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Quotes of the Day:
"For me, to be a true thinker is to express your thoughts, so whether by means of literature,
other writings, theater, or film, a thinker's message could be transmitted to a certain public."
- Yoshishige Yoshida
"Two percent of the people think,
Three percent of the people Think they think,
And ninety-five percent of the people would rather die than Think."
- George Bernard Shaw
"I know nothing in the world has as much power as a word.
Sometimes I write one, and I look at it, until it begins to shine."
- Emily Dickinson
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 14, 2023
2. Gen. David Petraeus: How the war in Ukraine will end
3. U.S. focuses on training Ukrainian troops to use less ammo
4. 'Out of control': DoD reviews use of super-secret SAP classification, for space programs and beyond
5. Philippines, U.S. to hold biggest war games in years
6. S. Korea's Navy, Marine Corps to join Cobra Gold drills in Thailand
7. Mike Gallagher: A New Cold Warrior
8. IntelBrief: China’s South Asia Troubles
9. Cyber Sanctions Are Nice; Digital Takedowns Are Better
10. Suspected Iranian Weapons Seized by U.S. Navy May Go to Ukraine
11. Ukraine live briefing: Russia has lost, top U.S. general says; intense fighting in east
12. Militant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda’s probable new chief in U.N. report
13. Russia declares battlefield gains as Ukraine urges faster military aid
14. We Missed Social Media’s Dark Side. Let’s Be Smarter about the Metaverse
15. Nimitz Strike Group, Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group Drill in South China Sea
16. Countdown to counteroffensive: Give Ukraine ATACMS before it's too late - Breaking Defense
17. More Bang for the SFA Buck: Improving US Security Force Assistance in Ukraine and Beyond
18. It’s Time to Recognize Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 14, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2023
Key Takeaways
- US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. The Washington Post reported that US officials have privately signaled to Ukraine that Western security aid to Ukraine is finite, however.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly recruiting convicts and mimicking the Wagner Group’s treatment of convicts as cannon fodder.
- Russian forces continued offensive actions in the Kupyansk direction and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 14.
- Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast or in Kherson, Mykolaiv, or western Zaporizhia oblasts on February 14.
- Russian ground forces on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia have been reduced to one-fifth of their initial strength numbers before the invasion of Ukraine, supporting ISW’s longtime assessment that the Kremlin is not concerned about a NATO conventional military threat against Russia.
- A Ukrainian and Tatar partisan group reportedly conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a car carrying two Russian military personnel and two Russian special service representatives in Nova Kakhovka on February 10.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may meet on February 17.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 14, 2023
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2023
George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick Kagan
February 14, 8:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. Austin stated that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (a coalition of 54 states supporting Ukraine’s defense) will “support Ukraine's fight for freedom over the long haul” and will support Ukraine during a spring counteroffensive.[1] The Washington Post reported on February 13 that the Biden administration will announce a new aid package for Ukraine “in the next week.”[2]
The Washington Post reported that US officials have privately signaled to Ukraine that Western security aid to Ukraine is finite, however. The Washington Post reported on February 13 that an anonymous US government official stated that US government officials are trying to “impress upon [Ukrainian officials] that [the US Government] can’t do anything and everything forever.”[3] The Washington Post also reported that US officials stated that recent Western aid packages for Ukraine “represent Kyiv’s best chance to decisively change the course of the war.“[4]
Western reporting indicates that there continue to be Western concerns about Ukraine’s determination to hold Bakhmut. The Washington Post also reported that US defense planners assess that Ukrainian forces are unable to simultaneously defend Bakhmut and launch a spring counteroffensive and have urged Ukraine to prioritize the spring counteroffensive over defending Bakhmut.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s decision to defend Bakhmut is likely a strategically sound effort despite its costs for Ukraine.[6] Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut has forced the Kremlin to expend much of the Wagner Group as a force and commit high-value Russian airborne forces to sustain attritional advances.[7] Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut has degraded significant Russian forces and will likely set favorable conditions for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive. Had Russian troops taken Bakhmut without significant Ukrainian resistance they could have hoped to expand operations in ways that could have forced Ukraine to construct hasty defensive positions in less favorable terrain. Therefore, Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut and undertaking an effort to set conditions for a counteroffensive are likely complementary, not mutually exclusive, activities considering that Russian forces would have continued their offensive beyond Bakhmut had Ukraine yielded the city earlier.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly recruiting convicts and mimicking the Wagner Group’s treatment of convicts as cannon fodder. CNN reported that the Russian MoD had been directly recruiting prisoners who deployed to Soledar, Donetsk Oblast, into formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps in October 2022.[8] Convicts complained to CNN about gruesome abuses and noted that they suffered heavy casualties after they were ordered to storm Ukrainian defensive positions. CNN also obtained a recording from a deceased convict who feared that the Russian MoD would execute him after he survived an assault on Soledar, though this soldier was killed in action days later anyway. These convicts specified that the Russian MoD recruited them after Wagner Group initially overlooked them, and even accused Russian forces of conducting deliberate friendly fire against the convicts.
The Russian MoD’s decision to recruit prisoners is an indicator that the Kremlin seeks to exploit convicts for future human wave attacks in a similar fashion as the Wagner Group despite convicts’ limited combat effectiveness. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate Andriy Usov stated that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov are creating a convict cannon fodder reserve that they could directly control through the MoD’s own private military companies.[9] Russian MoD’s integration of these convict forces into the LNR formations also may suggest that Russian military commanders are attempting to avoid the restructuring of some of their conventional units to fit underprepared convicts. ISW had previously observed instances of Russian proxy armed formations receiving poor treatment from Russian conventional forces, and the Russian command may have sought to not further disturb unit morale by integrating convicts.[10]
The Russian MoD’s recruitment of prisoners in fall 2022 may also coincide with the intensifying criticism from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin began to publicly attack Russian military commanders in early October, and the Russian MoD’s intervention in his recruitment scheme may have ignited some of these grievances with the conventional Russian military and MoD bureaucracy.[11] A representative for the Russian prisoner group Gulagu.net also noted that many in Moscow began to fear Prigozhin and his unpredictable and ever-growing large “organized criminal group of mercenaries and killers.”[12] The Kremlin has since been distancing itself from Wagner—both rhetorically and by likely depriving Prigozhin of the ability to recruit and train convicts. The Ukrainian General Staff, for example, reported that Russian MoD began to use the Kadamovsky Training Ground in Rostov Oblast to train mobilized and volunteer personnel for a few weeks, while Wagner had not been able to train at the training ground since the beginning of 2023.[13]
Key Takeaways
- US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. The Washington Post reported that US officials have privately signaled to Ukraine that Western security aid to Ukraine is finite, however.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly recruiting convicts and mimicking the Wagner Group’s treatment of convicts as cannon fodder.
- Russian forces continued offensive actions in the Kupyansk direction and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 14.
- Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast or in Kherson, Mykolaiv, or western Zaporizhia oblasts on February 14.
- Russian ground forces on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia have been reduced to one-fifth of their initial strength numbers before the invasion of Ukraine, supporting ISW’s longtime assessment that the Kremlin is not concerned about a NATO conventional military threat against Russia.
- A Ukrainian and Tatar partisan group reportedly conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a car carrying two Russian military personnel and two Russian special service representatives in Nova Kakhovka on February 10.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may meet on February 17.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
ISW continues to assess the current Russian most likely course of action (MLCOA) is an imminent offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast and has therefore adjusted the structure of the daily campaign assessments. We will no longer include the Eastern Kharkiv and Western Luhansk Oblast area as part of Ukrainian counteroffensives and will assess this area as a subordinate part of the Russian main effort in Eastern Ukraine. The assessment of Luhansk Oblast as part of the Russian main effort does not preclude the possibility of continued Ukrainian counteroffensive actions here or anywhere else in theater in the future. ISW will report out on Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts as they occur.
Russian forces continued offensive actions in the Kupyansk direction on February 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian ground attacks near Hrianykivka, 16km northwest of Kupyansk.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting intensified on this sector of the front and that Russian forces entered Lyman Pershyi (10km northeast of Kupyansk), advanced around Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), and launched an offensive effort near Masiutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk).[15] One Russian source made an unsubstantiated claim that Ukrainian officials are evacuating Kupyansk in anticipation of Russian offensives.[16] Former Russian officer and prominent milblogger Igor Girkin downplayed claims of Russian offensive operations in this area and characterized them as battles of local importance resulting in tactical gains.[17]
Russian forces continued offensive actions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian ground attacks near Kreminna, Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), Shypylivka (8km southeast of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[18] Geolocated footage of Russian tanks operating west of Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna) shows that Russian forces have made incremental advances in the area northwest of Kreminna.[19] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai noted that mobilized Russian forces are arriving in Luhansk Oblast to replenish losses to frontline units and that Russian forces are constantly probing Ukrainian defenses along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[20] Haidai warned that Ukrainian officials are expecting large-scale Russian offensive attacks in the coming days as Russian forces try to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objective of seizing all of Luhansk Oblast.[21] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhii Cherevaty noted that Russian forces carried out a record number of artillery strikes in the Lyman direction west of Kreminna in the last week, likely as Russian forces conduct artillery preparation of the battlefield to support offensive operations.[22] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MOD) assessed that Russian troops may be trying to advance west of the Zherebets River, which roughly runs parallel to the Svatove-Kreminna line.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops attacked along the Dibrova-Zarichne line southwest of Kreminna and are attempting to break through towards Yampolivka and Nevske, 15km west and northwest of Kreminna, respectively.[24]
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a HIMARS strike against a Russian concentration area in Kadiivka (40km west of Luhansk City) on February 13.[25]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself, north of Bakhmut near Fedorivka (15km northeast), and north of Bakhmut near Paraskoviivka (5km north).[26] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhii Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian troops made contact 17 times within Bakhmut on February 13 and denied Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s claim that Wagner troops captured Krasna Hora (4km north of Bakhmut).[27] Prigozhin posted an expletive-filled rant on February 14 in which he emphasized that Wagner is nowhere near completing the encirclement of Bakhmut due to continued Ukrainian defense of the area.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces have cut the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway and that fighting is ongoing in Paraskoviivka, from where Wagner Group fighters advanced towards Vasyukivka (12km north of Bakhmut).[29] Geolocated footage posted on February 13 shows Russian forces have advanced within one-kilometer southeast of Vasyukivka.[30] One Russian milblogger remarked that Russian troops are making marginal advances north of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka and in southwestern Bakhmut itself.[31] Russian sources continued to discuss Russian attacks towards settlements southwest of Bakhmut along the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway, particularly Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, and Stupochky.[32]
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 14. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane and on the southwestern outskirts near Marinka and Pobieda.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces captured an unspecified Ukrainian position near Novobakhmutivka, about 15km north of Donetsk City.[34] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) posted an interview reportedly with soldiers of the DNR 1st Brigade, who are fighting near Vodyane.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motor Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are striking targets near Marinka.[36] Russian outlet RT posted footage of Marinka and claimed that Russian forces control two-thirds of the settlement and are fighting for every remaining building.[37]
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on February 14. DNR Head Denis Pushilin claimed that there is fierce fighting ongoing southeast of Vuhledar, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the southeastern outskirts of Vuhledar near the Mykilske dacha area, indicating that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces from outside the immediate vicinity of Vuhledar.[38] Aerial footage posted on February 13 shows that artillery fire has entirely leveled the dacha area southeast of Vuhledar.[39]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed offensive operations in Kherson, Mykolaiv, or western Zaporizhia oblasts on February 14. Russian forces continued routine shelling along the southern axis on February 14.[40]
Russian forces are likely prioritizing efforts to increase combat and defense readiness of forces in southern Ukraine while exaggerating the threat of a coming Russian offensive in this direction to distract and disperse Ukrainian forces. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Nataliya Humenyuk reported on February 14 that Russian forces are preparing for actions in all directions along the southern axis while attempting to create the impression that they are closing in on Ukrainian positions by using sabotage and reconnaissance groups and placing checkpoints, observation posts, and ammunition warehouses on islands on the Dnipro River delta.[41] Humenyuk added that Ukrainian forces are destroying these points. Humenyuk also noted that Russian forces deployed 200 members of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to Kherson Oblast to restore order among demoralized, dissatisfied Russian units and increase pressure on the local population.[42] A comparison of satellite imagery from January 21 and February 13 shows that Russian forces have constructed new trenches and barriers along the T2202 highway between Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast, and Armyansk, Crimea.[43]
Russian-backed Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Rogov on February 14 denied Western reports that Russia may be deliberately lowering Kakhovka Reservoir water levels to create an ecological disaster and shut down Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’s (ZNPP) cooling system.[44] Rogov accused Ukrainian forces of striking the Nova Kakhovka Dam and causing the water level to fall and then using the situation to discredit Russian management of ZNPP.[45]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian military officials are likely attempting to publicly appear as if they are addressing the emerging grievances from mobilized Russian personnel. Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova claimed that she sent an appeal to Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov to investigate appeals from mobilized personnel from the Republic of Tatarstan.[46] Moskalkova likely referred to an appeal from elements of the 1231st Regiment from Tatarstan who previously complained about their poor treatment as cannon fodder and lack of military equipment following their assignment under the command of unspecified elements of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps. The mobilized men of the 1231st Regiment submitted a formal complaint that the DNR command designated the mobilized men as disposable assault forces, after which Russian commanders reportedly withdrew the 1231st Regiment.[47] However, relatives of servicemen of the 1231st Regiment reported that the mobilized servicemen reassigned the individuals who cosigned the complaint to different units, subordinating some under DNR command, likely as a punitive measure.[48]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Kremlin cannot formally end Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial mobilization decree, claiming that the decree’s nullification would result in Russians losing their mobilization benefits and financial compensation.[49] The Kremlin and Russian MoD, however, are likely against any decree formally ending mobilization because that would allow mobilized Russians to return home from the frontlines. The Russian MoD likely framed mobilization as the legal basis for benefits in an effort to mislead Russians advocating mobilization‘s formal end. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian officials are attempting to mobilize scientists at the Polyus Scientific Research Institute by advertising the perks and social benefits for mobilized people.[50]
The Russian MoD continues its crypto-mobilization practices, prompting the United States Department of State to warn US-Russian dual citizens to refrain from traveling to Russia to avoid mobilization on February 13.[51] Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded to the US warning, stating that while a new wave of mobilization was not planned in Russia, dual citizens in Russia are “first and foremost, Russian.”[52] Peskov‘s statement, thus, indicated that the Kremlin would consider recruiting or mobilizing dual citizens. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that the Baikonur City Administration is offering 260,000 rubles (3,530 USD) to residents of Baikonur, Kazakhstan (a city that Russia leases for the Russian-controlled spaceport there) to participate in the war in Ukraine.[53] Meduza reported that the Baikonur City Administration announced in September 2022 that it would not allow the Kremlin to mobilize residents against their will.[54]
The Kremlin continues to withdraw forces and military equipment from its northwesternmost borders with NATO to support the Russian war in Ukraine. The Head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service Nils Andreas Stensønes told The Barents Observer that Russian ground forces on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia have been reduced to one-fifth of their initial strength numbers before the invasion of Ukraine.[55] Stensønes assessed that approximately three Russian battalion tactical groups (approximately 3,000 servicemen) stationed on the Kola Peninsula participated in the Russian invasion, of which up to half of their assigned personnel died in combat. Stensønes assessed that the Russian Northern Fleet has lost up to 100 tanks and armored personnel vehicles.[56] The Kremlin’s decision to deploy troops away from Russia’s borders closest to NATO supports ISW’s longtime assessment that the Kremlin is not concerned about a NATO conventional military threat against Russia.
Russian forces—especially underprepared mobilized personnel—continue to sustain heavy causalities as Russia intensifies its offensive operations in Donbas. An investigation by the BBC, Russian opposition outlet Mediazona, and open-source volunteers reported that of the confirmed 14,093 Russian deaths during the invasion, there is 1,082 Russian mobilized personnel who were killed in action—40 percent of whom died during the first weeks of 2023.[57] The report notes that the dates of obituaries of mobilized personnel in October indicate that troops trained for three to seven days. The report states that the Russian forces employed troops trained for one specialty in a different specialty at the front, indicating poor resource allocation, lack of cohesion, and planning unpreparedness.[58]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian officials are continuing efforts to integrate occupied areas into the Russian governance system. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on February 14 that the Kremlin is hosting a training course on civil service and managing the integration process for over 6,000 current and future occupation authorities at the Russian Higher School of Public Administration of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.[59] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russia launched this program and brought in a large number of Russian civil servants to fill a shortage of local collaborators.[60] Over 80 percent of the 6,000 “specialists” set to graduate from the program reportedly will be Russians.[61] Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova relatedly stated on February 13 that 60 DNR and LNR specialists will complete a week-long internship on child advocacy in Moscow.[62] Head of the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration Yevheny Balitsky claimed on February 14 that the Russian Federation Council Committee on Economic Policy met to discuss the economic development and integration of Zaporizhia Oblast.[63]
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 14 that members of the Ukrainian and Tartar partisan group “Atesh” conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a car carrying two Russian military personnel and two Russian special service representatives in Nova Kahovkha, occupied Kherson Oblast.[64] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that the explosion killed two and left two in serious condition.[65] A local Ukrainian Telegram channel claimed that the attack occurred on February 10 outside a Russian occupation police station.[66]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)
Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated on February 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may meet on February 17.[67]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/14/oborona-bahmuta-za-dobu-234-obstrily-37-boyezitknen-ponad-200-vorogiv-znyshheno/
[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/14/oborona-bahmuta-za-dobu-234-obstrily-37-boyezitknen-ponad-200-vorogiv-znyshheno/; https://suspilne dot media/384815-234-obstrili-za-dobu-aka-situacia-na-bahmutskomu-napramku/; https://twitter.com/Doranimated/status/1625255352122896411
https://closetheskyoverukraine.com/latest-news/russia-claimed-the-seizur...
[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/14/rosijski-vijskovi-nezadovoleni-komanduvannyam-ta-zabezpechennyam/
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/14/rosijski-vijskovi-nezadovoleni-komanduvannyam-ta-zabezpechennyam/
[44] https://ria dot ru/20230214/rogov-1851845675.html
[45] https://ria dot ru/20230214/rogov-1851845675.html
[47] https://t.me/astrapress/20944; https://www.tatar-inform dot ru/news/mobilizovannyx-iz-tatarstana-vernuli-v-svoi-polk-v-zone-svo-5896303?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop
[49] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/14/minoborony-rossii-mobilizovannye-lishatsya-sotsialnyh-garantiy-i-kompensatsiy-esli-putin-podpishet-ukaz-o-zavershenii-mobilizatsii
[53] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/14/zhitelyam-baykonura-goroda-v-kazahstane-kotoryy-arenduet-rossiya-predlozhili-po-260-tysyach-rubley-za-uchastie-v-voyne
[54] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/14/zhitelyam-baykonura-goroda-v-kazahstane-kotoryy-arenduet-rossiya-predlozhili-po-260-tysyach-rubley-za-uchastie-v-voyne
[55] https://www.etterretningstjenesten dot no/publikasjoner/fokus/innhold/Russland; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/14/glava-norvezhskoy-razvedki-zayavil-chto-iz-za-voyny-chislennost-rossiyskih-voysk-na-kolskom-poluostrove-sokratilis-v-pyat-raz; https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/02/four-fifths-kola-land...
[56] https://www.etterretningstjenesten dot no/publikasjoner/fokus/innhold/Russland; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/14/glava-norvezhskoy-razvedki-zayavil-chto-iz-za-voyny-chislennost-rossiyskih-voysk-na-kolskom-poluostrove-sokratilis-v-pyat-raz; https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/02/four-fifths-kola-land...
[59] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/02/14/vorog-gotuye-6000-praczivnykiv-dlya-okupaczijnyh-administraczij/; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/774; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3179
[60] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/02/14/vorog-gotuye-6000-praczivnykiv-dlya-okupaczijnyh-administraczij/
[61] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/02/14/vorog-gotuye-6000-praczivnykiv-dlya-okupaczijnyh-administraczij/
[64] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/02/14/na-khersonschyni-partyzany-pidirvaly-avto-z-okupantamy/
[65] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/02/14/na-khersonschyni-partyzany-pidirvaly-avto-z-okupantamy/
[67] https://ria dot ru/20230214/vstrecha-1851911817.html; https://russian.rt dot com/russia/news/1111078-peskov-vstrecha-putin-lukashenko; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/02/14/962896-v-kremle-anonsirovali-vstrechu-putina-i-lukashenko
understandingwar.org
2. Gen. David Petraeus: How the war in Ukraine will end
Relatively long read.
Excerpts:
Bergen: Who’s winning the war?
Petraeus: It is not Russia. Russia has, after all, lost the Battles of Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv; failed to take the rest of Ukraine’s southern coast (not even getting through Mykolaiv, much less to the major port at Odesa).
It has lost what it had gained in Kharkiv province. And it has had to withdraw its only forces west of the Dnipro River in Kherson province because the Ukrainians made the vital bridge connections to those forces impassable, took out the headquarters and logistics sites supporting those forces, and isolated them from the rest of the Russian elements east of the river.
That said, the battle lines since the withdrawal of the forces west of the Dnipro last fall have been fairly static, although Russian forces have made grinding, incremental and very costly gains in villages around Bakhmut in southeast Ukraine. And the Ukrainians are having to commit additional forces to defend the areas under pressure.
So, the situation is essentially a stalemate at present, albeit with Russia making costly attacks in several areas, and with both sides building up forces for offensive operations expected in the late winter (likely the Russians) and spring/summer (the Ukrainians).
The side that generates the most capable, well-trained and well-equipped forces by then will make the most significant gains. And my bet is on Ukraine in that regard.
Bergen: What are the lessons of the Ukraine War for the future of warfare?
Petraeus: I think we should recognize that, with a few exceptions, Ukraine is not the future of warfare. In large measure, it is what we would have seen had the Cold War turned hot in the mid-1980s – with largely Cold War weapons systems (albeit with some modernization).
We are, however, seeing some glimpses and hints of what the future of warfare might look like. We see the Ukrainian use of drones (of only modest range and capability) as aerial observers identifying Russian headquarters and other targets for the precision munitions the US has provided (which will double in range from 70-80 kilometers to 150 kilometers when the just announced US precision munitions arrive in Ukraine).
We see the impact of sophisticated, western-provided fire-and-forget shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. We have seen the impact of select use of medium-range anti-ship missiles. And we have seen use of offensive cyber capabilities, though not with enormous success, by the Russians.
Perhaps most notably, of course, we see a war taking place, for the first time, in a context that includes the widespread presence of smart phones, internet connectivity, and social media and other internet sites.
But, again, these are just hints of what the future of war between advanced powers would be. In such a conflict, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems would be incomparably more capable; precision munitions would have vastly greater range, speed and explosive power.
And there would incomparably greater numbers of vastly more capable unmanned systems (some remotely piloted, others operating according to algorithms) in every domain – not just in the air, but also at sea, sub-sea, on the ground, in outer space, and in cyberspace, and operating in swarms, not just individually!
And every intelligence and strike capability will be integrated and connected by advanced command, control, communications and computer systems.
Gen. David Petraeus: How the war in Ukraine will end | CNN
CNN · by Peter Bergen · February 14, 2023
Editor’s Note: Editor’s Note: Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America, and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. View more opinion on CNN.
CNN —
The war in Ukraine is at a stalemate, but that doesn’t mean it’s not changing. General David Petraeus predicts the war will look different this year with significant offensives likely staged by the two sides. Overall, the war continues to demonstrate basic weaknesses in Russia’s military, which was once thought to be one of the most capable in the world.
Petraeus has spent decades studying warfare and practicing its application. He was the US and coalition commander of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and later served as director of the CIA. He earned his Ph.D. from Princeton with a dissertation on the Vietnam War and the lessons the American military took from it. Petraeus is also the co-author, with British historian Andrew Roberts, of the forthcoming book, “Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine.”
As we approach the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, I asked Petraeus to reflect on the larger lessons of the war.
He says the Russians have lost many battles because of multiple failures of their military culture, doctrine, organizational structures, training and equipping. While Petraeus says this is in many ways the first open-source war, other aspects are being fought with Cold War tactics and weapons – albeit with upgraded capabilities, drones and precision munitions.
An expert from the prosecutor's office examines collected remnants of shells and missiles used by the Russian army to attack the second largest Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, on December 7, 2022.
Aleksey Filipov/AFP/Getty Images
Petraeus, who criticized the Biden administration’s withdrawal of Afghanistan, strikes a different tone on Ukraine. He says the President’s team has done a very impressive job of leading NATO and the West to counter the Russian invasion, though there have been times he would have liked to have seen decisions to provide certain weapons systems (such as western tanks and longer-range precision munitions) made sooner than they were.
The enormous US and western support of Ukraine means, Petraeus observes, that while the Russians may be preparing to send hundreds of thousands of soldiers into Ukraine in a new offensive, they will face off in the coming months with better-trained and better-organized Ukrainian soldiers armed with American longer-range missiles, armored vehicles and a tremendous amount of ammunition. And Petraeus says his money is still on the Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, as Petraeus notes, though Russian President Vladimir Putin set out to Make Russia Great Again with his invasion of Ukraine, he has, instead, achieved exactly that with the NATO alliance.
We conducted the interview over email.
Bergen: Who’s winning the war?
Petraeus: It is not Russia. Russia has, after all, lost the Battles of Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv; failed to take the rest of Ukraine’s southern coast (not even getting through Mykolaiv, much less to the major port at Odesa).
It has lost what it had gained in Kharkiv province. And it has had to withdraw its only forces west of the Dnipro River in Kherson province because the Ukrainians made the vital bridge connections to those forces impassable, took out the headquarters and logistics sites supporting those forces, and isolated them from the rest of the Russian elements east of the river.
That said, the battle lines since the withdrawal of the forces west of the Dnipro last fall have been fairly static, although Russian forces have made grinding, incremental and very costly gains in villages around Bakhmut in southeast Ukraine. And the Ukrainians are having to commit additional forces to defend the areas under pressure.
Residents cross a destroyed bridge as they evacuate the city of Irpin, northwest of Kyiv, during heavy shelling and bombing on March 5, 2022.
Aris Messinis/AFP/Getty Images
So, the situation is essentially a stalemate at present, albeit with Russia making costly attacks in several areas, and with both sides building up forces for offensive operations expected in the late winter (likely the Russians) and spring/summer (the Ukrainians).
The side that generates the most capable, well-trained and well-equipped forces by then will make the most significant gains. And my bet is on Ukraine in that regard.
Bergen: What are the lessons of the Ukraine War for the future of warfare?
Petraeus: I think we should recognize that, with a few exceptions, Ukraine is not the future of warfare. In large measure, it is what we would have seen had the Cold War turned hot in the mid-1980s – with largely Cold War weapons systems (albeit with some modernization).
We are, however, seeing some glimpses and hints of what the future of warfare might look like. We see the Ukrainian use of drones (of only modest range and capability) as aerial observers identifying Russian headquarters and other targets for the precision munitions the US has provided (which will double in range from 70-80 kilometers to 150 kilometers when the just announced US precision munitions arrive in Ukraine).
Opinion: In Ukraine's skies, drones tell a story of two wars
We see the impact of sophisticated, western-provided fire-and-forget shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. We have seen the impact of select use of medium-range anti-ship missiles. And we have seen use of offensive cyber capabilities, though not with enormous success, by the Russians.
Perhaps most notably, of course, we see a war taking place, for the first time, in a context that includes the widespread presence of smart phones, internet connectivity, and social media and other internet sites.
But, again, these are just hints of what the future of war between advanced powers would be. In such a conflict, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems would be incomparably more capable; precision munitions would have vastly greater range, speed and explosive power.
And there would incomparably greater numbers of vastly more capable unmanned systems (some remotely piloted, others operating according to algorithms) in every domain – not just in the air, but also at sea, sub-sea, on the ground, in outer space, and in cyberspace, and operating in swarms, not just individually!
And every intelligence and strike capability will be integrated and connected by advanced command, control, communications and computer systems.
Kyiv residents look at parts of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which Ukrainian authorities consider to be an Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, after a Russian drone strike on October 17, 2022.
Vladyslav Musiienko/Reuters
I recall an adage back in the Cold War days that stated, “If it can be seen, it can be hit; if it can be hit, it can be killed.” In truth, we didn’t have the surveillance assets, precision munitions and other capabilities needed to truly “operationalize” that adage in those days. In the future, however, just about everything – certainly every platform, base and headquarters – will be seen and thus be susceptible to being hit and destroyed (unless there are substantial defenses and hardening of those assets).
Imagining all this underscores, of course, that we must take innumerable actions to transform our forces and systems. We must deter future conflict by ensuring that there are no questions about our capabilities or our willingness to employ them – and also by doing everything possible to ensure that competition among great powers does not turn into conflict among them.
Bergen: Several years back, some people were calling NATO obsolete. Is it?
Petraeus: This question gets at one of the ironies of the situation. Putin set out to “Make Russia Great Again.” However, what he has done is make NATO great again – with two very capable, historically neutral powers (Finland and Sweden) seeking NATO membership; with substantially increased defense spending by NATO members, most notably Germany; with augmentation of NATO forces in the Baltic states and eastern Europe; and with the greatest unity among NATO members since the end of the Cold War.
Thanks to Putin, the description of NATO as suffering from “brain death” by French President Macron in late 2019 has turned out to be more than a bit premature.
Bergen: Is the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine surprising to you?
Petraeus: Not completely. In an interview with The Atlantic published shortly before the Russian invasion, I explained the considerable difficulties I expected Russia would encounter and noted that an invasion force of some 190,000 was much less than what likely would be required, especially if the Ukrainians proved to be as determined as I thought they would be (and they have been even more so).
Beyond that, though, even I didn’t foresee how miserably the Russians would perform.
Ukrainian servicemen fire with a French self-propelled 155 mm/52-calibre gun in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas on June 15, 2022.
Aris Messinis/AFP/Getty Images
Bergen: Is Russia failing because of failures of intelligence? Failures of its conscripts? Failures of Russian military culture? All the above?
Petraeus: All of the above and more. The list is long, including poor campaign design; wholly inadequate training (what were they doing for all those months they were deployed on the northern, eastern, and southern borders of Ukraine?); poor command, control, and communications; inadequate discipline (and a culture that condones war crimes and abuse of local populations); poor equipment (exemplified by turrets blowing off of tanks when fires ignite in them); insufficient logistic capabilities; inability to achieve combined arms effects (to employ all ground and air capabilities effectively together); inadequate organizational architecture; lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps; a top-down command system that does not promote initiative at lower levels and pervasive corruption that undermines every aspect of their military – and the supporting military-industrial complex.
Bergen: So, do we not have to worry about Russia as a “great power” anymore?
Petraeus: Not at all. Russia still has enormous military capacity and is certainly still a nuclear superpower, as well as a country with enormous energy, mineral and agricultural blessings. It also has a population (about 145 million) that is nearly double that of the next largest European countries (Germany and Turkey, each just more than 80 million).
And it is still led by a kleptocratic dictator who embraces innumerable grievances and extreme revanchist views that severely undermine his decision-making.
Bergen: You know the observation sometimes attributed to Stalin: “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Russia has a far bigger population than Ukraine: Will that make a critical difference to the Ukraine war over the long term?
Petraeus: It could if Putin mobilized all of Russia successfully. However, to date, the mobilizations have been partial, as Putin seems to fear how the country might respond to total mobilization. In fact, reportedly, more Russian men left the country than reported to the mobilization stations in response to the latest partial call-up of reserves.
Nonetheless, it is estimated that as many as 300,000 new recruits and mobilized reservists are being sent to the frontlines, with up to 100,000-150,000 more on the way. And that is not trivial – because quantity does, indeed, matter.
Bergen: But is Napoleon correct in this case: “In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one” – and Ukrainian morale seems to be higher.
Petraeus: That is a huge factor. Ukrainians sees the ongoing conflict as their War of Independence, and they have responded accordingly. President Volodomyr Zelensky has been positively Churchillian in rallying all Ukrainians to the service of their country as it fights for its national survival.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky looks on at a press conference for selected media at his official residence the Maryinsky Palace on March 3,2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine.
Laurent Van Der Stockt/Getty Images
Opinion: Where Zelensky goes from here
Thus, Ukrainians know what they are fighting for, while it is not clear that the same is true of many of the Russian soldiers, a disproportionate number of whom are from ethnic and sectarian minorities in the Russian Federation.
Moreover, Ukraine has, to date, done a better job than Russia of recruiting, training, equipping, organizing and employing additional forces – enabled by the extraordinary support provided by the US (more than $26 billion in arms, ammunition, and other security assistance since the beginning of the latest invasion) and other NATO and western countries. And I think we will see further evidence of this when Ukraine launches its counter-offensive in the spring or summer.
Bergen: What technologies have proven key to Ukrainian successes in this war? Several newish technologies seem to have proven important: Elon Musk’s Starlink mobile satellite systems kept communications open for the Ukrainians after the Russians had partially destroyed the phone system and jammed it. US-supplied HIMARS precision rockets have decimated Russian targets. Clearview AI, a controversial facial recognition technology used by some US police departments, has enabled the Ukrainians to identify Russian soldiers on the battlefield. TB2 Turkish armed drones have proven devastating to Russian targets and cheap commercial drones have helped the Ukrainians find targets.
Petraeus: All of those technologies have proven very important, and the Ukrainians have demonstrated enormous skill in adapting various technologies and commercial applications to enable intelligence gathering, targeting and other military tasks.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Kremlin in Moscow on January 30, 2020. (Photo by MAXIM SHEMETOV / POOL / AFP) (Photo by MAXIM SHEMETOV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
MAXIM SHEMETOV/POOL/AFP/Getty Images
Opinion: Why Netanyahu is suddenly a lot less friendly with Putin
In fact, the Ukrainians have also shown exceptional abilities to “McGyver” solutions for a variety of problems – whether adapting Western missiles for use on MiG-29 fighter aircraft, repairing battle-damaged armored vehicles left on the battlefield by the Russians (remember the Ukrainians’ “tractor army”), or jamming Russian communications.
And the Ukrainians also have demonstrated a very impressive ability to learn how to employ new weapons systems and vehicles much more rapidly than anyone anticipated, as they want to master new capabilities as quickly as is possible and get back to the fight.
Bergen: How would you grade the Biden administration’s approach to the Ukraine war?
Petraeus: I think the Biden Administration has led NATO and the rest of the western world very impressively in responding to the Russian invasion – providing enormous quantities of arms, ammunition, and other material and economic assistance. And also guiding the effort to impose economic, financial and personal sanctions and export controls on Russia. (And I offer this, noting that I am not a member of a political party and was very critical of the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and the way the withdrawal was conducted.)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Joe Biden during a joint news conference in the East Room of the White House in Washington, on December 21, 2022.
Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
To be sure, there have been times when I have felt that we should have decided to provide various capabilities (e.g., HIMARS, longer-range precision munitions, tanks, etc.) sooner than we have.
However, having sat around the Situation Room table in the West Wing of the White House, I know that it is far easier to second-guess from the outside than it is to make tough calls in office. But there are some additional capabilities (advanced drones, even longer-range precision munitions, fighter aircraft, and additional air defense and counter-drone capabilities) that I would like to see us provide sooner rather than later.
Eventually, for example, Ukraine is going to have to transition from eastern bloc aircraft (e.g., MiG-29s) to western ones (e.g., F-16s). There just aren’t any more MiGs to provide to them, and they reportedly have more pilots than aircraft at this point.
So, we might as well begin the process of transition, noting that it will take a number of months, regardless, to train pilots and maintenance personnel. All that said, again, I think the Administration has done a very impressive job and proven to be the indispensable nation in this particular situation – with important ramifications for other situations around the world.
Bergen: How would you grade Putin in this campaign? Has he got anything right?
Petraeus: Putin has earned a failing grade to date. Let’s recall that the first and most important task of a strategic leader is to “get the big ideas right” – that is, to get the overall strategy and fundamental decisions right. Putin clearly has failed abysmally in that task, resulting in a war that has made him and his country a pariah, set back the Russian economy by a decade or more (losing many of Russia’s best and brightest, and prompting over 1,200 western companies to leave Russia or reduce operations there), done catastrophic damage to the Russian military and its reputation and put his legacy in serious jeopardy.
That said, we should not underestimate Putin. He still believes that Russia can “out-suffer” the Ukrainians, Europeans, and Americans in the same way that Russians out-suffered Napoleon’s army and Hitler’s Nazis. And the US and our NATO and western allies and partners need to do all that we can, as quickly as we can, to enable Ukraine and prove Putin wrong.
Putin still believes that Russia can ‘out-suffer’ the Ukrainians, Europeans, and Americans in the same way that Russians out-suffered Napoleon’s army and Hitler’s Nazis.
Gen. David Petraeus
Bergen: The quasi-private Wagner Group is the force that Putin sends into the meat grinder of the toughest battles. Any thoughts on using mercenaries, many of whom are convicts, as a tactic?
Petraeus: What Russia has done with what are, in essence, mercenaries, as you note, is somewhat innovative – but also essentially inhumane, as it entails throwing soldiers (many of them former convicts) into battle as cannon fodder, and with little, if any, concern for their survival.
These are not the tactics or practices that, at the end of the day, foster development of well-trained, disciplined, capable, and cohesive units that have trust in their leaders and soldiers on their left and right.
Bergen: What are the lessons of Ukraine for the Chinese if they were to stage an invasion of Taiwan, which would not be over a neighboring land border but over a 100-mile body of water? Does the sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea navy, reshape how the Chinese might think about this question?
Petraeus: As a general observation, I think the developments in Ukraine have to be a cautionary tale for any country around the world contemplating a very challenging military operation – especially if that country’s forces have not engaged in major (or any) combat operations in many decades.
And especially if the target of such an operation has a population willing to fight fiercely for its survival and be supported by major powers – not just militarily but with substantial economic, financial, and personal sanctions and export controls.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on February 4, 2022, just weeks before the invasion of Ukraine.
Kremlin Press Office/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Bergen: Putin has hinted at using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine: Is that plausible? What would/should the US response be were that to happen?
Petraeus: It is certainly possible that Putin could order Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Peter, and we should be concerned about that possibility. However, that would be an incredibly bad decision on his part, as use of such weapons would result in Russia being in a worse situation than it was before their use, rather than a better situation.
And it is critical that the leaders of the US and other western nations – and of China and India, as well – convey clearly and repeatedly to Putin that the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for Russia would, indeed, be “catastrophic,” to quote US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
Bergen: Is this the first truly open-source war? The war in Ukraine is being fought in part on social media by Zelensky; commercial overhead satellites capture Russian battle groups moving around in real-time, and the social media accounts of Russian mercenaries in the Wagner Group document what they are doing.
Petraeus: Yes, I believe it is. This is the first war in which smartphones and social media have been so widely available and also so widely employed. The result is unprecedented transparency and an extraordinary amount of information available – all through so-called “open sources.”
Bergen: What does Putin want?
Petraeus: In the long term, Putin still wants to deny Ukraine its sovereignty and make it part of the Russian Federation. In Putin’s grievance-filled, revisionist version of history, Ukraine does not have a right to exist as an independent country.
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA - JANUARY 23: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (L) meets South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor (R) during his official visit in Pretoria, South Africa on January 23, 2023. (Photo by Ihsaan Haffejee/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Ihsaan Haffejee/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Opinion: How Russia outmaneuvered the US in Africa
That said, in the short term, having failed to take control of Kyiv and replace President Zelensky with a pro-Russian figure, Putin is seeking to expand the area of Ukraine controlled by Russian forces. Particularly in the southeastern part of Russia, and to solidify Russian control over the provinces that connect Russia with Crimea in the so-called land bridge, so that Russia does not have to rely solely on the Kerch Strait Bridge for connection with Crimea.
Bergen: Does Putin have a plan? Or is he just improvising?
Petraeus: Well, Putin recently made General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff, the commander of the war in Ukraine, presumably to ensure that the Russian Military and Ministry of Defense are doing all that they can to generate additional forces for the battlefield in Ukraine. And Russia has been seeking additional arms, ammunition, and weapons systems from other countries – such as Iran and North Korea – to make up for the shortfalls in production of Russia’s military industries that are constrained by export controls.
Beyond that, it appears that Russia is massing replacement soldiers and additional units to launch an offensive to take the portions of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the southeast, that they do not control – while also establishing defensive positions in depth in other areas that they control in the south.
M1A2 Abrams tanks stand on the grounds of the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division during a visit by the German president to U.S. forces on July 13, 2022, Bavaria, Grafenwoehr. Photo: Daniel Karmann/dpa (Photo by Daniel Karmann/picture alliance via Getty Images)
Daniel Karmann/dpa/picture alliance/Getty Images
Ukraine's new tanks won't be the instant game-changer some expect
That said, there does not seem to be a particularly innovative new plan, given the limitations of the professional capabilities of the Russian forces and their demonstrated inability to generate “combined arms effect” – to integrate the actions of tanks with infantry, artillery/mortars, engineers, explosive ordnance disposal, electronic warfare, fixed and rotary wing close air support, air defenses, effective command and control, drones, etc.
In the absence of that, we will likely see more of what we have seen in the past – Russian commanders throwing recently mobilized, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped soldiers into tough fights. And supported by massive artillery and rocket fires (assuming they can maintain the supply of artillery rounds and rockets), to achieve grinding, costly, incremental gains – with, perhaps, an occasional limited breakthrough.
And all of this will be happening while we await the Ukrainian offensive that will be launched in the spring or summer, with much better trained, better equipped and more capable Ukrainian forces.
Bergen: How will the next stage of the war be different from the first year?
Petraeus: There will be several new features this year, most significantly the additional capabilities on the Ukrainian side: Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles; longer-range and larger precision munitions for the US-provided HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket systems) that will enable precise strikes out to 150 kilometers (twice the range of the current precision munition); additional air defense systems of various types; augmented air defenses and additional wheeled armored vehicles, as well as enormous quantities of additional ammunition of all types.
A woman visits the grave of a Ukrainian serviceman, in the military section of a Kharkiv cemetery, May 21, 2022.
Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP/Getty Images
Beyond that, I believe we will see Ukrainian forces that are much more capable than the Russians at achieving the kind of combined arms effects that I described earlier and that thus enable much more effective offensive operations and can unhinge some of the Russian defenses. We may not see all this, however, until the spring or even summer, given the amount of time required for Ukrainian forces to receive and train on the new western tanks and other systems.
Meanwhile, in addition to the Russian offensive I mentioned earlier, I fear we will also see additional Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure with Russian missiles and rockets, as well as with Iranian-provided drones – which underscores the importance of doing all that we can to further constrain the Russian arms industries and also those of Iran.
Bergen: In 2003, at the beginning of the Iraq War, you famously asked a rhetorical question: “Tell me how this ends?” For the war in Ukraine: How does this end?
Petraeus: I think it ends in a negotiated resolution, when Putin recognizes that the war is unsustainable on both the battlefield (where Russia has in the first year likely taken many times the losses that the USSR took in nearly a decade in Afghanistan) and on the home front (which has been heavily impacted by economic, financial, economic, and personal sanctions and export controls).
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Also when Ukraine reaches the limits of its ability to withstand missile and drone strikes, getting a Marshall-like plan (developed by the US and G7) to help rebuild the country, and gaining an ironclad security guarantee (either NATO membership or, if that is not possible, a US-led coalition guarantee).
A security guarantee will be critical to enabling the success of the reconstruction effort and attracting outside investment.
CNN · by Peter Bergen · February 14, 2023
3. U.S. focuses on training Ukrainian troops to use less ammo
Are the cupboards getting bare in the Arsenal of Democracy?
If we had to go to war today in large scale combat operations (LSCO) would we have enough ammunition on hand? How many days of supply do we have and how long will it take for the industrial base to ramp up to sustain LCSO over time? Have we done the math?
U.S. focuses on training Ukrainian troops to use less ammo
By PAUL MCLEARY
02/14/2023 01:11 PM EST
Politico
Western nations are growing concerned over their ability to quickly replenish stocks.
The U.S. and Europe are looking at the current training efforts in England and Germany to change how Ukraine moves on the battlefield, including figuring out ways to fend off Russia without expending too much ammo. | Libkos/AP Photo
02/14/2023 01:11 PM EST
The U.S. is prioritizing helping the Ukrainians tweak the way they fight, relying less on artillery barrages and more on how the troops maneuver on the battlefield, as concerns mount over Western nations’ ability to replenish ammunition stocks.
The war in Ukraine has been marked by the massive use of artillery by both sides, with thousands of shells smashing into the front lines daily, straining the ability of the U.S. and European countries to keep up.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking to reporters after a meeting in Brussels with other NATO leaders, alluded to the growing concerns in Washington and elsewhere over stockpiles. He said Ukraine has “used a lot of artillery ammunition. We’re going to do everything we can, working with our international partners to ensure that we give them as much ammunition as quickly as possible.”
As the U.S. and Europe look for ways to increase their output of shells to keep their own warehouses stocked and supply Ukraine for its warm weather offensives, they are looking at the current training efforts in England and Germany to change how Ukraine moves on the battlefield. Part of that means figuring out ways to fend off Russia without expending too much ammo.
“We are working with the Ukrainian soldiers in various places throughout Europe to emphasize additional training on maneuver,” Austin said, “so that as they place more emphasis on maneuver, and shaping the battlefield with fires and then maneuvering, there’s a good chance that they’ll require less artillery munitions.”
The U.K., which has already trained 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in infantry tactics, has pledged to train another 20,000 this year with the help of Norway, the Netherlands and other NATO trainers on the ground.
There was some movement on the artillery issue in Tuesday’s Ukraine Defense Contract Group meeting in Brussels, a gathering of defense leaders from over 50 countries who meet once a month to coordinate military aid for Kyiv.
France and Australia have agreed to work together to produce more 155mm munitions, which are the backbone of Ukraine’s newly-acquired Western artillery arsenal.
The U.S. has also scrambled over the past year to increase its own output of 155mm shells, as Ukraine continues to fire thousands of rounds a day, burning through the one million-plus 155mm munitions the U.S. and allies have sent.
The U.S. Army has pledged to triple its monthly output of shells from the prewar total of about 14,000 a month to up to 90,000 a month by 2025.
The dwindling of ammunition stocks aren’t limited to cannon artillery. In recent meetings at the Pentagon, U.S. officials have informed the Kyiv’s representatives that it doesn’t have enough Army Tactical Missile Systems in its warehouses to spare for the Ukrainian military, POLITICO reported Monday.
Transferring the ATACMS, which would more than double the range of current Ukrainian rocket artillery to about 190 miles, would dwindle America’s stockpiles and harm the U.S. military’s readiness for a future fight, the Pentagon has told them.
POLITICO
4. 'Out of control': DoD reviews use of super-secret SAP classification, for space programs and beyond
SAP: special access program
Sap:
gradually weaken or destroy (a person's strength or power).
"our energy is being sapped by bureaucrats and politicians"
to weaken or exhaust the energy or vitality of
Sap: Slang. a fool; sucker; dupe.
a foolish gullible person
'Out of control': DoD reviews use of super-secret SAP classification, for space programs and beyond - Breaking Defense
John Plumb, DoD assistant secretary for space policy, suggested overuse of SAPs is hindering information sharing across programs and, more importantly, to allies
breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · February 14, 2023
John Plumb, DoD’s first assistant secretary for space policy (left) and Lt. Gen. Stephen Whiting, Space Operations Command head (center) are greeted by Army Maj. Gen. Tom James, Joint Task Force-Space Defense commander at Schriever Space Force Base, Colo., June 29, 2022. (US Space Force Photo by Tiana Williams)
WASHINGTON — Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks is leading a review of how the Defense Department uses tightly restricted Special Access Program (SAP) classification not just for space programs, but across the department, according to DoD space policy guru John Plumb.
“Inside the department, the deputy secretary has directed kind of a SAP reform effort, and that is hopefully coming to some conclusion soon. I can’t say too much about any of that, obviously, but that’s across all domains,” he told the Mitchell Institute today.
“I think anyone in those systems has understood that the number of SAPs has kind of spiraled out of control,” added Plumb, confirmed last March as DoD’s first-ever assistant secretary for space policy.
Concerns about US government over-classification of all things related to space — and especially the overuse of SAPs that compartmentalize access to information about individual programs to only a few officials — have reached a crescendo over the past year. A who’s-who list of top brass, members of Congress, industry leaders and Pentagon watchdogs for many years have been arguing that over-classification is harming the ability to convey the growing space threats from adversaries to lawmakers, the public and allied/partner nations, and hampered cooperation with industry and foreign partners to mitigate those threats.
Further, many senior military space leaders, such as former Joint Chiefs of Staff vice chair John Hyten, have vociferously argued that it is impossible to deter the hostile use of space with invisible weapons.
Plumb, for his part, has been focused in particular on mitigating over-classification in order to enable the Pentagon to better make use of the “asymmetric advantage” provided by US allies with space capabilities.
He noted that during a December “principals” meeting of the year-old Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative in New Zealand where the group worked “on how do we figure out how to be able to do information sharing and operation relevant speeds,” it was very clear that “the thing that limits us is over-classification of information.”
The CSpO comprises the US and six closely allied countries with military space forces and/or ambitions: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
Plumb emphasized that his primary goal is to “bring down” information secrecy levels only far enough “to maximize our ability to be ready to fight” — rather than declassification, which would allow broader congressional oversight and improved public understanding of US policies and space acquisition programs. This could include, he explained, allowing people with clearance to one specific SAP program to also be cleared into other related SAPs, as well as moving to “cross-level” security clearances of allied personnel to US equivalents.
“A lot of folks think of classification: ‘Oh, we’re going to declassify things so that they’re unclassified.’ I’m almost never talking about that,” Plumb stressed.
For example, as Breaking Defense first reported, he reiterated that there will be no declassified version of the Biden administration’s Strategic Space Review issued in November.
He also used carefully parsed language in addressing questions about US policy on how it intends to protect and defend military and Intelligence Community satellites and space systems, and whether/when the military will use offensive space weapons against those of adversaries.
Plumb noted that China, in particular, has had a “massive buildup of satellites going up every year” and a “wartime architecture” that “is aimed at” the US. As for DoD’s response, he reiterated the standard Pentagon talking points about its three overarching space goals: mission “assurance” and resilience of US space capabilities; “attribution” (i.e. timely detection/identification of adversary interference via space domain awareness); and capabilities to help “protect” the joint force from adversary space systems during a conflict.
“We have to be able to protect the joint force, that’s our service members in harm’s way on the ground or at sea, [from hostile space systems]. And we are going to do that,” he said. “This is where integrated deterrence becomes a more than a bumper sticker. Both to deter, and to fight and win if deterrence fails, we need to leverage options across all operations.”
That said, Plumb noted that DoD is on the hook — via language in the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act — to provide Congress with a “protect and defend” strategy for military and IC space assets.
“So, we will have something there,” he said.
Recommended
Under the deal, Maxar will be able to expand its SAR data offerings to international customers, and Umbra will get global eyes on its products, company officials told Breaking Defense.
breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · February 14, 2023
5. Philippines, U.S. to hold biggest war games in years
Philippines, U.S. to hold biggest war games in years
Reuters · by Reuters
MANILA, Feb 15 (Reuters) - The Philippines and the United States will this year carry out their biggest joint military drills since 2015, Manila's army chief said on Wednesday, against a backdrop of growing tensions with China in the South China Sea.
The exercises underscore improved ties with the United States under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and come as the Philippines condemns China's "aggressive" actions in the disputed waterway, including its use of a "military-grade laser" against one of Manila's vessels earlier this month.
The annual 'Balikatan' exercises will be conducted in the second quarter and involve more than the previous year's 8,900 troops, army chief Romeo Brawner told reporters.
"All of these exercises that we are doing are in response to all types of threats that we may be facing in the future, both man-made and natural," Brawner said.
President Marcos on Tuesday summoned China's ambassador to express "serious concern" over the intensity and frequency of China's activities in the South China Sea, most of which China claims as its territory.
China's use of a laser against a Philippine vessel on Feb. 6, which its foreign ministry insists was legal, has sparked expressions of concerns and support from Australia, Japan, and the United States.
Washington "will redouble its efforts with our Philippine ally" to bolster the Philippine military and coast guard's defence capabilities "as we work shoulder-to-shoulder to uphold the rules-based international order," Pentagon spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder said on Twitter.
The Philippines has granted Washington greater access to its military bases as part of the latter's efforts to deter China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and tension over self-ruled Taiwan.
In 2015, more than 11,000 troops from both countries participated in the joint military exercises.
"The exercises will involve a myriad of activities, not just focused on developing the war fighting capability of both armed forces, but also of the other non-traditional roles such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response," Brawner said.
Reporting by Karen Lema; Editing by Kanupriya Kapoor
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
6. S. Korea's Navy, Marine Corps to join Cobra Gold drills in Thailand
(LEAD) S. Korea's Navy, Marine Corps to join Cobra Gold drills in Thailand | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 15, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with troops' departure in para 2; ADDS more details in para 8)
SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Navy and Marine Corps will participate in a multinational humanitarian exercise set to kick off in Thailand later this month, officials said Wednesday.
The Navy's 4,900-ton Ilchulbong landing ship, carrying some 420 personnel, departed for Thailand to join the Cobra Gold exercise slated to take place in 11 regions in the country from Feb. 28 to March 10.
For the exercise led by the Thai and U.S. armed forces, the South Korean military has mobilized six assault amphibious vehicles, two K808 armored vehicles, two K55 self-propelled howitzers and a K77 fire direction center vehicle.
This undated file photo, provided by the Navy, shows the 4,900-ton Ilchulbong landing ship that will take part in the Cobra Gold 2023 exercise in Thailand. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The troops are set to take part in an array of field exercises, including amphibious landing drills with Thai and U.S. troops and special operations training in a jungle environment.
The Cobra Gold drills will also include a command post exercise, humanitarian civil assistance activities and cyber defense training.
"The Cobra Gold exercise will enhance multinational combined operations and overseas civil affairs operations and presents a good opportunity to improve military cooperation with participating countries," Navy Capt. Kim Tae-yeol, head of the South's contingent, was quoted as saying.
Launched in 1982, the annual Cobra Gold exercise focuses on training multinational forces for a range of procedures to stabilize a region embroiled in a virtual armed conflict.
This year's edition will involve troops from seven countries that also include Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, according to the Navy.
South Korea first took part in it in 2010 after attending it as an observer from 2002 to 2009.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 15, 2023
7. Mike Gallagher: A New Cold Warrior
Long read.
An interesting profile.
Excerpts:
Gallagher needed to get smart on China. And fast. “You need to take me to the Pottinger graduate school,” he remembers telling the Marine who spoke Mandarin Chinese. He asked his friend to pass along some notes only to roll his eyes. “We’re not spooky counterintelligence officers anymore,” he said begging for a quick reply “by email.” Pottinger refused. Worried about prying foreign eyes, he sent a 12-page document. It arrived at Walker campaign headquarters days later. In a manila envelope. By secure mail.
“He was absolutely right,” Gallagher said of the security precautions. Eight years earlier, John McCain’s campaign emails had been hacked. In 2016, the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton campaign would suffer the same fate. The typed notes Pottinger passed along served not only as the intellectual underpinning for how Gallagher thought about China, but eventually as the basis for the Trump administration’s “National Security Strategy on the Indo-Pacific” that McMaster and Pottinger would later write.
“I describe that as the long telegram of our new cold war,” Gallagher said, a reference to the famous “X Article” anonymously published in Foreign Affairs which popularized the Truman-era strategy of containment against the Soviets.
The thesis was simple: The old Nixon-era orthodoxy that a liberal trade policy with Beijing would lead to a liberal China was wrong. The CCP didn’t want to join the West’s polite post-war society. They wanted to wreck then remake it in their image through economic subversion, military coercion, or otherwise. McMaster, Trump’s second national security advisor, told RCP it represented “the biggest shift in foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.” Gallagher got it first.
Scott Walker was more than thrilled with his ad-hoc China scholar. “He had me focused on the problems with the Chinese Communist Party long before it was popular,” remembers the former Wisconsin governor who now serves as the president of the Young America’s Foundation. Gallagher plugged the campaign in with authors, human rights advocates, and ambassadors the world over to talk China, Walker said. Along with Robert O’Brien, who would later serve as Trump’s fourth and final national security advisor, he helped spearhead the plan for a 350-ship Navy.
“If my political team had been as good as our policy team,” Walker jokes good naturedly now, “I might be working on a second term in the White House right now. They were excellent.” But Walker lost, and three years after leaving the Marine Corps, Gallagher was out of a job.
Mike Gallagher: A New Cold Warrior
By Philip Wegmann
RCP Staff
February 14, 2023
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2023/02/14/mike_gallagher_a_new_cold_warrior__148856.html
The West is unprepared for everything all at once.
Cruise missiles explode sleeping American servicemen in Guam, Japan, and the Mariana Islands. Fifth generation fighter jets shoot scrambling American pilots from the sky, competing meaningfully for air superiority for the first time in a century. American submarines are sunk as they struggle to slow, then fail to stop, a naval armada that is as big or bigger than the one that liberated Europe.
The invasion of Taiwan has started, and the eyes of the world are less upon the United States than upon a suddenly terrifying China. To keep it that way, and to show they really mean business, as if the hypersonic missile strikes on Alaska and Hawaii were not enough, Beijing conducts “a nuclear test” somewhere over the Eastern Pacific. The mushroom cloud can be seen from California.
Well, at least that is what Rep. Mike Gallagher along with a team of academics and generals had to imagine when they poured over what looked like the most complicated “Risk” board ever assembled. It was only a war game, an exercise hosted last May by the Center for a New American Security.
Americans have become more “accustomed to low intensity conflict over the last two decades” than the global war Gallagher simulated with 16-sided dice. If the U.S. and China go to war, the Wisconsin Republican said in a “Meet the Press” interview, “a lot of people are going to lose their lives.” The lesson: “We want deterrence to actually work.”
That is also the mission statement, in so many words, of the House Select Committee on China which Gallagher now chairs, a mammoth undertaking to examine not just the military risk but also the ideological and economic threats presented by the Chinese Communist Party.
It is serious business. And Gallagher, a 38-year-old former U.S. Marine, is a serious man. Everyone says so.
There is a feeling in Congress that the effort might just rise above the normal self-importance of Capitol Hill. “The word ‘serious’ has been tossed around about this committee because that’s the desire,” said Rep. Mikie Sherrill. Confronting an existential threat, the New Jersey Democrat told RealClearPolitics, shouldn’t be something members “do for personal edification or partisan means.”
And that’s what had Gallagher “worried” when he pulled her aside. The two have served on committees together, and they teamed up in the CNAS war game. A U.S. Navy pilot before entering politics, Sherrill said during that exercise she appreciated the Marine’s “knowledge of ground operations.” His question on the House floor, between votes earlier this year, didn’t have to do with tactics or grand strategy. Who would the Democrats seat on his committee?
Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries had already promised Sherrill that “only serious members” were being considered, an assurance she relayed to Gallagher. “He was really pleased,” recalled Sherrill, who is one of 11 Democrats on the committee, “that everyone was in fact like-minded.”
It wasn’t like this in the previous Congress. Partisans couldn’t come to terms, even when it came to confronting a geopolitical rival. But emerging consensus on the China threat has changed things.
That, plus new leadership. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy picked Gallagher for the job, explaining to RCP that it was because he “possesses the right skills, vision, and knowledge to ensure Congress stays ahead of the threats from the Chinese Communist Party.” The first order of business: welcoming Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois as the ranking Democratic member. “What the CCP fears most,” Gallagher said in announcing the news, “is Democrats and Republicans working together to combat their malign influence.”
All that is needed now, said Florida Republican Rep. Mike Waltz, a friend of Gallagher and former Green Beret who served on the previous committee, is “a Sputnik-like wake-up call.” Chinese spy balloons the size of three city buses floating across the continental United States might just do the trick.
Gallagher and Krishnamoorthi released a joint-statement, a rarity in today’s Washington, condemning the blimp from Beijing as “a violation of American sovereignty.” Then they cheered when a Sidewinder missile from an F-22 fighter jet sent the balloon plunging into the Atlantic Ocean. Great power conflicts aren’t resolved with bipartisan talking points, but the episode illustrated the early promise for the China committee. It also underscored Gallagher’s constant warning: “What happens in Beijing, won’t stay in Beijing.”
In interviews with RCP, he sounds more like an academic than a politician. The struggle with the Soviet Union, he calls the “first Cold War.” The second has already started, and the West, he insists, is not the aggressor. “This is not something we chose,” Gallagher said, “the CCP, with their junior partner Russia, have been waging a new cold war against us for the better part of a decade.” That conflict will remake the world, he warns, “and we are just waking up to that now.”
“We’re not trying to take territory. We’re not trying to reshape a foreign country in our own image. We’re trying to defend the free world from communist, totalitarian aggression,” he said summarizing the emerging power conflict that will define the next century and the mission of his new committee. “That’s what it’s all about.”
For most of his life though, his focus was elsewhere. Like the rest of the country in the early 2000s, he was shaped by the global War on Terror. At Princeton, he changed majors to learn Arabic before joining the Marine Corps to fight jihadists insurgents, not communists. When he served as a counterintelligence officer, the congressman admits, he “wanted to be T.E. Lawrence,” not a modern Gen. Douglas McArthur. But now he studies China, working feverishly on how to keep a “new cold war” from turning hot. A human example of the U.S. pivot from the Middle East to Asia, the education of Mike Gallagher began in Anbar Province. He met a Marine fluent in Mandarin.
In November of 2007, Gallagher deployed to Iraq to lead a counterintelligence and human intelligence team. The next year, during a back-to-back deployment, he would take over another intel team, this one previously led by an officer named Matt Pottinger.
“He was about to get on a helicopter to get out of there,” Gallagher recalled of their first meeting, “but on the last day of his deployment he’s still poring over his laptop editing a report.” A former Reuters and Wall Street Journal reporter who was once roughed up by a state security guard in Beijing, Pottinger left journalism to join the Marines. Like Gallagher, his immediate mission was countering the Iraqi insurgency. But his bigger fear was in the East. “Why did he waste his time studying Mandarin and learning about the CCP,” Gallagher remembers thinking, “because clearly China is a backwater.”
The two would become close, but the warnings about Beijing seemed distant. They were foreign to the work Gallagher was doing at the height of the insurgency. By the end of his deployment, he’d personally conduct over 100 of what his team calls “tactical interrogations.” Business school was the plan after the military. Then he met then-U.S. Army Col. H.R. McMaster.
“Why don’t you come work for me?” asked McMaster. A West Point man with a doctorate degree in history, McMaster was at the time building a new strategy for the Middle East for Gen. Petraeus, a project he likened in an interview with RCP to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Project Solarium “but on steroids.” An energetic young lieutenant, especially one who spoke Arabic, could be useful. Reenlist, McMaster promised, and he’d have an opportunity to do stints at intelligence agencies while also returning to school, and be given the chance to “get out of your intellectual comfort zone.”
Gallagher always appreciated “the McMaster model of a warrior-scholar.” In more practical terms, he liked the idea of becoming “a PhD who could win a barfight.” His subsequent decision “to stick around the gun club” enabled Gallagher’s promotion to captain, while earning three separate postgraduate degrees in three years before his military retirement at the age 29. No drunken brawls were discovered in his record, though in 2015, while working as a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he successfully defended his doctoral dissertation at Georgetown University.
His attention didn’t turn fully to China until he decamped from Capitol Hill in 2015 to join the Scott Walker presidential campaign as an in-house foreign policy wonk. What would later become his defining purpose was born from necessity.
The threat of Salafi jihadism? Gallagher knew the ideology first-hand. The Iran-Iraq power dynamic? He could write a hundred memos for the candidate on the subject. ISIS? He’d fought them. For all his books and degrees, however, Beijing still remained a blind spot.
Gallagher needed to get smart on China. And fast. “You need to take me to the Pottinger graduate school,” he remembers telling the Marine who spoke Mandarin Chinese. He asked his friend to pass along some notes only to roll his eyes. “We’re not spooky counterintelligence officers anymore,” he said begging for a quick reply “by email.” Pottinger refused. Worried about prying foreign eyes, he sent a 12-page document. It arrived at Walker campaign headquarters days later. In a manila envelope. By secure mail.
“He was absolutely right,” Gallagher said of the security precautions. Eight years earlier, John McCain’s campaign emails had been hacked. In 2016, the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton campaign would suffer the same fate. The typed notes Pottinger passed along served not only as the intellectual underpinning for how Gallagher thought about China, but eventually as the basis for the Trump administration’s “National Security Strategy on the Indo-Pacific” that McMaster and Pottinger would later write.
“I describe that as the long telegram of our new cold war,” Gallagher said, a reference to the famous “X Article” anonymously published in Foreign Affairs which popularized the Truman-era strategy of containment against the Soviets.
The thesis was simple: The old Nixon-era orthodoxy that a liberal trade policy with Beijing would lead to a liberal China was wrong. The CCP didn’t want to join the West’s polite post-war society. They wanted to wreck then remake it in their image through economic subversion, military coercion, or otherwise. McMaster, Trump’s second national security advisor, told RCP it represented “the biggest shift in foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.” Gallagher got it first.
Scott Walker was more than thrilled with his ad-hoc China scholar. “He had me focused on the problems with the Chinese Communist Party long before it was popular,” remembers the former Wisconsin governor who now serves as the president of the Young America’s Foundation. Gallagher plugged the campaign in with authors, human rights advocates, and ambassadors the world over to talk China, Walker said. Along with Robert O’Brien, who would later serve as Trump’s fourth and final national security advisor, he helped spearhead the plan for a 350-ship Navy.
“If my political team had been as good as our policy team,” Walker jokes good naturedly now, “I might be working on a second term in the White House right now. They were excellent.” But Walker lost, and three years after leaving the Marine Corps, Gallagher was out of a job.
Congress might as well be the logical next step. A seat had opened in Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District, Gallagher was a Green Bay native, and his father and his uncle owned an eponymous Irish-Italian pizzeria in the area. “I said ‘this is a no brainer,’” O’Brien recalled. Gallagher already had a policy platform, the one he helped build for Walker. He knew the district. O’Brien’s sketched a quick campaign plan: “Have your first rally at Gallagher’s pizza, give out free pizza, run for office, and win.” He did. By double-digits.
And that is how Michael John Gallagher came to Congress. Those close to him can’t help themselves and say that all his earlier life, from the Marines to his time in academia, prepared him for the moment. O’Brien insisted that only “the sky is the limit for this guy.”
With a rising China, they similarly feel that Gallagher has been tapped on the shoulder and offered a chance to do some difficult but important thing. Juan Zarate, a deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush White House and a lifelong mentor to Gallagher, predicted that his protégé won’t come up short: “He’s literally fought battles on behalf of the country. He’s seen the enemy on the other side and understands what conflict looks like and, frankly, wants to avoid it. On navigating the most pressing, complicated foreign policy question of the day, he predicted confidently, “Gallagher can swim in those deep waters.”
A neon Miller High Life sign hangs on the wall in his office, and the three-term congressman tries to keep things in perspective. “I’m not good at speaking extemporaneously,” he volunteers. He certainly doesn’t talk about anything like walking with destiny. He’d likely blush if he heard how some friends and mentors talk about him. (O’Brien suggested the Oval Office could easily be in his future.)
“I’m not a Sinologist. I’m not a Mandarin linguist. I’m not an expert on China,” Gallagher says. “I’m just a member of Congress who’s interested and tries to study these issues,” he adds while sitting behind a bookshelf indicative of that broad effort – the historic letters of John Paul Jones next to the memoirs of President Reagan’s secretary of the Navy, the Bible paired with E.B. Sledge’s “With the Old Breed,” Barbara Tuchman’s “The Guns of August” stuffed next to just about every notable recent book of scholarship on Beijing.
Though polite and engaging, Gallagher gives off the aura of a man who would rather be doing other things when he sat down for our interview. But he can’t. The House is paralyzed until it selects a new speaker, and the day before he gave the fourth nominating speech for McCarthy. Eleven more rounds of ballots are counted before the new Republican leader can finally pick up the gavel. Because of House rules in the meantime, Gallagher can’t even get into a SCIF to review sensitive intelligence, let alone set up a committee. He calls it “Schrödinger’s Congress.”
But the chaos isn’t a problem. If anything, Gallagher said it puts the lie to the claim by Chinese President Xi Jinping that democracy is unworkable and that only top-down centralization can compete in a fast-moving order. He calls the frustrating floor debate “quintessentially American,” even “beautiful.” Then Gallagher reaches for a copy of “Presidential Command” by Peter Rodman. He reads aloud the section from the cold warrior’s book about how “the abolition of politics is a mirage and a dangerous one,” continuing on to quote that “the political process that is the ultimate determinant of national policy is not a corruption. It is the source of legitimacy.”
It is a very nice sentiment from a very well-respected book. Now Gallagher and his committee have to do the work to show its workable. The opportunity certainly exists.
“There is a high degree of consensus on China, but it is largely superficial so far,” said Elbridge Colby, a former assistant defense secretary in the previous administration, who is carefully optimistic about Gallagher’s committee. “There’s wide agreement that China is a threat, but much less agreement on how far and how fast we need to go in confronting it.” As things stand now though, Colby added, “there’s more bark than bite in our China strategy.”
The spy blimp that floated across the United States piqued the nation’s recent interest. But it will take more than popping one balloon to win the new cold war. As conservative columnist George Will noted recently in the Washington Post, while the Gallagher committee has a single focus, there is a myriad of thorny issues that must be explored.
Gallagher has blazed a trail on many of them already. In the new Congress, as Will argues with not a little admiration, the China committee ought to return to questions the former Marine first scouted. Plans for a 355-ship Navy seem to have been abandoned, China purchases US farmland at will, and Saudi Arabia has cut in front of Taiwan, despite the looming threat from Beijing, to purchase critical munitions from the American arsenal.
Those are just a smattering of the many economic, military, and ideological challenges that demand solutions. To guide the work, he outlines three “working hypotheses.”
Gallagher wants “to master the art of field hearings.” Rather than sticking around D.C., “bringing in the same think tank experts and talking to ourselves,” he wants to take the operation on the road both at home and abroad. Think Taipei to better understand military defenses, or New York to discuss the sinister effect of Chinese malinvestment. He suggests both, but has more travel in mind.
Once back on Capitol Hill, Gallagher envisions his committee working with other bodies in Congress as “a policy and legislation incubator, an accelerator.” Republicans and Democrats both say they want to confront the excesses of a rising China, and plenty of policy papers on the issue are collecting dust. “So how do we curate” the best ideas, he asks, and then “actually implement them, either in terms of passing a bill into law or just pushing the administration productively in the next two years.”
The final, and Gallagher says, least understood aspect: “The ideological and information domain.” It also may be the most uncomfortably intimate. He hopes his committee can educate the rest of Congress, in practical terms, on CCP espionage efforts in their states, districts, and to explain to his colleagues “here is why you’re a target yourself.” He warns that members of Congress, many of whom have access to sensitive information, are woefully unaware of how “to protect themselves against Chinese influence campaigns.”
According to at least one foreign national, who the FBI suspects of spying, politicians are easy targets. “If you are a student leader in political circles,” this person told RCP, then “you can see those people all the time.”
Gallagher has served as a pathfinder already, broadly scoping out areas of attack. Now all the chairman has to do is lead his little bipartisan platoon through that thicket. That is easier said than done, especially as time runs out. Forecasts vary, but experts expect the Chinese economy will surpass the United States by 2035. A military conflict could come sooner: Xi Jinping has ordered his military to muster enough strength to realistically invade Taiwan within the decade.
The committee will soon announce its first hearing, a retrospective slated for prime time on Feb. 28. Former senior officials from previous administrations will testify about where and how the United States got the China problem wrong for so long. It is an academic exercise but an important one. Alone, it won’t be enough.
To get something serious done, to move policy into law, counselled O’Brien, Gallagher will need to bring the White House into the process. “Mike is going to have to figure out who in the administration truly understands the threat,” the former national security advisor said. “He has to figure out who can convince the president to take the win.”
Biden has had his hands full with a land war in Europe of late, but the president isn’t ignorant to the threat in the East. While Republicans complain he didn’t blow the Chinese spy balloon out of the sky sooner, he has framed the coming century as a contest between “autocracy and democracy.” His restrictions on semiconductors, experts say, will go a long way to undercutting Chinese industry, a critical move to rebalance economic and military power on the world stage.
Gallagher has his gripes. He finds the current “autocracy vs democracy” line from Biden too simplistic and strategically limiting, given that the U.S. will have to partner with nations that aren’t perfect liberal democracies. He prefers to define the struggle as “the free world and our partners vs the Chinese Communist Party.” He also sees incoherence in an administration that identifies climate change, not the CCP, as “the greatest threat.” In Gallagher’s telling, John Kerry, Biden’s special presidential envoy for climate, is “the great high priest of that camp.” He hasn’t ruled out calling Kerry to testify.
All the same, Gallagher believes Biden “has been kind of mugged by reality.” There is no going back to the old way of dealing with Beijing when free trade was treated as a magical elixir that would induce better behavior out of the foreign power and make good global citizens out of communists. Gallagher said confidently that “the era of wishful thinking on China is over.”
Sen. Angus King is confident Gallagher won’t have any trouble working across the aisle. The Maine independent calls Gallagher “a first-class talent” who despite his doctorate and many degrees “doesn’t have an ounce of pretentiousness in his body.” The two worked on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission to develop a meaningful strategy for countering foreign cyber threats. None of those discussions, King reported, “ever had a partisan tinge.”
If the solarium is a model for the China commission, King predicted that change is coming. They didn’t just call witnesses and write white papers to let them collect dust in the Library of Congress. There was real substance that made a difference, King reports, noting that “two-thirds of our recommendations were enacted into law.”
Gallagher now hopes for similar success. The winds have shifted on China, and there is increasing bipartisan consensus that the United States must do more to meet the emerging threat. Those close to the Wisconsin Republican like his odds. “The Mike Gallagher’s of the world will outperform the princeling autocrats,” Pottinger said, a reference to the leader of the CCP. “So long as we keep our nerve.”
8. IntelBrief: China’s South Asia Troubles
IntelBrief: China’s South Asia Troubles - The Soufan Center
thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · February 15, 2023
February 15, 2023
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AP Photo/Andy Wong
Bottom Line Up Front
- China’s efforts to build economic and political influence in South Asia are running into significant headwinds, including with its longtime ally, Pakistan.
- Chinese relations with historic rival India remain tense over periodic border clashes and New Delhi’s participation in several U.S.-backed regional security groupings.
- Pakistani citizens have demonstrated against the conditions imposed by China for investments in Pakistan under Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
- China’s economic policymakers see potential value in pursuing investments in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, which has significant reserves of some critical minerals, but Islamic State groups pose a threat to Chinese investors there.
As China’s strategic influence around the globe grows, Beijing’s focus on South is exceeded only by its intense interest in East Asia. China shares a border with four South Asian states, including a narrow border along Afghanistan’s sparsely inhabited Wakhan Corridor. The corridor neighbors China’s Xinjiang province, where large numbers of Muslim Uyghurs are being detained by the government in what are reported to be camps imposing harsh penalties for expressions of faith or regional culture. Although China is wary of the return of Islamist hardliners amid the Taliban’s regaining power in Kabul, the Taliban poses no conventional military threat to China. Leaders in Beijing remain concerned however that the group is harboring ethnic Uyghur Islamist extremists of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) as it did during its pre-9/11 rule. The TIP, which was listed under the UN’s al-Qaeda sanctions regime when it was formerly known as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, seeks to use Afghanistan as a base from which to liberate Chinese Uyghurs. Strategically, Beijing is more concerned about the intentions and capabilities of India, whose population is set to exceed that of China this year, and with whom China’s troops have clashed on their border as recently as December 2022. China has long looked to Pakistan as an ally with which to apply pressure on India’s western border in the event of an all-out conflict.
While China has consistently sought to outflank India, Beijing has also aimed to engage New Delhi diplomatically to ease tensions and avoid having to divert additional forces to its western borders. However, in addition to occasional border clashes, Chinese President Xi Jinping has also failed to dissuade India from joining several U.S.-led regional groups, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) and the “I2U2.” The Quad – a security partnership between India, Japan, Australia and the United States – was revived in 2017 as part of a U.S.-led response to Chinese incursions in the the broader Indo-Pacific region. Notably, India also joined China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that same year. The I2U2, which India joined in 2021 and also features Israel and the United Arab Emirates, focuses more on technological collaboration on energy, health, and other functional issues than on countering China or any other power. However, traditionally a stalwart member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India’s membership furthers New Delhi’s movement toward Washington. India has refused to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiatitive (BRI), in part because signing on would have meant accepting China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects in the parts of the disputed Kashmir region that Pakistan controls.
BRI debts are creating problems for Beijing with its historic security partner, Pakistan, feeding into India’s assertions that China has imposed unsustainable financial conditions on recipients of BRI investments. However, accusations of Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy” are controversial, and existing evidence has not consistently supported the idea that BRI initiatives are driven primarily by Beijing’s top-down geopolitical mandates. According to Bloomberg, roughly 30% of Pakistan’s foreign debt was owed to China as of September 2022; this was about triple the amount it owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), according to the IMF. Given Pakistan’s current economic troubles, the country is in talks to reschedule its debts to Chinese and other creditors, and is negotiating to secure an IMF loan, which often requires substantial economic reform. Pakistan’s inability to service its debts has caused the Chinese companies that set up and now run BRI-related power stations in Pakistan to threaten to shut down operations if they are not paid.
In late 2022, months of protests erupted in the Pakistani port city of Gwadar, site of a large China-funded port development project in Balochistan, where there have been historic tensions with Islamabad and a spate of attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army; protestors voiced concerns about against Chinese-imposed security checkpoints, trade restrictions, and resource shortages in the area. Despite the unrest, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif joined President Xi during a November visit to Beijing in pledging to “accelerate the construction” of the Gwadar port. However, Xi also expressed “great concern” for the safety of Chinese nationals in Pakistan, urging Pakistani authorities to provide “a reliable and safe environment” for Chinese nationals and interests in the region. In December, a local leader of the protests warned Chinese citizens to leave the area, and, in early January, Pakistani authorities imposed a de-facto curfew on the area to compel protesters to cease their unrest.
In Afghanistan, China has been welcomed by Taliban figures because Beijing did not militarily support the ousted U.S.-backed government and because it has offered economic support; Chinese officials have said they hope for “friendly” relations with the new government. However, neither China nor any other government has officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. While U.S. forces helped the Kabul government stave off the Taliban insurgency from 2001-2021, China confined its activities to economic investment, initiating major mining projects to extract minerals, such as copper, crucial to China’s economy. China also invested in Afghanistan’s small hydrocarbons sector and reportedly eyed projects to develop Afghanistan’s significant deposits of lithium, a mineral critical to the global energy transition. The Taliban’s continued political and economic complicates China’s efforts to import equipment, skills, and hard currency funding into Afghanistan for its infrastructure projects there. Afghanistan’s banks are almost entirely disconnected from the global financial system, and billions of dollars in central bank funds have been frozen by the United States.
However, China remains wary of the Taliban’s hardline Islamist ideology and its past affiliations with radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and the TIP. While Beijing has not cancelled major investments in the country and Chinese investors continue to scout out new opportunities there, little progress has been made on existing projects, possibly owed to Chinese dissatisfaction with the Taliban’s ability to reign in the TIP. Meanwhile, militants of the group, Islamic State Khorasan, have threatened to target embassies in Kabul, including China’s, to “undermine the relationship between the Taliban and member states in the region,” according to a UN report released last week. In December, Islamic State-Khorasan claimed responsibility for an attack on a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul that has hosted Chinese business travelers since the Taliban takeover. China’s foreign ministry responded by calling for Chinese nationals to evacuate the country, with some predicting that such security incidents would likely dampen China’s enthusiasm for new investment in Afghanistan. Like their Western counterparts, China’s leaders undoubtedly hope that security will improve and Taliban policies will moderate so that Afghanistan will re-integrate into the global community. However, recent actions by the Taliban, particularly on women’s rights, suggest that moderation is not forthcoming.
thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · February 15, 2023
9. Cyber Sanctions Are Nice; Digital Takedowns Are Better
Cyber Sanctions Are Nice; Digital Takedowns Are Better
fdd.org · · February 14, 2023
February 14, 2023 | Policy Brief
Annie Fixler
CCTI Director and Research Fellow
John Hardie
Russia Program Deputy Director
The U.S. Treasury Department and several UK agencies announced sanctions on Thursday against seven members of a Russia-based cybercriminal group known as Trickbot. While these sanctions — the first UK designations targeting cybercriminals — are welcome, crippling the group will require further Western action.
For nearly a decade, the Trickbot gang has stolen online banking information and used ransomware to extort victims, Treasury and the UK government explained. Trickbot is intertwined with other Russian ransomware groups, including Conti and Ryuk. The British announcement blamed Trickbot for cyberattacks on hospitals, including the Irish Health Service Executive. The U.S. government previously called Trickbot “an increased and imminent cybercrime threat to U.S. hospitals and healthcare providers” amid a wave of ransomware attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic.
While noting that Trickbot is primarily financially motivated, both the U.S. and UK statements linked the group to Russian intelligence. Moscow has created a “haven for cybercriminals,” Treasury noted, and at times uses them to serve state or private interests. The UK National Cyber Security Centre said Trickbot members “have likely received tasking” from Russian intelligence.
Ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections, both U.S. Cyber Command and an international coalition of companies, led by Microsoft, temporarily disabled Trickbot’s infrastructure over concerns the group would try to disrupt the election. After Conti backed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a private researcher leaked a trove of Trickbot data highlighting the group’s connections to Russia’s security services and confirming its relationships with Conti and Ryuk. IBM later revealed that Trickbot has begun systematically targeting Ukraine.
Although a good step, Thursday’s sanctions likely will not achieve more than a marginal financial impact on Trickbot. The sanctions bar U.S. and UK persons from transacting with the seven designated individuals. Other persons who support the hackers could face sanctions as well. But Washington and London refrained from designating Trickbot itself, meaning its victims can still pay ransom to the group so long as they do not transact with sanctioned persons. Although Treasury has previously warned that paying ransoms may run afoul of sanctions, London is reportedly keen to avoid potentially “re-victimizing” hacking targets by making ransomware payments illegal.
However, sanctions are not the only tool the United States and its Western allies have in their arsenals. The new sanctions build on parallel efforts by U.S. and European law enforcement targeting cybercriminal gangs. The Department of Justice (DOJ) on Thursday unsealed an indictment against one of the Trickbot hackers for cyber fraud dating back more than a decade. Three days prior, Russian national Denis Mihaqlovic Dubnikov pleaded guilty to laundering cryptocurrency proceeds from Ryuk ransomware attacks. Dutch authorities had arrested Dubnikov in November 2021 and extradited him to the United States.
Last month, the United States and European countries disabled the digital infrastructure of the cryptocurrency exchange Bitzlato and arrested its senior executives on charges of facilitating criminal payments. The exchange had reportedly facilitated Conti ransomware proceeds, and Treasury labeled it a “primary money laundering concern.” Days later, American, German, and Dutch authorities seized the servers of another Russian ransomware group, known as Hive. Prior to the takedown, FBI agents had hacked into Hive’s networks and quietly provided decryption keys to its victims, starving the group of $130 million in potential ransomware payments, according to DOJ.
UK authorities pledged that Thursday’s sanctions would be the start of a “new campaign of concerted action” against ransomware, in coordination with Washington. The Record reported that additional actions are expected later this year.
As part of this campaign, the two allies should encourage other countries to join their efforts, starting by matching Thursday’s designations. While limited in impact, sanctions are a valuable first step against ransomware actors. To deal Trickbot a harder blow, however, Washington and its allies will need to disable the group’s digital infrastructure and arrest its hackers and moneymen if and when they venture outside Russia.
Annie Fixler is the director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program. They both also contribute to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from the authors, the Russia Program, CCTI, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Annie on Twitter @afixler. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD, @FDD_CCTI, and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · February 14, 2023
10. Suspected Iranian Weapons Seized by U.S. Navy May Go to Ukraine
I think this is a good move but the sad irony would be for Ukraine to go to north Korea to purchase ammunition for these former Soviet weapons systems. (note sarcasm) But it does beg the question: Who is producing ammunition for these weapons? The security assistance professionals may have their work cut out for them.
Suspected Iranian Weapons Seized by U.S. Navy May Go to Ukraine
U.S. officials are considering sending a cache of arms to help Kyiv in its battle against Russia
By Dion NissenbaumFollow
, Gordon LuboldFollow
and Benoit FauconFollow
Updated Feb. 14, 2023 6:17 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/seized-weapons-bound-for-yemen-may-go-to-ukraine-2516b45d?mod=hp_lead_pos7
The U.S. military is considering sending Ukraine thousands of seized weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition once bound for Iran-backed fighters in Yemen, an unprecedented step that would help Kyiv battle Russian forces, U.S. and European officials said.
U.S. officials said they are looking at sending Ukraine more than 5,000 assault rifles, 1.6 million rounds of small arms ammunition, a small number of antitank missiles, and more than 7,000 proximity fuses seized in recent months off the Yemen coast from smugglers suspected of working for Iran.
The unusual move would open up a new supply of firepower America and its allies could tap into as they struggle to meet Ukraine’s need for military support as its war with Russia enters its second year.
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The Ukrainian embassy in Washington, D.C., and the National Security Council declined to comment on the matter.
America and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies met this week in Brussels to discuss new ways to speed up the flow of weapons going to Ukraine and the military supply shortage the war is creating.
“The war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Monday, on the eve of the meetings. “The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain.”
The U.S. has provided Ukraine more than 100 million rounds of small arms ammunition as of this week and about 13,000 grenade launchers, guns and rifles, according to the Pentagon.
The challenge for the Biden administration is finding a legal justification for taking weapons from one conflict and transferring them to another. The U.N. arms embargo requires the U.S. and its allies to destroy, store or get rid of the seized weapons. Biden administration lawyers have been looking at whether the resolution creates any wiggle room for them to transfer the weapons to Ukraine, according to U.S. officials.
Advocates of the idea said President Biden might be able to resolve the legal question by crafting an executive order, or working with Congress to empower the U.S. to seize the weapons under civil forfeiture authorities and send them to Ukraine.
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There is precedent for the U.S. to use asset forfeiture laws to seize Iranian weapons. The Justice Department used such laws in 2020 to take control of two shipments of seized weapons, including guided antitank missiles, surface-to-air missiles and cruise missile parts.
Jonathan Lord, director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington-based think tank, and a proponent of the idea, said there is bipartisan support in Washington for the concept.
“This seems like a very easy thing for the White House and Congress to get behind and solve,” he said. “I think the president might be pushing on an open door here.”
A spokeswoman for Albania’s United Nations mission, which holds the U.N. Security Council’s rotating presidency, declined to comment. Iranian officials in New York and Tehran didn’t respond to requests on Tuesday for comment.
Nasr al-Din Amir, the Houthi deputy information minister, mocked the U.S. idea as ineffective.
“What change can this make to war?” he said of the idea to send the arms to Ukraine. “They’ve been sending much heavier weapons.”
The rifles and ammunition have been seized in recent months by the U.S. and France as part of a global effort focused mainly on preventing Iran from smuggling weapons into Yemen. Tehran’s Houthi allies have been fighting an eight-year war against the Saudi-backed government, which was forced out of the capital in 2014.
Typically, the weapons are seized and destroyed by the U.S. and its allies enforcing a United Nations arms embargo on Yemen. But U.S. officials said the global effort to supply Ukraine with weapons triggered a discussion about sending the confiscated military supplies to Kyiv.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a press conference in Brussels.
PHOTO: KENZO TRIBOUILLARD/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
U.S. military officials began seriously considering the idea late last year after the U.S. Navy seized a million rounds of ammunition on board a fishing boat traveling from Iran to Yemen, the officials said. A few weeks later, the American military seized more than 2,000 AK-47s from a small fishing boat in the Gulf of Oman. In mid-January, French forces found 3,000 assault rifles, nearly 600,000 rounds and more than 20 antitank rockets on board another fishing boat in the Gulf of Oman.
While the volume of seized armaments may not make a huge dent in the war effort, sending the weapons bound for Iran-backed forces in Yemen to the Kyiv government would allow America to turn the tables on Tehran, which has provided Russia with hundreds of so-called suicide drones used to target civilians in Ukraine, U.S. officials said.
It would also open the door for the U.S. to redirect other types of weapons seized off the Yemen coast, if needed by Kyiv.
“It’s a message to take weapons meant to arm Iran’s proxies and flip them to achieve our priorities in Ukraine, where Iran is providing arms to Russia,” said one U.S. official.
The U.S. and its allies have accused Iran of supplying Houthi fighters in Yemen with military aid for years. Iran, which provides open political support for Houthi forces, denies that it supplies weapons in violation of the U.N. arms embargo.
The U.N. says that Iran is the most likely source of missiles, drones, rockets and small arms that have helped the Houthis successfully hold their ground in the eight-year war against Saudi-backed Yemeni forces.
Houthi forces have repeatedly fired missiles and launched drones from Yemen targeting the capitals of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have both provided military support for the internationally recognized Yemeni government.
The war created what the U.N. calls one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters, with 23 million people in Yemen—almost three-quarters of the population—in need of humanitarian aid.
Last April, the U.N. helped broker a truce in Yemen to aid political talks aimed at ending the war. But diplomatic efforts to end the conflict remain stalled. The U.S. has accused Iran of using the lull to try to resupply Houthi fighters with weapons.
Ukrainian soldiers in Donetsk, Ukraine.
PHOTO: DIEGO HERRERA CARCEDO/ANADOLU/GETTY IMAGES
Aresu Eqbali in Tehran and Saleh Al-Batati in London contributed to this article.
Write to Dion Nissenbaum at Dion.Nissenbaum@wsj.com, Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com and Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com
11. Ukraine live briefing: Russia has lost, top U.S. general says; intense fighting in east
A powerful statement. Will it stand?
Excerpt:
“Russia has lost” the war in Ukraine, “strategically, operationally and tactically,” Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday in Brussels after a meeting of countries supporting Kyiv.
Ukraine live briefing: Russia has lost, top U.S. general says; intense fighting in east
By Emily Rauhala, Kelsey Ables, Ellen Francis, Erin Cunningham and Natalia Abbakumova
Updated February 15, 2023 at 7:25 a.m. EST|Published February 15, 2023 at 1:55 a.m. EST
The Washington Post · by Kelsey Ables · February 15, 2023
“Russia has lost” the war in Ukraine, “strategically, operationally and tactically,” Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday in Brussels after a meeting of countries supporting Kyiv. Russian President Vladimir Putin was wrong in thinking in he could quickly defeat Ukraine, Milley said, adding: “Ukraine remains free. They remain independent. NATO and this coalition has never been stronger.”
Still, fighting remains intense, with the Kremlin “trying to squeeze all possible aggression potential” out of its forces, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in his nightly address. “Speed in everything,” he said, urging partners to ramp up support for Kyiv. “In decision-making. In the implementation of decisions. In delivery. In training. Speed saves lives, speed brings back safety.”
Here’s the latest on the war and its ripple effects across the globe.
Key developments
-
Russia has put at least 6,000 Ukrainian children in 43 “reeducation” camps and institutions since the war began, according to the State Department-supported Conflict Observatory. The majority of camps are engaged in “systematic re-education efforts that expose children from Ukraine to Russia-centric academic, cultural, patriotic, and/or military education,” and a part of what the report describes as an operation “centrally coordinated by Russia’s federal government.”
-
NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said Tuesday in Brussels that Moscow is “preparing for more war,” and that Putin has underestimated the bravery of Ukrainians and the resolve of their allies. Meetings of top officials from NATO countries will continue in Brussels on Wednesday, with membership hopefuls Finland and Sweden also in attendance. “The main question is not whether Finland and Sweden are ratified together. The main question is that they are both ratified as full members as soon as possible,” Stoltenberg told reporters, according to Reuters. (Helsinki and Stockholm have committed to joining NATO together.)
-
Moldova briefly closed its airspace Tuesday after its Defense Ministry reported a balloon-like object had been seen in the sky. Earlier this week, Moldova accused Russia of plotting a coup against the country’s pro-West government; Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the claims “baseless and unsubstantiated” in an emailed statement.
Battleground updates
-
Heavy fighting continues in Bakhmut, where Russia is focusing most of its war efforts. Russia has been moving more troops to the eastern Ukrainian area, but many “are ill-trained and ill-equipped. And so their casualty rate has been really high,” U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters in Brussels on Tuesday. The ongoing fighting in the eastern city has raised concerns among some analysts that Ukraine will not be able to simultaneously defend Bakhmut and launch a successful spring counteroffensive, The Post reported.
Global impact
- U.S. officials said Iran was supplying Russia with deadly drones for use in Ukraine in hopes of becoming a bigger supplier globally. Iran views the war as “a great marketing opportunity,” a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst said at a briefing in London on Tuesday.
-
The founder of the Wagner Group admitted to creating the internet troll farm that U.S. officials say helped Russia interfere in American elections. In a post shared by a Wagner-affiliated Telegram account, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a Putin ally heavily involved in the war in Ukraine, said that he invented and managed the Internet Research Agency, which aimed to “protect” Russia from the West’s “propaganda” and is alleged to have inflamed tensions ahead of the 2016 election.
-
The European Union will investigate how to use billions of dollars frozen in Russian accounts to rebuild Ukraine, the Swedish government said. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said an ad hoc group would determine which funds have been frozen in the European Union and figure out how to “legally proceed to access those funds,” Reuters reported.
From our correspondents
Ukraine’s allies rush to send more equipment, risking logjams: As Kyiv plans to launch a spring counteroffensive, time is running out for Ukraine’s military supporters to gather and dispatch supplies. Transportation lines are quickly becoming overwhelmed, weaponry risks getting stuck and there was a “palpable sense of urgency” as top military and defense officials gathered in Brussels for the latest meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, report Karen DeYoung and Emily Rauhala.
Some have forecast that there will be a short window of opportunity for Kyiv to break through the front line. “If people want to wait until the end of March to send this stuff into Ukraine, the three transport nodes that we’re currently using will be completely saturated and [it] won’t get there in time,” a senior Biden administration official told The Post. “That’s what makes this short window even shorter.”
The Washington Post · by Kelsey Ables · February 15, 2023
12. Militant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda’s probable new chief in U.N. report
Militant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda’s probable new chief in U.N. report
The Washington Post · by Andrew Jeong · February 15, 2023
Saif al-Adel, who is wanted by the United States in connection with the 1998 bombings of its embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, has been identified by many countries as the new “de facto and uncontested” leader of al-Qaeda, according to a report by U.N. experts. Many U.N. member states also believe that Adel is located in Iran, the report said.
Adel is a former member of the Egyptian military and later fought the Soviets when they invaded Afghanistan in 1979. He is also a charter member of al-Qaeda and was a loyalist of Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, according to a profile of Adel written by the counterterrorism expert Ali Soufan.
When U.S. forces killed bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Afghanistan last year, Adel was seen by many experts as the terrorist group’s probable next leader. U.S. authorities had previously offered a $10 million reward for information leading directly to his “apprehension or conviction.”
According to a #UN report, #Egypt's Saif Al-Adel is the new de facto leader of Al Qaeda. He reportedly has his current residence in #Iran. pic.twitter.com/lqwyXFZCq8
— Łukasz Bugajski (@bugajski_lukasz) February 14, 2023
But al-Qaeda has not publicly declared Adel its new leader, possibly because of the political sensitivities of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, according to the report, which was circulated to the U.N. Security Council on Monday.
The Taliban, which has been seeking a measure of international legitimacy since it retook power in 2021, probably wants to avoid the embarrassment of acknowledging that it harbored Adel’s predecessor, the report said, citing assessments from member states. The group had previously signed an agreement with the United States pledging not to allow terrorist groups with international aims to operate out of territory it controls.
Rita Katz, an extremism expert and director of the SITE Intelligence Group, had raised the possibility of al-Qaeda naming a new leader under an alias and not unveiling a “face to match the name to,” when U.S. forces killed al-Zawahiri.
But many U.N. member states suspected that the “key factor” behind al-Qaeda’s silence is Adel’s suspected longtime residence in Shiite-majority Iran, which is led by Shiite clerics. The Sunni terrorist group has long viewed Shiite Muslims as apostates, according to a report by Brookings.
Adel’s alleged presence in Iran poses “difficult theological and operational questions” for al-Qaeda, the report’s authors say. (One unidentified U.N. member state denied the presence of any al-Qaeda members or dependents in the country.)
The alleged terrorist leader is believed to have been born in the early 1960s. He has been based in Iran since 2002 or 2003, when he went into hiding after the Sept. 11 attacks, Soufan wrote in an article for the CTC Sentinel, which is published by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy.
Adel was held by Iranian authorities for some years before a prisoner swap between Tehran and al-Qaeda that was reported in 2015, but his apparent continued presence there is a sign of pragmatism, wrote Soufan, a former FBI official who investigated the 1998 embassy bombings. The attacks killed 224 people and wounded more than 4,000.
“Despite the hateful necessity” of living under Shiite rule, “his best chance of survival, and therefore of continued effectiveness in the jihad, lay in a return to Iran,” Soufan wrote.
Not much is certain about the militant leader, with only three images of him known to exist, according to Soufan, who added that he stands out even among other al-Qaeda members for his “lack of remorse.”
U.N. member states assessed that there has been “no significant” recent change in al-Qaeda’s strength, according to the report. It said the threat from the group and its affiliates is elevated in and around conflict zones but remains “relatively low in other areas.”
The Washington Post · by Andrew Jeong · February 15, 2023
13. Russia declares battlefield gains as Ukraine urges faster military aid
Russia declares battlefield gains as Ukraine urges faster military aid
Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk
- Summary
- Russia says Ukrainian forces retreated in Luhansk
- Eastern city of Bakhmut prepares for Russian assault
- Zelenskiy urges allies to speed up military aid
- NATO allies focus on boosting ground forces, for now
KYIV, Feb 15 (Reuters) - Russia said on Wednesday its troops had broken through two fortified lines of Ukrainian defences on the eastern front, as Kyiv described the situation there as difficult and called for faster military aid ahead of a predicted Russian offensive.
The Russian Defence Ministry said the Ukrainians had retreated in the face of Russian attacks in the Luhansk region, although it provided no details and Reuters was not able to independently verify the battlefield report.
"During the offensive ... the Ukrainian troops randomly retreated to a distance of up to 3 km (1.9 miles) from the previously occupied lines," the ministry said on the Telegram messaging app.
"Even the more fortified second line of defence of the enemy could not hold the breakthrough of the Russian military."
The ministry did not specify in which part of the Luhansk region the offensive took place. Reuters was not able to independently verify the battlefield report.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's office said Ukrainian forces had repelled some Russian attacks in Luhansk but added: "The situation in the region remains difficult."
Luhansk regional governor Serhiy Haidai said Russia was pouring heavy equipment and mobilised troops into Luhansk but Ukrainian forces were still defending the region.
"The attacks are coming from different directions in waves," Haidai said. He added: "Those who spread the information that allegedly our defence forces have pulled back beyond the line of the administrative border (of Luhansk) - this does not correspond to reality."
The Kremlin has intensified attacks across a swathe of southern and eastern Ukraine in recent weeks, and a major new offensive has been widely anticipated.
Russia's main effort has been focused on the town of Bakhmut in Donetsk province adjacent to Luhansk.
The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not mention any significant setbacks in Luhansk in its regular morning update. It said Ukrainian units repelled attacks in the areas of more than 20 settlements, including Bakhmut and Vuhledar - a town 150 km (90 miles) southwest of Bakhmut.
Zelenskiy on Tuesday said Russia was in a hurry to achieve as much as it can with its latest push before Ukraine and its allies gather strength.
"That is why speed is of the essence," he said as NATO defence chiefs met in Brussels for talks that continue on Wednesday. "Speed in everything - adopting decisions, carrying out decisions, shipping supplies, training. Speed saves people's lives."
Bakhmut's capture would give Russia a stepping stone to advance on two bigger cities, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in Donetsk, giving it momentum after months of setbacks ahead of the Feb, 24 first anniversary of the invasion.
"The battles are literally for every foot of Ukrainian land," Zelenskiy said, describing the conditions on the eastern frontline in his evening address on Tuesday.
Ukrainian military analyst Oleh Zhdanov said in a YouTube video there was fighting "around every single house" in Bakhmut.
WESTERN SUPPORT
Ukraine is using shells faster than the West can make them and says it needs fighter jets and long-range missiles to counter the Russian offensive and recapture lost territory.
The United States and NATO have pledged that Western support will not falter in the face of a looming Russian offensive.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Tuesday he expected Ukraine to launch its own offensive in the spring. He added: "Ukraine has urgent requirements to help it meet this crucial moment in the course of the war. We believe there'll be a window of opportunity for them to exercise initiative."
On Jan. 20 a senior U.S. administration official said Washington was advising Ukraine to hold off with a major offensive until the latest supply of U.S. weaponry is in place and training has been provided.
Representatives of the 27 European Union countries meet in Brussels on Wednesday to discuss a new batch of sanctions against Russia, which the head of the bloc's executive said could amount to 11 billion euros ($11.8 bln) in lost trade.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said supplying Ukraine with fighter jets would certainly be discussed but that it was not a focus at the moment, and added he was in favour of raising NATO's military spending target. British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said Western allies could help Ukraine more quickly by supporting their position on the ground rather than focusing on the provision of jets.
Russia calls the invasion a "special military operation" against security threats, and says NATO shows hostility to Russia daily and is growing more involved in the conflict. Kyiv and its allies call Russia's actions an unprovoked land grab.
Russia holds swathes of Ukraine's southern regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, including its nuclear plant, nearly all of Luhansk and over half of Donetsk. Last year, Russia declared it had annexed the four regions in a move condemned by most United Nations members as illegal.
Russia plans to retake the settlements in the northeastern Kharkiv region that it surrendered to Kyiv last year, the head of the Russian-installed administration there said on Wednesday.
A U.S.-backed report published on Tuesday said Russia had held at least 6,000 Ukrainian children - likely many more - in camps in Crimea and Russia whose primary purpose appeared to be political re-education. Russia's embassy in Washington said Russia accepted children who were forced to flee with their families from the shelling in Ukraine.
Reporting by Caleb Davis, Sabine Siebold, Pavel Polityuk, Ron Popeski, Lydia Kelly, Aleksandar Vasovic, Tassilo Hummel, Steve Holland, Doina Chiacu, Ron Popeski and David Ljunggren; Writing by Stephen Coate and William Maclean; Editing by Himani Sarkar and Tomasz Janowski
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk
14. We Missed Social Media’s Dark Side. Let’s Be Smarter about the Metaverse
Excerpts:
There are some nascent efforts to conduct research at think tanks and non-profits, such as the Center for a New American Security. The funding for these research projects is miniscule compared to the reported $4 billion Meta/Facebook alone spends each quarter on developing its version of the metaverse.
Ultimately, it is likely that Congress will need to step in, but the Defense Department can take initial steps to ensure that these technologies are not adopted by troops and employees unless this research has been completed. We simply cannot afford to make the same mistakes again. There is a precedent for this. Early in the use of social media, the Pentagon blocked access to MySpace. This was seen as a heavy-handed tactic of leaders who didn’t understand the possibilities of that communication platform. Now those leaders appear prescient.
The good news is we can get this right. We have the time, but we need to move now. With the insights garnered from researchers, we can create virtual worlds that are innovative, safe, and collaborative, while at the same time ensuring free and open speech.
We Missed Social Media’s Dark Side. Let’s Be Smarter about the Metaverse
Think hard about the national-security implications of immersive virtual worlds.
defenseone.com · by Price Floyd
When I became the Pentagon’s acting spokesman in 2009, Secretary Robert Gates tapped me to draft the Department’s social media policy. I got it wrong.
I focused on the benefits of these newish technologies, not the dimly perceived problems that would grow into national threats. As today’s tech giants push toward a new vision of social media—an immersive experience sometimes dubbed extended reality or the metaverse—national-security leaders must not make the same mistake.
The potential dangers these social media platforms presented are now commonplace. Authoritarian and repressive governments (Russia, Iran, China, North Korea) exploit Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc., to target their own populations and those of democratic countries. This digital axis of evil works hard to divide the populations of democratic nations, attempting to weaken their governments from the inside.
Our policy to allow unfettered access and use of these technologies did not lead to an increase in civic engagement nor the spread of democracy. It has done just the opposite.
We missed these threats because no one took the time to think about where these technologies could lead us, and we didn’t and haven’t held any of them accountable.
We didn’t ask the right questions: How will you protect people’s personal data? Will you allow other nations and non-state actors access to this data? How could this data be exploited by those opposed to free and open societies? Few of us even took a step back to ask: How can this platform be free to use? How are they making money from my participation?
We only saw that an ever-growing audience could be reached through these platforms, and we didn’t understand that these were in fact new networks that had no regulation.
We were naïve in the extreme.
The question we must ask ourselves now is: will we to repeat our mistakes by hoping that these same digital actors will be good corporate stewards? Will they protect our data, our privacy, and our human rights? Are we okay with allowing them to operate virtual worlds without regulation?
There is a need for in-depth research that will look at the impact that extended/virtual reality technology will have on users and communities. It is imperative that we get in front of these technologies before they are widely adopted. These challenges include the health and physical impact on users, data privacy and security, governance, and diversity and inclusion.
For this research to be effective, it will probably mean requiring the companies that are developing these technologies to open their data to researchers and academics. Here are just a few of the many questions that should be asked and answered:
- How and where will all the data gathered by users be secured?
- What are the companies doing with the data now?
- How are participants' responses to stimuli being used in the design and development phase? (Let’s not wait until it’s deployed to find out)
- What is being done in the design phase to ensure that children are safe? How are they ensuring predators are not allowed to prey on children?
- Are the creators and designers themselves from diverse backgrounds?
- Is unconscious bias understood and addressed?
The answers to these and what are sure to be many more questions can inform the research, which should lead to specific policy and regulatory recommendations.
While companies may protest the intrusion, perhaps citing risks to their intellectual property, we shouldn’t allow that to stop us from protecting our national security and the health and wellbeing of the very people these companies claim to serve.
There are some nascent efforts to conduct research at think tanks and non-profits, such as the Center for a New American Security. The funding for these research projects is miniscule compared to the reported $4 billion Meta/Facebook alone spends each quarter on developing its version of the metaverse.
Ultimately, it is likely that Congress will need to step in, but the Defense Department can take initial steps to ensure that these technologies are not adopted by troops and employees unless this research has been completed. We simply cannot afford to make the same mistakes again. There is a precedent for this. Early in the use of social media, the Pentagon blocked access to MySpace. This was seen as a heavy-handed tactic of leaders who didn’t understand the possibilities of that communication platform. Now those leaders appear prescient.
The good news is we can get this right. We have the time, but we need to move now. With the insights garnered from researchers, we can create virtual worlds that are innovative, safe, and collaborative, while at the same time ensuring free and open speech.
Price Floyd was the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs from 2009 to 2010.
defenseone.com · by Price Floyd
15. Nimitz Strike Group, Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group Drill in South China Sea
I would love to get a tour of the PLA's JOC (joint operations center) and view their situation maps for the Asia Pacific/INDOPACiFIC.
Consider: Five US treaty allies in the region. Battle groups in the South China Sea. Balikatan in the Philippines (and new basing agreements), Cobra Goold coming up in Thailand, Key Resolve/Foal Eagle coming soon in Korea. Exercises such as Keen Sword and Yama Sakura in Japan. Australia authorizes US nuclear capable aircraft to land. Trilateral exercises among the ROK, Japan, and the US. Guam being reinforced. Security Force Assistance Brigade activities taking place throughout the theater. Discussion of deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles in theater. And much more.
I suppose all of this is being well orchestrated by a theater campaign plan.
The PLA must feel kind of "surrounded."
Nimitz Strike Group, Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group Drill in South China Sea - USNI News
news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · February 14, 2023
An MV-22 Osprey from the “Ugly Angels” of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 362 flies by the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) in the South China Sea on Feb. 11, 2023. U.S. Navy Photo
A United States Navy carrier strike group and amphibious ready group are drilling in the South China Sea in the service’s latest effort to test how the formations can operate together with their respective platforms.
The Nimitz CSG and the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group ARG started performing “integrated Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) operations” on Saturday, according to a U.S. Navy news release. The Navy did not disclose how long the two groups would operate together.
“The 13th MEU, combined with the amphibious capabilities of the ARG, enables the NIMCSG to employ the versatile capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. This seamless naval integration established a powerful presence in the region, which supports peace and stability,” the release reads. The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit is embarked on the Makin Island ARG.
Official social media pages of the Nimitz CSG, Makin Island ARG and the 13th MEU hinted at the joint exercise last week by continuously posting infographics of their composition throughout the week and tagging each other in the posts.
The ESF operation is “part of the Noble Fusion campaign of learning and experimentation for Seventh Fleet, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and the greater Navy and Marine Corps team. Task Force 76/3 is an experimental organization formed from the merging of Task Force 76 and 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, to support naval integration and staff operations,” according to the release.
Even before Noble Fusion began, the Navy has been experimenting with how amphibious assault ships with embarked F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters can integrate with carriers, USNI News previously reported. In June of last year, USS Tripoli ( LHA-7) participated in exercise Valiant Shield with carriers USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76).
Nimitz CSG units participating in the drills include aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) with embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17, and destroyers USS Decatur (DDG-73), USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93) and USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108). Cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) and destroyer USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60) round out the CSG, but the two ships are likely currently detached from the group, with a Navy release last week stating that Paul Hamilton conducted a joint sail with Indian Navy patrol vessel INS Savitri (P53) in the Indian Ocean on Feb. 7.
The Makin Island ARG units taking part in ESF include amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD-8) and amphibious transport dock USS Anchorage (LPD-23). The embarked 13th MEU includes Battalion Landing Team 2nd Marines, 4th Battalion, Combat Logistics Battalion 13, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 362 (Reinforced), and Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122. Amphibious transport dock USS John P. Murtha (LPD-26), which rounds out the Makin Island ARG, is currently in Dili, Timor Leste for the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) – Timor Leste exercise.
Meanwhile, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on Monday issued a statement stating that a China Coast Guard ship directed a military-grade laser light at PCG patrol vessel BRP Malapascua (MRRV-4403) on Feb. 6. Malapascua was supporting a rotation and resupply mission for the Philippine Navy (PN) in Ayungin Shoal in the West Philippine Sea as a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel with bow number 5205 directed a military-grade laser light at the patrol vessel. Ayungin Shoal, known internationally as Second Thomas Shoal, is where the Philippine Navy deliberately grounded landing ship tank BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) to stake its claim to the shoal and to serve as an outpost there that is manned by a garrison of a dozen Philippine Marines.
According to the statement, as Malapascua reached a 10 nautical mile distance from Ayungin Shoal, the CCG vessel was sighted approximately 4 nautical miles off the ship’s dead ahead, maneuvering from the port side and heading toward the starboard side. The Chinese ship illuminated the green laser light twice toward the Malapascua, causing temporary blindness to the crew on the bridge. The Chinese vessel also made dangerous maneuvers by approaching about 150 yards from the vessel’s starboard quarter. According to the Philippine Coast Guard, Malapascua altered course from Ayungin Shoal and headed toward Lawak Island to continue its maritime patrol and support patrol vessel BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701) for the PCG’s own rotation and resupply mission to its sub-stations in the Kalayaan Island Group.
China Coast Guard vessel using laser. Philippine Coast Guard Photo
“The deliberate blocking of the Philippine government ships to deliver food and supplies to our military personnel on board the BRP Sierra Madre is a blatant disregard for, and a clear violation of, Philippine sovereign rights in this part of the West Philippine Sea,” reads the statement, which went on to say that the CCG in August also prevented PCG ships from coming closer to the Ayungin Shoal while providing security to a PN resupply mission. In that incident, CCG 5205 and CCG 5102, together with the Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM), formed a 13 nautical mile radius blockade, with Sierra Madre as its reference to prevent Philippine government ships from reaching the ship. The statement added that in this particular mission, it was clear that the CMM vessels took orders from the CCG to prevent the Philippine ships from entering the shoal and that the CMM deployed their utility boats to support the blockade and shadowing by the CCG.
“The PCG will continue to exercise due diligence in protecting the country’s territorial integrity against foreign aggression. The Armed Forces of the Philippines can always rely on the PCG to support their resupply mission in Ayungin Shoal. Despite the dangerous maneuver of the much larger CCG ships and their aggressive actions at sea, the PCG ships will always be in the West Philippine Sea to sustain our presence and assert our sovereign rights” PCG Commandant Admiral Artemio M Abu said in the statement.
Last February, Australia accused a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warship of illuminating a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) with a laser while PLAN ships were sailing in Australia’s northern Economic Exclusion Zone and the RAAF P-8 monitored them. China denied the accusation and said its ships always operate safely and professionally.
Meanwhile, in Japan on Sunday, the Japanese Ministry of Defense issued a news release stating that around 12:50 a.m. local time that day, a PLAN Shupang-class hydrographic survey ship was sighted sailing northward in an area near Japan’s contiguous zone south of Yakushima Island, which is part of the Osumi Islands archipelago south of the main island of Kyushu. The hull number included in the release identified the ship as CNS Zhu Kezhen (20).
At around 2:30 a.m. on Sunday, the PLAN ship entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Yakushima Island and subsequently at around 4:10 a.m., the survey ship left Japan’s territorial waters northeast of Kuchinoshima Island and sailed westward, according to the Japanese MoD release. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) fast attack craft JS Shirataka (PG-829) and a JMSDF P-1 MPA of Fleet Air Wing 1 based at JMSDF Kanoya Air Base, Kyushu and a JMSDF P-3C Orion of Fleet Air Wing 5 based at Naha Air Base, Okinawa shadowed the PLAN survey ship.
Related
news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · February 14, 2023
16. Countdown to counteroffensive: Give Ukraine ATACMS before it's too late
Countdown to counteroffensive: Give Ukraine ATACMS before it's too late - Breaking Defense
With renewed fighting expected, Kyiv needs the ability to attack deeper behind Russian lines in occupied lands, write a trio of FDD researchers.
on February 14, 2023 at 12:42 PM
breakingdefense.com · by Bradley Bowman · February 14, 2023
Soldiers, from the 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade out of Fort Bragg NC, visited the New Mexico range to conduct reliability tests of early versions of the Army Tactical Missile System. (DVIDS)
Since Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv has repeatedly asked the West for more advanced weapons systems. Usually, after weeks or months of hemming and hawing, the platforms are approved to great fanfare, but the Biden administration has yet to approve long-range artillery missiles known as ATACMS. In the op-ed below, three experts from The Foundation for Defense of Democracies argue it might be now or never.
In a laudable but belated decision, the Biden administration earlier this month pledged to send Kyiv the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb, or GLSDB, a system with a far greater range than Ukraine’s Western-supplied artillery rockets. The bad news: The first GLSDBs won’t arrive until this fall, likely missing widely expected Russian and Ukrainian offensives that will determine the war’s future trajectory.
Therefore, Washington should immediately grant Kyiv’s request for the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which the US military already fields and could give to Ukraine now. ATACMS would enable Ukraine to strike key targets currently out of reach, helping it blunt Russia’s offensive and facilitate further Ukrainian gains. If the United States fails to act now, it risks allowing Moscow to regain the initiative or at least hampering Kyiv’s efforts to reclaim Ukrainian territory.
The GLSDB is a precision-guided munition with a 36 pound warhead. It can strike targets up to 150 kilometers away, nearly double the range of the Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System rockets fired by Ukraine’s Western-provided rocket artillery systems. But initial GLSDB deliveries won’t begin for at least nine months, and it’ll take even longer to field the system in substantial numbers. The Biden administration lost valuable time by taking months to decide whether to give Ukraine the GLSDB, further delaying delivery.
Kyiv can’t afford to wait that long. With each passing day, Russia causes more death and destruction, entrenches its hold on the occupied territories, and prepares for a large-scale offensive that’ll likely begin in the coming weeks or months. Meanwhile, Kyiv also is expected to launch a major counteroffensive this year, likely sometime this winter or spring. This next phase of the war could be decisive.
Giving Ukraine ATACMS now could help it enervate Moscow’s looming offensive by degrading Russian logistics and command and control, and striking areas where Russia tries to mass forces. For example, Russia’s logistics hubs in Dhzankoi and Luhansk city lie beyond GMLRS range but would be easy targets for ATACMS. The same goes for the thousands of troops Russia has reportedly massed in and around Mariupol. Ukraine could also hit Russian air defense systems and airbases inside occupied Ukrainian territory from which Russian aircraft conduct combat air patrols or provide close air support for ground forces.
Moreover, and as we have previously argued, ATACMS, with a range of 300 kilometers (about 190 miles), could hit key targets beyond the GLSDB’s reach. These include the Kerch Bridge, the main supply route for Russian forces in southern Ukraine, as well as the naval and air bases in Crimea from which Russia bombards Ukrainian critical infrastructure. ATACMS also has a much larger warhead, at 500 pounds, meaning Ukraine would need fewer successful strikes to destroy targets.
Just as it can help Kyiv blunt Russia’s offensive, ATACMS would also undermine Russia’s ability to resist attacking Ukrainian forces. Indeed, Ukraine’s previous counteroffensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions succeeded in part thanks to GMLRS strikes that degraded Russian logistics and command and control. But while GMLRS remains a potent capability for Ukraine, Russia has adapted, including by moving depots and command-and-control posts beyond the system’s range. Ukraine thus needs a longer-range system to achieve similar disruptive effects.
Weakening Russian defenses is especially key as Kyiv attempts to shift toward an emphasis on maneuver rather than artillery-centric attritional warfare, as Washington hopes. So far, Ukraine has conducted successful maneuver only where Russian defenses were weak. In recent months, however, Russia has built fortified defensive lines stretching from southern Ukraine up to the Russian-Ukrainian border in Luhansk Oblast. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s intelligence chief claims mobilization has roughly doubled the number of Russian troops in Ukraine, who now have less territory to defend following Russia’s retreats last fall. Moscow no longer faces a numerical disadvantage in manpower, the main factor behind Kyiv’s stunning counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast last September.
If Ukraine fails to make this shift, the conflict will likely remain at best a grinding war of attrition. This could play to Moscow’s advantages. Despite its apparent effort to conserve artillery shells, Russia retains a quantitative advantage in artillery fires, and Ukraine is unlikely to gain sufficient artillery superiority to make significant territorial gains through attrition. As Western munitions stocks dwindle, Washington fears this style of warfare will become unsustainable, especially if other industrial democracies don’t quickly increase production. Despite aggressive Western sanctions, Russia’s military-industrial complex is adapting and now running on a war footing, while much of Ukraine’s own defense industry has been decimated by Russian strikes.
Vladimir Putin is likely betting that transatlantic resolve will wane if Ukraine fails to continue making significant gains and the war drags on with no end in sight. Some American voters are shortsightedly questioning whether to continue supporting Ukraine. Kyiv may face mounting pressure from France and Germany to reach a diplomatic settlement, allowing Moscow to freeze the conflict temporarily while it readies itself for a follow-on war.
Yet the White House continues to refuse Kyiv’s repeated requests for ATACMS, arguing that the move could precipitate Russian escalation. But that risk is overstated. For one thing, Putin appears keen to avoid a direct military conflict with the United States, and that’s precisely what he’d be risking if Moscow were to attack a NATO member.
Second, as the Biden administration has itself reportedly recognized, Ukrainian strikes on Russian military targets in Crimea likely wouldn’t trigger Russian tactical nuclear use. Indeed, Putin has yet to resort to nuclear weapons even though Kyiv has conducted numerous strikes against airbases and other targets in Crimea. Despite Russian nuclear saber rattling, Moscow refrained from tactical nuclear use when Ukraine retook Kherson city, which Moscow officially declared to be part of Russian territory.
Moreover, Washington can mitigate the risk of escalation by conditioning the provision of ATACMS on a Ukrainian commitment to use the missiles only against targets in occupied Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. Admittedly, such a restriction hardly seems fair given that Russia continues to strike critical infrastructure across Ukraine, including using drones and potentially soon short-range ballistic missiles from Iran. But it would strike a balance between the twin goals of helping Ukraine defeat Russian aggression and avoiding direct conflict between NATO and Russia.
Doubling down on its refusal to provide ATACMS, the administration reportedly told Ukrainian officials in recent meetings at the Pentagon that it can’t send the missiles because the US does not have enough. That argument does not withstand scrutiny. The United States has produced thousands of ATACMS in various configurations and has only fired a small fraction of those, and a few dozen ATACMS could have an outsized benefit for Kyiv. Moreover, Congress authorized a multiyear procurement of 1,700 ATACMS in the most recent defense bill even as the Department of Defense begins to field a more capable replacement, the Precision Strike Missile. There is no doubt the United States is confronting a munitions production capacity crisis and must manage its inventories carefully to ensure sufficient stocks. But Congress would be wise to press the Pentagon to defend any assertion that it cannot send at least a few dozen ATACMS to Ukraine to help a beleaguered democracy defend its territory against the unprovoked Russian invasion.
The United States has invested tens of billions in helping Ukraine claw back territory. It would be foolish to withhold a critical capability that can help Kyiv make good on that investment. As the war enters a critical phase, Washington should move without delay to give Ukraine ATACMS.
John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a nonpartisan research institute based in Washington, DC. Bradley Bowman is senior director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power, where Ryan Brobst is a research assistant.
breakingdefense.com · by Bradley Bowman · February 14, 2023
17. More Bang for the SFA Buck: Improving US Security Force Assistance in Ukraine and Beyond
"Hard pivot to LSCO."
Conclusion:
Despite the US military’s hard pivot toward LSCO after its expensive, years-long struggle to build up partner forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion is a stark reminder that SFA will remain essential to securing US interests. US assistance so far has contributed to Ukraine’s remarkable performance in the face of Russian aggression. But doing so in a more efficient and sustainable manner, and leveraging SFA in pursuit of US strategic objectives elsewhere, requires a deliberate effort to optimize the planning and delivery of US military assistance.
More Bang for the SFA Buck: Improving US Security Force Assistance in Ukraine and Beyond - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Jahara Matisek, William Reno, Sam Rosenberg · February 15, 2023
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a strategic disaster for that aggressor, triggering a flood of security assistance from the United States and other international supporters of Ukraine. In 2022, the United States provided Ukraine over $20 billion in security assistance, a massive increase from the $2.8 billion in military aid from Washington between 2014 and early 2022—and this is on top of $9.9 billion in humanitarian aid and financial assistance of $15.5 billion. European Union institutions and countries provided over $51 billion of military, humanitarian, and financial assistance in 2022. Western political leaders responded with all the major instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic—to help Ukraine.
Practically every few weeks the administration of President Joe Biden asks US lawmakers to authorize billions in security force assistance (SFA) for Ukraine to fight Russian occupying forces. This overall effort encompassing training, advising, assisting, and equipping (TAAE) has translated into remarkable Ukrainian battlefield victories to reclaim territories in southern and eastern Ukraine. For most of 2022, TAAE was largely cobbled together by staffs at the US embassy in Ukraine, US European Command, the 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), 18th Airborne Corps, Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG-U), and other organizations. The November creation of the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U) at Wiesbaden aimed to address this fragmented approach to Ukrainian SFA and streamline US efforts alongside those of NATO allies. Meanwhile, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative allows the president to circumvent US military stocks by funding the direct industry purchase of armaments, such as the thirty-one brand-new Abrams main battle tanks the White House recently announced would be sent to Ukraine this year.
In December, our DoD Minerva team traveled to Germany to observe and assess current Western SFA efforts to make the Ukrainian armed forces more militarily effective and to understand the trajectory of SAG-U and its implications for this war and future strategic competition. We observed positive effects of recent policy changes but found more needs to be done. American SFA needs to become better aligned and unified to ensure Ukrainian forces can perform as well as it will need to as the conflict transitions from the comparatively static war of attrition that has taken shape during the winter months to one likely characterized by combined arms maneuver as anticipated spring offensives begin.
Unity of Command or Unity of Effort?
The intensity of security assistance to Ukraine is remarkable. Its effect in enabling Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has challenged assumptions that widely reported corruption in Ukraine’s political system inevitably undermined Ukraine’s military effectiveness.
Retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling provided insight into why Ukraine has outperformed many prewar expectations when he described how Ukraine’s military professionalized and reformed many of the Soviet-era institutions it inherited. It is clear that Ukraine escaped the “Fabergé Egg” army problem. Unlike what occurred with the infusion of tens of billions of dollars and expensive military equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, highly motivated Ukrainian forces put massive amounts of assistance to effective use rather than building an outwardly proficient yet hollow military—like a Fabergé egg, very pretty and expensive yet easily broken. Ukraine’s leadership has also demonstrated high levels of political will, which was lacking in Kabul and its armed forces.
The activities of both SAG-U and JMTG-U are predicated on long-term relationship building, which is difficult to measure and quantify, but is crucial in achieving the shared interests of Ukrainian and US leaders. For instance, the US National Guard’s State Partnership Program has maintained a relationship between Ukraine’s military and the California National Guard since 1993. Our team observed how Guard units have been a force enhancer and enabler in understanding personal and professional networks in Ukraine. They helped identify the right Ukrainian officials to work and liaise with to optimize American TAAE.
According to some US military advisors the team met, SAG-U is a good organizational step to consolidate the US-led TAAE effort. But in its current configuration, SAG-U is a temporary tool in a long-term process. While SAG-U has spearheaded equipment deliveries to Ukrainians, it is still finding its footing. Having recently replaced the 18th Airborne Corps, SAG-U is cobbled together with personnel from units across the joint force, many of whom have little or no SFA experience or firsthand knowledge about Ukraine. If the United States is to excel in efforts to help Ukrainian forces outperform their Russian adversaries, improved organizational efforts are needed to ensure that SAG-U aligns with integrated deterrence and is properly manned with the most qualified personnel from the joint force, interagency partners, and allied and partner militaries.
JMTG-U, formed by the US Army in 2015 to train and equip the Ukrainian military alongside advisors from Britain, Canada, Lithuania, and Poland, is a bright spot in American SFA efforts. Originally based in Ukraine, JMTG-U now operates in Germany, providing platform-specific training and, now, collective training for Ukrainian battalion-sized units. Operationally controlled by SAG-U and managed primarily by Army National Guard units, JMTG-U has been instrumental in Ukraine’s battlefield successes, providing critical training on artillery systems and targeting processes that have inflicted a significant toll on the Russian military. Task Force Orion, composed of a New York National Guard brigade combat team, currently runs the program. Many of the task force’s soldiers volunteered for the assignment and have previous experience working with the Ukrainian armed forces on an earlier JMTG-U rotation at the Yavoriv training center in western Ukraine before last February’s Russian invasion. Their knowledge of the Ukraine mission and familiarity with Ukrainian forces has proved essential in making the current incarnation of JMTG-U successful.
While SAG-U and JMTG-U have made important contributions, their efforts sometimes are at loggerheads with other units permanently stationed in the region. Unlike SAG-U and JMTG-U, units based in Europe are not solely focused on strengthening Ukraine’s military. They must attend to their own training and readiness. Tasked with little notice to provide maintenance training or instruction on artillery pieces to the Ukrainians, assistance can come at the expense of these units’ own readiness. More importantly, the hodgepodge of units working on SFA for Ukraine has created confusing command relationships and task organization. Many officers our team met expressed bewilderment at the command arrangements in Europe, lamenting that the United States is “building the plane in flight.” It is critical that US SFA moves beyond this ad hoc approach. The focused articulation of strategic interest on the part of political leadership and the operational intensity of the mission allow these organizations to overcome inefficiencies and friction, at least for now, but a more optimized method of organizing SFA efforts is necessary for it to be sustainable.
Moreover, hanging over all of the assistance Ukraine has received, since the invasion, have been natural concerns about escalation. Russia is a nuclear-armed power acting within what it defines as its core sphere of interest, and the United States and other Western supporters of Ukraine are challenging Moscow’s assumption that it has the right to do so. Because Russia possesses nuclear weapons, its leaders have the capacity to inflict intolerable pain upon the West. They periodically issue threats, veiled and direct, to do just that if various red lines are crossed. This is what Thomas Schelling called “nuclear diplomacy” in his Cold War classic, Arms and Influence, published in 1966—an effort to harness fear to coerce an opponent to bend to one’s will. Western assistance inevitably operates under this nuclear shadow. This is not a reason to pull back in fear, and instead argues for greater coordination of assistance. Doing so would signal greater Western strength and resolve—and can be more carefully managed to reduce chances of inadvertent escalation.
Institutionalize American and Allied Assistance
The fact that it took almost ten months and $20 billion of security assistance to create a mission dedicated specifically to militarily helping Ukraine is representative of the US military’s fixation on large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Such a LSCO paradox exists because while the US armed forces want to train for conventional warfare against a near-peer adversary, they have been involved more in irregular warfare—which includes missions like SFA—than LSCO over the last century.
There are a number of individual SFA reforms that can be rapidly implemented and, collectively, would improve outcomes. After two decades of disappointing results in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon should deliberately evaluate the ability of specific units and staffs to train foreign forces. The US military already has made progress in institutionalizing advising with the creation of the Army’s SFABs. But often, the job of working with foreign forces falls to regular army units that lack formal SFA experience. In Germany, Ukrainian soldiers frequently receive training from the 2d Cavalry Regiment soldiers on artillery or maintenance operations—not from SFAB advisors—largely because of proximity. But conventional units like these that are permanently stationed in Germany are not directly evaluated on their ability to teach or operate with partner forces. Many individuals we spoke to like helping Ukraine, but also worry that doing so reduces their own readiness. Asking soldiers to work on things outside of the mission-essential tasks fundamental to their unit’s readiness has to happen from time to time, but it is not an ideal situation, and in this case is a problem that can be addressed through support for well-resourced, dedicated training units.
The Way Forward
The United States and Ukraine have much to be proud of in the effort to defeat Russia’s full-scale invasion. SAG-U and JMTG-U are still evolving, but their battlefield impact so far is clear. If SAG-U can get its manning sorted and both organizations can deconflict the task organization in Europe, the United States will be better positioned, along with its NATO allies, to support Ukraine’s spring offensive.
Achieving SFA unity of effort among allies and partners will also be a force enhancer for the Ukrainians. For example, Australia just deployed military advisors to the UK to participate in Operation Interflex (successor to Operation Orbital), bringing to a dozen the number of countries contributing personnel to the British-led training mission of Ukrainian forces. However, a complaint from many Ukrainian troops is a lack of consistency among advisors in the way they advise, train, and teach. US forces utilize the Military Decision-Making Process, the Canadians teach the Operational Planning Process, and the British military instructs its 7 Questions combat estimate method. There would be a tremendous payoff to all Western military advisors in establishing common instructional methods, learning objectives, programs of instruction, and assessment tools to improve consistency and unity of effort.
The United States should also pursue smaller, more impactful goals like integrating SFA into national training centers more formally. After two decades of struggling to build partner forces, the US military must devise more systematic ways to evaluate the ability of units and their staffs to do so.
Finally, analysts and planners should consider the interplay between SFA and geography. When Russia invaded, it did so with simply too few troops to achieve its apparently expansive initial objectives in Texas-sized Ukraine. Moreover, Ukraine’s shared border with multiple NATO members—most notably Poland, a leading contributor of aid since the invasion—enables the delivery of SFA. In a future crisis, a similar effort to deliver assistance to Maryland-sized Taiwan—an island about three hundred miles away from US bases at Okinawa—would involve dramatically different considerations. Thus, as US policymakers fund approximately $10 billion in future security assistance to Taiwan, military advisors and planners will need to adapt to these harsher realities and rethink the organizational structure to training and equipping the Taiwanese military.
Despite the US military’s hard pivot toward LSCO after its expensive, years-long struggle to build up partner forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion is a stark reminder that SFA will remain essential to securing US interests. US assistance so far has contributed to Ukraine’s remarkable performance in the face of Russian aggression. But doing so in a more efficient and sustainable manner, and leveraging SFA in pursuit of US strategic objectives elsewhere, requires a deliberate effort to optimize the planning and delivery of US military assistance.
Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the National Security Affairs department at the US Naval War College, fellow for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and US DoD Minerva researcher, having published over eighty articles and essays on strategy, warfare, and security assistance. A 2020 Bronze Star recipient for his time as the director of operations and commander of the 451st Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron, he is a command pilot that previously served as a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute and associate professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy.
Dr. William Reno is professor and chair of the Political Science Department at Northwestern University. He has conducted fieldwork and interviews in conflict zones across Africa and the Middle East for over thirty years, having authored three books: Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Warlord Politics and African States, and Warfare in Independent Africa. Dr. Reno has published over one hundred articles in peer-reviewed journals, policy-relevant periodicals, and edited volumes on civil wars, rebels, and military assistance. Finally, he is the principal investigator for the US DoD Minerva-funded program studying how the United States can improve foreign military training.
Major Sam Rosenberg (@SamR2508) is a PhD student at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, serving as a Goodpaster scholar through the Army’s Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program. His dissertation research focuses on US efforts to build partner militaries for large-scale combat. Sam is an active duty Army officer, serving most recently with United States Northern Command on the commander’s initiative’s group and within the strategy and policy directorate. He commissioned in 2006 as an infantry officer and served in a variety of leadership positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, and Eastern Europe. He holds a bachelor’s degree in American politics from West Point and a master’s degree in national security policy from Georgetown University, where he studied as a Downing Scholar.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, or Department of Defense. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.
Image credit: Sgt. Spencer Rhodes, US National Guard
mwi.usma.edu · by Jahara Matisek, William Reno, Sam Rosenberg · February 15, 2023
18. It’s Time to Recognize Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative
Yes. and all aspects of sustainment. As I have said, our super power is the economic instrument of power and than mens we can out produce our enemies but also "out logistic" them as well - get the right amount of supplies to the right place in the right time (but I am not talking about just in time logistics). We need the right combination of capabilities - industrial base production, stocks, pre positions, and transportation.
Conclusion:
This does not simply mean that the United States should begin mindlessly mass-producing war materiel or ignore other challenges like ensuring the joint force has sufficient mobile logistics. Rather, it is an argument for better integration of the defense industrial base with U.S. national strategies — with the Army’s logistical expertise at the center. Rather than conclude the era of offensive maneuver is over, it is time to bring logistics back into discussions of large-scale combat operations.
It’s Time to Recognize Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Antulio J. Echevarria · February 15, 2023
Editor’s note: This is the second installment of a two-part series on the contemporary challenges to offensive maneuver based on observations from the war in Ukraine, and the implications for the U.S. Army.
In a previous article, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver,” Stephen Biddle rejected recent claims that an era of defensive dominance had dawned. As he noted, offensive maneuver has long been difficult against prepared defenses arrayed in depth. That is still the case. Moreover, Ukraine’s successful counter-offensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions — though not without their missteps and heavy costs, especially as regards the latter — should demolish the argument that offensive maneuver is dead. It can still succeed with proper preparations and force employment, though it might proceed incrementally and painfully against a competent foe. To advocate a significant redesign of U.S. ground forces at this stage, therefore, would be premature. Things can change, of course. But thus far, events in Ukraine suggest the U.S. Army’s Six Modernization Priorities are largely on track (though Army leaders should consider giving more attention to logistical capabilities). Modern militaries, like their predecessors, are best served by maintaining a flexible balance between offensive and defensive capabilities rather than going all in on one or the other.
That said, there are several issues the U.S. Army should address regarding the sustainment of large-scale combat operations, whether offensive or defensive. To do this, sustainment should be elevated to a principle of war to underscore the strategic importance of logistics and to provide an imperative for the better integration of America’s defense industrial base into U.S. deterrence and defense strategies. Some of these issues the Army can address with modifications to its new operations manual, Field Manual 3-0 (2022), and its logistics manual, Field Manual 4-0 (2019). Specifically, Field Manual 3-0 should afford at least as much importance to contested logistics as it does to contested deployments and offer operational planners some hypothetical scenarios or historical examples of planning under a range of logistical constraints. Field Manual 4-0 should explicitly elevate sustainment to a principle of war and thereby require Field Manual 3-0 to follow suit.
The Ammunition Crisis
Although offensive maneuver is not dead, the U.S. Army does have some work to do with respect to the way it thinks about large-scale combat operations. In fact, even if offensive maneuver were not possible and the war in Ukraine became one of attrition resembling the trench warfare of World War I, large-scale combat operations would still take place. They would not necessarily involve major breakthroughs and the recapture of large sections of Ukrainian real estate, but they would still likely require significant ammunition expenditure as well as the possible heavy consumption of other war material. For that reason, the Army would do well to examine more closely what some analysts are referring to as a “crisis over artillery ammunition.”
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The Ukrainian Armed Forces have reportedly consumed an average of 100,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition per month. However, the U.S. defense industry can replace only 14,000 rounds per month, though that number should increase to 20,000 rounds per month over the next two years. The story is similar for Stingers, Javelins, high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), and other critical weapons. Simply put, the rate of material consumption in this war, especially as regards artillery ammunition, is outpacing the rate of resupply. This crisis is the result of three factors: a production capacity established in prewar conditions, the need to honor the broad range of U.S. strategic commitments, and Ukraine’s unanticipated rate of material consumption.
Admittedly, the U.S. government is swiftly generating new contracts to enable industry leaders to close the gaps between production and consumption. But the defense industry may need months (or years in some cases) to bring production up to scale. Meanwhile, the center of gravity for the Ukrainians is material support from the West. Without it, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, brave and skillful as they are, cannot sustain the type of large-scale combat operations necessary to retake the territories they lost to Russian aggression.
The crisis has received only limited attention so far because Russian stockpiles of war material, including artillery ammunition, also seem to be running low. Both sides will likely have to reduce their tempo of operations and adjust the scope of their operations as a result. For the Ukrainians, however, such adjustments represent a lost opportunity. A drop in the rate of resupply means a loss of valuable operational momentum and allows the Russians time to rearm and refit. At the same time, Russian long-range missile and artillery strikes against Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure continue, thereby adding criminally to the noncombatant death toll.
Getting Serious about Sustainment
Clearly, some of the root causes of this logistics crisis fall outside the Army’s purview. But there is still a great deal it can do.
First, the Army should revise the tone of its new operations manual, Field Manual 3-0, which reorients Army thinking toward major wars after decades of fighting smaller conflicts. That was an important shift. But Field Manual 3-0 also assumes the logistical support the Army needs to fight large-scale combat operations will be there. As the budding ammunition crisis has shown, this is not a safe assumption. This conflict has not tested U.S. capacity to transport material across the Atlantic Ocean and through Central and Eastern Europe under fire, though the Russians have the capability to interdict logistical flow throughout the length of these supply lines. Another adversary, such as the People’s Republic of China, might choose to attack U.S. supply lines. As research from the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute shows, China and Russia have already penetrated U.S. supply chains with disruptive cyberattacks. Hence, we cannot assume the deployment of war material from the United States to the European or Pacific theaters will be uncontested in a future conflict.
Second, the U.S. Army should revise its logistics manual, Field Manual 4-0. The manual is a commendably realistic and painstakingly detailed document that explicitly recognizes the challenges of fighting in the modern battlespace. Indeed, the Army’s Field Manual 3-0 would benefit from a similar dose of realism. But Field Manual 4-0, too, needs to up its game. As explained in its sister document, Army Defense Publication 4-0 (2019), logistics falls under sustainment, which is “accomplished through the coordination, integration, and synchronization of resources from the strategic level through the tactical level in conjunction with our joint and multinational partners.” Yet unlike in partner forces such as the British Army, Field Manual 4-0 and Army Doctrine Publication 4-0 classify sustainment as a warfighting function rather than as a principle of war. A warfighting function is merely a “group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.” In other words, the U.S. Army is not on the same page as the British Army, one of its most consistent allies, in terms of the importance it attributes to sustainment (or what the British call sustainability). Ironically, the Russian army, as heir to the Soviet system, also sees logistics as a principle of war.
The U.S. joint force typically forms the hub of military interventions involving alliance or coalition partners, so it has the responsibility of synchronizing the efforts of those partners by strengthening their networks. In cases of a disconnect over the value accorded to something as crucial as logistics, the U.S. Army — as the logistics integrator of the joint force and its multinational partners — should round up rather than down. Elevating sustainment to a principle of war solves that problem and acknowledges sustainment’s role as an indispensable guideline for strategic planning.
To be sure, the U.S. military has had a love-hate relationship with the principles of war. Even the U.S. Army’s definition of a principle, a “comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations,” is unnecessarily cumbersome. It does, however, convey the right sense. Sustainment, stripped of its doctrinal verbiage, can be thought of as production capacity combined with the rate of flow, or delivery, into the theater of war. It is essentially a strategic imperative. The term’s downside, however, is that it implies maintaining the status quo in terms of rates of supply rather than surging in anticipation of new or larger operations. Despite this, retaining the term “sustainment” is preferable to inventing a new buzzword, such as “just-in-time” logistics or “precision” logistics, which often draws more attention to the term than to the idea behind it.
It might be useful, however, to distinguish between “operational sustainment,” referring to logistics within the theater of war, and “strategic sustainment,” referring to logistical flow outside, or up to, the theater of war. A reliable logistical flow lends credibility to U.S. security guarantees, giving strategic sustainment a political value that in some cases exceeds its military value. Conversely, gaps in U.S. supply chains, or the penetration of those chains by nefarious actors, can undermine Washington’s credibility. What’s more, strategic sustainment offers critical political leverage because it enables Washington to adjust the logistical flow to influence the actions of allies and partners.
U.S. policymakers should have brought U.S. industry leaders into strategic discussions long ago. Plans should have been made and updated periodically, just as U.S. combatant commands do with military contingency plans. Elevating sustainment to a strategic imperative can help avoid such gaps in the future while at the same time furthering the integration of America’s defense industrial base with U.S. national security strategies. As the joint force’s principal proponent for operational sustainment and the service typically responsible for providing logistical support to America’s multinational partners, the U.S. Army should be the loudest voice promoting that integration both at home and abroad.
Conclusion
The brewing sustainment crisis reveals a serious weakness, even a credibility gap, in the U.S. Defense Department’s concept of integrated deterrence. Simply put, America’s defense industrial base has not been fully integrated into Washington’s defense and deterrence strategies — which has in turn led to a production gap. The gap has occurred despite more than two decades of theorizing about and wargaming various branches and sequels of great-power competition in the European and Pacific theaters.
The West may develop as many theories of defense and deterrence as it likes, but as history has shown, production capacity coupled with the capability to deliver war material wherever it is needed (strategic + operational sustainment) can go a long way toward winning wars. The ability to win wars, moreover, aids in deterring them. Achieving integrated deterrence, in other words, will require an integrated defense.
In sum, the future of large-scale combat operations obviously depends on the future of strategic and operational sustainment. Therefore, the Army should better synchronize Field Manual 3-0 and Field Manual 4-0. The latter especially should help close the gap between strategic and operational sustainment by elevating logistics to a principle of war, just as America’s chief allies (and foes) have done. The former document should be revised with respect to its assumptions about the availability of U.S. logistics in order to explore alternate situations.
This does not simply mean that the United States should begin mindlessly mass-producing war materiel or ignore other challenges like ensuring the joint force has sufficient mobile logistics. Rather, it is an argument for better integration of the defense industrial base with U.S. national strategies — with the Army’s logistical expertise at the center. Rather than conclude the era of offensive maneuver is over, it is time to bring logistics back into discussions of large-scale combat operations.
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Antulio J. Echevarria II is a professor of strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the editor-in-chief of the U.S. Army War College Press. He has published six books on strategic thinking, the most recent of which is War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge University Press, 2021). He is currently researching strategic insights from the war in Ukraine.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Antulio J. Echevarria · February 15, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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