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Quotes of the Day:
“Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable.”
– George Orwell
“Every great cause begins as a movement, becomes a business, and eventually degenerates into a racket.”
― Eric Hoffer, The Temper of Our Time
"Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us."
– William O. Douglas
1. Kim Jong Un's daughter as 'designated successor'?
2. Lee approval rating rises to 63%, Gallup says
3. Colby promotes 'NATO 3.0' vision stressing allies' burden-sharing, increased defense spending
4. Trump gov't releases maritime plan codifying 'historic' shipbuilding cooperation with S. Korea, Japan
5. S. Korea, U.S. discuss strengthening naval supply chain in Indo-Pacific
6. South Korea, U.S. step up nuclear submarine talks
7. Russian ambassador in Seoul thanks North Korean troops for 'liberation' of Kursk
8. North Korean leader and daughter displayed in photos at embassy in Beijing
9. NIS employee says they sent money to 'North Korea drone infiltration' suspect for career advancement
10. 10. Security lapse and trade dispute (Korea and US)
11. N.K. leader again inspects construction of memorial for troops deployed for Russia's war against Ukraine
12. North Korean family faces ten years prison as neighbors suspect police setup
13. North Koreans buy river water from pullcarts as pipes freeze solid
14. The Role of Gender in Shaping the North Korean Escapee Experience
15. Yongbyon reactor’s heat signal vanishes on satellite scans
16. 6,000 North Korean Troops Killed or Wounded Fighting for Russia, Seoul Reveals
17. Kim Jong-un's brother's chilling final moments in airport assassination
1. Kim Jong Un's daughter as 'designated successor'?
Here is another important perspective on the Kim Ju-ae succession speculation provided by an escapee from north Korea, Ri Jong-ho. He provides his views at the Korea Regional Review which is the only platform providing deep insights from Koreans who escaped from the north and are now living in freedom. The mainstream media would do well to read their analysis.
Voices Feb. 13, 2026 / 2:00 PM
Kim Jong Un's daughter as 'designated successor'?
Such a determination constitutes a dangerous leap of logic.
By Ri Jong-ho
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/13/perspective-Kim-Ju-ae-called-successor/1951771006771/
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, attend the inauguration ceremony of Jonwi Street in Pyongyang in May 2024. On Thursday, South Korea's National Intelligence Service elevated its assessment of Kim Ju-ae from "undergoing succession training" to "designated successor." File Photo by North Korean Central News Agency/EPA
Feb. 13 (UPI) -- A 13-year-old girl stands at the launch site of an intercontinental ballistic missile. She receives ceremonial reviews from military generals and occupies the center of state affairs with the protocol befitting the nation's second-ranking figure.
This has been the pattern since Kim Ju-ae, the daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was first revealed to the world in 2022.
Last September, Britain's leading broadsheet The Telegraph spotlighted her under the provocative headline: "Is this the world's most dangerous 12-year-old?" On Thursday, South Korea's National Intelligence Service elevated its assessment of Kim Ju-ae from "undergoing succession training" to "designated successor."
This assessment, however, constitutes a serious logical overreach. Consider, first, an inconvenient fact: the North Korean regime itself has never once uttered the phrase "fourth-generation succession." No major world power -- neither the United States, China, Japan nor Russia -- has characterized Kim Ju-ae as a successor.
This judgment stands as one made solely and exclusively by South Korea's National Intelligence Service. South Korean media have uncritically amplified it, yet not a single intelligence agency in the international community has endorsed this conclusion. The reasons that this assessment fails to withstand logical scrutiny are manifold.
First, under the bylaws of North Korea's Workers' Party, party membership is permitted only from the age of 18. Succession presupposes party membership. Designating a 13-year-old minor as successor -- absent an emergency -- directly contravenes the very norms the regime itself has codified.
Second, Kim Jong Un, in his early 40s and facing no known health crisis (there is only speculation as to his health conditions), has no rational incentive to prematurely lock in a succession framework.
Historical precedent within the regime is instructive. In 1972, Kim Il-sung, upon reaching his 60th birthday, designated his 30-year-old son, Kim Jong-il, as successor. Over the ensuing two decades, real power gradually migrated to the son.
Chastened by this precedent, Kim Jong-il deferred his own succession decision until the very end, naming the 25-year-old Kim Jong Un only after suffering a debilitating stroke in 2008 that left him with limited time. There is no precedent in North Korean history of a healthy leader voluntarily diluting his own power.
Third, female succession poses a fundamental threat to the legitimacy structure of North Korean power. The regime's authority rests upon patrilineal descent from Kim Il-sung -- the so-called "Paektu bloodline."
Should Kim Ju-ae inherit the mantle of leadership, marriage would risk severing the Kim surname lineage, thereby undermining the very foundation of dynastic legitimacy that has been constructed over decades.
Fourth, Kim Jong-un's conduct breaks sharply with the norms of North Korean society itself. North Korea remains a society governed by conservative Confucian values and stringent party discipline. Both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, mindful of public sentiment and prevailing moral sensibilities, refrained from bringing their children to major state events. Kim Jong-un has abandoned this restraint entirely.
The most damaging dimension is the stark contrast between Kim Ju-ae's conspicuous appearance -- designer coats valued at millions of won -- and the grim reality endured by the populace. Behind the tears of millions of North Korean children suffering from chronic hunger, the sight of Kim Ju-ae at state functions does not inspire loyalty; it provokes a visceral class resentment -- the unspoken recognition that "we are servants, and they are royalty."
Fifth, China, North Korea's closest and most consequential ally, has never described Kim Ju-ae as a successor. For the Chinese Communist Party, which prizes collective leadership and party discipline, the political showcasing of a minor child is simply untenable. Even President Xi Jinping does not place his own daughter in the public arena.
Why, then, does Kim Jong-un persist in bringing his young daughter to missile launch sites and major state events? A more plausible interpretation is that this represents not "succession by designation," but rather a visual projection of deterrence.
Kim Jong Un harbors acute anxiety over the possibility of a U.S. decapitation strike or a regime-collapse scenario. The essence of placing his daughter at the forefront is to broadcast a message to the outside world: "Even if you come for me, a successor regime prepared to press the nuclear button is already in place" -- an exercise in manufacturing fear. This is closer to a visual demonstration aimed at deterring any attempt at physical elimination.
To be sure, this interpretation, too, is but one analysis grounded in limited information. Yet, at a minimum, when weighed against the internal consistency of the Workers' Party's own bylaws, historical precedent, the patrilineal power structure and the assessments of the international community, it offers considerably greater explanatory power than the "designated successor" thesis.
Drawing on decades of close observation of the North Korean leadership, it is my assessment that the National Intelligence Service analysis relies excessively on publicly available materials rather than core intelligence from within Pyongyang. This reveals a structural limitation in South Korea's intelligence apparatus.
What is more troubling still is that the South Korean media's reflexive repetition of "fourth-generation succession" as established fact inadvertently confers legitimacy upon North Korea's dynastic system.
The regime's official name is the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea." A discourse that normalizes profoundly undemocratic hereditary rule is tantamount to forgetting the existence of 26 million North Korean citizens stripped of their freedoms under an oppressive regime -- and to denying them even the possibility of systemic change. Intellectuals and elites within North Korea harbor deep resentment toward this uncritical posture in South Korean society.
The Kim Ju-ae phenomenon is a subject for rigorous analysis, not a foregone conclusion. Rather than leaping from fragmentary observations to the verdict of "fourth-generation succession," what is required is a clear-eyed and critical perspective -- one that penetrates to the anxiety of North Korea's leader, the internal contradictions of the regime, and the inherent limitations of intelligence analysis.
Ri Jong-ho is a former senior North Korean economic official who served under all three leaders of the Kim family regime. His most recent role was based in Dalian, China, where he headed the Korea Daehung Trading Corp., overseen by the clandestine Office 39 under the direct control of the ruling Kim family. Before his assignment in Dalian, Jong-ho held pivotal positions, including president of the Daehung Shipping Co. and executive director of the Daehung General Bureau of the North Korean Workers' Party, a role equivalent to vice-minister rank in the North Korean party-state. Subsequently, he was appointed chairman of the Korea Kumgang Economic Development Group under the North Korean Defense Committee by Kim Jong Il. Jong-ho is a recipient of the Hero of Labor Award, the highest civilian honor in North Korea. Following a series of brutal purges by Kim Jong Un, he defected with his family to South Korea in late 2014. Jong-ho resides in the greater Washington, D.C., area.
2. Lee approval rating rises to 63%, Gallup says
Comment: Like the Japanese PM and her recent election win, POTROK must be the envy of democratic leaders with an approval rating like this. How long will it last? The Korean people are fickle about their presidents.
World News Feb. 13, 2026 / 8:18 PM / Updated Feb. 13, 2026 at 8:18 PM
Lee approval rating rises to 63%, Gallup says
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/13/president-approval-rate/1711771031665/
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung speaks during the National Startup Era Strategy Meeting to discuss strategies to nurture startups at the main building of the Cheong Wa Dae presidential office in Seoul, South Korea, 30 January 2026. File. Photo by YONHAP / EPA
Feb. 13 (Asia Today) -- South Korean President Lee Jae-myung's approval rating rose 5 percentage points from the previous week to 63%, marking his highest level this year, according to a poll released Thursday by Gallup Korea.
The survey of 1,003 adults nationwide, conducted Monday through Wednesday, found that 63% of respondents said Lee was "doing well" in handling state affairs.
Those who said he was "doing poorly" fell 3 percentage points to 26%, while 11% said they had no opinion.
Among reasons for positive evaluations, "economy and people's livelihoods" ranked highest at 16%, followed by "real estate policy" at 11% and "foreign affairs" at 10%.
Related
For negative evaluations, "real estate policy" and "economy and people's livelihoods" were each cited by 15% of respondents. "Foreign affairs" accounted for 9%, while 7% cited concerns about "authoritarian leadership."
Regionally, approval was highest in Gwangju and South Jeolla Province at 81%, followed by Daejeon, Sejong and South Chungcheong Province at 69%. Support stood at 63% in Busan, Ulsan and South Gyeongsang Province, 62% in Incheon and Gyeonggi Province and 58% in Seoul. Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province recorded the lowest approval at 49%.
By age group, support was strongest among respondents in their 40s at 75%, followed by those in their 50s at 70%, 30s at 66% and 60s at 65%. Approval among those 70 and older was 57%, while respondents ages 18 to 29 showed the lowest support at 39%.
Support for the Democratic Party rose 3 percentage points from the previous week to 44%, while backing for the People Power Party fell 3 percentage points to 22%.
The poll was conducted via telephone interviews using randomly selected mobile virtual numbers. It had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. The contact rate was 40.4% and the response rate was 13.3%.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260213010005002
3. Colby promotes 'NATO 3.0' vision stressing allies' burden-sharing, increased defense spending
Summary:
Yonhap reports Elbridge Colby used a Brussels trip recap to push “NATO 3.0,” arguing NATO should return to burden sharing by “well resourced” European militaries and stop acting like a dependency. He contrasts NATO 1.0 in the Cold War with a post Cold War “NATO 2.0” that relied too much on the United States. Colby ties the concept to what he calls last year’s Hague Summit commitment: 3.5 percent of GDP for core defense by 2035 plus 1.5 percent for defense linked areas, and he describes that as a 5 percent path. The piece links this logic to alliance modernization with South Korea and its pledge to reach 3.5 percent.
Comment: This is in the Korean press because the Koreans are following the "Colby code" of CBMSL - the strategic doctrine of "critical but more limited support" to allies. I think Koreans fear that Bridge Colby will be the cause of "Korea passing."
Colby promotes 'NATO 3.0' vision stressing allies' burden-sharing, increased defense spending | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 14, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260214000500315
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- The Pentagon's policy chief on Friday renewed calls for a new version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that stresses allies' efforts to increase defense spending and take greater security responsibilities so as to adapt to "new" geopolitical realities.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby reiterated Washington's pursuit of "NATO 3.0" in social media posts, as he recapped his trip to Brussels this week, during which he attended the NATO defense ministerial talks on behalf of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
His remarks came as Seoul and Washington are working on "modernizing" the bilateral alliance -- an effort likely to see South Korea undertake "primary" responsibilities to deter North Korea at a time when President Donald Trump's administration seeks to focus on defending the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere, and deterring China.
"At the Defense Ministers meeting, I delivered remarks on the changing security environment and how NATO must return to its founding vision: allied burden-sharing through well-resourced and capable European militaries, rather than the post-Cold War model," he wrote on X, stressing NATO is "a partnership, not a dependency."
"We call this vision 'NATO 3.0,'" he added.
U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby speaks during an event celebrating the Korean National Day and Armed Forces Day in Washington on Nov. 14, 2025. (Yonhap)
Colby said that NATO 1.0 during the Cold War was an "alliance of strong, self-sufficient nations carrying their own weight," while NATO 2.0 following the Cold War "overly relied on the U.S. and became distracted from its core purpose."
"In this era of great power competition, NATO must adapt to new realities," he said.
"NATO 3.0 will be a strong and durable alliance. Last year's Hague Summit spending commitment matches the present security environment and America's commitments outside of Europe. The War Department is committed to helping our Allies step up and strengthen their militaries."
He was referring to the NATO summit in June where its members committed to spending at least 3.5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) annually on core defense expenditures by 2035, and up to 1.5 percent of GDP on other defense-linked areas.
"NATO's historic commitment last year to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense has put the alliance on a stronger and more durable path," he said.
South Korea has also committed to increasing its defense spending to 3.5 percent of its GDP -- a pledge that has led Colby to call the Asian country a "model ally."
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 14, 2026
4. Trump gov't releases maritime plan codifying 'historic' shipbuilding cooperation with S. Korea, Japan
Summary:
Yonhap reports the Trump administration released “America’s Maritime Action Plan” to rebuild U.S. shipbuilding and formalize “historic” cooperation with South Korea and Japan. The plan follows POTUS’ April executive order on restoring maritime dominance and is framed as a response to China’s vastly larger shipbuilding capacity. It proposes a “Bridge Strategy” in which the first ships in a multi ship contract are built in an allied yard overseas while the partner simultaneously invests in, buys, or partners with a U.S. yard to onshore later hulls. The document cites at least $150 billion in secured U.S. investment and links this to South Korea’s MASGA pledge.
Comment: MASGA. Now how about a JAROKUS Shipbuilding consortium (Japan - ROK - US)? This could be the biggest contribution by any ally to US national security. What credit will Korea (and Japan) receive for such a contribution?
Trump gov't releases maritime plan codifying 'historic' shipbuilding cooperation with S. Korea, Japan | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 14, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260214001700315
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump's administration unveiled an action plan Friday to rebuild America's shipbuilding industry, pledging to continue "historic" cooperation with South Korea and Japan, and proposing a strategy enabling the first ships in a contract to be built in an allied foreign shipyard.
The White House released "America's Maritime Action Plan," as Seoul and Washington are pushing to strengthen cooperation under the former's "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA)" proposal as part of a bilateral trade and investment agreement.
In April, Trump signed an executive order, titled "Restoring America's Maritime Dominance," which calls for drawing up the plan. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Director of the Office of Management and Budget Russell Vought, in coordination with other Cabinet members, developed the plan.
The Trump administration has been keen on shoring up America's shipbuilding sector as China is known to have over 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States in the midst of an intensifying Sino-U.S. strategic competition.
U.S. President Donald Trump reacts as he departs from the South Lawn at the White House in Washington on Feb. 13, 2026, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
"The United States will consult with China on shipbuilding capacity issues and continue its historic cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Japan on revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding," the document says, codifying collaboration with the two core Asian allies in the plan.
The plan proposes a "Bridge Strategy" for a multi-ship buy, in which the first ships in a shipbuilding contract are built in a foreign shipbuilder's home shipyard, while concurrent direct capital investments are made in a U.S. shipyard they have purchased or partnered with to eventually onshore construction in the U.S.
The strategy apparently reflects a reality of the U.S.' poor domestic shipbuilding capacity at a time when it seeks to secure more vessels at a fast pace.
The document also points out that Trump has secured at least US$150 billion of dedicated investment for America's shipbuilding industry, noting that the U.S. Commerce Department is working to mobilize these funds to achieve the investments.
For the MASGA initiative, South Korea has earmarked $150 billion, part of a $350 billion investment that it has pledged under the trade deal with the Trump administration in return for Washington lowering "reciprocal" tariffs on the Asian country to 15 percent from 25 percent.
In the document, the Trump administration stressed the importance of industrial cooperation with allies and partners.
"Close coordination with allies and partners will align trade policies to enhance investment in the U.S. maritime sector," it said.
"Diplomatic engagement and coalition building ensure that U.S. trade enforcement measures are reinforced by allied action, while targeted incentives encourage shipbuilders from partner nations to invest directly in America's MIB." MIB is short for maritime industrial base.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 14, 2026
5. S. Korea, U.S. discuss strengthening naval supply chain in Indo-Pacific
Summary:
South Korean and U.S. defense officials held recent talks in South Korea to deepen naval logistics cooperation and expand maintenance, repair, and overhaul work, especially spare-parts support tied to U.S. naval operations across the Asia-Indo-Pacific. A U.S. delegation led by Capt. Albert Sonon of NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support met with South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration and naval commands to explore MRO opportunities, citing South Korea’s strong industrial base. The sides also discussed supply support for platforms including the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft and the MH-60R Seahawk, aiming to streamline processes so the South Korean Navy can access secure parts faster and sustain mission readiness.
Comment: It takes more than building ships. Sustainment wins wars.
S. Korea, U.S. discuss strengthening naval supply chain in Indo-Pacific | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 14, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260213008000315
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- Defense officials of South Korea and the United States have recently held talks in South Korea on ways to deepen their cooperation on naval logistics and maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), officials said Saturday.
The meetings came as a U.S. delegation, led by Capt. Albert Sonon, director at the U.S. Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS), visited South Korea earlier this month for talks with officials from the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and relevant naval commands.
In the meeting with DAPA, the two sides discussed MRO opportunities for spare parts in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's area of responsibility, NAVSUP WSS said, noting that South Korea's "strong" industrial base supports the Pentagon's regional framework and strengthens collective defense.
The U.S. delegation also held discussions with officials from the Navy headquarters, logistics command and air command on advancing supply support for assets including the P-8A maritime surveillance aircraft and MH-60R Seahawk helicopter.
South Korean and U.S. officials pose for a group photo during a U.S. delegation's visit to the South Korean Navy's Naval Logistics Command in this photo uploaded on the Pentagon's Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) on Feb. 10, 2026. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
NAVSUP WSS said the aim of the talks was to streamline processes to give the South Korean Navy faster access to secure necessary spare parts to maintain mission readiness.
"This visit highlights our deep commitment to our allies and to a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific. The collaboration between NAVSUP WSS and our Republic of Korea partners is a testament to our strong alliance and shared dedication to maritime security," the U.S. unit said, referring to South Korea by its formal name.
South Korea's Navy separately said the chief of its Naval Logistics Command underscored the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in talks with the U.S. delegation, noting how around 100 foreign military sales projects involving the armed service is an integral part of their combined defense posture.
Both sides also discussed ways for practical measures to advance their military logistics support in a qualitative manner, which possibly includes sharing maintenance manuals, it said.
Also in February, senior officials from the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency held talks to discuss ways to advance their combined sustainment capabilities based on the steadfast South Korea-U.S. alliance. It marked the first official engagement between the two organizations.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 14, 2026
6. South Korea, U.S. step up nuclear submarine talks
Summary:
South Korea and the United States agreed that follow-on security negotiations, including nuclear-powered submarine cooperation and potential expansion of South Korea’s authority over uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, will be led by the two presidential National Security Councils. Seoul and Washington are reportedly arranging a U.S. negotiating delegation visit to Seoul as early as late February, led by NSC senior director Ivan Kanapathy, with officials from State, Defense, and Energy and other agencies. Seoul is also pursuing a South Korea–U.S. “2+2” meeting of foreign and defense ministers in Washington this month. Tariff uncertainty has reportedly complicated scheduling, so Seoul seeks stable channels and may propose a timeline for submarine efforts.
Comment: All of these issues: security, economic, trade, shipbuilding, submarines, nuclear technology, etc, are all linked.
South Korea, U.S. step up nuclear submarine talks
Posted February. 14, 2026 08:08,
Updated February. 14, 2026 08:08
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20260214/6101722/1
South Korea and the United States have agreed that follow-up negotiations in the security sector, including discussions on nuclear-powered submarines and expanded authority over uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, will be led by the National Security Councils at the presidential offices in Seoul and Washington. The two sides are reportedly coordinating a visit to South Korea by a U.S. negotiating delegation as early as later this month.
Seoul is also said to be seeking a South Korea-U.S. “2+2” meeting of foreign and defense ministers.
A senior South Korean government official said Feb. 13, “Given that a fact sheet agreement was reached at the summit level last year, the two countries are discussing moving forward with follow-up consultations in the security field under the overall direction of the two NSCs.”
A U.S. delegation led by Ivan Kanapathy, senior director for East Asia at the National Security Council, is reportedly preparing to visit Seoul as early as later this month. The delegation is expected to include officials from the State, Defense and Energy departments, along with representatives from other agencies involved in nuclear-powered submarines, uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing and shipbuilding cooperation.
Kanapathy had initially been expected to travel to Seoul late last month. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement of a 25 percent tariff increase reportedly disrupted trade-related agreements and affected the schedule for follow-up security consultations.
Separately, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back are said to be arranging a South Korea-U.S. “2+2” meeting in Washington this month with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Cho and Ahn are also scheduled to attend a separate 2+2 meeting in Canada later this month at the request of the Canadian government. Ahead of that session, they are considering a visit to the United States to initiate follow-up security negotiations.
Amid concerns that the reinstatement of U.S. tariffs could undermine security agreements, Seoul appears to be seeking to establish comprehensive consultation channels to accelerate discussions on nuclear-powered submarines and related issues. Observers say Seoul may present Washington with a proposed timeline for pursuing the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines.
Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com
7. Russian ambassador in Seoul thanks North Korean troops for 'liberation' of Kursk
Summary:
Russian Ambassador Georgy Zinoviev, speaking at a reception in Seoul, publicly thanked north Korean troops for helping “liberate” parts of Russia’s Kursk region, a rare on-the-record acknowledgment that underscores deepening Moscow Pyongyang military ties under their new treaty. He said the war would end only when Russia wins, repeating Kremlin demands on security, rights of Russian speakers, and recognition of annexed territory, and alleged an attempted attack after Abu Dhabi talks without offering evidence. He also noted the sharp drop in Russia South Korea trade, criticized export controls, warned Seoul against an AUKUS-like nuclear submarine path, and pitched the Northern Sea Route as unavoidable for Europe-bound logistics.
Comment: Not a very diplomatic thing to say in Seoul. I wonder what is the intended effect in Seoul (or do Russian diplomats only perform for an audience of one - Putin)?
Russian ambassador in Seoul thanks North Korean troops for 'liberation' of Kursk
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com
Published: 13 Feb. 2026, 16:46 Updated: 13 Feb. 2026, 16:48
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-02-13/national/northKorea/Russian-ambassador-in-Seoul-thanks-North-Korean-troops-for-liberation-of-Kursk/2523812
Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev speaks to reporters ahead of a Maslenitsa spring festival event at the Russian Embassy in Jung District, central Seoul, on Feb. 28, 2025. [NEWS1]
As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, Moscow’s ambassador in Seoul publicly thanked North Korean troops for the “liberation” of part of the Kursk region, in a rare acknowledgment of their role on the battlefield and a sign of how the conflict has drawn Pyongyang deeper into Russia’s orbit.
“Russia is well aware of the contribution made by North Korean forces in liberating the southern part of the Kursk region from Ukrainian troops and Western mercenaries,” Ambassador Georgy Zinoviev said Wednesday at a reception at the Russian Embassy in central Seoul. He spoke in Russian, and his remarks were translated into Korean at the event.
"We will not forget the greatness of the Korean People’s Army," he said.
He added that relations between the two countries had entered “a new and higher stage,” referring to the bilateral treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev, right, and the Russian Embassy's third secretary Vladislav Sorokin attend an informal event marking Russian Diplomat’s Day, observed on Feb. 10, at the Russian Embassy in Jung District, central Seoul, on Feb. 11. Sorokin provides interpretation during the event. [HAN JEE-HYE]
Zinoviev's comments came as military cooperation between the two countries has become more visible, and amid reports that North Korean troops have been deployed to defend Russian territory.
Border areas, including Kursk, which Russia in 2025 said it recaptured after Ukraine launched a surprise offensive in 2024, have continued to face repeated drone and artillery attacks from Ukrainian forces. Zinoviev’s remarks suggested North Korean forces played a role in reinforcing and maintaining defensive lines in the border region.
Western officials and some news outlets have offered a darker assessment. They say North Korean soldiers have taken part in large-scale assaults — sometimes described as “human wave” attacks — or have been positioned in ways that reduced Russian casualties.
Reports have also suggested that some units were deployed to forward positions without adequate equipment or protection. Russian officials have avoided discussing battlefield tactics and instead emphasized what they describe as North Korea’s broader strategic contribution.
Pictured is a North Korean soldier captured by Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region as revealed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on his X account. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
Zinoviev also said the war would end only on Moscow’s terms.
“The war will end when Russia wins,” he said, outlining three conditions: the complete elimination of threats to Russia’s security, guarantees of the fundamental rights of Russian-speaking residents in Ukraine and a resolution of territorial issues in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
Those principles restate longstanding Kremlin demands, including halting NATO’s expansion and recognizing Russia’s claimed annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
Asked about negotiations, Zinoviev said “immediately after the Abu Dhabi talks, there was an attempt to carry out a terrorist attack against members of the Russian delegation,” adding that “such incidents complicate the negotiation process.” He did not provide evidence.
He said Russia "prefers a diplomatic solution," but added that past agreements had fallen through due to what he described as external factors, voicing concern about possible Western involvement.
He also referred to a previously discussed 28-point peace proposal and said “progress was not made after the United States withdrew its position.”
The reported proposal would have required Ukraine to recognize Russian control over certain territories, reduce its armed forces and abandon its bid to join NATO — conditions Kyiv and its Western allies have rejected.
Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev, third on left, and other officials attend an informal event marking Russian Diplomat’s Day, observed on Feb. 10, at the Russian Embassy in Jung District, centrral Seoul, on Feb. 11. [RUSSIAN EMBASSY]
Beyond the battlefield, Zinoviev turned to the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Seoul since the war began.
He said annual trade had fallen from $21.1 billion before the invasion to $10.9 billion and argued that South Korea’s export controls on roughly 1,400 items had made it “virtually impossible” for major automotive and electronics companies to operate in Russia. At the same time, he added, “Korea is a sovereign state, and Russia has no intention of offering recommendations or instructions.”
He also addressed concerns about South Korea’s reported pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines. Based on publicly available information, he said, the effort appeared likely to follow the Aukus model, referring to the security partnership among the United States, Britain and Australia.
If a nuclear-weapon state were to transfer weapons-grade highly enriched nuclear material to a non-nuclear-weapon state, he warned, it “could pose a serious challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system.”
"Such a move could be seen in Northeast Asia as military pressure on Pyongyang and would not help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula," he said.
On the Northern Sea Route, an Arctic shipping corridor that Russia has promoted as an alternative pathway to Europe, Zinoviev said the route structurally passes through Russian territorial waters or exclusive economic zones.
"If South Korea seeks new logistics corridors to Europe, cooperation with Russia would be unavoidable," he said.
"The Northern Sea Route is not merely commercial but a strategic project operating in high-latitude and extreme conditions. Russia continues to invest in its infrastructure alongside partners including China and India," he said.
The reception, held in a conference room inside the embassy to mark Russia’s Diplomatic Worker’s Day, took the form of a small tea gathering and lasted more than two hours.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY HAN JEE-HYE [kim.juyeon2@joongang.co.kr]
8. North Korean leader and daughter displayed in photos at embassy in Beijing
Summary:
north Korea’s embassy in Beijing posted an outdoor display of 25 photos of Kim Jong Un’s recent activities, with a large central image featuring him beside his teenage daughter, Ju-ae. The caption in Chinese offers New Year blessings from Kim but does not name her. This is the first time she has taken center stage on the embassy board, which previously highlighted Kim alone or with China’s Xi Jinping. Other photos show Ju-ae at events such as Wonsan-Kalma’s opening and a Beijing parade. Seoul’s intelligence assesses she appears to be positioned as successor.
Comment: Giving us what they think we want us to see about "succession?"
Friday
February 13, 2026
dictionary + A - A
North Korean leader and daughter displayed in photos at embassy in Beijing
Published: 13 Feb. 2026, 13:34
Updated: 13 Feb. 2026, 17:43
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-02-13/national/northKorea/NK-leader-and-daughter-Juae-displayed-in-photos-at-Beijing-embassy/2523688
An outdoor board at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing displays images of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter Ju-ae on Feb. 12. [YONHAP]
Kim Ju-ae, daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, took center stage with her father in photos displayed on an outdoor board at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing, amid speculation that she is being positioned as his successor.
The embassy's outdoor board, seen by Yonhap News Agency on Friday, was carrying 25 photos of the North Korean leader's activities, including a larger central image juxtaposing Kim with his teenage daughter.
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Showing their attendance together at a New Year's performance in Pyongyang, the central image featured a Chinese caption saying that Kim was sending New Year's blessings to the people, without mentioning Ju-ae.
The North Korean Embassy in Beijing has previously displayed images of Kim, sometimes in the presence of Chinese President Xi Jinping, but this is the first time that a photo of him with his daughter has taken center stage.
The other 24 photos also included several images of Ju-ae with the leader, including their attendance at the inauguration of the Wonsan-Kalma beach resort area in June last year, and Ju-ae shaking hands with Xi in Beijing on the occasion of a Chinese military parade in September.
The display of these images is notable as Seoul's intelligence agency assessed Thursday that Ju-ae appears to be in the process of being designated as Kim's successor.
"Kim Ju-ae has shown her presence at various events, including the founding anniversary of the Korean People's Army and her visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun," a lawmaker said the previous day, citing information from the National Intelligence Service.
"Signs have been detected of her voicing her opinion on certain state policies," the lawmaker also said.
North Korea has, however, not confirmed the daughter's name or her official status so far.
It is unclear when the new photos were first displayed on the embassy board. When last seen in December, it was carrying only Kim's image.
The embassy has typically replaced the photos on the board two or three times a year, often featuring Kim's meetings with Xi to highlight the friendship between the two nations.
9. NIS employee says they sent money to 'North Korea drone infiltration' suspect for career advancement
Summary:
Korea JoongAng Daily reports that an NIS Grade 8 employee told investigators he sent money to a graduate student, surnamed Oh, who is suspected of dispatching drones into north Korea at least three times. The employee said he kept contact partly because he believed it could help his career and possibly lead to a future covert-operations assignment. Investigators suspect possible conspiracy and applied charges including alleged violations of the Aviation Safety Act and the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act, plus an enemy-benefiting offense. The employee reportedly transferred 5.05 million won across 16 transactions and received 3.65 million won back.
NIS employee says they sent money to 'North Korea drone infiltration' suspect for career advancement
Published: 13 Feb. 2026, 19:50
Updated: 13 Feb. 2026, 19:56
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-02-13/national/northKorea/NIS-employee-says-he-sent-money-to-North-Korea-drone-infiltration-suspect-for-career-advancement/2524128
A joint military-police investigation task force probes North Korea’s claim of South Korean drone incursions as it conducts raids on the homes and offices of three civilian suspects on Jan. 21. [YONHAP]
An employee of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) told investigators they transferred money to a graduate student under investigation in the so-called “North Korea drone infiltration” case because they wanted to keep in touch with him.
The case centers on allegations that the student, identified by his surname of Oh, and an associate sent drones into North Korea at least three times. North Korea separately accused South Korea of drone incursions in September 2025 and again on Jan. 4, 2026, and those accusations led the military and police to launch a joint investigation last month.
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A joint investigation task force questioned an NIS employee at the Grade 8 level on Thursday, local news outlet Yonhap News Agency reported Friday, suspecting the employee may have conspired with Oh. The task force applied charges, including violations of the Aviation Safety Act and the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act, as well as a general enemy-benefiting offense.
The employee said they maintained contact in part because they believed a future promotion could eventually place them in a covert-operations role.
The employee lent Oh 5.05 million won ($3,500) over 16 transactions and received 3.65 million won back. The employee was appointed as a career civil servant in June 2022 and now handles support work in an administrative department.
This composite image, carried by the North's state-controlled Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 10, shows debris of drones that Pyongyang claimed were sent by Seoul across the inter-Korean border. [YONHAP]
Investigators are also looking into a person surnamed Kim, who presented as a North Korea-focused director at drone manufacturer Estel Engineering.
The task force also summoned Kim on Thursday and questioned them over suspicions that they received several million won from the Korea Defense Intelligence Command.
Kim had previously been found to have told an acquaintance that they had developed drones and even tested sending them over Pyongyang. Kim told police the remarks were bluster.
The task force is also questioning Oh for a fourth time over the accusations that he sent drones into North Korea on at least three occasions.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY KIM JI-HYE [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]
10. Security lapse and trade dispute (Korea and US)
Summary:
Coupang’s breach risks becoming a Korea United States trade fight, but it should stay a consumer protection case. Korean investigators say a former employee manipulated authentication and accessed tens of millions of records over time, including names, contact details, and delivery information, sometimes with sensitive access notes. Coupang’s early effort to narrow what counts as a “leak” weakened trust, since Korean standards treat data as leaked once it escapes company control. Some in Washington frame Seoul’s response as discrimination against a U.S.-listed firm, but Coupang’s main market is Korea. Seoul should enforce law with due process, and both sides should communicate clearly to avoid tariffs.
ED Security lapse and trade dispute
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- Published Feb 12, 2026 1:06 pm KST
- Updated Feb 12, 2026 2:58 pm KST
Both Seoul and Washington should properly manage Coupang fallout
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20260212/ed-security-lapse-and-trade-dispute
A Coupang logistics center in Seoul on Sunday. Coupang will continue Rocket Delivery service through the Lunar New Year holiday. Yonhap
Coupang’s data breach case shows signs of escalating beyond a mere security failure into a trade conflict between Korea and the United States.
U.S. Congress is reportedly pushing for an informal hearing, while a U.S. senator has accused Korea of discriminatory treatment against the U.S.-listed firm — a development that could evolve into a broader trade dispute between the allies, potentially even involving tariffs. Yet the essence of the case is clear. It concerns a grave lapse involving a massive data breach and the company’s responsibility in addressing it. Expanding the matter into a diplomatic or trade confrontation serves neither side’s interests.
According to the findings of a joint public-private investigation in Korea, a former employee allegedly accessed and exposed tens of millions of user records by manipulating authentication systems. Personal information including names, email addresses, phone numbers and delivery details was accessed over an extended period. While no confirmed cases of fraud related to the breach have yet been reported, the scale of the exposure has raised legitimate concerns about potential misuse. The seriousness of the breach lies not only in the number of affected users but also in the nature of the information involved, which in some cases included sensitive delivery access details.
Equally troubling has been how the company characterized the scope of the leak. Coupang initially maintained that only a small fraction of records had been stored or extracted. However, under Korea’s established data protection standards, personal information is considered “leaked” when it leaves the effective control of the company and becomes accessible to an unauthorized party, regardless of whether it was permanently stored or externally distributed. Attempts to narrow the definition have only deepened public skepticism and eroded trust.
At the same time, the reaction in Washington suggests a misinterpretation of the facts. Some U.S. lawmakers appear concerned that regulatory actions taken by Seoul could amount to unfair treatment of a U.S. enterprise. Such apprehension deserves to be addressed through transparent communication, but this must also be grounded in a full understanding of the situation. Coupang may be listed in the United States, but its principal market, operations and consumer base are in Korea. The enforcement of Korean privacy laws in response to a data breach affecting tens of millions of Korean users is a matter of domestic regulatory responsibility, not trade discrimination.
Privacy protection is not merely a preference but a widely shared democratic value. Both Korea and the United States maintain robust legal frameworks governing the handling of personal data. It would be counterproductive to frame a domestic enforcement action as a geopolitical affront. To do so risks politicizing a consumer protection issue and entangling it unnecessarily with broader trade and security agendas.
Korean authorities, for their part, must also exercise restraint. Legal remedies — whether administrative fines, corrective orders or civil litigation — should proceed strictly within the bounds of law and due process. Heated rhetoric or punitive posturing could invite further misunderstanding and give credence to claims of bias. The government’s priority should be to ensure accountability, strengthen preventive safeguards and reassure consumers, while engaging in close diplomatic communication with U.S. counterparts to prevent the issue from spilling over into unrelated economic matters.
Ultimately, the greatest responsibility lies with Coupang itself. As a company that has thrived on the trust of Korean consumers, it must demonstrate humility and transparency. Rather than appearing to rely on political lobbying or external pressure, the firm should fully cooperate with regulators, clearly acknowledge the scope of the breach and present credible measures to prevent a recurrence. Corporate accountability, not geopolitical maneuvering, is the appropriate path forward.
Allies inevitably encounter disputes. The strength of a partnership is measured not by the absence of friction but by the maturity with which disagreements are managed. The Coupang data breach should remain what it fundamentally is: a serious corporate and regulatory issue requiring corrective action and institutional reform. Allowing it to metastasize into a trade confrontation would be a costly distraction.
Both governments, and the company at the center of the controversy, must act with prudence to ensure that consumer protection does not suffer collateral damage in the form of an avoidable diplomatic rift.
11. N.K. leader again inspects construction of memorial for troops deployed for Russia's war against Ukraine
Summary:
north Korea’s state media says Kim Jong Un inspected construction of a memorial museum for troops killed while fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine. KCNA framed the project as a “sacred monument” and said Kim urged builders and designers to honor the Party and people’s respect for the fallen. This was his third visit, after the October 2025 groundbreaking and a tree planting ceremony last month. Yonhap notes reporting that, since October 2024, north Korea has sent over 10,000 troops and weapons to support Russia, with thousands believed killed.
Comment: Following up to make sure his last on the spot guidance was implemented?
N.K. leader again inspects construction of memorial for troops deployed for Russia's war against Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · February 14, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260214001800315
SEOUL, Feb. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has again visited the site of a memorial under construction for troops killed while fighting alongside Russia against Ukraine, state media reported Saturday.
Kim inspected construction efforts for the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at the Overseas Military Operations the previous day after the project broke ground last October, according to the Korean Central News Agency.
"He called upon the service personnel, designers and creators, involved in the construction of the memorial museum, to deeply cherish the profound feelings of respect of the Party and people and successfully build the museum into a sacred monument," it said.
It marked Kim's third visit to the memorial under construction after attending last year's groundbreaking and a tree planting ceremony last month.
Since October 2024, North Korea has sent more than 10,000 troops and conventional weapons to support Russia's war efforts, with thousands believed to have been killed.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) inspects the site of the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at the Overseas Military Operations under construction on Feb. 13, 2026, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · February 14, 2026
12. North Korean family faces ten years prison as neighbors suspect police setup
Summary:
In Onsong County, North Hamgyong province, police detained a family accused of secretly watching foreign media after an unannounced raid. A local officer claimed police acted on a tip and said the search found “foreign pornography,” raising the expected penalty. Neighbors now believe the householder could face about ten years in prison, while other relatives may be banished to a remote area. Locals doubt a neighbor report triggered the raid because people avoid informing, and they also question the plausibility of a family watching pornography together. Some suspect police needed a scapegoat ahead of a party congress.
Comment: The pornography label may be an escalation tactic to justify harsher punishment. Enforcement pressure before political milestones can drive arbitrary targeting. If no one is informing anymore, who benefits most from the claim of a “tip”?
North Korean family faces ten years prison as neighbors suspect police setup
dailynk.com · February 13, 2026
The householder faces a likely ten-year sentence while the rest of the family may be banished to remote areas, with locals fearing they could be the next scapegoats
By Eun Seol - February 14, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-family-faces-ten-years-prison-as-neighbors-suspect-police-setup/
FILE PHOTO: Chinese-made MP8 device popular among young North Koreans. (Daily NK)
A North Korean family in Onsong county, North Hamgyong province, is being questioned by police after being caught watching foreign media.
The community has been rocked by rumors that family members will be imprisoned or banished, with some locals suspecting that the whole thing was a police setup.
A source in the province told Daily NK recently that the family was apprehended by police early in the month.
“There are several peculiar aspects of the case that have set the rumor mill running,” the source noted.
According to the source, family members were secretly watching foreign media when police made an unannounced raid.
News about the family’s arrest spread rapidly and sent shockwaves through the community. A local police officer said police had launched the raid after being tipped off and that the raid had turned up pornographic videos from other countries. The officer added that the family would not be getting off lightly.
Anxious locals have heard that the householder is likely to receive a ten-year prison sentence and that the rest of the family may be relocated to a remote area.
“This family may not have been well off, but they had a reputation for living quietly and being well-behaved. So neighbors were shocked to learn that the family is going to be ripped apart over viewing foreign media,” the source said.
Suspicious circumstances fuel setup theories
But locals point to several dubious aspects of the case, including the claim that police had been tipped off about the family.
“North Koreans are constantly encouraged to report lawbreakers to their neighborhood watch unit. But nowadays people don’t pay attention to what other families are doing, so hardly anybody actually makes those reports. People generally don’t want to get a reputation as a busybody, so they think it’s odd that somebody would have ratted out the family,” the source said.
Another strange part of the police narrative is the claim that the family watched pornography together.
“It’s hard to imagine parents and children sitting in the same room and watching that kind of video. The initial story was just that the family had been watching foreign media, but then they suddenly called it foreign pornography, which makes people more suspicious,” the source said.
Some even suspect that the family was set up by police, who are under pressure to get results before the upcoming party congress.
“Many people think the police chose their target in advance and that this family were just unlucky scapegoats. So some are afraid that they may be the targets next time,” the source said.
Read in Korean
A Note to Readers
Daily NK operates networks of sources inside North Korea who document events in real-time and transmit information through secure channels. Unlike reporting based on state media, satellite imagery, or defector accounts from years past, our journalism comes directly from people currently living under the regime.
We verify reports through multiple independent sources and cross-reference details before publication. Our sources remain anonymous because contact with foreign media is treated as a capital offense in North Korea—discovery means imprisonment or execution.
This network-based approach allows Daily NK to report on developments other outlets cannot access: market trends, policy implementation, public sentiment, and daily realities that never appear in official narratives. Maintaining these secure communication channels and protecting source identities requires specialized protocols and constant vigilance.
Daily NK serves as a bridge between North Koreans and the outside world, documenting what’s happening inside one of the world’s most closed societies.
dailynk.com · February 13, 2026
13. North Koreans buy river water from pullcarts as pipes freeze solid
Summary:
A prolonged cold snap in north Korea’s northern border regions has frozen or burst water pipes, leaving households without tap water for days. In places like Hyesan and nearby counties, residents haul water from rivers and wells, often using unsafe river water for washing and well water for drinking, which forces multiple trips. The disruption has fueled a surge in “water merchants” pushing pullcarts loaded with large jugs, selling cheaper river water to families who live far from the river or lack time. Similar patterns appear in Sinuiju. Frozen sewage pipes compound the crisis as wastewater dumped outside turns into dangerous ice.
Comment; We just cannot fathom the hardships of the Korean people in the north. May we never forget their plight.
North Koreans buy river water from pullcarts as pipes freeze solid
dailynk.com · February 13, 2026
Newcomers undercut established sellers while families mobilize school children to pull handcarts, making water sales a new way to earn amid commerce collapse
By Lee Chae Eun, Jeong Seo Yeong - February 14, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-koreans-buy-river-water-pullcarts-pipes-freeze-solid/
North Koreans clearing a road of snow in Pujon county, South Hamgyong province, in 2004. (Flickr, Creative Commons)
Cases of water pipes freezing or exploding have occurred throughout the northern regions of North Korea amid a protracted cold spell. Locals are taking water directly from rivers or wells as water supplies experience interruptions, with a notable increase in the number of so-called water merchants.
“Water pipes have frozen solid as temperatures remain below -30 degrees Celsius (-22 degrees Fahrenheit) in the border region, including in Hyesan, Kimhyongjik county, and Kimjongsuk county,” a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province said recently. “All homes have been without water for several days, and the authorities have done little about it, so people draw water from the river or wells every day.”
Hyesan residents usually use water from the Yalu River—which is not safe to drink—for laundry and other daily tasks, and use iron-rich well water for drinking. Since one must go to different spots to draw water for different uses, with the long treks and added hassle, some people just buy water to use.
“Households that live near the Yalu River can easily draw water themselves, but those living more than 30 minutes from the river have to spend a lot of time and effort to draw water,” the source said. “So, the number of pullcart merchants who sell water from jugs has soared.”
New water merchants undercut established sellers
Water merchants have appeared before, but they usually sold water from wells with water that was reputedly beneficial to one’s health. However, with water supplies cut off for a while due to frozen water pipes, more people are selling water drawn from the Yalu River at prices much lower than those for well water.
“Pullcart merchants sell water from four or five 50-liter jugs that they load onto their carts after drawing it from the Yalu River,” the source said. “They sell the water for 2,500 North Korean won (roughly $0.35) per jug, about half the price of drinking water from a well.”
“People who can’t or are too busy to draw water themselves buy at least one jug from the pullcart merchants, and as the number of such people grows, the merchants make 10,000 to 15,000 won ($1.40-$2.10) a day,” the source said. “The pullcart merchants, who saw their earnings drop this month with state smuggling at a standstill, can at least make a living by selling water.”
The situation is much the same in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province.
“In almost every neighborhood in Sinuiju, including Paegun and Kunhwa neighborhoods, nobody gets tap water with water pipes frozen due to the cold spell, so there’s a daily ‘war’ to draw water,” a source in North Pyongan province said. “The number of water merchants who—taking this as an opportunity—sell water from handcarts has increased this month.”
“It’s hard to make a living with commerce at a standstill, so many people have become water merchants, even mobilizing their children on vacation from school to pull handcarts, in the hope of making a bit of money since they can at least draw some water,” the source said. “Selling water seems to be becoming a new way to make a living.”
Water merchants usually draw their water from a well in Sokha village and sell it for around 8,000 won ($1.10) for six 10-liter jugs.
Recently, longtime water merchants and newcomers have argued over prices.
Merchants who recently jumped into the game due to the cold spell have lowered their prices to around 500 won to win the regular customers of the existing water merchants, leading to arguments.
Meanwhile, with the cold spell freezing not only water pipes but also sewage pipes, most people are simply tossing their wastewater outside. The wastewater then freezes in the cold, creating sheets of ice that cause accidents, with young children and older people slipping and falling.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · February 13, 2026
14. The Role of Gender in Shaping the North Korean Escapee Experience
Summary:
Ellie Richard argues that gender shapes who escapes from north Korea and how. It cites claims that roughly 80 percent of escapees are women, and ties that pattern to social roles and state control. Men face tighter party surveillance and long mandatory military service, which narrows escape windows. Women carry family survival burdens, engage more in jangmadang activity, and become exposed to cross border networks. That exposure creates opportunity and danger. In China, brokers and traffickers exploit women through forced marriage, sex trafficking, and cybersex coercion, while Beijing’s policy of treating them as “economic migrants” enables repatriation. Returnees face severe detention abuse.
Comment: I hope the culture warriors do not attack this.This is an important perspective to understanding the situation with Korean escapees. If women dominate escape flows, then information operations, protection pathways, and resettlement services that ignore women’s specific risks will miss the main human terrain. If women are the primary escape cohort, why is policy still not built around disrupting the China-based trafficking and repatriation pipeline first?
The Role of Gender in Shaping the North Korean Escapee Experience
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/the-role-of-gender-in-shaping-the-north-korean-escapee-experience
2/12/2026
0 Comments
By Ellie Richard, former HRNK intern
Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO
The dangers of escaping from North Korea are well-documented. Between dodging landmines, eluding border patrol agents, and avoiding arrest by Chinese officials, North Korean escapees face a path replete with risks. Success on this journey can be the difference between life and death – and it’s a trek that disproportionately affects one group above all others:
North Korean women.
According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “approximately 80% of North Korean escapees are women.” There are plenty of reasons why North Korean women flee the country more than their male counterparts. To begin, men and women assume different roles in North Korean society, and such differences influence escape capabilities. Men are typically under strict surveillance from the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), and they are required to serve in the military for a minimum of ten years. While service in the military is compulsory for men, participation is voluntary for women. Women who enlist in the military — though not all are required to — serve for six years. This relatively shorter term provides a broader window for escape for women, as men are conscripted for longer periods.
Generally, North Korean women have more time to spend on their families and communities compared to men, especially married women. Most women in the country participate in the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea, an organization that enlists women in various public mobilization campaigns. Women who are a part of this union spend their weekends working on public infrastructure projects, including road construction work and railway assignments. Married women are exempt from union service, allowing them more time to care for their families. As primary caretakers, they bear a heavy burden, particularly as many families struggle to meet basic needs.
Food insecurity is a common push factor that encourages women to flee from North Korea. Most North Korean citizens suffer from some form of food insecurity. The World Food Programme estimates that 10.7 million people are malnourished in North Korea, which is approximately 40% of the population. Food shortages largely stem from North Korea’s decision to prioritize military spending and nuclear weapons development rather than agricultural sectors. Such food deprivation places an enormous strain on North Korean women, who assume more family responsibilities than men. Driven by the urgent need to feed their families, many women flee North Korea in search of food and resources essential for survival.
This food insecurity and resulting economic hardships encourage women to seek pathways to escape from North Korea. During the famine of the 1990s, many women became more involved in informal markets known as the Jangmadang. Their participation in these markets enabled them to gain more financial independence and, as a result, become exposed to outside market actors. Women were introduced to economic opportunities outside of North Korea, and these opportunities for a lucrative career became enticing as many struggled to feed their families.
Human traffickers target these women and prey on their vulnerabilities — especially ringleaders who run complex human trafficking networks in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Perpetrators in China work in tandem with corrupt brokers who lure North Korean women to China under false promises of employment to exploit them for financial gain. One common form of exploitation and crime is sex trafficking. A report by the Migration Policy Institute states that “more than 60 percent of North Korean girls and women between ages 12-29 who escape are trafficked into China’s lucrative sex trade.”
Cybersex trafficking is a dangerous subset of this crime. The Migration Policy Institute reports that in recent years, “a growing number – approximately 15 percent of those trafficked – have been coerced into cybersex, which includes livestreamed sexual abuse and rape to a paying clientele of mostly South Korean men.” Such a finding demonstrates the expansive nature of these trafficking networks, as traffickers exploit women in China and other countries.
The black market for North Korean women in China extends beyond sex trafficking, too. Traffickers also coerce women into forced marriages. Indeed, the Migration Policy Institute finds that “more than 30 percent [of women] are believed to be sold into forced marriages with rural Chinese men.” This situation stems from a lack of marriage-age women in the northeast region of China due to previous population control measures implemented by the PRC. The infamous ‘one child’ policy, where the government restricted families from having more than one child, resulted in a skewed sex ratio in China, as families would undergo gender-based abortions to avoid having a female child. This female infanticide, in turn, created a large demand for brides, and North Korean women proved a convenient solution.
The consequences of this situation are devastating. North Korean women in forced marriages not only suffer from rape and gender-based violence but also live under constant threat of arrest. They have no official standing in China, nor do they have any legal avenues they can pursue to protect themselves. The Chinese government often categorizes North Korean escapees as ‘economic migrants’ rather than asylum seekers, and such mis categorization facilitates a system of forced repatriation. The government can deport citizens without acknowledging the immense danger they face upon returning home, including imprisonment, torture, and execution upon return to North Korea. Female escapees face a unique set of hazards. The Transitional Justice Working Group affirmed that “in detention centers and interrogation facilities, female returnees are reportedly subject to invasive gynecological exams, beatings, and sexual assault, all without medical justification or legal oversight.” Women carrying children face even greater consequences. Pregnant women in detention centers are subjected to forced abortions and infanticide as punishment for their ‘disloyalty’ to the Kim regime.
This data, if nothing else, provides a window into the experiences of women who try to escape from North Korea and the dangers they face along the way. However, the data can only tell so much of the story. Statistics on a page cannot sufficiently convey the overwhelming fear these women experience and the strength they are required to possess during their journeys. The voice of Vivian Kim, an escapee-turned-human rights advocate and U.S. CEO, best showcases the resilience of female North Korean escapees.
***
Originally born in the northern province of Hamgyong Bukdo, Vivian spent her entire childhood and adolescence in North Korea. She witnessed extreme poverty and starvation firsthand, as well as the censorship and indoctrination levied by the Kim regime. She knows how it feels to live in a totalitarian state, and she knows how dangerous it is to leave it, having done so herself in 2010. Vivian recently described her experience leaving the regime in an interview with HRNK, and among all the trials and tribulations she faced, one topic kept resurfacing throughout the conversation:
Fear.
When asked about the scariest moment during her escape, Vivian didn’t hesitate to answer: “Every single moment. It’s not just one moment. Every single step. Every single moment until I got to Thailand.” Her journey stretched from backcountry roads in China, jungles in Laos, rivers in Thailand, and eventually the Hanawon refugee center in South Korea. Natural dangers jeopardized her safety at every location, as she navigated rugged mountains, frozen rivers, and treacherous insects during her trip.
Man-made threats were even more frightening. “The first scary thing when I decided to escape, and as I crossed the border, was that I might be shot in the back by the North Korean government,” Vivian said. “The second [threat] was not by the North Korean government but by the brokers, the human traffickers.”
In her interview with HRNK, Vivian provided greater insight into the mindset of the brokers who help North Koreans escape. Many of them charge substantial fees to individuals and their families looking to leave North Korea. Even if a woman can meet the base costs, she still runs the risk of being outbid by a human trafficking perpetrator who wants to sell her into sex work. Many brokers will choose the more profitable option, creating a cycle of exploitation. Vivian’s husband, a fellow defector and human rights advocate named Jake Kim, wired a substantial amount of money to their broker to protect his wife’s safety. As a result, Vivian avoided any ensnarement in these human trafficking rings. The same cannot be said for every woman who makes this journey. Many who rely on their brokers are ultimately betrayed, highlighting how difficult it is for these women to decide whom to trust.
These anxieties stick with defectors long after they arrive in a safe new country. Some defectors might struggle to trust people following their experiences with these brokers. Vivian, meanwhile, still carries trauma related to law enforcement as the Chinese government could have arrested her on multiple occasions.
“Police cars are normal. Police cars are everywhere in the world, but the lights, not only for me but for all North Korean escapees in China, [I feel like] someone is watching me, and they are going to shoot me,” Vivian lamented. “It’s so so scary. Every time I see police car lights, it’s this kind of trauma.”
The struggles she faced, both as a North Korean defector and as a woman, during her escape, were tremendous. Her journey is described in much greater detail in her book, A Necessary Lie: Escape for Freedom and Love, which she co-wrote with her husband and author Heidi Tucker.
After speaking with HRNK, Heidi reaffirmed how traumatizing this experience was for Vivian, having worked with her to translate her story. “The fear kept coming up,” Heidi recalled. “The fear of Vivian crossing the ice [on the frozen Yalu River]. She was just like ‘How did my heart not stop beating? The fear that they were going to shoot her in the back at any moment…[she] would often go back to the fear.”
Fear is a central part of her story, but so too is the strength and perseverance she displayed in the face of this distress. Despite the odds being widely stacked against her, Vivian Kim found a way out and eventually reunited with her husband. She is now a loving mother of two children, a proud college graduate, a prominent CEO of a children’s clothing brand, and an empowered human rights activist in the United States. Vivian’s story is nothing short of inspiring and a critical reminder of the importance of this issue.
***
I believe that the United States of America has a moral responsibility and strategic opportunity to promote and protect the rights of North Korean citizens and refugees. Escapees — many of them women — are often overlooked and forgotten about. To amplify their voices, I believe we must urge members of Congress to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. Although this legislation largely enjoyed bipartisan support, it expired in 2023 and its renewal is critical. The bill not only reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to protecting human rights and democracy on the international stage but also funded vital refugee support programs and supported independent media outlets like Radio Free Asia and Voice of America that broadcast information into the country. Reauthorizing this act would send a clear message: the United States cares about the well-being of North Korean refugees and citizens and will not turn away from their struggle.
With over three years since the last congressional hearing on North Korea, it’s time to push for renewed focus. Contact your representatives to demonstrate your concern for this issue. More specifically, let them know that you want to see the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 renewed. The time for passive concern has come and gone. We must act decisively, and we must act now.
Ellie Richard is a senior at the University of Michigan, where she is pursuing a double major in International Relations and Spanish, along with a minor in History. As a pre-law student, she is deeply passionate about foreign affairs, with particular interests in international human rights law and immigrant rights protection. Ellie brings valuable research experience to HRNK, having previously served as a research assistant for the University of Michigan Law School. In that role, she collaborated with former U.S. State Department Ambassador and Department of Justice Prosecutor Luis C. deBaca to create an archive documenting the early efforts of the anti-human trafficking movement. This experience — combined with a formative lecture on the implications of the Songbun system in North Korea — sparked her interest in Korean peninsula affairs and strengthened her commitment to uncovering human rights abuses through research with HRNK.
Bibliography
Bremer, Ifang. "Almost half of North Korea's population undernourished due to food shortages: UN." NK News, July 14, 2023. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.nknews.org/2023/07/almost-half-of-north-koreas-population-undernourished-due-to-food-shortages-un/#:~:text=Security / Human Rights-,Almost 12 million North Koreans are undernourished%2C a new U.N.,from between 2019 and 2021.
"Democratic People's Republic of Korea." United Nations World Food Programme. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea?utm_source=
Hee-Seok Shin, Ethan, April Song-Ah Park, Jeonghyun Kang, et al. "Documentation and Accountability for North Korea's Crime of Enforced Disappearance: Stock-taking and Recommendations." Transitional Justice Working Group, 2025. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea/.
Kim, Vivian. Interview by Ellie Richard. Washington D.C. July 19, 2025.
Natsios, Andrew, Avie Vaidya, Clayton Elbel, et al. "Is There a Famine in North Korea?" The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Last modified June 17, 2025. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/IS-THERE-A-FAMINE-IN-NORTH-KOREA.pdf.
Reddy, Damian. "Communication to the Commission on the Status of Women." Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu. HRNK Insider. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2025/08/communication-to-commission-on-status.html.
Scarlatoiu, Greg. Interview by Ellie Richard. Washington D.C. August 2025.
Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. "Trafficked and Forgotten: The Plight of North Korean Women in China." 2024. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://timep.org/.
Tucker, Heidi. Interview by Ellie Richard. Washington D.C. July 28, 2025.
Um-Lo, Noël, and Eunsook Jang. "Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors." Migration Policy Institue, July 8, 2025. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/north-korean-defector
15. Yongbyon reactor’s heat signal vanishes on satellite scans
Summary:
Daily NK reports a thermal anomaly at north Korea’s 5MWe Yongbyon reactor. Landsat-9 infrared data shows the reactor building’s surface reading colder than nearby terrain, and at times colder than the Kuryong River, even as melted ice along the riverbank suggests warm cooling-water discharge. The pattern began after exterior renovations completed in summer 2025. The author argues thermal cladding on the walls and roof may be suppressing heat transfer, reducing what infrared satellites can detect. Nighttime lights on a road toward the radiochemical lab add a hint of late-hour movement.
Comment: I defer to the nuclear experts.
Yongbyon reactor’s heat signal vanishes on satellite scans
dailynk.com · February 10, 2026
Thermal cladding installed on reactor building may be blocking infrared satellite surveillance
By Bruce Songhak Chung - February 11, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/mystery-at-yongbyon-north-koreas-reactor-hides-its-heat-from-satellites/
Satellite thermal data show that North Korea’s 5MWe reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex is registering surface temperatures far colder than its surroundings, even while the facility remains in operation — an anomaly that may reflect a deliberate effort to defeat infrared monitoring.
The unusual thermal pattern has persisted since North Korea completed an exterior renovation of the reactor building in summer 2025. Cooling water discharged into the Kuryong River continues to confirm that both the 5MWe reactor and a light-water reactor are running, yet the reactor building’s surface registers no outward heat signature. In some readings it shows temperatures colder than the river itself. The most likely explanation is that North Korea applied thermal cladding to the building’s outer walls and roof, suppressing heat transfer to the surface and sharply limiting what infrared satellites can detect.
Yongbyon’s thermal puzzle raises surveillance questions
Satellite imagery combining Sentinel-2B optical data and nighttime luminosity shows the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Melting snow and ice along the Kuryong River bank indicate cooling water discharge from the reactor, while unidentified lights were captured on a road leading to the radiochemical laboratory in the early morning hours. (VIIRS nighttime luminosity + Sentinel-2B/ESA)
Whether the renovation was done to improve energy efficiency or to deliberately degrade the effectiveness of international satellite monitoring remains an open question.
Two sets of satellite imagery captured in late January provided fresh evidence of activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex during extreme winter conditions. Optical imagery from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-2B satellite showed sections of the Kuryong River bank where snow and ice had melted, consistent with warm cooling water being discharged from the reactor and light-water reactor through two pump stations. The thawing along the Kuryong River in the middle of winter is taken as evidence that Yongbyon’s reactors are continuing to operate for nuclear material production even in harsh conditions.
Nighttime luminosity imagery captured by the U.S. Suomi NPP polar-orbiting satellite at 1:30 a.m. on Jan. 28 revealed unidentified lights on a road section running from the reactor zone toward the radiochemical laboratory. The surrounding complex was otherwise completely dark. In a region that goes dark as soon as the sun sets, what appeared to be vehicle headlights in the early morning hours is interpreted as a sign of vehicle movement or covert nighttime activity.
Reactor colder than the frozen river
Satellite imagery combining Sentinel-2B optical data and nighttime luminosity shows the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Melting snow and ice along the Kuryong River bank indicate cooling water discharge from the reactor, while unidentified lights were captured on a road leading to the radiochemical laboratory in the early morning hours. (VIIRS nighttime luminosity + Sentinel-2B/ESA)
Thermal infrared data from the U.S. Landsat-9 Earth observation satellite show the surface temperature distribution around the 5MWe reactor area deviating sharply from normal operational patterns for a nuclear facility.
In imagery captured Dec. 21, 2025, the ambient temperature in the area ranged from minus 2 degrees Celsius to a low of minus 7 degrees Celsius. The reactor building’s surface temperature was measured at between minus 5 and minus 6 degrees Celsius — colder than the Kuryong River itself, which registered 0 to minus 1 degrees Celsius. Buildings typically absorb solar heat during daylight hours and read warmer than surrounding terrain in thermal imagery. An operating reactor building reading colder than the adjacent river is described by the analyst as anomalous and abnormal.
In thermal infrared imagery from Jan. 22, taken when temperatures dropped to an average of minus 11 degrees Celsius and a low of minus 17 degrees Celsius, the reactor building’s surface held at between minus 14 and minus 15 degrees Celsius — on par with the winter forest across the Kuryong River. The absence of any heat signature from an operating nuclear reactor has continued to appear in subsequent thermal satellite analyses.
Assessment
On Nov. 21 last year, 38 North reported that North Korea replaced and repainted the outer walls and roof of the 5MWe reactor building between April and August 2025. Thermal infrared satellite analysis conducted since then has consistently shown the reactor building and its immediate surroundings reading significantly colder than the surrounding environment, a pattern that has continued without interruption.
I believe that the renovation work took place around June to July 2025, and that the suppressed heat signal most likely reflects the installation of thermal cladding. Thermal cladding reduces energy loss by preventing interior heat from escaping to the building surface, and is the most probable cause of the dramatic reduction in detectable thermal infrared signatures at Yongbyon.
Whether the exterior renovation was intended to reduce heat loss or to impede international thermal satellite monitoring remains difficult to determine. As additional Landsat-8 and Landsat-9 thermal infrared satellite data become available, more analysis on this issue will be needed.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · February 10, 2026
16. 6,000 North Korean Troops Killed or Wounded Fighting for Russia, Seoul Reveals
Summary:
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service assesses that roughly 6,000 north Korean troops have been killed or wounded while fighting for Russia in and around Kursk, out of an estimated deployment of about 10,000 combat troops plus 1,000 engineering personnel. The NIS says around 1,100 personnel returned to north Korea in December and could be rotated back, and it argues the campaign has delivered battlefield learning on modern tactics plus Russian technical help that may accelerate weapons upgrades. Ukrainian military intelligence also claims north Korean units are actively engaged and are absorbing drone-era methods that Pyongyang is now institutionalizing.
Comment: Can we exploit this information?
6,000 North Korean Troops Killed or Wounded Fighting for Russia, Seoul Reveals
united24media.com · Dariia Mykhailenko
Feb 13, 2026 11:33
Updated Feb 13, 2026 12:33
3 min read
Authors
Dariia Mykhailenko
News Writer
https://united24media.com/latest-news/6000-north-korean-troops-killed-or-wounded-fighting-for-russia-seoul-reveals-15864
Approximately 6,000 North Korean troops have been killed or wounded in Russia’s war against Ukraine, Yonhap reported on February 12, citing data from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS).
According to the intelligence agency, around 10,000 North Korean combat troops and 1,000 engineering soldiers are currently deployed in Russia’s Kursk region to support Moscow’s war effort against Ukraine.
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The NIS estimates that roughly 6,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed or injured during the war. It also noted that about 1,100 troops and engineers who returned to North Korea last December could be redeployed to the battlefield.
“Despite suffering 6,000 casualties, the North Korean military has achieved the results of acquiring modern combat tactics and data in the battlefield, as well as upgrading its weapons systems with technical assistance from Russia,” the NIS stated.
The intelligence service also reported that Pyongyang has established a new department dedicated to unmanned aerial vehicles and is accelerating efforts to develop a system capable of designing and mass-producing drones.
North Korean servicemen remain actively engaged in Russia’s war against Ukraine, operating alongside Russian units and accumulating practical experience in contemporary warfare, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) reported.
Read more
Category
War in Ukraine
How Russia Is Supercharging North Korea’s War Machine
Apr 17, 2025 11:44
According to HUR, North Korean troops are stationed in Russia’s Kursk region, an area used by Russian forces to stage repeated attacks on Ukrainian border settlements.
Ukrainian intelligence says the North Korean contingent is participating directly in combat operations. Their roles reportedly include operating tube artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, conducting aerial reconnaissance missions, spotting targets for artillery, and корректing rocket fire.
HUR assesses that one of Pyongyang’s primary goals in joining the war effort is to gain expertise in drone warfare and modern battlefield tactics. Ukrainian officials describe this as a key element of North Korea’s involvement, pointing to the growing emphasis on unmanned systems and networked combat operations.
Under ongoing military arrangements between Moscow and Pyongyang, North Korean units are reportedly rotated in and out of the Kursk region. Since the start of their deployment, around 3,000 North Korean soldiers have returned home after completing combat tours, according to Ukrainian intelligence.
Read more
Category
War in Ukraine
How North Korea Joined Russia in Its War on Ukraine
Oct 30, 2024 11:47
Many of those returning are believed to be reassigned as instructors, tasked with transferring battlefield knowledge—including drone usage, artillery coordination, and reconnaissance methods—to other units within North Korea’s armed forces.
Meanwhile, media reports indicate that some North Korean troops captured while fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine have requested transfer to South Korea rather than being returned to Pyongyang.
In October 2025, several detained North Korean soldiers expressed a desire to defect to Seoul instead of repatriation. The individuals were reportedly taken prisoner during combat operations in the East of Ukraine and are believed to have been part of North Korean units deployed in support of Russian forces.
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Category
Latest news
Russia Claims North Korean Forces Have Reached the Frontline in Ukraine for the First Time
Nov 24, 2025 14:24
Ukrainian authorities are said to be working with relevant international organizations to ensure that the detainees are treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions governing prisoners of war.
Earlier, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un allegedly ordered troops fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine to detonate grenades on themselves instead of being taken prisoner.
According to sources familiar with the matter, North Korean soldiers deployed to the front are subjected to political indoctrination sessions twice a week. During these meetings, commanders reportedly praise those who killed themselves in combat to avoid capture, portraying such acts as the ultimate proof of loyalty to Kim and as a higher form of courage than that shown by their Russian counterparts.
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17. Kim Jong-un's brother's chilling final moments in airport assassination
Summary:
Kim Jong-nam, estranged half brother of Kim Jong Un, was attacked at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in February 2017 when two women smeared VX nerve agent on his face, and he died shortly after despite medical treatment. The women said they thought it was a prank, a claim that featured in court proceedings and later outcomes: Indonesian Siti Aisyah was released in 2019, and Vietnamese Doan Thi Huong later took a reduced charge and was freed in May 2019.
Comment; If he would do this to his own brother.(even half brother) .. well... just imagine what he will do (and does) to anyone else. north Korea’s use of a banned chemical weapon (VX) in public was meant to terrorize rivals and signal reach.
Kim Jong-un's brother's chilling final moments in airport assassination
dailystar.co.uk · Maria Leticia Gomes · February 13, 2026
Nine years ago, Kim Jong-nam was killed at Kuala Lumpur airport after two women wiped deadly VX nerve agent on his face, believing they were participating in a harmless television prank
Maria Letícia Gomes GAU Writer
Kim Jong-un's brother murdered in mysterious airport "prank" - court decisions and diplomatic fallouts
Nine years ago today, Kuala Lumpur airport was experiencing a typical hectic day, with passengers and holidaymakers passing through Malaysia's capital. Blending in amongst fellow travellers was a middle-aged North Korean gentleman dressed casually in a blue polo shirt and jeans, wandering around the budget airline terminal whilst awaiting his return flight to Macau.
Kim Chol was the alias used by Kim Jong-nam - the alienated half-brother of Kim Jong-un, who had originally been tipped to succeed his father as North Korea's supreme leader.
Around 9am, Kim lingered near a self-service check-in machine when a woman suddenly approached and smeared an oily liquid across his face before fleeing.
A second woman then appeared, placing her hands over his eyes and dragging them down across his mouth, before offering an apology and vanishing into the crowd, reports the Mirror US.
Kim, already experiencing wooziness and discomfort, located an airport staff member to report what had happened. He was quickly wheeled away on a stretcher to the airport's medical facility, where personnel described him as perspiring heavily, unresponsive, and clearly in agony. Medical staff administered atropine, adrenaline and performed tracheal intubation, but he died rapidly, within thirty minutes of the assault.
A subsequent post-mortem examination would reveal the victim had been poisoned with VX nerve agent, amongst the deadliest chemical weapons in existence - a substance that triggers swift respiratory collapse by inhibiting the acetylcholinesterase enzyme.
In Kim's case, the chemical had triggered catastrophic failure of his lungs, brain, liver and spleen, alongside pupil constriction and involuntary defecation. Officials discovered he was carrying approximately US$100,000 in cash and four North Korean passports, all displaying the name Kim Chol, with his true identity only established a month later through DNA matching with his son, Kim Han-sol.
Malaysian authorities swiftly detained two women caught on security cameras - Đoàn Thị Hương, a 28-year-old Vietnamese citizen, and Siti Aisyah, a 25-year-old Indonesian woman.
Both women insisted they believed they were taking part in an innocent television prank, yet faced murder charges carrying Malaysia's mandatory death penalty.
During their testimony, they described being recruited separately months beforehand by men posing as Japanese, Chinese or South Korean TV producers, who paid them to approach random people in shopping centres or hotels and briefly touch their faces to capture their reactions.
Police enquiries showed Aisyah had carried out similar "pranks" on at least 10 separate occasions, whilst Hương had done so four times, with both women promised US$100 for the airport operation.
Investigators identified the masterminds as North Korean operatives, including one called Ri Ji-u, who appeared in Aisyah's mobile contacts under the false name "James."
Following the assault, airport surveillance footage captured the women cleansing their hands in terminal washrooms - behaviour that matched protocols for handling VX contamination.
Prosecutors ultimately acknowledged that the women had genuinely been manipulated as unwitting carriers of the chemical weapon. Each woman transported a separate harmless element which, when combined, proved fatal.
Several years on, in March 2019, Aisyah's murder charges were withdrawn after Indonesia's government intervened. Hương faced imprisonment but her charges were subsequently downgraded - she admitted guilt to causing harm with dangerous weapons and walked free in May 2019.
Predictably, international diplomatic focus and press scrutiny swiftly shifted towards North Korea, as four North Korean operatives - subsequently confirmed as intelligence officers - were spotted on CCTV departing Malaysia within hours of being near the scene.
The group separated, travelling via Jakarta, Dubai and Vladivostok before arriving in North Korea's capital, Pyongyang. North Korea refused to acknowledge culpability, however, and insisted Kim had suffered a heart attack.
Malaysian authorities dismissed these assertions and confirmed they were working alongside the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to determine the deadly substance deployed in the assault. Kim Jong-nam had been living in exile from his homeland since 2003, and was vocally opposed to his family's authoritarian rule.
South Korean intelligence sources revealed that his younger sibling Kim Jong Un had given a permanent kill order against him, and insisted this wasn't their first assassination attempt. In 2019, the Wall Street Journal disclosed that Kim Jong-nam had been working as a CIA informant, which strengthened theories that his killing was government-sanctioned.
The murder triggered what remains one of the most serious diplomatic rows in North Korean or Malaysian history to this day. The Southeast Asian nation scrapped visa-free travel for North Koreans and kicked out their ambassador - whilst Pyongyang prevented Malaysian nationals from departing North Korea.
Article continues below
Tensions subsided when Kim Jong-nam's remains were handed back to his relatives, as they had requested.
The episode provoked worldwide condemnation, with South Korean officials branding it proof of Kim Jong Un's "reign of terror," and America reinstating North Korea as a terrorism sponsor - citing Kim Jong-nam's murder amongst the justifications for the designation.
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dailystar.co.uk · Maria Leticia Gomes · February 13, 2026
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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