"... December 7, 1941 – a date that will live in infamy –"
Quotes of the Day:
"If we abandon our ideals in the face of adversity and aggression, then those ideals were never really in our possession. I would rather die fighting than give up even the smallest part of the idea that is 'America.' "
-Maj Ian Fishback in his letter to Senator John McCain
"This will not be the last time a virus threatens our lives and our livelihoods"
- Sarah Gilbert, Oxford vaccine creator
“One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we've been bamboozled long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle. We're no longer interested in finding out the truth. The bamboozle has captured us. It's simply too painful to acknowledge, even to ourselves, that we've been taken. Once you give a charlatan power over you, you almost never get it back.”
- Carl Sagan
1. N.K. leader Kim urges nurturing 'absolutely loyal' commanding officers
2. U.S. fields new radar designed to detect ballistic missiles from N. Korea
3. N.Korea ranked 17th for relative power among 26 Asia-Pacific countries
4. [Election 2022] How rival presidential candidates differ on US policy
5. An inside look at the Korean War Veterans Memorial renovation | Military Times Reports
6. The Merits of Formally Ending the Korean War
7. Attacks on possible Korean peace plan are politically and financially motivated
8. Can Moon Jae-in Finally End the Korean War?
9. The Long Shadow of the Asian Financial Crisis in South Korea
10. Kim Jong Un and the ‘Supreme Leader System’
11. North Korea creates special prosecutorial teams to eliminate corruption
12. Newsweek’s Misfire on Aid Monitoring in North Korea
13. Moon pledges S. Korea will do more for U.N. peacekeeping missions
14. Can America Take On Russia and China In the Grey Zone? (and north Korea too)
15. Which Will South Korea Choose: The U.S. or China?
16. North Korea continues crackdown on streetside commerce in Chongjin
1. N.K. leader Kim urges nurturing 'absolutely loyal' commanding officers
What the report does not say out loud is that anything less than absolutely loyalty to Kim Jong-un by military commanders will likely result in the death penalty. So I think nurturing is too timid of a description of what is required.
(2nd LD) N.K. leader Kim urges nurturing 'absolutely loyal' commanding officers | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with English-language report)
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Dec. 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has presided over a gathering of military educators and called on them to nurture commanding officers to be "absolutely loyal" to the ruling Workers' Party, Pyongyang's state media reported Tuesday.
The party's Central Committee and Central Military Commission convened the gathering at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang on Saturday and Sunday to make a "radical turn" in education projects in line with the "changing times," according to the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"(Kim) underscored the need to prepare all the military educationists to be true soldiers immensely loyal to the idea and leadership of the party and to organize and provide the military education strictly guided by the party's idea, policy and method so as to bring up all the cadets to be commanding officers who remain absolutely loyal to the Party Central Committee," the KCNA reported.
Kim then called for concerted efforts to open a "period for new surge and leaping progress" for military educational revolution to ensure the "invincibility of our revolutionary forces."
During the gathering, there was not any reported mention of the North's nuclear force or of any particular country.
The gathering came as Kim has been seen as striving to strengthen national unity and tighten discipline among military personnel amid persistent economic woes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and crippling economic sanctions.
It was attended by leading military education workers, senior officials from the General Political Bureau of the North's Korean People's Army and the General Staff and other related officials.
The latest meeting of military education workers is the country's eight such session and the second since Kim took power in late 2011. The last session took place in November 2015.
In July, Kim presided over a gathering of military commanders and political staff.
(END)
2. U.S. fields new radar designed to detect ballistic missiles from N. Korea
Excerpts:
Hill said the LRDR will eventually be upgraded to track hypersonic missiles, though its current focus is to detect ballistic missile threats.
Still, the radar will be "very powerful" and will "pick out the lethal objects," as opposed to decoys or non-lethal objects from a missile, such as boosters or fuel cans.
"If we can pick out the lethal objects, then we're going to be shooting at that lethal object and not at boosters or beanbags," Hill said.
"So that's the technical geek stuff behind the term discrimination. It's picking out the legal object or legal objects."
U.S. fields new radar designed to detect ballistic missiles from N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Monday completed the construction of a new long-range radar in Alaska that is designed to give early warnings for incoming ballistic missiles from rogue nations, such as North Korea, the chief of the U.S. missile defense said.
Vice Adm. Jon Hill, director of U.S. Missile Defense Agency, also explained the new long range discrimination radar (LRDR) will be powerful enough to discriminate or identify lethal objects, such as warheads, allowing the U.S. to successfully intercept such objects.
"There's a rogue nation there (in the INDO-PACOM region) that is targeting the United States, (has) demonstrated ballistic missile capability time and again and very recently," Hill said in a virtual media roundtable, referring to North Korea.
"So the radar was strategically placed in Alaska, so with this wide field of view that we can capture threats coming from that region," he added.
His remarks came shortly after the U.S. marked the initial fielding of the new radar, which the MDA director said will likely become fully operational "roughly in 2023" after testing and systems integration.
The U.S. began constructing the long-range radar following a series of missile provocations from North Korea.
Pyongyang has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missiles since November 2017, but staged several short-range missile tests this year, including the test launch of a self-claimed hypersonic missile in September and a submarine-launched ballistic missile the following month.
Hill said the LRDR will eventually be upgraded to track hypersonic missiles, though its current focus is to detect ballistic missile threats.
Still, the radar will be "very powerful" and will "pick out the lethal objects," as opposed to decoys or non-lethal objects from a missile, such as boosters or fuel cans.
"If we can pick out the lethal objects, then we're going to be shooting at that lethal object and not at boosters or beanbags," Hill said.
"So that's the technical geek stuff behind the term discrimination. It's picking out the legal object or legal objects."
(END)
3. N.Korea ranked 17th for relative power among 26 Asia-Pacific countries
Excerpts:
Notably, North Korea’s military capability outstripped Japan, Australia, Pakistan and Singapore.
North Korea came in at sixth place in terms of military capability, while South Korea was ranked fifth among the 26 countries in the region.
The think tank additionally pointed out that South Korea’s military capability rating remained unchanged from the previous year, whereas North Korea’s score was slightly down.
N.Korea ranked 17th for relative power among 26 Asia-Pacific countries
Asia Power Index shows N.Korea’s military capability outstrips Japan and Australia
Published : Dec 6, 2021 - 15:02 Updated : Dec 6, 2021 - 17:14
Australia’s Lowy Institute releases its 2021 Asia Power Index report (Lowy Institute`s official website )
North Korea was ranked 17th for its relative power among 26 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia’s Lowy Institute said in an annual report.
The foreign policy think tank on Sunday released its 2021 Asia Power Index report, which comprehensively gauges the power of Asia-Pacific countries by using 131 indicators across eight thematic measures.
The index assessed a wide range of country‘s capacities, including military and economic capabilities, diplomatic and cultural influences, resilience, and future resources.
North Korea remained in 17th, and was followed by nine countries including Brunei, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.
Pyongyang’s overall score was 11.5 out of 100. The score declined by 0.8 point from last year mainly due to a huge 5-point drop in diplomatic influence, which measures the scope and standing of the country’s foreign relations.
The Lowy Institute explained Pyongyang “derives its power principally from its military resources and nuclear weapons capability,” labeling it as a “misfit middle power” in the region.
North Korea’s military capabilities
Notably, North Korea’s military capability outstripped Japan, Australia, Pakistan and Singapore.
North Korea came in at sixth place in terms of military capability, while South Korea was ranked fifth among the 26 countries in the region.
The think tank additionally pointed out that South Korea’s military capability rating remained unchanged from the previous year, whereas North Korea’s score was slightly down.
The military capabilities of Japan and Australia, major allies of the US, also decreased despite its enhanced coordination with Washington to collectively deter China and maintain military balance in the Asia-Pacific region.
Specifically, Pyongyang was ranked fifth for its armed forces, which measure the total number of active military and paramilitary personnel and their readiness posture. Pyongyang outstripped Seoul, which came seventh in armed forces.
In contrast, North Korea was ranked 17th in annual defense expenditure, whose amount is around 10 percent of South Korea’s defense spending.
Pyongyang’s negative power gap
Another key point that the report highlighted was that Pyongyang had the largest negative “power gap“ among the countries. The power gap shows discrepancies between the country’s available resources and global influence.
Pyongyang has a negative power gap as it exerted undersized influence relative to their resources.
The think tank said North Korea was ranked 26th, the lowest among the countries both for economic relationships and cultural influence.
The economic relationship is evaluated based on trade relations, investment ties and economic diplomacy, while cultural influence is the index evaluating a country’s ability to “shape international public opinion through cultural appeal and interaction.”
The Lowy Institute explained Pyongyang’s “diplomatic and economic isolation limits its regional influence resulting in a Power Gap score of –7.3.”
North Korea’s negative power gap “further deteriorated” this year, which means the country exercised less influence than expected, considering its available resources.
In general, US power in the Asia-Pacific region has increased under the Biden administration, as it enhances its collective deterrence with allies and partners against China and takes initiative in regional vaccine diplomacy efforts.
According to the report, the US is the sole country that registered gains in overall scores among the top 10 countries, while the COVID-19 pandemic has attenuated the power of almost all countries this year.
Washington, for the first time in four editions of the Asia Power index, was assessed as having enhanced its regional power, defying its “prevailing regional downward trend.”
China’s regional power, antithetically, was undermined by the COVID-19 pandemic, reversing last year’s trend of emerging diplomatically and narrowing the gap with the US.
This year, the US came out on top, followed by China, Japan, India, Russia and Australia, with South Korea remaining seventh place in the Asia Power Index.
4. [Election 2022] How rival presidential candidates differ on US policy
Some fairly clear differences between the two. But as we all know foreign policy will not be a strong contributing factor in determining the outcome of the election.
[Election 2022] How rival presidential candidates differ on US policy
Published : Dec 6, 2021 - 16:32 Updated : Dec 6, 2021 - 18:03
Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung (left) and People Power Party presidential candidate Yoon Suk-youl (Yonhap)
At a time when uncertainty looms large on regional and international security order, South Koreans will head to the polls in March to elect a new president.
The leading contenders are Lee Jae-myung of the liberal ruling Democratic Party of Korea and Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative opposition People Power Party. While domestic issues such as runaway housing prices and continuing economic fallout from the pandemic are expected to be on the forefront of voters’ minds, the result will also have tremendous impact on Seoul’s foreign policy, especially as it treads carefully amid the intensifying rivalry between its security ally Washington and key trade partner Beijing.
Seoul’s new leadership will also have wider ramifications for the Joe Biden administration, as it views its East Asian ally as a key partner to Washington’s battle in containing an increasingly assertive Beijing in the region, as well as dealing with nuclear-armed Pyongyang.
Both Lee and Yoon highlight “national interest” as the foundation of their foreign policy, but what that entails and how to build that is where their differences lie. Lee, who is widely expected to continue incumbent President Moon Jae-in’s diplomacy, says he will take a “pragmatic and balanced” approach, alluding he will refrain from openly taking sides between Washington and Beijing. Meanwhile, Yoon places bolstering the South Korea-US alliance as key, as well as forging stronger ties with like-minded democracies in resolving issues on the Korean Peninsula and around the world.
“The US would traditionally prefer a conservative president from South Korea. But when it comes to Seoul’s US policy, personal characteristics and background have also shaped their policy, in addition to the party’s ideology,” said Park Ihn-hwi, a professor of international politics at Ewha Womans University. “Also there’s the North Korean factor. Depending on the candidate’s stance on Pyongyang, the allies could either clash or work well together.”
For decades, South Korea’s conservatives have generally placed a greater emphasis on the US alliance, to the extent that it has irked China in the past, including with the 2017 deployment of the US-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system in South Korea, despite backlash from China. Meanwhile, the progressives tend to emphasize nationalism and diplomatic autonomy, and have opted for “strategic ambiguity” between the US and China.
Observers, however, note that both candidates are not all black and white when it comes to dealing with the US. Despite the ideological split of their respective parties, the two have also taken into consideration the complexity of the geopolitical environment and changing dynamics of voters, and have left doors open for diplomatic leeway, holding themselves at a distance from their parties’ polarized stance.
“The two candidates are well aware of the security environment Seoul faces, and despite the differences in the liberal and conservative party, they both recognize the US-South Korea alliance as given,” said Seo Jung-kun, a professor of political science at Kyung Hee University.
For example, Lee has set up a “practical diplomacy committee” and recruited experts like Wie Sung-rak, a former ambassador to Russia who has in the past voiced criticism against the Moon administration’s foreign policy, for a more balanced stance.
“Lee has been reaffirming the importance of the US-South Korea alliance and expressed a stronger position against North Korea than the incumbent Moon administration,” said Seo. “Meanwhile, Yoon stresses the importance of a ‘US-South Korea alliance’ -- which is critical to the conservative voters who don’t want a reevaluation of the alliance -- but has shown a newer conservative side, such as expressing that he is willing to be more open in dealing with the North’s denuclearization issue.”
Observers say the two candidates, who are both relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs, have only touched on the basics at this point and not gotten into much detail concerning their US policy. But the remarks on US policy by the candidates and their advisers could provide a glimpse into the thinking of the presidential hopefuls.
Yoon Suk-yeol: Stronger US alliance, tougher on China
Ex-Prosecutor General Yoon has stressed on forging a stronger alliance with the US, hinting that he would align more closely with the US and get tougher on China.
“I cannot overemphasize the importance of a comprehensive South Korea-US alliance covering all areas, not only the security, but also health, administration, climate change and cutting-edge technology,” Yoon said last month during his meeting with visiting US Sen. Jon Ossoff and Daniel Kritenbrink, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. “A firm alliance between South Korea and the US has become ever more important in global issues beyond national security.”
Yoon, who stressed global coalitions of democratic states, dangled the possibility of joining the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that involves like-minded regional democracies -- Japan, Australia and India -- which is widely viewed as a mechanism to contain China.
He also stressed the need to cooperate with the Five Eyes alliance -- the intelligence-sharing club among the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- in order to protect security interests against North Korea’s nuclear threats, but has stopped short of backing Seoul’s possible full membership to the group.
Meanwhile, the conservative candidate also said South Korea could additionally deploy THAAD and strengthen its missile security system as a matter of “national sovereignty.”
The remarks will largely be welcomed by Washington, but could potentially rattle Beijing again. In 2017, Seoul’s decision to deploy the US-missile system angered China, which views THAAD as a threat to its national security, and it hit back at Seoul with economic retaliation.
But an official with the Yoon camp stressed that advocating the US alliance doesn’t mean that it will not value its ties with China.
“The Moon administration has taken a strategic ambiguity position in US-China rivalry, and we are not entirely breaking away from that,” said a foreign affairs adviser with Yoon’s camp who wished to remain anonymous. “We are focusing on strengthening the alliance (with the US) and upgrading to the next level, while at the same time managing ties with China.”
Lee Jae-myung: Balanced diplomacy amid US-China rivalry
Lee’s campaign put emphasis on the importance of its alliance with the US, but stressed that there is no need for Seoul to constrain its diplomatic maneuverability by siding with one superpower over another.
This largely echoes the Moon administration’s stance, which has maintained “strategic ambiguity” in juggling its security partnership with Washington and trade reliance upon Beijing.
“Amid the intensified rivalry between the US and China, there have been many situations where South Korea is pressured to choose,” Lee said during a press conference with foreign media last month. “Our diplomatic principle is based on pragmatic diplomacy centering on national interest. We shouldn’t be swayed, but establish a situation where we can make a choice.”
“We cannot ignore the security alliance with Washington, and have to deepen our ties,” he said, describing the US as “Korea’s only ally” and China as a “strategic partner.” “But at the same time, we cannot neglect our ties with China, which is geographically very close and the exchange is expanding.”
During another event last month, Lee said that “there aren’t only two options for Seoul to choose,” when asked what Seoul will do if it has to pick a side between the rivals.
On the possible concern that “strategic ambiguity” could weaken the US-South Korea alliance, the Lee camp assured that the decades-old alliance is the basis of Seoul’s foreign policy.
At a forum held last week, Lee’s adviser Wi said Seoul’s role is to be “close to the US and not too far from China.”
“The US is our ally and China is our partner, and we can say we have a closer relationship with the ally,” he said. “If we are aiming to do diplomacy based on the value of a democratic, market economy, we have to set the direction closer to the US.”
In regard to the controversial THAAD issue, Lee in the past had called to remove the missile-defense battery from South Korea, but his recent intentions over the matter have not been as clear.
“In principle, I cannot agree that the (THAAD deployment) is fully in accord with the country’s national interest in East Asia, but am aware that one cannot simply get rid of it as it has already been deployed,” he said last month, adding if Seoul were to additionally install another battery, there would need to be a full review before making the decision.
5. An inside look at the Korean War Veterans Memorial renovation | Military Times Reports
A video update very much worth the 6 minutes to watch to learn about the almost complete overhaul of the Korean War Memorial.
Note it features our former boss, General Tilelli who is leading this effort. Note also (as we have discussed) the great honor for our KATUSA brothers who fought and died alongside their U.S. Army brothers.
6. The Merits of Formally Ending the Korean War
Tell me how this is in any way a valid assumption:
Ending the Korean War would reduce military tensions in the Indo-Pacific at a time when such a positive development is badly needed. From the Ladakh region of the India-Chinese border to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, numerous fault lines of great power rivalry litter the region and threaten to unleash conflict at a moment's notice. The rise of China as an economic and maritime power has undoubtedly made its neighbors uneasy. South Korea in particular has taken on increased skepticism of Beijing in recent years. While a peace treaty would be immaterial to China’s military build-up in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, it would help kickstart the long and arduous process of dismantling the 70-year military build-up on the Korean Peninsula, certainly a welcome rose in a field of thorns.
This plays right into the strategy of north Korea and China. It is counter to the nature,objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and given that, an end of war declaration might have the opposite effect as Kim seeks to exploit it to support his strategy. And there are some leaps of logic that such a declaration will protect the f;auth lines of great power rivalry."
The Merits of Formally Ending the Korean War
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On Nov, 23, U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-In announced ongoing joint efforts to finalize an end of war declaration document. The Korean War (1950-53) that killed an estimated 1.2 million Koreans and 40, 000 Americans never formally ended, but rather was halted with an Armistice Agreement that left the Korean Civil War frozen and the peninsula divided indefinitely at the 38th parallel with a Communist North and Capitalist South. While hostilities have flared periodically during the ensuing 68 years, the armistice has helped hold back the prospects of war. A formal end of war declaration presents a new opportunity to achieve peace and security in the Indo-Pacific through military de-escalation and should proceed at full speed.
Ending the Korean War would reduce military tensions in the Indo-Pacific at a time when such a positive development is badly needed. From the Ladakh region of the India-Chinese border to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, numerous fault lines of great power rivalry litter the region and threaten to unleash conflict at a moment's notice. The rise of China as an economic and maritime power has undoubtedly made its neighbors uneasy. South Korea in particular has taken on increased skepticism of Beijing in recent years. While a peace treaty would be immaterial to China’s military build-up in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, it would help kickstart the long and arduous process of dismantling the 70-year military build-up on the Korean Peninsula, certainly a welcome rose in a field of thorns.
With U.S. deterrence against North Korea already secured by an overwhelming nuclear and conventional advantage, Washington could finally bring its troops home. U.S. troops have resided on the Korean Peninsula since 1945 and 30,000 troops remain as a “trip-wire” force to quickly respond to hostilities. American and Korean troops operate under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) which was established during the Cold War to deter/defeat outside aggression against South Korea, more precisely a North Korean invasion. While previous North Korean leaders routinely pursued forceful reunification, the current regime has not done so. Kim Jong-Un has contrarily named the potential for conflict as a key obstacle preventing reunification. Formal peace with Pyongyang would acknowledge the relative decline in the North’s conventional capabilities and leave CFC with little to deter/defeat, thereby eliminating the need for permanently-stationed American troops.
Washington would enjoy a more sustainable East Asian grand strategy with fewer committed resources. South Korea is scheduled to assume wartime operational control in 2022 after decades of delay. With half of its outstanding security challenges effectively gone with the stroke of a pen, Seoul would face relatively slim odds of ever having to execute wartime operation control making its security situation much more stable over the long-run. Japan has similarly taken on a greater share of its defense burden. The initiative of both nations means their Washington-led alliances can be upheld with less of the burden being shouldered by the U.S. military. Japan and Korea would also both be free to focus on their remaining shared security challenge, China.
Peace in Korea would improve U.S.-China relations. China has a firm stake in the future of the Korean Peninsula, divided or otherwise. It would no doubt be pleased to see its capital no longer in the shadow of American forces and the looming threat of nuclear war made more distant on its border. North Korea and China have a defense treaty, a pact they renewed in 2021. But with war no longer a factor, Beijing would be free from getting dragged into an unwanted conflict to protect its fledgling client state. The Korean War is fundamentally a proxy conflict between American and Chinese spheres of influence and its conclusion would remove a long-standing source of friction between them. We should not be surprised if such a development leads to progress in other areas of U.S.-China relations.
North Korea has long held it will only negotiate a peace treaty unilaterally with the U.S. The Biden and Moon administrations will fundamentally test this assertion. While it remains unclear if Pyongyang will commit to signing, its weakened state in lieu of the COVID-19 pandemic suggests it will be more amenable to negotiation than would otherwise be the case. Washington and Seoul have not yet agreed how to incorporate denuclearization into the document. However, this detail is marginal given that the U.S. has already recognized North Korea as a de facto nuclear power making denuclearization extremely unlikely. Whether Pyongyang’s nukes stay or go pale in significance to what potentially lies ahead. The time has come to replace the Armistice with a formal peace treaty and promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific through military de-escalation.
Ryan C. Bercaw is a former Marine Corps intelligence analyst specializing in East Asia. His work has previously appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette. The views expressed are the author's own.
7. Attacks on possible Korean peace plan are politically and financially motivated
My cautions about the end of war declaration are not politically and financially motivated. They are based on my understanding and analysis of the nature, objectives, and strategy of theKim family regime and the absolute requirement that we deter war on the Korean peninsula and if deterrence fails we can support our ally in successfully defending the ROK.
But I absolutely agree with Ms. Lee on this point:
To avoid misunderstanding, Washington and Seoul should discuss in concrete terms what ending the Korean War would mean for mutual defense and long-term security interests in East Asia outside of the UNC. Such consultation should take place before any peace declaration, if they have not already taken place, and explained to the American public.
However, I believe an objective analysis of the impact on mutual defense and long term security will reveal that before any end of war declaration is made that there must be a sufficient reduction in the threat from the north, particularly the direct threat to Seoul from the Kesong Heights and the maneuver forces along the DMZ (the nuclear and missile threats are another story!) I would also like to see this question be answered in affirmative: Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
As I have written paper and words do not trump steel. Balanced analysis and encouragement will not either.
Conclusion:
President Biden’s instincts on foreign policy have been hawkish on certain issues like China but peace-oriented on others, as seen by his decision to end the Afghanistan War. All those who support finally ending the Korean War, seven decades after it began, should help the Biden administration overcome these analytical and political hurdles through balanced analysis and encouragement.
Attacks on possible Korean peace plan are politically and financially motivated – Responsible Statecraft
Attacks on possible Korean peace plan are politically and financially motivated
There are legitimate challenges facing a formal end to the war, but they can be overcome through balanced analysis.
December 6, 2021
Last week’s announcement that China supports an end-of-war declaration is a major step forward in the Korea peace process. A similar statement by the United States would give credence to President Biden’s pledge for a “calibrated” policy on North Korea while also advancing the U.S. interest in a more stable Korean Peninsula.
Indeed, the Biden administration appears sincere in its offer to talk to North Koreans without preconditions. It also has not shut debate around ending the Korean War — a move that would enjoy support from dozens of members of Congress, anti-war groups, humanitarian organizations, families awaiting recovery of American prisoners of war and missing in action service members (POW/MIA) from the Korean War, among others.
To get there, the Biden administration must confront several key questions and dynamics that could derail a serious peace process. Successfully navigating these issues could transform U.S. foriegn policy in the Koreas from one based on primacy to multilateralism.
Alliance Issues
One of the most complicated questions surrounding the formal end to the Korean War is what that will mean for U.S. defense of its ally South Korea. Analysis of the United Nations Command (UNC), the core vehicle for implementing the Armistice Agreement, is critical for understanding the security environment once a formal peace treaty is signed — a process that could be initiated through a political statement such as an end-of-war declaration.
The legal grounds under which the UNC can remain in South Korea would cease to exist post-peace treaty, since its purpose as laid out in UN Security Council resolutions S/1501 and S/1511 was primarily to repel any North Korean attack against the South. To avoid misunderstanding, Washington and Seoul should discuss in concrete terms what ending the Korean War would mean for mutual defense and long-term security interests in East Asia outside of the UNC. Such consultation should take place before any peace declaration, if they have not already taken place, and explained to the American public.
Us vs. Them Mentality
Critics of the Korea peace process say that improving bilateral relations is akin to rewarding “bad behavior.” This type of thinking assumes that North Korea will be forever hostile, locking the U.S. into a policy of maximum pressure and non-engagement. Such a moralistic lens absolves any U.S. complicity in the past breakdown in talks, such as Washington’s failure to meet its commitments in the 1994 Agreed Framework, or the Treasury Department’s designation of Banco Delta Asia in Macao as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern the same week that the Six Party’s Joint Statement was released.
Of course North Korea also bears responsibility for failures of past agreements and for framing U.S. interests in ways that perpetuate a siege mentality. A better way forward would be for both sides to recognize each other’s legitimate interests — North Korea’s desire for security, and U.S. desire for stability and nonproliferation — and focus on achieving tangible, sustainable progress in a step-by-step manner that becomes progressively larger and more consequential.
Rising Anti-China Sentiments
The growing intensity of anti-Chinese sentiments in Washington poses a major threat to the Biden administration’s ability to address the North Korea issue. As a former Chinese official noted in a track II meeting, “to China, the U.S. is trying to deprive China of its space in the international system,” which could reduce Beijing’s desire to work with the United States on the North Korea issue.
Part of the problem is that North Korea and China are regularly lumped together as threats that justify an ever-increasingly militarized U.S. foreign policy. For example, the 2021 Global Posture Review emphasizes the threat of North Korea and China as the main impetus for the U.S. military to increase its presence in the region. Hardliners in Congress also make it difficult to pursue cooperation with Beijing on issues of common interest such as North Korea.
For instance, Senator Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) description of President Biden’s China policy as “appeasement” and labeling of the Democratic Party as “structurally pro-China” reduces room for creativity and risk-taking that are necessary for the Biden administration to tackle the North Korea issue. This tendency is common among Democrats as well, including nominees for ambassadorships to Asia, who reinforce the narrative that China is a country to be defeated rather than a country to work with.
Defense Industry-Funded Opposition
Following reporting that the U.S. and South Korea were close to agreeing on the text of an end-of-war declaration (a claim that is unverified by U.S. sources), there has been a flurry of articles by scholars at U.S. think tanks about the folly of pursuing peace with North Korea.
One expert at Heritage Foundation described an end-of-war declaration as an “empty promise.” Another expert at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) described it as lacking in “seriousness about genuine security threats.” What is left unsaid is how enmeshed some of the think tanks that advance U.S. military intervention are with the defense industry. For example, the Heritage Foundation received at least $5.8 million from the Hanwha Group between 2007 and 2015. Hanwha is a South Korean conglomerate that produces autonomous weapons systems, including SGR-A1 that is designed to replace human guards on the demilitarized zone.
It is important to note that not all analysts at traditionally interventionist think tanks advocate for militaristic ideas. For example, Kori Schake of AEI recently spoke favorably of an arms control agreement with North Korea over pursuing unrealistic goals like invading the country to forcibly remove all of its nuclear weapons. The exchange of views by scholars who represent alternative perspectives should be encouraged, especially when they advance less escalatory, more diplomacy-centered solutions.
Perhaps the biggest unknown is how North Koreans will respond to U.S. support for ending the Korean War. In an ideal scenario, it would be met favorably, and lead to a broad agreement to return to the negotiating table. In the worst case scenario, Biden would be rebuffed, providing ammunition to those who are skeptical of diplomatic engagement with North Korea. If Beijing can help clarify Pyongyang’s position on the issue of ending the war and/or help those in Washington who are seeking dialogue with North Korean officials, that would help close the information gap, which in turn will give Americans more confidence to pursue diplomacy with North Korea. In the meantime, those who watch this issue should be clear-eyed in terms of the financial interests driving certain commentaries toward a deterrence-only, confrontation-based policy on North Korea.
President Biden’s instincts on foreign policy have been hawkish on certain issues like China but peace-oriented on others, as seen by his decision to end the Afghanistan War. All those who support finally ending the Korean War, seven decades after it began, should help the Biden administration overcome these analytical and political hurdles through balanced analysis and encouragement.
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8. Can Moon Jae-in Finally End the Korean War?
Certainly not unilaterally. Not without Kim Jong-un.
Excerpts:
Cato Institute Senior Fellow Doug Bandow made the case for such a declaration being in America’s national interest. “The United States does have a strong incentive to negotiate with the North since the alternative, an updated form of ‘strategic patience’ ignoring Pyongyang’s activities, is not an option,” he
wrote in October. Given the rate at which North Korea is advancing its nuclear weapons program and the failure of any other measures, a peace declaration is the best option.
Moreover, the argument that it would necessarily result in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is unconvincing, he argued, given that U.S. troops remain in Germany and Japan to this day.
But, as Yoon Sukjoon sees it, each country involved has a different understanding of a peace declaration and wildly different goals about it. South Korea wants to use the declaration to spark negotiations with the North, but it is also a “personal indulgence by Moon in advance of his retirement,” Yoon said. North Korea wants “an easing of sanctions without having to give ground on denuclearization.” China is fine with maintaining the status quo, but they also benefit from the Moon administration’s friendliness as it seeks to win Chinese support, and they may use the declaration to argue for the removal of U.S. troops and weapons systems. The U.S., by contrast, seeks to “devolve more responsibility onto South Korea” and “align South Korean foreign policy more closer with its own in its struggle to contain China.”
The Moon administration views a declaration of peace as an initial step towards getting serious denuclearization negotiations started. But others insist denuclearization comes first.
Not all of these goals can be achieved together. Can any of them?
Can Moon Jae-in Finally End the Korean War?
The Moon administration views a declaration of peace as an initial step towards getting serious denuclearization negotiations started. But others insist denuclearization comes first.
Almost seven decades after combat ended in the Korean War, South Korea might finally make a declaration of peace with North Korea. Diplomats are frantically engaged in talks, trying to iron out terms and win international support before ROK President Moon Jae-in leaves office in five months.
South Korea never signed the Korean War Armistice Agreement in 1953, as then-President Syngman Rhee still insisted on retaking the entire Korean Peninsula. Attempts at reaching a formal peace agreement failed at the 1954 Geneva Conference (attempts at creating a peaceful settlement in Indochina, the other issue on the agenda, didn’t go much better). Four summits between South and North in the three decades of the twenty-first century resulted in statements and flimsy agreements but nothing that came close to producing lasting peace. When former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il met in 2000, North Korea had no functioning nuclear weapons. Now they are estimated to have between thirty and forty and could have two hundred in five years. Can Moon do what so many before him have failed to do?
Moon follows in a line of progressive presidents, starting with Kim Dae-jung, who felt that “sunshine” would warm North Korean attitudes towards the South. Roh Moo-hyun endorsed Kim in the 1997 presidential election, briefly served in a ministerial post, and was nominated by the Democratic Party of Korea as Kim’s successor. Moon served as Roh’s campaign manager for his successful election campaign, stuck with him through his impeachment, arguing the case for his acquittal in front of the Constitutional Court, and helped plan Roh’s 2007 10.4 Inter-Korean Summit.
Roh and North Korean regime leader Kim Jong-il signed a “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” with strikingly similar language to the declarations of 2018 and 2019, but he came up short on his goal of a peace declaration. Roh was never on the same page with the United States. The U.S. position, as articulated by George W. Bush at a press conference taking place during the APEC summit, was, “That [the Korean War] will end … when Kim Jong-il verifiably gets rid of his weapons programs and his weapons.”
This disagreement over order has been one of the major issues at the summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. North Korea demands that sanctions be lifted first, while the United States demands that verifiable steps be taken towards denuclearization.
The Moon administration, like the Roh administration before it, views a declaration of peace as an initial step towards getting serious negotiations started. Korean conservatives tend to side more with the American position that North Korea should not be trusted too easily and that a declaration should be an end goal.
This schism between Korean progressives and conservatives on the idea of a declaration was on display at a debate between the two leading presidential candidates’ foreign policy advisors on November 30. Korea University Graduate School of International Studies Professor Kim Seong-han, who advises conservative candidate Yoon Seok-youl, said, “In order to bring about an end of the war, North Korea must give up its development of nuclear weapons.”
Former Korean Ambassador to Russia Wie Sung-rak, who represents the progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung, called a declaration “one part of the peace process,” which would “achieve a virtuous cycle advancing the conditions for denuclearization.”
Moon administration officials have also described a declaration of peace as a beginning step with highly symbolic value. “By putting an end to the Korean War, our government intends to commence the process of making irreversible progress in denuclearization and turning the abnormally long armistice into a peace regime,” First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun said on November 15.
“This doesn't mean a legal, structural change in the current armistice regime, including the UNC's (United Nations Command's) standing,” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Choi Young-sam said in an attempt to allay fears that such a declaration would harm South Korean security and alliances.
But, critics ask, if such a declaration of peace would be non-legally binding and would result in limited material changes, then what is the point?
Yoon Sukjoon, a retired Navy Captain and senior fellow at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, wrote in an article for The Diplomat, “Such a statement seems unlikely to achieve anything substantive, however, and the United States has been reluctant to go along with Moon’s plan.”
Disagreements over the legal implications of ending the war could lead to disputes about the interpretation of a declaration. “An immediate concern is that people have different understandings of its significance. Some see a declaration as a non-binding political statement, while others conflate it with a formal peace treaty that would dissolve the Armistice Agreement,” Frank Aum, a senior expert on Northeast Asia at U.S. Institute of Peace, said in an interview with the National Bureau of Asian Research.
“[I]t will be very difficult to separate the symbolic part of the end-of-war declaration from its legal or substantive meaning,” said Woo Jung-yeop, a research fellow at the Gyeonggi-based Sejong Institute, also speaking with the National Bureau of Asian Research.
But Aum sees it as “a risk worth taking” given the lack of progress through other means. He emphasized that bilateral engagement would be key: “If it doesn’t include DPRK buy-in and is not accompanied by a process and immediate bilateral concessions, it would fizzle out quickly.”
The status of American forces may come into question. “[T]he DPRK (or China) would take advantage of a declaration. They could argue that the UN command is no longer necessary or legitimate after an end of the war has been declared,” Woo said.
Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow on Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, argued in an op-ed that even a symbolic declaration could have real negative consequences “by creating a false sense of security. Declaring peace prior to addressing the real threat to peace—North Korea’s nuclear and conventional forces—could generate domino-effect advocacy for prematurely reducing U.S. deterrence and defense capabilities that protect America’s allies in the region.”
That is also the position taken by People Power Party (PPP) candidate Yoon. At a Q&A session with the foreign press in November, he said, “If it comes … it will weaken the UN Command Office in Korea and related military bases in Korea. … If that is achieved, there will be growing voices calling for the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces in Korea.”
The Democratic nominee Lee, on the other hand, who sees himself as carrying on the mission of Kim, Roh, and Moon, said an end of war declaration “can’t be stopped and shouldn’t be stopped.” He argued, “Judging based only on the current situation, I believe the current policy of appeasement is proving to be more effective than a hard-line confrontational policy or sanctions policy.” (Both Lee’s and Yoon’s statements were filtered through interpreters.)
Lee, who has been emphasizing Japan’s colonial history during his campaign, also tied opposition to a peace declaration with support for Japan’s interests: "I believe Japan's political circles could make such claims (against the declaration) because that would be in Japan's national interests. But from our perspective, we have to clearly turn the state of armistice into an end-of-war state and go beyond a peace treaty to co-exist and develop into a mutually beneficial relationship of co-prosperity.”
While the declaration of peace is subject to the influences of multiple countries, Japan is actually a minor player compared to the two Koreas, the United States, and China. South Korean officials have been meeting with both American and Chinese counterparts to try to get buy-in.
Cato Institute Senior Fellow Doug Bandow made the case for such a declaration being in America’s national interest. “The United States does have a strong incentive to negotiate with the North since the alternative, an updated form of ‘strategic patience’ ignoring Pyongyang’s activities, is not an option,” he wrote in October. Given the rate at which North Korea is advancing its nuclear weapons program and the failure of any other measures, a peace declaration is the best option.
Moreover, the argument that it would necessarily result in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is unconvincing, he argued, given that U.S. troops remain in Germany and Japan to this day.
But, as Yoon Sukjoon sees it, each country involved has a different understanding of a peace declaration and wildly different goals about it. South Korea wants to use the declaration to spark negotiations with the North, but it is also a “personal indulgence by Moon in advance of his retirement,” Yoon said. North Korea wants “an easing of sanctions without having to give ground on denuclearization.” China is fine with maintaining the status quo, but they also benefit from the Moon administration’s friendliness as it seeks to win Chinese support, and they may use the declaration to argue for the removal of U.S. troops and weapons systems. The U.S., by contrast, seeks to “devolve more responsibility onto South Korea” and “align South Korean foreign policy more closer with its own in its struggle to contain China.”
The Moon administration views a declaration of peace as an initial step towards getting serious denuclearization negotiations started. But others insist denuclearization comes first.
Not all of these goals can be achieved together. Can any of them?
Mitchell Blatt is a former editorial assistant at the National Interest, Chinese-English translator, and lead author of Panda Guides Hong Kong. He has been published in USA Today, The Daily Beast, The Korea Times, Silkwinds magazine, and Areo Magazine, among other outlets. Follow him on Facebook at @MitchBlattWriter.
Image: Reuters
9. The Long Shadow of the Asian Financial Crisis in South Korea
Another era of Korean history I witnessed. I recall three things from this. With the radical change in the won-dollar relationship, US military personnel were purchasing brand new Ford Explorers with US specifications for half the price they cost in the US. I recall civil society mobilizing and the Korean people working together to overcome the IMF crisis by lining up at government offices to donate gold and jewelry to help pay off the IMF debt. And lastly, Korea was the first country suffering from the IMF crisis to pay off its IMF loans.
The Long Shadow of the Asian Financial Crisis in South Korea
Seoul’s approach to pandemic relief is colored by the formative experience of the 1997-98 crisis.
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In November, South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party proposed sending citizens another round of stimulus checks in response to the economic challenges created by the ongoing pandemic. However, Finance Minister Hong Nam-ki opposed this call and suggested a smaller but more-targeted assistance package. Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum backed up this position by adding that the government could not afford another round of universal assistance despite anticipating a larger-than-expected surplus in tax revenue this year.
Curiously, public polling in the first week of November revealed that over 60 percent of Koreans agreed with the government’s objection to universal relief. Why might this be? It is certainly not because people feel that COVID-19 is no longer a major source of economic pain. The latest round of universal disaster relief moved forward as late as September of this year and public assistance packages to-date have been broadly popular.
Rather than feelings of contentment, uncertainty is the chief driver of the people’s apprehension towards another round of relief payments. Public discussions reveal fears of exposing South Korea to international volatility – an unease that stems from the country’s experience during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.
The Thai baht’s devaluation in the summer of 1997 precipitated a panic as international investors became worried that other currencies in the region might be similarly vulnerable. In particular, countries with comparable debt profiles such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea experienced a sudden outflow of U.S. dollars. Unable to finance short-term loans, several flagship companies in affected countries collapsed, with consequences reverberating up and down the value chain.
The Asian Financial Crisis still casts a heavy shadow over South Korea because it was incredibly traumatic. Unemployment during the turmoil tripled and 80 percent of households experienced loss of income.
Structural readjustment measures that Seoul adopted as part of a rescue plan coordinated by Washington also left deep scars, leading to greater job insecurity and heightened inequality in subsequent years. For instance, the number of workers without full-time contracts increased by over 800,000 between 1997 and 2000.
The chaos also convinced South Korean policymakers and the public that the country was more vulnerable to erratic shifts in international market conditions than it had previously assumed. The failure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide effective assistance during this crisis despite its stated mission of acting as a backstop in these panics further exacerbated Seoul’s angst.
The belief that South Korea must prepare for future bouts of financial instability on its own remains a significant driver of the country’s macroeconomic policies, most notably its fastidious accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
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Despite preventative measures adopted since the crisis, both the public and policymakers remain deeply wary of creating any reasons for investors to lose confidence in the South Korean market again. This fear has been further sharpened in recent months by changes in U.S. monetary policy that are expected to pull investors and their capital from emerging markets to the United States. South Korean market observers have raised alarm that these anticipated outflows will most heavily affect countries with higher debt levels.
This anxiety creates resistance to public policy that demands greater government spending and borrowing (such as relief funds), particularly as the 2022 budget is already expected to increase the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio to over 50 percent. The IMF’s expression of concern around the debt increase further adds to this unease.
But public discussions on what the country risks by not committing more resources and support at this critical moment are worryingly few and far between.
Worsening gender inequality is one consequence of inaction that is not on the forefront of policy consideration. In May, the former head of the Korea Desk at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) called attention to how the growing demand and cost of caretaking tasks during the pandemic have pushed more South Korean women out of the labor force. Market surveys suggest that 476,000 female workers left the labor market in 2020, with more than four-fifths shifting to the status of homemaker. He warned that the resulting loss of productivity will have long-term ramifications on the country’s economic growth.
While this is a global trend, South Korea is starting from a pre-pandemic environment where gender inequality was far worse than in peer economies. Data from the OECD confirms that the country persistently suffers the largest gap in total income generated between genders among member states. Without further public assistance helping households overcome the onerous increase in the cost of caretaking, South Korea will likely suffer further loss of female workers, with deep consequences for both growth and social welfare down the road.
Another point of contention is whether it is reasonable for the South Korean government to spend more aggressively at this moment.
The IMF is correct to point out that the growth of South Korea’s debt-to-GDP ratio has been quick. From 47.9 percent in 2020, the figure is expected to rise to 55.1 percent in 2022 and 66.7 percent by 2026. This is the fastest increase among the 35 nations that the IMF classifies as advanced economies.
Credit ratings agency Moody’s also noted last year that even if Seoul were to hit its debt ceiling of 60 percent, “Korea will remain less indebted than advanced economies that share a similar rating, such as France and the UK.” George Washington University International Business Professor Danny Leipziger similarly saw greater downsides from South Korea engaging in “a tepid use of fiscal policy.”
With South Korea exhibiting both a need for public spending and fiscal capacity to increase its budget, the only remaining constraint is the public’s low tolerance for perceived risk. But built on the trauma of the Asian Financial Crisis, the people’s aversion to increased public debt is understandable.
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South Korea is hardly alone in its need for greater public spending. Placing the global economic recovery at the forefront, the United States could do more to reassure countries needing to increase public spending that its monetary policy would not risk prompting sudden shifts in international capital flows. And influential commentators should probably say and do less to limit fiscal actions at this time.
10. Kim Jong Un and the ‘Supreme Leader System’
Excerpts:
Since November 2021, South Korean media have all reported that Kim Jong Un has begun to be called “Supreme Leader” (Suryeong) in North Korea, with major media outlets in neighboring countries carrying similar reports.
However, this South Korea reporting is misplaced. That Kim Jong Un is being called “Supreme Leader” is nothing new; Japanese researchers and analysts first began noting it last fall.
...
Of course, one challenge that remains for this “great Supreme Leader” is the economy. It is with this awareness that he attended history’s first U.S.-North Korea summit in 2018, but unfortunately he found U.S. President Donald J. Trump a difficult negotiating partner. Following the breakdown of talks in Hanoi, Kim was forced to revert to “self-reliance,” but North Korea will need sanctions to be lifted before there can be any major improvement in the lives of its people. That in turn will inevitably involve further talks with the United States.
As Kim enters his second decade in power, it remains to be seen whether or not any good will emerge from him becoming “great Supreme Leader” and “outstanding Supreme Leader” and specifically whether he will be able to successfully address the major economic and diplomatic challenges that confront his country.
Kim Jong Un and the ‘Supreme Leader System’
After 30 years, the model is still alive and well.
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Suzuki Masayuki, the first person to be awarded a doctorate in North Korean politics in Japan, called the North Korean political system the “Supreme Leader system” (Suryeong-je), which he defined as “a system that aims to ensure continuous leadership by the Supreme Leader across generations,” in his “Kita Chosen: Shakaishugi to Dento no Kyomei” (North Korea: Confluence of Socialism and Tradition) (University of Tokyo Press, 1992). At the time of publication, North Korea was still led by Kim Il Sung, but it is surprising how Suzuki’s thinking remains an effective analytical model nearly 30 years later. A translation of the book was also made available for South Korea, and it is no wonder that it was widely read as basic reading and a textbook in North Korean studies in the 1990s.
Since November 2021, South Korean media have all reported that Kim Jong Un has begun to be called “Supreme Leader” (Suryeong) in North Korea, with major media outlets in neighboring countries carrying similar reports.
However, this South Korea reporting is misplaced. That Kim Jong Un is being called “Supreme Leader” is nothing new; Japanese researchers and analysts first began noting it last fall.
More specifically, it started with a joint editorial by the Rodong Sinmun and the Kulloja dated October 3, 2020, titled “The feats of our party unselfishly serving the people cannot be defeated.” The Rodong Sinmun is a daily Worker’s Party of Korea newspaper, while the Kulloja is a monthly party magazine, and joint editorials of the two carry important ideological meaning. This joint editorial, the sixth since Kim Jong Un took power, said, “Kim Jong Un is the great Supreme Leader of the people who is tirelessly strengthening and developing our Party as a revolutionary party that unselfishly serves the people.” With the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea coming up three months later, this was part of the preparations to make Kim Jong Un the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
Subsequently, the number of articles calling Kim Jong Un “Supreme Leader” has continued to increase, and he was even called “outstanding Supreme Leader” in May 2021. The Rodong Sinmun’s editorial of May 31, grandly published on the front page, used the expression “the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, an outstanding Supreme Leader of the Juche revolution and peerless statesman.”
After celebrating the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea on October 10, Kim Jong Un began to be touted as the “Great Father.” An October 22 editorial used expressions such as “The glory of the people never ends for holding in high esteem the great parent who handles and defends both fate and future as their great Supreme Leader,” “the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, the outstanding leader of the revolution and the great father of the people,” and “great pride and self-confidence with the respected General Secretary as the great leader of the revolution.” An editorial dated November 11 was titled “Let’s shout out across the world the strong and brave spirit of the people who held in high esteem the great Supreme Leader,” and repeatedly referred to Kim Jong Un as the “Great Supreme Leader,” for example by saying, “holding in high esteem the respected General Secretary as the great Supreme Leader.”
“Supreme Leader” was originally a designation used for Kim Il Sung only, and if the expression “Great Leader” (the usual translation for “Uidaehan-Suryeong-nim”) is used, that still generally means him. That is an important designation that surpasses specific posts such as president of the State Affairs Commission or General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and with this move Kim Jong Un is finally placing himself fully alongside his grandfather and father. Given that North Korean media outlets did not start to call Kim Jong Il “Supreme Leader” until after his death, 37-year-old Kim Jong Un has acquired the title at a much earlier stage.
It is now a full decade since Kim Jong Un became North Korea’s “Supreme Leader.” Over the years he has become more confident in holding the reins of power, with frequent changes in his senior officials, thorough ideological education of the people, and short bouts of intensive nuclear missile development.
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Of course, one challenge that remains for this “great Supreme Leader” is the economy. It is with this awareness that he attended history’s first U.S.-North Korea summit in 2018, but unfortunately he found U.S. President Donald J. Trump a difficult negotiating partner. Following the breakdown of talks in Hanoi, Kim was forced to revert to “self-reliance,” but North Korea will need sanctions to be lifted before there can be any major improvement in the lives of its people. That in turn will inevitably involve further talks with the United States.
As Kim enters his second decade in power, it remains to be seen whether or not any good will emerge from him becoming “great Supreme Leader” and “outstanding Supreme Leader” and specifically whether he will be able to successfully address the major economic and diplomatic challenges that confront his country.
11. North Korea creates special prosecutorial teams to eliminate corruption
I think in north Korea almost every crime can fall into the category of an anti-state (or more appropriately for the regime, anti-party) otfense.
But all of this bears watching as this could be an indicator of internal instability to come.
Excerpts:
In the end, the Ministry of State Security got to investigate the individual as his crime was an anti-state offence, not an economic crime.
The source said such disputes are common as law enforcement bodies such as the Ministry of State Security and prosecutors have ill-defined territories. He also said the prosecutorial teams will find that investigating corruption on the part of the Ministry of State Security – the so-called “first line of defense of the regime” – is no easy task, orders notwithstanding.
In North Korea, the prosecutor’s office includes central, provincial, city and county offices, special prosecutorial offices, and other organs. Broadly speaking, the prosecutor’s office is tasked with overseeing compliance with the law.
That is to say, it determines if state orders and decisions are legal and catches and punishes criminals and other violators of the law. Prosecutors play an important role in maintaining the North Korean regime.
However, the capabilities and roles of the Central Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department and Ministry of State Security have grown under current North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with the status of the prosecutors falling so noticeably that people now say agents of the Ministry of State Security or Ministry of Social Security are far above prosecutors.
North Korea creates special prosecutorial teams to eliminate corruption
Their primary mission is to wage a “fierce struggle” on law enforcement agencies, trade units, and traveling merchants who collude to embezzle state supplies or imported goods
By Kim Chae Hwan - 2021.12.07 2:43pm
Kim Jong Un at the leadership podium during the Party Foundation Day military parade in Pyongyang on Oct. 10, 2020. / Image: KCNA
North Korea has created special prosecutorial teams to eliminate corruption, Daily NK has learned.
The move comes amid continued criticism this year by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un of “laziness” on the part of economic cadres.
According to a Daily NK source on Monday, North Korean authorities formed the new prosecutorial teams nationwide in early August, the result of a decision by the Third Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee in June. They officially launched the teams after spending July choosing members and setting up offices.
The teams are composed of anywhere from five to 10 ordinary prosecutors and led by the deputy head of the local prosecutor’s office or a cadre prosecutor. They are currently operating throughout the country.
Their primary mission is to wage a “fierce struggle” on law enforcement agencies (the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Social Security), trade units, and traveling merchants who collude to embezzle state supplies or imported goods.
The authorities have in mind officials from the Ministry of State Security or Ministry of Social Security who engage in corruption of all kinds as they misuse their authority to secure funds. That is to say, by establishing a body that can keep watch over and crack down on such officials, the authorities have essentially created yet another mechanism to stop corruption.
Moreover, the teams have been tasked with busting crimes and illegal acts that interfere with the establishment of the “socialist economic management order” in economic sectors such as metallurgy, energy generation, mining and railroads and transportation, including the pillaging or illegal processing of state property.
The teams are taking a close look into past issues with how local enterprises processed their products or carried out exports.
They are also intensively ferreting out officials from the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Social Security who take bribes or kickbacks.
However, they are running into friction with the Ministry of State Security, a so-called “special agency.”
In fact, there was a fight early last month between a prosecutorial team in Hyesan, Yanggang Province, and officials from the counterintelligence desk of the local branch of the Ministry of State Security over the user of a Chinese-made mobile phone. The two sides apparently squared off in a turf war over who could take possession of the suspect.
In the end, the Ministry of State Security got to investigate the individual as his crime was an anti-state offence, not an economic crime.
The source said such disputes are common as law enforcement bodies such as the Ministry of State Security and prosecutors have ill-defined territories. He also said the prosecutorial teams will find that investigating corruption on the part of the Ministry of State Security – the so-called “first line of defense of the regime” – is no easy task, orders notwithstanding.
In North Korea, the prosecutor’s office includes central, provincial, city and county offices, special prosecutorial offices, and other organs. Broadly speaking, the prosecutor’s office is tasked with overseeing compliance with the law.
That is to say, it determines if state orders and decisions are legal and catches and punishes criminals and other violators of the law. Prosecutors play an important role in maintaining the North Korean regime.
However, the capabilities and roles of the Central Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department and Ministry of State Security have grown under current North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with the status of the prosecutors falling so noticeably that people now say agents of the Ministry of State Security or Ministry of Social Security are far above prosecutors.
12. Newsweek’s Misfire on Aid Monitoring in North Korea
Both of these statements can be true. Inspeaking with escapees from north Korea they confirm both paragraphs. The regime diverts aid and also uses its Propaganda and Agitation Department to try to make the people believe aid is provided because of the regime's power and strength. But the Korean people in the north are well aware that the international community provides aid. One escapee who served in the north Korean 4th Corps told me they did not have to grow rice in the military because they received it from the South. Even though the regime removed all markings from the rice sacks to indicate the rice came from South Korea, the soldiers knew that it did because of the quality of the rice sacks which they valued because they could make useful things from them such as clothes. Rice sacks from north Korea were cheaply made and not good for anything more than one time use.
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests North Korean citizens at the local level know that their own lives or the lives of their families or communities may have been saved because of the provision of US and other humanitarian assistance to their country. This reflects the best in citizen diplomacy.
Therefore, the editorial’s statement that “Donors unfortunately allow the regime to distribute their food, which leads to a multitude of ills, including the regime bragging that other nations are sending tribute to the Kim family” is a misfire when it comes to the work of US NGOs and their direct contact with North Koreans at the grassroots level.
Newsweek’s Misfire on Aid Monitoring in North Korea - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
My long-time acquaintance, Asia analyst Gordon Chang, recently offered his perspective on the provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korea in Newsweek magazine. After reviewing the editorial, I am compelled to respond. The broad-brush condemnation of food aid to North Korea casts a shadow over the ongoing work of US and Canadian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) providing humanitarian assistance (including some food aid) to the neediest of North Korea’s citizens. American organizations actively strive to comply with the US government licensing and operational requirements for working in North Korea as set forth by the Departments of Treasury, Commerce and State.
(Source: WFP/James Belgrave)
Indeed, the diversion of food aid and other humanitarian assistance has been of paramount concern for international donors working in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through the years. My first trip to the country in 2002 was in response to the question of diversion and additional food aid issues by then US Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Dick Lugar and other US officials. Among other points of concern, North Korean officials had not been allowing the World Food Programme (WFP) to perform spot-checks on the distribution of food aid. At that time, about 90 percent of US food aid to the DPRK was handled through the WFP, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Notably, the US government has provided virtually no food aid to North Korea since 2009.
Over the past 19 years of working on North Korea-related issues, first in the Senate and later in the nonprofit sector, I’ve witnessed considerable progress by food and humanitarian assistance donors to the North in establishing more effective monitoring mechanisms.
Admittedly, for those who view children and the neediest of North Korean citizens as acceptable victims of war, no level of monitoring of food, medical and other humanitarian assistance to North Korea may satisfy. However, for those who support the provision of assistance to the neediest segments of the North Korean population, they can be assured that US NGOs, as well as the majority of other international donors to the DPRK, place high value and go to significant lengths to be sure aid makes its way to intended recipients.
While the US government has not provided food aid to North Korea for several years, US NGOs have been operating in North Korea on a separate track, some as far back as the 1980s. These efforts have been largely focused around provision of medicines and treatments for persons suffering from disease and other medical challenges and nutritional support for children and vulnerable adults (pregnant/nursing women), as well as initiatives to build long-term food security for the people of North Korea. Over the decades, American humanitarian workers on the ground in North Korea have developed meaningful and often longstanding relationships with North Korean citizens, which helps facilitate their work.
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests North Korean citizens at the local level know that their own lives or the lives of their families or communities may have been saved because of the provision of US and other humanitarian assistance to their country. This reflects the best in citizen diplomacy.
Therefore, the editorial’s statement that “Donors unfortunately allow the regime to distribute their food, which leads to a multitude of ills, including the regime bragging that other nations are sending tribute to the Kim family” is a misfire when it comes to the work of US NGOs and their direct contact with North Koreans at the grassroots level.
Pre-pandemic and prior to North Korea closing its borders, humanitarian assistance provided by US NGOs included medicine for hepatitis, tuberculosis and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, and malaria; as well as blankets, hygiene kits and food. Nutritional support for children has been a major focus of US and other international NGOs and other aid agencies, including the World Food Program and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Malnutrition is a major contributor to the contraction and spread of disease. Some US NGOs have dug wells to provide clean drinking water (not easily diverted from one location to another).
NGO assistance monitoring methodologies vary according to the type of aid. In the medical program administered by one NGO, patients are weighed at every clinic visit. These are generally outpatients who do not all receive supplemental food. For those who are evaluated for supplemental food, in addition to weight, strength measurements are taken, and the weight and strength are tracked over time. The NGO workers are then able to clearly see if there are improvements, which would be expected outcomes from the additional protein/nutrition and treatment.
Do these practices provide a solid guarantee that some diversion does not occur? No, however, as a result of the multiple components incorporated into the monitoring protocols and repeated visits, humanitarian workers can generally ascertain over time that assistance is reaching intended recipients. If they sense there is a problem or that aid is not reaching targeted recipients, monitoring protocols are modified, or aid is stopped.
One example of how aid has helped improve lives of vulnerable populations can be seen in changes to child stunting rates. Because of an increased focus on child nutrition by the North Korean government supplemented by international assistance, significant improvements have been made. According to UNICEF, the rate of stunted children decreased from 32.4 percent in 2009 to 19 percent in 2017. However, these figures may regress as treatments have stopped due to the pandemic, and the food situation is worsening.
Since the closure of the North Korean border in early 2020, US NGO humanitarian assistance has not entered the country. Thousands of cargo containers (some including US NGO aid) continue to sit idly on the Chinese side of the border, denied entry into the country by North Korean officials due to COVID-19 contamination fears. Supplies of medicine for tuberculosis (TB) and multidrug-resistant TB patients may be depleted. In that event, North Korean TB patients lacking treatment may die, and the lack of medicine will result in further spread of the disease throughout the North and possibly into South Korea and China. The full extent of the health and food situation in North Korea is yet to be seen; however, the deprivation of medicine and other humanitarian assistance will certainly exacerbate the situation.
Overall, responsible donors to North Korea are cognizant of the diversion challenge. However, there is evidence, through the work of North American NGOs, the UN and others, that meaningful progress continues to be made.
The views in this article reflect the personal perspectives of the author and not the National Committee on North Korea.
- [1]
North Korean officials do not allow US private NGOs to have permanent service offices in their country. Consequently, prior to the shutdown of North Korea’s border due to the COVID-19 pandemic, NGO representatives continued to operate from their US base, some making multiple weeks-long trips on an annual basis.
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[1] In addition, the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) facilitates communications between US NGOs and United Nations (UN) agencies operating in North Korea. This collaboration and information sharing has contributed to improved monitoring capabilities and practices as well.
13. Moon pledges S. Korea will do more for U.N. peacekeeping missions
Moon pledges S. Korea will do more for U.N. peacekeeping missions | Yonhap News Agency
By Kim Deok-hyun
SEOUL, Dec. 7 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in said Tuesday that South Korea will do more for U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world to help war-torn nations build lasting peace.
"The Republic of Korea knows the importance of U.N. peacekeeping operations for peace and reconstruction better than anyone," Moon said in congratulatory remarks to a virtual U.N. peacekeeping ministerial conference, citing the nation's development story from the 1950-53 Korean War.
Moon said South Korea will dispatch more medical personnel to the nation's peacekeeping units and provide more equipment to U.N. peacekeeping operations around the globe.
Moon asked the participating ministers to support South Korea's bid for a seat as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for the 2024-25 period.
"The Republic of Korea has the valuable experience of going from an aid recipient to becoming a donor nation," Moon said, adding Seoul is committed to contributing more to promote peace and prevent conflict.
Moon also called on the international community to support Seoul's efforts to declare a formal end to the Korean War, saying such a declaration would be the first step toward peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.
The Korean War, in which South Korea and a U.S.-led United Nations Command fought against invading North Korean forces backed by China, ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty.
Moon believes an end-of-war declaration will help revive stalled peace talks with North Korea.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. Can America Take On Russia and China In the Grey Zone? (and north Korea too)
Of course I want to highlight a north Korean excerpt:
North Korea’s grey zone lets them play both aggressor and victim
North Korea’s ballistic missile tests could easily be considered grey zone hostile acts, but it’s worth noting the soft power of grey zone activities as well, and North Korea’s own narrative campaigns are under-discussed. While China’s soft-power foreign influence comes in the form of bags of money (investment) and Russia’s often looks like social media troll farms, North Korea’s adoption of a Chinese narrative about the United States acting as an imperial “bully” in the Pacific demonstrates the value of international media as a coordinated tool for grey zone operations.
As the Trump administration applied pressure to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un to end his nation’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to ferry them to far-flung targets, the nation that usually trades in aggressive threats had a sudden change of heart. Instead, Kim assumed the role of embattled leader trying to keep the American wolves at bay as the United States bullied the small nation into submission. The truth, of course, was that Kim’s nuclear efforts were always about securing leverage for international negotiations, and the North Korean regime simply saw the value in discrediting a polarizing president’s approach to pressuring them on the world’s stage.
The switch from disputatious fight-mongering to playing the role of the victim is not, in itself, a very hostile act — but the coordination between North Korea’s chosen narrative and China’s public statements in the same vein had specific intent. Delegitimizing America’s position on the Korean continent in the world press not only helped to present China as the reasonable diplomatic leader in the region, it helps to discredit America’s own critical statements about China’s own aggressive acts.
Can America Take On Russia and China In the Grey Zone?
America has a massive grey zone disadvantage.
Here's What You Need to Remember: The unfortunate result is an ever-expanding grey zone that has come to encompass acts as innocuous as public officials’ remarks on Twitter and as nefarious as literal assassinations.
In recent years, the phrase “Grey Zone” has seen a great deal of use among military strategists and the media alike. Like so many buzz words (or phrases in this case) to come before it, the concept of the grey zone began as an important topic of discussion among military academics and policy makers, but quickly spiraled into headline fodder about America’s strained relations with global competitors like Russia, and increasingly, China.
So what exactly is the grey zone? It’s the metaphorical gap between peace and war, in which nations increasingly find themselves competing. Activities or operations in the grey zone, oversimplified, are clearly hostile acts that don’t meet the criteria to be considered an overt act of war. While the term itself does not have a single, unanimously-agreed upon definition, the Cambridge Dictionary offers a slightly more confusing explanation:
Grey Zone: Activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war.
The domain of America’s enemies
Russia’s grey zone activities may be among the most highly publicized, owing to both the nation’s heavy-handed use of cyber warfare campaigns and the aggressive actions of the nation’s covert operatives on foreign soil. Russia’s high-profile activities in the grey zone in recent years include the nation’s influence campaigns during the 2016 American presidential election, the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal on UK soil in 2018, Russia’s successful hacking of the U.S. electrical grid in 2019, and countless others. Each of these actions prompted a critical response from the United States or other affected nations, but one could argue, none of those responses amounted to serious deterrence regarding future operations of the sort.
Russia is far from the only nation to engage in grey zone operations against the United States or its interests in recent years, however. China, Iran, and North Korea are all on the list of nations leveraging grey zone tactics of one sort or another in ongoing campaigns aimed at reducing or eliminating American advantages in realms ranging from kinetic capabilities to popular perception–and let there be no mistake, losing ground in either realm represents a security risk for the United States.
China’s grey zone is the size of the Pacific
China’s approach to the grey zone is perhaps best displayed throughout the vast South China Sea, where the nation’s illegal claims of sovereignty and military efforts to enforce them encroach on what would have once been considered literal acts of war, but are now relegated to the grey zone because open war is too severe an option to pursue. Chinese maritime forces, split between its Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia, amount to a massive 700-vessel fleet. China has used this numbers advantage to great success, surrounding Vietnamese oil platforms and starving the workers out to take control of natural resources, bullying nations off of their own fishing territory, and even fortifying island chains that international courts clearly ruled don’t belong to them.
China is able to act with relative impunity within the region, provided its forces don’t directly engage American personnel or equipment, for a simple reason: The world’s choices are to call China’s bluff and dive into a terrible war between nuclear powers and massive Naval forces… or resort to yet another round of public statements decrying China’s aggressive and illegal pursuits of territory and resources in the Pacific.
Iran’s grey zone can fit surface to air missiles in it
Iran’s downing of a U.S. Air Force RQ-4A Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft in 2019 offers another powerful example of grey zone aggression. According to U.S. forces, the RQ-4 never came closer than 21 miles from Iranian shores, but Iran claims it closed to within just eight (international waters begin 12 miles from shore). Iran’s Revolutionary Guard fired on the Global Hawk with a Russian-made S-125 surface-to-air missile and the resulting hit cost the U.S. Navy a $220 million drone.
Firing on a military aircraft ostensibly flying over international waters is certainly a hostile act, but not hostile enough to warrant a new full-fledged war in the Middle East.
North Korea’s grey zone lets them play both aggressor and victim
North Korea’s ballistic missile tests could easily be considered grey zone hostile acts, but it’s worth noting the soft power of grey zone activities as well, and North Korea’s own narrative campaigns are under-discussed. While China’s soft-power foreign influence comes in the form of bags of money (investment) and Russia’s often looks like social media troll farms, North Korea’s adoption of a Chinese narrative about the United States acting as an imperial “bully” in the Pacific demonstrates the value of international media as a coordinated tool for grey zone operations.
As the Trump administration applied pressure to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un to end his nation’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to ferry them to far-flung targets, the nation that usually trades in aggressive threats had a sudden change of heart. Instead, Kim assumed the role of embattled leader trying to keep the American wolves at bay as the United States bullied the small nation into submission. The truth, of course, was that Kim’s nuclear efforts were always about securing leverage for international negotiations, and the North Korean regime simply saw the value in discrediting a polarizing president’s approach to pressuring them on the world’s stage.
The switch from disputatious fight-mongering to playing the role of the victim is not, in itself, a very hostile act — but the coordination between North Korea’s chosen narrative and China’s public statements in the same vein had specific intent. Delegitimizing America’s position on the Korean continent in the world press not only helped to present China as the reasonable diplomatic leader in the region, it helps to discredit America’s own critical statements about China’s own aggressive acts.
America’s massive grey zone disadvantage
Every nation, from the smallest to the largest, operates in the grey zone, and that includes the United States. Most of the operations conducted by the CIA, as well as many conducted by America’s special operations forces, could all be classified as grey zone operations–or hostile actions taken in foreign territory that are not considered acts of war. The truth is, there’s always been a grey zone, the concept has just benefited from better branding in the 21st century.
Despite political infighting and social issues that have risen to the forefront of American consciousness in recent years, the nation itself remains incredibly safe, prosperous, and powerful. That’s actually a problem when it comes to deterring or defending against grey zone operations. Nobody wants a new war, and the truth is, nobody would benefit from one either. Bad actors are just as aware of that as good ones.
Economic sanctions like those levied on Russia and North Korea have proven to be rather effective at making life harder for specific facets of aggressive governments, but not quite effective enough to serve as a real means of deterrence. North Korea’s situation has steadily worsened as a result of new sanctions levied by the U.S. and its allies in recent years, but even as troops literally starve on their posts, Kim’s nuclear ambitions remain undeterred.
Russia’s heavily sanctioned economy has left the nation unable to fund its military modernization efforts and has forced its military-industrial complex to pursue headline-grabbing pseudo-technologies aimed at foreign sales, rather than strategic capability. But, Russia has proven no less apt to engage in aggressive grey zone activities after new sanctions are levied. There’s good reason for this in both cases: The damage of economic sanctions has already been done. The deterrent value of sanctions diminishes as they’re levied. You can only take away the same dollar so many times.
That leaves the United States with little recourse but to threaten retaliation when it comes to the grey zone, but that’s where things get a lot more complicated. If the U.S. chooses to retaliate in kind within the grey zone, it discredits America’s initial complaint about the legality of the inciting incident. If the U.S. hacks Russia’s electrical grid in response to Russia hacking America’s, it legitimizes hacking for both nations as a necessary defense exercise. If, however, the U.S. opts to respond with conventional military force, it risks a new World War between nuclear powers.
Neither is a particularly enticing proposition.
Why doesn’t America just get dirty in the grey zone?
If the global community were as simple as your local bar, nations like Russia could be likened to the shorter-statured but stout guy who’s always looking for a fight, but benefits from the policing presence of the community. Even if you’re sure you could beat that guy up, there’s no real value in doing it. You’ll just have to eat a few punches, get blood all over your shirt, and spend the night in a jail cell. Likewise, the United States would almost certainly win a war with Russia… but to what end? America, and the world, would almost certainly be worse off when the dust finally settled.
So, in the same way you’ll tolerate sarcastic remarks and sideways glances from the bar’s resident tough-guy, America is forced to tolerate increasingly aggressive acts from bad actor nations. Part of the problem is actually rooted in America’s strength as a nation and the world’s success at avoiding the horror of global war for the past 75 years: It’s just not worth risking World War III over a Russian spy ring infiltrating NATO defense files in Bulgaria.
The unfortunate result is an ever-expanding grey zone that has come to encompass acts as innocuous as public officials’ remarks on Twitter and as nefarious as literal assassinations. In once case, Russian mercenaries who were likely working on behalf of the Russian government even attacked U.S. special operations forces in Syria. When the dust settled, the Russians were soundly defeated by the Americans and their Syrian counterparts, and Moscow claimed to have had nothing to do with it. Yet again, the grey zone grew to swallow up what would normally be seen as a clear act of war.
The more the grey zone grows, the more complex the defense environment becomes. Warfare isn’t always the answer, but with sanctions often failing to have the intended effect, America is left with precious few alternatives but to engage its enemies in kind. Unfortunately, therein lies another challenge. While nations like Russia and China do hold events they refer to as elections, America’s nation-level opponents are largely not beholden to the will of the populous they preside over.
China’s Xi Xinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, like North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, have no expiration date on their rule and maintain strict governmental control over all media within their borders. Put simply, the people have very little say in what their governments do, and as a result, the governments can get away with a great deal. In the United States, on the other hand, the American people play an active and vocal role in politics. Often, the American people are the ones to shine a critical light on America’s behavior on foreign soil for the world to see. Americans demand that America play the role of the good guy despite the complexities of the geopolitical world, and while that’s a moral and ethical strength, it can often play out like a strategic weakness in the grey zone.
America’s covert grey zone efforts are the subject of extensive debate and criticisms when revealed, limiting America’s ability to fight on an even footing with more aggressive states that don’t hold public hearings. Again, that’s not an assessment of what’s right or wrong–which is as essential an issue for the American people as it is inconsequential to this discussion–this is an observation about systems of government and how they can create strengths and vulnerabilities under different circumstances.
The truth is, it’s better to live in a democracy where the ethics of warfare can be openly debated, but when we say better, we mean for people, not for the pursuit of strategic goals. A good thing can still be a limiting thing.
It’s only going to get worse in a new era of great power competition
The United States has recently pivoted away from the counter-terror operations of the past two decades and back toward near-peer competition with nations like China and Russia, and with this new Cold War of sorts will inevitably come a rapid expansion of the grey zone as it pertains to each. With both nations now fielding their own stealth fighters, developing stealth bombers, deploying hypersonic missile platforms, and expanding ever further into space, America’s technological lead is rapidly diminishing.
As China and Russia continue to approach technological parity, they will grow ever more aggressive in the grey zone, all while remaining diplomatically and politically committed to avoiding war. In fact, it’s likely that China, in particular, will leverage America’s responses to their own grey zone activities as a symptom of America’s aggression, capitalizing on the general public’s lack of understanding or simple disinterest in the nuanced world of covert operations.
In order to counter this seemingly inevitable erosion of America’s defensive positioning, the United States has to find a way to pose a sub-existential threat to its opponents, without compromising the moral and ethical framework established by its people. This covert or diplomatic tool will have to be threatening, but not so threatening that it breaches the barrier into overt acts of war. This tool will need to offer the same or similar results every time, as opposed to the diminishing returns of economic sanctions, and perhaps most importantly, it needs to seem humane when compared to kinetic options.
America needs a new weapon to compete in the grey zone in the 21st century, and it needs one soon.
This article first appeared at Sandboxx.
Image: Reuters.
15. Which Will South Korea Choose: The U.S. or China?
As many korean friends will telme there choice was made in October 1953 when the ROK and US signed the Mutual Defense treaty,
Which Will South Korea Choose: The U.S. or China?
South Korea will have an increasingly difficult time appeasing both giants.
The United States and China increasingly appear headed toward a new Cold War. It won’t be a repeat of Washington’s drama with the Soviet Union: no one imagines the complete decoupling of two economies today so tightly knit together. However, suspicion, hostility, and conflict increasingly look to become the primary measures of Sino-American relations.
What of governments caught in between the two behemoths? The ancient Korean kingdom long viewed itself as shrimp among whales—the empires of Japan, Russia, and China. Koreans suffered greatly when the former defeated the latter and turned the peninsula into a colony. However, today’s South Korea, more than a shrimp, is facing increasing pressure from two mega-whales, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, to choose between them.
Throughout the Cold War, there was no choice to make. North Korea was backed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and PRC. South Korea was supported by the United States and (somewhat less enthusiastically) Japan. “Cross-recognition” among the various parties was suggested to reduce regional tensions. The end of the Cold War led to Russian recognition of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1990 and Chinese recognition two years later. However, no similar allied move was made toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Although Beijing and Washington obviously differed in their perspective toward the North, they both opposed the DPRK’s nuclear program. Pyongyang’s relationship with China was cold, a matter of practical politics rather than fervent ideology. Moreover, China was as much a suitor of the South as the latter was of China. With its focus on economics, Beijing was determined to open an economic relationship with the ROK; the latter saw China as a force for moderation in dealing with North Korea.
Despite the Tiananmen Square massacre, Sino-American relations remained strong. Chinese political ambitions remained modest so there were few serious conflicts between the two governments. If Seoul had been asked to choose, it would have picked America, which was more important for both security and economic reasons.
The international environment has since changed dramatically. The U.S.-China relationship deteriorated dramatically over the last decade, and especially the last couple of years. Beijing typically operates without allies but is increasingly ready to punish governments that adopt policies judged hostile to the PRC. The United States is pressing its allies and friends, even those well outside of Asia, to join an anti-China coalition.
In 2017, Beijing essentially launched economic war against South Korea for allowing deployment of America’s THAAD missile defense system. Washington pushed Seoul to publicly criticize the Xi government for effectively outlawing political opposition and free speech in Hong Kong. Most recently the ROK attempted to say enough about Taiwan to satisfy Washington but not so much as to upset Beijing—without success on the latter case, however.
Maintaining both major power relationships without giving offense is going to be increasingly difficult for Seoul. Strife and military confrontation increasingly dominate U.S.-China relations. As Taiwan moves to the fore other countries will find it harder to maintain neutrality.
Unfortunately for South Korea, an alliance that doesn’t speak to Washington’s priorities doesn’t matter as much to the United States. Randall G. Schriver, a Trump Pentagon official now with Project 2049 Institute, last week chided the ROK: “You can’t have an alliance where one side views something as the primary important challenge, the organizing principle, and the other side doesn’t embrace that without some loss of relevance over time. And that’s the drift we’re on.”
After all, North Korea threatens America only indirectly, because of Washington’s alliance with Seoul. Yet the South is stronger than its antagonist on almost every measure of power. In contrast, the United States is concerned about Taiwan because the latter is significantly weaker than China. Washington is seeking allies to meet this serious challenge—and hoping to rely on the South, which has benefited so much and long from American support.
Indeed, that points to perhaps an even greater threat to the alliance: public opinion. Although the mutual defense treaty does not require South Korean participation in a conflict over Taiwan, an ROK decision not to join in such a war would undermine popular support for the United States's guarantee against North Korea. Why should Americans defend South Koreans for the benefit of South Koreans if South Koreans won’t fight with Americans for the benefit of Americans?
South Koreans are not alone in wanting to fight only when it is their interest. The Europeans are shameless free-riders. They don’t want to act on each other’s behalf, let alone for America. For instance, last year’s Pew Research Center found that just a third of Germans favored defending European allies. Yet the former presumes that the U.S. cavalry, so to speak, will rush to save them if necessary. Washington needs a better set of allies.
Indeed, the ROK will also be at increased risk because Japan is edging closer to America and against China. Although nothing is certain in wartime, leading figures in Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party are pressing to increase military expenditures and align with the United States against the PRC in a conflict over Taiwan. The American public would not soon forget the contrast between a Japanese government supporting America and a South Korean government refusing to do so.
As relations between the United States and PRC worsen, more countries are likely to be caught in between. The South Korean “shrimp” is likely to suffer when the American and Chinese “whales” fight. If forced to choose, what will Seoul decide?
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Image: Reuters
16. North Korea continues crackdown on streetside commerce in Chongjin
The regime is eliminating the people's "safety valve" for survival in favor of implementing more control over the population. Markets feed the people and the people pose a threat to the survival of the regime. Thus the regime must exploit COVID to further roppress the people.
North Korea continues crackdown on streetside commerce in Chongjin
North Korean authorities have launched a sweeping crackdown on streetside commerce in Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province, ahead of the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Jong Il.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Monday that Chongjin’s party committee issued an order calling on the Ministry of Social Security to conduct an aggressive crackdown on locals engaged in private commerce near markets or in alleyways from Dec. 1 to mark the 10th anniversary of Kim’s death. The authorities have responded with a sweeping clampdown on private commerce near markets and in alleyways throughout Chongjin.
Ahead of this, Chongjin’s party branch called on locals to mark the anniversary of Kim’s passing in a solemn, quiet atmosphere, reportedly informing inminban (people’s units), government bodies and organizations that they would strongly curb “capitalistic disorder.”
In response, the Ministry of Social Security and enforcement teams sent by the ministry descended on the neighborhoods surrounding Chongjin’s downtown markets, including the Sunam Market, Pohang Market, and Ranam Market. They overturned and confiscated items belonging to locals who were selling fruit, greenhouse vegetables, tofu, and other food.
Locals caught in the sudden crackdown bewail how enforcers overturned and took their things and they themselves were dragged off to the Ministry of Social Security’s waiting rooms.
The source said streetside commerce is commonplace not only in alleyways near markets, but in all neighborhoods where people live. He said in the face of extremely difficult living conditions, people are doing business to survive, not make money. Despite this, the government order is preventing them from doing so, he claimed.
In this undated file photo, a market official can be seen on patrol in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province. / Image: Daily NK
Daily NK understands that the Ministry of Social Security is engaged in a merciless crackdown, calling violators “criminals” for failing to obey government policy telling merchants to restrict their activity to markets and accusing them of “anti-party, reactionary activity” for doing what the party forbids them to do.
Even the enforcement squads sent by the ministry are clamping down on locals engaged in streetside commerce, telling residents they should be careful “at least for the month of December, no matter how tough it is,” as it is the 10th anniversary of Kim’s death. They are also encouraging locals to “live properly” for the 10th anniversary, remembering the day Kim passed while “crying real tears.”
In particular, squads are reportedly browbeating locals, telling them that people who think only of themselves during the month of Kim’s death “can go starve to death”; that it is ideological problematic to express discontent with the crackdown on “grasshopper merchants,” who are a “product of capitalism”; and that ideologically seditious people have no right to live in North Korea, “even if their families starve to death.”
In response, locals are complaining that they would not be toiling in the cold to sell things if things were not so terrible, or hustling on the streets if they had the money to pay market fees (to use stalls).
The source said political campaigns like the anniversary of Kim’s death cannot fill the stomachs of hungry people, and that people are saying the authorities must now stabilize the lives of the people by taking such measures as releasing food harvested this autumn.
The source said locals suffering from difficult living conditions are engaging in “hectic” commerce, hopping from one place to the next to avoid the authorities “to save their families and preserve their lives.”
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
