Quotes of the Day:

“If you want to understand any problem in America, you need to focus on who profits from that problem, not who suffers from the problem.”

– Dr. Amos Wilson

“All life is problem solving.”

– Karl Popper

“It is easy to sanctify policies or identities by the deaths of victims. It is less appealing, but morally more urgent, to understand the actions of the perpetrators. The moral danger, after all, is never that one might become a victim but that one might be a perpetrator or a bystander.”

– Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin

Pearl Harbor Attack, December 7, 1941

The National WWII Museum 

"No moment in the history of the United States casts a longer shadow than Pearl Harbor. “Remembering” it has become a national imperative, a patriotic duty for the American people, and reminding us of that duty has become a ritual of media and political discourse—repeated so often and in so many ways that it’s become part of the routine of our communal life."

- Rob Citino, PhD

 https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/topics/pearl-harbor-december-7-1941

​​

​

1. Hegseth declares end of US 'utopian idealism' with new military strategy

2. See How a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Could Unfold

3. Chinese Jets Locked Radar on Japanese Fighters

4. PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan

5. New US National Security Strategy reveals Trump administration’s latest stance on Taiwan

6. New US NSS mentions Taiwan multiple times, reveals Washington’s real logic of treating Taiwan as pawn: experts

7. Hegseth Defends Pentagon Strike on Drug-Boat Survivors

8. Smerconish: 'Before we judge the strike, we must judge a system that fails 100,000 families.'

9. How a Cryptocurrency Helps Criminals Launder Money and Evade Sanctions

10. Hong Kong Holds Vote as Officials Move Against ‘Anti-China’ Elements

11. China’s National Security Office in Hong Kong Summons Foreign Journalists

12. U.S. spent more on Afghanistan rebuild than Marshall Plan; nothing to show after two decades of war

13. From Lenin to the Narcos: Manwaring’s Lessons on Political War in the Age of Paramilitaries (book review)

14. Engaging Rwanda: A Pragmatic Approach To The Great Lakes Conflict

15. Concept of Small Boats: Sri Lanka’s Contribution to Naval Battles

16. The Common-Sense Realism of the National Security Strategy

17. Experts react: What Trump’s National Security Strategy means for US foreign policy

18. Opinion | The National Security Strategy is less a strategy than a mood board

1. Hegseth declares end of US 'utopian idealism' with new military strategy

​Summary:

Hegseth declares the post-Cold War era of U.S. "utopian idealism" over and aligns Pentagon strategy with zones of influence: U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, China in the Pacific, Europe on its own. He signals reduced democracy promotion and interventions, prioritizing border security and a lethal Caribbean counternarcotics campaign, while pressing allies to fund their own defense. On China he emphasizes respectful coexistence and acceptance of Beijing’s military buildup, not overt confrontation. He touts a $1 trillion budget to "supercharge" the defense industrial base, investing in ships, drones and air defense, while criticizing Europe’s politics yet rejecting further U.S. nation-building.

Excerpt:

“President Trump and this administration seek a stable peace, fair trade and respectful relations with China,” he said. The U.S. will follow a policy of “respecting the historic military buildup [China is] undertaking,” he added, while the Pentagon “maintains a clear-eyed appreciation of how rapid, formidable and holistic their military buildup has been.”

Comment: The NSS and NDS are collectively a corrective to past US national strategies. Interesting times. (The Chinese curse may be appropriate here).

Was our strategy really one of "utopian idealism?" Or is that simply a culture war narrative applied to advance a new narrative by the dominant factions within the administration?

From this, will the G2 become the G1? Will we lose our silk web of alliances in Asia as they succumb to PRC/PLA political warfare (coercion)? And if so how will that affect the US economic situation? 

​In short, is "respectful coexistence" with China replacing "utopian idealism?" 

I can only hope there is a classified strategy along the lines of Reagan's NSDD 32 that will implement a realistic strategy against China and that what we are reading in public is in support of the proper application of our diplomatic and information instruments of national power that are ultimately designed to support that classified strategy to protect our vital national interests.

Hegseth declares end of US 'utopian idealism' with new military strategy

The Defense secretary, speaking at the Reagan Defense Forum, outlined defense priorities that focus on the Western Hemisphere and reevaluate the U.S. relationship with Europe.

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/06/hegseth-reagan-forum-defense-strategy-00679736?utm

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks to senior military leaders at Marine Corps Base Quantico on Sept. 30, 2025, in Quantico, Virginia. | Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

By Paul McLeary

12/06/2025 06:11 PM EST

SIMI VALLEY, California — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Saturday launched a full-throated attack on post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, castigating former presidents and generals by name while declaring the age of American “utopian idealism” over.

Hegseth, speaking at the annual Reagan Defense Forum, outlined a new military focus on the Western Hemisphere, demanded allies fend for themselves and took a more conciliatory approach to China’s armed forces.

His remarks underscored the new National Security Strategy released late Thursday and previewed the Pentagon’s own upcoming strategy, which will lay out the military’s global priorities.

“Out with idealistic utopianism,” he said. “In with hard-nosed realism.”

The Defense secretary’s speech revealed an administration moving toward a policy that recognizes zones of influence led by great powers — China in the Pacific, the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere and Europe broadly, although he made only a passing reference to Russia.

The U.S. should not be “distracted by democracy building, interventionism, undefined wars, regime change, climate change, woke moralizing and feckless nation-building,” Hegseth said. “We will instead put our nation’s practical, concrete interests first.”

The Pentagon chief also used the defense industry-focused forum to more forcefully outline the Trump administration’s strategic refocus closer to home. It comes amid a military campaign in the Caribbean that has sunk more than 20 small boats allegedly carrying drugs and killed around 80 people. The administration has said it is combating “narco-terrorists,” though some lawmakers and experts have decried it as illegal.

Hegseth also suggested the military would become more involved in patrolling the southern border with Mexico. “We’ll secure the border in part by organizing training and equipping units specifically for border defense missions, including operations in the land, maritime and air,” he said.

While defense strategies in recent years have focused on deterring China, Hegseth suggested the upcoming one would take a softer approach.

“President Trump and this administration seek a stable peace, fair trade and respectful relations with China,” he said. The U.S. will follow a policy of “respecting the historic military buildup [China is] undertaking,” he added, while the Pentagon “maintains a clear-eyed appreciation of how rapid, formidable and holistic their military buildup has been.”

Hegseth praised countries such as South Korea, Poland and Germany for increasing defense spending in recent years, citing President Donald Trump’s push to ensure countries pay more on their own defense.

“Allies are not children,” he said. “We can and should expect them to do their part.”

The Defense secretary also reiterated a point he emphasized in a November speech about “supercharging the U.S. defense industrial base.” This includes new investments in ships, drones and air defense systems such as the nascent Golden Dome project. They are part of the $1 trillion defense budget that includes a $150 billion boost from the megabill passed by Congress this year.

The Trump administration, in some respects, wants to have it both ways when it comes to foreign relations. The National Security Strategy criticizes European allies for not embracing far-right parties that espouse ethnic nationalism, and says Washington will support efforts aimed at “restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.” But Hegseth on Saturday also rejected U.S. interventions in other countries’ affairs.

The Trump administration will “rightly prioritize our homeland and hemisphere,” he said. “Threats persist in other regions, and our allies need to step up, and step up for real.”

Hegseth, in questions after the speech, defended a Sept. 2 second strike on a boat that killed survivors wounded after the first hit. The revelation, reported by The Washington Post, has led to a bipartisan outcry in Congress over whether the action amounted to a war crime.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Gen. Dan Caine, speaking after Hegseth, said it was his and Special Operations Command chief Gen. Frank Bradley’s idea to brief senior lawmakers on Capitol Hill this week about the specifics of the strikes.

Hegseth has refused to back down. He said Saturday he supported the second strike launched by the commander of the Special Operations Command.“If you bring drugs to this country in a boat, we will find you and we will sink you,” he said.

Caine, the top military officer, doubled down on Hegseth’s comments. “Over the last few years, we haven’t had a lot of American combat power in our own neighborhood,” he said. “I suspect that’s probably going to change.”

Jack Detsch contributed to this report.

2. See How a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Could Unfold

​Summary:

China is rehearsing a three-phase campaign to take Taiwan that would be among the hardest operations in modern war. A mass missile “joint firepower strike” would try to blind air defenses, airfields, ports and command nodes while deterring U.S. entry. Amphibious and airborne forces would then attempt contested crossings and landings using limited PLA sealift, mobilized civilian shipping and new mobile piers. Taiwan’s mountains, poor beaches, dense coastal cities and a fortified Taipei favor the defender and create grinding urban and terrain warfare. Outcome hinges on U.S. intervention, Taiwan’s resilience and China’s ability to sustain large forces across the strait.

Comment: Please go to the link to view the interactive website and graphics.

My question is that if this is the most obvious and conventional way to attack the nation of Taiwan, assuming Taiwan and its friends (allies) will plan to defend against this type of attack, what is the PLA really planning that we are not seeing so that we fail to plan for it?

See How a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Could Unfold

WSJ

An amphibious assault to conquer the island democracy would be one of the toughest military operations to pull off

By Niharika Mandhana

Follow

, Daniel Kiss

Follow

 and Carl Churchill

Follow

Dec. 6, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/how-china-chinese-invasion-taiwan-ba7e3916?st=nGX9XX&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Five miles off Taiwan’s coast, ZTD-05 amphibious vehicles roll out of ships and zip over the water amid a hail of artillery fire. The Chinese soldiers inside have their orders: Seize the beach, or die trying.

Close by, China’s airborne troops are taking losses. They arrived before dawn in low-flying Y-20 aircraft to seize Taoyuan Airport. Taiwanese defenders downed several planes. The paratroopers that landed, scattered, are in a race to assault the airfield before Taiwan wrecks it.

This hypothetical battle scenario imagines a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, as militaries, policymakers and wargamers are doing. An amphibious invasion would be one of the toughest military operations to execute. And an all-out war would be extremely bloody, devastate the global economy and change the course of the 21st century.

Whether Beijing will try to conquer the democratically governed island by force is the biggest geopolitical unknown facing the world. A close second: How the U.S., Taiwan’s main defense partner, would respond.

The Strait

The Taiwan Strait is a daunting obstacle. Tens of thousands of Chinese troops would need to cross it with tanks, trucks and more while Taiwan’s missiles and mines—and possibly U.S. bombers and submarines—target the invading fleet.

The strait can be hostile without any of that. Depending on the month, amphibious vehicles attempting to land on Taiwan would encounter some mix of typhoons, unpredictable currents, strong winds, rain and fog. “Really, really nasty,” Joshua Arostegui, a U.S. Army War College expert on China’s military, said of the sea conditions.

The Island

Taiwan is much bigger than Okinawa and Iwo Jima, the nearby Japanese islands U.S. forces captured in gruesome World War II battles.

The 1945 battle of Okinawa was “the last time a very large-scale amphibious operation happened,” said Ian Easton, author of a book on a possible Taiwan fight. “And that one was pretty simple compared to what an invasion of Taiwan would be.”

At the time, the U.S. also had extensive plans to storm Taiwan, then controlled by Japan. It aborted the effort, called Operation Causeway, because the scale and complexity demanded many hundreds of thousands of troops.

The Terrain

Mountains run the length of Taiwan’s main island, and line cities and beaches. Built into them are tunnel networks and military bases. In a fight, defenders would fire from high, concealed positions.

The topography also complicates a key decision for China: where to land. If amphibious forces approached Taiwan’s east coast, they would confront steep cliffs. If they landed in the south, soldiers would find themselves fighting through rugged “slow-go” terrain to Taipei.

The Beaches

Taiwan’s beaches aren’t suited for amphibious landings. Many are too small to mass a sizable force. A number of them are bordered by mountains, cities or paddy fields, making it harder to break out of the beach perimeter.

This isn’t Normandy of the D-Day landings.

China’s options would be limited by another priority: seizing a seaport or airport—ideally both—to bring follow-on forces and bulky supplies. Only a few areas offer a beach, port and airfield in close proximity.

The Cities

Most of Taiwan’s 23 million people are concentrated along the coast that faces China.

Taiwan is increasingly preparing to bog down Chinese forces in deadly urban combat, said K. Tristan Tang, an associate fellow at Secure Taiwan Associate Corp., a Taipei-based research group. Defenders know the cities, can set up sniper positions and make it difficult for China to identify strongholds nested in the concrete, he said.

Taipei

Taipei is ringed by mountains and crisscrossed by rivers. It would be heavily defended, especially against “decapitation strikes” targeting key government buildings, mockups of which Chinese forces train on.

If Chinese troops came up the Tamsui River, Taiwan could block their path by dropping a major bridge that straddles it, said Tang. Taiwanese marines, equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, would likely defend the city’s airport.

Sources: Republic of China Statistical Yearbook; U.S. Dept. of War; Geospatial Information Authority of Japan; European Space Agency; U.S. Census; Singapore Statistics Dept.; Hong Kong Census and Statistics Dept.; Statistical Handbook, Japan; Ian Easton's "The Chinese Invasion Threat."

The flip side is that Beijing knows these problems better than most. A hot war isn’t inevitable, but Chinese leader Xi Jinping has asked his military planners to get ready, driving a rapid peacetime buildup.

Shape of the war

How would an invasion unfold? A lot would depend on what Taiwan does to fight back, whether the U.S. intervenes and how well Chinese forces work together across the skies, seas, sand and space.

Chinese doctrine and Western experts point to three broad phases. First, China would hit Taiwan with missile barrages. Second, its ships would cross the Taiwan Strait and amphibious units would attempt to land on one or more beaches. Third, Chinese forces would break out of the landing zone and launch a ground assault for Taipei.

In reality, the war would involve a dizzying array of attacks and counterattacks. China could begin by snapping up Taiwan’s small outer islands. It could enforce a blockade to squeeze Taipei into submission. It could sever undersea internet cables to plunge the island into digital darkness, or order crippling cyberattacks.

Phase 1: Firepower

China would unleash a “joint firepower strike,” pounding Taiwan with missiles. The goals: to “soften” Taiwan up by battering its defenses, make it safer for Chinese ships to cross the strait, break Taiwan’s will to fight, and dissuade a U.S. intervention with a strong show of force.

The campaign would likely involve hundreds of missiles falling on hundreds of targets, from Taiwan’s air defense systems and air force bases, to ammunition bunkers, command hubs and coastal artillery. The blitz would aim to destroy warplanes on the ground, crater runways and discombobulate the defenders.

How long the bombardment lasts—a few days or a few weeks—is a crucial decision Chinese war planners would have to make. Stretching it out could give the U.S. time to act, but failing to eliminate key capabilities could imperil the invasion’s next steps.

China has undertaken a dramatic buildup of missiles. The Rocket Force, which was elevated to a full military branch a decade ago, has 3,500 missiles across different ranges.

It’s not just the Rocket Force. China’s ground forces, warships and modern jet fighters like the J-16 would all strike Taiwan.

During military drills in 2022, the Chinese army brought the PCH191 rocket launcher to Pingtan Island, 85 miles from Taiwan. Developed over the past decade, it can throw munitions of varying ranges, including volleys of low-cost rockets.

The Rocket Force would go after tough targets, such as U.S.-made Patriot air-defense systems.

It could also attack Taiwan’s underground military installations using “bunker buster” missiles like the DF-11AZT, said Decker Eveleth, an expert at CNA, a U.S.-based research organization. Those warheads wouldn’t destroy deeply buried facilities but could collapse tunnel entrances, he said.

The Rocket Force’s Base 61 would be a key player. The brigades under it, located across from Taiwan, are growing in size and capability.

One big dilemma for Beijing: whether to pre-emptively strike U.S. bases in the region. American warplanes flying from these bases—in Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam—could sink a lot of Chinese ships, but striking them would instantly put the world’s top two powers in a head-to-head war.

If China went after U.S. targets in Japan, it would launch a lot of missiles at once. “Not just a large number but a large variety so that missile defenses have to cope with different types of missiles coming at different speeds from different trajectories and different directions,” said Eric Heginbotham, a principal research scientist at MIT’s security studies program.

One of the earliest missiles would be the Dongfeng-17. Equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle, it skims along the earth’s atmosphere and can maneuver, making it less predictable.

The biggest trend in the Rocket Force has been the extension of range, Heginbotham said. The Dongfeng-26 missile can reach Guam, a hub of American military power.

“It has a heck of a warhead,” Heginbotham said. “It’s very accurate, comes in fast and has ferocious killing capability.”

Sources: China Maritime Studies Institute, Joshua Arostegui; People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023, Decker Eveleth; CSIS

Phase 2: Crossing and landing

After the blitz comes the amphibious assault. In this part of the invasion, Chinese ships would be sunk, landing forces could be blown up in the water or cut down on beaches and fighting akin to bloody World War II battles might unfold.

How would it begin? Thousands of Chinese troops and millions of tons of warfighting equipment would move to coastal staging areas in China on trucks, trains and planes—potentially tipping off its adversaries.

“If they’re going to go big—and they’re either going to go big or they’re not going to go—it’s going to take a lot of preparation,” said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong.

In the last two years, however, some People’s Liberation Army watchers have begun to wonder if it could use the cover of military exercises to obscure the warning signs. Since 2022, Chinese drills around Taiwan have grown far more complex and realistic. If that trend intensified year after year, China could pivot to a rapid, high-intensity attack, some experts said.

Picking the right landing spots would be tricky.

If amphibious forces headed to southern Taiwan, they might have an easier fight since Taiwan’s army is concentrated in the island’s north. But after that, they would have to wage a grinding overland campaign to Taipei, river by river, ridgeline by ridgeline, said Mark Cancian, a retired colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps who has run wargames simulating such a scenario.

Defenders could blow up bridges, collapse tunnels and bog down the enemy in cities or mountains.

Approaching Taiwan from the north would put the landing teams closer to Taipei, but they would meet stiff resistance on and beyond the beach from tanks, artillery, mines and more. Taiwan would focus its counterattacks and plant booby traps on the limited pathways out of the beaches.

Since a military restructuring in 2017, China has honed an A-team that would likely act as the spearhead. They are the army’s six amphibious combined arms brigades, totaling around 30,000 troops and more than 2,400 vehicles, Blasko’s research shows. These forces would cross the strait on ships, launch into the water in speedy armored vehicles, and “swim” to the target beach in rows.

China has also rapidly built out its marine corps, from two brigades in 2017 to 11 today, that would execute missions in tandem or separately from the army.

The most-debated question: Can Chinese forces and their weapons get across the Taiwan Strait in the numbers they need?

China’s navy has dozens of amphibious ships, but not hundreds. It hasn’t hugely ramped up production of the types of landing vessels that would best serve a Taiwan attack, though it could do so relatively easily in the future, being the world’s top shipbuilder. Instead, it has churned out ever-larger warships better suited to projecting power far from China’s shores.

These behemoths would nonetheless be pressed into service for a Taiwan fight.

To fill the gap in “sealift,” China’s military would lean on a secondary source: civilian ships. Take for instance roll-on, roll-off ferries that typically carry passengers, trucks and cargo, but are now built to defense standards and train with the military.

These large ships have modified ramps that can drop down until submerged, allowing armored vehicles to roll out into the water, said Michael Dahm, a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer and senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. The stern ramps can withstand heavy waves and weight, he said.

The main challenge would be scaling up for a conflict in which they would need to convoy in close formation under the protection of warships sailing alongside, Dahm said.

Phase 3: Breakout and seize Taipei

A successful beach assault offers a foothold. After that, however, waves of soldiers—potentially hundreds of thousands—need to follow to break out of the beach, push deeper and take Taipei. Their equipment, such as heavy battle tanks and truckloads of bullets, fuel and medical supplies, can’t swim ashore.

The best way in is a port.

“If they take a port it’s kind of game over,” said Thomas Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

That is because China could then bring in civilian ferries, deck cargo ships and other commercial vessels. These would be loaded up with warfighters and large volumes of logistics needed for a ground campaign. “The vast majority of their sealift is going to be the commercial stuff and its supply is near limitless,” said Shugart.

This is Taiwan’s nightmare. To avoid it, its forces could sabotage its ports to keep them out of Chinese hands or sink ships in the channel to block access.

This year, another capability showed up on the Chinese coast: mobile piers that can be used to unload directly onto a beach or possibly to a damaged port. The setup consists of three barges that line up one behind the other, close to the shore. Each has retractable legs that thrust down into the seabed to hold the ships in position.

Once steadied, long bridges extend out, connecting one barge to the other, and the first barge to the shore, research by Dahm and Shugart shows.

The result is a 2,700-foot causeway where ferries or civilian cargo ships could pull up. Tanks, trucks and tactical vehicles would roll out to the bridge and onto Taiwan, possibly hundreds at a time. These piers would be vulnerable to attack, though, which means they could only be used once a beach was secured.

If China got a large force ashore, it would move on Taipei, waging a 21st-century battle for a megacity.

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com, Daniel Kiss at daniel.kiss@wsj.com and Carl Churchill at carl.churchill@wsj.com

WSJ

3. Chinese Jets Locked Radar on Japanese Fighters

​Summary:

Chinese J-15s twice locked fire-control radar on Japanese fighters near Okinawa, a serious escalation that Tokyo labeled dangerous and protested diplomatically. The encounters followed PM Sanae Takaichi’s remarks that a Taiwan conflict could trigger Japanese self-defense deployments alongside the U.S. China framed its flights as routine training and accused Japan of unsafe intercepts. The incidents occur as the PLA Navy expands operations around Japan and Australia and prepares for a possible Taiwan campaign by 2027. Waters south of Japan are emerging as a key battlespace, increasing crisis-escalation risks and testing Japan’s deterrence posture and alliance coordination with Washington.

Comment: What if an attack on Taiwan does not negin first with an attack on Taiwan? What if Japan and the Philippines (and more precisely their territory) are neutralized first before an attack? And could they be neutralized prior to hostilities through coercion and political warfare to ensure they sit out the fight? And if coercion does not work could they be the first strikes in the campaign to take Taiwan.

Chinese Jets Locked Radar on Japanese Fighters

WSJ

Tokyo says incidents in international waters near Okinawa were dangerous, as diplomatic tensions with Beijing simmer

By Jason Douglas

Follow

Updated Dec. 7, 2025 2:04 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinese-jets-locked-radar-on-japanese-fighters-16576128

Shinjiro Koizumi, Japan’s defense minister. AFP/Getty Images

• Chinese warplanes locked radar on Japanese military aircraft near Okinawa in two separate incidents, which Tokyo deemed dangerous.
• The incidents occurred after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested Japan could be drawn into a conflict over Taiwan.
• China has expanded its naval presence, with its aircraft carriers operating near Japan and Chinese ships traveling around Australia.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Chinese warplanes locked radar on Japanese military aircraft near Okinawa in two separate incidents, which Tokyo deemed dangerous.

TOKYO—Chinese warplanes locked radar on Japanese military aircraft in the seas near the Japanese island of Okinawa on Saturday, in two separate incidents that Tokyo said were dangerous acts.

The incidents add to tensions between the two countries as China continues its diplomatic pressure campaign against Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. She angered China’s ruling Communist Party when she said early in November that an attack on Taiwan could drag Japan into conflict in defense of itself and its allies, which include the U.S.

A Chinese J-15 jet fighter that took off from the Chinese navy’s Liaoning aircraft carrier on Saturday locked its radar on a Japanese F-15 that was investigating its presence in the airspace over international waters near Okinawa, Japan’s defense minister, Shinjiro Koizumi, said on his official X account. The incident occurred around 4:30 p.m. local time.

A second, similar incident occurred two hours later, Koizumi said, involving a different Japanese plane. Like many countries, Japan conducts air defense identification zone, or ADIZ, operations to identify aircraft coming close to its airspace.

No one was hurt, but Koizumi said Tokyo had lodged a protest with Beijing over the Chinese aircraft’s behavior. “This radar lock-on incident constitutes a dangerous act that exceeds the scope necessary for the safe flight of aircraft,” he said on X.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi Issei Kato/Reuters

In a message posted Sunday on a People’s Liberation Army Navy social-media account and attributed to Senior Capt. Wang Xuemeng, the Chinese military said that in recent days Chinese aircraft were conducting routine flight training and that they were repeatedly approached by Japanese aircraft. Wang accused the Japanese pilots of acting unsafely.

China has the world’s largest navy and has been steadily broadening its maritime reach with large-scale drills far from Chinese shores. In June, both of Beijing’s in-service aircraft carriers were spotted operating in the Western Pacific close to Japan. During that deployment, a Japanese patrol was tailed by Chinese aircraft.

In late February and early March, three Chinese navy ships traveled through the Tasman Sea and around Australia.

The waters south of Japan would be an important theater in a Chinese military effort to take over Taiwan, a self-ruled democracy that Beijing considers its own territory, to be seized by force if necessary. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has set military modernization goals including fielding a force that could seize Taiwan by 2027, U.S. officials have said.

Responding to questions in the Japanese Parliament on Nov. 7, Takaichi said that in the hypothetical scenario of an attempt to seize Taiwan, Japan could be forced to deploy its military under the self-defense clauses of its largely pacifist constitution. She added that Japan’s longstanding position is that issues surrounding Taiwan should be resolved peacefully.

Beijing says Taiwan is a purely domestic affair and reacted with fury. It urged Chinese travelers to stay away from Japan, threatened to stop imports of Japanese seafood, and continues to wage a campaign against Takaichi herself in diplomatic circles and state and social media, where it accuses her of seeking to revive Japan’s wartime militarism.

Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

4. PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan

​Comment: Please go to the link to view the graphic.

PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan

https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/85475

PLA Activities

2025.12.06

Issuing Authority：Political Warfare Bureau

PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan

1.Date:

6 a.m. Dec. 5 (Fri.) to 6 a.m. Dec. 6 (Sat.) (UTC+8)

2.PLA activities:

29 sorties of PLA aircraft and 6 PLAN ships operating around Taiwan were detected as of 6 a.m. (UTC+8) today. 19 out of 29 sorties crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s northern, central and southwestern ADIZ. ROC Armed Forces have monitored the situation and employed CAP aircraft, Navy ships, and coastal missile systems in response to detected activities.

3.PRC balloon activities:

1 PRC balloon was detected during this timeframe.

Keywords：

Regional dynamics

Taiwan Strait

Chinese Communist Party

5. New US National Security Strategy reveals Trump administration’s latest stance on Taiwan

​Summary:

The new National Security Strategy elevates deterring a Taiwan conflict as a near-term priority while advancing an America First focus on U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. It stresses preserving conventional military overmatch inside the First Island Chain and maintaining the longstanding “no unilateral change to the status quo” policy. Taiwan’s semiconductor centrality and its position astride key sea lanes drive this emphasis. The NSS presses allies, especially Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, to expand access, spending and acquisition of next-generation deterrent capabilities, and calls for stronger naval investment and coalition measures to keep South China Sea shipping lanes open.

New US National Security Strategy reveals Trump administration’s latest stance on Taiwan

defensescoop.com · Brandi Vincent · December 5, 2025

Questions have swirled about what the administration's Taiwan policy will look like, as the White House pushes for an "America First" diplomatic approach.

By

Brandi Vincent

December 5, 2025

https://defensescoop.com/2025/12/05/trump-national-security-strategy-taiwan-asia-china/

Beyond elevating efforts to expand U.S. influence and prowess in the Western Hemisphere, the new National Security Strategy makes it clear that deterring a conflict with China over Taiwan — via military might and existing partnerships — marks a near-term priority for the second Trump administration.

The White House unveiled its 33-page plan late Thursday, ahead of releasing the forthcoming National Defense Strategy and other foreign policy papers that are collectively expected to guide the federal government and its investments during the rest of President Donald Trump’s term.

China has escalated tensions with Taiwan over the last decade — and particularly since Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed his intent to ensure that the People’s Liberation Army would be equipped to “unify” or invade its smaller neighbor by 2027.

Since Trump took office earlier this year, questions have swirled about what his cabinet’s policy on Taiwan would look like, as they also advocate for a so-called “America First” approach to diplomacy and security policy.

“A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority,” officials wrote in the new NSS. “We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”

Specifically, the U.S. aims to build up its military capacity to deny aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. That geopolitical concept refers to a string of islands stretching from Japan to portions of the Philippines and Indonesia, and includes Taiwan.

“But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend — and more importantly do — much more for collective defense,” the NSS states.

The nation’s diplomatic efforts under Trump will therefore involve placing pressure on U.S. allies and partners to grant the American military more access to their ports and other facilities. Economically, the administration will also call on its counterparts to spend more on their own defense arsenals and to purchase next-generation assets designed for deterring aggression.

The document notes that officials will further urge Japan and South Korea to increase their defense spending — with an emphasis on capabilities that can help to protect the First Island Chain — while also continuing to push for greater defense investments in dealings alongside Taiwan and Australia.

Earlier this week, Trump signed the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, which among other inclusions directs a new review of the Department of State’s guidance on U.S.-Taiwan engagements.

The new White House strategy additionally points to “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a related security challenge.

If an adversary did so and subsequently imposed a “toll system” over the critical global commerce routes or closed them completely, it argues, U.S. interests could be disrupted.

“Strong measures must be developed along with the deterrence necessary to keep those lanes open, free of ‘tolls,’ and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country. This will require not just further investment in our military — especially naval — capabilities, but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond, if this problem is not addressed,” the strategy notes.

Broadly, the new plan places a sharp emphasis on the U.S. reasserting and enforcing dominance in the Western Hemisphere by implementing a new “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” reducing migration, and sparking a stronger American industrial base.

“We want to recruit, train, equip, and field the world’s most powerful, lethal, and technologically advanced military to protect our interests, deter wars, and — if necessary — win them quickly and decisively, with the lowest possible casualties to our forces,” the NSS states.

Written by Brandi Vincent

Brandi Vincent is a Senior Reporter at DefenseScoop, where she reports on disruptive technologies and associated policies impacting Pentagon and military personnel. Prior to joining SNG, she produced a documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. Brandi grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland. She was named Best New Journalist at the 2024 Defence Media Awards.

defensescoop.com · Brandi Vincent · December 5, 2025

6. New US NSS mentions Taiwan multiple times, reveals Washington’s real logic of treating Taiwan as pawn: experts

Summary:

China’s Global Times frames the new U.S. NSS as proof Washington treats Taiwan as a pawn, not a partner. Beijing-linked experts stress the document’s sharper, more militarized Taiwan language, which highlights Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance and its position as a gateway to the second island chain. They argue this exposes U.S. “real logic” and undercuts any “values-based alliance” narrative. The article claims Washington is trying to preserve its “Taiwan card” as cross-Strait dynamics shift, while the NSS’s core is a Western Hemisphere refocus and criticism of Europe. Chinese analysts say the strategy will not fundamentally alter cross-Strait power balances.

Comment: Th​i​s article is the first Chinese report I have seen interpreting our new NSS. Fairly dismissive. The PLA and CCP are probably relatively pleased with the Western Hemisphere focus. Also the Chinese three warfares (two of the three) will be able to exploit the idea that the US no longer has "values based" alliances. We should expect to see these themes and messages emphasized in coming days and for as long as the NSS remains in existence. This will have severe implications for our diplomatic and information elements of power. Our diplomats are going to be severely challenged. And since we have almost completely kneecapped if not decapitated our information instrument of power we are going to see unrestricted warfare and the three warfares on a scale we have never seen. The PLA and CCP are going to exploit our NSS to try to defeat us diplomatically and informationally.

WORLD / AMERICAS

New US NSS mentions Taiwan multiple times, reveals Washington’s real logic of treating Taiwan as pawn: experts

By Global Times

Published: Dec 06, 2025 08:28 PM

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1349890.shtml

Photo taken on December 2, 2025 shows the White House, in Washington, D.C., the United States. (Xinhua/Hu Yousong)

The White House released US President Donald Trump's National Security Strategy (NSS) report for his second term Thursday evening local time, described by US media Politico as "a rare formal explanation" of Trump administration's foreign policy worldview. The 33-page document focuses on the Western Hemisphere, citing the Monroe Doctrine while using "some brutal words for Europe, suggesting it is in civilizational decline, and pays relatively little attention to the Middle East and Africa," Politico said in a report published on Friday.

Reuters said US presidents typically release such strategic documents in the first year of each term to guide budget allocation and policy priorities across government agencies. Trump issued his first-term strategy in December 2017, while former president Joe Biden released his in October 2022. 

According to Politico, Trump intends for the US to maintain a larger military presence in the Western Hemisphere to counter migration, drug trafficking, and the rise of rival powers in the region, as outlined in his new NSS. The document places an unusually heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and frames this focus primarily as protecting the US homeland. 

According to AFP, the national security strategy, meant to flesh out Trump's norms-shattering worldview, elevates Latin America to the top of the US agenda in a sharp reorientation from longstanding US calls to focus on Asia to face a rising China.

However, in the Asia section of the 2025 NSS, Taiwan is still mentioned multiple times. Reuters noted that the updated NSS mentions "Taiwan" eight times across three paragraphs, with wording stronger than that of Trump's first-term strategy, but unlike the Biden administration, it largely avoids indicating how it would respond to potential future conflicts.

Zhu Songling, a professor at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, told the Global Times that the wording on Taiwan in this US NSS is more explicit, more militarized, and more geopolitical than the 2017 and 2022 versions. This strategy makes clear that, for the US, Taiwan's importance lies in "its dominant position in semiconductor production" and in the fact that "Taiwan provides a direct gateway to the second island chain," revealing Washington's real logic in treating Taiwan as a pawn.

Zhang Jiadong, a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, told the Global Times that for decades, playing the "Taiwan card" has been a basic approach in US policy toward China. Now, Washington fears losing this card, because the situation across the Taiwan Straits is gradually moving in a direction that serves the shared interests of people on both sides. The wording in the US NSS signals an intent to "block" this trend precisely because the US worries it can no longer play the card as freely as it once did.

Zhang added that "the references to Taiwan in the new US NSS actually reflect a shift in the balance of power across the Taiwan Straits." The US is merely signaling its so-called concerns, he said, while the strategy will not fundamentally change cross-Strait relations, nor will it alter the basic dynamics in the region.

Commenting on Washington's stance toward Taiwan, Zhu said the NSS makes it clear that the US officially views Taiwan as a chip factory and a strategic conduit, exposing the myth of a "values-based alliance" promoted by the DPP authorities. Increasingly, people on the island see more clearly whether the US is "protecting Taiwan" or "harming Taiwan," and whether the DPP authorities are "safeguarding Taiwan" or "bringing trouble to Taiwan."

Although the latest NSS made comments on China-related issues, CNN and some other US media outlets said that the core of the new US strategy is a call for a "readjustment" of America's military presence in the Western Hemisphere and a critique of Europe. 

CNN also noted that the document formalizes earlier criticisms of Europe. In February, US Vice President JD Vance told European leaders in Munich, Germany, that the biggest security threat was "from within," rather than from China or Russia, CNN reported.

7. Hegseth Defends Pentagon Strike on Drug-Boat Survivors

​Summary:

Hegseth, at the Reagan National Defense Forum, strongly defended the second strike that killed two survivors of a Sept 2 boat attack in the Caribbean, the first operation in POTUS’s new narco-terrorism campaign. He said Adm Frank “Mitch” Bradley acted within intent, judging survivors as still “in the fight” with potential access to radios and concealed cocaine. Hegseth denied ever ordering operators to “kill everybody.” Lawmakers who viewed video say the men appeared helpless and unarmed, with no visible drugs, prompting war-crime concerns. The Pentagon inspector general is investigating Hegseth’s prior disclosure of Yemen operation details, and DOD may release the strike video.

Hegseth Defends Pentagon Strike on Drug-Boat Survivors

WSJ

The defense secretary makes his first detailed public remarks about the operation

By Lara Seligman

Follow

Dec. 6, 2025 6:09 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/hegseth-defends-pentagon-strike-on-drug-boat-survivors-9ed69fe2?mod=hp_lead_pos4

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaking Saturday at the Reagan National Defense Forum. Jonathan Alcorn/Reuters

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defended the decision to kill two survivors of a Sept. 2 strike on an alleged drug-smuggling boat.
• Hegseth stated he fully supported how Navy Adm. Frank Bradley conducted the operation.
• The Pentagon is reviewing the public release of video from the operation.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defended the decision to kill two survivors of a Sept. 2 strike on an alleged drug-smuggling boat.

SIMI VALLEY, Calif.— Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defended the U.S. military’s decision to kill two survivors of a lethal strike in the Caribbean in a follow-up attack on the capsized boat, in his first detailed public remarks about the operation.

During the Sept. 2 strike, the first of President Trump’s campaign against alleged drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, a U.S. military aircraft struck a boat carrying 11 people that Pentagon officials had identified as drug traffickers. Hegseth himself gave the order to strike, the defense secretary said Saturday at the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley.

As the boat burned, Hegseth left the room about five minutes after the strike, he said. A couple of hours later, he said he was told that the commander, Navy Adm. Frank “Mitch” Bradley, had ordered a second strike because there were several survivors who “could still be in the fight.” Hegseth said he was told the survivors may have had access to radio and could have linked up with another drug-smuggling boat, that the narcotics were still in the area and the survivors were “actively interacting” with them.

Hegseth said he agreed with how Bradley had conducted the operation.

“I said, ‘Roger, sounds good,’ ” Hegseth said. “From what I understood then and what I understand now, I fully support that strike. I would have made the same call myself.”

Hegseth denied that at any point he told the operators to kill everybody on the boat. The Washington Post reported last month that Hegseth gave a spoken directive to kill everyone aboard.

Navy Adm. Frank Bradley was at the Capitol on Thursday to brief members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Zuma Press

The details of the Sept. 2 operation have been at the center of a controversy over whether the second strike, which killed two survivors, constituted a war crime. Hegseth is also under fire in a Pentagon inspector general review, which concluded that he violated department regulations when he shared sensitive information about a U.S. military operation in Yemen on Signal. Asked whether he would do the same thing again if he had the chance, Hegseth said “I don’t live with any regrets. It’s not a healthy way to live.”

Following the first Sept. 2 boat strike, the two survivors struggled to flip a remnant of their capsized boat over the course of an hour and waved as an aircraft passed overhead, according to lawmakers and other people briefed on the attack. Some lawmakers said the men appeared helpless with no weapons or communications devices.

Bradley said in closed-door testimony this week that the attack was justified because the survivors could have been signaling to other vessels to help them finish their drug run, although he noted a surveillance drone detected no other boats in the immediate vicinity, The Wall Street Journal previously reported.

No drugs were visible in the video. Bradley, however, told lawmakers that he believed the remnant of the boat concealed submerged packages of cocaine. Unless destroyed, the drugs and the men could conceivably float to a nearby shore or vessel and continue their mission, he said, according to people familiar with the briefing.

Hegseth said Saturday the Pentagon is “reviewing” whether to publicly release the video that was shared with Congress. Trump has said he would be open to doing so.

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

8. Smerconish: 'Before we judge the strike, we must judge a system that fails 100,000 families.'

Comment: The two videos below from CNN are probably the two best discussions of the controversial September 2d attack. The first is Smerconish's opening monologue to his show today and the second is Smerconish's follow-on interview with Admiral Stavridis. 

Smerconish is one of the most thoughtful, balanced, and skilled commentators, analysts, and interviewers in the business today. His Saturday morning show is the only news show I watch without fail every week and the only one I have set to record automatically. 

https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/06/world/video/before-we-judge-the-strike-we-must-judge-a-system-that-fails-100-000-families

Smerconish: 'Before we judge the strike, we must judge a system that fails 100,000 families.'

Smerconish highlights how the justice system races to prosecute suppliers in high-profile celebrity overdose cases but rarely does the same for the tens of thousands of non-famous Americans who die annually.

Admiral: "If those were my Navy SEALs floating in the water, I would want them afforded the opportunity to surrender"

Admiral James G. Stavridis joins Smerconish to discuss the latest boat strike controversy and what the public needs to hear.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/06/world/video/admiral-if-those-were-my-navy-seals-floating-in-the-water-i-would-want-them-afforded-the-opportunity-to-surrender

9. How a Cryptocurrency Helps Criminals Launder Money and Evade Sanctions

​Summary:

Stablecoins, especially Tether, are now core tools for smugglers, sanctioned actors and money launderers, moving dollar value across borders outside bank controls. Criminal networks swap cash for stablecoins, route funds through offshore exchanges and Telegram bots, then convert them into anonymous Visa and Mastercard products with high limits. A Times test showed how easily cards can be issued with no identity checks. The new U.S. GENIUS Act tightens rules on U.S. platforms but cannot reach major offshore issuers like Tether or intermediaries in places like Kyrgyzstan. Traceability exists in theory, yet regulatory gaps and political entanglements blunt enforcement.

How a Cryptocurrency Helps Criminals Launder Money and Evade Sanctions

NY Times · Aaron Krolik · December 7, 2025

Through layers of intermediaries, stablecoins can be moved, swapped and mixed into pools of other funds in ways that are difficult to trace, experts say.

Listen to this article · 10:25 min Learn more

By

Aaron Krolik welcomes tips on stablecoin uses and abuses at nytimes.com/tips

• Dec. 7, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/07/technology/how-a-cryptocurrency-helps-criminals-launder-money-and-evade-sanctions.html

Credit...Jeremy Leung

Smugglers, money launderers and people facing sanctions once relied on diamonds, gold and artwork to store illicit fortunes. The luxury goods could help hide wealth but were cumbersome to move and hard to spend.

Now, criminals have a far more practical alternative: stablecoins, a cryptocurrency tied to the U.S. dollar that exists largely beyond traditional financial oversight.

These digital tokens can be bought with a local currency and moved across borders almost instantly. Or they can be returned to the traditional banking system — including by converting funds into debit cards — often without detection, a New York Times review of corporate filings, online forum messages and blockchain data shows.

A report released in February from Chainalysis, a blockchain analysis firm, estimated that up to $25 billion in illicit transactions involved stablecoins last year. And as more Russian oligarchs, Islamic State leaders and others have begun using the cryptocurrency, the rise of these dollar-linked tokens threatens to undermine one of America’s most potent foreign policy tools: cutting adversaries off from the dollar and the global banking system.

“Bad actors are moving faster than ever before,” said Ari Redbord, a former Treasury official and the head of policy at TRM Labs, a blockchain data company. Sanctions and other economic penalties, he said, lose force when criminals can move millions with a few clicks.

Governments are racing to contain the activity. Late last month, Britain arrested members of a billion-dollar money-laundering network that purchased a bank in Kyrgyzstan in order to help evade sanctions and facilitate payments in support of Russian military efforts. For a fee, Britain’s National Crime Agency said, the launderers would convert money, often generated from the drug trade, firearm sales and human trafficking, to Tether, the most popular stablecoin.

“These ‘cash to crypto’ swaps are an integral part of a global criminal ecosystem,” said Sal Melki, deputy director for economic crime at the National Crime Agency.

For decades, the Treasury Department has relied on banks and credit card companies to root out illicit financial activity, requiring them to spend billions on compliance measures that track and block groups that are subject to government sanctions — or face enormous fines. Since most of the world’s dollar-denominated trade flows through these regulated channels, transacting with those facing sanctions has been extraordinarily difficult.

Stablecoins bypass this system entirely. Through layers of intermediaries, digital dollars can be moved, swapped and mixed into pools of other funds in ways that are more difficult for the authorities to trace, Mr. Redbord said.

A Test of How Easily Money Can Be Converted

To test just how easily crypto can slip between the cracks of banking controls, I found a crypto A.T.M. in Weehawken, N.J., to convert cash into stablecoins.

Soon after I fed two $20 bills into the machine, I received a notification on my phone that crypto had arrived in my digital wallet. A Telegram bot then guided me through the next step: using the stablecoins to generate a Visa payment card number with a balance that I could spend anywhere.

A payment card functions very much like a debit card, though it is not tied to any of my bank accounts. In this case, the card I was issued did not require me to provide an address or identity check of any kind — in effect creating a degree of anonymity for my spending.

My experiment was perfectly legal, despite anti-money-laundering laws in the United States that require banks to scrutinize the identity of an account holder and the source of funds before issuing credit, debit and payment cards.

The Telegram bot that issued my card was run by WantToPay, a company that advertises Visas and Mastercards to Russians who want to shop abroad or make purchases online but are blocked by U.S. sanctions. Because of sanctions tied to the invasion of Ukraine, many American companies cannot process payments from most Russian banks.

In its ads, on WantToPay’s website and on its Telegram channel, the company promises instant issuance without any of the traditional customer checks that banks must perform.

A screen shot of one of WantToPay’s advertisements.

WantToPay is incorporated in Hong Kong, though a Russian entrepreneur in Thailand leads the company, corporate records show.

Hundreds of reviews on Russian-language online forums describe using the cards to circumvent restrictions and pay for services such as ChatGPT, Netflix and other online platforms that Russians cannot otherwise use.

WantToPay did not respond to multiple requests for comment. After I contacted the company, references to Visa and Mastercard disappeared from its website, and it posted a notice on Telegram that it was no longer issuing cards.

Visa said in a statement that it maintained robust compliance controls and required all clients and partners to follow applicable laws. After I alerted Visa to the WantToPay cards, Visa said it had opened an investigation into the company.

A spokesman for Mastercard said the company has zero tolerance for unlawful activity and reviews potential issues ensure compliance with local laws and standards.

Devon Spurgeon, a spokeswoman for Telegram, said the platform complies with all U.S. money laundering regulations removes illegal content upon confirmation.

WantToPay, however, was only one link in a chain of financial intermediaries I encountered. While it marketed my card to me, I learned that WantToPay used another company to generate it. I soon traced my Visa to Dock, a Brazilian financial-technology firm that issues cards for companies such as WantToPay.

Dock is one of many financial firms that help companies issue Visa and Mastercard cards through banks, but are themselves not a regulated financial institution, meaning they are not subject to the same compliance standards as their banking partners.

Dock denied any relationship with WantToPay, and the financial firm said it had canceled cards it believed were tied to illicit activity. In a statement, the company said customers must comply with mandatory know-your-customer requirements.

The growing chain of custody of my card illustrated how illicit actors can use crypto to exploit gaps between companies responsible for issuing cards and those responsible for enforcing financial rules.

On Telegram and elsewhere, I was able to identify 24 additional companies advertising anonymous Visa and Mastercard products funded by stablecoins, with spending limits up to $30,000. The companies are incorporated in countries across the globe, including Costa Rica, Malta, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Russia, according to corporate filings and government records. Most rely on automated Telegram bots to manage customer sign-ups and transactions.

Limited Jurisdiction

In July, President Trump signed the GENIUS Act, which was described as the United States’ first major piece of crypto legislation. It established a federal regulatory system for stablecoins, defined rules to ensure financial stability and created compliance programs intended to combat illegal activity and sanctions violations.

Circle, the second largest issuer of stablecoins, praised the law, saying it showed the federal government was modernizing anti-money-laundering rules for the digital era.

In an interview, Dante Disparte, an executive at Circle, said the company cooperated with law enforcement agencies to freeze assets when violations were identified. He added that cryptocurrency offered users a greater presumption of innocence than traditional finance.

A spokesperson for Tether said in a statement that criticisms related to illicit finance overlooked the fact that blockchain transactions were far more traceable than cash, and that most illicit activity occurred in secondary markets outside its control. The company emphasized that it worked closely with global law enforcement agencies and that it had helped to freeze more than $3.4 billion in illicit funds

But critics argue the law has limits. The regulations apply primarily to U.S.-based exchanges such as Coinbase, which must verify customers and monitor transactions. Yet funds can still move freely through offshore platforms, unregulated coins and decentralized finance systems that face none of those requirements.

Tether, which has over $180 billion worth of stablecoins in circulation, is based in El Salvador and would not be covered by the new rules. The company holds more than $112 billion in U.S. Treasuries, and any law enforcement action against Tether could potentially risk destabilizing important financial markets.

The picture is further complicated by political and financial ties surrounding Tether. The company has close connections to the family of Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who is responsible for restricting exports of sensitive U.S. technology — restrictions that people can try to sidestep by making transactions with stablecoins like Tether.

One of Mr. Lutnick’s son, Brandon, is the chairman of Cantor Fitzgerald, which provides services to Tether, placing the family in a position where the company behind the world’s largest offshore dollar token intersects with a key federal enforcement role. Another son, Kyle, is executive vice chairman of the firm.

Cantor Fitzgerald and the Commerce Department declined to comment.

Efforts to police the offshore crypto ecosystem have repeatedly fallen short. A Kyrgyz company this year introduced dollar-backed Visas and Mastercards bought with stablecoins pegged to the ruble. Even after the United States and Europe placed sanctions on the ruble-pegged coin, known as A7A5, and its issuer, supporting banks, exchanges and the oligarch tied to its development, the token continues to circulate.

Shortly before U.S. authorities placed sanctions this year on the main exchange that traded A7A5, it quietly transferred tens of millions of dollars in stablecoins to new wallets that had not been identified by the authorities to be seized under the sanctions, according to a Times review of blockchain activity.

David Bolaños contributed reporting from Costa Rica.

See more on: Visa Inc.

NY Times · Aaron Krolik · December 7, 2025

10. Hong Kong Holds Vote as Officials Move Against ‘Anti-China’ Elements

​Summary:

Hong Kong holds tightly managed legislative elections while mourning a high-rise fire that killed at least 159 and exposed serious safety and regulatory failures. The government pushes aggressive turnout efforts, targeting even displaced residents, while warning “anti-China elements” under national security laws and summoning foreign media over coverage. Only 20 of 90 seats are directly elected, with candidates pre-vetted for “patriotism” and pro-democracy forces jailed, exiled, or barred. Beijing curates younger, mainland-linked loyalists to deepen control. Authorities seek higher turnout to claim legitimacy, but voter registration is down and many residents see little real choice or trust in accountability.

Comment: Since 2019 Hong Kong has foreshadowed what will likely happen to Taiwan if Taiwan ever submits to PRC domination. And will likely be more oppressive than what is happening in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong Holds Vote as Officials Move Against ‘Anti-China’ Elements

NY Times · David Pierson · December 7, 2025

The government is pushing hard to raise turnout in an election overshadowed by a deadly fire and public anger over safety lapses and official accountability.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/07/world/asia/hong-kong-fire-election-campaign.html

The burned Wang Fuk Court apartment complex in Hong Kong last month.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

By

Reporting from Hong Kong

Dec. 7, 2025Updated 6:03 a.m. ET

The Hong Kong government was doubling down on a campaign to increase voter turnout in tightly controlled legislative elections on Sunday that are largely devoid of opposition parties, even as the city continued mourning a deadly fire that has prompted calls for official accountability.

At least 159 people were killed last month when a blaze engulfed Wang Fuk Court, a high-rise apartment complex, in the city’s deadliest fire in decades. Officials have said that substandard construction materials likely contributed to the spread of the fire, raising questions about the city’s oversight of its building industry and whether warnings had been ignored.

Residents are being urged to cast ballots on Sunday in an election in which pro-establishment candidates approved by Beijing are all but certain to dominate.

“I’m not voting,” said Mary Chan, 55, a Hong Konger who was at a memorial near the site of the fire earlier this week, where she folded paper cranes as a way to offer peace to the dead. “What’s the point? To help them perform?”

Entering a polling station on Sunday near the site of the fire.Credit...Chan Long Hei/Associated Press

In a sign of how sensitive the fire has become, the authorities have invoked national security laws to warn of consequences for “anti-China elements” who they say are looking to use the fire to cause trouble. At least three people have been arrested by national security police since the disaster.

On Saturday, Beijing’s national security arm in Hong Kong summoned representatives and journalists from some foreign media organizations, including The New York Times, to warn them about coverage of the disaster.

Questions abounded after the fire about whether to postpone the elections, which analysts said were being treated as a test of legitimacy for the government. Campaign activities were suspended for several days after the blaze, but Hong Kong’s chief executive, John Lee, ultimately decided to go ahead with the poll, explaining that the new legislature was needed to help speed up fire recovery and to introduce regulatory reforms.

“At this critical moment of post-disaster reconstruction, we must look to the long term, steadily move ahead and gradually promote the normal functioning of society,” Mr. Lee said on Tuesday.

Mr. Lee has led the government campaign urging residents to participate in the elections. For weeks, Hong Kong has been saturated with posters, banners and social media posts promoting the polls as a civic duty. Even public restrooms outfitted with speakers played a jingle calling on people to vote.

Hong Kong’s chief executive, John Lee, at a news conference on Tuesday. Despite the Wang Fuk Court disaster, he decided to go ahead with Sunday’s elections, explaining that the new legislature was needed to help speed up fire recovery and to introduce regulatory reforms.Credit...Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

The government mobilized civil servants to show up at the polls and asked chambers of commerce to get businesses to incentivize employees to cast ballots. On Saturday, the government hosted a citywide “Election Fun Day,” that included a gala, carnivals and open houses at government offices.

Even the thousands of displaced residents of Wang Fuk Court, where seven towers were consumed by the fire on Nov. 26, have been the focus of a get-out-the-vote drive. The government said on Tuesday that social workers, who were each assigned a household to help through the aftermath of the fire, would also help residents find their new polling stations and direct them to free transportation.

The outreach effort may also be a way for the authorities to monitor residents in case they begin organizing opposition to the government and its handling of the fire, said Victoria Hui, an associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame who studies Hong Kong. “It seems that they are trying to kill two birds with one stone,” Ms. Hui said.

Yam Kai-bong, a former local official in Tai Po, the district where the fire took place, said that a high voter turnout in his former district would be seen as a stamp of approval. “They can announce to the world that the people still believe in the system, believe in the government and believe in the pro-establishment party,” said Mr. Yam, who now lives in Britain.

“The government desperately wants to tell the public that everything is normal,” he said.

Eric Chan, Hong Kong’s No. 2 official, told reporters on Sunday morning that the social workers would not be instructing Wang Fuk residents to vote.

A shelter for residents who lost their homes in the fire last month. They have been the focus of a get-out-the-vote campaign.Credit...Billy H.C. Kwok for The New York Times

During the last election in 2021, only 30 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. That was the lowest rate in decades and nearly half the record-high turnout in 2016, long before a national security law imposed in 2020 effectively wiped out the pro-democracy opposition.

In 2021, Beijing imposed an electoral overhaul that required all candidates to be vetted as sufficiently patriotic to China. Before those changes, opposition lawmakers were a major force in the legislature who often frustrated the city’s pro-Beijing leaders. After quitting en masse in 2020 in protest, many ended up in jail or living in exile.

Only 20 of the 90 seats up for grabs on Sunday in the city of more than seven million people are directly elected. That is down from 35 seats before the 2021 reforms. The remaining 70 seats are decided by a select group of voters comprising Beijing loyalists and representing different industries and professions.

“Some Hong Kong people may feel they do not have a genuine choice of candidates,” said Emily Lau, a veteran pro-democracy politician and former lawmaker who now hosts an interview show on YouTube.

China is trying to deepen its influence in the legislature after a wave of older and established pro-Beijing politicians abruptly announced in October that they would not seek re-election. In their place are many younger candidates with political and financial ties to the mainland, said John Burns, emeritus professor of politics at Hong Kong University.

China’s representative office in Hong Kong “carefully curates these contests so that the people that they want to win will win,” said Mr. Burns.

A polling station in Hong Kong in 2021. Officials in Hong Kong and Beijing hope that voter turnout this year will exceed the levels of the last election, when only 30 percent of registered voters cast a ballot.Credit...Jerome Favre/EPA, via Shutterstock

The limited choice on the ballot has sullied enthusiasm for an electorate that traditionally used to skew about 60 percent in favor of the opposition parties. Voter registration this year is down eight percent from 2021 at 4.1 million.

In Tai Po, near the site of the fire, voting was the furthest thing from the minds of at least two residents who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were afraid of attracting the attention of the police.

One resident said she appreciated the temporary housing the government had provided, but said she needed to dedicate her energy to finding a permanent home and filling out paperwork for financial aid.

Another resident said he would spend Election Day moving into a new apartment. He said he had lost interest in elections ever since opposition parties were no longer allowed.

A social worker who was assigned to help Wang Fuk Court families said her supervisors had instructed her to provide information about the election, in addition to helping with financial aid applications and accompanying them on visits to a psychiatrist.

The social worker, who declined to be named because of potential government repercussions, said she felt uncomfortable with the orders related to the election, particularly because some of her charges were still mourning the death of their loved ones from the fire.

Li Cheuk-man, a 42-year-old consultant who was displaced by the Wang Fuk fire, said he would vote for certain candidates he thought would address the problems that led to the blaze. He hoped the government would address his financial losses from the fire, help his family find a new home and bring those responsible for the disaster to justice.

“The government is like our guiding north star,” he said. “Our family is drifting at sea now, not knowing where to go.”

He has spent the past week and a half since the disaster trying to secure relief funds and care for his family, he said.

“After my wife and kids have fallen asleep, I’ve cried in a room alone, not knowing what to do,” Mr. Li said.

Billy Ho, a 46-year-old clerk and resident of Tai Po, said outside a polling station that he had cast his vote for candidates he thought could improve Hong Kong’s economy.

Asked if he felt his vote would make a difference given the relative absence of opposition parties, Mr. Ho said he could only hope it would.

“If you don’t even hope for it, it’s a waste of the rights you still have,” he said.

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.

See more on: John Lee

NY Times · David Pierson · December 7, 2025

11. China’s National Security Office in Hong Kong Summons Foreign Journalists

​Summary:

Beijing’s national security office in Hong Kong summoned foreign media, including The New York Times, warning them over coverage of the Wang Fuk Court fire and upcoming legislative elections, and citing possible national security law consequences: “Do not say you have not been warned.” Officials accused “some foreign media” of distorting facts, smearing the government’s rescue and relief work, and interfering in the election. They insisted “press freedom” cannot excuse violations of Chinese sovereignty or law. Analysts view the move as a direct threat to press freedom and evidence that mainland security officials are now leading Hong Kong’s political narrative management.

Comment: After living in a free and democratic nation, who would want to live under PRC rule?

China’s National Security Office in Hong Kong Summons Foreign Journalists

NY Times · The New York Times · December 6, 2025

The authorities accused “some foreign media” of smearing the government’s response to a fire at a high-rise complex, saying: “Do not say you have not been warned.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/06/world/asia/hong-kong-fire-media-national-security.html

Smoke rising from the Wang Fuk Court residential complex in Hong Kong last month. Beijing’s national security arm in Hong Kong said that some foreign news outlets had twisted facts and spread false information.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

By

Dec. 6, 2025

Beijing’s national security arm in Hong Kong summoned representatives and journalists from some foreign media organizations, including The New York Times, on Saturday to warn them about coverage of the city’s deadliest fire in decades as well as of upcoming legislative elections.

The warning underscores the heightened scrutiny facing international news organizations in Hong Kong after Beijing imposed a national security law on the city with sweeping powers to curtail dissent. The officials said foreign journalists would face consequences if they were deemed to have violated the law, with one saying: “Do not say you have not been warned.”

During the briefing, officials from the Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong read aloud a statement that criticized recent reporting by the foreign media on a massive fire last month at Wang Fuk Court, a high-rise complex in northern Hong Kong, that had killed at least 159 people.

The statement said some reports had “distorted facts,” spread false information, and smeared the government’s rescue and relief work. The statement also said that some reporting had “attacked and interfered with” the legislative election to be held Sunday. The officials did not give specifics or single out any particular outlets or reports.

“‘Press freedom’ and ‘obeying the law’ are not mutually contradictory,” the statement warned. “No media organization may use the banner of ‘press freedom’ to interfere in China’s internal affairs or interfere in Hong Kong’s affairs.”

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China and Hong Kong? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The officials did not identify themselves or take questions. The national security office later posted the same statement on its website.

The meeting was a rare direct engagement between China’s national security office in Hong Kong and the foreign media. It highlighted the increasingly assertive role the office plays in regulating public discourse in the city, said Thomas E. Kellogg, the executive director of the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, who called it a “direct threat to press freedom in Hong Kong.”

“Since the national security law went into effect, local media outlets have been under attack,” he said. “This move shows that Beijing wants to increase the pressure on international media outlets as well.”

In recent days, the office put out statements warning “anti-China forces” not to exploit the Wang Fuk Court fire to try to undermine social stability. It also said that “hostile foreign forces” were seeking to cause trouble for the Hong Kong government, adding that the authorities would punish such forces “no matter how far away” they may be.

Analysts have said that the sharply worded statements by the security office suggested that the authorities are concerned that last week’s disaster could fuel a fresh political reckoning in a city that was engulfed with antigovernment protests in 2019.

“This is not a step that a confident government would take,” Mr. Kellogg said. “This move also shows that mainland officials are taking the lead in managing the fallout from this tragedy.”

The warnings also come as the Hong Kong government has been encouraging residents to vote in legislative elections on Sunday.

Turnout at the last poll, in 2021, hit a record low, following a major overhaul of the political system that tightened the Chinese Communist Party’s grip over the territory. Beijing imposed a “patriots only” policy that limited which candidates could run, leaving space only for the barest semblance of an opposition.

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 7, 2025, Section A, Page 13 of the New York edition with the headline: China Issues Warning to Foreign Journalists

See more on: Communist Party of China, The New York Times

NY Times · The New York Times · December 6, 2025

12. U.S. spent more on Afghanistan rebuild than Marshall Plan; nothing to show after two decades of war

​Summary:

The SIGAR final report concludes the U.S. spent over $148 billion on Afghan reconstruction, more in real terms than the Marshall Plan, with little to show after the Afghan state and its $88 billion U.S.-built military collapsed in 2021. Corruption in Kabul is described as a “white-collar criminal enterprise” that poisoned legitimacy and hollowed security forces. Additional costs include $763 billion for warfighting, $14 billion for resettlement, and billions in weapons, infrastructure and an empty embassy now in Taliban hands. The war cost 2,450 U.S. troops, 66,000 Afghan soldiers and 48,000 civilians. SIGAR saved $4.6 billion but often faced obstruction from U.S. agencies.

Comment: I suppose this validates the SECDEF/SECWAR's charge of failed "utopian idealism."

U.S. spent more on Afghanistan rebuild than Marshall Plan; nothing to show after two decades of war

washingtontimes.com · Mike Glenn

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, December 3, 2025

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/dec/3/us-wasted-billions-trying-fix-afghanistan-says-acting-inspector/

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

The U.S. government spent more money on the ambitious but ultimately futile effort to create a stable and democratic Afghanistan than it did on the post-World War II Marshall Plan, which rehabilitated more than a dozen European countries ravaged by conflict.

Congress appropriated just over $148 billion for Afghan reconstruction from 2002 to 2025. About $88 billion of that was spent creating a military that swiftly collapsed in August 2021 in the face of pressure from the Taliban, Gene Aloise, the acting special inspector general in charge of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, told the Defense Writers Group on Wednesday.

Those figures don’t include the $763 billion spent arming the Afghan military and security services during the two-decade war, or the $14 billion used to resettle about 200,000 Afghans in the U.S. after the resignation and flight of President Ashraf Ghani, officials said Wednesday while releasing the final report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR, the watchdog agency created by Congress.

By comparison, the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, cost American taxpayers about $135 billion in today’s dollars to rebuild 16 countries, including key World War II allies such as Britain and France.

Mr. Aloise knew the task ahead would be daunting after speaking with a three-star general at a U.S. base in Kabul during his first visit to Afghanistan.

“He had a big problem. He had to spend $1 billion by the end of the year. He had one month to do it,” Mr. Aloise said. “He had no idea what he was going to spend that money on.”

The general rebuffed him when Mr. Aloise asked whether there was anything SIGAR could do. The Defense Department had no intention of returning the unspent funds, he was told.

Mr. Aloise blamed corruption by Afghan officials for most of the waste from America’s longest war. He compared the government in Kabul to a “white-collar criminal enterprise.”

Advertisement

Advertisement

“Corruption affected everything,” he told reporters. “It turned the people against the government we were trying to build there. It weakened the armed forces. It weakened everything we tried to do.”

The true cost of the war was more than the dollars spent propping up an Afghan government that fell once the U.S. military was out of the picture. It included 2,450 U.S. service members who were killed and 20,760 who were wounded in combat, along with 66,000 Afghan troops and 48,000 civilians who were killed.

“The cost was much higher than just the money,” Mr. Aloise said.

The 200-member SIGAR staff faced challenges in getting their message heard by top military and government leaders, despite their quarterly reports tracking the rampant waste, fraud and abuse in Afghanistan.

“We were fighting a war [and] we were just a little blip in this whole room of noise,” Mr. Aloise said. “It was hard for us.”

Advertisement

Advertisement

About $7.1 billion worth of U.S.-funded military weapons and hardware was left behind in Afghanistan when American troops completed their withdrawal in August 2021. Intended for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, the weapons fell into the hands of the Taliban after the collapse of the U.S.-backed government.

The figures don’t tell the whole story. SIGAR officials said more than $24 billion in military infrastructure and $24 billion in civilian infrastructure — all U.S.-built and paid for — was there for the taking by the Taliban when the U.S. left.

“And that doesn’t include the $1.5 billion we spent on the U.S. Embassy, which is sitting there empty,” Mr. Aloise said.

The SIGAR auditors were sometimes blocked by U.S. agencies involved in the war effort. They often identified Afghan officials who were receiving bribes or kickbacks, only to be told they were working for the CIA or other government organizations.

Advertisement

Advertisement

“We were told ‘hands off. You can’t go after those guys,’” Mr. Aloise said. “We did what we could do, [but] there was a lot more that we knew about.”

Despite the uphill battles, the SIGAR efforts saved the American taxpayers more than $4.6 billion. Their audits and investigators identified more than 1,300 instances of waste, fraud and abuse totaling more than $29 billion, Mr. Aloise said.

Mr. Aloise said the Obama and Trump administrations were largely supportive of the auditors’ work. However, he slammed the Biden administration for shutting them out for a year after the collapse of Afghanistan. Their position was that SIGAR’s mandate ended once U.S. troops were no longer there.

“They wouldn’t talk to us. They wouldn’t work with our people. They told their people not to work with our people,” he said. “It was terrible. Never in 50 years have I seen such pushback. It took a bipartisan effort in Congress to get that work started again.”

Advertisement

Advertisement

After the collapse of the government in Kabul, the Pentagon launched what became the largest noncombatant evacuation operation in U.S. history. The U.S. shuttled out tens of thousands of Afghans, many who had worked with American forces and were facing serious threats from the fast-advancing Taliban forces.

Republican and Democratic administrations promised to bring stability and democracy to Afghanistan, but despite the cost in blood and treasure, they ultimately delivered neither, SIGAR said.

• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · Mike Glenn

13. From Lenin to the Narcos: Manwaring’s Lessons on Political War in the Age of Paramilitaries (book review)

​Summary:

Max Manwaring argues that modern conflict is “irregular asymmetric political war,” where gangs, cartels, militias, and mercenaries act as instruments of statecraft, not side crimes. Drawing on Lenin’s phased model, he shows how propaganda, coercion, and proxy violence are used to engineer political outcomes and erode legitimacy. The decisive terrain is now psychological and political, with information and perception trumping firepower. Nonstate actors from Jamaican posses to narco-paramilitaries blend criminal and political motives to reshape orders indirectly. His core lesson for strategists: legitimacy, governance, and unity of effort, not kinetic strikes alone, decide success against hybrid criminal political networks.

From Lenin to the Narcos: Manwaring’s Lessons on Political War in the Age of Paramilitaries

Small Wars Journal · Matthew P. Arsenault

|

12.05.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/05/manwaring-modern/

By Max G. Manwaring. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2010. ISBN: ‎ 978-0806141466. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources Cited. Index. Pp. i, 258. $26.95.

In Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries, Max G. Manwaring argued that contemporary conflict had become a form of “indirect but total war,” where state and nonstate actors deploy gangs, militias, and criminal networks to coerce political change. Writing in 2010, Manwaring rooted this logic in Lenin’s revolutionary model of phased struggle, but his insight reaches beyond leftist movements. Today, the Leninist template of indirect political war—blending propaganda, coercion, and proxy violence—has been adopted by actors across ideological lines, from Russia’s Wagner Group to Mexico’s cartels to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. The fusion of criminal and political motives that Manwaring foresaw now defines the landscape of modern irregular warfare.

Manwaring has long been recognized as one of the leading theorists of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, best known for developing the SWORD model—a framework emphasizing legitimacy, unity of effort, and the integration of hard and soft power in small wars. In Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries (2010), Manwaring extended his earlier work by arguing that contemporary conflict had evolved into what he termed “irregular asymmetric political war.” This was not a struggle confined to insurgent movements or failed states; it was a total, multidimensional competition in which nonstate intermediaries—gangs, militias, cartels, and mercenary networks—served as instruments of political power. These actors, he wrote, “appear to be formless and do not often present a coherent structure that can be attacked militarily” (pp. 4), yet they operate as deliberate extensions of statecraft.

At the center of Manwaring’s analysis is a strategic shift: the decisive terrain of modern conflict has moved from the battlefield to the political and psychological sphere. The aim of war, he insists, remains Clausewitzian—compelling an adversary to do one’s will—but the center of gravity has changed. Success or failure now depends on morale, perception, and legitimacy rather than on military capability. “Information (propaganda)—not military technology or firepower—is the primary currency by which modern ‘war amongst the people’ is run” (pp. 15).

To explain how this kind of political warfare is organized and sustained, Manwaring turns to the revolutionary method articulated by Vladimir Lenin—a model that transforms information, agitation, and organizational discipline into instruments of strategic coercion. In many ways, Lenin’s early twentieth-century conception of propaganda as a weapon of statecraft anticipates today’s information operations and influence campaigns, where the battle for perception replaces the battle for territory.

The result is a theory of conflict as political engineering. Gangs, cartels, and pseudo-militaries are not peripheral criminals, but strategic tools used to restructure the political order. They advance their patrons’ interests by manipulating public perception, coercing populations, and degrading institutional legitimacy. Manwaring’s Jamaican posses, Argentine Piqueteros, Colombian narco-paramilitaries, and Hezbollah all operate within this schema: each fuses social control with violence to pursue political objectives indirectly. The common denominator is not ideology but the method—a Leninist logic of power acquisition through organized coercion and subversion.

What makes Manwaring’s argument enduringly relevant is its reversal of analytical focus. Instead of treating nonstate violence as a byproduct of state weakness, he portrays it as an instrument of political design. His claim that “state-supported and state-associated gangs are important components of contemporary irregular asymmetric political war” (pp. 5) reads today less as a warning than as a description.

Recent U.S. military strikes against alleged Venezuelan drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean underscore how blurred these boundaries have become. Ostensibly counter-narcotics actions, such operations reflect a deeper strategic tension: When criminal networks acquire political utility or state sponsorship, the distinction between law enforcement and warfare collapses. Yet, responding with force to such ambiguous threats risks reinforcing the very dynamics Manwaring warned about—treating political pathologies as military targets rather than symptoms of eroding legitimacy. In this sense, the strikes reveal both the accuracy of Manwaring’s diagnosis and the legal and strategic unease it generates for states confronting hybrid, deniable actors.

Manwaring’s work ultimately reminds us that the most dangerous conflicts of the twenty-first century are not fought by mass armies or formal insurgencies but by the constellation of hybrid actors operating in the spaces between crime, politics, and war. His argument that legitimacy—not firepower—is the decisive currency of modern conflict offers a corrective to strategies that rely too heavily on kinetic solutions against amorphous threats. The recent U.S. strikes in the Caribbean demonstrate how easily governments can be drawn into treating criminal-political networks as military targets, even when the legal and strategic foundations for doing so remain uncertain. Manwaring would likely caution that such actions – if not paired with efforts to strengthen governance, restore legitimacy, and undercut the political utility of these groups – risk perpetuating the very instability they aim to prevent. His book endures not because it predicts every case, but because it provides a framework for recognizing how contemporary actors—from cartels to state-backed militias—adapt a Leninist logic of indirect coercion to reshape political orders. As the irregular conflict continues to evolve, grappling with Manwaring’s insights is essential—not only for understanding our adversaries but also for avoiding strategic missteps of our own.

Check out all of Small War Journal‘s series of great book reviews.

About The Author

Matthew P. Arsenault

Matthew P. Arsenault holds a PhD in political science and has worked on issues of political violence across academia, government, and the private sector.

Article Discussion:

Become a Member To Engage!

Unlock exclusive members-only ad-free content, members discussion, content, and updates directly from the SWJ Team, for only $10/yr.

SIGN ME UP → or Learn More

Small Wars Journal · Matthew P. Arsenault

14. Engaging Rwanda: A Pragmatic Approach To The Great Lakes Conflict

​Summary:

Rwanda’s proxy M23 has evolved from a constrained actor in 2012, when UN action, ICC pressure, and Western aid cuts forced Kigali to back down, to a dominant powerbroker after its 2019–2025 offensives in eastern DRC. Rwanda’s “endearment strategy” – peacekeeping, security exports, investment climate, image-building – muted international pushback and shifted regional leverage. The author argues that DRC has squandered decades of support and failed to reform. He urges a pragmatic U.S. pivot: negotiate a mineral deal with Rwanda tied to dismantling M23 and funding accountable development in the Kivus, while conditioning continued assistance to DRC on real security and governance reforms.

Engaging Rwanda: A Pragmatic Approach To The Great Lakes Conflict

Small Wars Journal · Craig Denker

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/06/rwanda-m23-great-lakes-conflict/

The 2012 rise of the Mouvement de Mars 23 (M23) as a Rwandan proxy force triggered swift international condemnation, successfully impeding Rwanda’s momentum through bilateral sanctions and a United Nations-backed offensive operation. However, over the past decade, Rwanda has strategically endeared itself to Western donors, particularly the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, by demonstrating itself as a capable and willing partner. Through this endearment strategy, Rwanda reshaped its international image, which in turn muted the international response to M23’s 2019 resurgence. Through this international delay, Rwanda received the requisite freedom to remobilize its proxy force and seize large swaths of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While the M23 threat is not new, the strategic hesitancy of the international community made clear that regional power dynamics shifted from an environment that constrained Rwanda, making it ripe for exploitation. The opportunity to replicate the international pressures of 2012 has passed. After decades of support to the DRC, the international community must now adopt a new playbook that recognizes the evolving power dynamics and prioritizes regional stability through pragmatic engagement with Rwanda.

Historical Overview of M23

M23’s origins are directly rooted in the perpetual Great Lakes conflict, where they serve as a reincarnation of Rwanda’s previous proxy groups, including the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP); the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL); and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). Throughout this conflict, beginning with the 1996 First Congo War through the present day, Rwanda’s various proxies have claimed to support marginalized Congolese Tutsis and national reconciliation. While the protection of these communities has remained a constant narrative, their motivations have shifted over time from revenge for the Rwandan Genocide, to desires for DRC regime change—and, more recently—to economic ambitions with the emergence of conflict minerals, which continues to shape the conflict today.

More specifically, M23 emerged from the failed March 23, 2009, peace agreement, giving the group its namesake, “Movement of March 23.” This agreement required the CNDP to integrate into the Congolese Army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique de Congo, or FARDC) in exchange for governmental support to national reconciliation and a guarantee that former CNDP members within the FARDC would remain in the Kivu region. However, after years of government inaction and attempts to remove CNDP leadership from the Kivus, former CNDP leaders defected and established M23 on May 6, 2012. Following the defection, M23, like the CNDP before them, attempted to seize the DRC’s eastern logistical hub of Goma. This offensive was met with immediate international condemnation that included the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which led to a military response that successfully recaptured Goma within ten days and militarily defeated M23.

Following their 2013 defeat, M23 entered into the Addis Ababa Agreement, where the DRC agreed to conduct security reform, promote national reconciliation, and prevent armed groups from destabilizing the region. However, once M23 no longer posed a threat, Kinshasa saw little need to fulfill the agreement, showing its lack of interest and capacity to address the conflict’s underlying drivers. This defeat of M23 should have been a turning point for regional relations, given the cohesion demonstrated by the FARDC and MONUSCO. To the contrary, Kinshasa continues to lack the ability or the will to address drivers of conflict, such as poverty, land disputes, and ethnic ideology.

2012 International Response

The 2012 international response to M23’s emergence and eventual seizure of Goma was immediate and decisive, including actions by the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN, and Western powers. Within hours of M23’s advance on Goma on November 20, 2012, the UN Security Council (UNSC) strongly condemned M23 by unanimously adopting UN Resolution 2076. While this resolution did not explicitly name Rwanda as an accomplice, the UNSC meeting held on the same day required the presence of both DRC and Rwandan representatives, in which the DRC accused Rwanda of supporting M23. Moreover, although MONUSCO lacked a mandate to conduct offensive operations in November 2012, it did directly support the FARDC in their retaking of Goma. This served as the catalyst for expanding MONUSCO’s mandate to include “targeted offensive operations” conducted by its Force Intervention Brigade. Although previous UN missions have been authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the UN mandate, this decision made MONUSCO the first UN mission authorized to conduct offensive operations. This critical decision by the UNSC is credited with playing a substantial role in the eventual, although short-term, defeat of M23.

Since 2004, Rwanda has consistently supported UN peacekeeping missions, routinely ranking in the top five of all troop-contributing countries and providing the largest contribution by an African nation.

In addition to the strong UN response in 2012, the ICC increased pressure on regional governments to execute the arrest warrant of M23’s leader, Bosco Ntaganda. While the ICC had an outstanding arrest warrant for Ntaganda dating back to 2008, the announcement of M23’s emergence in May 2012 resulted in a renewed warrant for Ntaganda’s arrest on May 14, 2012. Although there is debate over whether the ICC’s efforts are an effective deterrent during a conflict, the ICC’s actions still demonstrate a concerted, unified international effort to pressure regional governments. Furthermore, Ntaganda’s eventual surrender to the ICC on March 18, 2013, is credited with increasing defections from M23 due to fears of reprisals among M23 fighters, ultimately weakening the group and enabling its downfall.

In parallel with UN and ICC efforts, Western countries cut aid to Rwanda to curtail its support for M23. The US announced a $200,000 cut to military support months before M23 seized Goma and reduced overall funding for Rwandan military training by 37% between 2011 and 2013. In 2013, the US also listed Rwanda under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA), limiting Rwanda’s eligibility for military aid under US law. Additionally, within ten days of M23 capturing Goma, the UK announced the suspension of £21 million in aid ($33.18 million). Overall, Western donors cut $240 million in aid to Rwanda between 2012 and 2013, effectively pressuring Rwanda to abandon its support of M23, forcing the group’s temporary defeat.

Under this pressure, Rwanda buckled and abandoned its support for M23. Although this victory was short-lived, the 2012 response revealed a shared global perception of Rwanda as the antagonist and spotlighted its susceptibility to international pressures. However, through its deliberate endearment strategy, Rwanda avoided long-term international condemnation, and Rwanda’s renewed support during M23’s 2019 re-emergence was met by a significantly muted international response.

Rwanda’s “Endearment Strategy”

Rwanda’s endearment strategy is a multifaceted approach that includes reshaping its international image and gaining favor with Western influencers. Part of this effort started before 2012 with economic investments to boost its tourism industry. However, other programs are much more recent, such as its Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events strategy. While this strategy predates 2012, there was a renewed emphasis in 2012 to attract various international organizations to hold conferences in Kigali, which helped reshape Rwanda’s international image. In 2017, Rwanda revamped government processes to streamline business registrations, making it easier to open businesses in Rwanda. In 2021, Rwanda announced a partnership with the National Basketball Association (NBA), opening opportunities for Rwanda to market itself. Together, these efforts increased foreign investment, improved regional and global trade, and crafted a perception of an incredible post-conflict success story.

Beyond perceptions, Rwanda has established itself as a willing and capable partner in supporting Western interests in Africa. Since 2004, Rwanda has consistently supported UN peacekeeping missions, routinely ranking in the top five of all troop-contributing countries and providing the largest contribution by an African nation. Although this has been a trend since 2004, Rwanda saw a nearly 74% increase in troop contributions between 2011 and 2020. In 2020, Rwanda deployed bilaterally to the Central African Republic (CAR) to support the government against armed groups. While in the CAR, Rwanda conducted operations with Wagner Group. However, after reports of human rights abuses, Rwanda ceased operations with Wagner, indicating the capacity of the Rwandan Defense Forces as an effective and professional fighting force in Africa when incentivized and held accountable. Additionally, in 2021, Rwanda deployed soldiers to Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, to combat terrorism along its northern frontier. Coincidentally, Cabo Delgado is also home to several Western-funded liquefied natural gas projects, notably French-owned TotalEnergies and American-owned ExxonMobil, giving the impression that Rwanda is serving as a Western proxy to protect economic interests. Despite that perception, Rwanda has proven itself to be a formidable security partner in a region where Western nations are increasingly reluctant to engage militarily.

Diplomatically, Rwanda proved to be a willing partner in the UK’s “Asylum Partnership Agreement”. First announced in 2022, this partnership, had it come to fruition, would have seen UK asylum seekers sent to Rwanda in exchange for at least £370 million ($462.5 million) in development aid. However, the deal was repealed by the UK in 2024, after having already paid Rwanda £290 million ($288.5 million).

Although Rwanda has been carefully constructing its international image since the turn of the century, Kigali has made concerted efforts since 2012 to position itself as a pragmatic and reliable Western ally in an unstable part of the world. Through post-conflict economic growth, a whitewash of its national image, and serving as a reliable exporter of security, Rwanda has engineered a situation in which the international community must think twice before condemning its actions.

2019-2025 International Response

Beginning in 2019, after international pressure tapered off, M23 re-emerged, first seizing territory in North Kivu and, by January 27, 2025, capturing Goma. Shortly thereafter, with little response from the international community, M23 extended control across North and South Kivu. The key difference between M23’s 2012 and 2025 seizures of Goma was Rwanda’s growing influence, which is a direct result of Rwanda’s endearment strategy. Over the last decade, Rwanda strategically increased its negotiating power and, for the first time, holds considerable diplomatic leverage. This shift is clearly reflected in the reduced international pressure and the growing hesitancy among Western countries to condemn Rwanda for supporting M23.

While international pressure on Rwanda began almost immediately after M23’s 2012 seizure of Goma, the response from 2019 through 2025 has been diluted and delayed. Since the renewed violence, the ICC has not issued any additional arrest warrants for M23 leaders. Furthermore, between 2019 and 2023, UN Resolutions only briefly mention “concern” about M23’s advances and foreign support, despite a published 2022 UN report that provided irrefutable evidence that Rwanda was directly supporting M23. In 2024, the UN again condemned M23 and its “support by any external party,” while also noting its use of advanced technology and weaponry. However, the first time the UN directly condemns Rwanda is February 21, 2025, nearly a month after M23 recaptured Goma and nearly three years after initial reports of Rwandan involvement.

Additionally, while the U.S. maintained CSPA restrictions, the only additional sanctions were imposed against two individuals within the Rwandan government, which did not take effect until a month after the initial recapture of Goma. Similarly, a month after M23’s advance, the UK announced a cut to defense support and aid to Rwanda. However, the government did not specify exactly how much aid that amounted to. Eventually, nearly six weeks after the fall of multiple strategic cities in the Kivu region, the UK announced the suspension of future payments linked to the “Asylum Partnership Agreement”.

Although these responses are relatively weak, they appear forceful when compared to France’s inaction. Unlike the US and UK, France has not imposed sanctions or withheld aid from Rwanda. Their only response has been through general UN condemnations. Additionally, despite evidence that Rwanda had renewed its support to M23, France provided over €500 million ($539.2 million) in development aid to Rwanda between 2021 and 2023. This continued aid, along with their muted diplomatic response, underscores the importance of the Franco-Rwanda relationship, particularly considering Rwanda’s military presence around French energy assets in Mozambique.

This collectively delayed and cautious international response, despite its knowledge of Rwanda’s involvement with M23, suggests a shift in regional power dynamics and a relative acceptance of Rwanda’s aggressive maneuvers. While Rwanda eventually capitulated under international pressure in 2012, Kigali now holds a dominant negotiating position that the US should leverage to reduce human suffering while also seizing an opportunity to address national economic needs.

Policy Recommendation

The response to this shifting power dynamic and growing humanitarian crisis should be pragmatic. Rwanda has routinely demonstrated a superior capability in addressing conflict drivers and enforcing sovereignty, compared to the DRC. Through their post-conflict development, Rwanda diversified its economy, exercised effective governance, attracted substantial foreign investment, and developed a professional military capable of protecting civilians, whether at home or in combat zones, which, despite extensive international support, the DRC has failed to do. Therefore, instead of prioritizing engagement with the DRC and developing a mineral-for-security deal, the US should negotiate a mineral deal with Rwanda that includes mining incentives for US companies and favorable trade agreements for the importation of natural resources. In exchange, the US will support a peace agreement where Rwanda maintains control of current territorial gains within Eastern DRC while requiring the dismantling of M23 and arrest of its leaders and Rwandan military commanders accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

To ensure accountability, this deal would require a jointly funded, but US-controlled, development fund to be used for rebuilding and developing the Kivus within Rwanda’s seized territory. This fund would be used to develop programs that directly target the drivers of conflict by investing in economic opportunities within the region and increasing access to essential services. Release of the funds would be contingent on Rwanda addressing the needs of marginalized communities by integrating local government structures, increasing equitable representation in government, and enforcing anti-corruption measures to rebuild trust in government institutions. The intent of this agreement is to provide Rwanda with the necessary incentives and international support to reduce conflict while ensuring accountability.

Instead of prioritizing engagement with the DRC and developing a mineral-for-security deal, the US should negotiate a mineral deal with Rwanda that includes mining incentives for US companies and favorable trade agreements for the importation of natural resources.

This deal would not absolve the DRC of responsibility nor neglect its needs as a sovereign nation, but it would reduce the burden by shrinking the size of the territory the government is unable to control, such as the Kivu region, and allow the government to focus its efforts on areas it can control. As part of this deal, the US would agree to continue providing security assistance and support to the much-needed security reforms. However, the amount would be determined by the reform efforts implemented within the FARDC. As Jason Stearns, a prolific researcher on the Great Lakes Conflict, suggests, these reforms must include the removal of Commanders accused of war crimes, the implementation of a merit-based promotion system, the complete cessation of support to armed groups, and an effective, enforced anti-corruption initiative. Additionally, the US should pledge to restart humanitarian and development projects halted by USAID’s dissolution, with the requirement that DRC government institutions are active participants in the process. Furthermore, as Gracelin Baskaran recommends, the US should revise Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, putting an end to the unintended ban on Congolese minerals and easing import regulations for US companies. However, this revision should be contingent on the DRC revising its business practices to increase access for foreign businesses and on using these increased funds to support community reconciliation efforts, build infrastructure in marginalized communities, and increase access to essential services, thereby reducing barriers for US corporations looking to enter the market. Collectively, these efforts would ensure that the DRC has the requisite support to pursue essential reforms to address drivers of conflict while maintaining mechanisms of accountability and creating an environment for sustainable foreign investment.

US support to Rwanda in this conflict may appear controversial. However, as Stearns argues, if the Congolese government wanted to avoid conflict, it would have already implemented security and economic reforms to address poverty, land conflicts, and military elitism. Meanwhile, Rwanda has demonstrated its capability to attract and efficiently manage foreign investment, reduce corruption, and improve the quality of life in its post-conflict era, whereas the DRC has failed to do. Despite receiving presidential waivers for its human rights abuses and nearly $72.5 million in US military assistance between 2010 and 2024, the DRC has failed to create an effective and professional military capable of responding to crises within its borders. Until the DRC demonstrates interest in addressing conflict, the US should exercise caution with its investments and prioritize accountability over optimism. Therefore, instead of continuing with high-risk investments in the DRC and condemning Kigali, a demonstrably capable government, the US should hold Kinshasa more accountable for the lack of improvement in human suffering within its borders.

Conclusion

The Great Lakes Region has experienced a power shift that US policymakers cannot ignore. Although both Rwanda and DRC share culpability for this conflict, Rwanda has demonstrated significant growth through its post-conflict recovery and evolution into a central powerbroker, while the DRC has grown less capable. This is not an argument in defense of authoritarianism, nor an excuse for the unlawful seizure of territory. Instead, it argues for a pragmatic approach that accounts for the new regional dynamics. Despite years of international support, the Congolese government has failed to reform and establish control. The continued treatment of Kinshasa as the primary stakeholder has not worked; therefore, the US must explore a new strategy that prioritizes pragmatism.

By engaging Rwanda directly, the US can address the root causes of instability in the Kivus while also securing its own economic needs. Simultaneously, this does not abandon the DRC or the Congolese people; rather, it reduces the burden on the DRC so it can focus on areas where the government has the capacity to govern. This strategy intends to offer a path to stability in Eastern Congo. However, stability is only possible if the US prioritizes support to those with a proven track record in delivering results.

Craig Denker

Craig Denker is a current United States Army Foreign Area Officer and former Civil Affairs Officer with experience in East and West Africa. He holds a Master's in Global Affairs from George Mason University.

Small Wars Journal · Craig Denker

​15. Concept of Small Boats: Sri Lanka’s Contribution to Naval Battles

Summary:

Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE forced its navy to abandon inherited Mahan–Corbett blue-water doctrine and “out-guerrilla the guerrilla” at sea. Facing Sea Tiger suicide craft and wolf-pack swarms, Colombo shifted to indigenous fiberglass “Arrow Boats,” mass-produced, fast, heavily armed, and employed in SBS and RABS small-boat swarms. Paired with FACs and concealed forward basing, these craft broke LTTE naval power by 2009 and restored coastal control. The concept anticipated today’s littoral and USV trends, echoed in Ukraine’s Sea Baby and exported to partners like Nigeria, underscoring small, agile, cheap boats as decisive assets in crowded littoral battlespaces.

Concept of Small Boats: Sri Lanka’s Contribution to Naval Battles

Small Wars Journal · Punsara Amarasinghe

|

12.05.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/05/concept-of-small-boats-sri-lankas-contribution-to-naval-battles/

When Sri Lankan armed forces fought with the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) for thirty years, they confronted their biggest most ferocious threat. This threat came from the asymmetrical advancements of LTTE guerrillas, which challenged the conventional military strategies of Sri Lankan forces. With time, and at a heavy price, Sri Lankan forces became accustomed to grappling with asymmetrical warfare. It may not be an exaggeration to state that the Sri Lankan Navy adopted intense structural and doctrinal changes earlier than the other two-armed forces in Sri Lanka when it came to understanding the enemy. As the LTTE’s activities intensified along the northern and eastern coasts of Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Navy retained a largely traditional posture, reflecting the doctrines inherited from the British naval system. The British instructors had instilled in them the doctrines of Mahan’s concept of absolute naval supremacy and Corbett’s maritime strategy—ideals revered by these post-colonial naval officers but offering little insight into the unconventional challenges posed by the LTTE’s naval wing, the “Sea Tigers.”

At the outset of the LTTE’s naval operations, its mechanical power was considerably inferior to the conventional maritime capabilities of the Sri Lankan Navy, which possessed a larger fleet of Fast Attack Crafts (FAC), while the LTTE’s vessels were limited to small boats with speeds below 25 nautical miles per hour. To overcome this disparity, the LTTE frequently resorted to suicide attacks, inflicting significant damage on the Sri Lankan Navy. Following the first suicide attack launched by the LTTE against the naval vessel Edithara, such tactics remained their preferred strategy, progressively undermining the strength and morale of the Sri Lankan Navy. In addition to suicide attacks, the LTTE emulated the tactics of the Italian World War II special unit Decima Flottiglia MAS by training their own divers to sabotage naval vessels docked in harbors. They further improvised their approach in the sea battles adopting Wolf Pack tactics in which LTTE relied on using many small boats to surround the FAC’s of Sri Lankan Navy.

The growing complexities of sea routes—encompassing geopolitical rivalries and challenges in maritime governance—now shape the dynamics of modern naval engagements, underscoring the need to reassess Sri Lanka’s maritime strategy.

With time and experience, especially after 2005, the Sri Lankan navy developed a formidable counter-strategy to match the LTTE’s superiority in asymmetrical sea battles. It may be a truism to state that the circumstances faced by the Navy after the LTTE launched the 4th Elam War compelled them to alter their strategic culture. For instance, after 2005, the LTTE increased the number of boats it deployed during attacks. The Sri Lankan Navy realized they would need at least 25 to 30 FACs at once to crush such intense assaults. Yet, acquiring enough FACs from the international market quickly was impossible. The Navy’s solution for this dilemma was ingenious: they decided to manufacture their own small boats from fiberglass. This extraordinary concept arose from the strategic acumen of then Navy Commander Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda. As Paul A. Povlock, a scholar from the US Naval War College, later described, this tactic was to “out-guerrilla the guerrilla”.

Karannagoda referred to these newly constructed small boats as “Arrow Boats” because of their resemblance to a sharp arrow, each powered by a 250-horsepower engine. The firepower mounted on these boats ranged from 14.5 mm twin-barrel guns to grenade launchers imported from China. Two specialized units within the Sri Lankan Navy—the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS)—were established to operationalize the small-boat concept and mastered swarm tactics to outmaneuver the LTTE’s naval units. Throughout the Sri Lankan Navy’s engagements with the LTTE, the Sea Tigers consistently targeted Navy FACs along the coastal areas of Point Pedro and Mullaitivu in northern Sri Lanka. The primary challenge the Sri Lankan Navy faced in deploying the newly built Arrow Boats against the Sea Tigers was the absence of a harbor at Point Pedro to station these vessels. However, the boats were concealed behind sea rocks during the inter-monsoon period, and their first combat engagement in 2007 crippled the Sea Tigers.

As Admiral Karannagoda recalls later, the first active participation of arrow boats in a sea battle proved their effectiveness to the Sri Lankan navy as arrow boats could destroy two LTTE Sea Tiger fighter crafts. Later Sri Lankan Navy embraced a new concept of combining arrow boats with FACs, which led to an increase in the defensive capabilities of the navy and to protect its traditional vessels, such as battleships, in the open sea.

Some analysts argue that the Sri Lankan Navy’s approach to small boats resembled that of the British Navy, which had introduced innovative coastal motor boats during the First World War. This innovation enabled the British Navy to achieve decisive victories against the Imperial German Navy in the North Sea. Despite the conceptual similarities, the Sri Lankan Navy’s innovation proved decisive, as the maritime activities of the Sea Tigers rapidly declined. Naval engagements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Navy along Sri Lanka’s northeastern coast reached their peak in 2006, prior to the adoption of the small boat concept. However, following structural reforms within the Navy, small boats known as “arrow boats” were introduced, marking a significant tactical advancement. Their superior speed and firepower greatly enhanced the Navy’s ability to suppress Sea Tiger activities, reducing the number of direct confrontations between the two forces to only eleven in 2007. Within a year, the number of confrontations declined further, reaching its lowest point in 2008. By March 2009, the Sri Lankan Navy had achieved complete control over the island’s coastal waters.

The small-boat concept did not fade following the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009; rather, its tactical value was recognized within the domestic defense industry.

According to retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, future conflicts are expected to occur in littoral zones, where the sea meets the land. Conventional naval warfare has largely receded into history since the conclusion of the Falklands War. The growing complexities of sea routes—encompassing geopolitical rivalries and challenges in maritime governance—now shape the dynamics of modern naval engagements, underscoring the need to reassess Sri Lanka’s maritime strategy. Although no direct parallel can be drawn, Ukraine’s recent innovations in confronting overwhelming Russian naval superiority serve as a salient reminder of the Sri Lankan Navy’s small-boat doctrine. Sea Baby, an unmanned surface vessel (USV) developed by the Security Service of Ukraine to counter Russian naval advances in the Black Sea, bears notable resemblance in design to the Arrow boats employed by the Sri Lankan Navy. The small-boat concept did not fade following the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009; rather, its tactical value was recognized within the domestic defense industry. For instance, in 2016, Nigeria procured nine inshore Arrow boats from Sri Lanka under a contract valued at USD 4.2 million, reaffirming the strategic and commercial value of the small-boat concept—an emblem of the Sri Lankan Navy’s indigenous innovation.

Tags: naval warfare

About The Author

• 
  
• Punsara Amarasinghe
• Mr. Amarasinghe is former Post-Doctoral researcher at Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Pisa. He is a contributor to RUSI and Romanian Military Thinking. Currently he serves as a lecturer at General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University in Sri Lanka.
• View all posts

Small Wars Journal · Punsara Amarasinghe

16. The Common-Sense Realism of the National Security Strategy

​Summary:

The 2025 NSS finally embodies a “common-sense realism” long urged by America First and realist analysts. It rejects post-Cold War utopianism, treats China as pacing threat and Asia as priority, and links security to industrial revival and supply-chain resilience. Alliances are instruments, not sacred trusts; Europeans must carry more weight. A Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine elevates hemispheric defense, migration control, and counternarcotics. Lawson faults the NSS for not going far enough to split Russia from China, yet judges it the most coherent U.S. grand strategy blueprint since Nixon, contingent on disciplined implementation.

Comment: The most positive review I have read on the new NSS.

The Common-Sense Realism of the National Security Strategy

The National Interest · Greg R. Lawson

December 5, 2025​

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-common-sense-realism-of-the-national-security-strategy

The Trump administration has rightly reoriented US foreign policy toward domestic renewal, more balanced alliances, and hemispheric protection.

For nearly a decade, a small but growing group of analysts has argued that American foreign policy needs a massive course correction. With the unveiling of President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy yesterday, that broad-based course correction is at hand and clearly articulated.

While the United States cannot, and should not, retreat into isolationism, it has desperately needed a reorientation toward the world as it actually is. For too long, Western intellectuals, policy wonks, and political leaders bought into the “End of History” and “Unipolar Moment” framing of how the world would operate after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Instead of continuing to act as if the United States could perennially play the role of Atlas holding up the world, a consistent theme emerged in realist policy analysis: the United States could no longer afford a foreign policy driven by ideological aspiration, institutional inertia, or the comforting illusions of unipolarity. The United States needed a realism fit for a new competitive age—not the caricature of realism that pretends America can withdraw behind its oceans, but a realism grounded in material strength, strategic triage, and an unsentimental view of how great-power politics actually works.

With the release of the 2025 National Security Strategy, it is fair to say that an American administration has finally produced a strategic document that fully embodies this worldview and does so unapologetically. The NSS contains a strategic sensibility that realists and America First-oriented analysts have been advancing for years—one that places geopolitical balance, economic resilience, and clear prioritization at the center of US statecraft, while discarding the moralistic overreach that defined the post-Cold War era. The result is a document that, while not perfect, marks the most significant intellectual advance in American grand strategy since the Nixon administration.

The first point of alignment is prioritization, something that has been the Achilles’ heel of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The 2025 NSS does not mince words: China is the pacing challenge, and the Indo-Pacific is the priority theater. This is precisely the analytic structure outlined in some of my own previous work, which recommended cultivating a strategic framework linking the United States, India, Japan, and (under the right circumstances) Russia to prevent the emergence of a Sino-centric Eurasian order.

Likewise, the NSS’s emphasis on geoeconomics could have been lifted directly from arguments made by realists for years. It has long been evident that the United States has allowed its industrial base to atrophy even as global competition shifted from purely military confrontation to a contest over supply chains, technology platforms, and industrial capacity. The 2025 NSS not only acknowledges this shift—it places it at the center of American strategy. By linking national security to industrial policy, supply-chain resilience, advanced manufacturing, and technological leadership, the NSS essentially acknowledges that economic power is a form of strategic power. This is not a rhetorical shift. It is a recognition that strategy begins at home.

The NSS also takes a remarkably pragmatic approach to alliances. For years, alliances have been treated more as sacred relics than as strategic instruments. But alliances are tools, not ends in themselves. Allies should contribute materially to shared strategic objectives, rather than simply offering moral support or rhetorical solidarity. This is especially true of allies in Europe that the NSS rightly critiques for their history of free-riding on US defense spending while often lecturing US leaders on morality.

The NSS reflects this worldview almost exactly: it calls for real burden-sharing, for alliances tailored to functional missions, and for a sober reassessment of what partners can realistically deliver in a world where American resources are not limitless. This is not abandonment of the United States’ global role—it is reform, the kind necessary to ensure alliances remain sustainable and strategically coherent.

Related Articles

• Artificial Intelligence (AI)
• Diplomacy
• Land Warfare

Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy Takes Aim at Europe

In the recently released strategic document, the Trump administration depicts Europe as facing “civilizational erasure.” Is this true for Central Europe?

• Marek Magierowski

December 5, 2025

• Diplomacy

The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

In the spirit of Theodore Roosevelt, Trump could assert a right to intervene diplomatically, or perhaps even militarily, to prevent some extraregional red team from ensconcing itself in the Americas.

• James Holmes

December 5, 2025

• Artificial Intelligence (AI)
• History
• Migration
• Nuclear Warfare

Dejà Vu All Over Again: The Risks of Historical Amnesia

US policymakers are forgetting the lessons of history at just the moment their recollection is most needed.

• Mathew Burrows
• Robert A. Manning

December 5, 2025

Perhaps most importantly, the 2025 NSS overall embraces a form of common-sense realism that has been absent from American strategy for too long. The document does not promise to remake the world in America’s image. It does not offer transcendent missions or moral crusades. Instead, it proposes a world where the United States advances its interests through strength, prudence, and selective engagement. This, too, aligns with a neo-Nixonian approach: a willingness to engage diplomatically, even with difficult states, to use leverage rather than lectures, and to prioritize outcomes over appearances.

There is, of course, one central area where the NSS does not go far enough: Russia. The United States needs to distance Russia from China to avoid the further consolidation of the Sino-Russian Axis, a true geopolitical nightmare that threatens the Eurasian and global balance of power. Such a move would conceptually replicate the triangular diplomacy that Nixon and Kissinger employed so effectively in the 1970s.

The NSS recognizes the need for stability with Russia and the danger of a consolidated Sino-Russian bloc. Still, it stops short of articulating the transactional diplomacy that will likely be necessary to achieve a strategic split. Washington continues to view Russia primarily through the lens of the Ukraine conflict, and while that view is understandable, it risks missing the larger structural stakes of Eurasian geopolitics.

The NSS also focuses on the Western hemisphere. However, this new “Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine rightly seeks to combat major problems for the United States, including drug running, especially the fentanyl-based “reverse Opium War” waged by China, instability that leads to unconstrained immigration flows while seeking to reassert American dominance in its strategic backyard, rather than ceding critical territory to China. This certainly fits an America First geopolitical and defense-oriented strategy.

Still, these slight divergences should not obscure the larger point: the NSS and realist grand strategy share a remarkably similar and coherent worldview. Both see the world entering a period of intensified great-power competition. Both understand that America’s relative power must be underwritten by domestic renewal. Both reject ideological adventurism in favor of strategic restraint. Both prioritize shaping the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. And both argue that alliances must be recalibrated, especially when it comes to a declining Europe—not discarded—to meet the challenges of a multipolar world.

For many years, America First foreign policy and defense analysts have rightly worried that the United States was drifting without a strategic compass, pulled by habit, ideology, and institutional inertia. The 2025 NSS is a sign that this drift may finally be coming to an end.

The document is not perfect, and how it is implemented will be far more important than how it is written. But for the first time in a generation, American grand strategy rests upon a foundation that is intellectually coherent, strategically realistic, and aligned with the geopolitical world as it actually exists, not in the imagination of naïve idealists.

Ultimately, the NSS is not merely a policy document. It is a strategic correction—one that realist analysts have long argued was necessary—and one that the United States can no longer delay.

About the Author: Greg Lawson

Greg R. Lawson is a contributing analyst with Wikistrat and a research fellow at the Buckeye Institute. He has previously contributed to The National Interest, RealClear World, and Eurasia Review. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @ConservaWonk.

17. Experts react: What Trump’s National Security Strategy means for US foreign policy

Comment: 16 experts give their assessments of the NSS. Mixed review; slightly generally positive I believe.

Experts react: What Trump’s National Security Strategy means for US foreign policy

atlanticcouncil.org · jcookson · December 5, 2025

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-trumps-national-security-strategy-means-for-us-foreign-policy/#garlauskas

The Trump 2.0 worldview is now on paper for the world to see. Late Thursday, the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy (NSS), a twenty-nine-page document outlining its principles and priorities for US foreign policy. The document articulates what US strategy is—for example, a focus on the Western Hemisphere and a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. And it addresses what US strategy isn’t: continued pursuit of a post–Cold War goal of “permanent American domination of the entire world,” which the NSS describes as a “fundamentally undesirable and impossible goal.”

Below, our experts dig into what the strategy includes and leaves out—and emerge with their biggest takeaways. This post will be updated as more contributions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Matthew Kroenig: Where the NSS succeeds—and falls short 

Jason Marczak: The NSS gives new insight into Trump’s Venezuela goals 

Alexander B. Gray: The Western Hemisphere “Trump Corollary” is a logical focus on strategic geography 

Tressa Guenov: The NSS avoids taking on US adversaries’ goals

Daniel Fried: The NSS offers an inconsistent but workable set of elements 

James Mazzarella and Kimberly Donovan: The NSS is as much about economic statecraft as national security

Torrey Taussig: The administration’s treatment of Europe undermines its own interests

Rama Yade: On Africa, the NSS emphasizes trade and a more interventionist security policy 

Markus Garlauskas: The NSS sends clear signals to friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific

Thomas S. Warrick: An emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests

Jorge Gastelumendi: Trump’s energy- and technology-dominance goals will need more of a focus on resilience

Caroline Costello: A major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing

Alex Serban: NATO’s eastern flank must respond to shifting US priorities with greater self-reliance and European cooperation 

Dexter Tiff Roberts: Trade and tariff policy is jeopardizing the strategy’s worthy goals

Tess deBlanc-Knowles: To reach the NSS’s tech leadership goals, the administration needs to invest in research

Where the NSS succeeds—and falls short

While they might not have conceived of it this way, the true challenge facing the authors of the United States’ new national security was how to update the country’s mostly successful eighty-year, post-World War II grand strategy for a new era. The new National Security Strategy’s greatest strengths, therefore, come when it doubles down on past principles that still work and identifies creative solutions to new problems.

The strategy is traditional in its strong support for nuclear deterrence and preventing hostile powers from dominating important regions. It calls for strong alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific—to be achieved in part by allies stepping up to do more for their own defense and greater coordination on economic security. The document prioritizes achieving freer and fairer terms for global trade and deeper economic engagement in most world regions.

It provides creative solutions for new challenges with a suite of policies to address the downsides of globalization (on border security, revitalizing domestic manufacturing, and so on) and by laying out a vision for US victory in the new tech arms race.

The document falls short where it rejects principles that have worked in the past (e.g., the pragmatic promotion of democracy and human rights) and where it fails to clearly identify and address new challenges before the country (the threat from revisionist autocracies and their interlinkages should have received much more attention).

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

The NSS gives new insight into Trump’s Venezuela goals

The new NSS is clear: The Western Hemisphere is now the United States’ top priority. This is a long overdue and welcome shift, as US interests should begin close to home. The strategy captures on paper what we have seen from the Trump administration in action thus far, including the twin goals laid out of “Enlist and Expand.” This approach underpins efforts to control migration, stop the proliferation of drug cartels, reduce nonfriendly foreign influence, and secure critical supply chains. But also, and importantly, it includes incentivizing new waves of US investment, since strong domestic economies serve US interests.

The priorities laid out in the NSS—from a holistic perspective—dovetail with many of the interests of countries across the Western Hemisphere, such as security and economic growth, which have been the top concerns of voters in recent elections. There’s also a regional yearning for greater US investment, especially in infrastructure such as telecommunications, technology, and ports, all of which simply has not come at the desired scale. The NSS provides a blueprint for the broader US government to elevate its role in these critical sectors, and it underscores the need for a whole-of-government approach.

The strategy gives insight into the Trump administration’s ultimate goal in Venezuela. A country where Maduro and his cronies currently provide safe haven for criminal groups, profit from trafficking, and welcome the influence of foreign adversaries is a direct threat to US national security. Success in Venezuela, therefore, means ushering in a democratic government that’s a genuine US partner as part of the goal to “expand” US partnerships. And a US shift to the Western Hemisphere as part of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine also signals that the redeployment of US forces to the Caribbean is not time-bound.

The NSS further details a multi-pronged hemispheric effort to counter the influence of external powers, including Russia and, especially, China. For China, this means addressing Beijing’s growing footprint across commerce, investment, soft diplomacy, military training, and more. What should we look at next? How will implementation be prioritized, and how will this strategy translate at the country level across the hemisphere?

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The Western Hemisphere “Trump Corollary” is a logical focus on strategic geography

Trump’s NSS is a much-needed corrective to decades of “strategies” that, through their failure to force difficult choices about priorities and resource allocation, commit the United States to an overstretched conception of national strategy. This NSS is remarkably and refreshingly frank about the essential objectives of the United States: securing the homeland, which requires a secure Western Hemisphere, and preventing outside great power adversaries from exerting malign influence in the hemisphere. The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which seeks to guarantee US access to key hemispheric locations (think the Panama Canal, Greenland, and much of the Caribbean) will likely stand as an overt, twenty-first century statement of a logical and previously unexceptional focus on strategic geography. The Trump Corollary carries real security and economic implications for American interests and security in the homeland. This strategic focus is likely to encourage new resources dedicated to intelligence, military, law enforcement, and economic statecraft programs focused on the hemisphere.

The administration’s statement of intent for the Indo-Pacific is a consistent throughline from its 2017 NSS, but it also reflects evolving geopolitical realities. The NSS reiterates US commitment to preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific and strengthening regional partners and allies against China’s malign activity. It defines the region as the essential non-hemispheric theater for geopolitical competition. Importantly, the NSS seeks to draw a line between security in our hemisphere and deterrence of Beijing more broadly. This makes explicit a long-running reality of the US competition with China: Beijing seeks to distract the United States from maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific by pursuing adversarial activities in the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, the NSS is a useful thematic reminder that US national strength stems from more than simply the military balance. The strategy is explicit on the need for a strong defense-industrial and manufacturing base to sustain that military balance, alongside dominance in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and supercomputing. The NSS should be understood as a limiting document that seeks to more narrowly define US objectives globally, while also expanding the definition of US national power in a more comprehensive direction, building upon Trump’s long-stated belief that economic security is national security.

Taken together, these lines of effort reflect a coordinated, holistic approach to preserving US national power in the decades to come.

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council (NSC).

The NSS avoids taking on US adversaries’ goals

This NSS articulates key policy patterns into a declarative set of priorities for the administration. But it also leaves several strategic holes on how and whether the United States will address the effect that adversaries will continue to have on realizing the NSS’s goals.

On Russia, the strategy notes that Europe sees Moscow as an existential threat, but it does not contain any meaningful treatment about the threat Russia poses to the United States in terms of realizing its economic, soft power, or military projection—not just in Europe but around the world. The United States is cast more as an arbiter between Russia and Europe rather than the object of an almost singular focus by Russia on counteracting US influence and power projection. The strategy’s focus on Africa is welcome, but there is no acknowledgement that Russia and China continue to actively thwart nearly every US objective on the continent.

The strategy acknowledges Iran’s role as a major regional destabilizer, but the Tehran problem is largely set aside as bygone. Let’s hope that is the case. Still, the Middle East has continuously demonstrated to every successive US administration that the United States must always remain vigilant in the region. Iran’s influence in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Gaza, and beyond must be closely monitored even as the administration pursues its investment-focused regional agenda. Similarly, North Korea is not explicitly named in the strategy, yet Pyongyang surely will have designs on global attention over the next three years.

The strategy’s muted treatment of adversary goals is likely intentional, a bid to signal a new chapter for the United States where it is less encumbered by the strategic irritants of the post-Cold War era and is free to pursue a bolder interest-based agenda. The reality remains that US adversaries do not want to see this NSS realized whether the United States names them or not. US strategy must continue to take those factors into account.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was the US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the US Department of Defense.

The NSS offers an inconsistent but workable set of elements

The newly released NSS seems to combine:

• an overlay of post-Iraq/Afghanistan weariness and reaction, a sort of right-wing version of the post-Vietnam “come home, America” thinking of the Democrats in the early 1970s;
• ideological posturing, particularly directed against Europe with a sharp partisan element of support for “patriotic” (presumably meaning nationalist and nativist) parties;
• a call for fortress America (the document refers to the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” which seems to mean a desire to prevent outside powers such as China from establishing economic leverage in the hemisphere);
• a strong assertion of US interests in pushing back on Chinese economic coercion and distortion of global trade as well as Chinese expansionism. The section on Asia has good language about no change to the Taiwan “status quo” and lots about protecting the Western Pacific island chains;
• possibly workable language on economic policy, with emphasis on preventing foreign domination of critical resources and technologies and foreign exploitation of international trade, and;
• inconsistent, occasionally odd, and probably compromise language on Europe that combines partisan hostility to Europe’s mainstream politics with grudging but welcome recognition that the United States needs to work with Europe.

The NSS is weak on Russia, which is mentioned only in a European context. But it does call for a “cession of hostilities” in Ukraine that leaves Ukraine a “viable state” and terms this a “core interest” of the United States. That’s not sufficient, given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to engage in US efforts to end the war, but it is good enough to support a good-enough policy, if the Trump team decides to push Russia to achieve this core interest.

The strategy’s ideological hostility toward Europe combines with its implied bitterness over perceived US overextension and general disdain for “values” to drive US withdrawal from leadership of the free world—and even the concept of the free world itself. At the same time, the NSS elsewhere recognizes that the United States will need its friends, Europe included, to contend with its adversaries, especially China. This gives the NSS an internal incoherence. To a policy practitioner, the incoherence could provide an opportunity to build on the NSS’s better elements.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He formerly served as special assistant and National Security Council senior director for presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, ambassador to Poland, and assistant secretary of state for Europe.

The NSS is as much about economic statecraft as national security

The second Trump administration’s NSS is as much an economic statecraft strategy as it is a national security strategy, justifying US internationalism primarily based on economic interests, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, and, perhaps surprisingly for those concerned about the merger of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) into the Department of State, reinforcing the importance of soft power.

It frames foreign policy around traditional economic statecraft objectives such as preserving secure supply chains, access to raw materials, protecting US export markets, and ensuring dominance of US technology and industrial capacity. International assistance is not dismissed, but it is also not presented as a tool of humanitarian obligation or for providing global public goods. Rather, assistance is considered meaningful when it helps protect or advance US interests.

While this may seem cold-hearted, it actually reflects what many in the Global South already assume to be the reality of all foreign assistance and is how this funding has been justified to the American people for decades. Even as the United States provides food aid, for instance, US leaders talk about it as helping US farmers or creating global stability to ensure Americans’ own safety and prosperity. The NSS also notes plans to scale up the use of two of the most important US government development tools, the Development Finance Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, reversing a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)-era assault on development in general.

—James Mazzarella is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. From 2017 to 2019, he served at the White House’s National Security Council (NSC) and National Economic Council, first serving as director of international development and then senior director for global economics and development.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served as acting associate director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Intelligence Division, in the US Treasury Department.

The administration’s treatment of Europe undermines its own interests

Throughout 2025, the Trump administration’s purported aim in Europe has been to shift the burden of conventional defense onto the shoulders of European allies. The administration scored a win at the Hague Summit by pushing NATO allies to agree to an ambitious defense spending pledge of 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2035. Unfortunately, the NSS does nothing to help further US national security interests, by the administration’s own definition, on the European continent.

By underplaying—and refraining from even referencing—the conventional threat Russia poses to transatlantic security, the NSS does not empower those nations that are working to take on greater defense responsibilities. Instead, the NSS seeks to embolden those nationalist and populist parties (such as the AfD in Germany) that would be the most likely to cut defense budgets and downplay the conventional threats that have traditionally fallen to a reliance on the United States. In this regard, the NSS is an own goal that undermines the administration’s stated objectives for what it seeks to achieve with European allies.

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.

On Africa, the NSS emphasizes trade and a more interventionist security policy

On the Africa front, the paper is thin—a half page at the bottom of the strategy—and is not surprising. It repeats the key angles of the Trump administration’s approach to Africa as already outlined before Trump’s election by Project 2025 (with a clear refutation of “liberal ideology”) and after Trump’s election by Troy Fitrell, the State Department’s senior bureau official for African Affairs, in Abidjan and in Luanda.

Following the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development in July, the strategy shifts US–Africa relations from aid to trade and investment: the United States signals a stronger focus on commerce, mining (especially critical minerals), and energy investments in African countries. The United States plans to support private-sector growth and expand market access.

It is on security that the Trump administration has perhaps evolved the most, with a more interventionist policy. The administration started this shift in February with large strikes on Somalia against a leader from the local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The strategy emphasizes that combating the “resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa” remains a priority. Because security is not far from commerce, the landmark peace agreemen signed yesterday at the US Institute of Peace between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo , with the goal of ending a three-decade war that has taken millions of lives, will also serve as a platform to advance US business interests. It seems the administration will next turn to Sudan and the ongoing genocide in Darfur.

The strategy does not say anything, though, about the two most remarkable developments this year with respect to US-Africa relations—the rising tensions with the two largest African economies, South Africa and Nigeria. These disputes seem more motivated by domestic considerations (protection of Christians, Afrikaners, and Israel) than the competition with China on African soil, reminding us that any Trump foreign activity is guided by the principle of “America first.”

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The NSS sends clear signals to friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific

Public US government strategic documents are more meaningful for what they signal to friends and adversaries than for driving change in US actions. This NSS’s writing suggests a domestic audience, but its words are being parsed closely in the Indo-Pacific—where the time zone differences enabled publishing local first takes while Washington slept.

Language on China and Taiwan garnered the most attention. For example, some commentators are already opining that shifting from the last NSS’s wording of “oppose any unilateral changes” to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, to “does not support any unilateral change” is a softening, despite the new NSS calling this a “longstanding declaratory policy.” Any worried readers should instead direct their attention to the NSS’s blunt imperative on “reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.” This is stronger language than any previous NSS on Taiwan’s defense. Even more important is the recent context: the president’s signing of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act and the announced $330 million package of advanced US arms sales to Taiwan.

Similarly, South Korean concerns that North Korea was mentioned seventeen times in the first Trump administration’s NSS, but not once this time, are misplaced. Pyongyang has obviously not been a high priority for Washington since the inconclusive Hanoi summit of 2019, but the United States is doubling down on its alliance with South Korea and remains steadfast in deterring threats from the North. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un might take solace that boilerplate language on denuclearization was absent, but Kim would be foolish to see this as a concession.

At least for the Indo-Pacific, friends and adversaries alike should read the clear signals in the NSS—the United States is committed to strengthening extended deterrence in the region, even as it reminds its Indo-Pacific friends that Washington expects them to increase their military contributions to such deterrence.

 —Markus Garlauskas iis director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He served for two decades in the US government as an intelligence officer and strategist.

An emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests

As expected, the new National Security Strategy is a combination of traditional views of the importance of American power, but with an emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests as a driver of international engagement. For the first time in decades, the Western Hemisphere is given precedence, with the strategic goal of reducing mass migration. Border security is seen as a key element of national security―a proposition that most Americans would agree with, even if they disagree on how to handle immigration enforcement domestically. More paragraphs in the NSS are devoted to Asia (25) than Europe, the Middle East, and Africa combined (13, 7, and 3).

Counterterrorism, soon to be the subject of its own national strategy, is barely mentioned, but previews of the counterterrorism strategy show a vision of global terrorism reduced to a problem that governments can deal with on their own, with limited outside support needed. This would represent important progress and is a goal that would benefit the United States and its counterterrorism partners around the world.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Trump’s energy- and technology-dominance goals will need more of a focus on resilience

The 2025 NSS clearly outlines ambitions for US energy, industrial, and technological dominance. However, to secure long-term success in those aims, I believe the document should place even greater emphasis on building resilience—both in infrastructure and in financial systems.

Resilient, modern infrastructure is the foundation of reliable energy and technological networks. Without robust power grids, supply chains, and communications systems, ambitions for advanced nuclear reactors, AI-driven innovation, and export leadership remain fragile. Supporting that infrastructure—and embedding redundant, disaster-resistant systems—gives real durability to the energy- and technology-dominance goals.

Likewise, broadening access to financial opportunities and capital—especially for infrastructure, clean energy, and emerging tech—would strengthen economic inclusion and mobilize domestic innovation at scale. A strategy anchored in resilience and financial empowerment would therefore bolster not just short-term gains, but enduring strength, capacity, and stability for decades.

—Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

A major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing

It is striking that this NSS frames China as more of a potential economic partner than an adversary, pledging to pursue “a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The previous NSS described China as a values-based adversary seeking to “create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model.”

Why is China an adversary? There are, broadly speaking, two answers to this question: because China’s rise challenges US economic and security interests, and because Beijing is replacing the rules-based international system with one that favors its authoritarian model. This NSS makes it clear that the Trump administration views the US-China rivalry as an interest-based competition, not a clash of values.

The NSS neither denounces nor even mentions China’s authoritarianism. It also prioritizes deterring conflict over Taiwan for strategic and economic reasons, not to preserve its democracy. This represents a major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing. This is the first time since the 1988 NSS—published during a period of optimism toward China’s reform and opening to the world—that the NSS has neither condemned China’s governance system nor expressed an intent to promote democratic reform in China.

—Caroline Costello is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

NATO’s eastern flank must respond to shifting US priorities with greater self-reliance and European cooperation

The new NSS signals a major reordering of US global priorities. This will have important implications for all of Europe, including countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, a region that was named in one of the administration’s seven priorities for the continent. One clear message: Washington is urging European allies to take over conventional defense responsibilities while the United States retains a more limited role in the continent’s security, mostly as a nuclear backstop.

For states on NATO’s eastern flank, this recalibration raises legitimate concerns. Given the ongoing war in Ukraine and continued pressure from Russia, diminished US engagement could weaken the sense of reliability that underpins collective defense guarantees and NATO’s Article 5.

At the same time, the shift pushes Europe—including eastern flank nations—to reassess strategic autonomy. That means investing more in defense capabilities, strengthening regional cooperation, and possibly speeding up modernization and institutional reforms. For Romania, this aligns with the objectives laid out in its new national security strategy, which was presented by President Nicușor Dan and approved by Parliament last month.

But this transition comes with difficulty. Diverging threat perceptions between the United States and Europe regarding issues including Russia, China, migration, and climate change could strain alliance cohesion and reduce predictability.

This strategic pivot by the United States may force Romania and its neighbors into a period of heightened responsibility and adaptation. This will require greater self-reliance, deeper cooperation among European countries, and a reassessment of regional security dynamics—all while navigating uncertainty over long-term transatlantic security guarantees.

—Alex Serban is the Director for the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office and formerly a senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Trade and tariff policy is jeopardizing the strategy’s worthy goals

The Trump administration’s decision to frame the China challenge as one centered around economics is welcome. Indeed, successive US administrations have had a blind spot in recognizing how Beijing’s mercantilist practices have often hurt US industries and workers and allowed China to quickly narrow the technological gap with the United States. The focus on finding ways to better combat China’s state-directed subsidies and unfair trade practices, secure global supply chains, and trade more with the Global South, which the NSS correctly calls “among the greatest economic battlegrounds of the coming decades,” is also welcome. The fact that China doubled its exports to low-income countries between 2020 and 2024, which the NSS highlights, is indeed a challenge the United States should address. And the NSS’s declaration that the United States “must work with our treaty allies and partners,” whose economies, when combined with the United States’, account for half of global output, to “counteract predatory economic practices” (clearly referring to China), is on the mark, as well.

But the challenge, in large part of the White House’s own making, is that many US allies and partners are feeling less confident about economic and trade policy making in Washington than ever before. Much of that is due to the chaotic and possibly illegal tariff policy of the US president, which the Supreme Court is about to weigh in on in a case with potentially massive economic and diplomatic consequences. A Pew Research Center survey from earlier this year shows that most countries view China rather than the United States as the world’s leading economic power, with 41 percent choosing Beijing compared to 39 percent for Washington. This is a striking reversal from just two years earlier. What’s more, that survey was conducted before Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement of sweeping, unprecedented global tariffs on April 2; since then, this sentiment is likely to have shifted even more in China’s favor. And this shift in perceptions is convincing some countries to strengthen economic partnerships with US rivals.

Take the example of India (mentioned only four times in the NSS, compared to twenty-one references to China). While for much of the past decade-plus it has been seen as a key counterweight to China and successive US administrations have worked to improve relations with New Delhi, that relationship is now at risk. The imposition of 50 percent tariffs on India, in part for purchasing Russian oil and gas while China was largely given a pass for purchasing even larger quantities of Russian energy products, has upset New Delhi and seems to be driving its recent efforts to improve relations with Beijing.

A high-profile leaders’ meeting in August between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during Modi’s first trip to China in seven years, is one sign of this shift. A closer relationship between China and India could also challenge Washington’s desire to see New Delhi contribute more to “Indo-Pacific security,” including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (a grouping comprised of the United States, Australia, Japan, and India), another worthy goal the NSS highlights. And Modi’s warm welcome of Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi this week is another warning sign of how a US national security strategy aimed at leaning on allies and partners to confront global threats is being undermined by US trade and tariff policy.

—Dexter Tiff Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, which is part of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served for more than two decades as China bureau chief and Asia News Editor at Bloomberg Businessweek, based in Beijing.

To reach the NSS’s tech leadership goals, the administration needs to invest in research

The NSS rightly emphasizes that leadership on emerging technologies is central to US national security. It recognizes that national security depends not only on military might, but on a robust economic foundation. As such, the strategy places due emphasis on essential investments in the US economy, workforce, and research enterprise to enable US leadership in critical technologies and to sustain the country’s military advantage.

The strategy also acknowledges technology as an instrument for cooperation and influence, a strategy that China has skillfully employed across the globe. However, it falls short in articulating a clear framework for pursuing the level of technology export and capacity-building needed to counter Chinese influence at scale.

As the administration moves to implement the strategy, its proposed $44 billion cut to federal research and development spending threatens to undermine its own vision and erode the very foundations upon which technological leadership depends.

—Tess deBlanc-Knowles is the senior director of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. She previously served as senior policy advisor on artificial intelligence at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

​18. Opinion | The National Security Strategy is less a strategy than a mood board

​Comment: Ouch!

But it is not completely negative:

Excerpt:

But it’s not all pablum. Some ideas threaded through the strategy are quite sound. Trump’s relentless focus on burden-sharing in Asia and Europe has ruffled feathers, but it’s laudable, and long overdue, to push allies to spend more on defense. So is the admission that isolationism is a non-starter “for a country whose interests are as numerous and diverse as ours" — a message more than a few administration officials would benefit from internalizing.

Opinion | The National Security Strategy is less a strategy than a mood board

Washington Post · Editorial Board

The Trump administration attempts to define “America First” in the broadest possible terms.

December 5, 2025 at 6:01 p.m. ESTDecember 5, 2025

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/12/05/national-security-strategy-is-less-strategy-than-mood-board/

No one thinks President Donald Trump is going to consult his National Security Strategy as he considers how to respond to international crises, but the document still provides important insights into how the administration sees the world. And the latest iteration, like much of his foreign policy, is a mixed bag.

The 33-page document released Thursday night by the White House is overflowing with sweeping aspirations and generalizations but short on details. What it aims to offer instead is a corrective to what this administration sees as undisciplined moralizing by foreign policy elites that led the United States into a kind of strategic insolvency.

By being everything all at once, it risks being nothing at all. “America First,” the document explains, means being “pragmatic without being ‘pragmatist,’ realistic without being ‘realist,’ principled without being ‘idealistic,’ muscular without being ‘hawkish,’ and restrained without being ‘dovish.’” Good luck with all that.

But it’s not all pablum. Some ideas threaded through the strategy are quite sound. Trump’s relentless focus on burden-sharing in Asia and Europe has ruffled feathers, but it’s laudable, and long overdue, to push allies to spend more on defense. So is the admission that isolationism is a non-starter “for a country whose interests are as numerous and diverse as ours" — a message more than a few administration officials would benefit from internalizing.

Other points are more debatable. Unchecked migration has angered enough voters for Trump to ride to victory twice. But it’s not useful to lump economic and assimilation concerns with fear-mongering about heading off “invasions” of drug cartels, human traffickers and terrorists. That has yielded a confused and confusing policy on Venezuela.

Similarly, a maniacal drive to address trade imbalances through bilateral diplomacy, often by threatening sledgehammer tariffs, has brought mixed results at best. Yes, tariff revenues are flowing in, but pressure on consumer prices is building. And bullying accelerates a rebalancing of the international order. See India’s warm welcome this week for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

A few elements of the report border on bizarre. The document foreswears imposing values on autocratic societies while simultaneously vowing to meddle in the internal affairs of other democracies, “especially” those of allies.

On Asia, the strategy evinces a clear understanding that the U.S. must remain economically predominant. The document correctly identifies Chinese economic coercion and Beijing’s attempts to distort global trade as threats. An emphasis on securing U.S. supply chains is valuable. The language on Taiwan is also adequately muscular and linked to securing access to trade routes in the South China Sea.

Ultimately, there’s plenty to work with in this grab bag of ideas. But like its predecessors, this is less a strategy than a mood board.

Washington Post · Editorial Board

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com