Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Though we may be outnumbered and outgunned, the power of truth and justice is on our side."

– Kim Chwa-chin

"Start where you are. Use what you have. Do what you can."

– Arthur Ashe

"Our power is our ability to decide."

– Buckminster Fuller

1. Opinion | I was head of the NSA. In a world of threats, this is my biggest worry. by Paul M. Nakasone

2. GOP Lawmaker Warns of ‘Serious National-Security Threat’

3. House intel chair sounds alarm on ‘serious national security threat’

4. The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific Region

5. Opinion | Even from a Russian prison, I can see Putin’s weakness

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2024

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 14, 2024

8. Finally, sailors can put hands in their pockets under policy update

9. On Ukraine’s Front Line, Soldiers Are Forced to Tune In to Washington Politics

10. US lawmakers led by China hawk Mike Gallagher to visit Taiwan next week

11. Pentagon Used Six-Bladed ‘Ginsu’ Weapon to Kill Iraqi Militia Leader

12. The Senate Rejects American Retreat

13. The Ukraine War at Two: Time for some reality

14. The Navy SEAL Mission Is Shifting from Raids to Supporting the Service, Leader Says

15. More expertise may be needed for military commands to call for non-kinetic capabilities

16. US Cancels Multibillion-Dollar Classified Military Satellite Program

17. Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles?

18. Putin says Russia prefers Biden to Trump because he is 'more experienced and predictable'

19. Joe Biden Could Send Millions Of Artillery Shells To Ukraine, For Free, Tomorrow. And It’s Perfectly Legal.

20. Gaza and the End of the Rules-Based Order

21. The quiet intimacy of a desperate frontline evacuation (Ukraine)

22. Trump’s NATO Threat Reflects a Wider Shift on America’s Place in the World

23. Ukraine’s microphone-laden balloons that battle Russian drones awe US

1. Opinion | I was head of the NSA. In a world of threats, this is my biggest worry. by Paul M. Nakasone

Excerpt:

I worry that we could make ourselves blind to external threats such as the ones I’ve named and more if Congress allows a critical intelligence collection authority — Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act — to expire in April, or renews it with crippling restrictions. Either move would be a self-inflicted wound that our nation cannot afford.

Opinion | I was head of the NSA. In a world of threats, this is my biggest worry.

The Washington Post · by Paul M. Nakasone · February 14, 2024

Gen. Paul M. Nakasone was commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, director of the National Security Agency and chief of the Central Security Service until Feb. 2. This column was written in his official capacity while still in office.

Approaching the end of my five-plus years as director of the National Security Agency, I have heard the same question again and again: What’s your greatest worry as you conclude decades of service to your nation?

People expect me to name a particular country or challenge threatening the United States — maybe China or Russia, or even criminal hackers targeting our critical infrastructure. I have plenty of worries about each of those. What worries me most, though, isn’t an external threat, but the possibility that we are on the verge of making a grave mistake.

I worry that we could make ourselves blind to external threats such as the ones I’ve named and more if Congress allows a critical intelligence collection authority — Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act — to expire in April, or renews it with crippling restrictions. Either move would be a self-inflicted wound that our nation cannot afford.

Let me go back in time to explain. I was at the Pentagon when terrorists crashed Flight 77 into the building on Sept. 11, 2001, killing many of my colleagues at the Department of Defense. As the 9/11 Commission examined how our country could have suffered such a devastating attack, it became clear that our government had been unable to connect the dots between terrorist plotters abroad and terrorist operatives on our soil. We needed to tear down the wall between the FBI and the intelligence community that was blocking access to foreign intelligence information that these agencies had already lawfully collected and stored in government databases, so that we could use it to better protect Americans.

We also needed a sensible way to work with U.S. technology companies whose services were increasingly being exploited by terrorists and other hostile actors abroad to plot against us. Congress provided just that in 2008 with the creation of Section 702.

This law strikes an elegant balance in allowing intelligence collection that targets only non-Americans located abroad while imposing stringent protections for Americans’ privacy anywhere in the world. Applying it requires the approval of a federal court as well as oversight by the executive branch and four separate congressional committees — meaning that every branch of government has a say in how we can use it.

Fast-forward to 2018, when I became commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency. Congress and the president had just reauthorized Section 702 — and for good reason. It works. Indeed, it has become more important than ever given its contributions to thwarting a wide array of national security threats.

Some examples: Section 702 has disrupted planned terrorist attacks at home and abroad, and contributed to the successful operation that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022. Information acquired through Section 702 has provided insights into the Chinese origins of a chemical used to synthesize the deadly drug fentanyl and into drug-smuggling techniques. Section 702 has helped uncover gruesome atrocities committed by Russia in Ukraine, including the murder of noncombatants and the forced relocation of children from Russian-occupied Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Section 702 has even resulted in the identification and disruption of hostile foreign actors’ attempts to recruit spies in the United States.

Perhaps most strikingly, as the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security wrote in December: “Today, our warfighters depend on intelligence reporting using collection obtained pursuant to Section 702 to provide critical insights on the battlefield, including the current crises in Europe and the Middle East.”

Section 702, in short, is essential and irreplaceable. But it is set to expire in April, unless Congress acts to renew it.

Failure to do so would be a self-inflicted wound of the highest order. At this moment, as the United States faces escalating threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, foreign cartels, sophisticated hackers, WMD proliferators, spies, terrorists and more, allowing Section 702 to expire would be an act of willful self-blinding.

The same is true of sweeping proposals to cripple this important authority, including requiring the executive branch to seek approval from a federal court to conduct U.S. person queries, which involves organizing and utilizing information that the government has already lawfully collected. That would be precisely the opposite of what the 9/11 Commission urged: It would erect a new wall blocking our access to intelligence already legally in the government’s holdings that could be used to protect Americans, effectively making it inaccessible to our intelligence professionals. That would be a huge step backward.

Instead, we should take a step forward by reauthorizing Section 702 — and improving it. That means enshrining in statute the extensive reforms the intelligence community has already made to prevent noncompliant queries of 702 databases. We are only human, and mistakes happen, but the key is to learn from our mistakes and be transparent about them so they can’t happen again. These are the boldest reforms to Section 702 the executive branch has ever proposed in a reauthorization cycle, and they’ll better protect both our security and Americans’ privacy.

Serving the public in uniform for more than 37 years has been the honor of a lifetime. As head of Cyber Command and the NSA, I urge Congress to reauthorize Section 702, and to do so without imposing new restrictions on how the government can use the vital information it provides. As I saw all too clearly at the Pentagon that morning on 9/11, American lives are at stake.

The Washington Post · by Paul M. Nakasone · February 14, 2024

2. GOP Lawmaker Warns of ‘Serious National-Security Threat’

GOP Lawmaker Warns of ‘Serious National-Security Threat’

Intelligence relates to a Russian military capability, according to a person familiar with the matter

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/security-threat-russia-intelligence-a1243acb?mod=hp_listb_pos1

By Dustin Volz

Follow, Gordon Lubold

Follow and Siobhan Hughes

Updated Feb. 14, 2024 8:48 pm ET

Rep. Mike Turner of Ohio, Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, released the statement. PHOTO: AL DRAGO/BLOOMBERG NEWS

WASHINGTON—A senior Republican lawmaker publicly warned about an unspecified “serious national-security threat” to the U.S. and requested President Biden to declassify information to allow for open discussion about how to respond to it, a move that sparked confusion in Congress just as lawmakers were debating whether to reauthorize a controversial spying program.

The unusual statement, issued by Rep. Mike Turner of Ohio, the Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said that classified intelligence had been made available to all members of Congress to review.

The classified intelligence is highly sensitive and relates to a Russian military capability involving incomplete ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon in space that could be used to target satellites, according to people familiar with the matter. One of the people said the issue was serious, but something that select lawmakers had in their possession for a number of weeks and didn’t present imminent urgency that should alarm the American public or allied countries.

Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, told reporters Wednesday that he had reached out to the so-called Gang of Eight—the Democratic and Republican leaders of each chamber and the heads of the intelligence committees—to schedule a briefing on a national-security matter that is set for Thursday. Sullivan didn’t specify what the issue was, but did note that it was “highly unusual” for the national security adviser to reach out to members of Congress directly for such a briefing.

Sullivan didn’t commit to declassifying the threat flagged by Turner. In the past, the administration has declassified information on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and arms deals between Iran and Russia.

“You are definitely not going to find an unwillingness to do that when it’s in our national-security interest to do so,” Sullivan said.

The aftermath of a deadly Russian missile attack on Kyiv, Ukraine, last week. PHOTO: ANDREAS STROH/ZUMA PRESS

House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.) said he was aware of the threat. He said, “Steady hands are at the wheel, we’re working on it, there’s no need for alarm.”

The request from Turner appeared to catch other top Republican and Democratic lawmakers and officials off guard, with some acknowledging they were aware of the threat and working to brief members.

It landed a day after Ukraine said that Russia had earlier this month launched for the first time an advanced hypersonic missile that is difficult to shoot down during an air raid on Kyiv. The kind of missile allegedly used, if confirmed, would represent an escalation in Russia’s capabilities of attacking Ukraine almost two years into the war. The Senate on Tuesday passed a $95.3 billion aid package that includes more funding for Ukraine, but the bill’s future is uncertain in the House.

It also came amid a debate in the House splintering both parties concerning whether to renew a controversial spying program that targets foreign threats overseas but collects electronic data on some Americans as well. Privacy advocates have long sought to require a warrant before the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other agencies can search the data for information about Americans, and Johnson had signaled there would be votes later this week on legislation to renew the program, which will expire in April absent congressional reauthorization.

“Bizarre timing considering we are trying to end warrantless government surveillance this week,” Rep. Andy Biggs, a Republican of Arizona, said on social media. Biggs and many other conservatives want to create a warrant requirement, while Turner and more national-security-oriented lawmakers agree with the Biden administration that doing so could cripple the program, which is known as Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Wednesday afternoon, hours into the confusion prompted by Turner’s statement, a spokesman for Johnson said any votes on FISA would be delayed to allow Congress more time to reach a consensus.

Rep. Thomas Massie (R., Ky.) called the decision “unbelievable,” saying on social media, “Just as we were winning the debate on requiring warrants for domestic spying in the FISA 702 reauthorization, the Speaker yanked the bill.”

Turner’s statement appeared to contribute to breakdowns in congressional proceedings Wednesday. In the Capitol, the House Rules Committee abruptly stopped a meeting before Turner could appear as scheduled, which civil libertarians took as a sign that House Republican leadership was trying to block a public debate about FISA and a related measure involving the ways the government buys and uses commercially available data for intelligence purposes.

Some lawmakers were privately suspicious that the cryptic note from Turner was a tactic to blow up a legislative process on FISA. Many of those lawmakers declined to attend a classified briefing on the intelligence referenced by Turner, concerned that they would then be muzzled and unable to air their concerns that the briefing was intended to bolster support for the FISA reauthorization and weaken support for amendments being pushed by civil libertarians.

Sens. Mark Warner (D., Va.) and Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), the leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the panel “has the intelligence in question, and has been rigorously tracking this issue from the start.” In a joint statement, they said they “continue to take this matter seriously and are discussing an appropriate response with the administration.”

They warned that officials must be cautious about “potentially disclosing sources and methods that may be key to preserving a range of options for U.S. action.”

Asked about Turner’s request on MSNBC, Sen. Chris Coons (D., Del.) said lawmakers “should not be conducting sensitive national intelligence and security discussions by press release and on cable news interviews.”

Sullivan said he was a “bit surprised” that Turner put out the statement ahead of Thursday’s planned briefing. “That’s his choice to do it.”

In an interview last month, U.S. Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said Russia’s space capabilities haven’t been diminished as a result of the war in Ukraine.

“They still have intentions to build weapons for space, and we are monitoring, assessing and responding to them,” Saltzman said without commenting on specific capabilities. He noted that Russia’s destruction of a satellite in 2021 was a disruptive and significant event in space.

Vivian Salama and Shelby Holliday contributed to this article.

Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com, Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com and Siobhan Hughes at Siobhan.hughes@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Wednesday afternoon, a spokesman for House Speaker Mike Johnson said any votes on FISA would be delayed to allow Congress more time to reach a consensus. An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated the day as Tuesday. (Corrected on Feb. 14)

Appeared in the February 15, 2024, print edition as 'Intelligence Threat Cited by Lawmaker Relates to Russia'.

3. House intel chair sounds alarm on ‘serious national security threat’

House intel chair sounds alarm on ‘serious national security threat’

Russia has been experimenting with ways to disable satellites, raising concerns that classified intelligence about a new weapon could indicate a strategic threat to national security

By Shane Harris, Ellen Nakashima and John Hudson

Updated February 14, 2024 at 6:14 p.m. EST|Published February 14, 2024 at 2:22 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · February 14, 2024

In an unusual and cryptic public statement Wednesday, a leading member of Congress urged lawmakers to review classified information about what he called a “serious national security threat.”

Rep. Michael R. Turner (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, did not specify the nature of the threat or the country supposedly wielding it.

In a separate letter to fellow House members, Turner and Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut, the committee’s top Democrat, said the committee “has identified an urgent matter with regard to a destabilizing foreign military capability that should be known by all congressional policymakers.”

The lawmakers said the full committee voted on Tuesday to make the intelligence available to all House members for their in-person review in a secure room at the Capitol.

The information does not concern an imminent threat, and it was obtained using authorities granted to the intelligence community under Section 702 of a key electronic surveillance law that is being hotly debated in Congress, according to officials with knowledge of the matter and who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence.

Turner, a strong proponent of the surveillance authority, appears to want to use the information about the adversary capability to persuade skeptical colleagues that 702 is an indispensable intelligence tool, one official said.

Himes cautioned that the information Turner highlighted doesn’t concern a “panic now” issue. “It is a serious national security issue in the medium-to-long term that the Congress and the administration need to focus on,” said Himes. “But no need to buy gold.”

House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) also urged caution. “I want to assure the American people there is no need for public alarm. We are going to work together to address this matter, as we do all sensitive matters that are classified,” he told reporters.

Officials on Capitol Hill and in the intelligence community said they were aware of the nature of the military capability and the country concerned but declined to elaborate because the information is still classified.

Turner’s vague but intriguing public disclosure triggered a parlor game of speculation. One official would only allow that the country in question was a “major power,” such as Russia or China, and not a small nation that had achieved some new capability.

One Capitol Hill aide expressed annoyance at Turner for alerting the public about the information ahead of a planned briefing for top House lawmakers in the so-called “Gang of Eight,” who are traditionally privy to some of the most sensitive intelligence information.

Lawmakers in the House and Senate have been in possession of the raw intelligence concerning the foreign capability for several weeks and were preparing to learn how the administration might respond, this aide said. Turner’s disclosure could make that response more difficult if it revealed information about how the intelligence was obtained in the first place, the aide said.

Turner, in his initial statement, called on the Biden administration to declassify all information about the threat.

Speaking to reporters at the White House, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said he reached out to senior lawmakers last week and offered to brief them on the matter. “It is highly unusual, in fact, for the national security adviser to do that,” said Sullivan, who questioned why Turner chose to make the matter public considering that Sullivan plans to meet with members on the Hill on Thursday, along with intelligence and defense personnel.

That meeting, he said, “has been on the books for Thursday. So I am a bit surprised that Congressman Turner came out publicly today in advance of the meeting … for me to go sit with him alongside our intelligence and defense professionals tomorrow. That’s his choice to do that,” Sullivan said.

Asked if the meeting he requested was to discuss the same “serious national security threat” that Turner referred to in his statement, Sullivan demurred. “I’ll leave it to you to draw whatever connections you want,” he said. “I’m not in position to say anything further from this podium at this time.”

Sullivan added that the Biden administration “has gone further, and in more creative, more strategic ways,” to declassify intelligence “in the national interest of the United States than any administration in history.” But “at the same time, we, of course, have to continue to prioritize and focus very much on the issue of sources and methods.”

This is a developing story and will be updated.

Karen DeYoung and Abigail Hauslohner contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · February 14, 2024

4. The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific Region

Download the 21 page report at this link: https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Indo-Pacific-Report-1.pdf

This short report reveals that irregular warfare is all over the map in Asia. There is no single IW definition.

February 13, 2024

The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific Region

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/research-reports/the-conceptualization-of-irregular-warfare-in-the-indo-pacific-region/?utm

Authors: Dr. Sandor Fabian and Gabrielle Kennedy

Table of Contents

Preface

This report is the second in a series of volumes in which the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) explores the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare across U.S. allied and partner stakeholders in regions important for U.S. national security. This volume focuses on the Indo-Pacific region.

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the U.S. Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean. Home to more than half of the world’s population, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries, the Indo-Pacific has long been recognized as vital to the security and prosperity of the United States. The region faces several challenges that have major implications for U.S. security and partnerships in the region. The Indo- Pacific governments are confronted with natural disasters, resource scarcity, internal conflicts, and governance challenges. Additionally, the People`s Republic of China (PRC) is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might to pursue a sphere of influence in the region while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to expand its illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (February 2022) clearly states that “the United States is committed to an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. To realize that future, the United States will strengthen our own role while reinforcing the region itself. The essential feature of this approach is that it cannot be accomplished alone: changing strategic circumstances and historic challenges require unprecedented cooperation with those who share in this vision.”1

To contribute to the success of this vision, the IWC has compiled its second volume in a series of reports in which IWC strives to understand the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare (IW) across U.S. allies and partners. Understanding and bridging the gaps between the conceptualization of IW on the part of the United States and its allies and partners is a key first step to future cooperation and greater resiliency in the face of inevitable irregular threats.

This report compares such conceptualization across six academic institutions from countries of the Indo-Pacific region, including the Indian Manohar Parikkar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, the Sri Lankan General Sir John Kotelawala Defense University, the Operations Research Center of the Philippine Army, the Singaporean S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, The Malaysian National Defense University, and the Australian University of New South Wales. Representatives from these institutions provided responses to an IWC-generated formal survey and attended a semi-structured interview. Questions in both the survey and interview centered on how these institutions conceptualize IW, which IW threats they identify, what their research agendas are, and how they teach concepts related to IW.

Like the first volume of this series of geographically-focused reports, this second volume should be of interest to defense and foreign policy decision makers, defense practitioners, and scholars in the United States and allied and partner nations across the globe, the media, defense industry representatives and non-governmental organizations, and others concerned about the challenges associated with IW.

Executive Summary

To maintain critical competencies and to develop new capabilities in IW, continued and wide-ranging study of the concept must remain a high priority. With a focus on the Indo-Pacific region this report is the second in a series of volumes exploring the commonality and difference in ideas related to IW across U.S. allies and partners. Identifying base-line knowledge of IW-related thought in allied and partner academic and professional military educational institutions and exploring areas of potential cooperation on issues relevant to IW are critical to U.S. national security interests and the success of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The report finds that there is no overarching or consistent definition of IW used among relevant institutions in the Indo-Pacific region. This trend trails through other findings uncovered by this investigation, such as the lack of codified threats and the lack of institutionalized education on IW. On a more granular level, the report finds that geography impacts conceptualization of IW, with proximity to a potential adversary and the geographic nature of the state correlating with the approach to defining IW. Though the responses of the participants should not be construed as definitive answers for the entire region or even their associated states, the geographical, institutional, and general definitional trends found through this study allow this research an application wider than the institutions studied.

This report finds that there is no codified or unified approach in the Indo-Pacific region to conceptualizing IW, addressing IW-related threats, or teaching IW-related content. Most of the institutions studied tied IW to domestic issues and those that are not strictly related to defense and must, therefore, be addressed by other parts of the state. The answers of institutions surveyed also displayed a strong relationship between IW tactics and violence. This, combined with the fact that non-state actors are seen as IW actors across the region, displays the impact of the Indo-Pacific states’ experience with insurgency and terrorism on the current-day conceptualization of new threats and tactics used by adversaries.

Acknowledgements

IWC would like to express its appreciation to all who contributed to the successful completion of this study. Our greatest gratitude goes out to Col. (ret.) Divakaran Padma Kumar Pillay, PhD. from India, Sinduja Jayaratne from Sri Lanka, Suzanne Faelnar from the Philippines, Rohan Gunaratna PhD. from Singapore, Dr. Mohd Mizan bin Mohammad Aslam from Malaysia, Andrew Maher from University of New South Wales from Australia, and Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim from the Australian National Defense University.

5. Opinion | Even from a Russian prison, I can see Putin’s weakness

I wonder how this gets out of prison and then what happens to the author when the authorities learn of this publication? I have pasted the author's bio below for those (like me) who are not very familiar with him.

Regarding this excerpt and the upcoming Russian "election," I am reminded of Stalin's quote: "It is not the vote that counts, it is who counts the votes."

Excerpt:

Putin’s official vote tally on March 17 will likely be the highest in all his 24 years in power. But it will also be the furthest removed from reality. A small upstart campaign by a cautious critic has exposed the lie behind the Kremlin claims of solid public support for Putin and for his war. “Few people believed this could happen, but Russian citizens now feel that change is actually possible in our country,” Nadezhdin told journalists after the meeting of the election commission.

This doesn’t mean that change will happen tomorrow or next month. But a society that feels more empowered and more confident about itself is suddenly a force to be reckoned with. And that is bad news for any dictator.

Opinion | Even from a Russian prison, I can see Putin’s weakness

By Vladimir Kara-Murza

Global Opinions contributor

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February 14, 2024 at 3:24 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Vladimir Kara-Murza · February 14, 2024

“SPECIAL REGIME” PRISON COLONY No. 7, OMSK, Russia — If you listen to Vladimir Putin’s propaganda, things couldn’t be going better for him. The Russian president is winning the war in Ukraine, his hold on power is as strong as ever and — most importantly and underpinning all of this — the Russian people are fully united in support of their national leader and his “special military operation,” as the official media invariably refers to the war. Surprisingly, there are even people in the West who take this at face value.

But actions speak louder than words. The Kremlin’s propaganda narrative was shown up last week when the Central Election Commission barred Boris Nadezhdin, the sole antiwar candidate running in Russia’s presidential election, from the March ballot.

The formal pretext was the usual one offered in such circumstances: “technical irregularities” in the small percentage of the voter signatures submitted in support of his nomination (misprints in passport numbers, some of the collectors’ signatures not notarized and so on). The real reason was given by an unnamed Kremlin source, who told Meduza (an independent online media organization) that the Putin administration had underestimated how many Russians are actually opposed to the war in Ukraine — and that Nadezhdin was polling in the double-digits. It was an “unpleasant surprise,” the source candidly admitted.

For many Russians, on the contrary, the sudden takeoff of Nadezhdin’s campaign was not just a pleasant surprise, it was a much-needed moral boost in a society disoriented, demoralized and increasingly repressed since the start of Putin’s full-blown war on Ukraine almost two years ago. The goal of the combined efforts of propaganda and crackdown (there are hundreds of political prisoners in Russia, with a growing number arrested for speaking out against the war) was to make antiwar Russians feel not only afraid but also isolated and shunned by their own countrymen. To a large extent, these efforts have worked. I receive dozens of letters in my prison mail every week from all over Russia, and the prevailing mood in them about the situation in the country was gloom and despair.

I say “was,” because this suddenly changed last month.

To be clear, Nadezhdin is not a firebrand national protest leader. He is no Boris Nemtsov or Alexei Navalny. Nadezhdin, a lawyer and former member of the Russian parliament and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, is a cautious critic of the Putin regime who was, until recently, a regular guest on state TV talk shows and who always stays within the red lines imposed by the Kremlin for public discourse. For example, he refers to the war in Ukraine as the “special military operation.” But in his manifesto he also called the war a “fatal mistake” and made its immediate cessation his main campaign promise.

The public reaction was not foreseen by anyone, least of all by Nadezhdin himself. In cities and towns across Russia — not just large metropolises but also faraway provincial centers such as Novorossiysk and Gorno-Altaysk — people formed long lines at Nadezhdin’s campaign offices to sign the petitions required for his nomination. The wait was often several hours; the majority of those who came were young people. It was about these lines — the largest antiwar demonstration in Russia since Putin’s attack on Ukraine — that most people wrote to me through the prison mail in January. The mood change was as marked as it was sudden. “It was unbelievable to see that there are so many of us,” one young woman, a single mother, wrote me from Eastern Siberia. “For the first time in two years I felt at home in my own country.”

In four weeks, more than 200,000 people have signed their names, home addresses and passport details in support of Nadezhdin’s nomination (an act of courage in itself, given the realities of Putin’s Russia), while tens of thousands have sent donations to his campaign totaling more than 100 million rubles ($1,091,000). A survey released by Russian Field, a private polling company, showed that Nadezhdin shot to second place behind Putin and far ahead of the pro-war candidates from the official “opposition” parties — all this despite a total blackout of his campaign on national television.

Even more telling, state pollsters simply stopped publishing any survey results relating to the presidential election. The Kremlin doesn’t like surprises in general. But this one must have brought unpleasant memories from the 2020 presidential election in neighboring Belarus, where fellow dictator Alexander Lukashenko faced the largest protests of his rule after the unexpectedly strong campaign by opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who was initially dismissed by the regime as a little-known provincial “housewife.” History often makes unorthodox choices for its agents of change.

The formal results of Russia’s March election (it feels wrong to write this word without quotation marks) are, of course, not in doubt. With Nadezhdin out of the running, Russians who oppose the war will be left to spoil their ballots or boycott the vote altogether. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has more than enough tools in its toolbox — from traditional coercion of state employees to uncontrolled mass online voting — to produce the required numbers.

Putin’s official vote tally on March 17 will likely be the highest in all his 24 years in power. But it will also be the furthest removed from reality. A small upstart campaign by a cautious critic has exposed the lie behind the Kremlin claims of solid public support for Putin and for his war. “Few people believed this could happen, but Russian citizens now feel that change is actually possible in our country,” Nadezhdin told journalists after the meeting of the election commission.

This doesn’t mean that change will happen tomorrow or next month. But a society that feels more empowered and more confident about itself is suddenly a force to be reckoned with. And that is bad news for any dictator.

The Washington Post · by Vladimir Kara-Murza · February 14, 2024Vladimir Kara-Murza

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Moscow/Washington

Russia, human rights, democracy

Education: M.A. (Cantab.) in History from Cambridge

Vladimir Kara-Murza is a Russian politician, author, and historian who has been imprisoned in Russia since April 2022 for speaking out against the war on Ukraine. A longtime colleague of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, he was a candidate for the Russian Parliament and served as deputy leader of the People’s Freedom Party. Leading diplomatic efforts on behalf of the opposition, Kara-Murza played a key role in the adoption of targeted Magnitsky sanctions on Russian human rights violators in the United States, European Union, Canada, and Great Britain. U.S. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) called him “one of the most passionate and effective advocates for passage of the Magnitsky Act”; U.S. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) described him as “a courageous advocate for the democratic process and fundamental universal human rights.” Twice, in 2015 and 2017, Kara-Murza was poisoned and left in a coma; a subsequent media investigation by Bellingcat and The Insider has identified officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service who were behind the poisonings. He is a contributing writer at the Washington Post and hosts a weekly show on Echo of Moscow radio, and has previously worked for the BBC, RTVi, Kommersant, and other media outlets. He has directed three documentary films, They Chose Freedom, Nemtsov, and My Duty to Not Stay Silent; and is the author of Reform or Revolution: The Quest for Responsible Government in the First Russian State Duma and a contributor to several volumes, including Russian Liberalism: Ideas and People, Europe Whole and Free: Vision and Reality, and Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics: Power and Resistance. Kara-Murza led successful international efforts to commemorate Nemtsov, including with street designations in Washington and Vilnius. He was the founding chairman of the Nemtsov Foundation and served as vice president at Open Russia and the Free Russia Foundation; both organizations were designated as “undesirable” by Vladimir Putin’s government. Kara-Murza is a senior advisor at Human Rights First and a senior fellow at the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights; and has been a visiting fellow at the University of Chicago, leading a seminar course on contemporary Russia. He has been profiled on CBS 60 Minutes and NBC Nightly News, and has appeared on CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and BBC Newsnight. Kara-Murza is a recipient of several awards, including the Sakharov Prize for Journalism as an Act of Conscience, the Magnitsky Human Rights Award, and the Geneva Summit Courage Award. He holds an M.A. (Cantab.) in History from Cambridge. He is married, with three children.

Honors and Awards: Magnitsky Human Rights Award; Sakharov Prize for Journalism as an Act of Conscience; Geneva Summit Courage Award; Train Foundation’s Civil Courage Prize; Oxi Courage Award; Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights Prize from the Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes

Languages spoken in addition to English: Russian, English, French

Books by Vladimir Kara-Murza:

Reform or Revolution: The Quest for Responsible Government in the First Russian State Duma (Moscow 2011)

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Russia’s Choices: The Duma Elections and After (London 2003), contributor

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Russian Liberalism: Ideas and People (Moscow 2007), contributor

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Why Europe Needs a Magnitsky Law (London 2013), contributor

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Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics: Power and Resistance (Stuttgart 2018), contributor

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The Presence of the Past: Essays on Memory, Conflict, and Reconciliation (Washington / London 2019), contributor

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Europe Whole and Free. Vision and Reality (Warsaw 2019), contributor

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6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces successfully sank another Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) landing ship in the Black Sea off the southern coast of occupied Crimea on the night of February 13 to 14.
Ukraine reportedly continues efforts to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel by using more advanced systems and equipment, although continued delays in Western security assistance will undermine these efforts.
Russia is similarly pursuing battlefield advantages through technological innovation despite its focus on generating manpower and materiel in greater mass than Ukraine.
Russian authorities may be generating enough new forces to sustain losses generated by the current tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine through 2025.
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) stated that the Russian military’s ongoing restructuring and expansion effort aims to intensify Russian military posturing against Finland and the wider NATO alliance.
The Kremlin is conducting information operations against Moldova very similar to those that the Kremlin used before its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, likely to set conditions to justify possible future Russian escalation against Moldova.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenburg stated on February 14 that NATO does not see any immediate threat of military attacks on a NATO member but noted that there is a “constant risk” of hybrid attacks.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied recent Western reports that Russia recently proposed freezing the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia reportedly is developing a space-based anti-satellite weapon.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Marinka, and Krynky amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact on February 14.
Russia continues efforts to expand its defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize and culturally indoctrinate youth and students in occupied Ukraine into Russian identity and ideology.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 14, 2024

Feb 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2024

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 14, 2024, 7:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on February 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces successfully sank another Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) landing ship in the Black Sea off the southern coast of occupied Crimea on the night of February 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on February 14 showing Ukrainian maritime drones striking the Caesar Kunikov Ropucha-class landing ship off the coast of occupied Alupka, Crimea.[1] The GUR reported that maritime drone strikes caused the ship to sink and stated that Russian search and rescue operations were not successful. The GUR stated that the Caesar Kunikov was the largest amphibious landing ship of its project 775 type. Ukrainian forces have destroyed or damaged at least five BSF landing ships since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[2] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that only five of 13 BSF landing ships that Russia had at the start of the full-scale invasion remain “in service” and that “four ships are under repair, four are destroyed, and five are still in the ranks.”[3] Ukrainian strikes damaging and sinking BSF landing ships further reduce Russia’s ability to conduct amphibious operations, although ISW continues to assess that Russia is unlikely to conduct an amphibious landing operation in Ukraine since Russian naval infantry are deployed across Ukraine and a Ukrainian strike campaign in summer and fall 2023 successfully sequestered the BSF to the eastern part of the Black Sea.[4]

Ukraine reportedly continues efforts to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel by using more advanced systems and equipment, although continued delays in Western security assistance will undermine these efforts. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated in an interview published on February 14 that Ukraine cannot compete with Russia in the number of artillery shells, tanks, and soldiers that Russia can generate but that Ukraine can achieve an advantage on the battlefield by using high-tech weapons.[5] Havrylyuk stated that Ukrainian forces have proven that a well-trained army with more advanced weapons can defeat an enemy with numerical superiority in manpower and equipment.[6] Havrylyuk argued that Ukrainian forces have superior strike capabilities that have previously allowed Ukraine to degrade Russian logistics and combat capabilities.[7] Havrylyuk stressed that Ukraine only has these superior capabilities when it has enough long-range high-precision munitions and enough ammunition for Western-provided artillery systems that have longer ranges and better accuracy than Russian artillery systems.[8] Havrylyuk specifically highlighted Ukrainian efforts to integrate strike drone capabilities throughout the Ukrainian Armed Forces at scale and noted that Ukraine aims to gradually increase the proportion of machines to people on the battlefield.[9]

Havrylyuk acknowledged that Ukrainian progress in expanding drone operations does not replace Ukraine’s need for advanced artillery systems and other long-range capabilities, however. Havrylyuk stated that the war in Ukraine demonstrates that artillery plays a key role on the battlefield and noted that Ukrainian MLRS and artillery units have caused the majority of Russia’s losses in Ukraine.[10] Havrylyuk stated that drones have certain advantages over artillery, specifically in cost, but are more susceptible to external factors such as Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and natural factors, likely referencing weather.[11] The drones that Ukrainian forces currently possess are not able to generate certain battlefield effects that artillery can achieve, such as the destruction of field fortifications, and most Ukrainian drones cannot reliably destroy Russian armored vehicles as artillery can. Havrylyuk argued that Ukraine needs to focus on combined operations using drones and artillery systems to increase the accuracy of Ukrainian fires and conserve artillery ammunition.[12] Ukraine’s ability to conduct such combined operations currently relies on Western provisions of artillery shells, and Havrylyuk acknowledged that shell shortages continue to affect Ukrainian capabilities and force Ukraine to adjust operational plans.[13]

Russia is similarly pursuing battlefield advantages through technological innovation despite its focus on generating manpower and materiel in greater mass than Ukraine. Russia has gradually expanded its defense industrial base (DIB), sourced critical equipment and ammunition from abroad, and established a crypto-mobilization apparatus that has allowed the Russian military to deploy more personnel and materiel in Ukraine than Ukrainian forces.[14] Havrylyuk stated that Russia is focused on advantages in the quantity of military materiel, although this Russian focus on mass has not precluded Russia from pursuing select technological adaptations.[15] Russian forces have particularly focused on deploying EW systems along the frontline and are likewise attempting to expand the use of drones at scale in Ukraine.[16] Russia has not conducted a general mobilization of manpower and materiel and remains unlikely to do so, currently limiting the mass that the Russian military can bring to bear in Ukraine.[17] It remains unclear how much further Russia can mobilize its DIB and generate new forces without taking significant and possibly unpopular actions given Russia’s persistent economic and human capital constraints.[18] ISW has previously assessed that if the Russians retain the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine for a long time they may prioritize force generation efforts over the requirements of their current offensive efforts, and the Russian command could also use such prioritization to focus more heavily on technological innovation and adaptation at scale.[19] There are no indications that the Russian command intends to adopt such an approach, however.

Havrylyuk’s description of the Ukrainian effort to pursue advantages through the use of more advanced systems echoes former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s strategy of using technological adaptation and innovation to offset Russian numerical advantages in Ukraine, seize the theater-wide initiative, and restore maneuver to the battlefield.[20] The Russians could in principle also attempt such an approach, but Ukraine appears to be pursuing it in a much more deliberate and concerted effort than Russia. Ukraine is revitalizing its DIB in order to produce and sustain many of these advanced systems on its own or in direct partnership with other countries and to integrate them into Ukrainian tactics, and a premature end to Western security assistance would cede to Russian forces operational advantages before Ukraine could achieve such self-sufficiency.[21] The Ukrainian ability to see such a strategy to fruition is dependent on continued Western support that allows Ukrainian forces to maintain battlefield advantages while providing Ukraine with new advantages over Russian mass.

Russian authorities may be generating enough new forces to sustain losses generated by the current tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine through 2025. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on February 13 that the Russian military continues to grow despite taking significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russian military recruiters are currently meeting almost 85 percent of their quotas for contract recruits.[22] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be suffering losses along the frontline in Ukraine at a rate close to Russia’s current force-generation rate.[23] RUSI assessed that Russian forces will likely have the manpower and materiel to be able to maintain a steady tempo of assaults throughout 2024 despite the fact that Russian forces’ quality is unlikely to increase as long as Ukrainian forces can maintain a sufficient level of attrition across the theater.[24] RUSI noted that Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian assaults and attrit Russian forces is highly dependent on continued Western assistance to Ukraine, which is consistent with ISW‘s ongoing assessment that the collapse of Western aid at this time would eventually lead to the collapse of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and hold off the Russian military.[25] It is unclear if Russia’s ongoing force-generation campaigns would be able to make up for additional losses that Russian forces would sustain by intensifying offensive operations.

RUSI additionally reported that Russian forces typically engage in localized tactical assaults until they have lost up to 30 percent of their manpower, after which they are rotated out and reconstituted.[26] Losses of 30 percent are extremely high. Most units become combat ineffective after taking much lower losses. The Russians are therefore likely fighting their units past the point at which they have become combat ineffective before rotating them out for reconstitution. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 11 that Russian forces withdraw their units to rear areas when they are at 50 percent or less of their intended end strength and return them to the front following recovery and replenishment.[27] The Russian command’s willingness to allow a unit to be severely degraded to between 50 and 70 percent of the unit’s end strength significantly impacts the unit’s combat effectiveness. This approach to force management likely explains the observable pattern of Russian operations on the ground. Localized assaults continue until they stall out, whereupon offensive operations pause while the command rotates and replenishes degraded units. ISW has observed this pattern in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions since January 2024.[28] Russia can likely sustain this approach for a long time but cannot accelerate its progress as long as Ukraine has the materiel necessary to conduct effective defensive operations. Successful Russian operational-level offensives in Ukraine will likely require the Russian command to commit relatively combat effective and well-equipped units and formations to offensive operations at scale, something the Kremlin has generally been unable or unwilling to do.[29]

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) stated that the Russian military’s ongoing restructuring and expansion effort aims to intensify Russian military posturing against Finland and the wider NATO alliance. The VLA reported on February 13 that the Russian military is forming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Moscow Military District (MMD) in order to posture against Finland and NATO while also attempting to “partially strengthen its units” in the Baltic region as the war in Ukraine continues.[30] Russian formations garrisoned near the Baltics, such as the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) and 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, are currently heavily committed to combat operations in Ukraine.[31] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu have indicated that the Russian military is reforming the LMD to prepare for a potential future conventional war against NATO.[32] The VLA’s assessment that the Russian military may be attempting to use these reforms to strengthen its forces along NATO’s flank is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russia may be arranging military assets in a way to posture along the border with NATO members in the mid-to-long term.[33] The VLA stated that about 19,000 Russian forces were stationed in the direction of Estonia before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that the Russian military may double the number of personnel and armored vehicles and increase the number of tanks and artillery systems near the Estonian border when Russia begins to feel confident about the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Russia would likely use an increased military presence on NATO’s eastern flank to intensify threats against NATO to further Russia’s long-term goal of weakening and containing the alliance.[34]

The Kremlin is conducting information operations against Moldova very similar to those that the Kremlin used before its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, likely to set conditions to justify possible future Russian escalation against Moldova. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov answered a question after his speech to the Russian State Duma on February 14 about the Transnistria conflict and falsely alleged that the United States and European Union (EU) control the Moldovan government.[35] Lavrov claimed that the West stopped the 5+2 negotiating process in the Transnistria conflict. The 5+2 process included Russia, Ukraine, Transnistria, Moldova, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as mediators and the EU and US as observers. Lavrov claimed that Russia will “do everything” to resume the 5+2 process. Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Serebrian stated on January 28 that Moldova would not return to the 5+2 process as long as Russian-Ukrainian relations did not improve and Russia’s war in Ukraine continues.[36] Lavrov claimed that there are about 200,000 Russian citizens in Transnistria and that Russia is “concerned about their fate” and “will not allow them to become victims of another Western adventure.”[37] Lavrov further alleged that Moldova decided not to give state budget subsidies to regions such as Gagauzia that oppose Moldovan integration with the EU. Lavrov compared Moldovan actions concerning Gagauzia to the way the West “refused” to give former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych time to review Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU in 2013. Lavrov claimed that the West is issuing similar “ultimatums” to Chisinau about EU integration.

The Kremlin previously accused Ukraine of abandoning and disregarding the Minsk Agreements, which established the post-2014 armistice following the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and involved Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE with France and Germany as mediators, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has regularly claimed that Ukraine’s alleged violations of the Minsk Agreements “forced” Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022.[38] The Kremlin has also used the idea of protecting its “compatriots abroad” to justify the fact that Russian troops have occupied Transnistria since 1992 as well as Russia's full-scale invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.[39] The Kremlin has also accused the US of orchestrating the protests that erupted after Yanukovych’s withdrawal from the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 and claimed that the alleged subsequent US-backed “coup” forced Russia to invade Crimea and begin military operations in Donbas in 2014 to protect those that “opposed the coup” and Russian “compatriots abroad.”[40]

ISW continues to assess that Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have been attempting to set information conditions to justify possible Russian efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent its integration into the West, and the fact that Lavrov furthered these narratives — and added additional allegations — suggests that the Kremlin is orchestrating these wider efforts in the information space.[41] Other officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), including MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, have previously claimed that Moldovan authorities are trying to economically “strangle” Transnistria, are preventing a diplomatic solution to the Transnistria conflict, and face widespread domestic discontent towards Moldovan government policies.[42] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger has recently seized on the Transnistria issue to consistently promote similar Kremlin narratives as well as claims that Moldova is “militarizing” in order to “forcefully reintegrate” Transnistria into Moldova — an effort for which Russia, the milblogger claimed, must prepare.[43] Moldovan authorities recently accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of conducting exercises and using weapons in the Moldovan security zone in violation of the OSCE Joint Control Commission (JCC) protocols.[44] The timing of a possible Russian hybrid operation in Moldova is unclear, but the Kremlin is setting informational conditions to make it possible soon.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenburg stated on February 14 that NATO does not see any immediate threat of military attacks on a NATO member but noted that there is a “constant risk” of hybrid attacks. Stoltenberg stated that NATO is working to improve intelligence, intelligence sharing, and collaboration with civil society to combat hybrid threats.[45] ISW has recently observed Kremlin actors, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, setting informational conditions to justify possible Russian hybrid attacks on Moldova as well as the Baltic states, Denmark, and Finland.[46]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied recent Western reports that Russia recently proposed freezing the conflict in Ukraine.[47] Peskov called Western reporting on the supposed proposal “untrue” and claimed that US involvement in Ukraine will not change the war’s course and that Russia will continue the war until all its goals are achieved.[48] Reuters reported on February 13, citing unnamed Russian sources, that the US rejected a ceasefire proposal from Russian President Vladimir Putin in late 2023 or early 2024.[49] An unnamed US source denied any official contact with Russia and reiterated that the US will not engage in peace negotiations with Russia that do not involve Ukraine.[50] ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian officials are interested in good-faith peace negotiations with Ukraine but continues to observe signals that Russia may be open to bilateral discussions leading to the US abandonment of Ukraine.[51] Russian officials recently blamed the US for the absence of constructive peace negotiations to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to frame the West as the only meaningful negotiating partner in Ukraine and convince the West to accept the Kremlin’s premise that Ukraine has no independent agency.[52] Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) Director General Kaupo Rosin stated on February 14 that the Kremlin is pushing the false narrative that Russia is interested in peace negotiations in the West in order to undermine Western military support for Ukraine.[53] ISW previously assessed that Russian statements suggesting that Russia is or always has been interested in peace negotiations are very likely efforts to feign interest to prompt preemptive Western concessions regarding Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[54]

Russia reportedly is developing a space-based anti-satellite weapon. US House Intelligence Committee Chair Michael Turner stated on February 14 that he made information about a “serious national security threat” available to all members of Congress and called on US President Joe Biden to declassify all information relating to the threat.[55] Western media reported that two sources stated that the intelligence concerns Russia’s desire to put an anti-satellite nuclear weapon into space to use against satellites, not to launch a nuclear weapon onto Earth.[56] The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials said that the new intelligence was serious but that Russia is still developing the capability and has not deployed it yet.[57] NYT reported that the possible Russian capability does not pose an urgent threat to the US, Ukraine, or America’s European allies. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on February 9 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) launched a Soyuz-2.1v launch vehicle from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome with an unspecified classified payload “in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense.”[58]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces successfully sank another Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) landing ship in the Black Sea off the southern coast of occupied Crimea on the night of February 13 to 14.
Ukraine reportedly continues efforts to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel by using more advanced systems and equipment, although continued delays in Western security assistance will undermine these efforts.
Russia is similarly pursuing battlefield advantages through technological innovation despite its focus on generating manpower and materiel in greater mass than Ukraine.
Russian authorities may be generating enough new forces to sustain losses generated by the current tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine through 2025.
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) stated that the Russian military’s ongoing restructuring and expansion effort aims to intensify Russian military posturing against Finland and the wider NATO alliance.
The Kremlin is conducting information operations against Moldova very similar to those that the Kremlin used before its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, likely to set conditions to justify possible future Russian escalation against Moldova.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenburg stated on February 14 that NATO does not see any immediate threat of military attacks on a NATO member but noted that there is a “constant risk” of hybrid attacks.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied recent Western reports that Russia recently proposed freezing the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia reportedly is developing a space-based anti-satellite weapon.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Marinka, and Krynky amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact on February 14.
Russia continues efforts to expand its defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize and culturally indoctrinate youth and students in occupied Ukraine into Russian identity and ideology.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 14. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that there was positional fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka and Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[59] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces have intensified assaults with heavy equipment along the frontline in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions but noted that equipment and weapons shortages are limiting Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations in these directions.[60] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 14. Geolocated footage published on February 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces advancednear Ivanivske near the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Bakhmut highway (west of Bakhmut).[62] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers wide and 750 meters in depth south of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[63] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka; and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne and Shumy.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian forces in Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut).[65] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut); elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bakhmut; elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating south of Bohdanivka; and elements of the Russian 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Ivanivske.[66]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Avdiivka on February 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced to the main Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) in Avdiivka along Hrushevskoho Street.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Avdiivka near the Avdiivka quarry, south of the Avdiivka Coke Plant, and up to 1.4 kilometers in width and up to 930 meters in depth south of Avdiivka from Opytne.[68] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims, however. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lukhoviy stated that Ukranian forces maintain multiple supply routes into Avdiivka.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control 17.5 percent of Avdiivka.[70] ISW can confirm that Russian forces currently occupy at least 15.4 percent of Avdiivka as of February 14. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne, and Stepove; southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Nevelske, Tonenke, and Pervomaiske; south of Avdiivka near the Tsarska Okhota restaurant area and Opytne; near the Avdiivka Coke Plant on Avdiivka’s northwestern outskirts; and in northwestern and southern Avdiivka.[71] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces conducted 73 airstrikes in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) and that this was the largest series of Russian airstrikes in this direction in 2024 so far.[72] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Russian forces typically conduct upwards of 30 glide bomb strikes against Avdiivka alone daily.[73] Lukhoviy stated that Russian forces have concentrated about 50,000 personnel in the Avdiivka direction.[74] Elements of the DNR’s “Pyatnashka” international volunteer brigade are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[75]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on February 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Marinka (west of Donetsk City).[76] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novomykhailivka and Heorhiivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[77] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[78] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District) and the “Russkiye Yastreby” (Russian Hawks) detachment of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People‘s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[79]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 14. Positional fighting occurred south of Zolota Nyva (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[80]

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 14. Positional fighting continued near Robotyne, northeast of Robotyne near Novopokrovka and Mala Tokmachka, east of Robotyne near Verbove, and south of Robotyne near Novoprokopivka.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) shot down a Ukrainian helicopter operating near Robotyne on February 13.[82]

Russian forces recently advanced within Krynky amid continued positional engagements in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on February 14. Geolocated footage published on February 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Krynky.[83] A Ukrainian military observer stated that Ukrainian forces recaptured positions within Krynky, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these reported Ukrainian gains.[84] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least seven Russian assaults in east bank Kherson Oblast.[85] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division‘s (18th CAA) 17th Tank Regiment and 26th Motorized Infantry Regiment, the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division’s 337th and 328th VDV regiments, the 28th Motorized Infantry Regiment (18th CAA), and the 144th Motorized Infantry Brigade (40th Army Corps, 18th CAA) are reportedly operating near Krynky.[86]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of February 13 to 14. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential buildings in Velykyi Burluk, Kharkiv Oblast with an S-300 missile and struck Selydove and Novohrodivka in Donetsk Oblast with an unspecified number of missiles.[87]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to expand its defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the Russian DIB enterprise Research and Production Corporation Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (NPK KBM) JSC in Moscow Oblast on February 14 to check the enterprise’s production of portable and operational-tactical missile systems.[88] Shoigu inspected samples of the Khrizantema-S anti-tank missile system with Khrizantema-M anti-tank guided missiles, the Gibka-S MANPADS combat vehicles, the Dzhigit support-launcher for Verba MANPADS missiles, and the Arena-M active protection combat system. NPK KBM General Contractor Valery Kashin stated that the company has submitted the Arena-M system for qualification tests and is working to improve the system’s protection against loitering munitions. NPK KBM Director General Sergei Pitikov stated that the enterprise has expanded its production capacity and increased production of unspecified equipment by “several times.”[89]

Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 14 that Republic of Chechnya authorities are increasingly coercing Chechnya’s residents into Russian military service.[90] Vazhnye Istorii, citing Chechen opposition sources, reported that Chechen authorities coerced about 30 percent of the Chechen personnel fighting in Ukraine into military service. Chechen opposition sources told Vazhnye Istorii that Chechen authorities have increasingly coerced individuals to join the Russian military and have recently begun coercing individuals considered “extremists” or “Islamists” into the military. Chechen human rights activists told Vazhnye Istorii that Chechen authorities forcibly recruit critics of the Chechen government and their relatives, individuals who evaded mobilization and their relatives, and those charged with fabricated or real violations of the law. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on February 1 that Chechnya has sent over 36,000 personnel to the war in Ukraine including about 16,000 volunteers (dobrovoltsy) who underwent training at the Spetsnaz University in Gudermes.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues to expand domestic weapons and equipment production. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on February 14 that Ukrainian manufacturers are working to modernize and produce “a considerable line” of weapons and equipment including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), grenade launcher ammunition, and systems to conceal air defenses.[92]

Ukraine continues to expand measures for monitoring and tracking the use of international military aid. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 14 that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved a new procedure for monitoring and regulating the use of international military aid that will regulate government bodies interacting, receiving, transferring and accounting for the provision of international military assistance.[93] Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform reported on February 14 that Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Yuriy Dzhyhyr met with US embassy representatives to discuss reforming the Ukrainian audit system and the creation of a Ukrainian MoD auditing committee.[94] Dzhyhyr and US officials also discussed joint inspections of weapons storage facilities.

Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair announced on February 14 that Canada will allocate 60 million Canadian dollars (about $44 million) to Ukraine as part of the Ukraine Defense Contract Group (UDCG) Air Force Capability Coalition for the purchase of spare parts, weapons, avionics, and ammunition for F-16 aircraft.[95]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize and culturally indoctrinate youth and students in occupied Ukraine into Russian identity and ideology. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov and Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on February 14 that occupation authorities are promoting the Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya) military-patriotic program in occupied Kostyantynivka and Mariupol to instill pro-Russian and militarized ideas in Ukrainian youth.[96] Andryushchenko stated that Yunarmiya representatives taught children how to assemble and disassemble small arms at a school in occupied Mariupol.[97] Luhansk Oblast occupation administration head Leonid Pasechnik claimed that he and Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko visited a new “Voin” military sports training center in occupied Luhansk City.[98] Pasechnik stated that local students will participate in a new Russian “Cyber Voin” drone operator training program at the center and thanked Kiriyenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin for supporting this initiative.[99] The Ukrainian Resistance Center previously reported that Ukrainian teenagers will undergo weapons and military engineering training and attend lectures about the war in Ukraine at another “Voin” training center in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[100]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to the Russia State Duma on February 14 and promoted boilerplate rhetoric casting the US as a global destabilizing force and Russia as a reliable international security partner.[101] Lavrov specifically highlighted Russian outreach efforts to China and Africa amid the Kremlin’s continued efforts to portray Russia as a core part of an alleged “world majority” resisting the West.[102] ISW has previously assessed that increasing Russian rhetoric about an anti-Western “world majority” suggests that the Kremlin is insecure about the possibility of diplomatic isolation against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[103]

The Kremlin is attempting to promote longstanding information operations to Catholic audiences by baselessly claiming that Pope Francis supports Russian positions regarding negotiations and alleged religious discrimination in Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to the Vatican Ivan Soltanovsky promoted a longstanding Russian information feigning interest in meaningful negotiations by claiming that Pope Francis is ready to act as mediator and that Russia is prepared to engage with a papal envoy on a negotiated settlement in Ukraine.[104] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin continue to routinely indicate that they are not interested in any meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and continue to pursue objectives amounting to Ukrainian capitulation.[105] Soltanovsky also claimed that Pope Francis considers alleged religious persecution against the Kremlin-controlled Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) in Ukraine unacceptable.[106] The Kremlin has notably engaged in systematic religious persecution in occupied Ukraine as part of its campaign of destroying Ukrainian identity and ethnic cleansing.[107] Pope Francis has not publicly issued comments reflecting these alleged positions.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 14 that Belarusian personnel recently completed combat training with Russian forces at the 333rd Training Center in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and returned to Belarus.[108] Belarusian Armed Forces Combat Training Department Head Major General Alexander Bas stated that Belarusian military instructors will continue to train at the 333rd Training Center.[109]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

Iraq: Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei discussed the removal of US forces from Iraq, counterterrorism, and border security with senior Iraqi politicians in Baghdad on February 13 and 14. The effort to expel US forces from Iraq supports Iran’s goals but ignores the current security situation in Iraq.
Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi released a statement on February 14 that warned “war merchants and seditionists from the Islamist parties” against “tampering with the stability of Anbar [Province].” Halbousi was likely referring to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties that are pushing for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq.
The Gaza Strip: The number of Palestinian militia attacks in the northern Gaza Strip dropped from a daily average of 5 attacks between January 31 and February 6 to a daily average of 2.7 attacks between February 7 and February 13.
The IDF conducted a two-week, division-sized clearing operation in early February that targeted Hamas underground infrastructure and fighters.
The IDF degraded Hamas units during previous clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip earlier in the war, but Hamas “took advantage” of the IDF’s withdrawal in late December to reconstitute some of its military units.
Ceasefire Negotiation: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo on February 14 for “low-level” follow-up talks to discuss ceasefire proposals.
Lebanon: Likely Lebanese Hezbollah fighters fired 11 122mm Grad rockets at the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed in northern Israel on February 14. The IDF conducted a series of major airstrikes on February 14 that targeted Hezbollah positions and assets in southern Lebanon in response to the attack targeting Safed.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 14, 2024

Feb 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, February 14, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei discussed the removal of US forces from Iraq, counterterrorism, and border security with senior Iraqi politicians in Baghdad on February 13 and 14. Iranian judicial officials rarely travel abroad. Acting Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi claimed that the Iraqi Parliament will pass a law in the coming weeks to “completely” end the US presence in Iraq during his meeting with Ejei.[1] Mandalawi described Iraq as a “strong” country that “does not need foreign forces to protect it.”[2] Prominent Shia cleric Ammar al Hakim separately expressed support for the Iraqi federal government’s negotiations with the United States about the status of US-led international coalition forces in Iraq during his meeting with Ejei.[3] Ejei expressed support for ending the US-led international coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq.[4] Facilitating the removal of US forces from the Middle East is one of Iran’s most important strategic objectives and Iran supports Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ ongoing military and political campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.

Mandalawi and Ejei’s positions support Iran’s goal to remove US forces from Iraq, but these positions ignore the current security situation in Iraq. Iran and its proxies and partners support the effort to expel US forces from Iraq. Mandalawi’s claim that Iraq “does not need foreign forces to protect it” ignores the realities of the US mission in Iraq and the issues plaguing the Iraqi Security Forces. The US mission in Iraq focuses primarily on advising Iraqi general officers and improving the ISF’s deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics.[5] US forces in Iraq do not conduct combat operations. Iran's partners in Iraq aim to remove US forces in part because the US support for the ISF strengthens the ISF's position vis-a-vis the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Iranian-backed actors in the PMF view some ISF units as a possible threat and seek to undermine them. The Counterterrorism Service (CTS), for example, arrested 14 Kataib Hezbollah members in a raid in June 2020.[6] CTP-ISW continues to assess that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces from Iraq would very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[7]

Ejei separately discussed border security and counterterrorism with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani. The Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office reported that Ejei and Sudani discussed joint efforts to confront terrorism and drug trafficking, while Iranian state media emphasized that Ejei called on the Iraqi government to “fully implement” the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad.[8] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[9] Iran has historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militant groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate joint operations into Iran. Ejei also met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid.[10]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani visited Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters in northwestern Iraq on February 12.[11] Sudani visited an Iraqi Army 21st Division headquarters along the "Wadi al Tharthar line,” an area that extends from Salah al Din Province to the Iraqi border with Syria in western Ninewa Province.[12] Sudani formed the 21st Division in February 2023 at the request of the Iraqi Defense Ministry.[13] Brig. Gen. Imad Ahmed Mohammad assumed command of this division after serving in the Directorate of Military Engineering.[14] Sudani also visited the 44th PMF Brigade (Liwa Ansar al Marjaiya) in Hatra, Ninewa Province.[15] The 44th PMF Brigade is affiliated with Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, who is an influential quietist grand ayatollah based in Najaf.[16] Hamid al Yasiri commands the brigade.[17] Iraqi media reported that Sudani traveled to northwestern Iraq to demonstrate that areas where ISIS members previously infiltrated Iraq from Syria are now safe.[18] Sudani reiterated during his visit to these headquarters that Iraq has an “obligation” to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq.[19]

Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi released a statement on February 14 that warned “war merchants and seditionists from the Islamist parties” against “tampering with the stability of Anbar [Province].”[20] Halbousi was likely referring to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties that are pushing for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq. An independent Iraqi outlet framed Halbousi’s warning within the context of Sudani’s visit to Iraqi Army and PMF headquarters on February 13.[21] The outlet suggested that Halbousi might oppose the Shia Coordination Framework efforts to end the US-led international Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq.[22] Halbousi may also have been referring to Shia Coordination Framework efforts to prevent his favored candidate from becoming parliament speaker.

The number of Palestinian militia attacks in the northern Gaza Strip dropped from a daily average of 5 attacks between January 31 and February 6 to a daily average of 2.7 attacks between February 7 and February 13. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters mortared Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on February 14, but CTP-ISW cannot confirm the point of origin. The IDF conducted a two-week, division-sized clearing operation in early February that targeted Hamas underground infrastructure and fighters.[23] The IDF degraded Hamas units during previous clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip earlier in the war, but Hamas “took advantage” of the IDF’s withdrawal in late December to reconstitute some of its military units.[24] Hamas will likely continue to appoint new commanders in the aftermath of the latest clearing operation and learn from its mistakes to better protect its new leaders from future Israeli operations.[25] Hamas retains many experienced commanders—including the Gaza City Brigade commander—who will continue to rebuild the organization between Israeli clearing operations.

Key Takeaways:

Iraq: Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei discussed the removal of US forces from Iraq, counterterrorism, and border security with senior Iraqi politicians in Baghdad on February 13 and 14. The effort to expel US forces from Iraq supports Iran’s goals but ignores the current security situation in Iraq.
Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi released a statement on February 14 that warned “war merchants and seditionists from the Islamist parties” against “tampering with the stability of Anbar [Province].” Halbousi was likely referring to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties that are pushing for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq.
The Gaza Strip: The number of Palestinian militia attacks in the northern Gaza Strip dropped from a daily average of 5 attacks between January 31 and February 6 to a daily average of 2.7 attacks between February 7 and February 13.
The IDF conducted a two-week, division-sized clearing operation in early February that targeted Hamas underground infrastructure and fighters.
The IDF degraded Hamas units during previous clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip earlier in the war, but Hamas “took advantage” of the IDF’s withdrawal in late December to reconstitute some of its military units.
Ceasefire Negotiation: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo on February 14 for “low-level” follow-up talks to discuss ceasefire proposals.
Lebanon: Likely Lebanese Hezbollah fighters fired 11 122mm Grad rockets at the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed in northern Israel on February 14. The IDF conducted a series of major airstrikes on February 14 that targeted Hezbollah positions and assets in southern Lebanon in response to the attack targeting Safed.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on February 14. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed at least ten Palestinian fighters.[26] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting two armed Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[27] The airstrike caused secondary explosions.[28] Palestinian militias have not claimed any attacks targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip since February 9.[29]

The IDF continued clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis on February 14. The IDF 98th Division located tunnels and captured large quantities of weapons during clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 14.[30] The division also directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters attacking IDF forces in the city.[31]

A journalist at Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis told CNN that hundreds of patients and people left the hospital on February 14 amid sounds of “heavy gunfire.”[32] Israeli forces opened a “secure route” on February 14 from the hospital and its surroundings to evacuate civilians to the humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip.[33]

Palestinian fighters attempted to defend against Israeli operations across Khan Younis on February 14. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, fired a rocket-propelled grenade targeting an IDF tank near Nasser Hospital.[34] The militia reported that its fighters also targeted Israeli forces in central and eastern Khan Younis using small arms and mortars.[35] Hamas’ military wing posted footage on February 14 of its fighters firing RPGs targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[36]

Israel will allow the United Arab Emirates field hospital in Rafah to use Starlink satellite internet services.[37] The hospital, which is one of the few international field hospitals in the Gaza Strip, is staffed by 50 doctors, nurses, pharmacists and lab technicians.[38] Israel said on November 27 that Elon Musk said that he would not activate Starlink in the Gaza Strip unless Israel permits him to do so.[39]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo on February 14 for “low-level” follow-up talks to discuss ceasefire proposals.[40] Unspecified Israeli officials said that Netanyahu will not agree to further ”low-level” talks unless Hamas agrees to reduce the number of Palestinian prisoners that Israel would release as part of a ceasefire deal.[41] The Qatari prime minister and US, Egyptian, and Israeli intelligence chiefs met in Cairo on February 13 to broker a deal for the release of hostages and an extended pause in fighting in the Gaza Strip.[42]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least four times across the West Bank on February 14. The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and PIJ both claimed small arms fire targeting Mairav, a town in Israel near the West Bank.[43] A local Israeli official said that there were no injuries.[44] The IDF returned fire towards Jilbon, in the West Bank.[45] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades said separately that it fired small arms targeting Israeli security forces near Hebron and Jenin.[46] PIJ claimed two attacks targeting the IDF near Jenin.[47]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Likely Lebanese Hezbollah fighters fired 11 122mm Grad rockets at the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed in northern Israel on February 14.[48] The attack killed one Israeli soldier and injured eight others.[49] Hezbollah launched the rockets from Ramish, southern Lebanon, which is about 10 miles north of Safed.[50] Israeli media said that the Iron Dome launched interceptors at the barrage but failed to intercept the rockets.[51] Hezbollah did not claim the Safed base attack or any other attack on February 14. Hezbollah last fired a rocket barrage targeting the IDF in Safed in late November 2023.[52] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas—attributed the attack to Hezbollah and praised the operation.[53] The IDF said that it monitored two other rocket salvoes targeting Northern Israel on February 14.[54]

The IDF conducted a series of major airstrikes on February 14 that targeted Hezbollah positions and assets in southern Lebanon in response to the attack targeting Safed. The strikes targeted Hezbollah military buildings, combat operations rooms, and Rawdan unit infrastructure.[55] Hezbollah media claimed that the Israeli strikes also killed young civilians. A senior Lebanese Hezbollah official vowed ”retaliation” in response to the strikes.[56]

The IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi visited the IDF Northern Command and local municipality officials after the Safed base attack.[57] Halevi stated that the war against Hezbollah would “probably not” happen ”tomorrow” but that the IDF is preparing for war in Northern Israel.[58] Halevi reiterated the IDF’s promise that it will allow residents of northern Israel to return to their homes by pushing Hezbollah back from the border.[59]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted a pre-emptive strike that targeted one Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missile in Yemen on February 13.[60] The Houthis had prepared to launch the missile targeting ships in the Red Sea.

CENTCOM said that the Houthis separately launched one anti-ship ballistic missile into international shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden.[61] US Navy ships in the area did not intercept the missile because its trajectory did not endanger any vessels.

The US Defense Department deputy press secretary stated that Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have not attacked US forces since February 4.[62] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack targeting US forces since February 4. An unspecified security source told Reuters on February 10 that US air defense systems intercepted one-way attack drones targeting Conoco Mission Support Site in eastern Syria.[63]

The deputy head of the Russian Center for Reconciliation in Syria claimed that the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Nairab Airport in Aleppo, Syria, on February 12.[64] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported on February 12 that the Syrian Arab Army planned to detonate explosives in Aleppo.[65] The Syrian Defense Ministry normally confirms Israeli airstrikes. An independent analyst on X (formerly Twitter) said on February 12 that explosions in Aleppo were controlled detonations, not airstrikes.[66]

Iranian officials claimed that unspecified terrorist actors caused two explosions on natural gas pipelines in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari and Fars provinces on February 14. The two explosions targeted Iran's main south-north natural gas pipeline on February 14.[67] Iranian officials stated that there were no casualties.[68] The explosions disrupted gas supply to several villages in Esfahan, Zanjan, North Khorasan and West Azerbaijan provinces.[69] Iranian energy officials called the explosions an act of ”terrorist sabotage” and alleged that ”Iran’s enemies” aimed to cut off gas supply to Iran’s major provinces.[70] The Iranian oil minister said that gas pipelines and oil refineries are ”targets” for the United States and its allies, and he compared the attack to a series unclaimed attacks on more than a dozen gas pipelines in four regions of Iran in 2011.[71] IRGC-controlled media described the explosion as a ”terrorist act of vandalism.”[72] No group claimed responsibility for the explosions.

8. Finally, sailors can put hands in their pockets under policy update

I wonder if this will knock the world off axis. The Navy has learned one of the Special Forces recruiting secrets. When I joined SF I recall a non-SF colonel telling me that the only reason people join SF is so they do not have to wear helmets or carry protective masks and so they can put their hands in their pockets.

I saw a social media post that said something with a few keystrokes and no expenditure of funds, the Navy radically changes recruiting to adjust to the current environment.

Finally, sailors can put hands in their pockets under policy update

navytimes.com · by Diana Correll · February 14, 2024

The Navy announced a sweeping range of uniform and personal appearance policy updates on Wednesday – including reinstating the female bucket cover and allowing sailors to place their hands in their pockets.

The changes are the largest series of Navy uniform and grooming reforms since December 2022, when the service announced the introduction of a new, lightweight safety boot and modifications to the maternity service dress blue coat.

The policy update rescinds restrictions barring sailors from placing their hands in their pockets, which the Navy previously claimed is “inappropriate and detracts from a professional military appearance.”

“Sailors are authorized to have hands in their pockets when doing so does not compromise safety nor prohibit the proper rendering of honors and courtesies,” the NAVADMIN said.

The Navy retired the female combination cover, known as the bucket cover, in 2018. But the service is now permitting all sailors to wear the cover with service dress and dinner dress uniforms, according to a new naval administrative message, or NAVADMIN, released Wednesday. Female officers and chief petty officers are also authorized to wear the cover with service khaki and summer white uniforms.

Sailors cannot purchase the bucket cover from Navy Exchange uniform stores, and must instead privately obtain one for wear.

Additionally, the Navy is allowing female sailors to wear the tiara as an optional uniform component when wearing dinner dress blue and white jacket uniforms. Sailors may purchase the tiara from the Navy Exchange online as a special order item.

Navy announces uniform changes, including a new boot, expected in 2023

Updates include a new, lightweight safety boot and adjustments to the maternity service dress blue coat. Also, 2POCs will begin wider distribution.

The policy also offers modifications to fitness attire, allowing sailors to wear black or navy blue leggings with the physical training uniform shorts and fitness suit pants.

Likewise, female sailors may now wear t-shirts specifically designed for women, so long as the shirts adhere to the Navy’s color, fabric, and neck configuration standards.

“The intent of this policy update is to address expressed dissatisfaction regarding the required wear of male or unisex t-shirts that are not designed to fit female bodies,” the NAVADMIN said.

Sailors may also wear false eyelashes or eyelash extensions in uniform – provided they are no more than “14 millimeters in length as measured from the eyelid to the tip of the eyelash.”

“False eyelash color will match the color of the natural eyelash,” the NAVADMIN said. “Eyelash extensions cannot hinder wear of protective eyewear.”

The policy changes take effect immediately.

9. On Ukraine’s Front Line, Soldiers Are Forced to Tune In to Washington Politics

The sad truth is these Ukrainian soldiers probably have a better understanding of US politics than many Americans.

On Ukraine’s Front Line, Soldiers Are Forced to Tune In to Washington Politics

Troops ration ammunition and watch as U.S. aid package struggles through Congress; ‘McConnell is not a bad dude’

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainian-soldiers-forced-to-tune-in-to-washington-politics-922e3dd7?mod=hp_lead_pos8&utm

By Alistair MacDonaldFollow and Ievgeniia Sivorka | Photographs by Joseph Sywenkyj for The Wall Street Journal

Updated Feb. 14, 2024 2:32 pm ET

OCHERETYNE, Ukraine—The consequences of politics in Washington are playing out in Oleksander Kucheriavenko’s Humvee on the eastern front of Ukraine’s war against Russia.

On a patrol Wednesday, Kucheriavenko, a sergeant, fired several grenade rounds from his armored vehicle at a Russian assault team—and then stopped, to conserve ammunition. Like many Ukrainian soldiers, Kucheriavenko is concerned that Republican attempts to block additional military aid to Kyiv will strip them of already-scarce ammunition, armored vehicles and spare parts, rendering defense against Russian onslaughts even harder.

A national-security focused bill that includes about $60 billion of funding for Ukraine has been held up in Washington for months as some Republicans use its passage to extract political concessions or to protest the war’s growing price tag. Early Tuesday, the Senate passed the funding plan, which includes additional amounts for Israel and Taiwan, by 70 votes to 29. The bill now goes to the Republican-controlled House, where it faces an uncertain fate amid the greater power of Ukraine skeptics and the influence of Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump, who has opposed more aid.

Oleksander Kucheriavenko is concerned that Republican attempts to block additional military aid to Kyiv will strip troops of already-scarce ammunition.

Ukraine’s struggles in battles at hot spots such as the besieged city of Avdiivka near here show why the loss of U.S. funds, almost half of all foreign military aid, would be a massive blow.

Forces here are already running low on artillery and other ammunition. One battery is down to nine rounds of one particular caliber. Brigades in Avdiivka bristle with U.S. Bradley armored vehicles, Abrams tanks and M109 self-propelled howitzers, all of which need replacements and a constant flow of spares as fighting whittles down supplies.

Ukraine is fighting an adversary with much deeper reserves of manpower and ammunition, leaving Kyiv reliant on Western help.

The fire from Kucheriavenko’s U.S.-supplied Mk 19 grenade launcher killed at least two Russian soldiers, decapitating one, he said. But because of the need to conserve ammunition, Kucheriavenko was unable to fire his full belt of 32 grenades, which he believes would have killed the entire six-man Russian assault team.

Such grisly tallies are essential in this war of attrition in which neither side has made significant breakthroughs for well over a year.

Brigades use U.S. Bradley armored vehicles in battles in Avdiivka, Ukraine.

Ukrainian soldiers are conserving ammunition for their Mk 19 grenade launchers.

“We use ammunition now only if the situation is critical,” said Kucheriavenko of his grenade launcher, which is mounted on the U.S.-made Humvee.

That is why Ukrainian soldiers find themselves suddenly interested in U.S. politics.

“The lives of our boys depend on” U.S. funding, said Kucheriavenko, who wears a “Republic of California” arm patch on his uniform.

Since Russia invaded two years ago, the U.S. has donated around 44% of all foreign military assistance to Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute research group in Germany, or around $44.2 billions’ worth, by the Department of Defense’s latest tally.

To be sure, Ukraine has had some successes, particularly against the Russian Navy in the Black Sea. Ukraine’s military said Wednesday it had used naval drones to sink a large Russian landing craft off occupied Crimea. The threat from Ukrainian drones has made Russian warships wary of venturing out into large parts of the Black Sea, allowing Ukraine to restart large-scale exports from its main port of Odesa, in a major boost to the economy.

On land, even with U.S. supplies, Ukraine is running low on ammunition for artillery and missile defenses, simply because the West can’t make it fast enough.

“For every five to seven enemy shells, we respond with one,” said Col. Serhiy Cherevaty, deputy commander of strategic communications of Khortytsia.

Andriy Prokopenko praised the U.S. Senate minority leader.

In this part of the front in east Ukraine, some say that ratio can be even less favorable.

One Ukrainian officer said his brigade was running so low on 152 mm artillery shells, that their gunners had only nine left for the fight in Avdiivka. Russian infantry penetrated the city from the north and south in recent weeks.

The U.S. is the biggest single supplier of artillery shells to Ukraine, having sent over more than 200,000 152 mm rounds, two million 155mm artillery shells and thousands of other calibers.

Ukrainian soldiers have been keeping up with U.S. politics through Telegram channels and media outlets.

“Mitch McConnell is not a bad dude actually,” said Andriy Prokopenko, 28, the commander of Kucheriavenko’s unit. McConnell, the Republican Senate minority leader, has been a backer of Ukraine.

For now, the U.S. continues to send weapons and supplies using funding and approvals already agreed with Congress.

Doug Bush, the U.S. Army’s assistant secretary for acquisitions, logistics and technology, said that there is a lag time between government funds drying up and it affecting what is sent to Ukraine.

“A lot of the funding that Congress provided is already on contract and flowing through the system,” Bush said in an interview. “But we need the supplemental funds to sustain that for the long” term, he said. It can take a long time for weapons to be ordered and then made.

A Ukrainian soldier wounded along the front line near Avdiivka handed over a grenade in an ambulance.

A U.S. defense official said that the lack of certainty over weapons supply will make it hard for Ukraine to plan operations.

The threat of American ammunition tailing off means some brigades are already holding back.

Kucheriavenko, who serves in the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, says his unit should be using about 1,000 Mk 19 grenade rounds a week but often ends up using 100 to 200. They save the ammunition for bigger assaults.

“Nobody is going to shoot a single soldier, we just don’t have the munitions,” he said.

Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade has poured Bradleys, Abrams tanks and M109 howitzers into the Avdiivka fight.

Lt. Oleksandr Shyrshyn said the

BAE Systems-produced Bradley is the best infantry-fighting vehicle he has experienced. They are doing most of the fighting within the city while Abrams tanks are being used to hold off the Russians on the city’s flanks. “For Bradleys we have enough today, but for tomorrow it is not enough,” he said. As he spoke, large explosions sounded around Ocheretyne and the front line just over 2 miles away, and a Bradley drove through the snow toward enemy positions.

Shyrshyn said that even with current U.S. support he doesn’t have enough spares.

Lt. Oleksandr Shyrshyn said the Bradley is the best infantry-fighting vehicle he has experienced.

One Bradley was destroyed and several have been damaged by mines or lost their tracks, so need to be repaired. Some also arrived in Ukraine in a state of disrepair already, according to one person familiar with the matter.

Russia is currently focusing much of its efforts on Avdiivka, where its forces recently broke into the city’s southern and northern suburbs.

Russian troops have been entering in infantry fighting vehicles and scattering to houses, said Ivan Sekach, a spokesman for the 110th brigade which is currently fighting there. Sometimes, Russian troops will enter houses where Ukrainian troops are, or vice versa. The two sides have sometimes occupied apartments next to each other, he said.

One Ukrainian soldier spent 41 days trapped in the basement of a bombed-out house on its outskirts, surrounded by Russians, before being rescued.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian soldiers destroyed a sewerage system that Russians had been using to enter the city, in what Ukrainians had jokingly dubbed as Moscow’s Operation Poop, said Sekach.

At a nearby store, exhausted looking Ukrainian soldiers stocked up on food and coffee.

“Everybody wants to go home,” said one infantry soldier.

A door of a residential building has the word ‘people’ written on it in Ukrainian in Ocheretyne, Ukraine.

Residents of Ocheretyne, just over 2 miles from the front line in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, live in the basement of a building.

Underscoring increased pessimism over Avdiivka, engineers were digging a 4.5-mile long antitank trench 15 miles behind the city. They began the 4-meter wide trench a week ago and had already dug three others in the area, one of which runs past a cemetery.

If the U.S. pulls funding, Europe, which now provides more financial and military aid than America, could increase its supplies.

Some European equipment has been crucial, including Britain’s Storm Shadow cruise missile and Germany’s Iris T missile-defense system.

European countries can also continue to send key American equipment, such as Himars and Patriot air-defense systems, from their own inventories or by ordering new ones.

US lawmakers led by China hawk Mike Gallagher to visit Taiwan next week

Gallagher, who heads House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, is due to arrive on February 21, report says
While the trip is certain to rile Beijing, analysts do not expect the PLA to respond with large-scale drills around the island

By Lawrence Chung South China Morning Post2 min

February 14, 2024

View Original

They will also meet newly elected parliamentary speaker Han Kuo-yu of the opposition Kuomintang, a Beijing-friendly party.

Taiwan’s presidential office has not confirmed the visit, while the foreign ministry said it did not have “related information at present” and that it “always welcomes American congressmen and friends from various sectors to visit and show support to Taiwan”.

Wisconsin Republican Gallagher said he planned to travel to the island with committee members “this quarter” during a January 19 podcast with American political commentator Hugh Hewitt.

Taiwan detects 14 mainland Chinese planes performing ‘combat readiness patrols’

He named Lai as one of the officials he would meet and said he had learned a lot from Lai when they met during his visit to Taiwan in February last year. Gallagher also told Hewitt that he looked forward to meeting Hsiao Bi-khim, the vice president-elect and Taiwan’s former de facto ambassador to the US. He said Hsiao and Lai would “make a strong team”.

Beijing, which regards Taiwan as part of its territory, to be reunited by force if necessary, has denounced Lai as an “obstinate separatist” whose leadership could bring war to the island and blacklisted Hsiao over what it saw as her advocacy of Taiwan independence.

Most countries – including the United States, Taipei’s informal ally and top arms supplier – do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state but are opposed to any attempt to forcibly change the status quo.

Gallagher has said William Lai and Hsiao Bi-khim would “make a strong team”. Photo: EPA-EFE

Analysts expect Beijing to respond to Gallagher’s trip, especially if he meets Lai and Hsiao.

“Beijing is certain to be riled by Gallagher’s visit but not to the point that it would send dozens of warplanes and warships to surround and menace Taiwan,” said Huang Kwei-bo, a professor of diplomacy at National Chengchi University in Taipei.

He said Beijing was likely to react with “routine actions” such as verbal protests and small-scale military operations around the island.

Tensions flared in August 2022 over then-US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taipei, which Beijing saw as a serious violation of sovereignty and a breach of the one-China policy. The PLA responded with an unprecedented week of live-fire drills that included sending ballistic missiles over Taiwan.

While Gallagher has announced that he will not seek re-election, Huang said he could still remain influential and that the Taipei visit would be a show of support for Lai, who has sought to foster links with Washington to counter Beijing.

James Yifan Chen, a professor of diplomacy and international relations at Tamkang University in New Taipei City, said the US Congress would continue to support Lai and the DPP government after Gallagher’s departure.

“With or without him, the US bipartisan support of Taiwan will remain strong,” Chen said.

He said Gallagher’s hawkish stand on Beijing would also remain strong. “He might be able to raise his anti-China voice in another higher [government] position,” Chen said.

Gallagher has advanced a series of bipartisan recommendations for Congress to enact, including establishing a Taiwan arms stockpile, and swift delivery of the backlog of US$19 billion worth of weapons the US has yet to ship to the island.

11. Pentagon Used Six-Bladed ‘Ginsu’ Weapon to Kill Iraqi Militia Leader

Pentagon Used Six-Bladed ‘Ginsu’ Weapon to Kill Iraqi Militia Leader

Eager to avoid escalating tensions with Baghdad, U.S. used missile designed to avoid civilian casualties

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-used-six-bladed-ginsu-weapon-to-kill-iraqi-militia-leader-7dfe0687?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Gordon Lubold

Follow and Nancy A. Youssef

Feb. 14, 2024 9:11 am ET

The funeral of Abu Baqr al-Saadi last week in Baghdad. PHOTO: AMEER AL-MOHAMMEDAWI/ZUMA PRESS

WASHINGTON—The Pentagon killed a Kataib Hezbollah leader in downtown Baghdad last week using a weapon that employs six long blades to shred its target and minimize civilian casualties, defense officials said.

The modified Hellfire missile, which inside the military is referred to colloquially as “the flying Ginsu,” recalling the popular knives sold on TV infomercials in the 1970s, was used to target Abu Baqr al-Saadi, the leader of Kataib Hezbollah in Syria. The U.S. use of the Ginsu in the Baghdad strike hasn’t been previously disclosed.

The strike on al-Saadi, who was traveling in a car, was part of a retaliatory response to the Iranian-backed group for their role in attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, where a Jan. 28 attack on a base killed three American soldiers, the officials said.

The weapon, formally known as the R9X, is an inert Hellfire missile designed by the Pentagon and the CIA to kill terrorist leaders. It was employed, in part, because of concerns that killing innocent bystanders could inflame an already tense political situation in Iraq, which hosts roughly 2,500 American troops, the officials said.

Imagery of the strike on al-Saadi, showing the remnants of a burning but largely intact vehicle, was reminiscent of others involving the Ginsu. A weapon with an explosive warhead, like the traditional Hellfire missile, would have likely destroyed the vehicle.

U.S. military officials declined to comment on the use of the Ginsu.

Inert, but Lethal

The U.S. has developed a variant of the Hellfire missile that replaces an explosive warhead with a ring of blades.

Hellfire R9X missile

Stowed and deployed weapon:

Blades kill the targeted person, while the absence of an exploding warhead avoids unintended casualties.

six blades deploy at last second

Seeker

system

6 ft.

No warhead

Note: Graphic illustration based on description of weapon.

Source: U.S. military

Roque Ruiz/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Ginsu, also sometimes referred to as the Ninja bomb, is designed to plunge more than 100 pounds of metal through the tops of cars and buildings to kill its target without harming individuals and property close by. Instead of exploding, it has telescoping knives that eject out of its nose at the moment of impact.

It is unclear how many times the Pentagon has used the weapon, but typically it is employed against high-profile individuals in areas where targeting them risks killing bystanders. Some U.S. defense officials say they believe al-Saadi may have been in a crowded part of the Iraqi capital because he thought he was safer among so many civilians.

The U.S. used the weapon in the targeted killing of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2022 and in a strike on Islamic State in Afghanistan in response to the group’s deadly attack in Kabul in August 2021 that killed 13 American troops near the city’s airport.

U.S. Airstrike Kills Iraq Militia Leader Behind Attack on American Base

The Senate Rejects American Retreat

Twenty-two Republicans vote to help allies and rebuild U.S. defenses. Will Speaker Mike Johnson now let the House work its will?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-passes-aid-bill-ukraine-israel-taiwan-u-s-military-defense-mike-johnson-c8c62a09?mod=Searchresults_pos7&page=1

By The Editorial Board

Feb. 13, 2024 6:34 pm ET

Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska PHOTO: MARIAM ZUHAIB/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Senate’s 70-29 predawn vote Tuesday approving U.S. aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan was a rare bipartisan accomplishment in Washington. This is a victory for American security that would buttress U.S. defenses and hold the line against compounding dangers abroad.

Some 22 Republicans voted for the bill, up from 17 who supported starting work on the bill last week, and the converts include Jim Risch of Idaho and John Boozman of Arkansas. A yes vote took political courage. Donald Trump and his new GOP establishment are campaigning against Ukraine, and President Biden is incapable of pressing a public case for his own policies abroad.

But China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are mounting an increasingly aggressive and coordinated challenge to U.S. power. Some Republicans grasp the stakes and are acting as a backbone to a weak President, in the best Republican tradition since World War II. Arthur Vandenberg helped Truman establish NATO, and Bob Dole supported Bill Clinton in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Deserving particular credit: GOP Senators Dan Sullivan of Alaska, Susan Collins of Maine, Roger Wicker of Mississippi and Thom Tillis of North Carolina. All shaped the bill for the better and repeatedly explained the U.S. interest in Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan—over angry barrages from the bill’s opponents.

Sen. Sullivan was right when he said on the floor that the measure isn’t so much a foreign aid bill as a down payment on a badly needed American rearmament. About 60% of the bill’s $95 billion in funding will flow to a brittle U.S. industrial base that is straining to produce enough artillery shells, missiles and air defenses for the U.S. and its allies.

Yet the vote was instructive about some Republicans who portray themselves as defense hawks, not least Sen. Lindsey Graham, who voted no, demanding Congress focus first on the border. The South Carolinian is now ducking this weekend’s Munich Security Conference, where he’s been a regular, perhaps to spare himself the embarrassment. But the country needs him in a role more useful than Mr. Trump’s political spokesman.

Sen. Tom Cotton also voted no, and on the floor he said the bill offered too much economic and budget support for Ukraine. Yet Republicans managed to cut President Biden’s financial aid request by nearly $4 billion, to $7.9 billion. Europe is stepping up to offer more cash, and Republicans have a strong hand to continue trimming this account.

But much of the rest of the $95 billion is for U.S. arsenals and Red Sea operations, and a no vote heralds weakness against China and Iran as much as it does Russia. Anyone who thinks a fight over Taiwan is coming should be rushing to pass $2 billion in weapons sales and training for Pacific partners. The bill also includes billions to produce 100,000 155mm artillery rounds per month. Ukraine is voraciously consuming shells, but 155mm is important to Israel, Taiwan and U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula.

Wherever the U.S. fights, troops need air cover, and the measure helps grow Patriot missile production to 650 a year, from 550 now. The U.S. is expending Tomahawk missiles in the Middle East and needs more of its best weapons in the Pacific. The bill devotes $133 million to expanding production of rocket motors that feed cruise missiles.

***

Next up is the House, and Speaker Mike Johnson said this week the body will “continue to work its own will on these important matters.” If he means it, he won’t let the GOP’s isolationist wing block the will of the House majority that supports Ukraine. The supporters include half the Republicans, and critics can offer amendments. Mr. Johnson ascended to power as an affable patriot, and he can’t dodge this test of his leadership and convictions.

If Mr. Johnson blocks a vote, he and Republicans will bear responsibility for what comes next—in Ukraine and elsewhere. The world will absorb the lesson that the U.S. is unprepared to provide weapons for allies willing to fight in their own defense against a marauding dictator, as the Ukrainians have done with valor and at great cost.

Seventy Senators are on record opposing a diminished America in a world that is more dangerous than it’s been in decades. House Republicans now face a test of what they believe, and the stakes couldn’t be higher.

The Navy SEAL Mission Is Shifting from Raids to Supporting the Service, Leader Says

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · February 14, 2024

SAN DIEGO -- The leader of the Navy SEALs -- the elite special operators who most famously led the raid that killed Osama bin Laden -- says the units are pivoting away from being a counterterrorism force to supporting other elements of the Navy.

"For 20-plus years, I think we've gotten used to being the supported effort," Rear Adm. Keith Davids, the head of Naval Special Warfare Command, told a crowd of attendees at the annual naval WEST 2024 conference.

"We still need character and competence; we still need problem solvers; we need people that don't quit," Davids said. "We need them to not just do point target raids, we need that now to work in support of the fleet joint force."

A brief survey of the most recent announcements of SEAL exercises and activities bears that out. Many of the exercises that the operators have conducted lately have focused on concepts such as maritime interdiction or search and seizure of other ships and have been conducted off of Navy platforms.

Davids said that integration and cooperation is happening "to the degree I've not seen in my 33-plus years of commissioned service."

"I feel like I'm back in the Navy in a big way," he added.

While Davids did not break the trend of the typically secretive command and offer specifics on what that integration looks like, he did say that, broadly it could be something like identifying targets for a ship missile strike or providing electromagnetic jamming in support of airstrikes.

The recent death of two Navy SEALs a month ago also offers more insight into the kind of work the operators are now engaged in.

The two SEALs who perished after falling into the water amid a boarding in heavy seas were part of a team that was working off of the expeditionary mobile base USS Lewis B. Puller and searching ships in the Red Sea looking for Iranian weapons.

The seizure in which the pair of operators perished also led to the discovery of Iranian-made missile components, including "propulsion, guidance and warheads for Houthi medium-range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as air defense-associated components," a statement from U.S. Central Command said.

Davids also noted that the SEALs are "really good at hunting people and terrorist networks," and it "turns out those methodologies actually apply ... to systems, not just people."

The shift Davids describes -- especially the move from being the force that demands support to one that provides it -- is a seismic one for the community. However, the two-star admiral told the crowd that there are few complaints from inside the teams.

"What I found is if they see purpose, and you're part of the high-performing team, they're all for it," Davids said, adding that "retention is good."

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · February 14, 2024

15. More expertise may be needed for military commands to call for non-kinetic capabilities

But no mention of the most important non-kinetic (and perhaps non-technological) capabilities - psychological operations or warfare. (and the use of information warfare described below is not the type focused on influencing target audiences). Perhaps it is because we do have a lot of expertise in psychological operations but we just choose not to effectively employ it.

More expertise may be needed for military commands to call for non-kinetic capabilities

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · February 14, 2024

SAN DIEGO, Calif. — In order to better integrate so-called non-kinetic capabilities into operations, more expertise may be needed within command organizations to help top leaders comprehend what their options are, according to senior Navy officials.

Non-kinetic effects, or capabilities that essentially don’t blow up or explode — such as cyber, electromagnetic spectrum or space-based tools — are often less understood than their kinetic counterparts. Commanders know what traditional types of weapons are capable of, as an exploding target can be easier to visualize than electronic warfare.

However, commanders may not always have these non-kinetic capabilities resident within their organization due to either authorities constraints or the fact they are more specialized and require unique units that might have to be assigned.

“If you don’t have the capability resident within your formation, then you have to call for fires. That’s part of the rehearsal is calling for fires. But what’s become clear to me in the world of … non-kinetic, cyber and space effects, [is] I don’t always know what those fires are or where to go to call for them or have any understanding,” Vice Adm. Michael Boyle, commander of 3rd Fleet, which has responsibility in the Pacific, said during the annual WEST conference. “We need to build the expertise within our headquarters to know what fires exist within the joint force. That’s in kinetic, non-kinetic, across joint capability and partner capability and beyond, and at any classification level.”

Boyle later noted that commanders and organizations don’t know what they don’t know, and they have to build expertise and liaisons to help educate people about the tools that are at their disposal.

“Whether it’s a carrier strike group, or a three-star headquarters or a four-star headquarters, within the planning element, they have to know what’s available, what’s the full capability,” Boyle told DefenseScoop, noting that calling for fires is nothing new within the military.

“If you’re a JTAC on the ground, a joint [terminal] air controller, who is supporting troops on the ground, you call for close air support from the sister service of the Air Force. I’m just talking about calling for close air support that may be a cyber effect, a space effect, an exquisite capability of a sister service. But I have to know that it exists,” he said.

Several years ago, the Navy created O-6 level information warfare commanders as permanent fixtures within carrier strike groups, with other pilots elsewhere in the force. The Marine Corps also created the Marine Corps Information Command at the beginning of 2023 to help integrate and explain non-kinetic capabilities and authorities across the globe.

However, Boyle said they’re stovepiped right now within the Navy, and in a future fight against a sophisticated adversary like China, the carrier strike group — the main fighting unit for the Navy in the past — might not be suitable on its own.

“I’m not saying that the carrier [strike group] doesn’t have applicability or capability. We just have to evolve in this maneuver fight. We’re no longer an island that’s being protected by our strike group. We are a maneuvering element of the fight and I want to be able to give the carrier strike commander battlespace to own,” he told DefenseScoop. “In some cases, it may be very limited because I am not authorized to push target engagement authority down to him. In other cases, I am, then he’s got to be able to plan and call for joint fires.”

Fleet Cyber Command/10th Fleet, which is the Navy’s cyber organization and cyber component to U.S. Cyber Command, is working to build some of that expertise to send around to organizations within the cyber, information and space communities.

“Our goal really there is to create expertise … I need experts, not generalists when we’re going against the kinds of adversaries that we are with the capabilities that they have. We need people that can bring that expertise to bear,” Vice Adm. Craig Clapperton, commander of Fleet Cyber Command, 10th Fleet and Navy Space Command, said during the conference.

While 10th Fleet had been the Navy’s space entity for years, this past January it officially also became Navy Space, the service’s component for U.S. Space Command. Increasingly, space and space-based capabilities are falling into the fold of information warfare within the Department of Defense, such as in the Navy and Marine Corps, including space in their cyber and information warfare commands.

As the command brings on its space personnel, for which the office of the chief of naval operations approved missions, functions and tasks that’s driving the manpower, they are seeking to build integrated firing elements to help organizations integrate non-kinetic capabilities.

“Pushing forward what I call integrated firing elements that are going to go around to the Echelon 2 and Echelon 3 staffs and then work to do exactly that. These are going to be specially trained people … There will be [warfare tactics instructors] within them, but they will also be a broader group,” Clapperton said. “Then they will rotate through these Echelon 2 and Echelon 3 staff to talk about exactly how we use space as a force multiplier for you and how we can work together to synchronize and integrate those capabilities.”

Clapperton noted that the final manpower assessment for space is not complete yet, but officials believe it could drive an increase within their staff by up to 250 people.

While the addition of Navy Space brings more responsibility to the command, Clapperton said it provides a boost when added to the other capabilities resident within the command.

“When you step back and look at it, the blending of those authorities and those capabilities, and then creating those experts in space, in cyber and information technology, and then bringing all of their skills together — it’s actually been really powerful and a force multiplier for us,” he said.

Written by Mark Pomerleau

Mark Pomerleau is a reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare and cyberspace.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · February 14, 2024

16. US Cancels Multibillion-Dollar Classified Military Satellite Program

Seems like the second major program announced for cancellation (following the Army's helicopter program). Are these decisions wake-up calls for the defense Industry and their cost overruns?

US Cancels Multibillion-Dollar Classified Military Satellite Program

Contractor discloses Space Force ‘termination for convenience’
Cancellation driven by cost, payload performance, people say

By Anthony Capaccio

February 15, 2024 at 5:00 AM EST

The US Space Force canceled a multibillion-dollar Northrop Grumman Corp. program to develop a classified military communications satellite because of increased costs, difficulties developing its payload and a schedule delay, according to a regulatory filing and people familiar with the decision.

Northrop was formally notified last month of the termination within “our restricted Space Business,” the defense contractor said in a regulatory filing, using jargon for classified programs. The filing offered no details on the classified satellite or the reasons it was called off, which were provided by people who commented on condition of anonymity because of its secret status.

The company expects to reduce its space segment’s $40.4 billion backlog by about $2 billion during the first quarter “related to the termination,” according to the filing. An industry official said the program was awarded to Northrop in January 2020.

Northrop has been lobbying the House defense appropriations subcommittee to salvage some of the program, according to the people familiar with the issue.

David Keffer, Northrop’s chief financial officer, referred cryptically to the project’s cancellation during the company’s Jan. 25 earnings call, mentioning that a decrease in space unit sales partly “reflects declines in a restricted program due to shifts in government priority.”

Northrop spokesman Lindsey Borg said in a statement that he couldn’t comment “given that it’s in the restricted domain” and referred questions to the Air Force. Northrop also has unclassified space contracts, such as the Tranche 1 Transport Layer satellite system to identify hypersonic weapons and advanced missiles.

A rendering from Northrop Grumman’s unclassified Tranche 1 Transport Layer satellite system.Source: Northrop Grumman

Air Force space acquisition spokesperson Laura McAndrews said the service “doesn’t have anything to provide on this query given classification.” A spokesperson for John Plumb, the Defense Department’s assistant secretary for space policy, also declined to comment, citing “operational security.”

The decision to cancel the program — described in Pentagon nomenclature as a “termination of convenience” — was spearheaded by Frank Calvelli, the Air Force’s assistant secretary for space acquisition, according to a US official and the industry official familiar with the decision. Calvelli notified congressional committees last year of his intention to seek cancellation as part of preparation for the Space Force’s budget presentation for fiscal 2025.

As a result, funding for the program contained in a $841 million procurement request for “Space Force Special Space Activities” was slashed in the final defense policy bill for fiscal 2024, the current year, with lawmakers citing a $497 million “classified overrun.Separately, the House defense appropriations subcommittee cut the request by $481 million and its Senate counterpart cut $461 million. A final version of that bill is being negotiated.

17. Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles?

Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles?

Firing off more weapons than America buys causes stockpiles to decline quickly. These are the same weapons reserve the nation would need should Beijing seek to use force to take Taiwan while the United States is supporting wars in two other regions.

The National Interest · by Mackenzie Eaglen · February 12, 2024

Beyond America’s snacks, the White House should be worried about the U.S. military’s “shrinkflation” problem. Year after year, inadequate budgets that don’t keep up with inflation cause Pentagon civilians to propose retiring more aircraft than are being delivered to the force, sending more ships to the ghost fleet than are being built, and now firing off more precision weapons than can be replaced anytime soon.

As retaliatory strikes against Iran-backed rebels and terrorists continue, anxiety is rising in Washington. Not just about growing threats but also about dwindling American stockpiles of select munitions and concerns that production lines are “maxed out.”

While concern is widely shared about the rising cost of defense in the Red Sea, a transition to offensive strikes has now raised a similar concern as the U.S. Navy (and Air Force) continue to expend powerful and expensive ordnance on a broad swath of targets.

Recent operations repeatedly deplete years’ worth of missile production overnight.

Since initial strikes began on January 11, Navy ships have repeatedly employed both carrier-launched aircraft and sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to strike Houthi radar, drone, and anti-ship missile sites.

The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is one of the Navy’s premier capabilities and has been a deep strike weapon of choice for many commanders across conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. As a sea-launched cruise missile designed for land attack, it can be fired from submarines or ships with a range of over 900 miles. Tomahawks, therefore, serve as the Navy’s primary land-attack capability without putting aviators at risk.

While the Navy does have a large existing stockpile of Tomahawks to sustain its land-attack capability, it has recently been firing the missiles faster than it can replace them. According to the Navy, opening day strikes alone expended more than 80 Tomahawks to hit 30 targets within Yemen.

Last year’s entire Tomahawk purchase of 55 missiles accounted for 68 percent of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in one day. This is an unsustainable rate of expenditure. However, this represents adherence to, rather than deviation from, the norm.

Prior strikes in Syria expended fifty-nine Tomahawks in 2017 and an additional sixty-six in 2018. The Navy bought just 100 Tomahawks in 2018 and then zero Tomahawks in 2019—failing to offset the expenditure rate of the Syria strikes.

Firing off more weapons than America buys causes stockpiles to decline quickly. The same weapons reserve the nation would need should Beijing seek to use force to take Taiwan while the United States is supporting wars in two other regions.

Like most of the United States high-tech precision-guided munitions, the Tomahawk suffers from a recent history of inadequate and unstable procurement. In the last ten years, $2.8 billion has been spent on TLAM procurement by the Navy to procure just 1,234 missiles.

While this stock may seem impressive at first glance, it does not come close to matching what is needed for a global navy confronting enemies in too many places at once.

Considering the U.S. Navy has over 140 ships and submarines capable of launching Tomahawks, new missile buys are spread thinly across available fleets, with the last decade’s Tomahawk buys amounting to just 8.8 new missiles per ship.

Nor has the president’s budget done enough to rectify the Navy’s Tomahawk shortfalls. In the 2024 White House budget request, the Navy would buy zero new land-attack Tomahawks and instead opt to invest in the experimental modification of fifty standard land-attack Tomahawks into the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) variant, designed to hit ships at sea.

While Navy officials have emphasized their effort to expand Tomahawk production, budget documents indicate that production and delivery rates of the missile are set to decline before they improve. Considerable effort and dollars in the White House budget skew towards modification and capability enhancements for existing Tomahawks, rather than the purchase of new missiles.

With a minimum sustainment rate of ninety Tomahawks per year required to keep production lines running, the Army and Marine Corps are barely sustaining production with their buys of experimental land-launched versions of the missile. Additionally, while the Navy is working on increasing the annual production of Tomahawks through sales to allies, it remains to be seen just how much additional production capacity this will create.

Even if the Navy wanted to buy more missiles, it’s not clear that industry could surge to meet demand. Fluctuating Tomahawk buys have led to unstable production rates and poor business planning for the industry and its suppliers. Uneven demand has materialized in production bottlenecks of key components like rocket motors, which make it difficult to surge production.

This is concerning given that each new Tomahawk has a two-year long lead time to build. Navy documents indicate that orders from last year are not expected to start delivery until January 2025, at a rate of just five missiles per month.

Victory in the next war will require a robust arsenal and deeper magazine depth of our fighting forces. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, US forces launched roughly 800 land-attack Tomahawks during the initial invasion. By today’s production rate, that would take us a decade to replenish. Fighting China would certainly require far more—and Beijing knows it.

With an inadequate supply of Tomahawks, the Navy’s land attack capability will overly rely on naval aviation, the presence of which will not be guaranteed within the ranges of China’s dense air defense network and sophisticated rocket force.

Though the Senate’s version of the pending national security supplemental does allocate $2.4 billion to replenish combat expenditures from operations in the Red Sea, a closer reading of the bill indicates that this topline does not go entirely to replenishing combat expenditure but instead the entire operation as a whole. The funding will thus be split between various accounts, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations, and may not adequately address this Tomahawk shortfall.

While an additional $133 million in the bill for cruise missile rocket motors is a welcome investment for relieving bottlenecks, Congress should also force the Navy to procure a steady quantity of the missile for years to come.

While the Senate’s supplemental may be a step in the right direction, it is also imperative for appropriators in Congress to recognize their pivotal role in sustaining our Navy’s strike capabilities. The Navy needs defense appropriations to kick-start key initiatives and lock in key munition buys.

Strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis and terrorists in the Red Sea are necessary, and the Tomahawk is the right tool for the job. But the Pentagon cannot allow these strikes to undermine the Navy’s readiness and capabilities in other theaters. Insufficient procurement will only lead to empty launch cells across our fleet and guarantee that the next war will not end on our terms.

About the Author

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

Main Image: U.S. Navy Flickr

The National Interest · by Mackenzie Eaglen · February 12, 2024

18. Putin says Russia prefers Biden to Trump because he is 'more experienced and predictable'

Political and psychological warfare. . Does Putin think he can put his thumb on the US election scale?

Does this help or hurt either candidate? How will they react to this?

I have to add this from the 2017 NSS (again, and I will continue to emphasize this):

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Putin says Russia prefers Biden to Trump because he is 'more experienced and predictable'

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 14, 2024

MOSCOW (AP) — President Vladimir Putin said that Russia would prefer to see U.S. President Joe Biden win a second term, describing him as more experienced and predictable than Donald Trump — even though Moscow strongly disagrees with the current administration’s policies.

Putin’s comments during an interview with Russian state television Wednesday were his first about the upcoming U.S. presidential election, likely to pit Biden against Trump. They come at time of heightened tension between Russia and the West — and deep disagreements in the U.S. about how best to counter Russia and help Ukraine, which is fighting Moscow’s forces.

“Biden, he’s more experienced, more predictable, he’s a politician of the old formation,” Putin said, when asked which candidate would be better for Russia. “But we will work with any U.S. leader whom the American people trust.”

The comments were rare praise for Biden, a fierce critic of the Russian leader who has frequently lauded Trump. At a campaign rally Wednesday night, Trump appeared to embrace Putin’s criticism, saying: “Putin is not a fan of mine.”

And Putin did refer to his disagreements with Biden.

“I believe that the position of the current administration is badly flawed and wrong, and I have told President Biden about that,” he said.

Putin has claimed that he sent troops into Ukraine to protect Russian speakers there and to prevent a threat to Russia’s security posed by Ukraine’s bid to join the NATO alliance. Ukraine and its Western allies have denounced Moscow’s action as an unprovoked act of aggression. Several NATO countries, chief among them the U.S. under Biden’s leadership, have sent Kyiv weapons and other military aid to fend off Russia’s attack.

Trump, meanwhile, recently called into question U.S. funding for Ukraine and said he once warned he would allow Russia to do whatever it wants to NATO member nations that are “delinquent” in investing in their own defense. Those comments sent shock waves through Europe, where some leaders are preparing for a time when the U.S. does not play the pivotal role in NATO that it does now.

Trump’s statement sharply contrasted with Biden’s pledge “to defend every inch of NATO territory.” Biden accused Trump on Tuesday of having “bowed down to a Russian dictator.”

In the interview, Putin described NATO as a “U.S. foreign policy tool,” adding that “if the U.S. thinks that it no longer needs this tool it’s up to it to decide.”

Asked about speculation on Biden’s health issues, Putin responded that “I’m not a doctor and I don’t consider it proper to comment on that.” He added that Biden seemed in fine shape when the two leaders met in Switzerland in June 2021.

Biden’s team has worked to alleviate Democratic concerns over alarms raised by a special counsel about Biden’s age and memory. They came in a report determining that Biden would not be charged with any criminal activity for possessing classified documents while a private citizen.

Asked about his impressions from his last week’s interview with former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, Putin said he expected Carlson to be more aggressive. Putin used the interview to push his narrative on the fighting in Ukraine, urge Washington to recognize Moscow’s interests and press Kyiv to sit down for talks.

Carlson didn’t ask Putin about war crimes Russian troops have been accused of in Ukraine, or about his relentless crackdown on dissent.

“I expected him to be aggressive and ask the so-called tough questions, and I wasn’t only ready for it but wanted it because it would have given me a chance to respond sharply,” Putin said.

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 14, 2024

19. Joe Biden Could Send Millions Of Artillery Shells To Ukraine, For Free, Tomorrow. And It’s Perfectly Legal.

Joe Biden Could Send Millions Of Artillery Shells To Ukraine, For Free, Tomorrow. And It’s Perfectly Legal.

‘Excess defense articles’ remains a powerful authority.

Forbes · by David Axe · February 14, 2024

Turkish-made M483A1 shells in a Ukrainian howitzer.

Via @war_noir

There’s a bureaucratically complex but perfectly legal way for the administration of U.S. president Joe Biden to send to Ukraine the thing Ukrainian brigades need the most: artillery shells. Millions of them.

As Russia’s wider war on Ukraine grinds into its third year and Russia-aligned Republicans in the U.S. Congress continue to withhold U.S. funding for Ukraine, Ukrainian artillery batteries are desperately low on ammunition.

Six months ago, Ukrainian batteries were firing as many as 6,000 shells a day and, in some sectors of the 600-mile front line, even matching Russians batteries’ own shellfire.

Today, four months after Republicans began blocking aid, the Ukrainians are firing just 2,000 shells a day. At the same time, the Russians—flush with shells from North Korea and Iran—are firing up as many as 10,000 shells a day.

That firepower disparity is the main reason why Russian forces are—admittedly at great cost—slowly advancing in and around the eastern city of Avdiivka, currently the locus of Russia’s winter offensive.

Given indicted ex-president Donald Trump’s cultish hold over the Republican Party and Trump’s longstanding affinity for authoritarian Russian leader Vladimir Putin, there’s seems to be little prospect of Biden getting much, or any, fresh funding for Ukraine now that Republicans hold a slim majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.

But that doesn’t mean Biden is powerless to help Ukraine. An under-appreciated U.S. law gives the president authority to sell at a discount, or even give away, any existing weapons the U.S. military declares excess to its needs.

The law caps annual transfers of so-called “excess defense articles” at a total value of $500 million a year. But the same law doesn’t dictate how much value the president assigns to a particular weapon. He in theory could price an item at zero dollars.

Biden only rarely has used his EDA authority for Ukraine. And where he has used it, lately it’s been a part of complex “ring-trades” where the U.S. government gives excess weapons to third countries—Ecuador and Greece, to name two—then encourages those same countries directly or indirectly to give to Ukraine some of their own surplus weapons.

The United States for instance offered Ecuador ex-U.S. Army UH-60 transport helicopters, freeing up Ecuador to donate to Ukraine its surplus Mi-17 helicopters as well as rocket-launchers and air-defense systems. Greece is getting ex-U.S. Air Force C-130 airlifters and ex-U.S. Army ground vehicles on the understanding the Greeks will try to find surplus weapons to pass onward to the Ukrainians.

There’s no legal reason Biden couldn’t cut out the middleman and use his EDA authority directly to support Ukraine. And there’s no practical reason this aid couldn’t include artillery ammunition.

Generally speaking, most artillery ammunition in U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps stockpiles clearly isn’t excess. Indeed, the Army and Marines need all the modern shells they can get as they prepare for Ukraine-style wars.

But there’s an important exception. There are potentially four million 155-millimeter dual-purpose improved cluster munitions in storage in the United States. M483A1 and M864 DPICM rounds respectively scatter 88 or 72 grenade-size submunitions, each of which can kill or maim a soldier.

All of these shells are obvious candidates for the “excess” label. The U.S. Army years ago determined that these DPICMs—produced in large quantities between the 1970s and 1990s—are unreliable and unsafe, as any particular submunition has up to a 14-percent chance of being a dud.

The Army around 2017 declared a requirement for a new cluster shell with a one-percent dud rate. “Rounds now in the U.S. stockpile do not meet the Office of the Secretary of Defense's goal,” wrote Peter Burke, then the service’s top ammunition manager.

That orphaned, according to a 2004 report, 402 million DPICM submunitions. Do the math. That’s as many as 4.6 million 155-millimeter shells.

The Biden administration managed to ship to Ukraine, under authorities that don’t fall under the EDA law, an undisclosed number of DPICMs—tens of thousands, perhaps—before aid ran out and Republicans blocked additional money.

The White House’s main practice, for the first two years of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine, has been to give to Ukraine weapons from U.S. stockpiles—and then immediately to replace the donated materiel with newly-produced weapons.

In that sense, almost nothing Biden has given to Ukraine actually has been free. It has cost the Ukrainians a portion of the $75 billion in financial aid the U.S. Congress approved for Ukraine before Republicans gained their majority.

If Biden abandoned this practice, he could designate all the DPICM shells remaining in U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps warehouses as excess—and donate them to Ukraine without needing a single dollar to replace them.

All four million or so remaining rounds should be available. Enough for years of intensive combat.

Now, there is a caveat in the EDA law. All weapons must be given away “as is, where is.” In other words, the U.S. government legally can’t pay for shipping.

But another caveat is that any weapons in Germany are excluded from this rule. Biden could ship those DPICMs to Germany aboard a few sealift ships and then declare them as excess to need before having the U.S. Army drop them off somewhere the Ukrainian armed forces would have no trouble retrieving them.

Why Biden hasn’t already put in motion this plan is unclear. It’s possible—likely, even—he prefers to hold out for $60 billion in fresh funding, which gives him more options for buying, or even developing from scratch, a wide array of weapons for Ukraine.

But once Biden decides, as many other observers already have decided, that Russia-aligned Republicans never will approve more money for Ukraine, he could lean on his EDA authority—and speed millions of shells to Ukraine’s starving batteries.

Forbes · by David Axe · February 14, 2024

20. Gaza and the End of the Rules-Based Order

Excerpts:

Israel and its biggest supporter, the United States, must accept that the stated military objective of destroying Hamas has wrought an overwhelming cost to civilian lives and infrastructure, which likely cannot be justified under international law. It is now more important than ever that the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court act decisively to deliver indictments for crimes committed by all parties to the conflict.

Neither historical grievances nor long-term prospects for peace in the Middle East, and arguably beyond, can be addressed without an international and inclusive process that specifies a dismantling of Israel’s system of apartheid and allows for the security and rights of all populations to be protected.

The painful memories of wrongs, both recent and from long ago, can help save lives today, as well as in the future, in Israel, in the Palestinian territories, and beyond. That process must begin immediately, however, as time is running out. If history indeed repeats itself, as we are told it often does, then we should consider ourselves well warned. With the universal application of international law likely in its death throes and nothing yet to take its place save brutalist national interests and sheer greed, widespread anger can be, and will be, exploited by the many ready to foster even broader instability on an even greater global scale.

Gaza and the End of the Rules-Based Order

What the Israel-Hamas War Means for the Future of Human Rights and International Law

By Agnès Callamard

February 15, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Agnès Callamard · February 15, 2024

After more than four months of conflict, Israel’s campaign of retaliation against Hamas has been characterized by a pattern of war crimes and violations of international law. Israel’s stated justification for its war in Gaza is the elimination of Hamas, which is responsible for the horrific crimes committed during its October 7 attack on Israel: 1,139 people, mostly Israeli civilians, killed; thousands more wounded; a yet unknown number of women and girls subjected to sexual violence; and 240 people taken hostage, many of whom are still held by Hamas.

In response, Israel forcibly displaced Palestinians, imposing conditions that have left hundreds of thousands without basic human necessities. It has carried out indiscriminate, disproportionate, and direct attacks on civilians and “civilian objects,” such as schools and hospitals. Some 28,000 Palestinians have been killed, the majority of them women and children. Vast sections of Gaza have been pulverized; a fifth of its infrastructure and most of its homes are now damaged or destroyed, leaving the region largely uninhabitable. Israel imposed a prolonged blockade, denying Palestinians adequate food, potable water, fuel, Internet access, shelter, and medical care: action amounting to collective punishment. It is detaining Gazans in inhumane and degrading conditions, and Israel admits that some of those detained have already died. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, violence against Palestinians by Israeli forces and settlers has increased markedly.

The United States and many Western countries have supported Israel, providing military assistance, opposing calls for a cease-fire at the United Nations, stopping funding of the UN Relief and Works Agency serving Palestinian refugees, and rejecting South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), even as the carnage continued to unfold.

Today’s diplomatic complicity in the catastrophic human rights and humanitarian crisis in Gaza is the culmination of years of erosion of the international rule of law and global human rights system. Such disintegration began in earnest after 9/11, when the United States embarked on its “war on terror,” a campaign that normalized the idea that everything is permissible in the pursuit of “terrorists." To prosecute its war in Gaza, Israel borrows ethos, strategy, and tactics from that framework, doing so with the support of the United States.

It is as if the grave moral lessons of the Holocaust, of World War II, have been all but forgotten, and with them, the very core of the decades-old “Never Again” principle: its absolute universality, the notion that it protects us all or none of us. This disintegration, so apparent in the destruction of Gaza and the West’s response to it, signals the end of the rules-based order and the start of a new era.

THE AGE OF UNIVERSALITY

Universality, the principle that all of us, without exception, are endowed with human rights equally, no matter who we are or where we live, lies at the heart of the international human rights system. It was the foundation of the Genocide Convention and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both adopted in 1948, and it continued to inform new means of accountability over the years, including the International Criminal Court established in 2002. For decades, that legal infrastructure has helped ensure that states uphold their human rights obligations. It has defined human rights movements globally and underpinned the twentieth century’s greatest human rights achievements.

A critic of this system might argue that states have only ever paid lip service to universality. The twentieth century abounds with examples of failures to uphold the equal dignity of all: the violence used against those advocating for decolonization, the Vietnam War, the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, and many more. These events all testify to an international system rooted more in systemic inequality and discrimination than in universality. With good reason, one could contend that universality was never applied to Palestinians, who, as the Palestinian American scholar Edward Said expressed it, have been, instead, since 1948, “the victims of the victims, the refugees of the refugees.”

Yet the fate of universality resides not in the hands of those who betray it. Rather, as a perennial ambitious project for humankind, its power rests, first and foremost, in its continual proclamation and in its persistent defense. Throughout the twentieth century, the principle of universality had countless setbacks, but the overarching direction was toward proclaiming, affirming, and defending it. That shifted, however, in the early years of the twenty-first century, with the unleashing of the “war on terror” following the tragic events of 9/11.

TAKING THE GLOVES OFF

For the last 20 years, the doctrine and methods of the “war on terror” have been adopted or mimicked by governments the world over. They have been deployed to expand the reach and range of state “self-defense” measures and to hunt down, with the barest of restraints, any people or authorities deemed to warrant the loosely defined but widely applied designation of “terrorist threat.”

The extraordinary toll of civilian killings in Gaza committed in the name of both self-defense and countering terrorism is a logical consequence of that framework, which has perverted and almost dismantled international law and, along with it, the principle of universality.

American airstrikes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria resulted in mass civilian casualties. Invariably, the U.S. military would claim that it had taken the necessary steps to protect civilians. But it gave little explanation as to exactly how it distinguished civilians from combatants and why, if distinguished properly, so many civilians had been killed.

It is as if the grave moral lessons of the Holocaust, of World War II, have been all but forgotten.

Over the last 20 years, governments around the world have adopted similar methods. In Syria, Russia’s relentless bombings of civilian infrastructure led to thousands of civilian deaths. Yet in cases documented by Amnesty International, Russian authorities claimed their armed forces were striking “terrorist” targets, even when they were destroying hospitals, schools, and markets. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was also justified with spurious references to self-defense and exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. Its indiscriminate attacks have led to thousands of civilian casualties, amid mounting evidence of crimes under international law, such as torture, deportation and forcible transfer, sexual violence, and unlawful killings. China, too, has invoked “the fight against terrorism” to justify its widespread crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, which resulted in crimes against humanity.

Israel’s massive bombardment of Gaza has roots that go deeper in history than the long running “war on terror,” including the 1948 expulsion of roughly 750,000 Palestinians from their homes, which came to be known as the nakba, or catastrophe. But it is also a thoroughly twenty-first-century manifestation of the erosion of international law in which little to none of the restraints set by the post–World War II system have been respected: not those in the UN Charter, in international human rights law, or even under the Genocide Convention, as argued by South Africa.

WHERE IS THE OUTCRY?

Immediately after October 7, Western governments condemned Hamas’s crimes and expressed unconditional support for Israel, an understandable and predictable response to the horror inflicted on the population of a close ally. But they should have shifted their rhetoric once it became clear, as it quickly did, that Israel’s bombing of Gaza was killing thousands of civilians. All governments, especially those with influence over Israel, should have unequivocally and publicly denounced Israel’s unlawful actions and called for a cease-fire, for the return of all hostages, and for accountability for war crimes and other violations on both sides.

It did not happen. For the first two months of the war, the Biden administration largely downplayed the loss of lives in Gaza. It failed to denounce Israel’s relentless bombings and devastating siege. It did not acknowledge the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including 56 years of Israeli military occupation, and instead bought into Israel’s counterterrorism framing.

And as the war continued, the Biden administration defended Israel’s tactics. It parroted certain of Israel’s unverified and later repudiated claims about Hamas atrocities. Although the United States eventually became more vocal about the protection of Palestinian civilians, it has refused to publicly support key steps that would help save their lives. Instead, at the UN, the United States vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for humanitarian pauses to the war. Only on December 22 did it permit, through its abstention, the Security Council to adopt a compromise resolution calling for “urgent steps to immediately allow safe and unhindered and expanded humanitarian access” to Gaza and “the conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities.” It has never publicly entertained stopping its arms transfers to Israel.

Within days of the ICJ ruling and its calls for provisional measures to prevent genocide in Gaza, the United States and a number of other Western governments canceled funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency, which provides a lifeline to people in Gaza. That decision does not just ignore the evident risks of genocide; it serves to amplify and accelerate them. The United States’ superpower status and its influence over Israel means Washington is uniquely positioned to change the reality on the ground in Gaza. More than any other country, the United States can prevent its close ally from continuing to commit atrocities. But thus far, it has chosen not to.

This pattern of conduct comes at a huge cost. As one G-7 diplomat has put it, “We have definitely lost the battle in the Global South. All the work we have done with the Global South (over Ukraine) has been lost. ... Forget about rules, forget about world order. They won’t ever listen to us again.”

A CHANGE OF ERAS

Although there were rehearsals for events in Gaza that showed extreme disregard of international law, the war there may well signal a curtain call. The risk of genocide, the gravity of the violations being committed, and the flimsy justifications by elected officials in Western democracies warn of a change of eras. The rules-based order that has governed international affairs since the end of World War II is on its way out, and there may be no turning back.

The consequences of this abandonment are all too apparent: more instability, more aggression, more conflict, and more suffering. The only check on violence will be more violence. The end of the rules-based order will also bring spreading and palpable anger across all layers of society, in all corners of the earth, except among those positioned to reap whatever sullied rewards can be extracted from the breaking international system.

But steps can be taken to avert this worst-case scenario. They start with the immediate cessation of all military operations by both Israel and Hamas, with the immediate release of all remaining civilian hostages detained by Hamas and of all Palestinians unlawfully detained by Israel, and with the lifting of the siege of Gaza. The ICJ’s provisional measures to prevent genocide in Gaza must be fully implemented.

An Israeli tank near the Israel-Gaza border, January 2024

Amir Cohen / Reuters

Israel and its biggest supporter, the United States, must accept that the stated military objective of destroying Hamas has wrought an overwhelming cost to civilian lives and infrastructure, which likely cannot be justified under international law. It is now more important than ever that the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court act decisively to deliver indictments for crimes committed by all parties to the conflict.

Neither historical grievances nor long-term prospects for peace in the Middle East, and arguably beyond, can be addressed without an international and inclusive process that specifies a dismantling of Israel’s system of apartheid and allows for the security and rights of all populations to be protected.

The painful memories of wrongs, both recent and from long ago, can help save lives today, as well as in the future, in Israel, in the Palestinian territories, and beyond. That process must begin immediately, however, as time is running out. If history indeed repeats itself, as we are told it often does, then we should consider ourselves well warned. With the universal application of international law likely in its death throes and nothing yet to take its place save brutalist national interests and sheer greed, widespread anger can be, and will be, exploited by the many ready to foster even broader instability on an even greater global scale.

AGNÈS CALLAMARD is Secretary General of Amnesty International. From 2016 to 2021, she served as UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions.

Foreign Affairs · by Agnès Callamard · February 15, 2024

21. The quiet intimacy of a desperate frontline evacuation (Ukraine)

The quiet intimacy of a desperate frontline evacuation

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/the-quiet-intimacy-of-a-desperate?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1547592&post_id=141695427&utm

We take you inside an ambulance speeding from the trenches to the hospital, and what it means for the medics and loved ones who are touched by this process.

TIM MAK AND OKSANA OSTAPCHUK

FEB 15, 2024

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Editor’s note: To do this dangerous and high-stress reporting, we need your help. Fight Ukraine fatigue in the West by becoming a paid subscriber to The Counteroffensive! Gain access to our news reports, our reporter’s notebook section, and the ability to comment!

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Michael has never met me, and likely never will.

But I’ve met him.

I first see him, unconscious, in the back of a speeding ambulance, rushing west along the highway towards Dnipro, a hub for the wounded. Even if he were awake, the 50 year old would not be able to see me: his eyes are covered with bandages.

Two medics work on Michael as the ambulance speeds towards Dnipro.

His body is covered by the marks of violence: his left leg has been amputated. His left forehead and eye have trauma from an explosion.

He’s been pumped full of blood that is not his own, in order to save his life, along with a cocktail of drugs meant to improve his chances of survival: tranexamic acid to help with blood clotting; morphine and fentanyl to help with pain; and a long list of others.

The back of the ambulance is thick with the feeling of concentration, the air empty of sound except for the engine and machines working to keep this man alive. His bed, equipped with stabilizers to reduce movement on the highway, stays steady as equipment showing vital signs works ceaselessly. One medic sits near Michael’s head, the other, closer to his feet.

I’m embedded with MOAS, an NGO that began its work in Ukraine after the full-scale invasion. Since Feb. 2022, they’ve evacuated some 30,000 patients from the frontlines, focusing on only the most difficult cases – serious head trauma, stomach eviscerations, limb amputations, strokes. The drivers often spend 18 hours a day on the road, back and forth, back and forth.

30,000 is just a number. Here is one real person, in front of me, clinging on to life. His personal trauma, and the grating mental trauma his medics go through as they treat patient after patient, is a reminder of the cascading and cumulative effects of the war as we approach the two-year mark.

A moving ambulance creates a different relationship between medic and patient. It’s far more intimate, far more personal – and leaves a deeper mark on the psyche.

Yevhenii Solod, who works on the ambulance for MOAS, notes that in a hospital setting you’d rarely spend more than an hour at a time with a patient. But in an ambulance, you spend far more time with them, ensuring they are stable for the duration of the trip.

“For hours, their life is in our hands,” he said. “You cannot allow yourself to lose focus, even for a minute… mentally, it drains a lot.”

MOAS medics stand in front of one of the ambulances.

The relationship is mostly unspoken. Because MOAS focuses on the most critical cases, the vast majority of patients are unconscious – on a breathing apparatus, for example; unconscious or otherwise unresponsive. They meet their patients, who will never meet them.

“My dialogue is usually with the machines here… checking their vitals and keeping them alive,” Solod said. “I tried to stay away from feeling too empathetic… [this work requires you] to be a bit cold-blooded inside to do the job efficiently.”

He remembers a doctor who was once his boss that gave him this advice: you need to show patients love and compassion, but you need to develop a layer of control beneath it, so that you don't take the medical outcomes too close to the heart.

“I still have some gunpowder left,” Solod said, referring to his energy levels. “I know that [soldiers on the front lines] are going through much worse times. And we cannot survive without them.”

MOAS medics are on standby constantly. At their headquarters near the frontlines, in a town they’ve asked me to conceal for security reasons, we await orders for the next evacuation. Once nightfall comes about, we are locked in place and cannot leave – there are serious concerns that saboteurs or overhead imagery might detect their location if we move around after dark.

A MOAS driver behind the wheel.

Then comes the waiting. The doctors have a joke: when the journalists are here, it gets quiet. Days with overcast or foggy weather tend to be quieter, as drones are less useful and the artillery duels slow down.

When a patient needs evacuation, it happens in an instant.

“There is no time for exhaustion. You obviously feel it. But the situation that the boys are in – obviously this motivates you a lot,” said Artem Bildii, a MOAS team leader who organizes and coordinates evacuation teams. “We are going to continue grinding, continuing doing it. And I believe victory is going to be ours.”

The last I saw of Michael, from a screenshot of a video that I took of him being admitted to a hospital.

We don’t know what happened to Michael. After a ride from the MOAS headquarters to a hospital in Dnipro, he disappeared into the Ukrainian medical system. His wounds were extremely serious, but survivable, due to the quick work of soldiers and medics around him.

We do know what happens when the wounds are too severe, or if the combat situation makes it too difficult for timely evacuation. Medics know all too well what happens in that situation, which is why a certain level of cold-heartedness is needed.

In a town in Donbas I was passing through while reporting this story, I saw the ultimate consequences of the war – that death happens even when every medical intervention is performed perfectly and evacuation is swift.

A monument at the side of the road: “Pain will not cease in centuries...”

On the side of the road, I saw a large wall covered with photograph portraits of the local fallen, the soldiers who medics could not save.

“Pain will not cease in centuries. Heroes do not die. Glory to the heroes!” read the monument.

On that foggy, misty day, a woman approached, and tenderly wiped the moisture off the image of a man on the wall, pausing to kiss the photo – a ritual borne out of grief.

It’s a pain that does not forget, as Aeschylus put it, falling drop by drop upon the heart.

She left, and I wondered just how many Ukrainians feel that same pain today. This is what these medics fight, grind, and grit their teeth to stand against.

As I walked away, I turned back one more time to see her returning to the wall, hoping for one more solitary moment with the photo of someone she had clearly loved.

Her pain had still not ceased.

22. Trump’s NATO Threat Reflects a Wider Shift on America’s Place in the World

This gets to the fundamental question about our US national identity. What do the American people really want America's place in the world to be? Of course there will not be one overarching answer. Or could there be? Will the 2024 Presidential election be a referendum on this question?

Trump’s NATO Threat Reflects a Wider Shift on America’s Place in the World

Alliances that were once seen as the bulwark of the Cold War are now viewed as an outdated albatross by a significant segment of the American public.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/15/us/politics/trumps-nato-threat-reflects-a-wider-shift-on-americas-place-in-the-world.html

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President Donald J. Trump speaking in 2018 at a NATO summit in Brussels. He and his advisers say that NATO and other alliances no longer represent U.S. interests.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Peter Baker

Reporting from Washington

Feb. 15, 2024, 12:01 a.m. ET

Sign up for Your Places: Global Update. All the latest news for any part of the world you select. Get it sent to your inbox.

When former President Donald J. Trump told a campaign rally in South Carolina last weekend that he would encourage Russia to attack NATO allies who “didn’t pay,” there were gasps of shock in Washington, London, Paris, Tokyo and elsewhere around the world.

But not in South Carolina. At least not in the room that day. The crowd of Trump supporters decked out in “Make America Great Again” T-shirts and baseball caps reacted to the notion of siding with Moscow over longtime friends of the United States with boisterous cheers and whistles. “Delinquent” allies? Forget them. Not America’s problem.

The visceral rejection of the American-led security architecture constructed in the years after World War II serves as a reminder of how much the notion of U.S. leadership in the world has shifted in recent years. Alliances that were once seen as the bulwark of the Cold War are now viewed as an outdated albatross by a significant segment of the American public that Mr. Trump appeals to.

The old consensus that endured even in the initial years after the end of the Cold War has frayed under the weight of globalization, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Great Recession of 2008-09 and Mr. Trump’s relentless assault on international institutions and agreements. While polls show most Americans still support NATO and other alliances, the increasingly vocal objections in some quarters hark back to a century ago when much of America just wanted to be left alone.

“The alliance structure was built to win the Cold War and it’s sort of atrophied,” said Michael Beckley, a scholar of great power competition at Tufts University. “Trump was obviously very jarring when he came to office, but it was part of a long-term trend.” Indeed, he added, “if you look at U.S. history, the last 80 years I really look at as an aberration. Through most of U.S. history, Americans thought they had a pretty good thing going here on the continent and they were largely independent economically of other countries, and that’s still largely true today.”

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After speaking with Mr. Trump, Sen. Lindsey Graham opposed the $95 billion security package for international allies.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

That historic tension between go-it-alone nationalism and broad-coalition internationalism has played out in stark form in the last week. Just days after his speech, Mr. Trump followed up by vowing to end all foreign aid “without the hope of a payback” if he wins his old job back, offering only loans to be reimbursed. And Speaker Mike Johnson and House Republicans refused to even consider a $95 billion security aid package for American friends in Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.

Even some of the most outspoken Republican hawks in the Senate voted against the aid, most notably Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who opposed the package after speaking with Mr. Trump. Mr. Graham, who has long promoted muscular American leadership and portrayed himself as a ferocious backer of Ukraine and Israel, joined his Republican colleagues in demanding tougher action to secure the United States’ border with Mexico even at the cost of the allies.

The spurt of neo-isolationism over internationalism will surely be the main topic of discussion at the Munich Security Conference, which opens on Friday, as Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and other U.S. officials try to reassure rattled allies. In a sign of how much has changed, Mr. Graham abruptly withdrew as a leader of a congressional delegation to the conference, where he has been a faithful regular for years.

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Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, left, and Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general. “We know from history that when we don’t stand up to dictators, they keep going,” Mr. Sullivan said on Wednesday.Credit...Olivier Matthys/EPA, via Shutterstoc

“Our allies are watching this closely,” Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, told reporters on Wednesday as he urged passage of the security aid. “Our adversaries are watching this closely.”

“There are those who say U.S. leadership and our alliances and partnerships with countries around the world don’t matter or should be torn up or walked away from,” he added. “We know from history that when we don’t stand up to dictators, they keep going. And the consequences of that would be severe for U.S. national security, for our NATO allies, for others around the world.”

Mr. Trump has never seen it that way. While he has been ideologically flexible on many issues over the years, one constant going back to the 1980s has been his conviction that the United States has been shafted by allies on trade, immigration and security. The times have finally caught up with his views, and he has fanned the embers of disenchantment into a full-fledged flame.

He has successfully pushed the debate away from international engagement on multiple fronts. Where both parties once favored free trade agreements and spent decades expanding them around the globe, now neither party does. Where Democrats and at least some Republicans not that long ago were open to immigration within limits, today’s negotiations in Washington are all about securing the border, with no measures to legalize those here illegally.Editors’ Picks

Mr. Trump and his advisers reject the label isolationist in favor of nationalist, saying that given the changes around the world since the fall of Communism, it is time to rethink American priorities for a new era. NATO and other alliances, they say, no longer represent U.S. interests.

“The old idea of NATO’s collective defense needs to be reassessed,” Russell Vought, a former budget director for Mr. Trump who now serves as president of the Center for Renewing America, told The Financial Times. “We have a narrower view of our interests than Estonia would like us to have.”

Every president since the end of the Cold War has come to office promising a greater focus at home after what they portrayed as too much attention abroad, although most found it hard to live up to that.

Bill Clinton defeated the international coalition-builder George H.W. Bush by vowing to focus “like a laser beam on the economy,” but ultimately he kicked off NATO expansion into the former Soviet-dominated territory. George W. Bush succeeded Mr. Clinton by promising to curtail nation-building overseas, only to be transformed into a war president after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Barack Obama rode his opposition to the Iraq war into office and brought home most troops stationed there and in Afghanistan, yet found himself going to war in Libya to stop the slaughter of civilians and again later against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Even Mr. Biden, a committed internationalist, came to the White House determined to end the war in Afghanistan and abandoned decades of bipartisan free trade philosophy. But he rallied allies to counter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, reunified the NATO alliance and built a broader network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific region to counter an aggressive China.

None of those recent presidents, however, has been as hostile to alliances and international accords as Mr. Trump, who not only threatened to exit NATO but also tried unilaterally to withdraw troops from Germany and South Korea. Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade pact and other international institutions.

Every other recent president has complained about European allies not meeting their fair share of the defense burden — Mr. Obama derided them as “free riders” — but never as loudly or as menacingly as Mr. Trump, who has long suggested that he considered it a condition of whether the United States should come to their aid regardless of the Article 5 mutual defense commitment in the NATO treaty. Even many of Mr. Trump’s critics agree that NATO allies need to do more, though they disagree with his approach.

Under Mr. Trump, the number of NATO members meeting the goal of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on their own militaries increased to nine from six. Under Mr. Biden, the number has doubled to 18, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO general secretary, announced on Wednesday, although that probably reflects the fear of Russia since its invasion of Ukraine, a non-NATO state, more than pressure from Washington.

In the United States, the discontent with alliances can be found on both the left and the right, with liberals disenchanted over the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and more willing to blame NATO expansion for Russian aggression, and conservatives more suspicious of foreigners and determined to assert what they consider American interests.

Mr. Trump’s “America First” slogan mirrors that used by isolationists before World War II, a group later discredited as too sympathetic to or naïve about Adolf Hitler’s Nazis. Even when told the history of the slogan, Mr. Trump shrugged off the taint and embraced it as a pithy expression of his worldview.

“My gut is he’s just taking the old one-third isolationist part of the U.S. public in a new direction,” said Ivo H. Daalder, a former ambassador to NATO under Mr. Obama. “He’s mobilizing a constituency that’s always been against this. Some of them might be sick of the Iraq war or suffered from globalization. There’s probably an overlap in those constituencies. But the people you would have associated with antiwar and anti-globalization pre-Trump would have been on the left. This is on the right.”

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, where Mr. Daalder is chief executive, has found in polls that most Americans still support alliances but that a partisan difference has grown much wider in the Trump era.

While 80 percent of Democrats believe the United States benefits from alliances with Europe, just 50 percent of Republicans do, according to surveys released in October, with similar numbers for alliances in East Asia. Sixty-eight percent of Democrats would support aiding NATO allies like Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia if Russia invaded, while just 48 percent of Republicans would.

The Republican Party itself is increasingly split between the Trump faction and the non-Trump faction, the Chicago council’s polls indicate. Only 40 percent of Trump Republicans support military aid for Ukraine, while 59 percent of those identifying as non-Trump Republicans favor it, nearly the same as the 63 percent level among the overall public.

“The larger story is the end of bipartisanship on a whole set of issues,” Mr. Daalder said. “If you look at independents and Democrats — very strongly pro-Ukraine, pro-aid, pro-alliances, believing that a shared leadership role is more important than a unilateral role, willingness to defend allies — all there. Where it begins to fall is among Republicans and actually Republicans that have a very favorable view of Donald Trump.”

Heather A. Conley, president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a group that promotes the trans-Atlantic relationship, and a former State Department official, said the problem was that the American public had come to see only the trade-offs of alliances, not the value they bring.

“Over the last 20 years, national security leaders stopped talking about the benefit and only talked about the cost,” she said. “And yet NATO has followed the American national security agenda.” NATO allies backed the United States in fighting terrorism, supporting the war in Afghanistan and rallying against Chinese assertiveness.

Ms. Conley noted that anti-American forces were increasingly forging their own alignment, pointing to the convergence of interests of Russia, China, Iran and even North Korea.

“This is exactly when we need a global-alliance architecture,” she said. “It is our comparative advantage. It is our strength. It is the only way we are going to be victorious. But you have to explain that very clearly and Americans have to understand the benefits.”

Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent for The Times. He has covered the last five presidents and sometimes writes analytical pieces that place presidents and their administrations in a larger context and historical framework. More about Peter Baker

23. Ukraine’s microphone-laden balloons that battle Russian drones awe US

Interesting Engineering

9.6K Followers

Ukraine’s microphone-laden balloons that battle Russian drones awe US

Story by Christopher McFadden • February 14, 2024

https://interestingengineering.com/military/ukraine-microphone-laden-balloons-awe-us

The United States military is considering developing novel acoustic sensors to counter drone threats, The War Zone reports. Inspired by Ukrainian prototypes currently in use to find and track Russian drones, the sensors could provide a much-needed interim measure before the U.S. planned E-7A "Wedgetail" fleet comes online. Such sensors could provide much-needed early-warning systems to U.S. personnel to defend against long-range kamikaze drones in places like the Middle East.

General James Hecker, who leads the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), and NATO's Allied Air Command, recently shared information about Ukraine's acoustic sensor network and addressed air and missile defense issues during a press roundtable at this year's Air & Space Forces Association Warfare Symposium.

At the event, Hecker explained how the Ukrainian military has implemented a network comprising thousands of acoustic sensors nationwide to detect and track Russian kamikaze drones.

This network enables them to alert their air defenses in advance and dispatch teams to shoot down the drones. While far more sophisticated, any lover of military history will immediately think about using acoustic mirrors before and during the Second World War.

Before the invention of radar, military air defense forces used these large concrete parabolic passive listening devices called experimental parabolic sound mirrors.

These devices were used as early-warning systems to detect incoming enemy aircraft by listening to the sound of their engines. Hecker went on to explain that the U.S. military is exploring the possibility of testing this capability to enhance its ability to monitor and engage drone threats.

Return of the acoustic mirror

"At the unclassified level, Ukraine's done some pretty sophisticated things to get after [a] persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]" picture of "low altitude objects," Hecker explained, The War Zones reports. This now includes an acoustic sensor system that utilizes microphones to pick up and amplify ambient noise.

"Think if you have a series of sensors, think of your cell phone, okay, with power to it, so it doesn't die, right? And then you put a microphone to make the acoustics louder of one-way UAVs going overhead," Hecker explained.

"And you have … 6,000 of these things all over the country. They've been successful in [picking] up the one-way UAVs like Shahid 136s and those kinds of things," he added.

Hecker proposed that the acoustic sensor technology detecting drones could have applications beyond NATO. They could be a handy interim measure until more sophisticated ISR assets are online.

Detailed information was not forthcoming, but Hecker mentioned that he is looking forward to delivering "tethered aerostats" equipped with a payload capable of detecting one-way UAVs within the next six months to a year.

These aerostats can remain in the air for an extended period, except during strong winds, when they may need to be reeled down temporarily.

"What it does, you know, when it's airborne, it will give us a persistent picture, ISR picture, down to low altitude, where many of these one-way UAVs and cruise missiles operate at," Hecker said about the E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft that the Air Force and NATO are in the process of acquiring.

"And it has a pretty good capability in the range that it can detect those [types] of threats," he said.

A novel anti-drone warfare solution

"Unfortunately, they're [the E-7s] not coming off the line starting tomorrow," he continued. "So we have to look for ... interim solutions.," he added. Many modern airborne threats, including small drones, cruise missiles, and stealthy aircraft and missiles, pose significant challenges to current radars.

Given the difficulties in detecting, tracking, and defeating small aerial threats like kamikaze drones for frontline personnel, the kind of "back to the future" use of acoustic listening devices could prove invaluable for the U.S. military. What such systems will look like and how effective they will be is yet to be seen, but this is an interesting proposal nonetheless.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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