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Quotes of the day:
"The day knowledge was preferred to wisdom and mere usefulness to beauty. . . . Only a moral revolution -- not a social or a political revolution -- only a moral revolution would lead man back to his lost truth."
– Simone de Beauvoir
“Therefore the first progressive step for a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to realize that this feeling of strangeness is shared with all men and that human reality, in its entirety, suffers from the distance which separates it from the rest of the universe. The malady experienced by a single man becomes a mass plague. In our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as does the "cogito" in the realm of thought: it is the first piece of evidence. But this evidence lures the individual from his solitude. It founds its first value on the whole human race. I rebel—therefore we exist.”
– Albert Camus, The Rebel
"If you can't fly then run, if you can't run then walk, if you can't walk then crawl, but whatever you do you have to keep moving forward."
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
1. Feb. 16: Two systems coincidentally collide -- north Korea and America
2. The signal that crosses borders: Voice of America and Radio Free Asia
3. Highways congested nationwide on Lunar New Year
4. From lobster to Norse god: How Korean weapons get new names abroad
5. So, We Have a Maritime Action Plan
6. Lee vows efforts to build fair society in Lunar New Year message
7. France Considers Purchasing South Korean K239 Chunmoo Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
8. Why North Korea’s Kim is lauding Ukraine war sacrifices as key party congress looms
9. North Korea: Even Worse Than You Thought. (feat. Greg Scarlatoiu) (Podcast)
10. The Defector Podcast: Red Line | Former CIA Analyst: "North Korea’s Economy is Screaming."
11. How the Party Congress became North Korea’s biggest political event
12. The 2026 Window: Can the “Ember” of US-North Korea Diplomacy Still Catch Fire?
1. Feb. 16: Two systems coincidentally collide -- north Korea and America
Comment: A very powerful essay from Ms. Jihyun Park from north Korea and who is now a citizen of the UK. Only someone with her lived experience can make such a comparison. On the 16th of February (and every day) we in America should reflect on our Presidents' Day versus the brutal indoctrination that continues in north Korea.
Voices Feb. 16, 2026 / 1:13 PM
Feb. 16: Two systems coincidentally collide -- north Korea and America
By Jihyun Park
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/16/perspective-presidents-day-shining-star-north-korea/2561771263742/
North Korea celebrates the Day of the Shining Star, the birthday of its second leader, Kim Jong-il, which falls on Feb. 16 and is widely observed as a major holiday. File Photo by North Korean Central News Agency/EPA
Feb. 16 (UPI) -- The author prefers to use the lowercase "n" to challenge the Kim family regime's legitimacy.
This year, perhaps by coincidence, Presidents' Day in the United States falls on Feb. 16.
I honestly did not even know that America had a Presidents' Day. I learned about it only because it was marked on a calendar I purchased this year.
In the United States, Presidents' Day is observed on the third Monday of February, so the date is not fixed. In some years it is the 15th; in others it is the 21st. This year, it happens to be the 16th.
Related
Originally, the day was created to commemorate the birthday of George Washington, the first president. After institutional reforms, it expanded to honor all U.S. presidents, including Abraham Lincoln.
Today in America, however, the day feels less like a sacred ritual and more like a federal holiday. There is no punishment for not remembering it. There is no requirement to revere the president. Criticism is free. Indifference is also free.
But the same date, Feb. 16, carries an entirely different meaning in north Korea.
Feb. 16 is the birthday of Kim Jong-il, known as the "Day of the Shining Star." The date never changes. It is always Feb. 16.
From birth, this date is engraved into the minds of north Koreans through systematic indoctrination. Even after leaving north Korea, it remains in the mind. For many north Korean refugees, Feb. 16 is a date they wish they could erase from memory.
This is not merely a holiday. In a hereditary dictatorship, the leader's birthday functions as a political loyalty test.
Schools and workplaces are mobilized. Loyalty pledges, study sessions and performances are mandatory. Absence is not a personal choice; it becomes a political suspicion.
In America, the holiday is adjusted to a Monday for administrative convenience. In north Korea, the date itself is absolute symbolism. The difference is not procedural. It is about how power controls time.
Manufactured "global reverence"
Every year on Feb. 16, the north Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun publishes endless articles claiming that flower baskets from around the world have arrived to celebrate Kim Jong-il's birthday.
A few formal wreaths sent by certain embassies are inflated into "worldwide admiration." Messages from obscure or unverifiable organizations are presented as if the entire international community were united in praise.
At the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the embalmed body lies, the same loyalty oaths are repeated year after year.
The words spoken there are not expressions from the hearts of citizens; they are scripted sentences required by power.
In contrast, I have never seen news reports that countries around the world celebrate Presidents' Day in America.
No headlines announce foreign governments sending flower baskets to honor a U.S. president. The United States neither demands nor needs such gestures.
In a liberal democracy, a leader is not someone the world must worship, but a public official accountable to citizens.
Nature and youth consumed in the name of "Shining Star"
In north Korea, Feb. 16 is not simply one man's birthday.
The scars of how much nature and human life were sacrificed in that name remain visible throughout the country.
To engrave the name "Day of the Shining Star" Mount Paektu was transformed into a monument of loyalty.
Young people were mobilized to carve massive slogans into cliffs. Those who fell to their deaths or were injured are absent from official records.
Their deaths were not tragedies; they were described as "natural sacrifices in the process of loyalty."
Mountains became propaganda boards. Youth became raw material for devotion. Political indoctrination extended even to nature.
Trees had their bark stripped so that anti-Japanese revolutionary slogans could be carved into them. Trees were not living beings, but instruments for reproducing state mythology. When those trees withered and died, even their death was glorified as an expression of revolutionary spirit.
Students, university members, workers and soldiers are still mobilized to walk those paths annually and pledge loyalty.
Those pledges return with them to schools, workplaces and military units, continuing cycles of propaganda and indoctrination.
This is not commemoration. It is a violent ritual designed to permanently engrave the leader's existence onto both nature and human life.
What two dates reveal
I left north Korea, yet when Feb. 16 arrives, the date still surfaces in my mind first. It is not respect. It is the residue of repetition.
In one society, there is freedom not to remember. In another, there is an obligation to remember.
One system destroys nature, mobilizes youth, and enforces silence for a birthday. Another system allows a holiday to pass without consequence.
This contrast is not cultural. It is political.
north Korea remains a hereditary regime where loyalty to the leader is embedded in the constitution and the Workers' Party rules as a foundational principle of the state.
The international community has repeatedly raised concerns about systematic human rights abuses.
On Feb. 17, 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry formally concluded that crimes against humanity had been committed in north Korea.
The United Nations has labelled the brutal human rights abuses being committed in north Korea a "Crime Against Humanity."
The report documented political prison camps, forced labor, thought control and collective punishment. Within such a structure, the leader's birthday is not symbolic. It is a reaffirmation of regime loyalty.
In contrast, Presidents' Day in the United States does not elevate an individual above the Constitution. American presidents serve limited terms, can be replaced through elections, and can be impeached.
Respect is not mandatory. Power is not deified. Leaders do not stand above citizens.
The 16th of February
On one side, power monopolizes time and controls memory. On the other, time simply moves on without institutional limits.
That the two dates coincidentally overlap this year exposes, with uncomfortable clarity, how each system defines its relationship to its people.
I now stand in a society where memory is not forced.
And that alone proves that freedom is not abstract, it is a lived political reality.
Jihyun Park, a British Korean Conservative politician and regular contributor to the Korea Regional Review, is a north Korean escapee who fled twice from the country -- in 1998, which resulted in a forced repatriation, and in 2008, which was successful. She is a senior fellow for human security at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.
2. The signal that crosses borders: Voice of America and Radio Free Asia
My latest essay on Korea, VOA, and RFA.
Voices Feb. 16, 2026 / 11:30 AM / Updated at 12:29 PM
The signal that crosses borders: Voice of America and Radio Free Asia
"The news may be good or bad. But we shall tell you the truth." --Voice of America, 1942
By David Maxwell
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/16/perspective-Voice-of-america-radio-free-asia-silent/7691771257420/
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia Korean services have experienced fewer hours, weaker reach, less resilience against jamming and slower response in a surge. File Photo by Shawn Thew/EPA
Feb. 16 (UPI) -- The author prefers to use the lowercase "n" to challenge the Kim family regime's legitimacy.
A free and unified Korea will not be achieved by force alone. It will be achieved when truth moves faster than fear and when ideas cross borders the regime cannot fully seal.
For decades, the Korean-language services of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have done precisely that.
They have spoken directly to the Korean people in the north, not with slogans, but with facts. They have offered news, context, and a glimpse of normal life beyond the regime's narrative. In a closed system built on control of information, this is not a marginal activity. It is strategic action.
Related
When Washington weakens the signal
We can see what happens when VOA goes missing in a crisis. Iran is a case in point. The acting head of the U.S. Agency for Global Media took steps that cut capability at the very moment U.S. messaging mattered most, including placing VOA's Persian staff on administrative leave, constraining or delaying broadcast output and disrupting access to long funded transmission capacity, becoming a choke point for tools that help audiences defeat censorship online.
Those actions were aimed at Iran-focused outlets, but the lesson is wider and brutal. The same management logic has been applied to VOA and RFA Korean services: it means fewer hours, weaker reach, less resilience against jamming and slower response in a surge. The effect is not abstract. It is measured in silence where there should be signal, and in regime narratives filling the void before truth can arrive.
Information as a strategic weapon
The Kim family regime understands the power of information better than most democracies. That is why it criminalizes outside news, jams radio signals and punishes those caught listening.
These actions reveal a simple truth. Information threatens the regime's center of gravity. VOA and RFA do not call for revolt.
They do something more dangerous. They normalize truth. They show that the outside world is not collapsing, that South Korea is not impoverished and that the United States is not an enemy plotting the Korean people's destruction. Over time, this corrodes the myths that sustain total control.
Skeptics argue that broadcasts cannot change a system so brutal. They ask whether radios still matter in an age of smartphones. Yet, escapees consistently testify that foreign broadcasts shaped their thinking long before they escaped.
Change in north Korea is not sudden. It is cumulative. Information plants doubt. Doubt creates questions. Questions weaken obedience. What replaces fear when people realize they have been lied to their entire lives?
From authorization to action
Congress has already recognized this reality. Funds have been allocated through the ''Financial Services and General Government and National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026'' to support U.S. international broadcasting, including Korean-language services.
Allocation, however, is not execution. Money that sits unused does not reach listeners in Hamhung or Chongjin. Delays, bureaucratic caution or shifting priorities effectively silence voices that Congress intended to amplify. This is not a budgetary technicality. It is a strategic failure.
Deterrence is a pillar of U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula. Information operations must be treated with the same seriousness as military posture. VOA and RFA are not relics of the Cold War.
They are instruments of political warfare in the most literal sense, as George Kennan described in 1948. They speak to the people, not just the regime. Why fund aircraft carriers and missile defenses while neglecting the one tool that reaches the mind?
The moral and strategic imperative
A free and unified Korea will ultimately be achieved by Koreans. External pressure can shape conditions, but internal awakening makes transformation possible.
Supporting VOA and RFA Korean services aligns moral responsibility with strategic logic. It affirms that the United States stands with the Korean people, not just against their oppressors. It also recognizes that unification without truth would be hollow and stability without freedom would be temporary.
The question is not whether these broadcasts matter. The regime's fear answers that. The real question is whether the United States will fully use the tools it already possesses. If information is power, why would we choose silence?
David Maxwell, executive director of the Korea Regional Review, is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he works on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
3. Highways congested nationwide on Lunar New Year
Comment: Travel safely my Korean friends.
Highways congested nationwide on Lunar New Year | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · February 17, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260217000500315?section=national/national
SEOUL, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- Heavy traffic built up on major roads and expressways across South Korea Tuesday as people traveled to their hometowns on the fourth day of the Lunar New Year holiday.
The nation marks the major holiday, known as Seol, on Tuesday, with the holiday period beginning over the weekend and running through Wednesday.
On some sections of the Gyeongbu Expressway, which links Seoul to the southeastern city of Busan through major cities, cars were often at a standstill due to heavy traffic.
Around 6.15 million vehicles were expected to hit the roads nationwide this day, including 440,000 cars leaving the greater Seoul area and 470,000 heading toward Seoul from other regions.
As of 8 a.m., travel times were estimated at five hours from Seoul to the southeastern city of Busan, four hours to the southeastern city of Daegu, and two hours and 10 minutes to the central city of Daejeon, according to the Korea Expressway Corp. (KEC).
The KEC reported that outbound traffic from Seoul is expected to peak between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., and begin easing around 8 p.m.
Inbound travel times were relatively longer at six hours and 40 minutes estimated from Busan to Seoul, five hours and 40 minutes from Daegu, and two hours from Daejeon, the KEC said.
Inbound traffic is expected to peak between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. before easing at around 3 a.m. the following morning.
The Gyeongbu Expressway in southern Seoul is packed with vehicles on Feb. 15, 2026. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · February 17, 2026
4. From lobster to Norse god: How Korean weapons get new names abroad
Comment: Words like Chunmoo nd Hyunmoo probably do not easily translate in foreign languages
From lobster to Norse god: How Korean weapons get new names abroad | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · February 17, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260212010000320?section=national/defense
By Chang Dong-woo
SEOUL, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- South Korean weapons systems are often sold overseas under different names, reflecting localization efforts and industrial partnerships with purchasing nations.
A key example is seen in the K239 Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system developed by Hanwha Aerospace Co. Chunmoo roughly translates to "sky dance" in Korean, evoking the image of multiple rockets soaring through the air.
In Poland, the Chunmoo is referred to as Homar-K, part of Warsaw's Homar-branded rocket artillery program. Homar means lobster in Polish.
Warsaw's Homar artillery family also includes Homar-A, the Polish version of the M142 HIMARS produced by Lockheed Martin of the United States.
The multiple launch rocket system Chunmoo fires toward the sea off Goseong, Gangwon Province, northeastern South Korea, as the Army's 3rd Artillery Brigade conducts a two-day nighttime live-fire drill from April 16, 2025, in this undated photo released by the Army on April 18. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
In Norway, Hanwha Aerospace's K9 self-propelled howitzer is called the K9 Vidar.
Vidar is the name of a son of Odin in Norse mythology, associated with strength and survival. The name aligns the system's image with Norwegian heritage. Vidar also stands for versatile indirect artillery.
The Polish version of Hyundai Rotem Co.'s planned K2 battle tank, to be produced locally starting in 2029, has been renamed K2PL, with the PL standing for Poland, reflecting the specific requirements for the country's needs.
In the missile field, LIG Nex1 Co.'s Cheongung-II surface-to-air missile is marketed as KM-SAM Block II, or Korean medium-range surface-to-air missile. Cheongung translates to "sky bow," symbolizing an arrow shot into the sky to intercept incoming threats.
LIG Nex1's portable surface-to-air missile system Shingung, which means "new bow," is marketed internationally as Chiron, a mythological creature in Greek mythology.
This photo, provided by the Army on Nov. 22, 2024, shows a Qatari soldier (L) learning how to operate a Korean-made K2 tank as part of the Korea-Army International Course (K-AIC) program. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · February 17, 2026
5. So, We Have a Maritime Action Plan
Summary:
CDR Salamander argues the Maritime Action Plan, produced on time per an April 2025 Executive Order and signed by Marco Rubio as National Security Advisor and Russ Vought as OMB Director, should be read as economic, industrial policy, and budget guidance rather than a naval strategy. He highlights four pillars: rebuilding shipbuilding capacity (only eight US yards can build ships over 400 feet, under 1 percent of global commercial shipping built in the US, Maritime Prosperity Zones, universal fees on foreign-built vessels entering US ports); reforming maritime workforce education and training (fix deferred maintenance at the Merchant Marine Academy and support state academies); protecting the maritime industrial base (investigate PRC threats); and strengthening national security and resilience (increase US-flagged fleet, prioritize robotics and autonomy, boost Arctic presence, deregulation). He says the plan can anchor follow-on legislation but requires long-term, bipartisan, multi-administration follow-through.
Comment: He forgot to mention the important contributions of our allies (Korea and Japan - MASGA)
So, We Have a Maritime Action Plan
...now for the followthrough...
CDR Salamander
Feb 17, 2026
https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/so-we-have-a-maritime-action-plan?utm
In the second half of the last Midrats Podcast, Mark and I discussed the recently released Maritime Action Plan. I still don’t understand why we release such documents on a Friday before a three-day weekend, but whoever makes that call should be left with the next bar tab.
To their great credit however, the April 2025 Executive Order demanded a deliverable, and they got it done on time.
If you are looking for a naval strategy or other “this type of system doing that” report, you won’t find it here, and nor should you.
This is signed by Marco Rubio as National Security Advisor and Russ Vought as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. It is best seen as an economic, industrial policy, and budget priorities document. It isn’t primarily focused on the deployable fleet, but something foundational and arguably more important that everything else is built on.
Here are its four pillars, and the parts of it that got my attention.
- Pillar I: Rebuild Shipbuilding Capacity and Capabilities
- Only 8 yards in the USA that can build ships greater than 400 feet
- Less than 1% of the world’s commercial shipping was built in the USA
- Maritime Prosperity Zones
- Focus on geographical diversity, including the Great Lakes and our river systems
- Universal fees on foreign built vessels bringing products to American ports
- Pillar II: Reform Workforce Education and Training
- Fix the deferred maintenance disgrace at the Merchant Marine Academy
- Help lift up state Merchant Marine Acedemies
- Workforce development
- Pillar III: Protect the Maritime Industrial Base
- Investigate People’s Republic of China’s threats to our industrial base
- Pillar IV: National Security, Economic Security, and Industrial Resilience
- Increase US flagged fleet
- Prioritize robotics and autonomous systems
- Boost arctic presence
- Deregulation
They wind things up with some solid discussions about deregulation and proposed legislation. That last bit…that is under-appreciated.
If used properly, the Maritime Action Plan is a solid “Ref. A.” for follow-on legislation and programs. It gives someone the ability to have the handy hook of, “IAW the Maritime Action Plan…”
It also is a useful information source for leaders who have a lot on their plate but are not steeped in maritime issues. They know there are problems that need to be addressed, but don’t fully understand where to place the levers of power they have access to. This can be used as a guide to do just that.
In a way, a barrier removal exercise is key to see where we are, where we want to be, and what barriers are between the two. This does that.
Give it a read for the details but take this to heart: besides renovations to the Merchant Marine Academy and a few other side items, the core of this requires action that will not have a quick turnaround. This will need to be a multi-administration and bipartisan effort to be a success. This should be a thoroughly non-partisan effort. All sides “win” with a strong maritime industrial base, well capitalized national merchant marine, and a Navy second to none.
To enable that, both parties should ensure that their leading people driving this effort to rebuild our maritime infrastructure have exceptionally good playground manners and a reputation for healthy competition but not bringing a baggage train of toxicity with them as they walk through the door.
This effort is too important.
6. Lee vows efforts to build fair society in Lunar New Year message
Comment: Compare to KJU's words.
Lee vows efforts to build fair society in Lunar New Year message | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · February 17, 2026
SEOUL, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung pledged Tuesday to build a society free of injustice and unfairness in a message to the public on Lunar New Year in his second year in office.
Lee made the remark in a post on social media platform X, expressing hope that "all citizens fulfill their wishes in the new year."
"My wish is to create a world where no one inherits a dark and troubled world, where no one suffers from injustice and unfairness, and where no one can unjustly take away what belongs to others," he said.
Lee stressed that he did not seek to become the president for the sake of power but to use his presidential authority to carry out meaningful work.
He vowed efforts to address problems in the real estate market, build a safe and peaceful nation, and create a fair and rational society.
Lee took office in June last year following months of political turmoil triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed martial law bid in December 2024 and subsequent impeachment.
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a town hall meeting with residents at the exhibition and convention center in the southeastern city of Changwon, in this file photo from Feb. 6, 2026. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · February 17, 2026
7. France Considers Purchasing South Korean K239 Chunmoo Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
Comment: Arsenal of democracies.
France Considers Purchasing South Korean K239 Chunmoo Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
militarnyi.com · Roman Pryhodko February 15, 2026 15:10
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/france-considers-purchasing-korean-k239/
CGR080 and Ure-2 missiles for the K239 Chunmoo and Homar-K missile systems
The French Army is considering the purchase of South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo multiple launch rocket systems as a temporary solution to enhance its long-range strike capability.
According to Opex360, France’s artillery units currently operate only a small number of outdated LRU (M270) launchers. These systems require extensive maintenance and are no longer suited to the demands of modern high-intensity warfare.
France officially plans to develop its own long-range strike system, the FLP-T (Frappe Longue Portée – Terrestre), designed to provide a credible deep-strike capability. However, the system is not expected to enter service before 2030.
As a result, France has examined foreign alternatives, including the U.S.-made M142 HIMARS and Israel’s PULS system. Nevertheless, a recent study by the French think tank IFRI recommends the South Korean K239 Chunmoo, manufactured by Hanwha Aerospace, as the preferred option.
K239 Chunmoo, essentially an M270 on a wheeled chassis. Photo credits: Korea Defense Blog
The expert analysis highlights that the K239 Chunmoo is a modern, multi-role, multiple-launch rocket system with a wide range of available munitions and relatively short delivery timelines.
It is already in service or on order in several European countries, including Norway and Estonia, as well as Poland, which is expanding ammunition production in Europe for this system.
Under the 2024–2030 Military Programming Law (LPM), France is focusing on a sovereign solution to replace its M270 LRU launchers as part of the Long Range Land Strike (FLP-T) program. Two teams are working in parallel on the project – Safran/MBDA and Thales/ArianeGroup – with the selection of the winner expected in 2026.
The target specifications for FLP-T include a range of over 150 km, with delivery to the armed forces by 2030, followed by a gradual increase in range to 500–1,000 km. These timelines have prompted France to consider India’s Pinaka multiple-launch rocket system as a temporary measure to bridge the capability gap until the national system enters serial production.
MBDA/Safran Thundart rocket system. Photo credits: MBDA
In April 2025, at the exhibition in Le Bourget, the French company unveiled the fully French-made Foudre multiple launch rocket system, positioned in the same category as the American HIMARS.
The developers present it as a “100% French-made” system capable of directly competing with HIMARS.
In October 2025, French defense companies MBDA and Safran developed the Thundart multiple-launch rocket system to compete for a new system of this type for the French Army.
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militarnyi.com · Roman Pryhodko February 15, 2026 15:10
8. Why North Korea’s Kim is lauding Ukraine war sacrifices as key party congress looms
Summary:
north Korea is reframing losses from its involvement in Russia’s Ukraine war as patriotic sacrifice ahead of a key party congress later this month. Kim Jong-un attended the completion ceremony of Saeppyol Street, a new Pyongyang housing district redesignated for families of soldiers deployed to Ukraine and killed in action, and promised sustained state support and privileges, including elite schooling for their children. Analysts argue the project is part of showpiece construction meant to impress citizens and elites, justify overseas deployments amid discontent, and package casualties as “victory and glory.” The congress may have been delayed to showcase the district. Attention also centers on whether Kim Ju-ae appears at the congress.
Comment: This is narrative management. The regime turns death into proof of loyalty, then buys silence with keys and permits. It is also deterrence at home. If families fear the next call-up, the state must show it pays, remembers, and rewards. Kim Ju-ae at these scenes trains the public eye to see her near power and near sacrifice.
If the regime can convert battlefield losses into “heroic era” messaging, what counter-narrative can expose the trade-off between foreign war and domestic welfare without harming families?
If compensation and memorialization become a core tool for regime cohesion, what indicators should watch for rising discontent despite the benefits on display?
Why North Korea’s Kim is lauding Ukraine war sacrifices as key party congress looms
The new homes for families of fallen soldiers are part of a push to showcase tangible achievements before the party congress, analysts say
Published: 8:00am, 17 Feb 2026
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 8:00am, 17 Feb 2026
North Korea appears to be recasting the human cost of its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine as a carefully staged display of loyalty and leadership, with analysts pointing in particular to the unveiling of a new housing district in Pyongyang for families of fallen soldiers as a central part of that effort.
Several observers argue that leader Kim Jong-un is seeking not only to recast battlefield losses as patriotic sacrifice but also to head off potential unease before a key party congress later this month, where he is expected to tout his achievements and set the tone for the next five years.
On Sunday, Kim attended the completion ceremony of Saeppyol Street, a residential district redesignated for the families of soldiers deployed to the Ukraine war and killed in action, according to state media.
Accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju-ae and senior military officials, Kim used the occasion to pay tribute to the fallen and promise sustained state support for their relatives.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (right) and his daughter, Kim Ju-ae (second from right), greeting bereaved family members during the opening ceremony of Saeppyol Street on Sunday. Photo: EPA/KCNA
In a speech at the event, Kim said the new district fulfilled the “ardent wish of the motherland” to ensure that the lives of soldiers who “gave the most precious thing” would continue through their families.
“This is a moment that embodies the strength of Korea, symbolises the greatness of the Korean people, and records in the history of Pyongyang the most heroic era that defended our sacred dignity and honour,” he said.
“The party and the government will take every necessary measure to ensure that the beloved families … may lead proud and fulfilling lives under national preferential treatment and the care and concern of the entire society.”
Analysts said the housing project should be viewed within a broader push to showcase tangible achievements before the party congress.
Oh Gyeong-seob, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), said the North had been engaged in ostentatious construction projects, including the building of 50,000 new homes in Pyongyang, to flaunt Kim’s “people-loving” leadership.
“North Korea is pouring resources and manpower into showpiece construction projects meant to impress Pyongyang citizens and power elites and bolster their loyalty to Kim,” Oh told This Week in Asia.
“He needs eye-catching achievements as a message of success ahead of the 9th party congress” later this month, Oh said.
Kim also pledged that the party and government would take comprehensive measures to ensure the bereaved families receive state privileges and sustained social support so they could live “with pride and fulfilment”, promising to educate their children at the country’s best schools.
“The North is also emphasising that the state will continue remembering the fallen soldiers through various memorial programmes and take good care of their bereaved families amid discontent over sending their sons to a war abroad,” Oh said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (centre) and his daughter Ju-ae (back, left) with the families of fallen soldiers moving into their homes on Saeppyol Street in Pyongyang on Sunday. Photo: KCNA via KNS / AFP
Saeppyol Street was originally part of a 50,000-home construction project before being redesignated as a residential area for families of soldiers killed in action and others dispatched to help Russia in its war against Ukraine, following Kim’s meeting with them in August last year.
During the completion ceremony, Kim personally handed out “housing use permits” issued in the name of the party central committee, met bereaved families and toured the interiors of the newly built flats.
In recent weeks, he has repeatedly appeared at events related to troops deployed to the war, for which the North has sent more than 11,000 soldiers.
He visited the Mansudae Art Studio to oversee the production of statues for a memorial on Saeppyol Street, and toured the construction site with his daughter and military commanders while urging that the “heroism” of deployed soldiers be highlighted.
Analysts say the string of moves to honour the war dead and compensate their families reflects a calculated political effort to justify the deployment of troops to a foreign war and transform it into an opportunity to consolidate domestic solidarity.
“To maximise the achievements of the past five years at the party congress, one of the most crucial challenges for Kim is how to package the massive loss of life on the Ukrainian front as victory and glory,” said Hong Min, senior research fellow at KINU.
“The completion ceremony for Saeppyol Street visualises the state’s tangible compensation to the families of the war dead.”
According to Hong, the party congress appears to have been delayed by a few weeks to allow the leadership to showcase construction achievements – particularly the completion of Saeppyol Street – before the gathering.
“The Saeppyol Street ceremony is a highly calculated political move,” Hong said, “designed to domestically justify the sensitive issue of overseas military operations and convert it into a core achievement for regime cohesion”.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends a completion ceremony of Saeppyol Street in Pyongyang on Sunday. Photo: KCNA/Korea News Service via AP
Professor Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies said the memorial events for the war dead provided fresh material for the country’s propaganda apparatus, which relied heavily on agitation for its survival.
“The North is seeking to use the remembrance events to underscore Kim Jong-un’s ‘people-first’ revolutionary thought and consolidate unity before the party congress,” he told This Week in Asia.
Observers note that since 2024, the North has increasingly emphasised the young leader’s authority independent of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, and his father, Kim Jong-il.
“It remains under scrutiny whether ‘Kim Jong-unism’ will be institutionalised within the party and enshrined in the constitution following the congress,” Yang said.
Held once every five years, the congress is North Korea’s highest decision-making body and sets major policy directions on defence, the economy and foreign relations.
Oh of KINU said observers were also watching whether Kim’s daughter, 13, would attend the party congress, even though there was only a remote possibility of her being appointed to any official post given her young age.
“If she attends the party congress, we can safely say she is definitely being groomed as an heiress to power,” he said.
South Korea’s spy agency, the National Intelligence Service, told lawmakers last week that Ju-ae had entered what it described as a stage of internal succession designation, according to members briefed behind closed doors.
Lawmakers add that the agency will watch closely whether she attends the coming party congress, how she is presented and whether she is granted any formal title, amid signs she is being positioned as a potential fourth-generation leader.
Park Chan-kyong
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School
9. North Korea: Even Worse Than You Thought. (feat. Greg Scarlatoiu) (Podcast)
Comment: Very much worth listening to this from Greg Scarlatoiu. No one understands the human rights situation in north Korea better than Greg.
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Dive into a gripping Warfronts conversation with HRNK President & CEO Greg Scarlatoiu on North Korea’s prison camps, regime dynamics, overseas forced labor, abductions, and the Ukraine war pipeline—plus how you can access free reports and support HRNK.(Simon Whistler, WarFronts)
North Korea: Even Worse Than You Thought. (feat. Greg Scarlatoiu)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XO0UZtXKKL8
10. The Defector Podcast: Red Line | Former CIA Analyst: "North Korea’s Economy is Screaming."
Comment: Bill Brown has forgotten more about the north Korean economy than we will ever know. He talks with Hyunseung Lee who knows more than a thing or two about north Korea from his lived experience.
Link to the Podcast here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Kln06SQaj0
Red Line | Former CIA Analyst: "North Korea’s Economy is Screaming." #NorthKoreanCurrency #CIA
The Defector
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Prof. William Brown joins The Defector to discuss North Korea's Economy & Currency Crisis. In this episode, we explore dollarization in North Korea and market (Jangmadang) to understand the future of the North Korean stability. Subscribe for weekly expert analysis on North Korean security.
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In this Episode:
00:00 Intro & Guest Introduction
02:57 Personal background and historical context
06:03 Structure of North Korea’s economy and issues with data reliability
09:02 Economic relations between China and North Korea
12:00 Political projects and economic instability
15:02 Inflation and North Korea’s currency policy
17:34 Economic changes and inflation in North Korea
20:39 Social inequality and the North Korean elite
24:55 North Korea’s currency and foreign exchange system
28:58 Political economy and the government’s role in North Korea
35:11 The Kim Jong Un regime and South Korea’s political relations
35:44 Conversations between Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un
36:36 Park Chung Hee’s economic policy shifts
39:45 Modern architecture and technological progress in Pyongyang
42:34 Housing issues and living conditions in North Korea
45:52 Nuclear weapons and international politics
49:19 North Korea’s relations with China and Russia
52:06 South Korea’s independence and diplomatic strategy
55:41 The cost of unification between North and South Korea
57:24 North Korea’s natural resources and economic potential
01:00:19 South Korea’s economic development and social policies
01:01:37 Hydrogen and energy resources in North Korea
01:03:52 The need for robotics and technology
01:06:56 South Korea’s economic challenges and opportunities
01:09:38 Investment and economic relations between Japan and the United States
01:12:48 Tourism and the economic future of North Korea
William B. Brown is the principal of his small consulting firm, Northeast Asia Economics and Intelligence, Advisory LLC (NAEIA.com), and is a professor at the University of Maryland’s Global Campus, teaching a course on Contemporary China. He continues to do contracting work for the federal government from which he is retired and participates in professional panels on North Korea in the Washington area. He writes and speaks often on North Korean economic issues for Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.
His most recent government service was as Senior Advisor to the National Intelligence Manager for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and for the North Korea Mission Manager. His career as an economist and East Asia specialist has included positions in the analytical arm of CIA, Commerce Department’s Chief Economist’s Office, and the National Intelligence Council where he served as Senior Research Fellow for East Asia and as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Economics. Much of his research has been focused on the North Korean and Chinese economies.
His career has included management work for Virginia’s Department of World Trade in Norfolk and he served as Senior Research Officer and North Korea Referent in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. He also teaches as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, George Washington University and for nearly twenty years taught in George Mason University’s Graduate School of Public Policy.
Mr. Brown is a recipient of the Republic of Korea’s Samil National Security medal for his work on North Korea. He received an M.A. in Economics and Chinese studies, and most coursework for the Ph.D., from Washington University in St. Louis and his B.A. in International Studies from Rhodes College in Memphis. He was raised in Kwangju, Korea by Presbyterian missionary parents who themselves were born and raised in China and Korea, respectively. He and his wife live in Herndon, Virginia and have four grown children.
11. How the Party Congress became North Korea’s biggest political event
Summary:
NK News argues Party Congresses became north Korea’s main stage for big policy signals, personnel reshuffles, and legitimacy cues, rooted in Leninist “democratic centralism” where debate is pre-decision and unity is compulsory after. Reviewing past congresses, it describes Soviet-directed origins (1946), adoption of the emblem and early faction control (1948), Kim Il Sung consolidating power after Stalin’s denunciation era (1956) and achieving one-man dominance (1961). It notes succession signaling for Kim Jong Il (1970, 1980), a long freeze in congresses under Kim Jong Il (1980–2016), and Kim Jong Un’s normalization and title reshuffles in 2016 and 2021 alongside economic hard-line rhetoric. For the Ninth Congress (Feb 2026), it says to watch for title changes, policy shifts unlikely under hardline signals and Russian backing, and elite reshuffles, especially optics around Kim’s daughter.
Comment: The congress is a choreography of control. Titles and seating become a language that tells elites who is rising and who is fading. The regime uses history as a tool. It borrows Soviet forms, then bends them to dynasty, making “eternal” titles temporary when useful. With a new patron in Putin, the leadership can sell stability without reform, and propaganda can frame stagnation as discipline.
Remember that some scholars used to say in some jest that Kim Il Sung "out-Stalined Stalin." I think the Kim family regime has magnified every evil of the former Soviet Union.
How the Party Congress became North Korea’s biggest political event
A look back show how the Ninth Congress could announce policies, purge officials, herald a successor and more
Fyodor Tertitskiy February 17, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/how-the-party-congress-became-north-koreas-biggest-political-event/
Images: Rodong Sinmun, KCNA, edited by NK News
North Korea is slated to convene its Ninth Party Congress any day now, and on paper, it might sound like just another stiff political gathering of fawning officials in Pyongyang.
In reality, Party Congresses have always been the regime’s favored stage for big announcements, subtle purges and the occasional rewriting of titles, underscoring the importance of paying attention.
To understand why this upcoming meeting matters, we need to go back — way back — to Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and the strange career of “democratic centralism.”
According to Lenin’s doctrine, once the party line was decided, everyone had to fall in behind it. Debate was for before the decision, and unity was compulsory after. In theory, Party Congresses were the safety valve in this system — the one place where delegates elected from below could question the Central Committee, choose leadership and offer criticism.
In practice, the script came from the top, the delegates applauded on cue and “elections” were about as free and spontaneous as a well-rehearsed military parade. Still, because the congress was formally the party’s highest decision-making body, it remained the place to announce major restructuring and key personnel reshuffles, the event’s lengthy policy speeches setting the tone for years.
North Korea has followed this Soviet model to a T. So before we speculate about the Ninth Congress, let’s do what the North Korean leadership never likes anyone to do: look back. The first eight congresses tell a surprisingly dramatic story, one that sheds light on what we can expect from No. 9.
The First Party Congress in Aug. 1946 | Image: Wikimedia Commons
THE FIRST CONGRESS (AUG. 1946): MOSCOW’S PUPPET LEARNS TO WALK
The Workers’ Party of North Korea — its name at the time — was not born in Pyongyang, but in Moscow. It was a Soviet project from the start.
In the 1940s, Stalin marketed his satellite regimes as “people’s democracies,” supposedly softer and more pluralistic than the USSR itself. To sustain this illusion, communist parties were ordered to merge with social democrats and adopt neutral-sounding names: something about workers, unity or democracy, rather than plain “Communist Party.”
The first test case was East Germany, where the Social Democratic Party was forcibly swallowed by the communists, producing the Socialist Unity Party. North Korea was the second experiment.
There was just one problem: In the North, the real Social Democratic Party was already gone, as its leaders had fled the Soviet zone after clashing with the communists. So the Soviets simply invented a social democratic partner, the New People’s Party.
To maintain the façade, Kim Il Sung was not made chairman of this new party. That position went to Kim Du Bong, even though Kim Il Sung was the de facto leader from the start, second only to the Soviets.
This made-to-order party was then told to merge with the communists at the first congress of the joint political party. Curious North Korean cadres asked what the name of the new party would be. Moscow had not yet decided. The Soviet response was brutally honest: It doesn’t matter, just vote as you’re told.
Thus began the long history of the “Glorious Workers’ Party.”
State media coverage in March 1948, when the Second Party Congress took place | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE SECOND CONGRESS (MARCH 1948): FLAGS, SLOGANS AND A NEW EMBLEM
By the Second Congress, Korea’s division was solidifying into two separate states. Unsurprisingly, the speeches followed a simple script: the North as virtuous, the South as a puppet of imperialism.
Symbolically, this congress did introduce something new: the party emblem. The design (still in use today) showed a hammer, a Korean-style sickle and a brush, symbolizing workers, farmers and intellectuals.
Before that, observers reported an odd emblem: a hammer and two sickles, as if the party represented workers and farmers … and more farmers. That strange design disappeared and the new emblem became standard.
There was one more curiosity. At the time, the emblem often appeared next to the traditional Korean Taegukgi, the flag that later became the national flag of South Korea. Today, retouched images without the inconvenient flag appear in DPRK publications.
Even then, the party was still factional. Multiple communist groupings coexisted uneasily under one banner. However, Kim Il Sung was already asserting dominance: At the congress, he publicly scolded his rival O Gi Sop, signaling that “unity” would be enforced from above.
State media coverage of the Third Party Congress in April 1956| Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE THIRD CONGRESS (APRIL 1956): AFTER STALIN, KIM HANGS ON
The Third Congress was the first after North Korea’s failed attempt to conquer the South in the Korean War. Announced in 1955, it was supposed to be a routine event — until Moscow detonated a political bomb.
In Feb. 1956, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Around the communist world, leaders associated with Stalinist methods suddenly looked vulnerable. Kim Il Sung was one of them.
But in Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung survived, and decisively. His loyalists controlled the proceedings, dissenters were sidelined or silenced and the new Central Committee was stacked with Kim’s followers. A desperate attempt to oust him in August that year failed spectacularly.
In hindsight, this was one of the most important party events in Kim Il Sung’s life. Even the British Foreign Office saw the Third Congress as the moment when Kim could logically have been removed. Instead, he converted danger into total control.
State media coverage of the Fourth Party Congress in Sept. 1961 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE FOURTH CONGRESS (SEPT. 1961): ONE VOICE, ONE MAN, ONE PARTY
By the Fourth Congress, the story had changed again. North Korea had weathered its internal purges and moved toward political independence from the Soviet Union.
The party’s top bodies were now dominated by Kim Il Sung’s old comrades, many of them veterans of guerrilla warfare in Manchuria. The factional infighting that had defined earlier years was effectively over.
Borrowing a title from Soviet history, the leadership called this the “Congress of the Victors,” echoing the 17th Congress of the Bolshevik Party, Stalin’s triumph after a power struggle. The message was unmistakable: Kim Il Sung’s rule was unchallenged. All serious opposition, inside or outside the party, had been destroyed.
The modern cult of Kim had not yet fully formed, but the political landscape was already clear: one leader, no factions, no rivals.
State media coverage of the Fifth Party Congress in Nov. 1970 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE FIFTH CONGRESS (NOV. 1970): THREE REVOLUTIONS AND ONE RISING SON
At the Fifth Congress, Kim Il Sung unveiled his doctrine of the “three revolutions” — ideological, technological and cultural. This was more than just a slogan; it signaled a shift in how the regime thought about “revolution” itself.
In the Soviet model, revolution was a specific historical event: the seizure of power. In the Chinese Maoist model, revolution was a permanent condition, a continuous struggle led by the party. North Korea was moving toward the latter conception of revolution as a never-ending campaign, not a one-time uprising.
This congress also marked the first official appearance of Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il, at a Party Congress.
North Korean sources insist that it was Kim Jong Il who introduced the now-ubiquitous Kim Il Sung badges that every adult North Korean is expected to wear. The timeline fits: Photos of citizens wearing the badges started appearing not long after this congress.
At this stage, Kim Jong Il was not yet the formally designated successor, but he was very clearly the rising star.
State media coverage of the Sixth Party Congress in Oct. 1980 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE SIXTH CONGRESS (OCT. 1980): LONG LIVE THE PRINCE
Kim Jong Il had been named successor in February 1974, but for years it was a strange, almost Schrödinger-like appointment. Inside North Korea, internal party materials glorified the “Dear Leader.” Yet outward-facing media, and even the party daily Rodong Sinmun, were forbidden from mentioning him by name.
It seems Kim Il Sung had not fully made up his mind.
That changed just before the Sixth Congress, when North Korea’s ambassador to Switzerland confirmed publicly that Kim Jong Il was indeed the designated heir.
At the congress itself, he was duly elevated to all major party organs. Even so, the regime moved cautiously. His full-blown cult of personality did not switch on overnight. Only in 1981 did the Dear Leader’s portraits, slogans and songs become an everyday feature of North Korean life on display in outward-facing state media.
By then, father and son ruled together and were increasingly omnipresent in propaganda.
Kim Jong Il photographed in 2010 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE LONG PAUSE (1980-2016)
Official plans originally called for another congress after the sixth. In reality, the party system entered a kind of freeze.
North Korea’s economy began to falter. Then the communist world itself started to crumble. Across Eastern Europe, ruling parties held congresses that produced reforms, or implosions.
Whether out of fear, paralysis or both, Kim Jong Il chose to stop convening Party Congresses altogether. The Politburo aged and shrank, the party apparatus ossified, and formal structures quietly decayed.
Ironically, many of North Korea’s most consequential economic — and even political — reforms unfolded during this long intermission, a reminder that Pyongyang can change course without convening a congress.
Only after his stroke in 2008 did Kim Jong Il recognize the danger: If he died suddenly, the system might be left without a clear leadership mechanism. He named Kim Jong Un as successor in 2009, and soon afterward a Party Conference — an emergency mini-congress — repopulated the Central Committee with new members.
The party had been in hibernation, and it needed to be revived.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Seventh Party Congress in 2016 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE SEVENTH CONGRESS (MAY 2016): LIKE CHINA, BUT WITHOUT REFORMS
Kim Jong Un decided to normalize the deeply irregular system of Party Congresses. Under him, they were to be held every five years, in step with the pattern seen in neighboring China.
The Seventh Congress brought both symbolism and substance. Kim’s title changed from first secretary to chairman. Party secretaries were retitled as vice chairmen. These moves may sound cosmetic, but in a system where titles signal both rank and legitimacy, they mattered.
Unofficially, the congress also marked a shift in how the party related to the military. For decades, serving in the army was one of the easiest routes into the party. Soldiers were admitted in large numbers, and party membership was a powerful incentive to enlist.
After 2016, that pipeline started to close. The leadership pivoted from handing out rewards to tightening control, the carrot giving way to the stick.
THE EIGHTH CONGRESS (JAN. 2021): WHEN ‘ETERNAL’ TITLES EXPIRE
Right on schedule, the Eighth Congress opened five years later in Jan. 2021.
Kim Jong Un’s title changed yet again. To the surprise of many, he was named general secretary of the Workers’ Party, a position his father Kim Jong Il had supposedly been given “eternally” in 2012. “Eternal,” it turned out, lasted only until Kim Jong Un had different ideas.
The congress doubled down on economic hard-line positions. The market-style experimentation of earlier in Kim Jong Un’s rule did not rise to doctrine; instead, the rhetoric reaffirmed centralized planning and the virtues of the old command system.
Titles shuffled once more: Party vice chairmen became secretaries again. Symbolically, it looked like a return to the Kim Jong Il era, but with his son wearing the general secretary’s badge of authority.
The Eighth Party Congress in 2021 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
THE NINTH CONGRESS (FEB. 2026): WHAT TO WATCH FOR
Expectations for the Ninth Party Congress cluster into three areas.
The first concerns whether Kim Jong Un will invent a new title for himself. This is unlikely as he appears comfortable as general secretary, state media using the title frequently and proudly.
There has been speculation that he might resurrect the state title of president of the DPRK, formally held “eternally” by his grandfather Kim Il Sung. But the presidency is a state role, not a party one, so the congress may not be the venue for that move.
The second area to watch is policy shifts, including the likelihood of much-needed reforms.
Don’t hold your breath. The party never sanctified the modest economic openings of early Kim Jong Un years as core doctrine. In more recent years, the leadership has repeatedly signaled hostility to reformism.
North Korea has also found a new patron: Vladimir Putin. North Korean artillery shells in exchange for Russian economic and political backing give Pyongyang something hardliners have always craved — a way to“reform nothing while a friendly authoritarian power helps keep the lights on.
With that kind of support, the argument for bold economic change becomes weaker, not stronger.
The final area to monitor is changes in the composition of top party bodies. Congresses are the ideal time to retire some officials, promote others and elevate new faces.
Here the rumors focus on one person: Kim Jong Un’s daughter. Will she be given an official role? Will she even appear in a formal capacity?
It’s possible, but there are constraints. She is still a minor, and party rules require a certain age (18) for formal positions, unless amended. A more likely scenario is that she features prominently in optics and symbolism, while any formal elevation waits for the 10th Congress, when she is older and the leadership has prepared the ground more thoroughly.
That, of course, assumes there are no major upheavals before then, something North Korea’s history shows is far from guaranteed.
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. The 2026 Window: Can the “Ember” of US-North Korea Diplomacy Still Catch Fire?
Summary:
Frank Aum argues 2026 is a narrowing window for US–north Korea diplomacy because both POTUS and Kim Jong Un appear to want to meet, yet their preferred terms clash. Pyongyang signals willingness to talk only if Washington drops denuclearization and accepts nuclear reality under “peaceful coexistence.” POTUS avoids publicly foregrounding denuclearization, but his bureaucracy and US–South Korea documents still reaffirm it, so north Korea sees “no preconditions” as hollow. South Korea’s Lee Jae Myung END initiative keeps denuclearization and unification on the roadmap, further tethering POTUS. Missing a summit before the 9th Party Congress may harden Kim’s five-year direction. April Beijing and late-2026 APEC are cited as remaining openings before midterm politics and lame-duck dynamics shrink the chance.
Comment: The fight is over framing, not scheduling. “Peaceful coexistence” versus “denuclearization” is the cognitive terrain where legitimacy is won and lost. Seoul’s END language may soothe domestic politics, but it hands Pyongyang an easy propaganda line: engagement is a “farce” because the end state stays unchanged.
Acceptance of "peaceful co-existence" by the South is a torture and death sentence for 26 million Koreans in the north.
Ending denuclearization and shifting to arms control negotiations is a victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy.
The 2026 Window: Can the “Ember” of US-North Korea Diplomacy Still Catch Fire?
https://www.38north.org/2026/02/the-2026-window-can-the-ember-of-us-north-korea-diplomacy-still-catch-fire/Despite 2025 being a tumultuous year of high-stakes summits and tectonic shifts in geopolitical trends, US-North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) relations remained largely static, for better or worse. The lack of any breakthroughs intensifies a foreboding gloom about the prospects for diplomacy in the coming years. Yet, a flickering ember of hope remains for US-DPRK talks. History shows that engagement is possible when both sides have a sincere interest in being in the room. This is the case today: there is empirical evidence that both Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un possess a genuine, if highly idiosyncratic, desire to sit across from one another once again. The challenge in 2026 is whether they can bridge the chasm between personal interest and political reality before the clock runs out and structural barriers harden for the two countries.
It Takes Two to Tango: The Historical Prerequisite of Interest
As in any negotiations, the primary prerequisites for US-DPRK engagement are a simple, mutual interest in talking and a willingness to be flexible on terms. Diplomacy has consistently stalled whenever one or both sides lacked that basic desire and amenability. Between 1954 and 1992, there was no official high-level engagement because the Cold War context, mutual suspicion, and political constraints undermined the rationale for dialogue. North Korea’s threat of a nuclear program finally created the impetus for talks in the early 1990s, but diplomatic dead zones continued to emerge when one side tried to impose its will on the other: Talks stalled in 2001-2002 when President George W. Bush questioned the Agreed Framework and included North Korea in an “axis of evil;” in 2006, North Korea boycotted the Six Party Talks following US sanctions on Banco Delta Asia; between 2012-2018, Washington set high preconditions for talks while enforcing a strong pressure campaign, which extinguished Pyongyang’s own interest in resuming talks; and since 2019, despite US. interest in unconditional talks, North Korea has demurred as long as denuclearization remained a potential agenda topic. In each of these eras, each side was unwilling to engage unless it was on its own terms.
Conversely, when both sides felt the conditions were right to engage, talks happened. This was evident in the lead-up to and during the 1994 Agreed Framework period (1992-2002), the Six Party Talks period (2003-2008), the brief opening of the Leap Day Deal (2011-2012), and the historic Trump-Kim summitry (2018-2019). The common denominator in each period was that Pyongyang wanted to talk but had to manufacture a crisis to maximize leverage and intensify Washington’s desire to meet.
Today, the tables have turned because it is now the United States that is more eager for talks and North Korea that has greater leverage to impose preconditions. Nevertheless, amid deep pessimism about US-DPRK relations, there is a flicker of hope because the prerequisite of mutual interest in engagement still remains. However, the dance is stalled because both sides are insisting on leading with their own preferred terms.
The View from Pyongyang: Peaceful Coexistence and Nuclear Recognition
North Korea’s interest in engagement is not a matter of speculation; it is a matter of official record. In a September 2025 speech, Kim Jong Un signaled a clear opening, noting that “[i]f the U.S. drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the U.S.” His sister Kim Yo Jong previewed this line of thinking via KCNA a couple months earlier, arguing that, although the United States must rethink its denuclearization approach to North Korea because the circumstances from 2018 have changed, it is not beneficial for “two countries possessed of nuclear weapons to go in a confrontational direction and . . . it would be advisable to seek another way of contact on the basis of such new thinking.”
If Kim Jong Un was completely averse to engaging with Washington, he could have stayed silent and continued his military development path, comfortable in the leverage and security provided by Russian and Chinese support. Instead, his outreach signals a calculated pivot. He is offering a relationship, but only if the United States accepts the reality of his nuclear arsenal. By framing the goal as peaceful coexistence rather than denuclearization, he is attempting to reset the diplomatic baseline from one of disarmament to one of managed rivalry between two nuclear-armed states.
Trump’s Rhetoric vs. The Bureaucratic “Fact Sheet”
On the US side, President Trump has consistently expressed interest in re-engaging Kim. Since the start of his second term, and particularly during his summit meetings with South Korean president Lee Jae Myung in August and October 2025, Trump has maintained a striking degree of message discipline, repeatedly mentioning that he gets along well with Kim and wants to meet.
More striking, however, is what President Trump has not said. He has yet to state directly and publicly during his second term that denuclearization is his primary policy goal. In fact, in his solo remarks during the two 2025 summits with President Lee, the topic of North Korean denuclearization was conspicuously absent.
This silence underscores a significant gap between the President’s rhetoric and his administration’s official policy. Various administration spokespeople continue to reiterate that complete denuclearization remains the government’s position. Official documents, including the November 2025 Joint U.S.-South Korea Fact Sheet released following the summit, also reaffirm denuclearization as an alliance goal. This divergence suggests that the President’s inclination toward improving relations with North Korea is clashing against traditional alliance orthodoxy. Not surprisingly, the administration has yet to complete a North Korea policy review, which is typically conducted and announced early in the term’s first year, signaling a desire to maximize the president’s decision space.
Why a Trump-Kim Summit Never Happened
If both sides want to talk, why didn’t a summit during Trump’s October visit to Korea materialize? The answer lies in the unresolved friction over preconditions. While Trump was eager for a meeting, he was not yet prepared to explicitly accept North Korea’s demand, made by Kim just one month prior to Trump’s Asia tour, that the talks move away from denuclearization entirely. To do so still appears to be a bridge too far for the US establishment and potentially damaging to the US-ROK alliance. The Trump administration did offer talks without preconditions, the same approach that the Biden administration tried unsuccessfully throughout his term, but North Korea likely dismissed this framing given how denuclearization has publicly remained the ultimate goal. North Korea likely viewed Trump’s continued silence on its peaceful coexistence proposal as a sign that he was still beholden to the conventional thinking of the past. Without a clear signal that Washington was ready to abandon the denuclearization framework, Pyongyang saw no reason to engage or give Trump the political “win” of a high-profile summit.
The Lee Jae Myung Factor: The “END” Initiative
The approach of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is compounding the impasse. Since taking office in June 2025, Lee has championed his END initiative, which stands for Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization, as a pragmatic way to revitalize inter-Korean and US-DPRK talks. While Lee supports engagement and peaceful coexistence, his framework in practice undermines them because it continues to adhere to the pillars of long-term denuclearization and unification, which directly clash with North Korea’s own principles. Pyongyang has already renounced both, codifying a hostile “two states” policy and writing its nuclear status into the constitution. Kim Yo Jong called Lee’s outreach a “deceptive farce,” arguing that South Korea’s actual policies—including joint military drills, a US-ROK nuclear consultative group, and a constitution that claims sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula—reveal its true hostile intent.
Lee’s approach may also be contributing to President Trump’s hesitation. While dismissive of alliances, Trump still recognizes South Korea’s transactional value and may be holding back from fully accepting North Korea’s “no denuclearization” demand because he is trying to accommodate the personal entreaties of his South Korean ally. Lee’s insistence on keeping denuclearization on the roadmap effectively acts as a tether that prevents Trump from making the radical pivot that Kim Jong Un is demanding. By holding to denuclearization and unification as goals, Lee’s framework may be practical in balancing domestic sensitivities but could prove unrealistic and ultimately detrimental in jumpstarting dialogue.
On December 2, 2025, President Lee added three new principles to his North Korea policy that tried to downgrade the importance of denuclearization and align closer to North Korea’s “peaceful coexistence” framing. But given South Korea’s continued adherence to denuclearization in official alliance documents and unification in the country’s constitution, North Korea may continue to perceive these measures as superficial, semantic ploys rather than meaningful gestures.
The Cost of the Missed Opportunity: The 9th Party Congress
The failure to realize a summit before North Korea’s upcoming 9th Party Congress, expected in late February, represents a significant strategic oversight. These congresses are where the regime announces its five-year “marching orders.” Had Washington secured a positive engagement in late 2025, it could have helped shape North Korea’s foreign policy in a more constructive direction for the next half-decade. Instead, by keeping North Korea second-guessing about US intent and actions, the Trump administration may essentially enable Kim to draft his policy in a vacuum, potentially leading to further entrenchment of his nuclear posture and closer ties with Moscow. However, if the Party congress stays relatively silent about the United States and keeps North Korea’s policy direction more flexible, it may be a positive sign that Kim’s olive branch is still extended.
Why Kim Still Has Incentives To Engage
Maintaining openness to engagement would make sense for Kim because he still has powerful incentives to try to engage with the United States. A formal summit remains the ultimate validation of Kim’s standing as a world leader and a peer to the American president. Furthermore, if the two sides can reach an interim agreement that, for instance, focuses on a shutdown of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center rather than complete nuclear dismantlement, this may constitute a de facto acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power, a long-held strategic goal, and help bring it into the international fold. Economically, while Russia provides a temporary buffer, North Korea can only achieve significant modernization, diversification, and prosperity if it attains relief from US and UN sanctions, which only Washington can facilitate. Kim also remains focused on security concessions, specifically the suspension of US strategic asset deployments and a permanent scaling down of joint military exercises, which Trump already once agreed to in the past. In addition, a symbolic but powerful end of war declaration could help lead to changes in the regional security architecture and challenge the justification for the US military presence on the Peninsula.
Additional Bites at the Apple in 2026
From a US perspective, the 2026 diplomatic calendar offers two natural openings for a potential summit, should the two leaders’ wills align. The first is President Trump’s state visit to Beijing in April 2026, which provides a natural staging ground where Chinese president Xi Jinping, potentially wary of the burgeoning Russia-DPRK alliance, could help facilitate a Trump-Kim encounter to pull Pyongyang back into the Chinese orbit. Alternatively, Trump could seek to stop by the DMZ for a summit while in the region.
The second major opportunity is the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China in late 2026. With the world’s leaders gathering in China’s technological hub, there could be a strong gravitational pull for a major diplomatic rendezvous between the two leaders, again in China or in another stopover location. This could be the final chance for Trump to secure the “peacemaker” legacy deal he clearly desires before the political dynamics in Washington shift.
The Looming Political Cliff
If no engagement occurs by the end of 2026, the prospects for a summit during Trump’s second term drop precipitously due to a looming political cliff. If Democrats retake the House of Representatives in the November 2026 midterm elections, Trump will likely be consumed by oversight and potential impeachment hearings, leaving little political capital for high-risk foreign policy ventures. Furthermore, as 2027 begins, Trump will increasingly be viewed as a lame duck president, and North Korea may question his ability to deliver on long-term security guarantees or sanctions relief. Trump’s health and age (he turns 80 in 2026) will also be an important factor. If North Korea perceives Trump as a spent force, it might simply write him off and begin the long wait for the next administration, effectively freezing the Peninsula for at least several more years. In any case, it is unclear whether North Korea has any confidence in Trump given questions about the sustainability of any agreement.
A New Long Estrangement
If the United States and North Korea cannot find a way back to talks soon, they risk sleepwalking into a new extended era of diplomatic estrangement like the 38-year absence of talks between 1954 and 1992. The current trend is toward a similar generational freeze: setting aside the anomalous 18 months of talks in 2018-2019 facilitated by an unconventional president, the two countries have not engaged in official negotiations for 14 years.
Two factors are already pointing in this direction. First, as North Korea’s rejection of denuclearization hardens into a constitutional pillar, the traditional basis for talks has evaporated. There will no longer be any foundation for US-DPRK dialogue unless the two sides can develop a new creative rationale, especially in the current geopolitical environment of Russia’s continued need for North Korean munitions and personnel in the Ukraine conflict and recent US military actions in Iran and Venezuela
Second, it is probably unlikely that a future conventional US president will possess the same interest in meeting with Kim as Trump does. Donald Trump is a “black swan” in American diplomacy who has no qualms about meeting with international pariahs. Once he leaves, the door to this unique brand of diplomacy may close, leaving the international community to deal with an increasingly confident, unrestrained, nuclear-armed North Korea for decades to come.
To avoid this situation, it may be an unfortunate truth that the “least bad” scenario for the United States would be to reach an interim deal that deemphasizes denuclearization while constraining North Korea’s capabilities as much as possible. As Ankit Panda and I argued in a May 2025 report, given the unsustainable trajectory of US policy toward North Korea, Washington should pursue stable coexistence with Pyongyang as the overarching goal. This approach would emphasize mutual reassurance, risk reduction, and improved relations with North Korea while maintaining deterrence and, at least for the near term, tolerating North Korea’s continued possession of nuclear arms. For this to happen, President Trump must first signal unequivocally, whether through confidential channels or in public remarks, that he accepts Kim’s precondition.
At the same time, Kim should consider whether the stable coexistence framing also represents his best-case scenario: a foundational agreement that caps but still institutionalizes his nuclear program while also providing sanctions relief, security benefits, and improved relations with Washington and establishing the framework for future negotiations and benefits. Of course, Kim could decide that participating in alternative cooperation mechanisms like the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity and the Russia-North Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is sufficient or preferable. However, based on the limited utility of North Korea’s past experiences with the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, Kim may see greater value in solidifying his nuclear status and diplomatic and economic relations with the United States and its allies—the best of both worlds.
The ember of diplomacy is still flickering in 2026, but the United States and North Korea must demonstrate greater flexibility before the fuel and oxygen for talks run out.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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