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Quotes of the Day:
“Listen, I've got something very obvious to tell you. You're not allowed to give up. If they decide to kill me, it means that we are incredibly strong.”
– Alexei Navalny.
"When someone asked Abraham Lincoln, after he was elected president, what he was going to do about his enemies, he replied, 'I am going to destroy them. I am going to make them my friends.' "
– Abraham Lincoln
"The best things and best people rise out of their separateness; I'm against a homogenized society because I want the cream to rise."
– Robert Frost
1. North Korea: An Interesting Start to 2024
2. N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over aerial surveillance
3. Why N Korea no longer wants to reunite with the South
4. Short film about army life depicts North Korea’s caste system
5. North Korean KN-24 missile leaves huge crater in Bucha district
6. Kim Jong Un’s military threats put U.S. on edge
7. South Koreans Blame Feminism For Demographic Collapse – Analysis
8. Kim Jong Un draws red line at sea, renews promise to fire on South Korean ship 'that violates even 0.001mm'
9. U.S. lawmaker stresses Congress' 'long-term' commitments to S. Korea regardless of who's in White House
10. Russia & North Korea Increase Weapons Exchanges, Missile Sharing
11. Interview: “North Korean workers in China are angry, and things are no better back home”
12. Do not be discouraged by Kim Jong-un's unification statements
1. North Korea: An Interesting Start to 2024
Kim needs the threat from the South to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north while Kim prioritizes nuclear weapon and missile development. It also is necessary to cover up his failed promise of bringing peace and prosperity when his nuclear weapons and missiles were fielded. His regional development policy is already a failure even as it starts. But I do think we are placing too much emphasis on his daughter, It may be Kim deliberately creating a distraction.
Excerpts:
An excessive emphasis on a military buildup will impose new sacrifices on North Korean living standards. Kim Jong Un has acknowledged that “the reality is that even the simple needs of the people cannot be satisfied,” urging for improvements with regard to the food problem. Of particular note is his clarification of the policy for correcting the disparities between the capital Pyongyang and the provinces. Successive North Korean leaders have invested intensively in the capital to the extent that it is often ridiculed by foreigners as a “show window.” Kim’s own inspection visits are also biased toward Pyongyang, but for some reason, he has now begun to raise the issue of regional disparities, pointing out that “we absolutely cannot ignore them.”
A new proposal has been put forward in the “Local development 20×10 policy,” which will promote the construction of local industry factories in 20 counties over 10 years. The name is quite catchy, not always the case in North Korea. The contents of Kim Jong Un’s remarks indicate that he is quite serious about this plan, but there is naturally a limit to such grand plans in the absence of any prospect of the severe economic sanctions being lifted. Still, it’s a worthwhile policy for Kim to look now to regional economies, after so many years of neglect.
For Kim Jong Un, whose number one aim is to perpetuate the regime, what matters most may be his “beloved daughter.” Her growing presence in North Korea cannot be overlooked. Since her first appearance in North Korean media in November 2022, she has accompanied her father on numerous occasions, especially in the military sphere, including observations of missile tests.
Since the start of this year, the North Korean media have introduced Kim’s daughter with the phrase “accompanied by his beloved daughter.” Not only is honorific language always used, but her actions are introduced before those of other high-ranking officials such as the Politburo Standing Committee and Kim Yo Jong. It seems likely that the reason for Kim Jong Un’s efforts to protect the country by strengthening its military power and to win greater popularity by developing regional economies is out of concern for his daughter’s future.
North Korea: An Interesting Start to 2024
thediplomat.com
A new policy direction seems to be emerging.
By ISOZAKI Atsuhito
February 15, 2024
Credit: ASSOCIATED PRESS
On the first day of this year, Japan was shaken by a major earthquake that struck the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture. Among the messages of sympathy that poured in from around the world, one that surprised many observers came from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in the form of a telegram to Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. It is not clear whether Kim was approaching Japan as a way to drive a wedge between the three countries of Japan, the United States, and South Korea, or simply to show that he is a humanitarian. However, since this is the first time that Kim Jong Un has sent a direct message to a Japanese leader, we may assume that there was some political intent behind it.
The outreach notwithstanding, North Korea will still be pushing forward with weapons development this year. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea at the end of 2023 and the Supreme People’s Assembly in January this year, Kim said that the current situation is “on the brink of nuclear war,” crudely blaming this on the United States and its “followers.”
In particular, with regard to inter-Korean relations, Kim has suggested that it is no longer possible to unify the two countries, contrary to the South Korean administration’s advocacy of “absorption and unification,” and announced decisions to abolish three institutions that have served as liaisons to the South for many years as well as to prohibit the use of “residual words” such as “unification” and “80 million Koreans.” Demonstrating once again his strong tendency to press ahead once he makes a decision, Kim has also ordered that South Korea be clearly identified in the constitution as an “unchangeable main enemy.”
This is the biggest turning point since his grandfather Kim Il Sung called for the “Federal Democratic Republic of Goryeo” in 1980. However, since unification under North Korean leadership is not realistic, you could argue that Kim Jong Un is simply confirming the status quo with strong language. With the abolition of organizations such as the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, we may not expect any inter-Korean dialogue for the time being, so statements condemning the South will be issued by other organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
One of the lessons Kim learned from the 2018-2019 dialogue offensive was that no matter what advances are made in inter-Korean relations, no real benefit will accrue unless results are achieved in North Korea’s relationship with the United States. If Trump is re-elected this year and shows a willingness to compromise with Pyongyang, there is a possibility of U.S.-North Korea negotiations resuming, but all such measures would certainly go over South Korea’s head.
At the same time, Kim Jong Un has issued instructions for relations to be developed with other socialist states as well as “anti-imperialist states opposing the ‘hegemony strategy’ of the United States and other Western nations.” However, only five socialist countries remain, including North Korea, and so only a limited number of countries can band together for an anti-imperialist cause. Along with the strengthening of relations with Russia that proceeded with such pace last year, many eyes have been focused on trends in China-North Korea relations. As far as the tone of the North Korean media is concerned, the friendship with Beijing is stable, while trade has returned to pre-pandemic levels after being restricted to prevent the spread of COVID-19. With the restoration of inter-personal exchanges between China and North Korea, the real question is if Beijing can put the brakes on Pyongyang’s hard line.
An excessive emphasis on a military buildup will impose new sacrifices on North Korean living standards. Kim Jong Un has acknowledged that “the reality is that even the simple needs of the people cannot be satisfied,” urging for improvements with regard to the food problem. Of particular note is his clarification of the policy for correcting the disparities between the capital Pyongyang and the provinces. Successive North Korean leaders have invested intensively in the capital to the extent that it is often ridiculed by foreigners as a “show window.” Kim’s own inspection visits are also biased toward Pyongyang, but for some reason, he has now begun to raise the issue of regional disparities, pointing out that “we absolutely cannot ignore them.”
A new proposal has been put forward in the “Local development 20×10 policy,” which will promote the construction of local industry factories in 20 counties over 10 years. The name is quite catchy, not always the case in North Korea. The contents of Kim Jong Un’s remarks indicate that he is quite serious about this plan, but there is naturally a limit to such grand plans in the absence of any prospect of the severe economic sanctions being lifted. Still, it’s a worthwhile policy for Kim to look now to regional economies, after so many years of neglect.
For Kim Jong Un, whose number one aim is to perpetuate the regime, what matters most may be his “beloved daughter.” Her growing presence in North Korea cannot be overlooked. Since her first appearance in North Korean media in November 2022, she has accompanied her father on numerous occasions, especially in the military sphere, including observations of missile tests.
Since the start of this year, the North Korean media have introduced Kim’s daughter with the phrase “accompanied by his beloved daughter.” Not only is honorific language always used, but her actions are introduced before those of other high-ranking officials such as the Politburo Standing Committee and Kim Yo Jong. It seems likely that the reason for Kim Jong Un’s efforts to protect the country by strengthening its military power and to win greater popularity by developing regional economies is out of concern for his daughter’s future.
Authors
Guest Author
ISOZAKI Atsuhito
ISOZAKI Atsuhito is a professor at Keio University.
thediplomat.com
2. N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over aerial surveillance
We are watching closely. Are we also watching closely for the indications of instability? What resources can observe for those indicators? (rhetorical question)
N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over aerial surveillance | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 17, 2024
SEOUL, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday accused South Korea and the United States of heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula with aerial reconnaissance activities.
In a commentary carried by the Korean Central News Agency, the North said that Seoul and Washington have been stepping up their "spying activities" this month, calling such a move a "stern provocation" against the country.
The North claimed the countries attempted to secure information on the North's inner regions by conducting surveillance activities with the U.S. RC-135 Combat Sent and RC-135W Rivet Joint and South Korea's advanced high-altitude unmanned aircraft Global Hawk and E-737 Peace Eye early warning aircraft.
The North said it is closely monitoring such military activities and threatened that it is ready to destroy its enemies anytime.
North Korea has ratcheted up tensions on the Korean Peninsula with weapons tests this year, including launches of cruise missiles from sea and land, as well as artillery firings into waters near the western inter-Korean sea border.
This June 22, 2020, file photo shows an advanced high-altitude unmanned aircraft Global Hawk. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 17, 2024
3. Why N Korea no longer wants to reunite with the South
Yes, Kim fear's the South and not simply the South's superior military capability. It fear the prosperity of the South. It fears the example and idea of the South.
I would suggest the PSYOP professionals who are desigingin and orchestrating a strategic PSYOP campaign for the ROK/US alliance that they adopt a new theme and messages built around Kim's newly disv=covered illegitimacy - because he no longer seeks peaceful unification he cannot be considered a legitimate Korean leader. The Korean people in the north may be particularly receptive to this now because they are confused and upset over the policy change. They wanted unification most of all because they believed it would bring peace and prosperity. But it is Kim Jong Un who is now preventing this.
Excerpts:
Therefore, it should be acknowledged that Kim Jong Un faces domestic pressures if he is to preserve the power of his family’s dynasty. He must be seen to act decisively and he must have a prestigious military announcement for high-profile speeches on national holidays.
This is a situation that he inherited from his father and grandfather. But he has shown no sign of wanting it to change.
Why N Korea no longer wants to reunite with the South
Pyongyang’s policy pivot away from eventual reunification is not mere warmongering but driven by Seoul’s hardened line under Yoon
asiatimes.com · by Colin Alexander
In a speech delivered at the Supreme People’s Assembly in January, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, stated that reunification with South Korea was no longer possible and that their neighbor should now represent the “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.”
This amounted to a rare foreign policy pivot by Pyongyang, which consistently aimed for reunification of the peninsula since it was divided in the armistice that ended the 1950-1953 war.
Pyongyang’s new position towards the South has been widely interpreted as evidence of warmongering on the part of the North. The South, by contrast, is almost always portrayed as a benign neighbor and an unwilling target for threats of aggression. But it’s not as simple as that.
When it comes to North Korea’s foreign policy shifts, political developments and public opinion in the South play a key – if often understated – role. Pyongyang must also consider domestic factors when making statements about peninsular relations.
Politics in South Korea
Relations with the North are one of the most contentious issues in South Korean politics. Changes in power between political parties can often result in policy pivots in Seoul from hostility to reconciliation and back to hostility. Efforts towards friendlier peninsular relations are known as the “sunshine policy” in Seoul.
South Korea’s presidential system limits presidents to a single five-year term. This means that presidents interested in improving relations with Pyongyang only have a few years to make progress before leaving office.
For continuity to be guaranteed, the incumbent president is reliant upon their successor being similarly minded and possibly even part of the diplomatic team in a junior or advisory role and so already known to North Koreans.
These circumstances are difficult to manufacture though. Meaning that most of what is agreed by the South during friendlier times amounts to minor or temporary bridge building, which is a considerable frustration to the North.
For example, Pyongyang and Seoul made strides towards better relations during the recent five-year presidency of Moon Jae-in between 2017 and 2022. This led to the landmark moment in April 2018 when the two leaders met at the Demilitarized Zone along the 38th parallel.
Each leader stepped into the other’s country. Indeed, at the subsequent press event, Kim spoke – albeit clumsily from notes and with his head down – of the two Koreas as “one nation” and of his personal desire to see reunification. Moon made similar utterances of further cooperation.
Moon’s efforts towards dialogue with the North – without receiving from Pyongyang any concrete commitments to denuclearization in return – were widely criticized as weakness by his opponents.
It was one of the main reasons his democratic party lost the 2022 presidential election. Critics even referred to Moon’s efforts as the “moonshine policy” in reference to the illegal homemade liquor guaranteed to induce intoxication.
Fleeting Embrace: Then-South Korean president Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un shared warm relations. Photo: The Blue House
When it comes to the South’s attitude towards the North, it’s important to realize that weapons manufacturers engage in sophisticated and well-funded lobbying efforts around the world. These are usually accompanied by mainstream news and social media campaigns and think tank reports, reflecting a vested interest for some in keeping tensions high for financial gain.
In the aftermath of Moon’s presidency, the new administration of Yoon Suk Yeol of the People Power Party (from 2022 to the present) has taken a much tougher stance on North Korea. He has demanded “denuclearization first”, before any warming of relations. Yoon has also been critical of the South’s military capacity to deal with North Korean aggression and has pledged to increase spending on technological advancements.
To this end, the fluctuating position of the South towards the North, alongside the limitations to progress caused by its political system, ought to receive greater recognition as a contributing factor to Pyongyang’s decision to declare the prospect of reunification to be dead.
Domestic concerns in the North
North Korea is one of the most militarized societies in the world. This occurs in two ways. First, on account of the number of people whose livelihoods are attached to a thriving military in one form or another. And second, in terms of the important cultural space that the military takes within public life.
The North Korean military is widely revered and adored inside the country. The state-controlled mainstream media do not criticize the military, although they will acknowledge when missile tests, for example, are unsuccessful. Evening entertainment on North Korean television is regularly an assembly of military choirs or military personnel completing assault courses and other athletic challenges.
Public holidays such as September 9 (the anniversary of the founding of the Republic in 1948) are usually accompanied by military pageantry and news of a substantial military development – like the successful test of a nuclear bomb on September 9, 2016.
North Korea is a highly militarized society. Photo: KCNA via KNS
Estimates are that around 20% to 25% of North Korea’s GDP is taken up by military expenditure, with more spent by the state manufacturing military prestige through popular culture media content and the broadcasting of pageantry.
By comparison, most Western European countries spend between 1% and 3% of GDP per annum in peacetime on military matters and there is greater cultural space for a range of views on the military.
Therefore, it should be acknowledged that Kim Jong Un faces domestic pressures if he is to preserve the power of his family’s dynasty. He must be seen to act decisively and he must have a prestigious military announcement for high-profile speeches on national holidays.
This is a situation that he inherited from his father and grandfather. But he has shown no sign of wanting it to change.
Colin Alexander is Senior Lecturer in Political Communications, Nottingham Trent University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
asiatimes.com · by Colin Alexander
4. Short film about army life depicts North Korea’s caste system
Another description of the brutality and corruption of the regime and its military.
An 8 minute interview here: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/jeong-02162024125202.html
Short film about army life depicts North Korea’s caste system
Defector-turned-director based his film on his own experience in the military.
By Lee Hyunju and Mok Yong Jae for RFA Korean
2024.02.17
rfa.org
Park Jin Chul was still high on meth and slightly drunk when he spat into his hand and held it out in front of Ri Kwang Hyuk’s face.
“Eat this,” he ordered his junior non-commissioned officer.
Kwang Hyuk thought about submitting to his former classmate, who had once looked up to him but who now outranked him in the North Korean army.
But he had seen enough. Jin Chul was still the slacker he was back then, and he was only leading this unit because he came from a higher-status family. He talked down to his men and ordered them around like servants.
Defiantly, Kwang Hyuk stood motionless.
“Fine, if that’s how it is,” Jin Chul said as he grabbed Kwang Hyuk by the throat and slammed him against the wall.
Life in the North Korean military is very much like this scene from recently released short film “Two Soldiers,” said defector-turned-director Jeong Haneul, who had been a soldier when he escaped to the South across the demilitarized zone in 2012.
But the main point of his 23-minute film is not so much to reveal hardships facing soldiers but more to illustrate the unfairness of North Korea’s songbun system of ascribed status, he said.
It was this caste-like system that drove Jeong to risk everything to get to South Korea, where he became a film director.
“I titled the film ‘Two Soldiers’ to show through the lives of soldiers how differences in class and songbun exist as discrimination,” Jeong told RFA Korean.
Caste based on loyalty
Those with the highest songbun are descended from people who fought alongside national founder Kim Il Sung against colonial Japan prior to and during World War II, and have demonstrated through multiple generations that they are steadfast in their loyalty to the North Korean leadership.
These people are also the most privileged and can expect a fast track to membership in the ruling Korean Workers’ Party, which almost guarantees them cushy government jobs, the best education for their children, and expensive homes in the best parts of the capital Pyongyang.
Meanwhile those with the lowest songbun are descendants of those who collaborated with Japan during the colonial period, or criminals.
They have almost no hope of ever joining the party and they aren’t even allowed to visit the capital without a rare invitation from the government. They are given the most menial jobs and have little access to higher education.
An image from “Two Soldiers," to movie Haneul made the movie to show how differences in class and songbun exist as discrimination. (Courtesy Jeong Haneul)
In essence, those with low songbun are paying for crimes or lapses of loyalty committed by their grandparents or even great-grandparents, and those with high songbun are often reaping the rewards that they did not earn.
North Korea’s mandatory military service, which, for men, is now seven years but was 10 years until recently, brings people of all strata of society together, but those from the lower status must fall in line or else, Jeong said.
Sick of this system, Jeong sneaked away when the senior officer at his border guard post was taking a midday nap. Normally, a fence surging with 2,200 volts of electricity would have prevented such an escape, but it had collapsed in a recent typhoon.
The next day, he encountered a South Korean soldier on the southern side of the border and told him he wanted to defect.
As of 2024, the total number of North Korean escapees to have entered South Korea since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War is 34,078.
Jeong is among around only 400 who crossed the land border to South Korea and lived to tell the tale. Most take a much more circuitous route through China and Southeast Asia, from where they fly to Seoul.
Elements of truth
The film “Two Soldiers,” which debuted on Jan. 21 and can be viewed on YouTube, is based loosely on Jeong’s own experience.
His family were laborers, relatively low on the social ladder, so his time in the army was similar to that of the protagonist Kwang Hyuk.
Jin Chul, the arrogant and abusive higher ranking soldier in the film, is based on a schoolmate with whom Jeong served whose uncle was a high-ranking military official.
The classmate would brag that he would be a member of the party only five years after being discharged, easily get a recommendation to attend the prestigious Kim Il Sung University and become a party official upon graduation – making him one of the elite.
Soldiers drink imported whiskey – a rarity in North Korea – in a scene from the film “Two Soldiers.” (Two Soldiers)
“He was also able to be assigned a sleeping position wherever he wanted, and I remember his untanned face, " he said. “[He even] disappeared for several days during training to rest at his uncle's house in Pyongyang and then came back.”
In the movie, the privileged Jin Chul, whose uncle is a big shot political official, doesn’t even bother wearing his full uniform. When Kwang Hyuk arrives, Jin Chul orders Kim Kwang Il, a private under his command whom he treats like a servant, to bring some whiskey and food for him and his old schoolmate.
Kwang Hyuk questions whether it is wise to be drinking openly while they should be on duty, but Jin Chul explains that he’s the boss, and if Kwang Hyuk sticks with him, he can get preferential treatment.
Though soldiers aren’t supposed to have any visitors, Jin Chul’s girlfriend arrives in a Mercedes Benz convertible, and she delivers him a supply of “ice,” the North Korean street name for crystal meth.
Jin Chul later passes out on his bunk in the middle of the day after binging on meth. He uses the half-empty bottle of Ballantine’s whiskey as a makeshift pillow.
Intentionally exaggerated
Jin Chul’s portrayal could be seen as over the top, but Jeong says that is deliberate.
“I intentionally exaggerated the setting in the movie, but considering my experience in military life, North Korea is capable of doing more than that,” he said
Jeong, as a laborer, was in a better situation than farm workers, he said. In order to get off the farm, they would have to be recommended to a military school that trains officers or a security college that trains security agents after discharge.
During Jeong’s service, an order was issued to “reduce the number of former farm workers recommended to military schools,” which closed off many opportunities for them.
“This kind of discrimination is not anyone’s fault,” he said. “The North Korean authorities who created that system are the cause.”
While he was making “Two Soldiers,” Jeong said he was often reminded about his experience during bootcamp.
“I missed my parents so much and thought about my hometown a lot,” he said. “My weight was 45 kilograms [99 pounds]. I was almost malnourished.”
His lack of freedom was stifling, Jeong said.
“I was unable to do anything or go anywhere. There was no one on my side and I felt completely isolated,” he said. “I cried endlessly in the blowing autumn wind. I was hoping that someone would take me away and that someone would recognize me.”
Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
5. North Korean KN-24 missile leaves huge crater in Bucha district
Photos a the link,
Consider these craters at Camp Humphreys and Osan air base.
North Korean KN-24 missile leaves huge crater in Bucha district
https://news.yahoo.com/north-korean-kn-24-missile-152636752.html
Ukrainska Pravda
Fri, February 16, 2024 at 10:26 AM EST·1 min read
117
A huge crater caused by a missile strike in the Bucha district. Photo: Anatolii Fedoruk, Mayor of Bucha
Russia used what is likely a North Korean KN-24 missile in a large-scale missile attack on Ukraine on 15 February. The strike caused a huge crater in the Bucha district near the city of Kyiv.
Source: Sources of Ukrainska Pravda in law enforcement
Details: Ukrainska Pravda’s sources said this is not the first use of this type of missile.
According to the US CSIS analytical centre, the KN-24 has a range of up to 410 km and a payload of 400-500 kg. The missile looks similar to the US-produced ATACMS.
According to Forbes, the cost of such a missile can reach US$1.5 million.
KN-24 missile. Photо: Defense Express
Previously: On Thursday morning, a huge crater was created in the Bucha district of Kyiv Oblast as a result of a Russian missile strike, which also damaged numerous windows and roofs in the area.
Background:
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6. Kim Jong Un’s military threats put U.S. on edge
Excerpts:
Carlin and Hecker don’t conclude that North Korea is planning for a full-scale invasion of the South. But they do argue that Kim, sensing the U.S. is overstretched militarily due to Washington’s commitments to Ukraine and Israel, now questions the Biden administration’s will and ability to defend South Korea, where the Pentagon still has 30,000 American troops deployed as a tripwire against North Korean aggression. As a result, Pyongyang could increasingly try to test the defenses of the South, as it appears to be doing now in the Yellow Sea.
“The probing of the military situation might be the most likely, [for the North Koreans] to see just how far they can get away with it,” Hecker said on the NK News podcast late last month.
Current and former U.S. officials told Semafor that they are concerned North Korea is set to become just one of many U.S. adversaries challenging the American-backed order at the same time. These include: China threatening the Philippine navy in the South China Sea; Russia making gains in accumulating Ukrainian territory; and Iranian-backed militias attacking U.S. military personnel and assets in Iraq, Syria and the Red Sea. And these are all occurring as the U.S. is entering an election year.
Kim Jong Un’s military threats put U.S. on edge | Semafor
semafor.com · by Jay Solomon
The Scoop
The Biden administration is closely monitoring a military buildup between North and South Korea along their Yellow Sea maritime border, alarmed by Pyongyang leader Kim Jong Un’s growing threats to redraw the two countries’ Cold War map.
Kim oversaw the test-firing this week of a new surface-to-air missile system near the Northern Limit Line that’s served as the de facto sea border between the two Koreas since the 1950-53 Korean War. The North’s show of force followed Kim’s instructions last month to his country’s most powerful governing body, the Supreme People’s Assembly, that North Korea no longer recognize this maritime boundary and that its military should prepare for action against South Korean forces defending the line.
“The puppet Republic of Korea is trying to defend the so-called fictitious Northern Limit Line, which is neither based on international law nor has a legal justification,” North Korean state media quoted Kim as saying Wednesday. “They are using pretexts such as control over fishing vessels and maritime patrols to deploy warships of various classes to our waters and blatantly violate our sovereignty.”
Kim has specifically ordered combat readiness near two disputed Yellow Sea islands, Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong, over which North and South Korea fought an extensive artillery battle in 2010 that killed as many as 20 soldiers.
Current and former U.S. officials told Semafor this week that the North’s actions are particularly alarming given Kim Jong Un’s increasingly aggressive posture towards South Korea and his pledges to align more forcefully with Russia and China in their growing standoff with the West over issues ranging from Ukraine and the Middle East to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Kim, in his speech last month, also announced that he was abandoning North Korea’s long-held policy of reconciliation with the South and ordered the Supreme People’s Assembly to rewrite the country’s constitution to cement South Korea as Pyongyang’s most hostile foreign adversary. He’s also been issuing directives to his military to be prepared to take South Korea by force, according to state media.
“The situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950,” two of the U.S.’s most acclaimed North Korea watchers, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker wrote for the website, 38 North, last month. “That may sound overly dramatic, but we believe that, like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.”
The Biden administration has so far tried but failed to directly engage North Korea, despite numerous U.S. offers, and has instead been consumed by other foreign policy issues like the Afghanistan withdrawal, wars in Ukraine and Middle East, and Washington’s growing competition with Beijing. But North Korea might be preparing to force the U.S. to focus on the Korean Peninsula, as has historically been the case.
Donald Trump, during his single term, attempted to make the normalization of relations with North Korea one of his signature foreign policy successes. Trump held three summits with Kim Jong Un and exchanged letters with the 40-year-old dictator. In 2018, the two leaders signed the four point Singapore Declaration that laid out a plan for Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear arsenal – estimated to include 40 to 50 warheads – in exchange for an armistice ending the Korean War and normal diplomatic ties with Washington.
This diplomatic process collapsed, though, in 2019 after Trump and Kim failed to formalize an agreement at a summit in Vietnam. Carlin and Hecker now argue, as well as other North Korea-watchers, that Pyongyang’s leader essentially concluded that building relations with the U.S. was impossible. He moved instead to codify North Korea as a nuclear weapons state in his country’s constitution and doubled down on relations with Russia and China, Pyongyang’s Cold War patrons. This has included North Korea becoming a major arms supplier for the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine, including shipping munitions and rockets.
Carlin and Hecker don’t conclude that North Korea is planning for a full-scale invasion of the South. But they do argue that Kim, sensing the U.S. is overstretched militarily due to Washington’s commitments to Ukraine and Israel, now questions the Biden administration’s will and ability to defend South Korea, where the Pentagon still has 30,000 American troops deployed as a tripwire against North Korean aggression. As a result, Pyongyang could increasingly try to test the defenses of the South, as it appears to be doing now in the Yellow Sea.
“The probing of the military situation might be the most likely, [for the North Koreans] to see just how far they can get away with it,” Hecker said on the NK News podcast late last month.
Current and former U.S. officials told Semafor that they are concerned North Korea is set to become just one of many U.S. adversaries challenging the American-backed order at the same time. These include: China threatening the Philippine navy in the South China Sea; Russia making gains in accumulating Ukrainian territory; and Iranian-backed militias attacking U.S. military personnel and assets in Iraq, Syria and the Red Sea. And these are all occurring as the U.S. is entering an election year.
Room for Disagreement
U.S. officials and independent North Korea-watchers are largely united in their assessment that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is deteriorating. But there are divisions over whether they believe Kim Jong Un is seriously preparing his forces for a military offensive on the South, even a limited one. And there continues to be a debate inside Washington over whether Pyongyang’s dictator was ever serious about relinquishing his nuclear arsenal.
Successive U.S. administrations going back to President Bill Clinton’s have attempted to negotiate away North Korea’s nuclear weapons in exchange for economic and diplomatic incentives, only to be frustrated by Pyongyang’s backtracking or cheating. In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration canceled an agreement with Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons program – called the Agreed Framework – after learning the North had been secretly developing the technologies to enrich uranium. Trump administration officials, including former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have publicly stated that it was unclear if Kim was really offering to dismantle his arsenal during the Hanoi summit, though Pompeo said the diplomatic track could be reopened if Trump wins reelection this year.
North Korea experts say that the Kim family, including Kim Jong Un’s father and grandfather, have repeatedly increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula – particularly during U.S. election years – in an attempt to wrestle new economic concessions from South Korea and the West. This year could fit into that pattern.
“This recent propaganda increase has nothing to do with a policy shift after Hanoi, but the timing is related to the coming U.S. presidential elections,” wrote Thomas Schäfer, who served as Germany’s ambassador to Pyongyang for nearly a decade, in a rebuttal to the Carlin-Hecker article. “[North Korea] surely believes that a Republican victory (preferably with Trump, but even with some of the other Republican contenders) would give North Korea a second chance to further its objectives.”
Notable
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Kim Jong Un met last September with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a cosmodrome in the Russian Far East, fueling speculation that the Kremlin would provide North Korea with ballistic missile technologies in exchange for its support in Ukraine.
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Last month, North Korea, under the order of Kim, demolished a major monument symbolizing the unification of the two Koreas.
semafor.com · by Jay Solomon
7. South Koreans Blame Feminism For Demographic Collapse – Analysis
South Koreans Blame Feminism For Demographic Collapse – Analysis
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16022024-south-koreans-blame-feminism-for-demographic-collapse-analysis/
February 16, 2024 0 Comments
By East Asia Forum
By Dylan Motin
South Korea has the worst fertility rate in the world. Some link the country’s demographic collapse to the emergence of feminism, citing that it instils bitterness into the hearts of women, worsens gender relations and discourages young women from having children.
In public discourse, feminism and women’s rights advocacy are often associated with misandry and a hidden leftist or even pro-North Korean agenda of female supremacy. Given that there is little evidence that feminism is the source of South Korea’s demographic predicament, publicly focusing on this perceived issue may well divert South Korean policymakers from addressing the actual structural issues harming natality.
South Korea’s demographic crisis predates the rise of feminism as a widespread outlook and the 2017 MeToo movement. A country’s demography is considered sustainable when each woman has, on average, 2.1 children in her lifetime. South Korea’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell below 2.1 in 1983 and dropped down to 1.5 in 1998. This indicates that the natality crisis emerged during the rule of Chun Doo-hwan, hardly a time of feminist hegemony.
Contemporary South Korea is no feminist bulwark. It has the highest gender pay gap among OECD countries and some of the worst working conditions for women. The number of young women self-identifying as feminists decreased between 2021 and 2023.
South Korea’s demographic collapse, if unaddressed, could have serious repercussions. Even if Seoul could muddle through the economic and social repercussions, the resulting population decline would dramatically shift the regional balance of power.
South Korea still relies on conscription to maintain its military strength. The number of draftees, which represents around half of the force, could fall from 330,000 soldiers in 2020 to 240,000 by 2036 and 186,000 by 2039. Without radical changes, sustaining South Korea’s formidable military posture will become impossible.
As such, population decline represents an existential threat to South Korea. Its turbulent neighbour, North Korea, maintains around one million troops. China, Asia’s aspiring hegemon, has two million. China, North Korea and Russia all have nuclear weapons. An ageing and emptying South Korea would be an easy target for coercion. Pyongyang may even conclude that invading a crumbling South Korea to reunify the Korean Peninsula would be a cakewalk.
During the 2000s, the Russian government feared that its population’s low fertility would end its status as a great power and weaken its defence capabilities. It made the issue a national priority and managed to significantly reverse the trend. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, France had a stagnating population and faced a growing Germany. Here, too, efficient statecraft succeeded in redressing the country’s demography. It is important to note that in both cases, feminism had little to do with low natality.
Seoul should make its demography a national emergency and throw all its weight into finding solutions. Creating scapegoats for a multifaceted problem will not solve the issue. Instead, South Korea must acknowledge the underlying causes of its demographic crisis. The pressure to complete long degrees at university and then work long days with little rest makes raising children hard for young South Koreans.
Intense economic anxiety among the youth is another factor that delays births. Housing costs and household debt have risen significantly in recent years, further limiting the possibilities of forming a family. Dating and domestic violence also deter women from pursuing relationships. The social pressure of overinvesting time and money in children’s education further complicates the matter.
The traditional patriarchal model of the early-married, stay-at-home mother has deep roots in South Korean history and Confucian gender norms. But instead of clinging to an idealised version of bygone social relations, promoting a new one may help.
Childbirth outside of marriage is still frowned upon in South Korean society, yet the bar to marriage remains very high. This is because it is often associated with wealth, notably for buying a house. This creates a catch-22 whereby people envisage marriage only if they can afford a house, but affording a house is more challenging for unmarried than married people. Many are uninterested in marriage but still want to have children, yet suffering the condemnation of having a child ‘out of wedlock’ likely discourages them.
Decoupling marriage from childbirth would improve the situation. In 2022, only 2 per cent of births in South Korea occurred outside of marriage. The OECD average is around 40 per cent but above 60 per cent in France — one of the most fertile developed countries. Using the state’s public relations firepower to normalise extramarital birth and change its negative social perception could improve South Korea’s fertility markedly. Giving legal recognition to non-married families would also help.
This is just one approach to explore and the demographic crisis has many roots to treat. Yet it shows that low fertility does not come from the decline of traditions. Reimposing past gender relations and scapegoating feminism will not redress the situation. On the contrary, the dominant inflexible view of couples and childbirth is a part of the problem.
South Korea urgently requires a trans-partisan, whole-of-society effort to prevent its demographic extinction. It can only succeed if those in power offer policies based on a clear-eyed diagnosis of the crisis which looks beyond ideological divides.
- About the author: Dylan Motin is a Doctoral Candidate at Kangwon National University. He is also a researcher at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.
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Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum
8. Kim Jong Un draws red line at sea, renews promise to fire on South Korean ship 'that violates even 0.001mm'
But the NLL is not an internationally recognized border. There is no internationally recognized border in the West Sea. The NLL was created by the UN Command after the Armistice was signed simply as a control measure to prevent South korea vessels from going to the far north. It was really a force protection measure to prevent South Korean vessels from getting too close to north Korea where they might be fired upon.
Kim Jong Un draws red line at sea, renews promise to fire on South Korean ship 'that violates even 0.001mm'
North Korea has historically claimed maritime borders farther south than the internationally recognized Northern Limit Line, complicating the matter
By Timothy H.J. Nerozzi Fox News
Published February 16, 2024 7:02am EST
foxnews.com · by Timothy H.J. Nerozzi Fox News
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North Korea's supreme leader has drawn a red line at sea, vowing to fire upon any South Korean vessel that even barely crosses it.
Kim Jong Un reportedly attended the test launch of a new surface-to-air missile on Wednesday, where he told military officials to be prepared for a strike against any South Korean ship that enters North Korea waters from now on.
The supreme leader "stressed the need for the DPRK to thoroughly defend the maritime sovereignty by force of arms and actions, not by any rhetoric, statement and public notice," according to state-owned and operated news outlet Korean Central News Agency.
SOUTH KOREA SAYS RELATIONS WITH CUBA WOULD SEND 'POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW' TO NORTH KOREA
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a submarine-launched cruise missile test at an undisclosed location in North Korea in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency earlier this year. (KCNA via REUTERS)
DPRK is an abbreviation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea — the official name of the North Korean nation.
"He gave important instructions to bolster up military preparedness particularly in the border waters north of Yonphyong Island and Paekryong Island frequently invaded by the enemies' warships including destroyers, escort ships and speedboats," KCNA reported.
The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is the internationally accepted maritime line dividing North Korea and South Korea at sea — this standard border has been challenged by Kim Jong Un's regime in the past.
NORTH KOREA FIRES CRUISE MISSILES INTO SEA OF JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA SAYS: REPORT
Because of Kim Jong Un's frequent arguments that North Korean waters extend slightly farther to the south of the NLL, the exact parameters of the red line in the supreme leader's threats are somewhat hard to understand — making the situation even more volatile.
"What is clear is that when the enemy intrudes into the maritime border recognized by us, we will regard it as an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and an armed provocation against it," the dictator said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends the 19th expanded political bureau meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this image released by the Korean Central News Agency. (KCNA via REUTERS )
The threats make more concrete Kim Jong Un's increasingly specific threats against South Korean officials, military, and civilians in the wake of renewed hostilities.
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In a January parliamentary meeting, the dictator told government officials, "As the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal NLL and any other boundary can never be tolerated, and if the Republic of Korea violates even 0.001 millimeters of our territorial land, air and waters, it will be considered a war provocation."
North Korea has continued this year its common practice of firing missiles into the ocean area between itself, its southern counterpart, and the islands of Japan.
Timothy Nerozzi is a writer for Fox News Digital. You can follow him on Twitter @timothynerozzi and can email him at timothy.nerozzi@fox.com
foxnews.com · by Timothy H.J. Nerozzi Fox News
9. U.S. lawmaker stresses Congress' 'long-term' commitments to S. Korea regardless of who's in White House
We get these questions from our Korea colleagues all the time: What will a Trump administration be like? My response is that my crystal ball is still pretty cloudy. I do not know who will be elected.
But the ROK/US Alliance has always benefited from strong bipartisan support. It is only recently that there have been some cracks as some in Congress have been influenced by those misguided souls who think an end of war declaration will contribute to security. A piece of paper (end of war declaration) does not trump 1.2 million troops in the north with 70% arrayed between the DMZ and Pyongyang.
U.S. lawmaker stresses Congress' 'long-term' commitments to S. Korea regardless of who's in White House | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 17, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Feb. 16 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. lawmaker on Friday highlighted Congress' "long-term" security commitment to South Korea and its "very big" role in maintaining a robust South Korea-U.S. alliance, amid concerns that the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November could affect the bilateral relationship.
Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA) made the remarks as speculation has lingered that should former President Donald Trump return to the White House for a second term, he could employ what is known as a "transactional" foreign policy approach that could stoke tension in the alliance.
"I think Congress will, in a very bipartisan way, try to continue to maintain our long-term commitments regardless of who's in the White House," Bera said during an event organized by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Korea Studies.
Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA) speaks at a forum hosted by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Korea Studies in Washington on Feb. 16, 2024. (Yonhap)
He was responding to a question over whether Congress can play a role in case Trump would try to reduce U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) troop levels or drive a hard bargain over Seoul's share of the cost for stationing American troops in Korea.
On those issues, Congress has a "very big" role to play, Bera stressed.
"There is a very big role for Congress, which we demonstrated in the prior administration, when former President Trump talked about reducing troop presence. Congress acted very quickly in a bilateral way to put mechanisms in place that would make that fairly difficult," he said.
"On the burden sharing, Congress weighed in pretty significantly as well because we understand that the geopolitical security relationships (are) incredibly important not just to maintaining peace and prosperity on the peninsula. It's incredibly important to the U.S. maintaining peace and prosperity in the region as well as the world," he added.
Trump's foreign policy approach came sharply into focus this month as he made controversial remarks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) last week.
During a campaign rally in South Carolina on Feb. 10, Trump said that if reelected, he would "encourage" Russia to "do whatever the hell they want" to "delinquent" NATO members that fail to meet their defense spending commitments.
The remarks caused worries in South Korea, a country that relies on its sole treaty ally, the United States, for nuclear deterrence at a time when the North has called the South its "primary" foe, and escalated tensions with formidable weapons tests.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 17, 2024
10. Russia & North Korea Increase Weapons Exchanges, Missile Sharing
Russia & North Korea Increase Weapons Exchanges, Missile Sharing
The increasing military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang is an emerging shift in the global strategic landscape
https://warriormaven.com/global-security/russia-north-korea-increase-weapons-exchanges-missile-sharing
By Johnny Franks, Warrior Editorial Fellow
The increasing military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang is an emerging shift in the global strategic landscape that considerably impacts deterrence efforts by Seoul and Washington. This partnership has deepened in the era after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with North Korea becoming significantly more aligned with Russia's anti-Western stance and strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific arena. This is not merely about diplomatic support; it involves concrete military cooperation that directly challenges regional stability and international security standards.
One of the critical aspects of the cooperation is the weapons systems and military technologies being shared or supplied between Russia and North Korea. Reports note that North Korea has exported ballistic missiles to Russia, which are then used in the conflict in Ukraine. These ballistic missiles, combined with artillery and other military equipment from North Korea furnished to Russia, cast light on an observable exchange of weaponry and military material that serves Russia's military needs while engaged in its ongoing conflict. This is not a one-way street, as evidence points to North Korea's assets getting advanced technology for its space and missile programs in return, further strengthening its military capabilities and posing a significant proliferation threat.
It is in the technological dimensions of this cooperation that the concern is most alarmed. For example, Russia's interest in North Korea's KN-25 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) denotes how much military value Moscow sees in Pyongyang's arsenal. The KN-25's supposed 400-km strike radius exceeds that of Ukraine's Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), ostensibly positioning itself to impact battlefield dynamics drastically. The delivery of military hardware and technology not only breaches UN Security Council resolutions but also destabilizes the entire region and the global non-proliferation regime.
The exchange of military technologies does not stop at conventional systems. There has also been growing speculation about the exchange of nuclear technologies, cyber warfare capabilities, and advanced aerial systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones. A material exchange of this magnitude could significantly alter the balance of power in various regions. The transfer of such advanced military technologies would not only violate international sanctions but also potentially lead to a new arms race, with severe implications for global nonproliferation efforts and strategic stability.
The political and psychological dimensions of this cooperation should not be underestimated. Support from North Korea for the Russian-led war against Ukraine signifies unconditional defiance against the collective efforts of the international community to maintain peace and stability in general. Thus, the cooperation strengthens both military capabilities and the determination of both countries to resist outside pressures, further complicating deterrence efforts by Seoul and Washington.
This partnership imparts more than a mere reinforcement of military strength given that it strengthens the strategic positions against potential Western power projection. Moreover, for experts in military technology, gaining insights into the technical and strategic implications of Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation is crucial for crafting effective countermeasures to the emerging threats and challenges this alliance presents.
Johnny Franks holds an MA in U.S. Foreign Policy & National Security from American University and a BA in Diplomacy & World Affairs from Occidental College. With a specific interest in geopolitical security and military technology, Johnny has primarily focused his research and analysis on the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2014 onwards. As part of his MA coursework, Johnny contributed to developing an Arctic defense strategy in partnership with the U.S. Department of Defense
11. Interview: “North Korean workers in China are angry, and things are no better back home”
We must observe for indicators of instability. Will this spread to north Korea?
Interview: “North Korean workers in China are angry, and things are no better back home”
https://www.chosun.com/english/long-reads-en/2024/02/17/VTAV4RSPQVCJ5LUWKUGHJSRAMA/
Former N. Korean diplomat says recent riots in China reflect broader turmoil
By Lee Yong-soo,
Lee Jae-eun,
Kim Seo-young,
Woo Ji-won
Published 2024.02.17. 00:01
Updated 2024.02.17. 02:00
Ko Young-hwan, a former North Korean diplomat and Special Adviser to the Minister of Unification, talks about the riots that broke out in China’s Jilin province. / Jang Ryun-sung
North Korea has been acting out since the beginning of the year. Starting with firing 400 rounds of artillery shells off its west coast for three days last month, North Korea has mobilized hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles to conduct eleven hostile demonstrations against South Korea as of Feb. 16.
North Korea’s latest provocations came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared South Korea as its “number one enemy” late last year. Kim also threatened to use nuclear weapons if necessary to “pacify the entire territory of South Korea.” In the U.S., some commentators are raising the possibility of an imminent war on the Korean Peninsula.
Amid escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, reports emerged that thousands of North Korean workers in China’s Jilin province went on strike and rioted last month after finding out they would not be paid.
The workers, employed by a trading company associated with North Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, were promised full payment upon their return home. But the trading company had been transferring the withheld wages directly to Pyongyang, sparking outrage. The workers staged large-scale protests, occupying factories and taking North Korean officials hostage. Given that riots by North Koreans are virtually unheard of, recent events speak volumes about the fragile state of affairs within North Korea.
Ko Young-hwan, a former North Korean diplomat and Special Adviser to the Minister of Unification, confirmed the reported riots. The Chosunilbo met Ko at his office in Government Complex Seoul four days ago.
Have the riots stopped?
“They’ve managed to quell the protests, but underlying tensions remain. Unpaid wages amount to 10 million dollars, which North Korea cannot settle immediately. They’re paying the workers little by little, just enough so that they do not explode again. North Korea’s Ministry of External Economic Relations, Ministry of Social Security, Ministry of State Security, and embassy staff received orders to contribute to paying workers their withheld wages. North Korean workers have had their wages withheld before, but this incident stands out because 2,500 to 3,000 workers took collective action. [The North] wants to repatriate these workers, but they can’t - China won’t grant them visas.”
Why is China not granting them visas?
“A North Korean source told me that China is trying to “tame” North Korea. The atmosphere shifted after Kim Jong-un met Vladimir Putin last September and declared, “Our foremost priority is our relationship with Russia.” China used to help North Korea avoid sanctions by granting visas to restaurant workers and students, but they recently reduced the quota. Since the workers in China are unable to return home, North Korea cannot send the next batch of workers to China.”
Why won’t North Korea just arrest these workers?
“That’s exactly what North Korea would have done in the past. [After what happened in Jilin], the workers are considered political prisoners in Pyongyang. But their economic value is significant, and North Korea needs money. These workers are skilled artisans with 10 to 20 years of experience in sewing. While the average laborer earns between $800 and $1,000 per month, these workers receive $2,000, twice as much. Two thousand five hundred workers earning $2,000 monthly adds up to $60 million annually. Chinese companies are also very happy with their work. That’s a lot of money for North Korea.”
Ko Young-hwan, a former North Korean diplomat and Special Adviser to the Minister of Unification, talks about the riots that broke out in China’s Jilin province. / Jang Ryun-sung
How can they leave the ‘reactionaries’ alone like that?
“Occasionally, we obtain videos secretly filmed showing disturbances in North Korea’s markets. You can see ‘grasshopper’ vendors, who sell without a stall, confronting the inspectors. They argue, “Are you going to feed us?” and “If I can’t sell, my family starves,” making aggressive gestures, and the safety agents (police) become flustered and leave the scene. Such a thing would have been unthinkable in the past. Even during the recent riots in Jilin Province, workers smashed equipment and locked up officials to beat them, saying, ‘We won’t work until we get paid.’ Yet, the North Korean authorities seemed at a loss for what to do.”
Are you saying North Korea isn’t what it used to be?
“Violence has been on the rise in North Korea lately. The most frequently assaulted are security and safety agents. It has become commonplace for attackers to wait for the agents to return home or leave, then assault them in alleys and flee. It’s not like the old days when citizens couldn’t make a peep.”
Can control over the residents be maintained like that?
“Day and night are completely different. These days, security agents stop anyone on the street, snatch their cell phones, and if a South Korean song plays, they drag them away. They also ask for IDs if they hear young men and women calling each other ‘oppa,’ [a South Korean word for older brother], or ‘Honey.’ If their surnames differ, they say, ‘He’s not your oppa. You’ve been watching puppet regime dramas, haven’t you?’ and take them away. The control is so tight that people become anxious about using expressions they’ve used without a second thought, worrying if they might sound like they’re speaking in the South Korean style. They can’t even say ‘Nice to meet you’ because it’s considered a South Korean phrase. Life is hard enough, but with such oppression, people vent their frustrations under the cover of night.”
North Korea, starting with the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act in 2020, which included clauses for extreme punishment, successively enacted laws such as the Youth Education Guarantee Act and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, collectively known as the ‘anti-South Korea three acts,’ all during the administration of former President Moon Jae-in. Ko analyzed that Kim Jong-un’s actions, including the directive to demolish facilities at Mount Kumgang in October 2019, blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong in June 2020, and even going as far as to enact extreme laws, were due to the judgment that the side effects of South Korean cultural infiltration, such as ideological and systemic relaxation, far outweigh the benefits gained from inter-Korean exchanges.
What’s the economic situation in North Korea?
“Kim Jong-un recently lamented that ‘we can’t even provide necessities to the local people.’ Simply put, in the provinces these days, people have to dip food in salt since there’s no soy sauce or bean paste. In the past, they used to light lamps with petroleum or pine resin at night, but even that isn’t easy now. After 7 p.m., only a few people walk around, and people sleep right after the early evening. It’s like a zombie city, a ghost town. The only place that’s lit is the statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.”
It wouldn’t be a recent development that the situation has become difficult.
“When I was in the North, there was already a huge gap between Pyongyang and the provinces. Food distribution in the provinces was cut off during the North Korean famine, also known as the March of Suffering, and things got even harder in the mid-2010s as UN sanctions intensified. Still, people managed to get by with items found in the markets, but with the pandemic, the market hours have been shortened, and the items available for trade have been restricted.”
Is it any better in Pyongyang?
“Pyongyang has electricity only four hours a day, two hours each during rush hour. In high-rise apartments, 300 to 400 people line up to use the elevators at rush hour. Apartments in the Hwasong district, which Kim Jong-un boasts about, are 70 to 80 stories high. The residents are frustrated. They go out in search of firewood because houses are not heated. Many homeowners move to the outskirts because they can’t get wood.”
But N. Korea builds 10,000 apartments a year.
“The Pyongyang sewer system was built in 1958-1959 before the People’s Army of China withdrew. They’re building skyscrapers on top of it. When you flush the toilet, it clogs and backs up on the first floor. A North Korean defector from Pyongyang called it “an apartment without a butthole.” They’re just building apartments in a rush without maintaining sewer pipes or expanding sewage disposal facilities.”
Disposal of feces must be troublesome.
“Luckily, excrements have to be collected in the winter months. People fight over compost in cities and rural areas alike. Pyongyang is no exception. While the higher-ups pay the People’s leader to take care of it, the majority of the population composts their collected wastes by mixing them with briquette ashes. The collecting process is in full swing at this time of year.
Kim Jong-un has acknowledged the poor conditions in Pyongyang on several occasions. At a Politburo meeting Kim chaired in June 2020 amid the rampant spread of COVID-19, he openly addressed the urgent issue of sustaining the livelihood of Pyongyang’s residents. During his speech at the National Mothers’ Congress last December, he said, “We will first solve the problems of insufficient water and firewood, public transportation, elevators, and heating system for the capital’s citizens.” This means nothing has improved in three and a half years.”
Ko compared North Korea’s current aggressive stance to when it threatened “a sea of fire” upon Seoul in 2013. “In early 2013, North Korea threatened to turn Seoul into a ‘sea of fire’ daily, and Kim went to Jangjae Island and Mudo Island on the West Sea frontline and urged to ‘mow down the enemy lines,’ raising the risks of a possible war,” Ko said. “Jang Sung-taek’s power was great at the time, and Kim bluffed his way out because his power was vulnerable.”
He said North Korea is most likely ratcheting up hostile demonstrations against South Korea to cover up domestic turmoil. “A country that wants to go to war does not sell 5,000 containers of shells,” he added. “Kim’s biggest concern is passing on power to the fourth generation and continuing the ‘Kim Dynasty.’ How could he possibly go to war?”
☞Who is Ko Young-hwan?
Ko Young-hwan is a North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea. Born in Pyongyang in 1953, he studied at the Pyongyang Foreign Language Revolutionary Institute and the Pyongyang University of Foreign Languages before joining the diplomatic service in 1979. He was Kim Il-sung’s French interpreter for three years and eight months. He served at the North Korean Embassy in the Democratic Republic of Congo before returning home in 1991. He is the first North Korean diplomat to defect. He worked for 26 years at the National Security Strategy Institute, a National Intelligence Service think tank. Last September, he was named to the newly created position of special advisor to Seoul’s Unification Minister. He is the first figure elite North Koreans seek out when settling in South Korea.
North Korea
Kim Jong Un
12. Do not be discouraged by Kim Jong-un's unification statements
This was written nearly a month ago so it was before I spent some time with Ri Jong Ho to get his important insights. I think this is consistent with our recent paper in the National Interest ("The Real Reason North Korea Is Threatening War")though Ri Jong Ho helps us to gain much deeper insight into the regime.
I have updated my assessment of the regime since I wrote this. I am coming to the conclusion that Kim Jong Un really does feel threatened by the South (as I note below) and specifically he may feel that the ROK has the upper hand (or the moral high ground) on unification. His failure to bring peace and prosperity through his nuclear weapons and missiles combined with the information coming from the South on unification (and prosperity of the Korean people in the South) has caused Kim to focus on the South as the main enemy and jettison his policy of peaceful unification (which was never about peaceful unification but only a fig leaf for the real policy that remains - domination of the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Kim family regime). This article in the nK Daily ("Kim Jong Un has weaponized South Korea’s own name against unification") really makes me adopt this assessment. He is creating a poison pill to try to ensure that if unification is ever on the horizon that the Korean people in the north will resist it - Kim is trying to ensure there is a sustained resistance capability in the north even when he is no longer in power. . This is why the ROK (with alliance support) must win the information and ideological battle on the peninsula.
Do not be discouraged by Kim Jong-un's unification statements
The Korea Times · February 17, 2024
By David Maxwell
David Maxwell
There is a unique relationship between denuclearization, human rights and unification. The only way to achieve denuclearization and end the human rights abuses being committed against North Koreans is by achieving unification, which is a new Korea determined by the Korean people achieving the "Korean Dream" — a United Republic of Korea. Perhaps counterintuitively, it is the focus on human rights that must lead to unification, and only when unification is achieved can there be denuclearization. And the connective tissue among the three is information.
Human rights are a moral imperative. However, they are also a national security issue because Kim Jong-un must deny the human rights of the people in the North to remain in power. Dr. Jung Pak often asks whom Kim Jong-un fears the most. Is it South Korea or the U.S. military? It is the North Korean people, especially when they are armed with information and knowledge of their universal human rights. Therefore, Kim Jong-un creates the perception of external threats to justify the suffering, sacrifice and oppression of his people.
This is what we are seeing today. Kim Jong-un has called South Korea the main enemy. He has said he will no longer seek peaceful unification, and he has even dismantled the Arch of Unification, calling it an "eyesore." These statements and actions, combined with the development of advanced military capabilities to include nuclear weapons and missiles, are making the pundits and press speculate that war is possible soon. But by saying no to peaceful unification, Kim Jong-un has also removed hope for North Korean people who believe unification will change their lives.
They have demonstrated a level of resilience in the face of hardship outsiders can hardly imagine, from humanitarian disasters to starvation, because of systematic and deliberate policy designs by the regime, the denial of human rights and crimes against humanity that the U.N. assesses has not been seen at such a level since the Nazi rule in the last century. Yet North Korean escapees are often asked why they do not resist such tyranny. They explain that because of the massive indoctrination effort by the regime for more than 70 years, combined with a system of social control that is worse than any caste system ever devised, along with little to no knowledge of the outside world, they simply do not know what to do. People of the North live in Plato's cave, and all they see are the shadows of the Propaganda and Agitation Department's projects for them. They have no frame of reference for resistance, and all their effort goes into survival. This is the paradox: The people in the North are among the most resilient people in history, yet they also have the least resistance capability in the modern world. This offers insight into what might contribute to changing the lives of the Korean people in the North and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
We appear to be at a very tense point in Korea today. Kim Jong-un is executing a political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy to subvert, undermine and weaken South Korea, drive a wedge in the alliance and coerce political and economic concessions from South Korea, the United States and the international community. In 2024, he showed his true hand, that he considers the North a nuclear state and is prepared to use nuclear weapons to achieve the seven decades old goal of his father and grandfather: that is, to complete the revolution, rid the peninsula of foreign forces and dominate all of Korea under the rule of the Guerilla Dynasty and Gulag State. Now, following Kim's support for Putin's war in Ukraine, there should be no doubt that there is an axis of totalitarians who seek to do harm to the international community while continuing to oppress their people. We must realize that Kim will do in the South what the Kim family regime has done in the North to remain in power — he will deny the human rights of all Koreans, and South Koreans would suffer an unbearable fate if he were successful.
On the other hand, Kim is likely changing his rhetoric to "externalize the threat" because he may be under severe internal stress from North Korea's elites, military leaders and people. Kim needs to demonstrate that there is an existential threat from South Korea. Ironically, that threat is not from the South Korean military or its alliance with the U.S. It is South Korea's values of freedom, individual liberty, free market economy, rule of law and human rights for all that are most threatening. South Korea is the beacon on the hill for North Korean people, and this is a threat to Kim Jong-un.
Therefore, this is an inflection point in Korean history in which a major change could be upon us. But it also could be an opportunity if freedom-loving people in Korea, the U.S., and around the world are willing to seize it.
While the South Korea-U.S. combined military force is demonstrating superior deterrence and defense capabilities to prevent war and defeat the North if Kim decides to attack, now is the time to develop a new strategy that rests on the foundation of our military strength.
Ultimately, the two sides seek diametrically opposed end states. Kim has just revealed his true family regime strategy that has never actually sought peaceful unification. The regime seeks only domination. However, South Korean and U.S. presidents provided the vision for the alliance in their joint statement in April 2023: "The two Presidents are committed to build a better future for all Korean people and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace." And at the Camp David Summit, Yoon, Biden and Kishida agreed that we must seek a free and unified Korea.
This is the time to initiate a new strategy — what might be called the "Three Plus One Strategy." It should be based on three lines of effort: a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive information campaign and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. The "Plus One" is that it must rest on the strongest possible foundation of deterrence and defense to protect not only South Korea but all Koreans on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone.
The alliance must adopt a human rights upfront approach. Again, to reiterate, not only are human rights a moral imperative they are also a national security issue. Kim must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the North to remain in power. People in North Korea suffer because of Kim's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear and missile development over the welfare of the people.
The alliance should develop and execute a comprehensive information campaign. When responding to North Korea's provocations, South Korea and the U.S. must also address the North's human rights abuses. Discussing the nuclear program reinforces the regime's legitimacy, but calling out the regime for its crimes against humanity undermines its legitimacy.
Kim Jong-un took away all hope of his people when he revealed that he is not seeking peaceful unification. But we should not panic or overreact. This is now the opportunity for South Korea, the U.S. and all the world's freedom-loving nations to bring back that hope by supporting Korea's unification. The key tool is information, and these are some of the key elements:
Design an overt information warfare campaign targeting North Korea based on massive amounts of information, knowledge, truth and understanding.
Information includes massive quantities of information, from entertainment to news.
Knowledge means practical information on how to conduct collective action to bring change, best practices for agriculture and market activity, and educational lessons without the Juche influence.
Truth reflects the reality about the regime, the situation in North Korea and the outside world.
Understanding helps North Koreans familiarize themselves with the inalienable and universal rights everyone should enjoy.
Although denuclearization of the North remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational if the Kim family remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first, and then unification will follow and that there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong-un from making a denuclearization agreement. Today, even the most clueless person knows that Kim Jong-un will not denuclearize even though his policies have been an abject failure.
Everyone must understand that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses in North Korea is through the unification of the Korean Peninsula. South Korea and the United States must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign. They should focus all efforts on pursuing a free and unified Korea. Kim Jong-un's recent statements mean that focusing on Korean unification is more important than ever.
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and has spent more than 30 years in Asia as a service member and public servant. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is the vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the editor of the Small Wars Journal.
The Korea Times · February 17, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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