Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"In this kind of war a natural gap exists between the expectations of the of the politicians, of the public opinion, of the press and the real capacity of the armed forces to deliver. The gap is a characteristic of this kind of war. The gap is related the four dimensions: To the duration of the war; to the number of casualties; to the damage to the innocent civilians on the other side; and, what is more important, is the solution to the problem of the question of whether or not a decisive victory can or cannot be achieved."

– Giora Eiland

“Writing, as most art, is considered to be essentially superfluous. Who is an artist before a surgeon? Or a scientist? But the fact that tyrants and political forces of every age have been threatened by art again and again, condemned it as degenerate or poisonous, and have silenced, brutalized, or murdered artists because of their work only serves to illustrate how significant art is, that it is our one greatest power. I would even go so far as to say that the tyrant ‘understands’ art more than the devotee, for the latter is generally too ‘pious’ and adoring, almost like a simple-minded believer overwrought by faith who simply loves and finds everything ‘great,’ whereas the former suffers the transformative threat of art more, is even endangered by it, hence their terror.”

– Rainer J. Hanshe

“Ethics and oversight are what you eliminate when you want absolute power.”

– DaShanne Stokes

1. Seoul 'open-minded' about Japan's participation in Korea-US nuclear deterrence dialogue: ex-Seoul official

2. S. Korea vows 'overwhelming response' if N. Korea provokes

3. N. Korea's ruling party delegation visiting Russia for int'l forum

4. Key U.S. allies in Seoul, Tokyo hit by scandals, plunging polls

5. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Lack of foreign exchange leads to drop in RMB…Provincial trading companies can’t trade with China due to lack of foreign cash

6. North Korea cracks down on homes converted into Airbnb-style lodgings

7. What’s Driving Kim Jong Un’s New Regional Development Policy?

8. Hyesan residents suffer water shortages

9. Even With Trump, Kim Jong Un May Spurn Talks, Analysts Warn

10. Why one North Korean educator was deemed a “first-class reactionary”

11. Where is Kim Jong Un’s eldest son and what is he doing?

12. Some thoughts on Kim Jong Un’s outdated “20x10 regional development policy”

13. The real reasons why Kim Jong-un’s full-scale provocation is unlikely

14. UNC bases in Japan play critical role in Northeast Asia security

15. Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and two-state system

16. A movie star, a suicide and a nation's war on drugs (South Korea)

1. Seoul 'open-minded' about Japan's participation in Korea-US nuclear deterrence dialogue: ex-Seoul official

A good session at CSIS today. I am surprised they did not mention Syd Seiler's excellent speech describing north Korea's current situation. Of course the focus was on trilateral cooperation.

Seoul 'open-minded' about Japan's participation in Korea-US nuclear deterrence dialogue: ex-Seoul official

The Korea Times · February 13, 2024

Former South Korean National Security Advisor Kim Sung-han speaks during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Feb. 12. Yonhap

South Korea is "open-minded" about the idea of Japan participating in a currently bilateral nuclear deterrence dialogue between Seoul and Washington, a former South Korean national security advisor said Monday.

Kim Sung-han, who served as President Yoon Suk Yeol's top security advisor from 2022-2023, made the remarks, noting that while in office, he had discussions with his counterpart over the idea of Japan's participation in the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration that Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted during their summit in Washington last April as part of efforts to enhance deterrence against evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

"It depends on Japan. Korea is open-minded," Kim said during the form hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

"So we need to think about whether we will have ROK-U.S. NCG and ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral NCG, respectively, or we can have Japan join ROK-U.S. NCG in a gradual manner. It depends on Japan, which requires some closer cooperation and consultation beforehand," he added.

ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

Kim pointed out that for Japan, its participation in such an apparatus about the use of nuclear arms would be a sensitive issue — in an apparent reference to domestic opposition in Japan about any potential employment of nuclear weapons.

"I myself had a chance to talk to my Japanese counterpart about that issue when I was in the government. But this is a somewhat sensitive issue to Japan because NCG is about how to use nuclear weapons in a contingency," he said. "So from the Japanese perspective, this might provoke some domestic kind of discussions."

Expansion discussions of the NCG to include Japan came as Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have been stepping up security cooperation through three-way military drills and diplomatic talks to counter unceasing security threats from Pyongyang.

The CSIS forum centered on the issue of how to strengthen trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan amid the possibility that the three-way partnership could be affected by the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November.

Sung Kim, former U.S. special representative for North Korea, speaks during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Feb. 12. Yonhap

Sung Kim, former U.S. special representative for North Korea, stressed the need to "institutionalize" three-way cooperation to ensure that tripartite efforts to promote mutual interests continue regardless of domestic political events.

"Whether it's military exercises, information sharing or cooperation in cyber, once we institutionalize and establish friendly, cooperative activities among the three countries, less likely that they will be affected by elections," he said.

Highlighting the current stature, power and influence of South Korea and Japan, Kim stressed that it is "only natural" that there will be greater "challenge-sharing" and "burden-sharing" among the U.S. and its key Asian allies.

"I would say that irrespective of what happens in November here, we should expect to see more of an active role played by both Japan and ROK diplomacy," he said.

Noting that Pyongyang remains uninterested in dialogue and continues its weapons programs, Sung Kim underscored the growing need to cement trilateral cooperation.

"This is why it's even more critical that our three governments continue to focus on strengthening our extended deterrence cooperation, trilateral cooperation more broadly," he said. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · February 13, 2024

2. S. Korea vows 'overwhelming response' if N. Korea provokes

I am pretty sure the ROK is going to have a chance to test its overwhelming response in the near future.

Excerpts:

"Our military maintains a posture that can overwhelmingly respond to North Korea's artillery provocations, while continuously monitoring its weapons development and enhancing our deterrence and response capabilities," JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun said in a regular press briefing.

Lee said the military didn't immediately release the information as the rocket launcher does not fall within the scope of disclosure as outlined in its protocol. The JCS usually unveils the North's ballistic missile and major weapons tests.

The North conducted the test firing of the multiple rocket launcher shells toward the Yellow Sea from an area near the western port city of Nampho on Sunday, according to military sources.

S. Korea vows 'overwhelming response' if N. Korea provokes | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 13, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean military said Tuesday it is ready to "overwhelmingly" respond to any North Korean provocations as Pyongyang is dialing up tensions with a series of new weapons tests.

North Korea said Monday it has developed a 240 mm-caliber controllable multiple rocket launcher shell and its ballistic control system to expand its weapons arsenal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected and monitored the North's test firing in real time Sunday afternoon and has been analyzing its specifications jointly with the United States.

"Our military maintains a posture that can overwhelmingly respond to North Korea's artillery provocations, while continuously monitoring its weapons development and enhancing our deterrence and response capabilities," JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun said in a regular press briefing.

Lee said the military didn't immediately release the information as the rocket launcher does not fall within the scope of disclosure as outlined in its protocol. The JCS usually unveils the North's ballistic missile and major weapons tests.

The North conducted the test firing of the multiple rocket launcher shells toward the Yellow Sea from an area near the western port city of Nampho on Sunday, according to military sources.

The North's 240 mm multiple rocket launcher system is known to be deployed near the border, posing potential threats to the South's broader capital area.

The latest test came just days ahead of the late leader Kim Jong-il's birthday, a major holiday that falls on Friday this year, but there have been no special movements by the North Korean military so far, according to the JCS.

North Korea has ratcheted up tensions on the Korean Peninsula with weapons tests in the new year, including launches of cruise missiles from sea and land, as well as artillery firings into waters near the western inter-Korean sea border.

These images, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 12, 2024, shows North Korea conducting a ballistic control test firing of 240 mm-caliber controllable multiple rocket launcher shells the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 13, 2024

3. N. Korea's ruling party delegation visiting Russia for int'l forum

Excerpt:

The delegation plans to attend the first meeting of the forum, "For the Freedom of Nations," the KCNA said, without disclosing other details of the itinerary.

The forum will be held on Feb. 15-17 in a bid to develop multilateral cooperation for "the fight against modern practices of neo-colonialism," according to the website of United Russia.

N. Korea's ruling party delegation visiting Russia for int'l forum | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 13, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- A delegation of North Korea's ruling party officials have left for Russia to attend an international forum, state media reported Tuesday, amid deepening bilateral cooperation in the military and other sectors.

Kim Su-gil, alternate member of the political bureau of the Workers' Party, and other delegates departed Pyongyang on Monday for a trip to Russia at the invitation of Russia's ruling United Russia party, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The delegation plans to attend the first meeting of the forum, "For the Freedom of Nations," the KCNA said, without disclosing other details of the itinerary.

The forum will be held on Feb. 15-17 in a bid to develop multilateral cooperation for "the fight against modern practices of neo-colonialism," according to the website of United Russia.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 13, 2024, shows a North Korean delegation, led by Kim Su-gil (front, R), chief secretary of the Pyongyang Municipal Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, being seen off as it left Pyongyang to visit Russia to attend a global forum. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea and Russia have expanded the scope of cooperation following the summit between the North's leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September last year.

Pyongyang is suspected of having provided artillery and munitions to Russia for use in Moscow's war in Ukraine in exchange for Russia's potential transfer of weapons technology.

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui made an official trip to Russia in January after her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, visited Pyongyang last year.

Russian tourists also recently visited North Korea as part of the first group trip to the secretive regime since last year when North Korea partially opened its border amid eased concerns over the COVID-19 pandemic.

Seoul's unification ministry said exchanges between North Korea and Russia have become "vibrant" following last year's summit.

"We do not evaluate ordinary exchanges between North Korea and Russia. But they should stop illegal activities that violate U.N. Security Council resolutions, such as arms trades or the dispatch of (North Korean) workers," a ministry official told reporters.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

Russian tourists embark on 1st post-COVID group trip to N. Korea

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 13, 2024

4. Key U.S. allies in Seoul, Tokyo hit by scandals, plunging polls

Key U.S. allies in Seoul, Tokyo hit by scandals, plunging polls

Yoon, Kishida woes complicate hopes for united front against China, North Korea

By Andrew Salmon - The Washington Times - Friday, February 9, 2024

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

President Joe Biden, left, talks with Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, right, ahead of a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan, Sunday, May 21, 2023. Biden aims … President Joe Biden, left, talks with … more >

By - The Washington Times - Friday, February 9, 2024

SEOUL, South Korea — Washington has been keen to encourage the new cooperative spirit uniting Seoul and Tokyo, enabling the trilateralism U.S. defense planners have long sought to project in a region overshadowed by China and North Korea.

The voters in two key U.S. allies in East Asia are far less pleased with their leaders as China and North Korea threaten to sorely test President Biden’s high hopes at a precedent-breaking August summit at Camp David.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is reeling from a succession of party scandals, and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is facing fallout from questions over his wife’s behavior. Both have dangerously low approval ratings, but the South Korean leader looks more vulnerable.

Mr. Kishida’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP, looks firmly entrenched in power in Tokyo, Japanese political watchers say.

Mr. Yoon’s People Power Party, or PPP, is a minority in the National Assembly, and general elections in April could erode its position further. That could leave the president politically crippled with three years still to serve.

Ratings woes, wife troubles

The conservative Mr. Yoon won the presidential election by less than 1% in 2022. Facing an opposition-controlled house, the president, who had no prior diplomatic or overseas experience, surprised many in Seoul by focusing on foreign affairs early in his term.

His initiatives include patching up decades of historical animosity with former colonial power Japan, creating a nuclear consultative group, and expanding nuclear protection from the U.S. against an attack from North Korea.

With National Assembly elections looming, the scandal known as Diorgate has engulfed his wife, Kim Keon-hee, at a terrible time for the government.

In a bizarre affair in 2022, a Christian pastor met Mrs. Kim and gave her a Dior handbag worth $2,250. She asked him the reason for the gift but accepted the bag. The pastor’s aim in approaching Mrs. Kim was to win a meeting to urge Mr. Yoon to soften his hard-line policy toward Pyongyang. He captured footage of the event with a secret camera.

The news and footage broke in November, embarrassing Mr. Yoon, Mrs. Kim and the ruling PPP. In a rare TV interview last week, Mr. Yoon accused the pastor of a “political maneuver.”

Instead of apologizing on behalf of his wife, he excused her because of her good nature. “The fact that she was unable to coldheartedly reject him was the problem,” he said.

The wording generated fresh controversy. The small opposition New Future Party accused national broadcaster KBS, which interviewed Mr. Yoon, of becoming “a PR agency for the president’s family.” The main opposition has had a field day demanding an investigation into the actions of the South Korean first lady.

Low ratings are nothing new for Mr. Yoon, who was hovering around 30% positive within months of taking office. His latest ratings, 29%, combined with upcoming elections, could ignite a bigger political explosion.

“A lot of the public are gossiping about the Dior bag, though it is not a big thing. It should not affect their personal or economic circumstances,” said Yang Sung-mook, a former foreign affairs adviser to the opposition. “But it will grow in the public mind.”

That is ominous. Former President Park Geun-hye, though unmarried, was politically destroyed by her tight relationship with a corrupt associate, Choi Soon-sil. Ms. Park was impeached, out of office and imprisoned in 2017.

Mr. Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in, was also damaged politically by his close association with a friend he hired to reform the legal system. The friend, a colorful academic named Cho Kuk, lost the high-profile reform fight and became embroiled in his wife’s forgery case.

The big beneficiary of that scandal was Mr. Yoon. As chief prosecutor, he used the episode as a springboard to a campaign that gave him the presidency.

First ladies have proved problematic for previous presidents. Most notably, former President Roh Moo-hyun died by suicide after leaving office in 2009 amid a corruption probe that targeted his wife. After Roh’s death, the investigation was dropped.

Calling Mrs. Kim “a liability from the beginning,” Mr. Yang warned that momentum could build against Mr. Yoon. “If he loses the [April] general election, that could build up a loss to the next presidential election.”

That contest is not due until 2027, suggesting potentially weak leadership in Seoul for a prolonged period.

“A ‘lame duck’ president is usually the last few months or the last year in office, and it ties the president’s hands,” said Michael Breen, author of “The New Koreans.” “But this could be a ‘lame duck’ for three years,” with the opposition able to veto virtually all of his major proposals.

“If Yoon is going to face a so-called vetocracy, we will see stalemate and confrontation between the presidential office and the assembly for three years and people will be exhausted,” said Lim Eun-jung, an expert on Japan and Korea relations at Kongju National University, who expects voters to elect a “patchwork” assembly in April.

“That is why the ruling party is really obsessed with this election,” she added.

Kishida wobbly, LDP secure

In Japan, Mr. Kishida is facing what some consider the biggest political graft scandal in decades. Last year, a succession of LDP lawmakers and aides were found to be using money raised from selling tickets to events to pay into party slush funds and then understating the amounts on their taxes.

Local press reports say 10 people, including three lawmakers, are under scrutiny from prosecutors. Mr. Kishida has acknowledged that 37 lawmakers are correcting their personal financial records and statements.

The prime minister apologized publicly and removed implicated lawmakers from his Cabinet last month. “I humbly regret and made a determination to have policy groups make a complete break from money and personnel affairs,” he said.

An earlier imbroglio linked the LDP with the Unification Church.

In 2022, former Prime Minister and LDP icon Shinzo Abe was assassinated. The killer said he acted because his family had been coerced into making large donations to the church more than a decade ago. The right-wing Mr. Abe had connections with the church, which espouses anti-communism.

That drew attention to linkages between the LDP and the Unification Church, which has reportedly mobilized members to support the conservative party during elections. In September 2022, the party revealed that nearly half of the members it surveyed had relations with the church and Mr. Kishida removed seven ministers with links to the church. The Japanese branch of the church, whose parent organization owns The Washington Times, denies wrongdoing and is now battling left-wing critics trying to take away its tax-exempt status as a religious organization.

The double whammy of scandals is having an impact. A January poll found the approval rating for Mr. Kishida’s Cabinet had fallen to 27%.

Yet, the LDP, which holds the upper and lower houses of the Diet with a religious-based coalition partner, looks firm. The January poll found the LDP to have approval ratings of 31% — well ahead of the main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, with just 8%.

“Institutionally, it is very difficult to overthrow this huge giant, the LDP,” said Ms. Lim. “The Japanese Democratic Party don’t have real alternative ideas either, and as long as they are not that popular, Japanese, who are quite conservative, tend to keep choosing the ruling party.”

Although the LDP is secure, Mr. Kishida may not be. The party holds an internal leadership contest in September.

Correction: An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of Lim Eun-jung.

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

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5. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Lack of foreign exchange leads to drop in RMB…Provincial trading companies can’t trade with China due to lack of foreign cash

Kim's policies undermine the economy. He is more concerned with control than with the people's "prosperity." Kim has been trying to eliminate the use of foreign currency. This is one of the effects of that policy.

Note this form of "capitalism:"

◆ Trading companies visit families of defectors to ask for loans

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Lack of foreign exchange leads to drop in RMB…Provincial trading companies can’t trade with China due to lack of foreign cash

asiapress.org

(File photo) A female vendor in an open-air market, confidently trading in Chinese yuan. In her hand is 1 Chinese yuan in change. Photographed in Yanggang Province in October 2013 (ASIAPRESS)

The exchange rate of the Chinese yuan is surging in North Korea. On February 7 and 8, an ASIAPRESS survey of unofficial foreign currency markets in North Hamgyong and Yanggang provinces found that the rate rose to 1,400 won, up more than 10 percent from the previous week. It has been nearly five years since March 2018 since the rate reached 1,400 won, based on surveys conducted by ASIAPRESS.

"I think it's because of the severe shortage of foreign currency in the country," said a Yanggang province-based reporting partner, who added that there was a possibility of a temporary rise just before the Chinese New Year.

◆ Lack of funds has slowed down imports from China

Kim Jong-un's regime scrapped its zero-corona policy and eased border closures last year. Trade with China has recovered to near pre-pandemic levels in 2019 (see Graph 1). Meanwhile, the trade deficit with China widened to $1.7161 billion last year.

Changes in trade between China and North Korea based on reports released by China’s customs agency. (ASIAPRESS)

"There is a serious shortage of foreign currency for trading companies. We need to sell seafood and minerals to China to be profitable, but it's not easy because of the restrictions. The only things being exported lately are products produced through contract manufacturing. Even then, we need money first because we have to import the materials from China,” a reporting partner in Yanggang Province said. Wigs, eyelashes, and woodwork are some of the latest items to be exported from North Korea.

A businessman who has long been brokering North Korean trade in China's Jilin province told ASIAPRESS:

"Trade has resumed on the Tumen River side and in Hyesan since last summer, but it has been slowing down lately. North Korean trading companies have no money, so even if they want to sell Chinese goods, they can't. The Chinese trading companies are also completely demoralized."

Trade between China and North Korea by month in 2023 based on reports released by China’s customs agency. (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Trading companies visit families of defectors to ask for loans

According to the reporting partner in Yanggang Province, officials from trading companies in the province that are struggling for funds are visiting the homes of defectors' family members and those who have relatives in South Korea, Japan, and the United States to solicit loans and co-investments in trade. The officials know they are secretly receiving remittances from abroad.

Because the Ministry of State Security (the secret police) is cracking down on anyone with connections to South Korea, trading companies are making it harder for the authorities to investigate defector’s relatives by offering them jobs if they provide financing.

Presently, North Korea's trade is heavily controlled by the state, which has authority over what is imported and exported, and the domestic distribution of imported goods is largely handled by state-owned organizations. Since the zero-corona policy was lifted, trade has been limited to the west coast cities of Sinuiju and Nampo, while trade with China in provincial cities has slowed down. (KANG Ji-won)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org

6. North Korea cracks down on homes converted into Airbnb-style lodgings

Cracking down on "capitalism."

North Korea cracks down on homes converted into Airbnb-style lodgings

The move targets informal innkeepers and prostitution.

By Moon Sung Hui for RFA Korean

2024.02.12

rfa.org

As North Korea prepares for two important holidays, authorities declared an “emergency security period” and began cracking down on people who turn their homes into lodging for holiday travelers, a move that residents told RFA was also aimed at curbing prostitution.

Seollal, the Korean version of the Lunar New Year celebrated all over East Asia fell on Saturday. This year, that’s less than a week before the Day of the Shining Star on Feb. 16, a day on which North Koreans remember Kim Jong Un’s father, the late “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il, who ruled the country from 1994 until his death in 2011.

As the two days are in such close proximity, the period between will serve as kind of an extended holiday this year, and travelers will need a place to stay. People with room to spare in their homes can open them up for a little extra cash.

But the government in the northern province of Ryanggang launched a surprise police inspection to root out the informal lodgings this week, a resident living there told RFA Korean.

The resident said this was the second holiday lodging inspection this year, following one that happened ahead of Kim Jong Un’s birthday on Jan. 8.

“The purpose of accommodation inspections is stated to be related to the ‘war on spies,’ but the actual purpose is to detect and eradicate private inns and prostitution,” he said, explaining that these private inns were very popular around train stations and marketplaces prior to the pandemic, and “anti-socialist” activities like prostitution went hand-in-hand, with them.

“Even before the pandemic … strong controls were implemented against private inns,” he said. “But private inns have not been eradicated because the elderly residents have no other way to make a living.”

Even staying in the house of a friend during the holidays can get a traveler in trouble, another Ryanggang resident told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.

Official accommodations

Travelers are supposed to stay in officially registered inns and other lodging places that send a portion of their money to authorities. But homeowners offering private lodging can avoid paying that money to the government.

“Quite a few people were caught in this inspection because they did not register for official accommodations,” she said. “They were mostly relatives or acquaintances living in Ryanggang Province. Close relatives were released once their residence was confirmed, but acquaintances were released with a fine of 3,000 won (35 U.S. cents).”

The farther away from Ryanggang the person was from, the stiffer the fine, she said.

“If guests from outside of Ryanggang Province were brought in, unless they were relatives, it was considered running a private inn and 300,000 won ($35) fine was imposed on the landlord,” she said. “Even if they had a travel document, a fine of 300,000 won was imposed on out-of-town guests who stayed without registering their stay.”

Those caught running a private inn more than once not only have to pay the hefty fine, they must also spend three months in a disciplinary labor center, the second resident said.

“The same fine and punishment are also applied to women who engage in prostitution with foreign guests at a private inn,” she said.

The risk is high and the money one can earn from Ryanggang’s version of Airbnb is very low in comparison.

“In Ryanggang Province, if you only sleep at a private inn, the cost of lodging is 4,000 won (47 cents),” she said. “If you include a bottle of alcohol and a meal, the cost is 15,000 won ($1.78).”

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

7. What’s Driving Kim Jong Un’s New Regional Development Policy?

Some thoughts from a draft paper that will hopefully soon be published:

Despite the wealth of speculation about Kim Jong Un he can be described simply as a leader who has no strategic vision and is a reckless thinker that makes him unpredictable to a certain extent. He can only follow the seven decades old “playbook” of the Kim family regime.

Kim Jong Un has been advocating that the nation's strength and the happiness of its people lie in a powerful nuclear capability since the early days of his regime. However, after more than ten years in power, the country's economy and people's lives have been devastated due to Kim’s decision making.

Kim Jong Un's major dilemma is "how to lead the country while possessing nuclear weapons." He lacks any vision for ensuring the well-being of the people using his nuclear weapons. If he truly desires the prosperity and happiness of the nation, he must abandon nuclear weapons and embrace a market economy. However, he fears that opening the country will lead to the collapse of his regime. This is Kim Jong Un's paradox of possessing nuclear weapons.

Excerpts:

While Kim’s “regional development policy 20×10” appears to be an extension of previous policies, the question of whether it will succeed is another matter entirely. One obvious shortcoming of the policy is that it is based on self-sufficiency. The amount of aid from the central government should become clear in the first half of the year, but Kim may be reluctant to disburse money from funds under his direct control.

Another variable is the various kinds of “non-tax burdens” that may be foisted upon the North Korean populace during this process. Such measures are currently being prepared right now by the relevant agencies, and the authorities are expected to demand money or goods from each region, either at a fixed rate or at a rate tailored to local circumstances. The likely result is an absurd situation in which a policy designed to win the hearts of the people is implemented by picking their pockets. From Kim’s point of view, the potential for greater volatility in public sentiment is another worrying consideration.

Yet another thorny issue is the possibility that Kim will lose the support of loyal elements in North Korea. The elites concentrated in Pyongyang have enjoyed considerable luxury thanks to the sacrifices of those in the provinces. If North Korea begins to invest its limited resources in the provinces, the elites could quickly become less loyal to the regime. They may begin to feel that they are being shortchanged by the regime’s policies. Ultimately, Kim’s bold regional development gambit is likely to be a crucible for his leadership.

What’s Driving Kim Jong Un’s New Regional Development Policy?

thediplomat.com

The plan acknowledges the severe disparity in living conditions between Pyongyang and the rest of the country – and the resulting public discontent.

By Lee Sang-yong

February 13, 2024

Credit: Depositphotos

North Korea’s leadership recently announced a new regional development policy entitled the “regional development 20×10 policy,” which refers to a plan to build manufacturing facilities in 20 cities and counties every year over the next 10 years. The policy can be seen as an official acknowledgement of the severe disparity in living conditions between Pyongyang, known as the “capital of the revolution,” and the rest of the country, and how this fact is causing considerable discontent among the North Korean people.

It was surprising that such an admission came from the lips of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on January 15. Kim also departed from the norm by giving the program a long time frame of 10 years, apparently recognizing that its goals cannot be achieved in a short period of time. What are the Kim regime’s true motives?

A Ploy to Win Over the Public?

First, it is clear that the Kim regime could no longer ignore the continuing deterioration of public opinion in areas outside Pyongyang, commonly referred to as the “provinces.” In Pyongyang, the regime has been able to score points with the public since 2021 with housing projects in Songsin, Songhwa, and Hwasong districts and a terraced housing project on the banks of the Potong River. However, the provinces have had to foot the bill for these construction projects in Pyongyang, which has left many people outside the capital feeling financially exploited.

Moreover, provincial industries and markets have been devastated by the closure of the national border during the pandemic, and high hopes for foreign direct investment were dashed by North Korea’s determination to make a stronger nuclear arsenal an official part of government policy. Dissatisfaction with the regime is growing, and many see a bleak future.

Against that backdrop, Kim needed a ploy to win back the hearts of the people. The problem is that his scheme appears to be little more than another slogan for stabilizing the regime by once again blaming government officials. For example, in August last year, Kim publicly reprimanded Prime Minister Kim Tok Hun for “severely disrupting discipline” while on an on-the-spot inspection in North Pyongan Province. Later, through the Rodong Sinmun newspaper, Kim Jong Un repeatedly called officials incompetent and accused them of hindering the development of revolutionary projects. In this way, Kim has shown his willingness to place blame for North Korea’s economic woes on the prime minister and other officials.

Second, Kim seems to have adopted the strategy of once again exploiting the North Korean people’s fond memories of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. North Koreans remember the elder Kim as a leader who worked tirelessly to improve the provinces. According to North Korean propaganda, Kim Il Sung advocated the equal development of counties during a meeting of economic bureaucrats and provincial party committees in Changsong County, North Pyongan Province, in 1962. In effect, Kim Jong Un has officially pledged to continue the policy of regional development that his grandfather never completed. This amounts to an attempt to use “legacy politics” to further consolidate his position.

Kim has also resorted to a bit of grandstanding by holding meetings at Mt. Myohyang, a site symbolic of his grandfather. Kim Il Sung often summoned economic officials to his Myohyang villa to pressure them to find ways to save the economy from deepening crises. As a result, North Koreans tend to associate the mountain with Kim Il Sung. This may have been Kim’s goal, as he sought to demonstrate that he could be as hardworking as his grandfather.

Since taking power, Kim Jong Un has spent most of his leisure time in Chagang Province, where underground bunkers are always within reach, and in Wonsan, Kangwon Province, which is widely known as his home. But 10 years into his reign, Kim is rumored to have finished rebuilding and modernizing his villa and other guesthouses on Mt. Myohyang. Presumably, he took his close advisers to the villa after the renovations were completed.

Third, Kim has tried to cultivate an image of an easy-going and honest leader. The North Korean leader has complained that people in the provinces do not receive the basic necessities of life, and he has even allowed these complaints to be reported in full. He apparently wanted to show the North Korean public that he was aware of their situation while projecting the image of a leader who has been working on these issues for the past decade.

In particular, Kim set up a body (the Non-Permanent Central Committee for Promoting Regional Development 20×10 Policy) to take care of the provinces under the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea. He also placed his most trusted apparatchik, Jo Yong Won, secretary of organizational affairs of the Party’s Central Committee, in charge of the new body, emphasizing that it is not a mere formality but is intended to produce results. In other words, Kim is making it clear that he intends regional development to be his signature achievement for the next decade.

Challenges Ahead

Kim seems to despise the stigma of being the leader of a poor country. As soon as he took power, he focused on building the Masikryong ski resort in Kangwon Province, and he has also sent soldiers and young people to build up mountainous and rural areas. Following a housing project in rural towns such as Samjiyon in Yanggang Province, Kim has emphasized that other areas must follow suit by building more houses for the rural population. Notably, nine months after the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korea enacted the City and County Development Act, providing institutional support for provincial development.

Authors

Guest Author

Lee Sang-yong

Lee Sang-yong is the director of research and analysis at Daily NK. This article was translated by David Carruth and edited by Robert Lauler.

thediplomat.com

8. Hyesan residents suffer water shortages

Let's observe for indications of instability. The party is unable to care for the people.

Hyesan residents suffer water shortages

Thee local people's committee shows no sign of addressing the problem, which has infuriated local people

By Lee Chae Un - February 13, 2024

dailynk.com

Hyesan residents suffer water shortages - Daily NK English

FILE PHOTO: Hyesan, Yanggang Province, in August 2013. (Daily NK)

Residents of Hyesan, Yanggang Province, have been suffering from a water shortage, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK last Thursday that a growing number of families in Hyesan have recently been without running water. “Teenagers and the elderly are suffering from carrying water from the Yalu River or wells,” he said.

According to the source, the water outage began early last month when water pipes froze during a prolonged cold snap with temperatures of 20 degrees Celsius below zero.

As a result, people have to fetch water from the river or wells. With husbands working and wives going to market, children and the elderly have taken over the task of fetching water.

Hyesan’s very young and very old have suffered a number of injuries from slipping and falling while drawing water. In fact, in one neighborhood of the city, an elderly person and two teenagers were forced to wear plaster casts on their arms after slipping earlier this month.

“The path is so steep and slippery that it’s hard to walk unaided, and people pulling sleds with water jugs are having accidents,” the source said. “People hurt themselves even more because when they fall, they think of protecting the water jugs over their bodies because it is difficult to get another jug if it breaks.”

“The teenagers who were injured recently injured their arms by protecting the water jugs with their whole bodies when they fell,” the source said. “When children who should be playing are forced to fetch water and even hurt themselves by falling, their parents must be heartbroken.”

However, the local shows no sign of addressing the problem, infuriating locals.

“Young children and even the elderly are suffering from the water outage this cold winter, but the state isn’t even bothering to properly investigate the situation,” the source said. “Many locals are frustrated because they don’t know how long they will have to suffer and endure shortages of everything, including rice.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Lee Chae Un

Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

9. Even With Trump, Kim Jong Un May Spurn Talks, Analysts Warn

A key point: Kim's failures may be so catastrophic that not even the US can help it.

Excerpt:

Despite a prolonged period of pandemic self-isolation, continued international sanctions, and a diplomatic stalemate with the United States, Kim has survived economically and even made progress in weapons development, notes Rachel Minyoung Lee, an analyst with the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network.

These successes “likely reinforced the thinking in Pyongyang that there actually may not be much the U.S. can do for North Korea,” Lee said.

...

Warming North Korea-Russia ties make it even less likely that Kim will feel the need to find other avenues for diplomatic, military, and economic support, said Sydney Seiler, who until last year was the national intelligence officer for North Korea in the U.S. National Intelligence Council.

“He’s created an environment and a way forward that is less dependent on what one might call normal diplomatic relations or normal interactions with the outside, except for the few countries that would accept North Korea as it is,” Seiler told VOA.

...

If Trump were to pursue such an accommodation with Kim, it could raise tensions with South Korea. Unlike the situation during Trump’s first term, South Korea’s current president, Yoon Suk Yeol, is conservative and prefers a hawkish approach to the North.

Jessica Taylor, an Asia security expert at the Atlantic Council, fears Trump would continue to downplay North Korea’s launch of short-range missiles, which pose a major threat to U.S. regional allies.

Trump also may be willing to cancel joint military exercises with South Korea, “not only to appease North Korea but just because he doesn’t see them as necessary or worth the expenditure,” Taylor said.

In the end, Taylor thinks Trump’s North Korea policy will likely look much like it did the first time – lots of “bluster and showmanship…without getting into anything really concrete.”

Even With Trump, Kim Jong Un May Spurn Talks, Analysts Warn

February 13, 2024 6:37 AM

By William Gallo

voanews.com · February 13, 2024

Six months after the collapse of their 2019 summit in Hanoi, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent a letter to then U.S. President Donald Trump conveying a sense of personal betrayal.

“I am clearly offended, and I do not want to hide this feeling from you,” Kim told Trump in the last of 25 personal letters exchanged between the two men and shared with veteran U.S. journalist Bob Woodward.

In Hanoi, Trump had rejected Kim's offer to dismantle a major nuclear facility in exchange for lifting most U.S. sanctions. Over the subsequent months, the talks reached a standstill, as each side backed away from the commitments made at their initial 2018 meeting in Singapore.

In the letter, Kim expressed disappointment that the United States and South Korea were ramping up joint military exercises that had been scaled back as part of the talks.

“If you do not think of our relationship as a steppingstone that only benefits you, then you would not make me look like an idiot that will only give without getting anything in return,” wrote Kim.

FILE - President Donald Trump holds up a letter he says is from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, during a cabinet meeting at the White House, in Washington, Jan. 2, 2019.

Months after he sent the letter, Kim unveiled a major foreign policy shift to cope with what he called Washington’s “hostile policy.” The new approach, Kim declared, would emphasize self-reliance and a strengthened nuclear deterrent.

Since then, North Korea has developed an arsenal of weapons that can fly further, faster, and more stealthily than ever. North Korea has enshrined nuclear weapons in its constitution – a status Kim called “irreversible.” Kim has also rejected offers of talks with the United States, instead expanding ties with traditional friends Russia and China.

To many observers, the moves suggest Kim has given up on his country's long-term goal of normalizing relations with the United States – a development that may make it harder to convince North Korea to restart talks, even if Trump, the current Republican presidential frontrunner, were to return to the presidency in 2025.

“It will be a very different ballgame,” said Moon Chung-in, a foreign policy advisor to successive left-leaning South Korean administrations, including the previous government, which pursued talks with Pyongyang. “It could be extremely difficult to restart dialogue with Pyongyang.”

Trump still optimistic

No one knows how Trump would handle North Korea during a hypothetical second term, especially given the extreme contrasts he displayed toward the North during his first term.

In 2017, Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea and exchanged threats of nuclear war with Kim, before pivoting to diplomacy and claiming that he and the North Korean leader “fell in love.”

Since leaving office, Trump has continued to speak positively of his relationship with Kim and frequently claims that the friendship prevented nuclear war – an indication that he sees the talks as beneficial, even if they did not result in North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons.

In December, Politico, a U.S. news website, reported that Trump was considering a plan that would at least temporarily abandon the goal of North Korea's denuclearization. According to Politico, Trump would offer Pyongyang financial incentives to stop making new bombs. Trump denied the report.

“The only thing accurate in the story is that I do get along well with Kim Jong Un,” Trump said in a social media post.

It is not clear if the two men still exchange letters, or how much Trump would prioritize any outreach to Kim if he returned to office.

FILE - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae visit the Ministry of National Defense in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this picture released on Feb. 9, 2024 by the Korean Central News Agency.

Kim: happy with status quo?

If Trump wants to resume talks, Kim may not feel inclined to abandon his current approach, which has allowed him to navigate a series of formidable challenges.

Despite a prolonged period of pandemic self-isolation, continued international sanctions, and a diplomatic stalemate with the United States, Kim has survived economically and even made progress in weapons development, notes Rachel Minyoung Lee, an analyst with the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network.

These successes “likely reinforced the thinking in Pyongyang that there actually may not be much the U.S. can do for North Korea,” Lee said.

“Kim's biggest takeaway from the collapse of the Hanoi summit is that the U.S. will always carry out what it calls a ‘hostile policy’ toward North Korea, irrespective of who is the president,” she added.

Instead, Kim has expanded his partnership with Russia. According to the United States and its allies, North Korea has provided Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles, which Moscow has used during its war on Ukraine. In return, U.S. officials suspect Russia is assisting North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Warming North Korea-Russia ties make it even less likely that Kim will feel the need to find other avenues for diplomatic, military, and economic support, said Sydney Seiler, who until last year was the national intelligence officer for North Korea in the U.S. National Intelligence Council.

“He’s created an environment and a way forward that is less dependent on what one might call normal diplomatic relations or normal interactions with the outside, except for the few countries that would accept North Korea as it is,” Seiler told VOA.

Challenges ahead

While Kim could always change his mind and re-engage with the United States, he may demand much more in negotiations following several years of nuclear and missile advancements.

“But that likely will occur only if the U.S. is willing to shelve denuclearization and engage in some form of arms control or even risk reduction talks. And that is a very, very high threshold to meet, as the U.S., South Korea's and Japan's official position remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Lee said.

If Trump were to pursue such an accommodation with Kim, it could raise tensions with South Korea. Unlike the situation during Trump’s first term, South Korea’s current president, Yoon Suk Yeol, is conservative and prefers a hawkish approach to the North.

Jessica Taylor, an Asia security expert at the Atlantic Council, fears Trump would continue to downplay North Korea’s launch of short-range missiles, which pose a major threat to U.S. regional allies.

Trump also may be willing to cancel joint military exercises with South Korea, “not only to appease North Korea but just because he doesn’t see them as necessary or worth the expenditure,” Taylor said.

In the end, Taylor thinks Trump’s North Korea policy will likely look much like it did the first time – lots of “bluster and showmanship…without getting into anything really concrete.”

voanews.com · February 13, 2024

10. Why one North Korean educator was deemed a “first-class reactionary”

This is helpful in understanding the indoctrination that takes place in north Korea.

Why one North Korean educator was deemed a “first-class reactionary”

The incident reveals how North Korean schools continue to brainwash students about the greatness of the Kim leaders and idolize and deify the Kim family

By Kim Jeong Yoon - February 13, 2024

dailynk.com

Why one North Korean educator was deemed a “first-class reactionary” - Daily NK English

Teachers at a college in Chongjin participating in an education session. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

At the Second National Meeting of Elementary Propaganda Workers in 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent a letter to participants entitled “Let’s Use Novel Propaganda and Agitation to Increase the Momentum of the Revolution,” which read in part:

“Greatness education [about the Kim family] is not about how the leader exists apart from the people, but how he lives and dies, suffers and rejoices with the people. It should deepen the students’ understanding of him as a leader of the people who’s devoted to the happiness of the people. If the greatness education emphasizes the greatness of the leader by mystifying his revolutionary activities and personality, it may obscure the facts. Total loyalty comes when the people are captivated by the leader on a personal and comradely [political] level.”

In short, the letter instructed them to avoid mystifying or deifying the leader in ideological education. Kim urged the propaganda officials to inspire loyalty through humanistic propaganda and agitation about the leader instead of the “groundless and absurd” exaltations common in the propaganda of the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il eras.

In response, the Ministry of Education prepared a new nationwide curriculum with a new emphasis on making the leader appear human in “greatness education.” The ministry ordered schools to teach revolutionary history according to the new curriculum from the second semester. The ministry also instructed the provincial, city, and county education departments to inspect the first schools to teach revolutionary history using the new, more realistic curriculum, which was to begin on the first day of the second semester with this new humanistic approach.

These orders explain the strange scene that took place in a certain classroom at Sinpo High School in Sinpo, North Hamgyong Province, at the beginning of the second semester. As instructed, on September 2, 2019, eleven observers entered a single classroom to audit the lesson as a class of third-year students received their first lesson of the semester on the “revolutionary history of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.”

Educator says the “wrong thing” during lecture

Kim Wonchol, the then 51-year-old director of revolutionary history education at Sinpo High School, stood at the podium and gave a lecture on how Kim Il Sung had set up a secret base camp on Mt. Baekdu as the headquarters of the revolution while crossing the border between North Korea and China to bring the struggle against the Japanese imperialists to Korea.

In the middle of his lecture, a student raised his hand with a question. “In the second year, we went on an expedition to explore the long road to independence. The weather in Yanggang Province was so cold, unlike here [in Sinpo] near the sea. My textbook says that the weather at the secret base camp was bitterly cold, often hovering around minus 40 degrees [C]. How could people survive in such conditions?”

The teacher replied: “As you said, the weather on Mt. Baekdu is extremely harsh. Both the leader and each member of his anti-Japanese guerrilla unit were human beings, so how could they endure and survive in such harsh conditions? Smoke could give away their position to the enemy, so the rules of the secret camp prevented the fighters from even lighting a fire properly. It would have been impossible to survive the bitter cold without breaking the rules.”

The teacher concluded: “If we want to make a concrete improvement in the revolutionary ideological education of the new generation, we must revise the curriculum to base our education on historical facts.”

At that moment some of the observers sitting in the back of the room began whispering among themselves and writing furiously in their notebooks.

Taken away

That same evening, Kim was summoned to appear before the city’s party committee without explanation and never returned. Two days later, a Ministry of State Security truck arrived at the house in the middle of the night and took Kim’s wife and two daughters to an unknown location.

Later that year (2022), the Ministry of State Security agents involved in the case and their families leaked that Kim had been sent to a political prison camp for the crime of falsely teaching the new generation about the leader’s revolutionary activities.

During the Ministry of State Security’s investigation, Kim defended himself by saying, “All I did was follow what the marshal told the party, which was to educate the new generation in such a way that they could empathize with the leader [Kim Il Sung] on a human level. A student asked me how a person could survive in the minus 40-degree cold; should I say that he survived by his ‘wits’?”

As a result of his defense, the teacher was branded a “first-class reactionary.”

This incident was included in a bulletin distributed to educational personnel throughout the country at the end of 2022. Since then, education about the Kim family has more or less returned to what it was before Kim Jong Un’s letter. Two years later, at the time of this writing, North Korean schools continue to brainwash students about the greatness of the Kim leaders and idolize and deify the Kim family.

Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Kim Jeong Yoon

Kim is a journalist who writes the series “North Korea’s Secret Stories” for Daily NK.

dailynk.com

11. Where is Kim Jong Un’s eldest son and what is he doing?

Inquiring minds want to know. I wonder about future palace intrigue and sibling rivalry.

Excerpts:

There are two main theories regarding North Korea’s succession, the “Kim Ju Ae succession theory” and “the unconfirmed eldest son theory.” Well-known proponents of the Kim Ju Ae theory include Cheong Seong-Chang (director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Research Institute) and Jeong Se-Hyun (a former minister of unification). By comparison, the “eldest son” camp includes Koh Yo-Hwan (president of the Korea Institute for National Unification), Michaelo João (a close friend of Kim Jong Un during Kim’s study abroad in Bern in the 1990s), and Chris Volo (manager for Dennis Rodman, a basketball star who has met with Kim four times).

I will not be discussing the “Kim Ju Ae succession theory” in this article. I have already addressed why I don’t think she is likely to be Kim Jong Un’s successor in my previous articles “Kim Jong Un’s Successor” (Daily NK Korean, Feb. 2, 2023) and “Kim Jong Un’s Daughter Makes a Cameo” (Daily NK Korean, Dec. 16, 2022), as well as in my booklet “Towards the World, the Future, and Unification” (BookLab, March 2023).

Where is Kim Jong Un’s eldest son and what is he doing?

North Korea is now thoroughly a “Kim Jong Un-style country" and, given the level of his control, it's likely that Kim Jong Un is following a different path from his predecessors in educating his children

https://www.dailynk.com/english/where-kim-jong-un-eldest-son-what-he-doing/

By Gil-sup Kwak - February 12, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un conducted an inspection of the newly built Gwangchon Chicken Factory, according to state-run media on Jan. 8, 2024. He was accompanied by his daughter, Ju-ae. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published on Daily NK’s Korean website in June 2023.

Recently, there has been increasing interest in Kim Jong Un’s rumored son. Many are speculating about why Kim has only brought his daughter Ju Ae out in public, with some suggesting that Ju Ae is actually his eldest child while others believe that Kim’s son may be too young to be made public. This is a very intriguing topic of discussion.

It is hard to ignore media coverage with testimonies from individuals and sources who have met with Kim Jong Un or assessments from leading North Korea experts. However, due to the highly classified nature of the North Korean royal family, it is impossible to fully guarantee the accuracy of any of this information unless it is disclosed by individuals within the North Korean leadership or by government authorities. Moreover, intelligence agencies around the world, including South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), do not confirm such details, which are deemed sensitive.

I have tried to keep a close eye on the movements of the North Korean royal family. My current theory on North Korea’s future succession is based on two things:

The North Korean succession system is set up so that only members of the Kim family can succeed each other in perpetuity.
In Korean society, children take the surnames of their fathers, so if Kim Ju Ae succeeds her father, her offspring (the fifth-generation heir) would lose the “Kim” family name.

Keeping these key factors in mind, I speculate that one of Kim Jong Un’s sons will eventually succeed him. There is no need to argue this point, it is simply a matter of when and how.

However, after fielding questions about the succession issue from reporters, I have decided to put forth my own thoughts on the matter of Kim Jong Un’s son. I would like to emphasize that this article is based solely on my personal analysis and is not influenced by any data or evaluations from institutions or organizations that I am affiliated with.

Controversies surrounding Kim Jong Un’s son

The prevailing theory on the DPRK’s royal family is that Kim Jong Un has three children: an eldest son born in 2010, his middle daughter Ju Ae born in 2013, and a youngest son born in 2017. Recently, however, Ju Ae has often been seen accompanying Kim at public events, leading many to speculate about the actual number of kids Kim has and the line of succession.

There are two main theories regarding North Korea’s succession, the “Kim Ju Ae succession theory” and “the unconfirmed eldest son theory.” Well-known proponents of the Kim Ju Ae theory include Cheong Seong-Chang (director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Research Institute) and Jeong Se-Hyun (a former minister of unification). By comparison, the “eldest son” camp includes Koh Yo-Hwan (president of the Korea Institute for National Unification), Michaelo João (a close friend of Kim Jong Un during Kim’s study abroad in Bern in the 1990s), and Chris Volo (manager for Dennis Rodman, a basketball star who has met with Kim four times).

I will not be discussing the “Kim Ju Ae succession theory” in this article. I have already addressed why I don’t think she is likely to be Kim Jong Un’s successor in my previous articles “Kim Jong Un’s Successor” (Daily NK Korean, Feb. 2, 2023) and “Kim Jong Un’s Daughter Makes a Cameo” (Daily NK Korean, Dec. 16, 2022), as well as in my booklet “Towards the World, the Future, and Unification” (BookLab, March 2023).

And while the “Kim Jong Un’s unconfirmed eldest son” theory is certainly intriguing, there is no definitive “smoking gun” or other evidence to support it. No one has been able to ask Kim Jong Un whether or not he has a son or heard him speak about “all” of his children. As a result, this speculation is rooted primarily in the fact that we have only seen him bring Ju Ae to public functions. As such, there are clear limits to this theory.

“When Kim Jong Un first invited one of his old classmates from Bern, Michaelo João, to visit North Korea in 2012, he told [Michaelo] that his wife was pregnant. When Michaelo went back to North Korea again in 2013, he was told that Kim had had a daughter, but said that there was no talk about a son.” (RFA, May 24, 2023)

“President of the Korea Institute for National Unification Koh Yu-Hwan told a group of reporters at the Ministry of Unification on [May] 26, ‘Personally, I think it’s more likely that Ju Ae is the eldest child. Whether she is the successor or not will be confirmed later, but I think she is still in the running.’ He went on to compare Kim Jong Un bringing Ju Ae around with him as similar to what Kim Il Sung did to Kim Jong Il [when priming him to be his successor].” (Munhwa Ilbo, May 26, 2023)

“Chris Volo, Dennis Rodman’s manager who traveled with him to North Korea four times, spent about a week with the Kim family, including Kim’s younger sister, at their Wonsan villa in early September 2013. At the time, [Volo claimed] ‘we were the first people in the world that [Kim] told about his daughter, and he even allowed us to hold her. She was so young that she couldn’t even crawl.’ At the time, [Volo] said he saw no signs of anything connected to a [possible] son.” (RFA, May 30, 2023)

Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his wife and daughter at a banquet celebrating the founding of the DPRK’s military on Feb. 7, 2023, according to state-run media. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Views from South Korea’s intelligence community

Out of concern for source protection and counterintelligence operations, national intelligence agencies generally follow the NCND (“can neither confirm nor deny”) principle and do not confirm sensitive matters. However, we do know that South Korea’s NIS reported the existence of an eldest son at a private briefing for the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee.

“The People Power Party Assemblyman Yoo Sang-bom said that the NIS reported to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee in March that while it had no concrete evidence, information shared by other [countries’] intelligence agencies led the NIS to believe with a high degree of certainty that Kim’s [first born] child was a son.” (Yonhap News, May 26, 2023)

However, (Editor’s note: now former) Ministry of Unification Kwon Young-Se and a government official who spoke anonymously have commented that observers should not rule out the possibility that Kim Jon Un may not have a son.

“At the general meeting of the National Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee on Feb. 15, the Minister of Unification [Kwon Young-se] said that taking several factors into account, he can see North Korea making preparations to hand off the country to the fourth generation. However, the minister erred on the side of caution when responding to whether or not he felt Kim Ju Ae would be next in line, stating that there was no evidence allowing them to confirm the existence of any children besides Kim Ju Ae, including an older son. He could only reiterate that aside from Kim’s daughter Kim Ju Ae, it is believed but has not been confirmed that Kim has two more children, an older son and a youngest child of unknown gender. He said that he could not confirm with any certainty that Kim Jong Un’s [eldest] son exists.” (Chosun Ilbo, February 16, 2023)

“A senior government official also met with reporters on May 22, and speaking from personal opinion, said that [they] were not sure whether [Kim] had a firstborn before Ju Ae, and if so, whether [the eldest] was a son.” (Yonhap News, May 26, 2023)

Inferences and conclusions

As I mentioned earlier, information about Kim Jong Un’s children is highly classified. Unlike his father, after taking power Kim Jong Un has publicly been accompanied by his wife (Ri Sol Ju) and daughter (Kim Ju Ae) to official events, however, the rest of his family remains shrouded in secrecy.

“Tae Yong-Ho, a former North Korean diplomat turned South Korean politician, has said that he too cannot confirm whether or not Kim Jong Un’s eldest child is a son or a daughter. ‘I can say that up until I defected to the South in 2016, I had never heard any talk of Kim Jong Un having a son. However, I can’t say that he does not have a son just because I never heard about him. In North Korea, matters concerning the children of the Kim family, particularly anything regarding the leader’s succession, are closely guarded secrets.’” (News1, February 2, 2023)

The recent doubts about the existence of Kim Jong Un’s eldest son were triggered by comments made by Minister of Unification Kwon Young-Se in February 2023. However, there has been no conclusive information or announcement that would challenge the NIS’s report to the National Assembly in March. Even if there is no eldest son, this is not something that the intelligence agencies would be able to confirm publicly due to the separation of the administrative branch and intelligence agencies.

Four years or so ago, I wrote a booklet titled Analysis of Kim Jong Un (Sonin, April 2019). At the time, I was not in a professional position to receive any fresh intelligence, so I developed its content solely by conducting a psychological analysis of North Korean and domestic literature. Today, I would like to use this same method to speculate on the existence of Kim Jong Un’s son.

The main elements of my reasoning can be summarized in three points:

Kim Jong Un most likely has an eldest son who is being brought up behind the scenes.
Kim Jong Un is raising his children in a manner that differs significantly from how his father raised him.
Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Ju Ae, will not become his successor.

1) The likelihood of Kim Jong Un having an eldest son

First, in patriarchal Confucian cultures ruled by hereditary succession, sons and grandchildren are often seen as symbols of marriage. Kim Jong Un married Ri Sol Jo in 2009. Similar to South Korea before the 1990s, couples typically have children immediately after marriage in North Korean culture. Additionally, North Koreans do not commonly use birth control. Therefore, if Kim Ju Ae (born in 2013) is their eldest child, it suggests that the Kims were childless for a significant period after their marriage. Considering that they have now had (a rumored) three children, the possibility of Ri Sol Ju or Kim Jong Un being infertile is low.

Secondly, the NIS’s own intelligence estimates contributed to my belief in the “unconfirmed eldest son theory.” Naturally, after his marriage to Ri Sol Ju, when the NIS weighed the possibility of the existence of the eldest son, South Korean intelligence likely considered a wide range of information. One key piece of evidence at the time was reports that the Secretariat (the department responsible for acquiring luxury goods for the Kim family from overseas) appeared to be purchasing childbirth and infant supplies.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju-ae, led a field tour of an “important military vehicle production plant,” according to Rodong Sinmun on Jan. 5. The newspaper also unveiled a launch pad vehicle (TEL) carrying a cylindrical tube for the Hwasong-18, a new solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Thirdly, it’s not logically sound to completely rule out the existence of a son based on Kim Ju Ae’s public behavior alone. A daughter is a daughter, and a son is a son. Kim’s daughter is a good symbol of youth, peace, and the future (“Nuclear weapons are an all-purpose sword to be handed down to all generations”). She also has the unique advantage of portraying Kim Jong Un as a loving father figure while reinforcing the legitimacy of the Kim family’s perpetual succession.

What if Kim Jong Un had brought a son with him instead of Ju Ae? Considering the spate of rumors surrounding Kim’s health, it would have been akin to “pouring gasoline onto a fire.”

2) Shunning his father’s style of upbringing

Although he wanted for nothing materially, Kim Jong Un grew up in emotionally and mentally challenging circumstances. When he was younger, his grandfather (Kim Il Sung) did not recognize him as a legitimate child and forced young Kim to live in Wonsan and other residences outside of the official residence in Pyongyang. Likewise, he was not allowed to go to school and received a private education. Unable to interact with peers his own age, Kim turned to hanging out with his older bodyguards and cooks. To make matters worse, Kim was further isolated by being sent to study abroad in Switzerland against his will. In other words, it was not an easy journey.

With his history in mind, my personal analysis of Kim Jong Un is that he may have a strong “bastard-Oedipus complex.” This is evident in his public behavior since coming to power, which has been the complete opposite of his father Kim Jong Il, including his treatment of his wife, his public speeches, purging his father’s designated “guardians,” and the abolition of the songun line (military-first policy) established by his father.

Kim Jong Un ascended to the position of supreme leader through a third-generational patrilineal succession, which prevented him as heir from publicly criticizing his predecessor. In practice, however, North Korea has completely transformed into a “Kim Jong Un-style country.” Given this level of control, it is likely that Kim Jong Un is following a different path in educating his children. This might involve allowing them to live with him in the official Pyongyang Residence, sending them to regular schools with bodyguards (so they can socialize with their peers), and supplementing them with special tutoring (focused on cultivating them for future leadership roles).

3) Kim Ju Ae’s role has clear limitations

Let us consider the following scenario: a parent (person in charge) has a young child in their early teens who they expect to succeed them in the future. What is the natural thing for that parent to do? Educate them. The early teen years are a time for children to be focusing on their studies. It is not the time to attend public events to gain hands-on experience, especially for a child as young as Kim Ju Ae who has just turned 10.

I believe that Kim Jong Un making public appearances with his daughter since last year can be attributed to the fact that Kim Jue Ae is an optimal character to both grab attention and serve as the marketer of efforts aimed at ensuring the Kim dynasty will continue forever.

To summarize, while Kim Jong Un suffers from morbid obesity and anxiety, we must not forget that at 39 years old, he is still a young leader. Based on the theory of succession, the nature of the North Korean political system, and past experience, I believe that Kim’s most logical successor will be his eldest son. If Kim Jong Un either did not have a son in 2010 or there is some sort of complication with his eldest son, the title of fourth-generation leader will be passed on to his son born in 2017. In this process, Kim Yo Jong, Kim’s emotional and political confidante, will likely act as the regime’s “libero” (a key player with no fixed position) as a manager of the Mt. Baekdu Bloodline and her brother’s political and emotional partner.

Translated by Matthew Eteuati, Jr. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

12. Some thoughts on Kim Jong Un’s outdated “20x10 regional development policy”

Kim's failed promise. He cannot bring peace and prosperity to the people with his nuclear weapons and missiles.

Excerpt:

Kim Jong Un has been talking about war and “two separate states” since the beginning of the new year because North Korea is facing internal economic hardship and external geopolitical instability. Unable to meet his people’s basic needs for food, water, and heat, he has pointed the finger at external enemies. North Korea’s future appears bleak as it continues to use tree nuts to fuel its factories in a global era characterized by drastic daily changes. We can no longer stand idly by. We cannot allow the cries of agony and despair of the North Korean people to continue until 2034.

Some thoughts on Kim Jong Un’s outdated “20x10 regional development policy”

One reason why the regional development policy is bound to fail is that it mobilizes the North Korean military to build factories

By Kang Dong Wan, Dong-A University - February 13, 2024

dailynk.com

Some thoughts on Kim Jong Un’s outdated “20x10 regional development policy” - Daily NK English

The Eighth Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held at the headquarters of the party’s Central Committee from Dec. 26 to 30, 2023, according to the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Kim Jong Un recently admitted that his country’s regional economy is in a “pitiful state.” He confessed that “our party and state are facing a serious political problem that we cannot smoothly provide even the basic daily necessities for our people.”

The “20×10 regional development policy” presented by Kim Jong Un at the 19th Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea is a farce. Although the policy aims to promote people’s livelihood and regional development, it only reveals the dismal reality of the North Korean economy, which fails to provide even a reliable supply of red pepper paste to the country’s people. The policy aims to push forward with the construction of factories in 20 cities and counties within a decade. The government intends to reduce the disparities between Pyongyang and the regional provinces and improve people’s livelihoods. The North Korean regime has produced ideological propaganda to carry out this policy. It has escalated the propaganda frenzy by creating nine related propaganda images with titles such as “Our party’s long-awaited dream, the grandiose revolution.”

North Korea’s regional economic problems are dire. At the 19th Expanded Meeting, Kim Jong Un described the countryside as “an era-defining symbol of backwardness.” In my view, the 20×10 regional development policy is doomed to failure. The policy proposal itself is contradictory. It will be 2034 in a decade. The world is currently reorganizing itself around an AI-driven global industrial structure. In an era when high-tech industry determines a country’s destiny, Kim Jong Un has proposed building a few factories in the regional countryside to provide necessities. His proposal is outdated.

The regime has widely used the success story of Kimhwa County in its propaganda. Ironically, the success story only exposes the flaws in Kim Jong Un’s policies. The Korean Central News Agency constantly broadcasts a video on Kimhwa County praising how the county has successfully created products by using specialties of the region. The video claims that the county has used thorn bushes to produce jam and sugary drinks and corn and beans to produce staple foods. The video emphasized the county’s innovation in using oil extracted from tetradium to make soap and oil extracted from burl to make products. Similarly, the propaganda art promoting the 20×10 regional development policy has slogans such as “Let’s make effective use of the economic resources and raw materials of cities and counties.”

Similar claims can also be found in Rodong Sinmun news articles. An article published on Feb. 3 stated that “the people’s livelihood will be greatly improved if counties near mountains use mountain resources and those near the sea use sea resources to produce distinctive light industry products, furniture, and daily necessities. In short, the essence of Kim Jong-un’s policy proposal is to use raw materials extracted from local mountains and seas to produce necessities.

In the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South Korea is achieving revolutionary economic progress by forming regional industrial clusters focused on semiconductors, IT, AI, and robotics. North Korea may call what it is doing a “local revolution,” but it amounts to little more than producing food products such as soybean paste and red pepper paste from the fruits available in the mountains. The North Korean regime plans to do this for the next 10 years. Does it make sense to focus a country’s food supply strategy on harvesting fruits and seaweed in 2034?

Another reason why the regional development policy is bound to fail is that it mobilizes the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to build factories. It’s easy to see that the KPA has been mobilized for this purpose from propaganda slogans such as “In the struggle for the development of the provinces, let the KPA be the horseman and protagonist.” Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un is raising tensions on the peninsula by announcing that a war will begin this year. However, while Kim Jong Un claims to be preparing for war, the KPA has only been mobilized to build factories.

Kim Jong Un has been talking about war and “two separate states” since the beginning of the new year because North Korea is facing internal economic hardship and external geopolitical instability. Unable to meet his people’s basic needs for food, water, and heat, he has pointed the finger at external enemies. North Korea’s future appears bleak as it continues to use tree nuts to fuel its factories in a global era characterized by drastic daily changes. We can no longer stand idly by. We cannot allow the cries of agony and despair of the North Korean people to continue until 2034.

The translator requested anonymity. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Kang Dong Wan, Dong-A University

Kang is a professor at Dong-A University and the former head of the university’s Busan Hana Center.

dailynk.com

13. The real reasons why Kim Jong-un’s full-scale provocation is unlikely

"Never assume your enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible". So said Sun Tzu.

The real reasons why Kim Jong-un’s full-scale provocation is unlikely

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/02/13/G27RM642JNGOFHLPDXHDFY5H6I/

By Yu Yong-weon,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.02.13. 15:02

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visiting Ministry of Defense with his daughter in celebration of the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army on Feb. 8, 2024, as reported by North Korea's Korean Central Television (KCTV) the following day./KCTV

The recent actions of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, including labeling South Korea as the ‘principal enemy’ and discussing concepts like ‘territorial occupation’, alongside provocative acts such as testing hypersonic missiles, have heightened concerns over the Korean Peninsula’s potential for war.

These concerns have stemmed from a collaborative article published on ‘38 North’ on Jan. 11, authored by Robert L. Carlin, the former head of the Northeast Asia Division at the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Siegfried S. Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which asserted that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been since early June 1950. The article suggested that Kim Jong-un may be making strategic decisions reminiscent of his grandfather’s actions in 1950.

Following warnings from former U.S. government officials, the New York Times reported on Jan. 25 that Kim Jong-un could take “some form of lethal military action against South Korea in the coming months after having shifted to a policy of open hostility,” citing statements from multiple White House officials, exacerbating fears of conflict.

So, what is the likelihood of North Korea actually provoking a war? Beforehand, it’s important to distinguish between a full-scale conflict and localized provocations. A full-scale conflict, akin to the invasion movements observed in the Ukraine war, would inevitably exhibit pre-emptive indicators. This would involve unavoidable troop and equipment mobilizations, as well as the necessity of stockpiling ammunition and fuel beyond a certain threshold. However, according to intelligence gathered by South Korean and US authorities thus far, there have been no indications of such unusual activity.

In light of the heightened importance of ammunition underscored by the Ukraine conflict, reports also suggest that North Korea has exported over 5,000 containers and more than 2.3 million rounds of 152mm shells to Russia. Additionally, there are indications that new missile types such as the KN-23 have been exported to Russia. While South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik has made similar statements in media interviews, it remains inconceivable that a leader with sound judgment would initiate a full-scale conflict provocation in such a situation.

Moreover, it’s widely accepted that Kim Jong-un is advancing a fourth-generation succession, whether through Kim Ju-ae or someone else. There’s speculation that, for Kim Jong-un to ensure a seamless inheritance of North Korea to his offspring, he cannot risk provoking a full-scale conflict. If North Korea were to initiate such conflict, it’s anticipated that South Korean and U.S. forces would use a minimum of 1,000 missiles, alongside thousands of precision-guided bombs, to devastate Pyongyang and other key areas and targets, without even resorting to the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

It appears that a considerable consensus exists among both domestic and international government authorities and experts regarding the highly unlikely prospect of North Korea engaging in a full-scale conflict in the current situation. Sydney Seiler, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and former national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council (NIC), remarked on Feb. 1 that “the types of indicators one would expect to see on the eve of a North Korea attack simply have not been observed.”

However, there are widespread concerns about the possibility of high-intensity localized provocations, similar to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) or the shelling incidents on Yeonpyeong Island, as well as what’s known as ‘strategic provocations,’ including test-launches of ICBMs or SLBMs and a seventh nuclear test.

While many experts are apprehensive about these possibilities, they believe that the chances of such high-intensity provocations, which would elicit a robust retaliatory response from the South Korean military, are currently low. Instead, many experts agree that there is a higher likelihood of low to medium-intensity localized provocations, such as shelling near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), gunfire near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), or drone infiltrations.

14. UNC bases in Japan play critical role in Northeast Asia security

One of the important but overlooked contributions of the UN Command.

Tuesday

February 13, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Published: 13 Feb. 2024, 19:43

UNC bases in Japan play critical role in Northeast Asia security

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-02-13/national/diplomacy/UNC-bases-in-Japan-play-critical-role-in-Northeast-Asia-security-/1979455

The members on the Peace Odyssey take a group picture in front of the transport carrier C-130 Hercules at Yokota Air Base, Japan on Dec.5, 2023. From left, Choi Hyun-man, Mirae Asset Securities chairman; Im Hyug-baeg Korea University’s professor emeritus; Kim Kwang-doo, chairman of the Institute for the Future of the State; Yu Myung-hwan, former Foreign Minister, Park Tae-ho, former Foreign Ministry’s Trade Minister; Hong Seok-hyun, Chairman of JoongAng Holdings and the Korea Peace Foundation; Oh Se-Jung, former Seoul National University president, United States Forces official, Yoon Young-kwan, former Foreign Minister; Kim Yoon, Korea Japan Economic Association chairman; Choi Sang-yong, former Korean Ambassador to Japan; Park Hong-kyu, Korea University professor; Kim Jae-shin, former Korean Ambassador to Germany; Lee Won-deog, Kookmin University professor; Shin Jung-seung, former Korean Ambassador to China; Lee Ha-kyung, JoongAng Ilbo senior columnist; Choi Eun-mi, Asan Institute for Policy Studies fellow researcher and Wi Sung-rak, former Korean Ambassador to Russia. [WOO SANG-JO]

The Peace Odyssey, a delegation of incumbent and former diplomats, politicians and scholars led by Hong Seok-hyun, chairman of JoongAng Holdings and the Korea Peace Foundation, visited the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka, approximately an hour's drive south of Tokyo, on Dec. 5 and Dec. 6.

Upon arrival, the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and the amphibious command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) were visible.

The naval base serves as the home port for the USS Ronald Reagan.

The recent visit to the United Nations Command (UNC) rear base in Japan represents a continuation of the Korea Peace Foundation's ongoing quest for peace in Northeast Asia since its establishment in 2015.

Established in 1950 in the aftermath of the 1950-1953 Korean War, the UNC has been instrumental in preventing further conflict and upholding peace on the peninsula by maintaining the armistice and deterring North Korean aggression.

The UNC extended its presence to Japan to uphold these objectives.

The Peace Odyssey's trip marked the first time the UNC granted foreign civilians access to its rear bases in Japan since the Covid-19 pandemic.

There are seven UNC rear bases in Japan. The Peace Odyssey visited two — the Yokosuka Naval Base and the Yokota Air Base.

While the UNC has made most base facilities accessible, a few remain off-limits. Amid the rapidly evolving international landscape characterized by increased cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, the UNC sought to provide accurate information about its role.

Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) oft the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet docked at the Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, for maintenance on Dec. 6, 2023. [WOO SANG-JO]

U.S. Seventh Fleet on standby

The UNC rear base has highlighted the necessity of security cooperation with Japan in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

The seven UNC bases in Japan have emerged as crucial links in security cooperation between Korea and Japan and between Korea, the United States and Japan.

The UN rear bases operate with the mission of rounding up and supplying rear support to troops and equipment for UN member states in the event of an emergency in Korea. A significant military force is stationed in Yokosuka for this purpose.

Yokosuka is the port where U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry first arrived with a fleet of "black ships" on July 8, 1853.

The USS Ronald Reagan, the only U.S. Navy aircraft carrier among 11 forward deployed overseas, is stationed in Yokosuka.

Since the USS Midway (CV-41) was dispatched in 1973, the U.S. Navy has forward-deployed aircraft carriers such as USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and USS George Washington (CVN-73) at Yokosuka Naval Base.

The USS Ronald Reagan has been stationed in Yokosuka since 2015. In October last year, the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier visited Busan after participating in the first-ever South Korea-U.S.-Japan maritime interdiction and counter-piracy exercise southeast of Jeju Island. It then returned to its home port of Yokosuka in November.

A U.S. Seventh Fleet official told the Peace Odyssey that the USS Ronald Reagan patrolled or participated in exercises in Japan and the Indo-Pacific region for over half of the year.

During the visit, the USS Ronald Reagan was undergoing maintenance. The aircraft of Carrier Air Wing Five were relocated to the U.S. naval air base in Atsugi.

The USS Ronald Reagan runs on two nuclear propulsion reactors fueled by uranium enriched to 93.5 percent.

The aircraft carrier can operate for at least 20 years without refueling.

Nuclear reactor specialists from the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington State were inspecting the USS Ronald Reagan.

According to a Navy officer, the USS George Washington will replace the USS Ronald Reagan at Yokosuka Naval Base in 2024.

The amphibious command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) is the flagship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

The vessel is specially designed from bow to stern to accommodate various command and communication equipment.

One of the distinctive features was the bulging hull design, which, according to a Seventh Fleet official, resulted from expanding the space to mount equipment such as antennas.

Other vessels from the Seventh Fleet, including destroyers, were docked at the naval base.

All U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers are equipped with the Aegis system.

However, nuclear-powered submarines were not seen at Yokosuka Naval Base during the visit as they were deployed for operations.

The Seventh Fleet covers a vast territory, spanning the Pacific Ocean from the International Dateline to the center of the Indian Ocean.

The fleet maintains readiness to deploy 70 to 80 vessels, 275 aircraft, and 37,000 personnel at "any given time." Additionally, it can augment its strength by receiving reinforcements from the U.S. mainland and military bases worldwide if necessary.

The amphibious command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) of the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet docked at the Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan on Dec. 6, 2023. [WOO SANG-JO]

The Peace Odyssey visited the air base in Yokota the day before. It is over 7 square kilometers, twice the size of Yeouido in Korea.

The air base is the headquarters for the joint U.S. Forces Japan and the Fifth Air Force.

At the base's heart lies a runway extending for over 3 kilometers.

Various aircraft types, including transport planes, support planes, and helicopters, were visible throughout the base.

The 374th Airlift Wing is stationed at the air base. However, there were no fighter jets or bombers.

At the base, there was also a tiltrotor aircraft, the CV-22, capable of taking off like a helicopter and flying like a propeller plane.

A Fifth Air Force official said that Yokota Air Base serves as the central hub for Indo-Pacific operations.

The official highlighted that all equipment, supplies and personnel from the U.S. mainland are dispatched to every corner of the Pacific Ocean through Yokota Air Base.

The Peace Odyssey was introduced to the C-130J-30 Super Hercules, a four-engine turboprop military transport aircraft, during the visit. It represents the latest iteration of the C-130 Hercules, which has been in production since 1956.

The specifications of this upgraded military transport aircraft include a length of 35 meters, a height of 12 meters, and a wingspan of 40 meters. It features four six-blade propellers and an all-digitalized cockpit.

It can carry a maximum cargo load of 20 tons and take off from short runways as short as 1 kilometer in length.

“The more we learn about the meaning of operations in case of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the more we learn about the important role of the UNC,” said former Defense Minister Han Min-koo. “The national security of South Korea, the United States and Japan is closely interconnected through the UNC rear bases.”

The significance of UNC rear bases in Japan

President Yoon Suk Yeol, during last year’s speech marking the 78th anniversary of Korea’s independence from Japanese occupation, emphasized that the seven rear bases of the UNC in Japan are the primary deterrent against North Korea’s invasion of South Korea.

“The UNC automatically and immediately becomes involved and retaliates if North Korea invades South Korea,” Yoon said. “The UNC rear bases are the repositories for essential ground, naval and air forces.”

The rear bases mentioned by President Yoon include Yokosuka Naval Base, Yokota Air Base, Camp Zama on mainland Honshu, Sasebo Naval Base on Kyushu, Kadena Air Base, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, and the White Beach Naval Facility on Okinawa.

Following North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 84, permitting the establishment of a unified command center for UN member states.

It was the first and only UN force ever created.

General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and the Commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, also served as the Commander of the United Nations Forces.

In September 1951, Japan regained its sovereignty from the U.S. military government after signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Concurrently, Japan exchanged a memorandum of understanding with the UNC to continue supporting the UN forces stationed in Japan.

Three years later, Japan signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the UNC member countries that deployed their forces.

Through this agreement, the countries participating in the Korean War were granted the use of military bases in Japan for deploying soldiers as well as logistical supplies.

On July 1, 1957, the UNC relocated its headquarters from Tokyo to Seoul.

Since then, the seven bases in Japan have been managed on a smaller scale as rear bases.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jeong Seung-jo said when the South Korean military deployed troops from the Zaytun Division to Iraq in the early 2000s, it waited in Kuwait for a month before moving to its base in Erbil.

Supplies delivered to the base in Iraq also transited through Kuwait.

"The UNC-Rear would ultimately play a role similar to that of Kuwait in case of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula," said Jeong. "Due to its significant role in South Korea's national security, the UNC-Rear is essential for security cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan, and even more crucial for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan."

Tetsuro Kuroe, former Japanese defense vice minister, said that the presence of the United States-led UNC stationed on mainland Japan symbolizes the ironclad relationship between the United States and Japan.

The importance of the UNC rear bases grew in the 2000s as the forefront of economic sanctions against North Korea.

The UN, through the Security Council's resolutions, has imposed economic sanctions against North Korea, which has not only threatened security in Northeast Asia but also globally through its nuclear and missile development.

Additionally, the UN granted member states the authority to search vessels suspected of engaging in transactions that violate sanctions in international waters or harbors and to confiscate prohibited items.

Speaking anonymously, a diplomatic and national security official said that due to the 1954 SOFA agreement, the South Korean government has the freedom to utilize the UN rear bases in Japan after notifying the Japanese government in advance.

Because of this arrangement, North Korea has demanded the dismantling of the UNC, while China finds the UNC uncomfortable.

The UNC, which relocated to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, in 2018, has contributed to national security on the peninsula since the armistice in 1953.

However, following the transfer of operational control to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), established in 1978, the UNC's primary mission has evolved to managing the armistice agreement and operating the rear bases in Japan in case of emergencies.

Since 2014, the United States has been actively working on revitalizing the dormant UNC.

One key objective was to expand its role as a command center by increasing the number of personnel from approximately 40 to 50 to around 70.

Additionally, the UNC was slated to assume command of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) for UN member states, excluding the United States, in the event of a second Korean War.

As part of assuming a more significant role, the UNC requested the Moon Jae-in government to send a Korean field-grade officer to the command.

However, the Moon government denied the request and even opposed the entry of German and Danish officers sent to the UNC.

The reason cited by the Moon government was that the UNC was seen as interfering with inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.

The tensions between the South Korean government and the UNC turned around after the Yoon Suk Yeol government took office.

In November of last year, the South Korean government hosted its first Defense Ministerial meeting of UNC member states in commemorating the 70th anniversary of the armistice.

The 17 UNC member states reaffirmed their commitment to protecting peace and democracy on the Korean Peninsula and expressed their intention to expand joint exercises.

This year, the Korean government intends to send a Korean officer to serve at the UNC.

Kwon Tae-hwan, chairman of the Korea Defense Diplomacy Association, said that if North Korea didn't possess nuclear weapons, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces would be sufficient to address threats, allowing the UNC to focus on maintaining the armistice.

"However, given North Korea's advancement in nuclear and missile capabilities, we urgently require more than just a ROK-U.S. alliance," Kwon said.

The United States also seeks to broaden the UNC's role and mission beyond the Korean Peninsula.

In December last year, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a bill that proposes establishing a task force to analyze the security situation in the Indo-Pacific region and assess the feasibility of establishing the Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization, a coalition similar to NATO.

In September last year, former UNC Commander General Vincent Brooks proposed expanding the UNC to the Far East Command, which would encompass South Korea and Japan.

His suggestion was viewed as an intention to establish an Asian NATO in the context of the growing confrontation between the United States and China.

"Due to the shifts in the East Asian security landscape, the role and mission of the UNC have become more comprehensive," remarked Park Young-june, a professor at the College of National Security at Korea National Defense University.

BY KIM DONG-HO, CHUNG YONG-SOO, LEE CHUL-JAE AND JUNG JIN-WOO [lee.hojeong@joongang.co.kr]

15. Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and two-state system

The Koreas could sign a basic treaty and this would allow him to continue his political warfare strategy to subvert the ROK in pursuit of his ultimate domination.

Excerpts:

The two Koreas could sign a basic treaty that enables a two-state system. And the new treaty should include most elements of the 1991 Basic Agreement, and recognize each other as sovereign states with territorial integrity just like the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanys. To ensure the international legal status of this treaty, it should be signed by the heads of the two Koreas, ratified by their legislatures and registered as an international treaty at the U.N. Secretariat per article 102 of the U.N. Charter.

Furthermore, it is essential to secure the support of major stakeholder states such as the United States, China, Japan and Russia.

Negotiating both the Basic Treaty between the two Koreas and U.S.-North Korea diplomatic normalization will be extremely challenging. Nevertheless, the parties concerned should take these measures seriously, and try to realize a two-state system even if the possibility of success is low.

Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and two-state system

The Korea Times · February 13, 2024

By Kim Sang-woo

In times of shifting geopolitical moments, levels of volatility are typically matched by the potential to address unfolding crises and challenges to shape history. Now is no exception. It’s leadership that makes the difference — it will be so again.

At the World Economic Forum last month, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan defined our currently unfolding post-Cold War era as “strategic competition in an age of interdependence.” He added, “We have the capacity to shape what it looks like … The question is, are we prepared to put it to work?” It is a question of summoning the political will to respond to the challenges that we face.

At the end of 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared that reunification with the South was impossible and that the two Koreas no longer have any kinship or homogeneity. They are instead, he said, two separate “belligerent states in the midst of war.” This declaration is a significant, even momentous event. With this statement, Kim criticized and reversed his father’s and revered grandfather’s policies concerning reunification.

However, it is unclear whether Kim’s abandonment of “reunification” will lead to peace on the Korean Peninsula, because this policy shift was accompanied by Kim’s instruction to the military to prepare for a “showdown with the enemy.” This should, he said, be done through nuclear war, if necessary.

War could break out due to North Korean provocations, ranging from more missile or nuclear tests to limited conventional clashes with South Korea. It is still doubtful that Kim would launch a nuclear attack on the South, because it would likely result in North Korea’s demise, but a raid similar to the one undertaken by Hamas against Israel in October is a possibility that concerns South Korea.

Kim might be tempted to ramp up tensions to keep the pressure on during this election year, on both South Korea and the U.S., and to set the stage for negotiations if Trump wins the presidency. Kim has learned through experience that there are few consequences for misconduct but many potential rewards.

Kim probably does not want a major war, but it is possible that he could miscalculate and accidentally start one. Since the failure of the Hanoi summit in 2019, there have been almost no guardrails to prevent situations from spiraling out of control.

The advice offered by a fourth-century Roman general, "Si vis pacem para bellum" (if you want peace, prepare for war), has been a critical foundation of security for many centuries. Today it is called deterrence.

Deterrence — or peace through strength — has stood the test of time because it is widely believed to have worked. But it is not without risks. Strengthening defenses to deter an adversary may be interpreted by that adversary as an indication of aggressive intent and a serious threat to one's own security.

North Korea’s initial motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons may well have been defensive — to deter what it perceived as efforts to undermine or eliminate its regime. But now, Kim may feel emboldened by his increased capabilities to pursue offensive objectives.

In such an environment, the risk of armed conflict breaking out as a result of an accident, misperception or miscalculation can grow. To avoid war and ultimately achieve peace, deterrence should be accompanied by diplomacy.

North Korea recently denounced the reunification of the Korean Peninsula and began calling South Korea by its official name (the Republic of Korea). This was followed by describing South Korea as “a separate belligerent state.”

Despite the ambivalence, South Korea should consider Kim Jong-un’s “separate state” statement as an opportunity to raise the idea of a two-state system to North Korea.

A two-state system would establish a legal and political framework that could help facilitate peaceful coexistence and reduce security risks on the Korean Peninsula.

Although experts have explored a two-state system in the past, public sentiment has been negative due to criticism that it was anti-nationalist, anti-unification and anti-constitutional. However, today more than a majority of South Koreans approve of such a system, and amid the risk of conflict, especially nuclear, it is certainly worth exploring.

South Korea should take the initiative and convene an inter-Korean dialogue for the discussion as it did in 1991, when both Koreas entered the United Nations. At the time, they signed the Basic Agreement and were even considering to institutionalize it.

The two Koreas could sign a basic treaty that enables a two-state system. And the new treaty should include most elements of the 1991 Basic Agreement, and recognize each other as sovereign states with territorial integrity just like the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanys. To ensure the international legal status of this treaty, it should be signed by the heads of the two Koreas, ratified by their legislatures and registered as an international treaty at the U.N. Secretariat per article 102 of the U.N. Charter.

Furthermore, it is essential to secure the support of major stakeholder states such as the United States, China, Japan and Russia.

Negotiating both the Basic Treaty between the two Koreas and U.S.-North Korea diplomatic normalization will be extremely challenging. Nevertheless, the parties concerned should take these measures seriously, and try to realize a two-state system even if the possibility of success is low.

John Maynard Keynes wrote in a 1930 essay: “I predict that both of the two opposed errors of pessimism … will be proved wrong over time: the pessimism of the revolutionaries who think that things are so bad that nothing can save us but violent change, and the pessimism of the reactionaries who consider the balance of our economic and social life so precarious that we must risk no experiments.”

Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com), a former lawmaker, is chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project and a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.

The Korea Times · February 13, 2024

16. A movie star, a suicide and a nation's war on drugs (South Korea)

A movie star, a suicide and a nation's war on drugs

Los Angeles Times · by Max Kim · February 13, 2024

SEOUL —

South Korean actor Lee Sun-kyun learned he was being investigated for illegal drug use after reading about it in the news.

The story that leaked to the South Korean news media was that detectives from the city of Incheon were acting on a tip that Lee had taken ketamine and marijuana.

Best known for his role as a haughty tech executive in the Oscar-winning 2019 dark comedy “Parasite,” Lee was one of the country’s biggest movie stars. He had lead roles in two of the seven Korean films screened in May at the Cannes Film Festival.

South Korea has some of the harshest drug laws in the world, and recreational use has long been dealt with as a criminal matter rather than a public health issue. The police investigation was opened in October amid a renewed crackdown, and authorities seemed determined to make an example out of Lee.

He was paraded in front of reporters, drug-tested four times and once interrogated for 19 hours straight. Salacious personal details, leaked to the media, formed a pulpy narrative of a beloved star whose deviant private life was finally being unmasked.

Lee, 48, maintained his innocence. But on Dec. 27, after Lee went missing, police found him dead in his car at a park in Seoul in an apparent suicide.

South Korean director Bong Joon-ho, left, reacts during a Jan. 12, 2024, news conference in Seoul demanding an investigation into the death of actor Lee Sun-kyun.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

His death unleashed a swell of criticism that overzealous investigators and the media had turned Lee into a victim of what Jang Won-seok, a film producer and longtime friend of the actor, described as “a character assassination that pushed him to the absolute bottom.”

Fewer are questioning the way drug users are demonized in South Korea, a mind-set stoked by decades of government rhetoric and hard-line policy.

“The public sees drug use as a ‘social evil,’” Jang said. “Of the many scandals that a celebrity can suffer, drugs are among the worst.”

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Authorities became interested in Lee after a 28-year-old small-time former actress — whom they have identified only by her surname, Park — showed up at a police station claiming that a former friend and the movie star were drug users.

The former friend, a 29-year-old woman with the last name Kim, managed a members-only bar in Seoul. News accounts said the two had met years earlier in prison, where Kim was reportedly serving time for drugs and Park for fraud. But their relationship had recently soured.

It was Kim, facing prosecution, who provided the details about Lee and the drugs she said he used at her apartment several times.

Actor Lee Sun-Kyun is seen arriving at Incheon International Airport in South Korea on Feb. 12, 2020.

(The Fact / ImaZins via Getty Images)

According to police reports obtained by broadcaster MBC, her recollection of which dates this happened shifted repeatedly before detectives finally zeroed in on four specific days between October 2022 and June 2023.

Lee made a surprising counter-allegation, claiming that Kim had extorted $225,000 from him, while another blackmailer — later revealed to be Park — had resorted to extortion as well, to the tune of $37,000.

In South Korea, law enforcement authorities are barred from disclosing the identities of suspects under criminal investigation or allowing suspects to be recorded on video or photographed by the media. But by the time Lee was summoned by the police in late October, a regional newspaper, quoting an anonymous Incheon police source, had already broken the news about the investigation, setting off a maelstrom of coverage. “Lee Sun-kyun drug allegations create shock waves,” read a typical headline. “Damage expected to reach fellow actors and production staff.”

At the front of the station, a wall of reporters greeted Lee, who appeared tense and solemn — a sharp departure from his public image of clean-cut, jaunty wholesomeness.

“These sorts of A-lister celebrity drug scandals are almost unheard of in South Korea,” said Kim Hern-sik, a pop culture critic who has spoken about Lee’s case on national television. “And if you appear in the press like that, you’re automatically branded as guilty.”

As a local telecommunications company and vitamin manufacturer began pulling their advertising campaigns featuring Lee, questions circulated about who had tipped off the media about his trip to the station.

In a written statement, a spokesperson for police denied that they disclosed the date of Lee’s summons, adding that “we are in the process of ascertaining whether the source of the initial news report was from an internal leak.”

South Korean entertainment insiders hold a Jan. 12, 2024, news conference in Seoul after the death of actor Lee Sun-kyun in an apparent suicide. He was under police investigation for suspected drug use.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

Law enforcement experts have also criticized the police’s handling of the early stages of their investigation.

“Establishing the basic facts, like the specific dates of the alleged drug use, or vetting the credibility of the accuser’s allegations — these are things that should have been done very early on, before Lee was summoned,” said Kim Hee-jun, a former narcotics investigator with South Korea’s prosecutors’ office.

“I’ve investigated plenty of celebrities in the past, but not once did I summon them publicly,” he said. “Once the suspect is revealed to be someone famous and there is an expectant atmosphere being created, it’s difficult to say ‘oh, we looked into it and there’s nothing there.’ It can sway the investigation toward prosecution.”

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Most of Asia has taken a hard stance against recreational drug use, and South Korea is no exception. Citizens can even be prosecuted for consuming drugs outside the country.

But things weren’t always this way.

Cannabis seeds were used in traditional Korean medicine, and as recently as the 1960s, marijuana could be found growing wild in the countryside, where farmers would sometimes smoke the leaves like tobacco.

Recreational marijuana use took root among the countercultural youth of the 1970s, associated with rock ‘n’ roll and American GIs, who called it “happy smoke.”

Responding to pressure from the U.S. military — which blamed locally grown marijuana for American troops getting high — as well as the dissident undertones of pot culture, the Park Chung-hee military dictatorship declared that the drug was corrupting the country’s youth and made cannabis offenses punishable by death.

The regime’s anti-drug campaign featured a string of high-profile trials of celebrities, including Shin Joong-hyun, a guitarist known as South Korea’s “godfather of rock” who was tortured and institutionalized.

Marijuana use is no longer a capital offense, but the legacy of that era has endured. There are deep stigmas around drug use and widespread fears around the newfound availability of methamphetamine, MDMA and other drugs, which are sold on the dark web or anonymous messaging apps, paid for with cryptocurrency and delivered in contactless drop-offs.

A single dose of meth, which would have cost around $75 a few years ago, is now estimated to sell for as little as $15.

In April, the conservative administration of President Yoon Suk-yeol, a former prosecutor, launched a multi-agency narcotics investigation unit led by the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, the most powerful law enforcement body in the country.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol with President Biden at the White House in April 2023. Yoon’s conservative administration launched a multi-agency narcotics investigation unit in South Korea that month.

(Kent Nishimura / Los Angeles Times)

“The reason drugs used to be expensive in South Korea was the risk cost — if you were caught, your life would be ruined,” Justice Minister Han Dong-hoon said. “This administration is going to root out many offenders and will come down on them so hard that they will shriek.”

Police made 17,817 drug arrests last year, up from 8,107 in 2018, with teenagers and people in their 20s accounting for the biggest, sharpest spikes.

A survey by polling company Hankook Research in December 2022 found that almost 80% of South Koreans supported the drug war. A similar percentage associated drug use with “a lack of morals” and believed that, on top of the legal consequences, celebrities caught using drugs deserved to suffer additional social or economic fallout.

For law enforcement, the government has offered up clear incentives to score big wins.

In April, the country’s police chief announced “significant rewards” for the agency’s top performers — including special promotions for entire teams — calling for both major drug ring busts as well as awareness-raising efforts.

“That creates competition among narcotics departments and adds pressure to produce results,” said Kim Hee-jun, the former prosecutor. “And high-profile cases, like investigations into celebrities or famous corporate figures, are a prime example of these kinds of highly regarded performance outcomes.”

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Lee would have understood that drug scandals can torpedo careers long before a guilty verdict is even reached.

Fellow actor Yoo Ah-in, currently on trial on charges of using ketamine, marijuana and cocaine, is now widely regarded as persona non grata in the South Korean entertainment industry. Two movies and a Netflix series have indefinitely been put on hold, and he may also be on the hook for damages to advertisers for causing “social controversy.”

Lee was never arrested or charged, but between late October and late November, police gave him four drug tests, including hair tests said to detect drug use for up to a year.

One test was inconclusive and the rest were negative.

“If it had been a regular person, I think the case would have likely been closed right there,” said Kim Hee-jun, the former prosecutor. “It’s very difficult to prosecute a suspect without a positive drug test when the dates of alleged use fall within that detection window.”

Director Tae-gon Kim, from left, and actors Lee Sun-kyun, Kim Hee-won and Ju Ji-hoon pose during the photo call for the film “Project Silence” at the 76th Cannes Film Festival in May 2023.

(Daniel Cole / Associated Press)

But the investigation of Lee remained open.

“We investigated the case according to standard protocols and the law,” the police department said in a written statement. “In determining whether a charge exists, drug investigations take into account not only testing results, but also testimonies of involved parties and forensic data.”

In late November, as newspapers began to question why the police were pushing ahead with the investigation with seemingly little evidence, the national broadcaster KBS released parts of a recording of a phone conversation between Lee and his accuser.

The two appeared to be flirting with each other. At one point, Kim steered the conversation toward drugs, in what some have interpreted as an attempt to get Lee to incriminate himself. Lee’s response was distracted and noncommittal.

The source of the recording remains a mystery. Incheon police have acknowledged that it was filed as evidence but have denied leaking it.

Jang, Lee’s friend, believes that this recording was the compromising material used by Kim to extort Lee, who had a wife and two sons.

“Nobody really knows what the nature of their relationship was,” Jang said. “But he was a famous celebrity with a family, and I think the manager exploited that and the optics of the situation to extort him.”

Although KBS has defended its publication of the recording, others say the decision was the lowest point in what they regard as frantic, often prurient coverage of Lee. In two months, South Korean media published nearly 3,000 online news reports about Lee.

At a news conference held by Lee’s industry colleagues in early January, singer and music executive Yoon Jong-shin asked, “Can KBS say, on its honor as a public broadcaster, that the private conversation of the deceased, which had nothing to do with the allegations at hand, was really journalism in the service of the public interest?”

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Lee wasn’t the only target of his accuser. She also told investigators that Kwon Ji-yong, a famous musician known as G-dragon, had done cocaine at the bar she managed.

Police closed that investigation in mid-December after the musician passed his drug tests and his accuser admitted that she hadn’t actually seen him take the drugs.

South Korean police closed their investigation into Kwon Ji-yong, also known as G-Dragon, after the musician passed his drug tests. Above, he arrives at the Incheon police station for questioning in November 2023.

(Han Myung-Gu / WireImage)

But the police were not done with Lee. On the morning of Dec. 23, he showed up at the Incheon police station for his third interrogation. Police denied a request from his lawyers that he be allowed to enter the building through an underground parking garage, so he had to walk through a throng of reporters.

Police said that the overnight interrogation was arranged with Lee’s consent in order to make enough time for questions related to the drug case as well as his extortion case.

Three days later, Lee asked for a polygraph test. But before it could be administered he was dead.

The Incheon police agency is being investigated for its potential role in the leaks about Lee’s case. Park and Kim, Lee’s accusers, are being tried on extortion charges. Kim is also on trial for allegedly taking meth and marijuana.

A coalition of entertainment industry figures, including “Parasite” director Bong Joon-ho, are now campaigning for strengthened privacy protections for subjects of law enforcement investigations.

“Ultimately, the attitude of the public needs to mature, to not expect celebrities to be like pure, blank sheets of paper,” Jang said. “But there is a need for some basic safeguard to prevent something like this from happening again.”

Jang remembered his friend as warm and kind, recounting how Lee liked to hype up his colleagues, rearranging seats at restaurants so a younger actor had a chance to shine.

Amid the tide of eulogies, some drug experts hoped that Lee’s death would begin to change the national conversation around the country’s punitive approach to drugs.

But that has not happened.

“Other countries have adopted a rehabilitation-focused model, but South Korea has not,” said Lim Sang-hyeon, the director of a drug treatment facility in Gyeonggi province. “The public still sees drug users as criminals or menaces to society rather than patients. And that’s because the enforcement of drug laws paints them that way.”

South Korean director Bong Joon-ho is among the entertainment industry figures campaigning for strengthened privacy protections for subjects of law enforcement investigations.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

Kim Hee-jun said that the incident has at least raised questions that might eventually help inch public awareness forward.

“When I was a prosecutor, I myself only ever thought you needed to come down hard on drug users,” he said. “But over time, I saw the high recidivism rates, I sought out more information and came to see the issue in terms of not just crime, but also of disease and addiction.”

In January, he published a book that aims to demystify teenage drug use. An exonerated G-Dragon agreed to write the foreword.

“Prejudice stands in the way of healing and change,” he wrote. “To fix the heart of the problem, we must begin with prevention and positive education rather than law and punishment.”

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