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Quotes of the Day:
“Listen, I've got something very obvious to tell you. You're not allowed to give up. If they decide to kill me, it means that we are incredibly strong.”
– Alexei Navalny.
"When someone asked Abraham Lincoln, after he was elected president, what he was going to do about his enemies, he replied, 'I am going to destroy them. I am going to make them my friends.' "
– Abraham Lincoln
"The best things and best people rise out of their separateness; I'm against a homogenized society because I want the cream to rise."
– Robert Frost
1. Saving America’s future from the Blob
2. Making Attrition Work: A Viable Theory of Victory for Ukraine
3. How Navalny Changed Russia: Putin Cannot Silence the Opposition Leader’s Movement
4. The US Military Already Has a Decades-Old Countermeasure for Russian Space Nukes
5. U.S. Plans to Send Weapons to Israel Amid Biden Push for Cease-Fire Deal
6. Ukraine Withdraws From Besieged City as Russia Advances
7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2024
8. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 16, 2024
9. Suspected terror fund facilitator caught using remittance centers (Philippines)
10. N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over aerial surveillance
11. Four Months Into the War Against Hamas, the IDF Is Far Outperforming American Expectations, Report Says
12. Cult of the drone: UAVs have changed war but not outcomes
13. TikTok: An Expanding Front in Cognitive Warfare
14. With Prison Certain and Death Likely, Why Did Navalny Return?
15. The Legacy of Irregular Warfare Masters
16. Our Gathering Storm: On civil war in America and other unpleasant possibilities.
1. Saving America’s future from the Blob
I guess China is kicking our a** (and Russia is just misunderstood) – all because of the elite in Washington (AKA the Blob).
Excerpts:
The Blob’s blunders are so comprehensive, so thorough and so damaging that there is no short-term fix to the damage that the United States will suffer as a consequence. That does not necessarily portend the end of American primacy on the world stage. The loss of Vietnam entailed a devastating blow to American prestige, to the point that much of the US and the European elite believed that the Soviet Union would win the Cold War.
That didn’t happen, because America responded to its strategic setbacks by reinventing warfare. In order to do so we invented the Digital Age. In 1973 Russian military technology, especially in the decisive field of air defense, was the best in the world. By 1982 American avionics and smart weaponry had turned the tables. America’s capacity to innovate remains our greatest asset.
We need to take stock soberly of our position and correct the policy errors that left us without the capacity to produce enough 155mm shells to supply our allies, let alone make hypersonic missiles. We need a defense driver for high-tech R&D and manufacturing on the scale of the Kennedy Moonshot and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
I proposed a plan for accomplishing this in a 2023 monograph for the Claremont Institute, “Restoring American Manufacturing: A Practical Guide.” I am confident that this is the right policy, because we have done it three times before: During World War II, during the 1960s, and during the 1980s.
What we have done before, we can do again. We cannot stop the rise of China. But we can rise faster.
Saving America’s future from the Blob
How to understand – and rectify – the foreign policy disaster of 2024
By DAVID P. GOLDMAN
FEBRUARY 16, 2024
asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman
Never believe what bipartisan foreign policy establishment hacks say about China and Russia. They don’t believe what they say, either. The Blob (as Obama aide Ben Rhodes called it) learned through generations of strategic blunders that if everyone closes ranks and sticks to the same story, its members will survive a strategic disaster of any magnitude with their careers intact.
The same principle explains why not a single American banker went to jail after the subprime collapse of 2008, the biggest fraud in all financial history. The Blob’s logic is simple: If you go after one of us, then you have to go after all of us, and who will be left to put things back together?
Whether or not it was right for America to go abroad seeking monsters to destroy in Moscow and Beijing, the way we went about it was abominably stupid.
“If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared,” Machiavelli advised.
Washington has wounded Russia and China but not disabled them, setting in motion a tragic sequence of responses that in the worst case will lead to war, but more likely will leave the United States with vastly diminished strategic standing.
The rise of China and the resilience of Russia have persisted through serried waves of tech restrictions, $125 billion of NATO support for Ukraine and an unprecedented sanctions regime against Russia, including the seizure of $300 billion in reserves, among other measures.
The Black Legend propounded by the Blob states that China is on the verge of invading Taiwan because its Communist leaders hate democracy, and because it wants to distract its citizens from their economic misery. It claims that Vladimir Putin wants to revive the Russian Empire and invaded Ukraine because it “is a country that for decades has enjoyed freedom and democracy and the right to choose its own destiny.”
In fact China has bracing economic challenges, but no crisis, and no widespread popular discontent. It wants to preserve the status quo, barring a Taiwanese move toward sovereignty, which is all but ruled out by the results of Taiwan’s national elections this January.
China is a formidable strategic competitor, but its global plan centers on dominating key industries and export markets rather than military deployments – and that plan is proceeding at a rapid clip, despite American efforts to hobble it.
Russia made clear for a decade that it would not tolerate the extension of NATO’s boundaries to its border with Ukraine, as the late Henry Kissinger, former Ambassador to Moscow and now CIA Director William Burns, and others repeatedly warned.
Vladimir Putin declared on the eve of his invasion of Ukraine, February 23, 2022: “If deployed in Ukraine, [NATO weapons] will be able to hit targets in Russia’s entire European part. The flying time of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Moscow will be less than 35 minutes; ballistic missiles from Kharkov will take seven to eight minutes; and hypersonic assault weapons, four to five minutes. It is like a knife to the throat.”
The Biden Administration believed the Russian economy would collapse under US sanctions. In March 2022 President Biden declared, “The Russian economy is on track to be cut in half.”
Russia’s economy is not only larger today than it was two years ago, but has increased production of weapons up to tenfold, producing seven times more artillery shells than the combined West, by Estonian Intelligence estimates. Some 70 percent of casualties are inflicted by artillery, and Russia has an overwhelming advantage, as well as superior tactical air support and offensive missiles and drones.
Russia also produces 100 main battle tanks a month, while Germany produces 50 per year. With five times Ukraine’s population, Russia will win a war of attrition barring some catastrophic blunder.
How did Russia do this? China, India, Turkey, and other countries transformed their trade and financing profiles to support the Russian market. China’s exports to Russia nearly tripled from prewar levels. India became Russia’s top customer for oil and doubled its exports of machinery to Russia during 2023. Turkey and the former Soviet republics became conduits for unreported exports to Russia.
Ukraine is short of artillery ammunition and air defense systems. Russia’s cheap, Iranian-designed Shaheed drones are now penetrating Ukraine’s air defenses and hitting military installations and critical infrastructure. The United States doesn’t have enough inventory to keep Ukraine supplied.
Russia is gradually achieving its stated objective, namely to de-militarize Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower resources are thin, and the military is putting 50-year-old soldiers into the front lines. Last October, a Zelensky aide told Time that even if the West provided more weapons, “We don’t have the men to use them.”
None of these facts is contested, but the Blob’s enthusiasm for the Ukraine War increases in inverse proportion to its prospects for success. It is considered downright dangerous to question the wisdom of the war: Bill Kristol proposed to bar Tucker Carlson from returning to the United States after his projected interview with Putin.
Having called out the bear and gotten mauled, the Blob knows what consequences it may face. Germany is in recession after the cutoff of cheap Russian gas supplies pushed up the cost of energy, and Chancellor Olaf Scholz has an approval rating of 17 percent. France’s President Macron polls at 23 percent.
Having exacted Nibelungentreue (absolute, unquestioning loyalty) from reluctant NATO allies to pursue the war, Washington faces a populist revolt led by Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and the National Rally in France.
Heads should roll, or at least careers should abort. But the greater its blunders, the stronger the Blob’s solidarity. They have a story, and they will stick to it.
Ukraine, to be sure, is a warm-up act for the main strategic event of the next decade, namely America’s contention with China. China now buys more oil from Russia than from Saudi Arabia, and has nearly tripled exports to Russia by official count (and probably much more through third parties), but it has stayed on the sidelines, allowing Russia to do the bleeding.
With three times more manufacturing capacity than the United States, and a significant lead in automated manufacturing, China has made itself a fortress bristling with thousands of satellite-guided anti-ship missiles, perhaps a thousand modern aircraft, formidable electronic warfare capabilities, and other means of dominating its home theater. Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute wrote on January 4:
While select munitions stockpiles do exist, the war in Ukraine has shown that past munitions requirements based on rosy war assumptions have vastly underestimated the need for volume in modern warfare. According to RTX, the prime contractor for the SM-6, the existing SM-6 stockpile sits somewhere north of 500 missiles. This is not nearly enough for a drawn-out conflict with any peer adversary and potentially any sub-par one, too.
Beijing is well aware of our shortfalls as is evidenced by China’s rapid expansion and investment in its missile forces. China’s ground-based missile forces have nearly doubled in the last decade, and the Pentagon estimates that the PRC has stockpiles of thousands of missiles in reserve, all as part of a strategy to mass fire and overwhelm US warships in a potential conflict.
The ongoing skirmish between Houthi guerrillas and the US Navy in the Red Sea was a spectacle that allowed Beijing to watch and assess U.S. anti-missile capabilities. The outcome is alarming. The destroyer USS Gravely resorted to its Phalanx Gatling guns to destroy an incoming cruise missile only four seconds from hitting the ship, implying that its missiles failed to intercept the attacker.
An American destroyer carries about 100 anti-ship missiles. China claims to have an automated factory that can produce 1,000 cruise missiles per day. That’s unverified, but China has plants that assemble more than 1,000 electric vehicles a day; I visited a Chinese facility that produced 2,400 5G base stations a day with just 45 workers.
The US Navy is massively outgunned in the South China Sea. American strategists spin scenarios of Taiwanese resistance against a D-Day-style landing across the 70 miles of the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese are not stupid enough to send a slow-moving flotilla against Taiwan, not when they have the capacity to sink anything that floats on the surface within 1,000 miles of the island.
Fortunately, a confrontation over Taiwan is unlikely after the January elections, which returned the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to the presidency, but with a 40 percent rather than a 57 percent majority as in the last election. The new People’s Party holds the balance of power, and its leader holds the presidency of Taiwan’s parliament. Beijing appears satisfied with the resulting political gridlock.
Race to rise
The prevailing narrative in the Blob is that China is likely to attack Taiwan because of Xi Jinping’s obsession with personal prestige, and because it would distract from China’s internal economic problems. On February 6, Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins University and Michael Beckley of the American Enterprise Institute wrote of China that “many of the conditions that once enabled a peaceful rise may now be encouraging a violent descent.”
China has economic problems, to be sure. But they are high-class problems to have. When Deng Xiaoping began the reforms in 1979 that increased the size of China’s economy 16-fold in real terms (according to the World Bank estimate), only 3 percent of Chinese had tertiary education. Today’s number is 63 percent, on par with Germany.
China graduates about 1.2 million engineers and computer scientists each year, compared with slightly over 200,000 for the United States. Chinese universities by most international surveys are at or close to par with the United States.
Only 16 percent of China’s population was urban in 1979, compared with 64 percent today. China moved 700 million people from the countryside to the city and turned subsistence farmers into industrial workers, propelling a 40-year boom in urban property prices.
Chinese households have 70 percent of their wealth in property, and the cost of housing in Tier 1 cities has become prohibitive. Shifting investment away from property to industry is a wrenching and disruptive business, and the Chinese authorities went about the transition with characteristic heavy-handedness. China’s housing sector is in distress, but that is the least interesting part of the story.
With a declining workforce, China needs to raise productivity through automation, and export its labor-intensive industries to countries with younger populations. It has to shift the focus of investment from property (required to absorb the mass migration from the countryside) to industry, and it has to upgrade its industry.
One might say that China is in crisis, but China has always been in crisis. Uniquely among the world’s nations, its economy, built on a flood plain of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, has always required enormous investment in water management for irrigation, flood control, and transport.
Today China has marshaled its resources in a massive effort to overcome Washington’s efforts to limit its access to advanced technology. The cost of achieving semiconductor independence in the face of US sanctions is substantial. China is building 22 chip fabrication plants and expanding others, at a cost of perhaps $50 billion, roughly equivalent to the annual CapEx of the CSI 300 Index (roughly comparable to America’s S&P 500 Index).
Although Beijing subsidizes chip production heavily, the cost of duplicating large parts of the semiconductor industry in China will challenge the bottom lines of the companies involved.
China stunned American policymakers in September when Huawei released a smartphone powered by a home-produced 7-nanometer chip capable of 5G operation, an event that Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo called “incredibly disturbing.” According to news reports, China is on the cusp of producing 5-nanometer chips, only one generation behind the best that Taiwan and South Korea can make.
American experts didn’t think this was possible, because it isn’t economical to use older lithography equipment to make high-end chips. China doesn’t care about the economics, because the externalities of high-end chip production (in the application of artificial intelligence to manufacturing, logistics, and services) more than outweigh the costs.
America’s tech war with China has succeeded in imposing significant costs on China’s economy, cutting off in my guesstimate somewhere between 0.5 percent and 1 percent of its annual GDP growth. But this has only slowed China’s juggernaut, not stopped it.
Despite the costs, China leapfrogged Japan and Germany to become the world’s largest exporter of autos. It dominates the production of telecommunications infrastructure and solar panels, as well as steel and other industries. Its enormous investment in semiconductor fabrication will likely give China a dominant position in so-called legacy chips, which comprise 95 percent of the world market.
Meanwhile, China has doubled its exports to the Global South since 2017 and now exports more to developing countries than it does to all developed markets combined. Its export drive is supported by about $1.5 trillion of credits and investment through the Belt and Road Initiative. It is building digital broadband through the whole of the developing world, with transformative effects that lock many countries into China’s sphere of economic influence.
America’s efforts to “de-risk” import dependence on China have only diverted trade flows to the US by way of middleman countries that depend in turn on China. As International Monetary Fund economists wrote last November, “Countries replacing China tend to be deeply integrated into China’s supply chains and are experiencing faster import growth from China, especially in strategic industries.
Put differently, to displace China on the export side, countries must embrace China’s supply chains.”
Tariffs on Chinese goods and related measures to reduce America’s import dependency on China have made the rest of Asia (and to some extent Latin America as well) all the more dependent on Chinese supply chains.
The view of the United States from Beijing is grim. CPC leaders know that China must transform itself or suffer the deleterious consequences of an aging population. In China’s view America’s attempts to restrict Chinese access to high-end semiconductors, the building blocks of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, constitute an effort to destroy China, not to restrict its access to military technology.
By injuring China without disabling it, Washington has given China an incentive to undermine American interests wherever convenient. This is obvious in the Middle East, where China sees an opportunity to “exhaust” the United States, as Prof. Lui Zhongmin said in a February 6 interview.
The Blob’s blunders are so comprehensive, so thorough and so damaging that there is no short-term fix to the damage that the United States will suffer as a consequence. That does not necessarily portend the end of American primacy on the world stage. The loss of Vietnam entailed a devastating blow to American prestige, to the point that much of the US and the European elite believed that the Soviet Union would win the Cold War.
That didn’t happen, because America responded to its strategic setbacks by reinventing warfare. In order to do so we invented the Digital Age. In 1973 Russian military technology, especially in the decisive field of air defense, was the best in the world. By 1982 American avionics and smart weaponry had turned the tables. America’s capacity to innovate remains our greatest asset.
We need to take stock soberly of our position and correct the policy errors that left us without the capacity to produce enough 155mm shells to supply our allies, let alone make hypersonic missiles. We need a defense driver for high-tech R&D and manufacturing on the scale of the Kennedy Moonshot and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
I proposed a plan for accomplishing this in a 2023 monograph for the Claremont Institute, “Restoring American Manufacturing: A Practical Guide.” I am confident that this is the right policy, because we have done it three times before: During World War II, during the 1960s, and during the 1980s.
What we have done before, we can do again. We cannot stop the rise of China. But we can rise faster.
David P. Goldman is deputy editor of Asia Times and a Washington fellow of the Claremont Institute. This article was first published by The American Mind and is republished with permission.
asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman
2. Making Attrition Work: A Viable Theory of Victory for Ukraineei
We recognise that much of our analysis represents an incomplete first draft of military history. Other analysts and historians will undoubtedly revise and improve our understanding of this war. But it does seem fairly clear that the war has seen prolonged phases in which the ability to manoeuvre has been earned chiefly through extensive attrition and the destruction of the enemy’s capacity rather than through cognitive effects or effective employment of combined arms. Modern forms of long-range precision strike have helped Ukraine to interdict or suppress Russia’s logistical nodes, but they have not established fire control beyond tactical ranges or circumvented the need for close battle. We appreciate that these results may be due to the specific context of this war, and analysts should be careful in trying to translate observations about the Russia–Ukraine war in particular into lessons learned about the character of contemporary war in general.
While Western countries should continue to help Ukrainian forces improve their overall quality and their ability to scale up combined-arms operations, prevailing conditions in Ukraine still favour attritional and positional approaches rather than those suitable for manoeuvre warfare. The operative factor is attrition, inflicted primarily through artillery and strike drones. The West is therefore best served by focusing on resourcing Ukraine’s fires-centred approach and helping Ukraine scale offensive operations to exploit a fires advantage when it is attained. This may be impossible to achieve via quantity, but it can be done through a combination of means which altogether add up to meaningful superiority in support of an offensive. These two factors should drive investment in drones to offset shortages of artillery ammunition, cheaper precision-strike capabilities, and electronic warfare to help restore mobility to the front line and reduce current Russian advantages in drone systems.
Ukraine’s military leadership appears keen to embrace technological innovation and tactical adaptation, and to rebuild the force’s combat potential. These objectives will take time to achieve, but it is clear that Ukraine’s military recognises the scale of the challenge and the need to move out as soon as possible in 2024. This will be a long war requiring a long-term outlook in strategy, but also timely decision-making. Despite the high stakes, it has become less clear that Washington and European capitals can muster the political will to see Ukraine through this war. The fact remains that Ukraine and the West enjoy the overall advantage in resources, and attrition can prove an important part of their theory of victory.
SURVIVAL ONLINE9th February 2024
Making Attrition Work: A Viable Theory of Victory for Ukraine
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/01/making-attrition-work-a-viable-theory-of-victory-for-ukraine/
AUTHOR
Franz-Stefan Gady
@hoanssolo
ABOUT FRANZ-STEFAN GADY
Michael Kofman
The most effective way for Ukraine to rebuild its advantage is to mount an effective defence in depth, which will reduce Ukraine’s losses and ammunition requirements.
As the Russia–Ukraine war enters its third year, Ukraine faces a daunting task: how to restore its military advantage. The 2023 summer offensive, which dragged into autumn, was unsuccessful. Planning for the offensive appears to have been overly optimistic and poorly connected to how the Ukrainian armed forces actually fight, despite numerous analyses warning that the operation would prove costly and difficult, and that manoeuvre warfare was unlikely to attain a quick breakthrough against a well-prepared defence.
Conditions are not propitious for another major ground offensive in 2024. Our observations during field trips to Ukraine over the past year indicate that, to maximise Ukraine’s chances of eventual victory, Western countries need to recognise that the driving engine of Ukraine’s effectiveness has been a destruction-centred approach, resulting in high levels of attrition – that is, reducing an enemy’s capacity to fight by inflicting higher losses in personnel and materiel than one’s own side is suffering, which privileges firepower over mobility and direct attack or prepared defence over flanking action. Attempts at manoeuvre against a prepared defence have consistently floundered, especially in the absence of a decisive force advantage. While manoeuvre is still relevant on the battlefield, it will need a lot of help from attrition to bear fruit.
The West should focus on resourcing Ukraine’s ability to establish a decisive advantage in fires – meaning, typically, tube and rocket artillery, battlefield strike drones, long-range precision-strike systems and support by tactical aviation. No less important, the West needs to help Ukraine scale its capacity to employ units so that it can exploit that advantage in offensive operations. Western countries should also help Ukraine ramp up industrial production of those capabilities that provide the greatest advantages in an attritional war. The West will need to be appreciative of Ukrainian force structure and military culture, as well as the challenges posed by an increasingly mobilised military, which means avoiding the temptation to try to convert the Ukrainian military to a more Western, manoeuvre-centred way of fighting.
A war of attrition
The more we know about the history of this war, the clearer it becomes how much was contingent, and how little was in fact overdetermined. Russia’s initial invasion was a high-risk operation, premised on the assumption that a long war could be avoided through the combination of a subversion campaign and a decisive decapitation strike against the Ukrainian government. In essence, the Russian concept of operations was driven by political assumptions, and therefore involved the use of forces in a manner that did not reflect how the Russian military trains and organises to fight in larger-scale combat operations. The invasion instead assumed that Russian forces could paralyse Ukrainian decision-making, isolate Ukraine’s armed formations and quickly advance across the vast country without meeting sustained resistance. The plans and objectives were also kept secret from the Russian troops until the final days or hours, leaving them materially and psychologically unready for a major campaign.
The first few days saw a confluence of events. Ukrainian units deployed on short notice, encountering streaming columns of Russian forces that were trying to meet compressed timetables. The decisive factor in many of these battles was not Western-provided weaponry but rather artillery. Russian forces were dispersed, unable to mass as they attempted to rapidly advance along divergent routes, and at a firepower disadvantage despite having overall superiority in fires. The Russian invasion force was brittle, consisting of perhaps 150,000 troops, with a third of it composed of mobilised personnel from the Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics, and auxiliaries from RosGvardia, Russia’s National Guard.
Following a series of defeats, Russian forces regrouped and pursued a campaign in the Donbas, offsetting a deficit in personnel with an artillery fire advantage of 12:1. They fired an average of 20,000 shells per day during this time period, and likely averaged 15,000 over the course of 2022. Ukrainian casualties rose as Ukrainian forces were outgunned and ran low on ammunition. At this stage, Western assistance became crucial. Various types of tube artillery and long-range precision-strike systems entered the war. Most importantly, Western ammunition enabled Ukraine to sustain defensive fire so as to exhaust the Russian offensive in the Donbas and conduct localised counter-offensives to maintain pressure. Although Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Severodonetsk were ultimately successful, Russian forces paid a steep price. The decisive factor in the Russian campaign was artillery firepower, which allowed the Russian military to establish localised advantages in the correlation of forces, despite being disadvantaged in personnel overall.
Ukraine then retook the initiative, launching two major offensives of its own in late summer and autumn 2022. Attrition worked to its advantage. Ukraine had mobilised and substantially expanded the size of its forces, whereas Russia was trying to fight the war at peacetime strength. Russia lacked the forces to stabilise a front stretching more than 1,600 kilometres. In Kharkiv, Russia had only a thinly manned line with an incohesive mixture of units. The bulk of those units were the remnants of the Western Group of Forces, in some places at 25% strength, with low morale due to desertions. Ukrainian forces broke through at Kharkiv, leading to a Russian rout. But the decisive factor was attrition, which forced the Russian military to choose between defending Kherson and reinforcing Kharkiv.
The Russian military deployed airborne units in Kherson, prioritising that region with a relatively well-prepared defence. The initial Ukrainian offensive was unsuccessful, prompting the replacement of the commander in charge of the operation. Entrenched behind multiple lines peppered with minefields, Russian units held in September, yielding little territory. The geometry of the battlefield was highly favourable to Ukraine, with Russian units separated from their logistical-support network by the Dnipro River. Months of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes had further reduced the Russian supply line to one bridge across the Kakhovka Dam and a network of ferries. Although Russian forces contained a renewed Ukrainian offensive in October, Moscow was compelled to retreat in order to preserve the force, as the attritional battle strongly favoured Ukraine.
Kherson was a portent of the challenge to come in the Ukrainian counter-offensive of 2023. Ukraine struggled to break through a prepared defence. Months of HIMARS strikes constrained Russian logistics, but they did not enable a breakthrough, and Russian forces were ultimately able to withdraw. They were at their weakest point over the winter, but the Ukrainian army was also in no condition to press the advantage. Having run through mobilised personnel from Luhansk and Donetsk, Moscow was forced to mobilise another 300,000 men, which served to stabilise their lines. Meanwhile, a grinding battle at Bakhmut, led by the Wagner Group, turned into a bloody and politically symbolic fight. Wagner eventually captured Bakhmut in May due to three factors: the Russian airborne held their flanks to prevent counter-attacks; Russian commanders had access to a large supply of convicts from the Russian prison system to use as assault infantry; and most importantly Russia enjoyed a fires advantage of 5:1 for much of the battle. Both sides thought that attrition favoured them.
Based on our research, Ukraine enjoyed a favourable loss ratio over Russia of up to 1:4 in total casualties during the nine-month battle, but the Russian forces that were fighting as part of Wagner were likely 70% convicts. Bakhmut thus immersed Ukrainian units in a fight in which Ukraine had the advantage on the basis of the attrition ratio, but which would pit its more experienced and valuable soldiers against Russia’s relatively expendable ones. The city itself had little strategic value. Wagner was particularly effective in urban terrain owing to its ruthless employment of expendable assault infantry. As the battle dragged on, the rest of the Russian military used the time to dig in, entrenching and laying down minefields across much of the southern and northern fronts. Buoyed by mobilisation, the Russian military launched its own winter offensive in late January by way of a series of localised attacks across a broad front.
This effort proved unsuccessful because the Russian forces were unable to achieve a sufficient advantage to break through, the force quality being too low to coordinate attacks in large formations. Many of the attacks were undertaken by platoon-sized units, which quickly drew Ukrainian fire and were defeated. The fires advantage Russian forces enjoyed in 2022 also started to deteriorate. This was not due primarily to HIMARS strikes, which forced a reorganisation of the Russian logistical system, but rather to the fact that Russia lacked the ammunition reserves to sustain the volume of fire reached in 2022. Those deficits began to force doctrinal adaptation in the Russian military, with greater emphasis on strike drones and more precise types of munitions.
This brief, circumscribed account does not explore the air war or maritime operations, but it does highlight the importance of force management, terrain and establishing a fires advantage, and the struggle by both sides to effectively employ their forces in offensive operations. With the exception of an initial manoeuvre-and-strike phase, which failed for conceptual and political reasons, the war has been characterised by attritional fighting and set-piece battles. In 2022, Ukraine was able to make effective use of attrition and exploit the structural problems in the Russian war effort. In 2023, it was not able to repeat the success of 2022, though Russia too has failed to make any significant gains on the ground.
Ukraine’s 2023 offensive
Ukraine’s offensive was freighted with unrealistic expectations, but the fact remains that summer 2023 presented a good opportunity to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Russian forces were low on ammunition and lacked offensive potential. It was reasonable to think that Ukraine could establish an advantage in artillery fire, and the risk of a Russian counter-offensive was low. Western support, which has been essential to Ukraine’s war effort, was also likely to peak in summer 2023. The United States was burning through its stockpile of ammunition, while European states had failed to ramp up munitions production in 2022 and were just beginning to make the required investments, with lacklustre results. With elections looming in 2024, the political headwinds in Western capitals also suggested that funding to support Ukraine would decline following this operation. The US borrowed ammunition from South Korea, and other Western countries made efforts to contribute as part of a crash train-and-equip programme for Ukrainian forces. All told, the West trained and equipped nine brigades for the offensive. Ukraine would field several additional brigades from the armed forces and national guard, organised under two corps, and a reserve task force.
Ukraine had no risk-free options, but its strategy incorporated several choices and trade-offs, some of which compounded risk. Newly trained brigades, with just a few months of training, would take the lead in the assault, while more experienced units were kept fighting at Bakhmut. Ukraine also split its forces and artillery along three axes – Bakhmut, Velyka Novosilka and Tokmak – in hopes of pinning down Russian forces. Essentially, there were three offensives, which would pressure Russian forces such that they could not redeploy forces to one front without weakening another. In retrospect, the value of a prepared defence was underestimated, and Ukrainian forces could not attain the requisite advantage to break through along any of the operational directions selected. Western countries provided long-range air-launched cruise missiles in advance of the operation, but these capabilities did not prove decisive.
Whether Ukraine had sufficient breaching equipment, mine-clearing assets and air defence is still debated. But the more salient fact is that mobilisation had helped refill personnel levels within the Russian military and yielded more than 70 additional motor-rifle regiments, among other units. Consequently, Russian force density was much higher relative to terrain held. Furthermore, Russian engineering brigades prepared defences with digging machines and cement, using bunkers and towns as strong points. In the south, along the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis, the Russian military established multiple defensive lines and held the high ground. Russian units focused on manning the first line of defence and conducted counter-attacks to prevent Ukrainian forces from gathering momentum. The challenge to Ukraine – involving an established defence, a high force-density-to-terrain ratio and unfavourable geometry – was much greater than it had been in Kherson. In terms of the condition of Russian forces, the situation was practically the opposite of the one that had prevailed in Kharkiv during Ukraine’s breakthrough in September 2022.
The initial Ukrainian breaching effort in June failed. New units made common mistakes with respect to planning, coordinating artillery fire with assaults, orienting at night and employing breaching equipment, and in a few cases had engaged in unfortunate friendly-fire incidents early in the attack. Moreover, Ukrainian brigades could generate at most a few reinforced companies on the offence, backed by artillery. This meant that a brigade-level attack was in practice two reinforced companies advancing, with perhaps one in reserve. Ukraine was deploying combat power onto the battlefield in small packets, unable to coordinate formations at larger scale. Western equipment helped save lives, and proved much more survivable than comparable Russian kit, but by itself it was hardly a game-changer. In fact, more experienced units that stepped in after the failed initial assault, without Western equipment, performed better in both offensive and defensive tasks, demonstrating that while capability matters, experience and leadership also figure significantly into the equation. An advantage in artillery fire of between 3:2 and 2:1 yielded little better than overall parity, not enough to shock or suppress Russian formations, which anticipated and defended the main axis of the Ukrainian advance.
Subsequently, the Ukrainian military changed tactics, stressing dismounted-infantry attacks and seeking to attain an advantage in artillery fire sufficient to suppress Russian batteries. Much of the combat shifted to individual tree lines, typically at the level of platoons and occasionally that of reinforced companies. This approach reduced losses and preserved equipment, but did not lead to a breakthrough. Ukraine was able to breach the first Russian defensive line in the south but exhausted its offensive capacity by October without reaching its minimal objective of Tokmak. Ukraine also stuck with the overall strategy of splitting forces in three directions and keeping some of its better units in a sustained counter-attack at Bakhmut that yielded little. Russia had enough reserves to rotate in airborne regiments by September and generated additional combat power sufficient to launch its own offensive in Avdiivka in October. The Russian offensive in Avdiivka equally failed to achieve a breakthrough, but it demonstrated that Russia had regenerated sufficient combat power to try to retake the initiative, and sufficient reserves to stop a Ukrainian breakthrough that year.
If Ukraine’s summer offensive fell short of its objectives, it was hardly a disaster. Ukraine retained much of the equipment it had been allocated while inflicting significant losses on defending Russian forces. Tactically, it was closer to a draw. The initial attack failed due to a combination of planning choices, force-employment issues, a shortage of enablers and most importantly a lack of a clear fires advantage relative to a well-prepared defence. The West did fail to provide available counters that could have negated some of the Russian advantages, such as long-range strike against Russian helicopter bases. But the narrative that the offensive failed solely because the West failed to provide sufficient equipment to Ukraine lacks explanatory power, especially since Ukraine did not run out of equipment during the offensive and could not employ it at scale from the outset.
In retrospect, what is notable about the offensive is how conventionally it was planned. It assumed an assault could breach Russian lines relatively quickly, and then be exploited with reserve forces. This line of thinking discounted the presence of Russia’s layered defences, persistent drone-based surveillance and panoply of capabilities that could deny manoeuvre. Given that Ukraine lacked a decisive superiority in the overall correlation of forces, the errant assumptions likely stemmed from the inordinate influence of the Western manoeuvrist school of thought, whereby the cognitive impact and shock of a combined-arms assault was supposed to force Russian units to withdraw from the first line, enabling a rapid breach and obviating the need to inflict high levels of attrition to set the conditions for success. In fact, the course of the war indicates that Ukraine and its Western backers did not sufficiently appreciate the importance of attrition as an enabler of manoeuvre, and that of a firepower advantage over combined-arms integration. Manoeuvrist tenets, which projected strong cognitive effects from manoeuvre, did not prove out in Ukraine’s offensive, and indeed have not been validated over the two-year span of the Russia–Ukraine war.
Air superiority and fire control
The war has played out in a largely air-denied or air-contested environment. Nevertheless, Russian Aerospace Forces have enjoyed greater freedom of action than their Ukrainian counterpart and employed stand-off strikes to some effect. Tactical aviation – namely, American-made F-16s – or a much larger set of long-range strike capabilities are important factors, but by themselves they were unlikely to make the crucial difference. Ukrainian force structure and doctrine are not designed around attainment of air superiority or the need for substantial air-delivered fires, and some of the challenges posed by Russia’s defences did not have obvious air-power solutions.
There is a tendency to treat air power as talismanic. But unstated assumptions about air power or long-range strike are often baked into expectations for what they might achieve. While Ukraine is steadily acquiring F-16 fighter aircraft and training to use them, this transition is a multiyear process. The fighters will eventually help Ukraine employ more Western strike capabilities and contest Russian air power, but having Western aircraft does not secure the ability to attain and maintain air superiority in an air-denied environment.
There is much a military would have to adjust with respect to how air power is employed, its organisational capacity and how operations are planned to effectively integrate air and land operations, and to realise the benefits of air power most associated with US achievements. Presuming sufficient kit would easily translate into that level of operational capability is especially problematic against a military, such as Russia’s, with an extensive network of integrated air defences and a large fleet of tactical aircraft. It is therefore unsurprising and appropriate that current discussions in Ukraine centre less on conventional air superiority and more on the advantages derived from the employment of drones at the tactical level and as part of long-range strike campaigns. This is a productive way to think about the sort of strike-support roles drones can play, and their ability to offset deficits in other capabilities.
The ‘deep battle’ notion, advanced by some, that Ukraine might have attained fire control – that is, the ability to strike critical Russian targets far behind Russian lines to facilitate a breakthrough – had it been able to advance within range of Russian ground lines of communication also seems unconvincing. This technology-centred theory of success made little sense: if it had been possible to achieve deep-battle effects by leveraging long-range strike capabilities, the offensive would not have been necessary in the first place. In the event, fire control via long-range precision strike was not practicable, and the persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, magazine depth and other requirements needed to establish it at longer ranges were not attainable. Furthermore, long-range precision strikes were poorly coordinated with attacks along the front line, further reducing their tactical impact. Where Ukrainian forces excelled was in delegating HIMARS systems to engage Russian artillery and high-value targets close to the front line. This leveraged qualitative superiority in fires to establish some degree of advantage. However, in most battles in Ukraine, each side has been able to range the other’s ground lines of communication, command and control, and forward logistics, with the lines often separated by a few kilometres. With rare exceptions, the combatants could not control the engagement via fires, resulting in attritional warfare that could last weeks or months.
While it makes sense for Ukraine to pursue localised air superiority and contest Russian air power, expectations about how quickly such efforts might produce meaningful results should be low. A long-term strategy should incorporate these efforts, but should not assume that they will be decisive or serve as centrepieces of the approach. Although fire control appears impractical, Ukraine could instead cultivate an expanded long-range strike capability for targeting key supporting elements of the Russian war effort far beyond tactical depths. In particular, low-cost drones in high volumes might prove more useful in degrading the Russian air advantage than in directly contesting it, and could anchor a sustained Ukrainian strike campaign over the course of 2024. They should not be viewed as a substitute for close battle, however. No matter how abundant, long-range strike capability is not likely to force a collapse of Russian positions without another ground offensive. In sum, it is necessary but not sufficient, and no theory of victory should be based on these means alone.
Making attrition work
The most recent offensive raises the question of whether the West should emphasise a combined-arms, manoeuvre-based approach, or focus instead on helping Ukraine attain advantage via a destruction-based approach, especially given what is likely to be a prolonged attritional phase. The course of the war illustrates that manoeuvre will have to be earned, and that integration and simultaneity – basically, the key virtues of combined-arms operations – are not only difficult to achieve but also unlikely to produce breakthroughs under the conditions prevailing in Ukraine. Rather, the focus needs to be first and foremost on the attritional destruction of Russia’s forces by firepower in both the close and deep battles to pave the way for manoeuvre. Ukraine, in short, needs to embrace a destruction-centred approach for the next stage of the war, which may in time enable manoeuvre to be more successful.
Attrition is a more dependable approach in part because the force quality required to execute combined-arms operations at scale is often difficult to maintain and reconstitute later in a conventional war. The Ukrainian armed forces have had to undergo cycles of reconstituting and rebuilding formations, often after losing more experienced soldiers and leaders to attrition. New units often consist of mobilised personnel, officers from other formations, and those who were promoted in grade, most without any professional military education. The emphasis therefore has to be on the fundamentals to build planning capacity within battalion and brigade staffs. This is required before higher levels of coordination are possible and instilling a major doctrinal evolution into a traditionally fires-centred military is feasible.
Furthermore, Ukraine’s principal problem in the 2023 offensive was not an inability to conduct combined-arms manoeuvre. While it is true the new brigades trained by Western countries struggled to coordinate combat arms, this was ancillary rather than central to the offensive’s failure. Accordingly, it is incorrect to conclude that Ukrainian forces could not succeed because they could not fight like a Western military, or that fighting like a Western military doctrinally requires air superiority, without which success is impossible. In fact, Ukraine made progress by trying to gain better positions, fighting for relative fires advantage that reduced overall losses, and made Russia pay a high price to defend terrain. Fighting like a Western military is not necessarily a recipe for success in this war. As many Ukrainian soldiers have suggested, the operating environment is such that some Western tactics and techniques appear unsuitable or dated.
Restoring Ukraine’s advantage
In a prior article discussing the course of the war in 2022, we assessed that combined-arms training and precision-strike systems would not prove sufficient to escape attrition in the coming offensive. Assuming Ukraine and the West now accept the unavoidability of a long war, both need to settle on a long-term strategy to effectively defend against Russian offensive operations, reconstitute Ukrainian forces and maintain pressure on the Russian military with the goal of restoring a battlefield advantage to Ukrainian armed forces. The strategy should cast 2024 as a pivotal year, with an eye to restoring the ability to conduct a successful offensive in 2025.
At this point, Russia has several material advantages. It is likely to retain an artillery-fire edge over the course of the year and beyond. Russia will also continue regenerating combat power, recruiting more than 10,000 troops per month. It will probably hold the strategic initiative along much of the 1,000 km front line and expand its strike campaign against Ukraine given increased production of drones and cruise missiles. Moreover, Moscow is now set to spend 6% of GDP on defence – a significant increase – and the real figure may be closer to 8%. Its apparent intent is to overwhelm Ukraine through defence-industrial mobilisation and sustained regeneration of combat forces.
The most effective way for Ukraine to rebuild its advantage is to mount an effective defence in depth, which will reduce Ukraine’s losses and ammunition requirements. At present, Russia holds the defensive advantage, on account of dedicated engineering brigades, machinery and the capacity to fortify quickly, as well as extensive minefields and sophisticated minelaying systems, including those capable of distance mining. A better defence would also permit Ukraine to restructure its force deployments, rotate brigades and free up parts of the military for reconstitution.
Ukraine will also have to replenish its force. Based on our field research, Ukraine’s average soldier appears to be in his 40s, which is ill-suited for certain combat tasks. Ukrainian leadership needs to review policies on the ages of those conscripted. The West can assist by scaling up training programmes, which need to be adjusted on the basis of lessons learned in the 2023 offensive and Ukrainian experience in this war. Within Ukraine, expanded facilities and training ranges will be needed to rotate units off and onto the front line. Further, units that have been on the front lines since the beginning of the war – particularly those at Bakhmut – need rest and recuperation.
More broadly, Ukraine’s military requires recapitalisation. Ukraine and its Western backers need to increase industrial capacity and output of key systems in order to ensure that Ukraine will have the requisite fires advantage. For supporting countries, the challenge is to significantly increase production of artillery ammunition and air-defence interceptors. Our field research indicates that Ukraine will need around 75,000–90,000 artillery shells per month to sustain the war defensively, and more than double that – 200,000–250,000 – for a major offensive. At this stage, the Western coalition depends mostly on US stocks to sustain the lower range of this figure and does not have the ammunition to support a major offensive next year. Ukraine can reduce its requirements for artillery ammunition by significantly increasing production of strike drones, both first-person-view drones for use in close battle and long-range strike drones to target Russian critical infrastructure. To do this, Ukraine will have to resolve several financing, contracting and industrial-capacity issues. The West, for its part, will need to support Ukraine in procuring or developing munitions to use with drones, as such munitions from other sources are in short supply. Ukraine’s indigenous ability to maintain and repair Western armoured fighting vehicles and artillery is growing, and the West should work to advance the localisation of maintenance, parts replacement and production of strike systems.
Naturally, defence and reconstitution by themselves are not enough, and Ukraine will have to be careful about being drawn into costly battles like Bakhmut, which tend to lead to a sunk-costs mentality. These may be politically symbolic, but they trade short-term gain for strategic costs that hamper reconstitution. At this stage of the war, the West is neither expecting nor desirous of fleeting or isolated battlefield victories for the continuation of its support. Instead, Ukraine should plan for and execute strike campaigns – for example, against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Russian air bases in Crimea or key supporting infrastructure. Heading into 2024, it is clear that the optimal strategy is one that avoids a costly stalemate, or worse, a mounting Russian advantage that leads to Ukraine’s defeat. Both Ukraine and the Western countries involved retain good options, but success will require better alignment on strategy.
* * *
We recognise that much of our analysis represents an incomplete first draft of military history. Other analysts and historians will undoubtedly revise and improve our understanding of this war. But it does seem fairly clear that the war has seen prolonged phases in which the ability to manoeuvre has been earned chiefly through extensive attrition and the destruction of the enemy’s capacity rather than through cognitive effects or effective employment of combined arms. Modern forms of long-range precision strike have helped Ukraine to interdict or suppress Russia’s logistical nodes, but they have not established fire control beyond tactical ranges or circumvented the need for close battle. We appreciate that these results may be due to the specific context of this war, and analysts should be careful in trying to translate observations about the Russia–Ukraine war in particular into lessons learned about the character of contemporary war in general.
While Western countries should continue to help Ukrainian forces improve their overall quality and their ability to scale up combined-arms operations, prevailing conditions in Ukraine still favour attritional and positional approaches rather than those suitable for manoeuvre warfare. The operative factor is attrition, inflicted primarily through artillery and strike drones. The West is therefore best served by focusing on resourcing Ukraine’s fires-centred approach and helping Ukraine scale offensive operations to exploit a fires advantage when it is attained. This may be impossible to achieve via quantity, but it can be done through a combination of means which altogether add up to meaningful superiority in support of an offensive. These two factors should drive investment in drones to offset shortages of artillery ammunition, cheaper precision-strike capabilities, and electronic warfare to help restore mobility to the front line and reduce current Russian advantages in drone systems.
Ukraine’s military leadership appears keen to embrace technological innovation and tactical adaptation, and to rebuild the force’s combat potential. These objectives will take time to achieve, but it is clear that Ukraine’s military recognises the scale of the challenge and the need to move out as soon as possible in 2024. This will be a long war requiring a long-term outlook in strategy, but also timely decision-making. Despite the high stakes, it has become less clear that Washington and European capitals can muster the political will to see Ukraine through this war. The fact remains that Ukraine and the West enjoy the overall advantage in resources, and attrition can prove an important part of their theory of victory.
This article appears in the February–March 2024 issue of Survival: Global Politics and Strategy.
Author
3. How Navalny Changed Russia: Putin Cannot Silence the Opposition Leader’s Movement
A friend and a colleague suggested the media and political leaders stop referring to the late Alexei Navalny as the "Russian opposition leader." He recommends he be called the "Putin opposition leader" because he is very much not opposed to Russia, only Putin.
Excerpts:
Even after his arrest, Navalny’s name continued to be at the heart of the opposition agenda, both because he was the most recognizable figure, but also because he commanded unified support, both in the country and outside. Indeed, many of his supporters had been opposed to his decision to return to Russia in 2021, understanding that he was essentially returning to prison. They needed a leader to listen to and wanted him on the outside. But even from prison he found a way to communicate with them, no doubt further rankling the Kremlin.
In a way, Navalny’s death marks the culmination of years of efforts by the Russian state to eliminate all sources of opposition. For more than two decades, Putin has made political assassination an essential part of the Kremlin’s toolkit. It is a method he has used against troublemakers like journalist Anna Politkovskaya and whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko. He has used it against political opponents Boris Nemtsov, who was gunned down close to the Kremlin in 2015, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, who has been poisoned twice and is now in prison. Navalny, who had survived previous assassination attempts, was an even greater target.
But even now, the forces that Navalny has unleashed are unlikely to go away. His death is a terrible blow to anti-Putin Russians. It will be very hard to find a successor who can unify the opposition in the same way, even if the task is pressing, for it will be crucial for the Russian opposition to have a say in post-Putin future. But he has left behind his organization and his supporters and that is what matters. Those people are not going anywhere, and there may now be more of them than ever.
How Navalny Changed Russia
Putin Cannot Silence the Opposition Leader’s Movement
February 16, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by The Compatriots: The Russian Exiles Who Fought Against the Kremlin · February 16, 2024
The announcement on Friday that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has died in a remote Russian prison colony has left observers of the country in shock. For years the most fearless critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the pervasive corruption of Putin’s inner circle, Navalny had been serving a draconian 19-year sentence for extremism. Indeed, it was highly unlikely that he would ever be released as long as Putin was in power. But apparently, even that was not enough: According to the Russian prison service, Navalny collapsed after a short walk in the prison yard and lost consciousness and died soon after. The details of his death have yet to emerge, but in a Friday news conference, U.S. President Joe Biden expressed the consensus view of observers in Russia and around the world: “Putin is responsible.”
As brazen and heinous as it would be, a decision by Putin to kill Navalny should not come as a surprise. For the Russian president, silencing him once and for all makes perfect sense, even if the Kremlin’s spin-doctors try to deny it. After all, Navalny was a master of social media, who had often managed to beat the Kremlin at its own information game, exposing terrible abuses and misdeeds by the regime in Moscow, and broadcasting them to millions of people over YouTube and other platforms—even as the government did everything it could to silence him. In December 2020, he even managed to get a confession out of his own would-be government assassins, who had embarrassingly bungled an effort to poison him on a flight from Tomsk in Siberia to Moscow in August 2020.
Even more dangerous was Navalny’s extraordinary, boundary-defying popularity. Unlike any other Russian opposition figure since Putin came to power almost a quarter century ago, Navalny was able to build a following that went far beyond Russia’s urban elites. He reached people from every corner of the country, including workers and IT-engineers as well as liberals and professionals. His supporters were often equally fervent at home and abroad. And he was especially good at galvanizing younger Russians who might otherwise have turned away from politics altogether.
For Russian society, confused, depressed, and constantly besieged by an ever more repressive regime, Navalny was a lone uniting figure. Although Russian authorities isolated him in ever greater layers of confinement since his arrest upon his return to Russia in 2021, he continued to have that stature right up to the moment of his death. Navalny’s demise marks a dark new step in Putin’s ruthless pursuit of power. But it also raises a stark challenge for Russia’s opposition, which must now figure out how to sustain the unity he created and seize upon the movement he left behind.
ONE HUNDRED TOWNS AND CITIES
Navalny was hardly a prophet, but over the past decade he and a growing legion of supporters found a rare way to overcome the political obstacles that Russia’s liberal opposition had long found insurmountable. Ever since the 1990s, Russian liberals had been seemingly cursed by the reality that only in Russia’s biggest cities—places like Moscow and Saint Petersburg—could their push for democratic reforms be truly heard. Only in these urban environments were there liberal-minded populations who cared about building liberal institutions and democratic checks and balances. The rest of the country didn’t understand what democracy was about.
Putin, just like almost every autocratic leader in Moscow before him, from the tsars on up to Stalin, has long promoted this divide. As Putin’s Kremlin portrayed it, “real Russia”—the country beyond the big cities, didn’t understand Western freedoms. For these ordinary Russians, liberalism meant anarchy, and it was thus too early to give them Western-style rights. The liberals were out of touch with their own country. Again and again, this official narrative—and the liberal reformers’ relatively small following—was used as evidence that Russians were not ready for democracy. Thus began Putin’s strategy of “managed democracy”; only a strongman at the top, who understood the country, was capable of making reforms.
To some extent, the actual experience of Russia from the late Communist years to the 2010s seemed to support the Kremlin story. During the Perestroika years in the 1980s, for example, the democracy movement was largely concentrated in the big cities. And when the Soviet Union finally collapsed, only the democratic party Yabloko succeeded in building a broader network in other parts of Russia. But even Yabloko was unable to attract more than 20 percent of the vote at its peak in the 1990s. After Putin came to power, regional democratic activity quickly declined, seeming to provide further confirmation that Russia’s liberals, isolated in their big cities, were disconnected with the needs and interests of the rest of the vast country.
Navalny was the first opposition figure who managed to break this narrative. Combining his skills in using social media and a lawyer’s knack for unearthing precise, prosecutorial evidence with a natural sense of the issues ordinary Russians cared about most and natural gifts as a communicator, Navalny was able to attack the Putin regime in ways that had eluded more conventional liberals. Consider the reaction to Navalny’s 2017 YouTube documentary, “Don’t call him Dimon,” which exposed, in meticulous detail the rampant corruption of Russian Prime Minister and close Putin associate Dmitry Medvedev. The viral film helped Navalny organize protests in around 100 cities and towns across Russia that year, and by 2023 it had attracted more than 45 million views on YouTube. This national network of Navalny supporters, unknown to any other opposition figure, allowed him to destroy Kremlin conceits that he was just another lonely liberal in an ivory tower in Moscow, dreaming up implausible reforms.
YOUNG RUSSIANS
But Navalny’s power went far beyond his national message. By 2015, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, there was a growing consensus that Putin’s propaganda had largely succeeded on Russia’s youth, who were too young to remember the fleeting, tumultuous democratic reforms of the 1990s and had never really known democracy. Through years of indoctrination and top-down rule, it was assumed, Putin’s Kremlin had taken this rising generation out of politics altogether. Leave politics to us professionals, the understanding supposedly went, and we will let you enjoy the benefits of high oil prices, Western luxuries, and a rising standard of living.
Navalny’s organization, the FBK, or Anti-Corruption Foundation, exploded that myth. Crowds of teenagers joined the Navalny protests and became one of its principal forces. In 2017 a photo of a Russian policeman trying to pull two young boys down from a lamppost in Pushkin square in the center of Moscow became a symbol for Navalny supporters across the country. Thus, not only was Navalny able to build a national opposition political organization for the first time in Russia’s post-Soviet history—one that had a vast regional presence and appealed to multiple strata of Russian society. He also captivated Russia’s youth in ways that the Kremlin could not, thus posing a real threat to the long-term durability of the regime. And all of this was accomplished in the face of ever tightening repression, both covert and overt, from the Russian authorities.
Perhaps the most crucial element in Navalny’s unifying presence was social media, which his organization continually exploited—even after his arrest in 2021. Navalny’s team proved to be surprisingly adept at continually overcoming the technological challenges to political activity in Putin’s Russia. Navalny’s unstoppable social media presence became especially important after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine when the Kremlin took steps to silence or exile all opposition forces.
Large-scale arrests by Russian authorities at the beginning of the war made clear that any opposition political activities in the country would be impossible. Yet at the same time, Russian journalists who had gone into exile continued to engage with the Russians in the country, despite online censorship. It proved to be surprisingly successful: millions of Russians continue to rely on Russian exile journalists to get accurate information about crucial developments in the war in Ukraine, or about such internal upheavals as Prigozhin’s 2023 mutiny.
At the heart of this shift to online journalism, however, was the approach that Navalny had perfected over the previous decade. As the war began, opposition activists in exile discovered and adopted many of the Navalny organization’s strategies. Soon, all Russian opposition groups had moved to YouTube and Telegram, following on the Navalny’s team successful use of these platforms, including when Navalny himself had been in exile in Germany, after his poisoning. Soon, these platforms became the real home of Russia’s opposition, like Navalny, serving both Russians in the country and in its now vast diaspora, with commentary, investigations, and daily news coverage that had now become completely unavailable in official Russian media.
A MOVEMENT UNLEASHED
Even after his arrest, Navalny’s name continued to be at the heart of the opposition agenda, both because he was the most recognizable figure, but also because he commanded unified support, both in the country and outside. Indeed, many of his supporters had been opposed to his decision to return to Russia in 2021, understanding that he was essentially returning to prison. They needed a leader to listen to and wanted him on the outside. But even from prison he found a way to communicate with them, no doubt further rankling the Kremlin.
In a way, Navalny’s death marks the culmination of years of efforts by the Russian state to eliminate all sources of opposition. For more than two decades, Putin has made political assassination an essential part of the Kremlin’s toolkit. It is a method he has used against troublemakers like journalist Anna Politkovskaya and whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko. He has used it against political opponents Boris Nemtsov, who was gunned down close to the Kremlin in 2015, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, who has been poisoned twice and is now in prison. Navalny, who had survived previous assassination attempts, was an even greater target.
But even now, the forces that Navalny has unleashed are unlikely to go away. His death is a terrible blow to anti-Putin Russians. It will be very hard to find a successor who can unify the opposition in the same way, even if the task is pressing, for it will be crucial for the Russian opposition to have a say in post-Putin future. But he has left behind his organization and his supporters and that is what matters. Those people are not going anywhere, and there may now be more of them than ever.
Foreign Affairs · by The Compatriots: The Russian Exiles Who Fought Against the Kremlin · February 16, 2024
4. The US Military Already Has a Decades-Old Countermeasure for Russian Space Nukes
The US Military Already Has a Decades-Old Countermeasure for Russian Space Nukes
military.com · by Jared Keller · February 16, 2024
The national security of the United States is currently imperiled by a new threat from Russia, according to the White House: a "troubling" emerging, anti-satellite weapon that, while ostensibly incapable of "physical destruction" on the ground, could severely disrupt U.S. military and civilian operations in outer space. Some U.S. government officials suspect the system may be nuclear, a prospect that raises concerns that the Russian government could not only disable strategic satellites in orbit, but, in turn, deal a major blow to the U.S. economy by degrading both government and civilian space-based operations. The threat is apparently so dire that lawmakers in Congress are sounding alarm bells to the public.
Luckily, the U.S. military has a relatively simple countermeasure in place to deal with space-based weapons: just send up a fighter jet to blow the damn thing out of the sky. After all, the Air Force had done it before -- once.
A F-15 fighter jet piloted by then-Maj. Wilbert 'Doug' Pearson Jr. flies an ASM-135 anti-satellite missile on Sept. 13, 1985. (Paul E. Reynolds/U.S. Air Force photo)
In 1985, as the Cold War was winding down, the U.S. military found itself with a relatively new problem. The Soviet Union had developed a "robust" ability to launch small satellites into orbit that could keep track of U.S. Navy warships at sea, a capability that diminished the Pentagon's ability to suddenly project power at any shore in the world without significant risk of detection, according to Maj. Gen. Wilbert "Doug" Pearson Jr. (ret.), the one and only Air Force pilot to ever shoot down a satellite in orbit above the planet.
The U.S. military had been pursuing anti-satellite weapons since the dawn of the space race with the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik 1 in 1957, especially as fears of Russian space nukes grew at the height of the Cold War. According to Smithsonian magazine, previous efforts to develop anti-satellite weapons included air-launched ballistic missiles as well as "adapted versions" of the ground-launched, anti-ballistic missiles system, among others. None of those efforts proved viable solutions, although a fast-moving aircraft appeared the most likely platform to deliver a kill vehicle to an adversary's satellite.
"Earlier programs identified how absolutely difficult it was to hit a satellite with another object, because things in space, in order to be in orbit around the Earth, have to move at very high velocities, and hitting something at very high velocities is very difficult," Pearson told Task & Purpose of his miraculous space kill in a 2020 interview.
In response to the Soviet Union's rapid development of "co-orbital" anti-satellite weapons in the late 1970s -- weapons "designed to reach orbit, sync up with their targets and detonate, sending shrapnel out to destroy enemy satellites," per Smithsonian -- the Carter administration launched a weapons program that would lead to the development of the ASM-135 missile, the very system that Pearson would use to eventually take out a satellite in orbit. The underlying concept of the ASM-135 was simple: An aircraft would launch a two-stage missile at altitude that would then release an autonomous "Miniature Homing Vehicle" that would then impact an enemy satellite, breaking it into pieces at velocities reaching thousands of miles per hour.
By the early 1980s, Pearson was commander of the F-15 Anti-Satellite Combined Test Force out of Edwards Air Force Base in California. When the time came to test the ASM-135, the F-15 was the logical choice for a delivery vehicle. At the time, the twin-engine fighter jet "was the real racehorse of the fighter community," as Pearson put it in his 2020 interview. "It was big enough and powerful enough that it could carry a fairly large missile on the centerline. So it was the perfect choice. And it had good navigation capabilities, very reliable, and it could operate from many bases along the East or West coast."
After five successful test launches of the ASM-135 missile from an F-15, Pearson's team decided that the time had come to test the system on a real-world satellite target. The team chose the Solwind P78-1 satellite, a solar observation platform that had been orbiting the planet at an altitude of around 325 miles since it was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in 1979.
The day of the launch came down to Sept. 13, 1985. After rendezvousing with a refueling tanker about 200 miles from Vandenberg AFB, Pearson finally moved into position at an altitude of 30,000 feet to launch the ASM-135 at the Solwind satellite, which was moving at a speed of around 17,500 mph some 300 miles above Pearson's aircraft. According to Smithsonian, Pearson "lit the afterburners, accelerated the airplane to Mach 1.3, and pulled into a 60-degree climb" before hitting his aircraft's "pickle button" and launching the missile toward its target.
The ASM-135 missile quickly accelerated to 13,000 feet per second, streaking off into the distance. Because he couldn't get visual confirmation of impact with the Solwind satellite, Pearson keyed his microphone to talk to the Air Force team on the ground at Vandenberg AFB, but his friend SCott on the ground "couldn't get a word out because all the screaming and yelling at the control room totally overrode him," as Pearson recalled in his 2020 interview.
"Thirty-five years ago, hitting a bullet with a bullet seemed impossible to many people," Pearson told Smithsonian. "The F-15 ASAT program clearly demonstrated one high-speed object -- faster than a speeding bullet -- could be guided to a precise impact on another, even faster object."
Retired Maj. Gen. Doug Pearson (left) and his son, Capt. Todd Pearson, joke with one another on Sept. 13, 2007, prior to Capt. Pearson taking off on the Celestial Eagle remembrance flight at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla. (Erik Hogmeyer/U.S. Air Force photo)
Despite his successful shootdown of a satellite in orbit, Pearson's glory was short-lived: The ASM-135 program only conducted two additional test flights before lawmakers in Congress slashed the effort's funding the following year, according to Smithsonian. Pearson would go on to retire in 2005 as the commander of the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB.
And while the U.S. has since developed other methods to disable satellites -- the Navy destroyer USS Lake Erie used a Standard Missile-3 to kill a malfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office satellite in 2008 -- nobody else has matched Pearson's distinct honor as a "space ace" since that fateful day in 1985.
"I don't know exactly what happened, but we demonstrated we could do it," said Pearson of the discontinued program. "And we made it look relatively easy. It wasn't, but it looked that way."
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military.com · by Jared Keller · February 16, 2024
5. U.S. Plans to Send Weapons to Israel Amid Biden Push for Cease-Fire Deal
Excerpts:
The proposed delivery is small in comparison to the scale of Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza. An assessment by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence in December found that Israel dropped 29,000 weapons on Gaza in a little over two months, U.S. officials said.
Still, security analysts say any additional weapons deliveries would be seen by the Israeli government as a signal of U.S. backing for the war, and waning American leverage, at a moment when the conflict risks tipping into a dangerous new phase.
“The U.S. is both pouring fuel on this regional conflict and then trying to tamp out the flames,” said Brian Finucane, a former attorney at the State Department and now a senior adviser at International Crisis Group, a conflict-resolution organization.
The looming offensive on Rafah, which is on the border with Egypt, has caused alarm among foreign governments, U.N. officials and Palestinian leaders who fear that any attack on the area would cause death and destruction among the civilians sheltering there. Egypt in recent days began construction of a concrete enclosure in the area in preparation for a possible influx of tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees, Egyptian officials said this past week.
The Biden administration has said the offensive shouldn’t proceed without a plan to protect civilians there. Israel hasn’t publicly announced a plan for civilians in Rafah, but Israeli military officials say they intend to move the civilian population to other areas within Gaza.
U.S. Plans to Send Weapons to Israel Amid Biden Push for Cease-Fire Deal
Delivery would include bombs, precision-guidance kits and bomb fuses
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-plans-to-send-weapons-to-israel-amid-biden-push-for-cease-fire-deal-184e75bc?mod=hp_lead_pos4
By Jared Malsin
Follow
and Nancy A. Youssef
Follow
Updated Feb. 17, 2024 12:00 am ET
A satellite image released this past week shows a wall being built in Egypt along its border with Gaza as Israel prepared to launch an assault on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
ISTANBUL—The Biden administration is preparing to send bombs and other weapons to Israel that would add to its military arsenal even as the U.S. pushes for a cease-fire in the war in Gaza, according to current and former U.S. officials.
The proposed arms delivery includes roughly a thousand each of MK-82 bombs, KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munitions that add precision guidance to bombs, and FMU-139 bomb fuses, the officials said. The arms are estimated to be worth tens of millions of dollars. The proposed delivery is still being reviewed internally by the administration, a U.S. official said, and the details of the proposal could change before the Biden administration notifies congressional committee leaders who would need to approve the transfer.
The planned weapons transfer comes during a crucial moment in the war in Gaza as Israel prepares to launch an assault on the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, where more than one million Palestinians are sheltering from the war. Israel has said it needs to expand its military offensive in the area to attack Hamas militants hiding among civilians who have fled there from other areas of the strip.
The White House referred questions to the State Department and Defense Department, which both declined to comment. The Israeli Defense Ministry and Prime Minister’s Office didn’t respond to requests for comment. The Israeli military referred questions to the Defense Ministry.
An assessment of the proposed arms transfer drafted by the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem, and viewed by The Wall Street Journal, said the Israeli government requested “rapid acquisition of these items for the defense of Israel against continued and emerging regional threats.”
The assessment said there were no potential human rights concerns with the sale. “Israel takes effective action to prevent gross violations of human rights and to hold security forces responsible that violate those rights. In the past, Israel has been a transparent partner in U.S. investigations into allegations of defense article misuse,” the assessment says.
Bodies of Palestinians, most of whom were killed in Israeli strikes, at a hospital in Rafah earlier this month. PHOTO: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS
A former U.S. official said the transfer would be financed by U.S. military aid to Israel. The vast majority of Israeli weapons acquisitions from the U.S. come from the billions of dollars it receives in American government funding to bolster its military each year.
Precision-guided munitions would allow Israel to better target Hamas leaders and potentially strike in areas where enemy forces are entrenched underground. And while MK-82 bombs don’t have the same precision, Israel has kits that can be attached to them and improve their precision. Israel has used such bombs during the war in Gaza, U.S. officials say.
The U.S. has provided roughly 21,000 precision-guided munitions to Israel since the start of the war, and Israel has used roughly half of those. According to a U.S. intelligence assessment, the remaining weapons are enough for Israel to sustain 19 more weeks of fighting in Gaza. That span would shrink to days if Israel launched a second front against Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon, according to a person familiar with the U.S. assessment.
The transfer is indicative of a broader effort by the Biden administration to speed the flow of weapons to Israel after the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas, U.S. officials say. The U.S. began to airlift weapons directly to Israel shortly after the attack, and has twice invoked emergency rules to bypass Congress and deliver weapons to Israel.
President Biden has grown frustrated with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as the U.S. attempts to rein in Israel’s military campaign. But the Biden administration has so far ruled out placing conditions on arms sales to Israel as a means of coercing changes in Israel’s conduct of the war. Israel has said it needs the requested weapons to complete its campaign against Hamas in Gaza.
Biden strongly sided with Israel after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack but has since urged Israel to reduce the risk of civilian casualties in Gaza and accept a cease-fire deal that would also free hostages held by Palestinian militants. Facing re-election this year, Biden now faces an American public divided over the war, with his own party split between supporters of Israel and those calling for curbs on arms sales.
The war in Gaza has killed more than 28,000 people, most of them women and children, according to Palestinian health officials, whose numbers don’t distinguish between combatants and civilians. The war started after Hamas launched a cross-border assault that Israel says killed 1,200 Israelis, most of them civilians, in the most lethal attack in the country’s history.
PHOTO: MOHAMMED ABED/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The looming Israeli offensive on Rafah has raised concern that an attack on the area would cause death and destruction among the civilians sheltering there. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The deal also comes amid spreading concern among the American diplomatic corps about the use of U.S. weapons in Gaza. U.S. officials said this past week that they had launched an investigation into several Israeli strikes in Gaza, including one that killed 125 people in October, along with the possible use of white phosphorus in Lebanon.
The proposed delivery is small in comparison to the scale of Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza. An assessment by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence in December found that Israel dropped 29,000 weapons on Gaza in a little over two months, U.S. officials said.
Still, security analysts say any additional weapons deliveries would be seen by the Israeli government as a signal of U.S. backing for the war, and waning American leverage, at a moment when the conflict risks tipping into a dangerous new phase.
“The U.S. is both pouring fuel on this regional conflict and then trying to tamp out the flames,” said Brian Finucane, a former attorney at the State Department and now a senior adviser at International Crisis Group, a conflict-resolution organization.
The looming offensive on Rafah, which is on the border with Egypt, has caused alarm among foreign governments, U.N. officials and Palestinian leaders who fear that any attack on the area would cause death and destruction among the civilians sheltering there. Egypt in recent days began construction of a concrete enclosure in the area in preparation for a possible influx of tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees, Egyptian officials said this past week.
The Biden administration has said the offensive shouldn’t proceed without a plan to protect civilians there. Israel hasn’t publicly announced a plan for civilians in Rafah, but Israeli military officials say they intend to move the civilian population to other areas within Gaza.
Write to Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com
6. Ukraine Withdraws From Besieged City as Russia Advances
You have to live to fight another day.
Ukraine Withdraws From Besieged City as Russia Advances
Kyiv’s military chief orders outgunned forces to pull out of Avdiivka, the first city captured by Russia in months
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-withdraws-from-besieged-city-as-russia-advances-554644c0?mod=world_lead_story
By Isabel ColesFollow
, Alistair MacDonaldFollow
and Ievgeniia Sivorka
Updated Feb. 17, 2024 4:56 am ET
Ukraine’s top military commander ordered his outgunned forces to withdraw from the besieged eastern city of Avdiivka, as Russia’s army made its first major gain in months.
Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy said early Saturday that he was pulling back troops to better defensive lines in order to prevent encirclement and preserve lives. The Russian army’s push into the city came rapidly in recent days, as Ukraine’s lack of artillery ammunition hamstrung efforts to hold the invaders back. The Biden administration has blamed the lack of shells on Congress’s failure to send further military aid to Ukraine.
Russia’s capture of Avdiivka following a monthslong assault represents the biggest victory for President Vladimir Putin since his forces seized the eastern city of Bakhmut in May 2023. Moscow has retaken the initiative in the war as Ukraine is short on personnel and military equipment after a failed counteroffensive last year.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Saturday that the risk of encirclement prompted the decision to withdraw.
“It’s an absolutely logical, justified and professional decision to preserve the maximum number of Ukrainians,” he said at the Munich Security Conference, a global security and foreign-policy forum.
Control over the city puts Russia closer to its strategic aim of seizing all of the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions. But the slow pace of the Russian advance and the heavy cost in lives and armored vehicles have given Ukrainian officials confidence that Russian forces lack the tactical coordination and quality personnel needed for a major breakthrough.
Zelensky said Saturday that Ukrainian troops needed more weapons, particularly long-range strike weapons and air-defense systems, to combat Russian attacks. Russia, he said, was advancing by destroying buildings and showing disregard for its own soldiers’ lives.
“There are not enough weapons,” Zelensky said.
Russian forces had pressed deeper into Avdiivka on Friday, pounding it with guided aerial bombs after cutting a key supply road. Ukraine sent reinforcements including the powerful 3rd Assault Brigade this week in a deployment apparently aimed at securing the retreat.
A Ukrainian military medic treating a soldier who was wounded along the front line near Avdiivka. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Russian military bloggers posted an image of the Soviet victory flag flying from a sign in Avdiivka where Zelensky took a selfie during a visit to the city in December.
The Russian gains demonstrate the enormous challenge Kyiv would face against its larger neighbor without further U.S. support for Kyiv. The Senate this week passed a new aid package containing about $60 billion related to Ukraine, overcoming objections from Republican lawmakers. But the bill faces a further hurdle in the GOP-run House.
National Security Council spokesman John Kirby on Wednesday said a lack of shells was in large part to blame for the situation in Avdiivka.
“Russia is sending wave after wave of conscript forces to attack Ukrainian positions and because Congress has yet to pass the supplemental bill, we’ve not been able to provide Ukraine with the artillery shells they desperately need to disrupt these Russian assaults,” he said.
Zelensky said he would be prepared to accompany former President Donald Trump, whose influence in the Republican Party is widely seen as having eroded support for Ukraine, to visit the front lines and show him what was happening.
For every 10 artillery shells fired by Russia, Ukraine can respond with only one, according to a Ukrainian commander. PHOTO: LIBKOS/GETTY IMAGES
The decision to withdraw from Avdiivka contrasts with the battle for Bakhmut, when Ukrainian forces held out for as long as possible, taking heavy losses that depleted Kyiv’s army ahead of the counteroffensive. Syrskiy, who was criticized over that strategy when he commanded defense of that city, was promoted to commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces last week.
“Our soldiers performed their military duty with dignity, did everything possible to destroy the best Russian military units, inflicted significant losses on the enemy in terms of manpower and equipment,” Syrskiy said. “The lives of military personnel are the most valuable thing.”
Ukrainian forces began pulling out of the city this week, withdrawing from a military base in the south where they were at risk of being cut off by Russian forces. “We held this position as long as it allowed us to effectively deter and destroy the enemy,” said Oleksandr Tarnavskiy, commander of Ukrainian forces fighting in the southeast.
Ukrainian soldiers said they were suffering from acute shortages of ammunition. For every 10 artillery shells fired by Russia, Ukraine can respond with only one, Tarnavskiy said. Soldiers sometimes hold fire even when Russian soldiers are in their sights in order to preserve ammunition.
Another huge challenge is Russia’s intensive use of guided aerial bombs against which Ukraine has little protection, soldiers say.
“These bombs completely destroy any position,” said Maksym Zhorin, deputy commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade, adding that Russia dropped between 60 and 80 a day. He described the battle for Avdiivka as “many times more hellish” than Bakhmut.
Russia renewed its efforts to seize the city last fall as Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the south petered out. After failed assaults on the city using columns of tanks and armored troop carriers, the Russians changed tactics, sending waves of infantry forward in small groups.
Ukrainian troops had held off Russian attacks on Avdiivka since 2014. PHOTO: LIBKOS/GETTY IMAGES
The industrial city has long been a thorn in the side of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. The fortified town forms a salient north of Donetsk city, limiting Russian control of the region. Ukrainian troops had held off Russian attacks since 2014, when Moscow launched a covert invasion of Ukraine’s east. Once home to more than 30,000, Avdiivka had seen its population dwindle to 1,400 by the time Russia intensified its campaign for the city last fall.
On a recent day outside the city, Ukrainian soldiers talked of exhaustion and falling morale.
“Everybody is tired and they don’t know what will happen in the next few minutes, let alone tomorrow,” said Nazar Filipchuk, an infantryman who has been in the army for two years.
Among soldiers’ complaints was a lack of time off and that brigades aren’t being rotated out of hot-spot areas, in the way that U.S. and European forces would move units out after a defined tour of duty.
Behind Avdiivka, Ukrainian engineers were building a series of antitank trenches, likely as a defensive line to fall back to.
Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.
Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com and Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com
7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces have begun to withdraw from Avdiivka, and Russian forces appear to be focused on complicating or preventing a complete Ukrainian withdrawal.
- Ukrainian forces may have to conduct counterattacks to conduct an orderly withdrawal from Avdivika, and Russian efforts to complicate or prevent a Ukrainian withdrawal may become increasingly attritional.
- Germany and France both signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine on February 16.
- NATO officials are increasingly warning that Russia poses a significant threat to NATO’s security.
- Independent Russian survey data suggests that most Russians are largely apathetic towards Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine and are thus able to avoid thinking about the war entirely.
- The Russian reaction to the reported death of imprisoned opposition politician Alexei Navalny on February 16 was relatively muted.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, northwest of Bakhmut, and near Avdiivka.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture himself as an involved and effective wartime leader.
- Russian-controlled courts in occupied Ukraine continue to pass harsh sentences on Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 16, 2024
Feb 16, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2024
Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 16, 2024, 8:00pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:20pm ET on February 16 (excluding information pertaining to Avdiivka). ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces have begun to withdraw from Avdiivka, and Russian forces appear to be focused on complicating or preventing a complete Ukrainian withdrawal. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated early in the morning Ukrainian time on February 17 that he ordered Ukrainian forces within Avdiivka to withdraw to more favorable defensive positions in order to avoid encirclement and save the lives of Ukrainian personnel.[1] Syrskyi’s announcement comes after several confirmed Russian advances on the outskirts of Avdiivka in the past 24 hours. Geolocated footage published on February 16 indicates that Russian forces advanced further south along Hrushevskoho Street on Avdiivka’s western outskirts and south of the Avdiivka Coke Plant in northwestern Avdiivka, made marginal gains in dacha areas in northeastern Avdiivka, and captured the Avdiivka City Park in central Avdiivka.[2] The Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces acknowledged earlier on February 16 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from an established fortified position south of Avdiivka and that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from unspecified positions to new prepared defensive positions.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces are transferring reinforcements to the area to stabilize the situation and further degrade attacking Russian forces.[4] It is normal practice to bring in reinforcements to function as a receiving force that can allow withdrawing units to reconstitute behind prepared defensive positions. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing en masse and that Ukrainian withdrawals are becoming increasingly chaotic and costly.[5] ISW has not observed any visual evidence of large or chaotic Ukrainian withdrawals, however, and the continued marginal rate of Russian advance in and around Avdiivka suggests that Ukrainian forces are currently conducting a relatively controlled withdrawal from Avdiivka.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also advanced in eastern Avdiivka, up to the southwestern outskirts of Avdiivka, further south along Hrushevskoho Street, and west of Avdiivka in the direction of dirt roads that Ukrainian forces are using to supply positions in eastern and southern Avdiivka.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are close to cutting or have already cut one dirt road connecting Avdiivka with Lastochkyne (west of Avdiivka).[7] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are close to encircling the remaining Ukrainian forces within central, eastern, and southern Avdiivka, with one Russian milblogger claiming that little more than a kilometer separates the Russian positions on the western outskirts of Avdiivka and the Russian positions in southern Avdiivka.[8] ISW currently assesses that roughly three and a half kilometers separate Russian advances in these two areas based on available visual evidence. Russian milbloggers claimed that up to 5,000 Ukrainian personnel remain in Avdiivka and are effectively trapped in the settlement, but Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces have not encircled any Ukrainian units in Avdiivka as of 1300 on February 16.[9] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces are determined to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing from Avdiivka in an organized manner.[10]
Ukrainian forces may have to conduct counterattacks to conduct an orderly withdrawal from Avdivika, and Russian efforts to complicate or prevent a Ukrainian withdrawal may become increasingly attritional. Ukrainian forces may have to stabilize the frontline by counterattacking in the area where Russian forces are trying to close the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka in order to conduct an orderly withdrawal. A Ukrainian brigade that recently redeployed to conduct counterattacks within Avdiivka stated on February 16 that it has recently helped Ukrainian forces render elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR], 1st Army Corps [AC]) combat ineffective.[11] Further Russian gains within Avdiivka aimed at complicating the Ukrainian withdrawal and Ukrainian counterattacks covering withdrawing Ukrainian forces will likely result in further Russian losses. Russian forces would likely struggle to advance west of Avdiivka towards secondary prepared positions to which Ukrainian forces are withdrawing and would likely suffer considerable losses if they decided to frontally attack these Ukrainian positions across open fields. Russian forces likely aim to complicate or prevent the Ukrainian withdrawal in hopes of inflicting operationally significant losses on Ukrainian forces in the area, since the capture of Avdiivka itself would not offer any operationally significant benefits or avenues for operationally significant advances.[12]
Germany and France both signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine on February 16. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a long-term bilateral security agreement with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on February 16 providing for bilateral cooperation in the military, political, financial, and humanitarian spheres until 2034.[13] The agreement also states that Germany will provide over €7 billion ($7.5 billion) in military aid to Ukraine in 2024, including a €1.1 billion ($1 billion) aid package that is currently being prepared and will include 36 howitzers, 120 thousand artillery shells (including 50,000 155mm artillery rounds), two Skynex air defense systems, missiles for the IRIS-T air-to-air missile system, 66 armored personnel carriers (APCs), several mine-clearing vehicles, and various reconnaissance drone models.[14] Zelensky also met with German Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier to discuss the launch of joint weapons production.[15] Zelensky later met with French President Emmanuel Macron to sign a bilateral security agreement and reported that France will provide Ukraine €3 billion ($3.2 billion) in military assistance over the course of 2024.[16]
NATO officials are increasingly warning that Russia poses a significant threat to NATO’s security. The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 16 that recent new assessments of Russia’s military capabilities and potential threats to NATO states have led Western leaders to recognize Russia’s continued military potential and to increase defense investment.[17] FT quoted unnamed British military intelligence officials who warned that Russia’s aggressive intent has persisted and that Russian air and naval assets are still ”largely intact” while Russian land forces have been degraded in Ukraine. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been badly degraded by Ukrainian strikes, but most of the Russian Navy is stationed outside the Black Sea. FT noted that most Western officials expect that Russia would be able to reconstitute its forces ”within five to six years” (it is unclear if the officials are referring to 2030 or to a period starting with the end of the war, whenever that is) despite suffering major losses in Ukraine. This observation is consistent with ISW’s previous assessment that an end to the war on Russia’s terms would allow Russian forces to reconstitute rapidly and restore capabilities that Russia could use to attack NATO states.[18] Several European defense officials quoted by FT emphasized that there is a ”credible threat” that Russia could attack a NATO country in as few as three to five years. NATO officials’ increased warnings about the current state of the Russian threat align with ISW’s assessment that a Russia that emerges victorious in Ukraine poses a considerable threat to NATO and European security and that the West’s continued support for Ukraine to prevent Russian victory is therefore imperative for NATO‘s, and America’s, vital security interests.[19]
Independent Russian survey data suggests that most Russians are largely apathetic towards Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine and are thus able to avoid thinking about the war entirely. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 16 that independent Russian sociological data suggests the overwhelming majority of Russians have come to view the war as a background event that does not affect their daily lives.[20] Verstka stated that most Russians avoid thinking about or discussing the war unless they personally experience the loss of a family member.[21] Verstka reported that Russians who have lost loved ones and are suffering as a result of the war are the ”silent majority” and do not make efforts to influence the general mood of Russian society.[22] Verstka noted that there is growing discontent among the family members of mobilized and contact servicemen still serving in Ukraine, but that Russians largely view the concept of ”victory” in Ukraine as a benefit for the Russian government and do not expect any personal benefits from Russia’s war in Ukraine.[23] The New York Times reported on February 15 that the Pentagon estimates that Russia has suffered roughly 60,000 personnel killed and another 300,000 personnel wounded during fighting in Ukraine since February 2022.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently met with family members of deceased Russian servicemen and may be using such meetings to cater to the sizable constituency of people affected by personnel losses in Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.[25] Verstka’s findings, along with reports about how Russian officials deal with the deaths of servicemembers, suggest that Russian society has largely accepted and internalized the war and that individual instances of resistance to the war are siloed and not transmitted amongst wider communities.
The Russian reaction to the reported death of imprisoned opposition politician Alexei Navalny on February 16 was relatively muted. The Federal Penitentiary Service of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, where Navalny had been imprisoned, stated on February 16 that Navalny died at the penal colony after going on a walk and feeling unwell.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that the Kremlin did not know anything about Navalny’s death and that Putin is aware of the death, though Putin has yet to comment about Navalny.[27] Other senior Russian officials expressed anger at accusations that the Kremlin was somehow involved in Navalny’s death and called for people to wait for the results of an investigation into the death and the results of the autopsy.[28] Russians across the country laid flowers and held minor demonstrations near memorials for political prisoners, but Russian law enforcement largely prevented demonstrations from growing too large, and the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office warned against participating in an alleged planned large demonstration.[29] A few Russian ultranationalist milbloggers reiterated Kremlin lines criticizing Western accusations of Russian involvement in Navalny’s death.[30] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Navalny’s death is unimportant compared to the current situation in Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, and another milblogger claimed that it was a significant mistake for Russia to imprison Navalny and “let him die there” ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.[31] The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) expressed fear that Navalny’s death in Russian state custody and the detention of many other opposition figures in state custody could leave no one to lead a domestic resistance movement should Russia go to war directly against Western states.[32] Girkin’s wife Miroslava Reginskaya expressed concern for Girkin himself but claimed that his health is good.[33]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces have begun to withdraw from Avdiivka, and Russian forces appear to be focused on complicating or preventing a complete Ukrainian withdrawal.
- Ukrainian forces may have to conduct counterattacks to conduct an orderly withdrawal from Avdivika, and Russian efforts to complicate or prevent a Ukrainian withdrawal may become increasingly attritional.
- Germany and France both signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine on February 16.
- NATO officials are increasingly warning that Russia poses a significant threat to NATO’s security.
- Independent Russian survey data suggests that most Russians are largely apathetic towards Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine and are thus able to avoid thinking about the war entirely.
- The Russian reaction to the reported death of imprisoned opposition politician Alexei Navalny on February 16 was relatively muted.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, northwest of Bakhmut, and near Avdiivka.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture himself as an involved and effective wartime leader.
- Russian-controlled courts in occupied Ukraine continue to pass harsh sentences on Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently made several confirmed marginal gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Geolocated footage posted on January 27 shows that Russian forces advanced west of Synkivka on the eastern bank of Lake Lyman (northeast of Kupyansk) likely sometime in late January 2024.[34] Geolocated footage published on February 15 shows that Russian forces also recently advanced west of Karmazynivka (southwest of Svatove), and geolocated footage posted on February 16 shows that Russian forces recently advanced east of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna).[35] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional engagements northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka, Tabaivka, and Tymkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting in the industrial zone east of Bilohorivka and that Ukrainian troops withdrew from the area before launching tactical counterattacks.[37] Elements of the ”Aida” group of Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on February 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut).[39] Positional fighting continued near Vesele on February 16.[40] Elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic’s [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne.[41]
Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 16. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced closer to the northern outskirts of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of this claim.[42] Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne.[43] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction and elements of the 98th VDV Division’s 331st VDV Regiment are reportedly attacking in the direction of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut).[44]
See the topline text for ISW’s daily update on the situation in Avdiivka.
Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Avdiivka on February 16. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[45] Positional fighting continued southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[46]
Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka on February 16.[47] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka, and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[48]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Prechystivka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske.[49] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske.[50] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the recently reorganized Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces in the Novopavlivka direction (western Donetsk Oblast and Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) includes nine brigades, 11 regiments, two battalions, and three battalion-sized tactical detachments, including BARS (Russian Combat Reserves) and ”Storm”-type detachments.[51] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have one infantry regiment and up to three battalions in reserve in this direction.
A Russian milblogger claimed that positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[52] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]), including two motorized rifle brigades, one cover brigade, one motorized rifle regiment, one tank battalion, and two BARS-type tactical detachments, are operating in the Orikhiv direction (likely referring to the Polohy-Hulyaipole area) as part of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces.[53] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), including two brigades, 19 regiments, 10 battalions, and 10 BARS tactical detachments, are operating in the Orikhiv direction (likely referring to the Robotyne area) as part of the recently reorganized Dnepr Grouping of Forces.[54] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have up to four motorized rifle regiments of the territorial troops and one battalion in reserve in this direction. Elements of the Russian 71st Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[55]
Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Krynky.[56] Mashovets stated that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces operating in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction includes nine brigades, 19 regiments, nine battalions, and three BARS and ”Storm” tactical detachments with one infantry regiment in reserve.[57] Mashovets stated that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces is likely responsible for the Crimea direction and may undertake offensive actions in the lower Dnipro River area (likely referring to east bank Kherson Oblast) in the future.[58] Mashovets stated that the Dnipro Grouping of Forces includes a ”powerful” group of Russian Airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces, including elements of the 104th, 7th, and 76th VDV Divisions; the 49th Separate Air Assault Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District); the 83rd VDV Brigade; the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet); the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet); and the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla).[59]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture himself as an involved and effective wartime leader. Putin visited the “Robot Factory” at the Chelyabinsk Forging and Press Plant and the Stankomash Industrial Park in Chelyabinsk on February 16, which produce industrial robotics and industrial machinery parts, respectively.[60] Putin received reports on each facility’s production metrics and received questions from employees and engineering students about the development of the Southern Urals and Russian industry.[61]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)
Ukraine officials continue to highlight the importance of Ukrainian technological innovation and Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) in supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated on February 16 that Ukraine is innovating and developing a new doctrine of war through its use of drones.[62] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine’s efforts to develop an unmanned systems force will minimize human participation and casualties in the war.[63] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Ukraine’s private and state DIB companies are playing a major role in Ukraine’s war effort and noted that whoever masters new technology will win the war.[64] Danilov stated that Ukraine’s missile program is advancing and working to overcome unspecified technological challenges.[65] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on February 15 that Ukraine and NATO should focus on building long-term defense capabilities and a sustainable DIB and noted that Ukraine is prepared to work with its partners to create joint ventures and invest in scaling up Ukrainian domestic production.[66]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian-controlled courts in occupied Ukraine continue to pass harsh and likely illegal sentences on Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Supreme Court sentenced seven Ukrainian servicemembers to terms of 25 to 28 years in maximum security penal colonies for “murder and attempted murder in a generally dangerous manner motivated by ideological and political hatred” in connection with alleged Ukrainian artillery strikes on villages in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[67] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko noted that DNR courts have sentenced over 60 Ukrainian servicemembers to such terms in 2024 alone.[68] Former Ukrainian Deputy General Prosecutor Gyunduz Mamedov responded to another recent DNR court’s mass sentencing of 33 Ukrainian POWs on February 8 and noted that this sentencing violates international legal guarantees to the right to a fair trial.[69] Considering that international law does not recognize the legitimacy of the DNR in the first place, rulings made by DNR courts are therefore also likely illegitimate under international law and may constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.[70] ISW has previously reported on Russian show trials for Ukrainian POWs and assessed that this is likely a method of increasing tools of social and legal repression in occupied areas, demoralizing Ukrainians, and discouraging residents of occupied Ukraine from affiliating with their Ukrainian identity.[71]
Russian occupation authorities continue to use educational programs as a propaganda tool in occupied areas. DNR Head Denis Pushilin attended a meeting of the supervisory board of the “Znanie” (Knowledge) Society on February 16 and highlighted the importance of educational opportunities for youth living in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[72] ”Znanie” is a Russian public non-profit that carries out educational work in Russia, and now occupied Ukraine, as part of a presidential mandate on ”mass educational organization.”[73] ”Znanie” existed in Soviet times as an intellectual propaganda arm, and Pushilin reported that Russian First Deputy Presidential Head Sergei Kiriyenko is working to ”revive” the Soviet-style ”Znanie” organization for the modern era.[74] ”Znanie” will reportedly begin offering lectures in occupied Donetsk Oblast, likely as part of Russification efforts.
Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate control over information access in occupied areas. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Tourism, Sport, Culture, and Communications Dmitry Chernyshenko on February 16 to discuss Russian integration projects for occupied Kherson Oblast.[75] Chernyshenko noted that Russian occupation authorities have installed 17,735 sets of ”Russkiy Mir” television satellites, covering over 80 percent of occupied Kherson Oblast, and are providing residents with the ability to watch Russian television channels to receive ”objective information.”[76] Russian occupation authorities are likely using Russian satellite television such as the ”Russkiy Mir” model to control information disseminated to residents of occupied territories.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Alexander Lukashevich reiterated Kremlin narratives on February 15 and 16 intended to blame the West for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, present Russia as a victim of perceived Western aggression, and undermine Western support for Ukraine.[77] Lavrov specifically claimed that the West is attempting to ”bewitch” members of the alleged ”world majority” to support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s peace plan.[78] ISW has recently observed increased Russian claims about an anti-Western ”world majority,” which suggests that the Kremlin is likely insecure about the possibility of its diplomatic isolation against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[79]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed that Belarusian security forces detained several individuals, including three Belarusians, on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border as part of a counterterrorist operation on February 16.[80] Lukashenko claimed that the detainees planned to conduct sabotage operations on Belarusian territory and that Belarusian security forces routinely conduct multiple counterterrorist operations on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border per week.[81]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
8. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 16, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-16-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.
- Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis.
- West Bank: A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.
- Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a training exercise to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.
- Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq.
- Yemen: The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea.
- Iran: Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.
IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 16, 2024
Feb 16, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, February 16, 2024
Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.
- Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis.
- West Bank: A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.
- Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a training exercise to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.
- Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq.
- Yemen: The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea.
- Iran: Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on February 16. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed an aide to the Sabra Battalion commander in Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade.[1] Israeli forces killed the previous Sabra Battalion commander in November 2023.[2] Hamas has likely replaced the Sabra commander since his death as part of its effort to reconstitute itself militarily in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli aircraft struck a vehicle and killed three Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]
Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[4] CTP-ISW cannot determine the point of origin at this time.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on February 16. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters, and the IDF Air Force targeted a Palestinian fighter squad near Israeli ground forces.[5]
Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 16.[6] Israeli special operations forces began operating in Nasser Hospital on February 15 after receiving “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital.[7] Israeli forces detained 20 fighters who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack as well as dozens of suspects for questioning.[8] The IDF Maglan Unit (assigned to the 98th Division) found mortars, grenades, and weapons belonging to Hamas in the hospital area.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the vicinity of Nasser Hospital for the third consecutive day.[10]
The IDF reported on February 16 that it has been causing “significant damage” to Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.[11] Israeli forces killed several Palestinian fighters, raided military targets, and disarmed an improvised explosive device (IED) in Khan Younis.[12] Several Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations, primarily in eastern Khan Younis, on February 16.[13] Israeli forces began conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis in early December 2023.[14]
Israel withdrew the IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade from Khan Younis on February 15.[15] Only Israeli regular units remain in the Gaza Strip.[16]
Hamas policemen shot and killed a child, who was attempting to take food from a humanitarian aid truck in Rafah.[17] Riots erupted in the border area between Rafah and Egypt in response to the incident. The child’s family issued a statement holding Hamas responsible.[18] Israeli media reported that an unnamed Hamas official on the border denied the incident, saying that “there is no truth in what is being spread in the media and social networks.”[19]
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israel will not evacuate Palestinian civilians from Rafah to Egypt.[20] Gallant reported that Israel is “thoroughly planning future operations in Rafah” but did not offer more details.[21] Egypt has repeatedly raised concerns that an Israeli operation into the southern Gaza Strip will cause a flood of Palestinian refugees into Egypt and has even taken to reinforcing its border with the strip.[22]
US President Joe Biden reiterated to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel must have a plan for ensuring the safety of civilians in Rafah before proceeding with a military operation.[23] An Israeli official reported that the conversation lasted 40 minutes. Israel has not publicly outlined a plan for how it would evacuate civilians from Rafah in the event of a military operation there.
Israeli President Isaac Herzog “secretly” met with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdulrahman al Thani to discuss the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip, according to two sources familiar with the meeting.[24] The two met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks on February 14 due to Hamas’ demand that thousands of Palestinian prisoners be released as part of the deal.[25] An Israeli official told Axios that there is some progress and that Hamas may be willing to “soften its position.”[26]
Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 16. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting an Israeli military site and Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip.[27] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters also fired rockets targeting Ashkelon.[28] An Israeli military correspondent reported that three rockets landed in the sea.[29] The launches demonstrate that Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip retain some ability to fire rockets into Israel, despite Israeli operations.
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.[30] Israeli media reported the gunman fired at a bus stop.[31] The Mujahideen Brigades boasted that terror attacks like this one evade Israeli security. Hamas responded to the attack by repeating its previous calls for Palestinian civilians to conduct terror attacks targeting Israelis.[32] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF found an identification card in the attacker’s vehicle and used it to identify the perpetrator.[33] Local footage showed Israeli forces engaged in clashes with unidentified Palestinian fighters in Shuafat shortly after the shooting attack.[34] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the attack north of Kiryat Malachi “reminds us that the whole country is a front and that the murderers, who come not only from Gaza, want to kill us all.”[35]
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank. The al Quds Brigades, which is the militant wing of PIJ, in Jenin fired at Israeli forces stationed at the Dotan checkpoint, south of the Israeli Mevo Dotan settlement.[36] Israeli forces arrested one wanted individual in Aqaba, east of Tubas, for shooting at Israeli forces.[37] Unidentified Palestinian fighters threw improvised explosive devices at Israeli forces around Aqaba.[38] Unidentified Palestinian fighters separately clashed with Israeli forces in Aboud.[39]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
The IDF Northern Command conducted a training exercise on February 16 to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.[40] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade of the 36th Armored Division and reserve forces from the 146th and 210th Divisions conducted a multi-day exercise to simulate combat on the border. Armored, infantry, engineering, and artillery units practiced camouflage techniques, open-field combat, and evacuations.
Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 16. Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting IDF facilities in Ruwaisat al Alam and al Malikiyah.[41] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces at the Zibdin and Ruwaisat al Alam barracks in Shebaa Farms, using unspecified guided munitions.[42] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces in a fifth attack in an unspecified area of northern Israel.[43]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Allied Joint Force Command Naples Admiral Stuart Munsch to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq (NMI) on February 16.[44] Sudani and Munsch discussed NMI’s intelligence sharing with and training Iraqi security officers as well as logistical issues for NMI following a withdrawal of international coalition forces from Iraq.[45] NMI works with Iraqi security forces in a ”non-combat advisory and capacity-building” capacity to ”prevent the return of ISIS/Daesh, fight terrorism, and stabilize their country.”[46] NMI operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government.[47]
Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri nominated Mohammed Jassim al Amiri on February 16 as a compromise candidate for governor of Diyala Province.[48] Mohammed Jassim al Amiri is the 28-year-old son of the president of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, Judge Jassim Mohammad Aboud.[49] Ameri claimed that his nomination was an attempt to break the political deadlock delaying the appointment of a governor. Provincial councils are responsible for voting a governor into office, under Iraqi law.[50] Ameri’s decision to nominate the candidate for Diyala Province is particularly noteworthy given the military and political influence the Badr Organization has historically had there.
Demonstrators blocked roads in Baqubah, Diyala Province, to protest Ameri’s nomination for provincial governor.[51] The Iraqi Kurdish news outlet Shafaq reported that demonstrators set fire to tires in the street and set up a tent on the road connecting Baqubah to Muqdadiyah and Balad Ruz. Demonstrators called for the provincial council to reinstate the former governor of Diyala Province, Muthanna al Tamimi, as governor.[52]
The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea on February 16.[53] The UK Royal Navy’s United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and British maritime security firm Ambrey reported that the vessel’s captain reported an explosion but that the crew and vessel were unharmed. UKMTO and the Associated Press reported that missile fire caused the explosion.[54]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) in Yemen on February 15.[55] CENTCOM struck three mobile ASCMs that the Houthis had prepared to launch against vessels in the Red Sea. CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the ASCMs presented an “imminent” threat to US ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea.
CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that Iran directly supports the Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea during an interview with CBS News on February 15.[56] Cooper stated that Iranian support has been “critical” for the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Cooper also stated that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is “inside Yemen, and they are serving side by side with the Houthis, advising them and providing target information.” CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla separately told CBS News that the IRGC has continued supplying ”advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis. . . to undermine the safety of international shipping.”[57]
Other American officials and outlets have similarly detailed the IRGC’s direct involvement in the Houthi attacks in recent months. The US deputy national security adviser stated in December 2023 that the IRGC is helping Houthi forces plan and execute drone and missile attacks targeting ships.[58] The Wall Street Journal reported in December 2023 that the IRGC intelligence gathering ship Behshad, which is stationed in the Red Sea, provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have gone silent.[59] US outlet Semafor reported on January 15 that the IRGC Quds Force placed drone and missile operators and trainers as well as intelligence personnel on the ground in Houthi-controlled Yemen to direct attacks and provide tactical intelligence support to the Houthis.[60] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Houthi “procurement director” on January 25 for coordinating with the IRGC to smuggle Iranian-provided drones, missiles, and other weapons components into Yemen.[61]
Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.[62] The sources stated that the attacks on the pipelines required ”deep knowledge” and ”careful coordination.” The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to comment on the article. The sabotage disrupted the gas supply to several villages. Iranian officials stated there were no casualties.[63] IRGC-affiliated media reported that the explosions were a ”terrorist act of vandalism.”[64] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji noted on February 14 that the gas pipelines are ”targets” for the United States and its allies, though he did not name Israel specifically.[65]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed Israeli operations around Rafah in a phone call with Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan on February 16.[66] The ministers called for an end to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian aid provision to the Gaza Strip.
Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers arrested two Jaish al Adl fighters allegedly responsible for a December 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[67] The LEC spokesperson stated that the LEC also seized firearms and “related equipment” from the fighters. Jaish al Adl militants killed at least 11 LEC officers in a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask on December 15, 2023.[68] This incident is part of an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[69]
9. Suspected terror fund facilitator caught using remittance centers (Philippines)
Excerpts:
Based on reports from law enforcers, Mabanza received money overseas from sources in Malaysia, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
“Other than receiving money from foreign terrorist sources, Myrna Mabanza is also instrumental in collating these money and then, remitting them to local members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan,” said Department of Justice (DOJ) Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Rex Gingoyon.
Authorities said that Mabanza worked with other facilitators for the movement of the funds.
Suspected terror fund facilitator caught using remittance centers
FEB 16, 2024 8:28 PM PHT
JOHN SITCHON
rappler.com · by jsitchon0312 · February 16, 2024
SUMMARY
This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.
FUND FACILITATOR. Myrna Mabanza is identified as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ by the US and listed by the United Nations Security Council for her alleged links to the Al-Qaeda.
Rappler
Emmett Manantan of the Anti-Money Laundering Council confirmed that the suspect Myrna Mabanza used money service businesses to transfer funds to members of the Abu Sayyaf Group
CEBU, Philippines – Law enforcers said Friday, February 16, that Myrna Mabanza, the suspected fund facilitator of Islamic State (IS) forces in the Philippines who was arrested Thursday, used several remittance agencies to finance terrorist activities.
“The amounts involved were from money service businesses. These are the remittance agencies that we identified through intelligence and investigation conducted,” lawyer Emmett Manantan of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) said in a press conference Friday.
Based on reports from law enforcers, Mabanza received money overseas from sources in Malaysia, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
“Other than receiving money from foreign terrorist sources, Myrna Mabanza is also instrumental in collating these money and then, remitting them to local members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan,” said Department of Justice (DOJ) Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Rex Gingoyon.
Authorities said that Mabanza worked with other facilitators for the movement of the funds.
Gingoyon cited a report that detailed how Mabanza had allegedly remitted money to a certain Norkisa Omar Asnanul, a respondent to the case filed against Mabanza. Asnanul was arrested in December 2023.
“She (Mabanza)m sent P8,000, P8,000, and P50,000 on three occasions and this was through money remittances… when the money remittances were used, it is then where the AMLC was able to flag her down,” Gingoyon said.
DOJ undersecretary Nicholas Felix Ty said that the funds were used to purchase weapons, combat trainers, and to bankroll the travel of fighters from foreign countries.
Besides Asnanul, a suspected terrorist combatant Marsan Ahaddin Ajijul currently detained in Malaysia, was also named as a respondent in Mabanza’s case.
After she was arrested on Thursday, in Sulu, Mabanza was detained at the Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group headquarters in Zamboanga City.
As of this writing, the DOJ is conducting an evaluation of the security conditions prior to conducting a trial in Zamboanga City.
“Myrna Mabanza is a high-profile person. The facilities in Zamboanga might not be enough to contain her considering that she has numerous relatives in the Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi (ZamBaSulTa) area,” Gingoyon said.
“Transferring it to Manila, to the facilities in Taguig would ensure that she would be properly guarded under the strictest security protocols and we do have the regional trial courts in Manila and the anti-terrorism courts in Taguig,” said Gingoyon. – Rappler.com
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rappler.com · by jsitchon0312 · February 16, 2024
10. N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over aerial surveillance
We are watching closely. Are we also watching closely for the indications of instability? What resources can observe for those indicators(rhetorical question)?
N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over aerial surveillance | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 17, 2024
SEOUL, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday accused South Korea and the United States of heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula with aerial reconnaissance activities.
In a commentary carried by the Korean Central News Agency, the North said that Seoul and Washington have been stepping up their "spying activities" this month, calling such a move a "stern provocation" against the country.
The North claimed the countries attempted to secure information on the North's inner regions by conducting surveillance activities with the U.S. RC-135 Combat Sent and RC-135W Rivet Joint and South Korea's advanced high-altitude unmanned aircraft Global Hawk and E-737 Peace Eye early warning aircraft.
The North said it is closely monitoring such military activities and threatened that it is ready to destroy its enemies anytime.
North Korea has ratcheted up tensions on the Korean Peninsula with weapons tests this year, including launches of cruise missiles from sea and land, as well as artillery firings into waters near the western inter-Korean sea border.
This June 22, 2020, file photo shows an advanced high-altitude unmanned aircraft Global Hawk. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 17, 2024
11. Four Months Into the War Against Hamas, the IDF Is Far Outperforming American Expectations, Report Says
Four Months Into the War Against Hamas, the IDF Is Far Outperforming American Expectations, Report Says
Did President Biden try in October to throw Israel off a ground operation in Gaza? If so, Israeli pluck and knowhow are — at least so far — carrying the day.
ANTHONY GRANT
Friday, February 16, 2024
14:19:58 pm
nysun.com
What is for some a slow go and daunting political landmine is for others a bigger success story than has been publicly acknowledged — namely, Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza, and the American outlook on it could be about to change.
It is no secret that the relationship between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu is about as warm as the month of February. What is lost in the miasma of increasingly strained relations between Washington and Jerusalem is that irrespective of attempts by the White House to micromanage the conflict and despite comments by Mr. Biden himself that Israel’s military response has been “over the top,” the truth is that some bumps in the road notwithstanding, it has mostly been spot on.
For proof of that, one can look at how all of Hamas’s terrorist battalions in the northern Gaza Strip have been decimated or how the Hamas mastermind, Yahya Sinwar, is said to be cowering like a rat in a dark tunnel somewhere underneath Khan Younis.
One can also look at an underreported meeting that took place in Israel about a week after Hamas attacked on October 7. As journalist Amit Segal reports in this weekend’s edition of the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, at that time Mr. Biden dispatched a three-star Marine heavyweight, Lieutenant General James Glynn, to Israel as well as two senior officers with a view to advising Israel on what to do — and what not to do — in its operation to rout Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
According to the Yedioth report, the Americans sought, at the president’s behest, to “help the commanders of the IDF think about the difficult questions before them.” That thinking hinged mainly on trying to dissuade Israel’s military leaders from launching a ground operation in Gaza.
It was done by playing the Jewish guilt card: to wit, by prognosticating 20 daily IDF casualties if Israel went forward with a ground invasion, which by Mr. Glynn’s estimation, Mr. Segal writes, would be “time-consuming and bloody.”
While no one can dispute the fact that most wars inevitably come with a cost in human lives — and Israel’s war against Hamas is no exception — the reality is that the American casualty forecast was wrong. “The price we have paid since then is heavy,” Mr. Segal states, “but it is about a tenth of that.”
That is not to diminish in any way American military expertise. Mr. Glynn is a highly decorated general with no fewer than 23 medals, and no shortage of mettle either. He commanded the United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command between June 2020 and May 2022. He helped to liberate Kuwait and also led American units in Iraq as they fought against ISIS.
While the October meeting was characterized as advisory in nature, one need only glance at the names of the Israeli interlocutors present to comprehend the stakes: the defense minister, Yoav Gallant, the chief of the general staff of the IDF, Herzi Halevi, Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, and Mr. Netanyahu.
Instead of a ground op, the American team reportedly proposed a more targeted operation with correspondingly minor targets — the subtext there being: Don’t rock the boat too much. To that Mr. Gantz reportedly replied, “Your plan is feasible if the target is thousands of miles from the country [but] not when the target sits 500 yards from your people.”
As Mr. Segal points out, “there is no other example in modern warfare of what the IDF is doing in the Gaza Strip. It is fighting a monstrous tunnel system and dismantling it piece by piece, eliminating and paralyzing half of the opposing fighting force, and capturing targets that seemed unconquerable.”
Mr. Segal adds that in the last divisional operation in the northern sector of the Gaza Strip, “it took only an hour to reach the Shifa Hospital area from the [Israeli] border” and that now, “foreign militaries are interested in the air-land-sea combination operated by the IDF.”
Is it conceivable that one of those foreign militaries “interested” in Israel’s hard-fought Gaza battlefield successes and how they scored them is ours? If it is, don’t look for Mr. Biden to issue a press release. Don’t count on one from the president’s deputy national security advisor, Jon Finer, either: The Sun reached out to Mr. Finer for comment but as we headed toward Friday evening had not received a reply.
One thing, though, is clear. With a possibly imminent expansion of the Israeli campaign to Rafah in order to rid Gaza of Hamas’s remaining infrastructure, the dialogues of October are reverberating. Mr. Segal reported that last week Messrs. Netanyahu and Gantz both alluded to the Americans’ “warnings against entering Gaza” but proffered that “in fighting against a terrorist army our soldiers demonstrate extraordinary determination and groundbreaking abilities that the world will learn from.”
nysun.com
12. Cult of the drone: UAVs have changed war but not outcomes
Excerpts:
The lesson from Ukraine is that while drones have some value at the tactical and operational levels of war, they are strategically inconsequential. They are not a magic bullet, offering a game-changing capability to decide the fate of nations.
Instead, countries must rely on time-tested combined arms maneuver, wherein they integrate personnel and weapons systems at a particular time and place to achieve a particular goal against an adversary. When these effects are aggregated over the course of a war, they expose vulnerabilities that militaries exploit, and often with the assistance of allies and partners.
Only then can countries achieve military objectives that secure political outcomes, such as a negotiated settlement.
Cult of the drone: UAVs have changed war but not outcomes
Ukraine war lesson is that while drones have tactical and operational value they are still strategically inconsequential
asiatimes.com · by Paul Lushenko
Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have been central to the war in Ukraine. Some analysts claim that drones have reshaped war, yielding not just tactical-level effects, but shaping operational and strategic outcomes as well.
It’s important to distinguish between these different levels of war. The tactical level of war refers to battlefield actions, such as patrols or raids. The operational level of war characterizes a military’s synchronization of tactical actions to achieve broader military objectives, such as destroying components of an adversary’s army. The strategic level of war relates to the way these military objectives combine to secure political aims, especially ending a war.
In the war in Ukraine, what have drones accomplished at these three levels?
Mounting evidence, including my own research as a military scholar who studies drone warfare, suggests that drones have delivered some tactical and operational successes for both Ukraine and Russia.
Yet they are strategically ineffective. Despite its increasing use of drones, Ukraine has not dislodged Russia from the Donbas region, and Russia has not broken Ukraine’s will to resist.
Drone warfare in Ukraine
The drone war in Ukraine is evolving in ways that differ from how other countries, especially the United States, use UAVs.
First, the US uses drones globally, and often in conflict zones that are not recognized by the United Nations or do not have U.S. troops on the ground. Unlike this pattern of “over-the-horizon” strikes, Ukraine and Russia use drones during an internationally recognized conflict that is bounded by their borders.
Second, the US operates armed and networked drones, such as the Reaper, the world’s most advanced drone. Ukraine and Russia have adopted a broader scope of low- and mid-tier drones.
Ukraine’s “army of drones” consists of cheaper and easily weaponized drones, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI. Ukraine has also operated Turkish-manufactured TB-2 Bayraktar drones – the “Toyota Corolla” of drones.
UK-based defense and security think tank Royal United Services Institute estimated that Ukraine loses 10,000 drones monthly and within a year will have more drones than soldiers, implying it will acquire over 2 million drones. To manage these capabilities, Ukraine recently established a new branch of the armed forces: the Unmanned Systems Forces.
Russia has responded by importing Iranian-manufactured Shahed-136 attack drones. It has also expanded the domestic production of drones, such as the Orion-10, used for surveillance, and the Lancet, used for attacks.
Russia intends by 2025 to manufacture at least 6,000 drones modeled after the Shahed-136 at a new factory that spans 14 football fields, or nearly a mile. This is on top of the 100,000 low-tier drones that Russia procures monthly.
Third, the US uses drones to strike what it designates as high-value targets, including senior-level personnel in terrorist organizations. Ukraine and Russia use their drones for a broader set of tactical, operational and strategic purposes.
Analysts often conflate these three levels of war to justify their claims that drones are reshaping conflict, but the levels are distinct.
Tactical effects
Drones have had the biggest impact at the tactical level of war, which characterizes battles between Ukrainian and Russian forces.
Famously, Ukraine’s Aerorozvidka Air Reconnaissance Unit used drones to interdict and block a massive Russian convoy traveling from Chernobyl to Kyiv a month after Russia’s Feb. 24, 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It did so by destroying slow-moving vehicles that stretched nearly 50 miles, causing Russia to abandon its advance.
Both militaries have also adopted low-tier “first-person-view” drones, such as the US-manufactured Switchblade or Russia’s Lancet, to attack tanks, armored personnel carriers and soldiers. Russian and Ukrainian forces are increasingly using these first-person–view drones, combined with other low-tier drones used for reconnaissance and targeting, to suppress opposing forces.
Suppression – temporarily preventing an opposing force or weapon from carrying out its mission – is a role normally reserved for artillery. For example, suppressive fire can force ground troops to shelter in trenches or bunkers and prevent them from advancing across open ground.
Ukrainian soldiers use first-person-view drones against Russian forces.
These gains have led Russia and Ukraine to develop ways of countering each other’s drones. For example, Russia has capitalized on its advanced electronic warfare capabilities to effectively jam the digital link between Ukrainian operators and their drones. It also spoofs this link by creating a false signal that disorients Ukrainian drones, causing them to crash.
As a result, Ukrainian drone operators are experimenting with ways to overcome jamming and spoofing. This includes going “back to the future” by adopting terrain-based navigation, though this is less reliable than satellite-based navigation.
Operational limitations
Drones have been less successful at the operational level of war, which is designed to integrate battles into campaigns that achieve broader military objectives.
In spring 2022, Ukraine used a TB-2, along with other capabilities, to sink Russia’s flagship ship — the Moskva — in the Black Sea. Since then, Ukrainian officials claim to have destroyed 15 additional Russian ships, as well as damaged 12 more.
Ukraine also used sea drones – uncrewed water vessels – to damage the Kerch Bridge, connecting Crimea to mainland Russia, as well as attack fuel depots in the Baltic Sea and near St. Petersburg.
Footage appearing to show the damaged Russian warship Moskva emerges.
Though impressive, these and other operations have momentarily disrupted Russia’s use of the Black Sea to blockade Ukraine’s grain shipments, launch missiles against Ukraine and resupply its soldiers.
The problem is that Ukraine lacks air superiority, which has encouraged its use of an army of drones to execute missions typically reserved for bombers, jets, attack helicopters and high-end drones.
Though Denmark and the Netherlands have promised to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, thus replacing the country’s aging aircraft, they have not arrived. My research also suggests that the US will likely not sell its advanced Reaper drones to Ukraine, fearing crisis escalation with Russia. Further, these drones are vulnerable to Russia’s integrated air defenses.
Lack of air superiority exacerbates tactical challenges such as jamming and spoofing, while undermining Ukraine’s ability to deny freedom of maneuver to Russia.
Strategic myths
Despite these tactical effects and limited operational gains, drones are strategically ineffective.
Drones have not, and are not likely to, shape the outcome of the war in Ukraine. They have not allowed Ukraine to break its stalemate with Russia, nor have they encouraged Russia to end its occupation of Ukraine.
To the extent drones have been strategically consequential, the implications have been psychological.
Russia and Ukraine use drones to terrorize each other’s citizens as well as generate propaganda to stiffen their own citizens’ resolve. Russian and Ukrainian leaders also perceive drones as providing advantages, encouraging them to invest in these capabilities and perpetuate what I call the “cult of the drone.”
A series of drone attacks hits Moscow.
The lesson from Ukraine is that while drones have some value at the tactical and operational levels of war, they are strategically inconsequential. They are not a magic bullet, offering a game-changing capability to decide the fate of nations.
Instead, countries must rely on time-tested combined arms maneuver, wherein they integrate personnel and weapons systems at a particular time and place to achieve a particular goal against an adversary. When these effects are aggregated over the course of a war, they expose vulnerabilities that militaries exploit, and often with the assistance of allies and partners.
Only then can countries achieve military objectives that secure political outcomes, such as a negotiated settlement.
Paul Lushenko is Assistant Professor and Director of Special Operations, US Army War College
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
asiatimes.com · by Paul Lushenko
13. TikTok: An Expanding Front in Cognitive Warfare
This should be of interest to all PSYOP professionals.
Good to know now that President Biden's campaign is on TikTok.
"Cognitive sovereignty." A new phrase for me.
From a seminar in 2021 at Oxford.
For the purposes of the presentation, cognitive sovereignty essentially denotes our moral and legal interest in being able to comprehend our environs and ourselves.
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/cognitive-sovereignty-era-machine-learning-and-big-data#:
Conclusion:
The threat posed by TikTok and similar platforms in the context of cognitive warfare requires a multifaceted response. This should encompass regulatory measures, public education, private sector innovation, and international cooperation. The goal is not only to protect free speech and foster technological innovation but also to safeguard the public sphere from manipulation and misinformation. As the digital landscape continues to evolve, so too must the strategies employed to defend democratic values and processes. The road ahead is challenging, but with concerted effort and collaboration, democracies can turn the tide in the battle for cognitive sovereignty.
TikTok: An Expanding Front in Cognitive Warfare
Publication: China Brief Volume: 24 Issue: 4
https://jamestown.org/program/tiktok-an-expanding-front-in-cognitive-warfare/?fbclid=IwAR3xDcXEL7Xkj2EIo_5O59rNHJ3jf3FKiuRhrmTBEE0vbHbynOINee72CEY
February 16, 2024 11:22 AM Age: 22 hours
Image of how TikTok influences the Internet and reality. (Source: AI-generated image)
Executive Summary:
- PRC cognitive warfare strategies now include the cultivation of internet influencers who disseminate rumors and on platforms like YouTube designed to undermine Taiwan’s democratic institutions.
- TikTok has become a significant tool in shaping public opinion, exploiting its algorithmic power to spread narratives favourable to Beijing and critical of the United States, especially concerning the 2024 election in Taiwan.
- Taiwan’s commitment to freedom of speech complicates efforts to regulate platforms like TikTok, with nearly 5 million users exposed to PRC-influenced narratives, posing a challenge to democratic resilience and information integrity.
- The response to disinformation requires collective action, including regulatory measures, digital literacy education, international investigations into social media platforms’ operations, and global cooperation to uphold transparency and accountability standards.
The Evolution of PRC Cognitive Warfare Strategies
The landscape of the cognitive warfare perpetrated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan is in a state of relentless evolution, adapting and morphing with each passing year. Initially, the conflict was grounded in the physical realm, with Beijing deploying traditional united front tactics to disseminate rumours and sow discord. These efforts were rudimentary but effective, laying the groundwork for more sophisticated operations to come.
The PRC’s strategy underwent a significant transformation with the dawning of the digital age. The battleground shifted from the streets to the airwaves, with Beijing infiltrating media outlets to launch a comprehensive public opinion campaign aimed at the heart of Taiwanese society. Beginning in earnest from the turn of the millennium, this marked a pivotal turn in the nature of cognitive warfare.
Since 2015, the focus has shifted yet again. This time the digital frontier of social media is the target. PRC tactics have become more nuanced and multifaceted, ranging from the operation of content farms to the outright purchase of fan pages and the strategic management of online communities. These methods demonstrate a remarkable adaptability and an unyielding determination to influence public opinion.
Among the most insidious developments in this ongoing campaign has been the cultivation of internet influencers. These individuals, operating primarily on platforms like YouTube, have become—knowingly or unknowingly—conduits for propaganda. They broadcast a steady stream of rumours designed to undermine democratic institutions.
Social media platforms have not remained passive. Faced with these challenges, a variety of countermeasures have been implemented, signaling a recognition of the threat posed by unverified information. However, the advent of TikTok has introduced a new dimension to this complex web of information warfare. As other platforms began to tighten their controls, the PRC recognized the strategic advantage of owning and operating a social media platform. TikTok has emerged not merely as a tool for entertainment but as a formidable weapon in the PRC’s arsenal for shaping public opinion. Its algorithmic power and global reach have rendered it an invaluable asset in the dissemination of narratives that are pro-Beijing and/or critical of the United States.
Influence And The 2024 Election
The 2024 presidential election in Taiwan serves as a stark illustration of the potential impact of TikTok on democratic processes. The PRC’s strategy has evolved beyond the simple fabrication of rumours. By exploiting the natural divisions within Taiwan’s political landscape, in particular the animosity between rival parties, Beijing has been able to amplify discord and manipulate public perception to its advantage. The subtlety of this approach lies in its indirectness. By intensifying existing disputes, the PRC can achieve its objectives without overt intervention. This tactic of leveraging internal conflicts presents a considerable challenge to democratic resilience.
Taiwan finds itself in a precarious position in confronting this challenge. The island’s deep commitment to the principles of freedom of speech and expression complicates the task of regulating platforms like TikTok. Any attempt at censorship risks backlash from a populace that deeply values its democratic heritage. However, the ruling party’s cautious approach to TikTok has inadvertently ceded the informational high ground to Beijing, due to concerns over cybersecurity threats. With the platform dominated by narratives unfavorable to the ruling party and conducive to PRC interests, nearly 5 million Taiwanese users are exposed to a skewed representation of political realities. This situation highlights a critical vulnerability in the information ecosystem that the PRC is all too eager to exploit.
Managing the issue of disinformation on social media platforms is a collective endeavor. It is not merely a matter of regulatory enforcement but a challenge to culture and society more broadly. The ubiquity of platforms like TikTok in the daily lives of millions of people underscores the need for a concerted effort to cultivate digital literacy and critical thinking among the public. Educating users on how to discern credible information from conspiracies is a critical line of defense in the landscape of cognitive warfare. By empowering individuals to critically evaluate the content they consume, democracies can build a citizenry that is more resilient and less susceptible to the manipulative tactics employed by adversarial states. However, if the PRC’s tactics become more nuanced, the general public, armed only with basic media literacy, may struggle to resist the overwhelming volume of conspiracies or biased reports that circulate online.
Potential Taiwanese and International Responses
No country is immune to the effects of rumours and conspiracies. The strategies employed by states like the PRC to exploit these platforms have global implications.
Taiwan’s current approach is to passively report fake news and accounts to TikTok itself. Even when reports are accepted, TikTok, having no operational base in Taiwan, ignores them. The government is thus powerless to resolve this issue. Fake news reported before elections is dealt with only after the event. Compelling TikTok to establish a local presence would necessitate robust administrative action from the Taiwanese government, whether through advertising regulations, bandwidth restrictions, or demands on fraudulent content. Unfortunately, none of these are easy to implement.
International investigations have a part to play in affecting policy outcomes in Taiwan. Investigations into TikTok’s financial backers—for example identifying the company as Chinese-invested—and into the company’s control and manipulation of its recommendation algorithm would cause the company to fall under regulations concerning cross-strait relations, thus facing stricter controls. If the international community can work together to make these networks more transparent, it would help in developing regulatory standards worldwide. International forums and coalitions can also serve as platforms for sharing best practices, coordinating regulatory approaches, and facilitating joint investigations into the operations of social media giants. Through such cooperation, nations can exert collective pressure on these companies to uphold higher standards of transparency and accountability.
Conclusion
The threat posed by TikTok and similar platforms in the context of cognitive warfare requires a multifaceted response. This should encompass regulatory measures, public education, private sector innovation, and international cooperation. The goal is not only to protect free speech and foster technological innovation but also to safeguard the public sphere from manipulation and misinformation. As the digital landscape continues to evolve, so too must the strategies employed to defend democratic values and processes. The road ahead is challenging, but with concerted effort and collaboration, democracies can turn the tide in the battle for cognitive sovereignty.
14. With Prison Certain and Death Likely, Why Did Navalny Return?
With Prison Certain and Death Likely, Why Did Navalny Return?
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/17/world/europe/why-navalny-returned-to-russia.html
An activist who thrived on agitation, he feared irrelevancy in exile. Winning new respect as he continued to lambast the Kremlin from behind bars cost him his life.
By Neil MacFarquhar
During the years he ran The New York Times Moscow bureau from 2014 to 2019, Neil MacFarquhar covered Mr. Navalny at numerous political rallies and protests.
Feb. 17, 2024 Updated 7:02 a.m. ET
There was one question that Russians repeatedly asked the opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny, who died in a remote Arctic penal colony on Friday, and he confessed that he found it a little annoying.
Why, after surviving a fatal poisoning attempt widely blamed on the Kremlin, had he returned to Russia from his extended convalescence abroad to face certain imprisonment and possible death? Even his prison guards, turning off their recording devices, asked him why he had come back, he said.
“I don’t want to give up either my country or my beliefs,” Mr. Navalny wrote in a Jan. 17 Facebook post to mark the third anniversary of his return and arrest in 2021. “I cannot betray either the first or the second. If your beliefs are worth something, you must be willing to stand up for them. And if necessary, make some sacrifices.”
That was the direct answer, but for many Russians, both those who knew him and those who did not, the issue was more complex. Some of them considered it almost a classical Greek tragedy: The hero, knowing that he is doomed, returns home anyway because, well, if he didn’t, he would not be the hero.
Police officers detaining a protester in Moscow during protests in support of Mr. Navalny after his return. Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times
Mr. Navalny’s motto was that there was no reason to fear the authoritarian government of President Vladimir V. Putin. He wanted to put that into practice, Russian commentators said, and as an activist who thrived on agitation, he feared sinking into irrelevancy in exile. The decision won him new respect and followers as he continued to lambast the Kremlin from his prison cell, but it also cost him his life.
“Navalny was about action,” said Abbas Gallyamov, a former Kremlin speechwriter who sometimes had differences with Mr. Navalny over that job. “For him politics was action, not just democracy and theory like it is for many in the Russian opposition. They are quite content to sit abroad, speaking and speaking and speaking without doing anything with their hands. For him that was unbearable.”
The return represented both his unbridled emotional attachment to the cause and his deep sincerity, Mr. Gallyamov added.
Still, it prompted extensive bafflement and curiosity, not least because he had a wife and two adolescent children who stayed in exile.
Mr. Navalny with his family after voting in a mayoral election in Moscow in 2013. Vasily Maximov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
“Many have written throughout these three years: ‘Why did he come back, what kind of idiocy, what kind of senseless self- sacrifice?’” Andrey Loshak, a Russian journalist, wrote in a tribute published by Meduza, an independent news agency. “For those who knew him, it was natural: You see him in life and understand that a person cannot do otherwise.”
Mr. Loshak said that after Mr. Navalny’s return, he had posted the opposition leader’s picture with just one word for the caption: “Hero.” Before, he had considered that kind of self-sacrifice as the stuff of movies. “He was a beacon in this darkness
— here he sits somewhere in these terrible punishment cells and laughs at them,” he wrote. “It shows that this is possible.”
Some people were wary of Mr. Navalny. He began his political career in the nationalist camp and made some offensive comments about immigrants. Later, he characterized it as a temporary step needed to start building the opposition from someplace, because the nationalists were the only group then willing to take to the streets.
Mr. Navalny appearing in court in October 2022. Associated Press
A 28-year-old man living in Belgorod, near Ukraine, said that he had long been unsure of Mr. Navalny, and never considered him presidential material, but his return to Russia inspired new respect.
“Very dignified behavior and dignified acceptance of the inevitable,” the man wrote online in response to questions, declining to use his name while the Russian authorities were arresting some of those who mourned openly. “Aleksei was a brave man, worthy of respect, an example for many.”
Mr. Navalny himself expressed frustration that many Russians refused to take his decision to return at face value, sometimes implying that he had made some kind of background deal with the Kremlin. Perhaps he failed to express himself clearly enough, he wrote in the January Facebook post.
There were some echoes of history in the return. In 1917, after years of exile in Europe, Lenin memorably steamed into Finland Station in St. Petersburg by train, igniting tumultuous demonstrations that eventually brought the Bolsheviks to power and gave birth to the Soviet Union.
The IK-3 penal colony, where Mr. Navalny served his prison term, in the settlement of Kharp, in Russia’s Yamal-Nenets region. Reuters
Mr. Gallyamov said he sometimes regretted that Mr. Navalny had returned in the middle of January, deep in the Russian winter and distant from any elections, so the protests ignited by his immediate arrest at a Moscow airport did not translate into any sustained political reaction.
Mr. Putin thought at various times that he had solved his Navalny problem, not least by letting him leave to recuperate in Germany after he had been poisoned. The perception was that anyone in their right mind would not come back, but Mr. Navalny did.
Even in prison, Mr. Navalny became an issue for the Kremlin with his ability to make his views heard, like endorsing the call for all voters in the coming March 15-17 presidential election to show up at the polls at noon on March 17 as a silent protest against the Ukraine war.
“When Navalny came back, it was a nightmare for Putin. People were saying that he was a survivor,” said Yevgenia Albats, a prominent Russian journalist now at Harvard University. Some went even further, she said, suggesting that he had been resurrected from the dead.
In authoritarian regimes, such political challenges often boil down to a duel between two men to see who can outlast the other, and that is what happened in this case, Mr. Gallyamov said.
“Deep down, it is a psychological fight between two characters over who is the more powerful person,” he said. “Since Navalny was a real challenger, a real fighter, that is why he stayed on the agenda.”
People paying tribute to Mr. Navalny at a Memorial to Victims of Political Repression in St. Petersburg, Russia, on Friday. Dmitri Lovetsky/Associated Press
The most common reaction to his death among those who saw Mr. Navalny as the most viable opposition leader was that he had been murdered in prison, either directly or through three years of increasingly harsh conditions. The Kremlin, ever less tolerant of any criticism amid its stumbling war effort in Ukraine, silenced the moderates and gave free rein to the hawks, dooming Mr. Navalny, they said.
Asked about Mr. Navalny’s death, Dmitri S. Peskov, the spokesman for Mr. Putin, told reporters that he had no information on the cause of death but that it would be determined by doctors.
Ultimately, what drove Mr. Navalny to return to Russia was the fearlessness that he thought could bring him enormous political power, said Kirill Rogov, a former Russian government adviser who now leads Re: Russia, a Vienna-based think tank. “Navalny challenged them with his fearlessness,” he said. “They do not tolerate fearlessness.”
The example in South Africa of Nelson Mandela, who emerged from decades in prison a hero, troubled Mr. Putin, Mr. Rogov added.
In 2021, on the airplane back to Russia from Germany, Mr. Navalny sat next to his wife, Yulia, and together they watched “Rick and Morty,” an animated series involving a mad scientist.
At his first trial a month later, he quoted from the show in court: “To live is to risk it all,” he said. “Otherwise, you are just an inert chunk of randomly assembled molecules drifting wherever the universe blows you.”
Milana Mazaeva contributed reporting.
Neil MacFarquhar has been a Times reporter since 1995, writing about a range of topics from war to politics to the arts, both internationally and in the United States. More about Neil MacFarquhar
15. The Legacy of Irregular Warfare Masters
I am reminded that Giap's theory was called Dau Tranh. "Douglas Pike, in his seminal work on the Vietnam War details the Vietnamese strategy of Dau Tranh (the “Struggle”) emphasizing that the strategy was beyond a purely military strategy but one which mobilized the entire population – a political struggle with the three now famous action programs (or “vans”): action among the enemy; action among the people, and action among the military. This was a comprehensive political-military strategy that had as a key element the psychological influence of its own people, its military, and that of the enemy. But the focus was not just on the enemy’s military force; it struck right at the heart of the enemy: the will of the enemy government leadership and its population." "Timeless Theories of War in the 21st Century," 2005.
Of all the masters' strategies I think Dau Tranh should be thoroughly studied to both defend against it as well as for possibly employing relevant elements of it.
Graphic at the link.
January 31, 2024
The Legacy of Irregular Warfare Masters
Sal Artiaga – Irregular Warfare Practitioner
https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/insights/the-legacy-of-irregular-warfare-masters/
Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon.
Engulfed within the nebulous terrain that delineates the boundaries of irregular warfare, a domain characterized by its defiance of conventionality and its asymmetrical tactics, we find ourselves confronted with a pantheon of enigmatic leaders whose tales are etched in the annals of history. These leaders, whose inherent amalgamation of idiosyncratic traits and characteristics demarcates them from their contemporaries, also serve as indomitable beacons illuminating the path toward victory. While history has lauded leaders like Mao Zedong, T.E. Lawrence, Michael Collins, and Vo Nguyen Giap for their contributions in this arena, a closer examination of their strategies reveals both triumphs and controversies that surrounded their methods. The following discussion aims to dissect and reveal the finely woven tapestry that captures the essence of these historical giants, highlighting unique qualities that have immortalized their respective contributions to irregular warfare, while also revealing the threads that bind them together.
Photo by shark ovski on Unsplash
The Confluence of Adaptability and Innovation Epitomized by Mao Zedong
An inimitable figure whose colossal shadow continues to loom large over the rich tapestry of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mao Zedong was a quintessential embodiment of the symbiotic confluence of adaptability seamlessly intertwined with an unyielding spirit of innovation. His intricate collection of guerrilla warfare tactics stands as a testament to his unparalleled malleability and innovative strategic acumen in navigating the ever-shifting sand dunes of the warfare landscape. Armed with an astute comprehension of the multifarious socio-political intricacies that shaped the tumultuous epoch of the Chinese Civil War, Mao astutely adapted his guerrilla warfare strategies in alignment with the needs of the populace, thereby securing their unwavering allegiance and support. However, it is essential to note that his tactics, while effective, also contributed to significant civilian upheaval and suffering. These tactics include but are not limited to forced collectivization and the Great Leap Forward, violent land reforms, and the cultural revolution. Acknowledging these dual aspects of Mao’s leadership offers a more nuanced understanding of his legacy. Mao’s groundbreaking masterpiece on the complex web of guerilla warfare is still read today, serving as a lasting reminder of his strategic acumen.
T.E. Lawerence, a Marriage of Visionary Leadership with Strategic Intelligence
The name T.E. Lawrence, or Lawrence of Arabia, as he is more popularly known, stands as a colossal edifice within the hallowed halls of history, symbolizing the marriage of visionary leadership with strategic intelligence. His crucial leadership position as the helmsman guiding the Arab Revolt during the turbulent storm of the First World War was unquestionably marked by an extraordinary strategic acumen and a visionary leadership style that went above the norm. Together with his unmatched military prowess, Lawrence’s intricate knowledge tapestry, woven from the cultural and social insights gleaned from the Arabian Peninsula, proved instrumental in uniting the disparate and fractious Arab tribes, enabling them to mount a formidable and cohesive campaign against the might of the Ottoman Turks. Nevertheless, Lawrence’s strategies sometimes led to tribal tensions, a fact often overlooked by romanticized historical accounts. An objective analysis recognizes both his strategic ingenuity and the post-war challenges his approach created. Still, his unique and innovative approach, which synthesized traditional Arab guerrilla warfare tactics with the modern aspects of contemporary military strategy, underscored his foresight. This intuition was evident in his profound cultural understanding, his development of innovative military tactics, his strategic vision for the region, and his anticipation of the conflict’s long-term implications. By blending traditional and modern elements in a manner that was ahead of his time, Lawrence left a lasting impact on both military strategy and the history of the Middle East.
Michael Collins as the Paragon of Resourcefulness and Charismatic Leadership
Emerging from the fog of history, Michael Collins stands tall as a paragon of resourcefulness and charisma, his leadership proving pivotal in galvanizing the Irish masses and channeling their collective discontent and abhorrence of British imperialism into a resolute and unwavering fight for the cause of independence. Collins, with his innovative guerrilla warfare tactics, ingeniously employed the limited resources at his disposal to create real turbulence that kept the British forces in a perpetual state of tumult and disarray. While he is celebrated for his leadership, it is also critical to address the ethical considerations of such tactics, which often blur the lines between combatants and non-combatants. Still, his charismatic demeanor, coupled with his impeccable leadership style, endeared him to the Irish populace, thereby further cementing his exalted status in the annals of irregular warfare history. He was known for his approachability, his commitment to the Irish cause, and his ability to inspire those around him. This popularity extended beyond his life, as he became a symbolic figure for Irish independence and resistance.
The Vietnamese Maestro Vo Nguyen Giap, the Embodiment of Cultural Insight
The hallowed name of Vo Nguyen Giap continues to reverberate as a synonymous emblem representing the historic Vietnamese triumphs over both the imperialistic clutches of the French and the juggernaut of American forces. The distinguishing hallmark that set Giap apart from his contemporaries was his profound cultural insight and an empathetic connection that he forged with the very soul of the Vietnamese people. His military strategies, while deeply ensconced in the foundational bedrock of guerrilla warfare principles, were exponentially enhanced, and amplified by his cultural awareness and empathy, thereby enabling him to forge a robust support base amongst the local populace. This empathetic approach towards understanding and sharing in the trials and tribulations of the Vietnamese people stood as a pivotal linchpin in solidifying the unwavering support for both the Viet Minh and the North Vietnamese Army. Giap’s strategy of “People’s War” exemplified his empathetic understanding of the Vietnamese people. This strategy relied heavily on the support and participation of the rural peasantry. Giap understood that for the war to be successful, it was essential to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, particularly the peasants who formed most of the population. He worked to educate and mobilize them, not just as soldiers but also as logistical support and intelligence gatherers. However, the human cost of these strategies was considerable, and Giap’s role in these outcomes must be part of the assessment.
Comparative Analysis
The following table compares the strategies, contexts, and outcomes associated with each leader:
LeaderStrategyContextOutcomesMao ZedongGuerilla warfare, Mass mobilizationChinese Civil WarVictory, but with civil strifeT.E. LawrenceUnifying disparate groups, Mobile warfareArab Revolt during WWIShort-term success, long-term instabilityMichael CollinsIntelligence network, Hit-and-run tacticsIrish War of IndependenceIndependence, with ethical debatesVo Nguyen GiapProtracted engagement, Popular supportFirst Indochina War, Vietnam WarVictory, with heavy casualties
Practical Applications for Modern Strategic Thought
The study of these historical leaders is not solely academic. Modern irregular warfare practitioners can derive several practical applications from their experiences:
- The necessity of adaptability in strategy as political and social landscapes evolve.
- The importance of winning hearts and minds, alongside more tangible military objectives.
- The ethical implications of guerrilla tactics and their long-term effects on peace and stability.
- The value of cultural understanding in shaping both military strategies and post-conflict resolutions.
Legacy
In the final analysis, as we traverse the intricate labyrinth that characterizes the rich and diverse traits of these four illustrious figures of irregular warfare history, it becomes manifestly clear that the resulting landscape is indeed multifaceted. The intricate interplay of adaptability, strategic foresightedness, resourcefulness, cultural insight, and empathy were not merely superficial attributes, but rather, they stood as the very bedrock upon which their storied successes were meticulously built. These iconic figures, namely Mao Zedong, T.E. Lawrence, Michael Collins, and Vo Nguyen Giap, not only set themselves apart from the mosaic of their contemporaries but also indelibly etched their legacies in the timeless and boundless expanse of irregular warfare history. The insights gleaned from this meticulous dissection of their characteristics is not merely an academic exercise relegated to the dusty shelves of history, but rather, it is an imperative necessity, for it provides us with a lantern to illuminate our path and guide us through the realm of irregular warfare, thereby equipping us with the requisite arsenal needed to traverse this battlefield victoriously.
16. Our Gathering Storm: On civil war in America and other unpleasant possibilities.
To end on some depressing news.
Everyone likes the parallels with the Roman empire.
Conclusion:
To cite a well-known historical example, the Roman civil wars of the first century BC were preceded by years of violent factional politics and elite fracturing. As in the case of Rome, there will be plenty of off ramps along the way. Pompey and the Senate could have avoided war with Caesar had they been a little more flexible, after all. Of course, if men of Pompey’s and Brutus’s caliber couldn’t find their way to those off ramps, I doubt the cast of geriatrics and buffoons leading our politics will.
Our Gathering Storm
On civil war in America and other unpleasant possibilities.
americanmind.org · by Vance Byers
If you had asked me ten years ago about the possibility of a future civil war in America, I—an “Intelligence Community” veteran who analyzes civil conflict in Asia—would have laughed. I’m not laughing anymore, and neither are a lot of other people. Recent tensions between the federal government and Texas over the former’s refusal to secure the border and enforce immigration law are bringing to life scenarios that once seemed theoretical, if not fantastic. In mid-January, “Texas soldiers” took control of a section of the border near Eagle Pass and then denied access to federal agents, setting the stage for a standoff some alarmists are calling “today’s Fort Sumter.” Even as Texas pushes beyond legal and normative boundaries, creating a potential constitutional crisis in the process, more dangerous challenges lie ahead. In today’s America, a combination of democratic backsliding, ethnic factionalism, and elite splintering have set the stage for a series of intractable political and legal challenges that could plausibly lead to violence in 2024. The only real questions now relate to the scale of the violence and whether the American union will ultimately survive it.
I’m not alone in my pessimism; Barbara F. Walter, a prominent political scientist, argues that the conditions for civil war are emerging in America. Her findings are a relatively sound synthesis of a large body of research into the correlates of civil war. What mars Walter’s study is that she embeds her findings in a tendentious analysis of American politics, laying the blame for these dangerous trends at the feet of white men, Republicans, and all the other boogeymen of the Left. There is a revealing irony in seeing an assessment of the prospects for civil war laid out so myopically by a rising member of the ruling class, as if the last eight years of Democratic Party-led soft coups and anarcho-tyranny never happened. It is this same lack of self-awareness that is driving our society to a breaking point.
Since 2016, right-wing populist movements have, with varying degrees of success, pushed back against the managerial elite that sits atop the Western political order. From recent riots in Ireland over migrant crime, to farmer protests in Europe over taxes and climate policy, regime opponents are demanding to be heard. But rather than seeing these events as an invitation to adjust course, today’s optimates, disdainful of the plebs and their tribunes, are doubling down on their divisive policies and embracing authoritarian methods to subdue the populares.
In Canada, that meant shutting down the bank accounts of “Freedom Convoy” protestors. In Britain it meant suppressing information about so-called “grooming gangs.” In Germany, it has meant a concerted effort to marginalize a major political party that could culminate in the banning of that party. In the United States, which has been at the center of the right-wing populist storm since the beginning, the system has attacked Trump and Trumpism from many directions. The man is effectively facing multiple life sentences for a mix of speech and paper crimes, while at the same time regime agents work to expropriate his wealth in a politically-motivated sham trial in New York. The rank-and-file members of the movement also face peril. Some are in jail for crimes that, while technically real, would be forgiven if committed by regime allies. These unfortunates can best be described as political prisoners. Others face daily censorship and loss of livelihood—forcing a retreat from the daylight of public discourse in favor of the shadows of social media shitposting and electronic samizdat.
Predictably, the effect of these ever more nakedly antidemocratic, antiliberal acts has been to drive the Right toward embracing its own hardline measures. One can see a newfound desire to reject the old politics of compromise and dogged adherence to system norms in favor of tit-for-tat factional politics of the sort unfamiliar to most Americans. The old conservative establishment—dedicated as they are to the system—is increasingly marginalized. Replacing them is a motley crew of diverse thinkers, from Catholic integralists to Nietzschean vitalists, united only in their disdain for the system and their unwillingness to play the role of the beautiful loser. It is this combination of intellectual ferment and frustration with traditional politics that is driving interest in the writings of men like Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s ideas, particularly the “friend-enemy distinction” and the “state of exception,” have taken on an almost cliched quality as conservatives seek intellectual justifications for embracing hard-nosed, action-reaction politics. Similarly, talk of a “Red Caesar”—a Napoleon-like figure willing to pick up the crown of a collapsing America with his sword—further signals that many on the Right are increasingly open to hitherto unthinkable solutions to increasingly insoluble problems.
All this has combined to push the American political system from the sometimes messy, but mostly safe world of liberal democracy—where leadership transitions are predictable, and disagreements are sorted out at the ballot box—to the decidedly less safe world of anocracy—where confidence in institutions is low and a winner-take-all system raises the stakes for all players in the political game. As Walter and other scholars of intra-state war have noted, anocracy is a bad place to be, because democratic backsliding correlates strongly to civil war—something no one should be eager to see.
But a slide toward authoritarian politics is only one of the forces in play. Of equal concern is the rise of ethnic factionalism in America. Ethnic diversity in itself does not correlate strongly to civil war, but it does provide convenient fracture lines for a society. The presence of distinct ethnic communities also helps to reduce the force of the collective action problem at the heart of the civil war question, attenuating the increased risk of death or imprisonment faced by the early adopters of resistance to the state. For our society, atomized, deracinated, and individualistic as it is, the collective action problem is even more acute. We’ve been bowling alone for a long time, and so ethnicity, race, and religion provide useful connection points for people who otherwise lack a common basis for organizing. The presence of a coherent ethnic community provides would-be rebels with not only a means of framing potential grievances (e.g., past oppression by a majority group); it can also provide potential rebels with unique cultural institutions capable of facilitating collaboration (e.g., the stereotype of the local radical mosque) and thus lowering collective action barriers.
In contrast to how a sane regime would manage the challenge of presiding over a multiethnic society through policies intended to downplay racial grievances and encourage unity, America’s ruling elites seem committed to the opposite course. Indoctrinated as they are into a globalist ideology of struggle toward a borderless utopia, America’s ruling elite seem fully committed to an endless cycle of relitigating and reinterpreting the country’s past through the lens of race and gender inequality. The result is the rekindling of dormant racial animus and the breeding of new resentments as essential national myths are discredited with every school renamed and every statue melted down to be replaced with “inclusive art.”
Yugoslavia provides a useful historical example. Under Tito, imperfect though his administration was, ethnic hostility was largely contained through a mix of repression and calibrated inter-group power sharing. When Tito died in 1980, it didn’t take long for what scholars call “ethnic entrepreneurs” like Slobodon Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman to tap into deep-seated resentments to advance political goals. In some cases, such figures are little more than demagogues pursuing power. In other cases, they’re true believers acting in pursuit of their vision of the greater good. In the United States, we can see both at work. But regardless of the animating spirit behind their actions, the results are the same—a deepening of inter-ethnic cleavages and an increased risk of violence.
Another piece of the puzzle is elite fragmentation. Bottom-up political change is a rarity in society. In most cases, a tightly organized counter-elite forms to challenge the dominant elite either as the old elite splits, or as a new elite emerges to challenge the old order. To be sure, cascading state failure can happen in the absence of a viable counter-elite, as Stephen Kotkin noted in his path-breaking book The Uncivil Society, which looked at the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. However, civil wars almost always involve the emergence of a determined vanguard elite.
In the Spanish Civil War, a highly factionalized ruling elite fragmented along Left-Right lines. A split within the military between left- and right-wing military officers helped ignite Guatemala’s civil war in 1960. Divisions within the Russian ruling class helped set the stage for revolution and civil war. In the case of America prior to 2016, it would have been appropriate to think of the elite as united in its basic assumptions and ideology—the “transpartisan,” managerial elite James Burnham described in The Managerial Revolution. While there were some minor disagreements about policy—how much to tax and how much to spend—even on matters of war and peace there was remarkable uniformity of opinion.
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 changed all that. For the first time in decades, American elites are truly fractured. The Republican Party has become more the party of Donald Trump and less the party of Nikki Haley. The substance of this is that the Republican Party is becoming a true counter-elite as it grows more alienated from the assumptions of the old managerial order, and more open to a radically different vision of society and governance. Meanwhile, federalism ensures a certain amount of political fragmentation is already baked into the American system; it’s no coincidence that the battlelines for America’s first civil war largely matched state borders.
While civil war has captured recent headlines, there are other possibilities worth discussing. One that has received some attention is the chance that an insurgency will emerge in America. If a civil war involves violence between the state and an internal challenger capable of fighting back with either regional secession or national control on the line, an insurgency is a smaller scale politico-military struggle that is often regional in nature and asymmetric in its operational profile. In the real world, the lines between the two are often blurred, which is why social scientists often use a battle death requirement to help code conflicts as civil wars or insurgencies—the former is usually set at 1,000 in a year or over a longer, but still condensed period of time, with conflicts below that threshold being characterized as terrorism, insurgency, or “civil conflict.”
Insurgencies almost never emerge in wealthy states, not because such states lack populations with internal grievances; rather, rich countries have high levels of “state capacity,” the resources and reach to exercise full control over their territory. Poor countries with inaccessible terrain, such as mountainous regions, often struggle with insurgencies, because weak states are less able to stop insurgent groups from forming and metastasizing in rural areas. The American government is many things, but it is not weak, at least not in a hard power sense. This reality then adds to the collective action problem mentioned earlier. It takes a special kind of lunatic to attempt to launch an insurgency under such conditions.
So, what do we have to look forward to in 2024? Were I a betting man, I would bet against a full-blown, hot civil war. Greg Abbott doesn’t strike me as a man of “supreme daring,” and while this year’s presidential election will almost certainly include a heavy dose of factional politics, any major dustup is likely to occur after months of litigation, name-calling, and 1930s-style street battles. While insurgency is probably not in the offing, lower order forms of violence are probably on the horizon—to include lone-wolf terrorism and organized factional violence. So far, most of the violence we’ve seen has emanated from the Left, although it is difficult to prove that definitively, as prosecution rates for the Left’s shock troops and berserkers are much lower than those for their right-wing analogues. This is because the former have so far benefited from some regime protection. As the Right becomes more unified under Trump’s leadership and more intellectually and morally at peace with embracing a rougher brand of politics, we’re likely to see a more open embrace of tit-for-tat factional fighting.
To cite a well-known historical example, the Roman civil wars of the first century BC were preceded by years of violent factional politics and elite fracturing. As in the case of Rome, there will be plenty of off ramps along the way. Pompey and the Senate could have avoided war with Caesar had they been a little more flexible, after all. Of course, if men of Pompey’s and Brutus’s caliber couldn’t find their way to those off ramps, I doubt the cast of geriatrics and buffoons leading our politics will.
americanmind.org · by Vance Byers
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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