Quotes of the Day:

"Intellectual virtues are civic virtues; intellectual vices leave the citizens vulnerable to superstition and demagoguery."

~ George Scialabba

"Tell me, what is it [that] you plan to do with your one wild and precious life?"

~ American poet Mary Oliver [1935-2019]

"This minding of other people's business expresses itself in gossip, snooping and meddling, and also in feverish interest in communal, national, and racial affairs. In running away from ourselves we either fall on our neighbor's shoulder or fly at his throat."

~ Eric Hoffer [1902-83], in "The True Believer: Thoughts On The Nature of Mass Movements" [1951]

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 11, 2023

2. Chinese spy balloon has GOP saying no cuts to defense

3. U.S. blacklists 6 Chinese entities it says are linked to balloon program

4. Asian countries push back on China demand

5. Philippines appeals ICC decision to proceed with probe into Duterte’s drug war

6. China held Taiwan war council in October, general’s memo reveals

7. Stop Saying “War in Ukraine”—It Is Russia’s War Against Ukraine and Democracy

8. Dan Rice, Special Advisor to Ukraine Army CinC Zaluzhnyi

9. Helping Ukraine win quickly benefits everyone

10. Influence Networks in Russia Misled European Users, TikTok Says

11. 10,000 cartel drones detected crossing U.S. border last year

12. Lessons from the meme war in Ukraine

13. Is Putin’s Russia heading for collapse like its Czarist and Soviet predecessors?

14. Iranian President Raisi to visit China to shore up ties

15. White House cyber adviser to retire next week

16. Report: Pentagon wants to revive top secret commando program in Ukraine - Responsible Statecraft

17.Taiwan is shaping as the defiant underdog in seemingly inevitable 'David versus Goliath' battle with China's massive fighting force

18. The Case of US Assent to Ukraine’s Further Dismemberment (Part One)

19.  The Case of US Assent to Ukraine’s Further Dismemberment (Part Two)

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 11, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive military effort.
• The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries.
• Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna.
• Russian forces continue to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely draining the Kakhovka Reservoir north of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting inside Russian prisons due to the expiration of an agreement between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 11, 2023

Feb 11, 2023 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 11, 9 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Andriy Chernyak, stated that Russia does not have the resources necessary to launch a large-scale offensive operation on February 24 to coincide with the anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion.[1] Chernyak noted that Russians are preparing to intensify their attacks in eastern Ukraine in the next few weeks and are currently searching for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have regained the initiative on the Svatove-Kreminna line but that the offensive has not yet reached its full tempo.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, also noted that the Russian leadership had ordered the capture of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts’ administrative borders and said that the grinding Russian operations in Bakhmut are a “symbol” of Russia’s inability to conduct rapid and powerful offensive operations.”[3]

Russian milbloggers continue to appear demoralized at the Kremlin’s prospects for executing a major offensive. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander Alexander Khodakovsky questioned why Russian forces are wasting their limited resources on small-scale grinding advances rather than accumulating combat force to launch larger-scale offensives.[4] Another milblogger amplified Khodakovsky’s concern, accusing Russian presidential administration officials of creating unattainable expectations for Russian offensives.[5]

Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive offensive operation. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to quickly advance in the first days of their offensive to capture Vuhledar and that Russian forces had lost the initiative by the end of January due to Ukrainian forces’ rapid transfer of reserves to the area.[6] The milblogger made his assessment that the Russian offensive to capture Vuhledar has likely culminated in response to viral footage showing Ukrainian forces destroying a disorderly column of Russian mechanized forces in the Vuhledar area.[7] Russian milbloggers seized on the footage to criticize the Russian military command for repeating the same failures that have plagued the Russian military throughout the war in Ukraine, with one prominent milblogger arguing that such incidents illustrate that the Russian army is unable to conduct an offensive along the entire Donetsk front.[8]

The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare. The Russian military command is deploying its most elite units to the Bakhmut area in smaller formations using urban infiltration tactics, according to the limited footage of Russian tactics in the area that ISW has observed.[9] These tactics seem to be resulting in significant tactical Russian advances in the Bakhmut area that could lead to operational gains if Ukrainian forces choose to withdraw from Bakhmut. Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast and along the Svatove-Kreminna line have resulted in marginal advances without operational significance thus far. ISW has observed limited footage of Russian tactics in areas separate from the Bakhmut effort that suggests that Russian forces are engaging in more traditional mechanized maneuver warfare tactics with regular, not elite, motorized rifle, naval infantry, and tank elements.[10] All the formations so far observed were rendered combat-ineffective in earlier phases of the war and have very likely been reconstituted with mobilized personnel. The Russian military appears to have been unable to prepare its mobilized personnel to conduct effective mechanized offensive operations in the short period of time since their call-ups, as ISW forecasted.[11] The lack of adequate vehicles, ammunition, and other materiel is likely contributing to the ineffectiveness of Russian mechanized maneuver tactics thus far. The Russian military is unlikely to be able to scale its approach from the Bakhmut area to the wider theater because the tactics it is using in Bakhmut are more suited to dense urban environments and because Russian forces lack the number of elite formations needed to conduct a larger offensive in eastern Ukraine in the same fashion. ISW‘s assessment regarding the prospects for future Russian mechanized offensive operations is offered with low confidence due to the limited available footage depicting Russian military tactics across the entire front line.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries. Prigozhin attempted to improve the declining reputation of his Wagner mercenaries in an interview with a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Semyon Pegov (known under the alias Wargonzo) on February 10. Prigozhin responded to a series of questions about Wagner controversies such as high casualties and ineffectiveness of recruited convicts, execution of deserters, treatment of recruited forces as cannon fodder, Prigozhin’s harsh criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and his supposed political aspirations, and Wagner mercenaries bearing “symbols of the Third Reich” despite fighting to “denazify” Ukraine.[12] Prigozhin notably confirmed that Wagner has stopped recruitment in prisons because of the expiration of an agreement permitting such recruitment with an unspecified agency – likely the Russian MoD. Prigozhin falsely denied ever criticizing the Russian conventional military and inaccurately presented his critiques as similar to the commonly expressed frustrations among Russian milbloggers regarding poor communications between the Russian military command and Russian units, as well as professionalization efforts that have been widely criticized. Prigozhin also denied having political aspirations and attacked his long-standing enemy St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov.

The Kremlin is continuing to dim Prigozhin’s star by depriving him of the right to recruit in prisons and by targeting his influence in the information space. In addition to the Wargonzo interview, a Wagner-affiliated milblogger obtained a document that outlines rules for covering the war in Ukraine with explicit requirements to refrain from mentioning Wagner and Prigozhin in the media.[13] The document also calls on media officials and milbloggers to refrain from praising Deputy Commander of the Russian Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, who is reportedly affiliated with Wagner.[14] The milblogger noted that he is not sure about the authenticity of the document, but the Russian MoD and the Kremlin had already been deliberately avoiding mentioning Wagner and Prigozhin as ISW has previously observed.[15]

Prigozhin likely attempted to deflect attention from his controversies by undercutting the Kremlin’s unrealistic goals for the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin forecasted that it would take Russian forces up to two years to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders and three years to advance to the Dnipro River from the east. Prigozhin added that Russian society would need to be drastically militarized for the Kremlin to reach the English Channel, likely either hyperbolizing Russia’s aims of destroying NATO or referring to the Cold War-era Soviet war plans aimed at conducting a rapid blitzkrieg to the Channel coast. Prigozhin likely sought to contribute to the current concern within the Russian information space about the Russian military command's ability to sustain a major offensive in Donetsk Oblast to reestablish his reputation relative to that of the Russian MoD. The Wargonzo interview itself was likely a Kremlin ambush of Prigozhin aimed at calling public attention to Wagner controversies. Prigozhin likely saw this interview as an opportunity to elevate his name but instead found himself on the defensive throughout.

Prigozhin’s criticism of the Kremlin’s military campaign resembles the rhetorical approach of the former Russian militant Igor Girkin. Girkin had previously assisted the Kremlin by leading proxy armed formations in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 until the Kremlin deprived him of any influence following his surrender of Slovyansk in July 2014. Girkin became an embittered critic of the Kremlin and the Russian military command while seeking to rehabilitate his reputation in extremist Russian nationalist circles. Prigozhin’s uncharacteristically nihilistic forecast about Russian offensive prospects closely mirrors Girkin’s forecasts, and it is possible that Prigozhin is also turning into a bitter zealot who is losing his ability to leverage his parallel military to obtain political influence.[16] If the current Russian offensive stalls rapidly, on the other hand, the star of the conventional Russian military may once again wane, possibly re-opening a path for Prigozhin to regain significance and opportunities.

Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 20 of 24 Russian UAVs and one Kh-101 missile overnight.[17] Russian forces chiefly targeted energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Dnipro, Kryryi Rih, and Khmelnytskyi cities.[18] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces used a naval drone to strike the Zatoka road and rail bridge in Odesa Oblast (28km south of Odesa City on the Black Sea coast), the first observed instance of Russian forces operating unmanned naval drones.[19] The footage suggests that the bridge may have sustained severe damage, but the true degree of damage is currently unknown. Russian forces also conducted airstrikes against Snake Island, and Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk suggested that Russian forces conducted these strikes to demonstrate that Russian forces have not forgotten about offensive actions in southern Ukraine.[20] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces currently lack the ability to threaten southern Ukraine with a full-scale offensive. The Ukrainian Operational Command South stated that Russian forces are trying to incite panic in the areas bordering Moldova.[21]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive military effort.
• The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries.
• Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna.
• Russian forces continue to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely draining the Kakhovka Reservoir north of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting inside Russian prisons due to the expiration of an agreement between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

ISW continues to assess the current Russian most likely course of action (MLCOA) is an imminent offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast and has therefore adjusted the structure of the daily campaign assessments. We will no longer include the Eastern Kharkiv and Western Luhansk Oblast area as part of Ukrainian counteroffensives and will assess this area as a subordinate part of the Russian main effort in Eastern Ukraine. The assessment of Luhansk Oblast as part of the Russian main effort does not preclude the possibility of continued Ukrainian counteroffensive actions here or anywhere else in theater in the future. ISW will report on Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts as they occur.

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove amidst conflicting claims about Russian advances on February 11. A Russian milblogger claimed that battles near Hryanykivka (53km northwest of Svatove) are ongoing and that Russian forces established control over Dvorichna (55km northwest of Svatove).[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely captured Dvorichne (53km northwest of Svatove) on February 10, and it is possible that this milblogger confused the two settlements.[23] Another prominent milblogger argued that it was premature to assess whether Russian forces captured Dvorichne as it is notably far away from Russian positions, but another milblogger noted that this milblogger likely mistook Dvorichne for Dvorichna.[24] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces are in Dvorichne nor that Russian forces have made any advances closer to Dvorichna. A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault towards Stelmakhivka (15km west of Svatove).[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kreminna area on February 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Kreminna, Shepylove (8km south of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces are strengthening their grouping of forces in the Kreminna area.[27] Footage published on February 10th claims to show Russian elements of the 98th Guards Airborne Division in the Kreminna area.[28] Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances west of Shepylove.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault from Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) in the direction of Zarichne (17km west of Kreminna).[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continue to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valery Zaluzhnyi told US Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley on February 11 that Russian forces conduct up to 50 attacks daily in the direction of Donetsk City and conduct constant attacks around Bakhmut.[31] Zaluzhnyi stated that fierce fighting continues around Vuhledar and Marinka and that Ukrainian forces have managed to regain previously lost positions in Donetsk Oblast.[32] Zalzuhnyi added that effective artillery is the key to battlefield success in these areas of the frontline and noted that this requires both weapons and ammunition.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on February 11. Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that there were 39 combat engagements between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area in the past 24 hours.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, Krasna Hora (6km north of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[35] Geolocated footage published on February 11 shows Russian forces walking freely in the eastern part of Krasna Hora and likely indicates that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the settlement.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Krasna Hora and that Wagner Group fighters currently hold positions in the southeastern part of Paraskoviivka (7km north of Bakhmut).[37] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Wagner Group elements conducted assaults in the direction of Fedorivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[38] Geolocated footage posted on February 11 indicates that Wagner Group fighters likely secured marginal advances in the northeast outskirts of Bakhmut.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[40] Geolocated footage published on February 11 shows a destroyed bridge over the Siverskyi Donets Canal along the T0504 highway west of Ivanivske, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge to set conditions for a withdrawal from Bakhmut.[41] Ukrainian forces are unlikely to have destroyed the bridge and likely intend to maintain critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut as they continue to defend the city. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that the DNR 132nd Brigade of the 1st Army Corps made unspecified advances in the direction of Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut).[42]

Russian forces are highly unlikely to launch a coordinated effort to capture Siversk in the coming weeks, contrary to previous claims from Russian milbloggers. Prominent Russian milbloggers recently responded to Wagner Group advances north of Soledar (20km south of Siversk) and Russian claims about the capture of Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (13km northeast of Siversk) by suggesting that Russian forces were launching a complementary effort to encircle Siversk.[43] ISW assessed that Russian forces would need to launch a far more concerted effort in the direction of Siversk from the north, east, and south to drive on the settlement.[44] ISW has observed the Wagner Group’s offensive operations north of Soledar have waned in previous days, suggesting that these operations were in service of the overall Russian effort to encircle Bakhmut and not orientated towards Siversk. Russian milbloggers have also not mentioned a Russian offensive to take Siversk since Russian claims about the capture of Bilohorivka proved to be false.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Paraskoviivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Krasnohorivka (21km southwest of Avdiivka) and Avdiivka itself.[47]

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on February 11. A Russian milblogger claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing in the dacha area south and southeast of Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[48] Geolocated footage published on February 11 shows the aftermath of a Russian thermobaric artillery strike near Vuhledar.[49] Thermobaric artillery systems are military district-level assets and may suggest that Russian forces are prioritizing operations around Vuhledar. A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack towards Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[50]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in southern Ukraine on February 11.[51] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces increased their sabotage and reconnaissance operations along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[52] Rogov also expressed continued concern that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a possible future counteroffensive.

Russian forces are likely draining the Kakhovka Reservoir north of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. NPR reported that Russian forces deliberately opened the sluice gates of the Kakhovka Reservoir immediately after they blew the dam bridge during the withdrawal from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast on November 11.[53] NPR noted that the water level in the Kakhovka Reservoir dropped from 16.1 meters on December 1, 2022, to 14.1 meters on February 6. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that water levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir are decreasing uncontrollably and will threaten the security of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)’s ability to draw water from the reservoir for its reactor cooling systems if the water level dips below 13.2 meters.[54] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi corroborated this statement, noting that the current water level does not pose a threat to the ZNPP but may threaten the ZNPP’s security if the water level continues to drop.[55]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue to accumulate manpower in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces continue to bring in manpower to support law enforcement activities and are not preparing for an offensive.[56] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces in southern Ukraine, particularly in east bank Kherson Oblast, lack the necessary force concentration to attempt a full-scale offensive.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin confirmed on February 11 that Wagner Group stopped recruiting inside Russian prisons due to the expiration of an arrangement between Wagner and likely the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[57] Prigozhin stated that unspecified military detachments outside of his jurisdiction – likely referring to Russia’s conventional armed forces – will continue convict recruitment efforts.[58] A Wagner Group-affiliated Russian milblogger also claimed that the Russian MoD is increasing its efforts to recruit inside Russian prisons.[59] The United Kingdom MoD assessed on February 11 that the increasing conflict between the Russian MoD and Wagner Group was likely the main factor in the termination of the Wagner Group-MoD agreement regarding prison recruitment.[60] Prigozhin’s influence and appeal will likely continue to decline as the Russian MoD continues measures to undercut Wagner Group forces’ battlefield effectiveness, as ISW has previously reported.[61]

Tensions between Russian irregular forces are increasing as Russian military command attempts to integrate mobilized soldiers into Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) units, which have operated semi-independently since 2014.[62] Relatives of mobilized soldiers from Tatarstan published an appeal to the governor of Tatarstan claiming that the Russian military command wants to send their relatives’ unit back to combat even though DNR commanders mistreat mobilized soldiers and use them like cannon fodder.[63] The Russian MoD transferred the unit from the front line on February 8 following the personnel‘s own complaints.[64] Mobilized soldiers from Kaliningrad Oblast complained to the governor of Kaliningrad Oblast that DNR commanders attempted to send them to conduct a ground assault with no prior preparation.[65] Tuvan Republic Head Vladislav Khovalyg stated on February 8 that the Russian MoD agreed to transfer a group of Tuvan mobilized soldiers from the frontlines after they also complained that DNR soldiers harmed and shot at them, as ISW reported on February 6.[66]

Russian authorities opened a criminal case against an Omsk resident on February 10 under laws on the intentional destruction or damage of property for an unsuccessful arson attack against an Omsk City military recruitment center.[67] Russian authorities typically levy charges of terrorism for similar acts. A Russian activist group claimed on February 10 that Russian authorities added a Kazan resident to the Russian Federal Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring) register of “terrorists and extremists” following his December 19 detention under accusations of planning a terrorist attack against a military registration and enlistment office in Stavropol Krai.[68]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin discussed the socio-economic development of occupied Ukraine with Kherson and Zaporizhia oblast occupation authorities on February 11.[69] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that occupation authorities plan to focus on intensive construction of infrastructure and industrial enterprises and reviving the Kherson Oblast agro-industrial complex.[70] Saldo insisted that landowners who left Kherson Oblast must return and work by an unspecified date or occupation authorities will redistribute their land.[71]

Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai claimed on February 11 that Ukrainian partisans destroyed an automated railway control station near Shchastia, Luhansk Oblast on a section of the railway connection between Shchastia and Starobilsk.[72] This attack may impede Russian forces’ ability to transfer forces, equipment, and supplies within rear areas of Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupatsiini-viiska-namahaiutsia-znaity-slabki-mistsia-v-oboroni-ukrainy.html; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/12038

[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/11/za-mynulu-dobu-poblyzu-bahmuta-znyshheno-276-okupantiv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[9] https://www.tiktok.com/@skala_battalion/video/7192718873869798662?_r=1&_t=8ZKrzwrdje9; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1618410185248354304 ; https://t.m... ua/2023/01/22/71-yegerska-brygada-dshv-likvidvala-okupantiv-u-rajoni-bahmuta/ ; . https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1617251122489475072?s=20&t=nXvpiwE68k4...

https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1620815459175256064

https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1620803776448978944

https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1620810915326332929 ;

[12] https://dzen dot ru/video/watch/63e67fbd7270fb396dc1e99d?share_to=telegram

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06WktXitLHYhSzkPGsuQ... https://suspilne dot media/382193-ukraina-dolae-naslidki-raketnoi-ataki-rf-ssa-ne-zaperecuvatimut-proti-peredaci-zsu-vinisuvaciv-353-den-vijni-onlajn/

[18] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=6407926955905701; https://suspilne dot media/382193-ukraina-dolae-naslidki-raketnoi-ataki-rf-ssa-ne-zaperecuvatimut-proti-peredaci-zsu-vinisuvaciv-353-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/kommunist/15736; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/77762; https://t.me/rybar/43509 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/77784; https://t.me/rybar/43517 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/77782; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/16616; https... https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/45137

[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/11/okupanty-atakuvaly-ostriv-zmiyinyj-shhob-pereviryty-nashu-gotovnist-do-oborony-nataliya-gumenyuk/

[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/11/golovnokomanduvach-zsu-pospilkuvavsya-telefonom-z-golovoyu-obyednanogo-komitetu-nachalnykiv-shtabiv-ssha/

[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/11/golovnokomanduvach-zsu-pospilkuvavsya-telefonom-z-golovoyu-obyednanogo-komitetu-nachalnykiv-shtabiv-ssha/

[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/11/golovnokomanduvach-zsu-pospilkuvavsya-telefonom-z-golovoyu-obyednanogo-komitetu-nachalnykiv-shtabiv-ssha/

[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/11/za-mynulu-dobu-poblyzu-bahmuta-znyshheno-276-okupantiv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[57] https://dzen dot ru/video/watch/63e67fbd7270fb396dc1e99d?share_to=telegram

[58] https://dzen dot ru/video/watch/63e67fbd7270fb396dc1e99d?share_to=telegram

[66]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operation... https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/08/mobilizovannyh-iz-tuvy-pozhalovavshihsya-na-izbieniya-voennymi-dnr-perevedut-v-55-yu-brigadu-voennosluzhaschih-etogo-podrazdeleniya-podozrevayut-v-ubiystve-mirnyh-ukraintsev

understandingwar.org

2. Chinese spy balloon has GOP saying no cuts to defense

So if they keep sending balloons will there be advocates for defense spending increases? Is this an unintended consequence for China? Or perhaps China wants us to continue to increase defense spending or at least sustain high levels of spending.

Chinese spy balloon has GOP saying no cuts to defense

BY ALEXANDER BOLTON - 02/12/23 6:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/3853482-chinese-spy-balloon-has-gop-saying-no-cuts-to-defense/

A growing number of Senate Republicans are saying that President Biden and Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) should take defense spending cuts off the table in their negotiation over the debt ceiling.

The Republicans are digging in their heels after receiving a classified briefing on a Chinese spy balloon that floated over sensitive military installations. 

“The entire civilized world should recognize that communist China is probably the greatest threat we’ve ever faced, more severe than Soviet Russia was because of its economic integration into the West,” said Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) after receiving a briefing from senior administration officials on the spy balloon. “We should take every step we can to try to reduce our dependency on China [and] try to build stronger military deterrence against them. 

“I do not think that we should be talking about cutting the defense budget at all right now. If anything, substantial defense increases,” he said. 

Defense cuts weren’t popular with most Republicans even before the controversy surrounding the Chinese spy balloon, which was shot down off the coast of South Carolina a week ago Saturday.

But the balloon controversy, which some see as underlining an aggressive stance from Beijing, has become a No. 1 reason to draw a line against defense cuts.

“Having a strong robust national security is essential to deterring bad behavior,” said Senate Republican Whip John Thune (R-S.D.). “I think it’s OK to try to find savings and do the audits and do all that sort of thing to become more efficient, but just willy-nilly saying we’re going to cut defense I think would be a mistake.” 

Sen. Tim Kaine says ‘ill-timed’ spy balloon was ‘incompetent’ move by China 

Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.) said “there is no way that we should be looking at defense cuts right now.” 

“We’re probably going to need more and not less with regard to that. The primary responsibility of the Congress of the United States is the defense of our country and this one is a serious threat,” he said of China. 

The tough GOP line on defense spending could make it even harder to reach a deal on spending cuts — which House and Senate Republicans are demanding as a price for raising the debt ceiling.

Democrats are against cuts to discretionary domestic spending and certainly do not want to reduce social spending if the Pentagon’s budget is not going to be touched.

President Biden has also drawn a line against cuts to entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare. McCarthy on Monday also pledged that cuts to Medicare and Social Security are off the table. 

Senate Republicans had previously said they would leave the deficit reduction talks entirely to Biden and McCarthy, but it’s getting tough for them to stay out of it completely when there’s growing talk of the need for a new military buildup to counter China and Russia, which is beginning a new offensive in Ukraine. 

“They believe in in strength,” Rounds said of China, noting that the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which he serves, has authorized the new B-21 stealth bomber. “We’re not going to be a pushover.” 

He pointed out that a Chinese-owned company tried to set up a corn milling plant within 12 miles of Grand Forks Air Force base in neighboring North Dakota, which he called extremely suspicious.   

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another outspoken opponent of cutting defense funding, said he’s open to cutting wasteful programs within the Pentagon but he wants to redirect those savings to other defense-related priorities. 

“I don’t mind reforming the Defense Department and doing away with certain programs. I want to apply it back into the Defense budget and put it in other areas. We need a bigger Navy,” he said. 

“I don’t think anybody believes our Navy and our military footprint west of the international dateline is sufficient to deter China,” he said. 

Republican lawmakers also say they’re not interested in cutting funding for veterans, law enforcement or border security, which doesn’t leave much on the table for Biden and McCarthy to discuss.   

“Boy, I tell you they’re making their job very difficult,” said Bill Hoagland, a senior vice president at the Bipartisan Policy Center who previously served as the Republican staff director of the Senate Budget Committee. 

“If you take entitlements like Medicare and Social Security off the table, you take defense off the table — obviously interest [payments] are off the table — what you’re left with is the safety-net programs [like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program] and non-defense discretionary,” he said. “They’re making their climb up this hill even more difficult.” 

Hoagland said that non-defense discretionary spending accounts for less than 15 percent of all federal spending. 

He said that means there’s little chance Biden and Republican leaders will agree to a deficit reduction package of any significant size. 

Other policy experts share that view. 

“Whatever gets done will be a trim at best,” said Jim Kessler, the executive vice president for policy at Third Way, a centrist Democratic think tank. 

“One out of every ten federal employees is a law enforcement official,” he noted. “Who are we cutting from the border or from the FBI or TSA? I think this gets hard. 

“Governing is a lot harder than being in the opposition. Kevin McCarthy is going to learn that,” he said. 

Sen. Rand Paul (Ky.), a leading Senate Republican budget hawk, said his GOP colleagues need to broaden the parameters of the negotiations if they’re going to have any meaningful impact on the deficit. 

He said lawmakers who want to take defense cuts off the table “are just not serious about trying to do anything about the debt.” 

 “All spending would have to be on the table in order to have any kind of real hope of assessing the debt,” he said.

“This came up with the omnibus at the end of the year and the question was: ‘Which is more important for our national security, adding $45 billion in military spending or having a $31 trillion debt?’ From the perspective of fiscal hawks like myself, the $31 trillion in debt is more of a danger to our national security,” Paul said.  

3. U.S. blacklists 6 Chinese entities it says are linked to balloon program

U.S. blacklists 6 Chinese entities it says are linked to balloon program

Axios · by Sareen Habeshian · February 11, 2023

The U.S. has blacklisted six entities in China that it says are linked to aerospace programs, including balloons, used by the military for intelligence.

The big picture: The move, which comes after the U.S. last week downed a Chinese balloon that's suspected of being used for surveillance, will likely only increase the tension between the two countries.

Details: The six entities were targeted for "their support to China’s military modernization efforts, specifically the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) aerospace programs including airships and balloons," the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security stated.

• The five companies and one research institute are now restricted from obtaining U.S. "items and technologies" without government authorization, per an agency news release.

What they're saying: "This protects U.S. national security by imposing additional U.S. government oversight on exports of items subject to U.S. jurisdiction and sends a clear message to companies, governments, and other stakeholders globally that the entities on the list present a threat to national security," the agency said.

Meanwhile, China has denied that the balloon was a surveillance airship, and denounced its downing as an "obvious overreaction and a serious violation of international practice."

• China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reaffirmed the stance Friday, saying, "The Chinese side has repeatedly shared information and stated its position on the unintended entry of the unmanned Chinese civilian airship into U.S. airspace due to force majeure."
• Asked about the U.S. resolution condemning China over the matter, Mao said it's "purely about scoring political points and dramatizing the whole thing. China deplores it and firmly opposes it."

Axios · by Sareen Habeshian · February 11, 2023

4. Asian countries push back on China demand

My War College classmate: General Perkasa.

Excerpts:

Beijing is demanding that Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan surrender their territorial rights to the South China Sea. But all have rejected its claim of “historical” ownership of the 3.5 million square kilometre waterway.

Now escalating military pressure from China is forcing the traditionally non-aligned South East Asian states to seek mutual and international support.

...

General Andika Perkasa, who stood down as Indonesia’s top military commander last month, said he’d like to see improvised ties with the security partnership between India, Australia, Japan and the US (the so-called “Quad”).

That brings its own problems.

“Indonesia needs to lead ASEAN in strengthening and deepening ASEAN co-operation on multiple sectors to increase its resilience from outside influence,” Indonesian Institute of Advanced International Studies analyst Muhammad Rifqi Daneswara says.

But the association’s fractured voice also risks being ignored, he adds.

“Western countries have been increasingly trying to counteract China’s power in the Indo-Pacific region using Quad and AUKUS, instead of working with ASEAN.”

Asian countries push back on China demand

news.com.au

By Jamie Seidel

11 Feb, 2023 03:52 PM

7 mins to read

nzherald.co.nz · by Jamie Seidel

Jakarta is calling Beijing’s bluff.

Indonesia has moved to revive regional talks on China’s long-demanded “code of conduct” for the South China Sea. Will it force the new, “loveable” Xi Jinping to reveal his true colours?

Beijing is demanding that Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan surrender their territorial rights to the South China Sea. But all have rejected its claim of “historical” ownership of the 3.5 million square kilometre waterway.

Now escalating military pressure from China is forcing the traditionally non-aligned South East Asian states to seek mutual and international support.

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“The situation in the South China Sea is far from stable,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyst Greg Poling says.

“Chinese vessels engaged in dangerous and escalatory encounters with those of other states regularly throughout 2022.”

Now Jakarta has put Beijing in a position where it must either put up or shut up.

Well, what do we have here? The PLAN AF's KJ-500 AEW&C has undoubtedly been attached to Mischief Reef. Most likely, an MPA and an ASW aircraft were deployed together. There were two Type 022 Houbei-class missile boats believed to have been positioned to support CCG operations. pic.twitter.com/5q1RNsVGXK

— Mr WB (@WBWhiskeyBravo) February 8, 2023

A two-day meeting of the powerful Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional bloc produced a statement stating China’s artificial island fortresses and aggressive behaviour at sea, “have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region”.

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But the ASEAN ministers have agreed to Beijing’s demands to restart talks on a decades-old proposal for a mutual “code of conduct”.

On the surface, Beijing is pleased.

“This helps China and ASEAN members to enhance trust, build consensus, and achieve the goal of managing crises, preventing conflicts and deepening practical maritime co-operation through the establishment of rules and regulations at an early date,” Ding Duo of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies says.

The regional envoys, however, aren’t playing by Beijing’s rules.

ASEAN has invoked “the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)”.

China was one of the first to sign the UNCLOS treaty. And Chairman Xi Jinping, stung by the growing international backlash against his wolf warrior diplomatic belligerence, has begun emphasising “co-operation”, “convergence of interests,” and “open regionalism”.

Chairman Xi Jinping has begun emphasising “co-operation”, “convergence of interests,” and “open regionalism”. Photo / AP

But Beijing insists international law does not apply to the East and South China seas. Only its own.

What comes next may force Indonesia and Vietnam to join the Philippines in appealing for international support.

Trouble in the ‘hood

Jakarta has committed $197 billion to modernise its military.

Australia’s largest neighbour is in the “advanced stages” of securing 36 new F-15 Eagle fighters from the US. This is on top of an order for 42 Rafale fighters from France announced last year.

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But the world’s fourth most populous nation has also begun using its ASEAN leadership role to strengthen maritime co-operation with neighbouring countries.

“At least now ASEAN and China have a formal forum to defuse tension in the resources-rich sea,” a Jakarta Post editorial states.

“Everyone is a loser if open and armed conflicts erupt in the region no matter how powerful they are militarily and economically.”

Chairman Xi proclaimed the People’s Liberation Army’s modernisation must be complete by August 2029. He says only then can the “rejuvenation of the nation” be assured.

Despite this, Xi is also attempting to convince the world he is committed to a “peaceful,” “highly complementary,” “mutually beneficial,” and “win-win,’ environment in the Asia Pacific. With conditions.

“China stands firmly against all forms of hegemonism and power politics, the Cold War mentality, interference in other countries’ internal affairs, and double standards,” Xi told a Communist Party meeting late last year.

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19/1/2023

 Indonesian Navy @_TNIAL_ warship (KRI Bontang-907) and aircraft (NC212) shadowed  Chinese Coast Guard vessel CCG 5901 sailing east of  continental shelf boundary

They shadowed the vessel until it moved away ~33NM from the boundary

KRI Bontang pic.twitter.com/QBkoIbFBAx

— Reserve Jatosint (@JatosintRSV) January 20, 2023

The mixed messages have Indonesia worried.

“Although Xi emphasised peace and rejected the arbitrary use of force, Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has grown,” says University of Islam Indonesia academic Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat.

“As for Indonesia, its relationship with Beijing will be tested by China’s increasing military power and Xi’s commitment to defending his country’s sovereignty and territories.”

Pushed to the limit

Indonesia and Vietnam earlier this year peacefully negotiated the mutual exploitation of a patch of the South China Sea that falls within something of a “grey zone” under UNCLOS exclusive economic zone (EEZ) definitions.

This enables both nations to exploit local subsea natural gas reserves.

Beijing, however, is angry.

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The gas field straddles the southernmost limit of its ambiguous “Nine Dash Line”. That, Beijing says, means all its wealth of fish, minerals, and fossil fuels belongs solely to China.

Yesterday, 22 Jan at 0600L, Royal #Malaysia Navy offshore patrol vessel KD Kelantan (F175) arrived to counter #China Coast Guard vessel 5303, which has been harassing oil/gas exploration at Luconia Shoal since 12 Jan.

Credit: Starboard Maritime Intelligence, @Starboard_NZ pic.twitter.com/8tuT2lnIqt

— Ray Powell (@GordianKnotRay) January 22, 2023

It responded by demanding a halt to drilling and sent an enormous coast guard ship to patrol the waters north of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.

But that’s just one intimidatory act by Beijing among many.

“I’m not going to be embarrassed to say this, but our ability to operate patrolling in our EEZ around Natuna can only last days”, now-retired Indonesian general Andika Perkasa warned late last year.

But President Joko Widodo was willing to risk $208 billion worth of trade with Beijing by deploying warships to confront Chinese incursions in the area and persist with the exploration agreement with Vietnam.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Photo / Indonesian Presidential Palace via AP

Meanwhile, Beijing has continued to up the ante.

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“Dozens of Chinese Coast Guard and hundreds of militia boats operated daily across the waterway, harassing Southeast Asian civilian and military vessels,” CSIS analyst Poling says. “But Southeast Asian governments, for the most part, (have) held their ground.”

First, Chinese people oppose these bases. Second, these bases won’t weaken China’s determination to keep the option to resolve the Taiwan question by force if necessary, not can they change China’s South China Sea policy. They can’t form deterrence against China. pic.twitter.com/0sydK4lWIB

— Hu Xijin 胡锡进 (@HuXijin_GT) February 2, 2023

These incidents have motivated the Philippines to revive its military ties with the United States. And this was recently extended to allow the return of US military forces to bases within the archipelago.

While reticent about strengthening relations with the US, Hanoi has begun fortifying its own South China Sea islands.

Now Jakarta is considering its traditionally strictly non-aligned stance towards global diplomacy may no longer be tenable.

Balancing act

Like the rest of ASEAN, Indonesia is reluctant to step into the spotlight on the world stage. But it finds itself with little choice.

“Beyond ASEAN, Indonesia can also boost its profile by increasing collaboration with the forces of friendly countries,” university academic Rakhmat writes.

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“Such security partnerships, including military drills with the US and France in the last two years, are the way forward to maintaining regional security while emphasising that Indonesia is a country adhering to a neutral, free and active foreign policy.”

Choosing sides, however, remains an unpopular notion.

Good talk with FM Penny Wong of Australia this morning (Canberra, 8/2)  

We discussed among others trade & investment relations & agreed to strengthen people-to-people contacts. pic.twitter.com/ULldHujAL9

— Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia (@Menlu_RI) February 8, 2023

“I don’t think there’s a consensus that China is the adversary,” Evan Laksmana of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the National University of Singapore told the South China Morning Post.

“Some would see China as a nuisance. You will find still those who would argue that China remains the most important economic partner.”

But that position is becoming increasingly indefensible as China’s harassment of Indonesian civilian and military shipping escalates.

General Andika Perkasa, right, with General Mark Milley. Photo / AP

General Andika Perkasa, who stood down as Indonesia’s top military commander last month, said he’d like to see improvised ties with the security partnership between India, Australia, Japan and the US (the so-called “Quad”).

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That brings its own problems.

“Indonesia needs to lead ASEAN in strengthening and deepening ASEAN co-operation on multiple sectors to increase its resilience from outside influence,” Indonesian Institute of Advanced International Studies analyst Muhammad Rifqi Daneswara says.

But the association’s fractured voice also risks being ignored, he adds.

“Western countries have been increasingly trying to counteract China’s power in the Indo-Pacific region using Quad and AUKUS, instead of working with ASEAN.”

Share this article

nzherald.co.nz · by Jamie Seidel

5. Philippines appeals ICC decision to proceed with probe into Duterte’s drug war

Philippines appeals ICC decision to proceed with probe into Duterte’s drug war

benarnews.org

The Philippines has formally appealed to the International Criminal Court to overturn its decision to allow an ICC prosecutor to press on with investigating the drug war under former President Rodrigo Duterte that left thousands of people dead.

In its appeal, a copy of which was released Wednesday, the Philippine government maintained that it “disagrees with” and “rejects” the Jan. 26 decision by the ICC, which is based in The Hague, Netherlands.

“The appeal is against the whole decision,” read the Philippines’ official document, dated Feb. 3 and signed on behalf of the government by Solicitor General Monardo Guevarra.

In late 2021, when Duterte was still in power, the world court suspended its probe into extrajudicial killings committed during his administration’s crackdown on illegal drugs, after Manila requested a deferral because of its own investigations into the killings.

But in authorizing the ICC prosecutor to resume the investigation, the court argued that various “initiatives and proceedings relied on by the Philippines do not amount to tangible, concrete and progressive investigative steps being carried out” by Manila into the killings linked to Duterte’s drug war.

An old van converted into a coffee shop on wheels is parked in the compound of the National Shrine of Our Lady of Perpetual Help in the Manila district of Baclaran, Feb. 8, 2023. Relatives of Filipinos slain during the drug war by former President Rodrigo Duterte operate the mobile coffee shop, whose proceeds help other affected families. [Jojo Riñoza/BenarNews]

“The Philippine Government disagrees with, and hereby rejects, the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s conclusions,” Guevarra’s appeal partly stated.

“The relief being sought is a reversal of the decision and the denial of the OTP’s request to resume investigation regarding the Situation in the Republic of the Philippines,” he stressed, referring to the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).

Dr. Aurora Parong, co-chairperson of the Philippine Coalition on the ICC, said that Guevarra appeared to be using a tactic to delay “the quest for justice”of families of victims of the drug war under Duterte.

The move, Parong said, “serves as an obstacle to efforts for justice at the International Criminal Court while domestic efforts to deliver justice remain very inadequate.”

“The Philippine government's appeal at the ICC doused cold water to the ray of hope for justice at the international court among the families of the tens of thousands killed in the war on drugs,” she said.

More than 8,000 suspected drug addicts and dealers were killed when Duterte launched his drug war after he became president in 2016. He actively told members of the police force that he would protect them from prosecution if they were charged, as long as the deaths occurred while they were performing their mandate as law enforcement officers.

During his term (2016-2022), Duterte also withdrew the Philippines from an international treaty that created the ICC, and he repeatedly argued that he would not allow himself to be subjected to an international trial.

benarnews.org

6. China held Taiwan war council in October, general’s memo reveals

Excerpts:

The Chinese war council that the general mentioned in the latest memo was the basis for a string of warnings from senior U.S. officials that month about China’s timetable for possible military action against Taiwan. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Oct. 17 that China is accelerating plans to take over Taiwan.

“There has been a change in the approach from Beijing toward Taiwan in recent years,” Mr. Blinken said at Stanford University. “And instead of sticking with the status quo that was established in a positive way, [there was] a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and that Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.”

Adm. Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations, added to the concerns a day later.

Asked about a Chinese timeline for gaining control over the democratic-ruled island and whether it would take place around 2027, Adm. Gilday said the Chinese have delivered on every promise sooner than expected.

“When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule it out,” he said. “I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying that. It’s just that we can’t wish that away.”

China held Taiwan war council in October, general’s memo reveals

Memo predicting conflict by 2025 clashes with Biden detente push

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

The four-star Air Force general who predicted a likely war with China within two years also revealed in his memo that Chinese President Xi Jinping has convened a “war council” of senior military leaders on Taiwan.

Gen. Michael Minihan, commander of the Air Force Air Mobility Command, said in the Wednesday memorandum leaked last week to wing commanders that Mr. Xi had secured his position as supreme leader and “set his war council in October 2022.” The outspoken general disclosed the meeting while offering his perspective on a military clash with China over Taiwan.

The general said he hopes he is wrong, but “my gut tells me we will fight in 2025.”

Air Mobility Command and Pentagon representatives declined to comment on the details of the memo.

The 2025 war prediction has generated headlines, but the revelation of the Chinese war council in October may matter more. U.S. officials said the gathering included top members of the Central Military Commission, the Chinese Communist Party’s most powerful institution, which is also headed by Mr. Xi and two People’s Liberation Army generals.

Gen. Minihan said his memo is the first of eight monthly directives aimed at increasing readiness, integration and agility for the military to “deter, and if required, defeat China.” U.S. forces must be prepared to fight “inside the first island chain” — the string of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines that China regards as its primary line of defense on its Pacific coastline, he said.

It’s not the first time the general has sounded the alarm. During an industry aerospace conference in Washington this fall, Gen. Minihan, who spent 10 years at the Indo-Pacific Command, warned about the threat posed by China in stark language and said the military is not ready for a conflict inside the first island chain.

“Lethality matters most,” said Gen. Minihan, a former C-17 transport pilot now in charge of moving military goods in C-17s, C-5s, C-130s and refueling tankers. “When you can kill your enemy, every part of your life is better. Your food tastes better. Your marriage is stronger.”

The Chinese war council that the general mentioned in the latest memo was the basis for a string of warnings from senior U.S. officials that month about China’s timetable for possible military action against Taiwan. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Oct. 17 that China is accelerating plans to take over Taiwan.

“There has been a change in the approach from Beijing toward Taiwan in recent years,” Mr. Blinken said at Stanford University. “And instead of sticking with the status quo that was established in a positive way, [there was] a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and that Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.”

Adm. Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations, added to the concerns a day later.

Asked about a Chinese timeline for gaining control over the democratic-ruled island and whether it would take place around 2027, Adm. Gilday said the Chinese have delivered on every promise sooner than expected.

“When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule it out,” he said. “I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying that. It’s just that we can’t wish that away.”

Adm. Sam Paparo, commander of the Navy’s Pacific Fleet, which would be in charge of responding to a conflict with China over Taiwan, made clear that the danger of a Chinese attack is real.

“This is a decade of concern,” Adm. Paparo told The Washington Times on Oct. 18. “So I absolutely see the logic in the secretary’s discussion.”

Adm. Paparo said Beijing’s war preparations are evidence of PLA “rehearsals” for military action.

The largest such rehearsal took place in August, in the wake of the visit to Taiwan by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that infuriated Chinese leaders. Days after the visit, the PLA launched large-scale aerial and naval exercises, including missile firings that bracketed the island.

Retired Navy Capt. Carl O. Schuster, a former intelligence officer, analyzed the Chinese war games and noted that the drills were conducted at six locations around Taiwan for several days. Despite their timing around the Pelosi visit, the war games were large and complex and showed months of planning.

Military analysts said the war games were intended to show off Chinese military power to intimidate Taiwan and warn the United States and Japan not to intervene in any Chinese operation against the island.

The exercises “marked the largest PLA air-missile-maritime exercise ever conducted,” said Capt. Schuster, who at one time was director of operations at the military’s Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii.

In addition to missile firings, Chinese forces practiced a naval blockade of Taiwan through test firings of land-attack and anti-ship missiles. The PLA used battalion-sized amphibious operations along the coast opposite Taiwan, and military drones penetrated the airspace over offshore Taiwanese islands and the northwest and southwest corners of Taiwan’s air defense zone.

The Biden administration has stepped up diplomatic engagement with China in an effort to step back from growing military talk and tensions on both sides. President Biden met in November with Mr. Xi at a Group of 20 summit in Indonesia, and Mr. Blinken is scheduled to visit China on Saturday and Sunday.

Divided opinion

Beijing condemned Gen. Minihan’s remarks, and the Pentagon sought to play down the prediction of war by 2025. “These comments are not representative of the department’s view on China,” said a Defense Department spokesman.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, asked in Tokyo on Jan. 11 about Chinese plans for a Taiwan invasion, replied, “I won’t second-guess Mr. Xi, but what I will tell you what we’re seeing recently is some very provocative behavior on the part of China’s forces and their attempt to reestablish a new normal.”

Increased warplane and warship activity in the Taiwan Strait are provocative and intended to create a “new normal,” Mr. Austin said. “But whether or not that means that an invasion is imminent, I seriously doubt that.”

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, Texas Republican, said he agreed with Gen. Minihan’s assessment.

“I hope [Gen. Minihan] is wrong. I think he is right, though,” Mr. McCaul said on “Fox News Sunday.”

Retired Navy Capt. Jim Fanell, a former intelligence director for the Pacific Fleet, said Gen. Minihan’s assessment was prudent and rational.

“Regarding Gen. Minihan’s comments about Xi and his ‘war council’ being likely to conduct an invasion by 2025 is not warmongering, but aligns with similar predictions of a PRC invasion that have been made by several senior U.S. military officers,” Capt. Fanell said.

Two Indo-Pacific Command commanders, the commander of Strategic Command, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday and other senior officers have made similar warnings about a coming conflict with China, he said.

Taiwanese and Japanese officials also have voiced warnings about potential Chinese aggression across the Taiwan Strait.

“All these voices of warning have one thing in common: an increasingly aggressive and expansive PLA whose actions are the kinds of indications and warning military commanders throughout history have seen before conflict begins,” Capt. Fanell said.

Capt. Fanell said the most compelling evidence involved the PLA’s August exercises around Taiwan. Since that event, the PLA has dramatically increased its operations around Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait, he said.

Capt. Fanell said the Pentagon’s apparent downplaying of Gen. Minihan’s warning suggests that civilian defense leaders “are more concerned about upsetting Xi and the Central Military Commission than in exposing the PRC’s threatening behavior.”

“Instead of vilifying the general, this administration and Congress should take his words to heart and turn them into action that can deter and, in worse case, defeat an invading PLA force,” Capt. Fanell said.

A U.S. official involved in China affairs offered yet another take on the memo, saying Gen. Minihan’s comments appear linked to interservice rivalry over U.S. military preparations for war with China. The Army and Air Force are said to be trying to outflank the Navy in any new command structure.

China also is expected to recalculate plans for military action against Taiwan after Russia’s military slog in Ukraine.

U.S. efforts to build up alliances in Asia are part of an effort to deter China from taking military action.

Japan and Australia have signaled that they would join a U.S. military defense of Taiwan, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday on a visit to Tokyo that the alliance is working closely with partners in the region and is concerned about threats from China.

“Working with partners around the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific, is part of the answer to a more dangerous and unpredictable world,” Mr. Stoltenberg said in remarks at a university.

“The war in Ukraine demonstrates how security is interconnected. It demonstrates that what happens in Europe has a consequence for East Asia, and what happens in East Asia matters to Europe,” he said, and “the idea China doesn’t matter for NATO doesn’t work.”

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

7. Stop Saying “War in Ukraine”—It Is Russia’s War Against Ukraine and Democracy

Sun, 02/12/2023 - 12:09am

Stop Saying “War in Ukraine”—It Is Russia’s War Against Ukraine and Democracy

 https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/stop-saying-war-ukraine-it-russias-war-against-ukraine-and-democracy

By Nataliya Shpylova-Saeed

Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has entered its second year. During the past months, the Kremlin has continued to engage in ongoing combat efforts, artillery shelling, and missile and drone attacks targeting civilian infrastructure across the country. The number of civilians who became victims of Russia’s atrocious assault is growing and the country’s infrastructure is in imminent danger of collapse.

Russia perpetuates its plan to depopulate the occupied parts of Ukraine and to deport both adults and children to Russia. At the same time, Russian teachers arrive in Russia-occupied Ukrainian towns and cities and diligently follow the orders of their Russian “bosses” beating into the heads of Ukrainian children Russia’s vision of Ukraine: “Ukraine as a sovereign state does not exist” and “Ukrainians are confused about their nationality—in essence, you are Russians who, under the influence of external Western forces, erroneously decided that you are Ukrainians. Ukrainians do not exist!”

In spite of Russia’s ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, the international community remains quite hesitant and very often unclear regarding how to define “the situation on the ground.” Unfortunately, an ambiguous and feeble description of Russia’s barbaric war perseveres: “crisis” and “conflict” are often used to avoid the term that clearly describes what Russia launched against Ukraine: war. Moreover, quite often in media space, there is a misleading formulation: “War in Ukraine.” What is going on in Ukraine Who is the perpetrator? What country has to be held accountable?

To be clear: Russia has been engaging in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine for one year. However, Russia has been systematically waging war against Ukraine since the occupation of Crimea and Donbas in 2014.

After February 24, 2022, scholars and commentators preferred to call it “Putin’s war” as if taken back by this brutal military aggression. Shortly after the assault, Frontline PBS released a documentary “Putin’s Road to War.” One of the speakers specified that it was “Putin’s war,” not Russia’s war. To be fair, the documentary clearly describes how Putin arrived at his “final solution” and how it was brought into execution. But the film also fell into the lines of those who were hoping that Russian society would rise and protest against the Kremlin’s brutality.

There were a few protests in Russia immediately after February 24, 2022. The number of people defying the Kremlin regime’s military decisions was much lower than the number of protesters who had flooded the streets a few years prior demanding the cancelation of the rigged elections. In January, when a Russian missile hit a residential building in Dnipro killing more than forty people, a few silent “flower protests” took place in towns and cities across Russia. At the same time, more than 70 percent of people in Russia support the war against Ukraine. Moreover, according to Lev Gudkov, Russian sociologist and director of the Levada Center, there is little compassion toward the suffering of Ukrainians which is inflicted by Russia: “The Russians have little compassion for the Ukrainians. Almost no one here talks about the fact that people are being killed in Ukraine.” The public opinion that dominates Russian society is that Ukraine is part of Russia and that it has been overtaken by “the collective West.” For more than twenty years, Putin has certainly contributed to this collective perception of Ukraine in Russia. What we should pay close attention to, however, is why the level to which the Russians echo the views first broadcast by Putin and his supporters is so overwhelming.

After one year of the heinous atrocities, educational and research institutions, as well as media venues, re-incorporate formulations such as “the Ukraine war” or “war in Ukraine,” as if trying to find a way to not put full responsibility on Russia. This echoes a statement made by Emmanuel Macron, President of France, a few months into the brutal all-out war, suggesting that Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, should consider concessions on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine to help Putin “save face.”  

A year ago, there was some hope it was indeed “Putin’s war.” But twelve months have elapsed and today there is more silence in Russia than last February. After the first wave of mobilization in the fall of 2022, thousands of Russians fled the country. Now they live outside the immediate threat of censorship, surveillance, and persecution. Are there a lot of massive anti-Putin and anti-Kremlin protests organized by Russians outside Russia? Is there a pervasive presence of Russian academics that openly recognize their little, if any, knowledge of Ukraine? Unfortunately, no. Instead, many scholars from Russia who managed to leave the country express their opinions on Ukraine without really studying the country, its history, and its culture. This is an eloquent example of an imperialist mentality when one can fake their expertise by re-applying Russian knowledge to the Ukrainian case. In this epistemological framework shaped by imperialist attitudes, Ukraine is nothing more than “an extension of Russia.”

How many more civilians should be killed in Ukraine for the world to take a stance and name things for the way they are? How much destruction is needed to finally dismantle a long-lasting fascination with “the mysterious Russian soul”? Disrespect toward human rights, political neighbors and partners, toward law, freedom, and democracy constitute the very core of Russia today. It is not simply Putin’s war—it is Russia’s war against Ukraine, against democracy and freedom, human dignity and the value of life. 

About the Author(s)

Nataliya Shpylova-Saeed

Nataliya Shpylova-Saeed is a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Russian and Eurasian Studies Program at Colgate University (Hamilton, NY). She has a Ph.D. in Slavic languages and literatures (Indiana University, 2022). She also holds a Ph.D. in American literature (Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2007). Her research interests include contested memory, with the focus on Ukraine and Russia. She is a review editor of H-Ukraine. Since 2016, she has been a host on the New Books Network (Ukrainian Studies, East European Studies, and Literary Studies channels). 

8. Dan Rice, Special Advisor to Ukraine Army CinC Zaluzhnyi

Dan Rice, Special Advisor to Ukraine Army CinC Zaluzhnyi

The first thing Ukraine needs is the capability to strike deep into the occupied territories

ukrinform.net

Against the backdrop of growing support from Ukraine's Western partners in terms of arms supply, including heavy tanks, and mounting concerns about the Kremlin's likely plans to launch another "major offensive" attempt, Ukrinform spoke with Dan Rice, special adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who once again visited Ukraine for consultations with the military leadership and assessment of the situation at the front.

He spoke of what weapons should Ukraine ask for from its partners immediately, how Putin's nuclear blackmail is perceived in the West, whether it is worth worrying about further bipartisan support for Ukraine in the United States, what is the modern-day war about, and much more.

MY HOPE IS THAT UKRAINE WILL HAVE A FEW MORE ARMORED COMBAT BRIGADES THAT CAN ENVELOPE AND DESTROY RUSSIAN FORCES

- Germany has freed the Leopards and now President Biden said he is sending 31 Abrams, noting that this will improve maneuverability of Ukrainian forces. How would you comment on this move? Could this be a counteroffensive game changer?

- Modern combat is about “fire and maneuver”. Ukraine has proven very successful at fires- direct fires, indirect fires in both the defense and the offense. In order to take large areas of occupied territory back, it requires an armored force with tanks, armored fighting vehicles, coordinated artillery and air power, so Ukrainian forces can punch through and envelope (maneuver) large-scale Russian forces and destroy or capture them. The main battle tanks and fighting vehicles being provided will provide that capability. The numbers are increasing steadily, and Ukraine will need 300 or more main battle tanks and 300 or more armored fighting vehicles to take a major offensive. My hope is after we have a few more armored combat brigades that Ukraine can envelope and destroy a large-sized Russian division unit.

UKRAINE NEEDS THE CAPABILITY TO REACH DEEP AND DISRUPT ANY SUPPLY DEPOTS, LARGE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF HIMARS

- The January 20 package included hundreds of armored vehicles, air defense systems, missiles, and other capabilities. At the same time, Russia still outnumbers Ukraine in terms of most major weaponry – artillery, armored vehicles, and aviation. In your opinion, what weapons that have not yet been transferred to Ukraine are now most required by the Ukrainian army? What kind of equipment should the Ukrainian government ask partners to send?

- The first thing Ukraine needs is the capability to strike deep into the occupied territories with long range rockets such as ATACMs and/or fighter/bomber aircraft such as the F-16. Russia has moved supply depots outside the range of HIMARS, and Ukraine needs the capability to reach deep and disrupt any supply depots, large troop concentrations and command and control that are outside the range of HIMARS. These do not have to be committed upon sequentially, they should be approved immediately by the west to be available in time for the spring and summer offensives from both Ukraine and Russian forces.

TOW MISSILES ARE IDEAL FOR THE OPEN TERRAIN OF THE DONBAS

- Ukraine received BGM-71 TOW systems from the U.S. as part of one of the previous aid packages (1,500 heavy anti-tank TOW missiles, August 2022). The launchers were installed on highly mobile HMMWVs. The first messages about their combat use appeared on social media late September. How did they perform in combat conditions? Is the supply of this range of missiles expected to increase?

- One of the first recommendations I had in May 2022 was to request TOW missiles. The Javelin is an the best “fire and forget” single man launched anti-tank weapon in the world with a 93% kill rate in combat, but there are limited Javelins available in the world. The TOW is a much older system of course, and is a much larger system and requires a crew of three to fire. But there are tens of thousands of them in excess inventory in the U.S. Army. And they can still kill Russian tanks and Russian soldiers. They are both readily available, and despite needing a larger crew, and requiring the operator to guide the missile to the target, they work. And they have longer range than the Javelin. They are ideal for the open terrain of the Donbas for long-range strikes against armor or bunkers. Now that the HMMWV-mounted TOWs have proven themselves in combat, I would expect this number to increase significantly soon.

DPICM IS A LEGAL WEAPON

- Let’s touch on DPICM. Talks about this type of munitions have been going on for some time. It is noted that its use can bring more efficiency to the battlefield, since one projectile does the job of a dozen high-explosive projectiles. But some are concerned about the ethical aspect. There’s ambiguous public opinion on these munitions primarily because 3% of them do not explode, and their use in the urban terrain is impossible due to the threat to the civilian population. What is your opinion on the matter?

- DPICM is needed immediately on the battlefield. It is a legal weapon. I have been publishing and speaking about this since July when I discovered in the Donbas that we were only providing the much less effective High Explosive (HE) rounds. Ukraine will obviously only use this against known Russian military targets. Those in the west that argue against giving Ukraine DPICM have never been to Ukraine during the war. There is unexploded ordnance everywhere, due primarily due to the illegal Russian invaders. To deny Ukraine the ability to defend herself, by claiming someone in the west cares more about Ukrainian civilians than Ukrainian leadership cares, is ignorant, arrogant and dangerous.

DPICM was designed specifically to fight against superior numbers of, specifically, Russian artillery on the European battlefield. It is the moral imperative for the West to provide DPICM rather than the much less effective High Explosive rounds that are currently being provided. The Cluster Munitions Convention was a well-intended, but naïve group of Western leaders who only handicapped the 50 year-old planned defense of Europe against a superior Russian invading artillery force. And Ukraine is paying the price for the West’s naivety. Neither Ukraine, nor Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Turkey signed the Cluster Munitions Convention because they knew the main artillery defense, against a superior Russian artillery invasion, was always intended and planned to be DPICM. Not HE.

THERE ARE FRINGE ELEMENTS ON BOTH REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

- The United States is certainly one of Ukraine's key partners in the war, and its role in ensuring Ukraine's security is difficult to overestimate. But the need to continue military support for Ukraine is regularly questioned by a certain group of Republican lawmakers. In general, Russia uses the Ukraine issue to deepen the existing tensions between the Republicans and Democrats. How would you assess the domestic political risks for the U.S. in this regard? Is the issue as urgent as Russian propaganda is trying to portray?

- No, I do not believe it is an urgent issue. There are fringe elements on both the Republican and the Democratic parties that used the Ukraine war in the November 2022 election to try to differentiate from their opponents for election purposes. Many of these voices were silenced after the November elections and certainly after President Zelensky's historic and incredible speech before Congress December 21, 2022. I believe the United States, and NATO, will remain firmly behind Ukraine.

WE NEED TO BREAK THE WILL OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY WITHIN UKRAINE AND THE WILL OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION TO SUPPORT THE WAR

- In your expert opinion, what could be the next turning point in the war and when could it happen?

- In every war, each commander wants to win. There is always uncertainty. A surprise could happen either way. But I believe momentum is decidedly leaning towards a Ukrainian victory. The Ukrainian army is much larger and much better supplied than one year ago. Ukrainian leadership has time and again proven far superior to Russian leadership. The Russian army has been degraded significantly over the past year in every possible way. The Ukrainian army has proven to be the best army in all of Europe, and is now being supplied with the proper arms and ammunition, by all of Europe and the United States. Russian casualties have increased daily to almost 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 wounded every day. Putin’s propaganda at home in Russia can only last so long. Returning soldiers, wounded and those rotating out, all know this war was futile and baseless. Discontent within Russia is reporting increasing with these continued mobilizations and increased casualties for a futile effort.

We need to break the will of the Russian army within Ukraine and the will of the Russian population to support the war. The need for DPICM to increase Russian casualties in this war of attrition could not be over-exaggerated. DPICM could be the game changer to win this war of attrition.

I BELIEVE BOTH COMMANDERS WILL PLAN A SPRING OFFENSIVE

- What is your assessment of Putin’s possible next step in the war? Experts believe he could launch another major offensive despite it not being seen as feasible at the moment? Do you think he will proceed with this plan and if so, where the Russians could strike?

- I believe both commanders will plan a spring offensive. Russia, in my opinion, has lost the ability to make any significant gains on the offensive. Russia has lost the ability to sustain any large-scale offensive due to Ukrainian proven ability to defend, even significantly outnumbered, using a small number of precision-guided weapons supported by very accurate artillery.

EARLY IN THE WAR, MANY WESTERN POLITICIANS WERE MORE AFRAID OF PUTIN LOSING

- Is there a feeling overseas that the leaders are wary of nuclear threats voiced by some Russian senior officials? Do you think Moscow is succeeding in intimidating the West with its “nuclear baton”?

- Everyone in the West is concerned about an escalation, conventional or nuclear. I believe early in the war, many Western politicians were more afraid of Putin losing than they were concerned with Ukraine losing. So the weapons and ammo flow started off terribly slowly. And one by one new weapons systems were approved. And the slow response was paid for in Ukrainian blood. The horror of this Russian horde has become more alarming to the West, and President Zelensky’s leadership has educated them that supplying the Ukrainian military with the weapon it needs to win, is not just in the best interests of Ukraine, but all of western civilization.

Russia has had nuclear weapons since 1949. Putin knows this is an elective offensive war that he started. He knows if he uses a tactical nuclear weapon or intentionally causes a meltdown in Zaporizhia, nuclear facility, would spell the end of his regime. I believe the concern for a nuclear event is very low, and that is reflected in the significant increase in weapons of all types now being supplied by the West. The fear of continued Russian aggression within Ukraine, and if successful in Ukraine, then elsewhere in Eastern Europe, has finally spurred the West to increase lethal aid to Ukraine, rather than withhold it as was done last summer.

THIS WAR IS ALREADY BOGGED DOWN IN AN ARTILLERY DUEL WAR OF ATTRITION

- How would you assess the risk of the war being frozen and moving into a long-term phase? What should Ukraine and its partners do now to prevent this from happening?

- This already is bogged down in an artillery duel war of attrition. Which is why the West MUST immediately provide increased lethal fires, mostly from DPICM and ATACMS. So long as there is a Russian front line in Ukraine, it should be under fire from the most lethal conventional firepower the West can provide. And that is DPICM and ATACMs.

We provided 1 million rounds of High Explosive (HE) and rough numbers probably killed 50,000 Russians. That’s one dead Russian for every 20 rounds. I believe when DPICM is used on this terrain, in the open, with accurate drone observers, and experienced and accurate Ukrainian gunners, against attacking Russians, every round will kill multiple Russians. That’s an exponential increase in lethality that more than warrants any trade-offs.

Ievgen Matiushenko

ukrinform.net

9. Helping Ukraine win quickly benefits everyone

Conclusion:

If we continue to prevaricate about giving the Ukrainians what they need, they will still withstand Russia’s offensive, still continue to wear down Russia’s already weakened military, and still reclaim their territory. But the war then could drag on another year at a huge cost to us, to Ukraine, to the many poorer countries whose economies have crumbled since the war disrupted food exports, and to the Russian people.

The choice should be clear.

Helping Ukraine win quickly benefits everyone

BY DAVID A. SUPER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 02/12/23 10:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3854685-helping-ukraine-win-quickly-benefits-everyone/

After months of insisting that they could not send western tanks to Ukraine, the U.S. and many of its allies agreed last month to do so. The same pattern of postpone-then-commit had previously delayed the provision of advanced air defense systems, medium-range artillery, and other vital weapons systems. It has begun anew with respect to the Ukrainians’ request for western fighter jets and longer-range missiles that could destroy ammunition depots deeper in occupied Ukraine.

This makes no sense.

We need to declare firmly that our goal is for the Ukrainians to take back their country as quickly as possible. And then we should immediately take all steps necessary to bring about that result.

At this point, it is clear the Ukrainians will win the war. But it is up to us how long the war will linger, how badly the country will be devastated, and how many people will die on both sides. If we give the Ukrainians what they need to block the coming Russian offensive and to sever Russian supply lines to southern Ukraine and Crimea, this war can end relatively soon, without forcing the Ukrainians to storm every Russian defense line on their territory.

Some have been slow to recognize that Russia’s military is a far cry from the powerful Soviet armies that crushed Nazi Germany almost 80 years ago. Massive corruption has long hollowed it out. Never was that more obvious than when the Ukrainians managed to sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet with two relatively unsophisticated home-grown missiles: apparently several of the ship’s self-defense systems were not working.

Despite huge losses in Ukraine, Russia has yet to deploy its supposedly most modern, powerful tank, the Armata. Apparently the Armata only works when nobody is shooting at it. It is pretty good in military parades — except for the time it had to be towed out of Red Square.

Russia is sending its soldiers into battle with rusted-out rifles, flimsy helmets, and field communications based on cheap cellphones that allow the Ukrainians to listen in.

This corruption has forced Russia to rely overwhelmingly on just two major strengths: an enormous volume of artillery and an utter indifference to human lives, very much including those of its own soldiers.

Russia’s massed artillery allowed it to flatten numerous Ukrainian cities and towns. Doing so deprived defenders of cover but also made a mockery of Russian claims to be “liberating” Ukraine. This allowed it to push forward for a time. More recently, however, it has been running short of ammunition, in part because western rockets have allowed Ukrainians to target Russian ammunition depots.

No longer able to blanket areas with shells, Russia has resorted to human wave attacks. These often involve untrained draftees from Russia’s ethnic minorities and convicts paroled to fight. Its professional soldiers assess which Ukrainian defensive positions are least effective at mowing down the massed attackers and target follow-on offensives accordingly. Wounded soldiers are left to die.

Russia’s nine-month-long obsession with the wrecked and strategically insignificant town of Bakhmut has cost it many thousands of lives, with still no result. Because the Ukrainians value their soldiers far more, they may eventually leave the town if the risks become too great, but for now they are content to let Russia weaken itself pointlessly.

More recently, Russia has added a third advantage: It has friends in low places. The terror drones it has bought from Iran, in exchange for helping Iranian weapons programs, have killed many civilians and done serious damage to the Ukrainian power grid. They have not, however, had any impact on the course of the war. The artillery shells North Korea has provided accomplished more but can still be destroyed in ammunition depots if the Ukrainians have enough shells of their own.

Ukraine has consistently held the initiative since late summer. Russia’s imminent offensive likely will not change that in the long run. But even when they are badly armed, badly trained, badly motivated, and badly led, and even when their tactics deliberately sacrifice many lives for scant territory, 500,000 mobilized soldiers can cost a significant number of Ukrainian lives. And the Ukrainians likely will temporarily cede some territory to save lives and combat effectiveness.

Had the west provided tanks sooner, the Ukrainians could have cleared the jumping off points for this offensive.

Some have questioned whether the Ukrainians can retake Crimea by force. Of course, many experts with outdated understandings of Russia’s military predicted that it would conquer Ukraine within a few days — and then insisted that all land the Russians took was gone forever … only to have the Ukrainians reclaim half of the lost territory already.

In fact, the Ukrainians may not need to storm Crimea. So far, they have retaken three large areas from Russia: northern Ukraine around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy; eastern Ukraine around Kharkiv; and southern Ukraine, including Kherson. In only one of the three — Kharkiv — did the Ukrainians have to storm Russian positions directly. In the north and around Kherson, the Ukrainians severed tenuous Russian supply lines, forcing Russia to withdraw on its own.

The Crimean Peninsula is far more isolated and difficult to supply than either northern Ukraine or Kherson. Russia’s garrison there is almost entirely dependent on a few highways across still-occupied parts of southern Ukraine and the bridge Russia built across the Kerch Straits that separate it from Russia.

Once western tanks arrive, the Ukrainians will be well-positioned to sever the overland supply route at Melitopol, where local civilians are already engaged in extensive sabotage against Russian occupiers. And at that point, medium-range missiles could reach the Kerch Bridge. The Ukrainians have every right to bring it down, as most of it lies on Ukraine’s side of the international border.

The only question is how much we let the Ukrainians accomplish in their summer offensive.

If we commit now to giving the Ukrainians enough tanks to act simultaneously in the South and the East, enough long-range missiles to keep the Russians from bringing their North Korean ammunition to the front and enough fighter jets to protect their tanks and shoot down Iranian drones, the Ukrainians can reclaim so much of their country that further occupation ceases to serve any purpose for Russia and the war ends later this year.

If we continue to prevaricate about giving the Ukrainians what they need, they will still withstand Russia’s offensive, still continue to wear down Russia’s already weakened military, and still reclaim their territory. But the war then could drag on another year at a huge cost to us, to Ukraine, to the many poorer countries whose economies have crumbled since the war disrupted food exports, and to the Russian people.

The choice should be clear.

David A. Super is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law and Economics at Georgetown University Law Center. He also served for several years as the general counsel for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Follow him on Twitter @DavidASuper1

10. Influence Networks in Russia Misled European Users, TikTok Says

Excerpts:

The company did not say whether the accounts had ties to the Russian government.

TikTok, which is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, has struggled with many of the same conspiracy theories, false narratives, manipulated media and foreign disinformation campaigns as its social media peers.

In its report, covering mid-June through mid-December 2022, TikTok said it took down more than 36,500 videos, with 183.4 million views, across Europe because they violated TikTok’s harmful misinformation policy.

The company removed nearly 865,000 fake accounts, with more than 18 million followers between them (including 2.3 million in Spain and 2.2 million in France). There were nearly 500 accounts taken down in Poland alone under TikTok’s policy banning impersonation.

Early in the fighting in Ukraine last year, the company said, it noticed a sharp rise in attempts to post ads related to political and combat content, even though TikTok does not allow such advertising.

Influence Networks in Russia Misled European Users, TikTok Says

The New York Times · by Tiffany Hsu · February 9, 2023

The covert and coordinated campaign was disclosed in a new report that also addressed misinformation, fake accounts and moderation struggles.

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A building in Ukraine destroyed by Russian forces in December. Last summer, 1,704 TikTok accounts made a coordinated and covert effort to influence public discourse about the war in Ukraine, the company said on Thursday.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

By

Feb. 9, 2023, 6:28 p.m. ET

Last summer, 1,704 TikTok accounts made a coordinated and covert effort to influence public discourse about the war in Ukraine, the company said on Thursday.

Nearly all the accounts were part of a single network operating out of Russia that pretended to be based in Europe and aimed its posts at Germans, Italians and Britons, the company said. The accounts used software to use local languages that amplified pro-Russia propaganda, attracting more than 133,000 followers before being discovered and removed by TikTok.

TikTok disclosed the networks on Thursday in an in-depth report that examined its handling of disinformation in Europe, where it has more than 100 million users, noting that conflict in Ukraine “challenged us to confront a complex and rapidly changing environment.”

The social media platform compiled the findings to comply with the European Union’s voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation, which counts Google, Meta and Twitter among its other signatories. TikTok offered the detailed look into its operations as it tried to demonstrate its openness in the face of continued regulatory scrutiny over its data security and privacy practices.

As a newer platform, TikTok is “in a unique position to innovate in the search for solutions to these longstanding industry challenges,” Caroline Greer, Tiktok’s director of public policy and government relations, said in a blog post on Thursday.

The Spread of Misinformation and Falsehoods

• Artificial Intelligence: For the first time, A.I.-generated personas were detected in a state-aligned disinformation campaign, opening a new chapter in online manipulation.
• Deepfake Rules: In most of the world, the authorities can’t do much about deepfakes, as few laws exist to regulate the technology. China hopes to be the exception.
• Lessons for a New Generation: Finland is testing new ways to teach students about propaganda. Here’s what other countries can learn from its success.
• Covid Myths: Experts say the spread of coronavirus misinformation — particularly on far-right platforms like Gab — is likely to be a lasting legacy of the pandemic. And there are no easy solutions

The company did not say whether the accounts had ties to the Russian government.

TikTok, which is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, has struggled with many of the same conspiracy theories, false narratives, manipulated media and foreign disinformation campaigns as its social media peers.

In its report, covering mid-June through mid-December 2022, TikTok said it took down more than 36,500 videos, with 183.4 million views, across Europe because they violated TikTok’s harmful misinformation policy.

The company removed nearly 865,000 fake accounts, with more than 18 million followers between them (including 2.3 million in Spain and 2.2 million in France). There were nearly 500 accounts taken down in Poland alone under TikTok’s policy banning impersonation.

Early in the fighting in Ukraine last year, the company said, it noticed a sharp rise in attempts to post ads related to political and combat content, even though TikTok does not allow such advertising.

In response, the company said it began blocking Ukrainian and Russian advertisers from targeting European users. The company also hired native Russian and Ukrainian speakers to help with content moderation, worked with Ukrainian-speaking reporters on fact-checking and created a digital literacy program focused on information about the war.

The platform restricted access to content from media outlets associated with the Russian government — such as Russia Today and Sputnik — and said it expanded its use of labels identifying state-sponsored material. Amid an uptick in livestreamed videos coming from Russia and Ukraine since the conflict began, TikTok said it stopped recommending such content to European users.

The report underscored how some attempts to mitigate misinformation have had limited effect. When users saw a pop-up label warning of unverified content, less than 29 percent did not continue trying to share it. Less than half a percent of the 145.5 million “learn more” tags seen by viewers exposed to potential Holocaust denial content translated into a click on the tag, which led to a page of authoritative resources.

TikTok said that in the coming months it would update its policies prohibiting deceptive synthetic content such as deepfakes, as a wave of generative artificial intelligence tools hit the market. It said it would focus on setting up fact-checking partnerships in Portugal, Denmark, Greece and Belgium and expanding its misinformation moderation teams. The company also said it was working on expanding researcher access to its data on disinformation and content moderation.

The New York Times · by Tiffany Hsu · February 9, 2023

11. 10,000 cartel drones detected crossing U.S. border last year

Drones and balloons.  

10,000 cartel drones detected crossing U.S. border last year

washingtontimes.com · by Stephen Dinan

One single sector of the southern border saw more than 10,000 illegal drone incursions from Mexico last year, a senior Border Patrol agent told Congress on Tuesday.

Chief Patrol Agent Gloria Chavez, who oversees the Rio Grande Valley sector in southern Texas, said the cartels use the drones to keep tabs on where the Border Patrol is, so they can figure ways to sneak people and other contraband such as drugs through the gaps.

She and John Modlin, chief patrol agent in the Tucson sector of Arizona, said the cartels are driving the chaos on the border, controlling the crossings and forcing the Border Patrol to react to the smugglers’ tactics.

“In Tucson sector, everything south of the border is controlled by the cartels,” Chief Modlin told the House Oversight and Accountability Committee.

He said the cartels have figured out new ways to keep agents distracted.

Where in the past groups of 10 or 12 people would come across and a single agent could nab them, now the cartels divide them up into one or two, which means it takes more agents to nab the same number. Chief Modlin said they call that “task saturation” and said the cartels are doing it intentionally.

Analysts have long warned of the cartels’ ability to pull the strings at the border — and they profit handsomely.

The Washington Times reported last year that cartels make at least $2.6 billion a year just for migrants paying to use the crossing routes through their territory. The overall smuggling economy, including payments to drivers, stash house operators and coordinators, is more than $20 billion.

• Stephen Dinan can be reached at sdinan@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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washingtontimes.com · by Stephen Dinan

12. Lessons from the meme war in Ukraine

Graphics at the link: https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/lessons-from-the-meme-war-in-ukraine/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Excerpts:

What insights can we draw from this early analysis of memes in Ukraine? In a sense, the most powerful argument that can be made in defense of memes is theoretical. Countries have always relied on psychological operations conducted through visual expression. They do so because they think that the visual medium is effective for persuasion. In a domestic context, the supporters of political candidates place yard signs around communities because they think people can be persuaded by these visual insinuations, and research suggests that those resources are not wasted. These signs influence vote shares.

Our initial investigation suggests that memes can play a similar role. They offer a simple and digestible way to communicate with supporters, both at home and abroad. Propping up support among citizens is important, if not integral, to the war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainians are at the literal tip of the spear; if they do not resist, the country will fail. The psychological persuasion and support of expatriates is also crucial because they live in countries that materially support the Ukrainian military.

Though our research reflects a mix of memes intended to connect with these audiences, we also find that memes, at least in Ukraine, also play a supporting role to combat operations. As we show, the frequency and popularity of memes track closely with key military milestones in the war and mostly function informally as a way to highlight battlefield successes. To best capitalize on the psychological dividends that memes promise, however, officials should better integrate them into their overall wartime strategies, perhaps through a “Meme Warfare Center,” as recommended by other analysts. The relative decline of memes throughout the Ukrainian war raises another set of questions. Why, if their messages have such powerful potential, have memes declined over time? Do memes operate in a similar fashion as the news cycle where internet-users simply move on to the next viral social issue after a matter of time? Have meme creators concluded that the images are not effective? Has another form of online persuasion, if any, taken their place? Does the use of different social media platforms, including Facebook, LinkedIn, Telegram, and Twitter, shape the frequency and popularity of memes, as well as the anticipated effects? Scholars should study these and related questions to better understand if—and how—memes can play a role in the psychology, and perhaps even outcomes, of war.

Lessons from the meme war in Ukraine

The Brookings Institution · by Sarah Kreps, Paul Lushenko, and Keith Carter · February 10, 2023

Illustration of a mini replica of tanks and soldiers, seen in front of the Ukrainian flag in Krakow, Poland. (Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto)

In 1927, the political scientist Harold Lasswell wrote about political propaganda as “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols.” Underlying Lasswell’s work were two sets of insights. One is that the mass public played a key role in political outcomes, such as success and failure in war. Second, that those public attitudes could also be manipulated. Scaling to the mass-level, however, required simplicity. This included the use of symbols and slogans that were memorable, such that they could frame “pictures”—or, cognitive shortcuts—that the public recalled when engaging elected officials to shape certain policies.

Nowhere has the use of propaganda been more ubiquitous than in war, especially because acquiescence or resistance is based on public sentiment and behavior. In World War II, Hollywood produced films that “created a communal viewing experience unlike any during World War I” intended to maintain resolve for the war. These films capitalized on the public’s predisposition to understand social life in terms of in- and out-groups, which shapes how people often interpret foreign policies, including the use of force.

In contemporary conflict, those symbols have increasingly taken the form of memes, defined as a “piece of media that is repurposed to deliver a cultural, social, or political expression, mainly through humor.” Online users have attempted to counter the Islamic State by creating memes satirizing the group’s barbarism, especially on specific “Troll ISIS Days.” Lebanese Internet-users have ruthlessly mocked Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, with memes.

Memes have also been a staple of the war in Ukraine, providing a valuable window into key questions about how actors use memes for political purposes in war. Who is the audience, what is the message, and what events drive the production of these memes?

To explore these and related questions, we compiled an original dataset of memes posted by Ukrainians throughout the war. The memes were all taken from Reddit, a popular social media website that allows users to comment in discussion forums based on shared interests. Overall, our analysis of Ukrainians’ use of memes points to several findings that shed new light on how other countries may use memes during conflict. First, memes are not used in isolation from a particular military operation on the battlefield, such as an offensive or counter-offensive. Rather, they are concurrent and complementary to these military efforts, suggesting that they are meant to play a supporting role. Second, memes do not seem intended to directly influence diplomacy, but may further diplomatic efforts indirectly by bolstering popular support for the war. Third, memes target a diverse array of audiences, including Ukrainian citizens, expatriate audiences abroad, and Russians, especially soldiers’ families. This suggests that those creating and posting memes assume that success is a function of both domestic resolve as well as foreign material support.

Our empirical approach: Data, method, and descriptive trends

We analyzed Ukraine-related memes generated between the beginning of the war on February 24, 2022, and January 14, 2023. Although the Internet is rife with memes, we focused on Reddit, using the PRAW library in Python, which uses Reddit’s Application Programming Interface to request data from the website. To optimize the library, we used it against a handful of subreddits, which limited our scraping to three subreddits used almost exclusively by Ukrainians: (1) /r/ukrmemes, (2) /r/UkraineMem, and (3) /r/ukraine22memes. This approach yielded 1,365 visual memes, along with metadata for each meme, including its title, author’s screen name, date and time of dissemination, and popularity. The latter is a score that Reddit publishes with every post to help users gauge how much attention it is getting, and is the difference between the number of “upvotes” and “downvotes” a post receives. A greater number of upvotes, therefore, indicates the post is more popular with Reddit users. Finally, we also randomly sampled from our data to confirm that our machine-coding process was reliable.

The graph below illustrates how the Ukrainian meme war has evolved over time. By plotting meme frequency and popularity against The New York Times’ key monthly developments in the war, we are able to show how the intensity and public uptake of memes correlates with political and military milestones throughout the war.

This figure, made from data provided by Reddit, reflects the meme score (left y-axis) and frequency (right y-axis) from February 24, 2022, to January 14, 2023. For ease of interpretation, we put dates in a day/month/year format (click to expand).

The graph above reveals several patterns. First, the use of memes surged during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has steadily declined throughout the war. This trend suggests that the meme campaign is likely more informal or crowd-sourced than centralized among Ukrainian officials and leaders. If this were a coordinated, top-down effort, we would expect to see more continuity over time, especially in terms of frequency. As a bottom-up effort, the declines point to the possibility of war fatigue among the population.

Second, the frequency and popularity of memes correspond to major ebbs and flows in the Ukraine war, with spikes that clearly relate to major offensives and battles. More specifically, memes seem to play a supporting role designed to amplify tactical effects on the battlefield rather than precede them as a separate form of psychological operations. This finding is in line with what U.S. Army General Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, observed at a recent security forum in Sweden: “hard power is a reality.” In short, memes are meant not to replace hard power on the battlefield but instead to provide a psychological dividend to the successful application of hard power.

Third, even as memes mirror major milestones in the war, they do not seem to correspond closely with important diplomatic and political events. Among these include the announcement on May 18, 2022, that Sweden and Finland submitted accession documents to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the White House in late December 2022. This may suggest that memes are hitched to some immediately observable effects, which are typically more pronounced on the battlefield rather than diplomacy, considering negotiations often occur over a longer time horizon.

A typology of memes

Given the visually evocative nature of an image, fully understanding the role played by memes in the Ukrainian conflict requires more than just empirical analysis. Examining a subset of specific memes tells a more complete story of what some analysts have referred to as “memetic warfare,” or the use of memes to control the narrative. Accordingly, we randomly selected a handful of memes that piece together a story about messages and audiences.

Our analysis suggests that a rich typology of memes has emerged during the war. For instance, expatriates in places like the United States often generate memes to establish a sense of solidarity and support abroad. The meme below illustrates this purpose while capitalizing on a clear reference to the popular U.S. television show, “The Office.” Published on December 14, 2022, the Ukrainian is translated as “Glory to Ukraine!” suggesting a pro-Ukrainian sentiment. Such sentiment may be important to sustain public support for the war, especially in the United States where Congress passed the “Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022” on May 9. Following the precedent of World War II, this act facilitates the transfer of arms and equipment to the Ukrainian government to enable its military operations against Russia.

Memes can also serve as a commentary on a military operation. The meme below shows a Russian billboard that reads “Kherson—Forever Russia.” The bottom panel then mocks this claim with a SpongeBob SquarePants cartoon, suggesting that Ukrainians believe Russia’s attempt to occupy Kherson is as ridiculous as a childrens’ cartoon. This meme was posted on November 9, 2022, just as the Ukrainians were in the process of recapturing Kherson, which culminated several days later.

Similarly, the meme below is from April 20, 2022, days after the Ukrainians had used a drone to sink the Russian warship Moskva, the flagship ship of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet. It portrays a tough-looking Putin on a ship at the bottom of the sea. The artist appears to be Hajo de Reijger, a freelance illustrator who writes for Dutch newspapers and is based in Amsterdam, but the meme clearly has universal accessibility in highlighting how damaging the sinking of the Moskva was to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s image as a competent military leader.

Lastly, some memes are in both Ukrainian and English, suggesting they are designed to shape the attitudes of domestic and international audiences. The following meme, also posted on June 11, 2022, carries the following title: “Putin lacks imagination—У Путина нет воображения.” This statement highlights Putin’s targeting of civilians during the war, contrasting this immoral and illegal use of force with other countries’ investment in children, a message that could be intended for an audience in Russia, for example soldiers’ parents.

The implications

What insights can we draw from this early analysis of memes in Ukraine? In a sense, the most powerful argument that can be made in defense of memes is theoretical. Countries have always relied on psychological operations conducted through visual expression. They do so because they think that the visual medium is effective for persuasion. In a domestic context, the supporters of political candidates place yard signs around communities because they think people can be persuaded by these visual insinuations, and research suggests that those resources are not wasted. These signs influence vote shares.

Our initial investigation suggests that memes can play a similar role. They offer a simple and digestible way to communicate with supporters, both at home and abroad. Propping up support among citizens is important, if not integral, to the war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainians are at the literal tip of the spear; if they do not resist, the country will fail. The psychological persuasion and support of expatriates is also crucial because they live in countries that materially support the Ukrainian military.

Though our research reflects a mix of memes intended to connect with these audiences, we also find that memes, at least in Ukraine, also play a supporting role to combat operations. As we show, the frequency and popularity of memes track closely with key military milestones in the war and mostly function informally as a way to highlight battlefield successes. To best capitalize on the psychological dividends that memes promise, however, officials should better integrate them into their overall wartime strategies, perhaps through a “Meme Warfare Center,” as recommended by other analysts. The relative decline of memes throughout the Ukrainian war raises another set of questions. Why, if their messages have such powerful potential, have memes declined over time? Do memes operate in a similar fashion as the news cycle where internet-users simply move on to the next viral social issue after a matter of time? Have meme creators concluded that the images are not effective? Has another form of online persuasion, if any, taken their place? Does the use of different social media platforms, including Facebook, LinkedIn, Telegram, and Twitter, shape the frequency and popularity of memes, as well as the anticipated effects? Scholars should study these and related questions to better understand if—and how—memes can play a role in the psychology, and perhaps even outcomes, of war.

Sarah Kreps is the John L. Wetherill Professor of Government at Cornell University and the director of the Cornell Brooks School Tech Policy Institute.

Paul Lushenko is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army and deputy director of the Cornell Brooks School Tech Policy Institute.

Keith Carter is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army and director of the defense and strategic studies program at the United States Military Academy.

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Alexey Elkin for excellent research assistance, as well as Matthew Evangelista, Bryn Rosenfeld, Aleksandar Vladicic, and an anonymous reviewer for feedback on this research.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or Government.

. We manually reviewed a cross-section of the memes to check the accuracy of our scraping technique. Specifically, we built an algorithm to randomly select a percentage of memes from our database. This process resulted in a subset of 34 memes—approximately 3% of our database—from which we ensured they were, in fact, memes. Our hand-coding recorded an 85% fidelity rate on the machine-coding, suggesting that the volume of memes may be somewhat lower than the overall number of hits we gathered but we have no reason to think that this affects the broader patterns we observe.

The Brookings Institution · by Sarah Kreps, Paul Lushenko, and Keith Carter · February 10, 2023

13. Is Putin’s Russia heading for collapse like its Czarist and Soviet predecessors?

​Wishful thinking? Or be careful what you wish for?

Excerpts:

The post-Soviet experience offers important lessons for today’s policymakers as they look ahead to the increasingly realistic possibility of a post-Russia world. While the collapse of the Russian Federation is a daunting prospect, it does not necessarily have to end in disaster.

In order to avoid the worst-case scenarios that many are currently predicting, it is vital to manage the process by engaging with democratically-minded people in all regions of Russia along with the country’s national minorities. In order to avoid being caught out, Western leaders need to accurately gauge the mood within Russia and assess the appetite for greater regional autonomy or independence.

Many in the West remain reluctant to take any steps that could be seen as promoting the idea of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, some argue that talk of decolonizing the Russian Federation risks legitimizing popular Kremlin propaganda narratives of a Western plot to destroy Russia. At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russian imperialism at the top of the international security agenda while fueling serious discussion over the viability of the Russian state. In today’s highly volatile geopolitical climate, it makes sense to prepare for every eventuality.

Russian imperialism has proven deeply resistant to previous democratization efforts. Nevertheless, we may yet live to see the emergence of a democratic Russia as a productive and respected member of the international community. Alternatively, the Russian Federation may go the same way as the Czarist and Soviet empires and fragment into a number of smaller states, which could then develop into successful democracies. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that unless today’s Russia abandons its imperial identity, Europe will face more wars.

​

Is Putin’s Russia heading for collapse like its Czarist and Soviet predecessors?

By Taras Byk

atlanticcouncil.org · by Peter Dickinson · February 9, 2023

On January 31, delegates gathered at the European Parliament in Brussels for a conference exploring the prospects for the “decolonization” of Russia. Organized by MEPs from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political group within the European Parliament, this event highlighted growing international recognition of modern Russia’s imperial identity and increasing awareness of the threats this poses to European security.

Participants included representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, many of whom have been working for some time within the framework of the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. They were joined by numerous Members of the European Parliament and a host of international experts.

An event on this scale would have been hard to imagine just one year ago. However, the invasion of Ukraine has thrust the topic of Russian imperialism firmly into the European mainstream. Over the past year, a steady stream of analytical articles and opinion pieces have appeared in respected international publications accusing Vladimir Putin of pursuing an imperial agenda in Ukraine and calling for the decolonization of Russia itself. While there is still no consensus on the desirability of a new Russian collapse, the topic is no longer taboo.

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The last big Russian collapse caught the world by surprise and was far from universally welcomed. Indeed, some in the West saw the looming 1991 disintegration of the USSR as hugely destabilizing from an international security perspective and sought to prevent it. Most notoriously, US President George H. W. Bush traveled to Kyiv just weeks before the August 1991 Ukrainian Declaration of Independence to warn members of Soviet Ukraine’s parliament against “suicidal nationalism.”

Critics argue that the international community has been equally accommodating of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild Russia’s imperial influence since the turn of the millennium. The Second Chechen War, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine all failed to fundamentally disrupt relations between Russia and the West. Indeed, in areas such as the energy sector, cooperation continued to deepen even after Moscow had illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparked a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These flourishing economic ties helped create the financial foundations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

As the Putin regime has attempted to reassert its imperial influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries that were formerly part of the Czarist and Soviet empires, Moscow has also been actively restricting the rights of the dozens of different national and ethnic groups within the boundaries of the modern Russian state. Despite calling itself the Russian Federation, today’s Russia is a highly centralized and increasingly authoritarian country. National minorities throughout Russia must contend with the colonial exploitation of natural resources in their homelands while also playing a disproportionately prominent role in the Kremlin’s wars of aggression.

Over the past year, Putin’s imperial ambitions have run into serious trouble in Ukraine. The Russian dictator expected a short, victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, his invading army has suffered catastrophic losses in both men and armor amid a series of battlefield defeats that have seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

Despite these setbacks, Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists continue to promote an unapologetically imperialistic agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently hinted that Moldova may face the same fate as Ukraine, while menacing statements directed at the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian nations are routine features of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media. Until this imperial aggression is addressed, it will remain the greatest single threat to European security.

There are various different perspectives on the problem of Russian imperialism. Some commentators advocate a reformed Russia existing as a genuinely federal and broadly democratic state within its current borders. Others argue that today’s Russia is an unrepentant empire and will remain so until it is broken up into a series of smaller countries.

This second and more radical option alarms many Western policymakers and commentators, who fear that the break-up of the Russian Federation would have disastrous consequences for nuclear proliferation and regional security. Gloomy forecasts anticipate a Russian collapse leading to a chaotic aftermath marked by the rise of nuclear-armed regional warlords and uncontrolled migration involving tens of millions of people.

In many ways, these fears mirror similar concerns at the time of the Soviet collapse. However, while the fall of the USSR brought considerable human misery for huge numbers of former Soviet citizens, this was accompanied by only a relatively small number of localized armed conflicts. Meanwhile, those nations that escaped the Soviet sphere of influence and were welcomed into NATO and the EU have gone on to prosper. Indeed, it is no coincidence that post-Soviet Russian aggression has focused on Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, all countries that the West hesitated to embrace after 1991.

The post-Soviet experience offers important lessons for today’s policymakers as they look ahead to the increasingly realistic possibility of a post-Russia world. While the collapse of the Russian Federation is a daunting prospect, it does not necessarily have to end in disaster.

In order to avoid the worst-case scenarios that many are currently predicting, it is vital to manage the process by engaging with democratically-minded people in all regions of Russia along with the country’s national minorities. In order to avoid being caught out, Western leaders need to accurately gauge the mood within Russia and assess the appetite for greater regional autonomy or independence.

Many in the West remain reluctant to take any steps that could be seen as promoting the idea of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, some argue that talk of decolonizing the Russian Federation risks legitimizing popular Kremlin propaganda narratives of a Western plot to destroy Russia. At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russian imperialism at the top of the international security agenda while fueling serious discussion over the viability of the Russian state. In today’s highly volatile geopolitical climate, it makes sense to prepare for every eventuality.

Russian imperialism has proven deeply resistant to previous democratization efforts. Nevertheless, we may yet live to see the emergence of a democratic Russia as a productive and respected member of the international community. Alternatively, the Russian Federation may go the same way as the Czarist and Soviet empires and fragment into a number of smaller states, which could then develop into successful democracies. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that unless today’s Russia abandons its imperial identity, Europe will face more wars.

Taras Byk is a manager at Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv.

14. Iranian President Raisi to visit China to shore up ties

Iranian President Raisi to visit China to shore up ties

Politico

The two nations are opposed to the U.S.-led Western domination of international affairs.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, right, and Chinese President Xi Jinping pose in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on Sept. 16, 2022. | Shen Hong/Xinhua via AP

By Associated Press

02/12/2023 07:38 AM EST

BEIJING — Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi will meet with his counterpart Xi Jinping during his three-day trip in China starting Tuesday, as the two U.S. rivals seek further cooperation.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying made the announcement Sunday, saying Raisi’s visit was at Xi’s invitation.

Raisi will meet with Xi and their delegations will sign cooperation documents, according to Iran’s state news agency IRNA. Meeting with Iranian and Chinese business leaders and Iranian expatriates in China is also part of his itinerary, the report added.

Raisi’s visit is expected to deepen ties between the two political and economic partners that are opposed to the U.S.-led Western domination of international affairs.

The two leaders met last September in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, when Xi underscored China’s support for Iran.

In December, Raisi pledged to remain committed to deepening the strategic partnership during a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Hu Chunhua in Tehran.

China is a major buyer of Iranian oil and an important source of investment in the Mideast country. In 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement that covered major economic activities from oil and mining to industry, transportation and agriculture.

Both countries have had tense relations with the United States and have sought to project themselves as a counterweight to American power alongside Russia.

Washington has accused Iran of selling hundreds of attack drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine and has sanctioned executives of an Iranian drone manufacturer. At that same time, ties between Moscow and Beijing have grown stronger.

Iran on Saturday celebrated the 44th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution amid nationwide anti-government protests and heightened tensions with the West.

POLITICO

Politico

15. White House cyber adviser to retire next week

White House cyber adviser to retire next week

BY JULIA MUELLER - 02/08/23 5:10 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3850063-white-house-cyber-adviser-to-retire-next-week/

White House cyber adviser Chris Inglis is set to resign from his post as national cyber director next week, The Hill has learned.

Inglis, who was appointed by Biden as the nation’s first national cyber director, is set to serve his last day on Feb. 15 after decades of government national security work and a year-and-a-half in the position. 

It was reported late last year that Inglis would step down from the role as President Biden’s principal adviser on cybersecurity policy and strategy and cybersecurity engagement with the country’s key stakeholders. 

Inglis’s principal deputy, Kemba Eneas Walden, will reportedly step up as acting director until the White House nominates an official successor. CNN first reported.

The cyber czar position was created as part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act to strengthen the U.S. “digital ecosystem” while “aggressively addressing and mitigating the risks and threats at large in cyberspace,” according to the White House.

“As the first National Cyber Director, Chris Inglis has set a high bar for future officeholders. His long career in public service has made our nation safer,” House Homeland Security Committee Democrats wrote on Twitter.

16. Report: Pentagon wants to revive top secret commando program in Ukraine - Responsible Statecraft

The Quincy Institute provides its own analysis fth Washington Post report about those damn "commandos."

Report: Pentagon wants to revive top secret commando program in Ukraine - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos · February 10, 2023

QiOSK

Report: Pentagon wants to revive top secret commando program in Ukraine

Washington Post exclusive comes in wake of report that the US has been giving Kyiv coordinates for every single strike against Russia.

February 10, 2023

Written by

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Report: Pentagon wants to revive top secret commando program in Ukraine

According to a report in the Washington Post this morning, Pentagon officials want to revive pre-Ukraine war orders that would allow them to insert commandos in the form of “control teams” to direct Ukrainian operatives to counter Russian disinformation and monitor troops movements on the ground.

This would require the U.S. personnel to be in Ukraine or in a neighboring country.

This follows a Washington Post report last night that quoted numerous Ukrainian officials with one U.S. source saying that the U.S. provides targeting coordinates for the “vast majority” of its HIMAR and other advanced weapon strikes against Russia, if not all of them.

The exclusive report called the targeting assistance “a previously undisclosed practice that reveals a deeper and more operationally active role for the Pentagon in the war.”

If the military gets its way on the commandos, it will be crossing another red line, but we’d likely never know if it actually happens, because the activities would be “top secret.”

According to today’s report by reporter Wesley Morgan, the U.S. had been operating such teams in Ukraine under Section 1202 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act until the invasion last year, when the orders were yanked.

Military officials are eager to restart these activities in Ukraine to ensure that hard-gained relationships are not lost as the war wears on, said Mark Schwartz, a retired three-star general who led U.S. Special Operations in Europe when the programs began in 2018. “When you suspend these things because the scale of the conflict changes, you lose access,” he said, “and it means you lose information and intelligence about what’s actually going on in the conflict.”

Sometimes these “control teams” of American commandos (which operate all over the world in conflict zones) can do their thing from a neighboring country, but they are also known to be inserted into the same territory as their operatives, according to Morgan. According to reporter Nick Turse, who writes extensively about the top secret orders authorizing U.S. forces to operate in places we don’t know about, Section 1202 orders require less oversight and are “used to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” taking part in irregular warfare.

The Washington Post report indicates that this request likely won’t be resolved until the fall, but it is yet another reflection of forces inside the U.S. government that are angling to get closer to the conflict in order to assist the Ukrainians. For that reason, they may not get their way with skeptical members of Congress. “What started as a reconnaissance mission can quickly turn into combat when the surrogates start getting shot at,” said one official. “I think that’s a real possibility in Ukraine, and I’m not sure how the department is going to change people in Congress’s minds about that.”

Meanwhile, last night’s story on the targeting aid is a confirmation of what many had guessed all along — that Ukrainians are unable to operate the sophisticated weaponry the U.S. is giving them without assistance, and shows, too, that we are closer to direct combat with Russia than acknowledged.

One senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian forces almost never launch the advanced weapons without specific coordinates provided by U.S. military personnel from a base elsewhere in Europe. Ukrainian officials say this process should give Washington confidence about providing Kyiv with longer-range weapons.

A senior U.S. official — who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue — acknowledged the key American role in the campaign and said the targeting assistance served to ensure accuracy and conserve limited stores of ammunition for maximum effectiveness. The official said Ukraine does not seek approval from the United States on what to strike and routinely targets Russian forces on their own with other weapons. The United States provides coordinates and precise targeting information solely in an advisory role, the official said.

The Pentagon issued a statement confirming the assistance, but emphasizing that “Ukrainians are responsible for finding targets, prioritizing them and then ultimately deciding which ones to engage. The U.S. does not approve targets, nor are we involved in the selection or engagement of targets.”

It did not comment on the suggestion that Ukrainians are completely dependent on the U.S. to fire these weapons. As one Ukrainian suggested to the paper, even if they were to get the more sophisticated ATACM missile systems they are asking for, the U.S. shouldn’t be afraid of their misuse (firing into Russia). “You’re controlling every shot anyway, so when you say, ‘We’re afraid that you’re going to use it for some other purposes,’ well, we can’t do it even if we want to.”

My colleague Anatol Lieven, director of the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia Program, had this to say:

“It is very difficult to see how if U.S.-employed Ukrainian operatives are sent on reconnaissance missions into Russian-held territory, they will not identify targets for attack by Ukrainian artillery and aircraft. Members of Congress need to ask themselves how America would react if these positions were reversed, and how long it will be before Russia retaliates against the United States for U.S. intelligence help to Ukraine that has killed so many Russian soldiers.”

Written by

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos · February 10, 2023

17. Taiwan is shaping as the defiant underdog in seemingly inevitable 'David versus Goliath' battle with China's massive fighting force

Taiwan is shaping as the defiant underdog in seemingly inevitable 'David versus Goliath' battle with China's massive fighting force

Stefanovic visited Taiwan to find out how prepared the island nation is for a Chinese invasion as part of a special investigation for the new Sky News Australia documentary Are We Ready For War?

Peter Stefanovic

Sky News Australia Host

4 min read

February 12, 2023 - 7:00AM

skynews.com.au · February 11, 2023

The deserted beaches of Kinmen Islands are a time warp.

Long rows of spikes on concrete slabs jut from the sand as a first line of defence against a naval invader.

They are relics of past wars that resemble the famous steel “hedgehogs” from Omaha Beach used during the Normandy landings in World War Two.

As China doubles down on its intention to take Taiwan, Sky News presenter Pete Stefanovic investigates if Australia is prepared for war in a special investigation. Watch from 7:30pm this Wednesday 15 February on Sky News Australia.

The spikes may be defensive tools of a bygone battle, but decades on they could still offer some form of resistance if war was to ever return to this small Taiwanese outpost.

That return might not be far off.

The Kinmen islands are the westernmost point of Taiwanese controlled territory.

They stand just a few kilometres from the Chinese mainland.

So close, in fact, that the island’s roughly 70,000 residents can see the tall buildings scattered across China’s eastern coastline.

In the David and Goliath battle that is the China-Taiwan matchup, Goliath stands tall, looking down and breathing all over this small group of islands.

But what the islands lack in size, they make up for in pride and history.

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu told Sky News Australia Host Peter Stefanovic he fears China could 'attack Taiwan at any time'. Picture: Sky News Australia

This is where Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists fought against communists in the 1950s.

Bunkers still snake around the outskirts with a clear view of China’s approach. Again, useful in 2023.

It’s a strange feeling to be here on this day and look from one grey wintry shore to another.

One foe to the next. A land and stretch of sea that’s been fought over time and time again, and still remains in dispute.

I’m on a frontline that separates dictatorship and democracy, but while Goliath huffs and puffs David carries on. It’s been this way for more than seventy years. They call it the status quo.

If China - with its massive fighting force - goes ahead with its long-awaited plan to take back Taiwan, the Kinmen islands would be the first hurdle in the way.

Not that it’s much of a hurdle.

This isn’t the 1950’s anymore. Kinmen is very small. A dot in the atlas.

Peter Stefanovic visited the Kinmen Islands - the first hurdle for China's People's Liberation Army if the communist power decides to attack Taiwan. Picture: Sky News Australia

China’s PLA is now the biggest in the world and would run right over the top of these villages. The villagers know it.

Strangely, it gives them a sense of comfort. Because why would China bother? What’s in it for them? There are bigger prizes further east.

The main island of Taiwan, and its capital Taipei.

Here, life too carries on but with a heightened sense of collective anxiety.

Near-daily flyovers from enemy aircraft, and constant grey war tactics tend to do that. A reminder that war is never far away.

Joseph Wu is Taiwan’s Foreign Minister.

I’d spoken to him before during pandemic lockdowns but on this visit we travelled to Taipei to meet in person.

Mr Wu has one of the toughest jobs in world politics and he fears it’s just a matter of time before Xi Jinping orders his army to advance.

The year I hear most often is 2027.

The idea being that Xi Jinping will have then completed an unprecedented third five-year term and will need something big to show for it.

It will also be the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army.

“The military threat is increasing, and we are concerned that China might feel that they are confident enough to use military force against Taiwan without too much opposition. If they have that kind of confidence, they may attack Taiwan at any time,” he told me.

Just like the Kinmen islands Joseph Wu and Taiwan’s army is severely outnumbered in size and power.

I point this out to Mr Wu and ask what sort of a fight they can really put up.

“How long can you last without help,” I asked.

Mr Wu is very diplomatic, and tries to assure me Taiwan will fight on its own.

He points to Ukraine and how the world underestimated it in the face of a Russian onslaught. He takes inspiration from Zelensky’s brave men and women.

There’s a strong sense of pride here too he reminds me, and the majority of people have no interest in re-joining greater China.

Wu also suggests Taiwan’s rugged terrain, and its built-up capital city will be tough for an invading force to overcome.

He also believes that despite a dwindling local army, a good portion of Taiwan’s 24 million residents will take up arms.

I doubt very much Taiwan can handle China on its own.

However, the ledger starts to square when other players are drawn in - the United States, and Japan.

Australia would find itself under tremendous pressure to take part.

South Korea, and the Philippines might become involved - so would any country that fears an expansionist China.

Perhaps Indonesia. India, too.

Xi Jinping would surely know this. A move on Taiwan would not be so simple.

Goliath might just have a fair fight on its hands.

skynews.com.au · February 11, 2023

18. The Case of US Assent to Ukraine’s Further Dismemberment (Part One)

The Case of US Assent to Ukraine’s Further Dismemberment (Part One)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 25

By: Vladimir Socor

February 10, 2023 05:20 PM Age: 2 days

jamestown.org · by Vladimir Socor · February 10, 2023

The boldest prescription yet for a United States–abetted defeat of Ukraine by Russia—and, ipso facto, a Western defeat—has come out of one unit of the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC. It envisages large territorial concessions by Ukraine to Russia—in effect, more and even more land for peace, albeit a precarious peace. It is, thus far, quite possibly, the most comprehensive prescription of this kind in the public domain originating from the foreign policy establishment (neither “populist,” “isolationist” nor “academic realist”). The Biden administration appears to be the primary addressee of this report (Rand.org, January 2023).

The paper is premised on a negative definition of US interests: namely, what Washington does not wish to happen as a consequence of its (however limited) support for Ukraine. The report identifies three “paramount interests” and “top priorities” for the US:

• Minimizing the risks of escalation that could lead to direct conflict between the US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia. If Ukraine were to rout the Russian military and regain Ukraine’s territories, the risk of a Russian-NATO war would spike.
• Averting any situation that might prompt Russia to threaten or use a non-strategic nuclear weapon. Western retaliation (even if non-nuclear) to Russian nuclear use would produce a direct US-Russian conflict or a NATO-Russian war and the breakdown in transatlantic unity.
• Avoiding a “long war” between Ukraine and Russia. If the war in Ukraine were to end, the risks of escalation between Russia and the US and NATO or the likelihood of a direct clash between them would diminish significantly. The United States could then focus on other foreign policy priorities elsewhere (see below).

The report, however, does not address US strategic rationales and objectives for supporting Ukraine in the first place and the appropriate extent of such support. This omission is surprising since the paper recommends a lower level of US engagement without assessing the considerations that have produced both the current level of engagement and its self-denying limitations.

Those considerations, reflecting a range of values and interests in the US government and society, include: enabling Ukraine to defend its sovereign territory (namely, this time, from further amputations after those suffered in 2014); upholding Ukraine’s right to choose its security alignment (watered down by the Alliance from “Ukraine will be a member of NATO”); resisting Russia’s unprovoked aggression (a case of serial Russian recidivism, with proselytizing effects on other potential aggressors); standing up for Ukrainian democracy in the face of Russia’s expansionist tyranny; securing NATO’s member and partner countries on the Alliance‘s eastern front (euphemism: “flank”); and, overarchingly, the necessity for neo-containment of Russia.

All those considerations relate, directly or indirectly, to the European balance of power, of which Ukraine has been the fulcrum throughout the 20th century (if not earlier) and remains so to date. The RAND report, nevertheless, does not address this core issue of European security, nor the concerns of the NATO allies directly affected by it. Instead, the report confines itself to a minimalist or negative conception of US interests and objectives: essentially, what not to do, what to avoid doing and how to reduce the existing level of engagement.

Having defined US interests in this way, the report postulates a wide gap between Washington and Kyiv in terms of their respective “priorities”—although priorities can be understood as interests in this case. The paper suggests that US interests are not coterminous with the extent of Ukraine’s recovered territorial control. While Ukraine’s top priority is, “understandably,” to regain its Russian-controlled territories, the top priorities for the US are to avert escalation to a Russia-NATO war, Russian nuclear use or a long war between Ukraine and Russia.

This way of framing the problem leads to suggestions that Ukraine should desist from seeking to regain its territories: namely, all those territories that are currently under Russian control. According to the RAND paper, attempts to regain Crimea should be ruled out because Russia could respond with nuclear threats or use if necessary. Apart from Crimea, Russia’s long-term control of areas beyond the February 24, 2022, frontlines would impact Ukraine’s economy “far less severely,” as compared with the areas that Russia already held before February 24. Areas under Russian control as of December 2022 (i.e., seized in the first and second invasions) are “unlikely to prove hugely economically significant.” And, ultimately, the now-existing frontlines “do not deprive Kyiv of economically vital areas that would dramatically affect the country’s viability.” The implication is that Ukraine does not have compelling material reasons for regaining the Russian-occupied territories, whether considering those seized in the first or second Russian invasion.

The economic consequences of losing Crimea, most of Donbas and the Azov Sea littoral areas are, however, “hugely significant” indeed; in fact, they actually serve to “deprive Ukraine of economically vital areas dramatically affecting its viability.” These areas generated the lion’s share of Ukraine’s export-oriented industrial production, a considerable share of its agricultural exports (currently stolen and exported as “Russian” produce) and served as major Ukrainian export outlets, which Russia currently occupies or interdicts.

Apart from these economic considerations, Ukraine’s leadership and public opinion would turn down proposals to desist from trying to liberate the occupied territories. According to the latest opinion survey conducted by the well-respected Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Centre, 54 percent of respondents support fighting to eject Russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and restore the borders as of January 2014. Only 18 percent are prepared to trade some parts of the occupied territories in exchange for the cessation of hostilities; and of those, only 8 percent would give up Crimea in such a tradeoff. And 60 percent believe that a negotiated peace with Russia is impossible because Moscow does not honor these agreements (Dif.org.ua, January 5, accessed February 8).

Such polling results have been consistent throughout the 12 months of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine. They indicate that Ukrainian territorial concessions are neither politically feasible nor apt to buy peace with Russia (see Part Two).

jamestown.org · by Vladimir Socor · February 10, 2023

19. The Case of US Assent to Ukraine’s Further Dismemberment (Part Two)

Excerpts:

The direct costs of a long war to the US include its own expenditures to support Ukraine as well as the impact of economic disruptions stemming from the war. Washington’s cooperation with Moscow on “key US interests” will be unlikely as long as the war continues. As a result, the Kremlin could play spoiler on nonproliferation and other issues. This pleading, however, seems to assume that Russia can cooperate with the US in good faith and that it is not in the nature of Russian foreign policy to play spoiler on almost any issue. These are ahistorical assumptions.

The argument runs, as long as Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, it will constrain Washington’s ability to focus on competition with China. Competing effectively with China, however, requires defeating Russia in Europe before pivoting to the Asia-Pacific theater. Ukraine has demonstrated that it can accomplish this goal without direct involvement from the US, if given the proper tools.

The Case of US Assent to Ukraine’s Further Dismemberment (Part Two)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 25

By: Vladimir Socor

February 10, 2023 05:25 PM Age: 2 days

jamestown.org · by Vladimir Socor · February 10, 2023

Ukraine’s leadership and public opinion are adamant in ruling out land-for-peace tradeoffs with Russia. Leadership statements and public opinion surveys testify to this attitude. Such tradeoffs have, nevertheless, been proposed in a recent RAND Corporation report (Rand.org, January 2023).

Ukrainian territorial concessions to Russia, the paper suggests, would, of necessity, encompass territories seized by Russia in both invasions (2014–2015 and 2022–2023). But, according to the RAND report, Russian territorial gains from any tradeoffs need not be codified de jure. They could be framed as de facto renunciation by Ukraine in return for an end to the war and without official Western recognition of Russia’s annexations. As in the case of Crimea from 2014 onward, the United States and its allies would treat Russia’s seizure of further Ukrainian territories as illegitimate and illegal. This clearly alludes to Donbas, the Russian-occupied parts of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces and potentially anything Russia might yet seize from Ukraine, “regardless of where the de facto lines are drawn.”

According to the paper, the actual amount of land illegally seized is of secondary importance. What matters more is that the forcible territorial changes should not receive official acceptance at the international level. With Moscow in violation of the territorial integrity norm in Ukraine since 2014, the argument goes, Russia would not necessarily do more harm to the international order if it keeps some of the territories it gained in 2022. Either way, Russia would control some Ukrainian territories in violation of this territorial integrity norm. The implication is that Ukraine pushing back to the lines before Russia’s re-invasion on February 24, 2022, would scarcely mitigate the damage to those “norms” and might, by implication, not be worth continuing a Ukrainian war of liberation.

The authors are concerned with preserving “international norms” on the territorial integrity of states and the inadmissibility of border changes through force. They proceed from the US interest in reinforcing those norms as enshrined in international law. But the recommendations offered would preserve those norms in outward appearance only. The claim that Washington (the West) imposed a “steep price” on Moscow in 2014 weakens the case further. And far from constituting a “powerful pushback,” de facto acceptance of territorial grabs could encourage, rather than discourage, further violations by Russia and others. Acceptance under a cover of non-acceptance de jure, and accompanied by sanctimonious rhetoric, would look hypocritical to the interested parties, bystanders and violators alike.

By that logic, an armistice that would freeze the existing frontlines cutting across Ukraine would not result in undermining those “norms” in international law as long as the conquests are unrecognized de jure. The paper envisions an armistice whereby Russia would stop its attempts to occupy additional Ukrainian territories and would cease missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets. Ukraine, for its part, would stop any counteroffensives of its forces aimed at regaining Russian-held Ukrainian territories. The issues of territories and borders between Ukraine and Russia would remain contested politically and economically, not militarily. Such an armistice could, according to the RAND report, serve as the basis for an eventual political settlement between Kyiv and Moscow. This scenario implies that Russia could keep such Ukrainian territories as it held at the moment of the ceasefire for an indefinite period.

These recommendations seem to prioritize the goal of avoiding a “long war” between Russia and Ukraine over the goal of supporting Ukraine in restoring its territorial integrity and even basic security. The authors believe that a long war is likely to be necessary for allowing Ukraine to regain significant amounts of its territory.

The paper anticipates some major risks and costs for the United States from a long war between Russia and Ukraine. If, for example, Ukraine retakes some areas beyond the pre–February 2022 frontlines, particularly aiming for Crimea, the risks of a Russian attack on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, with possible nuclear threats or use, “would spike,” possibly leading to a NATO-Russian war. Avoiding such forms of escalation is the “paramount US priority.” Conversely, the authors expect that these risks will be dramatically lower once the war ends.

The direct costs of a long war to the US include its own expenditures to support Ukraine as well as the impact of economic disruptions stemming from the war. Washington’s cooperation with Moscow on “key US interests” will be unlikely as long as the war continues. As a result, the Kremlin could play spoiler on nonproliferation and other issues. This pleading, however, seems to assume that Russia can cooperate with the US in good faith and that it is not in the nature of Russian foreign policy to play spoiler on almost any issue. These are ahistorical assumptions.

The argument runs, as long as Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, it will constrain Washington’s ability to focus on competition with China. Competing effectively with China, however, requires defeating Russia in Europe before pivoting to the Asia-Pacific theater. Ukraine has demonstrated that it can accomplish this goal without direct involvement from the US, if given the proper tools.

jamestown.org · by Vladimir Socor · February 10, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com