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Quotes of the Day:
“Friendship improves happiness, and abates misery, by doubling our joys, and dividing our grief.”
– Marcus Tullius Cicero
"The trick is in what one emphasizes. We either make ourselves miserable, or we make ourselves strong. The amount of work is the same."
– Carlos Castaneda
"There is nothing in the world really beneficial that does not lie within the reach of an informed understanding and a well-protected pursuit."
– Edmund Burke
1. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles off east coast: JCS
2. N. Korea may stage Jihad-style terrorist attack on S. Korea: Seoul expert
3. N. Korea could conduct localized provocation on border island: ex-Seoul official
4. Around 300 N. Korean workers arrived in Russia via train: expert
5. The Robust North Korea Sanctions Mirage
6. North Korea’s New Regional Development Plan Off to a Fast Start
7. Yongin residents get partial win in damage suit over light rail
8. North Korea hacked Yoon official’s emails last year
9. We now know North Korea is impossible to invade: Israeli struggles against Gaza’s tunnel networks prove it
10. N. Korea faces shortage of necessary supplies for agricultural production
11. Allies sign nuclear framework to brace for potential Trump return
12. Kim Ju Au (north Korea) 'I love seeing the quiet power that she really exudes in these pictures.'
13. Russia’s Dangerous New Friends
1. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles off east coast: JCS
Kim is on a roll. He continues to develop advanced military capabilities to support political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and the use of force to dominate the peninsula.
Excerpts:
On Jan. 24, North Korea test-fired a new strategic cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, named Pulhwasal-3-31, for the first time.
The country fired submarine-launched cruise missiles off the east coast on Jan. 28 and conducted two more rounds of tests involving Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missiles from the west coast in the same week.
Cruise missiles, powered by jet engines, fly low and maneuver, making them harder to detect and intercept.
Hwasal means an "arrow" in Korean, and Pulhwasal means a "fire arrow."
Experts believe the North's unusually fast pace of cruise missile tests is aimed at enhancing the performances of the missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which could pose a serious threat to South Korea.
(LEAD) N. Korea fires several cruise missiles off east coast: JCS | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 14, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with latest details in paras 5-8)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired several cruise missiles off the east coast Wednesday, the South Korean military said.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the missiles launched at around 9 a.m. into waters northeast of Wonsan on the east coast. It did not specify the number of missiles.
"While strengthening our monitoring and vigilance, our military has been closely coordinating with the United States to monitor additional signs of North Korea's provocations," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.
It marked the North's fifth cruise missile launch this year.
North Korea launches a missile on Feb. 2, 2024, in this file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the next day. The country conducted what state media called a "cruise missile super-large warhead power test" and test-fired a new anti-aircraft missile. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
On Jan. 24, North Korea test-fired a new strategic cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, named Pulhwasal-3-31, for the first time.
The country fired submarine-launched cruise missiles off the east coast on Jan. 28 and conducted two more rounds of tests involving Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missiles from the west coast in the same week.
Cruise missiles, powered by jet engines, fly low and maneuver, making them harder to detect and intercept.
Hwasal means an "arrow" in Korean, and Pulhwasal means a "fire arrow."
Experts believe the North's unusually fast pace of cruise missile tests is aimed at enhancing the performances of the missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which could pose a serious threat to South Korea.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 14, 2024
2. N. Korea may stage Jihad-style terrorist attack on S. Korea: Seoul expert
I think the "Jihadis" should call their attacks north Korea style terrorism. It is north Korea who attempted to assassinate the Korean President on multiple occasions or bombed a foreign city to try to kill a Korean head of state (in Rangoon, Burma). I think the "Jihadis" have learned from north Korea. But of course describing north Korean attacks as "jihad style" is getting attention.
N. Korea may stage Jihad-style terrorist attack on S. Korea: Seoul expert | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 14, 2024
SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea may attempt to mobilize its spies or sympathizers in South Korea to stage a terrorist attack on the South in a manner similar to attacks by Islamic Jihad, an expert said Wednesday.
Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) said North Korea is expected to raise military tensions as its leader Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean ties as relations "between two states hostile to each other" at a year-end party meeting.
"With Kim's announcement, North Korean spies and sympathizers in South Korea could work as 'wartime' agents to engage in activities commensurate with a state of war," Cho told a forum on the two Koreas' relations.
This photo, provided by the Korea Institute for National Unification on Feb. 14, 2024, shows the state-run think tank holding a forum on inter-Korean relations in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
He raised the possibility of North Korean espionage agents staging a terrorist attack in South Korea on orders from North Korea, or of South Koreans with pro-North Korean stances staging a "lone-wolf" terrorist attack.
During a key parliamentary meeting last month, the North's Kim also dubbed South Korea his country's "primary foe" and called for revising the constitution to codify a commitment to "completely occupying" South Korean territory in the event of war.
Oh Gyeong-seob, director at the planning and coordination division at KINU, said the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea's spy agency, is expected to intensify its espionage operations against the South and step up cyber attacks.
Chung Sung-yoon, a senior research fellow at the think tank, said he could not completely exclude the possibility that North Korea could use tactical nuclear weapons against South Korea in a preemptive manner, such as a potential attack on South Korean nuclear power plants in a worst-case scenario.
He also dismissed the chance that Pyongyang could stage a full-blown war on the Korean Peninsula as "near zero," saying that the country seems to be more interested in "institutionalizing" its military cooperation with Russia.
In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly reaffirmed its stance against all sorts of terrorism.
North Korea has a track record of staging terror attacks against South Korea in the past few decades, including the 1987 midair bombing of a South Korean airliner near Myanmar that killed all 115 people aboard.
The attack prompted the United States to put North Korea on its terrorism blacklist, but Washington removed Pyongyang from the list in 2008 to facilitate talks on ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.
In 2017, the U.S. redesignated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.
This photo, provided by the Korea Institute for National Unification on Feb. 14, 2024, shows the state-run think tank holding a forum on inter-Korean relations in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 14, 2024
3. N. Korea could conduct localized provocation on border island: ex-Seoul official
N. Korea could conduct localized provocation on border island: ex-Seoul official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 14, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea could undertake localized provocations this year, such as suddenly occupying a South Korean border island, a former senior Seoul official said Tuesday, amid concerns over the possibility of the North's saber-rattling ahead of the April parliamentary elections in the South.
Speaking at a forum, Kim Sung-han, who served as President Yoon Suk Yeol's national security adviser from 2022-2023, noted that Pyongyang might undertake "peacetime" provocations that would fall short of requiring a U.S. military response.
During peacetime, South Korea is to lead military operations on the Korean Peninsula, while the United States is to command wartime operations due to its possession of wartime operational control over South Korean troops -- an authority that Seoul handed over during the 1950-53 Korean War.
Recounting his time in office, Kim said that Seoul's presidential office, defense ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff have worked together to explore various scenarios of potential North Korean provocations.
"We made a bunch of scenarios of North Korean provocations ... including North Korea's sudden kind of absorption of one of the five islands in the West Sea, and many kinds of test launches of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, etc.," he said during the forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
"That belongs to kind of local -- not full-scale -- provocations that belong to kind of a peacetime operational control, which means only Korea will respond to them. ... That kind of scenario can be thought of as a future kind of local provocation that can be conducted by North Korea this year," he added.
Former South Korean National Security Adviser Kim Sung-han speaks during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on Feb. 12, 2024. (Yonhap)
Speculation has persisted that Pyongyang could engage in provocative acts ahead of the South Korean elections and the U.S. presidential election in November in an apparent bid to foster political conditions more favorable to the recalcitrant regime.
"North Korea has its own preferred presidential candidate of the U.S. In my personal view, North Korea is expected to show that the Biden administration's North Korea policy has been a total failure and try to contribute something to make its preferred presidential candidate win the elections by doing some provocative actions," he said.
Kim also commented on the process leading to the creation of the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a key deterrence body launched in line with the Washington Declaration that Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted during their summit last April.
The NCG came amid Seoul's stepped-up efforts to strengthen the credibility of America's "extended deterrence" commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.
"We considered several options, including the creation of the NCG and some others like the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons back to the ROK," Kim said, referring to his discussions with U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
"We reached the consensus that the NCG is a lot more useful because this is the way of eliminating kind of a longtime U.S. legacy -- so-called nuclear mysticism," he added.
He described "nuclear mysticism" as the U.S.' repeated statement on the protection of its allies and its call for the allies to trust it.
"I believe that kind of nuclear mysticism has contributed to the increase of skepticism on the part of South Korean people," he said. "So the NCG has been created to share the nuclear weapons operation mechanisms. This is big progress compared with before."
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 14, 2024
4. Around 300 N. Korean workers arrived in Russia via train: expert
Around 300 N. Korean workers arrived in Russia via train: expert | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 14, 2024
SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- Around 300 people presumed to be North Korean workers arrived in Russia via train earlier this month, a South Korean expert said Wednesday, amid deepening cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Citing a source in Russia, Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification, said hundreds of North Korean workers were seen disembarking a train at a station near Vladivostok on Feb. 5.
"They were seen carrying packages, but in light of their outfits, they were identified as workers at a glance, not as tourists," Cho said, dismissing the possibility of them being students studying abroad or officials on diplomatic missions.
He said they seem to be among the first group of North Korean workers that Pyongyang is likely to continue to send to Russia.
If confirmed, the move constitutes a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions banning the overseas dispatch of the North's workers.
All member states of the U.N. were required to repatriate any North Koreans earning income in their jurisdiction by the end of 2019 under UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in 2017.
The National Intelligence Service, South Korea's spy agency, declined to confirm the arrival of hundreds of the North's workers in Russia.
"We are monitoring situations related to North Korea's dispatch of its workers to Russia," it said.
North Korea and Russia have expanded the scope of their cooperation following the summit between the North's leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September last year.
This file image, captured from North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Sept. 14, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin holding a summit in Russia's Far East the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 14, 2024
5. The Robust North Korea Sanctions Mirage
I will just say, sanctions are insufficient if they are not part of a holistic and coherent strategy. They are simply one tool.
The Robust North Korea Sanctions Mirage
https://www.38north.org/2024/02/the-robust-north-korea-sanctions-mirage/
Source: Korean Central News Agency.
As a key component of its effort to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia, the Biden administration has sought to isolate Moscow. In fact, the White House has gone so far as to boast recently that US sanctions and export controls had forced Russia to “become increasingly isolated on the world stage.” Yet the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) continues to send ballistic missiles to Russia—in violation of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions—in exchange for military assistance of its own. Russia fired those North Korea-origin missiles at Ukraine several times beginning late last year. Washington has tried to shame Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un into stopping their relationship. The problem is, neither dictator has any shame.
Clearly, whatever policy the Biden administration has been employing against Pyongyang isn’t working. Instead, Washington must cripple Kim’s revenue flow to change his calculus.
John Kirby, the National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications, used a glitzy presentation from the White House press briefing room on January 4 to threaten consequences for continued DPRK-Russia proliferation activities. Kirby said those consequences would start with going to the UN Security Council to demand that Russia be “held accountable for yet again violating its international obligations.” But the United Nations is a lost cause. Russia has a veto ensuring that no substantive action against it can occur, and, as a result, the New York-based organization remains nothing more than a glorified debate club. For example, the US Mission to the UN issued a strongly worded statement, but neither Moscow nor Pyongyang blinked. Dictators like Kim and Putin do not quiver at statements, whether they are issued in the Brady Room or Turtle Bay.
Washington also imposed sanctions to “disrupt” and “expose” the arms transfers. But the Department of State’s own press release inadvertently highlighted the problem with those sanctions. It reminded readers that a November 2023 transfer of North Korean ballistic missiles and missile-related cargo had been facilitated by a company that had been previously sanctioned in May 2023. The parties used two airplanes that had been previously identified as blocked property in the May sanctions action. Thus, the department highlighted that sanctioning airlines and aircraft has not stopped this relationship and, worse, has not prevented the illegal shipments. Doing the same thing and expecting a different result is not an effective policy.
Unfortunately, these sanctions and similar botched responses to Pyongyang’s other provocations reinforce the fact that the administration is not serious about North Korea sanctions.
For instance, Kim’s September visit to Russia elicited a pledge from Putin to help the North with its space efforts. Two months later, on November 21, North Korea successfully placed a military reconnaissance satellite in orbit. The White House’s initial response did not mention sanctions or Russia; instead, it meekly encouraged North Korea to “choose engagement.” Kim chose otherwise, understanding that he can continue provocations without fear of the consequences.
A week later, the administration issued North Korea sanctions on consecutive days. However, this did not signify a shift in the administration’s approach. A deep dive into the actions reveals that the Biden administration simply checked the box of responding to the launch to get back to its other foreign policy priorities.
On November 29, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned a virtual currency mixer that North Korea used to launder proceeds from its cyber hacks. The UN Panel of Experts reported that North Korea stole $1.7 billion in cyberthefts in 2022. The Treasury Department’s sanctions acknowledged that the North Korean cyber heists occurred in March and June 2022. The year-and-a-half lag between the crime and the punishment reinforces that these sanctions are not a serious effort to address the Kim regime’s activities.
The next day, the United States, Australia, Japan and South Korea announced new North Korea sanctions. Treasury sanctioned eight foreign-based North Korean commercial and financial representatives. The State Department celebrated the unprecedented action and pledged to “continue to pursue actors who support the DPRK’s illicit activities and work with our allies and partners to deprive the DPRK of the funds to advance its destabilizing missile and weapons of mass destruction programs.” If only the rhetoric matched the administration’s actions.
The sanctioned North Korean weapons representatives are either based in China or Iran. The financial representatives are based in Russia or China. But, despite the fact that every transaction must have at least two endpoints, the administration did not sanction any Russian or Chinese banks, companies, or individuals—the administration only sanctioned those on the North Korean side of the transaction. In one example, Treasury highlighted that the Iran-based representatives tried to sell Chinese-origin aluminum and traveled to China multiple times. It defies common sense to believe that the representatives are not relying on Chinese banks, individuals and companies to further their sanctions evasion.
Thus, the administration continued its long-standing practice of targeting North Korean representatives without addressing the entire network of third-party sanctions evaders.
Washington should return to the robust North Korea sanctions campaign of 2016-2018. The majority of all sanctions placed against North Korea since 2005 occurred in this period. The impact goes beyond just numbers: During this time frame, Washington made an unprecedented qualitative change. The United States was willing to sanction Chinese banks, individuals and companies. These sanctions violators had allowed North Korea to launder more than $1 billion through the US financial system.
While Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development continued, the Kim regime changed its approach once sanctions were fully implemented. Over 20 countries ended diplomatic or commercial relationships with North Korea, severely impacting its overseas network. China started implementing sanctions, including on cross-border trade and overseas North Korean laborers, and the Wall Street Journal reported in 2018 that Pyongyang could face an economic crisis in 2019. China also prohibited its banks from opening new accounts for North Korea.
Faced with increased sanctions pressure, the Kim regime turned to negotiations and leader-level summits with former President Donald Trump in 2018.
The United States has lost that sanctions focus—and we have seen the consequences of ignoring North Korea’s weapons and diplomatic advances. The best way to change Kim’s approach is to put his strategic priorities—nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, elites and the military—at risk. Pursuing this strategy will either lead to negotiations or reduce the DPRK’s ability to simultaneously develop its prohibited nuclear and missile programs while also aiding Putin’s war in Ukraine.
The administration can do that by targeting Kim’s revenue. The administration should start by issuing comprehensive sanctions against North Korea’s cyber activities; interdicting vessels carrying prohibited coal exports and petroleum imports; and cutting off access to commerce and financing in China. Only with new actions do we have a chance of achieving new results.
The US-China relationship is different now than the 2016-2018 period, and the Chinese government will object to this new focus, but its banks will comply because they fear losing access to the US financial system. Reports recently emerged of this dynamic on Russia sanctions where Chinese banks are reportedly scrutinizing relationships with Russia because of US sanctions. Biden should use that same focus on the North Korea problem.
If the administration does not act, Congress must conduct oversight of the administration’s policy and force it to justify its ineffective sanctions policy.
The Kim regime is building a nuclear arsenal targeting the homeland and US troops in the region. If Kim is worried about his revenue, then he will curtail his extracurricular activities. Biden should stop treating Kim like a spoiled toddler and begin protecting Americans from North Korea.
6. North Korea’s New Regional Development Plan Off to a Fast Start
Chollima speed?
North Korea’s New Regional Development Plan Off to a Fast Start
https://www.38north.org/2024/02/north-koreas-new-regional-development-plan-off-to-a-fast-start/
Less than a month after Kim Jong Un announced plans to boost regional development with the construction of 200 new factories over the next decade, the foundations for one of the first factories are already apparent.
Commercial satellite imagery shows that in Yonthan (Yontan) County, North Hwanghae Province, a site that was vacant on February 4, now has the foundations laid for several buildings.
The speed with which construction has begun is impressive and typical of the pace at which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has approached recent high-profile economic projects. It is also vital if the country wants to avoid an early stumble in fulfilling the ambitious regional development plan.
Figure 1. Premier Kim Tok Hun visits construction site in Yonthan County that is part of North Korea’s new Regional Development 20×10 Policy. The image was published in a KCNA article on February 13, 2024. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)
Construction Status and Plans
North Korean state media reported on Tuesday that DPRK Premier Kim Tok Hun’s recently visited the site. The report said Kim also visited construction sites in nearby Unpha (Unpa), North Hwanghae, and Jaeryong (Chaeryong) and Unchon counties, South Hwanghae, although the location of those sites is yet to be determined.
The Tuesday report was accompanied by a photo of Kim at the Yonthan site.
Figure 2a. Medium-resolution Planet coverage shows no construction progress at site of KCNA image in Yonthan County on February 4, 2024. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.; Figure 2b. Medium-resolution Planet coverage shows construction progress at site of KCNA image in Yonthan County on February 12, 2024. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
The “20×10” regional development plan is an ambitious plan to build new factories in 20 counties a year over the next 10 years. It was presented on January 15 by Kim Jong Un to delegates of the Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang.
The plan is based on a project in Kimhwa County, Kangwon Province, that began after the area was damaged by floods. Over the last two years, factories have been built, supplying food, clothes, building materials, paper and consumer goods.
Revisiting the Pyongyang General Hospital
At the same January meeting, Kim also called for the Pyongyang General Hospital to finally open. The exterior of the building in central Pyongyang was completed in late 2020, but it has yet to be operational. State media has not commented on issues facing the project, but they likely include difficulties acquiring medical equipment needed to fill the hospital.
In early February, state media reported that Kim Tok Hun visited that site, too. Earlier, Kim Jong Un said the hospital in Pyongyang should be opened this year, and a new hospital should be built in Kangwon Province. Then, “modern general hospitals should be built in other provinces every year.”
Figure 3. Overhead image of Pyongyang General Hospital on imagery from January 6, 2024. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
7. Yongin residents get partial win in damage suit over light rail
I was worried but pleased to see the current mayor of Yongin is not at fault but the previous one was. The current mayor is Baek Kun-ki who was the former commander of the ROK Army Special Warfare Command and retired as a four star. I worked with him when he was the G3 and worked for him when he was the commanding general.
Excerpt:
The court said former mayor Lee Jeong-moon is guilty of committing a "grave negligence" in concluding an agreement that is highly favorable to its developer, without conducting a feasibility study of demand forecast in 2004.
Yongin residents get partial win in damage suit over light rail | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · February 14, 2024
SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- An appellate court on Wednesday upheld parts of a damage lawsuit brought by residents of Yongin over a controversial light rail system that they argue has cost the city hundreds of millions of dollars in losses.
The Seoul High Court ruled the current mayor of Yongin, south of Seoul, could charge 21.46 billion won (US$16 million) in compensations from a former mayor and a state research institute over the transit system that has put the municipality into financial trouble due to a low usage rate.
The incumbent mayor is required to make a request for the payment within 60 days and file a damage lawsuit in case the payment is not made in time.
The court said former mayor Lee Jeong-moon is guilty of committing a "grave negligence" in concluding an agreement that is highly favorable to its developer, without conducting a feasibility study of demand forecast in 2004.
A file photo of the Yongin EverLine service provided by a reader. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The court also found the Korea Transport Institute in charge of predicting demand for the transit and its researchers responsible for making an excessive demand forecast without using reasonable methods, thereby causing around 430 billion won in damages to the city.
Residents filed an administrative suit against them in 2013, saying the city should claim some 1.02 trillion won for the loss that the light rail business cost the city.
The Yongin EverLine, which connects Everland, the country's largest theme park, to the Giheung station under the Suin-Bundang Line, opened to the public in 2013, nearly three years after its completion, due to a dispute with its Canadian developer over the issue of minimum revenue guarantee.
The city eventually lost in international arbitration, paying the developer some 850 billion won along with additional expenses.
The transit service suffered huge losses as the number of its users was far lower than predicted by the research agency.
Lower courts did not recognize the legality of the suit filed by residents, saying a request for an audit should predate the lawsuit, but the Supreme Court dismissed the case and sent it back to a lower court for reevaluation in 2020.
A lawyer representing the residents said it could take a long time for the city to receive compensation as the accused are expected to appeal the ruling.
It marks the first time that residents have won a compensation lawsuit against a private investment business led by a local government, since the introduction of such suits in 2005.
According to government data, 50 residents' lawsuits had been filed as of the end of 2022, with seven cases currently under way.
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · February 14, 2024
8. North Korea hacked Yoon official’s emails last year
We are all vulnerable.
North Korea hacked Yoon official’s emails last year
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · February 14, 2024
NIS busts North Korean cyber criminal ring working for Pyongyang’s spy agency
By Kim Arin
Published : Feb. 14, 2024 - 18:43
(123rf)
North Korea appears to be behind the hacking of a presidential official’s email account in November last year, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service believes.
In a release responding to a news report on Wednesday, the presidential office said Wednesday that a private email account belonging to an administrative official was targeted in a cyber attack ahead of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s state visit to France and the UK in November. Citing the NIS, the release said the cyber attack was likely perpetrated by a North Korean source, but did not give further details such as why they thought this.
The presidential office said the email account fell vulnerable to the cyber attack “as a result of the carelessness of one official, who used a private account for official duties.” The office, adding that necessary measures have been taken to prevent a recurrence, the security system of the presidential office itself had not been exposed to the cyber attack.
The presidential office said that it was aware of the emails being hacked before the president left the country for Europe. “Cyber intrusions by foreign entities are a constant threat, and they are continuously being monitored,” the office said.
South Korean intelligence and military officials have warned of a rise in cyber attacks ahead of the general election in April.
According to the NIS, the number of instances of foreign state-sponsored cyberattacks against South Korean government institutions in the past three years is estimated to be more than 5,200. Most of them are believed to have been waged by North Korea.
More recently in December, the NIS launched an investigation following suspicions of the North Korean cybercrime ring Lazarus trying to hack the networks of South Korean courts and other judicial services.
The NIS is also working with the National Election Commission to mend security flaws in its networks after finding attempts of North Korean infiltration early last year.
For about a month from November last year, a series of outages affected South Korean government-run online services. A primary investigation by the NIS then found no evidence of foreign infiltration, with a plan to boost the security of government networks to be announced soon.
In the latest instance of North Korean cyber threats targeting private citizens, the NIS said Wednesday it busted a North Korean group that created fake gambling sites and sold them to South Korean cybercrime rings.
The NIS said that the North Korean group, which is based in China, works for the Reconnaissance General Bureau that oversees Pyongyang’s clandestine operations.
Each of the group's 15 members sends about $500 to Pyongyang by making illegal profits from creating and selling software to gambling sites, according to the NIS. From the gambling sites that they helped create, they were able to steal personal information of some 1,100 South Koreans.
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · February 14, 2024
9. We now know North Korea is impossible to invade: Israeli struggles against Gaza’s tunnel networks prove it
The nKPA is a "mole army." They love to dig and hide underground.
We now know North Korea is impossible to invade: Israeli struggles against Gaza’s tunnel networks prove it
Since the 2010s, the tunnel network in the Gaza Strip has been widely speculated to have benefitted from North Korean tunnelling methods and technologies
By A.B. Abrams - February 14, 2024
dailynk.com
We now know North Korea is impossible to invade: Israeli struggles against Gaza’s tunnel networks prove it - Daily NK English
Smuggling Tunnels, Rafah, Gaza (Flickr, Creative Commons)
Following the outbreak of open hostilities between between Israel and militia groups based in the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, the Israel Defence Force’s (IDF) invasion of the Palestinian territory which began 20 days later has faced serious difficulties tackling local militias operating from underground tunnel networks. Israel has for well over a decade sought to minimise the ability of Palestinian militia groups, including the forces of Gaza’s ruling authority Hamas, to build underground fortifications. Since 2007, it has imposed a blockade of the territory that has specifically targeted construction materials which could be used for this purpose. The success of these Israeli efforts has been limited, however, with the IDF having reported a decade ago that one underground network alone was 2.4 kilometres in length, 20 metres below the surface, and featured 350 tons of concrete in its construction. More recently senior Israeli officials have stated that there are some 5,700 separate shafts leading to the network, which is between 350 and 450 miles (560 and 725km) long. With Gaza itself being just 140 square miles (363 square km) in size, this represents a very significant degree of fortification. On Jan. 16, the New York Times reported that the IDF had been “astonished” by the size of the network, with Israeli officials estimating that it could take “years” to disable it.
Regarding the utility of the tunnel networks used by Palestinian militia groups, not only do they provide cover from many kinds of surveillance, but they also force Israel to expend costly and relatively scarce “bunker buster” munitions to engage targets. Footage released by militia fighters under Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad has also shown combatants making use of the tunnels to redeploy in teams behind Israeli lines, throwing grenades into groups of resting personnel or flanking Israeli armour to destroy it from close ranges using rocket-propelled grenades and other explosives. The tunnels have thus served as a major force multiplier in one of the most unbalanced conflicts in the world in terms of technology, firepower and manpower, allowing militia groups otherwise far from outstanding in their capabilities even by the standards of the Middle East’s many non-state forces to engage a leading regional military. Largely as a result, the latest reports from U.S. intelligence officials indicate that four months into the war, and having suffered increasingly serious economic losses and growing war fatigue, Israel is not close to achieving its goal of eliminating the little military power Hamas had.
The effectiveness of tunnel networks under Gaza for military purposes is particularly notable when considering that the network itself is far inferior to that deployed across Israel’s northern border by the Lebanese militia group Hezbollah. The tunnel and bunker network in the region south of Lebanon’s Litani River alone was, by 2006, estimated to have fortified command bunkers constructed to a depth of 40 meters using poured concrete, and over 600 ammunition and weapons bunkers fortified eight or more meters underground. This network was, according to Western and Israeli sources, constructed using North Korean technologies and with planning and supervision from Korean specialists who deployed to Southern Lebanon. Aside from the presence of Korean specialists, not only was southern Lebanon not under blockade, but the rock-hard soil in southern Lebanon was far more suitable for building tunnel networks compared to the much softer coastal soil in Gaza. The two networks were thus incomparable in their defensive value. This bodes ill for any potential Israeli invasion attempt of Southern Lebanon, reportedly currently under consideration, considering its forces’ struggles against the far inferior Gazan network.
Since the 2010s, the tunnel network in the Gaza Strip has been widely speculated to have benefitted from North Korean tunnelling methods and technologies, likely passed on by the sponsors of local militia groups namely either Iran or Hezbollah, but possibly provided with some input from Korean specialists directly. As observed by Victor Cha, former director for Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council, in 2014: “Hamas’ vast tunnel network almost certainly benefited from outside assistance, whether directly from North Korea or via Iran,” highlighting that cutting off this support was key to achieving the U.S. and Israeli objective of disarming the territory. It is similarly uncertain whether North Korean anti-tank weapons reported to now be widely used against Israeli forces were supplied directly or through Hezbollah or Iran, which the country is known to supply weapons to, with denials by Pyongyang indicating that the latter may be more likely. Nevertheless, with the tunnel network in Gaza being extremely limited compared to that built under southern Lebanon, let alone that under North Korea itself which is considered likely the greatest in the world, much can be extrapolated from Israel’s struggle in its current conflict regarding the difficulties an invasion of either Southern Lebanon or North Korea would pose. The former was attempted by Israel in 2006 and failed largely due to Hezbollah’s effective use of its underground network, while the latter has been seriously considered under multiple American administrations.
Long history
North Korean expertise in tunnelling and underground fortifications has its origins in the Korean War when U.S. forces dropped 635,000 tons of bombs across the peninsula, and in parallel to major investments in developing a modern air defence capability, the construction of key military and industrial sites deep underground was seen as key to preparing for a possible future American air assault. A recent example of North Korea’s ability to build airbases under mountains was provided in February 2023 when Iranian media released images of the country’s Eagle 44 airbase, which is considered highly likely to have been built with extensive North Korean support. Iran’s Fordow uranium enrichment plant is similarly thought to have been built with extensive North Korean assistance and was heavily fortified under a mountain. While footage of examples from within North Korea is more scarce, the Pyongyang Metro was notably built in 1965 as the deepest in the world after the United States began deploying and rapidly expanding an arsenal of several hundred nuclear weapons in South Korea, which peaked at 950 warheads and was largely aimed at North Korea. Three thick metal blast doors at every entrance allow the metro to serve as a citywide bomb shelter in the case of American nuclear strikes, which appears to have been its primary purpose.
North Korea’s network has allowed it to store and manufacture vast arsenals underground, and move them over long distances on wide underground roads, allowing assets ranging from mobile surface-to-air missile batteries to intercontinental range ballistic missiles to briefly surface, launch, and return to safety. While the country has only relatively recently begun to introduce solid-fuelled strategic ballistic missiles, which can be stored full-fuelled, for liquid-fuelled missiles underground tunnels allow missiles to be fuelled in relative safety from enemy strikes before surfacing briefly for launch. The value of this network was highlighted in 2016 when the Obama administration seriously considered launching strikes on North Korea. The Pentagon had informed the president at the time that options for a limited preventative attack were effectively non-existent as the country’s highly mobile nuclear delivery systems were stored deep underground in facilities which could not be located or neutralised. The Pentagon had concluded on this basis that nothing short of a full-scale ground invasion to occupy the country could disarm North Korea. The importance of North Korea’s underground fortifications was previously also reflected in the emphasis it received in Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s confirmation hearing in January 2001, when he stated at the core of his argument against launching a military assault on the East Asian state: “They have gone underground across that country in a way that few nations have done…They have underground emplacements of enormous numbers of weapons.” He thus referred to the country’s armed forces as “world-class tunnellers.”
The recent war between Israel and Palestinian militias in Gaza has provided an extreme case highlighting that even for forces with relatively negligible capabilities facing a major army, a relatively shallow and basic tunnel network can serve as a tremendous force multiplier. Israel’s struggles against tunnels in Gaza thus can be seen as an indicator of the tremendous difficulties the United States and its allies would face if attempting an invasion of North Korea, with the balance in manpower and firepower being far less favourable to the invaders while tunnel networks are overwhelmingly better fortified and more sophisticated. Footage from the frontlines has also highlighted the utility of tunnels not only to shield all manner of assets but also to redeploy forces behind enemy lines which even Gaza’s relatively shallow networks have proven highly capable of doing, facilitating multiple effective ambushes of Israeli infantry and armour. With North Korean forces preparing for over 70 years for a possible second American-led invasion attempt, following the first launched in September 1950, massive networks of underground fortifications have provided a key contributor to the country’s ability to deter such action. The proliferation of these tunnelling technologies on smaller scales abroad has provided an important demonstration of their potency, and following Israel’s struggles against Hezbollah’s tunnel network in 2006, its invasion of Gaza is expected to only further contribute to dissuading Pyongyang’s adversaries from considering testing its own defences.
The writer’s previous related assessment covering the North Korean proliferation of underground fortifications in southern Lebanon is available here.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
A.B. Abrams
A. B. Abrams is the author of Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years At War with American Power. He has published widely on defence and politics under various pseudonyms, and is proficient in Chinese, Korean and other East Asian languages. He has completed Masters degrees in related subjects at the University of London. Abrams has spent much time in North Korea, studied the Korean language at university in Pyongyang, and has many contacts with Koreans inside the DPRK and overseas.
dailynk.com
10. N. Korea faces shortage of necessary supplies for agricultural production
Again, we must observe for indicators of instability
N. Korea faces shortage of necessary supplies for agricultural production
Failure to deliver agricultural supplies to farms promptly could negatively affect farm preparations and overall farm production
By Mun Dong Hui - February 14, 2024
dailynk.com
N. Korea faces shortage of necessary supplies for agricultural production - Daily NK English
A tractor on a farm in North Korea. (Image: Todd Mecklem, Creative Commons, Flickr)
North Korea has again made the expansion of agricultural production one of its main tasks for the year, but the authorities are unable to provide the necessary supplies to farming communities, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK last Thursday that the warehouse of the Agricultural Supply Agency in Pyongsong is empty and has become “a paradise for rats.” The source added that the supply agency’s headquarters in Pyongyang and the provincial rural finance committee have taken a hands-off approach to the problem.
Supply agencies are agencies charged by the Cabinet with providing supplies to farms and businesses. For example, the supply agency under the North Pyongan Province Rural Finance Committee distributes agricultural supplies to local farms.
The supply agencies are supposed to provide various items to farms per the state plans, but the fact they are empty shows the seriousness of the agricultural supply shortage in North Korea.
Some empty warehouses have become “garbage dumps”
The source said the failure of the agricultural supply agencies to play their proper role “is a natural result of the lack of supplies from the central government.”
“Cases of empty agricultural supply agency warehouses in provincial capitals that have become garbage dumps or even criminal scenes are a serious social problem,” the source said. “If the situations at these agricultural supply agencies are this bad, the supply centers at higher levels must be even worse.”
Failure to deliver agricultural supplies to farms promptly could negatively affect farm preparations and overall agricultural production. However, North Korean authorities are not taking adequate steps to address the problem.
“People are saying that if the authorities can’t guarantee agricultural supplies, it would be better to abolish the agencies and use their buildings for housing,” the source said. “More and more people are saying that the authorities must immediately take measures [to deal with the problem].”
Daily NK was unable to confirm whether agricultural supply agencies in areas outside of South Pyongan Province suffer from the same problems.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Mun Dong Hui
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
11. Allies sign nuclear framework to brace for potential Trump return
We had a very good discussion with the deputy Defense Minister yesterday.
But job one of the NCG is to provide information that will enhance the confidence among the ROK in extended deterrence and give Kim Jong Un pause as well. The information plan and effort is just as important as the actual procedures that are established.
Allies sign nuclear framework to brace for potential Trump return
The Korea Times · February 14, 2024
Cho Chang-rae, left, South Korea's deputy defense minister for policy, shakes hands with Vipin Narang, U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, after signing a framework document on the Nuclear Consultative Group at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Monday (local time). Courtesy of Ministry of National Defense
Defense ministries of S. Korea, US sign NCG framework document
By Lee Hyo-jin
Wary of the potential return of former U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House this year, the defense ministries of South Korea and the United States signed a framework document on the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a collaborative mechanism established between the two allies to discuss and coordinate nuclear policy, security, and defense.
The move appears to be aimed at expediting the full implementation of the nuclear coordination agreement previously signed by South Korea and the U.S. to strengthen Washington's extended deterrence against the growing nuclear threat from Pyongyang.
With Trump emerging as the leading Republican presidential candidate, concerns are mounting over the potential impact of his reelection on the strengthened security commitments that the Biden administration pledged to Seoul.
South Korea's Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Cho Chang-rae and U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Vipin Narang signed the document at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Monday (local time), according to Seoul's defense ministry, Wednesday.
The document outlines the specific goals of the NCG based on the April 2023 Washington Declaration signed between President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden, the ministry added. Launched in July 2023, the NCG is a consultative body designed to discuss the enhancement of U.S. extended deterrence through joint nuclear planning to counter North Korean nuclear threats.
Based on the newly-signed document, Cho and his U.S. counterpart will spearhead efforts to fully establish guidelines regarding the planning and operation of nuclear weapons by the first half of this year.
"The fact that the framework document was signed between defense ministry officials, not officials from the presidential office and the White House, indicates that the allies have apparently opted to shift NCG discussions to the ministerial level, considering that interactions between presidential officials may weaken in the event of Trump's reelection," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
The NCG has conducted two meetings so far. The inaugural meeting took place in Seoul in July 2023, and the second was held in Washington in December that year, both involving Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo and then White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell.
The third meeting scheduled for June in Seoul will be organized by the defense ministries.
Kim Sung-han, a former top security adviser to Yoon, said during a forum earlier this week that South Korea maintains an open-minded stance regarding Japan's potential participation in the NCG. Kim added that he had discussed the matter with Japanese officials during his tenure.
His remarks are also interpreted as a strategy to uphold the current NCG framework in case Trump returns to the White House.
Republican presidential candidate and former U.S. President Donald Trump gestures to the audience as he leaves a rally at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, S.C., Saturday. AFP-Yonhap
During a campaign rally in South Carolina last week, Trump said he would “encourage” Russia to do whatever it wants to NATO countries that are “delinquent.” His remarks prompted a strong backlash from European leaders.
Park viewed that Trump's skepticism about military alliances extends to Asian allies as well, suggesting that if elected, he could be reluctant to carry out the agreement reached through the Washington Declaration.
"While Trump is unlikely to completely abandon the agreement, he could be skeptical about core aspects of the Washington Declaration, such as the regular deployment of U.S. strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula and joint military exercises based on conventional-nuclear integration (CNI), " Park said, noting Trump's previous pledge to cease joint drills with South Korea, referring to them as "war games."
However, Yang Uk, a defense analyst at the Asan Institute of Policy Studies, gave a different analysis.
"Although Trump considers military alliances burdensome and would demand increased contributions from allies, there is a growing opinion among Republicans that the U.S. should prioritize stronger extended deterrence, while reducing conventional weapons and the deployment of military troops," Yang said.
In that regard, the analyst anticipated that Trump is unlikely to scale back the Biden administration's strengthened commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea. Instead, he could once again threaten to reduce the number of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) troops to pressure Seoul to cover more defense costs.
The Korea Times · February 14, 2024
12. Kim Ju Au (north Korea) 'I love seeing the quiet power that she really exudes in these pictures.'
Video and photos at the link: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/fashion-02132024165208.html
'I love seeing the quiet power that she really exudes in these pictures.'
American stylist analyzes the fashion of North Korea’s ‘Respected Daughter’
By Park Jaewoo for RFA Korean
2024.02.13
rfa.org
UPDATED on Feb. 13, 2024 at 6:27 p.m. ET
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un uses force and missile launches to demonstrate his control. His pre-teen daughter and presumed heir Kim Ju Ae exudes “quiet power” – through the way she dresses.
That’s according to Lauren A. Rothman, a Washington-based stylist who offers fashion advice to celebrities, politicians and business executives.
At Radio Free Asia’s request, she analyzed 10 pictures of Kim Ju Ae and shared her impressions of what North Korea is trying to communicate both at home and abroad about the girl – thought to be around 11 years old – who may one day rule one of the world’s most isolated countries.
At her first public event – a missile launch in November 2022 – Kim Ju Ae was wearing a white designer coat topped with a white fur cloak, black pants and red leather dress shoes with bows.
In subsequent appearances, she was spotted wearing designer sunglasses, fur-collared overcoats, a pantsuit with a bow and fancy blouses made by European luxury brands. She has carried luxury handbags and always sports a carefully primped hairstyle.
Rothman, who specializes advising people who run for office, said the way Kim Ju Ae dresses is a calculated effort to make her appear young and innocent but also to command respect.
“I love seeing the quiet power that she really exudes in these pictures,” Rothman told RFA. “And what I mean by that is that we see everything from the young girl she could be, or was, in a fur or fleece hoodie into the woman she's going to be with a belted blazer or coat.”
North Korea experts have speculated that Kim Ju Ae’s public appearances are part of a propaganda effort to soften her father’s image by portraying him as a family man. The appearances could also be positioning her to one day rule after her father over a hereditary communist regime, they say.
The effect, however, has not always been positive among her people.
The state media barrage of images of her plump face and wearing nice clothing has aroused widespread, if secret, resentment among the public, sources have told RFA, in a country plagued by chronic food shortages and widespread poverty.
Inherited authority
Rothman said she observed what she calls “legacy dressing,” which is meant not only to confer Kim Ju Ae’s father’s power onto her, but also to help her to step into her own power.
“It is really interesting to think about [Kim Jong Un’s] daughter's ability to communicate politics at her age, which appears to be timeless in these photos,” she said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter Ju Ae at the civil defense military parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyang, Sept. 9, 2023. (Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) via Reuters)
In one photo, Kim Ju Ae is wearing designer sunglasses, a leather jacket and a fur collar – all of which conveys a sense of power and makes her look more mature than in earlier photos, Rothman said.
There was also a sense of timelessness to her style, she said, so that could be important politically.
In earlier appearances, the girl appeared primarily in white, she noted.
“Not only do I think that it's really powerful that in the first picture that was released, we're seeing her in white, but that's a very soft color, that's a very innocent color. And so, there's some real youthfulness,” Rothman said.
“So here when she's wearing a blazer, she has a pin and when she wears the white down jacket, she does not. And [for] most folks in politics …, darker colors stand the test of time.”
She said that for politicians and others who frequently appear in public, white clothing is difficult to keep clean, so it’s used mainly to emphasize youth, softness and purity.
In a photo that shows Kim Ju Ae wearing a white jacket and gold buttons to visit the naval command alongside her father, the purpose was to connect her style with that of the military, Rothman said.
Like her father
Kim Ju Ae often borrows elements of her father’s fashion, Rothman observed.
Kim Jong Un and his daughter Ju Ae commemorate the launch of a reconnaissance satellite, during a visit to the General Administration of Aerospace Technology, in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 24, 2023. (KCNA via Reuters)
“We're seeing a likeness. We're seeing a similarity and we're being trained already through nonverbal communication that they are one and the same.” Rothman said.
“We are being trained to think that ‘When I see her in this look, I'm also seeing him in this look,’ and there's something very subtle being communicated in the power of fashion.”
“When we see what I call this legacy dressing type of look, I definitely think it has some intention attached to it,” she said.
Rothman said that even if the fashion choices are not part of an intentional strategy, the Kim family may have chosen clothes that could communicate their inherent power unconsciously.
Kim Jong Un and his daughter make an official visit to the Naval Command of the Korean People's Army to celebrate Navy Day in North Korea, in this picture from August, 2023. (KCNA via Reuters)
Rothman said that Kim Ju Ae appears to be trying to present a soft family appearance to the rest of the world, but to North Koreans she may convey a strong force symbolizing the country’s leadership and power.
“Endless power is what these photos show me that the power doesn't end,” she said. “That the power doesn't rest, that the power is eternal and outer wear is a great way to communicate that power.”
Family fashion
Rothman also analyzed the fashion of supreme leader Kim Jong Un, First Lady Ri Sol Ju and his sister Kim Yo Jong, who is a high ranking and influential government official.
Kim Jong Un’s tailored clothing, such as his double-breasted coat, jacket and Mao-style jacket, appears to be an intentional choice reminiscent of a dynasty, she said. This choice of clothing itself symbolizes strong power to his people.
His wife, meanwhile, mimics the fashion of first ladies of other countries. Rothman said that in some pictures she even looks as if she’s trying to channel a little Jaqueline Kennedy Onassis, who was first lady when her first husband John F. Kennedy was U.S. president.
“There is such a pronounced difference between first lady dressing and executive presence dressing and that’s communicated here with the wife’s style, really looking tailored, looking traditional,” she said.
Kim Jong Un and his wife Ri Sol Ju wave to China's President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan upon their departure at the airport in Pyongyang June 21, 2019. (KCNA via AFP)
“There’s even a sweetness to that tailoring. We’ll see both playful touches, whether she’s got high boots on and is, you know, playing in the snow or, or at a creek here, you’ll see really tailored sleeves and collars that probably would make her a style icon in North Korea”
This is in sharp contrast to Kim Yo Jong, the leader’s sister, who needs to communicate capability and competence.
“So what we're seeing in his sister’s ensembles is that she really loves her blazers, which really communicates a great sense of executive presence,” said Rothman.
Rothman said that unlike Ri Sol Ju’s clutch bag, Kim Yo Jong prefers practical fashion by carrying a tote or shoulder bag with plenty of space and often wearing clothes with pockets.
Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un and first vice department director of the ruling Workers’ Party’s Central Committee, at the Metropole hotel during a North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi, Vietnam Feb. 28, 2019. (Leah Millis/Reuters)
Kim Yo Jong, who dresses simply, has only one accessory that she likes to wear: a headband. According to Rothman, headbands are called “half up, half down” in fashion terms, because half of the hair is decorated and fixed, and the other half is left down freely.
“Although she also has been shown with her hair down and with the headband, I think the headband is a little bit of fun.” said Rothman. “It's something unexpected and perhaps authentic, to her love of fashion which is not often communicated in these more severe serious suits.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
Update moves context closer to the beginning of the report.
rfa.org
13. Russia’s Dangerous New Friends
No mention of north Korea. I guess that is because it is an old friend. Or else it is just more pundits and academics who overlook the importance of north Korea as a partner in the axis of totalitarians.
Excerpto
To U.S. officials, pushing hard to break up the Russia-axis partnership may not seem like an urgent task. Washington, after all, is already consumed with stopping Russia’s efforts to subjugate Ukraine and containing the axis directly (as well as with competing against China in the Indo-Pacific). But the reality is that Washington cannot hope to address one problem without addressing the other. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has always been global in its intent and scope, reflecting Russia’s desire to undo the existing international order. Its patronage for the axis of resistance is part and parcel of that campaign. The axis aspires not just to kick the United States out of the Middle East but also to deal a body blow to a country it sees as an evil, imperialist empire. Moscow does not welcome the axis’s disruptive actions simply because they distract from Ukraine, and the axis is not pro-Russia purely because the Kremlin offers assistance. Rather, the two entities view each other as comrades-in-arms in a broader effort to weaken the West’s dominance. If Washington is serious about disrupting each one’s schemes, it must stop them from working together.
Russia’s Dangerous New Friends
How Moscow Is Partnering With the Axis of Resistance
February 14, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Hamidreza Azizi and Hanna Notte · February 14, 2024
Since invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia has forged deep ties to Iran. Moscow—which joined a sanctions regime against Tehran in the 2010s in an effort to restrict its nuclear program—has begun diplomatically shielding the Islamic Republic and boosting its investment in the Iranian economy. Tehran, in turn, has provided substantial battlefield support to the Russian military, including drones. Both developments have received substantial international attention and provoked widespread fury.
But Russia is simultaneously building another set of relationships that, although more subtle, are no less significant. Over the past two years, Moscow has intensified its ties to the “axis of resistance”: the network of Iranian partners and proxies that stretches from Lebanon to Iraq. This axis, which includes Hamas, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Iraqi and Syrian militias, believes itself to be in confrontation with Israel and, by extension, the United States. It is a natural ally for the Kremlin.
The war in the Gaza Strip has earned the axis newfound support and prompted it to take military action against U.S. troops, Israeli forces, and international shipping. In doing so, it has given Russia new chances to weaken the United States and the United States’ allies. Moscow has seized these opportunities. After October 7, Russia stepped up its diplomatic support for Hamas and the Houthis, defending their actions before the United Nations and blaming their attacks on the United States. It has provided technical and logistical aid for the axis as it strikes Israeli soldiers. And there are worrisome signs that Russia might enable Hezbollah in a potential confrontation with Israel, perhaps through sophisticated electronic warfare.
Moscow is not the puppeteer controlling the axis, and its efforts to incite the network’s members into further pressuring the United States will be measured. Russia wants to maintain ties with the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, as well as with Israel, and so it cannot afford to offer Iranian-linked groups unlimited backing. But Russia will still egg the axis on, encouraging its anti-American designs and working to make its attacks more effective. Washington will therefore have to respond with its own intensive efforts to counter this influence. The United States must, in particular, try to end the war in Gaza. It also must try harder to calm tensions throughout the Middle East. And Washington needs to push third parties, particularly its Arab allies, to undercut the partnership between Russia and the axis of resistance. Otherwise, Russia, Iran, and the two states’ friends may well curtail the United States’ power across the entire region.
ENEMY OF MY ENEMY
Russian engagement with the axis of resistance is not a new phenomenon. The two sides have had political contacts for many years. Hamas delegations, for instance, have frequented Moscow since 2006. The Russian military has been working with Iran-backed militias since Moscow began its military intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, during which Russia coordinated its operations with Hezbollah. During that year, Moscow also established contacts with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella organization that brings together Iran-backed militias in Iraq. And at the same time, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Syria created a quadrilateral intelligence center to coordinate the fight against the Islamic State (or ISIS), marking the beginning of intelligence sharing between Russia and the PMF (although the sharing was limited and had little effect).
Initially, Moscow shied away from providing these groups with systemic security assistance. But after invading Ukraine, Russia shed some of this caution. As Russia’s military focused its resources on Putin’s gambit in Ukraine, Moscow relinquished several key positions in central and eastern Syria to Iran-backed militias and to Hezbollah. According to reports by Reuters, Russia also ramped up intelligence sharing with Iran-backed militias and supplied Hezbollah with antiship missiles via Syria. In addition, it gave a green light for Iran to upgrade Syria’s air defenses. Such support has provided a major boost to these groups’ operational capabilities, enabling them to target U.S. interests in eastern Syria with increased frequency and precision.
For the axis, Russia’s patronage came at the perfect moment. After the 2020 assassination of the network’s founder, the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, the axis began steadily decentralizing, giving its members increased autonomy to seek out international partnerships. Almost all of them looked to Moscow for intensified engagement, hoping that the Kremlin’s recognition would provide them with an advantage on their respective domestic political turfs and, eventually, yield security assistance that could complement the support they obtain from Iran. This outreach, in turn, gave Russia a broader choice of prospective regional associates. The decentralization also made the axis more useful to Moscow by making the network more resilient—and therefore dangerous for Washington.
After October 7, the battlefield collusion between Russia and the axis reached yet another level. Russia has stepped up electronic jamming from its Khmeimim base in western Syria, disrupting Israel’s commercial air traffic. Russian pilots have resumed their air patrols along the Israeli-Syrian disengagement line in the Golan Heights, after a one-year hiatus. According to Iranian news outlets, Hezbollah struck Israel’s Meron air control base with Russian-made antitank guided missiles in January, suggesting that Moscow may be funneling arms to the militant group. And U.S. officials have warned that the Wagner paramilitary company—which the Russian Ministry of Defense is in the process of dismantling and rebranding—may provide air defense systems to Hezbollah in the coming months.
For the axis of resistance, Russia’s patronage came at the perfect moment.
Russia has combined this increase in military aid with more diplomatic and rhetorical assistance. Moscow has worked to deflect international criticism of Hamas onto the United States, arguing that Washington has dangerously monopolized the peace process and is therefore responsible for the renewed outbreak of violence in the Middle East. Moscow also defended the Houthis after the group unleashed drone and missile attacks on Israel and on international shipping in the Red Sea. And Russian diplomats have blamed the United States for the Houthis’ violence, arguing that the attacks are really provoked by what they call a U.S.-backed Israeli “slaughter” in Gaza. Along with China, Russia abstained from a United Nations Security Council resolution that called on the Houthis to stop attacking merchant and commercial vessels.
Russia’s relationship with the Houthis is, to be sure, complex. Moscow’s abstention allowed the resolution to pass, and some of the Houthi strikes have unintentionally hit ships carrying Russian oil. Should Houthi attacks prompt the closure of the Suez Canal, through which Russia sends most of its oil to India, the costs of Moscow’s exports could become prohibitive. But Russia did (unsuccessfully) try to squeeze several amendments into the security council proposal that would have deflected criticism of the Houthis. For the time being, the strikes have caused limited economic damage to Russia. And Moscow likely welcomes the disruption in global commerce. Although it might prompt inflation and supply-side shortages, Russia hopes that these consequences will harm Western societies above everyone else.
As a result, Moscow has not been bashful about helping the Houthis. Russia hosted their representatives at its foreign ministry in late January. In return, a Houthi official promised safe passage for Russian and Chinese ships transiting through the Red Sea. Other axis groups have also visited Moscow. Hamas representatives have twice traveled to Russia’s capital since October 7, where they enjoyed the opportunity to mingle with Iranian officials.
Russia’s actions raise concerns about its potential role in an expanding conflict between Israel and the axis, and especially one between Israel and Hezbollah. Though Russia does not want an all-out conflagration, which would likely engulf Syria and threaten Russian interests there, it will likely support Hezbollah if war happens. It could cause headaches for Israel’s defense planners, for example, by intensifying electronic jamming, which Russia has already ramped up since October 7—or announcing that it was “closing” Syria’s airspace. Russia would almost certainly avoid shooting down Israeli jets itself, but should Damascus engage Israeli aircraft with its arsenal of Russian-provided missile defence systems, aided by precise intelligence and electronic jamming from Russia, Moscow could maintain plausible deniability regarding any resulting incidents.
PEER PRESSURE
Moscow’s cooperation with the axis’s anti-American activism will not be unbounded. Russia remains heavily invested in its ties with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have afforded the Kremlin important economic benefits but have a hostile relationship to axis members. Russia also wants to maintain a modicum of civility with Israel, which is host to a sizable Russian-speaking population and might offer Ukraine military support in the future. Russian-axis cooperation may also be constrained by the fact that, in the short term, the two parties have different goals. The Kremlin likely wants to tie down American resources in the Middle East, while the axis wants to oust U.S. forces.
But these obstacles will not stop the relationship from deepening. The different actors benefit from mutual support; in February, for instance, Ukrainian military intelligence officials claimed that Russians operating Iranian drones were being trained by Hezbollah commanders in Syria. Russia and the axis are united by their animosity toward the United States, which both parties want to cut down to size. And the actors’ long-term goals are aligned: once its war in Ukraine reaches a lower intensity, Moscow also wants the United States to be evicted from the Middle East. Russian officials have hailed Iraq’s push for a drawdown of U.S. troops in the country, and they continue to deride the American presence in Syria. They have warned that they will not permit the United States to dictate plans for the “day after” in Gaza and the wider region, suggesting that Russia will try to throw wrenches into any coming diplomatic efforts that would smell of American success or would seek to sideline the axis.
For the United States, stopping this scheming will not be easy. Washington lacks direct leverage over both Russia and Iranian-backed resistance groups—as indicated by its recent poor track record in using military strikes to deter further attacks by the Houthis and Iraqi militias. But Washington can start by seeking an urgent end to Israel’s war in Gaza. The longer the war lasts, the more it will afford Russia multiplying paths to back, and benefit from, an increasingly strong axis.
Russia highly values Gulf countries as economic partners, and so it may well be susceptible to pressure from them.
More important, the United States can engage in serious diplomatic efforts to settle the region’s metastasizing conflicts. Washington’s current focus on weakening Iran and cutting its support for the axis will not automatically disrupt the axis’s ties with Russia. That requires containing and weakening the groups themselves, and to do so, the United States must seriously reengage with the countries where axis groups operate to strengthen their formal state structures. The axis would not be so powerful if the Iraqi, Lebanese, and internationally recognized Yemeni governments were not so weak and disorganized.
Finally, Washington should encourage third parties to use their leverage with Moscow to minimize mutual assistance between the Kremlin and the axis. Since Russia highly values Gulf countries as economic partners, it may well be susceptible to pressure from them to dial down the most malign forms of its assistance to pro-Iran groups. These states are, presently, united with the axis in their indignation over Israel’s campaign in Gaza, and so they have not made applying such pressure a priority. But once the war ends, Washington will have an easier time gaining Gulf support.
To U.S. officials, pushing hard to break up the Russia-axis partnership may not seem like an urgent task. Washington, after all, is already consumed with stopping Russia’s efforts to subjugate Ukraine and containing the axis directly (as well as with competing against China in the Indo-Pacific). But the reality is that Washington cannot hope to address one problem without addressing the other. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has always been global in its intent and scope, reflecting Russia’s desire to undo the existing international order. Its patronage for the axis of resistance is part and parcel of that campaign. The axis aspires not just to kick the United States out of the Middle East but also to deal a body blow to a country it sees as an evil, imperialist empire. Moscow does not welcome the axis’s disruptive actions simply because they distract from Ukraine, and the axis is not pro-Russia purely because the Kremlin offers assistance. Rather, the two entities view each other as comrades-in-arms in a broader effort to weaken the West’s dominance. If Washington is serious about disrupting each one’s schemes, it must stop them from working together.
- HAMIDREZA AZIZI is a Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and a Nonresident Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.
- HANNA NOTTE is Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a Nonresident Senior Associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Foreign Affairs · by Hamidreza Azizi and Hanna Notte · February 14, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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