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Quotes of the Day:
"People who shut their eyes to reality simply invite their own destruction."
- James A. Baldwin
"The trouble with the world is not that people know too little; it's that they know so many things that just aren't so."
- Mark Twain
"One could not get at the masses with arguments, proofs, and knowledge, but only with feelings and beliefs."
- Wilhelm Reich
1. North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy Has Failed: ROK - U.S. Alliance Needs a Superior Strategy
2. U.S. offer for dialogue remains on table, but will not reduce sanctions on N. Korea: State Dept.
3. S. Korea, U.S. to resume 'live, virtual, constructive' elements in springtime allied drills: USFK
4. North Korea ransomware targets hospitals to fund digital spycraft, US agencies warn
5. S. Korea slaps first sanctions on N. Korea over crypto theft, cyberattacks
6. North Korea Urges ‘Preparedness for War’ and Displays New Missile
7. Steel Bipartisan Legislation Requires President to Report to Congress on North Korea’s Malign Activity
8. Korea's 'strategic command' to oversee space, cyber units, F-35s, submarines: official
9. North Korean Leader Mum as Military Parade Rolls Out Largest ICBM Display
10. [INTERVIEW] Seoul, Washington forced to maintain greater discipline: Council on Foreign Relations
11. S. Korea's talk of nuclear armament warranted, but should focus on US extended deterrence: U.S. expert
12. Do 77% of Koreans Really Support A South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program?
13. N.K. leader calls for stronger military power in photo session with parade participants
14. Former US Forces Korea commander joins ‘green’ rocket company as adviser
1. North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy Has Failed: ROK - U.S. Alliance Needs a Superior Strategy
The latest from Mathew Ha and me. Mat is back in the saddle again.
Conclusion:
Recently a group of authors produced a new strategy recommendation that is based on the realization that Kim Jong Un will not agree to denuclearization. It is a strategy that focuses on human rights and influence operations, and provides a framework for dealing with north Korea as it really is rather than as some would wish it to be. It offers a new path forward because it is time for the U.S. and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks unification first and then denuclearization. It allows Kim the option to change or be changed from within due to his own failures in the eyes of the elite, the military, and the Korean people in the north.
The international community must understand that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea – ultimately leading to a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy Has Failed: ROK - U.S. Alliance Needs a Superior Strategy
19fortyfive.com · by Matthew Ha and David Maxwell · February 9, 2023
Approximately halfway into his first term, President Joe Biden has been given a wake-up call from Kim Jong Un that North Korea continues to remain a primary national security threat. Some policymakers, pundits, the press, and the public are concerned the administration has placed insufficient focus on in the first two years he has been in office due to the strategic competition with China, tensions over Taiwan and South China Sea, Putin’s War in Ukraine, and the threats emanating from Iran.
Adding to these challenges are Kim Jong Un’s new major policy directions for 2023 that he laid out at the plenary session of the ruling Korean Worker’s Party meeting. He announced that he plans to exponentially increase his nuclear arsenal and develop a new ICBM in 2023. He also characterized South Korea as his “undoubted enemy.” With Kim announcing his new policies, it is time for the U.S. and the ROK/U.S. alliance to implement a new strategy.
Such rhetoric is emblematic of Kim Jong Un’s tried and true political warfare tactics in employing hostility and aggression to gradually alter the status quo and extort concessions from South Korea and the U.S. to divide and break the ROK/U.S. alliance. Kim Jong Un backs his political warfare tactics with military provocations such as ballistic missile tests, of which he conducted a record more than seventy in 2022.
Biden Should Evaluate North Korea Strategy
For the remainder of his first term, the Biden administration should focus on crafting a superior political warfare strategy in tandem with the ROK Government as the ROK/U.S. alliance remains the linchpin to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the wider INDOPACIFIC. Such a strategy will integrate various forms of pressure that leverage diplomatic, economic sanctions, cyber tools, and information and influence activities to impose enough cost to show Kim Jong Un that seeking nuclear weapons is more costly than beneficial. More importantly, such actions must influence the elite and military leaders as well as the Korean people in the north that Kim Jong Un’s strategy has failed and that they can exert the only kind of pressure that could force Kim to change, pressure from within.
At the start of 2023 it is important to note that Kim’s seemingly increasing hostility reflects how his strategic failures have piled up since 2017. He failed to extort concessions of sanctions relief at the Hanoi summit and his regime’s failing economy continues to suffer following its self-imposed isolation due to the COVID 19 pandemic.
All four Presidents: Trump, Moon, Yoon, and Biden deserve credit in remaining resolute in maintaining all sanctions. This is despite North Korean threats, increased tension, and provocations, sanctions evasions activities with Chinese and Russian complicity. They correctly ignored the calls from pundits who do not understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime to lift sanctions as an incentive to bring Kim to the negotiating table.
Sanctions are essential in obstructing illicit cash flows that fuel the Kim regime. Escapees note that the lack of sanctions relief is one of the most significant failures of the Kim family regime since 1953.
President Biden correctly further extended North Korean sanctions in June 2021. Kim’s failures in turn have led to some of Kim’s worst domestic problems that pose the potential for internal instability. Mitigating this requires Kim to “externalize” threats. This is evident in labeling South Korea as the “undoubted enemy” and reminding Koreans in the north of the pressing need to ”exponentially increase their nuclear capabilities” in his speech during the plenary session of the ruling worker’s party congress. These statements clearly indicate that Kim will not give up his nuclear and missile programs. However, the most important reason for not providing Kim Jong Un concessions is that in doing so Kim would assess that his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are successful. Rather than negotiating in good faith he will continue these strategies because he will believe they work.
The Biden administration deserves credit for continuing scheduled military exercises of the ROK/U.S. Combined Force Command to restore readiness due to the previous decision to cancel exercises in 2018 when the former president referred to exercises as “provocative and expensive war games.”
Readiness was also reduced by the COVID pandemic. Maintaining Alliance military readiness is the number one priority to demonstrate the Alliance’s combined resolve in the face of North Korean provocations and to deter war.
South Korea Participates
South Korea is continuing to improve its military capabilities. It has established the Directorate of Countering Nuclear and WMD, which it said will lay the foundation for a new command. Building on the directorate, the South Korean military plans to launch the strategic command – an overarching entity spearheading overall operations against the North’s nuclear and WMD challenges.
The military continues to develop the three-pronged system consisting of the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, an operational plan to incapacitate the North Korean leadership in a major conflict; the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform; and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system. At the same time, the U.S. has continued to deploy strategic assets to the region to contribute to extended deterrence.
The foundation of deterrence and defense is absolutely critical for the alliance, moving forward with a new strategy. Kim Jong Un is not stupid. He will not attack in the face of strength unless he deems that he has no other option. This actually provides the alliance with the freedom of action to execute a superior political warfare strategy.
Although denuclearization of the north remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first and then unification will follow. To accomplish this, it has also been said there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong Un from making a denuclearization agreement.
Today even a blind man can read the tea leaves and know that Kim Jong Un will not denuclearize, even though his policies have been an abject failure. His political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies completely failed in 2022 because Presidents Yoon and Biden, like their predecessors, refused to make the political and economic concessions he demanded just to come to the negotiating table: namely to remove sanctions.
Recently a group of authors produced a new strategy recommendation that is based on the realization that Kim Jong Un will not agree to denuclearization. It is a strategy that focuses on human rights and influence operations, and provides a framework for dealing with north Korea as it really is rather than as some would wish it to be. It offers a new path forward because it is time for the U.S. and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks unification first and then denuclearization. It allows Kim the option to change or be changed from within due to his own failures in the eyes of the elite, the military, and the Korean people in the north.
The international community must understand that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea – ultimately leading to a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
Expert Biographies and Expertise
Mathew Ha is a political science PhD student at George Mason University’s Schar school of Policy and Government, he is a former research analyst focused on North Korea and China at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies n former analyst from Valens Global. His area of expertise includes U.S. foreign policy in Asia and North Korean cyber operations and sanctions policy.
David Maxwell, a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Editor-in-Chief of Small Wars Journal. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation (where he focuses on a free and unified Korea), and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.
19fortyfive.com · by Matthew Ha and David Maxwell · February 9, 2023
2. U.S. offer for dialogue remains on table, but will not reduce sanctions on N. Korea: State Dept.
One we lift sanctions Kim will assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies a success and rather than negotiate in good faith as a responsible member of the international community he will double down on his strategies because we will have proven to him that they work.
We need to continue to hold the line even if sanctions are being evaded with Chinese and Russian complicity. The fact that remains in place and that Kim has been unsuccessful in getting relief is what is most important. It is one of the regime's largest failures.
U.S. offer for dialogue remains on table, but will not reduce sanctions on N. Korea: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 10, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- The United States continues to remain open to dialogue with North Korea but will not reduce sanctions on the reclusive country just to bring Pyongyang back to the dialogue table, a state department spokesperson said Thursday.
On the same token, the department spokesperson said the U.S. will not reduce its joint military exercises with allies.
State Department spokesperson Ned Price is seen answering questions during a daily press briefing at the state department in Washington on Feb. 9, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
"We have an offer on the table to the DPRK for dialogue right now. This is an offer that the DPRK could have accepted over the course of nearly two years, and so far it has chosen not to," Ned Price told a daily press briefing, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"Instead, the DPRK has engaged in provocation after provocation, each one of which poses a threat to international peace and security in the region and potentially beyond," he added.
Pyongyang fired an unprecedented 69 ballistic missiles last year, far surpassing its previous record of 25 ballistic missiles launched in a year.
The North has accused the U.S. of provoking North Korean missile tests by staging massive joint military drills with South Korea and Japan that it claims are aimed at invading the North.
Price dismissed the North Korean accusation, insisting the "defensive maneuvers" the U.S. has undertaken with its allies were only aimed at ensuring U.S. commitment to the defense and security of South Korea and Japan.
"We are doing that in the face of provocations from the DPRK," he said. "We would like to see the DPRK cease these provocations. We would like to see the DPRK engage in dialogue. But until and unless that happens, our approach will remain the same."
The department spokesperson declined to comment when asked about the massive military parade held Wednesday (Korea time) in Pyongyang to mark the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea's armed forces.
A large missile, believed to be a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, appears during a military parade at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on the night of Feb. 8, 2023, to mark the 75th founding anniversary of the Korea People's Army, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
He only offered to say, "These are propaganda exercises on the part of the DPRK."
"What I will say is that our goal remains the same. That's the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are prepared to engage in dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK to that end." he added.
Youtube
https://youtu.be/ans5py6T_6Q
bdk@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 10, 2023
3. S. Korea, U.S. to resume 'live, virtual, constructive' elements in springtime allied drills: USFK
Excellent. This is very helpful. These concepts need to be explained to both publics in the ROK and the US.
But this is important because this provides the foundation of alliance combined deterrence and defense that will allow the execution of a superior political warfare strategy against the north.
S. Korea, U.S. to resume 'live, virtual, constructive' elements in springtime allied drills: USFK | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 10, 2023
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Feb. 10 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States plan to incorporate "live, virtual and constructive" (LVC) training elements in this year's springtime combined military exercise for the first time in five years, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said Friday, as part of efforts to bolster readiness against evolving North Korean threats.
The LVC framework refers to "live" field maneuvers, "virtual" simulation drills and "constructive" war games -- three key elements that are intertwined and synchronized based on the same exercise scenario. The allies last applied the LVC concept during the now-suspended Foal Eagle field exercise in 2018.
"Freedom Shield is a prime opportunity to leverage LVC capabilities," USFK spokesperson Col. Isaac Taylor told Yonhap News Agency, referring to the allies' regular exercise expected to take place next month.
"As technology has matured, the ability to synchronize the 'live,' 'virtual' and 'constructive' domains has improved, and as these capabilities evolve and mature, their use will continue to be incorporated into the exercise design to enhance combat readiness," he added.
LVC elements have not been infused into the two countries' combined drills in recent years, as their computer-simulated command post exercises took place separately from field drills following the suspension of the Foal Eagle exercise in 2019.
The plan to resume the LVC concept comes as the Yoon Suk Yeol and Joe Biden administrations have been pushing to reinforce combined drills that were scaled back or suspended during the former Moon Jae-in government keen on inter-Korean engagement.
The tech-based LVC concept is not new, Taylor pointed out, as the U.S. military has long been harnessing it to enhance realism in its training programs and the effectiveness of those programs, and minimize logistical training requirements.
The allies are poised to conduct some 20 combined exercises at the same level of intensity as the Foal Eagle drills in the first half of this year, according to Seoul's defense ministry.
Taylor hinted the USFK would seek to apply LVC elements in those planned exercises.
"The combined training is focused on ensuring that units are combat ready to execute their wartime mission," he said. "Where applicable, USFK leverages LVC capabilities to enhance that training."
This file photo, taken Jan. 13, 2023, show South Korean and U.S. soldiers engaging in combined drills at a training site in Paju, 28 kilometers northwest of Seoul. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 10, 2023
4. North Korea ransomware targets hospitals to fund digital spycraft, US agencies warn
We must not be distracted by missiles. We have to go after the regime's all purpose sword. We need to engage on the cyber battlefield now.
North Korea ransomware targets hospitals to fund digital spycraft, US agencies warn
cyberscoop.com · by Christian Vasquez · February 9, 2023
North Korea is deploying ransomware in the health care sector to supplement cyber ops against the U.S. and South Korean governments, according to a joint alert released Thursday from multiple U.S. and South Korean agencies.
Furthermore, the alert from the National Security Agency, FBI, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Health and Human Services, the Republic of Korea’s Defense Security Agency and the National Intelligence Service warns that Pyongyang is using the illicit cryptocurrencies obtained from the attacks to support state-backed espionage operations that target U.S. defense networks and the defense industrial base.
The joint release is just the latest warning from U.S. government officials that ransomware attacks originating in North Korea have grown into a national security crisis. In fact, many cyber officials and lawmakers have called for additional regulations to ensure health care organizations are implementing proper cybersecurity protections to help defend against the ongoing scourge of ransomware.
DPRK is actively ransoming Health Care and other critical infrastructure victims. Don’t give DPRK actors easy entry into your networks.
Great partnership here with @CISAgov, @HHSgov, @FBI and the South Korean government to defend against these attackshttps://t.co/OaKfNT5M22 pic.twitter.com/oT7XerXj02
— Rob Joyce (@NSA_CSDirector) February 9, 2023
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John Hultquist, head of threat intelligence at the cybersecurity firm Mandiant, noted on Twitter that his company has connected the ransomware targeting hospitals to the threat group known as Andariel, which has caused major disruptions at health care facilities.
“Andariel does not appear to be focused on fund-raising like some of their peers. They are still carrying out the old school intelligence mission, targeting government, the defense sector, NGOs and others. They may be doing this just to keep the lights on,” Hultquist noted.
Thursday’s warning from government agencies follows a June alert by CISA, FBI and the Treasury Department detailing how North Korean state hackers are using the Maui ransomware to target the health care sector, too. However, the most recent notice says that North Korean hackers also used other types of ransomware such as H0lyGh0st and deploy encryption tools such as LockBit 2.0.
cyberscoop.com · by Christian Vasquez · February 9, 2023
5. S. Korea slaps first sanctions on N. Korea over crypto theft, cyberattacks
Good work. It is a start.
S. Korea slaps first sanctions on N. Korea over crypto theft, cyberattacks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · February 10, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 10 (Yonhap) -- South Korea on Friday announced its first independent sanctions on North Korea in response to Pyongyang's cryptocurrency theft and other illicit cyber activities.
South Korea has decided to impose its own sanctions on four North Korean tech experts and seven organizations under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the country's military intelligence agency, involved in cryptocurrency heists and cyberattacks in the past, according to Seoul's foreign ministry.
The North is widely suspected of having engaged in cryptocurrency theft to finance its apparently advancing nuclear and missile programs. According to a U.N. Security Council report released last year, the North is accused of having stolen as much as $400 million worth of cryptocurrency in 2021.
Friday's announcement marked South Korea's first independent sanctions on North Korea in the area of illicit cyber activities.
The Yoon Suk Yeol administration earlier imposed sanctions on individuals and institutions related to the North's weapons programs and U.N. Security Council resolution evasions in October and December, respectively.
This file photo from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on Sept. 6, 2018, shows Park Jin-hyok of North Korea who was charged by the U.S. with multiple cyber attacks from 2014. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Those blacklisted include Park Jin-hyok, a computer programmer with the Chosun Expo Joint Venture who participated in the cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014, and Song Rim of Hapjanggang Trading Corp., a software developer who has programmed and distributed voice phishing smartphone applications.
Among the sanctioned organizations are Lazarus Group, which stole nearly US$620 million from the online game "Axie Infinity" in one of the single largest cybertheft cases in 2022, Bluenoroff and Andariel, all sponsored by the RGB.
The ministry said the sanctions are expected to draw attention to the risks of trading with those on the blacklist and raise awareness within the international community.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin said earlier this month Seoul and Washington will work to "close loopholes" in U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea and cut off Pyongyang's unlawful revenue streams by countering its illicit cyber activities.
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · February 10, 2023
6. North Korea Urges ‘Preparedness for War’ and Displays New Missile
... to support its political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
North Korea Urges ‘Preparedness for War’ and Displays New Missile
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · February 9, 2023
Analysts said the new weapon was probably a solid-fuel ICBM, which the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, has wanted to add to his country’s growing nuclear arsenal.
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A photograph provided by North Korean state media showed an intercontinental ballistic missile during a military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the North Korean army in Pyongyang on Wednesday.
By
Feb. 9, 2023, 4:38 a.m. ET
SEOUL — North Korea has unveiled what analysts said was a new, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile during a nighttime military parade in Pyongyang on Wednesday, the latest example of the country’s effort to fill its arsenal with increasingly advanced nuclear technology.
The parade, celebrating the 75th anniversary of North Korea’s military, featured ICBMs and short-range “tactical nuclear” missiles that demonstrated the North’s “tremendous nuclear strike capability,” North Korean state media said on Thursday.
North Korea has frequently boasted about its weapons technology. But experts, saying the isolated country has often exaggerated its abilities, have expressed doubt that it has acquired the technology needed to hit targets across an ocean with ICBMs.
The state media did not specify the capabilities of individual weapons at the parade, but the photos it carried showed the Hwasong-17 — the North’s largest ICBM — which was tested in November. The photos also showed a new ICBM-sized canister, a tube from which a missile is launched.
Although it was unclear if the canister was a mock-up or contained a real missile, it was mounted on a nine-axle vehicle, indicating that it was roughly the size of the North’s Hwasong-15 ICBM, first test-launched in 2017.
North Korea’s Missile Tests
Card 1 of 5
An increase in activity. In recent months, North Korea has conducted several missile tests, hinting at an increasingly defiant attitude toward countries that oppose its growing military arsenal. Here’s what to know:
U.N. resolutions. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula started rising in 2017, when North Korea tested three intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test. The United Nations imposed sanctions, and Pyongyang stopped testing nuclear and long-range missiles for a time.
Failed diplomacy. Former President Donald Trump met with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, three times between 2018 and 2019, hoping to reach a deal on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. After the talks broke down, North Korea resumed missile testing.
An escalation. North Korea started a new round of testing in September 2021 after a six-month hiatus. It subsequently completed several tests, including the firing of multiple intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, that violated the 2017 U.N. resolutions.
New provocations. Mr. Kim has launched a record number of missiles and focused on developing new ones in 2022. The North Korean leader has said that a "neo-Cold War" is emerging and has vowed to expand his country’s nuclear capabilities against South Korea “exponentially.”
The new canister looked like a slightly upgraded version of a weapon that North Korea unveiled during a military parade in 2017, suspected to be a solid-fuel ICBM but never tested, said Yang Uk, an expert on North Korean weapons at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
Wednesday’s parade featured at least 15 ICBMs or ICBM mock-ups, more than in any previous military parade, Mr. Yang said, basing his analysis on photos in North Korean state media. “They appear to have brought out all their ICBMs, including their solid-fuel ICBM launch vehicles,” he said.
Solid-fuel missiles are easier to launch and harder to spot. In recent years, North Korea has tested a series of short-range, solid-fuel ballistic missiles that it said were capable of delivering nuclear warheads to South Korea.
But all three ICBMs that North Korea has tested so far have relied on liquid propellants. In December, the country tested a powerful new rocket engine that it said could be used to propel a solid-fuel ICBM. After that test, Kim Jong-un, the North’s leader, urged his engineers to build a new, solid-fuel ICBM “in the shortest span of time.”
Since taking power in 2011, Mr. Kim has staged more than a dozen military parades, using them to display his nuclear arsenal and to boost the morale of his people, who have suffered under international sanctions and food shortages.
The new missile disclosed on Wednesday was likely “a mock-up of a solid-fuel ICBM,” said Kim Dong-yub, a North Korean weapons expert at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. “The canister may have been empty, but we cannot dismiss it as blustering. North Korea has often shown mock-ups in parades before testing the actual missiles.”
Mr. Kim did not deliver a speech at the military parade on Wednesday, as he has often done in the past. He did, however, attend with his daughter, according to North Korean media. The young girl, Ju-ae, is the only one of Mr. Kim’s children to appear with him in public.
Her frequent recent appearances in state media have triggered speculation among analysts that she was being groomed as Mr. Kim’s successor. Her father has taken her mainly to military-related events.
Since Mr. Kim’s talks with President Donald J. Trump fell apart in 2019, North Korea, with one of the largest standing armies in the world, has renounced diplomacy with the United States and doubled down on weapons development. Last year, it launched at least 95 ballistic and other missiles, a record.
U.S. and South Korean officials have said for months that the North was readying another nuclear test as well, the country’s seventh.
When U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and his South Korean counterpart, Lee Jong-Sup, met last month in Seoul, the allies agreed to expand their joint military drills to demonstrate their combined deterrence against the North.
When Mr. Kim presided over a meeting of his ruling Workers’ Party’s Central Military Commission this week, he exhorted his country to expand military drills and perfect “the preparedness for war.”
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · February 9, 2023
7. Steel Bipartisan Legislation Requires President to Report to Congress on North Korea’s Malign Activity
If we want to have a strategic strangulation campaign we must have a strategy to go after Kim's malign activities. While this focuses on continuing reporting requirements that are expiring, I hope the administration interprets this as Congress will provide bipartisan support for substantive actions against north Korea malign activities.
The legislation is at this link: https://steel.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/steel.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/steel_001_xml.pdf
Steel Bipartisan Legislation Requires President to Report to Congress on North Korea’s Malign Activity
https://steel.house.gov/media/press-releases/steel-bipartisan-legislation-requires-president-report-congress-north-koreas
February 9, 2023
Press Release
Washington, D.C.— Today, Rep. Michelle Steel (CA-45) introduced bipartisan legislation to require the President of the United States to provide reports on North Korea’s illegal and dangerous activity to Congress so that Congress may use the intelligence to strategically counter and deter Kim Jong Un’s regime. Rep. Steel was joined by Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA) and Del. Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen (R-AS-At Large) in introducing the legislation.
“These reports are vital as Congress shapes its response to North Korea’s continued aggression on the Korean Peninsula,” said Rep. Steel. “Just yesterday, Kim Jong Un held a massive military parade to display his nuclear arsenal. We must be completely clear on the danger posed by North Korea in order to properly respond with sanctions and other deterrents. This bill reaffirms our commitment to addressing North Korea’s significant threat to the national security of the United States and our allies. I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this legislation so we can send a clear message to the Kim regime and the networks in the Chinese Communist Party, Iran, and Russia that enable their growing hostility.”
“As North Korea sends arms shipments to Wagner Group forces to aid Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine and launches ballistic missiles over Japan’s sovereign territory, we must continue Congressional oversight on Kim Jong Un’s malign activity,” said Rep. Connolly.“I thank Representative Steel, who is among the first Korean American women to serve in Congress, for leading this effort to assert Congress’ role in assessing and addressing the national security threat that North Korea poses to the United States, our strong allies in South Korea and Japan, and partners in the Indo-Pacific.”
“This bill provides continuity in U.S. policy, and ensures the clarity of purpose to keep the Pacific region secure from North Korea’s regime,” said Del. Amata. “Thank you to Congresswoman Steel for her leadership so the U.S. is always ready with these up-to-date security essentials.”
Background
The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act and the Korean Interdiction and Modernization Sanctions Act are pivotal pieces of legislation that sharpen and strengthen U.S. sanctions against North Korea’s Kim Jong Un regime.
However, several of the reporting requirements in both bills are set to expire or already have expired. This includes reports to Congress on North Korean arms trafficking, enhanced at-sea inspections, cybersecurity, North Korea – Iran cooperation, and international financial messaging.
At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party and Russia continue to reward North Korea by blocking additional U.N. sanctions over its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. It is vital that Congress is fully aware of the CCP and Russia’s efforts to support North Korea’s threats to world peace.
Find the full text of the legislation here.
Foreign Affairs
8. Korea's 'strategic command' to oversee space, cyber units, F-35s, submarines: official
I think this is a good initiative.
Korea's 'strategic command' to oversee space, cyber units, F-35s, submarines: official
The Korea Times · February 9, 2023
U.S. Air Force B-1B bombers, center, F-22 fighter jets and South Korean Air Force F-35 fighter jets, bottom, fly over South Korea during a joint air drill, Jan. 1. Courtesy of Ministry of National DefenseSouth Korea's military plans to task its envisioned "strategic command" with overseeing space and cybersecurity units, and those running F-35 stealth jets and submarines, a defense ministry official said Thursday.
Speaking at a security forum, Ryoo Moo-bong, deputy defense minister for defense reform, detailed key features of the command that Seoul has been seeking to launch next year to counter evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
The command is designed to take charge of the Cyber Operations Command, units for missile, space and electromagnetic spectrum operations as well as those operating F-35 jets and submarines, he said.
"It will be in charge of missions overseeing operations of the three-axis system against the enemy's nuclear and missile threats," Ryoo said at the forum hosted by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the British Embassy in Seoul.
The three-pronged system refers to the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, an operational plan to incapacitate the North Korean leadership in a major conflict; the Kill Chain pre-emptive strike platform; and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is pushing to expand the JCS Directorate of Countering Nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to create the strategic command in 2024, according to Ryoo.
In particular, Ryoo highlighted the need to improve cyberspace and electromagnetic capabilities, which can be used to neutralize threats from hostile missiles even before their launch.
The seminar was attended by Colin Crooks, the British ambassador to Seoul, and KIDA President Kim Yun-tae. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · February 9, 2023
9. North Korean Leader Mum as Military Parade Rolls Out Largest ICBM Display
Excerpts:
Video of the nighttime military parade had not been aired by North Korea at the time of writing, and it will be some time before more is known about, in particular the new ICBM prototype unveiled in a cloud of suspense.
“Of interest in this military parade is that ‘hidden card’ that followed the Hwasong-17 on a nine-axle transporter erector launcher,” said Kim Dong-yup, professor at the University of North Korea Studies. “When we consider how North Korea has been presenting its new weapons, it does so first in a military parade then proceeds to develop and test it.”
Kim, the professor, noted the presumed solid-fuel ICBM could be a model of a forthcoming Pukguksong missile, the submarine-launched ballistic missile series, over the land-based Hwasong series. It could be less than a year before the world sees the new ballistic missile fly, he said, and by 2025, at the latest, before Kim Jong Un’s stated five-year plan for military modernization expires in 2026.
North Korean Leader Mum as Military Parade Rolls Out Largest ICBM Display
February 09, 2023 7:26 AM
voanews.com
Seoul, South Korea —
A grand nighttime event in Pyongyang Wednesday parading military hardware featured the largest contingent of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles to date, including a handful believed to be mock-ups of nuclear-capable missiles that would run on solid-fuel engines.
Reporting on the military parade marking the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army, North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency praised the ICBM display as a show of a “revolutionary development” of its defense power and its “tremendous nuclear attack capability.”
Eleven Hwasong-17 ICBMs were rolled out at Kim Il Sung Square, carried by 11-axle transporter erector launchers, according to images released by state media. They were followed by five smaller, previously unseen canisterized — in transportation containers — ICBMs that were not identified but believed by multiple analysts to be early versions of a solid-fuel ICBM Pyongyang has long aimed to develop.
“One ICBM launcher for every letter in the word ‘denuclearization.’ Coincidence?” asked Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a tweet. He raised concern that the sheer number of ICBMs — if capable — could overpower U.S. ground-based interceptors.
N. Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter attend a photo session with the scientists, engineers and others involved in the test-fire of the new Hwasong-17 ICBM in this photo released Nov. 27, 2022 by N. Korea's KCNA via Reuters.
The Hwasong-17 ICBM has been dubbed a “monster missile” for its hypothetical ability to reach the continental United States, carrying multiple nuclear warheads intended for multiple targets. Its first successful test was in November, which shot the missile on a vaulted trajectory, giving it an estimated flight distance of 15,000 kilometers.
North Koreans are known to be working on reentry technology, alongside a solid fuel engine — the latter of which would enable ICBMs preloaded with fuel, cutting the time from dispatch to launch, compared to their liquid-fueled counterparts.
Some Seoul-based analysts project Pyongyang could soon test the Hwasong-17 ICBM again — this time in a normalized, straightened trajectory — in what would be a highly inflammatory move for Washington.
“Our young regular armed forces developed into the most powerful entity, with a stockpile of overwhelming force, to completely suppress and crush imperialist tyranny,” the Korean Central News Agency said Thursday in its report on the parade referring to North Korea’s weaponized nuclear capability.
It also mentioned a new tactical nuclear weapons operation unit, which it said would fulfill “their strategic mission at any time loyal to the order of the leader only.”
SEE ALSO:
Kim Jong Un Shows Off Daughter, Missiles at North Korean Parade
Leader Kim Jong Un, taking in the military parade at a VIP box alongside his military top brass, joined by his wife and daughter, notably refrained from making an address.
Surprising silence
There had been expectations Kim Jong Un would use the occasion to send a vocal message to Washington and Seoul amid the allies’ reenergized combined military exercises as part of the U.S. pledge for extended deterrence. A U.S.-South Korea tabletop exercise, halted under the previous South Korean government of Moon Jae-in, will resume later this month, with a focus on a North Korea nuclear attack scenario, according to Seoul.
Last Thursday, in response to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s South Korea visit earlier in the week, North Korea’s foreign ministry blasted the U.S. for reaching “an extreme red line,” criticizing a pledge for increased U.S. strategic asset deployments to the region. Its spokesperson warned any military action by Washington would be met with “the principle of ‘nuke for nuke and an all-out confrontation for an all-out confrontation.’”
“This time, Kim Jong Un let North Korea’s expanding tactical and long-range missile forces speak for themselves,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul, on the absence of a speech. “Military parades largely serve to justify Kim’s policies to a domestic political audience. The message Pyongyang wants to send internationally, demonstrating its capabilities to deter and coerce, will likely come in the form of solid-fuel missile tests and detonation of a miniaturized nuclear device.”
New ICBM first impressions
Video of the nighttime military parade had not been aired by North Korea at the time of writing, and it will be some time before more is known about, in particular the new ICBM prototype unveiled in a cloud of suspense.
“Of interest in this military parade is that ‘hidden card’ that followed the Hwasong-17 on a nine-axle transporter erector launcher,” said Kim Dong-yup, professor at the University of North Korea Studies. “When we consider how North Korea has been presenting its new weapons, it does so first in a military parade then proceeds to develop and test it.”
Kim, the professor, noted the presumed solid-fuel ICBM could be a model of a forthcoming Pukguksong missile, the submarine-launched ballistic missile series, over the land-based Hwasong series. It could be less than a year before the world sees the new ballistic missile fly, he said, and by 2025, at the latest, before Kim Jong Un’s stated five-year plan for military modernization expires in 2026.
voanews.com
10. [INTERVIEW] Seoul, Washington forced to maintain greater discipline: Council on Foreign Relations
Scott influenced me to think about another political warfare line of effort in this excerpt below. Perhaps the regime is trying to drive South korea to go nuclear . Perhaps Kim believes that if the ROK withdraws from the NPT that it will be the subject of sanctions which of course would be devastating for the entire country. Kim is not afraid of the SSouth with nuclear weapons . It is more important to the ROK that it creates divisions with Korean society as well as drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. Therefore, we could interpret the regime's actions over the past year and that will likely continue in the coming months as a deliberate effort to drive the South to go nuclear and then come under tremendous international pressure.
Because North Korea's objective is to break the alliance and peel South Korea away from its dependence on U.S. protection, the CFR expert said Pyongyang is aware of the potential economic costs Seoul could incur by violating the NPT.
Mainstream thoughts behind North Korea's repeated missile threats are that the Kim regime's intention is for his country to be recognized as an official nuclear power and to initiate possible arms-control talks in the hope of better economic concessions.
"I do believe that both Seoul and Washington will be forced to exercise deeper consultation and maintain greater discipline to instill confidence that they are on the same page going forward," he said in a recent interview.
"I believe that current speculation in South Korea is way ahead of the actual discussion between governments on deepening of extended deterrence and the development of joint planning to deal with contingencies involving North Korean use of nuclear weapons. Most of the current speculation and perceived friction between the two sides is media generated," according to the expert.
[INTERVIEW] Seoul, Washington forced to maintain greater discipline: Council on Foreign Relations
The Korea Times · February 9, 2023
U.S. Air Force B-1B bombers, center, F-22 fighter jets and Republic of Korea Air Force F-35 fighter jets, bottom, fly over the Korean Peninsula during a joint air drill in South Korea, Jan. 1, in this photo provided by the South Korean defense ministry. AP-YonhapThis is the third in a series of interviews with security experts at leading think tanks in Washington and former U.S. officials on the implications of the escalating arms race in Northeast Asia and South Korea's growing nuclear ambitions. ― ED.
US-NK summit would require departures from both parties' current default policies
By Kim Yoo-chul
A few days after joint air drills by South Korea and the United States, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered his military to ensure the regime's readiness for war.
According to the North's official Korean Central News Agency, Feb. 7, its leader Kim attended a Central Military Commission gathering of the Workers' Party and asked his military to boast its strength.
The point of focus is how North Korea may leverage unfolding developments regarding the possible creation of a "missile department" purposed with the development of smaller nuclear warheads and advanced ballistic systems. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol confirmed that Seoul will not back away from the country's commitments under the nuclear Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Still, despite U.S.' concerns over rhetoric from the South's ruling party officials and think tanks on the domestic development of nuclear weapons, there remains a possibility that Seoul might move forward with the idea of pursuing a nuclear arsenal if the security situation with North Korea further deteriorates.
Scott A. Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)Leading think tanks in Washington were arguing for more effective and efficient measures in breaking Pyongyang's nuclear escalation which aims to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea. Such measures will require the commitment of both the Yoon and Biden administrations to commit to expanding on the "original bargain" underpinning Washington-Seoul nuclear defense cooperation.
Speaking to The Korea Times, Scott A. Snyder, a senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), said Seoul's pursuit of nuclear weapons would distance the country from the international community and risk severely damaging its export-reliant economy. Headquartered in New York, CFR is an independent nonpartisan think tank.
Snyder, who served as the project director for CFR's independent task force on policy toward the Korean Peninsula, went on to say that North Korea was clearly seeing the potential frictions and the estimated costs South Korea would take on by pursuing nuclear armament.
Because North Korea's objective is to break the alliance and peel South Korea away from its dependence on U.S. protection, the CFR expert said Pyongyang is aware of the potential economic costs Seoul could incur by violating the NPT.
Mainstream thoughts behind North Korea's repeated missile threats are that the Kim regime's intention is for his country to be recognized as an official nuclear power and to initiate possible arms-control talks in the hope of better economic concessions.
"I do believe that both Seoul and Washington will be forced to exercise deeper consultation and maintain greater discipline to instill confidence that they are on the same page going forward," he said in a recent interview.
"I believe that current speculation in South Korea is way ahead of the actual discussion between governments on deepening of extended deterrence and the development of joint planning to deal with contingencies involving North Korean use of nuclear weapons. Most of the current speculation and perceived friction between the two sides is media generated," according to the expert.
A photo released by the official North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows a new Hwasong-17 missile displayed in a military parade held to celebrate the 90th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA), at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, 25 April 2022 (issued 26 April 2022). EPA-Yonhap
He stressed he does not believe Yoon is "intentionally trying to generate tensions" with the U.S. or to pressure the U.S. with his public comments over the necessity of the country's own nuclear weapons developments.
"My reading of President Yoon's comments is that he faces domestic political pressure to take a tough stance, but he remains committed thus far to working closely with the United States to strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence," Snyder responded.
The U.S. stationed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991. Presently, neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear-related facilities are under consideration for redeployment here because stationing tactical nuclear weapons presents North Korea with an extra high-value target. Rather, the U.S. maintains full control over its nuclear weapons, rather than "sharing" them with South Korea.
Washington and Seoul have agreed to joint nuclear planning including the upcoming tabletop exercise (TTX) as described in last November's Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).
"President Joe Biden was asked about joint nuclear exercises, which would go well beyond what has been agreed to in the SCM and, which the White House clarified is something that would only be able to occur between two nuclear states," Snyder said. "Because there is a lot of potential for misunderstanding around the phrase and meaning of 'nuclear sharing,' it is important for both sides to define and explain clearly the steps being taken, and it is wise for both sides to avoid publicly discussing hypothetical scenarios and possible responses."
US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, left, meets with his South Korean counterpart Lee Jong-sup in Seoul on January 31, 2023. UPI-
Yonhap
Unfavorable conditions for dialogue
Nuclear diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea has been stalled since the collapse of the rare summit between North Korea's Kim and then U.S. President Donald Trump in Hanoi, Vietnam. Kim asked Trump for the lifting of economic sanctions against North Korea as a prerequisite to advance steps for nuclear disarmament. The requests were refused.
Given the deepening tensions on the peninsula, Snyder painted a rather pessimistic outlook for any future dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea on denuclearization.
"U.S. policy has not changed and North Korea's policy of not engaging in a denuclearization dialogue with the United States has not changed. Therefore, it is hard to be optimistic about the resumption of U.S.-North Korean dialogue under current circumstances," the CFR expert said.
Because North Korea is shifting to prioritizing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, decision-making pressures will be high.
"The holding of a U.S.-North Korea summit this year would require both Pyongyang and Washington to depart from their current default policies, which leave virtually no room for the possibility of summit-level dialogue under current circumstances," according to him.
Regarding the possibility to revise a defense cost-sharing agreement signed by South Korea with the U.S. in 2021, Snyder said he is doubtful that Seoul will be asked to reopen the negotiations as the signing doesn't reflect the needs of the current situation.
"I think it is highly unlikely that negotiations to revise the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) arrangements concluded in 2021 will be reopened. I am doubtful that the Biden administration will seek a direct financial contribution from South Korea regarding positioning of strategic assets in the Korean theater," he responded.
The Korea Times · February 9, 2023
11. S. Korea's talk of nuclear armament warranted, but should focus on US extended deterrence: U.S. expert
The debate and controversy will make the alliance stronger in the long run.
S. Korea's talk of nuclear armament warranted, but should focus on US extended deterrence: U.S. expert
The Korea Times · February 10, 2023
A photo released by the official North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows North Korean soldiers firing artillery during a military parade at Kim Il Sung Square to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army (KPA), the revolutionary armed forces of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK). in Pyongyang, North Korea, Feb. 8. EPA-Yonhap
Discussions about South Korea developing its own nuclear capabilities may be warranted amid increasing nuclear threats from North Korea but the country is not at a point where it should actually consider such an option, a former U.S. National Security Council (NSC) official said Thursday.
Gary Samore, former NSC official on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, also insisted the U.S. extended deterrence is credible enough that any nuclear attack by North Korea against the South or the United States would only be suicidal.
"We have to look for ways to strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence, but at the same time, we are not at the point where it makes sense to either return U.S. nuclear weapons to Korean soil where they were during the Cold War, or for South Korea itself to develop its own nuclear capabilities," Samore said at a webinar hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
The U.S. withdrew all its nuclear arsenal from South Korea in late 1991.
Some in South Korea have recently voiced a need to redeploy U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea or even for South Korea to consider developing its own nuclear capabilities amid an evolving North Korean nuclear threat that included an unprecedented 69 ballistic missile tests in 2022.
Samore, currently a professor of the practice of politics at Brandeis University in Massachusetts, argued the call for South Korea's nuclear armament may reflect concerns over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, as well as U.S. commitment to use all its military capabilities when necessary to defend South Korea.
"I think the Trump presidency really caused doubts in Seoul and in other U.S. allies about the long term reliability of U.S. security commitments," he said, noting that former President Donald Trump had openly opposed spending U.S. resources to help defend allies who could defend themselves.
"They don't know what the future of U.S. politics is, and who knows? President Trump could be reelected or someone like him in 2024 and they have to think about their options In the event that the U.S. security commitment is not as strong as it has been historically," added Samore.
Gary Samore, former NSC official on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is seen speaking during a webinar hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, Feb. 9. Yonhap
The former NSC official said a new North Korean nuclear test, unless it is met with "strong U.N. reaction," may increase the sentiment in South Korea that the country should develop its own nuclear weapons.
The United Nations Security Council held 10 meetings last year specifically to discuss and prevent North Korea's missile provocations, but failed to produce any concerted efforts due opposition from China and Russia, both veto power-wielding permanent members of the council and friendly neighbors of North Korea.
Samore stressed the need for the U.S. to continue developing its nuclear defense capabilities, but also build South Korea's confidence in U.S. extended deterrence.
"I think deterrence is still very strong because the U.S. and the ROK enjoy a overwhelming conventional military advantage over North Korea," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea. "And of course, in terms of nuclear forces, the U.S. nuclear forces are far superior to North Korea's nuclear forces."
"I think we have to continue, with our allies, to take steps to enhance deterrence, enhance defense, and that includes missile defense and includes Kill-Chain and those kinds of options, and at the same time, keep the door open to diplomacy," he added. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · February 10, 2023
12. Do 77% of Koreans Really Support A South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program?
Soem important insights in this article.
Graphics and data at the link. https://uskoreapolicy.substack.com/p/do-77-of-koreans-really-support-a
Do 77% of Koreans Really Support A South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program?
New surveys find high levels of support for South Korea's independent nuclearization. Here's what those numbers really mean.
Mitchell Blatt
4 hr ago
Survey results released by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies show that 76.6% of South Koreans think the ROK needs its own independently-controlled nuclear deterrent. This comes on the heels of a survey published by the Hankook Ilbo that found 66.8% of Koreans supported nuclear armament.
President Yoon Suk-yeol, in his New Year’s Policy Briefing on Foreign Affairs on January 11, became the first Korean president in the post-1988 democratic era to mention the possibility of South Korea “possess[ing] our own nuclear weapons.”
What do the survey results really mean? Are they an accurate reading of South Korean public opinion? Is Korean public opinion shifting in favor of acquiring its own nuclear program?
First, it is true that a majority of South Koreans indicate support for their country developing nuclear weapons across multiple polls. The Chey Institute’s poll is an outlier, but many other surveys from 2022 show support for nuclearization ranging from the high-60s to the low-70s.
The polls asked questions with different wordings and methodologies, but they all point to the same general results. The Chey Institute’s survey asked if South Korea “needed” nuclear weapons (“독자 핵 개발 필요?”), while the Hankook Ilbo survey asked “should” they have nuclear weapons.
The Chey Institute prompted respondents to consider the situation around the peninsula. When respondents think about how North Korea is progressing its nuclear program, China is acting belligerently to Taiwan, and Japan is increasing its military spending, they might be more likely to express agreement. Framing matters. Also, there is a difference between thinking you need something and supporting a course of action. When thinking about the implications of what acquiring nukes would entail, some soft supporters might oppose it.
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The Hankook Ilbo survey asked if respondents agreed or disagreed that South Korea “should also have nuclear weapons.” The level of overall support for this proposition was ten points lower but still well above 50%. The level of strong support was also higher: 34.0% strongly agreed and 32.8% generally agreed.
Furthermore, surveys conducted by the Asan Institute, the UniKorea Foundation, the Chicago Council for Global Affairs, and the South and North Development institute (SAND) found levels of support between 68% and 75%.
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2.) Support for developing nuclear weapons in South Korea has been high for over a decade. This is not a new development. As far back as 2011, a Choson Ilbo survey found 66.8% of South Koreans supported nuclearization.
Comparing surveys from the Asan Institute since 2013, there has not been a huge increase in the level of support.
There has been a 10-point increase in Koreans’ support for arming themselves with the ultimate deterrent since 2016. But the latest results are only 3.7 points higher than in 2013.
What happened between 2016 and 2022 that could account for this change? North Korea conducted two nuclear tests in 2016 (one in September) and another in 2017; the impact of that first test might have taken some lag time to bake into public consciousness only after being combined with the other two.
Donald Trump was inaugurated as President of the United States in 2017 and toyed with the idea of drawing down U.S. troops from Korea before ratcheting up talk of “fire and fury.” Korea hosted the 2018 Winter Olympics. Negotiations between the South, North, and the U.S. failed to produce changes in the North’s behavior. The U.S. withdrew from Syria and Afghanistan. Russia invaded Ukraine.
These factors could conceivably have caused South Koreans to become more desirous of having their own independent nuclear deterrent.
The main reason South Koreans want a nuclear deterrent is that they cannot be sure they can rely on the U.S.
According to the same Hankook Ilbo survey, only 36.7% of Koreans are sure the U.S. would intervene, in any and all circumstances, to support South Korea in the event of a military conflict with the North.
Historically, Korea has been skeptical of the U.S. and the international community. When the Korea Empire sent emissaries to the Second Hague Peace Convention in 1907 to protest Japan’s annexation of Korea, they were given the cold shoulder. The decision by President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War William Taft to accede to Japan’s annexation in 1905, following the Russo-Japanese War, was considered by Korea a violation of the Joseon–United States Treaty of 1882.
Korean developmental dictator Park Chung-hee briefly attempted to initiate a nuclear program from 1974-76 in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.
Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon wrote:
Hong attributes Park’s interest in nuclear weapons to his concern that Nixon’s Guam Doctrine would lead the United States to abandon South Korea in spite of its contribution to the Vietnam war effort, especially after the United States withdrew in disarray from Vietnam—at which time the ROK’s leverage from sending troops to Vietnam evaporated.
Historians ascribe Park Chung Hee’s drive for a defense less dependent on the United States to a combination of historical trends and events. The first and most potent was North Korean aggression which included escalating incursions and incidents on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in 1968, culminating in a commando raid on the Blue House in January 1968, followed three days later on January 23 by the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo, leading to a year-long negotiation for the release of its crew. These events began to generate the impression that the United States was weak-kneed in dealing with North Korean aggression. The second was the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. Nixon and Kissinger’s direct dealings with China without prior consultation with South Korea left Park wondering if they would also open dialogue with the North behind the South’s back. The North Korean attack on a US EC-121 spy-plane in international airspace occurred against the backdrop of these trends, leading Nixon to make preparations to attack North Korea with massive retaliation, including nuclear attack. But ultimately, he took no actual military action. [7]
The third factor for Park was the unilateral withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division in 1971, and on-going discussions in Washington and political pressure from Congress for further withdrawals.
In 2011, expressing his support for South Korea’s independent nuclear development, political scientist Yi Chun-geun recalled Charles de Gaulle’s question to President John F. Kennedy, would the U.S. risk New York for Paris?
“On the day when North Korea's nuclear missiles can attack Los Angeles, we will have to ask the Americans who are preventing our nuclear armament, ‘Is the US willing to sacrifice Los Angeles for Seoul?’ Americans will not fool themselves into answering ‘yes.’”
***
Does this mean South Koreans would really support a president implementing a nuclear program with all the consequences it might bring, including potential sanctions for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Maybe, maybe not, maybe depending on the circumstances. It is definitely a different question in practice than as a theoretical “yes or not”/“agree or disagree” response to a non-threatening survey.
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13. N.K. leader calls for stronger military power in photo session with parade participants
Photos and video at the link: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230210002752325?section=nk/nk
(2nd LD) N.K. leader calls for stronger military power in photo session with parade participants | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 10, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with details of Kim's daughter in paras 12-19; ADDS photo)
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Feb. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for bolstering the country's military strength at an unprecedented pace, during a photo session with the participants of a military parade held earlier this week, Pyongyang's state media reported Friday.
Speaking on Thursday, Kim stressed that the prosperity of the North depends on a "powerful army" and noted "one can demonstrate one's dignity and honor only when one is strong," according to the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
He added that suppressing the "increasingly brutal imperialist tyranny by force" requires its army to "grow stronger at an incomparably faster speed than that of the past history," the KCNA said in an English-language report.
Kim also praised the participants for glorifying the military parade as an event to be "specially recorded in history," saying that it has "made a clearer description of the prestige and greatness, high honor and rosy future of our state."
What is believed to be a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile appears during a military parade at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on the night of Feb. 8, 2023, to mark the 75th founding anniversary of the Korea People's Army, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended the parade. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Top military officials attended the photo session, including Ri Pyong-chol and Ri Yong-gil, who both serve as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the ruling Workers' Party.
Kim last held such a mass photo session early last month with members of the Korean Children's Union.
The North held the nighttime parade Wednesday to celebrate the 75th founding anniversary of its armed forces, during which it displayed its key weapons, including Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Kim attended the event along with his wife, Ri Sol-ju, and apparent second child, Ju-ae. State media did not mention whether Kim delivered a speech during the event.
Meanwhile, commanding officers of the North's defense ministry and general officers of the Korean People's Army paid tribute at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the bodies of state founder Kim Il-sung and late leader Kim Jong-il are enshrined, the KCNA said in a separate report.
They pledged to follow current leader Kim Jong-un and to fully demonstrate the "tremendous might and heroic spirit of the armed forces," it added.
Kim was not seen at the mausoleum in photos released by the North's state-controlled media.
Commanding officers of the (North) Korean People's Army (KPA) pay tribute to their late leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il during a visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang on Feb. 9, 2023, on the occasion of the KPA's 75th founding anniversary, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
In regard to Ju-ae's presence at the parade, South Korea's unification ministry said the North appears to have made "considerable" efforts to highlight her at the event based on photos published by the country's state media.
Photos carried by the KCNA showed Ju-ae overseeing the parade with the North's leader at the reviewing stand and Kim smiling as she touched his cheeks. Her attendance has fueled speculation that she may be groomed as Kim's successor.
"It is too early to judge (the possibility of her succession), but the government will watch relevant situations, leaving all possibilities open," the ministry's deputy spokesperson Lee Hyo-jung told a regular press briefing.
Ju-ae, believed to be 10 years old, made her first public appearance in November last year, when she, along with her father, attended the firing of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
She also visited troops with her father earlier this week ahead of the army anniversary, seen in photos showing her taking a central position for a photo shoot at a banquet, surrounded by the country's top military brass.
The North's state media has recently begun calling her the "respected" daughter from the "beloved" or "the most beloved" one, in a possible indication of an elevation in her public status.
Despite her frequent appearance in state media, many observers see the possibility of Ju-ae becoming a hereditary successor as low, given the North's patriarchal society and the rumored existence of an eldest son among Kim's children.
They said Ju-ae's presence at military events appears to be aimed at justifying a possible fourth-generation succession of the Kim dynasty, and sending a message that the North's nuclear and missile programs will defend the security of the future generation.
This image, captured from footage of North Korea's Korean Central Television on Feb. 9, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) smiling as his daughter Ju-ae touches his cheeks while attending a military parade the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Youtube
https://youtu.be/ans5py6T_6Q
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(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 10, 2023
14. Former US Forces Korea commander joins ‘green’ rocket company as adviser
Former US Forces Korea commander joins ‘green’ rocket company as adviser
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · February 10, 2023
ByDavid Choi
Stars and Stripes •
Gen. Robert Abrams, then-commander of U.S. Forces Korea, discusses the COVID-19 threat during an interview with Stars and Stripes in his office as Camp Humphreys, South Korea, March 27, 2020. (Stars and Stripes)
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CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — Retired Army Gen. Robert Abrams, the former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, has joined the "green" rocket engine manufacturer Vaya Space as a senior adviser, according to a company news release Thursday.
Abrams, who commanded roughly 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea, also led U.N. Command and Combined Forces Command from 2018 until his retirement in 2021. He was succeeded by Army Gen. Paul LaCamera.
Florida-based Vaya Space manufactures rocket engines from recycled plastics and uses over 20 metric tons for each launch, according to its website. The company is scheduled to launch its first Dauntless vehicle later this year, which will be powered by ignited thermoplastics and liquid oxidizer.
Abrams said he chose to serve on Vaya Space’s board “because I became convinced that their technologies coupled with their excellent leadership team can make a tremendous difference for our country,” according to the company’s release.
“Implementation of their technologies has the potential to bring a completely new and much needed capability for strategic and tactical missiles which can provide our forces decisive overmatch now and well into the future,” Abrams said in the release.
In a farewell speech before stepping down as USFK’s commander, Abrams described his role in South Korea as the “greatest honor and pinnacle” of his 39-year Army career.
“This has been the most amazing place to live and serve our nation,” he said at the time.
Abrams graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1982. He also commanded the Army’s National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif., and U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort Bragg, N.C.
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · February 10, 2023
15.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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