​Quotes of the Day:

"History does not entrust the care of freedom to the weak or timid." 

– Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Absolute freedom mocks at justice. Absolute justice denies freedom. To be fruitful, the two ideas must find their limits in each other. No man considers that his condition is free if it is not at the same time just, nor just unless it is free. Freedom, precisely, cannot even be imagined without the power of saying clearly what is just and what is unjust, of claiming all existence in the name of a small part of existence which refuses to die.”

– Albert Camus, The Rebel

"Judge a man by his questions rather than by his answers." 

– Voltaire

1. Korean Peninsula Update, February 17, 2026

2. The Politics of Interpretation: Who Governs the Korean DMZ?

3. N. Korea designated 'high-risk jurisdiction' for money laundering, terrorism financing for 16th year

4. S. Korea seeks to reinstate no-fly zone under suspended 2018 inter-Korean military pact

5. Kim skips Kumsusan visit on father's birthday

6. Spy agency seeks military base access for insurrection probes

7. Major overhaul of Army digital network in South Korea nearly complete

8. Asia After America: How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

9. Kim Ju-ae's Unprecedented Resident Hugs Fuel Succession Speculation

10. USTR hints at possible adjustments in steel, aluminum tariff implementation

11. Seoul clings to hope for an empty train station, a symbol of inter-Korean ties

12. No further delays in bill to support investment in US

13. Puppies and PC games: Kim Jong Un promotes ‘modern’ living at housing ceremony

1. Korean Peninsula Update, February 17, 2026

Comment: Access the entire report at the link below.​  

Ths succession discussion would benefit from these "alternative" views from people who are actually from north Korea. I do not think we could be so accepting of the South Korean NIS assessment without considering other perspectives such as these.

The convenient return of the Kim Ju-ae succession narrative

By Jihyun Park

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/12/perspective-Kim-Jon-Un-successor/4451770939474/

Kim Jong Un's daughter as 'designated successor'?

Such a determination constitutes a dangerous leap of logic.

By Ri Jong-ho

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/13/perspective-Kim-Ju-ae-called-successor/1951771006771/

The Kim Ju-ae succession myth

By Hyunseung Lee

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/16/perspective-north-korea-kim-Ju-ae-not-successor/6291771253906/

Korean Peninsula Update, February 17, 2026

February 17, 2026

https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-february-17-2026/

Toplines

Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un likely intends for his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, to succeed him, according to the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS). The NIS assessed that the WPK may give Kim Ju Ae, who is roughly 13 years old, an official title at the upcoming 9th Party Congress.[1] The WPK first secretary position, which is the de facto number two post, has been empty since Kim established it at the 8th Party Congress. South Korean lawmaker Lee Seong-known separately said on February 12 that the NIS seen indicators that Kim Ju Ae is “expressing opinions on policy matters,” reflecting her growing involvement in state affairs.[2]

Kim Ju Ae has become an increasingly public figure since first appearing in November 2022. Kim Ju Ae publicly appeared 10 times in 2023, 12 times in 2024, and 15 times in 2025, according to the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.[3] Japanese media separately suggested in November 2025 that Kim Ju Ae had appeared publicly over 600 times since November 2022 based on facial recognition analysis.[4] The scope of her public activities expanded from participation in military and economic events to political and foreign relations events in 2025. North Korean state media often displays her alongside her father, Kim Jong Un, including when she stood between him and her mother, Ri Sol Ju, at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on January 1, 2026. The palace holds special political significance in North Korea because it houses the bodies of former leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

ISW-CDOT previously assessed that the Kim regime is preparing Kim Ju Ae for succession.[5] Kim Jong Un may be formalizing the succession early to avoid political instability in the years ahead.

Around 8,000 North Korean troops remain deployed around Kursk Oblast, Russia, and have performed fire support functions under Russian command, according to Ukrainian military intelligence. This gives Pyongyang valuable military experience and continues to strengthen its alliance with Moscow. Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, the GUR, stated on February 4 that North Korean troops based in Kursk Oblast have fired artillery, including with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), into Ukraine.[6] The North Korean troops have also conducted aerial reconnaissance to adjust artillery fire. North Korea initially deployed 11-12,000 troops to Kursk Oblast in October 2024 in order to help Russia repel a Ukrainian incursion into the territory. North Korean troops fought on the frontlines of that operation and took heavy casualties of around 2,000 killed and 4,000-5,000 wounded, according to South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence.[7] The GUR stated that North Korea has continued to deploy both combat troops and de-mining engineers to Kursk Oblast on a rotating basis based on agreements with Russia.[8] The troops have apparently transitioned to a fire support role in Russian operations but continue to gain modern combat experience that North Korea will try to integrate into its military training. The GUR estimated that around 3,000 North Korean troops have returned to North Korea to share their experiences for training purposes.

Deputy chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Yehor Cherniev, said on February 10 that North Korea’s provision of munitions to Russia constitutes a much larger threat to Ukraine than the deployment of North Korean troops.[9] North Korea became a major supplier of munitions to Russia around 2023 and has recently provided between 35 and 70 percent of Russia’s artillery shells and ballistic missiles each month, according to Ukrainian estimates from late 2025.[10] Ukrainian sources also reported in February 2025 that the accuracy of North Korean ballistic missiles had dramatically improved since North Korea entered the war, suggesting that North Korea was receiving some technical benefit from supporting Russia.[11] The North Korean involvement in fire support operations around Kursk Oblast could similarly help North Korea improve its artillery operations.

Russia is opposing South Korean efforts to build nuclear submarines, despite Russia reportedly enabling North Korea to develop the same capability. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev said on February 9 that South Korean efforts to acquire enriched uranium from the United States to build Seoul’s first nuclear-powered submarine could violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[12] Zinoviev said that Russia supports “broad international discussions” under the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding verification activities related to nuclear materials used in submarine reactors.[13] US President Donald Trump agreed to support the South Korean development of nuclear submarines, civilian uranium enrichment, and spent fuel reprocessing during his summit with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung in October 2025.[14] Zinoviev said that it is too early to predict whether the US-South Korean nuclear submarine plan will violate the NPT, however, because the United States has only given general approval for the plan and has not publicized specific details.

Zinoviev’s warnings about US-South Korean nuclear submarine cooperation follow reports that Moscow may have transferred nuclear reactor technology to North Korea. South Korean intelligence reported in September 2025 that Russia supplied North Korea with two or three submarine propulsion systems, potentially including an operational nuclear reactor, steam turbines, and cooling systems.[15] Spanish media reported on January 16 that the Ursa Major — a ship owned by the sole transport provider for Russia’s Ministry of Defense — was transporting coolant and steam piping components for two Russian VM-4SG nuclear reactors to Rason, North Korea, when it sank off Spain’s southeastern coast in December 2024.[16] North Korea has been developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) as a key component of its nuclear force since 2021 but currently lacks a large enough submarine to carry them. North Korea has allegedly begun developing a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine with a displacement of 5,000 to 8,000 tons.[17] South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear submarines is meant to offset capability gaps with North Korea, potentially driven by Russian assistance to Pyongyang.

Key Takeaways

1. North Korean succession: WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un likely intends for his daughter Kim Ju Ae, who is roughly 13 years old, to succeed him, according to the South Korean NIS. His daughter has become an increasingly public figure in recent years.
2. North Korea-Russia cooperation: Around 8,000 North Korean troops remain deployed around Kursk Oblast, Russia, and have performed fire support functions under Russian command, according to Ukrainian military intelligence.
3. Korean Peninsula nuclear issues: Russia is opposing South Korean efforts to build nuclear submarines despite reportedly enabling North Korea to develop the same capability.

2. The Politics of Interpretation: Who Governs the Korean DMZ?

​Summary:

Friction between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the South Korean government over DMZ access has become an institutional and political confrontation rooted in the armistice system. The dispute intensified during the 2018 inter-Korean projects, then escalated after blocked visits in 2025 and a South Korean bill to assume approval authority for non-military DMZ visits. The Armistice Agreement separates MDL crossing authorization from DMZ entry approval, but the MAC became inoperable after north Korea refused to participate, concentrating authority under the UNC commander. Competing legal interpretations now serve divergent strategic priorities, risking alliance friction and prompting calls for pragmatic delegation and coordination mechanisms.

Excerpt:

Ultimately, the DMZ access issue is a test of how effectively the South Korea-U.S. alliance can manage the legacy of the armistice system for the future. Rather than clinging to competing legal claims, both sides must recognize evolving command structures and the necessity of practical delegation. The challenge is to find a balance where security, stability, and administrative efficiency can coexist. For the armistice system to remain a cornerstone of peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is time to move beyond legalistic confrontation and design a sustainable framework for coexistence.

Comment: The "divergent strategic priorities" of the ROK government and the UNC are exactly the desired effects Kim Jogn Un's political warfare strategy is meant to create. This friction only benefits Kim Jong Un. The dispute is over meaning as much as movement. Each side uses legal text to shape legitimacy, which turns access approvals into a signaling contest that can harden public narratives about sovereignty and control. If selective interpretation becomes the default tool, compromise space shrinks. The authors imply that unresolved procedural friction can spill into broader alliance trust, because the argument is no longer technical, it is identity and authority. If the legal argument is being used to justify strategic interests, what alliance mechanism can reduce narrative escalation so the dispute does not become a standing symbol of intra-alliance mistrust?

The Politics of Interpretation: Who Governs the Korean DMZ?

The legal disagreement over who controls DMZ access – South Korea’s government or the U.N. Command – has evolved into a full-fledged institutional and political confrontation.

By Hanbyeol Sohn and JunHyeong Ahn

February 17, 2026

https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/the-politics-of-interpretation-who-governs-the-korean-dmz/

Credit: Depositphotos

Recent friction between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the South Korean government over approval of access to the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) goes far beyond a routine administrative discrepancy. It reveals a structural clash between the legal framework of the armistice system created more than 70 years ago and the administrative sovereignty of a modern democratic state. 

The debate over the scope and limits of authority to approve access to the DMZ first intensified during the implementation of the 2018 inter-Korean agreements, when Seoul and Pyongyang sought to conduct joint inspections of cross-border rail and road links. These plans soon ran up against the armistice and sanctions framework, and the projects were delayed as access approvals were withheld and U.N. Security Council sanctions exemptions remained pending. Since then, the issue has evolved from a one-time coordination problem into a recurring source of tension.

Recent incidents underscore how far the controversy has escalated. In July 2025, Cardinal Lazzaro You Heung-sik’s planned visit to the DMZ to deliver a peace message was blocked after the UNC denied access. In November of the same year, even a planned visit by South Korea’s first deputy national security adviser was halted for safety reasons. These episodes suggest that high-level activities directly tied to national security and peacebuilding are now subject to a strict interpretation of the armistice regime.

The conflict sharpened further in August 2025, when a bill was introduced in South Korea’s National Assembly to allow the government to assume approval authority over non-military DMZ visits, including tourism, ecological preservation, and academic research. On December 16, 2025, the UNC issued an official statement reaffirming its exclusive jurisdiction under the Armistice Agreement. At a press briefing the same day, it warned that the legislation would violate the agreement and could lead to serious consequences if enacted. 

The legal disagreement over DMZ access had now evolved into a full-fledged institutional and political confrontation.

Divided Authority, Institutional Drift

The Armistice Agreement distinguishes between two distinct regulatory regimes: crossing the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and entering the DMZ. Article I(7) requires specific authorization from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) for crossings of the MDL. Article I(8), by contrast, vests the authority to approve entry into the DMZ in the commanders of the opposing sides who control those areas. According to the letter of the agreement, authority to approve access to the southern portion of the DMZ rests with the UNC commander.

The problem emerged in the early 1990s, when North Korea effectively rendered the MAC inoperable through its unilateral refusal to participate. With the consultative body no longer functioning, the authority to approve MDL crossings and the authority to permit DMZ entry – originally distinct – became functionally merged under a sole arbiter: the UNC commander. 

To institutionalize this practice, the UNC adopted regulations such as UNC Regulation 551-4: Compliance With the Korean Armistice Agreement. Over time, the consultative character once embedded in the MAC process weakened, while the character of unilateral administrative control by the commander strengthened.

Today’s tensions stem from this drift. As the MDL crossing authority and DMZ entry authority merged in practice, they were increasingly interpreted as a broad control authority held by the UNC commander. This concentration of authority gradually expanded beyond safety and security-oriented clearance to include a substantive review of the visit’s purposes. The result is a widening gap between the text of the Armistice Agreement and its contemporary implementation. The dispute is therefore not about whether authority exists, but about the scope of that authority in practice.

Administrative Sovereignty vs. Security Jurisdiction

For decades, the DMZ functioned as a silent buffer designed to deter conflict, and UNC access controls served as a key mechanism for maintaining military stability. Over the past decade, however, the environment surrounding the DMZ has changed profoundly. Despite fluctuations in inter-Korean relations, the zone has increasingly been reimagined not only as a military buffer but as a site of ecological preservation, historical restoration, and peace tourism.

This growing non-military demand for access has collided with long-standing armistice management practices. As South Korean national and local authorities seek to manage resources within their territory and ensure public access, the UNC’s comprehensive approval procedures – treating all access as a potential military risk – have generated unavoidable tension. The proposed DMZ Peaceful Use Act symbolizes how this friction has moved from isolated incidents to the institutional and legal level. The DMZ is no longer merely a military confrontation zone; it has become a contested space over the legitimacy of governance.

On the ground, these frictions inevitably become a battle over how to interpret the armistice text. Crucially, the legal arguments presented by both sides are not purely academic disagreements; they are tools used to justify strategic interests.

South Korea has pursued a teleological interpretation of the agreement, emphasizing the phrase “purely military in character” in the preamble to argue that UNC authority is inherently circumscribed by the need to prevent security threats. This approach reflects domestic political demand to use the DMZ as a peace asset and a broader effort to reinterpret long-standing UNC practices through a modern lens of sovereign administrative control.

The UNC, in contrast, relies on textual interpretation and the primacy of security to preserve its existing authority. By emphasizing the literal language of Article I(8), it seeks to block the introduction of South Korea’s administrative demands into the armistice framework. For the UNC, the Armistice Agreement is not merely a peacekeeping instrument but also a legal foundation for maintaining its multinational status and exclusive management role in Northeast Asia. Access control justified by security risks thus reflects a strategic effort to retain leadership in armistice management.

At its core, the debate over DMZ access is less about ambiguity in the treaty text than about divergent strategic priorities. Both sides selectively emphasize different provisions to support policy goals. Still, this selective reliance on legal arguments narrows the space for practical compromise and risks fueling unnecessary friction within the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

From Legal Contestation to Practical Coexistence

The United States and South Korea should now move beyond exhaustive legal contestation and develop pragmatic arrangements that meet both contemporary security needs and evolving administrative demands. Given the difficulty of fundamentally revising the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the solution lies not in rewriting the text but in adapting its implementation through practical delegation and coordination.

First, the scope of delegated authority for non-military issues should be clarified and codified. The UNC has already delegated key armistice management functions to the South Korean military, including MDL maintenance, marker management, and monitoring of hostile acts within the DMZ. These precedents demonstrate that the armistice regime operates more effectively when UNC authority is combined with South Korea’s practical capacity. As the transition of wartime operational control continues to reshape command relationships among the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UNC, and the Combined Forces Command, the scope of delegated responsibilities is likely to expand. Approval authority for non-military access should be redefined within this broader trend.

Second, the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) should establish a dedicated channel for armistice policy. Beyond discussing procedural issues, this mechanism should jointly develop operational guidelines for MDL crossing and DMZ access approvals. A high-level consultation mechanism should also be institutionalized to resolve conflicts between UNC authority and South Korea’s administrative sovereignty. Such a mechanism would ensure that armistice management aligns with broader alliance strategy rather than remaining confined to closed military decision-making.

Ultimately, the DMZ access issue is a test of how effectively the South Korea-U.S. alliance can manage the legacy of the armistice system for the future. Rather than clinging to competing legal claims, both sides must recognize evolving command structures and the necessity of practical delegation. The challenge is to find a balance where security, stability, and administrative efficiency can coexist. For the armistice system to remain a cornerstone of peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is time to move beyond legalistic confrontation and design a sustainable framework for coexistence.

Authors

Guest Author

Hanbyeol Sohn

Hanbyeol Sohn is a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at Korea National Defense University and director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs. His research focuses on the ROK-U.S. alliance, extended deterrence, and military strategy. 

Guest Author

JunHyeong Ahn

JunHyeong Ahn is a professor in the Graduate School of National Security at Korea National Defense University (KNDU) and director of the Center for Security Policy at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research focuses on international humanitarian law, rules of engagement (ROE), and the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.N. Command, with a recent emphasis on global governance in AI and cyber security.

3. N. Korea designated 'high-risk jurisdiction' for money laundering, terrorism financing for 16th year

​Comment: The regime survives on its illicit activities. The question is are we doing enough to shut them down? And in addition to the effects on the regime, we should also be concerned with the damage done to our financial system and legitimate businesses. Going after north Korea's illicit activities is both an offensive and defensive action. 

World News Feb. 18, 2026 / 1:44 AM

N. Korea designated 'high-risk jurisdiction' for money laundering, terrorism financing for 16th year

By Yi Wonju, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/18/North-Korea-designated-high-risk-jurisdiction-money-laundering-terrorism-FATF/6291771396599/

North Korea was designated a "high-risk jurisdiction" for money laundering and terrorism financing for the 16th consecutive year, Seoul's Financial Action Task Force said Wednesday. File Photo by Stephen Shaver/UPI | License Photo

North Korea has been designated a "high-risk jurisdiction" for money laundering and terrorism financing for the 16th consecutive year, financial authorities said Wednesday.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is tasked with combating money laundering and terrorism financing, has put North Korea in the highest risk category along with Iran and Myanmar, according to the Financial Intelligence Unit under the Financial Services Commission.

"The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's continued failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regime and the serious threats posed by the DPRK's illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing," the organization said on its website, referring to North Korea by the acronym of its formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The FATF, which works under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, has categorized North Korea as a "high-risk jurisdiction" since 2011.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

4. S. Korea seeks to reinstate no-fly zone under suspended 2018 inter-Korean military pact

​Comment: Kim Jong Un says I can achieve political warfare effects without even trying. This action weakens ROK/US alliance readiness, reduces alliance ISR capabilities (giving the nKPA more freedom of action), and creates friction within the alliance. All win-win only for the regime.

What are the strategic effects that this action is supported to achieve? How is South Korean security enhanced by this action? If Kim interprets this action as weakness he has no reason to make connections to reduce tensions. Instead he sees success so he will likely double down on his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy.

Unilateral concessions are not confidence building measures. They are actions of appeasement. 

World News Feb. 18, 2026 / 1:36 AM / Updated at 1:39 AM

S. Korea seeks to reinstate no-fly zone under suspended 2018 inter-Korean military pact

By Park Boram, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/18/South-Korea-no-fly-zone-DMZ-drone-reinstatement-Unification-Ministry/2311771396128/

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks to reporters at a press briefing on Wednesday. Photo by Yonhap

South Korea will seek to reinstate a no-fly zone over the border with North Korea under the suspended 2018 inter-Korean military pact aimed at easing tensions, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Wednesday.

Chung disclosed the plan at a press briefing after expressing regret earlier this month over drones sent into North Korea by South Korean civilians, which the North denounced as a violation of its sovereignty.

"In cooperation with our military authorities, (the government) will preemptively review and seek to reinstate the September 19 inter-Korean military pact, including the designation of a no-fly zone," Chung said.

The minister said the action is aimed at preventing any unintended military clash and building trust between the two militaries.

Related

• Kim Yo Jong warns of 'terrible response' to South Korean drone incursions
• Unification ministry rejects claims of 'submissive' stance toward N. Korea
• South Korea raids spy agencies in probe of alleged N. Korean drone case

The no-fly zone under the 2018 pact prohibits the operation of planes and drones within 15 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone in eastern areas and 10 km in western parts.

The pact was signed while liberal former President Moon Jae-in was in office, aimed at halting hostilities along the border and between the militaries, but both Pyongyang and Seoul suspended it between 2023 and 2024 amid rising tensions.

The plan was announced days after Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, again demanded South Korea come up with steps to prevent a recurrence of drone incursions, which the North claimed took place in September and on Jan. 4.

Chung had earlier expressed regret over the drone incursions, and Kim called Chung's message "sensible behavior" last week.

The ministry on Wednesday said the government also plans to strengthen penalties for those who fly unauthorized drones in the no-fly zone and revise the law on inter-Korean relations to ban acts that escalate inter-Korean military tensions.

He again expressed "deep regret" over drone incursions occurred under the previous Yoo Suk Yeol administration, in a step apparently aimed at appeasing the North Korean regime ahead of a key ruling party congress, where major policy lines are expected to be outlined.

The minister said the announced plans were discussed at a recent meeting of security-related ministers and represent the official stance of the Lee Jae Myung administration.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

5. Kim skips Kumsusan visit on father's birthday

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un did not visit the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on the “Day of the Shining Star,” the birthday of Kim Jong Il. State media said senior party and government leaders paid tribute there while Kim sent a flower basket. Instead, Kim appeared at a major domestic event, cutting the ribbon for 10,000 new apartments in Pyongyang’s Hwasong district and meeting assigned residents. He praised builders, called Hwasong a model district, and said capital construction must intensify, with broader goals to be presented at the upcoming party congress. The article notes his mausoleum visits have become less routine since 2022, and analysts link this to emphasizing independent authority and showcasing domestic achievements.

Comment: He is shifting the regime’s legitimacy narrative from ancestral veneration toward performance and delivery, with housing as proof. Skipping a ritual while still sending a flower basket signals controlled continuity, but also confidence that loyalty will hold without constant symbolism. In a cognitive warfare lens, the imagery of modern apartments, residents, and praise for workers is designed to crowd out scarcity narratives and shape perceptions before the party congress.

World News Feb. 17, 2026 / 10:45 PM / Updated Feb. 17, 2026 at 10:45 PM

Kim skips Kumsusan visit on father's birthday

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/17/kim-jong-il-birth-anniversary-holiday/1181771385610/

A photo released by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (R) and his daughter, Kim Ju Ae (2-R), greeting bereaved family members during the opening ceremony of Saeppyol Street, a new housing district dedicated to the families of fallen soldiers in the Hawasong area of Pyongyang, North Korea, on 15 February 2026 (issued 16 February 2026). Kim Jong Un did not attend a memorial ceremony at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on Sunday marking the birthday of his late father. Photo by KCNA / EPA

Feb. 17 (Asia Today) -- Kim Jong Un did not attend a memorial ceremony at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on Sunday marking the birthday of his late father, instead appearing at a housing completion event in Pyongyang, state media reported.

North Korea's state news agency said senior party and government officials paid tribute at the mausoleum on the anniversary of Kim Jong Il's birth, a holiday known as the "Day of the Shining Star." Kim sent a flower basket but did not attend.

Among those present were Premier Pak Thae Song, Supreme People's Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Choe Ryong Hae and Party Secretary Cho Yong Won, along with other senior officials.

Instead, Kim presided over a ribbon-cutting ceremony for 10,000 new apartments in the fourth phase of the Hwasong district housing project in Pyongyang. He met with residents who were assigned new homes and praised construction workers for their efforts.

Related

• 3 in 10 households in S. Korea raise pets, mostly dogs
• North Korea completes 50,000-home project before party congress
• South Korea debates free holiday tolls as debt burden rises

"Capital construction must continue to intensify," Kim said, calling the Hwasong development a model district equipped with political, economic and cultural facilities. He described the housing project as a "transformative achievement" of the current party term and said broader goals would be presented at the upcoming party congress.

Kim's absence from the mausoleum on his father's birthday is no longer unusual. In the past, he typically visited the site five times a year, including on New Year's Day and on the birth and death anniversaries of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. That pattern began to change in 2022.

Analysts say the shift reflects Kim's effort to emphasize his independent authority after more than a decade in power. As his rule has stabilized, they say, appearances at the mausoleum appear increasingly selective.

With the ninth party congress approaching, prioritizing a high-profile housing ceremony over a memorial visit may also signal an emphasis on showcasing domestic achievements.

Observers also note that Kim has recently distanced himself from some policies associated with previous leaders, including rhetoric on ethnic nationalism and reunification, while describing inter-Korean relations as those between "two hostile states."

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260217010005276

6. Spy agency seeks military base access for insurrection probes

​Comment: Unfortunately, the martial law debacle is going to be a gift that keeps on giving. 

World News Feb. 17, 2026 / 11:06 PM / Updated Feb. 17, 2026 at 11:06 PM

Spy agency seeks military base access for insurrection probes

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/17/national-intelligence-service-revision-rules/6001771387325/

National Intelligence Service chief Lee Jong-seok (C) attends a plenary session of the intelligence committee at the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea, 12 February 2026. Photo by YONHAP / EPA

Feb. 17 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's National Intelligence Service is seeking authority to enter military bases to collect information related to insurrection, treason and rebellion, under a proposed revision to its security-related operating rules.

Officials at the intelligence service and the Defense Ministry said Tuesday that the agency recently issued a legislative notice for a partial amendment to regulations governing responses to national security infringement crimes and related activities. The proposal was drafted after prior consultations with the Defense Ministry and other relevant agencies, they said.

The amendment would require relevant institutions to provide swift cooperation and information sharing to help the intelligence service respond to cases involving insurrection, treason and rebellion.

It would also add a legal basis requiring commanders of the relevant units to promptly cooperate when intelligence service personnel request access to military facilities.

The move could allow access as early as next month, officials said.

National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok raised the issue of limited investigative authority during his confirmation hearing last June, saying the agency's powers were so weak that it could not enter military units.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260217010005283

7. Major overhaul of Army digital network in South Korea nearly complete

​Summary:

A $27 million overhaul of the U.S. Army communications network in South Korea is nearly finished after about 18 months. Led by the 1st Signal Brigade, the Army Transport Edge project modernizes the transport layer that connects 52 sites across the peninsula for broadband, voice, video, and data, replacing older hardware and improving routing, bandwidth management, and connectivity. Leaders say it also strengthens cybersecurity and supports the Army’s shift toward a zero trust environment by verifying users and systems before access. The main challenge has been upgrading while keeping the legacy network running. Full transition off the legacy network is targeted for Sept. 26, pending completion.

Comment: I believe the overall purpose of this is to improve command and control for the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. The Army is the executive agent for the joint and combined force. This is arguably one of the most important contributions to the joint and combined warfighting capabilities in Korea. 

Major overhaul of Army digital network in South Korea nearly complete

Stars and Stripes · Alejandro Carrasquel · February 18, 2026

U.S. Army Maj. Scott Tanaka, senior network engineer for 1st Signal Brigade, at brigade headquarters, Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Jan. 30, 2026. (Alejandro Carrasquel/Stars and Stripes)

CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — A $27 million upgrade of the U.S. Army’s communications network for broadband, voice and video communications in South Korea is nearing completion after nearly a year and a half.

Soldiers and civilian professionals with the 1st Signal Brigade modernized the communications network that connects 52 sites in South Korea and that must be ready in wartime.

The project — Army Transport Edge — calls for new network architecture designed to replace older hardware and reduce the time it takes to manage routing, bandwidth and connectivity across the Korean Peninsula, according to Maj. Scott Tanaka, senior network engineer for the 1st Signal Brigade.

Empower AI, of Reston, Va., was awarded a contract by the Army in November 2023 to support the project, according to a company news release at the time. Empower did not respond to requests by email and phone Feb. 10 for additional information.

U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Meisler, 311th Signal Command Commander, rappels down a communication tower at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Aug. 22, 2023. (Minjo Cheo/U.S. Army)

The Army Transport Edge project improves how the Army delivers information but also strengthens cybersecurity in a theater where commanders depend on constant communication, Tanaka said during a Jan. 30 interview.

“Having an edge in your cyber warfare capabilities today is a critical factor, and this new network is a huge bolstering component in just that,” Tanaka said. “This new network allows the United States Army to deliver information faster, and more conveniently to key systems and their users while also safeguarding them in the cyber realm.”

Work on Army Transport Edge began in November and December 2023 as part of broader modernization efforts in South Korea, Tanaka said. The project focused on improving the Army’s transport layer — the digital backbone that carries voice, video and data traffic.

The network modernization is part of a broader shift toward a zero trust security environment, which aims to verify users and systems before granting them network access, Alan Krall, deputy director for the 41st Signal Battalion, said during the same interview Jan. 30 at the brigade headquarters.

“As we get to the zero trust environment, the network that we’re building increases the amount of security that we’re building into the system,” Krall said. “So, it solves the security problem.”

A soldier assigned to U.S. Army Network Enterprise Center-Walker checks servers at Camp Walker, South Korea, March 17, 2025. (Shawnee Vercammen/U.S. Army)

The battalion’s biggest challenge has been modernizing the network while keeping the old network operational, Krall said.

The Army aims to move completely off the legacy network in the fall, though the timeline depends on successful completion of remaining work, he said.

“We’re tentatively scheduled to be offline, I think Sept. 26 this year,” he said. “That’s the goal.”

The modernization project improves speed, reliability and the Army’s ability to expand network support during large exercises or emergency operations, especially when additional units surge into South Korea.

The Army Transport Edge network is already operational across the peninsula, Tanaka said, but some capabilities, including automation features designed to support a faster swap to a backup network and recovery, are still being developed and refined.

Stars and Stripes · Alejandro Carrasquel · February 18, 2026

8. Asia After America: How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

​Summary:

Zack Cooper argues the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia-Indo-Pacific failed because Washington kept expansive ends while starving the means, creating a “Lippmann gap” that erodes credibility and deterrence. The original rebalance had three pillars: security, prosperity, governance. Only security received sustained effort. Trade and development agendas collapsed after the TPP failure, weak IPEF follow-on, and renewed protectionism, while democracy and anticorruption messaging became inconsistent and politically costly. The result is a quiet retrenchment toward defending the first island chain, especially Taiwan, while Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands drift toward Beijing.

Excerpts:

As Washington retrenches, Beijing is likely to test the remaining American positions, raising questions about what Washington is and isn’t willing to defend. Chinese forces are already pushing closer to Taiwan and operating more frequently and in larger numbers around Japan, around the Philippines, and farther into the Western Pacific. To date, the United States has been most clear about what it will do to protect its closest allies but more ambiguous when it comes to other partners’ defense. Friends that Washington asks to do more are likely to press for clearer U.S. commitments in return. Such clarity might deter dangerous tests of those commitments, but it also entails risk. Removing ambiguity about what the United States considers to be within its defense perimeter—especially when it comes to contested outlying islands, which are harder to defend—would make it necessary to react more forcefully to any violation to maintain deterrence. In cases in which the United States is genuinely willing to escalate, clarity is often the best policy, but that means that vaguer commitments will likely be tested.

Finally, the United States will need to decide whether to retrench abruptly or incrementally. A slow withdrawal might prevent panic but leave all allies and partners fearful that they could be next on the chopping block; a rapid adjustment could avoid a slow-moving landslide but cause immediate instability if allies and partners do not have time to prepare. Either way, Washington will need to reset allies’ expectations about future American policies, making some disruption unavoidable. But a one-time change in the U.S. defensive position might be preferable to repeated reminders that the United States is shifting its posture. Allied leaders must be quietly consulted beforehand, however, so that they can adjust their own strategies accordingly and express confidence about the new approach to their publics.

It would have been far better for the United States to properly resource a strategy featuring deep economic engagement and support for good governance alongside a stronger security posture. Yet wondering whether that version of the pivot to Asia would have succeeded is now just an academic exercise. An incomplete pivot, with expansive security objectives but no economic or governance strategy to speak of, will certainly not succeed. Instead, it will risk—in fact, it is already risking—a catastrophic failure of deterrence. Moving on from the pivot and accepting retrenchment is not the best way to protect U.S. interests in Asia. But it is unavoidable.

In 2024, Fumio Kishida, then Japan’s prime minister, told the U.S. Congress that he detected “an undercurrent of self-doubt among some Americans about what [the United States’] role in the world should be.” Today, that undercurrent looks more like a tsunami, and countries in the Asia-Pacific region are already seeking higher ground. What is left in its wake—where the United States maintains its commitments, and where it pulls back—will affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Asia. It is therefore time for Americans to discuss not what would make for an ideal strategy, but how to enact a realistic one. Even that may not be enough to contain China’s growing influence. But after falling short of its grand ambitions in Asia, the United States has left itself no other option.

Comment: Does anyone feel like this is a wake-up call for us? Are we ready to cede Asia to Chinese influence and domination? Or is it a fait accompli, a self fulfilling prophecy, or foregone conclusion because of our failures? Is retrenchment in the best interests of the US?

A first-island-chain strategy becomes brittle if partners’ political cohesion and economic options shrink, because deterrence is social and institutional, not just kinetic. China’s best move may be political segmentation: peeling partners through selective coercion and inducements rather than frontal military tests. U.S. credibility now hinges less on slogans and more on predictable trade, aid, and governance choices that make alignment affordable for regional elites.

If the U.S. cannot deliver prosperity and governance at scale, what is the minimum viable coalition that still deters China without provoking allied hedging?

Does narrowing to Taiwan reduce risk, or does it invite China to apply pressure everywhere else because the perimeter is now explicit?

What is the real center of gravity: forward forces, or the political will of Manila, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo to absorb costs over time?

Asia After America

Foreign Affairs · More by Zack Cooper · February 17, 2026

How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

Zack Cooper

March/April 2026 Published on February 17, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/asia-after-america-cooper

Looking out over the East China Sea from Yonaguni, Japan, November 2023 Issei Kato / Reuters

How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

Zack Cooper

March/April 2026​

​The pivot to Asia has failed. A decade and a half ago, in 2011, President Barack Obama committed to rebalancing U.S. strategy and resources to focus on the Asia-Pacific. “Let there be no doubt,” he pledged on a visit to Australia, “The United States of America is all in.” Although the phrasing changed and policymakers and politicians argued about the tactical details, Obama’s successors affirmed the logic behind the pivot, which soon became the core bipartisan assumption of American strategy. In speech after speech, U.S. officials emphasized that the only way to prevent China from dominating Asia was for the United States and its allies and partners to make a major investment in the region’s political, economic, and military stability.

Yet nearly 15 years later, U.S. leaders have still not matched their words with action. American promises to foster greater prosperity and better governance now elicit eye rolls throughout Asia. A perpetually distracted United States neglects much of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Few today are asking when the pivot will come. Instead, the question in regional capitals is how far the United States will pull back.

With the United States facing divisions at home and distractions abroad, it has become clear that deep engagement across all of Asia is no longer realistic. Yet the assumptions behind the pivot have persisted, as have the calls to finally give the effort priority. The problem is that having a strategy that cannot be executed in the foreseeable future creates dangers of its own. During World War II, the political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote that “foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power” and warned that not doing so “leads to disaster.” Today, Washington has a “Lippmann gap” in Asia: means have failed to match ends for so long that U.S. commitments have lost credibility. The longer the gap between pledges and action is allowed to remain, the greater the risk of a disastrous failure of deterrence.

The pivot to Asia was based on the assumption that U.S. power was capable of fostering strong regional economies, governments, and militaries that could prevent China from overturning the regional order. Today, however, Washington is not seriously contesting Beijing’s economic and political influence across much of the region, particularly on the Asian mainland. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly narrows U.S. regional security objectives to protecting the first island chain—a string of archipelagoes that runs through Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines—but this retrenchment has been proceeding quietly for years.

Parts of this thin defensive line rest on shaky ground: countries that are economically dependent on China and thus vulnerable to its political pressure and influence campaigns. China will naturally seek to displace the United States if Washington scales back its commitments. The pivot aimed to make that difficult, if not impossible, by locking in U.S. engagement and ensuring that countries in the region were strong and confident enough to uphold their interests. By serving as a counterweight to China’s massive economy and substantial political influence, the thinking went, the United States gave these countries options. But as the United States curtails its economic and political engagement, it faces the prospect that China could pick off U.S. allies and partners one by one. Many of these countries are already rethinking their alignment decisions and concluding that Beijing may be a more appealing partner—or an inevitable regional hegemon.

As a result, any U.S. strategy that focuses primarily on the military defense of a handful of countries on the first island chain may not be sustainable. But the better option—a comprehensive pivot—is now a practical impossibility. What is left is a strategy based on shoring up a defensive line that might not hold forever but could contain Chinese expansion for now. If executed well, such a strategy could buy enough time for missteps by China to create new openings for the United States and its allies and partners in Asia. Chinese regional dominance is by no means assured. Beijing is increasingly overconfident and is likely to overplay its hand. Still, Chinese leaders are now the ones with the cards to play. The pivot was meant to anchor U.S. leadership in Asia; its unraveling could leave China to set the rules.

THREE-POINT TURN

When it introduced the pivot, the Obama administration outlined three pillars on which the rebalance depended: security, prosperity, and good governance. The central logic was that promoting all three would make the United States’ Asian partners stronger and better able to defend their sovereignty, thus preventing China from overturning the regional order. In practice, however, only the security pillar received sustained U.S. attention and resources. Washington deepened its alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea and pledged to shift 60 percent of U.S. Navy assets to the Indo-Pacific. But it never delivered on its vision for economic engagement or good governance.

At first, the United States had a plan for regional economic engagement. The Obama administration championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-country trade agreement that included many of Washington’s most important regional partners. The objective, in Obama’s words, was to enshrine “an open international economic system, where rules are clear and every nation plays by them.” But the United States proved unwilling to be bound by the very rules it had helped write. The Senate refused to ratify the TPP by the end of Obama’s term, and then the first Trump administration withdrew from the accord altogether in 2017 and began imposing tariffs on Chinese goods. The Biden administration did little to change course. It kept most of Trump’s tariffs in place and showed no interest in joining the successor to the TPP. An intended replacement put forward in 2022, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, did not offer increased access to the U.S. market, disappointing foreign partners. As Singapore’s ambassador to the United States lamented in 2023, “We’re not getting the kind of trade agenda that we would have liked” from the Biden administration.

In Trump’s second term, coercive and protectionist economic policies, combined with the dissolution of development aid and humanitarian assistance programs, have made the situation worse. For leaders in Asia who want to deliver economic growth to their people, a more protectionist United States is less attractive as a partner—and China looks more attractive by comparison. Asian officials are fond of saying that they “don’t want to choose” between Washington and Beijing. But regional leaders worry that, when it comes to their economic relationships, choices are becoming unavoidable, and many may favor China.

U.S. commitments have lost credibility.

The pivot’s governance pillar has crumbled even more spectacularly. Democracy, anticorruption, and human rights were important elements of this agenda when it was first announced. The Obama and Biden administrations made the promotion of democracy and human rights central to their policies, seeing them as both moral and strategic imperatives. This aroused suspicion across much of Asia, where less than half of people live in free societies. When the Biden administration held its 2021 Summit for Democracy, it excluded Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. The omissions put many South and Southeast Asian governments on the defensive, worried that the United States was undermining their domestic political systems.

The second Trump administration has been quiet about human rights and democracy, which has comforted some autocrats. Yet many regional leaders find it troubling that the United States is now rejecting many of the rules, norms, and institutions that it once advanced as part of its good governance initiative. Washington is using economic coercion against its own allies and partners. It has launched military strikes against Iran and Venezuela, which many smaller Asian countries worry will be perceived as a dangerous precedent that China or other great powers might use to justify attacks on weaker neighbors. Finally, U.S. anticorruption efforts stalled when Trump paused enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act shortly after his 2025 inauguration. Countries are now supporting major commercial projects that involve the Trump family in hopes of currying favor with the U.S. government.

Not surprisingly, Washington’s reputation has taken a hit across much of Asia. According to a 2025 Pew Research Center survey conducted during the first few months of Trump’s second term, favorable attitudes toward the United States in Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea had declined by nine to 16 percentage points from a year earlier. If the United States continues to embrace force and coercion—dismissing the rules, norms, and institutions that once tied American hands but bought the country influence—its favorability ratings will decline further, and other countries will be even less inclined follow Washington’s lead.

PIVOT WITHIN THE PIVOT

As the economic and governance agendas have collapsed, the full weight of the rebalance has come to rest on the security pillar. Yet even on security, Washington has not delivered all it initially promised. The United States has remained distracted by crises elsewhere in the world. It never shifted away from the Middle East, and the Biden administration, faced with a major war in Europe, rightly chose to support Ukraine. The Trump administration’s focus on the Americas adds yet another competing priority. As a result, U.S. leaders have never had enough time to consistently engage South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Only Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have attracted sustained attention and resources from the United States.

The problem has worsened lately. In the last year, top-tier U.S. military assets—carrier strike groups and air and missile defense units—have been pulled away from Asia to assist with other missions. Recent increases in overall U.S. defense spending have barely kept pace with inflation, and even if the Trump administration succeeds in forcing allies and partners to spend more, their contributions cannot offset China’s massive outlays. This leaves Washington without the means to execute a region-wide approach. Recognizing this constraint, U.S. policymakers have tightened their focus, concentrating American diplomacy and defense strategy on the Taiwan Strait to the detriment of other parts of the region. This shift has been most obvious under the Trump administration, but it has been underway for nearly a decade.

Nowhere are the effects more evident than in South Asia. For two decades, U.S. officials pursued a deeper relationship with India. But the second Trump administration has undone much of this progress. American intervention in the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan created the perception that Trump was prioritizing Islamabad over New Delhi, and the fallout has pierced hopes that India might align more with the United States. The Quad, the security partnership among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, had strong backing in Trump’s first term but now appears to be on the verge of obsolescence: a planned 2025 summit never materialized because of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s obvious irritation with Trump and Trump’s apparent indifference to the group.

At a U.S.–South Korean military exercise in Yeoju, South Korea, August 2025 Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters

The story is not much better in Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands. In his first term, Trump admirably improved ties with the Philippines, Vietnam, and many Pacific Island countries. Today, the U.S. treaty alliance with the Philippines remains strong, with frequent bilateral meetings and deepening defense cooperation. Yet other Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, are reevaluating their policies toward the United States. Singapore’s prime minister has lamented that the United States “is rejecting the very system it created,” by adopting protectionist policies and imposing tariffs on its friends. This view is also held by many Pacific Island countries, where Washington’s downgrading of issues that matter to them—including development, public health, and climate change—is incentivizing closer cooperation with Beijing.

The one subregion the United States seems committed to is Northeast Asia, home to Washington’s top security concern: China. In the 2025 National Security Strategy, China is mentioned more than any other U.S. adversary, and Taiwan is mentioned more than any other American ally or partner. The section on deterring military threats in Asia is almost entirely focused on preventing an invasion of Taiwan; North Korea is not mentioned once. In effect, the United States has narrowed its conception of its security interests in Asia to cross-strait security.

Yet even U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan remains muddled. Trump insists that Chinese leader Xi Jinping will not take Taiwan on his watch, and his administration has pressed regional allies to allow American forces to use their territory and to contribute their own forces if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait. But Trump himself has not publicly stated what he would do in a cross-strait conflict, instead commenting in January that it is “up to Xi” how to handle Taiwan. He has even referred to the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a “G-2,” suggesting he is interested in some kind of great-power compact.

The basic logic of the pivot was that it was in the United States’ interest to help build strong economies, effective governments, and capable militaries across Asia because this would make it harder for China to overturn the regional order through coercion or the use of force. Countries in Asia would then be free to make the choices that benefited them most, which Washington assumed meant continued cooperation with the United States. But with all three pillars cracked or crumbled, the constraints U.S. policymakers tried to place on China’s regional influence are giving way.

IN SEARCH OF PLAN B

As Washington’s economic and political engagement recedes, with no reversal in sight, military deterrence is all that remains of U.S. strategy in Asia. But the United States’ traditional approach to regional security, weakened as it has been, is increasingly courting danger. Its original objective was to prevent China from altering the territorial status quo anywhere in the region, which required the United States to maintain a forward defense perimeter up to the coast of the Asian continent. Washington aimed to help allies and partners with which Beijing or Pyongyang had territorial or maritime disputes—including India, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—to deter the use of force or coercion. The United States regularly sent ships and aircraft just off China’s coast in an effort to prevent China from coercing Washington’s friends or exerting control over disputed territories, waters, and airspace. It also invested in regional militaries to ensure that they could better defend themselves and work more closely with American forces. And as the American military edge deteriorated, the United States called on receptive Asian allies to increase their own defense spending and host additional U.S. forces on their territory.

The main problem with this approach was that it required not just American military engagement but also a positive economic and governance agenda to be successful. Building effective militaries requires dynamic economies and efficient governments, and only a network of strong regional militaries can help smaller states defend their interests against China. Without steady U.S. support for economic growth, good governance, and regional integration, the entire region’s deterrence posture suffers. Making matters worse, a growing chorus of critics in Washington argues that it is no longer powerful enough to execute such an expansive strategy, that the strategy is needlessly provocative to Beijing, and that too few countries in the region are willing or able to step up military cooperation with the United States. Others insist that the American people are tired of foreign entanglements and unwilling to support the rise in military spending that this strategy demands.

In short, meeting the most expansive version of American security aims in Asia has become unrealistic. The gap between those objectives and U.S. and allied capabilities is apparent to all, including China. And Beijing has been only too willing to take advantage. Despite long-standing U.S. opposition to Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea, Beijing has restarted its island-building campaign there. It is also stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, raising the risk of a cross-strait crisis. Deterrence is eroding across the region, intensifying the danger of a major war in the years ahead.

Military deterrence is all that remains of U.S. strategy in Asia.

Avoiding that outcome requires that the United States align its commitments and capabilities. Yet there is danger in pushing retrenchment too far, such as by concentrating U.S. defenses along the second island chain, thousands of miles east of the Chinese mainland (or even on the third island chain, which includes Hawaii). In this scenario, Australia and Japan, established U.S. allies that lie at the southern and northern ends of the second chain, could still anchor the American regional military presence. Between them, the defensive line would comprise many small isles stretching over thousands of miles, including the Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands (most notably Guam), Yap, and Palau. This strategy would exclude several friends in East Asia from the U.S. defense perimeter—the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan—effectively conceding that the United States would not defend them against an attack.

A second-island-chain strategy would push many Asian leaders to cut deals with Beijing. All of Southeast Asia would be within China’s sphere of influence, so the Philippines and other claimants bordering the South China Sea would have little hope of upholding their rights in disputed waters. South Korea would find itself isolated and surrounded by nuclear powers in China, North Korea, and Russia; without the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, Seoul would have to choose between acquiring its own nuclear weapons and submitting to demands from Pyongyang and Beijing. Taiwan, which China would never permit to have nuclear weapons, would likely be forced to unify with the mainland or face an unwinnable war.

There is no guarantee that China would be satisfied with this U.S. withdrawal, either. It is likely that a stronger, more confident Beijing would expand its horizons to match its growing capabilities. Japan, then, could be particularly vulnerable. Beijing is already contesting Japan’s legal claims to Okinawa and other parts of the Ryukyu Island chain. Japan’s westernmost island, Yonaguni, is only 70 miles from Taiwan, so defending it and isles near it with conventional weapons would be difficult, perhaps impossible, if Chinese forces were stationed in Taiwan. The United States could threaten nuclear escalation to deter Chinese encroachment, but that threat might not seem credible amid a broader regional withdrawal. Japan might then decide to go nuclear itself or at least reach a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, to more credibly defend its territory.

The geography of the second island chain presents a final problem. These small, remote islands and the facilities they house would be vulnerable to Chinese military strikes and political influence. Without facilities in the Philippines and Taiwan able to track Chinese air and naval forces passing through the first island chain, it would be harder to detect these forces before they reached Guam or other second-island-chain territories. Additionally, leaders in some Pacific Islands might prefer to remain neutral and accept Chinese investment offers rather than allow the United States to operate from their territory. This is already a concern in Yap, where Chinese companies are rebuilding a World War II–era airfield. A second-­island-­chain defensive line might therefore look more like a set of scattered defense bubbles than a full-fledged defensive perimeter. Ultimately, this minimal strategy might not protect U.S. territories in the Pacific and could leave even the most capable American allies feeling they had no choice but to submit to a vast Chinese sphere of influence.

Withdrawal to the second island chain, in sum, would likely be catastrophic. The more realistic option is thus U.S. retrenchment to the first island chain. This approach would trim U.S. commitments while retaining some of the most capable U.S. allies and partners, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The United States would likely maintain its presence in Australia and South Korea, given its enduring alliances with both countries and its desire to avoid leaving crucial allies out of the U.S. defense perimeter, a costly mistake Washington made ahead of the Korean War. But it would leave most of the rest of the region off the list of U.S. priorities, including the treaty ally Thailand and the emerging great power India. In practice, this could mean, for example, abrogating the U.S. alliance with Thailand and stating explicitly that the United States will not intervene if China encroaches on the territory or maritime claims of partners on the Asian mainland.

This strategy still faces several challenges. First, it is not clear that American leaders would be willing to devote the resources it requires. Although Trump has floated a $1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027, few in Congress seem inclined to support what would amount to a 50 percent increase in defense spending. The United States would still have commitments up and down the first island chain, including to the Philippines and Taiwan, neither of which can deter China without considerable U.S. assistance. Additional defense spending, or at least redeployments from other regions, might therefore be necessary. After all, China can focus most of its military might on its near seas, whereas Asia remains one of several areas of operation for the U.S. military. If Beijing fields nine aircraft carriers by 2035, as a recent Pentagon report predicted it will, U.S. forces would be badly outnumbered, even if Washington economized elsewhere.

Furthermore, the first-island-chain strategy would require key allies and partners to strengthen their cooperation with Washington while the United States pulled back elsewhere. The United States simply cannot balance China’s military power unless Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan spend more on defense, give U.S. forces greater access to their territory, or do both. Yet their leaders could be wary of doing more if they see overall commitment to U.S. alliances waning; some might even consider whether it would be wiser to improve relations with Beijing than to give in to Washington’s demands. This problem is compounded by domestic divisions in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Political parties in each country take sharply different approaches to foreign policy, so changes of government often bring strategic reassessments. The more the United States is seen as unpredictable and coercive, the more pressure there will be on a new leader to change course. And as Beijing’s economic and political influence grows, it will become harder for Washington to respond to Chinese efforts to affect decision-making in Manila, Seoul, and Taipei.

This strategy would also do little to discourage the rest of the region from engaging more deeply with China, because it would not make the United States more attractive as an export market or more active diplomatically. Thailand is already strengthening economic and military ties with Beijing. If others, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, also choose to work more closely with China, the United States could be forced to watch from the sidelines as Beijing builds a sphere of influence covering most of continental Asia and part of maritime Asia, as well—making a defense of the first island chain increasingly difficult to sustain.

HARD CHOICES

However flawed a pullback to the first island chain may be, it is the most likely outcome in the years ahead. The challenge will be to shore up this thin defensive line as much as possible to maintain deterrence for as long as possible. Allies and partners along that chain will need to be strong and confident enough to work with the United States to counterbalance China, even in the absence of a U.S. economic and political strategy in the region. What will determine success, therefore, is not just how well Washington resources its military posture but also how it navigates complex regional geopolitics.

American policymakers will need to decide whether the United States can build an interlocking set of security alliances or let a scattering of individual defense partnerships suffice. The Biden administration encouraged allies and partners in Asia to work more closely together, whereas the Trump administration has at times preferred a bilateral approach because it maximizes U.S. leverage. Even an informal arrangement bringing American allies together would require a substantial investment of time and resources from Washington and regional capitals. Some countries would no doubt remain hesitant to cooperate with one another because of historical tensions, legal restrictions on foreign entanglements, fears of being dragged into others’ conflicts, and concerns about China’s response. Yet without deeper defense industry cooperation and operational integration among regional militaries, it might not be possible to build a sufficiently strong defensive system along the first island chain.

The United States will also have to decide how to handle allied interest in acquiring nuclear weapons—something it has, until now, opposed. If the United States abrogates some of its commitments and pulls back some of its conventional forces, the likelihood of allied proliferation will increase. Japan and South Korea, in particular, may pursue nuclear deterrents of their own if they perceive U.S. extended deterrence to be weakening. Simply rejecting nuclear discussions may not dampen interest, particularly in Seoul, which is surrounded by nuclear-armed states. Indeed, some in Washington might even welcome allied proliferation to offset the worsening conventional military balance and thereby deter encroachment by China or North Korea. One option to examine seriously is the development of nuclear sharing arrangements, which might mollify Asian allies without resulting in significant regional or global nuclear proliferation.

There is danger in pushing retrenchment too far.

As Washington retrenches, Beijing is likely to test the remaining American positions, raising questions about what Washington is and isn’t willing to defend. Chinese forces are already pushing closer to Taiwan and operating more frequently and in larger numbers around Japan, around the Philippines, and farther into the Western Pacific. To date, the United States has been most clear about what it will do to protect its closest allies but more ambiguous when it comes to other partners’ defense. Friends that Washington asks to do more are likely to press for clearer U.S. commitments in return. Such clarity might deter dangerous tests of those commitments, but it also entails risk. Removing ambiguity about what the United States considers to be within its defense perimeter—especially when it comes to contested outlying islands, which are harder to defend—would make it necessary to react more forcefully to any violation to maintain deterrence. In cases in which the United States is genuinely willing to escalate, clarity is often the best policy, but that means that vaguer commitments will likely be tested.

Finally, the United States will need to decide whether to retrench abruptly or incrementally. A slow withdrawal might prevent panic but leave all allies and partners fearful that they could be next on the chopping block; a rapid adjustment could avoid a slow-moving landslide but cause immediate instability if allies and partners do not have time to prepare. Either way, Washington will need to reset allies’ expectations about future American policies, making some disruption unavoidable. But a one-time change in the U.S. defensive position might be preferable to repeated reminders that the United States is shifting its posture. Allied leaders must be quietly consulted beforehand, however, so that they can adjust their own strategies accordingly and express confidence about the new approach to their publics.

It would have been far better for the United States to properly resource a strategy featuring deep economic engagement and support for good governance alongside a stronger security posture. Yet wondering whether that version of the pivot to Asia would have succeeded is now just an academic exercise. An incomplete pivot, with expansive security objectives but no economic or governance strategy to speak of, will certainly not succeed. Instead, it will risk—in fact, it is already risking—a catastrophic failure of deterrence. Moving on from the pivot and accepting retrenchment is not the best way to protect U.S. interests in Asia. But it is unavoidable.

In 2024, Fumio Kishida, then Japan’s prime minister, told the U.S. Congress that he detected “an undercurrent of self-doubt among some Americans about what [the United States’] role in the world should be.” Today, that undercurrent looks more like a tsunami, and countries in the Asia-Pacific region are already seeking higher ground. What is left in its wake—where the United States maintains its commitments, and where it pulls back—will affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Asia. It is therefore time for Americans to discuss not what would make for an ideal strategy, but how to enact a realistic one. Even that may not be enough to contain China’s growing influence. But after falling short of its grand ambitions in Asia, the United States has left itself no other option.

ZACK COOPER is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a Lecturer at Princeton University. Between 2005 and 2008, he served at the U.S. Department of Defense and on the National Security Council. He is the author of Tides of Fortune: The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries.

Foreign Affairs · More by Zack Cooper · February 17, 2026

9. Kim Ju-ae's Unprecedented Resident Hugs Fuel Succession Speculation

​Comment: We cannot stop speculating about Kim Ju-ae.

Kim Ju-ae's Unprecedented Resident Hugs Fuel Succession Speculation

North Korea Completes 50,000-Household Project; Analysts Debate Kim Ju-ae's Role in Succession Narrative

By Jung A-im

Published 2026.02.17. 14:24

Updated 2026.02.17. 21:02https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/02/17/UUHIGE6SDVCGLJO6SPDDTGMKCQ/

The completion ceremony for 10,000 housing units in the 4th phase of the Hwasong District in Pyongyang takes place on the 16th, the Korean Central News Agency reports on the 17th. /Korean Central News Agency-Yonhap

North Korea has completed its five-year core project to construct 50,000 housing units in Pyongyang. During this process, an unusual scene of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, interacting directly with residents has drawn attention.

The Korean Central News Agency reported on the 17th that the completion ceremony for 10,000 households in the Hwasong District’s fourth phase was held the previous day, attended by Kim Jong-un. With this completion, the goal of constructing “10,000 households annually,” proposed at the Workers’ Party’s 8th Congress in early 2021, has been finalized.

The project proceeded by sequentially developing housing in the Songsin-Songhwa District and the Hwasong District northeast of Pyongyang. Following the completion of the Songsin-Songhwa District in 2022, the first, second, and third phases of the Hwasong District in 2023, 2024, and the first half of 2025, the fourth phase of the Hwasong District—10,000 households—was completed this time after construction began in February.

The Central News Agency stated that the plan was “exceeded” with the establishment of “nearly 60,000 households.” It added, “Through the monumental five-year struggle, textbook experiences and new standards for Juche architecture have been created, which will powerfully lead construction projects across the country on a broader scale during the 9th Party Congress period.”

After cutting the ribbon and inspecting the site at the ceremony, Kim Jong-un said, “Based on the transformative achievements and experiences made during the 8th Party Congress period, more ambitious goals for progress and creation will be specified at the 9th Party Congress.” The agency further conveyed that he “expressed a firm resolve to complete the Hwasong District as a model area encompassing all political, economic, and cultural elements and to renew the entire capital region in the spirit of the new era.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter Ju-ae attend the completion ceremony in the Hwasong District in Pyongyang and share a conversation with residents. /News1

During this event, multiple scenes of Kim Ju-ae interacting with residents were publicly released. Photos showed Kim Ju-ae, alongside her father, hugging newly settled residents and offering congratulations. The same scenes were prominently featured in the Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper read by North Korean residents.

It is unusual for Kim Ju-ae to be shown naturally interacting with ordinary residents rather than high-ranking officials. Some interpret this as an attempt to imprint her as a potential successor from the Baekdu bloodline ahead of the 9th Party Congress. Recently, the NIS reported to the National Assembly that Kim Ju-ae has been providing opinions on certain policy matters, indicating she has entered the stage of being designated as a successor.

Yang Moo-jin, a distinguished professor at the University of North Korean Studies, said, “This can be seen as a message to strengthen her image as a successor by symbolically demonstrating the father’s revolutionary ideology of ‘putting the people first.’”

However, considering that Kim Jong-un’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, also appeared at the event, some suggest the staging might aim to highlight the family’s intimate image rather than emphasize succession.

10. USTR hints at possible adjustments in steel, aluminum tariff implementation

​Summary:

USTR Jamieson Greer signaled the administration may tweak how steel and aluminum tariffs are applied, because compliance on derivative products is forcing firms into “bean counting” and extra hiring. He still framed the metal tariffs as a success and said they will stay, pointing to revived domestic production lines and new smelter plans under POTUS’s approach. The implication is targeted administrative relief, not rollback, to keep the policy durable while reducing friction for importers and manufacturers.

USTR hints at possible adjustments in steel, aluminum tariff implementation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 18, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260218000400315?section=national/diplomacy

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer hinted Tuesday that Washington could adjust how its tariffs on steel and aluminum are applied, as companies have grappled with the onerous task of calculating the duties, particularly on derivative products.

Greer made the remarks in a CNBC interview after the Financial Times recently reported that U.S. President Donald Trump's administration plans to scale back some tariffs on steel and aluminum goods.

"You may want to sometimes adjust the way some of the tariffs are applied for compliance purposes," he said.

"We've heard stories of companies that have had to hire extra people for compliance. We are not trying to have people, you know, do so much bean counting that they are not running their company correctly," he added.

This Getty Images-AFP photo shows U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer testifying before the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee on Capitol Hill in Washington on Dec. 09, 2025. (Yonhap)

The Trump administration has imposed 50 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. It has also added refrigerators, washing machines and other items to the list of derivatives subject to the steel tariff, calculating the duty on those products based on the value of the steel content in each of them.

Greer described the metal tariffs as "successful," stressing that they will remain.

"The president's tariffs on steel and aluminum have been very successful, shipping more steel than ever, opening up new steel lines, new aluminum smelters announced," he said, "So clearly, those are going the right direction. They are going to stay in place."

Commenting on the timing of a Supreme Court ruling on Trump's sweeping tariffs instituted under an emergency law, Greer said that he cannot be sure about it, noting the United States has "separation of powers."

The high court is currently deliberating on the legality of Trump's use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose "reciprocal" and other tariffs on trading partners. The court has scheduled Friday as its next opinion day.

"We really do have separation of powers and we can never be sure February 20 is the next designated date to hand down an opinion. So we'll see," he said. "We've heard comments from Supreme Court justices in recent weeks, saying it takes time to write up answers."

He reiterated that if the IEEPA tariffs are struck down, the Trump administration will try to replace them.

"If and when it comes and we win, then we'll just carry on our successful tariff and trade policy program," he said. "If it goes the other way, then we'll try to recreate that the best way possible so we can have continuity in what the president is doing."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 18, 2026

11. Seoul clings to hope for an empty train station, a symbol of inter-Korean ties

​Summary:

Jejin Station sits spotless on South Korea’s east-coast frontier, built in 2006 to reconnect rail to Mount Kumgang and beyond, yet it has been largely unused for years. Brief momentum returned in 2018–2019 when a South Korean train crossed north to survey reconnection plans, but diplomacy collapsed and the project stalled. Seoul’s Lee Jae Myung administration now wants to revive the Gangneung–Jejin rail segment by 2028, even as north Korea has physically torn up or destroyed inter-Korean links and declared reunification dead policy. The station endures as infrastructure, museum, and wager on political change.

Comment: False hope is not a strategy. If we want to effectively deal with north Korea we must base all engagement on a thorough understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. 

Seoul clings to hope for an empty train station, a symbol of inter-Korean ties

Jejin Station is a gateway to North Korea but has barely seen visitors for decades, a reality the South wants to change

Ifang Bremer February 18, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/seoul-clings-to-hope-for-an-empty-train-station-a-symbol-of-inter-korean-ties/

The Pyeonghwa Thongil Express (PTX) at Jejin Station | Image: NK News

The floor of the departure hall at South Korea’s Jejin Station is spotless, almost gleaming. Outside, the rails are free of weeds. Everything about it suggests a place waiting for travellers. 

Except this station, perched on the North Korea border, has not seen a single train or passenger in nearly a decade.

Now, the Lee Jae Myung administration wants to change that.

Jejin was built in 2006 as the southern terminus of the Donghae Bukbu Line, which was envisioned as a rail corridor reconnecting the two Koreas along the east coast. The line linked the ROK’s Gangwon Province with the Mount Kumgang area in the North, a popular travel destination for South Koreans until the suspension of inter-Korean tours in 2008.

The exterior of Jejin Station on the east coast of South Korea, just 3 miles from North Korea | Image: NK News

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The station again saw activity during the brief period of inter-Korean détente under former President Moon Jae-in from 2018-2019, when a South Korean train crossed into the North for the first time in a decade to survey the feasibility of reconnecting rail networks. 

But the collapse of nuclear talks and subsequent breakdown of inter-Korean ties indefinitely suspended the brief experiment with rail cooperation.

As late as 2022, some senior South Korean officials, including the then-chief executive of the national rail operator, continued to express optimism about the project to connect railways. That optimism faded under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which showed little interest in reviving the routes.

Then the DPRK demolished rail links to Jejin along with all other inter-Korean connections in 2024, in line with a new policy denouncing reunification. The result is that a station conceived as infrastructure for reconciliation has instead become a monument to stalled relations.

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young voiced hope for change during a tour of the station last month, where he inspected ongoing construction at the site. 

Standing on the platform, he said he began to “dream again of a Eurasian train” that departs Busan, passes through Gangneung and Jejin, continues north through Mount Kumgang and Wonsan, then onward to Rajin, Khasan, Vladivostok and eventually London.

Train tracks that lead to North Korea. The DPRK blew up its side of the track in 2024. The area on the left is under construction as part of a plan to further develop the station by 2028. | Image: NK News

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The four-lane road leading to Jejin Station was largely empty when NK News visited in late January, a week after Chung, save for the occasional military vehicle. 

But there were some signs of construction at the platform, reflecting Seoul’s ambitions for inter-Korean ties. Concrete slabs lay exposed, steel rebar jutting skyward, with bundles of construction materials tucked beneath blue tarps.

Reaching the station requires passing through a military checkpoint staffed by armed soldiers. Once at the station, photography is restricted in many directions, reflecting its location inside a civilian control zone and the heavy military presence. North Korea lies just beyond view, and the immediate area is overseen by the South Korean Army’s 22nd Infantry Division.

The station forms part of the Inter-Korean Transit Office, a sprawling complex of storage halls, customs facilities and inspection points built to accommodate dozens of trucks a day. 

Inside the station, that vision is rendered in an exhibit for schoolchildren, which shows a mock ticket to London priced at 1.5 million won ($1,030) for the 12-day journey.

Other infrastructure is not merely for display. The immigration and security hall, complete with baggage scanners and passport inspection desks, resembles a small airport terminal, fully intact and unused. Photography is prohibited because of the sensitive equipment, a Unification Ministry official said.

Empty benches inside the departure hall of Jejin Station | Image: NK News

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The Lee administration says it wants Jejin to be more than a museum of past ambitions. The Unification Ministry confirmed that the construction at the site is part of a broader project launched in 2022 to reconstruct rail infrastructure between Gangneung and Jejin, scheduled for completion in 2028.

Construction is currently blocked by the station’s only train, the “Peace Train” installed on the tracks in 2021 as part of a 5 billion won ($3.5 million) educational exhibit. The train, intended as a symbol of peace and reunification, is slated for removal or relocation to make way for restoration of the Donghae North Line, a process expected to cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

North Korea, meanwhile, has offered no indication that it intends to reciprocate and reconnect its tracks with the South.

Still, some officials in Seoul say they are searching for an opening. Since taking office, the Lee administration has pushed to restore suspended inter-Korean agreements and reduce tensions, with Minister Chung emerging as one of the most vocal advocates for reversing the downward spiral in relations.

“They say the hour before sunrise is the darkest,” he said during his visit to Jeji Station last month. “Today’s piercing cold, too, will eventually pass. The frozen ground will thaw, and closed roads will open once again.”

At least for now, on the empty platform and in the unused departure hall, spring still feels a long way off.

A mural depicts an inter-Korean rail connection in a rural area outside the station. A train track is supposed to be built at this location as part of the Gangneung-Jejin line. | Image: NK News

Edited by David Choi

12. No further delays in bill to support investment in US

Summary:

Korea Times argues Seoul must stop dithering on a “Special Act” meant to back South Korea’s pledged $350 billion investment in the United States. It contrasts Japan’s newly announced $36 billion in projects, framed as part of a larger pledge that helped secure a 15 percent tariff rate, with South Korea’s slower ratification and rollout. The editorial warns POTUS is signaling impatience and could restore higher tariffs if Korea does not move faster. Domestic partisan conflict, including fights over judiciary reform bills, is blamed for derailing bipartisan review. The piece urges both parties to pass the bill promptly and match urgency to today’s market, resource, and technology realities.

ED No further delays in bill to support investment in US

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• Published Feb 18, 2026 2:41 pm KST
• Updated Feb 18, 2026 4:45 pm KST

Japan's initial investment projects in US can serve as a guide

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20260218/ed-no-further-delays-in-bill-to-support-investment-in-us

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to reporters aboard Air Force One while flying from Palm Beach International Airport to Washington, Feb. 16. AFP

As the Lunar New Year holiday wrapped up on Wednesday in Korea, U.S. President Donald Trump's administration announced that Japan will finance three projects in the United States totaling $36 billion. These comprise the first part of the $550 billion investment pledge that Japan made in exchange for a reduced blanket tariff rate of 15 percent. The first project is a natural gas power plant in Ohio, which U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said would be the largest natural gas-fired generating facility in the United States. The other two are an oil export facility in Texas and an industrial diamond plant in Georgia, the latter of which Lutnick said would allow the U.S. to domestically source synthetic diamond grit, which is used in advanced manufacturing and semiconductor production.

This new development in Japan's investment deal stands in contrast to the pace of Korea's own pledged $350 billion investment in the United States. Korean exports have also been hit with a 15 percent tariff, lowered from 25 percent in exchange for the investment package, which would unfold over the years as annual installments of $20 billion. Already Trump has said he is not satisfied with Korea's pace in ratifying the special bill to support the investment plan, indicating that he may raise Korea's tariffs back up to 25 percent. If it had somehow escaped anyone's attention that tariffs remain the U.S. president's preferential tool in trade negotiations, Trump has made sure his message will not be forgotten or regarded lightly.

Trump reiterated this stance when announcing Japan's investments, writing on his social media account, "The scale of these projects are so large, and could not be done without one very special word, TARIFFS."

Since Trump threatened to raise tariffs on Korean imports back up to 25 percent, top Seoul officials have visited and met with their counterparts in Washington, and returned with a plea for the National Assembly to expedite the passage of the Special Act on Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Management. The ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and main opposition People Power Party (PPP) agreed to accelerate the act's ratification by forming a special bipartisan committee. However, events went awry, fueled by partisan fighting last week, when the majority-holding DPK pushed through judiciary reform bills for a plenary session vote, likely to be held on Feb. 24. The judiciary reform bills have received mixed reception, as Supreme Court Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae has openly opposed their contents, which include a clause enabling constitutional appeals for cases finalized by the Supreme Court. The PPP, taking issue with the DPK's move, halted the first bipartisan committee review for the U.S. investment bill. PPP leader Jang Dong-hyeok also canceled at the last minute a Cheong Wa Dae luncheon.

The fact that the two parties remain in friction over issues such as the judiciary reform bills indicates that Korea's legislators may be too consumed with party agendas and the June local elections. It reflects a disconcertingly inward inclination of the lawmakers, who, while all smart individuals, invariably seem to fall in line with party politics once they enter the National Assembly. The legislators of today must have a parallel capacity for understanding the new global political and economic order, which is aligned with markets, resources and technology. At the very least, the government did manage to launch a committee to begin reviewing potential investments in the U.S. under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources.

There is now just over a week left in the month of February. Even if a plenary session is convened on Feb. 24, the likelihood of addressing the special bill to undergird Korea's U.S. investment plans is uncertain. It is time for both parties to work together.

13. Puppies and PC games: Kim Jong Un promotes ‘modern’ living at housing ceremony

​Summary:

NK News reports Kim Jong Un used a Pyongyang housing ceremony to sell a “modern” lifestyle, pairing a claimed milestone in his five year plan to build 50,000 homes with images of consumer comfort. State media highlighted the Hwasong district’s new PC gaming center, pet shop, musical instrument store, and a car dealership, signaling that privileged residents should expect leisure, pets, and imported style inside a nominally socialist system. Photos showed Kim, Ri Sol Ju, and their daughter handling puppies and touring facilities. KCNA framed the buildout as a capital facelift and hinted at another large construction push after the coming party congress.

Comment: He probably lets them eat cake too. Is this real or a Potemkin village? 

Puppies and PC games: Kim Jong Un promotes ‘modern’ living at housing ceremony

North Korean leader claims victory in 5-year project to build over 50K homes across capital’s new skyscraper streets

Colin Zwirko February 17, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/puppies-and-pc-games-kim-jong-un-promotes-modern-living-at-housing-ceremony/

Kim Jong Un, his wife Ri Sol Ju and young daughter browse puppies at a new pet shop in Pyongyang | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2026)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un promoted puppies and computer games for residents of a new residential skyscraper district in the capital on Monday, according to state media, celebrating the claimed completion of his five-year, 50,000-home project.

State propaganda’s focus on the Hwasong Area’s latest consumer options appears to be part of Kim’s recent push to offer more “modern” lifestyle choices to wealthier North Koreans under the nominally communist system, on par with the middle class in neighboring countries. 

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Tuesday that the final batch of 10,000 homes across over a hundred apartment towers and low-rises in the Hwasong Area was ready for residents. 

“Pyongyang has been given a radical face-lift as befitting the capital city of socialist Korea in five short years” through the construction of “nearly 60,000 houses and public buildings with advanced civilization” in the Songhwa and Hwasong areas, KCNA declared.

This aerial photo shows new skyscrapers that are part of the 2025-26 Hwasong Area 10,000-hope project in the foreground, and Saeppyol Street buildings in the background that officially opened on Sunday | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2026)

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Kim reportedly wants to “turn Pyongyang into a world-class city where all desires of the people come true,” it added.

Photos showed Kim along with his wife and young daughter checking out the newest PC gaming center, built in a cyber-kitsch architectural style. The first of its kind opened last April nearby.

They also browsed puppies and kittens on sale at the Songam Pet Shop. One image showed Kim holding a white puppy with his daughter petting it.

The animals were displayed in glass cages on the wall, similar to pet shops in other countries, with large signs that say “dog” and “cat” above them in English alongside baby-talk Korean (“멍멍이” and “야옹이”).

Select North Koreans have reportedly kept pet dogs over the years and it is not unheard of to see someone walking their dog in Pyongyang, but the practice has not yet become as common as it is abroad, nor supported by pet shops catering a wide range of related products and grooming services like the new one opened this week. 

A spotlight, possibly edited onto the photo later, highlights Kim holding a puppy and his daughter petting it | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2026)

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The new gaming center appears similar to one opened last year nearby, which features exclusively foreign-made shooter, sports and racing games | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2026)

North Korean authorities also still promote dog meat as a staple food, building a giant “sweet meat” restaurant — the DPRK euphemism for dog meat — near the central Kim Il Sung Square a few years ago.

The leader highlighted a musical instruments shop selling expensive pianos and violins as a key attraction of the new neighborhood as well. 

Authorities also recently began allowing private car ownership, and the Hwasong Area’s second car dealership was built as part of the latest neighborhood construction.

Kim said capital residents “will enjoy a civilized and affluent life to their heart’s content” in the near future. KCNA did not describe the shops, gaming center or new car dealership.

In addition to the ruling family’s inspections, the event featured a concert and mandatory singalong calling Kim the “Dear Father,” KCNA reported. 

Kim handed out resident certificates to a select group of people, though the report did not reveal how authorities chose them. State propaganda also does not discuss the existence of the country’s real estate market.

Kim’s wife and daughter appear interested in electric guitars in the background | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2026)

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THE NEXT 50K?

In traditional fashion, Tuesday’s propaganda report claimed that Kim guided every small aspect of construction, saying he believes “socialism should be built in the mind of the people first and the housing problem is a matter of their greatest interest.”

Kim did not address the crowd at the event, but top party official Ri Il Hwan encouraged capital residents in a speech to help make the city more “civilized” by following orders that will soon be revealed by authorities at the Ninth Party Congress later this month. 

Meeting with construction workers, the DPRK leader also suggested they would soon be charged with building “a more gigantic construction project” in Pyongyang, promising “another exciting five years” of similar construction.

NK Pro analysis suggests housing construction will continue in 2026 in the Hwasong Area, likely to the south and west of buildings constructed in the last year. 

The DPRK leader handed out a select number of resident licenses at Monday’s event | Image: KCNA (Feb. 17, 2026)

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Satellite imagery has revealed that worker camps have cleared that area, setting up at the foot of the newest apartment towers and near the Pyongyang Zoo. Worker tents have also appeared to the southeast, an area Kim singled out for redevelopment last year. 

The leader called for razing slum-like residential areas of east and north Pyongyang at the time, but signs have yet to appear of redevelopment activity in these areas. 

The 50,000-home project was a “top-priority” of the five-year economic plan enacted at the Jan. 2021 Party Congress. 

It began in 2021 with 10,000 homes on Songhwa Street in southeast Pyongyang, including an 80-story concrete skyscraper. Civilians and soldiers built dozens more apartment towers in four projects over the next four years in a rural part of the capital’s northeast, now called the Hwasong Area.

Separate housing projects added during that span pushed the number beyond 50,000, meaning authorities have “over-fulfilled” their promise to citizens, KCNA reported Tuesday. 

These include the “youth-built” Jonwi Street, the Kyongru-dong luxury apartments built for the most loyal elites and Saeppyol Street built over the last year for families of soldiers killed in the Ukraine war. Kim Jong Un attended the opening ceremony for that project on Sunday, just down the street from the Hwasong neighborhood.

Kim’s 60,000 number likely does not include dozens more apartment towers built across the capital in the past five years, which were not promoted under government-led propaganda projects. 

These appeared to utilize state-backed building and design organizations, but were likely funded by private domestic and foreign investments, with the intention of putting the homes up for sale.

Meanwhile, KCNA conspicuously did not mention the birthday of former leader Kim Jong Il in the housing ceremony report, instead keeping the focus on the “benevolent father” Kim Jong Un. This aligns with a growing trend to prioritize the current leader’s personality cult while reducing those of the past leaders. 

The report simply stated the event was “held with splendor on February 16, the auspicious holiday of our state.”

Though Kim Jong Il’s name was kept out of the report on his son’s event, state media otherwise did report on mandatory celebrations for the former leader held across the country in recent days.

Edited by Bryan Betts

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com