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Quotes of the Day:
"Only life lived for others is worthwhile."
- Albert Einstein
“Socrates said, “The misuse of language induces evil in the soul.” He wasn’t talking about grammar. To misuse language is to use it the way politicians and advertisers do, for profit, without taking responsibility for what the words mean. Language used as a means to get power or make money goes wrong: it lies. Language used as an end in itself, to sing a poem or tell a story, goes right, goes towards the truth. A writer is a person who cares what words mean, what they say, how they say it. Writers know words are their way towards truth and freedom, and so they use them with care, with thought, with fear, with delight. By using words well they strengthen their souls. Story-tellers and poets spend their lives learning that skill and art of using words well. And their words make the souls of their readers stronger, brighter, deeper.”
~ Ursula K. Le Guin
"The hardest lesson I’ve had to learn as an adult is the relentless need to keep going, no matter how shattered I feel inside."
– Ernest Hemingway
1. ROK: YOON TROUBLES (John Batchelor Show)
2. Trump will nominate a free speech lawyer to public diplomacy role (And Allison Hooker to Undersecretary for Political Affairs).
3. Trump taps North Korea expert Allison Hooker as under secretary of state
4. T-Mobile’s Game-Changing Collaboration with Starlink has begun Nationwide Testing of Satellite-Based Connectivity
5. Russia, North Korea Boost Their Cooperation Amid Tough Ukrainian Resistance
6. Trump and Kim Jong-un Have Opposing Visions for North Korea on Nuclear Weapons
7. ‘Huge smiles’: Lawmaker sends 500 valentines to US troops near North Korean border
8. The Roots of South Korea’s Political Crisis
9. South Korea Has More Leverage Over China Than You Think
10. Impeached South Korean President Yoon Blames Opposition for Martial Law Decree
11. Did China meddle in South Korea’s election? Concern over claims by Yoon supporters
12. FM Cho to hold 1st talks with Rubio in Munich this weekend
13. S. Korea urges N.K. to 'immediately stop' dismantling separated family facility at Mt. Kumgang resort
14. Declassified dossier shows N. Korea demanded South dismantle DMZ barricade in 1990 talks
15. Trump taps ex-NSC official involved in N.K. diplomacy as under secretary of state
16. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Surveillance and Control of Mobile Phones Intensifies: Information Extracted During Repairs, Daily Photography Monitored
17. 41% of Korea's US exports feared being subject to 'tariff bombs'
18. US withdrawal from UN human rights body draws mixed reactions
19. US Senate introduces bill to 'allow allies to build warships'… "Utilizing allies' comparative advantage"
20. Kim Jong-un's Choice
21. Korean experts: Social consensus needed before revising ‘unification plan’”
1. ROK: YOON TROUBLES (John Batchelor Show)
9 minute interview here:
https://audioboom.com/posts/8653322-rok-yoon-troubles-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center-for-asia-pacific-strategy-on-th
2. Trump will nominate free speech lawyer to public diplomacy role
In addition to the Public Diplomacy nomination a number of other nominees were announced. You can track all administration nominees at this helpful Washington Post tracker at this link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2025/trump-appointee-tracker/
The question is will Ms. Rogers take the lead in overseeing an effective information and influence campaign for the United States and orchestrate all the information levers and tools across the interagency? If not her, then who?
Note Allison Hooker and her Korean expertise.
Excerpts:
Allison Hooker has been tapped for under secretary for political affairs, the third most senior role in the department. Hooker is an expert on Indo-Pacific security and previously served in Trump’s first administration as the lead Korea specialist on the National Security Council.
Trump has also tapped Thomas DiNanno of the Hudson Institute as under secretary for arms control and international security, meaning he could play a crucial role in potential “denuclearization” talks with Russia and China — something the president has said he wanted.
Christopher Pratt, who was the principal deputy special envoy for hostage affairs in the first Trump administration, has been selected to become assistant secretary for political-military affairs, a key role managing arms transfers and security partnerships.
Joel Rayburn, a former diplomat and Middle East specialist who worked for Sen. Bill Hagerty, a Tennessee Republican, has been tapped as the department’s top Middle East official. Paul Kapur, a professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School, will be nominated to lead the department’s efforts in South and Central Asia. And Caleb Orr has been selected to lead the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which oversees global trade and sanctions efforts.
https://www.semafor.com/article/02/12/2025/trump-set-to-nominate-key-state-department-officials
Trump will nominate free speech lawyer to public diplomacy role
Mathias Hammer, Eleanor Mueller, and Ben Smith
Updated Feb 12, 2025, 11:23am EST
politics
North America
Joshua Roberts/File Photo/Reuters
The Scoop
US President Donald Trump is set to nominate a slate of top State Department officials, including the third-highest ranking position at the agency and several crucial posts overseeing arms control, the Middle East, and South and Central Asia, according to a list of nominees from the White House dated Feb. 11 obtained by Semafor.
The nominations include a New York lawyer, Sarah Rogers, who has defended the National Rifle Association on free speech grounds and litigated against content moderation. Her appointment to be the under secretary for public diplomacy — a role that had, in the Biden administration, been involved in efforts to combat false information on social media, signals that the Trump administration is planning to globalize its push to force social platforms to allow a wider range of speech.
Rogers will replace Darren Beattie, an outspoken and divisive MAGA figure who is acting in the role. Beattie, who was never expected to take the role on a permanent basis, had courted controversy in the past for associating with extreme figures and espousing foreign policy views at odds with Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s hawkishness.
Rogers has no obvious foreign policy experience, but brings a similar point of view on key issues around speech and social media platforms. A partner at the New York litigation boutique Brewer, Rogers represented the National Rifle Association alongside the ACLU in a winning appeal to the Supreme Court last March. She also represented the NRA against the New York State Attorney General, who was seeking to dissolve the organization, which the NRA beat back on First Amendment grounds. And she represented the playwright David Mamet in an amicus brief in support of a Texas law barring platforms from moderating content based on political viewpoints.
Know More
Rogers is one of a handful of top State Department officials proposed for Senate confirmation.
Allison Hooker has been tapped for under secretary for political affairs, the third most senior role in the department. Hooker is an expert on Indo-Pacific security and previously served in Trump’s first administration as the lead Korea specialist on the National Security Council.
Trump has also tapped Thomas DiNanno of the Hudson Institute as under secretary for arms control and international security, meaning he could play a crucial role in potential “denuclearization” talks with Russia and China — something the president has said he wanted.
Christopher Pratt, who was the principal deputy special envoy for hostage affairs in the first Trump administration, has been selected to become assistant secretary for political-military affairs, a key role managing arms transfers and security partnerships.
Joel Rayburn, a former diplomat and Middle East specialist who worked for Sen. Bill Hagerty, a Tennessee Republican, has been tapped as the department’s top Middle East official. Paul Kapur, a professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School, will be nominated to lead the department’s efforts in South and Central Asia. And Caleb Orr has been selected to lead the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which oversees global trade and sanctions efforts.
The White House and State Department did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
3. Trump taps North Korea expert Allison Hooker as under secretary of state
I see the jump. Can we see the conclusion? I am not sure if this adds up to negotiations with north Korea.
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, former North Korea envoy Joseph Yun was named in January as interim ambassador to South Korea. Additionally, Trump appointed Alex Wong — who helped coordinate past Trump-Kim summits — as deputy national security adviser, and tapped Richard Grenell as a special envoy overseeing the North Korea portfolio.
Combined, the latest appointment could mean the White House will ultimately pursue talks with North Korea, once again.
“Hooker has extensive experience negotiating with North Korea under the previous Trump administration,” said Peter Ward, a contributing analyst at NK Pro and researcher at the Sejong Institute. “I think this signals that the administration is preparing for dialogue with Pyongyang.”
Trump taps North Korea expert Allison Hooker as under secretary of state
Hooker accompanied Trump to key summits with Kim Jong Un and experts say appointment signals interest in renewed talks
https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/trump-taps-north-korea-expert-allison-hooker-as-under-secretary-of-state/
Chad O'Carroll February 13, 2025
Former United States Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, Allison Hooker and Donald Trump | Image: Donald J. Trump via Twitter
U.S. President Donald Trump nominated Allison Hooker as under secretary of state for political affairs, a seasoned diplomat whose Korea expertise suggests Washington may pursue renewed talks with Pyongyang in the coming months and years, according to experts.
Hooker, a veteran Korea specialist, played a key role in past Trump administration negotiations with Pyongyang. Her nomination on Tuesday comes as the White House has been appointing other key foreign policy officials with prior experience engaging North Korea.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has suggested a shift away from the Biden administration’s sanctions-focused approach to dealings with Pyongyang, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appeared to acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear status.
Meanwhile, former North Korea envoy Joseph Yun was named in January as interim ambassador to South Korea. Additionally, Trump appointed Alex Wong — who helped coordinate past Trump-Kim summits — as deputy national security adviser, and tapped Richard Grenell as a special envoy overseeing the North Korea portfolio.
Combined, the latest appointment could mean the White House will ultimately pursue talks with North Korea, once again.
“Hooker has extensive experience negotiating with North Korea under the previous Trump administration,” said Peter Ward, a contributing analyst at NK Pro and researcher at the Sejong Institute. “I think this signals that the administration is preparing for dialogue with Pyongyang.”
Director for Regional Affairs at Pacific Forum Rob York shared a similar sentiment.
“She’s an experienced hand at this, which is welcome. It also suggests the Trump administration is teeing up a deal with Kim, but time will tell if the Kim regime is interested,” he told NK News.
Hooker spent decades shaping U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula, serving in senior National Security Council roles across multiple administrations. Under Trump, she was deputy assistant to the president and senior director for the Korean Peninsula, where she focused on U.S. policy toward the Koreas.
She also accompanied Trump to key summits — including in Singapore and Hanoi with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and at the DMZ with South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
From 2001 to 2014, she served as a senior North Korea analyst at the State Department’s intelligence arm, contributing to the Six-Party Talks aimed at curbing Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.
However, any push to restart talks between Washington and Pyongyang faces significant hurdles with Kim Jong Un dismissing diplomacy while expanding his nuclear arsenal and military ties with Russia.
But with a potential Trump-Putin summit now on the horizon, Pyongyang may find itself drawn back into negotiations with Washington.
Edited by Alannah Hill
4. T-Mobile’s Game-Changing Collaboration with Starlink has begun Nationwide Testing of Satellite-Based Connectivity
As I watched the Super Bowl I saw the commercial advertising this capability and I immediately thought that we could use this. The question is can we get Starlink and T-Mobile to develop the capability and provide connectivity over north Korea to connect to the 8 million smartphones inside the north?
And on a broader scale this could have global communications implications for communications in denied areas (under the rule of authoritarian regimes)
https://www.techi.com/t-mobile-starlink-satellite-mobile-connectivity-testing/
T-Mobile’s Game-Changing Collaboration with Starlink has begun Nationwide Testing of Satellite-Based Connectivity
For several years, mobile dead zones were an unavoidable source of annoyance, whether it was on the hike in the mountains, a drive on those long rural highways or standing alone in one of the most peculiar corners of a house where calls mysteriously drop. Thanks to T-Mobile and SpaceX’s Starlink, the two companies have now officially launched widespread testing of their satellite-to-cell service that aims to push mobile access to even the remotest locations. If you text “HELP” from a remote island and no one replies, at least you’ll know it’s personal.
Game-Changer and edge in the Wireless Market:
T-Mobile, last Sunday launched a beta trial of the satellite service to allow such customers to send text messages via satellite. The company will make the service available for free to beta testers until July, after which it will be a standard offering in T-Mobile’s premium plan, Go5G Next, with no additional charges. Other T-Mobile customers can opt into the service for an additional $15 per month after the launch this summer.
Company estimates that about 500,000 square miles of the U.S, previously unreachable by traditional cell towers, will stay connected. Text messages are the first step, voice and data capabilities are expected to follow, hence eventually keeping the uninterrupted mobile coverage alive. Its market partner has given T-Mobile a competitive edge in relation to its competition.
This aspect also connects T-Mobile to other smartphone manufacturers such as Apple and Google to integrate the satellite connection capability into the operating systems. As Mike Katz, T-Mobile’s president of marketing, strategy and products, said, “T-Mobile has been working closely with Apple and Google to ensure that this experience is integrated directly into their OS (operating system), and this will be the default satellite system across both of those phones”.
He emphasized on the service’s performance on nearly all smartphones of the last four years, indicating no need for new devices or specialized hardware. Katz said, “This is something that nobody else in the U.S. has done, and one of the big distinctive things this network has is that it works across almost all smartphones from the last four years”.
T-Mobile has also opened its satellite service to rival customers, specifically those from AT&T and Verizon, without the requirement of switching networks. Katz said, “Customers who sign up for the trial will get a 33% discount when the service is commercially launched”. It seems that this could mark a paradigm shift in the way telecom companies will require cross-network cooperation on improvements in infrastructure.
Future of Satellite-Enabled Mobile Networks:
Satellite technology is the next frontier that mobile networks compete for as they strive to achieve universal connectivity. While T-Mobile and Starlink are taking the lead, the vision of customers of the extinction of “no service” zones will be a reality in the future. The trial invitation gives customers a glimpse of the future when portable companies will no longer be limited to cell towers but would attain a vast reach of a limitless space.
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Fatimah Misbah Hussain
https://www.techi.com/
Fatimah Misbah Hussain is a tech writer at TECHi.com who transforms complex topics into accessible, compelling content for a global audience. She covers emerging trends, offers insightful updates, and explores technology’s evolving impact on society with clarity and depth.
5. Russia, North Korea Boost Their Cooperation Amid Tough Ukrainian Resistance
Russia, North Korea Boost Their Cooperation Amid Tough Ukrainian Resistance
Fresh North Korean troops are pouring into the embattled Kursk Oblast region of Russia after the initial wave of North Koreans suffered prohibitive casualties.
DONALD KIRK
Feb. 11, 2025 03:29 PM ET
nysun.com
The flow of troops, arms, and civilians between Russia and North Korea is moving both ways as casualties pile up and supplies run short amid freezing winter temperatures and tough Ukrainian resistance.
That hellish image emerges amid reports that fresh North Korean troops are pouring into the embattled Kursk Oblast region of Russia, hard by the eastern Ukraine border, after the initial wave of North Koreans suffered prohibitive casualties.
Wearing Russian uniforms and carrying Russian identification cards, the North Koreans are the tip of the spear of the Russian drive to turn back the Ukrainian forces that crossed the border in August, making up somewhat for the loss to Russia of the Crimean peninsula and much of the southeastern Donbas region more than 10 years ago.
“Russia has once again deployed North Korean soldiers alongside its troops,” Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said in a social media post. “Hundreds of Russian and North Korean soldiers,” he claimed, “have been destroyed” in the latest fighting. “This is crucial because battles on Russian territory prevent further escalation against our cities and land.”
A Seoul website that tracks North Korea, NK News, said North Korean troops had been redeployed to the Kursk region “after a brief withdrawal from the frontlines” — and “their tactics appear as deadly as before.” New to combat, unfamiliar with the flat terrain, and easy targets for Ukrainian drones, the North Koreans initially suffered about 1,000 killed and 3,000 wounded, a casualty rate of a third of the 12,000 troops that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, had sent there.
How much they learned, though, is open to question. NK News quoted the chief of Kyiv’s Center for Countering Disinformation, Andrii Kovalenko, as saying “the same assault groups are now advancing head-on and suffering losses” even though “they were previously withdrawn and not used in assault operations after sustaining casualties.”
Going the opposite direction, a Russian newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, reports “hundreds of Russian soldiers” wounded in Ukraine are being treated in North Korea. Russia’s ambassador to North Korea, Alexander Matsegora, described “the hospitality” accorded the Russians as “a reflection of North Koreans’ warm attitude toward Russians,” said the report.
North Korea and Russia, he was quoted as saying, share “a common history filled with examples of close cooperation and mutual assistance.”
So generous were the North Koreans, the ambassador said, that they “refused Russia’s offer of financial compensation for the medical care, food, and other expenses related to the Russians’ stay in North Korea,” according to the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War. He neglected to mention that Mr. Kim had promised President Putin vast quantities of arms and thousands of troops.
The influx of wounded Russians into North Korea, though, may have a dual purpose — “part of the military training programme for the North Korean soldiers and the exchange of combat experience,” Ukrainska Pravda said on its website.
“The Russian military command has reportedly been sending wounded personnel back into assault groups without treatment, demonstrating a general disregard for soldiers’ health in the Russian military and calling into question official Russian claims to be sending Russian soldiers abroad for treatment, particularly to North Korea.” the Institute for the Study of War said.
In fact, ISW said, “The arrival of combat experienced Russian soldiers, particularly if they include officers or non-commissioned officers, to North Korea may allow the Russian military to work with North Korean forces and disseminate lessons from the war in Ukraine while ostensibly recuperating.”
The traffic between Russia and North Korea also includes students on internships and professors on long-term deals to teach Korean in Russian universities. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reports, moreover, that North Koreans “are increasingly entering Russia on student visas to take construction jobs,” ISW said.
Civilians living in areas under Russian control may suffer the most. “The human costs of this war are enormous,” two professors, Peter Liberman at City University of New York and Andrew Kosenko at Queens College, write in Foreign Affairs. “Russian forces are ruling occupied Ukraine with an iron fist, engaging in a ruthless campaign of torture, kidnapping, violence, and arbitrary killing.”
nysun.com
6. Trump and Kim Jong-un Have Opposing Visions for North Korea on Nuclear Weapons
Yes they do. This is where POTUS' zero sum deal making comes in - I win you lose.
The question is who wins and who loses? Kim Jong Un certainly thinks he is going to win with his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy.
Perhaps we should change the rules and flip the negotiating table and focus on unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights.
Trump and Kim Jong-un Have Opposing Visions for North Korea on Nuclear Weapons
When Kim leaves no doubt of his ambition to build more warheads, and the missiles to send them to distant targets, his remarks appear almost like a direct rebuff of Trump, who has repeatedly said he hopes the two can meet again.
DONALD KIRK
Feb. 10, 2025 04:07 PM ET
nysun.com
President Trump is facing what may be an insurmountable obstacle to a fourth meeting with the North Korean leader: Kim Jong-un’s renewed vow to expand his nuclear program.
On the 77th anniversary of the founding of North Korea’s armed forces, Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency said Mr. Kim “clarified once again the unshakable policy of more highly developing the nuclear forces” in accordance with “new plans for rapidly bolstering all deterrents.”
This was after Mr. Trump, from Washington, said flatly, “We will have relations with North Korea, with Kim Jong-un.” When Mr. Kim left no doubt of his ambition to build more warheads, and the missiles to send them to distant targets, his remarks appeared almost like a direct rebuff of Mr. Trump, who has repeatedly said he hopes the two can meet again.
Sitting beside Prime Minister Ishiba of Japan in the Oval Office on Friday, Mr. Trump recalled the personal relationship he believed he had formed with Mr. Kim, with whom he has often said he “fell in love” during their first summit, in Singapore in June 2018. He seemed to think the relationship had blossomed in their two subsequent meetings — a summit at Hanoi in February 2019 and a third meeting four months later at Panmunjom on the line between the two Koreas.
Mr. Trump did not, however, mention the basic reason for Mr. Kim to avoid welcoming a reunion — the humiliation of Mr. Trump’s abrupt walkout from their Hanoi summit after Mr. Kim refused to give up his nuclear program.
So angered was Mr. Kim that he ordered the execution of his nuclear envoy to Washington and other officials whom he believed had deliberately misled him into believing Mr. Trump would recognize the North as a nuclear power, according to South Korea’s biggest-selling newspaper, Chosun Ilbo.
Skipping the debacle in Hanoi, Mr. Trump said he “had a good relationship” with Mr. Kim, and “I think it’s a very big asset for everybody that I do get along with them” — meaning not only Mr. Kim but others in his entourage.
Mr. Kim did not refer to Mr. Trump or their previous meetings as he launched into hyperbolic language, describing his nuclear forces as “immutable ones for real war to promptly smash the origin of any attempt of the hostile forces to infringe the sovereignty of the country and the security of its people and threaten regional peace.”
Without alluding to either America or Japan, Mr. Kim’s remarks appeared to reflect his fury over the affirmation, in the joint statement issued by Messrs. Trump and Ishiba, of longstanding demands for North Korea’s “complete denuclearization.” The inference was that Mr. Trump had never budged from his position in Hanoi that the North had to give up its nukes — and the missiles to send them to distant targets, including America and Japan as well as South Korea — as a condition for a real deal with Washington.
Also, Mr. Kim of course could not have been happy about the statement’s declaration of “the need to deter and counter” North Korea’s “malicious cyber activities” and its “increasing military cooperation with Russia.” It was the allusion to the North’s role in the Ukraine war that presumably prompted him to come close to acknowledging for the first time that he’s ordered North Korean forces to fight for the Russians.
Both Mr. Kim and President Putin have chosen not to mention the presence of the North Koreans, who wear Russian uniforms and carry phony Russian ID cards.
“Our army and people will invariably support and encourage the just cause of the Russian army and people to defend their sovereignty, security and territorial integrity,” KCNA quoted Mr. Kim as saying. That was said to be “in keeping with the spirit of the treaty on the comprehensive strategic partnership” between the North and Russia reached in the mutual defense treaty signed during Mr. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang last June.
nysun.com
7. ‘Huge smiles’: Lawmaker sends 500 valentines to US troops near North Korean border
When I first glanced at the headline I thought the Congresswoman was sending the Valentines to the Korean people in the north. But alas...
Still, a nice gesture for 500 or the 28,500 US troops in Korea.
Excerpts:
This year, for the first time, cards were sent to soldiers deployed to Hovey from Lewis-McChord, she said.
“Service members who are stationed abroad should also feel appreciation for their service,” Miller said.
‘Huge smiles’: Lawmaker sends 500 valentines to US troops near North Korean border
Stars and Stripes · by Luis Garcia · February 13, 2025
An American soldier receives a Valentine's Day card at Camp Hovey, South Korea, Feb. 11, 2025. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
CAMP HOVEY, South Korea — Nearly 500 Valentine’s Day cards were delivered to soldiers near the DMZ this week, marking the first time a Washington congresswoman’s annual program has reached overseas.
Rep. Marilyn Strickland, D-Wash., sent a staffer to Camp Hovey on Tuesday to deliver valentines collected in Washington state’s 10th Congressional District, which includes southern Tacoma, Olympia and Joint Base Lewis-McChord.
The Valentines for Veterans and First Responders program, launched in 2022, has grown into an annual effort involving thousands of messages from students and community groups in Strickland’s district, spokeswoman Siena Miller told Stars and Stripes by email Wednesday.
This year, for the first time, cards were sent to soldiers deployed to Hovey from Lewis-McChord, she said.
“Service members who are stationed abroad should also feel appreciation for their service,” Miller said.
At the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment motor pool, soldiers received valentines decorated with handwritten messages, drawings and crafts.
“To me, small things count, and they really matter,” Spc. Todd Marquez, of California, said at the motor pool Tuesday. “Sometimes you might be having a bad day, and little things like this help a lot.”
American soldiers receive Valentine's Day cards at Camp Hovey, South Korea, Feb. 11, 2025. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
Hovey is 11 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone, a 2 ½-mile-wide, heavily guarded swath that divides the two Koreas. Units of the 2nd Infantry Division, primarily combat arms such as field artillery and mechanized infantry, are stationed there.
Marquez, who serves with the artillery regiment, said the gesture reminds troops that people back home are thinking about them.
“I probably speak on everybody’s behalf in saying that we appreciate it,” he told Stars and Stripes. “It’s really thoughtful, and it does help morale with the unit.”
For 1st Lt. Gerard Massey, of Texas, the impact went beyond the physical gift.
“It’s not necessarily the valentine itself; it’s the mental acknowledgment,” he said. “It’s the ‘hey, we know you’re forward, we know you’re making a sacrifice, and we appreciate you.’”
Massey said the effort resonated across the unit.
“What may have taken them five minutes to make means the world to us,” he said. “There were huge smiles on faces today because of this.”
American soldiers pose with their Valentine's Day cards at Camp Hovey, South Korea, Feb. 11, 2025. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
Luis Garcia
Luis Garcia
Luis Garcia is a reporter and photographer at Osan Air Base, South Korea, who enlisted in the U.S. Army in 2020.
Stars and Stripes · by Luis Garcia · February 13, 2025
8. The Roots of South Korea’s Political Crisis
Apparently the roots are rooted in cement and will be difficult to uproot.
Which country has had more impeachments since the late 1990s: America or Korea?
But what the good professors do not cover is the impact of China's United Front Work Department and north Korea's United Front Department and Cultural Engagement Bureau, all of which are actively conducting subversion in the South for multiple objectives, from undermining the ROK political system to cause collapse, to driving a wedge and the ROK/US alliance to force US forces from the peninsula, and to create dilemmas for the US in the greater game of strategic competition between the US and China. We cannot understand and address the political turmoil in the South without acknowledging the contribution of China and north Korea to the turmoil. One of the major political reforms that is necessary is to counter Chinese and north Korean subversion and tat requires political leaders on both side to acknowledge their malign activities and collectively work to counter them,
Excerpts:
Unfortunately, big changes seem unlikely. For years, political scientists in South Korea have recognized the undue power of the executive branch, often referring to it as an “imperial presidency.” When presidential scandals occur, these critiques are part of the mainstream conversation, too, with calls for reform echoing on the news and in editorial pages. Yet no substantial reform occurred after two former presidents were impeached in 2004 and 2016, or when a third, Lee Myung-bak, was sent to jail under a cloud of scandal. Political parties have been unable to agree on limits to presidential power. And some reforms, such as changing the duration and number of presidential terms or granting the legislature more oversight authority, could require constitutional amendments. Moving toward federalism almost certainly would. Changing the constitution, unsurprisingly, is difficult: both a parliamentary vote and approval in a national referendum are needed, and no amendments have been adopted since 1987. Reforms to legislative elections may be easier: the National Assembly can, with the approval of the Constitutional Court, issue rules that affect its own composition, as it did in 2020. But such measures alone would not directly address the problem of excessive presidentialism.
The mere fact of three impeachments since 2004 suggests the South Korean presidency is too powerful, and deepening, emotionally charged polarization is only raising the stakes with each election. Without institutional reform, crises like the one Yoon has triggered are sure to recur. The centuries-old formula for making democratic governance work is to dilute power by distributing it. If it follows that script, South Korea could yet avoid repeating history.
The Roots of South Korea’s Political Crisis
Foreign Affairs · by More by Robert E. Kelly · February 12, 2025
Why the Country’s Presidents Frequently Overstep—and What It Will Take to Keep Them in Check
Robert E. Kelly and Jaekwon Suh
February 12, 2025
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol arriving for his impeachment trial in Seoul, January 2025 Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters
ROBERT E. KELLY is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University.
JAEKWON SUH is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University.
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With democracies around the world under duress, South Korea seems to stand out as an example of resilience. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s attempt in December to seize undue power was knocked back by lawmakers’ swift action and a surge of popular outrage. Although the country’s institutions have held up relatively well, the upheaval also underscores the growing strain on South Korean democracy—and the prospect of crises to come.
On the night of December 3, Yoon declared martial law, only for the National Assembly to order the decree lifted within a few hours. Then, on December 14, Yoon was impeached and suspended from his duties. Less than two weeks later, with South Korea’s highest court still reviewing Yoon’s case, acting President Han Duck-soo was impeached as well. Citizens immediately took to the streets to protest Yoon’s power grab, and most members of Yoon’s party, however grudgingly, condemned his overreach. Pro- and anti-Yoon demonstrations have continued through the back-to-back impeachments, but they have stayed impressively peaceful. No one has died or been seriously injured; the police have been cautious, backing down when confrontations threatened to spin out of control.
Yet the depth of the turmoil is disturbing. Yoon’s martial law declaration was a huge shock, and his supporters’ rallying in his defense suggested some degree of endorsement in right-wing circles—Yoon is a conservative—for the cessation of constitutional governance. Most South Koreans had thought such antidemocratic attitudes had long been banished from the country’s political culture. And the impeachment of the acting president was almost as troubling. Two previous South Korean presidents have been impeached—Roh Moo-hyun in 2004 and Park Geun-hye in 2016—since the country’s democratization in 1987, but in neither case was the acting president also removed. South Korea has entered new constitutional territory: it is unclear what powers the “acting acting” president, Choi Sang-mok, the minister of economy and finance, even has.
Concerning, too, is the fear that this is not the last of South Korea’s recurring political crises. At their root is a structural problem: power is highly concentrated in the presidency, and deepening polarization is driving ever-fiercer fights over that office. Yoon’s stepping down might offer a reprieve, but not a lasting solution. South Korea’s political system needs bold reform to diffuse power and remove the incentives for presidents to attempt to rule by decree. Although discussion of such reforms started to build in December and has continued to today, momentum toward real change could easily fizzle out. It may be only a matter of time, then, until South Korea’s democracy is once again pushed to the brink.
STUCK IN GRIDLOCK
The South Korean presidency is imbued with a lot of power: it has wide latitude to make judicial and prosecutorial appointments, create budgets, and conduct foreign policy, without enough checks and balances. The executive overshadows other governing bodies, including the National Assembly, the courts, and local governments. This concentration of authority is a legacy of decades of dictatorial rule before South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987. Unsurprisingly, the promise of holding the presidential office inspires intense, zero-sum competition between South Korea’s two main political parties. The ruling party is tempted to simply ignore the opposition, while the opposition, fearing that the incumbent could abuse the office and lock rivals out of power, resists the full exercise of presidential rule. The result is regular constitutional scuffles over the extent of the president’s authority, attempts by presidents from both parties to more or less rule by fiat, and threats by the opposition to impeach sitting presidents.
A worsening cultural cleavage between the political left and right has sharpened this fight over the presidency in the past few decades. South Korean voters tend to align with one party simply because it is not the other party, not because they prefer their chosen party’s policies—a practice referred to in political science research as negative partisanship. This tendency is not unique to South Korea; it became increasingly visible in the United States, too, when Donald Trump entered American politics, fueling the country’s so-called culture war. Wherever it appears, negative partisanship worsens political strife. Parties become vehicles to advance one side in cultural or identitarian disputes, precluding the pragmatism and compromise that are necessary for democracy to run smoothly. Neither bloc wants to budge, the norms and constitutional guardrails that limit power are continually threatened, and politics grows bitter and personalized.
Not all polarization is bad. Ideological polarization, or divergence based on policy differences, can be beneficial to a democracy by encouraging parties to develop distinct identities related to coherent policy platforms. But in South Korea, polarization has become more emotional than ideological. A study conducted by the political scientist Kim Sung-youn of Konkuk University found that the share of South Korean voters with negative feelings toward the opposing party jumped from 57.2 percent in the 2011 presidential election to an astonishing 86.5 percent in the 2022 election.
The depth of the turmoil in South Korea is disturbing.
This level of resentment, grievance, and even loathing for the other side makes it difficult to find any middle ground. South Korean conservatives and progressives increasingly identify each other as cultural enemies rather than just political opponents. As the list of issues on which they disagree grows longer, consensual governance becomes harder. Until the 2010s, the most divisive issue between the left and the right was foreign policy. South Korean conservatives were staunchly anticommunist and pro-American; progressives wanted outreach to North Korea and distance from American dominance. Conservatives accused the left of North Korean sympathies—a charge echoed in Yoon’s martial law declaration—whereas progressives saw the right as acquiescing to American imperialism. This disagreement led to large swings in South Korean foreign policy based on the president’s party affiliation. But on domestic policy, there was a broad consensus supporting an active economic development program and a moderately generous welfare state. Heated battles over government spending and cultural issues were rare.
In the last decade or two, however, the domestic consensus has been fracturing. Issues related to gender, family, sexuality, religion, and generational difference have become deeply divisive. Fundamentalist Protestantism has emerged as a strident, controversial voice in South Korean conservative politics. Feminism and women’s empowerment have sparked a backlash among younger South Korean men and others who blame the movement for the country’s extremely low birthrate and contracting population. For years, strong economic growth supported government spending on social programs, but policymakers increasingly face resource constraints as the country’s ratio of working people to retired people falls rapidly. Intergenerational conflicts loom as the tax base shrinks and the national debt rises.
Unhelpfully, South Korea’s many political cleavages tend to map onto the two main political parties rather than cut across them. The parties have thus become tied more to emotionally charged identities than to bundles of policy preferences. The result is partisan gridlock. Frustrated by the difficulty of governance, South Korean presidents are frequently tempted to wield their personal authority to force through their preferred policies. Yoon’s liberal predecessor Moon Jae-in, for example, sidestepped the legislature as he pushed a highly divisive policy of détente with North Korea, inviting increasingly hysterical right-wing opposition. President Lee Myung-bak, who served from 2008 to 2013, was so determined to advance a trade deal with the United States that his party shut out opposition legislators from a key part of the deliberations—and the lawmakers responded by attacking the closed doors of the hearing room with a sledgehammer and chainsaw, all captured on television. Yoon’s martial law declaration may be the most extreme example, but he is not the first to flirt with rule by decree.
CRISIS POINT
South Korea’s political fractures were on full display from the beginning of Yoon’s tenure in 2022. He had run a divisive campaign that emphasized right-wing social and foreign policy positions, including attacks on feminism, hints he would shut down the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and a pledge to shore up the U.S.–South Korean alliance after his predecessor had ostensibly undermined it with overtures to North Korea. He won the popular vote by less than one percentage point. For most of his presidency, Yoon’s approval rating hovered close to 30 percent, and it had fallen to around 25 percent before his martial law declaration.
Yoon’s unpopularity handed the opposition a large majority in the National Assembly after legislative elections in April 2024. The Democratic Party of Korea, the leading left-progressive party, used its new legislative dominance to persistently impede the Yoon administration’s attempts to govern. It proposed investigations into prosecutors pursuing corruption cases, which resulted in protracted institutional conflict as the administration took steps to block the investigations. Procedural battles ground policymaking to a halt. The DPK also accused Yoon’s wife of corruption, generating a salacious scandal that deeply wounded Yoon personally. South Korea was becoming ungovernable; the system seemed unable to overcome intense partisan divisions and deliver any kind of policy.
Yoon is not the first to flirt with rule by decree.
South Korean conservatives strongly suspected that gridlock was the DPK’s intent. The DPK assumed, correctly, that voters would blame the unpopular Yoon for the standstill, giving the party little reason to concede anything to a president whose right to rule it had never truly accepted. (Yoon, arguably, had only won the presidency in 2022 because a third-party candidate had split the vote on the left.) When Yoon issued the martial law declaration, he cited government paralysis as a reason to suspend regular order.
The opposition may have provoked Yoon, but his response was wildly disproportionate. Yoon did not seem to grasp that divided government—in which one party controls the executive and another the legislature—is a normal condition in modern democracies, not a national emergency that requires the suspension of the constitution. His actions, and his supporters’ defense of them, reflect how the South Korean right has embraced the dalliance with authoritarianism and conspiracy that is increasingly common among Western conservative parties, including the Trump-led Republican Party in the United States. Many of Yoon’s supporters have not admitted that he overreached and should therefore be removed from office. His party was split in the vote to impeach. On the streets, conservative protesters, frightened that the left could win the next election, have rallied to Yoon. They have waved “Stop the Steal” signs and stormed a court that was involved in the impeachment investigation, drawing disturbing parallels to the Trump supporters who, after Trump’s loss in the 2020 U.S. election, charged into the U.S. Capitol building. And similar to their counterparts on the Western hard right, Yoon’s most fervent followers cultivate an online culture that promotes conspiracies and accuses the left of succumbing to communist manipulation.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
The best outcome in the short term would be for Yoon to resign and admit he went too far in trying to declare martial law. Instead, he has dug in his heels, prolonging demonstrations on the streets and forcing a confrontation with police that ended with his arrest in mid-January. South Korea’s political system is paralyzed, and it is unclear how the pro- and anti-Yoon camps will respond when the Constitutional Court renders its judgment on Yoon’s impeachment.
But even if the current crisis is resolved relatively neatly, whether through Yoon’s resignation or a court verdict, South Korea will still have deeper problems to contend with. The cultural shifts polarizing South Korean society cannot be meaningfully addressed through political or constitutional action—these are changes that society itself must reckon with. Structural political reform, however, can help reduce the competitive incentives inherent in the country’s presidential system, lowering the stakes of elections so that intense divisions between right and left are less likely to produce crises of the kind South Korea is enduring now.
Part of the solution is to reduce the power of the presidency, which would ease the partisan combat over a single super-office. Such reform has been widely discussed in South Korea for years, and recent bad behavior on both the left and the right, culminating in Yoon’s tumultuous presidency, has underscored its urgency. These changes could take many forms. Instead of a single five-year term, for instance, the president could serve for four years and be eligible to run for a second term, which would increase the leader’s accountability to the public. The National Assembly could be granted greater authority to set budgetary priorities rather than respond to budgets submitted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as it does now. Legislative oversight of foreign policy and the judiciary could also be enhanced by making reviews of government activity a regular part of parliamentary practice instead of restricting the oversight role to appointing special prosecutors and investigations. Moves toward greater federalism, such as giving South Korea’s provinces and municipalities their own tax-and-spend authority, could further disperse political power.
Without institutional reform, crises are sure to recur.
Another type of reform would address the makeup of the National Assembly. Typically, the vast majority of seats in the legislature are held by South Korea’s two main parties, setting up the right and left for a clash. Election law reform could give smaller parties a greater chance at representation, relaxing this two-party standoff. Currently, around 15 percent of the members of the National Assembly are elected via proportional representation, in which seats are allocated to parties based on their share of the national vote rather than through direct contestation in a geographically defined district. In 2020, the National Assembly issued a rule to keep the two largest parties out of these seats to make space for smaller parties that might bring fresh ideas to the legislature. But the main parties got around this rule by setting up satellite parties to run on the proportional representation lists and vote with them when they got elected. Increasing the size of the National Assembly and expanding the share of seats filled by proportional voting could reduce the impact of satellite parties. Germany offers a potential model: half of its legislature is directly elected, and the other half is elected by party list, giving several small parties enough seats to play a meaningful role in governance.
Relatedly, changes to South Korea’s Political Parties Act could allow more parties to contest elections. The law sets excessively high requirements for establishing a political party: it must have a central organization in Seoul and at least five city or provincial party organizations, each with at least 1,000 members. Only national parties are recognized. If these requirements were loosened, regional parties could begin to contest elections. Without regional parties, it will be much more difficult to move away from the current two-party system or move toward federalism, both critical ways to dilute the excessive concentration of power in the presidency.
Unfortunately, big changes seem unlikely. For years, political scientists in South Korea have recognized the undue power of the executive branch, often referring to it as an “imperial presidency.” When presidential scandals occur, these critiques are part of the mainstream conversation, too, with calls for reform echoing on the news and in editorial pages. Yet no substantial reform occurred after two former presidents were impeached in 2004 and 2016, or when a third, Lee Myung-bak, was sent to jail under a cloud of scandal. Political parties have been unable to agree on limits to presidential power. And some reforms, such as changing the duration and number of presidential terms or granting the legislature more oversight authority, could require constitutional amendments. Moving toward federalism almost certainly would. Changing the constitution, unsurprisingly, is difficult: both a parliamentary vote and approval in a national referendum are needed, and no amendments have been adopted since 1987. Reforms to legislative elections may be easier: the National Assembly can, with the approval of the Constitutional Court, issue rules that affect its own composition, as it did in 2020. But such measures alone would not directly address the problem of excessive presidentialism.
The mere fact of three impeachments since 2004 suggests the South Korean presidency is too powerful, and deepening, emotionally charged polarization is only raising the stakes with each election. Without institutional reform, crises like the one Yoon has triggered are sure to recur. The centuries-old formula for making democratic governance work is to dilute power by distributing it. If it follows that script, South Korea could yet avoid repeating history.
ROBERT E. KELLY is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University.
JAEKWON SUH is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Robert E. Kelly · February 12, 2025
9. South Korea Has More Leverage Over China Than You Think
Although counterintuitive, the THAAD controversy actually turned out to be a good thing because it demonstrated that the South could counter CHinese economic warfare on its own (with emphasis on its own).
Excerpts:
The realization that South Korea could pursue its preferred policy and withstand Chinese economic retaliation allowed Seoul to become bolder in its relationship with Beijing in recent years. In 2021, then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in joined the leaders of 13 other countries in asking for further investigation by the World Health Organization into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. The same year, he signed a joint statement with then-U.S. President Joe Biden in which South Korea, for the first time, called for “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” Both moves displeased China.
In 2022, South Korea voted in favor of the U.N. Human Rights Council debating the human rights situation in Xinjiang. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration also publicly sparred with Xing Haiming, the provocative Chinese ambassador to South Korea, whom Beijing later removed from his posting in an attempt to improve relations with Seoul.
If this doesn’t sound like the policy of a country afraid of economic retaliation from China, it’s because South Korea doesn’t see itself as dependent on its neighbor. South Korea has cards to play in its relationship with China, and economic interdependence—even if asymmetric—is one of them.
South Korean policymakers understand that full-blown economic or diplomatic confrontation with China is not in their country’s interests. Shortly before Yoon’s impeachment last year, for example, his government sought to patch up strained relations with China, including a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, where Yoon described China as an “important country” for cooperation. But as former South Korean Foreign Ministers Kang Kyung-wha and Park Jin have indicated, Seoul should be more assertive and mature in its foreign policy and not simply at the mercy of great powers—particularly Beijing.
In this respect, South Korea’s use of its economic strengths to withstand coercion from China could serve as a template for other middle powers worried about retaliation from the world’s second-largest economy. Australia, with its abundance of natural resources; Germany, with its manufacturing strengths; and Japan, with its technological prowess, all have leverage in their relationships with China. They, too, can counter Beijing’s economic actions and survive without bending the knee to the Chinese market.
South Korea Has More Leverage Over China Than You Think
The middle power has found a way to survive without bending the knee to Beijing.
By Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance.
Foreign Policy · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo
- Foreign & Public Diplomacy
- Economics
- Science and Technology
- China
- South Korea
February 10, 2025, 6:00 AM
According to conventional wisdom, South Korea is caught between its long-term ally, the United States, and its largest trading partner, China. Though South Korea cooperates with the United States for a great deal of its security, including its extended nuclear deterrence, China and Hong Kong accounted for 23.7 percent of South Korean exports in 2023.
Because of this, South Korea is often portrayed as hopelessly and dangerously dependent on China for its trade and even its economic survival. Though this view of the South Korean economy and trade position is compelling, it is wrong.
The economic relationship between South Korea and China is better characterized as one of asymmetric interdependence: The two countries are dependent on each other, even if the sheer size of the Chinese economy means that South Korea relies more on its trade partner than vice versa.
This matters profoundly for South Korean foreign policy because it means that Seoul does not have to hedge between Beijing and Washington in a bid to preserve economic relations with China, as some analysts posit.
The idea is catching on in South Korea, where a growing number of policymakers and businesspeople have quietly moved away from the view that their country or their firms are irremediably dependent on China. The result is that Seoul has become bolder in siding with Western countries and challenging China when its interests are at stake.
The situation looked different not long ago. In 2015, under President Park Geun-hye, South Korea signed a free trade agreement with Beijing. By 2018, exports to China and Hong Kong peaked at 34.4 percent of South Korea’s total. South Korean investment in China had declined from the record numbers registered in the 2000s, but flows remained steady as South Korean firms continued to outsource manufacturing to their lower-cost neighbor.
Meanwhile, the number of Chinese tourists in South Korea hit a high mark in 2016, when roughly half of the 16 million foreign visitors to the country came from China. In short, China was providing both the growing market and the cheaper production base for South Korean firms, as well as a significant boost to tourism, which is an increasingly important sector for the South Korean economy.
Today, not only has South Korea’s share of exports to China declined, but South Korean investment in its neighbor has also plummeted as firms look for less politically charged manufacturing locations. In fact, the United States became South Korea’s top foreign investment destination in 2023, attracting a record 43.7 percent of the country’s total overseas investment, as South Korean firms sought to take advantage of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act. And while China remains the largest source of foreign tourists in South Korea, they now account for fewer than 30 percent of the country’s visitors.
Ultimately, the economic relationship between South Korea and China is becoming more balanced, and Seoul cannot simply be described as dependent on its neighbor.
Why has this relationship shifted? At the risk of oversimplifying, the answer lies in chips. In the 1960s, South Korea began assembling semiconductors for foreign firms. Buoyed by huge investment from the public and private sectors, in the 1980s South Korea started to manufacture its own DRAM chips. It became one of the few countries with firms able to develop and manufacture NAND flash memory chips in the 2010s. Today, Samsung and SK Hynix compete at the cutting edge of an industry upended by the artificial intelligence boom.
In recent years, semiconductor shipments—including chips themselves, as well as manufacturing equipment, materials and parts, and silicon wafers—have accounted for between 20 and 25 percent of South Korean exports by value annually. In 2024, China and Hong Kong accounted for over 51 percent of South Korea’s semiconductor exports, an indicator that might seem to suggest that South Korea could be dependent on the Chinese market.
The reality is that Chinese firms buy South Korean semiconductors not because of U.S-China competition, to gain leverage over Seoul, or out of the goodness of their hearts. They buy South Korean semiconductors because they need them. This is not going to change anytime soon: Chinese chipmakers are at least two or three generations behind their South Korean, Taiwanese, and U.S. competitors. And due to U.S. sanctions that prevent the export of the most advanced chips to China or their manufacturing there, Chinese firms are unlikely to catch up with South Korean firms anytime soon. China also relies on South Korea in other sectors where the latter has a technological edge, such as hydrogen-fueled ships, humanoid robots, and electronic displays.
In areas such as AI, hybrid vehicles, solid-state electric batteries, or 6G, in which South Korean firms compete against Chinese counterparts (among others), U.S. sanctions and export controls imposed on China could help Korean companies gain a competitive advantage, as is already happening with chips. This would exacerbate the interdependence of South Korea and China’s relationship, with Chinese firms seeking to acquire technologies from South Korean peers that they are unable to develop themselves.
This relationship of interdependence is also the result of South Korean firms dramatically decreasing their investment in China. For years, investment in China by South Korean conglomerates allowed Chinese manufacturers to rapidly acquire new technologies, especially in the semiconductor and display industries.
The tide turned in 2012, when China targeted Japanese carmakers in the wake of a dispute over the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the Diaoyu), triggering a boycott among Chinese consumers. This taught South Korea an important lesson: For China, politics trumped economic ties—even for a neighbor as important as Japan. South Korean firms began shifting investment away from China. Most notably, South Korea and Vietnam signed a free trade agreement in 2015, making Vietnam a preferred investment destination for South Korean firms. Seoul later went on to sign bilateral trade agreements with other Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Another crucial turning point came in 2016, when Park announced that South Korea would deploy the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system to strengthen its deterrence against North Korea. Beijing, however, complained that it could be used to spy on Chinese missile tests and retaliated with informal economic sanctions. These failed to influence the Seoul, which moved ahead with deployment; eventually, Beijing backed down and quietly removed the sanctions. Though China intended for its retaliation to be a display of its economic coercion abilities, it only helped accelerate South Korea’s shift away from trade and investment ties.
The realization that South Korea could pursue its preferred policy and withstand Chinese economic retaliation allowed Seoul to become bolder in its relationship with Beijing in recent years. In 2021, then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in joined the leaders of 13 other countries in asking for further investigation by the World Health Organization into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. The same year, he signed a joint statement with then-U.S. President Joe Biden in which South Korea, for the first time, called for “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” Both moves displeased China.
In 2022, South Korea voted in favor of the U.N. Human Rights Council debating the human rights situation in Xinjiang. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration also publicly sparred with Xing Haiming, the provocative Chinese ambassador to South Korea, whom Beijing later removed from his posting in an attempt to improve relations with Seoul.
If this doesn’t sound like the policy of a country afraid of economic retaliation from China, it’s because South Korea doesn’t see itself as dependent on its neighbor. South Korea has cards to play in its relationship with China, and economic interdependence—even if asymmetric—is one of them.
South Korean policymakers understand that full-blown economic or diplomatic confrontation with China is not in their country’s interests. Shortly before Yoon’s impeachment last year, for example, his government sought to patch up strained relations with China, including a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, where Yoon described China as an “important country” for cooperation. But as former South Korean Foreign Ministers Kang Kyung-wha and Park Jin have indicated, Seoul should be more assertive and mature in its foreign policy and not simply at the mercy of great powers—particularly Beijing.
In this respect, South Korea’s use of its economic strengths to withstand coercion from China could serve as a template for other middle powers worried about retaliation from the world’s second-largest economy. Australia, with its abundance of natural resources; Germany, with its manufacturing strengths; and Japan, with its technological prowess, all have leverage in their relationships with China. They, too, can counter Beijing’s economic actions and survive without bending the knee to the Chinese market.
Foreign Policy · by Ramon Pacheco Pardo
10. Impeached South Korean President Yoon Blames Opposition for Martial Law Decree
Or more specifically he should blame Chinese and north Korea influence on the opposition.
Asia
Impeached South Korean President Yoon Blames Opposition for Martial Law Decree
https://al24news.com/en/impeached-south-korean-president-yoon-blames-opposition-for-martial-law-decree/
18 hours ago 349
South Korea’s impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol has blamed the main opposition Democratic Party for his controversial martial law decree on December 3, accusing them of attempting to “destroy” his government. Speaking at the Constitutional Court on Tuesday, Yoon cited opposition lawmakers’ refusal to applaud his budget speech as an example of their obstruction, as reported by the Seoul-based Segye Ilbo newspaper.
Yoon claimed that opposition legislators deliberately boycotted his speech, leaving parliament half-empty, and used their actions to justify his emergency measures. He previously alleged election fraud as another reason for declaring martial law. However, Kim Yong-bin, secretary general of the National Election Commission, dismissed these claims, while Baek Jong-wook, a former intelligence official, declined to comment.
Yoon is under criminal investigation for abuse of power and insurrection, making him the first sitting South Korean president to be arrested. Suspended since December 14 after parliament voted for his impeachment, he remains in detention following his January 19 arrest. The Constitutional Court has up to six months to decide whether to remove or reinstate him, with the final hearing scheduled for Thursday, though additional sessions may be held.
11. Did China meddle in South Korea’s election? Concern over claims by Yoon supporters
The short answer is yes. The long answer is that China has been very good at covering its covert action which is why the evidence is not obvious. But all the signs are there.
But let's read this article for the propaganda that it is (this is the South China Morning Post from Hong Kong even though the journalist is from South Korea)). It is disinformation to try to discredit Yoon's supporters. The Chinese Three Warfares are being skilled played out in South Korea (Psychological Warfare, Legal Warfare, Public Opinion or Media Warfare)
From some research I have been doing on this:
South Korea
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Cultural Penetration: Confucius Institutes in South Korea have been used to promote pro-China narratives while masking their political agenda.
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Targeting Political Elites: Reports suggest Chinese actors have cultivated relationships with South Korean politicians to influence policies on issues like THAAD or Taiwan.
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Media Ownership: Chinese-linked entities have acquired stakes in South Korean media to shape public discourse subtly.
By blending these covert tactics with overt diplomacy and economic incentives, the CCP ensures that its influence operations are not only effective but also difficult to trace directly back to Beijing.
In South Korea, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) United Front Work Department (UFWD) operates through several front organizations designed to influence the Chinese diaspora and foster pro-Beijing sentiments. Notable among these are:
1. Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification in Korea (CCPPNR): Established in 2002, this organization is directly subordinate to the UFWD. It has multiple chapters across South Korea, including in Seoul, Incheon, Gwangju, and Jeju. The CCPPNR focuses on promoting China's stance on Taiwan and unification policies.
2. Association of Overseas Chinese in Korea: Also founded in 2002, this association aims to unite the Chinese diaspora under the PRC's leadership. It has become the largest diaspora association in South Korea, surpassing older associations that identified more with the Republic of China (Taiwan). The association operates under the guidance of the PRC Embassy in Korea.
3. Korea Chinese Huaqiao Alliance Council: This organization works closely with the CCPPNR and the Association of Overseas Chinese in Korea, sharing overlapping leadership and membership. It plays a role in consolidating various Chinese community groups in South Korea.
4. All-Korean Nationals of Chinese Descent Council: Similar to the Huaqiao Alliance Council, this group collaborates with other United Front organizations to integrate the Chinese community in Korea under pro-Beijing leadership.
These organizations often share leadership and collaborate closely, creating a centralized network that advances the UFWD's objectives in South Korea. Their activities range from cultural exchanges to political lobbying, all aimed at promoting China's interests and policies within South Korea.
Did China meddle in South Korea’s election? Concern over claims by Yoon supporters
A ‘Hate China’ campaign would be a ‘losing game for Korea’, one observer warns, pointing out the backlash in China would be even greater
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 8:00am, 12 Feb 2025Updated: 11:43am, 12 Feb 2025
Claims by South Korea’s conservative bloc that China meddled in the country’s election could escalate tensions with Beijing and jeopardise trade ties, analysts have warned.
Beijing has voiced strong discontent over the allegations by supporters of suspended President Yoon Suk-yeol, who on December 3 plunged the country into political chaos with a martial law decree that he insisted was necessary to investigate election fraud involving China and North Korea.
Seoul’s election watchdog has dismissed the allegations as baseless.
Adding to the controversy, a viral fake news story on YouTube claims that martial law troops arrested 99 Chinese “hackers” who helped opposition parties at the National Election Commission.
In response, Dai Bing, the Chinese ambassador in Seoul, issued a statement late on Monday condemning the spread of unfounded allegations.
“China has all along upheld the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. And we have always honoured our word and are completely above board on it,” he wrote on social media.
In a December 12 speech defending his actions, Yoon cited security concerns linked to China. He referenced the arrest of three Chinese students last June for using a drone to photograph a visiting US aircraft carrier, and the November detention of a 40-year-old Chinese national caught taking pictures of South Korea’s spy agency.
He also warned that “Chinese-made solar power facilities will destroy forests across the country”.
His remarks that month drew a sharp rebuke from Beijing. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said China found the comments “deeply upsetting” and “absolutely” opposed being dragged into South Korea’s internal political disputes.
South Korean prosecutors indict impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol over martial law
Yoon’s supporters have gone further, alleging that China played a role in his impeachment and claiming that large numbers of Chinese nationals were joining rallies demanding his removal.
Ambassador Dai in his recent social media post expressed hope South Korea would maintain stability, development and prosperity. “We believe that the ROK [South Korean] people have the wisdom and ability to properly deal with their internal issues.
“But at the same time, we oppose relating their internal issues with China for no reason, and believe they can have a clear understanding of the complexity and make correct judgments accordingly,” he added.
Dai also stressed the strong people-to-people exchanges between China and South Korea, with many nationals working, studying, and travelling between the two countries.
“In this regard, it is hoped that the ROK side would effectively safeguard the safety and legitimate rights of Chinese nationals in the ROK,” he said.
His remarks came amid warnings for Chinese students, tourists, and residents in South Korea to avoid political rallies due to potential threats from right-wing extremists leading the campaign against Yoon’s impeachment.
“Yoon and his supporters are fuelling anti-China sentiments to expand their support base and justify their martial law decree,” said Ha Nam-suk, a Chinese studies professor at the University of Seoul. “But what they are doing is like poisoning the well,” he warned, noting that China was South Korea’s largest export market and a key regional power.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul (right) with Chinese ambassador Dai Bing in Seoul on February 6. Photo: South Korea’s Foreign Ministry/EPA-EFE
Kim Hee-gyeo, a Northeast Asian Cultural Studies professor at Kwangwoon University, said Yoon’s conservative party and its supporters were amplifying anti-China rhetoric to distract from the political turmoil triggered by the martial law crisis.
Now facing trial on charges of orchestrating an “insurrection”, Yoon is also awaiting a Constitutional Court ruling on his impeachment, sought by the opposition-controlled National Assembly.
“A ‘Hate China’ campaign would be a losing game for Korea, as 100 anti-China speeches could trigger 1,000 or even 2,000 anti-Korea speeches in China,” Professor Kim cautioned.
Lee Dong-gyu, a senior researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, warned that the allegations of Chinese election interference risked damaging diplomatic efforts to mend ties following last year’s summit between the two nations at the Apec meeting in Peru.
“This dispute could impose extra diplomatic burdens on South Korea as it grapples with the chaotic aftermath of the martial law decree,” he said.
Park Chan-kyong
FOLLOW
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.
12. FM Cho to hold 1st talks with Rubio in Munich this weekend
(2nd LD) FM Cho to hold 1st talks with Rubio in Munich this weekend | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 13, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info throughout)
SEOUL, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul will hold his first talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week in Munich, Germany, on the sidelines of a multilateral security conference, the foreign ministry said Thursday.
During the meeting, Cho and Rubio are expected to discuss North Korean nuclear issues, trilateral cooperation with Japan and bilateral economic cooperation, ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said during a press briefing.
Both Cho and Rubio are scheduled to participate in the 61st Munich Security Conference, set for Friday through Sunday. Their talks are said to take place Saturday for about half an hour.
It will mark the first one-on-one talks between the top diplomats of South Korea and the U.S. since President Donald Trump took office in January for his second term.
The trip to Munich represents Cho's first overseas travel since the political turmoil in South Korea triggered by now-impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol's short-lived martial law attempt in December last year, plunging the country into a leadership vacuum.
These AFP and Yonhap images show U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio (L) and Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul. (Yonhap)
Seoul and Washington are also reportedly in the process of arranging separate trilateral talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya on the sidelines of the conference, also on Saturday.
During their bilateral meeting, Cho and Rubio are expected to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance under Trump's second term and coordinate their respective polices on North Korea's denuclearization.
Cho is also expected to emphasize South Korea's contributions to the upkeep of U.S. forces stationed in the country and Seoul's position on Trump's recent announcement of new import tariffs, according to the ministry.
Cho and Rubio held their first phone call on Jan. 23 and agreed to maintain close cooperation on North Korea's nuclear issues.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is also reported to attend the conference in Munich, but no bilateral talks between him and Cho have been arranged so far.
On Feb 20 and 21, the South Korean foreign minister is also scheduled to participate in the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Group of 20 in Johannesburg, South Africa.
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 13, 2025
13. S. Korea urges N.K. to 'immediately stop' dismantling separated family facility at Mt. Kumgang resort
The regime is consistent with its stated policies. Just like making South Korea a bank space on north Korean maps it is trying to eradicate all influence from the South.
The very example and existence of the South and the knowledge of the South among the Korean people in the north is an existential threat to the regime.
(LEAD) S. Korea urges N.K. to 'immediately stop' dismantling separated family facility at Mt. Kumgang resort | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 13, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info throughout)
SEOUL, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Thursday that North Korea was dismantling a reunion facility for separated families inside its Mount Kumgang tourist area and urged Pyongyang to immediately stop.
Koo Byoung-sam, spokesman at the South Korean ministry, also voiced "strong regrets" over North Korea's move, vowing to consider legal steps against Pyongyang's infringement upon the South's property rights.
The reunion facility for separated families had been the only intact South Korean side-owned structure at the Mount Kumgang resort, as North Korea has demolished all other facilities within the tour zone, once considered a symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation.
"We express strong regrets over the unilateral demolition ... and sternly urge North Korea to immediately stop it," Koo said, adding that all responsibilities arising from the incident should lie with North Korea.
The spokesperson denounced the demolition as an act against humanity that "tramples upon" the hopes of separated families and violates South Korea's property rights.
"We will review necessary measures, including legal action and cooperation with the international community," he said.
With a budget of 51.2 billion won (US$35.2 million) from South Korea, the 12-story building was completed in 2008 through an inter-Korean agreement to host reunions of families from South and North Korea. The two Koreas have remained separated since the 1950-53 Korean War and the subsequent division of the Korean Peninsula.
As of the end of December, 36,941 South Koreans had registered with the government their wish to reunite with family members in the North, while many others have died of old age without ever having the chance to reunite.
This undated photo, provided by the unification ministry, shows reunion facilities for separated families at the Mount Kumgang tourist area in North Korea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 13, 2025
14. Declassified dossier shows N. Korea demanded South dismantle DMZ barricade in 1990 talks
While at the same time they were digging infiltration tunnels under the DMZ (4 of which we have discovered but according to defector reports 21 were planned for - what have we missed?)
Why did they want the "barricades" dismantled? Perhaps to lull the South into complacency in preparation for a future attack.
Recall one of the reasons Hwang Jang Yop defected in 1997: He was concerned that Kim Joon Il might actually make the decision to again attack the South and he thought his defection could help prevent that.
Declassified dossier shows N. Korea demanded South dismantle DMZ barricade in 1990 talks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 13, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea demanded during inter-Korean talks in 1990 that South Korea dismantle a barricade it had installed along their border, calling it "a disgrace" to the Korean people, according to an official dossier declassified Thursday.
The information was disclosed in the unification ministry's official documents recording inter-Korean talks held between September 1984 and July 1990, which total 2,266 pages and include separate minutes from such talks.
The ministry declassified and released such records after keeping them secret for more than 30 years due to their sensitivity.
This file photo, provided by the unification ministry on Feb. 13, 2025, shows members of the South and North Korean delegations to the fourth preparatory meeting for high-level inter-Korean talks shaking hands on Nov. 15, 1989, at North Korea's Tongilgak pavilion in the truce village of Panmunjom. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The document showed that during high-level inter-Korean talks in 1990, the North Korean side demanded that the South dismantle "a concrete wall" along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, accusing it of passivity in advancing their ties.
The North was referring to an anti-tank barricade that the South Korean military had installed for defense purposes at the time of the talks.
Paek Nam-sun, then the head of the North Korean delegation, bristled at the structure during a meeting on Jan. 31, 1990, noting, "It's nothing less than a disgrace to the (Korean) people to have an artificial wall installed at a time when having a Military Demarcation Line within a nation is heartbreaking enough."
Paek demanded that South Korea express its intent to end its exclusionary policy by dismantling the wall, in response to the South's claim that the structure was being used as an excuse to delay progress of the talks.
The scene demonstrates North Korea highlighting the unity of the two Korean peoples, in stark contrast to its current attitude of antagonizing the South.
Since April last year, the North has installed anti-tank structures and mines along the DMZ, and blown up roads and railways connecting the two sides, in line with leader Kim Jong-un's 2023 order to designate South Korea as its primary foe.
In another meeting in 1989, Paek protested the South's use of terms like "high-level official talks" and "prime ministers' talks," arguing they sounded as if the two Koreas were different countries and did not sufficiently reflect the Korean people's commitment to unification.
This image, provided by the unification ministry on Feb. 13, 2025, shows a book of newly declassified official records on past inter-Korean talks. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 13, 2025
15. Trump taps ex-NSC official involved in N.K. diplomacy as under secretary of state
I think South Korea/MOFA is likely pleased with these two nominations.
(2nd LD) Trump taps ex-NSC official involved in N.K. diplomacy as under secretary of state | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 13, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS 8th para)
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Dong-hyun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump has nominated a former White House official who was involved in diplomacy with North Korea during his first term, as under secretary of state for political affairs, according to Congress.
On Tuesday, the president notified Congress of the decision to nominate Allison Hooker, who previously served as senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, a key post for U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific, according to Congress' website.
Her nomination comes after Trump has voiced his openness to reengaging with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and reaffirmed his commitment to pursuing the "complete denuclearization of North Korea."
This file photo shows Allison Hooker, former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. (Yonhap)
During the first Trump administration, Hooker was deeply involved in preparations for Trump's summits with North Korean leader Kim in Singapore in June 2018, Hanoi in February 2019 and the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom in June 2019.
From 2001-2014, Hooker served as a senior analyst for North Korea in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She was also selected as the 2013-2014 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs fellow in South Korea.
Before the nomination, she had been mentioned as a possible candidate for U.S. ambassador to South Korea.
Trump has also nominated Thomas DiNanno, former deputy assistant secretary of state, as under secretary of state for arms control and international security -- a post that deals with matters related to America's extended deterrence to South Korea.
DiNanno is currently an adjunct fellow at the Washington-based Hudson Institute. On its website, the institute said that he previously led the United States' extended deterrence engagement with South Korea, Japan and Australia, as well as the U.S.–China Space Security Dialogue in Beijing in 2019.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S.' commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear arms, to defend its ally.
This photo, provided by the State Department, shows Thomas DiNanno, former deputy assistant secretary of state. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 13, 2025
16. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Surveillance and Control of Mobile Phones Intensifies: Information Extracted During Repairs, Daily Photography Monitored
The regime recognizes the threat. I hope someone is working on software that can be infiltrated to counter north Korean surveillance activities on smartphones.
Just as an aside, it is unlikely we will get a commercial industry to procure such software because it is not commercially viable. There is no profit in it. This is one of the reasons why we need government grants to entities that try to develop these types of capabilities. Grants from State's DRL and IIP , NED, or UASID's DRG could contribute to developing the capabilities to help the Korean people in the north free themselves.
I wonder how DOGE will assess the value of these organiztions the type of work they do for US national security.
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) – USAID
- Mission: Promotes democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law through foreign assistance programs.
- Activities: Supports electoral processes, civil society development, and anti-corruption initiatives in developing countries.
- Contribution to National Security: Strengthens global stability by promoting democracy and reducing the likelihood of state failure, which can lead to conflict, terrorism, or mass migration.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) – State Department
- Mission: Promotes democracy, protects human rights, and advocates for labor rights worldwide.
- Activities: Provides funding for human rights groups, monitors human rights violations, and engages in diplomatic efforts to advance freedom.
- Contribution to National Security: Counters authoritarian influence, prevents human rights abuses that can lead to conflict, and fosters alliances with democratic states.
Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) – State Department (Now part of the Global Public Affairs Bureau)
- Mission: Conducts public diplomacy by engaging international audiences with U.S. values, policies, and perspectives.
- Activities: Manages foreign language media, digital diplomacy, and cultural exchanges.
- Contribution to National Security: Counters misinformation, builds foreign support for U.S. policies, and strengthens diplomatic ties through strategic communication.
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
- Mission: Promotes democracy worldwide through grants to civil society organizations.
- Activities: Funds independent media, human rights groups, and political development programs.
- Contribution to National Security: Helps prevent the rise of authoritarian regimes hostile to U.S. interests and promotes stability in key regions.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Surveillance and Control of Mobile Phones Intensifies: Information Extracted During Repairs, Daily Photography Monitored
asiapress.org
A man using a mobile phone while flipping through a notebook. Mobile phone usage has been spreading in North Korea since around 2011. Photo taken by Gu Gwang-ho in Moranbong District, Pyongyang, June 2011
North Korean authorities are intensifying surveillance and control over personal mobile phone usage. People are reportedly being investigated merely for taking photos and videos in public, while others face punishment after authorities extract information from devices left for repair. The goal appears to be monitoring whether residents are using mobile phones for unauthorized information exchange, photography, or storing and watching foreign videos. (By KANG Ji-won / HONG Mari)
◆Information Extracted Leading to Arrests
In North Korea, "Information Technology Exchange Centers" exist not only in Pyongyang but in cities nationwide. These are essentially "mobile-related shops" established under local people's committees, enterprises, and universities. Besides selling and repairing mobile phones, they offer various apps for purchase and installation. They also handle computer sales and repairs, as well as domestically produced video DVDs.
In late January, a reporting partner from Ryanggang Province shared how simply leaving a phone at these "Exchange Centers" can lead to trouble:
"A neighborhood resident was arrested after leaving their phone at the 'Exchange Center'. They had been watching Chinese movies (which are illegal) privately on their phone. Their family is convinced the 'Center' was responsible for their arrest."
This suggests the Exchange Centers are extracting information from devices left for repair and reporting it to authorities. According to our partner, this isn't an isolated incident:
"Residents now prefer paying private repairers instead of using the Exchange Centers. However, authorities seem to be pressuring even these private repairers to report any suspicious information found on phones left for repair."
asiapress.org
17. 41% of Korea's US exports feared being subject to 'tariff bombs'
"Tariff bombs" I guess that's how friends, partners, allies and enemies who are at the receiving end of our economic warfare might describe them.
Perhaps every country should go ahead and lift tariffs on US goods and in return POTUS can lift tariffs on theirs. I think we forget these are "reciprocal tariffs." What if they were all lifted? Would we return to any kind of free market international economy?
41% of Korea's US exports feared being subject to 'tariff bombs'
donga.com
Posted February. 13, 2025 07:45,
Updated February. 13, 2025 07:45
41% of Korea's US exports feared being subject to 'tariff bombs'. February. 13, 2025 07:45. by 한재희기자 hee@donga.com.
Amid the onslaught of 'tariff bombs' from the second administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, South Korea's economic dependence on the U.S. has increased significantly compared to the first administration. A report found that the items subject to a tariff hike announced by Trump so far are all major Korean exports, and together, they already account for nearly half of the country's exports to the U.S. Analysts say that South Korea, a U.S. ally, is bearing the brunt of the US tariff bomb.
According to the Korea International Trade Association on Wednesday, South Korea's annual exports of semiconductors, automobiles, steel, aluminum, and pharmaceuticals, which Trump announced his tariffs, were worth 52.9164 billion U.S. dollars last year. These five items thus accounted for 40.9 percent of Korea's total exports to the U.S. last year, which totaled 127.847 billion dollars.
The five items on which President Trump has already decided or threatened to impose additional tariffs are all flagship Korean exports. In the case of automobiles, where Hyundai-Kia shipped 1.01 million units to the U.S. market last year, 49 percent of all Korean companies' overseas exports went to the U.S. last year. Semiconductors such as high-bandwidth memory (HBM) exceeded 10 billion dollars in exports to the U.S. last year. Bio product exports to the U.S. are also on the rise, with Samsung Biologics signing a major contract worth 1 billion dollars with a U.S. company in July last year.
Trump's tariff bombshell is particularly worrisome because these are South Korea's main industries, and the South Korean economy's dependence on the US has increased significantly in recent years. Exports to the U.S. nearly doubled from 68.6 billion dollars in 2017, the first year of Trump's first administration, to 127.7 billion dollars last year. The portion of South Korea's exports to the U.S. out of its total overseas shipments also jumped from 12.0 percent in 2017 to 18.7 percent last year, as South Korean companies moved operations to North America and expanded exports to the region to avoid the U.S.-China conflict, only to be bombarded with the ‘tariff bomb’ in their main industries this time.
Analysts say this increased dependence on the U.S. and the sweeping U.S. tariff hikes have made it much harder for Korean companies to cope with Trump's second administration than it was during the first. “If additional tariffs become a reality, the cost competitiveness of Korean companies will decline significantly,” said an official from a Korean conglomerate with operations in North America. ”Even if we immediately review the feasibility and decide to build a factory in the U.S., it could take four to five years, so we are worried about the tariff burden in the meantime.”
한국어
donga.com
18. US withdrawal from UN human rights body draws mixed reactions
US withdrawal from UN human rights body draws mixed reactions
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-withdrawal-from-un-human-rights-body-draws-mixed-reactions/7971418.html
February 11, 2025 4:57 PM
Washington —
Human rights experts in Washington are divided over whether the U.S. withdrawal from a United Nations body on human rights will hurt North Korea’s already poor human rights situation.
Last Tuesday, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order pulling the U.S. out of the U.N. Human Rights Council, or UNHRC, reintroducing the stance he held during his previous term.
SEE ALSO:
Trump orders target several UN bodies
The executive order said that the UNHRC has “protected human rights abusers by allowing them to use the organization to shield themselves from scrutiny,” adding that the council deserves “renewed scrutiny.”
The decision was announced ahead of Trump’s recent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who visited Washington for the first time since Trump’s second inauguration.
SEE ALSO:
Trump meets with Netanyahu, doubles down on relocating Palestinians
Since his first term, President Trump has been disapproving of the activities of the U.N. human rights body. In June 2018, the Trump administration criticized the UNHRC for its “bias against Israel,” stressing the council that year passed resolutions against Israel more than those passed against North Korea, Iran and Syria combined.
Negative impact
Robert King, who served as the U.S. special envoy for North Korea’s human rights under the Obama administration, said that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the U.N. Human Rights Council could negatively undermine international efforts to improve human rights conditions in the North.
“It will have a negative impact. The U.N. Human Rights Council has been a very effective body in terms of calling attention to North Korea’s serious human rights abuses,” King told VOA Korean on the phone last week. “And the fact that the United States will not be an active participant is again a very unfortunate situation.”
Roberta Cohen, former deputy assistant secretary of state for human rights, said leaving the UNHRC is “a short-sighted decision."
Cohen, who also served as senior adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, said it is important that the U.S. be seated at the council with a vote and be active in mobilizing support for any new initiatives.
“If the reforms are needed and they are, the U.S. should be involved heavily,” Cohen told VOA Korean by phone last week. “Walking away cedes the floor to your opponents.”
Cohen highlighted that the council was where the Commission of Inquiry on the Human Rights in North Korea, or COI, was conceived. The COI is widely considered to be the first systematic and thorough documentation of Pyongyang’s violations of human rights.
She added that an update of the COI is to be presented in September for the first time in more than a decade, saying that Washington needs to be part of the process when the report is introduced.
However, others question the role of the Human Rights Council in making a real impact on improving North Korea's human rights conditions.
“The Human Rights Council has become a very tragic farce. It was supposed to promote and protect human rights around the world but instead it coddles dictatorships and gives them legitimacy by including them as members of the council,” said Suzanne Scholte, president of the Defense Forum Foundation and a longtime North Korea human rights activist. “We're not addressing the horrific things that are happening to the North Korean refugees in China that are being shot and executed when they’re returned.”
‘Illegitimate’ members
Human rights experts have long criticized Beijing for failing to afford protection to North Korean refugees and forcefully repatriating them to North Korea.
SEE ALSO:
Analysts: China's Repatriation of North Korean Defectors Supports Pyongyang's Authoritarian Rule
David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy in Washington, said North Korean human rights issues need to be separated from how Trump wants to deal with the United Nations.
“This is about the Trump administration’s views toward U.N. organizations and how they are being misused by countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea,” Maxwell told VOA Korean on Monday via email. “When these organizations are coerced by members of the so-called axis of upheaval, they are not able to support the people who are suffering true human rights abuses.”
Meanwhile, Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Asia Policy Studies in Washington, said the U.S. has other tools to address the North Korean human rights issue.
“Pulling out of the UNHRC won’t make much of a difference practically speaking,” Yeo told VOA Korean via email last week. “The U.S. has other means and platforms to raise North Korean human rights objections, including its own State Department human rights reports.”
The U.S. rejoined the UNHRC shortly after the inauguration of Joe Biden as president in 2021, but the Biden administration decided not to seek a second term as a board member of the council when the three-year membership was to expire at the end of 2024.
The move was made amid the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, which launched a surprise attack on the former a year prior. The State Department explained at the time that the U.S. decided not to pursue a second term at the council “because we are engaged with our allies about the best way to move forward.”
Every March or April, the State Department releases the annual Human Rights Reports, which cover the human rights situations around the world. The document last year said there were credible reports of unlawful killing, enforced disappearances and torture taking place in North Korea.
19. US Senate introduces bill to 'allow allies to build warships'… "Utilizing allies' comparative advantage"
Good news for our Navy and South Korea. I hope it passes and achieves the intended effects.
Thi is a Google translation of a VOA report.
US Senate introduces bill to 'allow allies to build warships'… "Utilizing allies' comparative advantage"
2025.2.13
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7972828.html
A bill has been introduced in the U.S. Senate that would allow U.S. warships to be built in allied countries. The bill is drawing attention as it came as President Trump mentioned shipbuilding as a key area of cooperation with South Korea. Reporter Lee Jo-eun reports.
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Republican Senators Mike Lee and John Curtis co-introduced legislation on Friday aimed at improving the readiness of the U.S. Navy.
The bill, dubbed the Naval Readiness and Security Act, would allow shipyards in Indo-Pacific countries that have mutual defense agreements with the United States or in NATO member states to build warships and related parts.
The idea is to cut costs and shorten the delivery time of warships.
The two lawmakers also co-sponsored the Coast Guard Readiness and Security Act, which would accelerate the Coast Guard’s shipbuilding and procurement process.
The bill also would allow the Coast Guard to build major ship components in allied shipyards.
This is intended to allow the Coast Guard to procure vessels more quickly and efficiently, but it is stipulated that the target will be overseas shipyards that are “not under the influence of a hostile country such as China.”
“Strengthening the Navy and Coast Guard”
“These two bills leverage our diplomatic relationships and the comparative advantage of our allies to ensure that the United States remains at the forefront of maritime security,” Rep. Lee said in a statement that day.
[Rep. Lee] “Both bills are about leveraging our diplomatic relationships and the comparative advantages of our allies to ensure America remains at the forefront of maritime security.”
John Curtis, U.S. Republican Senator.
Senator Curtis also said the two bills contain “common-sense measures” to strengthen the Navy and Coast Guard while reducing costs and strengthening alliances with trusted partners.
[Rep. Curtis] “The Ensuring Naval Readiness Act and the Ensuring Coast Guard Readiness Act take common-sense measures to strengthen America’s Navy and Coast Guard while keeping costs down and reinforcing our alliances with trusted partners.”
In his first phone call with South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol after being elected in November last year, President Donald Trump mentioned cooperation in the shipbuilding industry with South Korea.
According to Kim Tae-hyo, First Deputy Director of the National Security Office at the Presidential Office in Yongsan, President-elect Trump said at the time, “The U.S. shipbuilding industry needs Korea’s help and cooperation,” and “I am well aware of Korea’s world-class warship and shipbuilding capabilities, and we need to closely cooperate with Korea not only in exporting our ships, but also in the areas of maintenance, repair, and overhaul.”
Democratic Rep. Amy Bera also said in a recent interview with VOA that “the U.S. Navy is currently falling behind China, which manufactures most of the world’s ships,” and that cooperating with allies like South Korea to leverage their shipbuilding capabilities could be one way to increase U.S. Navy capabilities, and that this would have bipartisan support.
This is Lee Jo-eun from VOA News.
20. Kim Jong-un's Choice
This is a Google translation of the weekly RFA column of Greg Scarlatoiu, the President and CEO of the US Committee for Human RIghts in North Korea.
My short version: Kim can change or he can be changed by the Korean people in the north.
[Scalatu] Kim Jong-un's Choice
https://www.rfa.org/korean/commentary/greg/kim-jong-un-choice-02102025092044.html
Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, USA
2025.02.11
Wonsan Galma Coastal Tourist Area, soon to open.
/Korean Central News Agency
00:00 /07:11
Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman, Committee for Human Rights in North KoreaOn October 7, 2023, the Iran-backed terrorist group Hamas attacked Israeli civilians inside Israel. A total of 1,139 people were killed, including 695 Israeli civilians and 71 foreigners. Eight Israeli children were also killed in this brutal attack. Since then, Israel has been waging war in the Gaza Strip to destroy and eliminate Hamas.
The terrorist group Hamas is in control of the Gaza Strip. Not only Israelis are suffering, but innocent Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip under Hamas' control are also suffering. Where will peace be? US President Donald Trump has proposed a bold vision. If Israel eliminates Hamas, the US will develop the Gaza Strip and make it the 'Riviera of the Middle East.' 'Riviera' is the name of the world-famous coastline and resort area in Italy and France. 'Riviera' means 'coastline' in Italian. If this vision is realized, other developed countries in the Middle East and Europe can also contribute to the development of the Gaza Strip.
Is this possible? It will undoubtedly be difficult. But dramatic positive change is impossible without a spark and a vision. America has done this before. And America has done it well.
The United States helped rebuild Japan after World War II and Korea after the Korean War. Korea and Japan, two economic powerhouses, rose from the ashes of war. With a bold vision and with the help of Saudi Arabia, European countries, Korea, Japan, and other advanced countries, Gaza can also rise from the ashes.
A similar development from "poor to rich" also took place in Western Europe after World War II. Like South Korea, which was destroyed by North Korea's invasion from June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953 under Kim Il-sung's direction, many European countries were destroyed by World War II from 1939 to 1945. The United States provided significant support for the reconstruction of Europe. This reconstruction process is known as the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was a reconstruction and aid plan planned by the United States for the reconstruction and economic prosperity of the liberal democratic countries centered on the Western European allies destroyed by the war after World War II. European countries that received development aid under this plan promoted political reforms to establish liberal democratic systems based on free market economies. So the countries that received aid through the Marshall Plan not only achieved rapid economic development, but also succeeded in political, economic, and social reform and openness.
By order of the former Soviet Union (USSR), the communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe refused to support the 'Marshall Plan'. The United States included not only its allies during World War II, but also former Axis countries such as West Germany and Italy in the 'Marshall Plan'. The 'Marshall Plan' led by the United States can be seen as the first step toward forming a European alliance.
On June 12, 2018, during his first term, President Donald Trump held a summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un in Singapore. Trump showed the North Korean leader a Hollywood-style video offering two alternatives: denuclearization and nuclear development or nuclear possession and misery, and delivered a message of peace between the United States and North Korea.
Despite such opportunities, the North Korean regime has not chosen peace and development. It has chosen to continue developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The North Korean regime has continued to spread instability and violence to Israel’s enemies supported by Iran, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Israel Defense Forces have found boxes full of North Korean rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons in Gaza. Iran has used North Korean liquid-fuel missiles to attack Israel. North Korea has exported millions of artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia (Russia) for use on the Ukrainian front. More than 10,000 North Korean soldiers are fighting in the war of aggression against Ukraine.
While the Kim family filled their coffers, the North Korean people suffered. The Kim family continues to exploit the blood, sweat, and tears of the oppressed North Korean people at home and abroad, in factories and seafood processing plants in China, factories and logging camps in Russia, and on the Ukrainian front.
North Korea has preached a “strong and prosperous nation” under the Kim Jong-il regime and a “byungjin line” under the Kim Jong-un regime. The problem with North Korea is that it cannot develop nuclear weapons and the economy at the same time. Both the Kim Jong-il regime and the Kim Jong-un regime sacrificed North Korea’s economic development in order to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea could also have an economic development plan like the “Marshall Plan.” However, in order to receive such development aid, North Korea must give up its nuclear and missile development. In addition, like the European countries that received development aid after World War II, it must pursue economic, political, and social reform and openness to become a modern country based on free markets and liberal democracy. During President Donald Trump’s second term, Kim Jong-un may be given a second chance to choose peace and national development. I hope that Kim Jong-un will choose peaceful development, not nuclear weapons and missiles, for the future of North Korea.
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Kim Sang-il
21.Korean experts: Social consensus needed before revising ‘unification plan’”
President Yoon was impeached but that does not mean the 8.15 Unification Doctrine has to be.
Korean experts: Social consensus needed before revising ‘unification plan’”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/korea-unification-plan-yoonseokyeol-doctrine-ethnic-modified-02132025092026.html
Seoul-Handohyeong hando@rfa.org
2025.02.13
At the opening ceremony of the '2024 Global Unification Dialogue' held at the JW Marriott Dongdaemun Hotel in Jongno-gu, Seoul in November last year, Kim Kwan-yong, senior vice-chairman of the Advisory Council for Democratic Peace and Unification, is giving an opening speech.
/Yonhap News
00:00 /04:36
Anchor : Last year, the South Korean government under President Yoon Seok-yeol announced the 'August 15 Unification Doctrine . ' According to a survey by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) , South Korean experts agreed that before revising the existing unification plan , social consensus must first be reached through communication with the public and discussions in the National Assembly . Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul .
On August 15th last year, South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol presented a unification doctrine consisting of three major unification visions , three major unification promotion strategies , and seven major unification promotion measures .
[ President Yoon Seok-yeol of South Korea ] On the day when a free, democratic, unified nation with the people as the masters is created across the entire Korean Peninsula , complete liberation will be realized .
The South Korean government's existing official unification plan is the ' National Community Unification Plan ' announced in 1994 , which includes a three- stage unification process of ' reconciliation and cooperation ', ' South-North union ', and ' completion of a unified state ' , as well as the three principles of ' independence , peace , and democracy ' .
The Yoon Seok-yeol government maintains that the August 15 Unification Doctrine inherited the existing unification plan and supplemented it to fit reality, but some have raised the point that it is a unilateral government-led revision .
In this situation, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a research institute under the Office of the Prime Minister of Korea, published a report titled “ New Korean Peninsula Unification Plan : Focusing on Expert Perception Survey ” on the 12th , which included the results of discussions with experts on the need for revision of the current unification plan and desirable revision methods .
As a result of the survey, many experts expressed the opinion that the name of the unification plan , “ National Community Unification Plan , ” the principle of “ independence, ” and the “ South-North confederation ” stage in the unification process need to be revised .
Regarding the name of the unification plan, 53% of the experts who responded to the survey responded that it needs to be revised , 44% said that the principle of ' independence ' needs to be revised , and 51% said that the ' South-North federation ' stage of the unification process needs to be revised .
The report first stated that the experts' opinion on the revision of the name of the unification plan " can be interpreted as reflecting the perception that the ' nationalist unification view ' is gradually losing its appeal in Korean society . "
Regarding the background of the many opinions on the revision of ' independence ' among the three principles of the unification plan, he explained that it may be because the concept of ' national independence ' is losing its persuasiveness in Korean society after globalization .
The report said that there were many opinions that the three-stage unification process needed to be revised overall, and interpreted this as a growing skepticism about achieving unification through the stages of “ reconciliation and cooperation ” and “ unification ” in a situation where North Korea has defined the South and the North as “ two hostile countries . ”
However, at the same time, experts expressed a cautious stance on actually revising the unification plan, saying that a consensus across society is needed before revising the unification plan .
Experts viewed efforts to build social consensus as most important, including direct communication with the public and gathering public opinion ( 17 out of 50 ), and bipartisan cooperation in the National Assembly, including the ruling and opposition parties ( 12 out of 50 ) , while only a minority (1 person ) emphasized the government's leading role .
In addition, 40% of experts expressed the view that the ‘ unification plan ’ and the ‘ North Korean denuclearization process ’ should be pursued independently and in parallel , and 34% expressed the opinion that denuclearization could be included in the ‘ reconciliation and cooperation ’ stage .
The opinions that the ' denuclearization process ' should be set as a prerequisite for the ' unification plan ' (16%) and that the ' denuclearization process ' should be set as a previous step to the ' reconciliation and cooperation ' stage (10%) were relatively small in number .
Participants are discussing the topic of 'A Korean Peninsula of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity: Vision and Strategy' at the '2023 Global Unification Dialogue' held at the Grand Walkerhill Hotel in Gwangjin-gu, Seoul. /Yonhap News
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Regarding the policy implications of this survey, the report suggested that “ rather than comprehensively revising the unification plan, the South Korean government should establish and concretize a North Korea policy that reflects each government’s individuality while inheriting and maintaining values , principles , and visions . ”
The existing ' National Community Unification Plan ' and the 'August 15 Unification Doctrine ' presented by the Yoon Seok-yeol government each include both a vision and a plan . However , considering that feasible policies will inevitably change depending on changes in the unification environment, it may be a better approach to maintain the vision while selectively revising policy elements .
The experts surveyed in this report include 50 people in total, including 25 from universities , 22 from research institutes , and 2 former high-ranking government officials .
The report's principal investigator is Research Fellow Park Joo-hwa, and senior research fellow Jeong Seong-yoon , associate research fellow Kim Min-seong , associate research fellow Baek Seung-jun , and associate research fellow Jeong Yu-seok participated as co-researchers .
Korean society , ' sympathy for unification ' and ' interest in North Korea issues ' are decreasing
Meanwhile, in Korean society, the consensus on the need for unification is decreasing.
According to the results of the '2024 Unification Awareness Survey ' by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies announced in October last year, the response that unification is not necessary was 35% , the highest since the survey began in 2007 .
The percentage of South Koreans who respond that they are interested in North Korean issues is also decreasing.
According to the results of the ' 2024 Unification Awareness Survey ' by the Institute for Unification Studies announced in June last year , only 34.5% of respondents said they were interested in the North Korean issue .
This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul .
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