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"December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by the naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan." - FDR
Quotes of the Day:
“Will future ages believe that such stupid bigotry ever existed?”
– Walter Scott
“One cannot see the modern world as it is, unless one recognizes the overwhelming strength of patriotism, national loyalty. In certain circumstances, it can break down, at certain levels of civilization it does not exist, but as a positive force, there is nothing to set beside it. Christianity and international Socialism are as weak as straw in comparison with it. Hitler and Mussolini rose to power in their own countries very largely because they could grasp this fact and their opponents could not.”
– George Orwell.
“Anger. Control your anger. If you hold anger toward others, they have control over you. Your opponent can dominate and defeat you if you allow him to get you irritated."
– Miyamoto Musashi
1. South Korean President Avoids Impeachment as Allies Boycott Vote
2. All but 3 ruling party lawmakers boycott vote on Yoon impeachment motion
3. Yoon says 'sincerely sorry' for imposing martial law, pledges no more such attempts
4. South Korean President Apologizes—and Vows to ‘Never’ Declare Martial Law Again
5. Uncertainty looms over Yoon's plans to delegate power to party
6. Massive rally near Nat'l Assembly calls for Yoon's ouster amid impeachment vote
7. Yoon's foreign policy is dead in the water
8. Turmoil ahead as South Korea’s presidential impeachment motion falls short
9. Was there method in President Yoon's martial law madness?
10. Yoon’s Coup Attempt Shows Sad State of Civil-Military Relations
11. South Korean Soldier Fighting for Ukraine Calls On Northern ‘Brothers’ to Surrender
12. North Koreans in Ukraine: Trouble Ahead?
13. North Korean Troops in Ukraine Struggling With Food Shortages: Intel
14. We're on our own (South Korea and the new US administration)
15. The illegalities of Yoon's emergency martial law
1. South Korean President Avoids Impeachment as Allies Boycott Vote
The irony. The President tries to upend the political process for his own political power, and yet it is the political process (and the gridlock caused by his one ruling party's boycott of the proceedings that keeps him in power.
South Korean President Avoids Impeachment as Allies Boycott Vote
Opposition lawmakers plan a second attempt to oust Yoon Suk Yeol for declaring martial law
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-korea-impeachment-vote-president-yoon-suk-yeol-6f96063e?mod=hp_lead_pos1
By Jiyoung Sohn
Follow, Timothy W. Martin
Follow and Soobin Kim
Updated Dec. 7, 2024 7:35 am ET
Protesters outside the National Assembly in Seoul call for the ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol. Photo: jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
SEOUL—South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol eluded impeachment on Saturday, as allied lawmakers walked out before a vote and stalled efforts to punish him for declaring martial law earlier this week.
Impeachment required a two-thirds majority in South Korea’s 300-seat legislature, but fewer than 200 lawmakers voted in favor of the bill, which was presented by the opposition earlier this week. The measure, if successful, would have stripped the conservative Yoon of his presidential powers immediately. Opposition lawmakers vowed to try a second time by Wednesday.
More to follow.
Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
2. All but 3 ruling party lawmakers boycott vote on Yoon impeachment motion
But will this lead to sustained public protests to try to force his resignation?
(8th LD) All but 3 ruling party lawmakers boycott vote on Yoon impeachment motion | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 7, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with latest developments on vote; CHANGES headline)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Dec. 7 (Yonhap) -- All but three lawmakers of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) boycotted a vote on an impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk Yeol on Saturday, reinforcing views that Yoon may survive impeachment over his short-lived attempt to impose martial law earlier this week, which left South Korea in political turmoil.
The vote was under way during a plenary parliamentary session, with the participation of all 192 opposition lawmakers and only three PPP lawmakers -- Reps. Ahn Cheol-soo, Kim Yea-ji and Kim Sang-wook.
Other PPP lawmakers had filed out of the session after taking part in a revote on a bill calling for a special counsel investigation into first lady Kim Keon Hee's corruption allegations, which was ultimately rejected.
National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik called on PPP lawmakers to return to the session and cast their votes for the impeachment motion.
A plenary session is held at the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 7, 2024. (Yonhap)
"You must vote," he said from the parliamentary hall where the session was under way. "That is the duty of a patriot, a National Assembly member of the Republic of Korea and an institution that represents the people."
The motion will be scrapped unless it meets the quorum of 200 votes.
It also requires the support of the same number of lawmakers, or two-thirds of the 300-member parliament, in order to pass.
The main opposition Democratic Party and five other minor opposition parties earlier submitted an impeachment motion, arguing Yoon's martial law declaration constituted violations of the Constitution and other laws.
At least eight of the 108 PPP lawmakers would need to break from their official party line and vote in favor of impeachment.
By law, an impeachment motion must be put to a vote between 24 and 72 hours after it is reported to a plenary session.
The deadline for the current motion is 12:48 a.m. Sunday.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 7, 2024
3. Yoon says 'sincerely sorry' for imposing martial law, pledges no more such attempts
It is hard for people to accept an apology for trying to upend the sacred democratic process.
(LEAD) Yoon says 'sincerely sorry' for imposing martial law, pledges no more such attempts | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 7, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with Yoon's address; ADDS photos)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Dec. 7 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said Saturday he is "sincerely sorry" over causing public concerns for declaring martial law earlier this week, while pledging not to make another such attempt again.
"I am sincerely sorry and apologize to the people who must have been very surprised," Yoon said in a televised public address, hours ahead of a parliamentary vote on an impeachment motion against him.
President Yoon Suk Yeol delivers a special address at the presidential office in Seoul on Dec. 7, 2024, to apologize for causing public concerns with his short-lived martial law declaration, in this image captured from KTV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Yoon made the remark in his first public appearance after he declared martial law Tuesday night and rescinded it six hours later after the National Assembly voted against it.
He said he imposed martial law due to "desperation" as president but acknowledged the abrupt decision caused "concerns and inconvenience" to the people.
"I will not avoid legal and political responsibility related to this martial law declaration," he said, vowing to leave all decisions, including his term, to his People Power Party in order to stabilize the nation.
Yoon was elected in May 2022 to a single, five-year term.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 7, 2024
4. South Korean President Apologizes—and Vows to ‘Never’ Declare Martial Law Again
Will this cut it? Of course it is doubtful given the President's approval rating before the martial law debacle.
South Korean President Apologizes—and Vows to ‘Never’ Declare Martial Law Again
Yoon Suk Yeol said his imposition of emergency powers was made out of desperation
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-korean-president-apologizesand-vows-to-never-declare-martial-order-again-683553bb?mod=hp_lead_pos5
By Timothy W. Martin
Follow and Jiyoung Sohn
Follow
Updated Dec. 6, 2024 10:35 pm ET
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol delivering a televised address to the nation Saturday. Photo: Lee Jin-man/AP
SEOUL—South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol promised to not declare martial law again, explaining that his stunning move this week was made out of desperation.
The conservative Yoon, in a brief televised address Saturday morning, apologized to the nation and said he would not evade legal and political responsibility for enacting martial law. In several hours, the country’s Parliament was set to vote on whether to impeach Yoon, whose popularity has sunk to new lows.
Yoon hadn’t delivered public remarks since an early Wednesday address announcing the lifting of martial law. The 63-year-old politician mentioned speculation, including within his own ruling party, that he could move for emergency powers for a second time.
“Let me make this clear: There will never be a second martial law,” Yoon said in remarks that lasted just under two minutes.
Yoon, a career prosecutor, won South Korea’s presidency in 2022 by a narrow margin of under 1 percentage point. Unlike in past presidential elections, the country remained bitterly divided after Yoon’s victory. The opposition party controls the legislature, limiting his political agenda.
Yoon’s successes typically came in the foreign-affairs arena, whether singing “American Pie” at the White House during a state visit last year or normalizing ties with Japan. Back home, the outsider status that made Yoon appealing as a candidate landed differently as the country’s leader. South Koreans disagreed with his cabinet appointments, communication style and handling of the economy.
Opposition lawmakers with signs calling for the impeachment of the South Korean president. Photo: Yao Qilin/Zuma Press
But Yoon’s move to declare martial law late Tuesday came as a shock, even among senior members of his cabinet and his ruling conservative party.
Yoon is about halfway through a five-year term that is set to end in 2027. By law, he can’t run for re-election.
He has seen dwindling support in what will be a tight vote over his impeachment, which requires a two-thirds vote. Opposition parties control at least 192 of the National Assembly’s 300 seats, meaning a handful of Yoon’s People Power Party members must break rank.
At least one conservative lawmaker has publicly pledged support to back impeachment.
If Yoon is impeached, he would immediately lose his presidential powers, from vetoing bills to appointing officials. The country’s prime minister would step in as acting president. But Yoon wouldn’t be removed from office until South Korea’s constitutional court certifies the impeachment vote, after reviewing its legal merits.
South Korea last impeached a president in 2016. It took about six months then to go from successful impeachment vote to constitutional court verdict to a snap election naming a new leader.
Following Yoon’s address, Lee Jae-myung, head of the opposition Democratic Party, called the president’s remarks deeply disappointing. “South Korea’s biggest risk right now is the very existence of the president,” Lee said. “The only resolutions are the president resigning or an early dismissal through an impeachment.”
Should Saturday’s impeachment motion be rejected, opposition lawmakers said they would push for a vote again on Dec. 11, opening a provisional National Assembly session. The prior day marks the end of its regular session.
On Saturday afternoon, South Korean citizens are expected to gather in mass rallies in front of the National Assembly building, as well as at Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul, an iconic site for the country’s transition to democratization in the 1980s.
Yoon, in his televised speech, signaled his willingness to work closely with his party to steady state affairs. The entire cabinet, except for himself and the prime minister, had tendered their resignations, and Yoon accepted the offer from the country’s defense minister, which according to Seoul’s military had proposed the idea of martial law to the South Korean leader.
South Korea’s top officials canceled much of their public schedules. Formal diplomatic activities including bilateral meetings with the U.S. and a state visit by Sweden’s prime minister were scrapped or postponed. Yoon said he would “delegate plans for stabilizing the political situation, including my term, to our party.”
Cho Kuk, the head of the minor opposition Rebuilding Korea Party, pleaded for conservative lawmakers’ support in the coming impeachment vote. “There is a chance to make this right. Please vote in favor of the impeachment. Do not become an accomplice to insurrection and an accomplice of a military coup,” Cho said.
Soobin Kim contributed to this article.
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com
Appeared in the December 7, 2024, print edition as 'Yoon: No New Bid For Martial Law'.
5. Massive rally near Nat'l Assembly calls for Yoon's ouster amid impeachment vote
I fear this is a harbinger of things to come for weeks/months until the President resigns. The people are going to force political change with demonstrations. Again, the irony is the President thought he could prevent this with martial law but it was his imposition of martial law that is causing this and will likely continue until he decides to resign.
This could be 1987 all over again. I recall coming to Seoul from the DMZ every so often in 1987 and feeling the the hint of tear gas in the air from the massive protests that we taking place and took place until there was an election and a peacefel from transfer of power from President Chun to Roh Tae Woo (though he was still a former general and there was not a translation to a civilian President until 1993 with the election of Kim Young Sam).
(2nd LD) Massive rally near Nat'l Assembly calls for Yoon's ouster amid impeachment vote | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 7, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout; ADDS photos, byline)
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Dec. 7 (Yonhap) -- Hundreds of thousands of people gathered in front of the National Assembly on Saturday, demanding the ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol, as lawmakers convened a plenary session to vote on a motion to impeach him over martial law turmoil.
Defying December evening chill, civic groups, labor unions, including the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), students and individuals filled streets near the Assembly in western Seoul, holding signs calling for Yoon's impeachment.
"Oust him," read one picket sign, while another urged, "Protect the nation with the power of candlelight (rallies)."
Lawmakers convened a general meeting Saturday evening to vote on an impeachment motion against Yoon over his widely criticized declaration of martial law earlier this week, which was swiftly lifted after the opposition-controlled parliament voted to reject it.
"Today, right here, we will mark the end of Yoon Suk Yeol," KCTU leader Yang Kyung-soo told the crowd from a podium. "Let us ultimately punish him with even more powerful protests."
Protesters hold a rally in front of the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 7, 2024, calling for the ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol over this week's martial law turmoil. (Yonhap)
As crowds gathered around the Assembly, subway trains bypassed National Assembly Station and Yeouido Station before services at Yeouido Station were reinstated shortly after.
Police estimated that around 149,000 people had joined the gathering as of 5:30 p.m., while organizers claimed the turnout was 1 million.
The main road leading from the southern end of Seogang Bridge over the Han River past the Assembly was closed to traffic.
Crowds calling for the ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol fill the streets around the National Assembly on Dec. 7, 2024, as parliament votes on a motion to impeach Yoon over his martial law declaration. (Yonhap)
The Federation of Korean Trade Unions, another major umbrella union, also condemned the president, saying the president's apology, issued before the parliamentary session, was aimed at preventing the passage of the impeachment motion.
Calls for an impeachment also emerged from the legal community.
The Korean Bar Association issued a statement shortly after Yoon's public address, declaring its support for impeachment. "We agree with the impeachment of the president for disrupting the constitutional order through an unconstitutional declaration of martial law."
A man in his 50s was detained by police after trying to immolate himself near the National Assembly in protest of Yoon's martial law declaration, according to officials.
Protesters hold a rally in front of the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 7, 2024, calling for the ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol over this week's martial law turmoil. (Yonhap)
Near Gwanghwamun in central Seoul, another massive rally by conservative civic groups supportive of Yoon filled the streets, urging the Assembly to vote down the impeachment motion.
Waving the Taegeukgi and the Stars and Stripes, rally participants chanted slogans such as "Protect the president" and "Arrest (opposition leader) Lee Jae-myung."
Police estimated that the rally in central Seoul drew 20,000 people, while organizers claimed the crowd reached 1 million.
Participants wave the Taegeukgi and the Stars and Stripes during a rally in central Seoul urging the National Assembly to vote down an impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk Yeol on Dec. 7, 2024. (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 7, 2024
6. Uncertainty looms over Yoon's plans to delegate power to party
It is uncertainty that is going to have the most impact on national security and national prosperity.
And what is going to happen with this:
"he would let the ruling party manage state affairs"
This is not going to engender confidence in South Korea within the international community, This will undermine South Korea as a global pivotal state.
Uncertainty looms over Yoon's plans to delegate power to party
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · December 7, 2024
Despite Yoon's pledge to entrust power to PPP, he could reclaim power without Constitutional changes, experts say
By Son Ji-hyoung
Published : Dec. 7, 2024 - 21:31
President Yoon Suk Yeol bows to the public to wrap up his televised address to the nation in his office in Seoul on Saturday. (Presidential office)
President Yoon Suk Yeol's announcement Saturday that he would let the ruling party manage state affairs, and the subsequent failure of the impeachment motion, might have brought a sigh of relief from the ruling bloc.
But widespread disruption will likely follow, as the Yoon administration and the National Assembly have already become dysfunctional. Key policy initiatives, such as Yoon's efforts to address social polarization and tackle the population crisis, now appear increasingly impractical.
Whether Yoon can be held to his promise to hand over power to his party remains questionable.
Also, the ruling bloc has yet to confirm the extent of the power a ruling party could be entrusted with. The president is the commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces, represents the nation vis-a-vis foreign states, and has the power to appoint leaders of institutions enshrined in the Constitution, among other roles.
The address did not indicate who from the ruling party -- which has long shown signs of infighting -- would take charge.
The relationship between the chief of the ruling party and the prime minister, who serves as the acting president in case a president is suspended or removed, also remains unclear
Han Dong-hoon, who chairs the ruling People Power Party, held talks Saturday after Yoon's public address with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo at the request of the party chair. The 80-minute meeting centered around promises to work together to stabilize the state affairs and domestic economy, People Power Party's Han told reporters after the meeting.
However, Yoon's remarks and the ruling bloc's promises should be deemed invalid in the country with a presidential system, an expert said.
Without any binding changes to the Constitution, Yoon may take his power back from the party whenever he wants.
"The president can take the lead again anytime he changes his mind," said Shin Yul, professor of political science at Myongji University. "No one will be able to stop him, if Yoon insists."
"He already lost public trust, and who would trust whatever promise he makes?" he added.
Normalizing the administration is also a tall order, given that all Cabinet members offered to resign Wednesday, soon after Yoon lifted martial law.
So far, Yoon only accepted the resignation of Kim Yong-hyun, then-Defense Minister and one of the masterminds behind Yoon's martial law declaration as he was facing imminent impeachment.
"The Yoon administration's policy drive will inevitably lose momentum," said Eom Ki-hong, professor of political science at Kyungpook National University. "All Cabinet members and president's aides already offered to resign. Working-level public servants will unlikely follow (the Yoon administration's) instructions, out of fear that they might pay the price for doing so.
Even before Yoon's martial law imposition, Yoon long struggled to replace Cabinet members, including ministers, as the ruling People Power Party only has 108 lawmakers in the 300-member parliament.
Moreover, the agenda of Yoon's impeachment will dominate the National Assembly, in which six opposition parties occupy a combined 190 parliamentary seats, while the key legislative agenda, including the annual budget for next year, is placed on the back burner.
Rep. Park Chan-dae, floor leader of the Democratic Party, said Saturday morning before the impeachment vote that the party would float similar motions indefinitely starting Wednesday, should the impeachment get voted down.
His party will repeatedly "knock the door until it opens," Park said.
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · December 7, 2024
7. Yoon's foreign policy is dead in the water
Oh the arrogance of Professor Robertson (don't listen to the Washington Blob, listen to him as all knowing). Yes, I agree that President Yoon's foreign policy has been upended by the martial law debacle.
So he offers the US this assessment and advice:
It took the foreign policy car to skid off the road with the imposition of martial law for the Washington blob to realize that Yoon’s promises of "global pivotal state" with freedom, democracy, and the rule of law were not just empty, but embarassing.
Yoon’s foreign policy was always what one could call neo-mercantilist. Closer alliances with the U.S. and Japan secured escape from enhanced U.S. controls on China trade and access to the U.S. market; closer relations with NATO secured access to partnerships and commercial relationships for South Korea’s growing arms industry; and not directly supplying Ukraine with arms, secured trade with Russia and allowed South Korea to sell arms to partners who would donate them to Ukraine. Neo-mercantilism at its best!
..,
Already, the U.S. has expressed its intent to draw down relations. Yoon’s martial law declaration was an insult. The U.S. neither expected it, not were prepared for it. Early responses were poorly prepared and ineffectual. Later responses expressed shock and concern. This week the U.S. Defense Secretary will visit Japan and no South Korean representative will be there. Trump will deal with Yoon as he indicated, like a cash machine.
As we ultimately head towards a progressive administration, the future of Korea-U.S. relations hold both the promise of frank communication with less false signaling, and the peril of an absolute fracas between a more independent-minded Seoul and an irrational Washington under trump. Either way, it’s up to the U.S. to better understand South Korea - I’d suggest less reliance on the Washinton blob. We are in for interesting times.
Yoon's foreign policy is dead in the water
Regardless of domestic politics, the "Global Pivotal State" and its "freedom, democracy, and rule of law" is now laughable and partners will be hesitant to deal with Yoon.
https://www.junotane.com/p/yoons-foreign-policy-is-dead-in-the-water?utm
Dec 07, 2024
I’ve written often about the hollowness of Yoon’s foreign policy and the risks of accepting it at face value. As is often the case in the modern world, any analysis that doesn’t match our own attitudes and opinions is lost in the algorithmic ether as we sit in our own echo chambers. Unless you search and seek different opinion using VPNs and MAC address caching; diverse browsers; and alternate social media accounts untainted by your location, shopping history and browswer cookies; you’re in an echo chamber whether you like it or not.
The Washington blob and its well-funded think-tanks and high-rolling commentators were in their own echo chamber. To secure funding, academics bought into it, and retold the same narratives. As a result, for most people, Yoon was exactly what they wanted to hear: a pro-American supporter of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. He never was - it was all well-supported rhetoric tailored to the audience.
Yoon’s errant foreign policy signalling
President Yoon Suk-yeol promoted South Korea as a "global pivotal state" supporting freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. These values were central to the administration’s core strategic documents: the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the subsequent Action Plan for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, and the National Security Strategy. These are values that resonated globally but carried particular weight with U.S. and U.S. partner audiences at a time of intensifying U.S.-China competition. It was errant signaling.
In foreign policy, signaling refers to the use of statements, speeches, and actions to convey a nation’s priorities, values, and intentions to the global community. It is a powerful tool for building alliances, deterring adversaries, and shaping international perception. Importantly, signaling depends on consistency between rhetoric and action.
When the rhetoric and action diverge, a country risks undermining its credibility, creating confusion, and ultimately alienating allies.
If you live and drive in South Korea, you’re probably well aware that signaling on the road sometimes seems like it’s based solely on personal preferences. A vehicle will signal based upon the character of the driver rather than the law Signaling serves a purpose. It warns drivers, whether you see them or not, of your intended actions and thereby allows them to plan accordingly and avoids collisions. Apply this to foreign policy, and we have a similar situation.
Yoon’s foreign policy signalling was like a retiree leaving a beachside condo for the drugstore. He signalled right, and then did not turn the signal off. A continuous right turn. He went through intersections, roundabouts, freeways, and bike lanes, always leaving that signal indicating a rightward turn - all the way to the drug store.
It started with the administration’s strategic documents. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, the subsequent Action Plan for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, and the National Security Strategy were empty. They sounded nice to Washington but were largely empty on the inside. As I said at the time, they were less strategic documents and more word salads to feed hungry American think-tanks.
Why did Yoon’s Indo-Pacific Strategy cover six regions: North Asia; Southeast Asia and ASEAN; South Asia; Oceania; African Coast of the Indian Ocean; Europe and Latin America? The document is the foreign policy equivalent of a shotgun. It shot a load in a broad arc in front of the user to cover every possibility.
The “Action Plan for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” is even worse. It’s a word salad in which every one of South Korea’s partners can find what they want. In saying everything, it said nothing. In the context of foreign policy signaling - it’s a failure. It did not prepare any state for the direction of South Korea’s foreign policy. Worse still, it built expectations that were not forthcoming. The retiree right turn.
The disconnect between Yoon's rhetoric and policy was starkest in the case of Ukraine. While South Korea condemned Russia’s invasion and eventually joined Western-led sanctions, its material support for Ukraine was notably restrained. Seoul provided limited economic and humanitarian aid but did not deliver lethal military assistance, citing concerns over provoking Russia and security concerns regarding North Korea - despite increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
It took the foreign policy car to skid off the road with the imposition of martial law for the Washington blob to realize that Yoon’s promises of "global pivotal state" with freedom, democracy, and the rule of law were not just empty, but embarassing.
Yoon’s foreign policy was always what one could call neo-mercantilist. Closer alliances with the U.S. and Japan secured escape from enhanced U.S. controls on China trade and access to the U.S. market; closer relations with NATO secured access to partnerships and commercial relationships for South Korea’s growing arms industry; and not directly supplying Ukraine with arms, secured trade with Russia and allowed South Korea to sell arms to partners who would donate them to Ukraine. Neo-mercantilism at its best!
Martial law? Impeachment? Constitutional amendement? What now?
Yoon’s foreign policy was a car crash waiting to happen. When you leave the signal on while driving, sooner or later people are not going to trust where you’re going. It’s the same in foreign policy.
Yoon’s foreign policy rhetoric was bound to undermine the state’s credibility, creating confusion, and ultimately alienate its allies and partners. At best, it would have occured in two years from now. South Korea’s foreign policy swings like a pendulum balancing elements of continuity and discontuity - “bumpy continuity” I call it. Sooner or later, the riduculous pro-U.S. and pro-Japan pendulum would swing back. Washington and the blob that supports it, either did not realize this, or chose to ignore it.
Regardless of what ultimately happens in domestic politics, be it impeachment, constitutional revision, or a continued but greatly weakened Yoon, the administration’s foreign policy is now dead in the water. The "Global Pivotal State" and its "freedom, democracy, and rule of law" is laughable and partners will be hesitant to deal with him, knowing whoever comes next will have more than enough authority to discard it.
Dealing with Yoon while he’s so unpopular risks poisoning bilateral relations. No state wants to do this with a lame-duck president, let alone one that sought to impose martial law and failed.
Already, the U.S. has expressed its intent to draw down relations. Yoon’s martial law declaration was an insult. The U.S. neither expected it, not were prepared for it. Early responses were poorly prepared and ineffectual. Later responses expressed shock and concern. This week the U.S. Defense Secretary will visit Japan and no South Korean representative will be there. Trump will deal with Yoon as he indicated, like a cash machine.
As we ultimately head towards a progressive administration, the future of Korea-U.S. relations hold both the promise of frank communication with less false signaling, and the peril of an absolute fracas between a more independent-minded Seoul and an irrational Washington under trump. Either way, it’s up to the U.S. to better understand South Korea - I’d suggest less reliance on the Washinton blob. We are in for interesting times.
8. Turmoil ahead as South Korea’s presidential impeachment motion falls short
So I asked the author, Andrew Salmon, this question: Why are they calling this a coup and what is an "autocoup?" This debacle does not seem to meet the definition of a coup: "A coup is typically an illegal and overt attempt by a military organization or other government elites to unseat an incumbent leadership.”
He gave me a very informative reply and I learned something new today:
I can't speak for they. I can speak for myself. Autocoup is a real word - recently coined, I suspect - that I learned recently. Here is the definition: START A self-coup, also called an autocoup (from Spanish autogolpe) or coup from the top, is a form of coup d'état in which a political leader, having come to power through legal means, stays in power through illegal means through the actions of themselves and/or their supporters.[1] The leader may dissolve or render powerless the national legislature and unlawfully assume extraordinary powers. Other measures may include annulling the nation's constitution, suspending civil courts, and having the head of government assume dictatorial powers.[2][3] END
So it turns out that it is not a new word. The OED says it was first used in 1971 (why I never recall it from my political revolutions classes with my political science professor and academic advisor, the late Dr. Mustafa Rejai (from Iran) in the 1970s at Miami University I don't know). And in all my studies of revolution and resistance I do not recall it.
I found a presentation for a lecture from the University of Washington that is instructive: Authoritarianism & coups & autocoups in democracies https://faculty.washington.edu/vmenaldo/Presentations/Authoritarianism%20&%20coups%20&%20autocoups%20in%20democracies.pdf
I went through the Assessing Revolutions and insurgent Strategies project from USASOC (https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html)and I could not find a reference to it. However, in the “Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies” https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/HumanFactorsS.pdf I did find a description of the leader who is likely to conduct an autocoup after he or she assumes power. A key point is paranoia. Does this describe Yoon? Was he overly afraid of north Korean sympathizers or communists within the South that he believed he had to do this? Which world leaders does this describe and if we can identify them can we assess they are likely to conduct "autocoups?"
P. 98-99 …. Egocentricity is a normal component in infantile development; however, as a child develops into adolescence he or she is supposed to become less self-absorbed and more cognizant of others. Narcissism is a psychoanalytic theory that holds that primary narcissism (or self-love) in the form of grandiose self does not diminish as the individual develops and expands his or her social network. If this fails to occur, regardless of reason, the grandiose self-image can result in individuals who are sociopathic, arrogant, and devoid of compassion for others. Some leaders demonstrate a marked desire for admiration and attention, a hallmark of narcissism. Their chosen methods of violence are often spectacular and attention grabbing, suggesting a more narcissistic clinical presentation. There are also those who exhibit a narcissistic leadership style although they probably do not meet the clinical criteria for an Axis II disorder. In fact, this leadership style is heavily represented in the military, industry, and academia. Characteristics of the narcissistic leadership style include a vulnerability to biased information processing that results in an overestimation of their own strength and an underestimation of their adversary’s, a grandiose and self-serving disposition, a lack of tolerance for competition, difficulty relying on experts, and a desire for sycophantic subordinates. Often displaying superficial arrogance over profound personal insecurity, they actively seek admiration, are vulnerable to insults, slights, and attacks, and are prone to rage. Key observables that indicate this style are the leader’s sensitivity to criticism, surrounding themselves with sycophants, and overvaluation of his chances of success and an underestimation of the strength of an opponent.
Another manifestation of the theory is the malignant narcissistic style of leadership: a combination of narcissism, paranoia, and sociopathy. These individuals exhibit grandiosity and suffer from poor underlying self-esteem with attendant sensitivity to slights, insults, or threats. They suspect and blame others, have no compunction regarding the use of violence, and lack empathy or concern for the impact of their actions on others. Observable characteristics of the malignant narcissist leader are displays of extreme grandiosity, paranoia, and other antisocial traits, the lack of inhibition in the use of violence, dreams of glory, lack of empathy regarding the impact of his or her actions on others, and the target of anger (subsequent to personal or group setbacks) being an external entity.
Turmoil ahead as South Korea’s presidential impeachment motion falls short
Questions rise over viability of 'zombie' president after failed autocoup
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
By - The Washington Times - Updated: 8:37 a.m. on Saturday, December 7, 2024
SEOUL, South Korea – A vote in South Korea’s 300-seat National Assembly to impeach embattled President Yoon Suk Yeol failed Saturday, plunging the nation into political uncertainty for the second time in less than a week.
A majority of 200 votes were required for the impeachment motion, presented by a group of opposition parties in the wake of Mr. Yoon’s stunning declaration of martial law late Tuesday night, to pass.
All but three of Mr. Yoon’s party members, who occupy 108 seats, exited the voting chamber, boycotting the vote and defying calls by the house speaker to return.
As a result, the magic number – 200 votes – could not be reached.
It remains to be seen whether Mr. Yoon will resign. Even his own party head has stated that he should not remain.
But so far there has been no signal from a man already being called a “zombie” president.
If Mr. Yoon does not declare, politics could be driven from the chamber to the streets.
In 2016, central Seoul was occupied by weekly million-man protests against then-president Park Geun-hye – like Mr. Yoon, a conservative. The public was shocked by news that she was taking policy advice from a corrupt crony who held no official position.
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Ms. Park was ousted, then jailed, in 2017. Today, in 2024, Mr. Yoon’s malfeasance looks graver.
His declaration of martial law was characterized by one protester at the scene as “insane.”
Unquestionably, it looked wildly out of place in modern, vibrantly democratic South Korea, a high-tech, pop-culture superpower. Martial law had previously been a leaf in the playbook of the military regimes that ruled South Korea, with an iron fist and bloody hands, from the 1960s to the 1980s.
It did not stand.
Amid dramatic scenes at the National Assembly — where uncertain special forces troops and police were confronted by thousands of demonstrators who converged after the news broke — lawmakers voted to overturn the decree in the early hours of Wednesday.
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Three hours later, Mr. Yoon bowed to the Assembly’s action.
He had been neither seen nor heard by his public until Saturday morning when he made a brief television broadcast.
Mr. Yoon, who has long been suffering from dangerously low approval ratings, admitted his martial law declaration was driven by his “desperation” as a president.
That is likely a reference to his inability to govern effectively due to the opposition’s control of the National Assembly, and to ever-building expectations that he could face impeachment for a number of scandals, some involving his wife.
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Mr. Yoon conceded that his declaration had caused “anxiety and inconvenience.” He offered a “sincere apology” to the public who, he said, “must have been very surprised.”
He added that he “would not avoid legal or political responsibility” and vowed that there would be no replay of martial law.
“I will entrust my party with methods to stabilize the political situation, including the remainder of my term,” he said.
That indicates Mr. Yoon’s hope that his fate does not lie in the hands of firebrand opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung.
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It was Mr. Lee who evaded police and troops to enter the National Assembly over a fence and rally votes early Wednesday morning. He stands to benefit considerably from an overthrow of Mr. Yoon. His leftist Democratic Party of Korea would likely sweep the next presidential election.
However, the head of Yoon’s own right-wing People Power Party, Han Dong-hoon, has emerged as the critical powerbroker in this political crisis.
Though it is a minority, the PPP occupies 108 seats in the Assembly. That means no vote can reach a two-thirds majority unless PPP members join in.
Over the last four days, Mr. Han has swayed in all directions.
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On the night of martial law, he joined the vote to undo the presidential decree.
He subsequently indicated that his party would not impeach, but the following day, after grim details about martial law planning were released, he indicated that they would.
This morning, amid Mr. Yoon’s public broadcast, Mr. Han appeared to turn again. That was borne out in the National Assembly tonight.
What happens next is unclear.
Prime Minister Han Duck-soo – a long-time political operator, whose movements on Tuesday indicate he had no inkling of Mr. Yoon’s autocoup – stands ready to take over the reins of government if the president resigns.
For now, Mr. Yoon, who has been deserted by multiple cabinet colleagues, remains in office.
Opposition parties vowed to repeat impeachment motions next week. One pundit, who dubs Mr. Yoon “a zombie president,” said the wheels of governance look set to grind to a halt.
“Everything Yoon complained about – obstruction and non-cooperation, which he used as a pretext for martial law – are going to get ten times worse,” said Dan Pinkston, a Seoul-based international relations professor at Troy University.
Unless Mr. Yoon steps down, Mr. Pinkston warned, “I don’t see a clear pathway out of this.”
In a nation where mass protest has a long history, movement is already underway.
“People are very angry, they are now demanding Yoon step down,” Yang Sun-mook, a former head of the DPK’s foreign affairs committee, said by phone from noisy demonstrations outside the National Assembly building this evening. “The people are going to give some pressure, there will be mobilization, it is going to escalate.”
Mr. Yoon is not totally isolated.
Some 10,000 mainly elderly conservative protesters converged Saturday on downtown Seoul’s Gwanghwamun district.
“We support martial law!” said one gentleman waving American and South Korean flags at the district’s iconic intersection. “Yoon Suk Yeol is innocent!”
The contours of Mr. Yoon’s autocoup became clearer Friday, as more officials and observers spoke up and more details were made public.
The key target of his action, carried out by special forces units and police, was not just the National Assembly. It was also the National Election Committee.
A Korean academic, who requested anonymity, explained the thinking behind the attempted seizure of the NEC’s computers and data.
Estimating that “25 percent of Koreans,” are suspicious about years of election manipulation, he said, “Under current law, the president or administration cannot ask for an audit or an inspection of the NEC.”
Calling that situation “a structural problem,” while alleging wrongdoing in the election machinery, he claimed, “During last April‘s general elections, 100 percent of the early votes were won by the DPK, but this is not a communist country: Is that statistically possible?”
From this explanation, had Mr. Yoon nullified the National Assembly and proven electoral interference, he could feasibly have ejected lawmakers who had won seats via foul means and shifted the political balance in his favor.
Update: This story has been updated to reflect that all but three of Mr. Yoon’s party members exited the voting chamber.
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
9. Was there method in President Yoon's martial law madness?
Michael Breen asks the question we have all been wondering: What was the pint? WHat was Yoon thinking? he provides some interesting insights.
Excerpts:
...Can’t we stop insulting President Yoon Suk Yeol?, they said. At least until we know for sure what his reasons were?
I could have argued. In fact, I could have laughed. But I’ve been married long enough to know that there is often merit in opinions that are the opposite of my own and that the only way to find out what it might be is to contemplate, rather than immediately react.
I will add that this was made easier because the first person who said this to me was not a fan of President Yoon. She was defending the office, not the person.
...
As former special forces chief, Chun In-bum, wrote in his column in this newspaper yesterday, two types of martial law are permitted in this country. Both give the government extensive power to suspend normal freedoms and arrest people without warrants, restrict media, ban demonstrations and so on.
One type, known as security martial law, may be directly imposed by the president. We may imagine, for example, that if North Korean leader Kim Jong-un were mobilizing to attack and if intelligence authorities learned that his special forces and agitators were already in place here, this type of martial law might well be justified.
The other type is emergency martial law. In this case, if the president considers the state to be sufficiently threatened, he has to notify the National Assembly and follow its decision. If a majority of lawmakers disagree with him and vote against martial law, he has to immediately repeal it.
...
A lot of commentators considered Tuesday night’s martial law to have been bungled. Yoon is so incompetent, he didn’t even do that right, people said. Why were the troops at the Assembly carrying rifles without ammunition? Why did they let the Assembly vote? Why did they then suddenly leave? Were they resisting orders? Come to think of it, why weren’t troops in broadcast and newspaper offices — like they were back in 1980? Why wasn’t the Internet down? Why was there not a single police or military roadblock in the entire country?
There may be a simple explanation. Perhaps Yoon let the lawmakers vote, knowing they would reject martial law, and knowing he would be back on TV repealing it before the cock crowed.
There is good reason to think this was his thinking. In his announcement of martial law, it was obvious that the national crisis he had in mind came from his frustration with the opposition's behavior in the Assembly. He didn’t conjure up a fake crisis to suppress them. He directly called them an anti-state, pro-North Korean den of criminals. He basically said, “Hey, commie gangsters, I want to shut you down and I need you to vote on it to give me permission.”
Unless he is a lunatic or a drunkard, he knew all along what the outcome would be.
That leads us to the obvious question — what was the point? To which, the most obvious answer was that this was a shot across the bows, a political ploy to try and make the opposition behave itself.
Was there method in President Yoon's martial law madness?
The Korea Times · December 5, 2024
By Michael Breen
In the wake of Tuesday night’s on-off declaration of martial law, as bewilderment turned to anger and the nation, it seemed, realized President Yoon Suk Yeol would likely be impeached for treason, one or two people voiced an opinion which I had not expected: Can’t we stop insulting President Yoon Suk Yeol?, they said. At least until we know for sure what his reasons were?
I could have argued. In fact, I could have laughed. But I’ve been married long enough to know that there is often merit in opinions that are the opposite of my own and that the only way to find out what it might be is to contemplate, rather than immediately react.
I will add that this was made easier because the first person who said this to me was not a fan of President Yoon. She was defending the office, not the person.
At the same time, something was puzzling me. That was the silence of the president himself. Why didn’t he come out and resign, or perhaps plead for understanding and mercy?
I imagined him, in his bunker, explaining to the first lady how his dramatic move to protect her — inspired, I wondered, by U.S. President Joe Biden’s fatherly overexercise of his power to pardon his son — had failed. But she, knowing he had put her before his work, was reassured that he loved her.
But now that things are calming down, I’m beginning to wonder if I had missed something and that there was some method in this presidential madness. Here is that line of reasoning.
As former special forces chief, Chun In-bum, wrote in his column in this newspaper yesterday, two types of martial law are permitted in this country. Both give the government extensive power to suspend normal freedoms and arrest people without warrants, restrict media, ban demonstrations and so on.
One type, known as security martial law, may be directly imposed by the president. We may imagine, for example, that if North Korean leader Kim Jong-un were mobilizing to attack and if intelligence authorities learned that his special forces and agitators were already in place here, this type of martial law might well be justified.
The other type is emergency martial law. In this case, if the president considers the state to be sufficiently threatened, he has to notify the National Assembly and follow its decision. If a majority of lawmakers disagree with him and vote against martial law, he has to immediately repeal it.
A lot of commentators considered Tuesday night’s martial law to have been bungled. Yoon is so incompetent, he didn’t even do that right, people said. Why were the troops at the Assembly carrying rifles without ammunition? Why did they let the Assembly vote? Why did they then suddenly leave? Were they resisting orders? Come to think of it, why weren’t troops in broadcast and newspaper offices — like they were back in 1980? Why wasn’t the Internet down? Why was there not a single police or military roadblock in the entire country?
There may be a simple explanation. Perhaps Yoon let the lawmakers vote, knowing they would reject martial law, and knowing he would be back on TV repealing it before the cock crowed.
There is good reason to think this was his thinking. In his announcement of martial law, it was obvious that the national crisis he had in mind came from his frustration with the opposition's behavior in the Assembly. He didn’t conjure up a fake crisis to suppress them. He directly called them an anti-state, pro-North Korean den of criminals. He basically said, “Hey, commie gangsters, I want to shut you down and I need you to vote on it to give me permission.”
Unless he is a lunatic or a drunkard, he knew all along what the outcome would be.
That leads us to the obvious question — what was the point? To which, the most obvious answer was that this was a shot across the bows, a political ploy to try and make the opposition behave itself.
Our reaction to this will be varied. It depends more on our prior political dislikes than our positive preferences. If we don’t like Yoon, we’re appalled. If we don’t like the opposition, perhaps Yoon now appears in a more positive light. The third way is to try and be objective.
Speaking objectively, the Democratic Party of Korea is a disgrace. In its longing for power, it barely conceals its contempt for the law and the institutions of democracy. It is contemptuous of elections that do not go their way. That is apparent in the way it has sought to impeach Yoon from the outset.
Before you tell me I’m prejudiced, I will say that I see no evidence that the ruling side is any better when it is in opposition.
I should say that Yoon’s pretend move — if my theory holds — at martial law to control his political opponents reveals a similar contempt for our democracy in this country.
Unlike an earlier president, Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in 2017 only because her own party’s leadership was unwilling to side with her, it appears that on this occasion Yoon’s party will back him. This may well save him.
If it doesn’t, he will probably be impeached and end up with a long sentence in prison — where he will have time to contemplate the irony of having been the prosecutor who pursued the case against Park — as he waits for his successor to pardon him.
As appalled as I am by this week’s events, I would rather see more of a forgive, unite and democracy-upgrade approach.
Frankly, we need politicians who are better than this and can give a greater measure of dignity to the offices they hold in a manner that the people of this country deserve.
Michael Breen (mike.breen@insightcomms.com) is the author of "The New Koreans."
The Korea Times · December 5, 2024
10. Yoon’s Coup Attempt Shows Sad State of Civil-Military Relations
As I learned, it was not a coup. It was an autocoup.
An anti-military screed (anti- South Korea).
Some facts. The last martial law imposition was in 1980 not 1987. I was there at the time. It was the height of the democracy movement and the preparation for the 1988 Olympics. Also Kim Young Sam purged the Hanahoe society between 1993-1998. I served with the last ROK general officer on active duty who was a member of the society. Again she is writing a mainly anti-military screed. Yoon never served in the military (health reasons) and the ROK military did the right thing in the end by not blocking the National Assembly vote. I do not think she has really observed how the ROK military has evolved and understands civilian control of the military (despite its Defense Ministers consistently being former military - they defer to civilian political leadership of the Presidents and the National Assembly. - there has not been a military leader as President since Roh Tae Woo left office in 1993). It is sad but of course she has a right to her opinion and analysis.
Yoon’s Coup Attempt Shows Sad State of Civil-Military Relations
The legacy of South Korea’s military dictatorship is stronger than it seems.
By Lami Kim, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
Foreign Policy · by Lami Kim
December 6, 2024, 12:52 PM
On Dec. 3, in an apparent attempt at a self-coup, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law. The move reflects the desperation of a leader facing plummeting popularity, mired in scandal, and under mounting pressure from South Korean elites. It was the first imposition of martial law in South Korea since the end of its military dictatorship in 1987.
Yoon’s attempt barely lasted six hours, after the National Assembly unanimously revoked his declaration. He now faces impeachment and charges of treason. But the episode, however brief, serves as a stark reminder that more than one-third of the Republic of Korea’s 76-year history was spent under military rule—spanning from 1961 to 1987—followed by an additional five years under a former Army general, albeit democratically elected. The lack of military coups since then had fostered a belief that South Korea had achieved stable civil-military relations and matured into a thriving democracy. Few could have imagined that in the 21st century, armored vehicles might once again roll into the streets of Seoul or that soldiers would try to break into the National Assembly to arrest lawmakers.
As shocking as it may seem, martial law has always been a possibility. South Korea’s past military dictatorship looms large over the country today, causing civil-military relations to fracture and democracy to falter. This moment should serve as an opportunity for South Koreans to eliminate the remnants of this history once and for all, ensuring that such incidents cannot recur in the future.
Yoon’s imposition of martial law has its roots in South Korea’s military dictatorship. Without democratic legitimacy, the military dictators who ruled in that 26-year period relied heavily on the “collective leadership” of Army officers who paid them allegiance. After Park Chung-hee’s coup in 1961, he filled key positions within the civilian administration and foreign service with members of Hanahoe—a secretive group formed in 1963 by graduates of the Korea Military Academy (KMA), a service academy for the Army. Most notably, Chun Doo-hwan, who supported Park during the coup as an Army officer, became a civil service secretary and later chief of personnel at the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.
Following Park’s assassination in October 1979, Chun, then commander of the Defense Security Command, staged a mutiny alongside other Hanahoe members. Facing widespread public outrage, Chun and his ally Roh Tae-woo orchestrated the brutal suppression of protesters in Gwangju in May 1980, leading to the deaths of hundreds, perhaps thousands. Under Chun’s regime, Hanahoe’s influence expanded further, with its members occupying critical roles in the presidential secretariat, the ruling party, and intelligence services.
Chun suspended direct presidential elections and handpicked Roh as his successor in a planned indirect presidential election in 1987. This sparked massive protests, during which several college students were killed. Under pressure from Washington, Chun ultimately conceded and reinstated direct presidential elections. Although Roh was eventually elected in 1987, South Korea’s military dictatorship officially came to an end. That doesn’t mean, however, that the military’s influence over civilian affairs truly disappeared.
Key civilian security positions are still predominantly held by former military leaders—mostly from the Army—often transitioning directly into these roles with little to no interruption after their military service. Since the 1961 coup, South Korea has not had a single minister of national defense who has not, at some point, been a member of the military. While civilians have been better represented in vice minister roles, retired military officers still constitute the majority.
This is concerning because retired military officers often maintain close ties with their service branches and the military as a whole, raising concerns about their ability to provide impartial supervision and enforce civilian authority. It also increases the likelihood of a civilian leader mobilizing the armed forces to serve their political objectives.
Adding to the concern is the homogeneity in academic and professional backgrounds among military leaders. While the Hanahoe faction no longer exists, most senior military leaders are KMA graduates and follow similar career paths within the Army. In 2020, President Moon Jae-in appointed the first non-KMA graduate as Army chief of staff in South Korea’s history, prompting unrest within Army leadership. When like-minded individuals with long-standing ties dominate senior military roles, the risk of collusion rises significantly.
Another persistent issue is the military’s strong partisan alignment, which can undermine democratic governance. Rather than operating as a politically neutral, professional institution, the South Korean military has maintained a strong affinity with conservative factions and frequently clashes with progressive civilian leadership. While it is not uncommon for military and security establishments to lean this way, the South Korean military’s conservative ties are particularly deep. During the dictatorship, the military collaborated with former military leaders and civilian members of the ruling conservative party to suppress the democratization movement led by progressives, using anti-communism and national security as justification.
These systemic flaws in civil-military relations nearly led to the imposition of martial law in 2017. While South Korea’s Constitutional Court was deliberating whether to approve Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, Defense Minister Han Min-koo, a retired Army general and KMA graduate, ordered Cho Hyun-chun, another academy graduate commanding the Defense Security Command, to set a plan for imposing martial law to suppress protests if Park were reinstated. The plan included the deployment of hundreds of armored vehicles and more than 6,000 combat troops to key locations, including the Government Complex in Seoul, the National Assembly, and various media outlets.
In order to prevent a vote to lift martial law, as the South Korean Constitution guarantees, the document also proposed arresting politicians who violated bans on protests and assemblies. It outlined measures to surveil and suppress the media, block internet portals and social media, and take control of the National Intelligence Service. Those who violated martial law were to be tried in military tribunals. Although not implemented, the mere existence of such plans in 2017 is deeply unsettling.
Now, the same civil-military problems—quasi-military dominance in key civilian defense roles, homogeneity, and partisanship—have culminated in Yoon’s attempt at a self-coup.
All three of Yoon’s defense ministers have been Army elites from KMA. Notably, Lee Jong-sup, Yoon’s first defense minister, resigned following allegations of interfering in a military investigation into the death of a young Marine, raising concerns about his loyalty to the president over the ministry and its personnel. Shin Won-sik, Yoon’s second defense minister, was later appointed national security advisor. Shin’s academy classmate, Kim Yong-hyun—who is also Yoon’s high school senior classmate, an important relationship in Korean political culture—succeeded Shin. Kim Seon-ho, the vice minister of defense, is also a KMA graduate. It was Kim Yong-hyun who proposed imposing martial law and orchestrated its implementation. He recommended Army Chief of Staff Park An-soo, a KMA junior classmate, as martial law commander to Yoon, bypassing Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Myung-soo, the highest-ranking active-duty officer who is from the Navy. Yoon approved the appointment. Two other KMA junior classmates of Kim Yong-hyun, Special Warfare Commander Kwak Jong-geun and Capital Defense Commander Lee Jin-woo, played critical roles in mobilizing troops during Yoon’s short-lived self-coup.
As dramatically as the self-coup failed, Kim presumably believed he could make it succeed—and that the rest of the military would be on board. Contrary to the Yoon administration’s weak excuse that martial law was merely a warning to the opposition and not intended to be maintained, the first article of the martial law proclamation—which banned all political activities, including those of the National Assembly—was clearly designed to prevent the legislature from lifting martial law and to lay the groundwork for a dictatorship. However, the failure of the coup was predicted by many from the very start, and opposition was instant and successful. So why did Kim proceed with this plan?
This phenomenon can perhaps be explained as a relic of the military dictatorship, during which a particular mindset was cultivated among army officers to suppress dissent—one that views the political opposition as pro-North communist forces that must be confronted, conflating national security with regime security. In this week’s coup attempt, Kim and his military subordinates, under the pretext of eradicating “pro-North Korean anti-state forces,” which Yoon claimed as the objective, may have believed that it was their duty to achieve this goal using the tools at their disposal.
This mindset is evident in Kim’s statements following the coup attempt. Addressing the military, he said, “We were outnumbered by the enemy,” referring to civilian protesters and opposition lawmakers. When asked by reporters about his motivations, he quoted a line from the KMA Creed of Cadets: “We choose the arduous path of justice over the complacent path of injustice.” This illustrates the grave danger of placing individuals prone to groupthink in key national defense positions, where their actions can be influenced by such distorted beliefs.
Without a doubt, Yoon’s coup attempt laid bare the South Korean military’s erosion of political neutrality and its failure to operate as a professional institution. Yoon’s imposition of martial law was illegal from the outset, as it did not meet the necessary conditions for such a declaration, such as the presence of an armed rebellion, a breakdown of law and order, or an external threat that renders civilian governance impossible. The military’s compliance with these unlawful orders exacerbates concerns over its allegiance.
Moreover, despite South Korean law explicitly prohibiting the use of armed force against the legislature under martial law, special forces attempted to seize the National Assembly to block a vote to lift it. Even after the National Assembly voted to revoke martial law—legally requiring immediate presidential compliance—military officers defied the decision, insisting on maintaining martial law until Yoon personally rescinded it. In no uncertain terms, the military was loyal to an individual leader over the nation. However, young soldiers on the ground, mostly conscripts and therefore untainted by the groupthink of Army elites, appeared to display passive resistance to what they perceived as unreasonable orders, which ultimately contributed to the passage of the resolution to lift martial law.
As South Koreans and supporters of democracy around the world anxiously watch how this situation unfolds, it is crucial to learn from what happened. This incident serves as a stark reminder that civil-military relations are never static and can regress without vigilant management. If there is a silver lining to this situation, it is that South Koreans now have an opportunity to confront the lingering legacies of military dictatorship and take definitive steps toward establishing healthy, sustainable civil-military relations. These steps should include instituting a mandatory moratorium before former military officers assume civilian defense positions and diversifying national defense leadership to prevent too much power from concentrating among Army elites with homogeneous backgrounds. Most importantly, the South Korean military should mandate the comprehensive inclusion of lessons on democratic civil-military relations in its military education curriculum so these principles will guide service members’ future decision-making.
Foreign Policy · by Lami Kim
11. South Korean Soldier Fighting for Ukraine Calls On Northern ‘Brothers’ to Surrender
South Korean Soldier Fighting for Ukraine Calls On Northern ‘Brothers’ to Surrender
kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · December 4, 2024
South Korea North Korea War in Ukraine
Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate (HUR) claims there are two North Korean special forces brigades in Russia’s Kursk region and food supply from the Russian army isn’t great.
by Stefan Korshak | December 4, 2024, 1:37 pm
Alleged South Korean fighter in service with Ukrainian troops calls on his North Korean “brothers” to surrender rather than fight on Russia’s side, in a video made public by the pro-Kyiv information platform InformNapalm on Tuesday.
A South Korean soldier fighting on Ukraine’s side on Wednesday published an appeal to his North Korean “brothers” currently to the Russian Federation to fight on the side of the Kremlin to save their lives and desert, and promised North Koreans reaching Ukrainian lines would be given “new lives” in a democratic state.
The video announcement first made public on a longstanding pro-Ukraine information platform called InformNapalm showed a masked man with Asian facial features, in an unmarked uniform, standing in front of an armored HUMMV combat truck.
“My brothers, you and I are from the same people, we have the same blood, we come from the same country. We are only divided by a border that you didn’t choose,” the soldier said in part.
Kyiv Post checks confirmed the Korean used in the appeal was typical of a native resident of South Korea, possibly the Seoul region. The kit out of the HUMMV in the video was like turreted, armored HUMMVs operated by the Ukrainian military.
The 90-second statement argued North Korean soldiers were fighting on Russia’s side for no reason and that, unless they quit the ranks of their unit, they would likely die as cannon fodder thrown against Ukrainian defenses.
Defection “to the south,” and soldiers surrendering to the Ukrainian forces, will be able to build a new life in freedom, “to be happy, protected and not to be afraid of tomorrow,” the soldier said. “We will not just receive you (as prisoners of war), we will help you start a new life. Here you will receive support, work, the chance to live with dignity, so that you could begin your life path anew.”
Other Topics of Interest
In an exclusive interview, Serhiy Sukhomlyn, the new head of the State Agency for the Restoration of Ukraine, describes the proposed change of focus within his ministry when the war ends.
Ukrainian military information platforms on Wednesday reported, citing Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) intelligence, that around 12,000 North Korean soldiers have deployed to Russia’s western Kursk region and are conducting pre-battle training.
A Ukraine Army General Staff (AGS) Wednesday statement identified two elite North Korean formations, the 92nd and 94th special forces brigades, as present in Kursk region and already attached to Russian units already in combat with Ukrainian forces.
AFU forces invaded Russia’s Kursk region in August, capturing a chunk of Russian territory roughly the size of Luxembourg. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered local defense units to wipe out the salient by mid-October, but that deadline was missed. In some battles, Russian units committed to counterattacks have suffered crushing losses.
The two North Korean special forces brigades likely see combat have been attached to three badly depleted Russian formations fighting in Kursk region for more than two months – the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 11th and 810th Marine Brigades, a Wednesday statement from military intelligence directorate (HUR) said.
Reportedly, North Korean soldiers assigned to Russia’s 11th Marine Brigade are complaining of insufficient food supplied to them by the Russian army. Kyiv Post could not independently confirm the HUR claim. News reports citing state intelligence in both Ukraine and South Korea said that the first North Korean troops embarked for service in Russia in mid-October and that leading echelons of that force had arrived in Russia’s western Kursk region by early November.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during Tuesday evening comments in a national television/video address said that North Korean troops had already suffered casualties, without stating the cause.
“We have a number of around 12,000 of them. There are already killed and injured. [Russian President Vladimir] Putin doesn’t want to lose the support of [Russian] society. So, instead of using Russians as cannon fodder, it will be North Korean soldiers as cannon fodder,” Zelensky said.
A salvo of between four to twelve Ukrainian long-range weapons, likely some of them UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles, on Nov. 20 struck a Kursk region monastery that, according to local social media and Ukrainian military intelligence reports, was being used as an underground Russian army headquarters. The Storm Shadow is an advanced weapon with a warhead designed to sink ships or penetrate deep underground before exploding.
Subsequent British and Ukrainian news reports said the Storm Shadow strike killed 18 Russian service members among them regional commander Lt. Gen. Valery Solodchuk, as well as an unspecified number of North Korean senior officers visiting the headquarters at the time. At least 33 officers and enlisted, among them three North Koreans of unspecified rank, were injured in those attacks, reports said.
North Korea is Russia’s closest ally in the Kremlin’s now 34-month-old invasion of Ukraine. Since intervening in the war on the Kremlin’s side Pyonyang has sent Moscow a reported 3.5 million artillery shells – a volume of ammunition roughly three times the total shell deliveries to Ukraine by its NATO nation allies.
Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty in June with terms for full-scale military cooperation including allowing troops from one country to fight alongside forces from the other signatory. Zelenskyi said that aside from artillery ammunition North Korea supplies Russia with rocket launchers and ballistic missiles used to bombard Ukrainian homes and businesses.
Zelensky on Monday repeated calls for Ukraine to be extended an offer to join NATO at an unspecified date in the future, to deter Russia and North Korea from attacking Ukraine.
However, reaction across the Atlantic Alliance has been lukewarm. Officials in the incoming White House administration have said the US should block Ukraine from NATO protection, to convince Russia and North Korea to stop attacking Ukraine.
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Stefan Korshak
Stefan Korshak is the Kyiv Post Senior Defense Correspondent. He is from Houston Texas and is a Yalie. He has worked in journalism in the former Soviet space for more than twenty years, and from 2015-2019 he led patrols in the Mariupol sector for the OSCE monitoring mission in Donbass. He has filed field reports from five wars and enjoys reporting on nature, wildlife and the outdoors. You can read his blog about the Russo-Ukraine war on Facebook, or on Substack at https://stefankorshak.substack.com, or on Medium at https://medium.com/@Stefan.Korshak
kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · December 4, 2024
12. North Koreans in Ukraine: Trouble Ahead?
Excerpts:
The other way around, however, talking of a new China-DPRK-Russia “Axis of Evil” is premature.
First, the North Korean deployment does not guarantee Russian commitment to its security. Ukraine War or not, the relationship will remain one-sided. Moscow would not sacrifice its troops or risk a war in Asia to save Kim Jong-un if he were to get into serious trouble.
Second, China wants Russia to erode the U.S. position, but not at any cost to itself. It will enable Moscow’s military effort but certainly not fight Russia’s wars on its behalf.
Finally, Beijing is well aware of North Korea’s attempts to diversify its partnerships with the ultimate goal of balancing China’s growing power. Xi Jinping is merely tolerating the DPRK’s actions.
This deployment of North Korean troops will not revolutionize the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia’s strategy, or the European security landscape. It also has little to do directly with China. However, it may reshape North Korea’s military posture and internal power dynamics over the long run, and that is probably where the attention should be.
North Koreans in Ukraine: Trouble Ahead?
This deployment of North Korean troops will not revolutionize the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia’s strategy, or the European security landscape.
The National Interest · by Dylan Motin · December 6, 2024
North Korean soldiers appear about to join Russia’s campaign to conquer Ukraine. Soldiers are one of the few things the DPRK has no shortage of, and it decided to use them to make money, secure Russian support, and gain combat experience.
It is a return to Pyongyang’s Cold War habit of covertly sending troops to support allies, as it did for the Arab states against Israel. What does this troop deployment imply for U.S. interests?
Russia and Europe
Some in Washington want to read this as a sign of Russian weakness and desperation, but this is wishful thinking. The DPRK’s small force represents only a fraction of Russia’s massive army, which proved able to regenerate itself. These few thousand soldiers do not fundamentally alter the battlefield situation. The deployment should be read in another light.
Enlisting allies in American wars is a longstanding U.S. practice to increase available troops, reduce the burden on the American people, and give a military operation a layer of international legitimacy. Few would describe British or Australian participation in the Iraq War as a sign of American desperation or weakness.
Russia is no different. For the Kremlin, the North Korean force is a low-cost addition and a symbolic win domestically and abroad.
Some also see the North Koreans in Russia as a major threat to European security. However, their presence will have a limited impact on Europe overall. The North Koreans are merely a Russian auxiliary force. They will have no independent role. Still, it is a clear warning for NATO and like-minded partners. Moscow’s next war will likely mean further requests for North Korean reinforcements.
North Korea
Does the deployment imply worse things to come on the Korean Peninsula? As with North Korea, its actions can be plausibly read as either aggressive or defensive.
In a defensive interpretation, North Korea is in the process of scrapping any hope of reunification and bolstering its border defenses. It is also growing its nuclear arsenal quickly to keep South Korea (ROK), the United States, and even China away. In that background, Russia is the last buoy for a small North Korea surrounded by larger hostile neighbors. Sending troops will bolster this battered ally and bring real combat veterans into the Korean People’s Army. Large amounts of North Korean ammunition went to Russia, limiting its ability to attack South Korea in the short to medium term.
Conversely, some experts believe that Kim Jong-un is contemplating military action. They would likely read the troop deployment as a prelude to aggression. Pyongyang wants trained soldiers prepared for war and wants to ensure full Russian support to defy the ROK-U.S. alliance.
Both hypotheses are plausible, and it is too early for definitive conclusions. Still, the defensive interpretation appears more consistent with North Korean behavior, at least for now.
That said, there are worrisome implications for the long-term inter-Korean balance. North Korea will likely get in return for its support cash, raw materials, and military, including nuclear, technologies. In the long run, it may secure access to new weapons from Moscow to modernize its armed forces, which rely heavily on outdated Soviet-era gear.
The Korean People’s Army will also gain actual combat experience in high-intensity modern warfare, something that its southern neighbor lacks.
Militaries promote personnel with combat experience. In Russia, serving in Syria was often a career booster for officers, and many who fought there are now at the helm. Similarly, we can expect that the North Koreans currently learning war in Russia will be the officers in charge of the DPRK’s military ten or twenty years down the road and, thus, yield tremendous political weight.
However, it is still too early to predict the impact on the DPRK’s force structure. If the North Koreans suffered heavy casualties, it could lead to a deeper rethinking and more profound reforms. However, if North Korean soldiers enjoy easy victories, there will be less impetus for reforms.
Note that they are coming at a time when Ukrainian lines are already crumbling.
Kim Jong-un may gain increased confidence in his soldiers from the adventure. In any case, Pyongyang’s planners will certainly learn that integrating all types of firing and reconnaissance systems with ground troops for swift blows is critical—something the Russians struggled with initially. The DPRK will also witness first-hand the importance of air control, as Russia has been bombing Ukrainian positions at will for months to great effect.
Pyongyang will undoubtedly be eager to find ways to rejuvenate its decaying air defense system and its antiquated, near-impotent air force.
What is China’s place in the story?
Washington has asked China to pressure North Korea into withdrawing its troops. Although China-North Korea relations are already abysmal, Beijing has little stake in North Korea’s Ukrainian adventure. Beijing is deeply committed to Russia’s military effort by supporting its economy and providing critical components for its defense industry. China has a vested interest in bolstering Moscow, its most powerful ally, to weaken and distract the United States.
Hence, it has no reason to disrupt Vladimir Putin’s efforts to employ North Korean troops.
Indeed, in all likelihood, the Chinese knew beforehand. Even if their intelligence had missed it before it became public, the Russians probably warned them. The Kremlin cannot afford to antagonize China, its key partner on the world stage.
Also, Putin knows better than to meddle in what Xi Jinping considers its Asian sphere of influence without first asking permission.
The other way around, however, talking of a new China-DPRK-Russia “Axis of Evil” is premature.
First, the North Korean deployment does not guarantee Russian commitment to its security. Ukraine War or not, the relationship will remain one-sided. Moscow would not sacrifice its troops or risk a war in Asia to save Kim Jong-un if he were to get into serious trouble.
Second, China wants Russia to erode the U.S. position, but not at any cost to itself. It will enable Moscow’s military effort but certainly not fight Russia’s wars on its behalf.
Finally, Beijing is well aware of North Korea’s attempts to diversify its partnerships with the ultimate goal of balancing China’s growing power. Xi Jinping is merely tolerating the DPRK’s actions.
This deployment of North Korean troops will not revolutionize the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia’s strategy, or the European security landscape. It also has little to do directly with China. However, it may reshape North Korea’s military posture and internal power dynamics over the long run, and that is probably where the attention should be.
Dylan Motin holds a Ph.D. in political science. He is currently a Non-resident Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He is also a non-resident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies and a non-resident research fellow at the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy. He is the author of Bandwagoning in International Relations: China, Russia, and Their Neighbors (Vernon Press, 2024).
Image: Astrelok / Shutterstock.com.
The National Interest · by Dylan Motin · December 6, 2024
13. North Korean Troops in Ukraine Struggling With Food Shortages: Intel
If there is one thing they are experienced with it is hunger.
North Korean Troops in Ukraine Struggling With Food Shortages: Intel
thedefensepost.com · by Joe Saballa · December 5, 2024
North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine are now struggling with food shortages just five months after their reported arrival on the battlefield, according to Kyiv’s intelligence unit.
In a recent war update posted on Telegram, the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) stated that some of Moscow’s foreign reinforcements are suffering from malnutrition due to inadequate food supplies for daily operations.
Most of these troops are stationed in the Kursk region, where fighting has intensified following a surprise incursion by Ukrainian forces in August.
To address the situation, the Russian government reportedly dispatched its deputy commander for resource support to implement a solution.
The official then ordered food rations from the food reserves of airborne assault brigades to alleviate the hunger issue among North Korean troops, the intel report added.
‘At Least 12,000 Soldiers’
Following the signing of a mutual defense treaty with Moscow, Pyongyang has sent more than 10,000 soldiers to support Russian forces, according to the US Department of Defense.
These reinforcements have been deployed to several frontlines, including the Kursk Oblast.
“All indications are that they will provide some type of combat or combat support capability,” US Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said. “We would fully expect that the Ukrainians would do what they need to do to defend themselves and their personnel.”
The North Korean forces have already faced their first casualties, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirming the deaths of North Korean soldiers in battle.
Additionally, the Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed a North Korean Bulsae-4 anti-tank missile system using a suicide drone.
thedefensepost.com · by Joe Saballa · December 5, 2024
14. We're on our own (South Korea and the new US administration)
Conclusion:
The direction America, with its internal structural ailments, takes is an immensely important issue for Korea, situated in a global conflict zone. It is questionable whether the Yoon Suk Yeol regime can effectively handle the unpredictable nature of a future Trump regime. There is deep concern that the fundamental security foundation Korea has built since the Korean War armistice could collapse under the next Trump government, potentially pushing Korea to the brink. This is an issue that no other country can undertake on Korea’s behalf. It’s a challenge that Korean leaders and citizens must confront and resolve themselves.
We're on our own
The Korea Times · December 5, 2024
By Park Jung-won
Donald Trump’s reelection as president of the United States has caused upheaval not only in American society but also worldwide. The deepening inequality resulting from America’s internal economic and social contradictions has fueled anti-elite sentiments among Americans, leading to dissatisfaction with the existing political establishment. This is seen as a decisive reason for Trump’s second electoral victory.
The fact that someone like Trump could be elected president twice, despite the typical challenges of rising to such a position in American politics, suggests that America has now entered a low-intensity stage of “civil war” due to its failure to resolve its internal contradictions. America’s allies around the world will soon be forced to deal with the consequences of this inward distraction.
Trump’s reelection occurred not because he was exceptional, but rather due to the incompetence and numerous problems found within the Democratic Party. When Trump lost the 2020 election to Joe Biden, the Biden administration should have countered by initiating major reforms to tackle the fundamental issues of inequality in American society, arguing that Trump’s approach would never make America great. They should have confronted and acknowledged the deepening inequality caused by entrenched powers and long-standing contradictions within the U.S., accepting that the situation was no longer bearable.
The Biden administration and the Democratic Party, however, have strayed far from the perspective of everyday Americans who feel the deep impact of inequality and instead have focused on elitist views and abstract concepts such as political correctness, which has led to their current difficulties. After struggling to push the uncompetitive and aging Biden as candidate for reelection, they instead selected Kamala Harris not through robust debate and democratic competition but in an outdated, almost monarchical succession. As Michael Sandel, author of “Democracy’s Discontent,” noted in an interview, the Democratic Party was originally a party that stood for ordinary Americans, gaining widespread support, as reflected in Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. However, current Democratic politicians have espoused noble values such as human rights, democracy and racial justice, yet they have often appeared as an elite group that has become arrogant after reaping the benefits of globalization for themselves.
The problem is that Trump also appears to misdiagnose the fundamental issues facing American society and thus prescribes the wrong solutions. His autocratic nature seems likely to lead to erratic decisions, making America not greater, but rather increasing the likelihood of an early lame-duck period, thereby exacerbating the country’s internal problems.
After World War II, the United States emerged as the world’s leading power and exercised global leadership. From America’s viewpoint, this might have been seen as a great mission, but it wasn’t purely driven by altruistic motives. It was ultimately aligned with America’s interests. Thus, the U.S. planned and led the world economic order as a guardian of liberal democracy and capitalism, with the U.S. dollar serving as the world’s reserve currency. Moreover, by acting as the world’s police and leveraging its economic superiority, the U.S. defeated the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union in the Cold War, emphasizing the dominance of American-style capitalism and liberal democracy.
Trump claims that the U.S. faces this current domestic crisis because it sacrificed its own interests to protect the world, but this is an exaggeration. For instance, if the U.S. had only pursued Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks and not invaded Iraq, it might not have faced such rapid domestic turmoil. However, by engaging in two wars, the U.S. spent vast amounts of money and exhausted its national power, and then suffered a significant blow with the 2008 financial crisis. While it might appear wealthy to other countries, internally, the U.S. has become a society burdened with debt. Under the guise of neoliberalism, a few elites deepened their own pockets, creating a 1-to-9 society, allowing dissatisfaction among the majority to reach a critical point.
The American elite has made significant profits globally but has only hoarded and enjoyed this wealth for themselves without sharing it with American society at large. But Trump doesn’t systematically address why inequality has become so severe in America or how the elite’s economic and structural harms are at the root of this issue. He vaguely blames Washington elites instead. He doesn’t speak out against the need to address major financial and monopolistic capital. Trump fails to articulate how big tech companies and financial capitalists exacerbate inequality and exploit Americans, or how they craft favorable laws and regulations through extensive lobbying and connections, suffocating the middle and lower classes. Additionally, he doesn’t persuasively discuss solutions to structural issues like housing and excessive temporary employment, which are the root causes of poverty in America today.
Traditionally known as the land of opportunity, America has now become a nation where opportunities seem closed. Despite Wall Street, monopolistic companies and real estate owners among many entrenched elites contributing to this issue, the focus isn’t on structurally solving these contradictions. Instead, blame is placed on illegal immigrants crossing the border and foreign companies benefiting from trade surpluses, suggesting that other countries thrived because the U.S. military protected them for free. Rather than proposing structural solutions for economic inequality within the U.S., is it realistic to believe that simply deporting illegal immigrants, recalling overseas troops and raising tariff barriers will automatically create jobs and improve American lives?
The direction America, with its internal structural ailments, takes is an immensely important issue for Korea, situated in a global conflict zone. It is questionable whether the Yoon Suk Yeol regime can effectively handle the unpredictable nature of a future Trump regime. There is deep concern that the fundamental security foundation Korea has built since the Korean War armistice could collapse under the next Trump government, potentially pushing Korea to the brink. This is an issue that no other country can undertake on Korea’s behalf. It’s a challenge that Korean leaders and citizens must confront and resolve themselves.
Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics, is a professor of international law at Dankook University.
The Korea Times · December 5, 2024
15. The illegalities of Yoon's emergency martial law
Martial Law myths debunked? I have to defer to Korean constitutional experts.
Excerpts:
It is difficult to fathom why Yoon did what he did. There is endless speculation about his motives, but what is clear is that this was a desperate move by a desperate man. There could not be a more clear demonstration of how unfit he is for the office. And his lack of judgment and inability to accept reality means there is no guarantee this will not happen again. Whatever the reason, Yoon’s shocking gambit provides more than ample grounds for impeachment. But impeachment takes time and there is the uncertainty surrounding the Constitutional Court, whose bench is only partially occupied. The best thing would be for Yoon to step down, but there is virtually zero chance of that happening. Is it now time for the law enforcement agencies to show their mettle?
The illegalities of Yoon's emergency martial law
The Korea Times · December 5, 2024
By Cho Hee-kyoung
For someone who has spent nine years studying for the bar exam in addition to four years as an undergraduate law major, President Yoon Suk Yeol seemed to have no idea about the constitutional provision regarding martial law and the relevant legislation.
If he had prosecuted a case the way he declared martial law, the defendant would have walked free. If Yoon had sat the bar exam the way he handled the declaration, well we know. In this instance at least, we can only be thankful for Yoon’s incompetence or unpreparedness. The making of the declaration and its manner of execution was marred by all manner of legal problems both procedurally and substantively and these will ultimately come back to bite Yoon.
First, we need to debunk some popular beliefs about emergency martial law. The declaration of emergency martial law does not give a carte blanche to whoever is in power. It is an emergency power given to the executive to be used in a certain narrow set of circumstances for strictly defined purposes. There are clear demarcations on what a commander must not do under martial law alongside what powers may be exercised. But because of our experience of misuse of martial law powers by past authoritarian regimes, there is a lasting impression that it is ruled by force without any strictures. That is not the case. If proper procedures and rules are not observed, declaration of martial law itself could be illegal. Here are some of those faults.
Further, article 77 of the Constitution gives the president the power to declare martial law in times of war, a serious disaster (natural or man-made, including external threats) or an equivalent state of emergency in order to respond to military necessity or for the purpose of maintaining public order. Nowhere in Yoon’s declaration of martial law could one find any reference to constitutionally approved grounds for declaring martial law. Instead, he cited as reasons for his declaration “anti-state forces” in league with North Korea working against the interests of the nation. The “anti-state forces” he mentioned were only a veiled reference to the opposition party. Yoon pointed to the number of impeachment motions and special prosecutions made by the opposition party as proof of their “anti-state” stance. Nowhere does he mention the proven corruption of various public officials, especially prosecutors, as well as his own dereliction of duties that have led to such measures having to be taken by the opposition party.
Second, the declaration of martial law must not only have proper constitutional grounds but must also comply with the formal requirements under the Martial Law Act, which requires any declaration of martial law to expressly state the reasons, the type (whether emergency or security martial law), the time and geographical area of execution and the martial law commander. Yoon’s declaration failed to give adequate reasons or reasons that meet constitutional requirements, which is like giving no reason at all. Nor does it identify the place where martial law would apply, and he failed to name the martial law commander. (Leaving the area blank does not mean it applies nationwide automatically. It must be clearly stated.) All of this clearly breaches the requirements of Article 3 of the Martial Law Act.
Third, the declaration of martial law must go through a process of examination by the Cabinet. It could not be confirmed whether this was duly complied with and there is still a question mark over the matter.
Fourth, once martial law is declared, the president must immediately, without any delay, notify the National Assembly. However, the National Assembly never received any notification from the president regarding martial law. In fact, as the quorum of lawmakers managed to gather inside the legislature building, forcing their way through the special forces and some even climbing over walls to vote to repeal martial law, the speaker of the legislature waited and waited for the notification from the president to arrive. It never did. In the end, the speaker took constructive notice so that he could move the motion without further delay.
Fifth, the first paragraph of martial law Decree No. 1 promulgated by Park An-soo, the head of the army appointed martial law commander by Yoon and who is also Yoon’s high school alum, close to midnight on Tuesday prohibited all political activities by the National Assembly, political parties, as well as all political assembly, demonstrations and associations. Although the Martial Law Act gives the martial law commander authority over the administrative and judicial branches, once martial law is declared, there is no authority over the legislative branch. This is deliberate because only the legislature, representing the people, can call for the revocation of martial law and act as checks and balances on the vast and concentrated power of the martial law regime. Any attempt to prohibit political activities of the legislative branch is in breach of the Martial Law Act and is unconstitutional.
There are numerous other serious, substantively illegal aspects of Yoon’s declaration of martial law, including sending special forces to occupy the National Assembly building and ordering the leader of the ruling and opposition parties as well as the National Assembly, despite the fact that the Constitution and the Martial Law Act both provide that Assembly members have immunity from arrest and detention. (There is an exception if they are caught in the commission of a crime, which Yoon tried to exploit deviously by prohibiting political activities). These acts are doubly serious as they may well amount to insurrection or treason, which is punishable by death or life sentence under the Criminal Code. There is no presidential immunity for these crimes meaning that arrest and detention are on the cards.
It is difficult to fathom why Yoon did what he did. There is endless speculation about his motives, but what is clear is that this was a desperate move by a desperate man. There could not be a more clear demonstration of how unfit he is for the office. And his lack of judgment and inability to accept reality means there is no guarantee this will not happen again. Whatever the reason, Yoon’s shocking gambit provides more than ample grounds for impeachment. But impeachment takes time and there is the uncertainty surrounding the Constitutional Court, whose bench is only partially occupied. The best thing would be for Yoon to step down, but there is virtually zero chance of that happening. Is it now time for the law enforcement agencies to show their mettle?
Cho Hee-kyoung is a professor of law at Hongik University. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of The Korea Times.
The Korea Times · December 5, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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