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Quotes of the Day:
"For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support. "
– George Washington
"The old terms must be invented with new meaning and given new explanations. Liberty, equality, and fraternity are no longer what they were in the days of the late-lamented guillotine. This is what the politicians will not understand; and that is why I hate them. They want only their own special revolutions- external revolutions, political revolutions, etc. But that is only dabbling. What is really needed is a revolution of the human spirit."
– Henrik Ibsen
"Of our political revolution of '76, we all are justly proud. It has given us a degree of political freedom, far exceeding that of any other nation of the earth. In it the world has found a solution of the long mooted problem, as to the capability of man to govern himself. In it was the germ which has vegetated, and still is to grow and expand into the universal liberty of mankind."
– Abraham Lincoln
To my Asian Friends: Happy Lunar New Year
To my Korean Friends: 새해 복 많이 받으세요
To my American Friends: Happy Presidents' Day
1. The Kim Ju-ae succession myth
2. A Defector Explains the Remote-Work Scam Helping North Korea Pay for Nukes
3. Does the UN Command have jurisdiction over the DMZ? There's no such provision in the Armistice Agreement.
4. North Korea opens street for families of soldiers killed in Russia-Ukraine war
5. Army boasts coastal security readiness ahead of Lunar New Year
6. Lee Jae Myung and Nixon: Divergent Perspectives on Military Oversight
7. What Colby’s Northeast Asia Tour Tells Us About the Future of Japan-Korea-US Trilateral Deterrence
8. Why Kim Ju Ae’s Path to Power Is Structurally Blocked
9. Korea goes adrift in processing legislation of US investment
10. Omotenashi Barefoot Hospitality: A new paradigm for Korea-Japan relations
11. How eager should we be to reopen dialogue with North Korea?
12. [Lee Byung-jong] Korea's Demilitarized Zone
1. The Kim Ju-ae succession myth
Comment: Hyunseung Lee provides another important perspective on the mutyh of succession. Our experts from north Korea are providing consistent analysis debunking the myths that are being repeated by intelligence services and the media. You can only find this type of analyst in our Witness for Freedom at the Korea regional review.
One very important point I want to highlight from Hyunseung and our other escapees is that by supporting this myth we are supporting Kim Jong Un's pursuit of legitimacy, domestically and internationally. We are legitimizing his rule when we should be working to undermine his legitimacy.
Voices Feb. 16, 2026 / 10:26 AM
The Kim Ju-ae succession myth
By Hyunseung Lee
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/16/perspective-north-korea-kim-Ju-ae-not-successor/6291771253906/
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, inspect a recently completed industrial complex in Kangdong County, on the outskirts of Pyongyang, North Korea, in December. Photo by North Korean Central News Agency/EPA
Feb. 16 (UPI) -- South Korea's National Intelligence Service and several media outlets have recently concluded that Kim Jong Un's daughter, Kim Ju-ae, has been designated as his successor.
Based solely on the public appearances of a 13-year-old girl, the "fourth-generation hereditary succession" is being treated as a foregone conclusion. However, this reflects a hasty judgment that overlooks the fundamental nature of North Korean power structures, and worse, dangerously legitimizes the Kim Jong Un regime.
In North Korea, "successor" is a forbidden word
Since the era of Kim Jong Il, mentioning a successor has been strictly taboo within North Korea. Publicly discussing succession is perceived as disloyalty to the Supreme Leader. This is not merely custom -- it is an iron rule embedded in the structure of North Korea's monolithic leadership system.
Kim Jong Il's case clearly demonstrates this. After being officially designated as successor in 1972, Kim Jong Il spent approximately 20 years consolidating real power while reducing Kim Il Sung to a figurehead.
Kim Jong Il became extremely hostile to early successor designation. When Ko Yong-hui, Kim Jong Un's mother, and her associates mentioned succession, Kim Jong Il reportedly declared, "Anyone who mentions a successor in front of me will be eliminated."
Kim Jong Un was only officially designated as successor in 2009, after Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke in 2008 and his health rapidly deteriorated. Without such urgent circumstances, Kim Jong Il would have delayed the designation indefinitely.
With Kim Jong Un currently in his early 40s and facing no apparent health issues, there is absolutely no reason for him to risk power fragmentation by hastily designating his 13-year-old daughter as successor.
The Iilusion that Kim Ju-ae is special
Interpreting Kim Ju-ae's accompaniment of Kim Jong Un on field inspections and her media exposure as unique "successor training" is an exaggerated reading. The children of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il also accompanied the leaders on field guidance trips. North Korean media simply did not publicize these activities externally.
It is a mistake to view Kim Ju-ae as special. Her media exposure merely represents a different packaging approach in North Korean propaganda -- nothing more. Her actions and position remain exactly what they are: the daughter of Kim Jong Un, nothing more and nothing less.
The titles "Respected Child" and "Morning Star General" carry no special significance, either. North Korea routinely bestows the title "General" on children of Kim Il Sung's direct lineage and addresses them respectfully as "Respected Child." To interpret this as evidence of succession is a misreading born from ignorance of the Kim family's internal culture in North Korea.
Succession that ignores party regulations?
The more fundamental issue is institutional impossibility. A North Korean successor holds the second-highest position in the Workers' Party. According to party regulations, membership begins at age 18. At 13, Kim Ju-ae cannot even become a party member. Succession designation would violate party regulations themselves.
North Korea operates as an extreme personality cult based on the "party's monolithic leadership system." The moment a successor is officially designated, loyalty becomes divided and power struggles begin among different factions within the hierarchy.
Kim Jong Il experienced this, and Kim Jong Un knows it well. A dictator seeking to maintain absolute power has no reason to plant the seeds of power fragmentation.
The gift that the "fourth-generation succession" frame gives the regime
Most concerning is how the South Korean government and media are legitimizing the North Korean regime by treating "fourth-generation succession" as a fait accompli.
Acknowledging a fourth generation is tantamount to accepting the third generation. It sends a message to the international community that North Korea's hereditary dictatorship operates stably and will continue indefinitely. This effectively packages the dictatorial system as a normal state.
Fourth-generation succession means "over 100 years of slavery" for North Korean citizens. For South Korea, it means being forced into "over 100 years of division." The frame that treats succession as natural fundamentally blocks any possibility of freedom and liberation for North Korean citizens and represents an anti-national abandonment of reunification hopes.
North Korea is a highly unstable state barely maintained through terror and isolation. Yet, when we create the illusion of a "stable succession system," the international community underestimates the possibility of regime change. This weakens international pressure for human rights improvements and systemic change, as well as undermining the momentum of the North Korean people themselves.
The system's fundamental contradiction
More fundamentally, hereditary succession itself represents North Korea's internal contradiction. The country's official name is the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea." It proclaims itself a "socialist system." Nowhere in these principles is hereditary succession justified. Hereditary politics is manifestly illegal even by North Korea's own professed ideology and system.
Yet, when South Korean society accepts and analyzes this as fact, it helps normalize the anti-constitutional power succession committed by the North Korean regime.
Time to focus on what matters
What we should focus on is not the frequency of Kim Ju-ae's media appearances. It is the abnormality of the North Korean system. It is the fact that 26 million people are suffering human rights violations under three generations of hereditary dictatorship.
Rather than wasting resources analyzing uncertain succession scenarios, we must focus on accurately diagnosing and responding to the essence of the North Korean regime -- terror rule, human rights violations, threats against South Korea and violations of international norms. The priority is informing the truth so that North Korean citizens can recognize the system's abnormality and the international community can demand change.
Kim Ju-ae is not yet a successor, nor has she been designated as one. She is simply a dictator's daughter. The moment we conclude she is the successor, we become trapped in the frame the North Korean dictatorship desires. Fourth-generation succession has not arrived and should never arrive.
Treating that future as inevitable is tantamount to abandoning the freedom of North Korean citizens and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.
Hyunseung Lee is a North Korean escapee, lead strategist at the Global Peace Foundation, the founder of North Korean Young Leaders Assembly and a regular contributor to the Korea Regional Review. He has experience in North Korea's shipping and mining sectors and as a sergeant in the DPRK Army Special Force. He fled in 2014 due to severe governmental purges. He holds a bachelor's degree in economics from Dongbei University of Finance and Economics and a master's degree in public administration from Columbia University.
2. A Defector Explains the Remote-Work Scam Helping North Korea Pay for Nukes
Summary:
A north Korean defector, Anton Koh, describes a pipeline of elite cyber operatives sent abroad, often based in China and Russia, to earn hard currency by stealing identities and landing high paying remote IT jobs, especially in the United States. Western estimates say these operatives infiltrated hundreds of Fortune 500 firms and generated up to $800 million in 2024. They use American collaborators to run “laptop farms” so company devices appear U.S. based; the Justice Department reported four Americans pleaded guilty tied to work at more than 136 firms. The regime seizes up to 90% of earnings for its nuclear program.
Excerpts:
Yet handing over 90% or more of their earnings to the regime was considered an act of “patriotic duty,” the report said. IT workers, including Koh, were generally sent back to Pyongyang every two or three years for roughly a month of “re-education,” to reinstate loyalty after being exposed to foreign information.
“In that environment we were being abused,” Koh said, “but we were also the perpetrators.”
Koh’s manager installed monitoring software to track the IT workers’ browsing histories. But to a group of software experts, workarounds were easily found. Koh said he surfed the web when the others slept.
His loyalty to the Kim regime faded not long after his first Google searches. He searched for “Kim Jong Il,” who was North Korea’s leader at the time and died in 2011.
Comment: Remote work became a battlefield, and the regime learned to tax it like any other export. The weak link is not code alone, it is identity, logistics, and Americans willing to rent access.
But exposure to open information is corrosive, even for the regime’s most trusted technical class.
If laptop farms and identity theft enable access, should countermeasures focus first on HR verification, on shipping and device custody, or on tracing payments to collaborators?
If the regime captures 90% of earnings, what pressure point is most effective: sanctioning facilitators, disrupting infrastructure in third countries, or tightening corporate compliance standards?
If elite cyber workers are both watched and tempted by outside information, what are we doing to exploit the "temptations?"
As an aside, I would offer this report from Robert Collins on the connection between human rights and Kim Jong un's nuclear program:
Slaves to the Bomb
To understand the challenges faced by the personnel who are involved in North Korea’s nuclear program, it is crucial to understand the recruitment, education, and training processes through the lens of human rights. This report offers a starting point toward that understanding. North Korea’s scientists and engineers are forced to work on the nuclear weapons program regardless of their own interests, preferences, or aspirations. These individuals may be described as “modern-day slaves” for the Kim regime’s nuclear weapons program. They are “slaves to the bomb.”
https://www.hrnk.org/documentations/slaves-bomb-role-north-koreas-nuclear-scientists/
A Defector Explains the Remote-Work Scam Helping North Korea Pay for Nukes
WSJ
Kim Jong Un’s cyber operatives have faked their way into IT jobs at American firms and elsewhere, pocketing big revenue for regime
By Dasl Yoon
Follow
Feb. 15, 2026 10:00 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/a-defector-explains-the-remote-work-scam-helping-north-korea-pay-for-nukes-277fc94f?mod=hp_lead_pos8
SEOUL—On a California-based company’s internal directory, he was just another face in the grid of remote workers—a prolific software developer with a polished LinkedIn profile and an IP address tracing back to the Midwest.
In reality, the man behind the coding lived in a state-run dormitory in China. His name was Anton Koh. And he wasn’t Chinese.
Koh belonged to a pipeline of elite North Korean cyber operatives, identified, trained and dispatched overseas by the Kim regime. Their mission: generate hard currency for Pyongyang by stealing foreigners’ identities to land remote IT jobs—with no gig more coveted than those from the U.S.
“I’m a software engineer and I have a great opportunity for you,” Koh said he messaged dozens of Americans daily, when remote working peaked during the pandemic. “It could be a lot of money for you too.”
Koh, who defected to South Korea in recent years, provides a rare window into Kim Jong Un’s digital warriors, who have managed to infiltrate hundreds of Fortune 500 companies, according to estimates from Google’s Mandiant division.
More than 40 countries have been targeted or involved in North Korea’s cyber work, according to a U.S.-led consortium of 11 nations documenting Pyongyang’s sanctions violations. The cyber agents are largely based in China and Russia, where the internet connection is stronger and won’t trace back to North Korea. They generated up to $800 million for the Kim regime in 2024, the group said.
American companies sit atop the list of targets because of the high pay and intelligence-gathering value. But the North Koreans don’t just work alone.
They seek to appear more credible to employers by paying Americans to host so-called “laptop farms,” where company-issued computers can be shipped and then used remotely by the North Koreans to appear online as if they were U.S.-based personnel. In November, the Justice Department said four Americans pleaded guilty to helping North Korean IT workers hold work at more than 136 American firms.
These overseas IT workers are the cash cows among North Korea’s illicit overseas labor, which helps funnel resources to Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The Kim regime is known to seize up to 90% of a given worker’s earnings, said Nam Bada, who interviewed defectors including Koh and other former IT workers for a report on Pyongyang’s cyber operations.
“A few IT workers can easily fund a missile,” said Nam, head of a Seoul-based North Korean human-rights group called People for Successful Corean Reunification, or PSCORE.
Due to their elevated roles in society, only a handful of North Korea’s hackers or cyber operatives are known to have defected over the decades. Just a few have ever spoken to the media. Koh’s account has been verified by South Korean officials and mirrors broader findings outlined in reports from the United Nations and third-party cybersecurity researchers.
Koh said his overseas posting afforded him luxuries nearly impossible to find at home: steady electricity, nutritious meals and internet access.
“It was like watching color TV for the first time after a lifetime of black-and-white,” Koh said of his first days in China.
Paralyzing pressure
Anson Chan for WSJ
Koh was seen as a child prodigy by North Korean authorities. They placed him on a track for software development after he aced the exams to get into an elite middle school that fed to a top university. He went overseas shortly after graduating college.
Upon arriving in China, Koh worked up to 16 hours a day. About 10 North Koreans crowded into a two-bedroom dormitory space containing little more than bunk beds and computers. Portraits of the ruling Kim leaders hung on the wall.
The revenue Koh and each of his colleagues generated was tracked in detail. At a monthly review session, the manager would hand out envelopes containing the workers’ 10% cut. Koh felt humiliated if his envelope was thinner than the others.
“The pressure and embarrassment could be paralyzing,” he said.
Koh admits he lived a life unattainable to most North Koreans. On Sundays, a day off for IT workers who met their monthly revenue quota of at least $5,000, Koh and his co-workers went shopping for American brands like Nike and the North Face. They dined on famed North Korean cold noodles or grilled lamb skewers washed down with cold beers.
Hitting the quotas got harder over the years, though, as North Korea’s operations became more well-known. Some clients started demanding live-camera interviews to land a job.
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Koh found a workaround by enlisting willing Western software developers to apply for jobs in their own names and even show up for video meetings. Without having to do any actual work, the Westerners typically received a lump payout of $500 or ongoing commissions of 30% or more. Koh handled all the coding or debugging work.
Some were so enticed by Koh they forked over copies of their ID cards, which then got used by other North Korean IT workers to grab more work.
The Covid-19 pandemic, coupled with better AI tools, turned into a breakthrough for workers like Koh. Remote working became common. Résumés could be written with native-level English proficiency. In recent years, video-filtering software has allowed IT workers to mask their identity.
The Kim regime recognized that remote job opportunities were plentiful abroad, and raised the quota for IT workers to $8,000 during the pandemic, Koh said. The IT workers took on more jobs, translating messages into English and managing collaborators.
Koh’s account echoes those heard by Mun Chong-hyun, a South Korean cybersecurity expert who has engaged with former North Korean IT workers online and tracked their behavior for more than two decades. Most hail from elite institutions, speak foreign languages and want U.S.-based work.
“They are online on weekends and at night, generating significant cash that helps maintain the regime,” said Mun, director of cybersecurity firm Genians Security Center.
Internet freedom
Statues in Pyongyang depict past leaders of the Kim regime. Kim Won Jin/AFP/Getty Images
The North Korean IT workers face constant surveillance, a lack of sleep and pressure to perform, according to defector testimonies published in a 2025 PSCORE report on North Korea’s cyber threats. During their workweek they are only allowed outdoors for short daily walks.
Yet handing over 90% or more of their earnings to the regime was considered an act of “patriotic duty,” the report said. IT workers, including Koh, were generally sent back to Pyongyang every two or three years for roughly a month of “re-education,” to reinstate loyalty after being exposed to foreign information.
“In that environment we were being abused,” Koh said, “but we were also the perpetrators.”
Koh’s manager installed monitoring software to track the IT workers’ browsing histories. But to a group of software experts, workarounds were easily found. Koh said he surfed the web when the others slept.
His loyalty to the Kim regime faded not long after his first Google searches. He searched for “Kim Jong Il,” who was North Korea’s leader at the time and died in 2011.
He read news articles about the “Dear Leader” drinking expensive whisky during North Korea’s massive famine in the late 1990s. “At first I thought, ‘This is a fabricated lie,’” Koh said.
But he kept seeing news articles in which portrayals of North Korea differed greatly from those in Pyongyang’s state-run media. He learned tens of thousands of North Koreans had escaped to the South. He later came to see all of the Kim regime’s promises as deceptions.
Following his escape, Koh’s life in South Korea is also demanding. His IT job limits his free time, but he finds happiness in the quiet of his own home. Sometimes he finds himself staring at his computer screen wondering how his old friends are doing. And how they feel about him.
“Maybe they think of me as a dirty traitor,” Koh said. “But maybe there’s a chance they understand me on a human level.”
WSJ
3. Does the UN Command have jurisdiction over the DMZ? There's no such provision in the Armistice Agreement.
Comment: The article below from Hankyoreh Ilbo (Google translated) is an example of the misinformation that proliferated throughout certain political factions in Korea about the United Nations Command and the Armistice Agreement. But more importantly Michael Bosack has provided detailed counterpoints that explain and debunk the misinformation in the article on his linkedIn page. His comments are very much worth reading and I hope that the media and experts will pay attention to his comments and analysis.
Mike Bosack
Mike Bosack
• 2nd
2nd
International Negotiator • Peacebuilder • War-tested Leader • Founder, Parley Policy Initiative
International Negotiator • Peacebuilder • War-tested Leader • Founder, Parley Policy Initiative
1w •
1 week ago • Visible to anyone on or off LinkedInnnect with Mike Bosack
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mike-bosack-57670260_dmz-%EA%B4%80%ED%95%A0%EA%B6%8C%EC%9D%80-%EC%9C%A0%EC%97%94%EC%82%AC%EC%97%90%EC%A0%95%EC%A0%84%ED%98%91%EC%A0%95%EC%97%94-%EA%B7%B8%EB%9F%B0-%EA%B7%9C%EC%A0%95-%EC%97%86%EB%8B%A4-activity-7426588710151868416-yrnU/
I normally don’t try to call out specific articles or news outlets, but I’d like to use this Hankyoreh piece (https://lnkd.in/gE35JSKT) as an example of some of the falsehoods about the DMZ that are being published in the information space (presumably to garner support for legislation that the ruling Minjoo Party is trying to push through the National Assembly).
Let’s break it down…
***
The writer states that the Armistice does not provide specific provisions on DMZ access procedures or MDL crossings. I refer you to Paragraphs 7, 9, and 17, which state that “no person, military or civilian,” is allowed to cross the MDL unless authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission; “no person, military or civilian,” is allowed to enter the DMZ unless authorized by the Military Armistice Commission; and responsibility for compliance rests with the “signatories hereto and their successors in command” (i.e., UNC & KPA Commanders), including the establishment of “all measures and procedures necessary to insure [sic] complete compliance with all the provisions hereof.”
***
The writer also states that “jurisdiction” and “administration” are new terms related to DMZ management that weren’t introduced until the early 2000s. However, Paragraph 10 of the Armistice Agreement states, “Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.” Civil administration includes jurisdiction.
***
He mentions the opening of two areas of the DMZ for inter-Korean cooperation but fails to mention that first, to enable the opening of those two areas, there were two formal “Subsequent Agreements” to the Armistice negotiated and signed by UNCMAC and KPA Panmunjom Mission delegates on 17 November 2000 and 12 September 2002, respectively.
***
The writer mentions bilateral discussions on DMZ management within the Security Consultative Mechanism in 2005 without acknowledging that in 2011, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff signed a joint memorandum reaffirming the ROK military’s adherence to UNC Regulations. In this memorandum, the ROK JCS Chairman and UNC Commander jointly acknowledged the UNC Commander's armistice maintenance authorities and responsibilities as articulated in Armistice Agreement; recognized that armistice maintenance is a continuous, daily responsibility; and affirmed that they will continuously implement and abide by the Armistice Agreement.
***
He mentions a subsequent agreement to the Armistice that guarantees free access for residents and civilians engaged in farming activities within the DMZ, but fails to acknowledge that the agreement was only for two villages: Kijongdong in the North and Daeseongdong in the South.
***
I'm here in case there are any other questions about this stuff, folks.
Does the UN Command have jurisdiction over the DMZ? There's no such provision in the Armistice Agreement.
Kwon Hyuk-cheol's Invisible Security
Kwon Hyuk-cheolreporter
- Last updated 2026-02-08 19:04Registered 2026-02-08 09:00
https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1243837.html I'll read the article for you.
6:37
On May 9, 2018, Joint Security Area (JSA) security guards stand guard at Panmunjom, located on the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone. (Photo by Kim Jin-soo, jsk@hani.co.kr)
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On the 28th of last month, United Nations Command (UNC) officials met with reporters and stated regarding the “Act on the Peaceful Use of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)” (DMZ Act) currently being discussed in the National Assembly, “If the DMZ Act is passed, it will be a head-on collision with the Armistice Agreement.”
On this day, a UN official emphasized, “If the South Korean government allows civilians to enter the DMZ without UN approval, it would be a violation of the Armistice Agreement,” and “According to the Armistice Agreement, jurisdiction over the DMZ south of the Military Demarcation Line lies with the UN Commander, and (this authority) has not changed at all in the past 70 years.”
The Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27, 1953, comprehensively outlined the basic direction for armistice management, but did not specifically stipulate procedures for entering and exiting the DMZ or crossing the Military Demarcation Line. The actual management and operation of the DMZ is governed by United Nations Command regulations. UN Command Regulation 551-4 stipulates, "The Secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission has the authority to approve entry and exit into the southern DMZ under UN Command control."
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The statement released by the United Nations Command on December 16th of last year states that "Article 1, Paragraph 9 of the Armistice Agreement grants jurisdiction to control access to the Demilitarized Zone," but the word "jurisdiction" does not appear in the original text of the Armistice Agreement. The term "military control" appears repeatedly in several provisions of the Armistice Agreement.
A sign near the Cheorwon Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Gangwon Province reads, "The DMZ is under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission." UNC regulations stipulate that this sign marks the Southern Limit Line (SLL) and is to be installed at entrances and exits to the DMZ where the SLL and roads intersect, subject to approval from the UNC Military Armistice Commission Secretariat. (Reporter Kwon Hyuk-cheol)
The UN Command's claim that "jurisdiction over the DMZ lies with the UN Commander and that there has been no change in the past 70 years" is also not true.
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From the signing of the Armistice Agreement in July 1953 until 2000, neither the Military Armistice Commission nor the United Nations Command (UNC) nor North Korea used the term "jurisdiction" for the DMZ. Following the first inter-Korean summit in June 2000, the concepts of "jurisdiction" and "administration" emerged during the process of opening portions of the DMZ and clearing mines to connect the Gyeongui Line railway linking Seoul and Sinuiju, the Munsan-Kaesong road, and the inter-Korean road for Mount Kumgang tourism. The UNC reportedly proposed these concepts first, and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense agreed to them.
At the time, as many civilians entered the DMZ for construction and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, crossing the Military Demarcation Line into North Korea, the issue of access approval arose. To ensure smooth passage, the South Korean government and the United Nations Command (UNC) designated and established certain areas within the DMZ as inter-Korean management zones. The South Korean government approved access and notified the UNC of the final decision, thereby separating management and jurisdiction. While the UNC retained final approval authority, the South Korean government was responsible for actual operation.
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During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, South Korea and the United States had previously negotiated a plan for the South Korean military to assume responsibility for things like DMZ entry and exit authorization from the UNC before the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). The joint statement from the 39th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul in November 2007 stated, "The two Ministers agreed to complete the coordination of armistice management responsibilities between the UNC and the ROK military prior to the transfer of wartime operational control in April 2012, in accordance with the agreed roadmap." A Ministry of National Defense official at the time stated, "By next year (2008), we will identify which tasks the UNC will continue to handle and which tasks will be transferred to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then determine how to transfer these tasks." They added, "The UNC will maintain its authority to manage the armistice, while the ROK military will assume a significant portion of the actual management duties, including access authorization and investigation of incidents and accidents within the DMZ." The coordination of responsibility for armistice management was abandoned as the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations continued to delay the return of wartime operational control.
Last September, the United Nations Command conducted training with the ROK Marine Corps and Coast Guard in the neutral waters of the Han River Estuary. (United Nations Command website)
With the return of wartime operational control (OPCON) becoming more tangible, South Korea and the United States will need to revisit the issue of armistice management, including authorization for entry into the DMZ. The transfer of OPCON is expected to accelerate, as the Donald Trump administration recently announced in its New National Defense Strategy (NDS) that South Korea should assume responsibility for North Korea's conventional military threat. Given the 2007 ROK-US agreement, which agreed to finalize the armistice management coordination between the UN Command and the ROK military prior to the OPCON transfer, the UN Command's recent insistence on DMZ jurisdiction appears jarring.
While civilians are currently prohibited from entering the DMZ, and only military personnel are permitted to do so, the Armistice Agreement allowed South and North Korean residents to engage in farming activities within the DMZ. A supplementary agreement adopted six months after the armistice agreement also guaranteed free access for residents and civilians engaged in agricultural activities within the DMZ.
Before the UN forces oppose the DMZ Act on the grounds that it “denies the UN Commander-in-Chief any authority over who can enter the DMZ and for what purpose,” it is necessary to examine the intent of the Armistice Agreement, which permitted civilians to enter the DMZ for non-military purposes.
4. North Korea opens street for families of soldiers killed in Russia-Ukraine war
Comment: Kim Jong Un is using his support to Putin's War to strengthen his propaganda.
North Korea opens street for families of soldiers killed in Russia-Ukraine war | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Woo Jae-yeon · February 16, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260216001100315
SEOUL, Feb. 16 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has built new homes in Pyongyang for the bereaved family members of North Korean soldiers who died during the Russia-Ukraine war, its state media said Monday.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended the opening ceremony of the new street called Saeppyol Street on Sunday, accompanied by his daughter Ju-ae and other officials.
In his speech at the ceremony, Kim said the new street "has been built thanks to the ardent desire of our motherland that wishes that the precious lives of its excellent sons, who defended the most sacred things by sacrificing their most valuable things, will live forever."
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits Saeppyol Street in Pyongyang, which houses new homes for the bereaved family members of North Korean soldiers who died during the Russia-Ukraine war, on Feb. 15, 2026, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Describing the street as "a source of honor for our generation and a pride of Pyongyang and our state," he said it is for "the bereaved family members of the fallen soldiers and other combatants, as well as the combatants of the regiment of the engineers, who have been dispatched to the overseas military operations."
"The Party and the government will take all necessary steps to ensure that these families lead a proud and worthwhile life while enjoying the preferential treatment by the state and the loving care of the whole society," he added, according to the KCNA.
After delivering the address and cutting the ribbon to mark the completion of the street, he visited the homes of some families to offer comfort.
In August last year, Kim revealed plans to build the town, stressing commemorative services for its deployed soldiers, in an effort to legitimize North Korea's participation in Moscow's war against Ukraine and bolster domestic support.
The report did not reveal how many homes were built for the families.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits one of the homes of the bereaved family of a soldier killed during the Russia-Ukraine war on Feb. 15, 2026, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Woo Jae-yeon · February 16, 2026
5. Army boasts coastal security readiness ahead of Lunar New Year
Comment: Readiness, deterrence, defense.
(Yonhap Feature) Army boasts coastal security readiness ahead of Lunar New Year | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · February 16, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260212011200315
By Kim Hyun-soo
GANGNEUNG, South Korea, Feb. 16 (Yonhap) -- A blurry silhouette of an unidentified vessel emerged on a screen monitoring the east coast near Gangneung, triggering an immediate warning broadcast in the situation room and prompting the commander to order the dispatch of an attack unit.
Monitoring soldiers frantically operated the console to zoom in on the object, successfully confirming its exact location at sea and obtaining a clear image of the vessel within minutes.
The commander, who oversaw the entire operation from the other side of a glass wall, ordered the deployment of a subunit 11 kilometers away to arm and strike the simulated target.
The routine response procedures of the 1st Coastal Security Battalion, affiliated with the Army's 23 Security Brigade, were carried out in an open-to-the-media mock drill Tuesday ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday.
The battalion is tasked with conducting around-the-clock coastal security operations in areas stretching some 40 kilometers across the eastern coastal city of Gangneung.
The rare media event was arranged in a bid to show the unit's watertight readiness and enhanced efficiency after it incorporated all surveillance devices previously set up at guard posts into a single command and control center.
"With the battalion commander now able to control all surveillance assets from the command room, the unit is managing the situation in a comprehensive manner and maintaining a readiness posture capable of immediate response in contingencies," said Lt. Col. Lim Joong Seok, who heads the battalion, told reporters.
This photo, provided by the Army, shows soldiers of the 1st Coastal Security Battalion monitoring the coast area from a command and control center in Gangneung, about 170 kilometers east of Seoul, on Feb. 10, 2026. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The unit is on the lookout for unreported vessels or objects in waters under its jurisdiction using surveillance equipment, such as radars, thermal observation devices (TODs) and surveillance cameras. The surveillance operation continues until the unidentified object is verified by the armed service.
The 1st Coastal Security Battalion is the first among the Army's Ground Operations Command to adopt the new coastal guard system capable of providing surveillance, maneuver and strike capabilities at one go.
The initiative was aimed at restructuring the military to better respond to the declining number of troops by positioning them into a single command center for increased efficiency.
It also strengthened the combat capabilities for the subunits by focusing their tasks on deployment and strike capabilities, and leaving surveillance work for soldiers in the control room.
"The military has greatly increased operational efficiency by operating surveillance forces at the battalion level and strike forces at the coastal company level, in line with future military structural changes," Lim said.
A soldier prepares to fly a surveillance drone at the 1st Coastal Security Battalion in the east coast city of Gangneung on Feb. 10, 2026, in this photo provided by the Army. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · February 16, 2026
6. Lee Jae Myung and Nixon: Divergent Perspectives on Military Oversight
Summary:
South Korea’s Defense Ministry removed the Ground Operations Command commander and the Navy chief from duty and referred them for investigation over alleged “involvement” in last year’s emergency martial law. A task force seeks probes of 110 people, mostly military, and discipline for many, which the author likens to a modern purge. The column argues civilian leaders with limited military experience are driving expansive oversight while South Korea faces over 1 million north Korean troops and tactical nuclear weapons. It recalls Nixon’s response to a U.S. military spying scandal, choosing restraint to avoid a constitutional rupture, and urges Lee Jae Myung to read Nixon’s testimony.
Comment: The danger is sweeping investigations will weaken command effectiveness and civil military trust at a time of external threat.
Lee Jae Myung and Nixon: Divergent Perspectives on Military Oversight
chosun.com · Kang Chun-suk
[Kang Chun-Suk Column] Comparing Martial Law Investigations to Nixon's 'Silent Coup' Response, Highlighting Civilian-Military Tensions
By Kang Chun-suk
Published 2026.02.13. 23:50
Updated 2026.02.14. 22:04
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/02/13/PGN4Y6L4KBDOBKDFR363MINYX4/
On October last year, Chief of Naval Operations Kang Dong-gil speaks during a national audit. The Ministry of National Defense announces on the 13th that he is excluded from his duties due to allegations of involvement in martial law. /Newsis
The Ministry of National Defense excluded the Army general serving as the commander of Ground Operations Command from his duties on the day before yesterday (the 12th) and handed him over to investigative authorities. Yesterday (the 13th), it announced that it would exclude the Navy Chief of Naval Staff (a general) from his duties, proceed with disciplinary measures, and take civil action. Both individuals are suspected of being ‘involved’ in last year’s emergency martial law. The term ‘involved’ is commonly used when someone has not planned or conspired in criminal actions but has had professional or accidental contact with those related to the case. When such incidents occur in authoritarian states like North Korea or China, media in democratic countries often use the term ‘purge.’
The government’s insurrection involvement investigation task force requested an investigation into 110 individuals. Among them, 108 are military personnel. Of the 89 individuals subject to disciplinary requests, 48 are also military personnel. It is said that the military investigation headquarters dedicated to insurrection will continue to expand. The ‘Sahwa (士禍, Korean literati purges)’ of the Joseon Dynasty, which refers to the eradication of talented individuals, must have been like this. This is a modern version of ‘Byeonghwa (兵禍, purge of military officers).’
The commander of Ground Operations Command is tasked with commanding 200,000 frontline Army troops to repel North Korean forces in the event of a provocation. The duties of the Navy Chief of Naval Staff require no explanation. Both individuals were promoted from lieutenant general to general under the Lee Jae Myung administration and appointed to their current positions. The Ground Operations Command commander, who was the 1st Corps commander during the December 3 martial law, did not mobilize troops after the martial law declaration but was criticized for not immediately issuing a return-to-unit order upon receiving a call from a subordinate involved in the martial law. The Navy Chief of Naval Staff, who was the head of the JCS Military Support Headquarters during the martial law, is accused of relaying an order from his superior, the JCS Vice Chairman, to support the formation of the martial law command, to the subordinate martial law section chief.
South Korea is confronting over 1 million North Korean troops armed with dozens of tactical nuclear weapons with a force of less than 500,000. Among the presidents, who are the supreme commanders of the military in such a country, few have served in the military as officers or enlisted personnel. In Israel, one would not even dream of becoming president. President Lee Jae Myung did not serve in the military due to a serious arm injury sustained while working at a factory at a young age. Prime Minister Kim Min-seok did not serve in the military as he was imprisoned for student activism. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back is a former defense soldier with the final rank of private first class.
The military is a special group connected by orders and obedience. Superiors sometimes give unjust orders. However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine what constitutes a just order and what is unjust. To recapture a hill where the enemy has densely planted landmines and deployed multiple machine guns, the attacking side often suffers several times more casualties than the defending side. In such a situation, is the superior’s order to charge the hill justified?
The generation in their 70s and 80s rarely fired a shot while in the military due to a lack of budget for ammunition. After several months, their hands would tremble when placing their fingers on the trigger, making it impossible to aim at targets. This was even more true for artillerymen handling cannons. Soldiers who do not train for several months become civilians, not soldiers. Yet, presidents who did not serve in the military frequently issue orders to halt training, citing inter-Korean relations.
In February 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon (right), the first U.S. president to visit Beijing, China, inspects the honor guard with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Behind Zhou Enlai stands National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, black horn-rimmed glasses. /Newsis
This incident occurred during the presidency of U.S. President Nixon. At the time, Nixon was secretly sending his national security advisor, Kissinger, to China to attempt the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations. The U.S. military was on edge, concerned that the president might make ‘strategic concessions’ to China and the Soviet Union for ‘political gain.’ Around this time, a Navy petty officer first class named Charles Radford was assigned to the most secretive National Security Council (NSC) meeting room in the White House. With his sharp mind and excellent shorthand skills, he immediately caught Kissinger’s attention and became someone the president could recognize by face. He accompanied Kissinger on the secret visit to China.
In fact, he was a military spy sent by the U.S. military to monitor the president and Kissinger. He rummaged through the president’s desk, secretly copied documents from Kissinger’s bag, and sent them to JCS Chairman General Thomas Moorer. Over 13 months, he sent 5,000 documents. His theft was discovered when the White House introduced a wiretapping system to prevent leaks.
The White House viewed the military’s surveillance of the president as a ‘Silent Coup’ and an act of treason. Kissinger advocated for the immediate arrest of the JCS chairman. What decision did Nixon make? The Navy petty officer was transferred to a transport unit in Oregon, and the Navy rear admiral who had been supporting the petty officer within the NSC was sent to a remote location. A messenger was sent to inform General Moorer that the White House had uncovered the incident. Moorer was not dismissed but allowed to complete his term.
Nixon explained to his key staff that the reason was to “protect the honor of the military and avoid creating a constitutional source of discord between the president and the military.” A few days ago, “The New York Times” reported that the seven-page testimony in which Nixon detailed the entire incident remains unsealed, still enclosed in an envelope. President Lee Jae Myung should read it once.
chosun.com · Kang Chun-suk
7. What Colby’s Northeast Asia Tour Tells Us About the Future of Japan-Korea-US Trilateral Deterrence
Summary:
Colby’s late-January stops in South Korea and Japan signaled a harder U.S. line in the Asia-Indo-Pacific: deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain, backed by allies who pay more and field more. The piece argues trilateral deterrence now hinges less on shared values and more on practical, interoperable capability and political will. Seoul and Tokyo are modernizing, tightening command-and-control ties, and resuming cooperative drills, but Taiwan remains the quiet fault line. If Washington stays ambiguous on Taiwan, denial loses speed and credibility. Legitimacy and readiness, not rhetoric, must be the alliance’s center.
Excerpts:
The maturation of Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral security cooperation depends on coordinated efforts that reinforce both operational effectiveness and political legitimacy in pursuit of Colby’s and the National Defense Strategy’s vision of a “decent peace” with Beijing. As Seoul and Tokyo move toward deeper military cooperation, Washington gains greater flexibility to manage its alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific and encourage its allies to move beyond their current roles in support of a collective defense.
In this sense, a successful deterrence-by-denial strategy along the FIC hinges on legitimacy – anchored in Seoul’s regional buy-in, Tokyo’s sustained resolve, and Washington’s continued leadership.
Comment: Trilateral cooperation is being reframed as an operational problem set, not a historical reconciliation project. Taiwan contingency planning is implicitly required, even when it is not named. “Fair share” is becoming a test of alliance seriousness, not a slogan.
Will CBMLS - "critical but more limited support" strengthen or weaken alliances and trilateral cooperation? What signal does BMLS send to the PRC as well as our friends, partners, and allies? Are they interpreting the "Colby Code" as a reduction in US assurance and resolve?
What Colby’s Northeast Asia Tour Tells Us About the Future of Japan-Korea-US Trilateral Deterrence
Colby’s visits to South Korea and Japan served to reinforce the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific vision, in which allies’ shoulder “their fair share” of collective defense.
By David Dichoso
February 13, 2026
https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/what-colbys-northeast-asia-tour-tells-us-about-the-future-of-japan-korea-us-trilateral-deterrence/
U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby (middle), gathers for a meeting with Tri-Command senior leaders at the United States Forces Korea Headquarters on Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Jan. 26, 2026.
Credit: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Daniela Lechuga Liggio
In the last week of January, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby visited South Korea and Japan, Washington’s two most important allies in the Indo-Pacific. His trip came directly after the release of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), which emphasized “deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain (FIC)” and a renewed focus on “Peace through Strength,” calling the United States’ allies and partners to take greater responsibility for their own defense.
As China’s revisionist expansion destabilizes the regional order and heightens the risk of a Taiwan contingency, expanding Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula will be essential to demonstrate the collective resolve needed to uphold the balance of power emphasized by the NDS. As such, Colby’s visit to both South Korea and Japan was not merely symbolic. Rather, his trip served to reinforce the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific vision, in which allies’ shoulder “their fair share” of collective defense.
A collective defense for the Indo-Pacific requires not only credible militaries but also the political will to accept shared strategic risks. A clear demonstration of capability and resolve by Seoul and Tokyo can extend their deterrence without overcommitting U.S forces. With strong economies and rapidly modernizing conventional military capabilities, South Korea and Japan are uniquely positioned to anchor Washington’s efforts to deter China’s attempt to gain regional hegemony – provided they continue to translate coordination into operational practice. Thus far, both Seoul and Tokyo are echoing this priority and signaling their resolve to work closely with Washington.
At last October’s South Korea-U.S. Summit, U.S. President Donald Trump welcomed President Lee Jae-myung’s commitments to strengthen South Korea’s military capabilities, raise defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, attain the capacity to hold operational control of its forces, and pursue greater strategic autonomy. Japan has similarly advanced defense reforms, with Defense Minister Koizumi Shinjiro outlining plans to revise the National Security Strategy, deepen Japan-U.S. command-and-control integration, and expand alliance training in Japan’s southwestern region in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, following Japan’s achievement of its initial defense spending goal.
Beyond these parallel reforms, deepening security ties between Seoul and Tokyo signal a mutual interest in closer cooperation and growing autonomy within their alliances with Washington. Just ahead of Koizumi’s meeting with South Korea’s Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back in Yokosuka, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) provided refueling and logistical support to a South Korean Air Force C-130 and its Black Eagles aerobatic team, marking the first such logistical support between the two militaries following Tokyo’s earlier refusal to do so. Substantively, both ministers agreed to expand people-to-people and troop exchanges between their forces and to resume their search-and-rescue exercises (SAREX), paving the way for Seoul and Tokyo to move past historical grievances that have long constrained efforts advancing their military cooperation.
These evolving defense postures in Seoul and Tokyo align with the core theory of the NDS’s “flexible realism” – self-reliant allies and partners who contribute equitably and strategically coordinate around shared interests. Colby articulated the logic in remarks at the Sejong Institute in Seoul, where he praised the country as a “model ally” and lauded its efforts in defense spending. Additionally, Colby noted that deterrence by denial emphasizes making aggression infeasible by denying adversaries quick or decisive military gains, and that the focus should be on a modernized force along the FIC that is in shared pursuit of peace and stability.
For Seoul and Tokyo, this means Washington expects them to continue investing in resilient, interoperable, and forward-positioned conventional capabilities that directly contribute to a stable balance of power and deny China regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Even while remaining their security guarantor, Washington can enable Japan and South Korea’s domestic development, strengthen allied defense industrial bases, and integrate ISR capabilities that reinforce early-warning and information-sharing architectures. Therefore, it is important that Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington align their national security interests to give flexibility to both alliances.
While the deterrence-by-denial strategy hinges on the unequivocal integration of South Korea and Japan into U.S. alliance structures, continued ambiguity about whether Washington would defend Taiwan risks delaying the rapid, decisive action such a strategy requires. Given Taiwan’s position at the center of the FIC, denying China “quick or decisive gains through military force” inherently implies allied intervention in a Taiwan contingency.
Although Seoul and Tokyo’s pursuit of greater self-reliance signals progress toward burden-sharing, the ambiguity surrounding support for U.S. action in a Taiwan defense scenario undermines the NDS’s denial strategy by reducing the speed, cohesion, and legitimacy required for an effective trilateral response should deterrence fail.
Reinvigorated Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral security cooperation offers Washington a practical way to translate aligned strategic priorities into operational readiness under a deterrence-by-denial framework along the FIC, even amid sensitivities surrounding Taiwan. Because the NDS omits Taiwan as a central element, Washington must further operationalize trilateral cooperation through the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework, including standing dialogues, exercises such as Freedom Edge, and enhanced information-sharing. Doing so would align regional objectives, reduce political friction, and signal to Seoul and Tokyo that a free and open Indo-Pacific is inseparable from stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The maturation of Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral security cooperation depends on coordinated efforts that reinforce both operational effectiveness and political legitimacy in pursuit of Colby’s and the National Defense Strategy’s vision of a “decent peace” with Beijing. As Seoul and Tokyo move toward deeper military cooperation, Washington gains greater flexibility to manage its alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific and encourage its allies to move beyond their current roles in support of a collective defense.
In this sense, a successful deterrence-by-denial strategy along the FIC hinges on legitimacy – anchored in Seoul’s regional buy-in, Tokyo’s sustained resolve, and Washington’s continued leadership.
Authors
Guest Author
David Dichoso
David Dichoso is a research intern at Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (IIPS). He formerly served in the U.S. Army and has served in Okinawa, Japan.
8. Why Kim Ju Ae’s Path to Power Is Structurally Blocked
Summary:
The essay argues Kim Ju Ae’s public elevation is theater, not succession. In north Korea’s neo-Confucian, military-first monarchy, legitimacy is coded male, and the aging security elite is structurally disinclined to swear life-and-death loyalty to a young woman. The piece suggests her visibility may mask a “hidden prince” groomed offstage, while she serves as a symbolic shield that draws scrutiny and absorbs intra-elite jealousy. If Kim Jong Un exits early, the author judges her patronage base and coercive credentials too thin, inviting a stabilizing grab by Kim Yo Jong or other power brokers.
Comment: More speculation on succession with some interesting analysis here. Succession signaling may be designed to confuse external intelligence while managing internal factions.
Regime “stability” incentives favor a proven enforcer over a youthful symbolic heir.
Questions for Korea watchers, and intelligence analysts:
What observable indicators would distinguish a real succession plan from deliberate misdirection?
If a hidden male heir exists, what problem does Kim Ju Ae solve that a quieter transition cannot?
In a sudden transition, who controls the military, nuclear weapons, the party files (within the OGD) and the money, and why would they accept a young ruler?
Why Kim Ju Ae’s Path to Power Is Structurally Blocked
Rigid patriarchy, the necessity of a male heir, and the threat of internal rivals ensure that the “Princess of Pyongyang” will remain a symbolic placeholder rather than a viable sovereign.
By Mitch Shin
February 16, 2026
https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/why-kim-ju-aes-path-to-power-is-structurally-blocked/
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae attend a ceremony marking the completion of the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, Wonsan, North Korea, June 24, 2025.
Credit: KCNA
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) recently told lawmakers in the National Assembly that Kim Ju Ae, the pre-teen daughter of North Korea’s autocratic leader Kim Jong Un, is being groomed as his successor.
Since her public debut at an intercontinental ballistic missile launch site in 2022, Kim Ju Ae has evolved from a “beloved child” to a “respected” figure in North Korean state media. The North’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency released multiple reports showing Kim Ju Ae escorted by senior military elites while battle-hardened generals offered formal salutes.
However, beneath this meticulously staged theater of loyalty lies a fundamental contradiction. In the secretive halls of Pyongyang, visibility does not equal viability. Even if Kim Jong Un is fully committed to passing the mantle to his daughter, he is fighting against the structural DNA of a regime that may prove more powerful than his own will.
To understand why Kim Ju Ae is unlikely to ever truly rule, one must look past the propaganda and into the brutal realities of North Korean power dynamics, gender politics, and the inevitable shadow of a hidden male heir.
A Neo-Confucian Monarchy in a Nuclear Age
The most immediate and insurmountable barricade for Kim Ju Ae is the deeply ingrained patriarchal nature of North Korea. Despite its “socialist” label, North Korea functions as a Neo-Confucian monarchy – a direct spiritual and structural successor to the Joseon Dynasty. In this system, the “Suryong” (the Supreme Leader) is not just a political head but the ultimate patriarch of a national family. Legitimacy in this framework is inextricably tied to a warrior-king archetype.
The North Korean power elite – the generals who control the nuclear silos and the party stalwarts who manage the secret police – is composed of aging hardliners who have spent decades navigating a strictly male-dominated hierarchy. For these men, many in their 60s and 70s, the concept of swearing absolute and life-and-death loyalty to a young woman is more than a cultural shift. It is a structural anomaly that threatens the internal logic of the regime.
Expecting the North Korean military brass to provide the same fervent loyalty to a teenage girl as they would to a male heir ignores the fundamental gender politics that have sustained the Kim family for three generations. In the world’s most militarized state, the leader must project “Songun” (Military First) authority, a role the military brass is historically and culturally unprepared to grant to a female youth.
While Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, has wielded immense power, even becoming the regime’s main voice on inter-Korean relations, she has notably operated as a shadow enforcer. Kim Yo Jong is a protector of the throne rather than its occupant. She is respected only as long as she acts as the voice of her brother.
This masculine iron ceiling is further reinforced by the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System,” which demands absolute obedience to a leader who embodies military command. For Kim Ju Ae to transcend this, Kim Jong Un would have to dismantle the very cultural foundations that keep his generals in line – a risk that could destabilize his own grip on power.
The Biological Smokescreen and the Strategic Logic of the Hidden Prince
The timing of Kim Ju Ae’s debut also defies the historical logic of the Kim dynasty. Traditionally, a successor is introduced when the incumbent leader faces a decline in health or an urgent need for transition. While Kim Jong Un is at the height of his power, crowning a successor too early may create a second sun in the sky, potentially diluting the incumbent’s absolute authority and creating factions within the elite.
In other words, Kim Ju Ae’s emergence is not an immediate coronation but a sophisticated strategic diversion. By placing his daughter in the spotlight, Kim Jong Un may be using her as a human shield. She absorbs the world’s scrutiny and the internal jealousy of the elite, allowing the real male successor – Kim Jong Un’s long-rumored oldest child – to be groomed in total secrecy. In this way, his son can be shielded from the prying eyes of international intelligence.
This biological imperative is rooted in Kim Jong Un’s own ruthless history. He is the one who ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, and the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, to ensure that no rival to the male “Paektu Bloodline” could exist. For him, power must be passed through a son to maintain its “masculine” purity in the eyes of his generals.
Even if Kim currently lacks a son to rule, the internal logic of the regime dictates that he would go to any length to produce one. To Kim Jong Un, a daughter is a valuable tool for propaganda and family stability, but a son is the only legitimate vessel for the survival of the state.
If Kim remains in power for another two decades, a seamless pivot will likely occur: the so-called hidden prince will be introduced as the true military genius, while Kim Ju Ae is reassigned as his loyal protector managing the administrative and emotional optics of the dynasty as the next Kim Yo Jong.
The Prospect of a Palace Coup
The most explosive scenario involves what happens if Kim Jong Un exits the stage prematurely. Even if Kim truly intends to hand over power to Kim Ju Ae, her survival in the post-Kim era is a statistical improbability. Should Kim die within the next decade, a 20-something Kim Ju Ae would be left in a perilous power vacuum without an established patronage network or military credentials. In this instance, the most formidable threat would be her own aunt: Kim Yo Jong.
Possessing the political gravity, the “bloodline” authority and the proven ruthlessness that Kim Ju Ae lacks, Kim Yo Jong would likely leverage her influence over the security apparatus and potential backing from pro-China factions to spearhead a coup. To the North Korean elite, Kim Yo Jong represents a known quantity and a seasoned enforcer who can maintain the status quo. In a choice between an untested teenage girl and a battle-hardened aunt who has already served as the de facto second-in-command, the military brass will almost certainly back Kim Yo Jong.
Kim Ju Ae would be seen as a symbol of a weak era to be purged in favor of a more traditional or established alternative. This internal struggle would be further complicated by external factors. Prioritizing stability above all, China would likely support a seasoned enforcer like Kim Yo Jong or a pro-Beijing male figure in the North’s military over the uncertainty of a teenage ruler.
Ultimately, the elevation of Kim Ju Ae is a masterpiece of North Korean political theater, not a definitive coronation. In a world governed by old men, bayonets, and Neo-Confucian shadows, the intent of a father cannot override the structural DNA of the regime. Kim Ju Ae may currently hold the world’s gaze but she is a placeholder in a system that only recognizes a king.
Whether by a palace coup led by an ambitious aunt or a tactical pivot to a hidden prince, the path to the supreme seat remains firmly barred to Kim Ju Ae. She is the face of the dynasty’s future, but the heavy crown of the Suryong will likely never rest upon her head.
Authors
Contributing Author
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula. He is also a non-resident research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies and associate fellow for the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
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9. Korea goes adrift in processing legislation of US investment
Summary:
South Korea is struggling to pass the legislation tied to its $350 billion U.S. investment pledge, as a new National Assembly committee meant to fast-track the bills is already bogged down in partisan dispute. The delay matters because Washington has warned it could restore a 25% tariff on Korean imports, up from 15%, if ratification of the November 2025 deal keeps slipping. Separately, Seoul’s aggressive probe of Coupang after a major data breach now risks becoming a political irritant in Washington, with its interim CEO slated to face U.S. lawmakers.
Comment: POTUS can use legislative drift and the Coupang dispute as mutually reinforcing leverage for a tariff squeeze. Even if tariffs do not rise, uncertainty alone can chill investment and compress Korean exporters’ margins. Seoul’s core vulnerability is political throughput: economic promises are only as credible as its domestic ability to execute them on time.
Is this a good situation for the ROK/US alliance?
Korea goes adrift in processing legislation of US investment
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By Lee Min-hyung
- Published Feb 16, 2026 2:55 pm KST
Coupang risk feared to cast impact on possible tariff hike
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20260216/korea-goes-adrift-in-processing-legislation-of-us-investment
U.S. President Donald Trump gestures as he boards Air Force One at Pope Army Airfield, in Fort Bragg, N.C., Feb. 13, en route to Palm Beach, Fla. AP-Yonhap
Korea faces mounting uncertainty over the timely passage of legislation required to implement its $350 billion investment pledge in the United States, as partisan rancor in the National Assembly shows little sign of letting up.
Last week, Seoul launched a special Assembly committee tasked with shepherding the legislation amid mounting trade pressure from Washington.
The U.S. has warned it could reinstate a 25 percent tariff on Korean imports, up from the current 15 percent, citing delays in Seoul’s ratification of a bilateral trade agreement clinched in November 2025.
The committee is mandated to operate for one month through March 9, with the stated goal of securing passage within that timeframe.
However, the committee’s inaugural meeting Thursday was cut short by a bipartisan dispute, which fuels concerns that the political polarization will continue to impede progress of upcoming meetings. With the legislative clock ticking, the prospect of a timely breakthrough remains unclear.
A reversion to the 25 percent tariff would pose a material risk to Korea’s export-driven economy. Major manufacturers, including Hyundai Motor Group, still remain heavily reliant on the U.S. market. The trade risk could weigh on corporate earnings, dampen investor sentiment and undermine broader economic stability here.
Compounding concerns is a separate but potentially consequential issue involving Coupang, the Seattle-headquartered e-commerce company whose principal operations are in Korea.
Coupang interim CEO Harold Rogers appears for questioning by police in Seoul, Feb. 6. Yonhap
The firm has come under intense scrutiny from Korean authorities following a large-scale data breach. Its interim CEO Harold Rogers has faced repeated questioning by police and lawmakers over the company’s handling of the incident.
The issue has drawn attention in Washington. Some members of U.S. Congress have called Seoul’s investigation as “discriminatory attacks” on an American tech firm. Rogers is scheduled to testify Feb. 23 before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee where he is expected to address his treatment during the Korean probe.
The Trump administration, which has consistently championed an “America First” trade posture, could interpret any adverse testimony as further justification for tightening trade measures, such as the tariff hike, against Korea.
While the Korean government maintains that the Coupang investigation and tariff issue are separate matters, market observers said the issues may become intertwined from the viewpoint of U.S. policymakers.
“Rogers’ upcoming testimony could generate negative sentiment toward Korea in the U.S., potentially influencing deliberations over tariff levels,” an industry official said. “There appears to be a perceptual gap between Seoul and Washington regarding the Coupang case.”
The auto industry here will be the largest victim, once the U.S. ends up reinstating the tariff to 25 percent. Hyundai Motor and Kia would face a combined cost of some 11 trillion won under the scenario, according to data from Daol Investment & Securities. The possible tariff hike will also deal a severe blow to local tiremakers and multiple auto parts makers.
10. Omotenashi Barefoot Hospitality: A new paradigm for Korea-Japan relations
Summary:
Nohsok Choi argues that the January Lee Jae Myung–Takaichi summit in Nara used “Omotenashi” as statecraft, and that the tone of personal warmth can unlock hard outcomes. He cites a protocol-breaking welcome, a shared drum moment, and a deal to pursue joint DNA identification of Korean victims at the Chosei coal mine as proof that symbolism can move stalled issues. He then shifts to the engine room: private-sector exchange, youth mobility, tourism, visas, and improving mutual favorability. His thesis is simple. Civilian ties can stabilize the relationship even as security politics sharpen, if both sides treat each other as equals.
Voices Feb. 14, 2026 / 2:18 PM
Omotenashi Barefoot Hospitality: A new paradigm for Korea-Japan relations
By Nohsok Choi
upi.com
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/14/hospitality-diplomacy-myung-takaichi-japan/7111771090744/
Feb. 14 (UPI) -- SEOUL -- The atmosphere of supreme hospitality displayed between President Lee Jae Myung and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in January is poised to further energize both diplomatic ties and private-sector exchanges.
This follows Takaichi's landslide victory in the lower house election on Jan. 9, where the Liberal Democratic Party established a "one-strong" dominance -- the largest post-war victory -- signaling a period of sustained leadership.
This political stability is naturally expected to deepen the "New Era of Korea-Japan Relations" and accelerate the private-sector exchanges agreed upon at the summit, with a particular emphasis on the youth and adolescent generations.
At the summit held last month in Nara, the Prime Minister's hometown, Japan's "Omotenashi" diplomacy became a central theme.
In an unprecedented breach of protocol, Takaichi personally greeted Lee at the hotel entrance. This Omotenashi -- the essence of wholehearted, selfless hospitality -- was further symbolized by the two leaders' impromptu drum performance.
This rapport broke a long-standing deadlock, leading to a breakthrough agreement on the joint DNA identification of Korean victims at Japan's Chosei coal mine.
The warm encounter catalyzed a comprehensive agreement to expand the scope of all-encompassing private-sector exchanges, specifically targeting:
- Economic, industrial, cultural, and sports sectors;
- Strengthening education and professional talent development;
- Reinforcing institutional support and foundational infrastructure;
- The quantitative and qualitative expansion of exchange programs for future generations.
As a result, the two nations have begun constructing a future of reconciliation rather than conflict, fostering an unprecedented climate of cooperation.
This cooperative spirit has long been brewing beneath the surface across various sectors and has now reached a substantive inflection point under the leadership of the two heads of state.
Amid speculation that the LDP's landslide victory could lead to constitutional revision and a more "war-capable" Japan, critics warn of rising regional tensions, while supporters call it a normalization of defense policy. Whatever the outcome of that debate, long-term stability may depend as much on civilian exchange as on security policy.
With that in mind, I asked an AI to recommend restaurants in the Gyeongbokgung Palace area run by Japanese chefs. The results cascaded in an endless stream; among the numerous recommendations, establishments such as "Seochon Nuha-no-mori" appeared instantly.
If such a vibrant Japanese culinary presence exists in just one specific area, the scale of integration nationwide must be immense. Witnessing this atmosphere, I found hope that if the various summit agreements move beyond declarations into actual operation, they will broaden mutual understanding and lead to substantive cooperation.
This is a hope that we will transition into a true New Era that overcomes past conflicts and brings mutual benefits -- not only for the present but for our children, daughters, and grandchildren.
Private-sector exchanges support this hope.
In 2025, bilateral travel reached 13 million visitors. Notably, approximately 9.5 million Koreans visited Japan -- a 7.3% increase from 2024 -- making Koreans the top group of visitors to Japan.
Meanwhile, about 3.2 million Japanese visited Korea, ranking second among all foreign visitors to Korea in 2025. Citizens of both nations are already visiting not just Seoul and Tokyo, but rural corners of both countries, expanding the scope of exchange by understanding each other's culture and lifestyles.
Moreover, the number of youth from both countries seeking employment or study abroad is surging. According to South Korean Ministry of Justice statistics, Japanese nationals residing in Korea on long-term visas reached 28,911 as of October 2025, a 12.6% increase compared to the same month of the previous year.
Specifically, as of October 2025 and compared to October 2019, those on E-7 (specialized occupation) visas rose by 37.7%, while C-4 (short-term employment) rose by 384% and D-4 (job-seeking) visas surged by 484%.
This indicates that a reciprocal "import of talent" from Japan has begun. This trend is particularly remarkable because it is occurring despite Japan's university graduate employment rate reaching 98.1% in 2025, suggesting it is driven by a genuine rise in mutual affinity.
An October 2025 survey showed Japanese favorability toward Korea reached 42.2%, doubling in the seven years since the first survey in 2018 found it at 20%, the South Korea Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism reported.
Conversely, a survey by Japan's Shinbun Tsushin Chosakai showed Korean favorability toward Japan reached 56.4% in 2025, exceeding 50% for the first time since the survey began in 2014.
Crucially, with Korea's per capita GNI ($36,914) surpassing Japan's ($35,793), according to the Bank of Korea's 2025 announcement, the two nations can interact from a position of economic parity.
This equality serves as a vital safeguard -- even if Japan undergoes a constitutional transformation, the risk of mutual conflict is significantly mitigated when both nations engage as equal stakeholders.
I propose that we further deepen this paradigm of cooperation over conflict by harmonizing Japan's meticulous Omotenashi with Korea's traditional "Barefoot Hospitality": The profound, unbridled warmth of rushing out to greet a guest with such overwhelming joy that one forgets to even put on shoes.
Nohsok Choi is the former chief editor of the Kyunghyang Shinmun and former Pariscorrespondent. He currently serves as president of the Kyunghyang Shinmun Alumni3Association, President of the Korean Media & Culture Forum, and CEO of the YouTubechannel One World TV.
Pride flag returns to Stonewall National Monument
Supporters watch as local politicians and others raise an LGBTQ+ pride flag at the Stonewall National Monument in New York City on February 12, 2026. Photo by John Angelillo/UPI | License Photo
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11. How eager should we be to reopen dialogue with North Korea?
Summary:
Michael Breen asks how hard South Korea should push to restart talks with north Korea after Kim Yo Jong offered faint praise for Seoul’s “regret” over alleged civilian drone incursions, then warned of a “terrible response” if it happens again. He frames the debate as South Korea’s core left-right divide: bend to enable dialogue, or wait for tangible returns. Breen admits he has shifted over time, from Churchillian faith in talking to cynicism about cash and concessions, and now doubts the upside after decades of failure. He warns eagerness can erode democratic principles and due process.
Comment: Good insights from Michael. Another question: How eager is KJU?
How eager should we be to reopen dialogue with North Korea?
By Michael Breen
- Published Feb 16, 2026 1:50 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260216/how-eager-should-we-be-to-reopen-dialogue-with-north-korea
How important is it to do whatever we can to get talks going again with North Korea?
I ask because Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of Kim Jong-un, said something vaguely nice last week and a lot of people seem to be feeling warm and fuzzy and a wee bit excited about it.
The prioritizing of dialogue is a profound question because it goes to the heart of what divides the political left and right in democratic South Korea. Strip away the labels, park the pet issues and put aside whatever image you have of a particular politician, and this is the hinge upon which our democratic politics swings.
If you believe dialogue is essential and that we should bend almost any which way to facilitate it, you are on the left. If you believe dialogue can wait until we are likely to get something tangible out of it, you are on the right.
It doesn’t matter what your economic prescription is, or what you think about same-sex marriage or climate change. In this country, on this question, it really is that simple.
Like most people, I’m a confused soul. I have flip-flopped on this dialogue thing over the years. I used to quote Winston Churchill in arguments with right wingers who favored the big stick approach and say, “Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war.”
After Kim Jong-il reneged on his promise to come to a summit in Seoul, I changed my mind. Of course, I realized that Kim, the "Guiding Star of the 21st Century" couldn’t come here. The myth of the workers’ paradise would have popped like a mouthful of bubblegum.
I still favored jaw to jaw, but more as a cynical tactic to keep them tied up and expecting cash under the table, something we have to watch out with our politicians.
But given the total lack of progress in 80 years, you have to wonder: What exactly is the upside in being so eager?
This week’s comments from Kim Yo-jong have revived that familiar dilemma. She was responding to Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s expression of “deep regret” over drone incursions into the North — apparently by civilians on our side. His statement was “quite sensible behavior” and “fortunate,” she said.
Then she wagged her finger, like a school principal dressing down a naughty boy, and warned that any recurrence would “provoke a terrible response.”
Some commentators see her remarks as a positive signal, a small opening in a relationship frozen by the North’s rejection of reunification. The administration of President Lee Jae Myung is clearly trying to create conditions conducive to dialogue.
But here is where the core question returns: How far should we go in manufacturing those conditions?
I ask because in this country, reunification is a sacred national task. It is held so dear that we risk forgetting our principles. The issue of the North has been used to justify some bad stuff. It was the pretext authoritarians on the right once used to withhold democratic rights and crush dissent. It has also served at times as an excuse for those on the left to sidestep democratic principles and ignore individual rights.
Two administrations ago, for example, two North Korean fishermen accused of murder were rapidly deported back to the North against their will and without even a trial here to establish guilt. Why? To curry favor and reopen dialogue with you-know-who.
You will recall that those drone operators violating North Korea airspace were apparently civilians. The government’s expression of “deep regret” over their “reckless” behavior felt pathetic to many people. Minister Chung missed a chance to make the simple democratic point to his thuggish counterparts that while our government safeguards individual rights, those rights exist within the framework of the law, and violations are handled through due process.
Why adopt a posture that appears fawning? Is it simply the perennial temptation to restart talks, even if they ultimately lead nowhere?
Don’t get me wrong, I am in favor of dialogue — especially if it can, over time, force open the North’s window.
It’s just that I don’t think we should be quite so eager. I suppose that means that, this week at least, I find myself on the right.
Michael Breen (mike.breen@insightcomms.com) is the author of "The New Koreans.” The views expressed here are his own.
12. [Lee Byung-jong] Korea's Demilitarized Zone
Summary:
Lee Byung-jong argues the DMZ is becoming an alliance friction point, not only a Korea versus north Korea front line. Seoul wants more access and a bigger voice in DMZ management for sovereignty and “peaceful use,” while the U.S.-led UN Command insists the 1953 Armistice requires unified control to prevent miscalculation. Under President Lee Jae Myung, the issue sharpened after South Korean officials were reportedly denied entry and lawmakers advanced a DMZ access law. UNC warned the bill could undermine the armistice system. The piece links this dispute to wartime OPCON transfer and alliance equality debates.
Comment: We must keep in mind that this alliance friction is exactly the condition Kim Jong Un is trying to drive with his political warfare strategy. The regime has long focused on undermining UNC and armistice legitimacy as the path to driving a wedge in the alliance. Both the US and the ROK need to keep this in mind as they work through issues.
[Lee Byung-jong] Korea's Demilitarized Zone
koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · February 13, 2026
https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10675887
Korea's Demilitarized Zone is supposed to be a point of confrontation between South Korea and North Korea. Increasingly, however, it is becoming a flash point between South Korea and the United States — the blood allies forged through the Korean War.
South Korea wants a greater say in its management, while the US insists on maintaining full control of the border as mandated by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. For Seoul, the issue is one of national pride and state sovereignty; for Washington, it is about ensuring stability through unified control.
The issue has existed for years, but since the arrival of President Lee Jae Myung's liberal and nationalistic government last June, it has resurfaced with renewed intensity. Late last year, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young complained that the US-led United Nations Command, which has jurisdiction over the DMZ, denied high-ranking South Korean officials access to the area.
"As a sovereign state, it is humiliating to be denied access to our own territory," Chung lamented. Since then, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea has moved to enact the Law on the Peaceful Use of the DMZ, which would make it easier for Seoul to access the area for nonmilitary purposes such as cultural, environmental or ecological events.
In response, the UNC issued an unusually strong statement last month opposing the bill, arguing that it would violate the armistice agreement and "undermine the armistice system."
The agreement — signed by the United Nations, China and North Korea after three years of war, without South Korea's participation — grants full control of the southern side of the DMZ to the UNC. The command has long maintained that the armistice system and its unified control of the DMZ have been instrumental in preserving relative peace in the area. It warns that fragmented control could complicate coordination and increase the risk of accidental clashes between the two Koreas.
The DMZ is one of the most dangerous places in the world. More than a million heavily armed troops are deployed along the border, as well as thousands of artillery pieces and other heavy weapons. Millions of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are also planted in the supposedly weapons-free zone. There have been a series of skirmishes over the decades, resulting in casualties, though none escalated into full-scale conflict. Most notably, two US officers were killed by ax-wielding North Korean soldiers in 1976 inside the Joint Security Area. Several underground tunnels dug by North Korea for surprise infiltrations have also been discovered along the border.
For Seoul's reconciliation-minded government, however, the DMZ represents a space where the two Koreas can reconnect through exchange and cooperation. The historic summit between President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018 at the truce village — followed by Kim's meeting with President Donald Trump there the following year — symbolized the DMZ's peace potential. Under previous liberal administrations in Seoul, a range of cooperative projects, including ceremonies marking the reconnection of railroads, were held in the area.
In this sense, the debate is not merely about the management of a 4-kilometer-wide, 248-kilometer-long strip of land. It reflects a broader and more consequential disagreement between Seoul and Washington over the future of their 75-year-old alliance. Having long operated as the junior partner, South Korea increasingly believes it is time for a more equal partnership in matters concerning the peninsula's security.
The issue is closely tied to the larger question of transferring wartime operational control of the joint forces from the US-led command to the South Korean military. South Korea already exercises operational control in peacetime, and the two sides have agreed in principle to transfer wartime control once South Korea's military capabilities are deemed sufficient. The Lee government now wants to accelerate this transfer to reduce its dependence on Washington.
Conservatives in Seoul, along with some in Washington, argue that advancing the transfer would be unwise given the superior capabilities of the US military and the rapid advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. They question whether South Korea is fully prepared to assume wartime control and contend that maintaining the current structure allows for more effective US nuclear deterrence. In this view, the issue is increasingly framed as a choice between sovereignty-driven autonomy and security-based pragmatism.
Ironically, President Lee's government has made "pragmatic diplomacy" its top foreign policy priority. Under that banner, South Korea has repaired strained ties with Japan and worked closely with Washington on security and other issues. Yet the renewed push for greater control over the DMZ appears to sit uneasily with that approach.
If Seoul's demands are met, they would bolster national pride and dignity as a sovereign state. At the same time, they could risk undermining border stability by increasing the possibility of unintended clashes. A truly pragmatic approach, therefore, would be for Seoul to pursue incremental adjustments to DMZ governance rather than attempting to dismantle the armistice framework that has prevented another war on the Korean Peninsula for seven decades.
Lee Byung-jong
Lee Byung-jong is a former Seoul correspondent for Newsweek, The Associated Press and Bloomberg News. He is a professor at the School of Global Service at Sookmyung Women's University in Seoul. The views expressed here are the writer's own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · February 13, 2026
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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