Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“No power and no treasure can outweigh the extension of our knowledge."

- Democritus

“As a young Black man in rural Mississippi in the 1920s and ’30s, Amzie Moore had assumed that God somehow loved white people more. “We had a terrible idea that it was sinful to be black, that God only loved white people,” he recalled. “I had assumed, reluctantly so, that it had to be something wrong with me.” His travels during World War II, and in particular his service in the Burma theater, opened his eyes. “I lost my fear of whites when I was in the armed forces,” he said. “I found out I was wrong. People are just people, some good, some bad, some rich, some poor.””

— Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 by Thomas E. Ricks

"An infected mind is a far more dangerous pestilence than any plague – one only threatens your life, the other destroys your character."

- Marcus Aurelius

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 7

2. A Better Understanding of Chinese Covert Operations (Book Review)

3. The Pentagon Marches Off to Climate War

4. IntelBrief: How Counterterrorism and Great Power Competition Coexist

5. Compromise NDAA released with $857.9 billion topline

6. Military sources: Ukraine missiles used US guidance

7. U.S.-French Commitment to Secure Space Assets Shines a Light on Cyber Vulnerability

8. How Biden, Congress can stop the UN from legitimizing antisemitism

9. US building a missile wall in the Pacific

10. Japanese warplanes in Philippines for first time since WW2

11. NATO's Nordic Enlargement: Contingency Planning and Learning Lessons

12. How ‘MacGyver’ magic can get Taiwan its Harpoon defenses faster

13. Germany arrests 25 accused of plotting coup

14. Are We Sleepwalking Through a ‘Decisive Decade’?

15. US military’s National Media Exploitation Center to refocus on China

16. China's looser anti-COVID measures met with relief, caution

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 7

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for a protracted war of conquest in Ukraine.
Putin is using Russia’s Human Rights Council to consolidate power while rejecting principles of international human rights law.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made comments supporting ISW’s previous assessments that an operational pause in the winter of 2022-2023 would favor Russia.
Russian forces used Shahed-136 drones in Ukraine for the first time in three weeks.
Russian efforts to pressure Belarus into joining the war in Ukraine may be causing friction in the Belarusian military.
Russian forces are likely increasing the pace of their counterattacks in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas.
Russian forces continued defensive operations and the reorientation of their forces in eastern Kherson Oblast.
Independent Russian media sources indicated that mobilization efforts will continue despite statements from Russian officials to the contrary.
Russian occupation authorities are likely transforming Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, into a rear military and logistics base for Russian forces.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 7

Dec 7, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 7, 7:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for a protracted war of conquest in Ukraine. During a meeting with the Russian Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC), Putin remarked that the “special operation” in Ukraine can be a “lengthy process” and that the acquisition of new territory is a significant result of this process for Russia.[1] Putin compared himself favorably with Russian Tsar Peter the Great by noting that Russia now controls the Sea of Azov, which Peter the Great also fought for.[2] This invocation of Russian imperial history explicitly frames Putin’s current goals in Ukraine as overtly imperialistic and still maximalist. Putin is conditioning Russian domestic audiences to expect a protracted, grinding war in Ukraine that continues to seek the conquest of additional Ukrainian territory.

The Russian information space responded positively to Putin’s assertions and set further conditions for the protraction of the war, with one milblogger comparing Ukraine to Syria and noting that Russian forces did not start meaningfully experiencing victories on the battlefield until years into the operation.[3] ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin has been setting information conditions for the protraction of the war in Ukraine since the summer following Russian forces’ dismal failures to secure and retain their primary objectives.[4] This informational conditioning is fundamentally incompatible with any discussions regarding a ceasefire or negotiations. Putin seems unwilling to risk losing domestic momentum by halting his offensive operations even briefly, let alone to pursue an off-ramp short of his full objectives, which, as he is making increasingly clear, appear to include the reconstitution of the Russian Empire in some form.

Putin notably is using the Russian HRC as a means to consolidate political power in a way that is fundamentally incompatible with basic principles of international human rights law. As ISW previously reported, Putin changed the composition of the HRC on November 17, removing Russian human rights activists who were critical of Kremlin censorship and installing political and proxy officials as well as a prominent Russian military correspondent.[5] The use of a domestic human rights body to advocate and set conditions for the perpetuation of a genocidal war in Ukraine undermines statements made by the Kremlin on Russia’s purported commitment to human rights. Putin’s comment accusing the West of using human rights to violate state sovereignty undermines a central premise of the international effort to protect human rights.[6]

Putin reiterated Russia’s formal position on the use of nuclear weapons in a statement to the Russian HRC on December 7 with no noteworthy changes. Putin claimed that the threat of nuclear war is growing, but that Russia will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons.[7] Putin added, however, that if Russia is not the first to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons, it will also not be the second to do so, because the “possibility of using [a nuclear weapon] in the event of a nuclear strike on [Russian] territory are very limited.”[8] Putin reiterated that Russian nuclear doctrine is premised on self-defense and stated that any Russian nuclear use would be retaliatory. Putin also emphasized that Russia is not “crazy” and is acutely aware of the power of nuclear weapons but will not “brandish” them. Putin’s statements support ISW’s previous assessment that while Russian officials may engage in forms of nuclear saber-rattling as part of an information operation meant to undermine Western support for Ukraine, Russian officials have no intention of actually using them on the battlefield.[9]

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the Russian military seeks an operational pause in winter 2022-2023 to regain the initiative and conduct a counteroffensive in spring 2023, partially supporting ISW’s prior assessment.[10] Stoltenberg told the Financial Times on December 7 that Russia seeks to “freeze” the fighting in Ukraine “at least for a short period of time so they can regroup, repair, recover... [a]nd then try to launch a bigger offensive next spring.”[11] Stoltenberg‘s statement supports ISW’s assessment that an operational pause would favor Russia by depriving Ukraine of the initiative. An operational pause this winter would likely prematurely culminate Ukraine’s counter-offensive operations, increase the likelihood that Ukraine loses the initiative, and grant degraded Russian forces a valuable three-to-four-month reprieve to reconstitute and prepare to fight on better footing.[12]

Putin continues to seem unwilling to pursue such a cessation of fighting, however. The Russian military is continuing offensive operations around Bakhmut and is—so far—denying itself the operational pause that would be consistent with best military practice. Putin’s current fixation with continuing offensive operations around Bakhmut and elsewhere is contributing to Ukraine’s ability to maintain the military initiative in other parts of the theater. Ukraine’s continued operational successes depend on Ukrainian forces’ ability to continue successive operations through the winter of 2022-2023 without interruption.[13]

Russian forces used Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian cities for the first time in three weeks, likely as a result of Russian forces having modified the drones for colder weather. Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated on December 7 that Russian forces resumed the use of Iranian-made loitering munitions after a three-week break and suggested that Russian forces had faced complications using the drones due to icing issues in colder weather.[14] Ukrainian Southern Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on December 7 that Russian forces resumed the use of the Iranian-made drones intending to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses in various areas of activity and open areas of the front in Ukraine.[15] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces deployed Shahed-136 drones in attacks on Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zhytomyr, and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[16] Russian forces have likely modified the drones to operate in colder weather conditions and will likely increase their use in Ukraine in the coming weeks in support of their campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. ISW has previously reported that Russian forces are increasingly reliant on Iranian-made weapon systems due to the depletion of the Russian military's high-precision weapons arsenal.[17]

Russian efforts to pressure Belarus into joining the war in Ukraine may be causing internal friction in the Belarusian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 7 that soldiers of the Belarusian border service and the Belarusian Armed forces are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the activities of the Belarusian military-political leadership due to the threat of Belarus entering the war in Ukraine.[18] ISW has previously assessed that Russian Defense Minister Army General Shoigu met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian Defense Minister Major General Viktor Khrenin on December 3 to place further pressure on Belarus to support Russia‘s offensive campaign in Ukraine.[19] ISW has also previously reported that Belarusian officials, including Lukashenko and Khrenin, have used rhetoric to support an ongoing Russian information operation aimed at fixing Ukrainian forces on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border with the threat of Belarus entering the war.[20] Russian pressure and the participation of Belarusian officials in the ongoing Russian information operation may be causing unease among Belarusian military personnel. ISW continues to assess that Belarus is highly unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine due to domestic factors that constrain Lukashenko’s willingness to do so.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for a protracted war of conquest in Ukraine.
Putin is using Russia’s Human Rights Council to consolidate power while rejecting principles of international human rights law.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made comments supporting ISW’s previous assessments that an operational pause in the winter of 2022-2023 would favor Russia.
Russian forces used Shahed-136 drones in Ukraine for the first time in three weeks.
Russian efforts to pressure Belarus into joining the war in Ukraine may be causing friction in the Belarusian military.
Russian forces are likely increasing the pace of their counterattacks in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas.
Russian forces continued defensive operations and the reorientation of their forces in eastern Kherson Oblast.
Independent Russian media sources indicated that mobilization efforts will continue despite statements from Russian officials to the contrary.
Russian occupation authorities are likely transforming Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, into a rear military and logistics base for Russian forces.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces are likely increasing the pace of their counterattacks in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated on December 7 that Russian forces are preparing a counteroffensive operation in western Luhansk Oblast, part of which would include operations in the direction of Kupyansk.[21] Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are actively countering Russian counterattacks in the Svatove area as well as elsewhere.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 6 that Russian forces conducted counterattacks along the entire line of the Svatove-Kreminna front.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on December 7 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Lyman.[24] Russian forces may be preparing for an increased pace of spoiling counterattacks in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk Oblast in order to preempt Ukrainian forces from increasing the pace of their eastern counteroffensive as conditions become more conducive for mechanized maneuver warfare in eastern Ukraine due to the winter.

Russian forces continued to defend their positions in the direction of Svatove amidst Russian claims of continued Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on December 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending in the direction of Kupyansk.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited attempts to break through in certain areas of the front in eastern Ukraine using small groups of forces.[26] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing to attack Russian positions along the Lyman-Peryshi-Synkivka line.[27] A Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization forecasted that Ukrainian forces are likely planning to surround Svatove and not assault it head-on.[28] ISW does not make assessments about specific future Ukrainian operations.

Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks as Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations in the Kreminna area on December 7. The Ukrainian General staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Bilohorivka (12 km south of Kreminna).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in the direction of Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and that Ukrainian forces withdrew from strongholds southwest of Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna).[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army are slowly advancing in the vicinity of Kreminna.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults within 21km northwest of Kreminna near Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka as well as along the Makiivka-Ploshchanka highway.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts.[33]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on December 7. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled attempted Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself, northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske (27km northeast of Bakhmut), Spirne (25km northeast of Bakhmut), Yakovlivka (12km northeast of Bakhmut), and south of Bakhmut near Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdiumivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[34] The attack on Bila Hora suggests that Russian forces may have crossed the Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal in Kurdiumivka and are pushing west.[35] Russian sources widely claimed that Wagner Group fighters took control of Yakovlivka and that fierce fighting is ongoing near Bakhmut in Opytne, Klishchiivka, and Soledar.[36] One Russian milblogger remarked that the daily small arms ammunition use of Wagner Group forces in the Bakhmut area is 2,000 rounds per day per person.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully attempted to regain certain lost positions south of Bakhmut.[38] Russian sources largely discussed the intensity of operations in this area and emphasized high Ukrainian losses.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked northeast of Avdiivka toward Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Novomykhailivka.[40] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage of the 1st and 3rd DNR battalions reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka and southwest of Avdiivka in Vodiane.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops advanced slightly westward of Novoselivka (15km northeast of Avdiivka) and reached the H20 Kostiantynivka-Donetsk City highway.[42] DNR Head Denis Pushilin noted that the Russian capture of Avdiivka is of critical importance in order to alleviate the artillery pressure of claimed Ukrainian strikes on Donetsk City.[43] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to regain lost positions southwest of Donetsk City in the Vuhledar area.[44]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations and are likely continuing to reorientate their forces in eastern Kherson Oblast as of December 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending positions on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast as well as strengthening its grouping of forces there.[45] Kherson Oblast Head Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces have decreased the number of their personnel on the eastern bank, where they are primarily stationed in observation posts.[46] Khlan also stated that Russian forces plan to pull major forces up from rear positions in eastern Kherson Oblast and elsewhere if Ukrainian forces attack Russian positions on the east bank.[47] Khlan also reported that Russian forces continue to construct trenches in eastern Kherson Oblast.[48] Russian Don Brigade commander Alexei Kondratiev denied that Ukrainian forces control any part of the Kinburn spit on December 7 in response to recent reports from Ukrainian officials that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations on the Kinburn Spit.[49]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian positions and rear areas in Kherson Oblast on December 7. A Ukrainian source reported that Ukrainian shelled Nova Kakhovka and Hopry (near Hola Prystan) in Kherson Oblast.[50] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Hola Prystan with HIMARS rockets.[51] A Russian source also claimed that Russian air defenses repelled Ukrainian drone attacks targeting the Belbek airfield in Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea.[52]

Russian forces continued routine artillery and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, on the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on December 7.[53] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City, Ochakiv, Nikopol, and Zaporizhzhia City.[54] The Zaporizhia Oblast Administration reported that Russian forces also conducted drone attacks on targets in Zaporizhzhia City and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down six of the drones.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also struck Dnipro City using Shahed-136 drones.[56] Dnipropetrovsk Head Valentyn Reznichenko reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all eight Russian Shahed-136 drones in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[57]

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Independent Russian media sources indicated that Russian mobilization will continue, despite official Russian claims to the contrary. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in a meeting with the Council on Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on December 7 that discussing additional mobilization measures “does not make sense” since there is “no need for the state and the Ministry of Defense today.”[58] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly deflected inquiries about another wave of mobilization, stating that “there are a lot of provocative messages, [however], we must focus on the information from the Ministry of Defense and the President.”[59] An independent Russian media source notably reported on December 5 that mobilization efforts may resume on December 12 and that 700,000 more Russians will mobilize between December and February.[60] This date is sooner than ISW has previously reported and is a direct contradiction to official Russian claims concerning mobilization.[61] Another independent Russian media source shared intercepted audio on December 5 of a Moscow mobilization official demanding that her employees pass out mobilization summonses at night.[62] Putin signed a federal law on December 5 that suspends civil service work if a civil service worker is mobilized.[63] A Russian milblogger also amplified a report that the government of Moscow City recently threatened criminal prosecution of those who did not appear to military registration and enlistment offices after receiving mobilization summonses.[64]

A Russian independent news source reported that Russian mobilization officials will target pro-Ukrainian sympathizers in Russia in the next wave of mobilization. This source reported that mobilization officials, with the aid of the Russian Ministry of Education and Russian universities, will specifically target students who “sympathize with the opponents of the war” and have participated in protests.[65] The report stated that officials will place these students in a special database of the Center for Combating Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (Center "E") and will ensure that students in the database receive summonses.[66]

The Russian government attempted to assure its public that Russian forces no longer face logistical and equipment challenges, despite Russian milblogger claims to the contrary. Putin stated in a meeting with the Council on Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on December 7 that problems with equipment provision and other logistical support issues for Russian forces have “already been solved” and that he will look into any reports that require additional attention.[67] Putin subsequently claimed that fewer soldiers are fleeing the frontlines.[68] The Russian MoD continued to boast about effective training for mobilized personnel with videos of Russian forces training in the Republic of Buryatia, Saratov Oblast, and Belarus.[69] A prominent Russian milblogger stated that the situation on the frontlines has stabilized in many ways and that Russian industry is now working.[70] A Russian source reported that those attending the meeting with Putin and the HRC were not allowed to bring up sensitive issues related to the war including the ongoing protest of mothers and wives of the mobilized.[71] A Russian milblogger stated that if Putin must personally deal with the provision of equipment to the Russian military, then the problem is not a logistical one, but a greater issue with the management of the military.[72] Another Russian milblogger condemned Russian military authorities for the lack of supplies and training, contrasting the logistical failures of the Russian forces with the successes of Wagner and stating that the Russian military must get its priorities straight.[73]

Russia continues to suffer from low morale and economic strain due to poorly-implemented mobilization. Russian sources continued to report instances of low morale in the Russian forces including one suicide, another attempted suicide, and multiple deaths due to alcohol abuse among the mobilized.[74] Russian media reported that a Russian mobilized soldier accidentally killed another servicemember in a training accident at a training ground in Luga, Leningrad Oblast on December 6.[75] A Russian source reported that the Russian National Guard deployed to entertain children in Elizavetino, Transbaikalia, because all male breadwinners were mobilized in that town.[76] Another Russian source stated that villagers and local officials have supported the livelihoods of struggling families of the mobilized by sharing in tasks like slaughtering pigs on a farm or catching crucian carp.[77] One Russian milblogger lamented that poor Russian cities are subsidizing mobilization by “plugging holes from the last crumbs” while Moscow Oblast has a multi-million-dollar budget.[78]

The Wagner Group experienced a case of desertion on December 6. A Russian source reported that an unidentified man in camouflage shot and wounded police officers in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, before escaping.[79] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that authorities apprehended the man on December 7 and identified him as a convict recruited into the Wagner Group from a penal colony in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan.[80] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin responded to the case by stating that it is of a “closed operational nature.”[81] Prigozhin assured that a Wagner task force will conduct an investigation of the case.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to tighten social control in occupied territories by deporting children to Russia. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik reported that United Russia’s Humanitarian Cooperation Headquarters head Anna Kuznetsova spent a weekend visiting Popasna Raion and Rovenky of occupied Luhansk Oblast with a humanitarian mission on December 5.[82] Kuznetsova noted that the Headquarters is sending children affected by the war to Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, for “rehabilitation.” Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian occupation officials are transporting children from Luhansk Oblast to the Chechen Republic for patriotic education.[83] Haidai stated that there are already more than 100 cases of deportation. The forcible transfer of children of one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[84]

Russian occupation authorities seem to be transforming Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, into a rear military and logistics base for Russian forces. The Ukrainian advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces settled in Ahrobaza and Berdyanske near Mariupol, resulting in military patrols on the village streets.[85] Andryushchenko further reported that occupation officials installed a mobile checkpoint for cars and male pedestrians in the “Morning Market” area of Mariupol for the first time since September.[86] The actions seem to be concerted efforts to increase security measures in Mariupol and the surrounding region.

Ukrainian partisans reportedly attempted an attack on Melitopol occupation administration deputy head Nikolai Volyk in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, with an improvised explosive device on December 7.[87] The sources reported that the attack did not injure Volyk.

Ukrainian authorities continue to enforce tough measures on occupation collaborators. The office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine announced on December 7 that it convicted a Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate priest in Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, for providing information about Ukrainian forces to Russian forces since April 2022.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70046 https://t.me/rybar/41821; https://ria dot ru/20221207/putin-1837018497.html; https://t.me/rian_ru/187966; https://t.me/rian_ru/187968

[2] https://tass dot com/politics/1547333

[6] https://tass dot com/politics/1547263

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70046

[14] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/12/07/yurij-ignat-syly-ppo-vidpraczyuvaly-vchora-po-dronah-kamikadze-na-vidminno/; https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/ppo-ukrajini-zbila-vsi-iranski-droni-novini-ukrajini-50289293.html

[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/12/07/yurij-ignat-syly-ppo-vidpraczyuvaly-vchora-po-dronah-kamikadze-na-vidminno/; https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/ppo-ukrajini-zbila-vsi-iranski-droni-novini-ukrajini-50289293.html

[21] https://gordonua dot com/ukr/news/war/rosijski-okupanti-gotujut-kontrnastup-u-luganskij-oblasti-mozhlivo-na-kup-janskomu-naprjamku-zsu-1639698.html; https://lb dot ua/society/2022/12/07/538388_okupanti_gotuyut_kontrataku.html

[22] https://gordonua dot com/ukr/news/war/rosijski-okupanti-gotujut-kontrnastup-u-luganskij-oblasti-mozhlivo-na-kup-janskomu-naprjamku-zsu-1639698.html; https://lb dot ua/society/2022/12/07/538388_okupanti_gotuyut_kontrataku.html

[43] https://tass dot ru/interviews/16512507

[58] https://ria dot ru/20221207/putin-1837018497.html; https://t.me/rian_ru/187966; https://t.me/rian_ru/187968

[63] https://publication.pravo(dot)gov.ru/Document/View/0001202212050012?index=0&rangeSize=1; https://ria(dot)ru/20221205/zakon-1836435752.html; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-dec-5-6

[67] https://ria dot ru/20221207/putin-1837018497.html; https://t.me/rian_ru/187966; https://t.me/rian_ru/187968

[68] https://ria dot ru/20221207/putin-1837018497.html; https://t.me/rian_ru/187966; https://t.me/rian_ru/187968

[77] https://29(dot)ru/text/animals/2022/12/05/71872019/; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-dec-5-6 ; https://vk.com/wall-187580720_36771

[87] https://ria do ru/20221207/volyk-1836868863.html ; https://t.me/readovkanews/48395 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/14834

[88] https://www.gp.gov dot ua/ua/posts/do-12-rokiv-za-gratami-zasudzeno-svyashhennika-upc-mp-v-luganskii-oblasti-za-informuvannya-voroga-pro-poziciyi-ukrayinskix-zaxisnikiv

understandingwar.org

2. A Better Understanding of Chinese Covert Operations (Book Review)

Excerpts:

Going forward, there will be additional questions about the direction of PRC influence operations. ‘Wolf warrior’ diplomacy has replaced a previous focus on positive stories about the PRC’s rise; however, the focus of the Belt and Road Initiative on decision makers shows continuity in the PRC’s influence targets.

Spies and Lies is a great resource for anyone seeking to gain insights into PRC influence operations. The author’s account of these operations provides readers great insight into MSS tradecraft and the book serves as a good preface to understand the backlash today as we move into an era of strategic competition.

A Better Understanding of Chinese Covert Operations

thecipherbrief.com

More Book Reviews

December 6th, 2022 by Spies and Lies, |

BOOK REVIEW: Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World

By Alex Joske / Hardie Grant Books

Reviewed by Dr. Michael J. Jensen

The Reviewer – Dr. Michael J. Jensen received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Irvine. He is currently Associate Professor and co-convenor of the National Security Hub at the University of Canberra where he teaches on national security and research methods. Dr. Jensen’s publications include edited books with Cambridge University Press and Palgrave.

REVIEW — The Mueller and subsequent Senate investigations have familiarized Americans with some of the techniques of Russian influence operations. How do influence operations run by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) differ? In broad terms, the PRC tends to work on influential agents rather than populations and through a variety of cutouts.

Alex Joske’s book, Spies and Lies brings to life these PRC operations which have gone little noticed and remain poorly understood by both the public and even government officials.

Drawing upon a wide range of open source data and interviews with intelligence officers, Joske shines a light on the role the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has played in promoting the ‘peaceful rise of China’ narrative in centers of decision making in the US and Australia. In presenting this argument, the author counters the myth that PRC intelligence operations rely on amateurs.

Joske also argues that the PRC has conducted a decades-long influence operation to convince Western countries that the PRC is seeking a ‘peaceful’ rise to great power status and that the operation targeted influential figures in or near centers of decision making in the United States.

Joske describes how MSS officers met with American government officials as well as representatives of think tanks and academics, given the accessibility of future leaders and policy influencers in the American system. This access is not reciprocal as academics and other researchers relying on access to the PRC could find that access taken away if authorities deemed their work overly critical. Even American-born academics feel pressure to self-censor.

The ‘peaceful rise’ narrative sought to grant the PRC access to technology and capital to help it develop and modernize. What constituted a ‘peaceful rise’ was often vague; however, the peaceful rise story also carried an implied threat if Western countries impeded its aspirations.

What makes this operation unique is both its operational expanse and duration. Efforts to convince the West of the PRC’s ‘peaceful rise’ appears to have a whole of government structure. What made this possible is the presence of high-level MSS officers working undercover across varieties of businesses and other front organizations involved in the campaign. This facilitated organizational coordination across the operation.

For Joske, the operation started in the 1980s, before the Tiananmen Square massacre with the co-optation of efforts by George Soros to facilitate liberalization and democracy in the PRC and continued into the Trump administration.

Joske includes over 60 pages of endnotes documenting the original sources of material on MSS operations and front organizations. He draws on a wide range of news reports and documents in both English and Chinese, highlighting details that often went unnoticed in the former and making the latter accessible to English speaking audiences.

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There are two main takeaways in Spies and Lies.

First, Joske challenges widespread beliefs that PRC intelligence operations are often amateur and operate with great volume rather than skill. Neither does the PRC tend to rely only on ethnic Chinese collectors and influence agents, nor does it rely primarily on nonprofessionals.

Trained undercover intelligence officers targeted incumbent and potential future authorities and opinion leaders to promote their message. The focus on leaders is likely indicative of an understanding in PRC intelligence circles that denies the public has an autonomous capacity to shape opinion formation and public policy.

Second, Joske argues that the PRC ‘peaceful rise’ narrative was a ruse, believed by naive government officials, business leaders, and members of other organizations. Although the US intelligence community was aware of the MSS role in promoting this narrative, American and Australian academics, business leaders, and even diplomats would meet with undercover MSS officers.

Although there are some cases of spectacular errors in judgment and potentially criminal cases documented in the book, it is less clear that the evidence supports the assessment that all of these people were naive. On the one hand, it may be the case that diplomats used the opportunity to collect intelligence as well.

Joske uses the Wikileaks Diplomatic Cables as a source for some of these claims. Also in those files was a directive from former President Bill Clinton for diplomats to collect information on the people they met. Additionally, there is little evidence that, for all of the effort, this outreach produced any concrete policy outcomes favorable to the PRC while disadvantageous to the US or Australia.

Going forward, there will be additional questions about the direction of PRC influence operations. ‘Wolf warrior’ diplomacy has replaced a previous focus on positive stories about the PRC’s rise; however, the focus of the Belt and Road Initiative on decision makers shows continuity in the PRC’s influence targets.

Spies and Lies is a great resource for anyone seeking to gain insights into PRC influence operations. The author’s account of these operations provides readers great insight into MSS tradecraft and the book serves as a good preface to understand the backlash today as we move into an era of strategic competition.

Spies and Lies earns a solid rating of 3 out of 4 trench coats.

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3. The Pentagon Marches Off to Climate War

The Pentagon Marches Off to Climate War

Biden’s new mandate on contractors adds green politics and costs to weapons.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-pentagon-goes-to-climate-war-biden-administration-green-rule-weapons-contractors-11669835241?mod=opinion_lead_pos1

By The Editorial Board

Dec. 7, 2022 4:39 pm ET

The war in Ukraine is draining U.S. arms stockpiles while geopolitical risks grow. Yet the Biden Administration is worried about—you can’t make this up—the climate impact of U.S. weapons and wants to impose costly green mandates on federal contractors.

A little-noticed rule-making proposed by the Department of Defense, NASA and the General Services Administration last month would require federal contractors to disclose and reduce their CO2 emissions as well as climate financial risks. The rule would cover 5,766 contractors that have received at least $7.5 million from the feds in the prior year.

Smaller contractors would have to publicly report their so-called Scope 1 and 2 emissions—i.e., those they generate at their facilities and from the electricity and heating they use. Firms with larger contracts would also have to tabulate their upstream and downstream Scope 3 emissions, including those from customers, suppliers and products used in the field.

For example, weapons manufacturers would have to quantify and disclose the amount of CO2 generated from their own facilities; manufacturers that produce steel, computer chips and motors used in their weapons; propellants and fuel; and even munition storage areas. It’s unclear if CO2 emissions will influence procurement decisions.

Large contractors would also have to publish an annual climate disclosure and develop “science-based targets” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in alignment with the goals of the 2015 Paris agreement. That means contractors will have to aim to zero out emissions and possibly require their contractors to do so.

Will Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies have to redesign weapons systems and aircraft to be powered by lithium-ion batteries? China mines and processes the critical minerals used in batteries and other green technologies that will be required to meet these “science-based targets.”

The proposed rule would also apply to non-defense contractors, including pharmaceutical, shipping and tech companies, though it curiously exempts universities, nonprofit research institutions and state and local governments. These exemptions are a concession that the rule imposes costly burdens.

But the very point of the rule is to force CO2 emissions reductions across the private economy by leveraging $650 billion in annual federal contracts. By covering Scope 3 emissions, the rule would sweep in tens of thousands of non-federal contractors, including many small businesses.

“Public procurement can shift markets, drive innovation, and be a catalyst for adoption of new norms and global standards,” the rule-making says. The climate conditions on contractors “will give visibility to major annual sources of GHG emissions and climate risks throughout the Federal supply chain and could, in turn, provide insights into the entire U.S. economy.”

In other words, this is a back door for the Administration to force businesses across the economy to report and reduce their CO2 emissions. It goes even further than the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed rule requiring publicly traded companies to report Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions.

The rule-making claims that federal contractors will benefit from climate mandates by “increasing senior management attention and funding for investing in GHG reduction projects.” Great. As the U.S. military faces strained budgets and growing threats, climate will be a costly new priority in national defense. The People’s Liberation Army must be dumbfounded by its good luck.

WSJ Opinion: Putin’s Culture War Against Ukraine’s National Identity

IntelBrief: How Counterterrorism and Great Power Competition Coexist - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 7, 2022

December 7, 2022

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IntelBrief: How Counterterrorism and Great Power Competition Coexist

AP Photo/Sylvain Cherkaoui

Bottom Line Up Front

Counterterrorism has been deprioritized by several governments confronting the return of inter-state conflict and great power competition; however, terrorism has often been used or exploited by states for their own strategic goals and the past two decades of global counterterrorism efforts offer some valuable tools and lessons.
At the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, many U.S. and allied training programs, including joint combined exchange training, could pay dividends in great power competition; international cooperation has delivered more harmonized international legal frameworks and platforms for partnerships.
Though the threat to the U.S. homeland posed by transnational terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda has been reduced significantly, they can inspire and influence threats against Western interests and have proliferated in other regions like the Sahel; resources and responses should reflect current threats and needs.
Counterterrorism and great power competition are dynamic and interconnected spheres; should the U.S. and its allies leave a political or operational vacuum, others can occupy the vacuum – a strong risk in places like Afghanistan and Mali where Russia and China retain influence.

Counterterrorism has been deprioritized by several governments confronting the return of inter-state conflict and great power competition; however, terrorism has often been used or exploited by states for their own strategic goals and the past two decades of global counterterrorism efforts offer some valuable tools and lessons. As counterterrorism approaches reach an inflection point after twenty years of the “Global War on Terror,” there are changes at myriad levels, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The core of Western counterterrorism focus has shifted from the Middle East to Africa; consequently, regional interests, including those of European partners, are more likely to be targets than the US.

Yet, for those who argue to jettison counterterrorism, it is important to recall that many states use and exploit non-state armed groups to achieve their strategic objectives, and counterterrorism and great power competition may be two sides of a single coin. Many of the tools and lessons learned from two decades of global counterterrorism efforts may be applicable to addressing current security challenges. The portfolio of security cooperation and building partner capabilities with a network of global allies, and the relationships forged between the intelligence agencies and security services of those countering al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, should be preserved and operationalized toward current and emerging priorities. The United States and its partners have worked through the United Nations and platforms like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) to harmonize international legal frameworks and partnerships, as well as strengthen the capacities of frontline officials and communities to deliver security, promote human rights and the rule of law, and build inclusive approaches. These are not unrelated to the efforts needed to support Ukraine in light of the Russian invasion, to preserve influence and gains made in the Sahel – particularly with the increased influence of the Wagner Group – or manage the range of challenges relating to Iran.

Once used as a set of tactical tools to address domestic security threats, counterterrorism was exceptionalized as a threat to international peace and security following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and elevated to a more strategic priority globally – without establishing a clear definition of terrorism. But several tactical measures, including joint combined exchange training, could pay dividends in great power competition, especially in terms of high-end capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); offensive cyber operations; and a host of other activities that would fall under the domain of unconventional or irregular warfare.

This false dichotomy between counterterrorism and great power competition undermines Western interests. Counterterrorism and great power competition are dynamic and interconnected spheres; should the U.S. and its allies leave a political or operational vacuum, others can occupy the vacuum – a strong risk in places like Afghanistan and Mali where Russia and China retain levels of influence. The West, whether through NATO or other regional configurations, can and must do both to meet the challenge of a rising China and a revanchist Russia. However, counterterrorism efforts must be more carefully tailored to meet the risks and needs particular to various contexts, especially as the threat is increasingly diffuse and diverse. In addition to Salafi-jihadist groups, there is also the rise of global far-right violent extremism, the continued state sponsorship of proxy groups, and myriad other ideologies motivating violence, including anti-5G/technophobia, so-called “Incels,” and QAnon conspiracy theorists.

Despite several ongoing conflicts – from Iraq and Syria to Yemen and Mali, for example – there has been remarkable consensus among international partners in countering terrorism. For two decades, it has been one area in which all five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council have largely been able to find agreement. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine and tensions among the P5 – China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. – will make the kind of international cooperation achieved on counterterrorism unlikely (though not necessarily impossible, depending on whether new attacks or threats materialize) going forward. The nature of ‘great power competition’ will make such global partnerships like the GCTF less likely and the investment in efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism is likely to diminish; though many such efforts could continue to inform state and local initiatives to address the drivers and grievances that fuel support for violent groups. The war in Ukraine has been instructive in that regard, with various Western countries displaying different levels of comfort in challenging Russia, wary of drawing Moscow’s ire as the Kremlin continues to weaponize energy supplies and food reserves. Similarly, there is no uniformity of approach on how to deal with Chinese power projection, Iran’s continued sponsor of proxy groups, or North Korea’s continued nuclear saber-rattling. What is certain, however, is that the many relationships developed and tools deployed in the global war on terrorism are worth refashioning for a new era of great power competition. Moreover, while we must learn lessons from the global war on terror – particularly the negative impacts on global human rights, democracy building, and civil society protection – we must not throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 7, 2022

5. Compromise NDAA released with $857.9 billion topline

Funny how a compromise results in a higher topline than both houses sought.

Compromise NDAA released with $857.9 billion topline - Breaking Defense

The topline is higher than either the HASC ($839 billion) or SASC ($847 billion) had sought in their initial versions of the language, and includes $816.7 billion for the Pentagon and $30.3 billion for nuclear activities in the Department of Energy.

breakingdefense.com · by Aaron Mehta · December 7, 2022

Congress is one step closer to having an NDAA settled. (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — The House and Senate Armed Services Committees this evening released the compromise language for the National Defense Authorization Act, with committee leadership agreeing to add $45 billion to the Biden administration’s initial budget request.

The $857.9 billion topline is higher than either the HASC ($839 billion) or SASC ($847 billion) had sought in their initial versions of the language, and includes $816.7 billion for the Pentagon and $30.3 billion for nuclear activities in the Department of Energy. It authorizes a 4.6 percent pay raise for both military servicemembers and the Pentagon’s civilian workforce, while calling for increased spending for a number of key weapon systems.

Getting the NDAA out has looked touch and go since the midterm elections in early November. Once it became clear Republicans would take control of the House, likely future Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., began making noises about holding the NDAA until his caucus was in charge. Then, last week, a group of Republican senators threatened to vote against the NDAA unless the Pentagon’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination was struck. (The language released tonight includes a requirement that the Pentagon “rescind the mandate that members of the Armed Forces be vaccinated against COVID-19.”)

But through it all, the four leaders of the authorization committees — Sens. Jack Reed, D-R.I., and Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., and Reps. Adam Smith., D-Wash., and Mike Rogers, R-Ala. — insisted the bill would get done, and done in a bipartisan manner. While Smith was overly optimistic over the weekend in declaring the NDAA would absolutely be out on Monday, his prediction that a vote will happen this week could still be on track.

“We are pleased to announce we’ve come to a bipartisan, bicameral agreement on this year’s National Defense Authorization Act,” the four men said in a joint statement. “This year’s agreement continues the Armed Services Committees’ 62-year tradition of working together to support our troops and strengthen America’s national security. We urge Congress to pass the NDAA quickly and the President to sign it when it reaches his desk.”

Of course even if the NDAA passes both chambers as is, getting the legislation finalized is only one part of the battle. The bigger question is whether appropriators can work out an omnibus funding deal before Dec. 16, when the current Continuing Resolution expires. The final defense topline could also prove a battle with appropriators, as the delta between the House ($762 billion) and the Senate ($850 billion) markups over the summer is significant.

Other key points in the NDAA include:

Airpower: The bill approves funding an additional four EC-37B Compass Call aircraft, an additional five F-35A aircraft, an additional 10 HH-60W helicopters, supports planned divestments of the A-10, and adds an extra $301 million to accelerate production of two prototype E-7 aircraft.

Seapower: The language authorizes multiyear or block buy contracts for the procurement of up to 25 ship-to-shore connectors, 15 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, eight Lewis-class oilers and five amphibious ships. Overall, it authorizes $32.6 billion for Navy shipbuilding, covering the procurement of 11 battle force ships: three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers; two Virginia-class submarines; two expeditionary fast transports; one Constellation-class frigate; one San Antonio-class amphibious ship; one John Lewis-class oiler; and one Navajo-class towing, salvage and rescue ship.

Notably, it also authorizes $25 million for continued research on the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), an effort the Biden administration has tried to kill.

Landpower: The Army will be happy to see it is getting increased funding for a large number of platforms, including the CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Blackhawk, MQ-1 Gray Eagle, Abrams tanks, Stryker upgrades, Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) systems, infantry squad vehicles, and medium and heavy tactical vehicles, M-SHORAD and Patriot missile defense systems, infantry squad vehicles, and medium and heavy tactical vehicles.

Manpower: It sets manpower levels for the Army at 452,000, the Navy at 354,000, the Air Force at 325,344, the Marines at 177,000 and the Space Force at 8,600.

The NDAA takes great pains to focus on Ukraine, with an emphasis on increasing munition production across the board. It also extends and modifies the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and authorizes $800 million in fiscal year 2023, an increase of $500 million above the President’s budget request. It also requires a report on the department’s plans for the “provision of security assistance to Ukraine in the short and medium term.”

And of course, it wouldn’t be a defense-related topic in 2022 without a focus on China. “The language extends the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) through fiscal year 2023, identifies approximately $11.5 billion of investments in support of PDI objectives, and authorizes approximately an additional $1 billion to address unfunded requirements identified by the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).” It also includes potentially interesting language requiring “the establishment of a joint force headquarters within the INDOPACOM area of responsibility.”

6. Military sources: Ukraine missiles used US guidance

I wonder if this story will cause a reaction by Putin?

Military sources: Ukraine missiles used US guidance

Both NATO and Russian observers reject Blinken denial of US satellite involvement in attacks on Russian bases

asiatimes.com · by Uwe Parpart and David P. Goldman · December 7, 2022

NATO sources as well as Russian military sources reject US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s claim Tuesday that the United States had nothing to do with Ukraine’s missile strike against Russian air force bases December 5 and 6.

“We have neither encouraged nor enabled the Ukrainians to strike inside of Russia,” Blinken told reporters during a meeting with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Australian officials.

Multiple military sources in NATO countries as well as Russia contradict him, reporting that the reconditioned Russian Tu-141 drones that Ukraine launched at Russian air bases downlinked US satellite GPS data to hit their targets.

The 1970s-vintage Russian recon drones were converted into cruise missiles, fitted with new guidance systems and directed by American satellites, the sources said. Ukraine does not have the capability to guide missiles on its own, they added.

Russia’s Defense Ministry identified one of the weapons as the Tu-141 in a December 6 statement. According to Russian military sources, the Russians identified the Tu-141 from fragments recovered after the missiles struck Russia’s Dyagilevo and Engels air force bases.

If, contrary to Blinken’s denial, the United States provided guidance for the missile attack, then Washington must be well aware that this brings NATO forces to the brink of direct involvement in the Ukraine war and the Biden administration must be prepared to run that risk.

The damage that Ukraine inflicted on Russian planes at the two Russian bases is trivial compared with the strategic risk that the United States has introduced into the conflict.

As Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley warned on November 9, there is no military victory in sight for the Ukraine War.

Russia analyst James Davis writing in the December 7 edition of the Global Polarity Monitor, a strategic report published in cooperation with Asia Times, described a military stalemate:

Russia continues to pursue a defensive strategy in Ukraine to solidify defensive lines and to raise the costs of Ukrainian military operations…. Moscow also remains confident that the growing expenditures of the West to sustain Ukraine will motivate Western leaders including President Biden to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Russia believes that holding the defensive lines will demonstrate that the cost of supporting Ukraine to achieve a complete reversal of the Russian position in Ukraine, including Crimea, is simply too high.

Milley’s mention of a “window” for peace talks during the winter pause in fighting provoked consternation among US officials who want victory at all costs. While Milley and US military leaders believe that the only way out of the war is negotiation with Russia, the US State Department and National Security Council are determined to achieve a military victory over Russia by any means necessary.

NATO is divided on how to resolve the Ukraine conflict. French President Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have revived the idea of offering security guarantees to Russia, including Ukrainian neutrality.

US Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland visited Kyiv December 3 to reassure the Ukrainians that the US believes that “Putin is not sincere” in proposing negotiations “and not ready for this.”

Ukraine doesn’t have the forces to mount an effective counteroffensive against the Russians, so a military solution presupposes NATO troops on the ground.

The attack on the Russian bases might be intended to provoke a Russian response that would, in turn, justify the deployment of NATO ground troops in Ukraine.

American satellites used to guide missiles into Russian territory, might be considered legitimate military targets, Russian foreign ministry official Vladimir Yermakov said November 30. A Russian attack on US satellites could draw the US into a war with Russia.

A prominent Chinese military columnist, Chen Feng of guancha.cn (“Observer”), wrote December 7 that “It is an open secret that Western satellites are being used to support the Ukrainian army in operations, but it is also a matter of mortal danger.” Chen offered a stern warning to Moscow:

Unless Russia can accurately identify a small satellite that is supporting the Ukrainian war and release credible evidence, destroying a small satellite of the United States or a NATO country is equivalent to launching a war against the United States or a NATO country. As far as the existing technology is concerned, it is impossible that Russia would have the ability to accurately identify the suspected satellite. Taking the initiative to draw the United States or NATO into the Ukraine war may not be a consequence that Russia can afford.

Yermakov “should not have made such a statement,” Chen concluded.

Guancha.cn frequently raises issues of importance to China’s leadership, and Chen’s widely-followed column suggests that Beijing has serious worries about the possible widening of the Ukraine conflict into a world war.

A Russian source with access to the thinking of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle said that Russia would not retaliate against US satellites. “That would be a casus belli for the United States,” the source said.

NATO military analysts worry that Russia might launch an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a conventional rather than a nuclear payload at a major Ukrainian target, as a warning to the West about the consequences of escalating the conflict. IRBMs travel roughly ten times faster than cruise missiles like the TU-141 and are practically impossible to shoot down.

A Russian military analyst, though, told Asia Times that this tactic was discussed and rejected by the Russian military. Reconfiguration of missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads would be difficult and time-consuming, the analyst said.

asiatimes.com · by Uwe Parpart and David P. Goldman · December 7, 2022

7. U.S.-French Commitment to Secure Space Assets Shines a Light on Cyber Vulnerability

U.S.-French Commitment to Secure Space Assets Shines a Light on Cyber Vulnerability

fdd.org · by Annie Fixler CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow · December 7, 202

Annie Fixler

CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow

Kelsey Shields

Auburn University’s McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security

In a joint statement with French President Emmanuel Macron, President Joe Biden committed on Thursday to strengthening the cybersecurity of commercial space systems. The vulnerability of these systems stems from their physical and technical characteristics as well as the U.S. government’s fragmented approach to risk management.

Recognizing the “growing use of commercial space capabilities to support” functions critical to national security, economic stability, and public safety, the United States and France pledged to enhance bilateral collaboration to increase the cyber resilience of space systems. The statement echoes the Biden administration’s October National Security Strategy which committed the U.S. government to “enhanc[ing] the resilience of U.S. space systems that we rely on for critical national and homeland security functions.”

Space systems are critical to national security, economic prosperity, and the daily activity of American citizens. For example, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) services enable not only car navigation systems but also the function of U.S. military assets and the time-stamping of ATM transactions. Thus, the commercial space industry is one of the fastest-growing industries today, generating more than $440 billion of economic activity in 2020 and projected to surpass $1 trillion in the next 10–15 years.

America’s adversaries recognize the importance of commercial space systems and have begun launching cyberattacks — sometimes via proxies — to degrade or destroy them. In October 2022, Konstantin Vorontsov, a senior Russian foreign ministry official warned that commercial satellites could become a retaliatory target if America continues supporting Ukraine. In fact, Russian hackers have already targeted these systems. Just one hour before its armed forces invaded Ukraine in February, the Russian government hacked U.S.-based satellite company Viasat, disrupting Ukraine’s military communications as well as internet service across Europe. Earlier, in 2018, Russian hackers targeted the global navigation satellite system (GNSS), sending faulty coordinates and navigational data to disrupt thousands of airplanes and ships’ movements via jamming and spoofing techniques. Meanwhile, China is testing capabilities to strike adversarial satellites through cyber and electronic warfare.

While the cybersecurity of all U.S. infrastructure is critical for national resilience, hardening cyber components of space systems is particularly challenging. These systems are difficult to monitor due to physical distance and mission length. Many space-based assets have dated technologies that are difficult to update and have not been recalled due to expense and lack of policy standards. Meanwhile, because space systems are not a distinct critical infrastructure sector, the industry does not have dedicated risk management support within the U.S. government.

This structural problem within the U.S. government, however, may soon change. Last month, the White House endorsed the findings of a statutorily-required Department of Homeland Security report assessing public-private collaboration to secure U.S. critical infrastructure. Among the findings was a recommendation to consider designating the space sector as a critical infrastructure sector and an agency within the U.S. government to serve as its sector risk management agency (SRMA). For each critical infrastructure sector, an SRMA is responsible for creating programs to help owners and operators identify and mitigate risk, facilitating information sharing between the government and the sector, and contributing to emergency response planning, among other tasks.

As the Biden administration considers this designation, it should leverage existing institutions — like the industry’s Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center — to better share information and resources and existing methodologies (like the Department of Energy’s Cyber-Informed Engineering) to build equipment and technology that is secure by design. As part of a larger national, bilateral, and multilateral effort to secure commercial space systems, these two steps will likely facilitate a better understanding within the industry of the cyber threats and create systems that are more resilient against these threats. Until that time, Russia, China, and other adversaries will continue to take advantage of the fragmented U.S. approach to cyber risk management of space systems.

Annie Fixler is the director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and an FDD research fellow. Kelsey Shields is a Research Analyst at Auburn University’s McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security and contributes to research on the cybersecurity of space systems at CSC 2.0, an initiative to continue the work of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission. For more analysis from the Annie and CCTI, please subscribe HERE. Follow her on Twitter @afixler. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CCTI and the McCrary Institute @McCraryCyber. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Issues:

Cyber

fdd.org · by Annie Fixler CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow · December 7, 2022

8. How Biden, Congress can stop the UN from legitimizing antisemitism

How Biden, Congress can stop the UN from legitimizing antisemitism

fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · December 7, 2022

Richard Goldberg

Senior Advisor

Will Kielm

Intern

United Nations officials urged countries in October and November to reject the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, the global benchmark for identifying anti-Jewish prejudice. The call to reject the IHRA definition reflects a split within the UN, where some officials are moving firmly against antisemitism, while others have adopted practices that are antisemitic per the definition.

On October 6, 2022, E. Tendayi Achiume, then UN Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, reported to the UN General Assembly that despite widespread endorsement of the IHRA definition across Europe and North America, it “has become highly controversial and divisive owing to its susceptibility to being politically instrumentalized and the harm done to human rights.” She claimed the definition is “wielded to prevent or suppress legitimate criticisms of the State of Israel” and urged countries “to suspend the adoption and promotion of the working definition and the examples attached to it.” In response, the U.S. State Department reaffirmed its support for the definition, which it described as “one of the most fundamental and critical tools in the arsenal to combat” antisemitism.

The IHRA (formerly the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research) has 35 member states and eight observers. In 2016, acting on the belief that governments cannot effectively combat antisemitism without knowing what it is and how it manifests itself, the IHRA adopted a working definition of antisemitism with concrete examples.

Those examples include: “accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations;” “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor;” and “applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”

According to the IHRA, 38 countries from across Europe, South America, North America and Asia — along with a “large number of regional/state and local governments” — already use its definition of antisemitism. In September, Lufthansa became the first airline to adopt it. The Obama administration embraced the definition in 2016 and the Biden administration affirmed U.S. support in March 2021.

In May 2022, then UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed issued an Action Plan to Combat Antisemitism, which called on governments to use the IHRA definition. Achiume’s October report was a veiled response to Shaheed — and a defense of UN agencies that engage in activities that IHRA defines as antisemitic. The Human Rights Council, for example, last year established a commission laying the groundwork to label Israel an apartheid state — meeting the IHRA definition’s criteria of “claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.” Additionally, both the council and the World Health Organization have standing agenda items castigating one country — Israel — thereby applying the kind of “double standards” identified by the IHRA working definition. Notably, another UN Human Rights Council official, Francesca Albanese, voiced opposition to the IHRA definition in November.

Late last month, Deputy U.S. Special Envoy for Monitoring and Combating Antisemitism Aaron Keyak called Shaheed’s action plan a “groundbreaking document” and a “true model” for the international community. The Biden administration should continue urging countries to adopt the IHRA definition — and offer resolutions within UN agencies supporting the definition wherever possible.

Additionally, as FDD previously proposed, Congress can defend the IHRA definition at the UN by prohibiting funding for any agency that sponsors, supports, enables, or engages in antisemitism pursuant to the definition.

Richard Goldberg is a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served on the White House National Security Council, as deputy chief of staff to former U.S. Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.), as former chief of staff to Gov. Bruce Rauner (R-Ill.), and as a Navy Reserve Intelligence Officer. Follow Richard on Twitter @rich_goldberg. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. Will Kielm is an FDD international organizations intern. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · December 7, 2022

9. US building a missile wall in the Pacific

Allies are the key.

US building a missile wall in the Pacific

But it is unclear whether its Pacific allies are willing to host missile batteries on their territories

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 8, 2022

The US Army has acquired its first Typhon land-based missile launcher, marking a significant development in its efforts to create a Pacific missile wall to deter China.

This week, multiple media outlets reported that the US Army had received the first of four prototype Typhon land-based missile launchers as part of its mid-range capability (MRC) program that fills in the service’s requirement for long-range precision fires in the Pacific theater.

The Typhon is designed to fire Standard SM-6 or Tomahawk missiles between 500 and 1,800 kilometers, filling in a gap between the US Army’s precision strike missile (PSM) and the long-range hypersonic weapon (LRHW), which have ranges of 482 and 2,776 kilometers respectively.

Each Typhon unit consists of an operations center, four Mk 41-derived vertical launch system (VLS) launchers towed by M983A4 tractor trucks, and associated reloading and ground equipment. Four Typhon units will compose one battery, with a battery having 16 missiles.

The Typhon is also expected to deploy the latest Standard and Tomahawk missile variants. The latest Standard SM-6 Block IB features a redesigned body and larger rocket motor, which, as noted by The Warzone, potentially gives it improved anti-air and anti-missile capabilities and a possible secondary land-attack function. Also, the latest Tomahawk Block V missile features new communications, anti-ship capability, and multi-effect warheads.

The MRC has had a short development time, starting from scratch in July 2020 to having working prototypes in just two years, enabling US and allied forces to train on the system quickly, notes Lieutenant-General Robert Rasch Jr, a senior officer at the US Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technology Office (RCCTO), which oversees the system’s development.

Likewise, the US Marine Corps has pursued similar projects to the Typhon. Given that, Asia Times has previously reported on the USMC’s tactical land-attack missile (TLAM) that can be positioned on ships, shores, and islands to provide the Marine Corps with a powerful weapon capable of sinking large enemy warships.

Apart from the TLAM, Asia Times has previously reported on the US Army’s and USMC’s OpFires land-based hypersonic weapon project, which possibly marks the high end of the USMC’s planned land-based precision-strike missile capabilities.

Land-based launchers may be more survivable than ship-based systems, providing increased effectiveness for less cost. They can also complement air and naval power by providing a constant presence on or near contested areas, providing tactical support and operational cover for US and allied forces.

At the strategic level, their mere presence on allied territory makes a pre-emptive strike against them a significant escalation of hostilities.

The Typhon and other similar projects may signify a change in US strategy from doing things itself to enabling its allies to support its efforts through implementing their own anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles.

In a February 2021 article in War on the Rocks, Paul van Hooft wrote that overcommitment has always been a pitfall of US grand strategy and that this posture may not be feasible in the Pacific, as China now has the means to inflict massive losses on the US.

Also, the Typhon may be part of efforts to shore up declining US conventional deterrence. In a November 2022 article in 19fortyfive, Mackenzie Eaglen notes that US conventional deterrence is in decline due to bureaucracy, complacency, and underinvestment in military industries.

The short turnaround time of the MRC may be an attempt to shore up the sagging US conventional deterrence posture by integrating already-existing subsystems into a new system.

Further, van Hooft argues that the US should ensure that its allies have access to standoff precision weapons to build their defensive bubbles.

For example, the US and its partners can deploy standoff weapons such as the Typhon in what Josh Heivly describes in a February 2022 article for the US Naval Institute Blog as stand-in forces, featuring small, dispersed units equipped with long-range standoff weapons operating inside adversary weapons ranges.

Moreover, Luis Simon argues in a June 2017 article in War on the Rocks that the US and allied deployment of A2/AD capabilities will not give way to Chinese hegemony in the Pacific. Instead, this deployment aims to achieve a more differentiated pattern of control, wherein neither the US nor China enjoys total wartime freedom of maneuver over contested airspace and waters.

Simon describes this situation wherein the US maintains influence over allied landmasses while China maintains control over its mainland, with a contested space in the East and South China Seas. This situation keeps a tense but stable military balance of power in the Pacific.

In addition, a 2017 study by RAND Corporation also describes the US and its allies defeating China’s A2/AD capabilities using land-based, multi-domain forces with long-range ballistic and cruise missiles to strike at its warships and naval and naval air bases throughout the Pacific theater.

The US Pacific Deterrence Initiative envisages creating a precision strike network in the First Island Chain spanning Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines and an integrated air and missile defense network in the Second Island Chain.

Reluctant allies

However, this strategy has its pitfalls. A 2022 study by RAND Corporation notes that finding a US partner willing to host missile systems such as the Typhon is far more challenging than looking for partners looking to host other types of US military presence, such as air and naval bases.

It says it is doubtful that the Philippines, Thailand or South Korea would be willing to host US ground-based long-range missile systems and that Australia and Japan would be less reluctant to do so, albeit marginally.

The report notes that the Philippines’ unpredictability as an ally, Thailand’s efforts to build better ties with China, and South Korea’s susceptibility to Chinese pressure make them partners unwilling or sub-optimal choices for hosting the Typhon.

Likewise, Australia’s distance from China and public reluctance to get dragged into a conflict are strong reasons against the deployment of the Typhon.

Similarly, Japan’s long-standing reluctance to host explicitly offensive capabilities is a strong argument against the probability of hosting such systems.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 8, 2022

10. Japanese warplanes in Philippines for first time since WW2

Historic of course. I wonder how China assesses this.

When I was at Clark last week I did not see a single military aircraft from the AFP or US (and I left before these Japanese aircraft arrived0.

Japanese warplanes in Philippines for first time since WW2

Manila and Tokyo have pursued a more comprehensive partnership that transcends historical enmities and traditional linkages

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · December 8, 2022

This week, the Philippines and Japan marked another major milestone in their blossoming security partnership. For the first time since the end of World War II, which saw Imperial Japanese forces brutally occupying the Southeast Asian country, Japanese warplanes landed in the Philippines.

Two F-15s from Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), along with a refueling aircraft and a transport airplane, landed at Clark Air Base in the northern Philippines amid much fanfare.

During the Cold War, Clark along with a naval facility in nearby Subic served as the site for America’s largest overseas military bases.

The JASDF forces are joining 60 colleagues that have been taking part in a special exchange program with Philippine Air Force (PAF) counterparts from November 27 to December 11.

Filipino military officials wasted no time in underscoring the relevance of the highly symbolic moment.

Colonel Leo Fontanilla, a PAF commander, vowed that the two sides would continue to work “hand in hand” in order “to advance our friendship and partnership and to strengthen both our air forces to effectively and efficiently sustain peace and stability in our region.”

On his part, the Philippine Air Force’s commanding general, Lieutenant-General Connor Anthony Canlas, earlier welcomed the historic visit by Japanese warplanes, the first in postwar period, as a sign that the former enemies “are now our allies” who share a common interest in a “rules-based order” in the Indo-Pacific region.

Back in 2018, the two countries marked another major milestone in their bilateral relations when Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) deployed, for the first time in the postwar period, an armored-vehicle unit to join in the Philippine-US Balikatan war games, where Japanese and Australia forces are regular participants.

In October this year, the Philippines also hosted members of the JSDF as part of the Kamandag, or Cooperation of the Warriors of the Sea, multilateral exercises, along with troops from other allied nations of the United States as well as South Korea.

And thus the Philippines, once a marginal player in regional affairs, has increasingly become the “pivot state” in the Indo-Pacific region. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who has rapidly restored frayed ties with traditional allies, the Southeast Asian country has become indispensable to Washington’s “integrated deterrence” strategy in the region.

Blossoming alliance

Perturbed by China’s growing assertiveness in adjacent waters, and eager to respond to renewed uncertainties following Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, the Philippines and Japan have pursued a more comprehensive partnership that transcends historical enmities and traditional linkages.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has sought to regain the trust of Southeast Asian neighbors such as the Philippines through a wave of trade, aid, and big-ticket investments.

In the early 1960s, Tokyo backed Manila’s bid to host the Japan-financed Asian Development Bank (ADB), the largest intergovernmental financial institution in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus the Philippines became pivotal to Japan’s regional development strategy, which enhanced the Northeast Asian country’s industrialization drive as well as soft power across Southeast Asia.

Over the succeeding decades, Japan also cemented its position as the largest source of overseas development assistance (ODA) to as well as a top investor and leading export destination for the Philippines.

In fact, the total value of Japan’s new infrastructure projects alone (US$29 billion), which include Metro Manila’s first subway metro as well as a North-South Commuter Railway project in the industrialized Luzon region, dwarfs that of China ($8 billion).

To deepen trade and investment ties, the two countries have also signed the Japan- Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), the Philippines’ first and most consequential bilateral free trade agreement.

By and large, Japan enjoys full-spectrum support among major elite factions in the Philippines, including former president Rodrigo Duterte, who maintained decades-long cordial ties with the Japanese Consulate in the southern city of Davao.

On one hand, then-Philippine president Benigno Aquino III actively pursued closer strategic ties with Japan, which embraced new foreign-policy activism under prime minister Shinzo Abe, in order to check China’s creeping encroachment into Philippine waters.

Aquino’s successor Duterte, who consciously pivoted away from Western partners in favor of Beijing and Moscow, further deepened strategic ties with Japan as part of his “independent” foreign-policy thrust.

While reformist Filipino presidents such as Aquino viewed Japan as a major fellow democracy and US ally, authoritarian populists such as Duterte saw the Northeast Asian country as an alternative power to the West. The upshot was a steady and substantial uptick in bilateral strategic cooperation, which has now extended into defense affairs.

This year, the two countries conducted their the first-ever “2+2” meeting of their top defense and foreign-policy officials. In their joint statement, the Philippines and Japan “underscored the importance of each country’s respective treaty alliance with the United States and that of enhancing cooperation with regional partner countries.” They also vowed to “strengthen defense cooperation in light of the increasingly harsh security environment.”

Maritime security has a been a centerpiece of the burgeoning Philippine-Japan alliance. Over the past decade, Japan has donated patrol vessels and surveillance aircraft to enhance the Philippines’ intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities in the South China Sea.

A new era

As if that weren’t enough, Japan is also now negotiating a new defense deal, specifically a reciprocal access agreement to facilitate sustained, robust and increasingly sophisticated joint military activities between the two sides.

Known as Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs), the proposed pact could see Japan emerging as the third major defense partner for the Philippines after the United States, which has a Mutual Defense Treaty with Manila, and Australia, which has a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with it.

Given Japan’s proximity and vast resources, a major defense deal could make the Northeast Asian country the other big ally of the Philippines, aside from the US. But that would require the approval of the Philippine Senate, which has the prerogative over new treaty agreements, as well as further reinterpretation, if not revision, of the Japanese pacifist constitution.

Though this seems like a tall order, rising tensions over Taiwan could expedite the blossoming security ties between Japan and the Philippines. Historically, both US allies have tried to avoid entanglement over the Taiwan issue by reiterating their “one China” policies. But things have been changing rapidly in recent years, with Japan recently expressing more categorical support for the self-ruling island in an event of a Chinese invasion in the near future.

Last year, the late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, who dramatically reshaped Japan’s postwar foreign policy, openly declared, “A Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan. In other words, it is also a contingency for the Japan-US alliance. [And] people in Beijing, particularly President Xi Jinping, should not misjudge that.”

On its part, the Philippines under Marcos Jr has also indicated its openness to assist US military intervention in an event of conflict in Taiwan. In particular, the Southeast Asian country has expressed its openness to avail its northernmost naval bases, which are perched just over a hundred nautical miles from Taiwanese shores, to American forces.

The deepening Philippine-Japan defense cooperation, therefore, is both driven by and responsive to the proximate crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Even short of amending its pacifist constitution, Japan can, under its “collective self-defense” doctrine, aid any joint military intervention in the First Island Chain, which extends from the East China Sea to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Growing military interoperability between Washington’s oldest East Asian allies, therefore, is pivotal to the Pentagon’s ability to prevent China’s full domination of the South China Sea as well as credibly deter any Chinese occupation of Taiwan.

Recognizing the broader significance of deepening Philippine-Japan security partnership, China’s nationalist mouthpiece, The Global Times, warned against any “actions [that] may add more insecurity and instability” in the region.

“The US also hopes that Japan can find a foothold around the South China Sea to rest and resupply, so as to better assist the US military to carry out various military operations,” the state-backed newspaper added.

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · December 8, 2022

11. NATO's Nordic Enlargement: Contingency Planning and Learning Lessons

Excerpts:

With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the balance tips decisively in favor of NATO. Finland and Sweden will not only bring notable capabilities into the alliance but also their existing integrated joint defense structures. The countries already have established deep and comprehensive bilateral defense cooperation, including joint naval units such as the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group and Swedish-Finnish Amphibious Task Unit. There are also almost weekly trilateral joint exercises of the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish air forces in Lapland, with the potential to be developed into an integrated Nordic air force with approximately 200 fighter aircraft. In 2012, the Nordic countries also established the Nordic Enhanced Cooperation on Air Surveillance, which became operational in 2017. The recent exercise Vigilant Knife, arranged on short notice to test the interoperability of Swedish and Finnish land forces in northern Finland and the rapid deployment of Swedish troops to Finland, proved very successful. These existing formats can and should be utilized in NATO’s defense planning for the new northern flank. In addition, the Swedish Armed Forces are recommending the creation of a NATO Maritime Component Command in Sweden to further solidify NATO’s command of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland.

Finland and Sweden could help close several of NATO’s critical capability gaps by contributing mobile anti-aircraft systems to an integrated air and missile defense system, providing more capacity for rapid air and naval lift, deploying advanced electronic warfare capabilities, particularly anti-drone technologies, and readying more and deeper strike options such as the Precision Strike Missile. When combined with better, more permanent, integrated command structures and a fully-integrated NATO defense plan, Finland and Sweden can dramatically enhance NATO’s deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic region.

NATO's Nordic Enlargement: Contingency Planning and Learning Lessons - War on the Rocks

MINNA ÅLANDER AND WILLIAM ALBERQUE

warontherocks.com · by Minna Ålander · December 8, 2022

In Finland, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered memories of the Winter War, when Finnish forces fought off a similar assault in 1939-40 with the assistance of thousands of Swedish volunteers. These memories prompted a swift and decisive response, as both Nordic countries abandoned their longstanding military nonalignment and applied for NATO membership less than three months into the war.

Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership will fundamentally alter deterrence and defense in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region. However, the alliance will still have to grapple with the challenges of natural geography in the region: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each border Russia and the Baltic Sea, which makes them particularly difficult to defend from Russian military coercion. Sweden and Finland can alleviate this pressure, give military planners new capabilities to defeat potential aggression in the Nordic-Baltic region, and help create a unified theater of operations from the Arctic to the North Atlantic and the Nordic region, and throughout the Baltic Sea.

These changes will enable NATO to fulfill its new Forward Defense strategy in the Nordic-Baltic region and deliver on the pledges contained in the 2022 Strategic Concept to “defend every inch of Allied territory at all times,” instead of relying on tripwire forces deployed to the Baltic region. Finland and Sweden’s membership in the alliance decisively changes the correlation of forces in NATO’s favor and makes the Forward Defense strategy more credible. But more work needs to be done. Finland and Sweden now must integrate their individual and joint defense plans and command structures into NATO so they can function seamlessly under a unified NATO command. They will also now contribute to closing some longstanding NATO capability shortfalls, including in areas such as air, sea, and ground lift, and integrated air and missile defense.

Become a Member

When thinking of how to best integrate Finland and Sweden into the alliance and what NATO’s deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic region should look like, it is useful to examine the initial lessons from the war in Ukraine. What did a worst-case scenario look like for NATO, and how does Finland and Sweden’s membership change the regional dynamic? NATO’s Nordic enlargement comes during a time of renewed focus on Article 5 collective (territorial) defense in Europe and new thinking about how to make NATO’s conventional deterrent more credible. Deterrence by denial should be based on a worst-case scenario for NATO members in which Russia recapitalizes its military and applies the lessons learned from its disastrous invasion of Ukraine.

Finland and Sweden are both experienced in dealing with Russia as a multi-domain challenge. They bring crucial experience in Arctic warfare as well as in countering hybrid threats through a comprehensive whole-of-society approach to security. Where other Western European countries have adopted an expeditionary force model, Finland has continuously focused on territorial defense and now has a war-time troop strength of 280,000 and a total reserve of 870,000. Sweden, in turn, has an advanced and fully NATO-compatible defense industry. Now, NATO can strengthen its northern flank by building on these advantages, as well as on existing bilateral Finnish-Swedish defense cooperation and wider regional structures like the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).

Lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the response from the West was not firm enough. Europe was slow to implement serious military measures and many countries rushed to resume business and energy dealings with Moscow. The slow transformation of NATO security in the Baltics lacked credibility. Allies agreed to a number of reinforcement measures at the 2014 Wales Summit, known as the Readiness Action Plan. NATO also agreed to geography-specific response plans for countries near Russia, known as Graduated Response Plans, which constituted the first actual defensive plans for the eastern Allies. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO agreed to establish a tripwire of forward-deployed, battalion-sized battlegroups in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania called the enhanced Forward Presence. This policy was designed to ensure that multiple allies, particularly the three NATO nuclear states, would be engaged against invading Russian forces, but with no expectation that they would be able to stop a large-scale Russian invasion.

Decisions made at the 2022 Madrid Summit went some way to addressing the failings of the previous force design. Allies agreed to increase the size of the enhanced Forward Presence forces to a brigade each and to station additional battalions in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. In addition, the alliance agreed to combine the Graduated Response Plans into a single battle plan for the entire theater.

With Finland and Sweden inside NATO, such an integrated theater defense plan becomes far more feasible. In the meantime, while Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine has caused a reassessment of the force correlation in the Nordic-Baltic region, it would be a grave error to assume that Russia would be as inept as it has been in Ukraine during a war against NATO. Therefore, NATO should build both the demonstrable will to defend its members and the capabilities to field a credible deterrence posture that leaves no room for ambiguity and misunderstanding on Russia’s part.

NATO’s Old Defense Plan for the Baltics: Tripwire and Hope?

The transformation of NATO’s defense posture from a tripwire to Forward Defense became more urgent after Russia was credibly accused of war crimes in Ukraine. Given these reports, NATO should not accept even temporary occupation by Russian forces. NATO military planners, therefore, should anticipate the worst with regard to Russian intentions and capabilities and alter their defense plans accordingly. Russia’s political and military planners appear to have made a series of misguided assumptions about the Ukrainian government’s willingness and capacity to resist. This helps explain aspects of Russia’s hitherto poor performance. Western defense planners should assume that Russia will learn from this war and not make similar errors when judging the Baltic states’ and Poland’s willingness to defend themselves — and that Moscow will perform better in a future conflict. Russia is also running out of other, “softer” policy options due to increasingly adversarial relations with the West.

Russia is certain to emerge weaker from the war with Ukraine. Up until the full-scale invasion, Russia retained a formidable order of battle in the region, which is now being decimated. However, it is inevitable that Russia will re-capitalize its military, seek to apply the lessons learned from its most recent war on Ukraine, and regenerate its lost capabilities over the next 5 to 10 years, just as it did in the aftermath of its disastrous Chechen wars, the invasion of Georgia, and its 2014 war on Ukraine. Moscow’s remaining capabilities in the Baltic region include long-range, precision-strike cruise missiles and a slew of ship-launched, land-attack cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as a substantial reserve of air-to-ground ballistic and cruise missiles and attack aircraft. Moscow also has deepened its relationship with Belarus, which has a modest land and air force, as well as nuclear-capable intermediate range missiles and fighter-bombers that could be used for interdiction strikes.

A Potential Russian Playbook for a Baltic Invasion

For an assault on the Baltic nations, Russia has multiple potential options, each likely to coincide with a large exercise with Belarus, such as ZAPAD. In the worst case scenario, an invasion would be designed to seize significant territory quickly — within hours — and force NATO to either accept the fait accompli or send tens of thousands of troops to retake it.

Russia would attack along four main vectors, blockading the Baltic states from Kaliningrad and Belarus. From its mainland territory, Russian troops could push on two fronts simultaneously: in the south Baltics, from the Pskov-Ostrov into Latvia, and in the north, from Gatchina-Luga into Narva.

Russia further could deploy airborne and amphibious units to Finland’s Åland Islands, Sweden’s Gotland, and Hiiumaa in Estonia to establish additional anti-air and anti-ship missile capabilities to defend the approaches to Klaipeda and the Gulf of Riga. NATO planners envision, based on evaluating Russian operational-strategic exercises like ZAPAD, an initial Russian missile assault designed to destroy large amounts of critical infrastructure as quickly as possible with platforms based in the Arctic, the Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. These would destroy key NATO command, control, and communication nodes, satellite ground stations, and critical airports and seaports — all to blind alliance members and degrade their ability to respond and reinforce rapidly.

NATO then would have to face the destruction of its forward-deployed forces and contend with a joint Russian-Belarusian blocking operation across the Suwalki Gap to prevent NATO land forces from relieving them. Russia could then declare a ceasefire to consolidate its territorial gains and dare NATO to mount an operation to dislodge them. All of these attacks would be timed to coincide with a surprise drill of Russia’s nuclear forces to ensure maximum strategic nuclear pressure on NATO’s nuclear powers.

Moving from Piecemeal Defense to an Integrated Forward Defense

With Finland and Sweden in NATO, and Denmark removing its opt-out in the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy, the whole strategic outlook changes for Russia. Now, previous restrictions to defense cooperation have been removed, allowing the wider Nordic-Baltic region to become a fully interconnected and coherent security space. Moreover, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has unified the Nordic and Baltic countries in their shared threat perception of Russia. The response to Russia’s actions has been to consolidate the geographic and security architecture in this now-unified region against current and future threats, while maintaining a clear and strong commitment to supporting Ukraine in its fight for survival.

If Russia had hitherto been free to intimidate and provoke the Nordic and Baltic countries from different angles, its room for maneuver will now be significantly limited. In the Arctic region, Russia no longer has two non-aligned countries between it and Norway. While Sweden and Finland had been counted on to defend their airspace, the risk of an alliance-wide response to any violation improves deterrence. Further, the sea route from the port of Saint Petersburg through the Gulf of Finland is narrow between Finnish and Estonian waters. The Swedish island of Gotland, located in the middle of the Baltic Sea, gives NATO’s Baltic defense plans strategic depth and better security of supply. Russia’s exclave Kaliningrad, only 330 kilometers from Gotland, loses its strategic potential and becomes a vulnerability instead.

Russia may also be forced to change the density of forces along its western borders. Moscow will have to monitor the 1,343 kilometers of new NATO border with Finland, which diverts attention from the Baltic states and creates a “troop sink” for Russia. At its southwestern border, Russia is facing Europe’s most combat-experienced and hostile forces in Ukraine. From a Russian perspective, the most crucial change will be that instead of focusing on potential offensive operations, military planners will have to spend more time planning defensive operations.

Saint Petersburg, less than 400 kilometers from Helsinki, is now vulnerable to NATO naval blockade. The room for maneuver in the Baltic Sea becomes significantly limited for Russia’s Baltic Fleet, with its base in Kaliningrad now subject to anti-ship missile strikes from land, sea, and air directed from 360 degrees. Furthermore, Russia’s Kola Peninsula directly borders Finland and Norway. One of Russia’s largest concentrations of nuclear assets crucial to its second-strike capability, including strategic sub-launched ballistic missiles and long-range aircraft, is located on the peninsula and is connected to the rest of Russia through only one mainland route.

This means that rather than being able to mass forces all along the borders of the Baltic states, Russia would have to divert tens of thousands of troops to defending Saint Petersburg and protecting its line of communication to the Kola Peninsula. Facing longer-range HIMARS ammunition, Russia would have to worry about artillery strikes from Finnish territory all along the Estonian border. What was a simple overmatch for Russia to attack the Baltics at Narva, Pskov, Braslaw, Grodno, Sovetsk, and the Suwalki Gap has now become an incredibly complex theater of operations where Russia may be on the defensive across several thousand kilometers of frontline against highly motivated NATO forces.

Recommendation: Invest in NATO’s New Northern Flank

With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the balance tips decisively in favor of NATO. Finland and Sweden will not only bring notable capabilities into the alliance but also their existing integrated joint defense structures. The countries already have established deep and comprehensive bilateral defense cooperation, including joint naval units such as the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group and Swedish-Finnish Amphibious Task Unit. There are also almost weekly trilateral joint exercises of the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish air forces in Lapland, with the potential to be developed into an integrated Nordic air force with approximately 200 fighter aircraft. In 2012, the Nordic countries also established the Nordic Enhanced Cooperation on Air Surveillance, which became operational in 2017. The recent exercise Vigilant Knife, arranged on short notice to test the interoperability of Swedish and Finnish land forces in northern Finland and the rapid deployment of Swedish troops to Finland, proved very successful. These existing formats can and should be utilized in NATO’s defense planning for the new northern flank. In addition, the Swedish Armed Forces are recommending the creation of a NATO Maritime Component Command in Sweden to further solidify NATO’s command of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland.

Finland and Sweden could help close several of NATO’s critical capability gaps by contributing mobile anti-aircraft systems to an integrated air and missile defense system, providing more capacity for rapid air and naval lift, deploying advanced electronic warfare capabilities, particularly anti-drone technologies, and readying more and deeper strike options such as the Precision Strike Missile. When combined with better, more permanent, integrated command structures and a fully-integrated NATO defense plan, Finland and Sweden can dramatically enhance NATO’s deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic region.

Become a Member

Minna Ålander is a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Her research focuses on Northern European security and Nordic defense cooperation, as well as Finnish and German foreign and security policies.

William Alberque is the director of the Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe in Berlin. He previously served at NATO, the U.S. Defense Department, the U.S. State Department, and the U.S. Department of Energy, working on issues such as arms control; nuclear safeguards; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; and the planning of military exercises.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Minna Ålander · December 8, 2022

12. How ‘MacGyver’ magic can get Taiwan its Harpoon defenses faster

Excerpts:

Thankfully, the text of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act released Wednesday authorizes the Pentagon to enter into a multiyear agreement for 2,600 Harpoon missiles. There is also money authorized to expand the associated defense-industrial base. If congressional appropriators support those authorizations with the necessary funding, it could provide a running start.

Meanwhile, Japan, South Korea and Australia possess hundreds of Harpoon missiles as well, and Washington should explore whether these countries might be willing to transfer — directly or indirectly — some of their Harpoon missiles to Taiwan in return for U.S. commitments of future capabilities.

The horrible events in Ukraine since February offer a painful reminder regarding the costs of procrastination and an unwillingness to provide beleaguered democracies the help they need before a potential invasion begins.

Washington demonstrates a world-class capability when it comes to issuing press releases announcing new arms sales to Taiwan. Now it is time to demonstrate world-class capability in delivering the combat capability.

War in the Taiwan Strait would be a disaster, but it is an avoidable one. Washington can decrease the likelihood of such a conflict by moving heaven and earth now to get Taiwan the Harpoon systems and missiles it needs as soon as possible, even if it takes some “MacGyver” magic.

How ‘MacGyver’ magic can get Taiwan its Harpoon defenses faster

By Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery (ret.), Bradley Bowman and Ryan Brobst

Defense News · by Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery (ret.) · December 7, 2022

The Pentagon has a problem. The Defense Department report last month on the Chinese military makes clear that Beijing is sprinting to develop the means it would need to conquer Taiwan. Unfortunately, many of the weapons Washington is sending to help Taipei deter or defeat that aggression are not scheduled to arrive anytime soon.

The Harpoon coastal defense system and the missiles it fires are a good example. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced in October 2020 the decision to approve a $2.37 billion sale to Taiwan of 100 of the delivery systems as well as 400 Harpoon Block II surface-launched missiles. These systems would provide Taiwan a “highly reliable and effective system to counter or deter maritime aggressions, coastal blockades, and amphibious assaults,” DSCA noted.

Unfortunately, due to insufficient production capacity, the lack of a contract between the U.S. Navy and Taiwan, and unacceptable continued delays associated with foreign military sales, the Harpoon shipment to Taiwan will not be complete until long after 2027.

Many worry that the People’s Republic of China could launch military aggression against Taiwan before then. The good news is that there are ways to expedite both the delivery of the system and the Harpoon missiles.

Pentagon sees no imminent threat to Taiwan from Chinese buildup

Annual report outlines China's military progress.

Harpoons are capable of hitting moving targets at sea and fixed targets on land with its approximately 500-pound warhead out to a range of at least 124 kilometers (77 miles), which would cover much of the Taiwan Strait. That is a vital capability for Taiwan, especially considering Beijing’s growing naval capabilities.

China boasts the largest navy in the world (approximately 340 ships and submarines) and is “the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage,” as the Pentagon’s China military power report notes, and “the [People’s Republic of China] is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and auxiliary and amphibious ships.”

To ensure it could employ these capabilities effectively, Beijing is devoting significant amounts of its maritime training on island-capture scenarios. In 2021, the People’s Liberation Army “conducted more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, greatly exceeding the 13 observed in 2020,” according to the report.

So what can be done to get the Harpoon systems to Taiwan sooner?

The Pentagon and Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense should start by using a “MacGyver”-type approach, not unlike the method used to get a Harpoon capability to Ukraine quickly. While such an effort for Taiwan would need to be conducted on a larger and more sustainable scale, using existing components can expedite delivery of initial capabilities for Taiwan, too.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army storm ashore from landing crafts in an exercise on the mainland coast close to Taiwan in 1999. (AFP via Getty Images)

The Pentagon and Taiwan’s MoD should work with Boeing, the manufacturer of the Harpoon, to design and field this system rapidly — something that can realistically be done by early 2024 and serve as a bridge to the 100 newly fabricated launcher systems requested by Taiwan.

This gap filler can be accomplished by building a relocatable ground-launch platform from existing U.S. inventories of Harpoon missile-launch support structures, Harpoon Ship Command-Launch Control Systems, ground platforms (essentially a steel plate), power generators, and communications systems providing voice and a data link to provide targeting data.

If Taiwan wants a more mobile system, it could work with the producer to mount a variant on an existing Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck instead of the steel plate. The launch support structures and Harpoon Ship Command-Launch Control Systems would be drawn from those taken off decommissioned U.S. Navy ships. The communications and data link could come from existing Taiwan systems. The generators and trucks can come from either country’s inventories. The missiles should come from the several hundred older missiles in the Navy’s inventory that are under consideration for demilitarization or destruction.

A prime contractor would need to pull these pieces and parts together — much as was done for Ukraine in a few short months — or in the standard episode of any “MacGyver” TV series.

A short fuse-procurement effort should include the purchase of four of the ground launchers, four of the truck-based launchers, and 64 missiles (each launcher holds four missiles, so eight launchers would need 32 missiles and a reload would require a further 32 missiles). If it becomes clear that the existing new construction procurement is delayed past 2026, an additional 64 missiles should be considered.

Delivering on the necessary timelines would require DSCA, Taiwan’s MoD, the U.S. Navy and Boeing to all be significantly more efficient and driven than we have seen in almost every case outside Ukraine over the past decade. The cost estimates (Boeing), the price agreement (Taiwan’s MoD), the paperwork (U.S. Navy), and the drawdown from inventory (United States and Taiwan) should all be fast-tracked within each organization. Strong congressional support and oversight will be critical throughout the process.

Simultaneously, Congress should work with the Pentagon to dramatically expand Boeing’s Harpoon missile production capacity. Such an order in the first quarter of fiscal 2024 could enable the United States to deliver the 100 Harpoon launchers and all 400 missiles by 2027 — significantly earlier than currently anticipated and potentially in time to help deter aggression.

Thankfully, the text of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act released Wednesday authorizes the Pentagon to enter into a multiyear agreement for 2,600 Harpoon missiles. There is also money authorized to expand the associated defense-industrial base. If congressional appropriators support those authorizations with the necessary funding, it could provide a running start.

Meanwhile, Japan, South Korea and Australia possess hundreds of Harpoon missiles as well, and Washington should explore whether these countries might be willing to transfer — directly or indirectly — some of their Harpoon missiles to Taiwan in return for U.S. commitments of future capabilities.

The horrible events in Ukraine since February offer a painful reminder regarding the costs of procrastination and an unwillingness to provide beleaguered democracies the help they need before a potential invasion begins.

Washington demonstrates a world-class capability when it comes to issuing press releases announcing new arms sales to Taiwan. Now it is time to demonstrate world-class capability in delivering the combat capability.

War in the Taiwan Strait would be a disaster, but it is an avoidable one. Washington can decrease the likelihood of such a conflict by moving heaven and earth now to get Taiwan the Harpoon systems and missiles it needs as soon as possible, even if it takes some “MacGyver” magic.

Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the senior director of its Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. Bradley Bowman serves as senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD, where Ryan Brobst is a research analyst.

13. Germany arrests 25 accused of plotting coup

We used to export coca cola, blue jeans, and Elvis Presley during the Cold War. Now the we export QAnon?

Germany arrests 25 accused of plotting coup

BBC · by Menu

Published
16 hours ago

About sharing

Image source, DPA Picture Alliance

Image caption,

Among the 25 detained was a minor aristocrat called Heinrich XIII

By Paul Kirby

BBC News

Twenty-five people have been arrested in raids across Germany on suspicion of plotting to overthrow the government.

The group of far-right and ex-military figures are said to have prepared for a "Day X" to storm the Reichstag parliament building and seize power.

A man named as Heinrich XIII, from an old aristocratic family, is alleged to have been central to their plans.

According to federal prosecutors, he is one of two alleged ringleaders among those arrested across 11 German states.

The plotters are said to include members of the extremist Reichsbürger [Citizens of the Reich] movement, which has long been in the sights of German police over violent attacks and racist and antisemitic conspiracy theories.

They also refuse to recognise the modern German state.

Jenny Hill:'Crackpot' movement becomes dangerous

Other suspects came from the QAnon movement who believe their country is in the hands of a mythical "deep state" involving secret powers pulling the political strings.

Interior Minister Nancy Faeser assured Germans that authorities would respond with the full force of the law "against the enemies of democracy".

A modern-day conspiracy coup?

The Reichsbürger group aren't new - they pre-date the pandemic. But this audacious plot indicates increased commitment - and radicalisation - which could go hand-in-hand with the growth of pandemic disinformation online.

The plot to kidnap the German health minister - masterminded by a gang linked to these people back in April - is the first indication this has strong ties with Covid-19 conspiracy movements.

Telegram groups related to "citizens of the Reich" show an interest in conspiracy theories suggesting Covid-19 and vaccines are part of sinister plots to control populations.

There's disinformation about the war in Ukraine - and posts too about QAnon, the sprawling US conspiracy theory that has links to the riots at Capitol Hill on January 6th.

They post in support of the Sovereign Citizens movements, which at its heart believes they are immune from government rules. Ultimately this group has co-opted a range of conspiracy beliefs that push the idea evil cabals are looking to control our lives - and they've got to overthrow them.

It might sound like a pretty outlandish plot to the average person, but it's emblematic of something important.

We've had warnings before about offline action linked to online disinformation and hate before - anti-vaccine violence and the riots at the Capitol in the US.

But this is a reminder that, even as the pandemic eases in some parts of the world, its conspiracy legacy remains - and can embolden little-known fringe groups to take action in the realworld.

An estimated 50 men and women are said to have been part of the group, which allegedly plotted to overthrow the republic and replace it with a new state modelled on the Germany of 1871 - an empire called the Second Reich.

"We don't yet have a name for this group," said a spokeswoman for the federal prosecutor's office. The interior minister said it was apparently made up of an organisation "council" and a military arm.

Wednesday's dawn raids are being described as one of the biggest anti-extremism operations in modern German history.

Three thousand officers took part in 150 operations in 11 of Germany's 16 states, with two people arrested in Austria and Italy.

Almost half of arrests took place in southern states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. More than one in five Reichsbürger are thought to be based in the south-western state of Baden-Württemberg alone.

Justice Minister Marco Buschmann tweeted that a suspected "armed attack on constitutional bodies was planned". Ms Faeser said later that the investigation would peer into the "abyss of a terrorist threat from the Reichsbürger scene".

Who are the Reichsbürger?

So-called Citizens of the Reich reject Germany's modern democracy and refuse to pay taxes
Once seen as harmless cranks, they are very active and pose a high level of danger, says BfV intelligence chief Thomas Haldenwang
Last year they numbered some 21,000, but they have since grown significantly
10% are thought to be violent, and antisemitism and conspiracy theories are widespread

The federal prosecutor's office said the group had been plotting a violent coup since November 2021 and members of its central "Rat" (council) had since held regular meetings.

They had already established plans to rule Germany with departments covering health, justice and foreign affairs, the prosecutor said. Members understood they could only realise their goals by "military means and violence against state representatives", which included carrying out killings.

Investigators are thought to have got wind of the group when they uncovered a kidnap plot last April involving a gang who called themselves United Patriots.

They too were part of the Reichsbürger scene and had allegedly planned to abduct Health Minister Karl Lauterbach while also creating "civil war conditions" to bring about an end to Germany's democracy.

A former far-right AfD member of the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, is suspected of being part of the plot, and of being lined up as the group's justice minister.

Birgit Malsack-Winkemann, who was among the 25 people arrested, returned to her role as judge last year and a court has since turned down attempts to dislodge her.

Reuters

The suspected terrorist group uncovered today is - according to the current status of the inquiry - driven by fantasies of violent overthrow and conspiracy ideologies

Nancy Faeser

German Interior Minister

A prominent lawyer was pencilled in to handle the group's foreign affairs, with 71-year-old Heinrich XIII as leader.

Public Prosecutor General Peter Frank said Heinrich was among the suspects whom investigating judges had asked to be held in custody.

Heinrich XIII styles himself as a prince and comes from an old noble family known as the House of Reuss, which ruled over parts of the modern eastern state of Thuringia until 1918.

Descendants still own a few castles and Heinrich himself is said to have a hunting lodge at Bad Lobenstein in Thuringia.

The rest of the family have long distanced themselves from the minor aristocrat, with one spokesman telling local broadcaster MDR during the summer that Heinrich was an "at times confused" man who had fallen for "misconceptions fuelled by conspiracy theories".

As well as a shadow government, the plotters allegedly had plans for a military arm run by a second ringleader identified as Rüdiger von P.

They were made up of active and former members of the military, officials believe, and included ex-elite soldiers from special units. The aim of the military arm was to eliminate democratic bodies at local level, prosecutors said.

Rüdiger von P is suspected of trying to recruit police officers in northern Germany and of having an eye on army barracks too. Bases in the states of Hesse, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria were all inspected for possible use after the government was overthrown, officials said.

One of those under investigation had been a member of the Special Commando Forces, and police searched his home and his room at the Graf-Zeppelin military base in Calw, south-west of Stuttgart.

Another suspect has been identified as Vitalia B, a Russian woman who was asked to approach Moscow on Heinrich's behalf. The Russian embassy in Berlin said in a statement that it did not "maintain contacts with representatives of terrorist groups and other illegal entities".

Several violent attacks have been linked to Germany's far-right in recent years. In 2020, a 43-year-old man shot dead nine people of foreign origin in the western town of Hanau, and a Reichsbürger member was jailed for killing a policeman in 2016.

The Reichsbürger movement is estimated to have as many as 21,000 followers, of whom around 5% are considered to belong to the extreme right.

Are We Sleepwalking Through a ‘Decisive Decade’?

nytimes.com · by Bret Stephens · December 6, 2022

The B-21 Raider under wraps in Palmdale, Calif.Credit...David Swanson/Reuters

Last week the Air Force unveiled its first new strategic bomber in 34 years — a boomerang-shaped stealth plane called the B-21 Raider that may ultimately cost taxpayers some $200 billion — and the country barely noticed. Also last week came reports that China’s nuclear warhead stockpile had doubled since 2020 and could reach 1,500 by the mid-2030s, closer to parity with the United States and Russia.

This also went mostly unnoticed. Maybe we were too busy freaking out over Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter.

The United States, President Biden says, has entered a “decisive decade” when it comes to geopolitics. He’s right. But even amid the war in Ukraine and China’s growing belligerence toward Taiwan, we mostly seem to be sleepwalking into it. The administration trumpets its promises to defend the free world. But it isn’t yet willing to provide sufficient means — a dangerous mismatch in an era of authoritarian adventurism.

Some hard facts:

Costs: The United States, goes a common talking point, spends more on defense than the next nine nations combined. That’s true but misleading. It doesn’t take into account significant American disadvantages in purchasing power and personnel costs. One example: a U.S. Marine private can make about as much in salary and benefits as a Chinese general.

Trends: Military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product, at around 3 percent, is well below the plus-4 percent average of the past 50 years. It will continue to fall for the next decade, according to projections from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, and more of the funding will be eaten up by inflation.

Scope: America’s defense commitments stretch from the North Atlantic to the Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Strait. The military ambitions of Russia, China and Iran, by contrast, are regional and therefore easier to concentrate. China now has the largest navy in the world, at least in terms of ship numbers, with its prime objective the seizing of Taiwan.

Readiness: The Air Force is short by about 1,650 pilots. The Army is short by roughly 30,000 recruits. More than half of America’s bombers were built during the Kennedy administration. The Navy has spent years trying to reach a target of 313 ships (it was close to 600 at the end of the Reagan administration) but still can’t break 300.

Competence: The Pentagon is broken. It has never passed an audit. Acquisition debacles — the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (a.k.a. Little Crappy Ship); the Air Force’s KC-46 tanker; the Army’s Future Combat Systems, to name a few — account for billions of wasted dollars and decades of wasted time. The Navy is struggling to maintain its ships, owing to long neglect of public shipyards, and our defense-industrial base would struggle to supply the military with equipment in the event of a war, much less two.

Urgency: We operate on the assumption that time’s on our side. Last year, the Biden administration trumpeted an agreement with Britain and Australia to help the latter build nuclear-powered submarines. But Australia will be lucky to acquire the full complement of subs before the 2040s because its industrial base is so inadequate.

These issues are compounded by public neglect. During the Cold War, defense problems were major political issues, so people paid attention. Now they are treated as technical-bureaucratic issues, so people mostly don’t.

At a minimum, we should ask whether we want capabilities adequate to our legal and traditional foreign commitments. If so, we should accept much higher spending, revolutionize our procurement processes, adopt a mind-set of strategic urgency, and develop reliable and sustainable supply chains. If not, we should pare our commitments and be prepared to live with the consequences.

Those include the possibility that countries such as Saudi Arabia and even Japan would acquire nuclear weapons. Do we want that? It’s a debate worth having. At least we should be clear about the trade-offs in a world where former allies no longer feel they can reliably depend on U.S. security guarantees against their nearest adversaries.

The picture isn’t totally bleak. The B-21 program has reportedly, so far, been running on time and under budget, evidence that the Pentagon is sometimes capable of getting things right. And the United States has been able to afford much higher proportional defense budgets in the past and should be able to do so again, provided there’s political will.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has exposed the fact that our enemies can also have feet of clay. The Chinese military likely suffers from some of the same deficiencies as the Russians, obscured by a system that keeps secrets from itself as often as it keeps them from others. Iran may yet be undone by its internal convulsions. “There is a Providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children and the United States of America,” said Otto von Bismarck. He might have added that we have usually been exceptionally fortunate in our enemies, too.

But luck’s a bad basis for policy. We are now in a new era of great-power competition in which our traditional military advantages can’t be taken for granted. Now is the time for real public debate about what we mean to do about it.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

nytimes.com · by Bret Stephens · December 6, 2022

15. US military’s National Media Exploitation Center to refocus on China

Typical move from the US playbook. Rearrange the deck chairs and consolidate resources for the one big problem.

US military’s National Media Exploitation Center to refocus on China

Defense News · by Colin Demarest · December 7, 2022

WASHINGTON — U.S. officials plan to shrink the National Media Exploitation Center, a hub coordinating FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency efforts to parse documents, video, audio and other information sources for defense and intelligence distribution, to better position it for a future competition with China.

“We are in the process right now of trying to define what it looks like for NMEC to succeed, when its primary focus is no longer on a terrorist hiding in a cave in Afghanistan,” John Kirchhofer, the DIA’s chief of staff, said Nov. 29 at a livestreamed Intelligence and National Security Alliance event. “We are reducing the size of NMEC, and we want what’s left of it to be really hyper-focused on strategic competition.”

The clearinghouse was established in 2001 to harmonize the receipt, analysis and sharing of documents and other information seized by the U.S. military and intelligence community. Its role now is in flux as the Department of Defense and other federal agencies move away from the counterterrorism operations that defined the past two decades and prepare for potential large-scale, technologically complex conflicts with China or Russia.

Kirchhofer said there “will be a shifting of priorities and focus for NMEC writ large,” including “increasing opportunities for Mandarin speakers” and “a corresponding reduction in requirements related to Arabic, Urdu or Pashto, just given where our focus is going to be in the future.” The center can be “highly relevant” in a fight against China and its People’s Liberation Army, the third-ranking officer added, “because that has become such a data-centric organization.”

Data centers are physical and digital targets, says Pentagon’s Eoyang

What Russia failed to take down online in Ukraine, it's attacking with missiles, according to Mieke Eoyang, a senior Pentagon cyber official.

Both the U.S. and China have invested heavily in military science and technology, with clean, plentiful data quickly becoming the lifeblood of planning and operations. In Washington, a corresponding concept, known as Joint All-Domain Command and Control, has emerged.

JADC2, as it’s known, is a strategy in which all corners of the military — land, air, sea, space and cyber — are seamlessly linked. The interconnectedness, officials argue, will allow for quicker and more-tailored responses to threats. Kirchhofer said the NMEC blazed a trail for efficient data collection, digestion and dissemination, what are now considered foundations of JADC2.

“It became highly relevant to the fight, a great asset for the community,” he said, “and one that really led the way for us when it came to dealing with big data.”

The chief of staff further expects the newer, leaner exploitation center to closely coordinate with the so-called China mission group, another entity the DIA is lashing together. A coalition of analysts and specialists, the group is meant to be a central repository that DIA insiders and agency outsiders can tap for needed expertise.

“We do believe they will be fully engaged, cross-matrixed in, with the China mission group when it comes to anything they’re doing related to China,” Kirchhofer said. “I go back to that box I mentioned earlier: If you’re working China in DIA, you’re in that box.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

16. China's looser anti-COVID measures met with relief, caution

China's looser anti-COVID measures met with relief, caution

AP · by HUIZHONG WU · December 8, 2022

TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — People across China reacted with relief and caution Thursday to the dramatic government decision to loosen some of the world’s most severe COVID-19 restrictions.

For the first time in months, Jenny Jian hit the gym in the southern metropolis of Guangzhou without being required to scan the “health code” on her smartphone, part of a nationwide system that tracks where hundreds of millions of people go.

Elsewhere, virus tests no longer were required to enter many public places under changes announced Wednesday that followed nationwide protests against restrictions that have confined millions of families to their homes. Schools in areas without outbreaks were ordered to reopen.

“It was implemented very quickly,” said Jian, a 28-year-old resident of the southern city of Guangzhou. “But policy is one thing. The main thing is to see what the experience is when I step out the door.”

The changes are in line with the government’s promise to make restrictions less burdensome while still trying to contain the virus. While it’s not clear if the new rules are a direct response to the protests, they address some of the most pressing issues that drove people on the streets.

The state crackdown on the demonstrations was swift, if largely out of sight, and the flash of public anger faded from view even before the changes were announced. For now, it’s unclear whether more protests will flare given a quickly changing situation.

Health

China begins implementing relaxed anti-COVID-19 measures

EXPLAINER: China's relaxed 'zero-COVID' brings big changes

EXPLAINER: What end of vaccine mandate means for US troops

Speedier drug approvals hit slowdown as FDA faces scrutiny

Among the most significant changes announced was that people who test positive for COVID-19 but show mild or no symptoms can now stay at home — a 180-degree turn from the previous policy, which sent all infected people to government field hospitals that became notorious for overcrowding and poor food and hygiene.

Chinese officials who spent three years warning the public about COVID-19’s dangers have also begun to talk about it as less threatening — a possible effort to prepare for living with the virus, as many other nations have done. On Thursday, official messaging particularly emphasized the point, with several state media outlets sharing a lengthy explainer that noted the virus is here to stay.

“The past three years have made us not want to come in contact with the virus ... but actually in human society, there are thousands of microorganisms,” a team working for prominent government doctor Zhang Wenhong wrote. “Inadvertently, every year we will get sick briefly because we’ve been infected by several of these.”

Still, experts were careful to underscore this was not the end of COVID-19 containment.

“It is not that we are going to lie flat. Precision prevention must be still adhered to,” said Yu Changping, a doctor in the department of respiratory medicine at the People’s Hospital of Wuhan University. “The opening is an irreversible trend in the future because most people have been vaccinated and there has been a lower number of serious illnesses.”

While outside experts have increasingly criticized China’s containment policy as unsustainable, they have also warned that the country will now face a challenging first wave, as the loosened measures will no doubt fuel an increase of cases. That could be particularly difficult because many elderly people are not vaccinated and the country’s strict policies have meant few people have natural immunity against the virus.

“Every country in experiencing their first wave will face chaos, especially in medical capacity, and a squeeze on medical resources,” said Wang Pi-sheng, Taiwan’s head of COVID-19 response. Wang said Taiwanese living in China could come home for medical treatment, especially if they’re elderly or at high risk.

Bracing for the possibility of getting infected, people in the southwestern city of Chongqing rushed to buy cold and fever medicine, in line with government advice. In Beijing, some pharmacies ran out of the drugs.

Even the possibility of buying such medicine was remarkable, as the new rules relaxed restrictions on them. During the height of the pandemic, such over-the-counter medications could only be purchased through a lengthy application process and just visiting a pharmacy risked triggering the health code smartphone app.

But after three years of continually changing restrictions, many were cautious about rejoicing too early, wondering how the new measures would be carried out.

“All the policies are there, but when it gets to the local level, when it gets to the sub-district level, your neighborhood, it’s a complete mess,” said 65-year-old Yang Guangwei, a retiree who lives in Beijing.

The new measures also mandate fewer PCR tests, noting they must be targeted at those in high-risk industries and not entire districts. At the height of some lockdowns, many cities carried out daily tests. In recent months, Beijing and Shanghai residents had to take one every two or three days just to be able to move around the city.

One Beijing resident who gave only his family name, Qian, out of concern for discussing government policy, noted that testing is still required to access some places.

“They say don’t test, but the workplace still requires it. That’s contradictory,” Qian said of his own experience.

Underneath the official announcement of rollbacks posted on social media by state broadcaster CCTV, users expressed skepticism and noted that uncertainties abound.

One user asked if universities, many of which had prevented students from entering and leaving freely in the past few years, would return to normal. Others wondered whether certain cities would get rid of their quarantine-upon-arrival measures, as mandated in the national policies announced Wednesday.

But some expressed hope that the measures would open up new possibilities, like travel, which has been severely curtailed.

___

Associated Press news assistant Caroline Chen in Guangzhou, China, researcher Yu Bing in Beijing and AP video journalist Johnson Lai in Taipei, Taiwan, contributed to this report.

AP · by HUIZHONG WU · December 8, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE