Quotes of the Day:

“The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections.”

– Lord Acton

"A room without books is like a body without a soul." 

– Marcus Tullius Cicero

“It is the right of a free individual to be unhindered in their liberty!

Especially to fail in their endeavors!

Only in this manner are they truly free.”

– Keith Parfitt

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 11, 2024

3. Statement From Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder on Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Health Status

4. CNN: Russia recruits 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine

5. Starlink's Dual Role: Aiding Ukraine's Defense and Assisting Russian Invaders?

6. The Cruel Sea: Reverse course and ensure US Navy is big and strong enough

7. White House promotes Kirby to expanded role to coordinate national security communications

8. Does Joe Biden Have a Deterrence Problem?

9. Biden campaign joins TikTok in an effort to reach younger voters

10. Israeli forces rescue 2 hostages in dramatic Gaza raid that killed at least 67 Palestinians

11. SOCOM Studying Drone, Electronic Warfare in Ukraine, Gaza

12.  U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Considerations for Congress

13. Air Force To Totally Revamp Its Structure To Compete With China

14. Opinion | Speaker Johnson should see what I just saw in Ukraine by Max Boot

15. Threats to America’s critical infrastructure are now a terrifying reality

16. The Cost of a Dysfunctional Congress

17. The Neurotic Fixations of U.S. Foreign Policy

18. Checking the Box but Missing the Mark: The Problems with Nonresident Joint Professional Military Education

19. Is America still the leader of the free world?

20. Romania Is Quietly Doing Great

21. Special Operations News - February 12, 2024 | SOF News

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.
• Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.
• Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort.
• Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 11, 2024

Feb 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 11, 2024, 6:35pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on February 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.[1] Zelensky also made several other service head appointments on February 11. Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol as Joint Forces Commander replacing Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev.[2] Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Ihor Skybyuk Air Assault Forces Commander replacing Major General Maksym Myrhorodskyi.[3] Zelensky appointed Major General Ihor Plahuta Territorial Defense Forces Commander replacing Major General Anatoliy Barhylevych, who was appointed Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on February 10.[4]

Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults. Satellite imagery dated May 10, 2023, and February 6 and 10, 2024 shows that Russian forces constructed a long line of train cars stretching from occupied Olenivka (south of Donetsk City) to Volnovakha (southeast of Vuhledar and north of Mariupol) over the past nine months.[5] A Ukrainian source reported on February 11 that Russian forces have assembled more than 2,100 freight cars into a 30-kilometer-long train.[6] The source reported that Russian forces began assembling the train in July 2023 and suggested that Russian forces intend to use the train as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.[7] The railway line between Olenivka and Volnovakha is roughly six kilometers from ISW’s current assessed frontline southeast of Novomykhailivka at its closest point and is in an area of the front that was relatively inactive when Russian forces reportedly began construction.[8] Russian forces have recently made marginal territorial gains in this area.[9] The Russians could have assembled the train for other purposes as well.

Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 11 that the Russian Security Council’s own DIB production data for 2023 indicates that the Russian DIB reached a peak output in September 2023 that was 38.9 percent higher than its average 2022 monthly output and has steadily declined in the following months.[10] Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB is struggling to compensate for moderately- and highly-skilled labor shortages and Russia’s inability to obtain the necessary industrial production equipment, spare parts, and servicing to sustain the pace and breadth of DIB production efforts.[11] Mashovets noted that Chinese companies in particular are less willing to provide Russia with equipment and spare parts, as ISW previously reported, and that Russia purchased many industrial production systems from Western states before the full-scale invasion but that Western companies are now unwilling to service or supply parts for these machines due to sanctions.[12]

Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko stated that Russia’s reported tank production numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[13] Kovalenko stated that Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, can produce roughly 60-70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions and assessed that Uralvagonzavod is likely only producing between three and six new T-90 tanks per month.[14] Kovalenko noted that tank manufacturers Uralvagonzavod, Omsktransmash, and the 103rd Armored Tank Repair Plant in Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai are primarily focused on restoring, repairing, and modernizing Russian tanks and that Uralvagonzavod is the only manufacturer producing new tanks.[15] Kovalenko stated that Russia is only modernizing T-54/55 and T-62 tanks and assessed that these may be Russia’s main battle tanks in the future. Kovalenko added that Russian manufacturers very rarely modernize T-72 and T-80 tanks. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev previously stated that Russian forces received 1,600 tanks in 2023, and Kovalenko attributed this number primarily to restored and modernized rather than serially produced tanks.[16]

Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term. Russia’s ability to modernize and use tanks retrieved from storage still gives Russian forces an advantage on the battlefield in the overall number of available tanks. Mashovets noted that some newly-produced tanks such as the T-14 Armada are poorly produced whereas older tanks such as T-72s (which Russia actively repairs) are more reliable.[17] Russia has consistently attempted to adapt to the limitations resulting from Western sanctions and to circumvent sanctions and will persist in these efforts. Russia’s DIB may struggle in the near term and increasing sanctions evasion measures and partnerships with states including China and North Korea may help compensate for existing DIB shortcomings in the medium to long term.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.
• Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.
• Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort.
• Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently made tactical flanking advances near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) as well as in eastern Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna) and its environs.[19] Positional fighting also continued southeast of Kupyansk near Orlyanske, Krokhmalne, Ivanivka, and Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Torske and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area.[20] The Russian “Udaya” Drone Group is reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[21]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and are two kilometers away from Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these claims.[22] ISW currently assesses that Russian forces are about 2.3 kilometers from the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[23] Positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Mayorske, Pivdenne, and Niu York.[24] Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the direction of Chasiv Yar, and elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade continue to operate near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[25]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional battles in the area on February 11. Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zaliznychnyi Lane in northern Avdiivka and east of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along Tymiryazyeva and Silhosptekhniky streets in northern Avdiivka and near Pervomaiske, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[27] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and Novobakhmutivka; in Avdiivka itself; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke and Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Perovmaiske and Nevelske.[28] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue attempts to interdict Ukrainian forces’ alleged main ground line of communication (GLOC) into Avdiivka.[29] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are increasingly using groups of armored vehicles during infantry assaults in the Tavriisk direction (from Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast).[30]

Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Pavlivka (southwest of Donetsk City and near Vuhledar) at the end of last week.[32] Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[33] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) reportedly continue operating along the Krasnohorivka-Heorhiivka line.[34] Elements of the Russian “Russkiye Yastreby” (Russian Hawks) detachment of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on February 11 that Russian forces “significantly” advanced towards Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border over the past week, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks north of Pryyutne.[37] Elements of the Russian 77th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the southern Donetsk direction; elements of the 14th Guards Special Purpose Brigade (Spetsnaz, Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are operating near Pryyutne; elements of the 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces) are operating near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka); and a mortar crew of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (11th Army Corps, Baltic Sea Fleet) and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Vremivka direction.[38] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly operating near Chervone (6km southeast of Hulyaipole).[39]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed evidence confirming this claim.[41] Positional battles continued near Robotyne and Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[42] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces are consistently competing for the initiative in the Zaporizhia direction and noted that this frontline is no longer a priority for either of the sides.[43] Elements of the Russian 108th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) are reportedly continuing to attack near Robotyne and Verbove, and unspecified elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[44]

Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently made marginal territorial gains in Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[45] Positional battles continued near Krynky on February 11.[46]

Russian forces increased the number of ships at sea in the Black Sea on February 11. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that there are 14 Russian ships currently at sea in the Black Sea, including four surface missile carriers.[47] Pletenchuk assessed that Russian ships may be returning to their usual practice of carrying out training and combat missions in response to the Ukrainian strike on the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) near Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea overnight on January 31 to February 1.[48]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 10-11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 45 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Balaklava and Cape Chauda, Crimea, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 40 of the drones over Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts.[49] Ukrainian military and government officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all the drones targeting Kyiv City.[50] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 Shahed drones over Mykolaiv Oblast, four Shaheds over Odesa Oblast, and one Shahed drone each over Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Vinnytsia oblasts. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command added that the strike series lasted for five and a half hours and chiefly targeted coastal infrastructure and agricultural facilities.[51] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces regularly launch drones along the Danube River (presumably in international airspace off the mouth of the Danube) - likely hoping to bypass Ukrainian air defenses by flying along Ukraine’s southwestern border -to ensure that Russian drones hit their intended targets.[52]

The Ukrainian government reported on February 11 that Russian forces damaged nearly 200 port infrastructure objects and injured more than 26 civilians since July 18, 2023, when Russian forces began a deliberate missile and drone campaign to destroy Ukrainian port and agricultural infrastructure.[53] The Ukrainian government added that Ukraine has exported over 22 million tons of various goods since the beginning of the operation of the temporary corridor through the Black Sea and that more than 700 vessels have used the corridor since August 2023 – despite Russian strikes on port infrastructure.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine.[54] Nepali opposition lawmaker and former foreign minister Bimala Tai Paudyal stated on February 8 that between 14,000 and 15,000 Nepalis are fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine according to testimonials from Nepali servicemen who had returned home. The Nepali government stated that about 200 Nepalis are currently fighting in Ukraine, however, and that at least 13 Nepalis have been killed on the frontlines. CNN, citing interviews with some Nepalis who fought in Ukraine, reported that Russia is offering Nepalis at least $2,000 per month and a fast-tracked process of obtaining Russian citizenship. Nepali interviewees revealed that the Russian command deployed some recruited personnel to Bakhmut in September 2023 after only two weeks of training and that the language barrier plays a large part in deaths among Nepalis on the frontlines as they struggle to communicate with Russian servicemen. CNN reported that many Nepali men travel to Russia on a tourist visa via the United Arab Emirates or India and are taken to a recruitment center upon arrival in Moscow, where they sign a contract to fight for one year. One Nepali recruit stated that many recruits try to escape from military camps after seeing gruesome images and realities on the frontlines.

Russian lawmakers recently introduced a bill into the Russian State Duma that would allow individuals in common-law marriages with Russian servicemen who died fighting in Ukraine to retroactively marry the servicemen.[55] Chairman of the State Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Pavel Krasheninnikov explained that this bill aims to protect the interests of the “actual” family members of military personnel. The bill stipulates that cohabitants of soldiers killed or missing in action will be able to confirm that they were in a common-law marriage before the deployment in a new court proceeding.[56] The bill, if passed, will allow courts to confirm a marriage if both individuals were in a common-law marriage and lived together for at least three years or at least one year if they have a child in common. The bill will allow common-law wives to petition the government for financial compensation following the death of their partners in combat. St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka observed that Russian officials first began discussing support for common-law wives after Russian President Vladimir Putin first drew attention to this issue during the meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights on December 4, 2023.[57]

A Russian Telegram channel focusing on military law observed on February 11 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deleted the draft law on raising the age for dismissal for all contract (kontrakniki) personnel to 65 years of age and for senior officers to 70 years of age during mobilization.[58] The Russian MoD previously proposed on February 8 to establish a single age limit for service during the mobilization period for all kontrakniki.[59]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues to expand its domestic drone production capabilities. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on February 11 that Ukraine has met and surpassed Russia’s production of long-range kamikaze drones over the past six months as part of Ukraine’s “Army of Drones” initiative.[60] Fedorov stated that up to 10 drone production factories are currently operating in Ukraine.[61] Fedorov added that Ukraine upgraded its Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus (MAGURA) marine drone with unspecified upgrades that will allow Ukrainian forces to conduct ”new surprises” in 2024.[62] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) in occupied Crimea overnight from January 31 to February 1 with a MAGURA V-5 marine drone.[63]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology. Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov reported on February 11 that authorities opened a student media center under the Russian Ministry of Education at the Crimean Federal University.[64] Aksyonov stated that the media center will provide professional development and growth opportunities for student media activists.[65] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian schools and youth organizations in occupied Ukraine teach false history and propaganda to militarize and destroy the Ukrainian identity of students.[66]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on February 11 that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 8 interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson was aimed at justifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to an American audience.[67] Peskov claimed that Americans “traditionally know little” about foreign countries and that it was important for Putin to convey his “historical vision” to the United States.

The Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation reported on February 11 that Russian information actors are attempting to portray newly appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi as a Russian and a Soviet in order to discredit Syrskyi and sow domestic distrust of the Ukrainian military.[68] ISW has observed Russian milbloggers and officials engaging in this information operation following Syrskyi’s appointment on February 8.[69] Syrskyi was deployed to Kharkiv Oblast during the 1980s and chose to remain in Ukraine and join the Ukrainian army when the Soviet Union collapsed.[70] Syrskyi chose to serve Ukraine against Russia even though he was born in Russia. Syrskyi has commanded Ukrainian troops against Russian-backed proxy forces and the Russian military since 2014.[71]

French Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne stated on February 10 that he hopes to announce a joint project to search for and counter Russian disinformation and interference in European politics with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski following their upcoming meeting in Paris on February 12.[72] Sejourne stated that the project will work to publicly explain the “tools” of Russian disinformation and provide evidence of disinformation in European politics. The French Foreign Ministry recently summoned the Russian ambassador to France after a Russian strike in Ukraine killed two French humanitarian workers amid a reported “upsurge” in Russian disinformation targeting France.[73] ISW recently observed Russian disinformation campaigns targeting France, which were aimed at constraining ongoing and future French security assistance to Ukraine.[74]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-11-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern and central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas, Egyptian, and Houthi officials issued threats likely to dissuade the IDF from a military operation into Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: Likely Iranian-backed militants tried to conduct a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria.
• Yemen: US Central Command forces conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and unmanned surface vessels.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 11, 2024

Feb 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, February 11, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern and central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas, Egyptian, and Houthi officials issued threats likely to dissuade the IDF from a military operation into Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Syria: Likely Iranian-backed militants tried to conduct a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria.
• Yemen: US Central Command forces conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and unmanned surface vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip on February 11. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) mortared Israeli military positions east of Gaza City.[1] The PFLP is a secular leftist Palestinian faction fighting with Hamas. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired rockets at an Israeli military position in southeast Gaza City.[2] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) clashed with and killed Palestinian fighters targeting Israeli forces with anti-tank missiles in the central Gaza Strip.[3] Israeli aircraft targeted a weapons warehouse and Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis on February 11. The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade and 89th Commando Brigade (both assigned to the 98th Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[5] The 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) launched a new clearing operation in eastern Khan Younis and detained approximately 60 Palestinian fighters.[6] Palestinian militias mortared Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis.[7] The IDF 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting three weapons depots and a Palestinian militia squad in Khan Younis.[8] The commander of the 98th Division stated that Israeli forces have “dismantled and destroyed” Hamas in Khan Younis both under and above ground.[9]

The IDF reported on February 11 that its 84th Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) “deepened” the damage it inflicted on Hamas’ Western Khan Younis Battalion.[10] Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade is composed of five battalions.[11] The Givati Brigade killed about 100 Palestinian fighters in several clashes using tanks, small arms, and air support “in the last few weeks.” Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in western Khan Younis on January 22.[12]

Hamas, Egyptian, and Houthi officials issued threats likely to dissuade the IDF from a military operation into Rafah on February 11. An unspecified senior Hamas official speaking to a Hamas-affiliated outlet said that an Israeli ground incursion into Rafah would “torpedo” hostage exchange negotiations.[13] Two Egyptian officials and a Western diplomat told the Associated Press that an Israeli ground operation in Rafah would freeze the Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords peace treaty.[14] A senior Houthi official warned that the Houthi movement would intensify attacks against Israel if the IDF entered Rafah.[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in an interview with ABC that Israeli forces would “provide safe passage” to Gazan civilians from Rafah to unspecified, already cleared areas north of Rafah and reiterated that the IDF will enter Rafah in the near future.[16]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 11.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice across the West Bank on February 11.[17]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 11.[18]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Likely Iranian-backed militants tried to conduct a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on February 10.[19] US air defense systems intercepted the drones.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and unmanned surface vessels (USV) on February 10.[20] CENTCOM forces struck three mobile ASCMs and two USVs north of Hudaydah in Yemen. CENTCOM conducted the preemptive, self-defense strikes after determining that the ASCMs and USVs presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

3. Statement From Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder on Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Health Status

Statement From Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder on Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Health Status

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Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following update on Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's health status:

Earlier today, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III was transported by his security detail to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center to be seen for symptoms suggesting an emergent bladder issue. He is still at the hospital and receiving treatment. At approximately 4:55 pm today, Secretary Austin transferred the functions and duties of the office of the Secretary of Defense to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has assumed the functions and duties. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and Congress have been notified.

We will provide additional updates on Secretary Austin's condition as soon as possible.

Austin Defense Secretary

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4. CNN: Russia recruits 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine

CNN: Russia recruits 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine

kyivindependent.com · by Alexander Khrebet · February 11, 2024

Russian army recruited 15,000 Nepalis to fight against Ukraine, CNN reported on Feb. 11, citing multiple sources.

As Russian casualties on the battlefield mount, the government in Moscow has announced the recruitment of foreigners into its army for a salary of $2,000 and quickly obtaining Russian citizenship.

Meanwhile, the Nepali government claims only about 200 of its citizens are fighting in Ukraine on the Russian side, with at least 13 having been killed in action and four captured as prisoners of war.

The opposition Nepali lawmaker and former foreign minister, Bimala Rai Paudyal, said that between 14,000 and 15,000 Nepalis are fighting in Ukraine, citing testimony from men returning from the front line.

CNN geolocated two training centers in Russia where Nepalis and other foreigners are training before being deployed to the front line in Ukraine.

Nepal urged the Russian government to stop recruiting Nepalese citizens into its army in December after at least six of its nationals were confirmed killed. The authorities then uncovered a domestic smuggling ring that recruited youths as foreign fighters for the Russian military.

Reuters reported on Jan. 5 that Nepal has halted issuing foreign work permits for its citizens to work in Russia until further notice after growing numbers of Nepalese mercenaries have been reported killed fighting for the Russian army in Ukraine.

The only foreign armies Nepalese law permits its citizens to serve in are the Indian and British armies. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, which has existed for over 200 years, comprises of Nepalese fighters.

The U.K.'s Defense Ministry reported in September that Russia was trying to recruit foreigners and migrant workers to avoid announcing another mobilization drive before the presidential elections, which are to be held in March 2024.

Commander: Russia increasingly deploys armored groups to storm Avdiivka

To storm Donetsk Oblast’s Avdiivka, Russia is increasingly deploying armored groups alongside its assault infantry groups, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavria group fighting on the southeastern front lines, reported on Feb. 11.

The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk

kyivindependent.com · by Alexander Khrebet · February 11, 2024

5. Starlink's Dual Role: Aiding Ukraine's Defense and Assisting Russian Invaders?

Starlink's Dual Role: Aiding Ukraine's Defense and Assisting Russian Invaders?

Elon Musk answers allegation.

Quincy Jon, Tech Times 11 February 2024, 04:02 pm

techtimes.com · by Quincy Jon · February 11, 2024

Quincy Jon, Tech Times 11 February 2024, 04:02 pm

Russia's utilization of SpaceX's Starlink communications service in Ukraine has raised concerns about the unintentional backing of invaders by SpaceX, owned by Elon Musk.

Ukrainian sources, speaking anonymously, revealed that the use of Starlink terminals by Russian forces was first detected several months ago, with an observed increase in usage, according to Defense One. Currently, tens of Starlink terminals are operational across the extensive frontline, adding challenges for the Ukrainian military, which is already grappling with ammunition shortages. Ukrainian artillery units, firing around 2,000 shells daily, face a significant disparity compared to their Russian counterparts.

Reports of Russian forces employing Starlink surfaced through Ukrainian media and social media posts. Volunteer groups supporting the invasion of Ukraine showcased Starlink terminals purchased for army units. The Pentagon acknowledged awareness of the reports, directing inquiries to Ukrainian partners for operational details.

(Photo : YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images)A Ukrainian serviceman stands next to the antenna of the Starlink satellite-based broadband system in Bakhmut on February 9, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Elon Musk Responds

In response, SpaceX asserted in a February 8 tweet that it does not engage in any business with the Russian government or military. The company clarified that Starlink is not operational in Russia, emphasizing that it has neither sold nor marketed the service in the country.

SpaceX does not do business of any kind with the Russian Government or its military.

Starlink is not active in Russia, meaning service will not work in that country. SpaceX has never sold or marketed Starlink in Russia, nor has it shipped equipment to locations in Russia. If…

— Starlink (@Starlink) February 8, 2024

Despite SpaceX's denial, Russian companies, such as iMiele.ru and DJIRussia, advertise Starlinks for sale. Ukrainian sources note the method of acquiring Starlinks from abroad and bringing them back to distribute to Russian forces. SpaceX, capable of deactivating Starlink devices used by unauthorized parties, may face challenges in monitoring and controlling their deployment in conflict zones.

SpaceX, led by Musk and the owner of the Starlink satellite system, clarified that it does not engage in any business with the Russian government or military. The company emphasized that if it becomes aware of sanctioned or unauthorized use of a Starlink terminal, it investigates and takes action to deactivate it.

In a tweet, Musk called claims of Starlink terminals being sold to Russia as "categorically false."

"To the best of our knowledge, no Starlinks have been sold directly or indirectly to Russia," the SpaceX owner stated.

Starlink, a satellite network providing broadband services, asserts that its service is not functional in Russia, though it remains unclear whether it operates in occupied Ukraine. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate, confirmed that the service has become essential for Ukrainian battlefield communications.

Ties Between Musk-Ukraine Deteriorating?

The rapport between Elon Musk and Ukrainian authorities has deteriorated during the conflict, commencing with the tech mogul's directive in 2022 for his engineers to deactivate Starlink satellite communications close to the Russian-occupied Crimea coastline. According to Politico, this action was purportedly to thwart an intended Ukrainian drone strike. Musk's reported concern was that the strike could heighten tensions and pose the risk of triggering a nuclear war.

The Starlink service played a crucial role in Ukraine's response to Russia's invasion, with SpaceX supplying thousands of devices through donations, military-funded transfers, and individual purchases by volunteers. These devices enabled frontline troops to establish high-bandwidth, mobile communication networks for coordinating artillery strikes and operating in operations centers.

Described as a "black swan" event by a drone operator, Ukraine's utilization of Starlink and associated devices has been crucial in defending cities like Bakhmut.

The US military also incorporates Starlink devices in exercises, as evidenced by a $70 million task order from Space Command for Starshield, a military-focused Starlink version.

ⓒ 2024 TECHTIMES.com All rights reserved. Do not reproduce without permission.

Join the Discussion

techtimes.com · by Quincy Jon · February 11, 2024

6. The Cruel Sea: Reverse course and ensure US Navy is big and strong enough

The Cruel Sea: Reverse course and ensure US Navy is big and strong enough to respond to what’s coming

Stars and Stripes · by Robert Andersen · February 11, 2024

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford — the lead ship in the Ford-class of aircraft carrier, the first new class in more than 40 years — arrives at Naval Station Norfolk on Jan. 18, 2024, following an eight-month deployment — the carrier’s first combat deployment. (Jacob Mattingly/U.S. Navy)

As the Chinese investment of the South China Sea — the Great Wall of Sand — reaches force majeure impregnability the U.S. Navy finds itself at sea, literally with up to eight aircraft carriers, a number not seen since the fleet went littoral, traded the high seas for the high deserts of the Forever Wars. This show-of-force constitutes a global stress test the Navy, operating at a red-hot tempo, cannot sustain for long. Crisis management concatenated tous azimut has no quarter for an undermanned, overworked, understrength sea service.

The 5th, 6th, and 7th fleets are stretched thin to say the least. Shooting down Houthi drones in the Red Sea and conducting airstrikes on targets in Yemen; deterring Iranian proxies in the Levant; conducting Freedom of Navigation transits through the Taiwan Strait; backstopping Ukrainian independence and keeping North Korea from going off the deep end are daunting enough. Mission Impossible if extreme duress for the duration.

The ever-present danger of a Chinese move on Taiwan keeps the 7th Fleet in a near-war footing. The “pacing threat” of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is enough to keep the war gamers pacing the 3 a.m. halls of the Pentagon. Some two dozen war games have shown that when it comes to escalation-dominance the PLAN has no peer. Victory At Sea in this century is no Richard Rodgers score.

The world’s largest navy commands the Scenario Sea. How the 25-year-old PLAN (dating from the last “humiliation” in the Taiwan Strait) would fare in a Cruel Sea is another story. A roll of the dice, though the odds weigh heavily in its favor. Certainly where Taiwan is concerned. The 7th Fleet has a “hundred tanker” problem, let alone the ability to relieve Taiwan once the missiles from the mainland begin to fly. Breaking a blockade around the island is a task for the fleet at flood tide. The East of Suez Fleet would be lucky to fight another day. Should the balloon go up on the naval gigantomachy in the Western Pacific the 7th Fleet would be hard-put to avoid another Tsushima. The Cruel Sea indeed.

But even if the two navies manage to stay out of harm’s way the Chinese have come to rule the waves. The secretary of the Navy’s recent call for a “maritime statecraft” is a day late and a dollar short. The Chinese not only boast the world’s largest navy, they also boast the world’s largest coast guard and the world’s third largest merchant marine and the world’s largest fishing fleet and the world’s biggest shipyards. Their maritime statecraft is second to none. Alongside ships and more ships and the building of ships the Chinese have also managed to become the port infrastructure master builders. All those container cranes at the Port Of Long Beach in California were made in China. Port Operations too is a Chinese tour de force in too many seaports. Piraeus, Greece for one, Panama City for another. Teddy Roosevelt is turning in his grave. Running the Panama Canal is a feat of Chinese mettle.

Beneath the radar the Chinese have become supply-chain predominant. Number one in so many key areas of maritime commerce. The nine-dash line is something of a joke. The Chinese breakout occurred in the 1980s and ’90s. Maritime statecraft is the ticket to global domination. The Chinese punched that ticket while the eyes-wide-shut of American triumphalism was doing a victory lap.

The U.S. Navy continues to contract; the merchant marine is a sad relic; shipbuilding is a non-starter; and the maritime statecraft of five administrations has been out-of-sight, out-of-mind. Decades of neglect and negligence have resulted in a fat chance of reversing course in time to head off a showdown in the Western Pacific. A nuclear showdown. As war game after war game has shown, the naval war goes nuclear in the blink of an eye.

Hubris accomplished. Fat Leonard take a bow. The squandering of American maritime supremacy surely ranks as one of the great debacles in recent history. A folie de grandeur, a folly surpassing that of the Forever War. Staving off defeat long enough for help to arrive in the guise of DARPA wonder weapons seems to be the plan of the day. Set Condition Zulu.

Absent a maritime statecraft on the scale and urgency of World War II — call it Victory At Sea 2.0 — the Pax Americana is fated to slip beneath the waves. Commence a century of American humiliation. The Maritime Administration needs to go from a moribund agency to a get-things-done brain trust free of red tape. Sealift rust buckets need to be deep-sixed, replaced with a flotilla of fast supply vessels. The Merchant Marine has to be stood up again, in numbers and fast. The days of flags of convenience are over. Above all the U.S. Navy has to become the lynchpin of a maritime statecraft that takes no prisoners. That reasserts predominance on the high seas. Think Ulithi Lagoon circa 1944. Among other things that means obligatory national service for all males age 18 to 21. The all-volunteer armed forces just got a demographic (and democratic) boost.

Well over a trillion dollars is going into “modernizing” the nuclear triad. That money, I submit, would be better spent on shipyards, and ships, and more ships, and the crews to navigate them through the perilous waters ahead. If the administration is serious about a maritime statecraft then it should be trumpeting it from sea to shining sea. The future of the U.S. Navy hangs in the balance. The scenario I can’t keep from envisioning finds tens of thousands of corpses floating in the sanguinary waters of the Cruel Sea. American corpses. Taking the high seas for granted has resulted in major rust. East of Suez is not a place to take lightly. Not at all.

Robert Andersen, who served aboard a destroyer, is writing a novel about the blue water Navy in Vietnam. Last year he was a Visiting Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

Stars and Stripes · by Robert Andersen · February 11, 2024

7. White House promotes Kirby to expanded role to coordinate national security communications

But will he be orchestrating and synchronizing our information and influence campaigns around the world? If not him, then who?

Excerpt:

He will also be in charge of coordinating communications for national security for several agencies.

Kirby’s frequent presence at the podium during White House press briefings with press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre ever since Hamas-led terrorists invaded Israel on Oct. 7 has made him one of the most visible faces of the Biden administration.

Despite the new role, he will continue to make appearances in the briefing room at times when national security is the dominant theme of the day, the official said.

White House promotes Kirby to expanded role to coordinate national security communications

John Kirby gets promoted to assistant to the president, from deputy assistant

 By Greg Wehner Fox News

Published February 11, 2024 7:48pm EST | Updated February 11, 2024 8:55pm EST

foxnews.com · by Greg Wehner Fox News

Video

Biden has been clear, we will respond to Iran: John Kirby

White House national security spokesman John Kirby joins ‘Fox News Sunday’ to discuss the U.S.’s decision to strike back against Iran proxies in the Middle East.

The White House’s top national security spokesperson, John Kirby, is being promoted to an expanded role that puts him in charge of coordinating communications across several agencies.

A U.S. official said Kirby’s new title will be White House national security advisor, elevating him from deputy assistant, up to assistant to the president.

In the new role, Kirby will direct a small team, separate from the National Security Council’s press office.

KIRBY APOLOGIZES FOR BIDEN ADMIN'S CLAIM ABOUT WARNING IRAQI GOVERNMENT AHEAD OF STRIKES

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby speaks during a press briefing at the White House, on Friday, Jan. 26. (AP/Evan Vucci)

He will also be in charge of coordinating communications for national security for several agencies.

Kirby’s frequent presence at the podium during White House press briefings with press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre ever since Hamas-led terrorists invaded Israel on Oct. 7 has made him one of the most visible faces of the Biden administration.

Despite the new role, he will continue to make appearances in the briefing room at times when national security is the dominant theme of the day, the official said.

KIRBY CLASHES WITH AL JAZEERA REPORTER OVER BIDEN'S MIDDLE EAST ACTIONS: ‘LET ME STOP YOU RIGHT THERE’

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby on Monday said the Biden administration was confident it can keep America's secrets amid reports of a Chinese spy base in Cuba. (AP Photo/Susan Walsh)

"Admiral Kirby’s decades of high level national security experience and his clear, strategic insights make him a deeply valued communicator and adviser on this team," Anita Dunn, senior adviser to President Biden said. "President Biden is proud to have John leading national security message coordination across the administration as we continue to make a forceful case for our national security interests at home and in the world."

The retired U.S. Navy admiral became the National Security Council’s coordinator for strategic communications in 2022, after being brought over from the Pentagon, where he served as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs starting in January 2021.

Kirby served in uniform for over 28 years before retiring in 2015 as a Rear Admiral in the Navy.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

After retiring, he served at the Department of State as the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Public Affairs from December 2015 to January 2017, as well as the State Department’s spokesperson from May 2015 to January 2017.

Greg Wehner is a breaking news reporter for Fox News Digital.

Story tips and can be sent to Greg.Wehner@Fox.com and on Twitter @GregWehner.

foxnews.com · by Greg Wehner Fox News

8. Does Joe Biden Have a Deterrence Problem?

Excerpt:

It’s worth pointing out, as Kissinger does not, that competence is central to capability. Capability is more than hardware. The finest weapon is no better than its user. As Admiral Bradley Fiske observed a century ago, only human excellence can unlock the full design potential of hardware. Hand an untrained or unmotivated soldier the latest in gee-whiz military technology and he will accomplish little on the battlefield. Hand a trained, motivated, competent soldier that same widget and he will accomplish much. The human factor matters—and how others assess the state of it could make the difference between failure and success in efforts to deter.

Sage foreign leaders, then, will take the measure of U.S. physical power and human proficiency when gauging how seriously to take deterrent threats issuing from Washington.

As an aside: Kissinger doesn’t carry his perceptual logic further, but we can. What he says about deterrence applies just as much to coercing antagonists and to reassuring allies, coalition partners, and bystanders we would like to recruit to our cause. If deterrence is about dissuading an opponent from undertaking some course of action it would like to take, coercion is about convincing an opponent to do something it would prefer not to do. Giving heart to allies and friends is about making a commitment to them and displaying the capability and resolve to keep that commitment. All three diplomatic domains involve molding perceptions among foreign governments, societies, and armed forces, hostile, friendly, or indifferent.

Does Joe Biden Have a Deterrence Problem?

Would you be deterred by an antagonist you believe to be incompetent, irresolute, or both? That question has become part of daily discourse about U.S. foreign policy, if seldom phrased in such stark terms. Contemporary events—in particular Russian aggression against Ukraine and the rise of a domineering China—explain why.

The National Interest · by James Holmes · February 11, 2024

Would you be deterred by an antagonist you believe to be incompetent, irresolute, or both? That question has become part of daily discourse about U.S. foreign policy, if seldom phrased in such stark terms. Contemporary events—in particular Russian aggression against Ukraine and the rise of a domineering China—explain why. The past couple of years, for example, it has become commonplace for rightward-leaning politicians to claim that the U.S. military’s flight from Afghanistan in August 2021 egged on Russian president Vladimir Putin to order the invasion of Ukraine mere months later, in February 2022.

Exhibit A: On the eve of war former president Donald Trump told Fox News: “How we got here is when [Putin and Xi Jinping] watched Afghanistan, and they watched the most incompetent withdrawal in the history of probably any army let alone just us. . . .” Trump contended that the Eurasian despots “watched that, and they said: ‘What’s going on? They don’t know what they're doing.’ And all of a sudden I think they got a lot more ambitious.”

Exhibit B: At a press conference on the day of the invasion, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell lambasted the Biden administration in similar terms: “I think the precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August was a signal to Putin, and maybe to Chinese president Xi as well, that America was in retreat. That America could not be depended upon.” The bottom line for Senator McConnell: “A combination of perception of weakness, and yearning for empire, is what led to the war in Ukraine.”

Now, clearly some of this is political expediency. It suits Republican magnates’ political interests to blame a Democratic administration for seismic misadventures like the Russian onslaught. And to be sure, it’s impossible to state with any measure of confidence that the Afghanistan pullout emboldened the Kremlin. Putin & Co. have no incentive to reveal the inner workings of Russian policy and strategy, for fear of handing the United States and NATO an advantage in some future imbroglio. So they will keep mum.

Someday, maybe, researchers will unearth evidence that Trump and McConnell were right or wrong about Russian calculations heading into February 2022. A future, more open Russian government might allow a peek into the state archives, or make key figures in these events available for interviews. But that will be far too late to inform policymaking in Washington DC today. Trump’s and McConnell’s claims about cause and effect between Afghanistan and Ukraine remain unproven.

We just don’t have the evidence to make a firm ruling one way or the other.

All of that notwithstanding, the Biden administration’s critics do have a point. Just ask another Republican magnate, the late Henry Kissinger. In his treatise The Necessity for Choice, Kissinger contends that there is a “paradoxical consequence” to deterrence. Namely that its success turns on “essentially psychological criteria” rather than brute military might. The point of warfare is to win. The point of deterrence is to make some course of action that a potential aggressor is contemplating—and that we want to deter—the least attractive of all courses of action open to the aggressor.

If an adversary’s leadership believes we can and will carry our deterrent threat, deterrence should hold.

But there are no guarantees. Human beings are fallible, and the human beings who make up the hostile leadership are the ones who decide whether they are deterred. Kissinger declares that deterrence “ultimately depends on an intangible quality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor.” He goes on to state that “a seeming weakness will have the same consequences as an actual one.” In a perverse sense, that is, we have a weakness if an adversary espies one—regardless of whether that weakness exists in reality.

Kissinger being Kissinger, he is able to reduce this murky phenomenon blending psychology with military might down to a simple formula to help us think things through. “Deterrence,” he writes, “requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor.” He adds that deterrence is a product of multiplying these three factors—capability, resolve, belief in our capability and resolve on the part of the aggressor—not adding them.

That makes a major difference in how we understand deterrence. “If any one of [the factors] is zero, deterrence fails,” Kissinger concludes glumly. That’s Algebra I. Multiply the biggest number by zero and you get zero. No amount of military power can deter unless political and military leaders are prepared to use it; no amount of resolve can deter without the military power to carry out the deterrent threat; neither physical might nor political willpower can deter unless the aggressor’s leadership is a believer in our capability and our will to use it.

Perception is king.

It’s worth pointing out, as Kissinger does not, that competence is central to capability. Capability is more than hardware. The finest weapon is no better than its user. As Admiral Bradley Fiske observed a century ago, only human excellence can unlock the full design potential of hardware. Hand an untrained or unmotivated soldier the latest in gee-whiz military technology and he will accomplish little on the battlefield. Hand a trained, motivated, competent soldier that same widget and he will accomplish much. The human factor matters—and how others assess the state of it could make the difference between failure and success in efforts to deter.

Sage foreign leaders, then, will take the measure of U.S. physical power and human proficiency when gauging how seriously to take deterrent threats issuing from Washington.

As an aside: Kissinger doesn’t carry his perceptual logic further, but we can. What he says about deterrence applies just as much to coercing antagonists and to reassuring allies, coalition partners, and bystanders we would like to recruit to our cause. If deterrence is about dissuading an opponent from undertaking some course of action it would like to take, coercion is about convincing an opponent to do something it would prefer not to do. Giving heart to allies and friends is about making a commitment to them and displaying the capability and resolve to keep that commitment. All three diplomatic domains involve molding perceptions among foreign governments, societies, and armed forces, hostile, friendly, or indifferent.

Reputation is everything.

Here endeth the theoretical excursion. Back to Trump and McConnell. The two Republicans’ critiques are subtly different. President Trump longed to exit Afghanistan during his presidency, so he could hardly rebuke President Joe Biden for going wobbly on whether to stand by an ally. So the ex-president alleged incompetence on the part of Biden’s Pentagon leadership. His point being that a Putin or Xi could well come to doubt the capability element of American martial strength. Rightly or wrongly, Putin or Xi could reason that, if U.S. forces botched the withdrawal from a struggle against a woefully outmatched foe, they would be incapable of executing far more forbidding missions such as halting aggression against Ukraine, or repulsing a Chinese assault in the Taiwan Strait or China seas.

Despite world-beating U.S. military technology, in other words, Moscow or Beijing could come to disparage U.S. military effectiveness. If so, Kissinger’s belief variable could drop to zero, driven down by hostile capitals’ perceptions of U.S. military incompetence. Perceived American weakness is weakness in the minds of Putin, Xi, and their lieutenants, and that’s where deterrence does or doesn’t work.

McConnell leveled the same charge as Trump with regard to incompetence while also questioning the Biden administration’s resolve to uphold its commitments not just to Afghanistan but to other allies. Hence his claim that Putin might well see America as being in retreat around the world—including in Russia’s near abroad. McConnell’s indictment was more damning than Trump’s because it faulted the administration not just for incompetence, which suppressed Kissinger’s capability variable, but also for political fecklessness, which suppressed the resolve variable.

If so, all three variables in Kissinger’s formula collapsed. Disbelief in U.S. power and resolve may well have suggested to Putin that he had permissive surroundings for maneuver in Eastern Europe. The United States and NATO neither could nor would stand against cross-border aggression. Why not roll the iron dice?

So Donald Trump and Mitch McConnell advanced a hypothesis about power and perception that, while unproven in this particular instance, is well-grounded in military theory. The U.S. armed forces and their political masters must burnish America’s reputation for martial prowess—or see deterrence fail again and again.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

The National Interest · by James Holmes · February 11, 2024

9. Biden campaign joins TikTok in an effort to reach younger voters

I guess we will not ban TikTok now.

Biden campaign joins TikTok in an effort to reach younger voters

Lawmakers have had a fraught relationship with the app that has become a powerful campaign tool

By Taylor Lorenz

Updated February 11, 2024 at 10:12 p.m. EST|Published February 11, 2024 at 9:39 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Taylor Lorenz · February 12, 2024

President Biden officially joined TikTok on Sunday.

The Biden campaign announced his arrival on the platform with a video captioned “lol hey guys” and a bio declaring “Grows the economy.”

In his first post, during the Super Bowl, Biden is asked by a staffer off screen which team he’s rooting for, to which he responds that he’s an Eagles fan.

@bidenhq

lol hey guys

♬ Fox nfl theme - Notrandompostsguy

The account is run by Team Biden-Harris, the name for the reelection effort, and will be posting content regularly as it does on other social channels including Threads, Instagram, Facebook, X and Truth Social, according to campaign advisers.

“Our Roman Empire is reaching voters wherever they are (did I do that right)?” said Rob Flaherty, deputy campaign manager for Biden’s reelection campaign. The phrase “Roman Empire” has become a meme that functions as shorthand for something a person cares deeply about and can’t stop thinking about.

Biden’s team has leaned hard into memes in attempts to connect with young people. Biden’s avatar on TikTok features a black and white photo of the president with laser eyes, a style of image popularized by the “Dark Brandon” meme which portrays Biden as a no nonsense super hero schooled in the dark art of politics.

“Young people around the country have been waiting for this moment,” said Aaron Parnas, a Gen Z political content creator. “The president is meeting us where we are, and we’ll help him with because of it.”

More than three dozen members of Congress, most of them Democrats, currently operate TikTok accounts.

However, TikTok has come under fire from Republicans, who’ve criticized the app’s ties to its Chinese parent company, ByteDance.

Biden’s campaign said that they’re taking advanced safety precautions around their devices and incorporating a protocol to ensure security of the account. The campaign’s presence is independent from the ongoing review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the government agency that’s tasked with investigating corporate deals for national security concerns and has been negotiating with TikTok owner ByteDance.

The White House has often used TikTok to spread messaging and has briefed TikTok creators on things such as the war in Ukraine, the president’s infrastructure initiatives, and the covid-19 pandemic.

In 2022, a group of TikTok creators spent an hour in the Oval Office in a private meeting with the president. The trip was organized by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in an attempt to leverage TikTok’s vast audience to influence the midterms. The DNC maintains an official TikTok account. Last December, the White House also hosted its first holiday party exclusively for content creators.

TikTok has become a powerful tool for campaigning. In 2020, a collective of hundreds of content creators joined TikTok for Biden, a collaborative effort aimed at getting the president elected. And other lawmakers, such as Sen. Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.), have made TikTok integral to their campaigning efforts. One of the most popular lawmakers on TikTok is Rep. Jeff Jackson (D-N.C.), who has amassed a following of over 2.5 million by posting regular videos about the top news.

“Last election, there was still an open question: Could influencers move the needle on political campaigns?” Daniel Daks, founder of the talent management firm Palette, who helped organize the TikTok creators’ trip to Washington to meet Biden and former president Barack Obama, said last year. “It’s been answered pretty solidly with a yes.”

Last year, The Washington Post reported that some Democrats worried the crackdown on TikTok could hurt the party’s ability to reach younger voters. “Ditching something that has proven to be incredibly helpful to winning elections is like shooting yourself in the foot,” said Aidan Kohn-Murphy, the founder of Gen-Z for Change, a coalition of creators formerly known as TikTok for Biden.

However, more recently, many young TikTok creators have used the platform to be critical of Biden. They’ve railed against his policies on climate change, the war in Gaza and failure to contain the pandemic. Last year, many young activists attempted to leverage TikTok to get the Biden administration to stop the Willow oil drilling project in Alaska. Their campaign was unsuccessful, however TikTok has remained a powerful political platform and hub for progressive activism.

In January, Biden’s reelection campaign announced they were seeking a director of digital partnerships to work with creators on TikTok and other social platforms to “amplify Joe Biden’s message and reach key voting blocs.”

Christian Tom, director of the White House’s Office of Digital Strategy, told an audience of content creators and industry executives at VidCon Baltimore last year that, for the first time, there is a specific team at the White House dedicated to forging partnerships with content creators.

“The work we do with creators has the most upside and potential of all the communications methods we employ,” Tom said. “Whether it’s spicy tweets from @WhiteHouse, or our work with creators, it’s about how we can find a way to appear in the feed in a way that feels authentic, organic and ultimately surprises you.”

Tom called Biden a content creator himself and touted some of the White House’s digital reach, noting that it has amassed more than 93 million followers across platforms.

Tyler Pager contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Taylor Lorenz · February 12, 2024

10. Israeli forces rescue 2 hostages in dramatic Gaza raid that killed at least 67 Palestinians

Israeli forces rescue 2 hostages in dramatic Gaza raid that killed at least 67 Palestinians

BY NAJIB JOBAIN, JOSEF FEDERMAN AND SAMY MAGDY

Updated 3:42 AM EST, February 12, 2024

AP · February 12, 2024

RAFAH, Gaza Strip (AP) — Israeli forces rescued two hostages early Monday, storming a heavily guarded apartment in the Gaza Strip and extracting the captives under fire in a dramatic raid that was a small but symbolically significant success for Israel. The operation killed at least 67 Palestinians, including women and children, according to Palestinian health officials in the beleaguered territory.

To assist the rescue forces, heavy airstrikes pounded the area near the apartment in Rafah, a city on the southern edge of the Gaza Strip where 1.4 million Palestinians have fled to escape fighting elsewhere in the Israel-Hamas war.

The raid was celebrated in Israel as a victory in the sluggish battle to free the hostages, with more than 100 captives still held by Hamas and other Gaza militants, and briefly lifted the spirits of a nation still reeling from Hamas’ cross-border raid last year.

But in Gaza, where civilians have borne a staggering toll since the war erupted on Oct. 7, the operation unleashed another wartime tragedy, with many Palestinians killed or wounded.

More than 12,300 Palestinian minors — children and young teens — have been killed in Israel’s war against Hamas, the Health Ministry in Hamas-run Gaza said Monday. That means minors make up about 43% of the total number of 28,176 Palestinians killed so far. About 8,400 women were also among those killed.

The ministry, which does not distinguish between combatants and civilians, provided the breakdown of minors and women at the request of The Associated Press. Israel claims to have killed thousands of Hamas fighters.

The plight of the hostages has profoundly shaken Israelis and the government has made freeing the dozens of remaining captives a top aim of its war, along with destroying Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. But as the fighting drags on, now in its fifth month, their freedom remains elusive and rifts have emerged in Israel over the best approach to end their ordeal.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted persistent military pressure will bring about their freedom — a position he repeated on Monday — even as other top officials have opposed this, saying a deal is the only way to secure their release.

Israel has described Rafah as the last remaining Hamas stronghold in Gaza and signaled that its ground offensive may soon target the densely populated city. On Sunday, the White House said President Joe Biden had warned Netanyahu that Israel should not conduct a military operation against Hamas in Rafah without a “credible and executable” plan to protect civilians.

The army identified the rescued hostages as Fernando Simon Marman, 60, and Louis Har, 70, abducted by Hamas militants from Kibbutz Nir Yitzhak in the Oct. 7 cross-border attack that triggered the war. Netanyahu’s office said they also hold Argentinian citizenship.

They were among roughly 250 taken captive during Hamas’ stunning cross-border raid, when an estimated 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed, according to Israeli authorities. In addition to the thousands killed, Israeli’s retaliatory air and ground offensive has displaced over 80% of the population and set off a massive humanitarian crisis.

Over 100 hostages were freed during a weeklong cease-fire in November. Israel says about 100 hostages remain in Hamas captivity, and Hamas also holds the remains of roughly 30 others who were either killed on Oct. 7 or died in captivity. Three hostages were mistakenly killed by the army after escaping their captors in December.

“Only the continuation of the military pressure, until total victory, will bring about the release of all of our captives,” Netanyahu said in a statement.

A DRAMATIC RAID

Israeli military spokesman Read Adm. Daniel Hagari said special forces broke into a second-floor apartment in Rafah under fire at 1:49 a.m. Monday, accompanied a minute later by airstrikes on surrounding areas. He said the hostages were being guarded by armed Hamas militants and that members of the rescue team shielded the hostages with their bodies as a heavy battle erupted in several places at once with Hamas gunmen.

The hostages were taken to a nearby “safe area,” given a quick medical check and airlifted to Sheba Medical Center in central Israel. Their medical condition was reported to be good. They are just the second and third hostages to be rescued safely; a female soldier was rescued in November.

The rescue, which Hagari said was based on precise intelligence and planned for some time, is a morale booster for Israelis but a small step toward winning the release of the remaining hostages, who are believed to be spread out and hidden in tunnels, likely in poor condition.

Har and Marman were kidnapped from a home in southern Israel along with three other relatives who were freed in the late-November deal. No other family members of theirs remain in Gaza, Israeli media reported.

Har’s son-in-law, Idan Begerano, who saw the released captives at the hospital, said the two men were thin and pale, but communicating well and aware of their surroundings. Begerano said Har told him immediately upon seeing him: “You have a birthday today, mazal tov.”

DOZENS KILLED IN STRIKES

The airstrikes that backed up the Israeli forces hit the jam-packed Rafah in the middle of the night and dozens of explosions could be heard around 2 a.m. Ashraf al-Qidra, spokesman for the Health Ministry in Hamas-run Gaza, said at least 67 people were killed in the strikes.

Al-Qidra said rescuers were still searching the rubble; an Associated Press journalist counted at least 50 bodies at the Abu Youssef al-Najjar Hospital in Rafah.

Footage circulating on social media from Rafah’s Kuwaiti hospital showed dead or wounded children. The footage could not immediately be verified but was consistent with AP reporting.

The wounded were seen lying on the hospital floor as medics tried to treat them. One wounded man was on the ground with two bloodied children lying beside him. “Rescue the girl,” he screamed.

A young man was also seen carrying the body of an infant who he said was killed in the attacks. He said the girl, the daughter of his neighbor, was born and killed during the war.

“Let Netanyahu come and see: is this (infant) your bank of targets?” he said. “For what is she to blame?”

CONCERNS ABOUT RAFAH

Netanyahu has said sending ground troops into Rafah is essential to meeting Israel’s war goals. Biden has urged Israel to exercise extreme caution before moving in. More than half of Gaza’s 2.3 million population is now crammed into Rafah, where hundreds of thousands live in sprawling tent camps and overcrowded U.N. shelters.

Biden’s remarks, made in a phone call with Netanyahu late Sunday, were his most forceful language yet on the possible operation.

Discussion of the potential for a cease-fire agreement took up much of the call, a senior U.S. administration official said, and after weeks of diplomacy, a “framework” is now “pretty much” in place for a deal that could see the release of remaining hostages held by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and a halt to fighting.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss negotiations, acknowledged that “gaps remain,” but declined to give details. The official said military pressure on Hamas in the southern city of Khan Younis in recent weeks helped bring the group closer to accepting a deal.

Netanyahu’s office declined to comment on the call. Hamas’ Al-Aqsa television station earlier quoted an unnamed Hamas official as saying any invasion of Rafah would “blow up” the talks mediated by the United States, Egypt and Qatar.

Biden and Netanyahu spoke after two Egyptian officials and a Western diplomat said Egypt threatened to suspend its peace treaty with Israel if troops are sent into Rafah. The Camp David peace accords have been a cornerstone of regional stability for over 40 years. Egypt fears a mass influx of Palestinian refugees who may never be allowed to return.

___

This story has been updated to correct that the number of minors killed is about 43% of the overall death toll in Gaza, not 47%.

___

Federman reported from Jerusalem and Magdy reported from Cairo. Associated Press writer Colleen Long in Washington contributed to this report.

___

Find more of AP’s coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/israel-hamas-war

AP · February 12, 2024

11. SOCOM Studying Drone, Electronic Warfare in Ukraine, Gaza

Of course it would be news if they were not studying the lessons

SOCOM Studying Drone, Electronic Warfare in Ukraine, Gaza

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Sean Carberry

JUST IN: U.S. Special Operators 'Gobbling Up' Lessons Learned in Ukraine, Gaza

2/9/2024

By

Defense Dept. photo

WASHINGTON, D.C. — While U.S. Special Operations Command has long been viewed as the “counterterrorism command,” it’s primary mission today is "integrated deterrence," which is why it is studying the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza to bolster its capabilities to thwart adversaries in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and elsewhere, its leader said.

SOCOM is “absolutely gobbling up any lessons learned we can from” the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander of Special Operations Command, told reporters during a Defense Writers Group event Feb. 9.

“We’re absolutely interested in how an electronic warfare environment we see — very contested environment in particular in Ukraine — affects those and what that means for tactics, techniques and procedures in the future. I think we're always interested in a unique environment that might have tunnels and subterranean locations that we would have to operate in as that is not only in Gaza, but it's certainly reflected in other parts of the world that we find ourselves in,” he said.

The command is also looking at how to do communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in tunnels, he said. “So, all that's really important to us as an ever-learning military, ever-learning SOCOM. And we're certainly taking full advantage of that as SOCOM and part of the [Central Command] team.”

And in Europe, Ukraine is probably close to, if not the most contested electronic warfare environment ever experienced in warfare, he said.

That means things like small drones that U.S. and Ukrainian special operators might have been accustomed to using are no longer “working in the way that we've seen them once be able to work, even in our global war on terrorism experience in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said.

“Taking those lessons for us on what is it that works and the tactics, techniques and procedures in order to allow the Ukrainians to continue to blunt the invasion and certainly deny Putin his objectives is a key part of what we're learning."

Another critical takeaway from Ukraine is how open-source intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is being used and how much information is available through non-government or military systems.

“I think folks are starting to really understand the power of everything you get out in the open-source arena,” he said. “And we're learning a lot from that as well. And we're watching them employ it, and in many ways to great effect. And the other thing we're really taking away is as they communicate, the dangers that provides with the signals that those things emanate, and what we ought to know and understand as SOCOM” and the broader U.S. military and what that means for any future conflict.

While Ukraine has bespoke electronic warfare systems — some provided by the United States and allies — Russia is often able to overwhelm those systems with sheer mass, he noted.

“Quantity has a quality all its own, even if it's not high quality,” he said. As SOCOM and the other services jump into technology and deploy AI and autonomy on vehicles like small UAS, it is often a one-to-one ratio — “one human to one platform,” he said.

“We would like that to be one human to many of platforms,” he continued.

“That's the same thing that could be part of the solution and certainly is the struggle with the Ukrainians right now — how do you get an exquisite platform that can get quality matched up against the quantity and now all of a sudden you get a bit of parity?” he said.

As important as quality is, quantity will still be needed against everything the Russian’s have in terms of electronic warfare capabilities, he said.

SOCOM is working with Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, head of European Command, and his team on what lessons to take back and what tactics, techniques and procedures to revise, he said.

Another area that requires new technology and approaches is countering the evolving UAS threat, he said.

“When we think about countering UAS, we look at it through the buckets of seeing the threat, synthesizing what that means and then countering it,” he said.

“There's a lot of work that goes on in a number of these locations where we're watching this on the common-ops picture space, bringing all these together and understanding what are we dealing with, I think absolutely drives us a lot more toward artificial intelligence — the ability to take in quite a bit of data, turn it around in a very rapid period of time to give us precise decision advantage so that we make the decision a lot faster about what we're seeing,” he said.

“And then what mechanism we may use to knock it down or to interdict it and then also putting us at the right place in time to do that, I think is a really key part of where we're going to go on seeing and sensing these … because they're getting more and more challenging in the way that they're at speed, the levels that they're flying, and certainly sometimes in the quantities,” he said.

“Even beyond artificial intelligence, it's the autonomy of systems to be able to pick that out faster than the human,” he continued.

In terms of disrupting the threats, “it really is about having a quiver of arrows, so to speak, to do that,” he said. “They all look different and may demand different interdiction solutions. … It could be microwaves or some other systems we're using. And we're also thinking about cyber and space as we think about this in the future.

“So, I think there's a number of advances that we've got to continue to take — some of them are under way, certainly some work we're doing in SOCOM to that level with artificial intelligence and autonomy to defeat it, as well for us to be able to use it against an adversary.”

While all of this requires new or updated technology, SOCOM still prioritizes investing in people first, technology second, he said.

“Humans [are] more important than hardware,” he said. “And we add to that, if we had one more dollar to spend, we're spending it on our people, and then we'll wrap the technology around, and we'll do the other pieces that we need to do.”

Topics: Special Operations

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Sean Carberry

12.  U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Considerations for Congress

The 9 page report can be downloaded here.  https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048

A little more detailed than the routine periodic 3 page update.

Note the section on Special Forces recruiting challenges.

I think it is worth reviewing the Title 10 USSOCOM authorities and additional responsibilities as these are most misunderstood.

Title X USSOCOM Authorities 

10 U.S.C. §167, Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, states: 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the commander of such command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, the following functions relating to special operations activities (whether or not relating to the special operations command). 

Current authorities include 

• • developing special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics; 
• • preparing and submitting budget proposals for special operations forces; 
• • exercising authority, direction, and control over special operations expenditures; 
• • training assigned forces; 
• • conducting specialized courses of instruction; 
• • validating requirements; 
• • establishing requirement priorities; 
• • ensuring interoperability of equipment and forces; 
• • formulating and submitting intelligence support requirements; 
• • monitoring special operations officers’ promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education; 
• • ensuring special operations forces’ combat readiness; 
• • monitoring special operations forces’ preparedness to carry out assigned missions; 
• • developing and acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services; 
• • commanding and controlling U.S.-based special operations forces; 
• • providing special operations forces to Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs); and 
• • conducting activities specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.4 

Additional USSOCOM Responsibilities 

In addition to the aforementioned Title X authorities and responsibilities, USSOCOM has been given additional responsibilities. In the 2004 Unified Command Plan (UCP), USSOCOM was given the responsibility for synchronizing DOD planning against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global operations against those networks.5 In this regard, USSOCOM “receives, reviews, coordinates and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements.”6 In 2008, USSOCOM was designated the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA).7 In this role, USSOCOM performs a synchronizing function in global training and assistance planning similar to the previously described role of planning against terrorist networks. In 2018, USSOCOM was also assigned the mission to field a Trans Regional Military Information Support Operations (MISO) capability intended to “address the opportunities and risks of global information space.”8

 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Considerations for Congress 

Congressional Research Service 

Summary 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations. In 1986, Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning, passed legislation (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen special operations’ position within the defense community and to improve interoperability among the branches of U.S. SOF. These actions included the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as a new unified command. 

As of 2023, USSOCOM consisted of approximately 70,000 Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian personnel assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and sub-unified commands. USSOCOM’s components are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC), the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified command. 

USSOCOM also comprises seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs are sub-unified commands under their respective Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). TSOCs are special operational headquarters elements designed to support a GCC’s special operations logistics, planning, and operational command and control requirements. 

Considerations for Congress include Army Special Forces recruiting and possible force structure reductions and Air Force Special Operations Power Projection Wings and future unit relocations. 

Contents 

Overview .........................................................................................................................................1 

Command Structures and Components .....................................................................................1 

Title X USSOCOM Authorities ................................................................................................2 

Additional USSOCOM Responsibilities .............................................................................2 

Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) ..............................................................3 

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) .............................................................................4 

Army Special Operations Command .........................................................................................4 

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) ..................................................................5 

Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) ..............................................................................6 

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) ....................................6 

Considerations for Congress............................................................................................................7 

Army Special Forces Recruiting and Possible Force Structure Reductions ..............................7 

Air Force Special Operations Power Projection Wings and Planned Future Unit Relocations .............................................................................................................................8 

Contacts 

Author Information ..........................................................................................................................9 

13. Air Force To Totally Revamp Its Structure To Compete With China

Air Force To Totally Revamp Its Structure To Compete With China

The Air Force is set to unveil a major structural shakeup at the Air & Space Forces Warfare Symposium on Monday.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED FEB 9, 2024 8:50 PM EST

twz.com · by Howard Altman · February 9, 2024

To counter the growing threat especially from China, the Air Force is undergoing major changes in how it operates and is organized. Dubbed “Reopitmization for Great Power Competition,” details of the initiative will be unveiled Monday at the Air and Space Forces Warfare Symposium in Denver by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and other senior leaders, an Air Force official told The War Zone.

The changes will run the gamut from how the Air Force organizes its operational units to how it acquires new weapons systems, Andrew Hunter, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, suggested on Friday.

“We're driving towards…the ability to do integration across our organizational stovepipes in the acquisition community but also on the operational community across the department to a much higher degree,” said Hunter, speaking at an Atlantic Council event.

“Optimizing for great power competition goes beyond just looking at modernization… beyond just looking at acquisition programs, and really looks at the entire Department of the Air Force enterprise...to ask the question, ‘is the structure that we have today fit for purpose, for the missions assigned to the Department of the Air Force? Or are they still in a structure or in a shape or burdened by the legacy of previous strategies - previous national defense security focuses?’”

What worked during 20-plus years of counter-insurgency fighting against enemies with limited weaponry won’t in a fight against China or Russia, Hunter noted.

An F-16 from the South Carolina Air National Guard takes off in Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force)

“In order to be successful, we were able to leverage that tremendous investment over the last 20-plus years to do very high-precision, highly effective and highly impactful things like airstrikes around the world, but on a very modest scale,” said Hunter. “What we're looking at in terms of strategic competition is the necessity to do that same thing, but at a pace and a scale completely unlike anything we've done before.”

Last week, Politico offered a glimpse at what some of the specific changes might look like from major commands (MAJCOM) level down to the wing level.

“Within the next few weeks, the service will announce it is consolidating some of its major three- and four-star commands, integrating fighter jets and bomber aircraft into single units, and beefing up its budget and planning shop, according to six people familiar with the plans,” the publication reported.

In the future, fighters and bombers might operate together in a single unit under a major Air Force reorganization plan. (South Korean Defense Ministry via AP, File)

The Air Force has nine MAJCOMs. Some, like Air Mobility Command (AMC) are functional, providing lift and refueling capabilities across the services. Air Combat Command (ACC) provides air combat forces while Global Strike Command provides combat-ready forces to conduct strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operation. Others, like U.S. Air Forces In Europe and U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFE) cover regional Air Force responsibilities.

Some of those MAJCOMs could be merged, Politico suggested.

At the operational unit level, the Air Force is considering a "composite wing" concept, where aircraft capable of taking out enemy air defenses, participate in air-to-air combat, and refuel all operate under one command structure instead of several.

A U.S. Air Force B-52H “Stratofortress” from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., is refueled by a KC-135 “Stratotanker” in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility Wednesday, Dec. 30, 2020. (Senior Airman Roslyn Ward/U.S. Air Force via AP)

"Crews for the different aircraft would regularly train together, making coordination easier and less time-consuming, the thinking goes.”

That's not a totally new concept. The Air Force tried that in 1991, spurred by then Air Force Chief of Staff Merill McPeak. The 366th Wing at Mountain Home AFB became the flying guinea pig for what was then called the Air Intervention Wing organization. However, for several reasons, the concept was eventually scrapped.

The early air intervention wing mix of aircraft at Mountain Home AFB., (Mountain Home AFB/366th Fighter Wing photo)

From our story about effort:

"Although the logic behind this concept was fairly clear, there certainly were drawbacks and roadblocks to executing it as originally envisioned. First off, basing five different aircraft types in operational units on a single base was grossly expensive. Each aircraft had its own infrastructure and logistical needs and with just one squadron of each type on strength, economies of scale were nowhere to be found."

"After years of real-world evidence, it became clear that replicating the intervention wing concept multiple times over would be near fiscally impossible in an era of declining force structure and budgets. The post-Cold War 'peace dividend' was going to be realized one way or another, and pumping huge sums of money into composite wings seemed to many like a lavish luxury with questionable utility."

We don't know enough about how a similar concept could work under the new plan, but basing the units separately but having them train together regularly could be a hybrid model that is more achievable and scalable in the long run.

The current concept of changing the wing structure had not been briefed at the senior level, an Air Force official told Politico, which added that none of the suggested changes were set in stone.

Kendall offered similar insights about how the flying branch will change to Air & Space Forces Magazine in an interview that published Jan. 26.

“...if we’re called upon to support an operation plan in the Pacific or in Europe, say, against a great power, we need ready deployable units, that can go do that job,” Kendall explained. “And that’s not what we have right now. … The units themselves have got to be structured to have all the capabilities they need when they go, and you want to have unity of command for those units. We don’t have that right now.“

A U.S. Air Force crew chief assigned to the 13th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron motions a U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon assigned to the 13th Fighter Squadron to taxi during exercise Cope North 21 at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Feb. 17, 2021. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Duncan C. Bevan)

Under the current structure, “when a new commander gets over there, his team does show up that day, and they just start to do what they’re doing,” Kendall posited. “And we’ve gotten used to that. It was an efficient way to do the kinds of things we’ve been doing for the last 20-odd years. But it’s not the way you want to go into a great power conflict.”

Kendall teased the need for these changes specifically to counter China back in September during the AFA's symposium at National Harbor, Maryland.

"China created two new military services, the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force, and it's substantially increased the capabilities of both the People's Liberation Army Air Force and the PLA Navy," he said at the time. "The Rocket Force is intended to attack America's high value assets, aircraft carriers, forward airfields, and key [command and control] and logistics nodes."

Soldiers assigned to a brigade under the PLA Rocket Force erect a ballistic missile system into position on a missile launching truck during a realistic training exercise on March 12, 2020. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zhang Feng)

"The Strategic Support Forces are designed to achieve information dominance in the space and cyber domains, including by attacking our space-based capabilities," he continued. "China has been reoptimizing its forces for great power competition and to prevail against the U.S. and Western Pacific for over 20 years. We must do the same."

The Air Force knows what it wants to do. How it will make that happen under the realities of budget constraints and competing interests across the services remains to be seen.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

twz.com · by Howard Altman · February 9, 2024

14. Opinion | Speaker Johnson should see what I just saw in Ukraine by Max Boot

Excerpts:

Many Ukrainians told us that they are inspired to fight on in part because they know that they are not alone — they have the support of the West. If the United States were to cut them off, it would be, among other things, a devastating psychological blow, giving Ukrainians the impression that they are being abandoned.

There is still time for the House of Representatives to do the right thing and pass the aid package that is finally advancing in the Senate. But it isn’t clear whether the speaker, in thrall to former president Donald Trump and his MAGA extremists, will even give the bill a floor vote. As Johnson (La.) prepares to make the most momentous decision of his political career, he should travel to Ukraine to meet the people whose lives and liberties rest in his hands.

Every time I visit Ukraine, I come away impressed by Ukrainian resilience and enraged by Putin’s continuing aggression. I imagine that Johnson, who professes to be a devout Christian, might feel equally moved by the suffering of the Ukrainians — and by their pleas for more U.S. support. (“We will not endure without the assistance of the U.S.A.,” Borovets warned.) But Johnson has not been to Ukraine since the Russian invasion and has not announced any plans to visit. That worries me. It’s easier to stab people in the back if you’re unwilling to look them in the eye.

Opinion | Speaker Johnson should see what I just saw in Ukraine

By Max Boot

Columnist

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February 12, 2024 at 6:15 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · February 12, 2024

KYIV — I wish House Speaker Mike Johnson and other MAGA Republicans who have been holding up desperately needed aid to Ukraine could see what I just saw there. In particular, I wish they had been with me on Wednesday morning in Dnipro, a bustling city of about 1 million people in eastern Ukraine. If they had been, they might be less willing to betray the people of Ukraine in their desperate struggle for survival against a barbaric invader.

The day began when air-raid alarms sounded at 5:15 a.m. Roused out of sleep, I stumbled down to the hotel bomb shelter along with other members of a U.S. delegation of policy analysts and former government officials invited to Ukraine by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. We were in Ukraine to see the important work UNHCR is doing to help the millions of people displaced by war.

That morning, as we spent hours in a bomb shelter, we saw why so many have been forced to flee their homes: Vladimir Putin keeps deliberately attacking civilian targets in the hope of breaking Ukraine’s will to resist. On Wednesday, the Russians launched 64 drones and missiles at Ukraine. Most were intercepted, but some got through. A few days later, we saw the damage to an apartment building in Kyiv where four people had been killed, 39 injured and hundreds of others forced out of their homes.

In Dnipro, we visited an apartment building where at least 64 people had died in an earlier Russian missile strike. Eerily enough, we could still see clothes hanging in a top-floor closet — visible because the entire front wall of the building was gone. Other Russian missiles have struck hospitals, schools and shopping malls in the area. These are targets of no military value whose destruction amounts to crimes against humanity.

The situation is even grimmer in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, which is located only about 20 miles from the Russian border. Russian forces are constantly bombarding Kharkiv with short-range rockets. The city’s best hotel, once favored by Western journalists and aid workers, was destroyed on Dec. 30. Most other businesses remain open, but many have boarded-up windows. We visited a “subway school” held underground, because it’s too dangerous for children to go to their normal classrooms. (Most of the city’s pupils are forced into the pedagogical purgatory of online learning.) I marveled at Ukrainian ingenuity in converting five subway stations into schools but was heartbroken by the necessity to do so.

In Kharkiv’s North Saltivka neighborhood — shelled regularly by the Russians for six months in 2022 — not a building had escaped damage. Once home to 40,000 residents, this district we visited is now virtually deserted. One of the few remaining residents, an elderly woman named Nadiia, couldn’t stop crying as she recounted to me the shock of the Russian invasion nearly two years ago. “I didn’t know what to do,” she said. “Bullets were flying past us. I was just praying.”

I wished I could comfort her and tell her that she was safe now, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Just last month, a Russian rocket demolished another nearby building. And residents have recently been forced to flee the town of Kupyansk, just 74 miles away, because the Russians are massing for another attack there in the hope of regaining territory lost to the Ukrainians in October 2022.

Last May, when I was in Ukraine, optimism was in the air. The Ukrainians were preparing a major counteroffensive that they hoped would drive the invaders out of the country’s south and shorten the war. But it ultimately failed, and the war grinds on — with no end in sight as it enters its third year. Putin has mobilized more troops, converted his economy to a war footing, and bought weapons from Iran and North Korea. Ukraine is struggling to keep pace. “People are tired,” Odessa’s regional governor, Oleh Kiper, told us. “They don’t understand what lies ahead.”

The first cracks are beginning to appear in the facade of Ukraine’s wartime unity. On Thursday, while I was on a train from Kharkiv to Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky fired the popular commander of his armed forces, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny. The two men had long had a tense relationship. Zaluzhny was replaced by Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, the former commander of land forces, who is less popular with the rank-and-file but gets along better with the president. The change of commanders was risky, but Zaluzhny’s exit was at least handled with dignity.

No matter who runs the military, however, Ukraine confronts two fundamental problems: a shortage of troops and a shortage of ammunition. The former is Ukraine’s own doing. It needs to mobilize more soldiers and to give a breather to those who have been fighting continuously for two years. But men are no longer rushing to volunteer as in the early days of the war, and an expansion of conscription would be unpopular and expensive. So Zelensky has dawdled, leading to complaints from front-line units that they don’t have enough troops to hold back the Russians’ meat-grinder assaults. Zelensky resisted Zaluzhny’s recommendations to mobilize as many as 500,000 additional troops. Now, a bill to expand conscription is finally advancing in parliament, but it will take time to train raw draftees.

The shortage of weapons, by contrast, is the West’s fault. The Western countries are collectively far bigger than Russia in both population and wealth, but they have not increased their armaments production as rapidly as Moscow has done. Ukraine is ramping up its own output, particularly of drones, but it will take years for it to develop the necessary manufacturing capacity. In the meantime, Ukraine faces an alarming shortage of ammunition: Russian forces are firing five artillery shells for every shell fired by the Ukrainians. If this disparity is not addressed soon, Ukrainian front lines might crumble. That is why it’s so critical for the United States to provide $60 billion in aid — much of which will go to U.S. defense companies.

The European Union, admittedly, just pledged $54 billion in financial aid to Ukraine, and European countries are providing far more aid overall than the United States. But Europe can’t meet Ukraine’s urgent military needs without U.S. help. Unless the United States steps forward soon, Ukraine will run low not only on artillery ammunition but also on air-defense ammunition. That could lead to greater destruction in its cities, which would spark a fresh refugee crisis and set back a burgeoning economic recovery.

Ukraine’s unheralded success in the battle for the Black Sea — employing sea drones and missiles to drive back the Russian fleet — has reopened that vital shipping route. As we discovered during a visit to Odessa, that region’s three ports are back to almost prewar levels of exports. The National Bank of Ukraine has forecast a 3.6 percent economic growth this year, but those projections will be dashed if Ukraine can’t safeguard its major population centers from Russian airstrikes.

The Ukrainians are not giving up, even if polls show that a small but growing minority — about 20 percent in December, up from 10 percent in May — are willing to make territorial concessions to the Russians if that will bring peace. Of course, Putin, buoyed by growing Republican opposition to aiding Ukraine, shows no interest in compromising, regardless of his feint in that direction in an interview last week with Tucker Carlson. So the killing continues.

“People are traumatized, but we don’t have a choice,” Deputy Foreign Minister Iryna Borovets told us in Kyiv. “We are fighting for our existence. … If the Russians win, there would be genocide.” A regional official in Dnipro pithily summed up the national mood: “We are tired but not exhausted.”

Many Ukrainians told us that they are inspired to fight on in part because they know that they are not alone — they have the support of the West. If the United States were to cut them off, it would be, among other things, a devastating psychological blow, giving Ukrainians the impression that they are being abandoned.

There is still time for the House of Representatives to do the right thing and pass the aid package that is finally advancing in the Senate. But it isn’t clear whether the speaker, in thrall to former president Donald Trump and his MAGA extremists, will even give the bill a floor vote. As Johnson (La.) prepares to make the most momentous decision of his political career, he should travel to Ukraine to meet the people whose lives and liberties rest in his hands.

Every time I visit Ukraine, I come away impressed by Ukrainian resilience and enraged by Putin’s continuing aggression. I imagine that Johnson, who professes to be a devout Christian, might feel equally moved by the suffering of the Ukrainians — and by their pleas for more U.S. support. (“We will not endure without the assistance of the U.S.A.,” Borovets warned.) But Johnson has not been to Ukraine since the Russian invasion and has not announced any plans to visit. That worries me. It’s easier to stab people in the back if you’re unwilling to look them in the eye.

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · February 12, 2024

15. Threats to America’s critical infrastructure are now a terrifying reality

Cyber civil defense nad personal cyber hygiene. We all have a role.

Excerpt:

The final piece of preparedness does not come from policymakers, but from the rest of us, as societal resilience is critical to not making the bad effects of critical infrastructure attacks much worse. In 2021, when a ransomware attack shut down the Colonial Pipeline, gasoline shortages were caused not by the direct disruption to supply, but by widespread panic buying.

Leaders at the local level should therefore engage their communities in preparedness planning. At the national level, leaders should be cognizant of our current state of political polarization. As in any attack meant to sow disruption and division, we do our enemies’ work for them when we panic.

Instead, we may do well to remember the lessons of the last major attack on the U.S. homeland. On Sept. 11, 2001, there was little room for vitriol and prejudice. Instead, if we act with the understanding that the homeland is already under attack, everyday Americans may realize that they are their neighbors’ best hope for safety and security.

Threats to America’s critical infrastructure are now a terrifying reality

BY STEPHEN WEBBER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR 02/11/24 01:00 PM ET

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On Jan. 31, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before Congress, explaining how Chinese government hackers were trying “to find and prepare to destroy or degrade the civilian critical infrastructure that keeps us safe and prosperous.”

These hackers, Wray continued, “are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities, if or when China decides the time has come to strike.”

Wray’s testimony offered a glimpse into the frightening possibilities attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure might unleash. But the truth is actually scarier: The American homeland has been under attack for the past two decades, with little in the way of meaningful response.

Policymakers must, then, begin to strengthen private sector and local preparedness for these ongoing attacks, as well as developing and resourcing the federal interagency for complex emergencies, with an emphasis on societal resilience.

As early as 2009, Chinese and Russian hackers infiltrated America’s electrical grid, installing malware that could be used for future attacks. One year later, Russia hacked the NASDAQ stock exchange and not only attempted to steal data but left behind what experts described as a “digital bomb” that could, when detonated, damage financial networks.

In 2013, disaster was narrowly averted after Iranian hackers infiltrated the control systems of the Bowman Avenue Dam in New York and nearly flooded a small town.

A 2017 hack of the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant in Kansas was later revealed to be the work of Russian hackers, as was a 2022 attack on an international food company, which temporarily closed all of its meatpacking plants in the United States.

China reportedly breached and surveilled the networks of the New York City subway system in 2021. Just this past May, Microsoft reported that the China-backed hacker network Volt Typhoon compromised its IT systems to access critical infrastructure on Guam.

These complex systems of critical infrastructure — which include energy, finance, food and agriculture, healthcare, municipal services, transportation, water and many more — are vulnerable, and not just to state actors. Even small groups of criminals have left thousands without electricity, cut off responders’ communications in major cities and prevented patients from receiving care at hospitals.

These known threats to civilian critical infrastructure are made worse because our national defense is dependent upon some of these very same systems. For example, the ability of the U.S. military to deploy forces overseas depends upon the civilian maritime industry, airlines, ports and railroads — all of which have been disrupted by cyberattacks from various bad actors within the past 10 years.

In 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported that Chinese hackers repeatedly breached the networks of U.S. Transportation Command’s civilian contractors, upon whom the military would rely for logistical support in the event of war. As Jen Easterly, the director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, warned last year, a foreign adversary could choose to target U.S. infrastructure to gain an advantage in a military conflict.

Given these known threats to the U.S. homeland, policymakers from the national to the local level must act now to better prepare their communities for the impacts of critical infrastructure attacks.

Among the first things policymakers can do is improve collaboration, as most critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector and overseen by local governments. Local officials and private companies should work to improve the security of both the physical facilities they manage, as well as their networks. Both groups should also plan for emergencies collaboratively, perhaps incorporating training and exercises with first responders as well.

National decision-makers should also better evaluate different federal agencies’ ability to manage multiple crises at once. The challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic could serve as useful starting points for developing, posturing and resourcing federal departments and agencies to respond to widespread disasters created by attacks on critical infrastructure.

The final piece of preparedness does not come from policymakers, but from the rest of us, as societal resilience is critical to not making the bad effects of critical infrastructure attacks much worse. In 2021, when a ransomware attack shut down the Colonial Pipeline, gasoline shortages were caused not by the direct disruption to supply, but by widespread panic buying.

Leaders at the local level should therefore engage their communities in preparedness planning. At the national level, leaders should be cognizant of our current state of political polarization. As in any attack meant to sow disruption and division, we do our enemies’ work for them when we panic.

Instead, we may do well to remember the lessons of the last major attack on the U.S. homeland. On Sept. 11, 2001, there was little room for vitriol and prejudice. Instead, if we act with the understanding that the homeland is already under attack, everyday Americans may realize that they are their neighbors’ best hope for safety and security.

Stephen Webber is a defense analyst at RAND.

thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org

16. The Cost of a Dysfunctional Congress

Excerpt:

Congress is increasingly a body for unserious people in both parties. The Adam Schiffs and Marjorie Taylor Greenes play to the cable TV and Twitter (now X) crowds and feed the partisan poison that makes legislative compromise more difficult.

This would matter less if this were the 1990s, a time of peace and prosperity. But the world is more dangerous than it’s been since the 1970s, and probably the 1930s, with rogue nations on the march. The U.S. needs leaders who understand these challenges, and too many talented men and women have concluded that Congress isn’t a body for people who want to make a difference.

The Cost of a Dysfunctional Congress

Rep. Michael Gallagher will retire, another sign of the decline of the House.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cost-of-a-dysfunctional-congress-gallagher-re-election-wisconsin-china-5fb56b11?mod=opinion_lead_pos4

By The Editorial Board

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Feb. 11, 2024 5:45 pm ET

Mike Gallagher (R-Wisc.) on January 31. PHOTO: KEVIN DIETSCH/GETTY IMAGES

Rep. Michael Gallagher’s decision not to seek re-election this year is understandable from a personal point of view. But it’s also another dispiriting sign of the decline of Congress as a place where people of intelligence and principle believe they can solve national problems.

The 39-year-old Republican said Saturday that he wants to devote more time to his young family. He believes in term limits for Congress and says he never ran for office with a goal of making it a lifetime career. He was first elected to his northeastern Wisconsin seat in 2016.

Yet Mr. Gallagher will be missed as a rare Member these days who wants to do something other than promote his social-media brand. As a former Marine intelligence officer who served in Iraq under Centcom Commander David Petraeus, Mr. Gallagher has focused on America’s fading ability to deter its enemies.

In this Congress he has chaired the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, a rare corner of the House that has done something useful. He and Democrat Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois have worked together to investigate the growing threat from China.

This includes U.S. vulnerability to Chinese espionage, cyber-attacks and influence schemes. The committee has been helpful in drawing attention to U.S. defense vulnerabilities, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Mr. Gallagher has argued in particular for urgently buying and deploying more long-range missiles in the Pacific theater that are crucial to deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

This military expertise is especially important given the Republican Party’s drift in the Trump era toward isolationism. The House GOP is increasingly dominated by Members who don’t support a military buildup despite the growing cooperation of U.S. adversaries China, Russia and Iran. The Senate still has some traditional hawks, but Mr. Trump’s influence is eroding support for peace-through-strength and long-time alliances even in the upper Chamber.

It’s hard to believe Mr. Gallagher’s decision to retire wasn’t influenced by the continuing dysfunction of the current House. The select China committee may not last past the current Congress, and he’s too junior to become Chairman of Armed Services. His principled stand against the GOP impeachment of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas suggests his lack of patience with his party’s resort to stunts that accomplish nothing.

Congress is increasingly a body for unserious people in both parties. The Adam Schiffs and Marjorie Taylor Greenes play to the cable TV and Twitter (now X) crowds and feed the partisan poison that makes legislative compromise more difficult.

This would matter less if this were the 1990s, a time of peace and prosperity. But the world is more dangerous than it’s been since the 1970s, and probably the 1930s, with rogue nations on the march. The U.S. needs leaders who understand these challenges, and too many talented men and women have concluded that Congress isn’t a body for people who want to make a difference.

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Appeared in the February 12, 2024, print edition as 'The Cost of a Dysfunctional Congress'.

17. The Neurotic Fixations of U.S. Foreign Policy

Excerpt:

Our reflexive overreliance on coercive tools and our stubborn adherence to unreachable objectives are significant obstacles to a more effective U.S. foreign policy. Instead of convincing others to do what we want with minimal recourse to threats and pressure—which is the primary task of diplomacy—Washington hopes that its toolbox of coercive instruments will allow it to get its way without having to compromise much, if at all. Understanding others and trying to work out mutually acceptable solutions is difficult and time-consuming, whereas slapping on a few more sanctions or sending a Tomahawk is quick, easy, and makes the people in charge look resolute. Unfortunately, this take-it-or-leave-it approach gives adversaries little reason to cut a deal and even less reason to stick to whatever deal we might be able to impose on them. If Americans want their leaders to think before they act, it’s time to start asking them a few more questions—and to insist on better answers.

The first part of this sentence feels a little iffy factually, as the initial proposition for an agreement was put forth by Kim Il Sung. The U.S. generally agreed to these terms for the 1994 agreement because the elder Kim had died in July (before the agreement was signed in October), and they thought the North Korean regime would collapse at any moment. That first suggests that Clinton had primarily been negotiating with Il Sung, and later finalized these terms with Kim Jong Il, who did initially agree to halt nuclear advancement (perhaps secretly continuing such tests regardless), but publicly it appears the U.S. failing on its end of the agreement is what led North Korea to abandon the agreement entirely.

The Neurotic Fixations of U.S. Foreign Policy

A close look at several ruts that American policymakers are currently stuck in.

Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20

Stephen M. Walt

By Stephen M. Walt, a co

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt

• U.S. Foreign Policy
• United States
• Stephen M. Walt

February 12, 2024, 2:30 AM

Rich and powerful countries like the United States can do the same things over and over, even when they aren’t working, without facing immediate and severe consequences. The White House can change hands, presidential appointees can come and go, and new crises can erupt without warning, and the same well-worn responses get pulled out of the drawer, dusted off, and put into practice once again. Sometimes familiar approaches are so deeply entrenched that they become almost reflexive: People in power rarely question them and dissenters face an uphill battle if they try to convince superiors to do something different. In extreme cases, nobody even questions them. It’s foreign policy on autopilot.

I’m not angling for a job in Washington, which leaves me free to raise questions about some of these rinse-and-repeat responses. Here are four of my current favorites.

1. Why do we keep thinking we can bomb our way to victory?

For more than a century, air-power advocates have claimed that it could be used to punish opponents and get them to say uncle. Because the United States, Israel, Russia, and a few other states can use air power with near-impunity in some places (e.g., Gaza, Ukraine, or Yemen), they keep thinking that dropping bombs, conducting drone strikes, or firing cruise missiles at their adversaries will convince the targets to run up the white flag and do whatever is being demanded of them.

If only that were true. In fact, as Robert Pape and others have shown convincingly, air power is rarely, if ever, an effective coercive tool. Bombing Germany and Japan with conventional explosives or incendiaries did not cause their leaders to surrender, and the massive coercive bombing campaign that the United States conducted against North Vietnam did not convince Hanoi to abandon its campaign to unify the country. Israel’s repeated aerial assaults on Lebanon and Gaza haven’t convinced Hezbollah or Hamas to lay down their arms or reduced Palestinians’ desire for their own state; if anything, such actions have merely strengthened their resolve. Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign in Yemen didn’t convince the Houthis to knuckle under, and Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities haven’t persuaded Kyiv to give up, either. You might regard NATO’s air campaign against Serbia in 1999 during the Kosovo War as a rare success story for air power, until you discover that Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic got a better deal at the end of that campaign than he’d been offered before the bombs started falling.

Air power is a poor coercive instrument for two main reasons. First, despite improvements in yield, accuracy, and surveillance, conventional air power cannot bring a society to its knees and force it to comply. There are simply too many ways for adversaries to adapt and endure. Look at Gaza: It is a small and densely populated enclave that Israel can bomb as freely as it wishes, but Israel still can’t eliminate Hamas that way, and its efforts to do so are doing untold damage to its global image. Second, dropping bombs on people produces not a desire to comply but a spirit of resistance and a desire for revenge.

I am certainly not suggesting that air power is of no military value. When combined with powerful ground or naval forces, command of the air can help countries win conventional military campaigns on land or at sea and eventually enable them to impose their will on a defeated opponent. What it can’t do is accomplish this goal by itself. Leaders with powerful air forces at their disposal should stop thinking that they provide a quick, low-cost, and highly effective way to persuade opponents to give in. But good luck convincing anyone in Washington, Jerusalem, or Moscow of that these days.

1. How many times must we “restore deterrence”?

When powerful countries use force against an adversary that has done something they don’t like, officials often claim their goal is to “restore deterrence.” Israeli officials have declared this to be their goal on numerous occasions over the years, most recently following Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7. Similarly, U.S. politicians seeking to justify the use of force routinely deem it necessary to restore deterrence against Iran, Russia, the Houthis, or whomever else might be doing something we object to.

Mind you: There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with this goal. If an opponent did something objectionable because it underestimated your resolve or capabilities and erroneously concluded that it could act with impunity, then a demonstration that it miscalculated may be in order. But if a country finds itself having to restore deterrence on a regular basis, it should consider the possibility that its responses aren’t having the intended effect. At a minimum, the need to keep punishing someone to restore deterrence tells you that hitting them in the past hasn’t altered their calculation of costs and benefits in the manner you wanted. It might even be making the problem worse, either by fueling the opponent’s desire for revenge or by increasing their need to show that they can’t be intimidated. Defiance in the face of repeated punishment is a good sign that an opponent is highly motivated, and states whose deterrent threats keep failing (and thus keep having to be restored) should ask themselves if there’s some other way to reduce the opponent’s motivation to challenge the status quo. Is it conceivable that some sort of compromise might do a better job of defusing the problem than another round of pointless and ineffective violence?

1. Can the U.S. finally acknowledge that North Korea won’t give up its nukes?

North Korea is a thorny problem for South Korea, the United States, and sometimes even its Chinese patron. Repeated U.S. administrations have been forced to pay more attention to Pyongyang than they probably wanted to, and a big part of their concern has focused on its nuclear program. The Clinton administration tried to persuade former leader Kim Jong Il to forgo nuclear weapons via the 1994 Agreed Framework, but neither side kept up its end of the bargain and the agreement ultimately collapsed. North Korea conducted its first weapons test in 2006 and is believed to have an arsenal of perhaps 40 to 50 warheads today.

North Korea wants nuclear weapons because they are the ultimate guarantee against a foreign-led effort to topple the Kim family. It is hard to think of a combination of carrots and sticks that would convince its leaders to give up this potent protection, yet North Korean “denuclearization” remains America’s main policy objective. In other words, the United States is officially committed to an unreachable goal, which cannot help but constrain efforts to develop a more effective approach to this recurring problem. Although well-credentialed experts have called for the United States and its regional partners to accept the reality of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, U.S. policy is still stuck. Isn’t it time to acknowledge reality and base U.S. policy on the recognition that North Korea is about as likely to give up its nuclear arsenal as the United States?

1. Will the United States ever stop overusing economic sanctions?

I sometimes wonder if there’s a machine buried in some obscure building in Washington that scans the news wires, identifies whoever is currently ticking off U.S. officials, and then spits out a list of economic sanctions to impose on the persons responsible for their irritation. I’m kidding, of course, but whenever U.S. policymakers are mad at someone and want to do something, their first recourse is to freeze some foreign assets, restrict trade, deny the enemy access to global financial markets, or limit some foreign official’s ability to travel. Sanctions have become the go-to move when force is not an attractive option, even when everyone knows they won’t alter the target’s behavior in the slightest.

As with air power, properly designed sanctions can help a country accomplish some of its foreign-policy goals. In wartime, for example, embargoes and other forms of sanctions can weaken an adversary and reduce its ability to fight, though they rarely have decisive effects and certainly do not work quickly. As careful scholarly studies have shown, the fear of future sanctions may convince some targets not to do something, but if they go ahead and defy the threat of sanctions it means that they anticipated the pressure and were willing to pay the price. Sanctions are usually too slow and too easily evaded to cause determined adversaries to alter their behavior, yet U.S. policymakers persist in applying them without bothering to consider if they will work. We are still waiting for the communist regime in Cuba to collapse after 65-odd years of sanctions, which tells you all you need to know about their effectiveness as a coercive instrument.

As you’ve probably noticed, there’s a common thread running through my list of questions. Because the United States has so many tools it can use to put pressure on others, there’s a powerful tendency to reach for one or more of them at the first sign of trouble. We decide what we want others to do (or not do), inform them of our demands, and then start ratcheting up the pressure or the punishment in the hope the other side will cave. This approach rarely works, however, because we are usually asking others to make substantial concessions and because bringing pressure to bear gives adversaries even more reason to resist us. After all, if a foreign government or rebel group gives in as soon as Washington drops a few bombs or imposes some financial penalties, what’s to stop U.S. officials from issuing additional demands later?

Our reflexive overreliance on coercive tools and our stubborn adherence to unreachable objectives are significant obstacles to a more effective U.S. foreign policy. Instead of convincing others to do what we want with minimal recourse to threats and pressure—which is the primary task of diplomacy—Washington hopes that its toolbox of coercive instruments will allow it to get its way without having to compromise much, if at all. Understanding others and trying to work out mutually acceptable solutions is difficult and time-consuming, whereas slapping on a few more sanctions or sending a Tomahawk is quick, easy, and makes the people in charge look resolute. Unfortunately, this take-it-or-leave-it approach gives adversaries little reason to cut a deal and even less reason to stick to whatever deal we might be able to impose on them. If Americans want their leaders to think before they act, it’s time to start asking them a few more questions—and to insist on better answers.

The first part of this sentence feels a little iffy factually, as the initial proposition for an agreement was put forth by Kim Il Sung. The U.S. generally agreed to these terms for the 1994 agreement because the elder Kim had died in July (before the agreement was signed in October), and they thought the North Korean regime would collapse at any moment. That first suggests that Clinton had primarily been negotiating with Il Sung, and later finalized these terms with Kim Jong Il, who did initially agree to halt nuclear advancement (perhaps secretly continuing such tests regardless), but publicly it appears the U.S. failing on its end of the agreement is what led North Korea to abandon the agreement entirely.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt

18. Checking the Box but Missing the Mark: The Problems with Nonresident Joint Professional Military Education

I have great respect for officers who complete non-resident PME. I remember getting my "box of books" when I was first time non-select for CGSC and boy was I happy when I was selected the second time and did not have to complete the remainder of the book (long before online capabilities) Those 50% who are not selected for resident CGSC and have to take PME remotely still have to do their day jobs and take their classes on their own time (unless the chain of command gives them time). And what upsets me is when those who are selected for resident PME (the best year of their lives) are able to relax, rest, and refit during that year and do not take advantage of all the educational opportunities beyond the minimum requirements and then complain about PME. PME provides a lot of opportunities beyond the minimum requirements but officers must seek them out.

Checking the Box but Missing the Mark: The Problems with Nonresident Joint Professional Military Education - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Douglas M. Morea · February 12, 2024

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You’re a field-grade officer in the US military, you’ve been up since 0400 and you’re ten thousand miles from home. Before the sun sets you’ve successfully completed your mission and brought your troops back safely. You miss your family, dreaming that tomorrow might bring a quick moment to call. And then, just as you are about to hit your bunk you remember: you’re enrolled in JPME-I (joint professional military education phrase one) and you still have mandatory online coursework waiting for you. With the threat of being passed over for promotion hanging over your head, you fire up the laptop, and hope that your ship’s Wi-Fi is working. As you click through the online posts via Blackoard or Canvas you can barely keep your eyes open. Your mind is divided between what happened that day, everything you’ve missed at home, the readings, the discussion posts, and the next mission. Are you thinking clearly? Can you concentrate on being an officer, a student, and a spouse or parent all at the same time? Will you be ready and rested to lead tomorrow? Are you learning anything, or are you simply burned-out and just checking the box?

This is the situation that many officers face as they enroll in JPME-I. Juggling a career, education, and family is difficult under the best of conditions, but in today’s strategic environment it is more challenging than ever. As the United States’ competitive edge diminishes, senior leaders are placing renewed emphasis on JPME to ensure unrivaled “intellectual overmatch against adversaries.” Considering the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and heightened competition with China, joint operations are more important than ever. Nonresident JPME has failed to keep pace with the stakes that accompany these global challenges.

The Joint Chiefs recently challenged military leaders to “reassess our current JPME framework” in order “to ensure we are evolving JPME requirements of the 21st century.” With these challenges in mind, the current nonresident JPME-I approach is not conducive to learning because instruction is not provided in the type of “environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-depth understanding” that US law specifies as a defining feature of JPME. Instead, the virtual classroom consists of readings and mostly asynchronous forum discussions that fail to successfully replicate traditional in-class learning or provide joint acculturation. The methods of instruction must be reformed to allow students to complete JPME-I in a full-time capacity and with an in-person joint acculturation component. Reformed nonresident JPME would better serve the joint force, services, and individual field-grade officers by optimizing knowledge of joint matters, allowing officers to focus on their primary responsibilities and personal commitments, and ensuring officers arrive to joint duty assignments as JPME-I-complete.

JPME has changed numerous times over its history. Since the late nineteenth century, officers have attended various service schools for professional military education to create intellectual advantage. By the early twentieth century, senior service colleges like the Army and Naval War Colleges routinely educated officers from other services—forming the basis for JPME. But joint education remained stagnant until World War II, when the two-front global war led to the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College in 1943 “to train selected officers for command and staff duty in unified or coordinated commands.” After much deliberation in the postwar years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and service secretaries established three war colleges in 1946 that evolved into today’s National Defense University and its subordinate colleges. The most impactful reforms occurred in 1986 with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which emphasized joint and combined operations.

To ensure military officers were adequately educated on these joint matters, the Goldwater-Nichols Act formalized joint education by placing it into law. JPME is defined by federal law as “consist[ing] of the rigorous and thorough instruction and examination of officers of the armed forces in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, of the subject matter covered.” JPME was established to properly educate US military officers on joint matters and prepare their leaders for joint duty assignments. Nonresident JPME today misses the mark. It neither properly educates nor prepares military leaders for joint duty.

JPME has two levels: intermediate 1 and senior 2. Intermediate-level service schools offer JPME-I and ILE (intermediate-level education) through resident and nonresident means. However, most officers do not have the opportunity to enjoy a year of resident intermediate- or senior-level school. So, most field-grade officers earn JPME-I credit through nonresident means. In practice this means about ten hours per week of after-hours online distance learning. While each service its own specific method, they all follow a common theme. Taking anywhere from ten months to three years, the courses must be completed on top of an officer’s primary professional duties—even during deployment. On paper such an additional workload sounds feasible; in practice this method of education hinders effectiveness, diminishes readiness, and provides for only the most minimal learning.

A study conducted in 2020 by the dean of institutional research at Santa Monica College showed that civilian students enrolled in six-week courses had higher success rates and lower dropout rates than those enrolled in the same courses over the length of a standard sixteen-week academic semester. A 2006 study published in the Journal of Economics and Finance Education also discovered that students who took short, focused courses achieved higher grades and were more knowledgeable when compared to those who enrolled in traditional courses of longer duration. The ten-month to three-year model that the services employ fails to accept the reality of adult learning, and the busy working conditions of military officers.

With nonresident JPME-I running concurrent to primary duty responsibilities, work performance and quality of life both suffer. This is especially true for field-grade officers who endure extended work weeks at their assigned units. Attempting to absorb course material during after-hours study over a long duration is academically ineffective and impacts mission readiness. This distance-learning requirement can create career conflicts and mental fatigue, even for top-performing officers, and often leads to burnout. At worst, the education becomes nothing more than an indifferent check-the-box exercise.

A systematic review of burnout among US military personnel conducted in 2023 discovered that high burnout was associated with several factors common to the military occupation. Adding distance JPME-I on top of military duties exacerbates the stress of military life. Field-grade officers are generally in their mid to late thirties and married with children. In addition to those familial responsibilities, many officers are leading or supervising subordinates, running departments, and—for some services and communities—commanding warfighting units. There is an impact beyond the individual. Excessive workloads impact work performance, readiness, quality of life and, as a result, retention.

Perhaps more importantly, contrary to the goals of JPME, distance learning offers little time and few chances for any meaningful joint acculturation. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy defines joint acculturation as “the process of understanding and appreciating the separate Service cultures resulting in joint attitudes and perspectives, common beliefs, and trust that occurs when diverse groups come into continuous direct contact.” Joint acculturation is a primary aim of JPME. It is a key prerequisite for successful joint operations as it allows officers to familiarize themselves with the other services’ cultures and capabilities. Joint acculturation in an online setting is impossible, even in the hands of a skilled online instructor.

Officers involved in joint planning and operations must know what the other services can and—more importantly—cannot do. Successful joint execution cannot happen without this. Military officers experience joint acculturation by being exposed to other services. It can occur by socializing with officers from different services, by working on a joint staff, by participating in joint exercises or operations, or during JPME. However, for joint acculturation to be successful, there must be adequate exposure. Nonresident JPME-I, doesn’t sufficiently offer this opportunity—because it’s too limited, too impersonal, and too disconnected. Students and instructors mostly correspond in online posts at random times. Yes, with today’s web-based programs like Microsoft Teams, students have the ability to communicate more effectively—but it’s still after-hours and requires nearly burdensome coordination. Realistically, who has time for or interest in deep conversations on service differences with classmates after-hours when you’re already exhausted?

For the sake of jointness, readiness, and retention, a more effective distance JPME-I course must be developed to allow officers to effectively learn course material and adequately prepare for joint duty. This can only be accomplished by creating a shortened distance-learning course that officers can complete as a primary duty. Officers would essentially get a six-week sabbatical to complete their assignments. To do this would require changing federal law to separate JPME-I from ILE, creating a shorter course that must not compete with demanding, service-specific responsibilities. But a new distance course isn’t enough. There must be a multiweek, in-person seminar solely on joint acculturation where officers meet and interact with each other on a daily basis.

With this new JPME distance hybrid course, field-grade officers like the one looking for Wi-Fi at the end of a long and demanding day would instead have six weeks of dedicated learning time (plus two weeks of acculturation) to not only read the assignments, but reflect on what they have read and apply it to the current and future fight. They would also now have the ability to discuss these ideas with their peers in person during formal and informal interactions. The check-the-box mentality of online JPME would be replaced and the knowledge from the courses would make for better officers, leaders, and joint warfighters.

JPME-I is about learning, and field-grade officers need to have the opportunity to be students. For the cost of only six weeks of an officer’s time, and two weeks of temporary duty at a JPME institution, the US military could maximize the value of joint education and finally hit the mark—while reducing burnout and maximizing readiness. Or the military could continue the status quo and risk its “intellectual overmatch” along with the United States’ competitive edge.

Commander Douglas M. “Dorothy” Morea was a naval aviator and a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) in Norfolk, Virginia.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Senior Airman Chevelle Gauntlett, US Air Force

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Douglas M. Morea · February 12, 2024

​19. Is America still the leader of the free world?

Excerpt:

Utah Sen. Mitt Romney was correct when he recently said, “America has long been considered the leader of the free world,” but it is difficult to escape the notion that, due mostly to Republican intransigence, America is not acting as such. It is not even leading from behind. Its allies are trying to drag it along, kicking and screaming. And so far, it has not budged. Indeed, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg recently traveled from Europe to try to talk Republicans into helping Ukraine. It is difficult to overstate the size of such a shift where Europeans are trying to talk Republicans into taking a more hawkish stance.

This shirking of leadership is a disaster for Europe. While Ukraine is holding its own against a much larger foe, it is running low on ammo and a stalemate aids Putin’s aggression. Professor Philips O’Brien of the University of St. Andrews recently said that Putin’s invasion, “changed the entire future of European security.” And the consequences are not relegated only to Europe. Taiwan’s de-facto ambassador, for example, has publicly argued that his country’s freedom is likely dependent on signaling to China that the West has resolve and will continue to help defend Ukraine from Russian aggression.

Is America still the leader of the free world?

In opposing the immigration bill, Republicans jeopardize the GOP’s reputation as the party most willing to defend our allies

deseret.com · by Cliff Smith [month] [day], [year], [hour]:[minute][ampm] [timezone] · February 12, 2024

Lately, the focus in Washington, D.C., has been on Republicans overwhelmingly opposing an enforcement-only immigration bill that had been negotiated with bipartisan support.

Much is being made of the fact that the border provisions in the bill were well to the right of proposals that Republicans have previously objected to, and that some Republican objections, including from former President Donald Trump, amounted to a complaint that any progress on the issue would be seen as a victory for President Joe Biden. That’s a crass and cynical position. National Review’s Noah Rothman believes it is both bad policy and bad politics for the GOP to reject the border compromise, and I’m sympathetic.

But the wider picture is even more disturbing. The only reason the border provisions were an issue is because they were mixed with aid to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel. Thus, in one fell swoop, Republicans have risked, in a very serious way, their mantle as the party most willing to defend America’s allies. In fact, it may already be gone.

It is difficult to overstate what a massive change this is in the DNA of American politics. As professor Colin Dueck of George Mason University, an expert on domestic politics and national security, writes in his book “Hard Line,” Republicans and conservatives have historically been “committed to building strong national defenses, determined to maintain a free hand for the United States internationally, and relatively unyielding toward potential adversaries,” and that this has “considerable domestic political as well as international significance.”

Complaining that most Republicans, at least on paper, are supportive of aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, and many senior ones, including Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell have a clear and consistent record of supporting such aid, is beside the point. Whatever political dynamics created last week’s events, it is undeniable that Republicans as a whole no longer prioritize that which would have been a core Republican principle just a few years ago. Good luck explaining that to a Republican circa 1984, 2004, or even 2012.

This will have political consequences. Parties can only coast for so long on historical images (i.e., Democrats care for the poor, Republicans want to protect America). Democrats were the party that won World War II and dominated American politics until, as Dueck put it, “Liberal Democrats began to abandon hardline foreign policy views following America’s war in Vietnam.” Then they became almost unelectable nationally for a generation.

From 1968 until 1992, Democrats only won the presidency once (and barely), after Watergate, the most serious domestic political scandal in American history. Republicans won four national landslides in that same time.

In other words, Republicans will not be able to play the “tough guy” forever while repeatedly promoting isolationist policies.

But this is not only a Republican problem. It is an American problem. Biden, and most Democrats in Congress, have been steadfast in support for aid to Ukraine, and, at least in public, supportive of Israel’s war against Hamas, and of Taiwanese independence. But the dovish elements in the Biden administration continually arise, and part of his base remains very skeptical of American power. The most progressive members of Congress have pulled their punches only in deference to Biden. It is not clear, if the administration, and the Democratic party writ large, will maintain its resolve over time. One can only hope.

Meanwhile, the EU just overcame Hungarian objections to dedicate $54 billion for Ukraine. European defense leaders such as Dutch Adm. Rob Bauer, a senior NATO official, said “We need a war-fighting transformation of NATO” if there is to ever be hope of deterring Russia in coming years. There is real concern that Russia could achieve something it believes was worth the price — by the Kremlin’s standard, not ours — which would only encourage more expansion.

Utah Sen. Mitt Romney was correct when he recently said, “America has long been considered the leader of the free world,” but it is difficult to escape the notion that, due mostly to Republican intransigence, America is not acting as such. It is not even leading from behind. Its allies are trying to drag it along, kicking and screaming. And so far, it has not budged. Indeed, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg recently traveled from Europe to try to talk Republicans into helping Ukraine. It is difficult to overstate the size of such a shift where Europeans are trying to talk Republicans into taking a more hawkish stance.

This shirking of leadership is a disaster for Europe. While Ukraine is holding its own against a much larger foe, it is running low on ammo and a stalemate aids Putin’s aggression. Professor Philips O’Brien of the University of St. Andrews recently said that Putin’s invasion, “changed the entire future of European security.” And the consequences are not relegated only to Europe. Taiwan’s de-facto ambassador, for example, has publicly argued that his country’s freedom is likely dependent on signaling to China that the West has resolve and will continue to help defend Ukraine from Russian aggression.

To believe the degradation of the American-led world order will not impact ordinary Americans lives is naïve. It will affect our what we buy, what we sell, our ability to travel, and our very concept of America and its place in the world. The late, great Charles Krauthammer was prophetic when said in 2016, “Two generations of Americans have grown up feeling that international stability is as natural as the air we breathe. It’s not. It depends on continual, calibrated tending.”

Is all this really at risk over the fight over a single spending bill? Maybe not. Ukraine will continue the fight even without American dollars, and Moscow could prove even more brittle than it currently appears. Also, the Senate is poised to advance Ukraine funding on its own and, at least on paper, most Republicans in the House, and virtually all Democrats, favor Ukraine funding. But previously, Republicans had refused to advance Ukraine funding without the border component they just rejected, so whether it’ll pass the House remains very unclear.

But even the most optimistic outcome stands to diminish America’s leadership and ability to shape foreign affairs.

This dynamic did not start yesterday. House Speaker Mike Johnson has the thinnest of majorities and can be ousted at any time by his least reasonable members. Tucker Carlson, until recently the most influential media figure on the right and the modern equivalent of Depression-era demagogue Father Coughlin, recently traveled to Moscow and interviewed Vladimir Putin, functionally doing Putin’s PR directly for him. Correcting the course will not be easy.

In the classic book, “The Good Earth,” Pearl S. Buck wrote that “If you will hold your land you can live — no one can rob you of land. ... If you sell the land, it is the end.” The land inherited by the past two generations is the international order, forged in blood, that wildly benefited America. In my lifetime, those dedicated most strongly to maintaining that order have been Republicans. If the current course continues, they will sacrifice not only their own futures, but the good of the country, and indeed the world.

Cliff Smith is a lawyer and a former congressional staffer. He lives in Washington, D.C., where he works on national security related issues.

deseret.com · by Cliff Smith [month] [day], [year], [hour]:[minute][ampm] [timezone] · February 12, 2024

20. Romania Is Quietly Doing Great

One of those who emigrated is now a great American (and a great American patriot - yes he also loves the New England Patriots) and close personal friend. He also provides us with knowledge of revolution and resistance to tyranny.

Romania Is Quietly Doing Great

The country lost a sixth of its population to emigration after 1990. Now, thanks to a thriving economy, young Romanians are coming back.

The American Conservative · by The American Conservative · February 12, 2024

When you tell Romanians you are visiting, their advice is unanimous: “Visit the rustic beauty of Transylvania, avoid the unsightly Bucharest.” Ignoring this counsel, I embarked on a month-long sojourn in Bucharest, wandering its streets in a sort of urban exploration, uncovering the unpolished truths beneath its surface. It’s a dirty, ugly city, they said. Perfect.

My arrival in Bucharest was marked by an almost ritualistic initiation: the airport cab driver ripped me off. This didn’t make me mad, instead I felt like I was finally part of the club, the screwed-by-a-cabbie-in-Eastern-Europe club. Admittedly, my own weariness and laziness made me an easy mark. I thought I was savvy, keeping an eye on the meter, but these drivers have a hidden button to jack up the meter they press when you are not looking. Lesson learned: If you must travel the roads of Bucharest—and Bucharest recently surpassed London as the EU city with the worst traffic—always take an Uber.

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My Airbnb was one floor above an establishment whose nature was thinly veiled by a sign declaring, “THIS IS NOT A BROTHEL.” Walking up the stairwell, my path often crossed with young women bearing the weight of sorrow in their eyes and men with a spring in their step. The stark contrast of these encounters, a daily reminder of the moral erosion lurking in the city’s underbelly, was sad in a way that sticks to your soul.

The city is like some kind of mad experiment where communist ghosts and capitalist dreams crashed into each other and decided to coexist. An eclectic mix of Latin warmth, Ottoman tradition, Balkan fire, and Slavic cool is manifest in its architecture. They used to call it “Paris on the Danube” because of grand French-inspired edifices like the Arcul de Triumf, a nod to the iconic Arc de Triomphe, but that nickname no longer sticks after the city’s urban fabric was forever scarred by the cataclysms of World War II. Heavily bombed first by the Allies and then, after Romania switched sides, by the Germans, Bucharest lost many historical buildings and structures.

The city’s landscape was then further transformed under the regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania’s communist dictator from 1965 to 1989, who ripped out the heart of the city by bulldozing large swaths to realize his utilitarian vision. Parisian grandeur was replaced with grey, grim, dystopian, decaying, crumbling “commie blocks” that look like they’re rotting away. Those things are everywhere, like leprosy eating away at the city, graffiti-laden relics of a city that’s seen too much.

The most emblematic legacy of Ceaușescu’s rule is the colossal Parliament building, the world’s heaviest building, weighing approximately 4,098,500,000 kilograms. In terms of size among administrative buildings, it is second only to the Pentagon. It bankrupted the country to build it. The locals have bestowed upon it the sardonic nickname “Ceaușescima,” a portmanteau of Ceaușescu’s name and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. According to a survey by Romania’s School for Political Studies, this building is paradoxically regarded by locals as simultaneously the most beautiful and the ugliest structure in the city.

In 1989, the toppling of Ceaușescu’s regime unleashed a maelstrom of revolution in Bucharest that once again destroyed much of the city. My scammer cab driver, who had been a soldier during that revolution, confided in me his act of rebellion: refusing to fire upon the protesters when ordered to do so, a memory he cherishes with a sense of honor. Following the revolution, the city further decayed, but now things are changing. The passage of time (and billions of dollars from the EU) has ushered in a renaissance of regeneration, energy, and progress, reshaping it into a destination of dark allure and electric modernity.

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The modernity of Bucharest is somewhat tainted by an overabundance of trivial, vapid, and tacky entertainment. The city is littered with bars, strip clubs, brothels, casinos, and gambling hubs, making it a haven for inexpensive European bachelor parties. This hedonistic façade coexists bizarrely with an abundance of witches, tarot card readers, and fortune tellers. Donald Dunham, an American diplomat stationed in Bucharest in 1948, noted of Romanians, “They are superstitious but religious at the same time.” While 96.5 percent of Romanians believe in God and 84.4 percent believe in saints, an astonishing 60 percent also read their horoscope, even though canon law of the Orthodox Church forbids astrology. In 2011, lawmakers backed down from legislation to tax witches out of fears that they would be cursed

Seemingly the only aspect of the city not to suffer from irrational contrasts is its demographics: Romania belongs to Romanians. In London, you’ll see more Pakistanis than British; Rome is teeming with hordes of selfie-stick-toting tourists. In Bucharest, I didn’t see a single African, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese person the entire month. Ethnic Romanians are 97 percent of the city’s population; 2 percent are Gypsy, Jewish, Turkish, German, or Hungarian; the remaining 1 percent belong to the rest of the world. Because of its homogeneity, the sense of safety in the city is palpable: Bucharest is ranked the 67th safest city in the entire world. There are virtually no pickpockets. With no tourists to prey on, why would there be? The murder rate of 1.3 per 100,000 people is on par with France, Sweden, and Finland, compared to a murder rate of 6.35 in the United States, whose peer countries include Zambia, Yemen, and Uganda.

This modern murder rate is a mere third of where it stood 30 years ago following the fall of communism, which coincides with a remarkable 732 percent surge in GDP per capita. This positive shift has begun to counteract the trend of outmigration that saw Romania’s population shrink by 14 percent during the same span, a trend driven more by emigration than declining birth rates. Approximately 3.4 million Romanians emigrated in the ten years following the country's entry into the EU. The peak of this exodus was in 2008, when 7.3 out of every 1,000 citizens left, but in 2024 the outmigration rate has dramatically decreased to just 0.7 per 1,000, signaling a significant turnaround.

The profession that was perhaps hit most by this wave of emigration was medical doctors. With the allure of higher salaries and more opportunities in Western Europe, their exodus was further exacerbated by the 2010 austerity measures that slashed public sector salaries by 25 percent. In 2020 alone, 2,173 Romanian doctors requested certificates of conformity to practice abroad, equating to nearly one doctor leaving every four hours.

Bogdan Enache, a millennial cardiologist practicing in Monaco for the last seven years, returned to Romania in 2024 to establish a practice in his hometown of Timisoara. “Mostly for the sake of my family, but in my days of optimism also with a thought that I can improve things here,” he tells me. “I have some reasons to believe that the tide is turning for Romania.”

“First and foremost, the economy has been growing. In the last ten years, the average net income has tripled,” says Dr. Enache. “And check out the fertility rates around Europe since 2000: Romania has gone from 1.3 to 1.8, which is the opposite trend of the rest of the EU, it doesn’t even seem close to others.”

Do Romanians resent the past two decades of mass emigration? “I don’t think there is resentment on a public/societal scale. I think people are still proud when their children go abroad (especially true for education),” says Dr. Enache. However, “there is a whole generation of children, sadly but predictably from lower income backgrounds, whose parents went to work in Europe and left their small children to be raised by their grandparents. They’d send money back and come to visit a couple of weeks per year. There have been some journalistic pieces about this phenomenon.”

In 2018, the Romanian government increased the salaries of medical personnel by up to 287 percent depending on speciality. Did that play a significant role in Dr. Enache’s return?

“Although not a key factor—I’m well aware I’ll be getting a pay cut—it is reassuring to know that I won’t be coming back to frustratingly low wages insufficient for decent living. The costs of daily life are much lower in Romania, so 1000 EUR gets you much further than 1000 EUR in Monaco,” says Dr. Enache. “The aspects most commonly cited by my colleagues [who emigrate] are wages, access to jobs, and an environment with the right infrastructure and equipment necessary to do the thing you’ve been trained for.”

The trend of emigration is reversing. Is it because Romania is more prosperous, or did people get disillusioned with the west and decide it’s not the wonderful golden land they imagined and thus not worth moving to?

“Definitely a bit of both. I think it’s also the case that people moving to another country find out that there’s no such thing as a perfect country and that every place has tradeoffs,” he says. “The cultural, economic, and developmental gap between Romania and ‘the West’ seems much much smaller nowadays than twenty or thirty years ago.”

“In some countries, such as France or the UK, the younger generations feel worse off than their parents or grandparents, whereas in other places, Romania, Poland, Czechia, our parents and grandparents had it so bad that it’s easier for our generation to feel positive progress.”

The American Conservative · by The American Conservative · February 12, 2024

21. Special Operations News - February 12, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News - February 12, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · February 12, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A 31st Rescue Squadron pararescueman jumps out of an MC-130J Commando II assigned to the 353rd Special Operations Wing over Okinawa, Japan, Jan. 19, 2024. Pararescuemen are trained, equipped and postured to conduct full spectrum personnel recovery operations in both peacetime and combat environments. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Tylir Meyer)

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SOF News

Report – U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Considerations for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS RS21048, updated February 9, 2024, PDF, 13 pages. Considerations for Congress include Army Special Forces recruiting and possible force structure reductions and Air Force Special Operations Power Projection Wings and future unit relocations. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048

New Ruck for Airborne Commo Soldiers. The U.S. Army Airborne Test Force (ATF) located at Yuma Test Center, Yuma Proving Ground, recently tested the Army’s newest Radio Carrier Rucksack (RCR) solution. The RCR was developed and produced by the Natick Soldier Systems Center in Massachusetts. It was tested in combat-realistic scenarios to see if the RCRs could be used in parachute operations without damage to radios or the ruck. “Airborne Test Force tests field radio ruck to survive airborne combat missions”, by Ana Henderson, U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground, DVIDS, February 8, 2024.

SOCOM Seeking Kamikaze Drones. The United States Special Operations Command is on the lookout for a loitering munitions capability that can be launched from AC-130J Ghostrider gunships, MQ-9 Reader drones, MH-60 helicopter and other platforms. “SOCOM gearing up to assess air-launched kamikaze drones”, Defensescoop, February 8, 2024.

SOF and Lessons Learned. The commander of USSOCOM, General Bryan Fenton, recently spoke with reporters during a Defense Writers Group event on February 9th. He provided some insight on how USSOCOM is learning from current conflicts. “U.S. Special Operators ‘Gobbling Up’ Lessons Learned in Ukraine, Gaza”, National Defense Magazine, February 9, 2024.

Floating Navy SEAL Base. The USS Lewis B. Puller is an expeditionary sea base (Business Insider, 5 Feb 2024) stationed in the Arabian Sea. it is used as a launching pad for Naval Special Warfare units and missions as well as a wide variety of military operations. The two SEALs lost in the VBSS mission on a dhow off the coast of Somalia were launched in a small boat from the Puller.

Army SOF to Transfer to Baumholder. U.S. special operations troops based in Stuttgart are expected to take up residence at a rural base in southwestern Germany in 2026, adding 1,000 people to a garrison once on the Pentagon’s chopping block. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) is expected to remain in Stuttgart. “Transfer of Army special operators to Baumholder on track for 2026”, Stars and Stripes, February 6, 2024.

Blacksmith Publishing is a media partner of SOF News. They are a book publishing firm, sell ‘Pinelander Swag’, have a weekly podcast called The Pinelander.

Cuts to PSYOP Units. Key psychological operations capabilities may soon be cut from the U.S. Army in an effort to trim USASOC force structure. “US may cut info-warfare assets as China, Russia expand influence ops”, Defense One, February 8, 2024.

U.S. Psychological Warfare Capability in Decline. Cole Livieratos and Ken Gleiman, two former Army officers, outline the long history of PYSOP and the proposed cut to United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) force structure that will gut the U.S. military’s ability to understand and influence the modern battlefield. “Special Operations Force Structure: Strategic Calculus or Organizational Power?”, War on the Rocks, February 6, 2024.

10th SFG(A) and VirTra Training. The VirTra simulator is a program featuring technology that can present different scenarios to its users which helps sharpen shooting skills. The different scenario options that VirTra features include active threat, hostage situation, threat recognition and high-risk entry. Through these scenarios, the VirTra simulator is actively analyzing the decisions that its users make and then adjusting what happens in the program based on those decisions. “VirTra Reality Simulator Training”, DVIDS, February 2, 2024.

10th SFG(A) Soldiers and Mountain Climbing. The NCOIC of the Special Operations Mountain Training Warfare Training Center is no stranger to high mountains and cold weather. “Summit or Survival: A Green Beret’s Odyssey From Everest to Denali”, Global Rescue, February 7, 2024.

Jacobs Loses Big SOCOM Contract. Jacobs lost out on a contract worth $2.8 billion for the Special Operations Forces IT Enterprise Contract (SITEC). (Washington Technology, 7 Feb 2024)

C-27 Spartan. One of the Army’s biggest aircraft is flown by the USASOC Flight Company located at Fort Liberty, North Carolina (FBNC). (The Aviationist, 7 Feb 2024)

SEALs in Exercise Dragon Trident. East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare Operators recently took part in an exercise that saw them infiltrating a fixed defensive position located in Nevada. (DVIDS, 9 Feb 2024)

International SOF

Ukrainian SOF. Ukraine says its special forces blew up a Black Sea mining platform in the night to throw off Russian drone operations. The SOF unit approached the platform in small boats, searched the facility, and then blew it up. (Business Insider, 6 Feb 2024)

Training UKRSOF. United States Special Operations Forces began training the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces in 2015. Much of that initial training instruction emphasized a comprehensive irregular warfare skillset over the formerly adopted Spetsnaz approach. Currently Task Group – Ukraine (TG-U), part of the much larger Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 10 (CJSOTF-1), is responsible for training, equipping, and advising UKRSOF. The CJSOTF collaborates with the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U). “The Key to Ukrainian Victory is Partnering (not Ukrainifying)”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, February 6, 2024.

NATO SOF. On February 8, 2024, the NATO Military Committee visited Allied Special Operations Forces Command in Belgium. The committee members received briefings on SOFCOM and the role of Allied and Partner SOF contributions to collective defense. (NATO, 9 Feb 2024)

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Situation Update. The conflict in Gaza Strip continues. Israeli actions are now focused on southern Gaza with operations underway in Khan Younis and future operations to be conducted in Rafa (The Hill, 9 Feb 2024) close to the Egyptian border. Most of the population of Gaza has been displaced with as many as 1.4 million in Rafa city. Rafa remains one of the last holdout areas of Hamas – an estimate of four battalions, intermixed with the refugees and city population. Attempts of a negotiated settlement have been unsuccessful. “Palestinians brace for Rafah assault as Israel promises evacuation plan”, Reuters, February 10, 2024.

Hostages. Hama still has over 130 hostages seized during the October 7th terrorist attacks in Israel. It is estimated that about 1/5 of hostages taken by Hamas are now dead. Two hostages, ages 60 and 70, were rescued by Israeli commandos on Sunday, February 11, 2024. They were held in Rafah; the IDF conducted air strikes in Rafah as a diversion.

King of Jordan in Airdrop Over Gaza. A video showed King Abdullah in military gear on board a plane in the latest mission by the Jordanian Air Force to drop urgent medical supplies to field hospitals it runs in Gaza. Thus far, Jordan has conducted 11 air drops. “Jordan’s King Abdullah participates in Gaza aid drop”, The Jerusalem Post, February 11, 2024.

• References:
• Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.
• Israel-Hamas War: Insights from RAND

Ukraine Conflict

Ten Year Anniversary of Ukraine War. In February 2014, Russia seized Crimea. Some nations conflate conventional warfare with war. However, irregular warfare – such as the taking of Crimea from Ukraine with “little green men” – is not recognized as warfare. Andrew Maher outlines four important lessons that can be drawn from the Ukraine conflict. “The anniversary of war in Ukraine – 10 years, not two years”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 7, 2024.

New Ukraine Military Leader. The popular general leading the armed forces of Ukraine has been relieved by President Zelensky. The president says he is looking for a different approach to mobilization, recruitment, and frontline management. The new Commander-in-Chief is General Oleksandr Syrskyi – the commander of Ukraine’s Ground Forces since 2019. “Ukraine’s new military chief focused on high-tech, command and control”, C4ISRNET, February 9, 2024.

Unmanned Systems Force. Drones have proven very effective for the Ukrainian military both on land and at sea. The security situation on the Black Sea has been improved for the Ukrainians because of airborne and seaborne drones equipped with explosives. As a result of the effectiveness of drones Ukraine has established a separate command for the use of UAVs.

Report – Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Igor Delanoe has provided a report on the performance and current status of the Black Sea Fleet. He describes how it has moved from the offense to an active defense. The Russian vessels have begun operating at a greater distance from the Ukrainian coasts. The Russians have learned some lessons from the current conflict and will likely be incorporating them into future naval operations – both in the Black Sea and around the globe. Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2024, PDF, 22 pages.

Report – The Kremlin’s Occupation Playbook. This publication describes the coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing taking place in occupied Ukraine. Institute for the Study of War, February 2024, PDF, 29 pages.

Report – Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine. Stacie Pettyjohn has published a detailed report on how drones have transformed the battlefield in the war in Ukraine. Center of a New American Security (CNAS), February 8, 2024, PDF, 67 pages.

Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats.

On storymaps.arcgis.com

National Security

Yemen Strikes. The United States has continued its campaign against Houthi missile sites and naval attack drones in recent days. In the past week U.S. forces have destroyed 29 missiles in Yemen and 10 drone ships.

SECDEF Back in Hospital. On Sunday, February 11, 2024, the Pentagon Press Secretary announced that Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin was transported to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center to be seen for a developing health issue. Austin has transferred the functions and duties of the SECDEF office to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks. The CJCS, White House, and Congress has been notified. The press release didn’t specify if it was a day visit or overnight stay. (DOD, 11 Feb 2024)

Border Security Bill, Dead on Arrival. The Senate worked for four months to come up with a compromise bill that would provide aid to Ukraine, Israel, humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and also improve border security and improve the immigration process. However, it died a quick death. Now Congress is looking to put together an aid bill for Ukraine and Israel that both political parties and both chambers of Congress can agree on. At the same time, there is a bipartisan push to include an amendment (formerly called the Afghan Adjustment Act) that would assist the many Afghans who arrived in the U.S. after Afghanistan fell to the Taliban in August 2021 as well as certain categories of Afghan military personnel. If included, the language would provide the possibility to apply for Special Immigrant Visa status for former members of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW).

Growing Importance of PMCs. The influence of private military organizations like Blackwater and Wagner Grup is set to increase in the coming decades. Read about the long history and coming future of mercenary groups. “The Future of Private Military Companies”, by Federica Saini Fasanotti, GIS Reports, February 6, 2024.

Report – U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas, Congressional Research Service, CRS R42784, updated February 5, 2024, PDF, 142 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784

Report – Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45811, updated February 9, 2024, PDF, 36 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45811

Report – Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), Congressional Research Service, CRS IF10613, updated February 8, 2024, PDF, 3 pages. The CRS has published a paper that describes what the FTO list is, the designation criteria, and who is on the list. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10613

Podcasts and Videos

Podcast – Stay Behind Operations. Brian Petit (retired SF officer) and Marta Kepe (RAND Corporation) are the guests for this podcast episode that contrasts conventional conflict with resistance warfare. They discuss how small states can impose outsized costs on occupying powers by operating behind enemy lines. Irregular Warfare Podcast, February 9, 2024, 46 minutes. https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/stay-behind-operations/

Video – What is Irregular Warfare? The Joint Special Operations University describes the nature of IW. February 8, 2024, YouTube, February 8, 2024, 4 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zt7LtwQ-WRg

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Defense Strategies

sof.news · by SOF News · February 12, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com