Quotes of the Day: 

"I have always imagined that Paradise will be kind of like a library."

– Jorge Juis Borges

"All struggles are essentially power struggles. Who will rule? Who will lead? Who will define, refine, confine, design? Who will dominate? All struggles are essentially power struggles, and most are no more intellectual than two rams knocking their heads together."

– Octavia E. Butler

"People over forty can seldom be permanently convinced of anything. At eighteen our convictions are hills from which we look; at forty-five they are caves in which we hide."

– F. Scott Fitzgerald

On 1 March (anniversary of the 1919 March First Korean Independence Movement) we will be transitioning both the Korean News and Commentary and the National Security News and Commentary newsletters to a new service from the Korea Regional Review and UPI (https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/)

Subscribe to our daily digital newsletter now at the link: 

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1. Korean Peninsula Update, February 10, 2026

2. Understanding North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and the Role of the ROK-US Alliance

3. The outsize influence of America’s admiral in Asia

4. What Japan's election results mean for Seoul-Tokyo relations

5. The country that executed a drama and the power that fears information

6. To the president of Ukraine: Spare the lives of North Korean soldiers

7. Navigating the Complexities of North Korean Strategy: Insights from David Maxwell

8. Unification ministry rejects claims of 'submissive' stance toward N. Korea

9. North Korea warns 'war criminal' Japan over Canada defense agreement

10. South Korea raids spy agencies in probe of alleged N. Korean drone case

11. How Chinese TikTok turns North Korean propaganda into memes

12. Seoul-Washington trade tensions cloud US security delegation’s planned visit

13. DAPA chief attends K9 howitzer plant groundbreaking ceremony in Romania

14. Eric Trump tours development projects in S. Korean city east of Seoul

1. Korean Peninsula Update, February 10, 2026

​Comment: An excellent new service from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). (this is the fourth issue so far). Read the entire update at this this link: https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-february-10-2026/

Korean Peninsula Update, February 10, 2026

understandingwar.org · Adam Grace · February 10, 2026

Toplines

North Korea may unveil new strategic capabilities at an upcoming military parade to showcase progress made under its five-year military modernization plan. A Washington DC-based think tank—the Stimson Center—reported on military parade preparations at Mirim Air Base and Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang beginning on February 3.[1] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acknowledged the ongoing preparations but stated that whether the parade is civilian or military is unclear.[2] North Korea held a military parade on the closing day of the 8th Party Congress in 2021 and unveiled weapon systems developed under the 2016–2020 military modernization plan, including the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Pukguksong-5. North Korea expanded its weapons development under the 2021–2025 modernization period and could present some of its progress when the 9th Party Congress ends around late February. The Stimson Center assessed that, of the 13 nuclear and conventional missile systems that North Korea designated as development targets at the 2021 8th Party Congress, four have been operationally deployed, two may be operational, three are undergoing testing, and the remaining four have an unknown status.[3]

North Korea likely seeks to develop its nuclear capabilities from a limited deterrent into one that is more survivable and accurate. The 2021–2025 defense modernization plan set miniaturization and light weighting of nuclear weapons and production of super-large nuclear warheads as key goals. North Korea likely intended to expand strike options with a wider range of delivery systems, while the development of super-large nuclear warheads suggests the pursuit of high-yield options for assured retaliation. North Korea likely sought to increase survivability against adversary targeting and missile defense through the development of solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), and SLBMs under the plan. North Korea likely received technical assistance from Russia in developing military reconnaissance satellites, which could enhance North Korean intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and thus support targeting.[4] North Korea’s progress on developing certain medium-range reconnaissance drones, nuclear-powered submarines, HGVs, multi-warhead rockets, and SLBMs remains unclear, however. Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un will likely announce military modernization tasks for the 2026–2030 period at the 9th Party Congress, which could focus on second-strike capabilities and improved targeting as well as rapid launch and diverse delivery systems.[5]

The North Korean economy has continued to rebound due to sanctions evasion and increased trade with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Economic recovery could embolden Kim Jong Un and decrease the likelihood that he engages the United States and South Korea diplomatically. The North Korean GDP growth rate rebounded from -0.2 percent in 2022 to 3.1 percent in 2023 and 3.7 percent in 2024. North Korea–Russia cooperation likely contributed to this growth, alongside weakening United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions enforcement against the regime since 2023.[6] North Korea’s imports from the PRC increased by 25.2 percent in 2025 compared to 2024, indicating a recovery of external purchasing power to roughly the 2018–2019 level, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. North Korea-PRC’s trade deficit with the PRC averaged approximately 1.6 billion US dollars—a level that would impose strain on the economy. Illicit and unreported trade likely reduces the recorded deficit.[7] North Korea has stolen over 13.26 billion US dollars of cryptocurrency since 2022, comprising the majority of its foreign currency reserves.[8] North Korea appears to have concentrated its resources in select industrial and agricultural sectors to stimulate the overall economy, according to a report by the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a South Korean research organization.[9] KDI also reported on WPK and cabinet officials’ satisfaction with North Korea’s economic performance in 2025.

Kim focused his public activities for the beginning of 2026 on sites connected to economic development initiatives. Kim emphasized progress made under North Korea’s “20×10 Regional Development Policy” at five of these sites, including two trips to the Sinuiju Greenhouse Complex, Onpho Working People’s Holiday Camp, Regional Development Policy-Construction Ceremony, and the Samgwang.[10] This policy is Kim Jong Un’s core economic initiative, introduced during the 2021 8th Party Congress, focused on addressing rural-urban development gaps and decentralizing regional economies to reduce the negative impacts of sanctions. [11] The North Korean economy stalled from 2020 to 2022 due to border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic, which hindered the progress of economic projects under the policy. North Korea resumed policy implementation efforts in 2023 and appears to be accelerating construction project timelines to make visible progress by the 9th Party Congress. Kim Jong Un is likely to frame the 2021-2025 five-year economic plan as successful and describe it as part of his “people-first principle,” a slogan intended to portray Kim Jong Un’s policies as improving North Korean people’s lives. North Korean propaganda is increasingly featuring visible economic achievements, particularly by showcasing Kim’s visits to key project sites. North Korean economic recovery will likely reduce incentives for North Korea to engage with South Korea or the United States, and pressure campaigns would require multilateral sanction reinforcement to be effective. Sanctions relief is unlikely to serve as negotiating leverage without cooperation from Russia or the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Continue reading at this link: https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-february-10-2026/

2. Understanding North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and the Role of the ROK-US Alliance

​Summary:

C.B. Duncan rebuts an earlier Small Wars Journal piece that argues for withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea and allowing South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. Duncan argues the earlier piece misunderstands the Kim family regime’s motives, the purposes of nuclear weapons, and the roles of USFK and the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command. Duncan claims north Korea’s nuclear program serves deterrence but also coercive diplomacy, economic bargaining, and domestic control rooted in ideology and propaganda, so removing USFK would not remove incentives. Duncan argues CFC exists to deter and defeat aggression and to build interoperability through exercises. Duncan warns a nuclear South Korea could worsen the security dilemma, violate nonproliferation norms, spur wider proliferation, and invite more gray-zone attacks.

Excerpt:

The complexities of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the strategic dynamics of the Korean Peninsula demand a nuanced understanding of the Kim regime’s motives and the role of the ROK-US alliance. This article has demonstrated that Pyongyang’s nuclear program is not solely a response to the presence of US forces in South Korea but is deeply rooted in coercive diplomacy, domestic political control, and ideological narratives. The US-ROK Combined Forces Command plays a critical role in maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and ensuring interoperability between allied forces. Furthermore, the proposal to arm South Korea with nuclear weapons introduces significant risks, including exacerbating the security dilemma, undermining nonproliferation norms, and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation. The strategic benefits of the US-ROK alliance far outweigh the financial costs, as the presence of US forces in South Korea not only deters North Korea but also strengthens regional security against broader threats from China and Russia. In conclusion, the removal of US forces and the nuclearization of South Korea would destabilize the region and embolden adversaries. Instead, a robust and well-coordinated alliance remains the cornerstone of deterrence and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The next step is to explore actionable strategies to strengthen the ROK-US alliance and address emerging challenges in the gray-zone, which I will elaborate on in a future article.

Comment: C.B. Duncan is right in this: We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. I also believe he is right in that we must sustain a strong and well coordinated ROK/US alliance. He is not just disputing policy options. He is warning that a narrow “troops out, nukes in” logic misreads north Korea’s political warfare and could produce the opposite of stability. He also treats CFC and USFK as regional posture assets, not only Korea assets, so any drawdown is framed as a strategic loss of flexibility against China and Russia as well as north Korea.

If north Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a tool for coercion and domestic control, what realistic event would ever convince Kim to trade it away, even if USFK left? (rhetorical question that I hope all know the answer to - Kim will never trade away his nuclear weapons for anything).

If a nuclear South Korea triggers escalation, proliferation, and intensified gray zone conflict, what alliance investments below armed conflict most credibly raise the cost of north Korea’s blackmail diplomacy?

Understanding North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and the Role of the ROK-US Alliance

by C.B. Duncan

|

02.11.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/11/understanding-north-korea/

Abstract

This article seeks to rebut the recently published “How to Deter North Korea while Pursuing America First Policy”. It identifies and clarifies fundamental misunderstandings present in the original article about the Kim regime’s motives and goals, the function of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the role of United States Forces Korea and the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, and presents challenges with the proposal to allow South Korea to proliferate.

Introduction

A recently published article on this platform advocates for the removal of US forces from South Korea and to allow for the ROK to become another nuclear-armed state. It makes the claim that these actions would serve to stabilize the Korean Peninsula amid ongoing tensions with the DPRK and benefit the American people by reducing the costs of keeping troops stationed in the region. While the article correctly notes that denuclearization on the peninsula is a long-sought-after goal that numerous approaches by the international community have failed to achieve, the proposed policy solutions demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the regional dynamics that impact such discussions – namely, Pyongyang’s motivations for the pursuit and maintenance of nuclear capabilities, the role of South Korea in broader regional stability from an American military perspective, and the risks and challenges inherent in allowing South Korea to proliferate. The article incorrectly identifies the DPRK’s nuclear program as primarily a response to USFK and the Combined Forces Command; in reality, the North’s arsenal serves coercive diplomacy and domestic political purposes in addition to security benefits, so removing USFK does not remove the incentive structure. In the present article, I seek to expand the scope of Capt. Kim’s arguments to demonstrate why nuclear tensions on the peninsula are not strictly nor primarily determined by US troop presence in the South; to explain the critical role of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in both Korean and broader East Asian stability; and to challenge the assertion that a nuclear-armed South Korea is sufficient to deter Kim Jong-Un’s (KJU) escalatory behaviors or otherwise contribute to a lessening of tensions in the region. I will conclude with policy recommendations which run directly counter to those proposed by Capt. Kim: advocating for a stronger US-ROK alliance, taking a more nuanced approach to burden sharing that enables South Korea to stand firm against interference while promoting greater interoperability, and increasing investments in American and allied political or irregular warfare capabilities that allow for the promotion of US strategic interests below the threshold of armed conflict.

Why Does KJU Want Nukes?

In his article, Capt. Kim correctly assesses a neorealist logic that asserts the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. Certainly, the Kim regime sees their nuclear arsenal as an effective deterrent against armed intervention by the United States, South Korea, Japan, or other nations who are perceived as adversarial. In fact, some neorealist thinkers have advocated for limited proliferation to both friendly and adversary states alike, claiming that their presence stabilizes regions and ultimately raises the stakes of armed conflict past an acceptable threshold. Certainly, the Kim regime sees examples of US military intervention in other countries (Capt. Kim’s article identifies the invasions of Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan, though it conflates the limited 2025 airstrikes against Iran as a full-scale invasion) as running counter to its main goal of regime survival, and would seek an effective deterrent to such actions by way of a nuclear arsenal. However, adhering to a purely realist perspective and viewing the nuclear question solely through balance-of-power dynamics fails to capture the full purpose of nuclear weapons to the Kim regime, which ultimately undermines the claim that a change in the balance of power on the peninsula (through the removal of US forces and nuclear arming of the ROK) would be enough to nudge the DPRK towards denuclearization. 

From a coercive bargaining standpoint, nuclear weapons fit neatly into KJU’s foreign policy and economic statecraft strategies. Through brinkmanship behaviors, Pyongyang can leverage nuclear threats and escalatory rhetoric to draw other countries to the bargaining table, extracting concessions while promising steps towards disarmament on which it will later renege. This has been demonstrated time and time again throughout history; the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Sunshine Policy era, Six-Party Talks, and even the 2018/2019 Trump-Kim summits all fit into this strategy: escalate tensions, negotiate for concessions as a stopgap measure to keep the economy afloat, continue to develop the nuclear program, rinse, and repeat. While the full scope of the economic strategy inherent in the DPRK’s nuclear program is outside of the purview of this article, it is reasonable to argue that the economic and bargaining utility of the North’s nuclear program markedly reinforces security motives.

Moreover, nuclear weapons provide substantial utility when considering domestic political aims as well as foreign ones. Nuclear weapons serve as a tangible symbol of the success of Juche (self-reliance) and songun (military first) ideologies, complementing the threat narrative on which the regime relies to maintain repressive domestic control and shuttle scarce resources towards the elite class and strategic programs. As such, the nuclear arsenal serves not only to deter external threats, but also the most substantial threat to KJU and his regime: the population of the DPRK itself. Were the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons, the regime would lose the ability to capitalize on one of its most profound propaganda themes and risk ceding political control over its repressed population. As such, the nuclear question is much more than a balance-of-power dynamic between US forces and the DPRK. It is a culmination of deeply held ideology, authoritarian governance, blackmail diplomacy, economic bargaining chips, and security considerations that drives the North to pursue nuclear weapons. Therefore, simply removing US forces from South Korea does little to alter any of the regime’s motivations, and Capt. Kim’s proposed solution of arming the South with nuclear weapons may actually exacerbate the situation further, rather than contributing to deterrence.

The Value of the Combined Forces Command

The US-ROK Combined Forces Command has existed since 1978 with the present mission to “Deter hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the ROK; and in the event deterrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against the ROK” – not, as Capt. Kim’s article claims, to pressure the DPRK to denuclearize. The purpose of the various joint and multinational exercises in Korea, such as Freedom Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield (FS and UFS, respectively), surpasses a mere show of force. Ultimately, the goal of such exercises is to increase interoperability between allied militaries in preparation for crisis or conflict while simultaneously demonstrating US and allied resolve in the face of external threats. Such exercises exist globally independent of denuclearization efforts; African Lion occurs in Morocco to “strengthen interoperability” and “build readiness”, while Balikatan in the Philippines is “designed to strengthen the alliance, showcase the capable combined force, and demonstrate the commitment to regional security and stability”. While US-ROK exercise scope and participation waxes and wanes in response to tensions on the peninsula, sometimes even being leveraged during nuclear negotiations, the outright goal of the exercises and the CFC’s existence writ large has never been denuclearization. Therefore, evaluating the benefits of US Forces Korea (USFK) or the CFC must consider such factors as deterrence as a whole, our relationship with South Korea, and continued stability through demonstrated strength, as outlined in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy. In terms of deterrence, which is most applicable in the present discussion, USFK serves a crucial role in the formula: Deterrence = Capability x Will x Perception by building the CFC’s capability to fight and win together, demonstrating the will of both the American and South Korean governments to contribute well-trained and capable forces to respond to threats and aggression. Further, leveraging joint exercises such as FS and UFS as observable events is designed to shape DPRK and other regional perceptions of alliance strength while contributing to increases in capability. 

Moreover, US military presence in South Korea is crucial for stability in the entire region, not just in response to the DPRK threat but also in managing threats from actors such as China and Russia. USFK/CFC Commander GEN Xavier Brunson’s recently released “East-Up Map” notes Korea’s positional advantage for contingency response, geographically central to Pyongyang, Beijing, and Vladivostok. Camp Humphreys’ presence on the Korean Peninsula is crucial to responding to threats from the DPRK, certainly, but also allows for American activities to impose costs on Chinese and Russian interests while simultaneously closer alliance ties with Japan and the Philippines. US troop presence in South Korea becomes crucial when considering multiple regional contingencies, including escalations with North Korea, wherein rapid staging of American and multinational forces will be enabled by existing logistical nodes in-country. The removal of the American military presence from the region may indeed save some money for the American taxpayer ($3 billion per year in an annual defense budget of more than $850 billion), but would incur massive risks in the loss of strategic placement and flexibility. Moreover, the costs of USFK are not capturable in a single line item; host nation contributions and indirect support further complicate the accounting. To summarize the benefits of continued troop presence in Korea and elsewhere in the Pacific, a Government Accountability Office report cited in Capt. Kim’s article identifies: regional stability and security, defense capability and interoperability, contingency response, denuclearization and nonproliferation (author emphasis added), strong alliances, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. These benefits offered by USFK’s continued existence far outweigh any current monetary costs.

Challenges to a Nuclear Seoul

Capt. Kim’s second assertion, that South Korea should become a nuclear-armed state, is problematic on a number of levels. According to his article, a nuclear armed South Korea could reach “credible parity” with the North, thus deterring a nuclear strike by Pyongyang in the absence of USFK. However, this fails to assess how the Kim regime would likely perceive this development. KJU recently declared South Korea as the North’s “principal enemy”, not the United States, and rejected the goal of peaceful reunification. As such, providing South Korea with the ability to become a nuclear power while denying the North the same recognition would likely exacerbate tensions, potentially leading to increased nuclear brinkmanship, and risks strategic miscalculations devolving into full-scale conflict between the DPRK and the ROK. This is the classic “security dilemma”: Seoul’s attempt at increased security would be perceived in Pyongyang as an existential threat, risking escalation. Secondly, public opinion polls on the South Korean public’s trust of the US nuclear umbrella, and subsequent support for an indigenous nuclear capability, ignore a number of crucial concerns. First, there has been no nuclear or WMD use by the North against the ROK or other regional allies under the US’s extended deterrence framework, despite periods of extremely high tension and threatening rhetoric. In addition, public opinion polls fail to recognize the legalities of such proliferation activities; South Korea has long been a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and would likely incur massive international repercussions if it withdrew. Finally, South Korea’s ascension to nuclear power status could prompt the same proliferation domino effect that the US has long sought to avoid in granting the same recognition to the North; other nations, both friendly and adversary, may see their own opportunities to nuclearize and upset the delicate balance in an already tense region or elsewhere in the world. While some theorists advocate for limited proliferation, doing so in a region as volatile as East Asia could quickly spiral into war. 

Another potentiality not explored in Capt. Kim’s article is an increase in gray-zone warfare and interference by the DPRK and other actors like China and Russia. According to his logic, the strategic deterrence provided by nuclear weapons may be sufficient to deter conventional or nuclear threats. History demonstrates that in similar circumstances, less powerful nations, such as the DPRK, or even great powers such as China, will undertake political warfare, “lawfare”, propaganda, cybercrime, and other activities meant to destabilize another state below the threshold of armed conflict. Capt. Kim points out that this is already the case in South Korea, who is the frequent recipient of interference attempts by both the PRC and DPRK; this would almost certainly be increased, were Seoul to develop nuclear weapons. The effects of such gray-zone activities are already apparent throughout the First Island Chain and even in the American mainland, imposing substantial social and cultural costs and creating political rifts that adversaries seek to exploit. While these efforts will continue regardless of South Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, an increase in destabilizing actions by the PRC and/or DPRK plays directly into their strengths and political playbooks while forcing South Korea, who along with much of the Western world is woefully unprepared to react to such attacks, to fight from the back foot. In sum, the ROK’s nuclear armament is an option with a great deal of hidden costs, legal and political challenges, and is ultimately an unacceptable replacement for conventional deterrence measures such as the presence of a well-trained, capable, and interoperable Combined Forces Command against the backdrop of a robust ROK-US alliance.

Conclusion

The complexities of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the strategic dynamics of the Korean Peninsula demand a nuanced understanding of the Kim regime’s motives and the role of the ROK-US alliance. This article has demonstrated that Pyongyang’s nuclear program is not solely a response to the presence of US forces in South Korea but is deeply rooted in coercive diplomacy, domestic political control, and ideological narratives. The US-ROK Combined Forces Command plays a critical role in maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and ensuring interoperability between allied forces. Furthermore, the proposal to arm South Korea with nuclear weapons introduces significant risks, including exacerbating the security dilemma, undermining nonproliferation norms, and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation. The strategic benefits of the US-ROK alliance far outweigh the financial costs, as the presence of US forces in South Korea not only deters North Korea but also strengthens regional security against broader threats from China and Russia. In conclusion, the removal of US forces and the nuclearization of South Korea would destabilize the region and embolden adversaries. Instead, a robust and well-coordinated alliance remains the cornerstone of deterrence and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The next step is to explore actionable strategies to strengthen the ROK-US alliance and address emerging challenges in the gray-zone, which I will elaborate on in a future article.

About The Author

• 
  
• C.B. Duncan
• C.B. Duncan is a student of international relations, concentrating on North Korea policy and defense strategy.

3. The outsize influence of America’s admiral in Asia

​Summary:

The Economist argues Admiral Sam Paparo, America’s top commander in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, has become unusually influential. After a Thailand-Cambodia border clash, he made repeated trips to Malaysia to press their military chiefs to stop, helping hold the dispute down until POTUS could attend an October peace deal signing in Malaysia. The article says Paparo must now manage three challenges: reassure anxious Asian partners that America will not abandon allies as POTUS shifts attention elsewhere; keep credibility with POTUS and advisers while resources are pulled to other theaters; and update U.S. war plans as China modernizes, including pushing AI-enabled command tools and efforts on missiles and autonomous systems.

Comment: The admiral embodies Dana Priest's description of CINCs as proconsuls (see her book from 2003 - The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military). Admiral Paparo’s personal diplomacy is being used as a substitute for missing or unsettled civilian signals, and that makes the theater’s reassurance hinge on one uniformed leader.

If the CINC in the Asia-Indo-Pacific becomes the main stabilizer because Washington is distracted, what happens to deterrence and alliance confidence when he rotates out or loses access to POTUS?

But my parochial question is does he have time for Korea? I think we need a Northeast Asia Combatant Command in Seoul more than ever. 

The outsize influence of America’s admiral in Asia

The Economist · Feb 5th 2026

Can Sam Paparo keep US strategy on an even keel?

https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/02/05/the-outsize-influence-of-americas-admiral-in-asia

OF THE EIGHT conflicts that Donald Trump imagines he has ended, at first glance the short border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia last July presents the cleanest case. To hear America’s president tell it, Mr Trump called the leaders of the two countries and threatened astronomical tariffs unless their guns fell silent. Soon, it is claimed, they did.

But the conflict was only the latest episode in a century-old grudge between the neighbours, and it continually risked flaring up again. So Admiral Sam Paparo made multiple visits to Malaysia on his blue-and-white Air Force jet. There he met the Thai and Cambodian military chiefs to tell them to knock it off. The intervention by the top American officer in Asia was key to smothering the dispute until Mr Trump could fly to Malaysia in October to preside over the signing of a peace deal.

Admiral Paparo’s quiet diplomacy is one way he is trying to show his usefulness to Mr Trump. Keeping the confidence of the president and others in the MAGA world will be essential if the career fighter-pilot is to address one of America’s much bigger problems: trying to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. In this, he has been a driving force behind the American armed forces’ efforts in recent years.

The chiefs of America’s Indo-Pacific Command, headquartered in Honolulu, are weighty figures in any administration. The admiral in charge (and it is always an admiral, reflecting the navy’s expansive role in this part of the world) is responsible for military operations across half the Earth’s surface and a dozen time zones—from Bollywood to Hollywood, as one of the admiral’s predecessors was fond of saying. Admiral Paparo has become unusually prominent and influential in Asia. That is partly due to the court politics around Mr Trump, which keep other top officials close to the president in Washington. Now the admiral must navigate three big challenges.

The first is to try to reassure worried friends in Asia that America will not abandon its commitments to allies, even as Mr Trump switches his focus to Venezuela and Greenland, contemplates a grand bargain with China and routinely expresses his contempt for many of his NATO allies in Europe. Admiral Paparo’s previous commands in the region mean that he has old friendships with many military chiefs. That counts all the more at a time when the White House is recalling and cutting short the tours of most ambassadors appointed by Joe Biden. He offers a rare instance of consistency.

The second challenge is to keep onside a wayward president and his advisers, especially the defence secretary, Pete Hegseth. Even in normal administrations the Indo-Pacific commander can find it hard, compared with America’s generals in Europe and the Middle East, to get the resources he wants. That risk was heightened after the Trump administration put the Americas ahead of Asia in its national defence strategy. The command’s resources risk being plundered for other contingencies. Its carriers and air-defence batteries often get dispatched to the Middle East; the focus on the western hemisphere makes the problem worse. But Admiral Paparo’s political nous has helped him limit the damage.

The biggest challenge the admiral faces is to make sure America’s war plans do not fall out of date as China’s armed forces rapidly modernise and technological changes cancel out some of America’s advantages. Admiral Paparo is unusually focused, compared with other American commanders, on making his command an AI-enabled one, experimenting with tools that speed up decision-making in a conflict and help ensure things like fuel and bullets quickly get to where they are needed. Other programmes focus on catching up with China on long-range missiles and autonomous weapons.

At a conference put on in January by the Pacific Forum, a think-tank in Honolulu, the admiral played host to several hundred officers, bureaucrats, defence eggheads, tech execs and representatives of allies. Over two days in windowless conference rooms just by Waikiki Beach, they held intensive discussions on how to win a war against “the adversary”, universally understood to mean China. The discussion was cerebral but no-nonsense. “He goes to sleep every night thinking about winning or losing the next great war,” says an admiring fellow admiral. “He has wargamed it more than anyone else.” With luck his wargames won’t be needed.■

Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence.

This article appeared in the Asia section of the print edition under the headline “America’s admiral in Asia”

4. What Japan's election results mean for Seoul-Tokyo relations

​Summary:

Dr. Soo Kim argues Japan’s snap election, called three months after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office, clarifies rather than transforms Seoul-Tokyo relations. The LDP won 316 of 465 seats, a two-thirds majority, and with the Japan Innovation Party holds 352 seats, giving Tokyo rare political consolidation and fewer domestic constraints. The column says recent Seoul-Tokyo management relied on caution and incremental engagement, but that may now be insufficient. The core issue is Seoul’s willingness to pay domestic political costs for strategic alignment despite shared concerns about China and north Korea. Takaichi’s mandate removes “excuses” for delay and forces Seoul to define priorities on trilateral cooperation, how to compartmentalize historical disputes, and how to deal with a more emboldened Japan.

Comment: Tokyo’s consolidation shifts the burden onto Seoul: if alignment stalls, it will look like a choice in Seoul, not instability in Tokyo. 

What Japan's election results mean for Seoul-Tokyo relations - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · Button LabelListenText SizePrint

By Soo Kim

• Published Feb 10, 2026 11:33 am KST
• https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260210/what-japans-election-results-mean-for-seoul-tokyo-relations

Sanae Takaichi, Japan's prime minister and president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), places pins marking the names of candidates who won lower house elections, at LDP headquarters in Tokyo, Sunday. AP-Yonhap

On Sunday, Japanese voters delivered a decisive verdict in a snap election called just three months after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi assumed office.

Framed as a referendum on leadership and national direction, the election produced an outcome few could ignore. Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured a commanding share of the lower house, winning 316 of 465 seats and achieving a two-thirds majority — the largest achieved by a single party in the postwar era. With its new coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, the ruling bloc now has 352 seats overall. The result is a rare political consolidation for Tokyo, one that leaves Takaichi with few domestic constraints to advance her agenda.

Soo Kim

For Korea, a cursory reading of these results may prompt anxiety or hope about the election’s implications on Seoul-Tokyo relations. But this perspective shifts the focus away from the key point that Seoul now faces: Japan’s election didn’t upend the relationship so much as clarify the strategic constraints under which Seoul must now pursue bilateral relations.

In recent years, Seoul-Tokyo relations were managed more as a process than a strategy. Diplomatic caution, sequencing and incremental engagement helped keep tensions from nearing the tipping point, but they also postponed a clearer articulation of longer-term goals. With Takaichi’s political authority now consolidated, that approach may no longer be sufficient. That is, the relationship can no longer be sustained or deepened by sensitivity management alone. What matters now is whether the two countries can align their strategic intent rather than continue the relationship without a shared destination.

The central challenge in Seoul-Tokyo relations has never been a lack of rationale for cooperation, but more about Seoul’s willingness to absorb the domestic political cost to secure it. The case for strategic alignment is straightforward on paper: shared concerns about China and North Korea, deepening economic ties and trilateral cooperation with the United States. What hasn’t been clear, however, is Seoul’s readiness to prioritize long-term strategic clarity over short-term political comfort.

Takaichi’s victory brings this dilemma into sharper focus. It points not only to her appeal to Japan’s electorate or economic agenda, but also to the public’s desire for assertive leadership in a tense regional environment. Her platform combined commitments to tax reform, fiscal stimulus and a more robust defense posture, including reconsidering formerly sacrosanct restrictions on military capabilities and exports. Domestically, her conservative agenda also extends to immigration and social policy, marking a clear ideological orientation in Tokyo that Seoul must now reckon with less as a flare-up than a sustained political reality.

To be clear, Japan’s election does not alter the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship. It does, however, remove the excuses. Tokyo now has the domestic strength to pursue its priorities and will be less constrained by domestic fragility, and Seoul may no longer be able to lean on Japanese uncertainty to delay hard choices.

Seoul should be prepared to define its own priorities with similar clarity and provide answers to long-deferred questions.

The first question is what it actually seeks to achieve through its trilateral cooperation with Tokyo and Washington. Endorsing cooperation in principle is easy; sustaining it in practice is not. Trilateral alignment requires navigating domestic political sensitivities while coordinating military planning, intelligence sharing and responses to regional contingencies. Seoul, therefore, needs to be clear about which elements of trilateral cooperation are essential and which can be phased in more gradually without undermining its core interests.

Second is the sticky topic of historical disputes. Seoul must confront which disputes are operationally and strategically critical and which can be compartmentalized. Historical issues have repeatedly threatened to disrupt otherwise functional coordination between the two countries. Treating these issues as secondary, however, often backfires, leaving Korean leadership with limited leverage, not to mention lingering domestic dissatisfaction. Seoul’s challenge, therefore, is to determine which disputes must be actively negotiated and which can coexist alongside its strategic cooperation with Tokyo without undermining its credibility or public legitimacy.

Finally, Korea may also want to consider how it engages a Japan that is more politically emboldened. A partner with a strong domestic mandate can pursue its policy objectives confidently and absorb domestic political criticism. Seoul must decide how much bilateral alignment it is prepared to offer, where it needs to articulate its own priorities and how to communicate its expectations in ways that protect both security interests and domestic legitimacy. To be clear, these are questions of agency, not reaction.

History matters. It always will. But the assumption that historical sensitivities must be resolved before strategic cooperation can deepen may be a form of strategic procrastination.

Seoul needs to determine whether those disputes remain deal-breakers to the dynamic or whether they can be managed alongside cooperation on shared security and economic concerns, particularly amid greater geopolitical turbulence.

Japan’s election did not change the fundamentals of Seoul-Tokyo relations — it clarified them. For Korea, the real burden lies less in decoding Tokyo’s politics than in defining its own strategic compass.

Clarity can be uncomfortable. But in foreign policy, discomfort is often the price of agency.

Soo Kim is a former CIA analyst and strategic risk consultant.

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5. The country that executed a drama and the power that fears information

​Comment: Information is power. Information is a threat. Use it wisely. 

This is another excellent column from Korea Regional Review regular contributor Ms. Jihyun Park, a UK citizen who is an escapee from north Korea. She is a good friend and colleague at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS).

We must take every opportunity to call out the brutality of the Kim family regime and help the Korean people in the north to create the conditions to help them free themselves.

Voices Feb. 11, 2026 / 5:00 AM

The country that executed a drama and the power that fears information

By Jihyun Park

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/11/The-country-that-executed-a-drama-and-the-power-that-fears-information/3571770771306/

The North Korean teenagers were not executed for watching Squid Game. They were executed because they glimpsed the possibility of choice, and comparison began. Photo courtesy of Netflix

Feb. 11 (UPI) -- The author prefers to use the lowercase "n" to challenge the Kim family regime's legitimacy.

Amnesty International recently released a report revealing that in north Korea , teenagers were executed for watching the South Korean drama, Squid Game. The shock of this event lies not only in the cruelty of the punishment. The fact that a single TV series could be met with execution clearly shows what this regime fears the most.

Did the drama really threaten national security?

Or was it the "possibility of a different life" that posed the real threat?

Related

• The politics of naming north Korean escapees
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• What It means to become a citizen

Dictatorship always fears information more than guns. During the Cold War, it was not military coups, but information that brought down Eastern European communist regimes.

Western radio broadcasts, smuggled videotapes, music and culture did not incite revolutions. They simply made comparison possible. And comparison breeds the question: "Why must we live like this?"

Information does not attack the regime directly. Instead, it erodes the myths that the regime depends on to maintain itself. Leaders become human rather than divine, and obedience becomes coercion rather than virtue.

This is why the Kim Jong Un regime obsessively blocks external information. What it fears is not K-pop or South Korean dramas, it is the cracks in perception that comparison creates.

The information blockade in north Korea is not mere censorship. It is a political project to maintain a language system, a worldview and a framework of authority.

For more than 70 years, north Korea has used the concepts of "imperialism" and "colonialism" as doctrinal tools to justify its rule. Every failure is blamed on external imperialism, and every act of oppression is legitimized as resistance.

The problem is that this language no longer remains confined to north Korea. China repeats the same rhetoric, and unfortunately, elements of South Korean and Western society are increasingly absorbing this language naturally.

Critiques of imperialism have become faith rather than analysis, and capitalism is treated not as an economic system, but as an ideology morally condemned in advance.

Kristin Niemietz's book, Imperial Measurement, precisely highlights this point. It criticizes modern discourse that reduces capitalism from an empirical, historical object of study into a moral doctrine of "intrinsically evil systems." Measurement and comparison disappear, leaving only moral binaries. As a result, capitalism is no longer something to be tested or understood - it is a belief system already condemned.

This structure closely resembles north Korea's propaganda logic. In north Korea, capitalism is not an economic system but an absolute evil that corrupts human beings. Citizens are trained to hate capitalism without understanding it. They cannot compare, they cannot choose. Socialists understand that the moment capitalism becomes an "ideology," independent thought stops.

This is why information is dangerous. Information does not promote capitalism; it makes comparison possible. It allows people to recognize that other lives exist, that other choices are possible. And that recognition turns individuals from objects of the regime into independent subjects.

The problem with socialism is that it cannot tolerate this subjectivity. Inequalities under capitalism are deemed intrinsic evils, yet human rights abuses under socialist states are always treated as exceptions. Nothing to Envy becomes a formula that absolves responsibility.

In reality, this ideology is the opposite of the truth. north Korea is a hereditary caste society where human value is assigned by bloodline. China, despite claiming socialism, detains Uyghurs en masse and systematically erases their religion and culture. This is not a product of capitalism -- it is violence justified in the name of socialism.

Yet, such realities are rarely addressed in contemporary discourses on imperialism and race. Instead, declarations like "the West is inherently guilty" and "only socialism is the solution" are endlessly repeated, leaving human rights abuses in East Asia largely invisible.

The north Korean teenagers were not executed for watching Squid Game. They were executed because they glimpsed the possibility of choice, and comparison began. And comparison threatens not only dictatorship, but also the moral supremacy monopolized by certain ideologies.

Information frees humans. That is why every dictatorships must control information, and every ideology selectively filters it. The moment capitalism is treated as an ideology and socialism as moral authority, comparison is prohibited and questioning becomes dangerous.

Silence in the face of information suppression is not justice. The true dividing line is not ideology -- it is information. Who can see what, who can compare and what questions can be asked?

The executions in north Korea were not a punishment for watching a drama. They were a punishment for the very possibility that humans could perceive, reflect and judge for themselves. And that possibility always begins with information.

Jihyun Park, a British Korean Conservative politician and regular contributor to the Korea Regional Review, is a north Korean escapee who fled twice from the country -- in 1998, which resulted in a forced repatriation, and in 2008, which was successful.

6. To the president of Ukraine: Spare the lives of North Korean soldiers

​Comment: This is a heartfelt plea from my friend, colleague, and regular contributor to the Korea Regional Review, Hyunseung Lee, asking the President of Ukraine to spare the lives of his fellow north Korean Special Forces soldiers. 

Voices Feb. 11, 2026 / 6:18 AM

To the president of Ukraine: Spare the lives of North Korean soldiers

By Hyunseung Lee

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/11/perspective-north-korea-soldiers-dream/8521770807451/

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a welcoming ceremony for soldiers from the 528th Regiment of Engineers of the Korean People's Army at the plaza of the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang, North Korea, in December. The troops returned from deployment in Russia's Kursk region, where they performed mine-clearing duties amid the Russia-Ukraine war. Photo by North Korean Central News Agency/EPA

Feb. 11 (UPI) -- Executive director's note: Hyunseung Lee, an escapee from North Korea, sent this letter to the president of Ukraine after watching the documentary at this link: https://youtu.be/1FSgwPU-wVk.

Your Excellency, Mr. President and Madam First Lady:

After watching Parts 1 and 2 of the Korean documentary MBC PD Notebook, "The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korean Soldiers," I found myself unable to stop crying in front of the screen. In the faces of the young North Korean soldiers -- who blame themselves in shame for being taken prisoner, who wake up night after night fearing for the families they left behind in North Korea -- I saw another layer of the war's cruelty, and moments in which human dignity itself is being trampled.

They said, "We want to go to South Korea."Those words were not a request for asylum. They were a desperate plea to live.

In front of the camera, one soldier said:

"I feel deeply uncomfortable just being alive. ... It feels like I betrayed my country. ""Won't the regret of not dying back then come back to me a hundredfold? From the beginning, I said I wanted to go to South Korea. I wish I could go ... but wanting to go doesn't mean I can. If I can't go to South Korea, death is the only option."

Another soldier, his voice shaking, confessed:

"If I'm sent back to North Korea, three generations of my family will be wiped out. I wake up in the middle of the night, terrified that I'll be repatriated to North Korea. Now, I'm absolutely certain that I must go to South Korea. But just because I want to go doesn't mean I'm allowed to, does it?"

Mr. President,

A human life must never be used as a bargaining chip.

Returning North Korean prisoners of war to North Korea under the name of prisoner exchange is a choice that condemns them to political prison camps, forced labor and a lifetime of silence. This is not justice. It is an irreversible death sentence. In the North Korean system, being captured as a POW is an unforgivable crime, and punishment does not stop with the individual -- it extends to three generations of their family.

None of these North Korean soldiers came to this land by choice. They were mobilized without knowing where they were going, forced into war and demanded only to sacrifice themselves.

Returning them through a prisoner exchange will not cause North Korea to halt its deployment to Russia or withdraw from the war. The North Korean regime does not view human lives as negotiation assets -- it treats them as disposable ammunition. The result is clear: The only voices that disappear are those capable of telling the truth.

I write to you as a former North Korean special forces soldier who escaped to find freedom. We were merely brainwashed by the regime; none of us wanted that life. No one chose that life.

The families of the captured soldiers are likely already classified as "unreliable elements." Over time, they will be quietly erased from society. The moment these soldiers are returned to North Korea, a death sentence is passed not only on them, but on their families, as well.

But, Mr. President, there is another path.

There is a path in which these soldiers return alive to the free world and testify to the truth of the Kim Jong Un regime's forced mobilization and systematic human rights abuses. As their testimonies accumulate, the international community will condemn these crimes with greater force, and the people of North Korea will come to recognize the regime's guilt.

The very fact that these men live freely and succeed with dignity becomes the strongest possible evidence of how wrong dictatorship, lifelong rule and human rights violations truly are. This is how future wars are prevented. This is how future sacrifices are stopped.

I also appeal directly to you, Madam First Lady.

As a mother and as a defender of human rights, you will understand. These young men's mothers are at this very moment lying awake in North Korea, worrying about their sons. Their families -- already under surveillance -- would rather see their children live free and happy lives in search of liberty than return home branded as traitors and die as outcasts.

There is one more reality that must be stated.

The current South Korean government pursues policies that avoid provoking the North Korean regime. There was even a case in which the president of South Korea was unaware that a South Korean citizen was being detained in North Korea.

Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the South Korean government will proactively initiate a proposal to guarantee freedom of choice or repatriation to South Korea for North Korean POWs.

That is why Your Excellency must act first.

I respectfully ask that you publicly propose this to the South Korean government. Please issue an official statement declaring that Ukraine guarantees North Korean prisoners of war the freedom to choose their country of asylum, and initiate consultations with the Republic of Korea regarding their transfer.

Mr. President, Madam First Lady,

Please do not block the course of their lives. Please do not close the door to freedom.

May the values Ukraine has defended -- human dignity and freedom -- shine once more through this decision. History will remember this moment, and this choice will be recorded as a true victory of humanity, even amid war.

Please, Send them to South Korea. Send them where they wish to go.

With the deepest respect and utmost urgency,

Hyunseung Lee,

Former North Korean Special Forces soldier

Founder, North Korean Young Leaders Assembly

Lead Strategist: North Korea Initiative, Global Peace Foundation

As one person who chose freedom

Hyunseung Lee is a North Korean escapee, the lead strategist at the Global Peace Foundation, the founder of North Korean Young Leaders Assembly and a guest contributor to the Korea Regional Review. He has prior experience in North Korea's shipping and mining sectors and as a sergeant in the DPRK Army Special Force. He fled in 2014 due to severe governmental purges. He holds a bachelor's degree in economics from Dongbei University of Finance and Economics and a master's degree in public administration from Columbia University.

7. Navigating the Complexities of North Korean Strategy: Insights from David Maxwell

​Please see Hyunseung Lee's new project: "The Defector."

Navigating the Complexities of North Korean Strategy: Insights from David Maxwell

by SWJ Staff

|

02.11.2026 at 04:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/11/navigating-the-complexities-of-north-korean-strategy-insights-from-david-maxwell/

Jan 31, 2026

Title: Navigating the Complexities of North Korean Strategy: Insights from David Maxwell

Introduction: In the latest episode of our podcast, we dive deep into the intricate world of North Korean strategy and international relations with expert David Maxwell. With years of experience and a wealth of knowledge, Maxwell sheds light on the critical issues facing South Korea and its allies today.

1. Understanding North Korea’s Strategic Landscape David Maxwell, with his extensive background in military strategy, emphasizes the importance of comprehending North Korea’s approach to warfare and international relations. He points out that the North’s strategy involves a blend of conventional and unconventional warfare, which complicates the geopolitical landscape. For example, he highlights that North Korea has been actively engaging in social warfare tactics, which aim to undermine the moral and political fabric of its adversaries.

2. The Recent Pentagon Report and Its Implications Recently, the Pentagon released a significant report outlining international policies that could shape future military strategies. Maxwell discusses the initial reactions to this report, noting that it has sparked a debate among national security experts. He argues that understanding the implications of this report is crucial for South Korea, especially as it navigates its relationship with North Korea and the United States. He notes, “The focus must be on strengthening alliances and ensuring that South Korea is prepared for any potential threats.”

3. The Role of Alliances in Regional Security Maxwell stresses the importance of alliances in maintaining regional stability. He explains that the perception of the United States as a ‘freeloader’ among allies can undermine collective defense efforts. He elaborates, “Our allies must invest adequately in their defense to bolster our mutual security. This includes South Korea, which has a significant role in the security architecture of the region.”

4. Addressing Financial Contributions to Defense Another critical point raised by Maxwell is the financial aspect of defense spending. He calls for a reassessment of how countries allocate their GDP towards defense, suggesting that South Korea should evaluate its contributions in light of its strategic responsibilities. He argues for a fair distribution of defense burdens, stating, “Countries must contribute equitably to ensure collective security and resilience against threats.”

5. The Future of South Korea’s Security Strategy Looking ahead, Maxwell emphasizes that South Korea must adapt its security strategy to evolving threats, particularly from North Korea. He advocates for a proactive approach that includes strengthening military capabilities and enhancing partnerships with other nations. He mentions, “To counter North Korea effectively, South Korea needs to be prepared both militarily and strategically.”

Conclusion:

In conclusion, David Maxwell’s insights provide a valuable perspective on the complexities of North Korean strategy and regional security dynamics. Key takeaways include the importance of understanding North Korea’s unconventional warfare tactics, the need for robust alliances, the necessity of equitable defense spending, and the importance of proactive security strategies for South Korea. As the geopolitical landscape continues to shift, staying informed and prepared is essential for navigating these challenges. 

Tags: David Maxwell, human rights, Hyunseung Lee, Kim Jong Un, Kim Regime, North Korea, Podcast, SWJ Podcasts, SWJ Videos, The Defector Podcast

About The Author

• 
  
• SWJ Staff
• SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.
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8. Unification ministry rejects claims of 'submissive' stance toward N. Korea

​Comment: Reject it all you like. But perception is reality and KJU's reality is that the MOU stance is supporting his political warfare strategy.

World News Feb. 11, 2026 / 4:16 AM

Unification ministry rejects claims of 'submissive' stance toward N. Korea

By Park Boram, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/11/Unification-Ministry-rejects-criticism-submissive-stance-North-Korea/6061770800781/

South Korea's Unification Ministry on Wednesday rejected criticisms that it has taken a "submissive" stance toward North Korea after comments by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, who is seen here at the National Assembly on Feb. 11. Photo by Yonhap

The unification ministry on Wednesday rejected media criticism that it maintains a "submissive" stance toward North Korea after Unification Minister Chung Dong-young made back-to-back remarks expressing regrets over actions that strained ties with the regime.

"Some are portraying the government's peace efforts as a submissive stance toward the North ... but the government is seeking to create conditions for inter-Korean trust in pursuit of peaceful coexistence," the ministry said in a press release.

The media criticism came after Chung expressed regret the previous day over the alleged privately led drone dispatch to North Korea in recent months and Seoul's 2016 shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation.

"We need the courage to acknowledge the wrongs we have committed, and in that perspective, the drone dispatch was a clear wrongdoing," the ministry said, adding that such past missteps must be overcome.

The Lee Jae Myung administration has repeatedly extended overtures for dialogue to Pyongyang since taking office last June, although Pyongyang has remained unresponsive.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

9. North Korea warns 'war criminal' Japan over Canada defense agreement

​Summary:

Thomas Maresca reports north Korea’s Rodong Sinmun condemned Japan’s new defense equipment agreement with Canada, calling Japan a “war criminal nation” and accusing Tokyo of accelerating militarization and preparing for overseas aggression. The paper claimed Japan’s expanding military partnerships amount to a “de facto military alliance” with NATO members and regional countries. The criticism follows Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s landslide election victory, which strengthens her push to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution and formally recognize the Self-Defense Forces as a military. Signed in late January, the Japan-Canada deal allows joint development and technology sharing and permits Japanese defense exports to Canada. Rodong Sinmun argued this violates the spirit of Japan’s postwar constitution.

Comment: The rhetoric suggests north Korea is using Japan’s widening defense ties to reinforce its long-running remilitarization narrative and to frame regional cooperation as hostile encirclement.

Remember what the CRInK thinks about Western alliances. The CRInK exists because of fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.

They fear the strength of the silk web of US friends, partners, and allies.

They are weak due to their inherent internal contradictions due to their dictatorial nature and need external threats to justify the suffering and sacrifices of their populations. 

They are desperate for various forms of support to overcome sanctions and other shortfalls. 

They envy the silk web of US friends, partners, and allies. 

World News Feb. 11, 2026 / 3:31 AM

North Korea warns 'war criminal' Japan over Canada defense agreement

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/11/North-Korea-warns-Japan-over-Canada-defense-pact/3311770797132/

North Korea's Rodong Sinmun newspaper on Wednesday condemned Japan's recent defense equipment agreement with Canada, accusing Tokyo of accelerating a drive toward militarization. Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, seen here Monday after her Liberal Democratic Party's landslide election victory, has pledged to bolster the country's military capabilities. Pool Photo by Franck Robichon/EPA

SEOUL, Feb. 11 (UPI) -- North Korea on Wednesday denounced Japan's new defense equipment agreement with Canada, accusing Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's government of accelerating what it called a drive toward militarization and overseas aggression.

An article in Rodong Sinmun, the ruling Workers' Party newspaper, described Japan as a "war criminal nation" and warned that Tokyo's expanding military partnerships amount to the formation of a "de facto military alliance" with NATO members and regional countries.

The criticism comes days after Takaichi's ruling Liberal Democratic Party secured a landslide election victory, strengthening her hand as she pushes to revise Japan's pacifist constitution and formally recognize the Self-Defense Forces as a military.

Signed in late January, the agreement allows Japan and Canada to jointly develop military systems and share technology, and permits Tokyo to export defense hardware to Ottawa.

Related

• Lee congratulates Japan's Takaichi on election victory
• Trump backs PM Takaichi before Japan vote, invites her to White House
• North Korea executes citizens for watching South Korean TV, Amnesty report says

Rodong Sinmun argued that such arrangements violate the spirit of Japan's post-World War II constitution, which renounces war and states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."

"As a war criminal nation, Japan is prohibited from possessing a military," the newspaper wrote. "Therefore, even the very formation of a military alliance is a red line that must not be crossed."

By strengthening its military agreements with other countries, Japan "aims to create an environment favorable to the realization of its ambitions for overseas aggression," the paper added.

Japan maintains well-equipped Self-Defense Forces despite Article 9 of its constitution, drafted under U.S. supervision after World War II. In recent years, Tokyo has gradually expanded its security role and eased restrictions on defense exports.

Takaichi, a conservative defense hawk, has pledged to further bolster Japan's military capabilities. During a Feb. 2 stump speech, she called for amending the constitution to formally recognize the Self-Defense Forces and "position them as a combat-capable organization."

Her agenda unfolds against a backdrop of heightened tensions with China, including concerns over Taiwan, and pressure from Washington for allies to shoulder a greater share of defense burdens.

North Korea has routinely portrayed Japan's security initiatives and its trilateral defense cooperation with the United States and South Korea as steps toward remilitarization and a threat to regional stability.

10. South Korea raids spy agencies in probe of alleged N. Korean drone case

​Summary:

South Korea’s military-police joint investigation task force conducted search-and-seizure operations at 18 locations, including the National Intelligence Service and the Army Intelligence Command, over allegations drones were sent into north Korea with possible intelligence involvement. Investigators are examining whether intelligence personnel contacted the alleged main perpetrator and provided cash payments tied to the drone activity. The NIS denies institutional involvement and says there was no government-level direction. Authorities booked three active-duty officers on suspected Aviation Safety Act violations and other charges, and added state-offense charges against three civilians accused of launching drones from border areas. Critics and some sources argue the scale makes independent civilian action unlikely and raises questions about internal controls, oversight, and compartmentalized intelligence structures.

Comment: The probe is as much about accountability as drones, because it tests whether South Korea’s intelligence compartmentation can shield high-risk activity from civilian direction and audit.

If cash payments and repeated contacts are confirmed, what oversight mechanism inside the NIS and the broader intelligence system is supposed to catch and stop an operation that could clash with stated policy before it becomes a strategic incident?

World News Feb. 10, 2026 / 10:09 PM / Updated Feb. 10, 2026 at 10:09 PM

South Korea raids spy agencies in probe of alleged N. Korean drone case

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

South Korean Deputy Defense Minister for national defense policy, Kim Hong-cheol, speaks during a briefing over North Korea's claims of South Korean drone incursions into the North in September last year and earlier this week, at the defense ministry's headquarters in central Seoul, South Korea, 10 January 2026. South Korea on 10 January denied North Korea's claims that its drones infiltrated into the North in September 2025 and on 04 January 2026. File. Photo by YONHAP / EPA

Feb. 10 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's military-police joint investigation task force has conducted search-and-seizure operations at the National Intelligence Service and the Army Intelligence Command as part of a widening probe into allegations that drones were sent into North Korea with possible involvement by intelligence officials.

The task force said it executed warrants at 18 locations, including intelligence agencies, as well as the homes and offices of civilian suspects. Investigators are examining whether intelligence personnel contacted the alleged main perpetrator and provided cash payments related to the drone activities.

The NIS has denied any institutional involvement, saying there was no government-level direction. However, critics argue that the scale and nature of the alleged operation make it difficult to believe it occurred without awareness within the intelligence community.

According to the task force, three active-duty officers - a major and a captain from the Army Intelligence Command and a captain from a separate military unit - have been booked on suspicion of violating the Aviation Safety Act and other charges. Three civilians accused of launching drones toward North Korea from border areas have also been additionally charged under the Criminal Act with general offenses against the state.

Earlier, investigators booked three civilians, including the head of a drone manufacturing company, a company executive responsible for North Korea-related operations and a graduate student who claimed to have flown drones into the North. During the investigation, authorities identified evidence suggesting that one NIS employee and three active-duty military personnel contacted the graduate student and provided several million won in cash described as activity expenses.

The Army Intelligence Command said the civilian was recruited as a collaborator to assist intelligence-gathering activities, not to carry out drone operations. The NIS said the employee involved had never held a position allowing access to agency funds and had not used intelligence budgets.

Investigators and analysts, however, question whether a civilian could independently carry out drone infiltration activities targeting North Korea. Given the suspect's repeated contact with intelligence officers, some observers say it is likely the incident was at least known within intelligence circles.

A source familiar with intelligence operations said it was premature to draw firm conclusions but noted that, given the nature of the alleged activity, it is difficult to rule out prior awareness or information sharing within the intelligence system. The NIS holds authority over budget oversight and operational audits of domestic intelligence bodies, raising further questions about internal controls.

The case has also reignited criticism of South Korea's intelligence agencies as highly closed organizations, with tightly compartmentalized budgets and operations. Some analysts argue that such structures could allow activities inconsistent with the government's stated North Korea policy to be carried out without effective civilian oversight.

"Operations of this scale are structurally difficult for a single agency to carry out alone," another source said. "Given the command and budgetary framework, it is hard to understand how this could have proceeded without passing through the NIS."

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260210010003810

11. How Chinese TikTok turns North Korean propaganda into memes

​Summary:

NK News reports Chinese Douyin users have turned north Korean state propaganda into viral parody by stripping audio and overlaying upbeat Chinese pop, making Kim Jong Un and mass-rally imagery feel surreal and absurd. A key creator, “Bubbles,” helped popularize the format in 2024 after earlier content on luxury cars, then refined a repeatable style that spawned copycats, captions, and in-jokes like “gratitude” emojis and a misheard lyric reframed as “You came from Dandong.” The trend shows many Chinese users view north Korea as an anachronism more than an ally or threat. Censors intervened in Jan. 2025, restricting Bubbles and removing hundreds of videos, yet the meme format persists online and even offline in Dandong reenactments.

Comment: These memes function as informal counter-propaganda, stripping regime spectacle of fear and replacing it with ridicule that travels faster than formal analysis. Censorship suggests Beijing tolerates mockery only up to the point it risks diplomatic friction or bleeds into commentary about China itself. I wonder how much these meme creators are trying to use north Korean absurdities to send subtle messages to Chinese viewers to get past censorship. Just the fact that China and north Korea are allies would seem to reflect negatively on Xi among the people who view these memes. 

Some questions: 

If Chinese youth learn north Korea through parody loops, how does that reshape Beijing’s room to defend or distance itself from Pyongyang when crises spike?

Does turning propaganda into comedy reduce north Korea’s coercive aura, or does it trivialize a real security problem until it is too late?

When platforms delete the original creator but the format survives, what does that imply about how censorship shapes, rather than stops, political narratives?

How Chinese TikTok turns North Korean propaganda into memes

Viral edits to pop soundtracks recast Kim Jong Un as an absurdity, reflecting dim views of DPRK but attracting censors

Jifan Li February 11, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/how-chinese-tiktok-turns-north-korean-propaganda-into-memes/

Kim Jong Un laughing during a public event, North Koreans waving and crying during a parade and emojis that people on the Chinese internet use to mock Kim Jong Un. | Images: KCNA, edited by NK News

In a video posted on China’s version of TikTok, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un rides a white horse through a snow-covered forest near Mount Paektu. Suddenly, upbeat Chinese pop music bursts in, clashing with the revolutionary myth-making.

The scene jumps again to a military parade, where ordinary Koreans fling their arms into the air in histrionic devotion as the incongruent soundtrack plays. More rapid cuts and heroic imagery follow until they combine to create a single, increasingly surreal loop.

The video is one of hundreds that have circulated widely on Chinese social media in recent years, recasting North Korea’s tightly choreographed state propaganda into viral parodies. 

Many of the clips are attributed to a mysterious content creator known online as Bubbles, whose videos amassed millions of views before abruptly disappearing from Douyin in Jan. 2025.

These memes offer a window into how many Chinese internet users view their communist neighbor — less a revolutionary ally or security threat than a strange and faintly absurd anachronism — while their sudden removal highlights continuing sensitivity surrounding DPRK-related discourse online.

ORIGINS OF THE MEMES

Chinese internet users have long mocked North Korean leaders online.

In 2014, a content creator known as Shagen Parody uploaded a series of videos stitching together animated images of Kim Jong Un dancing to the hit song “Little Apple” by the Chinese duo Chopstick Brothers. The clips circulated widely across Chinese social media and were shared overseas, establishing an early template for humor built on exaggerated representations of the North Korean leader.

The creator Bubbles burst onto the scene in 2024, but he did not initially focus on North Korea. His early Douyin posts centered on modified luxury vehicles, particularly high-end Mercedes Benz models. His online alias is widely believed to be a phonetic play on Brabus, the German firm known for premium Mercedes modifications, after Chinese transliteration.

Everything changed after a post on Bubble’s account featuring Kim alongside a Mercedes limousine unexpectedly went viral, drawing thousands of interactions. From there, Bubbles increasingly pivoted toward DPRK-related content, gradually refining a visual style that would come to shape memes about the country.

The account of Douyin content creator Bubbles with a red notice saying forbidden to follow | Image: Screenshot via Douyin

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Scenes from North Korea’s state-run Korean Central Television, originally designed to convey discipline and collective loyalty, instead appeared closer to parody in Bubbles’ edits. The videos followed a simple formula, stripping away the original audio and replacing it with incongruous Chinese pop songs or abstract background music.

One frequently used soundtrack drew on a misheard lyric from the Chinese pop song “Ni Ruo San Dong.” While the title originally means “You come from winter,” Douyin users reinterpreted it as “You come from Dandong,” referring to the Chinese border city across from North Korea. Paired with repetitive footage of crowds waving their hands and crying on cue, the lyric became shorthand for ridicule.

As the format spread, copycat accounts adopted the same music, captions and editing logic, pushing North Korea-themed parody well beyond a single creator.

“Serious political discussion filled with dense jargon is not well suited to mass online spaces,” said Shijie Wang, deputy editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation. “Deconstructed political figures are accessible to everyone. Even people with little background knowledge can participate by reposting an image, a line of text or a short video.”

Wang said the videos function less like conventional memes and more like parody or spoof videos, but both serve the same purpose by stripping political figures of their aura of seriousness.

That effect is reinforced through repetition. The same parade, rally or leadership appearance appears across multiple uploads, often relabeled with playful or contradictory descriptors such as cute, touching or domineering. View counts routinely climbed into the millions, pushing the videos into mainstream Douyin feeds.

Comment sections are also part of the experience. Sarcastic language, most notably the repeated use of the word “gratitude,” is often paired with emojis of waving hands and a crying face that mimic North Koreans greeting the leader.

A Douyin video showing Kim Jong Un visiting a KPA unit while riding in a black Lexus SUV. | Image: Screenshot via Douyin

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Another widely shared clip from Bubbles drew on an unscripted moment from Kim’s July 2024 tour of flood damaged areas in Sinuiju. In the original state footage, Kim stands aboard a small boat moving through flooded streets. At one point, the vessel drifts off course, brushing against riverside trees, with low hanging branches briefly swiping across his head.

Bubbles’ edit removes the narration and replaces it with light, upbeat background music. The moment is replayed in slow motion, lingering on Kim as he raises a finger and points sharply toward the rear of the boat, apparently indicating the obstacle it struck. 

However, Bubbles’ caption presents the gesture as directed at the boat’s driver instead: “When you think you have messed up badly enough, you might as well take a look at this video.” 

In the comment section, Chinese users joked that the gesture looked like an order to leave the boat immediately, turning a minor accident into a moment of exaggerated drama.

Chinese internet users, facing North Korea from the border city of Dandong, act out an exaggerated greeting to Kim Jong Un by waving their hands and leaping forward. | Image: Screenshot via Douyin, edited by NK News

VIRAL BEFORE VANISHING

While DPRK memes offered a low-stakes outlet for poking fun at an authoritarian leader, the jokes about an important Chinese ally could not completely avoid the ire of censors.

On Jan. 24, 2025, Douyin restricted Bubbles’ account from gaining new followers. By the following day, more than 900 of his North Korea related videos had vanished. 

The company has not offered an official explanation for the disappearance, but observers have speculated that diplomatic sensitivities involving Pyongyang and others may have been a factor, as well as concerns that the content could drift toward commentary on Chinese society or domestic politics.

For more than a year, Bubble’s account did not publish any new content, with only five tourist videos remaining. While he returned last month with a series of videos on the history of totalitarianism, he refrained from mentioning North Korea and his old meme videos are still nowhere to be found.

Despite this, the apparent takedown of his North Korea content did little to halt the trend. Copycat accounts continue to recycle Bubbles’ editing style, music and terminology. Searches for phrases such as “general’s dance” or “You came from Dandong” still surface similar videos.

The memes have also spilled offline. In Dandong, visitors have filmed themselves reenacting exaggerated greeting gestures toward the Yalu River, set to the same soundtracks popularized online.

Wang said the persistence of these formats reflects a deeper shift in perception. North Korea, he said, lacks the capacity to conduct effective propaganda in China and relies almost entirely on official Chinese channels to communicate its image.

“It is no exaggeration to say that Chinese young people’s understanding of the DPRK has been shaped by these deconstructions,” Wang said. “Across China’s political spectrum, the most favorable view of North Korea is usually that its survival is useful to China, not that it is admirable.”

Edited by David Choi and Bryan Betts

12. Seoul-Washington trade tensions cloud US security delegation’s planned visit

​Summary:

The Korea Times reports Seoul worries tariff tensions with Washington could spill into upcoming security talks. The concern began after POTUS announced on Jan. 27 a plan to raise tariffs on Korean products from 15% to 25%, citing delays in Korea’s legislature on a bill tied to a tariff agreement finalized last November. Despite urgent visits to Washington by senior Korean officials, no outcome has emerged, and the U.S. warned a 25% tariff if Korea fails to address nontariff barriers. A U.S. delegation is considering a late February or early March Seoul visit for security consultations, including Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines and expanded uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing rights agreed at an October summit. Analysts argue Washington is treating trade and security as a single package and could cancel the visit if trade stalls, while Seoul’s foreign ministry downplays spillover and highlights implementation steps.

Comment: It seems alliance bargaining is becoming package-deal diplomacy, where Washington’s security leverage is used to shape Korea’s trade compliance and timelines. If trade becomes the gatekeeper for nuclear-submarine and enrichment talks, how does Seoul protect its core deterrence priorities without conceding on tariffs in ways that undermine domestic legitimacy? Our ally is in a tough spot. Of whose making?

How does Xi, Putin, and Kim view this situation?

Seoul-Washington trade tensions cloud US security delegation’s planned visit

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By Lee Hyo-jin

• Published Feb 11, 2026 4:12 pm KST

Tariff deadlock feared to spill over as nuclear talks remain in early stage

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20260211/seoul-washington-trade-tensions-cloud-us-security-delegations-planned-visit

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, left, speaks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a meeting at the State Department in Washington, Feb. 3 (local time). AFP-Yonhap

Korea's tariff deadlock with the United States is raising concerns in Seoul over potential spillover into security negotiations with its key ally, including talks on nuclear-powered submarines and other nuclear-related issues.

Analysts say that if the trade impasse persists, it could even lead to the cancellation of a U.S. government delegation's planned Seoul visit for high-level security consultations.

These concerns began on Jan. 27, when U.S. President Donald Trump announced a plan to raise tariffs on Korean products from 15 percent to 25 percent, accusing the National Assembly of delaying passage of a bill required to implement a bilateral tariff agreement finalized last November.

Since then, top Seoul officials, including Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, made urgent visits to Washington to assure Seoul's commitment to the agreement and prevent the tariff hike — attempts that have yet to produce a tangible outcome. Adding to the pressure, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told Cho that Washington would impose a 25 percent tariff if Korea fails to address nontariff barriers.

The situation has raised concerns that the friction in trade could affect security issues as the two sides enter discussions. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a U.S. government delegation is considering a visit to Seoul in late February or early March to discuss pending security issues.

The two main items on the security agenda are Korea's pursuit of nuclear submarines and expanded rights over uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel, both of which were agreed upon during last October's summit between President Lee Jae Myung and Trump.

"The trade negotiations are inseparable from the security talks, and this is part of Washington's strategy," Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, told The Korea Times.

From the outset, Washington approached the negotiations as a single package, linking economic and security issues rather than treating them as separate tracks, Cho said.

"In that framework, the U.S., which holds a clear upper hand in security cooperation, is likely to use that advantage as leverage in trade talks," he added. "Given the Trump administration's approach to negotiations, it wouldn't be surprising if the U.S. delegation were to cancel its planned visit at the last minute should trade talks fail to make progress by then."

Min Jeong-hun, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, said the broader negotiations have highlighted differing priorities between the two allies.

"Throughout the series of trade and security negotiations that have been underway since last year, it has been evident that security has been Korea's priority, while trade has been Washington's," Min said. "When progress stalls in trade, it makes it more difficult to advance discussions on security."

Rim Kap-soo, center, government representative for Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation, poses during the inaugural meeting of a government task force on nuclear energy negotiations with the United States, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters in Seoul, Jan. 9. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The foreign ministry downplayed concerns that trade tensions would spill over into security matters, saying that various efforts to accelerate implementation of Seoul's investment commitments could help ease strains.

On Monday, the National Assembly established a special committee to oversee legislation implementing Korea’s investment pledges to the United States. The finance ministry said Tuesday that it would set up a system to conduct preliminary reviews of U.S.-bound investment projects before the legislation takes effect.

"If our efforts are conveyed clearly to the U.S. and foster a positive atmosphere for negotiations, it would also benefit discussions in the security field," a ministry official said.

Meanwhile, some point out the complexities in the security consultations themselves. It has not yet been decided whether nuclear submarines and spent fuel reprocessing will be addressed together or divided into multiple tracks.

On Korea's side, the government has formed separate task forces — one led by the defense ministry to handle nuclear submarine issues, and another led by the foreign ministry to oversee nuclear energy cooperation.

The U.S. delegation is expected to include officials from across the government, including the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.

13. DAPA chief attends K9 howitzer plant groundbreaking ceremony in Romania

​Comment: Again, a partner in the Arsenal of Democracies. I know it seems far-fetched but I wonder if within the agreements there is wording that requires this factory to produce K9 howitzers for the ROK in the event of a north Korean attack on the South. Is South Korea diversifying and dispersing its defense industrial base? 

DAPA chief attends K9 howitzer plant groundbreaking ceremony in Romania | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 11, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260211010300315?section=national/defense

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Feb. 11 (Yonhap) -- The chief of South Korea's defense procurement agency on Wednesday attended a groundbreaking ceremony for a plant to produce K9 self-propelled howitzers in Romania, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said, in a follow-up to a major export deal signed in 2024.

The ceremony came about 1 1/2 years after South Korean defense firm Hanwha Aerospace Co. signed a 1.4 trillion-won (US$1 billion) deal with the European country in July 2024 to supply 54 K9s and 36 K10 armored ammunition resupply vehicles.

Under the deal, the two sides had agreed to build a local production plant in Romania in what were seen as efforts to strengthen bilateral arms industry cooperation and boost overseas arms exports.

"The local production of K9 self-propelled howitzer is a case that demonstrates how South Korea seeks to strengthen its partner country's arms industry capabilities," DAPA Minister Lee Yong-cheol said in his congratulatory remarks.

"DAPA will continue to support mutually beneficial cooperation for (South Korean defense firms) and partner countries based on the companies' localization strategies," Lee said.

As part of his two-day visit to Romania, Lee also held back-to-back talks with senior government and parliamentary officials, including the defense and economy ministers, where both sides concurred on strengthening practical cooperation between the two nations.

The trip came as South Korea seeks to export Hanwha's Redback infantry fighting vehicle and Hyundai Rotem Co.'s K2 battle tank for Romania's bid to modernize its armored assets.

Lee Yong-cheol (R), minister of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), shakes hands with Romanian Defense Minister Radu-Dinel Miruta on Feb. 10, 2026, in Romania, in this photo provided by DAPA the following day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 11, 2026

14. Eric Trump tours development projects in S. Korean city east of Seoul

Eric Trump tours development projects in S. Korean city east of Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · February 11, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260211012200315?section=national/national

HANAM, South Korea, Feb. 11 (Yonhap) -- Eric Trump, the second son of U.S. President Donald Trump, visited a satellite city east of Seoul this week to tour local development projects, city officials said Wednesday.

Trump, who is visiting South Korea to attend a cryptocurrency forum, met Hanam Mayor Lee Hyun-jae earlier in the day to tour the site of a planned culture complex, named K-Star World, designed to feature a hotel and entertainment facilities.

He also visited the site of a former golf course Tuesday that was once used by the U.S. military stationed in South Korea but has now been transferred back to the country.

Trump, who serves as the executive vice president of The Trump Organization, reportedly showed interest in the sites and asked questions about them.

The city said it would seek cooperation with global investment companies, including The Trump Organization, in light of Trump's visit.

Eric Trump (C), executive vice president of The Trump Organization, is briefed by Hanam Mayor Lee Hyun-jae (R) during his visit to the city, just east of Seoul, to tour development projects, in this photo provided by the municipal government on Feb. 11, 2026. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · February 11, 2026

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com