a kind of border crosser, but not merely a kind of diasporic figure. It is a cultural translator and creative outsider positioned at the margins of global systems, reading and translating multiple languages and worldviews, transcending fixed categories to formulate new forms. This capacity is a bridge in a fragmented age.
Korea used butterflies in its official emblem for the event, a metaphor embodying APEC’s thematic aspirations of connection, innovation and prosperity. More than a symbol, the butterfly became a vessel interweaving Eastern and Western modes of thought.
In Gyeongju, a media art show used a butterfly image that seemed carried by a whisper of wind. Accompanied by the sound of the piri, a traditional reed instrument, it appeared to have emerged from a distant past. Infused with AI-generated silver particulates, its flight released energy that dispersed like pollen into waves of gentle light. Soon, more butterflies, each representing different nations, converged. The interaction of media art and K-pop produced a luminous choreography that extended to the banquet tables where global leaders sat.
The official banquet became an experience rather than a metaphor. The sound of a daegeum, a transverse flute, opened a meditative moment, followed by the fusion of media art and K-pop by G-Dragon that created a moment where the past and future resonated as one. BTS RM’s calm speech underscored that true connection begins not with protocols but with the effort to read one another’s stories. Together, it affirmed K-culture, grounded in reflective thought, was a new kind of border crosser.
Drones painting images across the night sky proved that technology can become an art of connection rather than a weapon of hegemonic competition. It was the moment when culture, through the power of translation, became the language of diplomacy.
Some critics thought the event might be mere spectacle, but the most compelling rebuttal emerged the following day, when Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations advanced dramatically. The emotional and narrative structures articulated the previous night through art and performance had quietly accumulated an invisible reservoir of trust at the negotiating table.
That night in Gyeongju demonstrated that culture can become a highly refined diplomatic instrument.
Nonetheless, there are limitations. Gyeongju’s infrastructure did not escape criticism for falling short of the summit's ambitions. But this also reflects the reality of a nation positioned at a border where continual effort is necessary to bridge the gap between aspirational vision and material conditions — a structural condition Korea must repeatedly confront.
In Gyeongju, world leaders encountered a temporal inversion that seemed to allow dialogue not only beyond the confines of national interest but across centuries, as though conversing with Silla envoys of the past and historians of the distant future. They were prompted to reconceive themselves not simply as state representatives but as actors concerned with the continuity of civilization.
In a fragmented and fatigued era, Gyeongju revealed not the chaos-inducing wingbeat of a butterfly but the capacity of a delicate, translucent movement to still the winds and generate new order. Culture is no longer ancillary to diplomacy; it constitutes one of the most resonant voices shaping our time — and may be the language of hope available only to those situated at the border.
Lee Kyung-hwa (khl@namjunepaikcfoundation.org), a graduate of Harvard University Graduate School of Design, is the international director of the Nam June Paik Cultural Foundation.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
14. Warning signs in Lee's inner circle
Summary:
Improper personnel solicitation in Lee Jae Myung’s inner circle has set off a serious warning flare. Rep. Moon Jin seog was caught texting presidential digital secretary Kim Nam kuk to push an ally for the KAMA chair, a private industry post outside Blue House authority. The casual reference to the chief of staff and first lady’s office shows personal networks bleeding into power. Kim’s quick resignation and a “stern warning” are not enough. The episode recalls Choi Soon sil and Park Geun hye. Without strong safeguards and a special inspector general, a small ethics breach can sink a presidency.
Comment: More on domestic politics for our situational understanding.
Warning signs in Lee's inner circle - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
- Published Dec 4, 2025 3:39 pm KST
- Updated Dec 4, 2025 4:04 pm KST
Improper solicitation is not a minor misstep, can sink a presidency
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20251204/ed-warning-signs-in-lees-inner-circle
The vacant seat of Rep. Moon Jin-seog, deputy floor leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, is shown during a steering committee meeting at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul, Wednesday. Yonhap
The recent disclosure that Rep. Moon Jin-seog, deputy floor leader of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), exchanged messages with presidential digital communications secretary Kim Nam-kuk suggesting a personnel recommendation has sparked a controversy that cannot be brushed aside.
In an apparent bid to ease the growing criticism, Kim offered to resign Thursday, which was accepted immediately. Despite such a hectic move to quell disputes, controvesy is expected to continue given the seriousness of the case.
During a National Assembly plenary session, an occasion intended for sober deliberation of the national budget, Moon was caught on camera urging Kim via text message to recommend a former executive of the Korea Automobile & Mobility Association (KAMA) for the association’s chairmanship. Kim responded that he would convey the request to “Hoon-sik hyeong and Hyun-ji nuna,” understood to be presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik and the first lady’s office director Kim Hyun-ji, adding playful suffixes of familiarity to their names.
Regardless of interpretation, the exchange is unambiguously inappropriate. It is troubling not only for its informality and candor but also for what it suggests about the proximity of personal networks to the levers of public authority within the presidential office.
The nature of the position in question only heightens the concern. KAMA is not a government-appointed body but a private industry association composed of major automakers. The presidential office has no formal standing to influence its leadership, and the first lady’s office even less. Moon and Kim undoubtedly knew this. Yet they acted as though proximity to power could tip the scales even within a private organization. Such behavior betrays a troubling misunderstanding of the boundaries that should separate public duty from private familiarity.
The casual invocation of terms of address such as “hyeong” and “nuna” to refer to senior officials further illustrates this cultural slippage. While harmless in private settings, such phrasing within the presidential office signals a workplace where hierarchy and formal procedure risk being overshadowed by personal bonds, at the cost of institutional integrity.
Recent history offers a cautionary tale. During the Park Geun-hye administration, Choi Soon-sil’s surreptitious involvement in personnel decisions and public-private ventures grew into a national corruption scandal that ultimately brought down a president. More recently, allegations of personnel requests channeled through figures close to former first lady Kim Keon Hee underscore how vulnerable such informal networks can be. Once unofficial recommendations begin to displace structured processes, the descent into favoritism and corruption can be rapid and politically devastating.
The presidential office said it has issued a stern warning to Kim Nam-kuk. That response is inadequate. Improper personnel solicitation by public officials is prohibited under the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act. In September, the administration dismissed another senior secretary for misconduct related to personnel matters. The differing standards in these cases raise questions about the consistency and seriousness of the government’s enforcement of its own ethics rules.
Moon, too, must be held to account. A lawmaker responsible for legislative oversight should not be attempting back-channel lobbying, particularly for a position outside governmental reach. His effort to leverage personal ties within the president’s inner circle reflects a disregard for the ethical limits that elected officials are obliged to uphold.
Beyond individual responsibility, this incident demands a thorough review of the presidential office’s internal safeguards. Procedures must be reinforced to ensure that personal requests cannot infiltrate official decision-making, or appear to do so. The administration must also move swiftly to appoint a special inspector general, a post that has remained vacant for far too long and whose absence has weakened oversight.
A small breach in ethical discipline can grow into a scandal large enough to damage an administration. This episode should not be dismissed as a mere embarrassment but rather treated as a warning. To preserve public trust, the government must reaffirm that its officials serve the nation, not personal connections, political favorites or discreet favors exchanged beyond the reach of accountability.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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