​Quotes of the Day:

"History does not entrust the care of freedom to the weak or timid." 

– Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Absolute freedom mocks at justice. Absolute justice denies freedom. To be fruitful, the two ideas must find their limits in each other. No man considers that his condition is free if it is not at the same time just, nor just unless it is free. Freedom, precisely, cannot even be imagined without the power of saying clearly what is just and what is unjust, of claiming all existence in the name of a small part of existence which refuses to die.”

– Albert Camus, The Rebel

"Judge a man by his questions rather than by his answers." 

– Voltaire

1. Hegseth forces ouster of senior Army spokesman in latest internal clash

2. U.S. Hardens Allegation That China Conducted a Secret Nuclear Test

3. ‘Woke’ AI Spat Escalates Between Pentagon and Anthropic

4. The Phantom Stealth Fighter That Exposes Europe’s Deep Divisions Over Defense

5. Special Operations News – Feb 17, 2026

6. Starlink Surprise (Ukraine – Russia) by Mick Ryan

7. Mapping the Human Terrain: The Enduring Role of Human Intelligence in the U.S. Army

8. Claimed or Unclaimed: Patterns of Attribution in Global Terrorism

9. Attributing Russian Information Influence Operations: Testing the Information Influence Attribution Framework with real-world case studies

10. Beijing pressured Japan over Taiwan. It only strengthened Tokyo’s resolve

11. Gone But Not Forgotten: Retaining Advising Capabilities Even as the Army Cuts Its Advising Units

12. Putin Could End the Ukraine War But Won't. That Means a Coup In Russia Is Possible

13. The Greatest Threat to Acquisition Transformation Is Fear

14. China Now Finds Itself in al-Qaeda’s Crosshairs

15. Putin, Xi and Trump Are Launching a Freedom Counterrevolution

16. China’s Digital Yuan and the Fight for Southeast Asia’s Financial Infrastructure

17. Asia After America: How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

18. U.S. and Japan: A New Conservative Axis

19.  The Globalist Delusion: Why America Must Build a New Operating System by Nadia Schadlow

20. U.S. Plans to Deploy More Missile Systems in the Philippines, Challenging China

1. Hegseth forces ouster of senior Army spokesman in latest internal clash

Summary:

SECDEF/WAR Hegseth ordered Army Secretary Dan Driscoll to remove Col. David Butler, a senior spokesman and adviser, according to defense officials. Butler had been nominated for brigadier general, but his name was on a delayed promotions list and he chose retirement rather than slow others. The move deepens reported tension between Hegseth and Driscoll, who is also serving as a diplomatic point person on Russia-Ukraine talks. Officials suggest Butler’s past role as Gen. Mark Milley’s spokesman was a key factor, reflecting a broader pattern of sidelining Milley-linked officers as POTUS backs Hegseth’s shake-up.

Comment: I have no words except to say that Dave Butler is a good man and does not deserve this kind of treatment. He should be promoted to BG. But he proved he is a man of superior value because he chose to resign so as not to disadvantage his peers.  Why do we have to be so vindictive? And why should a good officer suffer like this. Why can't we judge him on his accomplishments and not by he has served under (which is not by choice). 

Hegseth forces ouster of senior Army spokesman in latest internal clash

It marks the defense secretary’s latest move to push out an officer who worked for retired Gen. Mark A. Milley, a target of President Donald Trump’s.

UpdatedFebruary 17, 2026 at 12:57 p.m. ESTtoday at 12:57 p.m. EST

Washington Post · Dan Lamothe

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/02/17/pete-hegseth-dan-driscoll-david-butler/

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has forced the ouster of a senior military adviser to Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, defense officials said, marking the Pentagon chief’s latest intervention into the service’s internal affairs amid long-simmering tension between two of the Trump administration’s top political appointees.

Hegseth directed Driscoll to fire Col. David Butler during a discussion at the Pentagon last week, officials said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss a private conversation between Hegseth and Driscoll. It is at least the second time within months that Hegseth had raised the issue with him, including once at a meeting last year during which the defense secretary passed Driscoll a sticky note saying that Butler would not be promoted, people familiar with the discussion said.

Butler has served most recently as a spokesman and media strategist for Driscoll and Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff. He had been nominated for promotion to brigadier general, but Hegseth took issue with that plan for reasons that remain unclear, officials said.

Officials familiar with the matter said that Butler’s name appeared on a list of about three dozen promotion-eligible Army officers that should have been sent to the White House for approval months ago. It appears his inclusion was among the reasons those promotions have been delayed. After Hegseth’s order to Driscoll last week, these people said, Butler elected to submit his retirement paperwork rather than hold up his colleagues’ promotions.

Hegseth issued the directive Thursday, just ahead of Driscoll’s departure for Switzerland, where the Army secretary — in an unusual diplomatic role for the head of a military service — is participating in high-stakes discussions aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war. The Trump administration has made the Army secretary a point person in those complex, ongoing talks while Hegseth focuses on other issues, including reshaping the military at home and pressing the nation’s defense contractors to modernize.

Kingsley Wilson, a spokeswoman for Hegseth, referred questions to Army headquarters.

In a statement provided to The Washington Post, Driscoll acknowledged the colonel’s retirement but declined to address the reasons for it.

“We greatly appreciate Col. Dave Butler’s lifetime of service in America’s Army and to our nation,” the statement said. “Dave has been an integral part of the Army’s transformation efforts. He will be missed and I sincerely wish him tremendous success in his upcoming retirement after 28 years of service.”

Butler declined to comment.

The demand for Butler’s firing marks Hegseth’s latest clash with Driscoll, an Army veteran and close friend of Vice President JD Vance. Driscoll worked on the presidential transition team, and he has served since April as acting director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in addition to his responsibilities at the Pentagon. People familiar with their relationship have said it appears that Hegseth takes issue with Driscoll’s rising profile and increasing responsibilities within the Trump administration.

Hegseth has not criticized Driscoll publicly, but he has remained silent as others aligned with the Pentagon chief have done so in pointed terms. That includes the far-right political activist Laura Loomer, an unofficial adviser to President Donald Trump.

Loomer launched an extraordinary broadside against Driscoll last year, publicly questioning why the Army had spotlighted Medal of Honor recipient Florent Groberg in a social media post; she noted that Groberg is not “US born” and had spoken as a private citizen on behalf of Hillary Clinton during the 2016 Democratic National Convention. Loomer was later made a member of the Pentagon press corps as Hegseth maneuvered to curtail scrutiny of his activities and stewardship of the federal government’s largest agency.

Butler’s previous work as the senior spokesman for Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2019 to until his retirement in 2023, appears to be a factor in his removal, officials familiar with the matter said. Milley has been a political target of Trump and Hegseth for years, dating to clashes between the general and Trump during the president’s first administration.

Then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Mark A. Milley meets with lawmakers on Capitol Hill in 2022. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

Supporters of Milley have credited him for playing a leading role guiding the nonpartisan military through Trump’s tumultuous first term, while critics have accused him of violating Trump’s trust by discussing the president’s behavior with journalists and describing him as a “fascist to the core” once in retirement.

Hegseth, a former Fox News host who served as a mid-ranking officer in the Army National Guard, has echoed Trump’s criticisms and taken administrative action against Milley, directing a suspension of his security clearance, revoking his security detail last year and ordering a Pentagon inspector general review of his past actions. Administration officials also had Milley’s official portrait taken down at the Pentagon.

Milley stayed on as President Joe Biden’s senior military adviser for nearly three years, during a turbulent period that included the fall of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Trump and Hegseth have blamed Biden and Pentagon leaders at the time for allowing those events to happen.

At the same time, both men have downplayed independent assessments that found Trump’s 2020 deal with the Taliban helped set the stage for Afghanistan’s collapse. The administration has repeatedly claimed, too, that Trump would bring an end to the Ukraine conflict quickly after taking office, but that has failed to materialize.

Hegseth has forced out other military officers who worked for Milley on the Joint Staff, frustrating those who viewed them as evenhanded leaders caught in the middle of a political knife fight. They include Gen. James Mingus, who had gone on to become the Army’s vice chief of staff and was bypassed to run U.S. Central Command; and Lt. Gen. Douglas Sims, whose expected promotion to four-star general was rescinded by Hegseth last year. Numerous other senior military officers were fired last year, including Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Butler, over the last year, had helped manage high-profile Army events, including a sprawling parade of tanks and other military equipment through D.C. last summer. Butler said at the time that George and other senior Army officials were taking on the effort enthusiastically. He also was among a small group of Army officers who traveled with Driscoll to Ukraine in November on an unusual diplomatic mission as Trump has sought, unsuccessfully, to end the war there.

Several current and former defense officials expressed astonishment at Butler’s ouster, describing him as a steady hand and thoughtful strategist who has earned the trust of numerous generals, civilian political appointees and journalists.

One Army officer questioned why Hegseth would make an effort to fire a colonel on another Trump official’s staff. “It’s terrible for the Army,” the official said of losing its senior public affairs adviser.

“He’s about the most nonpartisan guy I know,” said a retired colonel who previously served with Butler, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation by Hegseth’s team. “That’s really too bad.”

Before becoming Milley’s spokesman, Butler held a high-profile assignment as the top U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan under Army Gen. Austin “Scott” Miller. Butler was selected for the post after previously working for Miller at the elite Joint Special Operations Command.

Washington Post · Dan Lamothe

2. U.S. Hardens Allegation That China Conducted a Secret Nuclear Test

​Summary:

U.S. officials reinforced an allegation that China conducted a low-yield nuclear explosive test near Lop Nor on June 22, 2020, citing seismic data from a Kazakhstan station and arguing the signals were inconsistent with an earthquake or mining. The CTBT Organization reported two very small events 12 seconds apart but said seismic data alone cannot determine cause with confidence. The dispute lands as New START has expired and POTUS seeks to pull Beijing into trilateral arms talks with Russia. U.S. officials warn that unreciprocated low-yield testing would create an “intolerable disadvantage,” while arms-control advocates caution testing could trigger a wider restart.

Comment: I will leave this to the nuclear experts to assess. 

U.S. Hardens Allegation That China Conducted a Secret Nuclear Test

WSJ

Seismic data points to a detonation in northwest China, U.S. says

By Michael R. Gordon

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Feb. 17, 2026 5:26 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-hardens-allegation-that-china-conducted-a-secret-nuclear-test-644a918a?mod=hp_lead_pos5

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Yeaw said the probable explosion was in northwest China. Julia Demaree Nikhinson/AP

The U.S. presented new seismic data Tuesday to buttress its recent allegation that China has secretly carried out low-yield nuclear tests, challenging Beijing’s insistence that it has scrupulously observed an international accord banning all nuclear detonations.

A senior State Department official said that a seismic monitoring station in Kazakhstan had detected a 2.75 magnitude event on June 22, 2020. The U.S. has accused China of conducting a clandestine low-yield nuclear test at that time.

“We are aware that China conducted a nuclear explosive test,” said Christopher Yeaw, an assistant secretary of state. He said the probable explosion occurred near Lop Nor in northwest China, which has long served as China’s main nuclear test site.

The U.S. allegation comes at a time when the Trump administration is seeking to pressure Beijing to join potential talks with the U.S. and Russia on drafting a new accord to limit nuclear weapons. The question of how to limit nuclear arms is all the more pressing as it follows the expiration earlier this month of the New Start treaty that reduced U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear arms.

President Trump is planning to visit Beijing for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in April.

Trump said last year that the U.S. would resume nuclear testing “on an equal basis” with China and Russia. The administration has yet to order a resumption of nuclear tests, but American officials have said that if they proceed, any U.S. tests would be similar to the low-yield nuclear detonations it has accused China and Russia of conducting.

China has repeatedly denied allegations that it has carried out such tests. China’s embassy in Washington didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment about the seismic data cited by Yeaw.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996 allows signatories to carry out activities to assure the safety and reliability of their nuclear arsenal, including experiments involving fissile material, as long as they don’t result in a nuclear-explosive yield.

The question is whether China has crossed that line, as the Trump administration now alleges, and whether the U.S. needs to respond in kind or can continue to rely on supercomputers and other techniques to maintain and upgrade its nuclear arsenal.

The treaty isn’t legally in force because not enough nations have ratified it, but major powers including China, Russia and the U.S. say they are abiding by its terms.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization that was established to monitor the treaty said earlier this month that it hadn’t detected any evidence of a Chinese nuclear explosion on June 22, 2020.

But Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the organization, revised that assessment Tuesday, noting in a statement that “two very small seismic events,” 12 seconds apart, had been detected on that date.

Floyd said the organization is capable of detecting underground explosions that might be nuclear tests if they have a yield equivalent to about 500 tons of TNT. Because the suspected blasts were so small, Floyd added, “it is not possible to assess the cause of these events with confidence” using seismic data alone.

The bomb that the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 produced an explosion equivalent to about 15,000 tons, or 15 kilotons.

Yeaw, who made his comments in an appearance at the Hudson Institute in Washington, said that the U.S. didn’t know the nuclear yield of the alleged June 2020 test because of China’s efforts to mask the seismic signature.

But he said such low-yield tests would help Beijing to update and expand its nuclear forces. The seismic signals that had been detected that day weren’t consistent with an earthquake or mining explosions, he said.

The U.S. has long had concerns about clandestine low-level tests. The Journal reported in April 2020 that the U.S. was concerned that China might be secretly conducting nuclear tests at its Lop Nor site. The U.S. said in 2019 that Russia was also likely conducting low-yield nuclear tests.

Some arms-control proponents say the U.S. should seek to resolve its concerns over possible Chinese and Russian violations by starting technical talks with those countries on ways to detect and deter very low-yield nuclear tests.

“Any U.S. resumption of testing in response to such allegations would be technically unnecessary and would set off a chain reaction of nuclear testing by other nuclear-armed states,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

Yeaw said the U.S., China and Russia “could creatively think about” new verification approaches. But allowing China and Russia to conduct low-yield tests while the U.S. refrained from such activities, he said, would leave Washington at an “intolerable disadvantage.”

He said he expects to discuss nuclear issues with Chinese and Russian officials at a United Nations forum in Geneva next week.

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the February 18, 2026, print edition as 'Data Bolster Claim That China Conducted Secret Nuclear Test'.

Michael R. Gordon is a national security correspondent for The Wall Street Journal. He has covered seven wars and reported on the State Department and the Pentagon.

He is the author of “Degrade and Destroy: the Inside Story of the War Against the Islamic State, from Barack Obama to Donald Trump.” He is also the co-author, along with the late Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, of three definitive histories of U.S. wars in Iraq: “The Endgame,” “Cobra II,” and “The Generals' War.”

He previously worked for 32 years for the New York Times, where he was posted in Moscow, London and Washington.

WSJ

3. ‘Woke’ AI Spat Escalates Between Pentagon and Anthropic

​Summary:

Anthropic’s Claude has become a flashpoint in the Pentagon’s push for AI models usable for any lawful mission. Reporting says Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s team is reviewing ties with Anthropic after the firm resisted contract terms that would allow broader military uses, including areas Anthropic flags as red lines such as domestic surveillance and autonomous lethal applications. A senior defense official floated treating Anthropic as a “supply-chain risk,” which could force vendors to certify they are not using Claude. The dispute is unfolding amid partisan pressure on “woke” tech and investor scrutiny of Anthropic’s politics.

‘Woke’ AI Spat Escalates Between Pentagon and Anthropic

WSJ

Pentagon might ask contractors to certify they don’t use Anthropic’s Claude amid tensions over how its tools are used

By Keach Hagey

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, Amrith Ramkumar

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, Deborah Acosta

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 and Vera Bergengruen

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Feb. 17, 2026 9:02 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/woke-ai-spat-escalates-between-pentagon-and-anthropic-433b7c5c?mod=hp_lead_pos1

Dario Amodei, chief executive of Anthropic, has said the company doesn’t have political motivations. Samyukta Lakshmi/Bloomberg News

When Anthropic was courting backers for its latest $30 billion funding round in recent weeks, it approached an unlikely investor: 1789 Capital, a pro-Trump venture firm where one of the president’s sons is a partner.

After weighing a nine-figure investment, 1789 decided not to proceed, citing ideological reasons, according to people familiar with the matter. Among its concerns were Anthropic leaders’ history of criticizing President Trump, the several former Biden administration officials on its payroll and its lobbying for AI regulation, the people said.

Anthropic had no problem ultimately raising the capital it wanted from investors including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund, Singapore’s GIC and Coatue Management. But its spurned appeal shows that while the startup doesn’t have money problems, it does have a growing political problem.

The startup is the maker of Claude, the only large-language-model that can be used in classified settings, a status from the Defense Department that has been a competitive advantage. Anthropic forged a partnership with data company Palantir in 2024 and won a military contract worth up to $200 million last summer.

But it has recently found itself in the Pentagon’s crosshairs—a conflict that could send shock waves through the U.S. defense complex.

The Pentagon wants to be able to use Anthropic and other AI tools for all lawful purposes. Anthropic, meanwhile, doesn’t want its technology used for operations including domestic surveillance and autonomous lethal activities.

Rivals OpenAI, Google and xAI have agreed in principle to have their models deployed in any lawful use cases, a Pentagon priority, Emil Michael, the undersecretary of war for research and engineering, said in an interview on the sidelines of a defense summit in West Palm Beach, Fla., on Tuesday. Anthropic hasn’t.

“We have to be able to use any model for all lawful use cases. If any one company doesn’t want to accommodate that, that’s a problem for us,” Michael said.

Anthropic and the Defense Department have been at odds for weeks over the contractual terms of how the startup’s technology can be used, The Wall Street Journal previously reported. Claude was used in the January operation to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Journal reported. An Anthropic employee asked a Palantir counterpart how Claude was used in the operation.

The standoff between Anthropic and the agency has now spilled into public view. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Pentagon, which has cast “woke” tech companies as a liability and treats any restrictions as an impediment to military effectiveness, is reviewing its partnership with Anthropic.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Al Drago/Bloomberg News

A senior defense official said on Tuesday that many at the Pentagon increasingly view Anthropic as a supply-chain risk and might ask contractors and vendors to certify that they don’t use the company’s Claude models. Because that designation is typically used for foreign adversaries, the move would mark an unusual rebuke of a U.S. company.

“Our nation requires that our partners be willing to help our warfighters win in any fight. Ultimately, this is about our troops and the safety of the American people,” chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said.

An Anthropic spokesman said the company “is committed to using frontier AI in support of U.S. national security. That’s why we were the first frontier AI company to put our models on classified networks and the first to provide customized models for national security customers.” Anthropic is having “productive conversations, in good faith,” with the Pentagon on how to continue that work, he said.

Classified work

Anthropic has sought to distinguish itself from its main rival, OpenAI—from which its founders defected in 2020—by focusing on serving the enterprise market. In that field, there is no enterprise bigger than the U.S. government, and within the federal government, the Defense Department is a prized pathway to lucrative contracts.

It signed an early partnership with Palantir and became the first LLM cleared to work on classified material. Anthropic has previously touted its work in the national-security area, creating an advisory group last year featuring former senators and security officials and showcasing its government work during a full-day event at Union Station.

OpenAI, by contrast, is currently going through the process of becoming certified to handle classified material.

Still, Anthropic’s focus on AI safety, policy views and ties to Democrats have irked the Trump administration.

Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei compared Trump to a “feudal warlord” in a pre-election Facebook post supporting Kamala Harris in 2024. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, he criticized the Trump administration’s chip sales policies.

His sister, Daniela Amodei, Anthropic’s president, recently posted on LinkedIn in response to ICE’s killing of American citizens in Minneapolis, saying that “is not what America stands for.” She praised Trump and others for calling for an investigation.

Anthropic has hired several former Biden administration officials, including former Biden AI adviser Ben Buchanan and former National Security Council official for technology Tarun Chhabra, who helps oversee the company’s work with the Pentagon.

Sending a message

The company’s approach has drawn heat from David Sacks, Trump’s AI czar, and others in the administration who say they oppose so-called “woke” AI. Dario Amodei has said the company isn’t woke and that Anthropic doesn’t have political motivations.

Tensions between Anthropic and the Trump administration began bubbling up after the company last summer won a contract worth up to $200 million.

A Jan. 9 AI strategy memo from Hegseth emphasizes that the Pentagon needs to be able to “utilize models free from usage policy constraints that may limit lawful military applications.”

Hegseth is using the recent Anthropic dispute to send a message, a defense official said.

Tech experts say that labeling Anthropic a supply-chain risk would hinder the military’s AI capabilities and set a bad precedent for its work with other companies.

“It would be hard to think of a more strategically unwise move for the U.S. military to make in the AI competition,” said Dean Ball, a senior fellow at the center-right Foundation for American Innovation think tank, who left his role as an AI policy adviser in the Trump administration last year.

Meanwhile, tech industry observers say the eagerness to do business with the Pentagon is a reversal from attitudes less than a decade ago, when thousands of Google employees signed a petition protesting some of the company’s work for the Department of Defense.

At the Tuesday West Palm Beach event focused on defense tech, Omeed Malik, president of 1789 Capital, which opted not to invest in Anthropic, joked that the tech industry has come a long way in embracing defense. But not all are onboard, he said.

“I’m not gonna embarrass anyone, cough, Anthropic,” Malik said. The crowd burst into laughter.

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Keach Hagey is a reporter at The Wall Street Journal covering the intersection of media, technology and power. Her reporting explores how institutions and individuals wield influence in the new information economy, with a current focus on artificial intelligence and OpenAI.

She is the author of "The Optimist: Sam Altman, OpenAI, and the Race to Invent the Future" (W. W. Norton, 2024) and "The King of Content: Sumner Redstone’s Battle for Viacom, CBS and Everlasting Control of His Media Empire" (Harper Business, 2018).

She was part of the team that broke the Facebook Files, a series that won a George Polk Award for Business Reporting, a Gerald Loeb Award for Beat Reporting and a Deadline Award for public service. Her investigation into the inner workings of Google’s advertising-technology business won recognition from the Society for Advancing Business Editing and Writing (Sabew).

Previously, she covered the television industry for the Journal, reporting on large media companies such as 21st Century Fox, Time Warner and Viacom. She led a team that won a Sabew award for its coverage of the power struggle inside Viacom.

Before joining the Journal, Keach covered media for Politico, the National in Abu Dhabi, CBS News and the Village Voice. She has a bachelor’s and a master’s in English literature from Stanford University. She lives in Irvington, N.Y.

Amrith Ramkumar is a reporter for The Wall Street Journal in Washington covering tech and crypto policy. He previously covered clean energy and was a Journal markets reporter in New York who wrote about special-purpose acquisition companies, or SPACs, when SPAC mergers were a popular alternative to traditional initial public offerings. He also previously wrote about stocks and commodities, including battery metals such as lithium and cobalt.

Amrith joined the Journal as a markets intern after graduating from Duke in 2017.

Deborah Acosta reports on Florida real estate for The Wall Street Journal. She previously covered national and international news at the New York Times, using innovative forms of visual storytelling. Ms. Acosta was part of a team of reporters that won the 2020 George Polk Award for International Reporting for a series of visual investigations.

Vera Bergengruen is a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal in Washington, D.C. Before joining the Journal, she was a senior correspondent at Time magazine, where she covered the intersection of national security, tech and politics and reported cover stories from Ukraine, Argentina and El Salvador.

Previously she worked as a national security and investigative reporter for BuzzFeed News. She began her journalism career at her hometown Miami Herald and its parent company McClatchy, where she did stints covering everything from hurricanes to Congress, the Defense Department and the White House.

Her work has won the Society of Professional Journalists' Sigma Delta Chi and Dateline Awards and a New York Press Club Award. She was also part of the team that worked on the Pulitzer Prize-winning Panama Papers investigation in 2017. Vera is originally from Uruguay and grew up in Chile, Germany, Mexico and Miami.

WSJ

4. The Phantom Stealth Fighter That Exposes Europe’s Deep Divisions Over Defense

Summary:

Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a French German Spanish effort to build a next generation stealth fighter with AI and drone swarming, is unraveling amid disputes over industrial leadership. Dassault demanded control, prompting pushback from Airbus and German officials, with Germany’s defense minister saying it would not be catastrophic if FCAS ends. The article argues Europe’s defense spending is large but inefficient because it is national, fragmented, and duplicative, producing incompatibilities and higher costs. Collaborative procurement remains limited, R&D shares lag the U.S., and standardization problems persist even in Ukraine support.

​

Comment: Europe has money, but it lacks a shared story of command and ownership. That narrative gap becomes a capability gap. Rivals can exploit it with wedges and doubt.

The Phantom Stealth Fighter That Exposes Europe’s Deep Divisions Over Defense

WSJ

Duplicated efforts, fragmented industry and soured collaborations are among reasons region isn’t getting more bang for its defense buck

By

Alistair MacDonald

in London,

Cristina Gallardo

in Barcelona and

Robbie Gramer

in Munich

Feb. 17, 2026 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/european-military-fcas-stealth-fighter-1c593a75

A model of the new French-German-Spanish stealth fighter was unveiled in 2019, but the project is now unraveling. benoit tessier/AFP/Getty Images

It was billed as the answer to high-tech U.S. stealth fighters. Instead, an ambitious pan-European project has become a case study into some of what has gone wrong with the region’s defense push.

The French, German and Spanish Future Combat Air System project was meant to build a next-generation aircraft to catch up with the latest U.S., Chinese and Russian models. Now the venture has devolved into bickering between defense companies Airbus and Dassault Aviation—and between Berlin and Paris—over who gets to lead its development, with all sides now questioning its future.

The unraveling collaboration is a symptom of one of Europe’s biggest problems when it comes to defense: While European countries’ spending on the military collectively dwarfs Russia’s and has overtaken China’s, the whole is somewhat less than the sum of its parts. With capitals often giving priority to contracts with national companies, Europe’s armed forces suffer from overlaps and incompatibilities, high prices due to low economies of scale, and a fragmented industry.

One solution has been for several countries to join forces in developing new systems. They have teamed up to build tanks, frigates and missiles. There is also a separate British, Italian and Japanese stealth fighter that could be delivered within 10 years.

“It’s more than essential to have more joint collaboration, it’s a matter of efficient spending of tax money and the credibility of European defense versus the threats that we face,” said Jean-Paul Alary, the CEO of KNDS, which was created through the merger of French and German defense giants.

The FCAS project, which has gone through various iterations for more than two decades, was conceived as a sixth-generation jet fighter, potentially surpassing the U.S. F-35. In addition to advanced stealth, making it much more difficult to detect by the enemy, it is meant to incorporate artificial intelligence and fly connected with a swarm of drones.

The venture, though, took a wrong turn last year, when French plane maker Dassault Aviation, a key partner, said it had to lead the development and construction of the aircraft. Chief Executive Eric Trappier argued that the project needed clear leadership, that Dassault should be able to select its subcontractors, and that it had the best record of developing combat aircraft.

Airbus said it remains committed to the FCAS program. Dassault declined to comment.

Airbus, a cross-European company—much of whose defense business sits in Germany—has pushed back. German politicians and labor unions are increasingly impatient with the French demands. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said last week that it “wouldn’t be the end of the world,” if the project didn’t go ahead.

“The Germans want to cooperate but are fed up with being pushed around by the French,” said Nick Cunningham, a defense analyst at Agency Partners.

Some cross-border projects succeed. But too often, they have descended into acrimony as companies and governments argued over specs or who would get the bulk of the contracts. France has dropped out of an earlier joint jet fighter project, the Eurofighter, while collective efforts to develop a long-range drone and a tank have been delayed.

Military spending by European Union member states, the U.K. and Norway could reach up to about $890 billion to $1 trillion in 2030, compared with the $832.3 billion the U.S. spent last year, according to a study by the Milken Institute think tank and Oliver Wyman, a management consulting firm.

Much of this spending is purely national. In 2022, collaborative procurement accounted for less than a fifth of the total spent on defense equipment in the EU, according to the study.

Development costs for weapon projects are vast. For Europe, this means a lot of redundant military spending and less going into research than other regions. In the U.S., research and development accounted for 16% of total military spending in 2023, according to the Milken study, against 4.5% in Europe a year earlier.

There is also a lack of standardization in a region whose militaries may have to fight together. European nations have supplied Ukraine with 11 different types of howitzer firing one caliber, the 155mm shell.

A French howitzer is used by Ukrainian troops on the front line. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

Jet fighters are among the most expensive weapons to develop and are seen as an example of where Europe should but isn’t coming together enough. There are currently three different jet fighters produced in Europe—all a generation behind what the U.S., China and Russia offer.

FCAS was one project that could have filled this gap.

There is something of a pattern for France, the world’s second-largest defense exporter after the U.S., getting blamed for disrupting joint ventures. Italy’s Leonardo abandoned a deal to make a tank with KNDS after the Franco-German company failed to offer enough of a share in the project’s development, according to a person familiar with the matter.

There were many reasons why Leonardo didn’t join, but the company and others are always welcome, said KNDS’s Alary, who added that his company is working on a separate artillery project with the Italian company.

French opposition also nixed an attempt to invite German satellite maker OHB to join the Bromo project—a proposed merger of space activities of Leonardo, Airbus and France’s Thales—a person familiar with the discussions said.

For all the bickering, defense analysts say Europe has little choice but to make such joint projects work if it is to step up as a pillar of NATO and more effectively deter threats from Russia. Some projects have been quietly ticking along, including a tank project and several collaborations aimed at producing long-range missiles.

“We need to combine the special technical and industrial capabilities of our two nations,” U.K. Defense Minister John Healey said on Friday, referring to Britain and Germany cooperating on a long-range hypersonic missile—a field Europe is behind on.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

How can European nations better coordinate military spending to avoid duplication? Join the conversation below.

Another way to go is multinational companies. Missile maker MBDA is often touted as the European defense company that works. Britain’s BAE Systems and Airbus each own 35.5% of it, with Leonardo holding the balance. Yet like Airbus, MBDA is based in France and has a French CEO.

European governments are also likely to increase projects where they pool their development budgets and have their national companies produce the resulting weapon. Italian naval shipbuilder Fincantieri and Naval Group in France codesigned a frigate that is made in their own yards and are working on a patrol boat together.

This wouldn’t lead to consolidation but would still generate efficiency, said Pierroberto Folgiero, Fincantieri’s CEO. “What should be here is defragmentation,” he said.

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Alistair MacDonald is a reporter for The Wall Street Journal in London, where he covers the defense industry and the Ukraine war. Alistair also takes an interest in the intellectual and developmental disabilities community, writing about the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine on people with autism, Down syndrome and other conditions. Alistair has won, or shared the honors, on several awards, including a Loeb, six Sabews and an OPC.

He has held a variety of jobs at the Journal, including markets editor for EMEA, senior Canada correspondent, and U.K. politics and general news reporter in London. Alistair has also worked at Reuters and outlets in his native North East of England.

Cristina Gallardo is a reporter covering the European defense industry at Dow Jones Newswires in Barcelona. Before joining the company in 2024, she worked for Sifted, a news website on technology startups associated with the Financial Times. She previously wrote about EU-U.K. relations, British foreign policy and defense for Politico in London and worked for the Spanish news agency EFE in London and Madrid.

Cristina has a bachelor degree in journalism from the Complutense University of Madrid and a MA in science journalism from City University London.

Robbie Gramer is a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal in Washington. He previously worked at Politico, where he was a reporter and the lead author of the newsletter NatSec Daily.

Robbie has reported from over two dozen countries across Europe, Asia, South America and the Middle East. He has reported from the halls of Congress, remote research stations in the Amazon rainforest and aboard Norwegian coast guard cutters high in the Arctic Circle. He was also the host of Foreign Policy magazine’s award-winning podcast, “After Hotel Rwanda,” about the kidnapping of a Rwandan human-rights activist and U.S.-led efforts to free him.

Before his career in journalism, Robbie was associate director of transatlantic security at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank. Robbie graduated from American University with a degree in international relations.

WSJ

5. Special Operations News – Feb 17, 2026

Special Operations News – Feb 17, 2026

February 17, 2026 SOF News Update 0

https://sof.news/update/20260217/

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Candidates assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School take part in a an early morning ruck march as part of Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) at Camp Mackall, North Carolina January 13, 2026. Candidates who attended the three-week assessment and selection were evaluated on their physical fitness, character and intellect as well as their ability to work individually and on a team. If candidates are selected at SEAS they go on to the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). (U.S. Army photo by K. Kassens)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it 2 or 3 days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Gen. (Ret.) Fenton and The Honor Foundation. An organization that provides for career transition for U.S. special operations personnel, the Honor Foundation, has appointed Gen. (Ret) Bryan Fenton a member of it Board of Directors. Gen. Fenton is a former commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

SOF in the Trump Administration. There are several senior leaders in the Trump administration with a strong background in special operations. Read more in “How SOF Experience Informs Leadership in the Trump Administration”, Special Operations Association of America, February 10, 2026.

CIA and USSOCOM to Collaborate in Technology. The Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command are joining up in an effort to incorporate new technology to be more prepared for future operations in forward areas of conflict. Special operators and intelligence specialists will be using diverse sensors, smart systems, distributed networks, communications platforms, and AI tools that are enhanced with the advanced technologies. The focus areas include advanced analytics, mapping tools, and more. The 17th Rapid Capability Assessment (RCA17) will take place from April 20-24, 2026 in Chantilly, Virginia.

For more info see:

“CIA, SOCOM gearing up for rapid capability assessment with an eye toward ‘field-forward’ ops”, DefenseScoop, February 10, 2026.

“USSOCOM RVCA 17 Event”, SAM.gov.

Chimera FPV Drones for 1st SOW. The U.S. Air Force issued a sole-source justification to buy Chimera small UAVs from Oak Grove Technologies for the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida. AFSOC has an approved training program for the Chimera platform. The UAS is a commercial off-the-shelf first person view (FPV) drone. “U.S. Air Force buys Chimera FPV drones for special unit”, Defence Blog, February 11, 2026.

Trump Visits FBNC and SOF Units. The President visited Fort Bragg, North Carolina and met with the unit responsible for the capture of Venezuelan President Maduro several weeks ago. Operation Absolute Resolve involved a few hundred soldiers from FBNC. “Trump honors special forces behind Maduro’s capture at Fort Bragg as global tensions escalate”, Fox News, February 13, 2026.

USSOCOM Contract to Iron Legion JV. The contract, with a ceiling of $265,164,486, is for intelligence support services for U.S. Special Operations Command. The work will be performed in both CONUS and OCONUS locations and is expected to be completed by March 24, 2026. Iron Legion JV LLC is a Tampa, Fl based organization.

“When You Know Your Era is Passing By”. Brad Arnold, founder, lead singer, and songwriter of “3 Doors Down” passed away on Sat, Feb 7, 2026, at age 47. The group’s songs like “When I’m Gone” and “Here Without You” played on many headphones and earbuds of military members deployed overseas during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). https://x.com/3doorsdown/status/2020209301915390037/photo/1

SOF and Sabotage. Justin Clipson argues that strategic sabotage must be a SOF core activity in future conflicts. This article examines the USSOCOM core activities, defines strategic sabotage, illustrates the necessity using a modern case study, and how SOF can help the U.S. in succeed in future conflicts. “Strategic Sabotage as a Special Operations Forces Core Activity”, Small Wars Journal, February 13, 2026.

White SOF and Commanders. Sal Artiaga writes on how senior command slots within SOF are going to JSOC officers more than to Special Forces officers with no JSOC experience. Read more in “Who Commands White SOF Now?”, SF Confidential, February 14, 2026.

SOF Intel and Emerging Technology. Sgt. Maj. Erich Franck has penned an essay that argues the special operations enterprise has some blind spots regarding strategic intelligence. Read more in “Special Operations Forces Enterprise: Strategic Intelligence and Emerging Technology”, Joint Special Operations University Press, February 2, 2026.

SOF, SSE, and AI. USSOCOM is looking for ways to add artificial intelligence (AI) to its sensitive site exploitation (SSE) toolbox. The command is exploring the use of AI capabilities in facial recognition, speaker identification, voice matching, biometrics, and more. “SOCOM Wants to use AI to Better Distinguish High Value Targets and Intelligence During Operations”, Sandboxx.us, February 10, 2026.

7th SFG(A) Wins Award for Language Program. The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) based at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida was named the USSOCOM Command Language Program of the Year. “7th SFG(A) Displays Excellence in Language”, DVIDS, January 30, 2026.

The War, PTSD, and the Homefront. Long after leaving the war zone a part of the war continues to live in the soldier. PTSD affects not only the soldier but his family as well. Omri Attar writes more in “When the War Comes Home: A Soldier’s Take on Healing”, Special Operations Association of America”, February 12, 2026.

International SOF

British SF in the 2030s. Simon Angim, an instructor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, provides this paper on the current state and deployment of UK Special Forces (UKSF). “British Special Forces in the 2030s: UKSF, Special Operations, and NATO First”, Military Strategy Magazine, Winter 2025.

UK as NATO ARF-SOCC. The United Kingdom is ready to serve as the NATO Allied Reaction Force (ARF) Special Operations Component Command (SOCC). After two years of intensive preparation and training, exercise Hyperion Storm validated the UKSF as the ARF-SOCC. This command leads Joint SOF consisting of air, land, and maritime task groups that is able to deploy on short notice for a crisis or contingency. The ARF-SOCC is responsible for planning, synchronizing, and controlling multinational special operations within a larger joint force. The UK will take over ARF-SOCC lead from Spain in July 2026.

SOF History

On February 24, 1944, Merrill’s Marauders began a campaign in northern Burma. The mission of the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) was to disrupt Japanese supply and communications lines.

On February 19, 1968, a Special Forces NCO, Fred Zabitosky, was with his recon team on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. He would be awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions that day.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3676994/medal-of-honor-monday-army-master-sgt-fred-w-zabitosky/

On February 23, 1991, SFODA 525 was inserted by helicopter at night and moved to a hide site to conduct a recon mission deep behind enemy lines in Iraq. On the next morning, the 24th, this 5th SFG(A) team would find itself fighting for survival against an overwhelming enemy force.

https://sof.news/history/sfoda-525/

On February 24, 2006, the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was officially activated at Camp Lejeune, N.C.

On February 21, 2008, Robin Moore, the author of The Green Berets, died. He attended the Special Forces Qualification Course and would later deploy to South Vietnam where he spent time with the 5th Special Forces Group.

National Security and Commentary

DoD Pulls Out of Educational Opportunities at Harvard. The defense department will discontinue some graduate-level professional programs, fellowships, and certificate programs for active-duty service members at Harvard University. This new policy begins with the 2026-2027 academic year. “U.S. Military to Sever Some Academic Ties with Harvard, Hegseth Says”, Harvard Magazine, February 12, 2026. (Editor’s Note: As a graduate of Harvard I just have to “SMH”)

CRS Report – The U.S. Army’s Mobile Brigade Combat Team (MBCT). The army is restructuring some of its brigades to enhance mobility, flexibility, and survivability. The MBCT is going to eventually replace all of the 14 Active Component and 20 Army National Guard Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) as part of a broad Army modernization effort to respond to evolving threats, lessons from Ukraine, and the demands of large-scale combat operations. CRS IF13128, February 9, 2026.

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13128

Intel, IO, Cyber, AI, IW

US-UK Intel Relationship. J.R. Seeger provides some insight into how well the United States and United Kingdom intelligence services worked together from the beginning of World War II. William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan was key in building this US-UK intelligence and security relationship. Read more in “The Origin of the US-UK Intelligence ‘Special Relationship'”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 29, 2026.

“Be Careful Out There”. Word of caution from your local military CI agent. When you are at the bar remember that “10 + 5 = Honeytrap”.

Maduro Raid and AI. There are reports that ‘Claude’, an artificial intelligence tool produced by Anthropic, was used during Operation Absolute Resolve – the raid conducted in Venezuela by special operations forces and supporting Air Force and Naval aircraft that netted President Maduro. Read more in “Pentagon’s use of Claude during Maduro raid sparks Anthropic feud”, Axios, February 13, 2026.

Medical Support and IW. Aaron Epstein, MD, writes on how insurgent and resistance groups in denied areas should structure how medical support is provided during irregular and clandestine warfare. Irregular Warfare Center, February 12, 2026.

AI and the “Dead Internet Theory”. The use of generative artificial intelligence to generate content on the internet is going to have increasingly negative implications for online viewing of websites and social media. Non-state and state actors are using AI to generate narratives to sway audiences to their ‘point of view’ – which in many cases does not reflect reality. There is so much misinformation and disinformation that it is becoming difficult to determine what is fact and what is false. At some point, the internet may become less and less reliable as a source of information and more as a weapon for bad actors. “War on Minds: Artificial Intelligence and the Information Environment”, The Soufan Center, February 12, 2026.

Strategic Competition

Russian’s Weaponization of Video Games. The Russians and other nefarious organizations are using video gaming as a recruitment tool. Gaming ecosystems offer Moscow plenty of room to use hybrid tactics with audiences abroad. The gaming platforms are converted into battlefields for influence and recruitment. This has assisted Russia into recruiting foreigners for the Ukraine war. “How Russia Turns Gamers into Fighters”,Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), February 13, 2026.

Russian IO and the GIUK Gap. Russia’s navy passing through the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap is heavily watched by NATO forces. As all of these island nations are part of NATO, Russia’s fleet would have a difficult time passing through the GIUK Gap in times of war. However, Russia is working on that problem set by conducting influence operations in Greenland and Scotland encouraging independence movements. Read more in “Atlantic Chokepoint, Cognitive Front: Russian Influence Operations and the GIUK Gap”, The Arctic Institute, February 10, 2026.

Allied Irregular Warfare and the High North. The Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted the joining of Finland and Sweden to the NATO alliance. This put NATO on an additional 830 miles of Russia’s border. The accession to NATO of these two countries presents the alliance with new opportunities for irregular warfare. IW can be used to bolster defensive capabilities (resilience) as well as create offensive or counter-offensive capabilities (utilizing the geographic position of the countries). Both Sweden and Finland have highly skilled special operations forces. “Northern Approaches: Finland, Sweden, and the Growing Opportunities for Allied Irregular Warfare”, by Rick Chersicla,Irregular Warfare Initiative, February 10, 2026.

Ukraine Conflict

General Kellogg Leaves Post. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Keith Kellogg is no longer the “Special Envoy” to Ukraine for the White House. He departed that post in December 2025. Apparently he was replaced by Steve Witkoff – a friend of President Trump and a real estate developer. The Secretary of the Army, Dan Driscoll, also seems to be involved in the Ukraine conflict negotiations. Kellogg was highly regarded by the Ukrainian government and military establishment. He was an Army career officer that retired in 2003 – among his career highlights is service in Vietnam, the Gulf War (as a civilian), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He was Special Forces qualified, a former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, and former commander of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). After his retirement from the Army he held positions in various defense corporations as well as with some ‘think tanks’. He served during both the first and second Trump administrations.

Russians Lose Some Starlink Access. Both Russia and Ukraine have made extensive use of the commercial Starlink service that provides long-range, jam-resistant communication. However, recently the SpaceX service is being denied to the Russians; while terminals officially registered in Ukraine will work. Russian situational awareness, intelligence reporting, and coordination has been hampered – negatively affecting combat operations. “Starlink Shutdown: Musk Throws Russian Forces Into Chaos”, Forbes.com, February 6, 2026.

Some Pretty Cool Intel Work by Ukraine. A Ukrainian cyber unit, working with two OSINT organizations – InformNapalm and MILITANT, created fake Telegram bots offering to register Starlink terminals; this after many Russian Starlink accounts went away. Looking hard for connectivity after SpaceX’s geofence block, the scam prompted desperate Russians to hand over terminal IDs, coordinates, and $5,870 in payments for Starlink access. The yield for Ukrainian intelligence? Over 2,400 entries on Russian troop locations delivered to Ukrainian intel. Read more in Business Insider, February 12, 2026. Thanks to the International Spy Museum for calling attention to this article in LinkedIn.

CRS Report – Russian Military Performance and Outlook. Despite a larger recruitment base for personnel and defense industrial capacity, the Russian military has not been able to decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The Russian military has suffered significant losses in equipment and personnel. However, it is projected to sustain current operations over the short term. Read more about personnel, casualties, command and control, equipment, ammunition, current military performance, and outlook for the future. CRS, IF12606, February 4, 2026.

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12606

U.S. Advisory Efforts in Support of Ukraine. Benjamin Stumpf writes about the job of advising in “What I Learned from Being a Planner in an Advisor Command: Reflections from the Security Assistance Groupe – Ukraine”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, February 12, 2026.

• References:
• Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats. On storymaps.arcgis.com See also https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Around the World

Iran’s IC. The intelligence community of Iran (map, NSI) is large with different organizations responsible for selected aspects of internal and external security. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is the main intel agency in Iran; however, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a very powerful security organization as well. Read more in “Iranian Intelligence Community: An Overview”, by Daniel Blanco Paz, Grey Dynamics, February 2, 2026.

ISIS Prisoner Transfer from Syria. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) completed moving ISIS detainees from detention facilities in Syria to Iraqi custody. Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) led mission planning, coordination, and execution of the operation. Almost 6,000 adult detainees were transferred to Iraq.

More News on Syria. For several days in February, U.S. Central Command carried out airstrikes on more than 30 ISIS infrastructure and weapons storage locations. Drones, fixed-wing, and rotary-wing aircraft were used for the strikes. The U.S. has also departed the al-Tanf Garrison in southeastern Syria. The Syrian military has taken over the base. The move from al-Tanf is part of an overall drawdown of U.S. forces from Syria. President has tried to downsize the U.S. military presence in Syria for many years – beginning withdrawal efforts from Syria in 2018.

2nd MBCT, 10th Mtn to CENTCOM. The 2nd IBCT, 34th Infantry Division of the Iowa Army National Guard currently deployed to the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) will soon be replaced by the 10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team. The MBCT is a new formation as a result of the Army’s transformation that is taking place. Read more in “U.S. Forces Complete Mission in Syria to Transfer ISIS Detainees to Iraq”, CENTCOM.mil, February 13, 2026.

USS Gerald R. Ford (aircraft carrier) and its escort ships are steaming to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. She will join the USS Abraham Lincoln that is already positioned there – having left the Pacific weeks earlier.

Erik Prince Busy in Africa . . . Again. Blackwater founder Erik Prince deployed a private security force to operate drones in the Democratic Republic of Congo to assist its army in securing a city against Rwanda-backed rebels. The private military company is involved in the recapture of the city of Uvira from AFC/M23 rebels. The conflict between the government of DRC and M23 is one of the eight or nine Trump says he has stopped through mediation. Apparently, there is still a little more mediation needed. “Trump ally Prince sent men, drones to help Congo’s army secure strategic town”, Reuters, February 10, 2026.

U.S. Contingent in Nigeria? Social media posts are stating that the U.S. has sent a small team of troops to Nigeria (map, NSI). The country has seen a lot of violence over the past few decades – some from the Boko Haram insurgent group located in northeast Nigeria and some from the conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen. See “Pentagon to send 200 troops to Nigeria to fight militants, reports say”, Stars and Stripes, February 11, 2026.

Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Parameters. The U.S. Army War College has posted its Winter 2025-2026 issue online. United States Army War College Press.

Spotlight. The February 2026 issue from the Irregular Warfare Center.

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/news/newsletter/february-2026-newsletter/

Video – Secretary Rubio delivers remarks to the Munich Security Conference, DVIDS, February 14, 2026, 30 minutes. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/996290/secretary-rubio-delivers-remarks-munich-security-conference

Book Review – From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces, by Col. (Ret.) Aaron Bank, Presidio Press, 1986. Review by the Harding Project.

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/throwback-thursday-69d

Podcast. Brown, Dave, “Episode 23: Assessing Russia’s Actions in Ukraine and Syria, 2014-2022 – Implications for the Changing Character of War” (2026). The Trident Podcast. 23. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/23

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6. Starlink Surprise (Ukraine – Russia) by Mick Ryan

​Summary:

Mick Ryan argues that modern war is not transparent and that surprise still bites. In early February 2026, SpaceX introduced a “whitelist” that blocked unauthorized Starlink terminals in Ukraine, cutting Russian forces off from Starlink they had obtained via black market, capture, or third parties. The loss disrupted Russian command and control, reduced assault tempo, and slowed advances in parts of southern Ukraine after February 8. It also degraded Russian drone and unmanned ground vehicle employment, forced riskier logistics methods, and was linked to reports of more friendly fire. Ukraine exploited the shock for local gains, but Ryan stresses the window is finite.

Starlink Surprise

Ukraine surprised Russia with the Starlink shut off, and they have made the most of that surprise to take back territory. But like all surprises, the time to exploit that opportunity is limited.

Mick Ryan

Feb 17, 2026

∙ Paid

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/starlink-surprise?utm

Image: 24th Brigade and @GeneralStaffUA

Regardless of the sophistication and cutting-edge technologies of military and intelligence organisations, the agency of humans and their desire to surprise their enemies is relentless. It is an enduring part of warfare and other forms of human conflict and competition that governments and military institutions must be prepared to counter through adaptation - and good leadership. “Surprise is Inevitable”, 9 October 2023

Throughout the time since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been increasing numbers of articles in the media, and analyses by think tanks, about the concept of battlefield transparency. And while there is a degree of legitimacy to this debate, the reality is that war is never transparent. We can certainly see more of the battlespace than ever before; that is hardly up for debate. But being able to see more is not the same as understanding what we see. Visibility does not equal wisdom.

Therefore, surprise still occurs on the modern battlefield. There have been many examples of this in the past four years. Examples in Ukraine include the defeat of the Russian Army in northern Ukraine in 2022, the October 2022 Kerch Bridge attack by Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s 2022 Kharkiv offensive and 2024 Kursk operations.

Beyond Ukraine, surprise has also occurred. The Hamas assault into southern Israel is a prime example of tactical and strategic surprise. So too was the rapid fall of Afghanistan and the more recent American raid into Venezuela to seize former President Maduro.

Another surprise has occurred in the past couple of weeks, with implications for Russian operations in Ukraine, is the shutdown of Starlink terminals used by Russia. This is not just a technological issue for Russia. It is also an example of how the shock of this surprise impacts on their wider Ukraine operations.

Starlink, Ukraine and Russia

Starlink terminals, provided by the American company SpaceX, became a crucial part of Ukraine’s military communications infrastructure early after the Russia full-scale invasion. The connectivity offered by Starlink terminals is more resistant to jamming or Russian interception. The mobility and deployability of Starlink terminals particularly in austere battlefield conditions, quickly saw it became the communications bearer of choice for Ukrainian command and control systems such as Delta. Other uses include drone operations, fire support coordination, casualty evacuation operations, and logistics.

But as the Ukrainians discovered early in the war, there were limitations. Midway through a maritime operation using drones controlled through Starlink, SpaceX shut down the connection before the Ukrainians could execute their attack against the Russians. Despite this, Starlink has become near-irreplicable for short and medium range drone strike coordination by the Ukrainian armed forces.

As shown throughout this war however, the Russians have been fast followers of Ukrainian innovation. This was the case with drone operations. It was also the case with the application of Starlink to battlefield communications. Reports emerged in 2023-2024 of Russian forces acquiring Starlink terminals through various means. This included the black market, captured Ukrainian equipment, as well as through third-party suppliers.

A February 2024 report in DefenseOne described how Russia was using Starlink terminals in Ukraine. The activity, reportedly detected by the Ukrainians in late 2023, involved dozens of terminals being used by Russian forces on the frontline. SpaceX responded to this, stating that the company “does not do business of any kind with the Russian Government or its military. Starlink is not active in Russia, meaning service will not work in that country. SpaceX has never sold or marketed Starlink in Russia, nor has it shipped equipment to locations in Russia.” A May 2024 report from DefenseOne described how the U.S. military and Ukraine were working to shut off Russian access to Starlink, noting that the Russians had been deploying replacement terminals as fast as SpaceX turned them off.

Since then, this has been an ongoing problem for the Ukrainians and the Pentagon, in what has essentially been a game of ‘whack-a-mole’. SpaceX claims to have implemented measures to deactivate terminals being used by Russian forces. This included geofencing capabilities to prevent unauthorized use of Starlink terminals by Russian forces in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine.

Starlink-equipped Russian Shahed drones. Source: ISW

The problem of overcoming the Russian use of Starlink gained new urgency in late 2025 when a Russian Shahed drone fired at Ukraine containing Starlink was recovered by the Ukrainians. The addition of Starlink to the drones apparently allowed them to extend their flight range inside Ukraine and to bypass Ukrainian electronic warfare efforts to disable the drones. As a report in Ukrainska Pravda described earlier this month:

Starlink’s operations are banned in Russia, preventing Ukrainian drones from being fully deployed in Russia’s rear. The absence of comparable restrictions over Ukraine has created an asymmetry, enabling Russian forces to conduct precision strikes hundreds of kilometres deep.

The Russian Shutdown

In early February 2026, SpaceX implemented a “whitelist” system that blocked all unauthorized Starlink terminals in Ukraine. This effectively cut off Russian forces’ access to the satellite internet system. Defence Minister Fedorov confirmed that Ukraine’s Defense Ministry has contacted SpaceX with proposals aimed at preventing Russia from using the system.

The shutdown was a big, nasty surprise for the Russians.

Almost immediately, it caused severe disruption to Russian military command and control along many areas of the frontline in Ukraine. It halted Russia ground force assault operations in many areas. Russian military bloggers acknowledged the communications crisis within Russian ground force units, with some describing “chaos” in their units. As one Russian telegram channel described the situation:

The Americans’ shutdown of Starlink terminals used by the Russian Armed Forces has negatively impacted communications in our units. Troops are urgently setting up backup communications methods, albeit ones that are less convenient.

The number of Russian attacks recorded along the frontline by the Ukrainian Armed Forces also decreased in the wake of the Starlink shutdown. The Institute for the Study of War has reported that the tempo of Russian advances in Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole areas of southern Ukraine has largely stopped since 8 February.

The Starlink shutdown has also apparently had a major impact on Russian ground forces employment of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV). The Russians (and Ukrainians) employ UGVs in functions such as frontline casualty evacuation, as well as tactical sustainment operations for food and ammunition. The loss of Starlink has now forced Russian military logistics troops to return to the use of manned trucks, cars, motorcycles or quad-cycle vehicles. These have proven to be more vulnerable to drone strikes.

Another outcome of the Starlink shutdown for the Russians has been an increase in the prevalence of Russian friendly-fire incidents. Reported by the Kyiv Post, Ukrainian partisans in eastern and southern Ukraine have indicated that Russian units have increasingly fired on their own troops in the wake of the shutdown. That is more good news.

Finally, the shutdown has had an impact on the activities of Russian drones in deep operations, particularly battlefield interdiction. What is this? Battlefield interdiction is the array of military activities that aim to disrupt, delay, or destroy an enemy’s capabilities and reinforcements before they can engage friendly forces.

The Russians over the last few months have been increasingly focused on these kinds of interdiction operations by attacking Ukrainian logistics, supply lines, and reserves. But to do so, the Russians have increasingly relied on Starlink equipped drones. They will now need to find other guidance methods.

Image: @GeneralStaffUA

Implications for Modern War

The possibility of surprise at any time lies in the conditions of human perception and stems from uncertainties so basic that they are not likely to be eliminated, though they might be reduced. Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision

The Starlink shutdown represents a blow to Russian military operations, forcing them back to less effective traditional communications while they develop or procure alternative means of secure digital connectivity. While the Russians deal with the shock of this surprise, what are the implications for the war in Ukraine of this surprise, and the implications for modern war more broadly?

First, while mass still matters in modern war, so does effective communications. As a junior officer, I was taught about the conduct of ‘command and control warfare (C2W)’. This is an endeavour to destroy and degrade the ability of enemy commanders to understand the battlefield situation, and to degrade their ability to exercise effective command and control over their forces. The shutdown of Russian Starlink terminals, at essentially no cost to Ukraine, demonstrates that these kinds of operations retain an enduring value and must be prioritised in modern war.

Second, reliance on systems that are being ‘pirated’ or procured from the black market is not an effective institutional strategy – in peace or war. It introduces vulnerability. Russia had no contracts for the delivery of Starlink services. Their use of the system not only fell afoul of the Ukrainians, but of the world’s richest man and his SpaceX company. While perhaps useful as a short-term approach, this is hardly a recommended long-term strategy.

Third, indigenous space-based capability must be a priority for contemporary military organisations. Whether this is the launch of sovereign satellite constellations, iron-clad contracts with civil satellite service providers or a combination of the two, the access to resilient, secure and assured space-based communications is non-discretionary in modern war. The democratisation of digital command and control systems is almost totally reliant on these space-based systems. If anyone doubts just how essential they are, ask the Russians in southern Ukraine.

Fourth, tactical and operational opportunism is an important quality in military leaders. Clearly the Ukrainians had a ‘heads up’ that Russia might lose its Starlink systems and made the appropriate preparations. In some cases, mainly in southern Ukraine, Ukrainian assault forces such as the 82nd and 95th Air Assault Brigades, along with the veteran 33rd and 475th Assault Infantry Regiments, have been able secure useful gains in territory, and attrit Russian ground forces. This has occurred across a 60-kilometre-long section of the frontline. Whether this can or will be replicated along the 1000 kilometres of the frontline remains to be seen. But the ability and willingness of Ukrainian military leaders in particular, and military leaders in general, to make the most of such opportunities is a crucial ability for commanders at all levels.

Now, that might sound very obvious. However, many of the incentives for peacetime military service do not prioritise this kind of tactical opportunism. Indeed, the incentives of peace time military service can often focus on collective and collegiate decision making with civilian defence officials. While the Ukrainians understand the imperative to incentivise tactical opportunism, many western military organisations are still on that learning journey.

Fifth, the Starlink shutdown will drive further adaptation. The Russians will adapt their communications to overcome the new deficiencies. They are already deploying alternative communications – line of sight communications and domestic satellite communications companies. The key questions are: will this adaptive response provide a more robust communications capacity for Russia, and what might Ukraine do about it? Regardless, the adaptation battle will continue, and we should continue to study this struggle to adapt faster and better than one’s adversary.

Sixth, is this an opportunity for China? China is already deploying its Guowang and Qianfan low earth orbit satellite communications constellations. Might the Russians and Chinese see the loss of Starlink as an opportunity to collaborate, for the Russians to test the military applications of the Chinese constellations and for the Chinese to learn more about assured communications in modern war? Alternatively, might Russia decide it needs to accelerating the development of its delayed sovereign system called Rassvet, which aims to deploy 900 satellites by 2035?

Finally, like all periods of shock after surprise, this will be a time-limited opportunity for Ukraine to exploit. Surprise – which is what has occurred to the Russian military institution with the Starlink shutdown – brings about shock. This shock has individual and institutional impacts. The common factor in all historical examples of shock that follows surprise is that it is time limited. Eventually the shock wears off, responses are developed and counterpunches delivered.

This will be the case with the Starlink shutdown as well. Ukraine will have a limited amount of time to exploit the opportunities of the degraded command and control environment now being endured by Russian ground forces.

The Starlink shutdown is yet another case of surprise in the Ukraine War. The battlefield, and war more generally, is not yet transparent.

The Russians are now fighting through the shock of the Starlink surprise. This demonstrates, again, that despite the availability and employment of many advanced technologies, human agency is still the driving factor at every level of war. We would be wise to always ensure that this is at the forefront of our considerations about strategy, force design as well as the development and deployment of 21^st century military forces.

7. Mapping the Human Terrain: The Enduring Role of Human Intelligence in the U.S. Army

​Summary:

Tyler Fleming argues that HUMINT remains essential in today’s “wicked” information environment of AI content, disinformation, and surveillance, because understanding intentions, motivations, and sentiment requires human contact. He says the Army has degraded HUMINT by shrinking missions, reducing tradecraft training, and reverting toward interrogation, risking loss of the force’s primary means to engage foreign people for intelligence. Fleming calls for scalable, mid-level HUMINT “human sensors” with language and practical tradecraft to support commanders from company to brigade, complement technical and agency collection, enable liaison and SOF, and build population-based networks. He notes HUMINT limits but says all disciplines need corroboration.

Comment: Mapping the human terrain is fundamental for operations in the human domain. (that is not meant to be sarcastic comment - we must undertand and embrace the human domina even if we do not want to name it as a domain) ). The Army is drifting toward a technical bias that can see signals and images, yet miss intent, which leaves commanders vulnerable in competition below the threshold of war. Tyler Fleming frames Scalable HUMINT as both collection and influence leverage, because relationship networks shape what populations share and what they believe. In a cognitive warfare lens, degrading HUMINT cedes the human narrative layer to adversaries, since machines can track movement but cannot reliably map meaning, fear, or allegiance.

Mapping the Human Terrain: The Enduring Role of Human Intelligence in the U.S. Army

by Tyler Fleming

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02.18.2026 at 06:00am

 ​https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/18/army-human-intelligence-humint/

​

Abstract

The direct collection of intelligence information from human sources is highly sensitive for good reason. Many people have risked their lives to pass valuable information to the United States, and practitioners have a strict responsibility to protect their assets and tend to avoid publicity. Nonetheless, spy novels and films have popularized human intelligence (HUMINT), though these often misrepresent the realities experienced by military HUMINT professionals. U.S. Army HUMINT soldiers quietly contribute meaningful intelligence successes through the identification, development, and maintenance of valuable human relationships worldwide.

Very little is written about the experience of these service members and, accordingly, very little public discourse takes place about their role within the military and the intelligence community. However, it is important to discuss this critical intelligence function in the context of the modern era of irregular warfare and strategic competition. As the Army moves beyond the Global War on Terror and the military adapts to a new future, our primary ground force will need to design a clear pathway to train, equip, and deploy its human-intelligence soldiers.

Although intelligence issues can be difficult to discuss due to classification, all information related to methods and capability in this writing can be found in the unclassified field manual FM 2-22.3 Army Human Intelligence Collector Operations.

Introduction

The current and future battlespace is a wicked information environment, with AI-generated content and near-instantaneous information delivery changing the rules and expectations of the cognitive domain on a moment-to-moment basis. Blended with malicious disinformation campaigns and increasingly complex surveillance environments, intelligence collectors face the formidable challenge of sifting through this rapidly changing, highly irregular battlespace for valuable information. Despite the difficulties, one rule remains true: the human element remains at the foundation of all intelligence work.

Great and middle powers are actively fighting irregular, conventional, and clandestine warfare over control of populations. This means that the ability to understand the intentions, emotional states, and motivations of the human actors who make decisions that affect this global balancing act is of critical importance. Human intelligence collection, the oldest and least technologically oriented method available, remains the most effective way to gather this kind of information. Unfortunately, the US Army has fragmented the skill set through a reduction in missions and a downgrading of its training pipeline. Unchecked, this regression will strip the Army of its primary means of interacting directly with foreign persons for the purpose of collecting intelligence.

The Case for Scalable HUMINT Collection in Modern Warfare

It should go without saying that the United States Army fundamentally requires an intelligence element capable of directly engaging with populations in both conventional and irregular warfare. The requirement has become increasingly critical as the nature of conflict evolves, yet the Army’s human intelligence (HUMINT) forces remain inadequately adapted for irregular operational environments. During the Global War on Terror, the Army identified a need to interact directly with populations in order for counterinsurgency (COIN) to succeed. The Army built a new capability by adapting its existing interrogators and retraining them to perform source operations. This empowered the Army to gather information from multiple sources within the population rather than relying solely on detainees, thereby establishing modern Army HUMINT collection practices.

It should go without saying that the United States Army fundamentally requires an intelligence element capable of directly engaging with populations in both conventional and irregular warfare.

In the post-GWOT shift to strategic competition, the service has reverted to a focus on HUMINT soldiers for interrogation, a capability reduction that will ultimately lead to obsolescence. Training opportunities on basic to mid-level tradecraft and operational skills that would enable collectors to safely meet and engage with sources are being systematically reduced across the force. Critically, this trend threatens the Army’s ability to understand and influence populations in contested environments where such understanding proves decisive, leaving the force especially vulnerable during Phase 0 operations across multiple fronts (as is currently the case). By reducing the Army’s human intelligence collection capability, field commanders are left with no means to gather intelligence from the people immediately outside their gates.

To be successful across the competition continuum, the Army must develop and deploy a rapidly scalable force of human sensors capable of operating in competitive environments, both permissive and semi-permissive, and interact directly with local populations to collect critical information. Local commanders cannot rely exclusively on information collected by separate intelligence agencies or through technical means alone. Direct human contact with civilian and military populations remains essential (despite common regressive attitudes about the superiority of overhead and technical capability), requiring adequately skilled collectors who can operate effectively at lower echelons.

Some argue that the Army should instead produce case officer-equivalent collectors comparable to those produced by intelligence agencies, or that other military occupational specialties can fulfill the HUMINT role just as well, but these alternatives fail to address the fundamental requirements of military commanders. Full case officers require years of training, cannot be produced at scale, and must remain focused on high-priority, high-risk sources. They play an important role but are underutilized when tasked with the common military applications required by company- to brigade-sized echelons.

Other occupations, such as counterintelligence agents, civil affairs personnel, foreign area officers, and special operations forces (SOF), cannot accomplish this mission either due to similar limitations in scalability or to their specialized mission focuses. The HUMINT collector specializing in limited, mid-level tradecraft and interpersonal collection techniques occupies a unique position ideally suited to serve local commanders in various roles while simultaneously contributing to the broader intelligence picture.

The Multifaceted Role of the HUMINT Collector

The modern HUMINT collector must be trained to execute a diverse array of missions across the operational spectrum, serving as the critical interface between military forces and the human terrain. Prior to the degradation of their mission, their responsibilities included debriefing friendly forces, liaison with foreign counterparts, conducting target analysis to identify high-value individuals, detainee interrogations, and, critically, managing low and mid-tier human sources. During the Iraq and Afghan wars, HUMINT collectors were often attached to maneuver elements, performing field interrogations and key leader engagements while on patrol. Outside active combat zones in permissive countries, collectors served as key liaisons to local populations. These core competencies were also significantly more effective when enhanced with appropriate language skills, which enabled direct communication and deeper cultural understanding.

The breadth of these responsibilities reflects the reality that human intelligence collection cannot be reduced to a single function, and none of these roles are directly replicated by other military occupations from a strictly intelligence-collection standpoint. Other soldiers will, of course, interact with foreign populations to some degree, but they are not driven by intelligence requirements and are not trained in the discreet questioning techniques and human engineering skills necessary to elicit useful information. Unlike other touchpoints, everything the HUMINT soldier does is recorded through formal reporting channels, which contribute essential pieces to the intelligence mosaic that commanders require for decision-making.

Direct Applications Across Echelons

The practical applications of properly trained HUMINT collectors extend across all echelons of military operations, from tactical to strategic levels. Perhaps most importantly, they develop and maintain relationships with local civilian population sources, creating information networks that provide early warning of threats and insight into population sentiments. Higher-echelon assets or technical collection platforms cannot replicate HUMINT collectors ground-level engagement.

HUMINT collection at scale can create its own sort of “persistent stare” directly into the collective consciousness of a given social network. This is what sets Army HUMINT apart from specialized, high-level collectors who spend years developing individual sources in the hopes of extracting some exquisite intelligence coup. It also sets them apart from other non-reporting military personnel who may gather insights but lack a mechanism to document and disseminate their observations. Army HUMINT is uniquely capable of casting a dragnet across an entire population to glean competitive insights at the local or regional level that can specifically inform military decisions.

At higher echelons, HUMINT collectors can also perform functions with greater operational and strategic significance. They can conduct demographic and sentiment analysis to transform individual data points into comprehensive assessments of dynamic populations. Collectors develop HUMINT targeting packets that guide field collectors toward priority intelligence requirements, ensuring efficient allocation of collection resources. Additionally, collectors also serve as liaisons to host nation and allied forces, facilitating information exchange and building the relationships essential for effective coalition operations. This higher-level analysis and coordination is a force multiplier to the effectiveness of tactical collection efforts.

Beyond conventional military operations, HUMINT collectors also serve as critical enablers for special operations forces. They provide expertise and capabilities that enable their supported teams to focus on operating seamlessly with partner forces, while the HUMINT element focuses on gathering incidental information from their activities and documenting it for broader dissemination, thereby allowing non-SOF and higher headquarters elements to benefit from these interactions. In nonstandard outstation operations, where small teams operate with minimal support in isolated locations, the ways in which HUMINT collectors interface with local populations and collect the observations and experiences of the team have the potential to elevate outstations from isolated observation posts into integrated intelligence nodes. Their ability to operate independently while remaining connected to the higher intelligence apparatus makes them uniquely valuable in the decentralized operations that characterize modern special operations.

The Strategic Imperative for Human Sensors

The importance of maintaining robust HUMINT collection capabilities becomes clear when examined through the lens of contemporary strategic competition. In irregular warfare environments where competition exists below the threshold of declared war, contests take place over populations rather than key terrain, and victory belongs not to whoever possesses superior firepower, but to whoever better understands and influences the population. Human sensors provide the necessary touchpoints at all levels, enabling military units to collect qualitative data on target populations. When those sensors comprise properly trained and authorized HUMINT elements deployed across the human terrain, they create an information network that operates at low cost and provides near-real-time intelligence unavailable through other means.

The value proposition becomes even clearer when considering resource allocation in budget-constrained environments. Technical intelligence platforms require enormous investments in equipment, maintenance, and specialized personnel. They excel at quantitative data collection but struggle to answer questions about motivation, intention, and sentiment. Agency-level case officers produce exceptional intelligence, but their high cost and limited availability prevent their deployment at the scale required for tactical and operational needs. Mid-level HUMINT collectors offer a more effective balance: commanders can train them in months rather than years, deploy them widely across the battlespace, and rely on them to deliver intelligence of sufficient quality and relevance.

Human sensors provide the necessary touchpoints at all levels, enabling military units to collect qualitative data on target populations.

The human dimension of warfare remains irreducible despite the age-old tendency to discard analog capability in favor of new technologies. Satellites can observe movements, and communications intercepts can reveal conversations. However, neither can explain why a local leader chooses to support one faction over another, or why a particular village proves more susceptible to enemy influence than its neighbor. Human interaction can answer questions of motivation, culture, and intention. When commanders lack access to the human dimension of the battlespace, they make decisions based on what adversaries have already done rather than why they act, forfeiting predictive analysis and forecasting.

Addressing Limitations and Investing in Capability

Critics correctly note that intelligence derived from human sources differs fundamentally from quantitative or technical intelligence. Human sources remain susceptible to misinformation, whether by deliberate deception or honest misunderstanding. They filter information through their own perspectives and biases with limited or secondhand access to information. The reliability of information from human sources can prove difficult to assess, requiring careful evaluation and corroboration. These limitations pose genuine challenges that intelligence collectors must account for through rigorous planning, effective questioning and elicitation, and thoughtful post-collection analysis.

However, these limitations apply to all intelligence disciplines, not uniquely to HUMINT. All intelligence requires corroboration from different sources before analysts can assess it with high confidence. Communication security measures or deliberate deception can deceive signals intelligence. Imagery intelligence shows what exists, but not why it exists or what it means, and open-source intelligence reflects the biases and agendas of its creators. The intelligence community has long recognized that effective intelligence requires integration of multiple disciplines, each compensating for the others’ weaknesses. HUMINT contributes unique strengths to this mosaic: access to intentions, motivations, and the human factors that drive decision-making. Combining a strong collection across all platforms under a team of skilled analysts creates an unparalleled force multiplier.

Rather than reducing or redirecting HUMINT capabilities in response to these challenges, the Army should reinvest in its HUMINT corps. The service should develop and field a large number of foreign-language-enabled human sensors equipped with attainable, mid-level tradecraft and honed oral and written communication skills. The approach should prioritize scalability and practical applicability to the current operating environment over speculative notions of utility in future conflicts. The United States has no need for pure interrogators in the irregular competition it faces globally at any given moment. Ten adequately trained collectors dispersed across the battlespace provide more valuable military intelligence in aggregate than one or two exceptional case officers working priority targets. Although agency officers may produce higher-quality intelligence from their specific sources, the information collected is not necessarily relevant or accessible to commanders in the field.

The training pipeline should focus on developing practical skills applicable across the range of military operations. Collectors need sufficient tradecraft to operate safely, build rapport with sources, assess source reliability, and protect themselves and their sources from adversary counterintelligence efforts. They need cultural awareness and linguistic skills sufficient for effective communication in their assigned region, along with targeting workflows to identify and prioritize collection opportunities. Additionally, recruiters should seek to identify intellectual generalists, assessed for their tolerance for ambiguity and their adeptness at innovative communication. This mid-level competency represents the sweet spot between the months required for basic military intelligence training and the years required to develop full-case officers capable of handling high-risk sources in denied areas.

Conclusion

The HUMINT collector represents a professional intelligence discipline requiring unique skills, knowledge, and authorities. While other personnel can and should engage with local populations as part of their missions, they cannot replace trained intelligence collectors any more than infantrymen can replace combat engineers or medics can replace physicians. The strategic environment now more than ever demands that military commanders understand populations as thoroughly as they understand terrain, and they will need skilled specialists to navigate and dominate that space.

In both irregular warfare, characterized by competition below the threshold of armed conflict, and in conventional warfare conducted in populated areas or alongside partner forces, human intelligence provides irreplaceable insights into the human dimension of the battlespace. The Army’s current trajectory, emphasizing either interrogation-focused collectors or relying on small numbers of high-level specialists, inadequately addresses this requirement. Neither approach provides the scalable, versatile, operationally focused capability that military commanders need. Instead, the Army needs to recognize that the prevailing importance of the human terrain requires a modernized human intelligence solution that enables direct contact by intelligence collectors.

Tags: collection, Great Power Competition, Human Domain, Human Intelligence, HUMINT, intelligence, interrogation, irregular warfare, military intelligence, US Army

About The Author

• 
  
• Tyler Fleming
• Tyler Fleming spent ten years as a non-commissioned officer enabling Army special forces with dedicated intelligence collections and targeting operations. He holds a M.A. in International Security from George Mason University, and is currently working to transform the way government acquires and shares data across the military and intelligence communities.

8. Claimed or Unclaimed: Patterns of Attribution in Global Terrorism

​Summary:

Mahmut Cengiz argues that claiming responsibility is a deliberate communicative choice, not a byproduct, and that most terrorist attacks now go unclaimed. He cites a long decline in claiming from about 60% in the 1970s to more than 90% unclaimed by 2019, and notes 2018–2022 claim rates around 8–13%. He links higher claiming to capable groups, high-profile or costly attacks, competitive environments, and concrete objectives such as separatism, while anonymity often reflects retaliation risk and operational security. Using GTTAC incident data, he shows spikes in 2023–2024 tied to post–Oct. 7 conflict dynamics and finds claim rates vary by ideology, group, and tactic.

Comment: Attribution is a cognitive battlefield signal: when claims rise, groups are trying to shape perception, deter, and outbid rivals, not just report facts. The long shift toward anonymity suggests many actors judge survivability and deniability as more valuable than propaganda, complicating policy response and escalation control. Because claim rates differ by ideology, organization, and tactic, attribution patterns can function as an analytic discriminator for intent and risk tolerance, but false claims can weaponize that same channel.

Claimed or Unclaimed: Patterns of Attribution in Global Terrorism

by Mahmut Cengiz

|

02.18.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/18/patterns-of-attribution-in-global-terrorism/

Introduction

Despite extensive research on terrorist violence, far less attention has been paid to whether attacks are publicly claimed and what those attribution decisions reveal about organizational strategy. Claiming responsibility is not a trivial byproduct of terrorism but a deliberate communicative act that shapes public perception, government response, and inter-group competition. Yet, empirical trends suggest that most terrorist attacks today go unclaimed, raising important questions about when, why, and by whom responsibility is asserted. This article examines credit-taking as a strategic choice, drawing on existing theoretical frameworks and original analysis of incident-level data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) to assess patterns in claimed attacks and perpetrator behavior over time.

Why Terrorist Organizations Claim or Conceal Responsibility

More capable terrorist organizations are generally more willing to claim responsibility for attacks than weaker or more constrained groups. Claims are typically issued through official spokespeople and are most likely when organizations seek publicity, anticipate limited retaliation, or target state institutions rather than civilians. Empirical research shows that claiming is more common following high-profile operations—particularly suicide attacks and incidents producing significant casualties—where signaling strength and resolve offer strategic value. Competition further incentivizes claiming, as multiple groups operating in the same environment vie for limited popular support and seek to demonstrate operational relevance. In contrast, anonymous attacks often reflect a desire to avoid retaliation or an organizational focus on intimidation rather than mobilization. Over time, however, the prevalence of claiming has declined sharply. While roughly 60 percent of attacks were claimed in the 1970s, fewer than 15 percent were claimed in the 1990s, and by 2019, more than 90 percent of attacks worldwide were unclaimed. As Abrahms and Conrad note, terrorist organizations now claim responsibility for approximately one out of every seven incidents annually.

Despite broad agreement that terrorism functions as both a violent and communicative act, empirical research has focused far more on attack characteristics than on the decision to publicly claim responsibility. Yet, attribution itself can amplify the psychological and political impact of violence by clarifying intent, identifying perpetrators, and shaping audience perceptions. While intimidation incentives suppress claiming overall, groups are more likely to claim costly attacks, operations conducted in democratic or institutionally constrained environments, and incidents occurring amid inter-group competition. Organizations pursuing limited and concrete objectives—such as territorial separatism—also exhibit higher claim rates than groups with diffuse ideological goals.

Terrorism has long been described as a form of theater—violence designed to send messages and generate political effects beyond the immediate victims. Claiming responsibility allows organizations to signal capability, attract attention, communicate intent, and prevent rival groups from free-riding on their actions. Across ideological contexts, groups ranging from environmental extremists to jihadist organizations have used claims to reinforce legitimacy and demonstrate relevance. Credit-taking also offers practical advantages over alternative signaling strategies: it is inexpensive, requires no specialized technical expertise, and benefits from a first-mover advantage that enhances credibility. Timely claims are difficult to counterfeit convincingly, making attribution one of the few reliable ways organizations can distinguish themselves from other potential perpetrators in crowded militant environments.

At the same time, claiming responsibility carries clear risks. Public attribution can trigger government retaliation, alienate potential supporters, or damage a group’s public image. As a result, organizations may refrain from claiming attacks when the anticipated costs outweigh the benefits. False claims further complicate the information environment, as groups sometimes claim responsibility for attacks they did not carry out to exaggerate their capabilities or project influence beyond their operational reach. Regardless of accuracy, such claims are often treated seriously by media outlets and policymakers, underscoring the strategic importance of attribution decisions.

Decisions not to claim responsibility reflect a complex interaction of situational pressures, attack characteristics, ideology, and organizational goals. Information asymmetries, internal constraints, and uncertainty about audience reactions can make anonymity strategically preferable. These decisions also shape—and are shaped by—government and public responses, influencing subsequent counterterrorism dynamics.

Competition is particularly influential in determining when attacks are claimed or attributed. In environments with multiple active groups, claiming responsibility can serve as a mechanism of outbidding, signaling strength and legitimacy to potential supporters. This incentive is strongest when organizations target similar objectives, as claims clarify responsibility and distinguish perpetrators. Competitive environments may also generate collaboration or false claiming, complicating attribution and increasing ambiguity when attacks go unclaimed.

Beyond competition, ideology and external pressures further shape claiming behavior. Politically motivated groups are generally more inclined to claim attacks than religious or millenarian organizations, which may view violence as expressive rather than instrumental. Counterterrorism responses also matter: both very low and very high levels of repression can increase incentives to claim, while moderate responses tend to suppress it, producing a nonlinear relationship between retaliation and attribution. State sponsorship further discourages claiming, as proxy groups are often pressured to preserve plausible deniability in exchange for material support. Finally, intensifying grievances may increase credit-taking, either strategically—as a signal to external audiences—or expressively, as a means of voicing collective frustration. The following section evaluates these dynamics empirically by examining patterns in claimed and unclaimed attacks.

Empirical Analysis of Claimed and Unclaimed Terrorist Attacks

From 2018 through 2022, claimed terrorist attacks consistently represented a small minority of total incidents, generally ranging between 8 and 13 percent annually, as seen in Figure 1 below. This pattern aligns with broader findings in the terrorism literature that most contemporary attacks go unclaimed, reflecting strategic incentives to avoid retaliation, preserve operational security, or emphasize intimidation over mobilization. The particularly low claim rate in 2020 underscores how uncertainty and operational constraints can further suppress attribution. During this period, credit-taking remained the exception rather than the norm, reinforcing the view that anonymity has become a dominant feature of modern terrorist violence.

Figure 1: Total Terrorist Attacks and Claimed Incidents, 2018-2024

By contrast, according to Figure 1 above, the sharp rise in claimed attacks in 2023 and 2024 is largely attributable to the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent regional escalation involving Iran-backed militant groups. Following October 7, organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and aligned militias operating in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen conducted sustained attacks against Israeli targets and U.S. facilities and frequently claimed responsibility. In this conflict environment, attribution served clear strategic purposes, including signaling resolve, demonstrating cohesion within the so-called “axis of resistance,” deterring adversaries, and mobilizing support. The resulting increase in claimed attacks reflects not a universal shift in terrorist behavior, but the disproportionate influence of a highly visible, politically charged conflict in which public credit-taking was both feasible and strategically advantageous.

GTTAC systematically categorized terrorist incidents between 2021 and 2024 by ideological motivation, enabling more precise analysis of attribution patterns across group types (see Figure 2). Under this framework, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and similar organizations are classified as religious (jihadist), while Shia militias and Palestinian militant groups are categorized as Iran-backed. Ethnically motivated violence is coded as ethnonationalist; attacks driven by revolutionary or Marxist ideologies are classified as left-wing; violence motivated by extremist nationalist or supremacist beliefs is coded as right-wing; and anarchist violence is treated as a separate category.

Analysis of claimed attacks during this period reveals substantial variation across ideological categories. Anarchist attacks were the most likely to be claimed, with 77.1 percent attributed, followed by Iran-backed groups (37.4 percent) and religious (jihadist) organizations (29.5 percent). Claiming was less common among ethnonationalist groups (20.2 percent) and left-wing organizations (19.0 percent), and least frequent among right-wing extremists (11.1 percent). These differences suggest that ideology and organizational structure strongly shape attribution behavior, with groups engaged in overt political signaling or embedded in broader conflict narratives more likely to publicly claim responsibility.

Figure 2: Percentage of Terrorist Incidents Claimed by Ideological Category, 2021–2024

Disaggregating claim behavior by specific organizations reveals substantial variation even among groups operating within similar ideological or operational categories, as seen in Figure 3 below. Ethnonationalist and separatist organizations exhibit the highest rates of credit-taking, with the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claiming responsibility for 95.1 percent of its attacks and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claiming 86.1 percent. These exceptionally high rates reflect the strategic importance of attribution for groups pursuing concrete territorial or separatist objectives, where public claims help reinforce legitimacy, mobilize local support, and distinguish the organization from rival factions operating in the same conflict space. Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), while Islamist in orientation, similarly demonstrates a high claim rate (86.4 percent), reflecting its embeddedness in an overt political-military conflict in which attribution serves signaling and deterrent purposes.

Figure 3: Percentage of Incidents Claimed by the Most Prolific Claiming Terrorist Organizations

According to Figure 3 above, among Iran-backed organizations, Hezbollah (72.9 percent) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (65.9 percent) also display relatively high claim rates, consistent with their role in regional confrontation and their use of public attribution to signal resolve, alignment, and deterrence against state adversaries. In contrast, jihadist organizations affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda show markedly lower and more uneven claiming behavior. ISIS affiliates range from moderate claim rates in ISIS-Khorasan (51.2 percent) and ISIS–West Africa (44.8 percent) to much lower rates in ISIS–Sinai Province (25.8 percent) and ISIS–Mozambique (20.9 percent), suggesting that local operational constraints and varying incentives for anonymity shape attribution decisions. Al-Qaeda affiliates exhibit even lower claim rates: al-Shabaab claims 37.9 percent of attacks, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula only 28.6 percent, consistent with strategies that emphasize intimidation, survivability, and operational security over public signaling. Collectively, these patterns reinforce the argument that claim behavior is closely tied to organizational goals, competitive environments, and expectations of retaliation rather than ideology alone.

The tactic categories capture meaningful differences in how terrorist violence is executed and communicated. Trauma tactics include highly personal and coercive forms of violence such as suicide attacks, kidnappings, hostage-taking, assassinations, executions, stabbings, car ramming, and forms of bodily mutilation or gender-based violence. These tactics often rely on fear, spectacle, and psychological impact. Assault tactics encompass more conventional forms of direct violence, including shootings, bombings, drive-by attacks, storming or rapid assaults, and unarmed attacks, representing the most common operational methods used by terrorist groups. Covert tactics involve concealment and deception, such as ambushes, booby traps, sabotage, mines and IEDs, and infiltration using disguise, prioritizing surprise and deniability. Coordinated tactics refer to complex operations involving temporal and spatial synchronization, including multi-site attacks or sequential strikes conducted by the same perpetrator or network, and typically require higher levels of planning and organizational capacity.

Numerically, assault tactics dominate terrorist activity, accounting for 35,509 total attacks, of which 6,925 were claimed, yielding a claim rate of approximately 19.5 percent. Trauma-based attacks, while fewer in number (6,905 incidents), exhibit a slightly lower claim rate at 17.7 percent, suggesting that groups employing highly coercive or intimate violence often prioritize intimidation over public attribution, as seen in Figure 4 below. Covert attacks show the lowest propensity for claiming, with only 15.4 percent of 10,537 incidents attributed, consistent with the strategic value of anonymity and operational security in such tactics. In contrast, coordinated attacks, though rare (837 incidents), are the most likely to be claimed, with a claim rate of 23.2 percent. This pattern indicates that groups are more willing to publicly associate themselves with complex, resource-intensive operations that signal capability, planning sophistication, and organizational strength. Together, these findings reinforce the argument that claiming behavior is closely linked to the communicative value and strategic visibility of the tactic employed.

Figure 4: Number of Claimed Incidents by Tactic Type

Conclusion

Taken together, the findings demonstrate that credit-taking is neither incidental nor uniform across terrorist violence, but a strategic choice shaped by organizational capacity, ideology, tactical selection, competitive environments, and political context. While the long-term trend shows that most attacks remain unclaimed, periods of heightened conflict—such as the post–October 7 escalation—illustrate how attribution can reemerge as a central tool of signaling and deterrence. Variation in claiming behavior across groups and tactics underscores that anonymity and publicity serve different strategic purposes depending on objectives and constraints. For analysts and policymakers, patterns of claiming and non-claiming offer valuable insights into intent, capability, and risk tolerance, suggesting that attribution itself should be treated as a meaningful indicator rather than a byproduct of terrorist activity. Incorporating systematic analysis of claimed and unclaimed attacks into threat assessments can therefore enhance understanding of militant strategy and improve counterterrorism decision-making.

Tags: claiming responsibility, credit-taking, incident-level data, Strategic Signaling, terrorism data analysis, terrorist attribution, unclaimed attacks

About The Author

• 
  
• Mahmut Cengiz
• Dr. Mahmut Cengiz is an Associate Professor and faculty member at the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University (GMU). He has extensive international field experience, having provided capacity-building and training assistance to both governmental and non-governmental partners across the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Dr. Cengiz is the author of seven books and numerous scholarly articles and book chapters that critically address issues related to terrorism, transnational crime, terrorist financing, and human trafficking. His 2024 book, Murder by Mail, co-authored with Mitchel P. Roth, offers an historical analysis of weaponized mail, tracing its development over two centuries. He contributes regularly to Small Wars Journal and <iHomeland Security Today. Since 2018, Dr. Cengiz has been a key figure in the establishment and continued development of the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC). In addition to his research and policy contributions, Dr. Cengiz teaches graduate-level courses on Terrorism, American Security Policy, and Narco-Terrorism at George Mason University. He is a Fellow at Small Wars Journal–El Centro.

9. Attributing Russian Information Influence Operations: Testing the Information Influence Attribution Framework with real-world case studies

Attributing Russian Information Influence Operations: Testing the Information Influence Attribution Framework with real-world case studies

by SWJ Staff

|

02.17.2026 at 04:58pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/17/attributing-russian-information-influence-operations-framework/

Attributing Russian Information Influence Operations: Testing the Information Influence Attribution Framework with real-world case studies 

By: James Pamment Ben Heap Victoria Smith Sofiia Dikhtiarenko for NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

“This report examines Russian Information Influence Operations targeting audiences in Ukraine and neighbouring regions, including Ukrainian civilians and defence forces, civilians in nearby states, and European pro-Kremlin groups. The analysis draws primarily on data from the Ukrainian Centre for Strategic Communications (CSC), complemented by recent government and civil society reporting.

The aim is to test and refine the Information Influence Attribution Framework (IIAF) by applying it to real-world Russian campaigns, in a context where EU sanctions on Russian state media, the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) policy framework, and the Digital Services Act (DSA) are raising evidential standards for attribution. As Information Influence Operations increasingly involve both governmental and civil-society actors, the report focuses on clarifying practical evidential thresholds and confidence levels that can withstand prospective legal and regulatory scrutiny.”

DOWNLOAD THE REPORT HERE.

Tags: Active Measures, Cognitive Domain, Human Intelligence, influence operations, information domain, intelligence, narrative, narrative warfare, NATO, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, open source intelligence, Russia, signals intelligence (SIGENT), SWJ Documents and Reports, weaponized narratives

About The Author

• 
  
• SWJ Staff
• SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.

10. Beijing pressured Japan over Taiwan. It only strengthened Tokyo’s resolve

​Summary:

Nathan Attrill argues Beijing’s 2025 pressure campaign against Japan over Taiwan backfired and strengthened Tokyo’s resolve. After Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi warned that Taiwan Strait stability is tied to Japan’s security and that contingencies could affect national survival, Beijing escalated public criticism and then applied calibrated, deniable economic coercion such as travel advisories, informal trade disruption, and suspended exchanges. ASPI coercion tracking shows public criticism incidents tied to Taiwan jumped from 50 in 2024 to 197 in 2025, with Japan rising from 1 to 53 and many framed as one-China violations. Japan did not retract, and Takaichi’s Feb. 8 landslide reinforced political legitimacy for firmness.

Excerpt:

In trying to sideline Japan, Beijing has made the country more central. The result resembles a geopolitical Streisand effect—the phenomenon in which an attempt to suppress or silence an issue only amplifies attention to it. By dramatically escalating public criticism against Japan in a single year, Beijing has elevated Tokyo’s prominence in Taiwan-related security debates rather than diminishing it. Attempts to deter discussion have instead drawn greater focus to Japan’s role.

Comment: Good. We should learn from Japan. Note the charts and graphs at the link. Should we minimize Chinese criticism as routine noise?

Beijing’s coercion is doing narrative work, but Nathan Attrill suggests it is now a blunt instrument against politically secure middle powers, and it can harden identity and resolve instead of producing compliance. The “visible but deniable” coercion model may create short-term sectoral pain, yet it also teaches targets where they are exposed, which accelerates diversification and strategic resilience in the Asia-Indo-Pacific. By widening one-China allegations into a catch-all, Beijing risks diluting its own signaling, because more states may treat the criticism as routine noise rather than a credible red line.

If coercion fails when a target is economically resilient and politically secure, what tools remain for Beijing to shape allied and partner behavior on Taiwan without triggering a Streisand effect?

How should Japan weigh short-term economic disruption against alliance credibility and deterrence signaling, when Beijing’s pressure is designed to be deniable and therefore hard to punish?

If Taiwan becomes an indirect target through pressure on third capitals, what coordination mechanism best prevents Beijing from separating partners through selective economic pain?

We need our silk web of friends, partners, and allies to provide our own "united front" against Chinese malign activities.

Beijing pressured Japan over Taiwan. It only strengthened Tokyo’s resolve | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Nathan Attrill · February 17, 2026

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/beijing-pressured-japan-over-taiwan-it-only-strengthened-tokyos-resolve/

Fresh from a decisive electoral landslide, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has emerged more politically secure than ever—despite Beijing’s attempt in 2025 to make her a cautionary example over Taiwan. Rather than isolating her, China’s pressure campaign has coincided with, and perhaps caused, a boost to her authority.

In seeking to discipline Japan for supporting Taiwan, Beijing has instead demonstrated the diminishing returns of coercion against politically confident middle powers. It has exposed the limits of pressure politics when the target is both economically resilient and politically secure.

Last November, Takaichi publicly referenced contingency planning related to Taiwan, stating that ‘peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are directly linked to Japan’s security’ and that Tokyo ‘cannot rule out preparing for contingencies that affect our national survival’. Beijing treated the remarks as a direct violation of its red lines under its one-China principle.

What followed was a highly visible pressure campaign deploying the same mix of coercive tactics that Beijing has used against Japan, Taiwan and other countries for years.

This escalation was not an isolated reaction. Rather, it reflects a broader surge in Beijing’s public criticism of foreign governments over Taiwan. Coercion data compiled throughout 2025 for ASPI’s State of the Strait—a weekly newsletter tracking Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan—shows that China publicly criticised other countries 197 times for engaging with Taiwan-related issues, up from just 50 incidents in 2024. The United States remained the primary target, but Japan’s rise was dramatic. Tokyo went from just one public criticism in 2024 to 53 in 2025—a 5,200 percent increase—making it the second most criticised country.

The shift is most evident in how aggressively Beijing invoked the one-China principle. In 2025, alleged violations of the principle accounted for 143 public criticism incidents, up from just 24 in 2024—Japan alone accounted for 46 of these. While criticism over meetings with Taiwanese officials (32, up from 11) and arms sales (13, up from 3) also rose, they were dwarfed by the surge in one-China allegations. The data suggests Beijing is applying the principle more expansively, using it as a catch-all justification to police a widening range of foreign rhetoric and engagement related to Taiwan.

China’s reasons for criticising countries engaging with Taiwan in 2025 (green) and 2024 (grey).

In the case of Japan, Beijing’s denunciation quickly shifted to economic coercion. It issued travel advisories, disrupted trade flows through informal restrictions and suspended bilateral exchanges. The measures were calibrated to be visible but deniable—classic boycott-style coercion designed to impose short-term pain without triggering formal trade disputes.

Japan’s tourism industry and certain local governments felt the pressure most acutely. Sectors exposed to Chinese demand experienced disruption. The intent was clear: create enough domestic economic discomfort to induce a rhetorical retreat.

That retreat never came. Japanese officials declined to retract Takaichi’s remarks. Instead, they reiterated that contingency planning regarding Taiwan is consistent with Japan’s constitutional and security framework. There was no apology, no reframing and no policy concession.

So, why did Beijing’s coercion tactics fail?

First, the costs were unevenly distributed. While exposed sectors suffered, the broader national economy remained resilient. More importantly, backing down would have had far greater costs for Japan’s alliances, its international reputation, and Takaichi’s domestic standing. Even before the election, retreating under Chinese pressure would have risked appearing weak on national security. The subsequent parliamentary landslide on 8 February only reinforced that judgment, confirming that a firm stance on Taiwan carried political legitimacy.

Second, the episode reinforced long-standing concerns in Tokyo about Japan’s economic exposure to Chinese markets and supply chains. Rather than demonstrating decisive Chinese leverage, Beijing’s actions highlighted Japan’s own areas of dependence. That, in turn, strengthened arguments within Japan for supply-chain diversification, strategic resilience and reducing vulnerability to coercive economic pressure.

Third, the campaign had no discernible effect on Taiwan’s behaviour. Taipei did not change its diplomatic or security posture; if anything, it moved closer to Tokyo. Pressure applied to Japan did not generate secondary constraints on Taiwan’s international engagement. Instead, the episode highlighted a different dynamic: Taiwan can become the indirect target of coercion triggered by decisions taken in other capitals. But instead of inducing restraint in Taipei, this reinforced the need for deeper coordination with like-minded partners.

More broadly, the jump from 50 to 197 public criticism incidents in a single year suggests that wolf warrior diplomacy remains very much alive when it comes to the topic of Taiwan. Far from retreating to quiet backchannel demarches, Beijing is increasingly pairing private protests with overt, highly visible denunciations. This public pressure is intended to signal resolve, deter others from following suit and rigidly police the narrative boundaries around Taiwan.

But for coercion to work, the target must alter its cost-benefit calculus. In Japan’s case, Beijing misjudged that calculus. Economic pain was real but limited. Political resolve was high and electorally popular. Alliance dynamics with the US and shared concerns over regional security further constrained any prospect of backdown.

In trying to sideline Japan, Beijing has made the country more central. The result resembles a geopolitical Streisand effect—the phenomenon in which an attempt to suppress or silence an issue only amplifies attention to it. By dramatically escalating public criticism against Japan in a single year, Beijing has elevated Tokyo’s prominence in Taiwan-related security debates rather than diminishing it. Attempts to deter discussion have instead drawn greater focus to Japan’s role.

Pressure campaigns with diplomatic coercion at their core may succeed in projecting anger. It does not guarantee submission. Takaichi’s landslide has not been blunted by pressure from Beijing. If anything, it has been burnished by it.

Top 10 targets of Chinese criticism for engaging with Taiwan in 2024 and 2025.

State of the Strait is available here. Governments and organisations can contact [email protected] to discuss co-funding this project and gaining access to the entire State of the Strait database.

aspistrategist.org.au · Nathan Attrill · February 17, 2026

11. Gone But Not Forgotten: Retaining Advising Capabilities Even as the Army Cuts Its Advising Units

​Summary:

Jacob Myers argues the Army’s decision to deactivate security force assistance brigades to prioritize lethality and large-scale combat risks losing vital advising capabilities. He says history shows advising skills such as rapport building, cultural fluency, access, and influence remain essential across conflict phases. Drawing on Vietnam-era lessons and SFAB experience, he warns that shifting fully to combat focus signals posture changes but can weaken partner capacity and U.S. influence if competencies atrophy. He recommends preserving advisor expertise through doctrine, training, distributed skills across units, and smaller dedicated cadres, since scalable advising supports interoperability, intelligence sharing, legitimacy, and crisis response even when formal advising units disappear.

Comment: The pendulum swings and what goes around comes around. In a cognitive warfare frame, rapport and trust are operational terrain. If the Army neglects them, rivals can occupy that human ground without firing a shot. If history shows advising requirements should we maintain force structure or institutional capability? 

Gone But Not Forgotten: Retaining Advising Capabilities Even as the Army Cuts Its Advising Units - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Jacob Myers · February 18, 2026

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/gone-but-not-forgotten-retaining-advising-capabilities-even-as-the-army-cuts-its-advising-units/

Leaders for years have been talking about an unpredictable future, the persistence of change, and the need for adaptability to deal with uncertainty and respond to the unexpected. Today is no exception. The Army Transformation Initiative outlines a vision to convert the Army for future warfare and reorganize force structures. In the aggregate, these understandable decisions require tough choices. Latest restructuring documents call for new command structures, the removal of outdated equipment, new physical fitness standards, and robust policy changes aimed to streamline procurement and overhaul innovation—all essentially simultaneously and at breakneck speed. The tough choices forced by these objectives now also include changes in advising and how the Army conducts security force assistance. Among the organizations to fall victim are the Army’s security forces assistance brigades (SFABs).

The Army’s decision to deactivate its SFABs and advisor training institutions to better align resources and provide commanders with units that are focused on warfighting and lethality is a sudden, albeit predictable change in view of the recently released US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. SFABs will now be a billpayer for this rapid transformation, with its units divested or reclassed to better align with current objectives. But, while security force assistance is no longer a core Army function for now, that does not mean that the advising lessons SFABs learned and the institutional capabilities they housed must be allowed to atrophy. Both those lessons and those capabilities can—and should—help the United States achieve its goals in this new age of change.

We’ve Been Here Before

“I have today ordered to Viet-Nam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately,” President Lyndon B. Johnson announced in a televised address on July 28, 1965. “These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement. We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat.”

Johnson’s comments marked a pivotal moment in US defense policy; it was a notice to the American people that the early-war advisory focus with its comparatively light footprint in Vietnam was at an end and a shift to direct US participation in major combat operations would now emerge.

Prior to this moment, the US presence in Vietnam had been relegated to a support role. However, following the defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu and the emergence of the “domino theory” as a key driver US policy, the United States adopted a more active approach in Vietnam. As officials determined how to organize US forces in Vietnam, advisors would be placed in main headquarters, assigned to divisions, and integrated into the training system to assist with building host-nation capability. Advisors would also be working at the local level assisting with combat operations and act as a continuity for Special Forces rotating in and out of Vietnam and other irregular defense groups. To manage the growing advisory mission the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established in 1962. Lessons learned during this time revolved around several themes: addressing gaps in cultural understanding, enhancing understanding of counterinsurgency theory, promoting civic actions, and fostering country orientation. Advisors equipped with this knowledge were able to improve US situational awareness, inform policymaking decisions, and provide local insights to enhance US and its South Vietnamese partners’ operations. As those partner forces faltered against their growing North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong adversaries, President Johnson eventually committed US ground troops and transitioned to full-scale combat operations. As a result, manning, resourcing, and funding prioritized US combat units. By 1966, “The buildup [had] eclipsed what had previously been an advisor ‘show.’” In essence, “The advisory effort had, at least in practice, been relegated to a secondary role.” Despite MACV’s best efforts to train advisors, it only skimmed the surface in addressing vast cultural and military challenges given the change in strategy.

By the 1970s, the United States saw a renewed interest in advising that supported four components of Vietnamization—a strategy to shift reasonability to Vietnam and exit the theater. It was in these final years of wartime transition that the functions and knowledge MACV developed were again utilized and valued. MACV responsibility again shifted to supporting South Vietnamese forces as the US footprint was reduced. Improving combat capability and capacity was MACV’s primary task, an objective intended to enable a US exit from the region while sustaining US support for its strategic goals.

Decades later, the transition from combat to advising would drive the genesis of the SFABs and associated advising institutions, as well. This latest era of US security force assistance took its initial form in 2006 with the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review. “U.S. forces have been engaged in many countries, fighting terrorists and helping partners to police and govern their nations,” the review noted. “To succeed in such operations, the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others.” For the next decade, however, this indirect approach would largely be taken absent a dedicated infrastructure to develop advising capacity. SFABs were then originally conceived in 2017 to transition ad hoc advisor sourcing to formalized advisor missions in Afghanistan, a break from the legacy military transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan that lacked the specialized training of security assistance and cultural competency required to effectively integrate with and train foreign partners. As specialized units designed to assess, support, liaise, and advise partners, the new SFABs thereby alleviated conventional combat units for other priorities, improved Army readiness, and permitted a dedicated mission to build conventional partner capacity in support of security force assistance requirements.

SFABs aligned with geographic combatant commands, advisors became regionally focused, and as the US footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan decreased—but the necessity for advisors remained—commanders used advisors to identify operational gaps that impacted foreign partner readiness in all combatant commands in preparation for the shift toward large-scale combat operations and a new era of strategic competition that would inevitably set the stage for any future conflict. However, while all SFABs largely had the same capabilities, their employment and utility greatly differed across combatant commands and regions as leaders were forced to adapt to the changing character of warfare. The mission of the SFABs, as it relates to large-scale combat operations and competition, therefore initiated debate among Army leaders and across combatant commands, leading to this moment today.

Like with the shift from advising to direct combat operations in Vietnam in the early 1960s, this Army’s reorganization toward preparing for large-scale combat operations now signals Army transformation intentions and a posture shift to various stakeholders, allies, and adversaries. Yet, US military history demonstrates that even when advising structures contract or dissolve, the underlying competencies of rapport-building, influence, and sustaining access remain indispensable for successful conflict outcomes and winning America’s wars. This transition requires foresight, prioritization, and innovation to ensure that the gains and competencies the United States has developed over the last twenty years with its allies and partners remain intact and utilized. Failure to do so risks jeopardizing defense objectives in strategically relevant regions and burden-sharing efforts to set conditions for lasting peace and stability.

The Path Forward: Leveraging Distributed Advising Competencies

A dwindling presence of US forces globally is certain to present challenges: an Africa continent more vulnerable to Russian and Chinese meddling and exploitation; accelerated Russian efforts to further destabilize Europe; and terrorist networks in the Middle East with more maneuver space to strengthen ties with one another, further impacting US interests for peace and economic development. However, a means to address these persistent threats is to capitalize on the work former SFAB units accomplished with allies and partners worldwide, and more importantly to transfer adviser skills and knowledge to other units and organizations to sustain or further build US influence across regions wherever they present.

Along the competition continuum, the importance of individual competencies (cultural fluency, social dynamics, and building rapport among foreign military and government leadership) will remain vital to ensuring US military success in any theater. A peace through strength approach requires local understanding to sustain the partnerships that permit preferred access. A testament to this fact was MACV’s need to leverage the advising capacity developed in its early years once again in the 1970s, when it sought to understand and identify defense gaps to ultimately facilitate an exit strategy by positioning advisors in headquarters and training facilities in South Vietnam. Despite the transition from a mainly advisory mission to a direct combat role and then back to an approach that once again leveraged advising capability, the need for high performers to serve as advisors was there throughout, and offers an instructive lesson today: During large-scale combat operations, the acquisition and employment of cultural knowledge enables the United States to build inroads with foreign partners.

There is also an operational element that, when perfected, can establish tangible advantages like greater interoperability with partners—as was the case when SFAB advisors helped a foreign corps headquarters coordinate with the US forces in the Warfighter 24-5 exercise. Daily interaction with partner forces ensured access and enhanced multinational interoperability. Just as advisors fully leveraged foreign partners’ capabilities through intelligence collection, drone operations, and strengthening the communication architecture in this exercise, the United States could effectively employ foreign formations in training environments and strengthen multinational operations where interoperability with the joint force is essential. This will be especially important if the United States and its allies find themselves needing to respond to an emerging crisis or conflict. Organizational presence facilitates the movement of materiel, information, and units to respond accurately and efficiently. Whether in the Indo-Pacific region or the Western Hemisphere, this knowledge is vital to both establishing and expanding a US military presence and countering non–Western Hemisphere rivals in the region. During crisis or phases under the threshold of armed conflict, rapport and trust mitigate insurgency resurgence and provide alternatives to counter messaging. Access enables influence operations and host-nation capacity-building, and breeds US legitimacy across various demographics.

Keep the Past Alive

In 1958, Eugene Burdick and William Lederer’s The Ugly American was published. The novel offered a proof of concept for what effective US advising and influence can look like. Among other characters, it followed Major James “Tex” Wolchek—serving as a US advisor in a local village in a fictional Southeast Asian country—and his efforts to counter adversaries’ disinformation and sustain access and credibility at the local level. By taking stock of local customs and fostering cooperative relationships, he undermines anti-American propaganda. With SFABs gone and the Military Advisor Training Academy likely to close, the US military may find it challenging to retain the individual skills—those that real-world advisors share with Wolcheck—without the proper training and emphasis aligned with tactical and operational objectives.

To get ahead of this scenario, the joint force can still seek innovative approaches of sustaining these skills and knowledge to ensure the United States maintains a competitive edge across vital regions. One way to do this is to incorporate cultural training, foreign partner engagement, and negotiation skills into predeployment training and exercises for rotational units. By doing so, interactions foreign partners have with the joint force can build on the work done by SFABs. Empowering noncommissioned officers and junior officers with these skills—and more importantly, trusting them to execute these functions in every interaction—signals the military’s trust in our tactical leaders. Enabling junior officers and noncommissioned officers to be stewards of important relationships also highlights to our partners the importance the United States holds on cultural and societal fluency as a means of building trust and warfighter competencies.

Additionally, focusing on relationship building helps to effectively counter the ugly American complex that adversaries often message to stymie US influence. Where time and resources permit, additional instruction on rapport building could be a recurring element of soldier development.

The Army’s current transition away from advisor units and institutions may paradoxically invite a fresh look at how the US military conducts security cooperation at echelon. A recent article argues that the deliberate downsizing of SFABs is plagued with consequences that may negatively impact security assistance capabilities. Perhaps, then, a smaller cadre of dedicated advisors or other functional areas held at the corps or theater level can still be utilized, and in fact, provide opportunities for a greater and more persistent presence and simultaneously improve the understanding of security force assistance for senior leaders. Advisor skills are indispensable across the competition continuum, and dedicated personnel could help sustain US efforts across that continuum even if the advising infrastructure is being removed.

Finally, as with every change, the joint force must not be ignorant of history and should seek to incorporate the many advising lessons US military organizations, from MACV to the SFABs have learned. Failing to adequately immortalize these hard-won lessons risks potential growing pains in future conflicts that equate to unnecessary loss of life, time, and treasure. In Vietnam, by 1970, the failure of seek-and-destroy warfare triggered a renewed interest in advising, chiefly in key billets that supported combat units and training institutions, as a means to winning the war. But this came at a cost of 54,493 US service members killed in action between 1965 and 1970. Advisor lessons learned can be preserved and deployed through doctrine, specialized advisor training centers such as the Security Force Assistance and Stability Integration Directorate, and the sustainment of integration between special operations forces and civil affairs partners. Such efforts could also lead to better interagency collaboration with the Department of State and joint services. This would not only create a broader network of informed soldiers, but also reduce unnecessary misunderstandings between the State and Defense Departments, which arise all too often when military personnel wade into the greater whole-of-government approach to security cooperation.

The Units Will Go, but the Capability Must Not

The Army’s decision to deactivate SFABs follows a predictable path of shedding advising capability as the US military’s institutional focus shifts toward kinetic warfighting. While this change may be uncomfortable, with dedicated units no longer conducting security force assistance at scale, it is not without precedent. However, even as the SFABs vanish, the United States cannot afford to abandon the core advising competencies that history shows are instrumental in war. Even in the warfighting-focused organizations that are now prioritized across the Army, advisor skills and functions—namely building and maintaining rapport, influence, and access with foreign partners—are a strategic asset that remain vital to achieving US military goals of peace and stability. The professional advisors may go, but the capability and its functions must not.

Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Myers is a US Army foreign area officer with a focus on European security. He currently serves as a security cooperation instructor at the Army’s Military Advisor Training Academy.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Aleksander Fomin, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Jacob Myers · February 18, 2026

12. Putin Could End the Ukraine War But Won't. That Means a Coup In Russia Is Possible

​Summary:

Alexander Motyl argues that Putin could declare victory and freeze the Ukraine war because Russia still holds Crimea, most of the Donbas, and parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. He says Putin does not do so because of three constraints. First, Putin may believe total victory is near, reinforced by sugarcoated reporting and wishful assumptions, despite high losses for small gains. Second, Putin may lack the political power to sell a partial win to fragmented elites whose support sustains the regime. Third, he may lack the means to persuade the public when propaganda collides with lived experience. Motyl concludes prolonged war increases elite opposition and raises coup risk.

Comment: Wishful thinking? Or should we be careful what some people might wish for? This is a regime cohesion argument more than a battlefield argument: Motyl treats elite belief, not territory, as the decisive center of gravity. In a cognitive warfare lens, the key vulnerability is narrative credibility. If the state story cannot match what Russians experience, coercion alone cannot stabilize consent. Motyl implies a dangerous feedback loop: continued fighting meant to protect the regime may instead accelerate elite fracture, making an internal rupture more likely.

Putin Could End the Ukraine War But Won't. That Means a Coup In Russia Is Possible

19fortyfive.com · Alexander Motyl · February 16, 2026

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/02/putin-could-end-the-ukraine-war-but-wont-that-means-a-coup-in-russia-is-possible/

Summary and Key Points: Putin could try to freeze the Ukraine war by declaring victory: Russia holds Crimea, much of the Donbas, and parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

-Yet three constraints may keep him fighting.

-First, he may believe victory is close, fed by sugarcoated reporting and his own assumptions.

-Second, he may lack the political power to sell an obviously partial win to fractured elites whose support keeps his regime intact.

-Third, he may doubt his ability to manufacture public belief when propaganda clashes with lived experience. As losses mount and gains remain thin, elite resistance grows—and a coup becomes more plausible.

Putin Could End the Ukraine War Tomorrow—Here’s Why He Won’t

If Russian President Vladimir Putin were as smart and powerful as he is made out to be, he would declare victory against the Ukrainians and the West and end his war in Ukraine immediately.

Parades, monuments, medals, ribbons, and speeches would follow, while happy Russians would bask in the knowledge that they had, once again, halted the onslaught of savage hordes and saved civilization.

Such a move would make great sense.

The war would be over. Russia would continue to occupy all of Crimea, most of the Donbas, and sizable chunks of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces.

Putin would be hailed by the White House, as well as most of Europe and the world, as a peacemaker—Russia could rebuild its tattered economy and make nice with its current enemies.

Presumably, Putin has the power and the means to declare victory. If this option is so patently obvious and reasonable, why doesn’t he pursue it? Naturally, he might sometime in the future, but his power and means are unlikely to be greater than they are now.

Capt. Michael Terry, 36th Fighter Squadron F-16 pilot, prepares to launch at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, July 9, 2020. The 36th Aircraft Maintenance Unit and the flight line operators wokred to make this aircraft mission-capable after being grounded for 186 days. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Noah Sudolcan)

There are three possible reasons Putin does not simply declare victory and end the war—each reason is about what he does not have. It may be that Putin is not quite as smart as he is assumed to be. Or, it may be that he lacks the power. Finally, he may lack the means.

As unlikely as it seems, Putin may sincerely believe that Russia is winning the war. The evidence points in the other direction—Russia is suffering huge personnel losses for minuscule, impermanent territorial gains—but Putin may be getting sugarcoated information from his minions, or be blithely ignoring anything that doesn’t fit his preconceived notions of success. Whatever the case, Putin is either ignorant or divorced from reality. In his view, why end the war today if Ukraine’s total defeat is just around the corner? Given such a mindset, it makes sense to wait.

But Putin may also lack the power to declare victory and get away with it. If Russia’s elites support him unconditionally—or if they are all on a short leash and are unable to express dissatisfaction—then Putin should be able to impose his vision of the war on such pliant folk. If, alternatively, Russian elites are fragmented and not universally beholden to Putin, then it makes sense for him to avoid declaring a victory elites know is still out of reach. Logic therefore suggests that the image of the omnipotent Putin able to manipulate his underlings is wrong. His regime appears to be as brittle as his hold on power is tenuous.

Finally, there’s the question of means. Coercion, which he happily employs, can do little to persuade Russians that victory is theirs. Propaganda can do the trick, but only if it’s not at complete variance with lived experience. Have Russians been brainwashed?

Are they captives of an authoritarian political culture? Or are they inwardly grumbling at the regime’s attempts to paint a pretty picture of the war? We can’t say for sure, but there must be some Russians who view the regime’s patriotic hoopla with skepticism. Putin may be aware of such mixed feelings, or he may be so starstruck by his own beliefs that he cannot judge what ordinary Russians believe.

In sum, there is good reason to believe that Putin can’t end the war. First of all, because he may not want to, mistakenly believing that victory is inevitable. Second, because his rule is weak, and an obviously mendacious move would be met with incredulity and opposition by elites. And third, because Putin can’t be certain he can manipulate the people to the extent necessary.

The most important of these three points is the second—Putin’s brittle regime. He may be irrational or unpopular, but the stability of his rule ultimately depends on elite support. If that goes, Putin can’t be far behind.

Ukraine tanks fighting. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

This brings us to a possibly optimistic conclusion: The longer the war lasts, the greater elite opposition in Russia will be, and the weaker his regime becomes.

Putin is too weak to act rationally today. He will be even weaker in the near term. When that time comes, a coup d’etat may be inevitable.

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

19fortyfive.com · Alexander Motyl · February 16, 2026

13. The Greatest Threat to Acquisition Transformation Is Fear

​Summary:

Bonnie Evangelista argues the biggest barrier to Defense acquisition transformation is not regulation but an incentive architecture of fear. The system is designed to produce compliance, documentation, and career safety, not speed or outcomes. Despite repeated reform waves since 1994, GAO data shows fielding timelines have grown from about eight to more than 11 years, and most pathways still default to linear “waterfall” delivery. Evangelista cites her experience accelerating an Army defensive cyber kit in nine months, only to see gains vanish when individual “heroes” rotated out because incentives still rewarded caution. She argues innovators are reputationally punished, silence becomes enforced, and real reform requires rewiring incentives so delay carries consequence and leaders provide top cover.

Comment: If innovators are punished through reputational labeling, adversaries do not need sabotage; the bureaucracy can self-paralyze. “Performative reform” functions like internal narrative management: leaders speak urgency while the organization quietly teaches risk avoidance.

The Greatest Threat to Acquisition Transformation Is Fear

Bonnie Evangelista

February 17, 2026

https://warontherocks.com/2026/02/the-greatest-threat-to-acquisition-transformation-is-fear/

The Department of Defense’s acquisition and sustainment culture is pathologically risk-averse. The greatest threat to acquisition transformation is not the Federal Acquisition Regulation. It is not congressional oversight, statutory constraints, insufficient training, or an absence of strategy.

The greatest threat is fear. Not fear as emotion, but fear as architecture.

The defense acquisition system is not broken. It is functioning precisely as designed. It produces compliance. It produces documentation. It produces defensible process. It produces career survivability.

But it does not reliably produce speed or meaningful results.

For more than three decades, senior leaders have promised reform. Since the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the acquisition community has cycled through transformation campaigns: Better Buying Power, the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, expanded other transaction authorities, congressional mandates, and more. Each wave arrives wrapped in urgency. Each diagnoses the same pathology: acquisitions are too slow, too rigid, too risk-averse.

And yet the system is getting worse, not better.

The Government Accountability Office reported that the average time to field capability for a major defense acquisition program has increased from roughly eight years to more than 11. The Government Accountability Office concluded in another report that while policy language aligns with speed and innovation goals, implementation across most pathways does not reflect leading iterative practices. Programs continue to default to certainty over speed, planning over execution, and documentation over delivery despite repeated findings saying that doesn’t work. Risk is managed by adding layers of review rather than by making smart decisions, which means acquisition professionals take almost no risk at all.

That is not because leaders lack intelligence or intent. It is because language does not change systems. Incentives do.

The dominant incentive in this system is fear: of audit, protest, scrutiny from the Government Accountability Office, being named in a congressional hearing, or of a poor performance review. Yet there is no consequence for managers whose projects are slow.

When visible failure carries career-ending consequences and invisible delay carries almost none, rational actors adapt.

Fear is not an anomaly inside acquisition culture. It is the operating logic of the system. And if fear defines the operating culture of acquisition, transformation will remain a romantic ideal rather than an achievable reality.

Transformation Isn’t New

Acquisition reform rhetoric is louder than ever with executive orders and strategy documents increasingly emphasizing speed, agility, commercial adoption, and outcomes. Even with all this momentum at the strategic level, meaningful change will remain stubbornly elusive at scale.

The Adaptive Acquisition Framework, established in 2020, was the most recent attempt to move the needle towards progress and explicitly intended to deliver capability “at the speed of relevance.” But outside the software pathway, the Government Accountability Office found no consistent incorporation of the iterative development cycles that enable commercial firms to move quickly. Big defense programs usually reverted to slow, linear, one-step-at-a-time (or “waterfall”) development processes instead of getting capability to the field quickly and improving it overtime.

Even with new authorities, flexibilities, and policy guidance intended to fix those problems, the underlying behavior of the system has barely shifted.

When “Fast” Fails to Last

I have been fighting these same problems since 2018, working on Army defensive cyber programs where the operational need was clear, urgent, and undeniable. We could not field software fast enough to cyber protection brigades operating against real and evolving threats. The cost of delay was not abstract. It was a real operational risk measured in degraded readiness and increased exposure.

So, we built a rapid acquisition construct designed to bypass the bureaucratic bottlenecks that everyone agrees are the problem. We streamlined decision-making, collapsed timelines, and focused relentlessly on delivery.

And it worked, but only briefly.

We accelerated delivery of a mobile hardware and software kit by five years. We moved from concept to fielded production in nine months. We aligned requirements, contracting, and delivery around operational needs rather than process milestones.

But nothing about that success endured beyond the extraordinary, and unsustainable, effort of a handful of individuals. Once the individuals driving the effort rotated out or burned out, the system reverted. Not because the authorities disappeared. Not because the law changed. Because the incentive structure remained intact.

Safety was rewarded over creativity. Procedural caution was praised over adaptive judgment. Exceptional delivery did not reliably translate into promotion, authority, or protection. Informal reputational signaling (e.g., quiet warnings, exclusion from key forums, coded performance feedback) communicated the real lesson: deviation carries risk.

That experience is not an anomaly. It is the pattern. Every meaningful acquisition breakthrough of the past decade occurred because a group of individuals, often at relatively low levels, decided to act against the institutional inertia. The Defense Innovation Unit trailblazed the first use of a commercial solutions opening solicitation method, paving the way for codifying more merit-based approaches into regulation. AFWERX flipped the acquisition script on leveraging industry-driven solutions with its open topic model. Kessel Run’s use of the cATO was the first meaningful attempt at improving cyber security practices for software focused on speed to production environments. The Joint AI Center’s Tradewinds Marketplace pioneered a streamlined acquisition model for emerging technologies that has become a critical enterprise pathfinder and centerpiece for the department’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy. Each demonstrated that pockets of innovation continue to emerge and what is possible when incentives temporarily align.

But without structural reinforcement, each remains vulnerable to bureaucratic gravity.

Reform dependent on heroics is not reform. It is temporary at best.

The Real Adversary is Performative Reform

This article is not arguing against Congress, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, or oversight writ large. It is arguing against a specific and pervasive leadership narrative: the belief that acquisition transformation can occur without redistributing risk, power, and consequence.

Leaders publish memos, give flowery speeches, and issue calls to arms. However, the operational reality shows leaders demand speed while rewarding caution. They praise innovation while protecting the status quo. They call for urgency while insulating decision-makers from downside. Ultimately, the department has perfected rhetorical reform while preserving incentive asymmetry.

Fear Is Not Irrational Because It Is Engineered

Fear inside acquisition is not cowardice but instead is a rational adaptation. In many cases, caution began as prudence. It was learned, reinforced, and rewarded. But over time, that prudence hardened into doctrine. Fear became institutionalized — not as emotion, but as a governing logic for how decisions are made, how risk is framed, and how careers are protected.

The Defense Innovation Board’s study on aligning incentives found that the department rewards the status quo and fails to provide top cover for innovators. The board’s scaling nontraditional defense innovation report concluded that culture, capital, and organizational structure should change together to enable speed.

In other words, everyone understands the problems, and few believe they can fix them without career risk. In that environment, inaction becomes the rational choice. Delay becomes normalized and is quietly rebranded as diligence.

An article by Alexis Bonnell in the Texas National Security Review calls out “bureaucratic sabotage” and draws an alarming parallel to the engineering nature of this problem: organizations can be slowed not through open resistance, but through rigid adherence to process, excessive communication, and compulsive caution. What the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency) once described during World War II as techniques to paralyze enemy bureaucracies, such as insisting on perfect compliance, referring decisions to committees, and elevating minor procedural concerns, now often appears inside the U.S. government under the banner of professionalism. The more concerning part is that these tactics read less like espionage and tradecraft and more like a contemporary staff meeting at the Pentagon.

Until consequences for delay approximates consequence for failure, behavior will not change.

The Unspoken Cost of Being First

The most dangerous lie in acquisition transformation is the idea that change fails because people are unwilling to try. The reality is the system is full of people who try and are punished for it.

First movers in acquisition are uniquely exposed. They challenge inherited norms, reinterpret guidance, and attempt to apply authorities in ways that deliver results rather than preserve process. They choose speed over certainty and outcomes over optics. When those efforts threaten the equilibrium of the organization, the response is rarely overt or immediate. It is reputational.

I ultimately left the Chief Digital and AI Office because I was labeled as reckless — as lacking judgment or expertise. As “working around policy” rather than exercising professional discretion. These labels followed me and have followed other first movers into performance reviews, promotion boards, and future assignments. Middle management, fearful of association or of being implicated in perceived risk, quietly distances itself. I saw this happen in different ways to the Chief Operating Officer and the Acquisition Chief at the Joint AI Center (which was later disestablished and folded into the Chief Digital and AI Office) before it happened to me. In both instances, the individuals were informally labeled and pushed out of the system or chose to leave.

This is not accidental. It is how bureaucratic systems restore balance when disrupted. The Defense Innovation Board’s study on incentives makes this explicit: innovators are punished not because they fail, but because they threaten the incentive structures that reward predictability, compliance, and risk avoidance over outcomes.

Silence Is a Feature, Not a Bug

One of the most corrosive features of today’s acquisition environment is not open resistance to change but enforced silence.

Many practitioners are not exercising judgment or initiative. They are reacting to what their reviewers, approvers, and leaders tell them to do. Direction flows downward; compliance flows upward. In theory, this is disciplined execution. In practice, it leaves little room for the people closest to the problems to offer their perspective when they see a better way of doing business.

The cost of that silence is stagnation. Problems persist not because they are unsolvable, but because they are never meaningfully challenged.

Leaders crave control because control feels safe and defensible. Status updates substitute for progress. Approval chains reward consensus and dilute accountability. Planning is prized over execution. Studying the problem becomes a career-safe alternative to solving it.

Courage With Eyes Open

If leaders are serious about transformation, then the solution is not another strategy document. It is institutional surgery.

Senior leaders should ask the uncomfortable question of whether they have institutionalized the “bureaucratic sabotaging” behaviors and can begin immediately by rewiring incentives, accountability, and daily management practices to privilege speed, learning, and mission outcomes over process compliance and risk avoidance. This can take many forms and can be as simple as shifting resources away from excessive analysis and staffing drills toward rapid prototyping, iterative delivery, and early user feedback; rewriting performance evaluations and promotions to reward measurable delivery speed rather than document and task completion; shifting accountability upward when approved risks fail instead of pushing consequences downward; requiring written justification for schedule slips and treating delay as a decision rather than a default; and publicly protecting pathfinders, granting named portfolios authority to move fast without career penalty.

Besides structural incentives and formal accountability measures, leaders should also reshape the daily behaviors that quietly reinforce fear and inertia. They can normalize intelligent failure by formally documenting and discussing lessons learned, rewarding teams that take informed, mission-driven risks even when outcomes fall short, and prohibiting negative career consequences for good-faith experimentation. Even more radical, they could change expectations across the enterprise by eliminating performative reporting requirements that consume time but do not accelerate delivery. Replacing slide decks and status theater with short written decision briefs, real-time data available in dashboards and platforms, and in-person problem-solving sessions. If a meeting does not result in a decision, cancel it. If a report does not change an outcome, stop requiring it.

These are uncomfortable moves. They redistribute risk upward and require leaders to accept more of it themselves. They reduce plausible deniability and make speed and failure visible.

Practitioners, in turn, should recognize their own agency within constraint. While they do not control the system, they do control daily choices: whether to raise an alternative in a review, whether to frame a problem around outcomes instead of process, whether to use existing authorities creatively rather than defaulting to precedent. Agency does not require recklessness, but it does require the willingness to act without guarantees.

No reform cavalry is coming. Leadership protection often follows action, not the other way around. Every breakthrough of the past decade began with individuals acting before the system made it safe.

No one is a mere observer of this system. Everyone is its designers and its operators.

If anyone operating at any level wants different outcomes, they ought to change what the system rewards. Culture is not something that lives in policy documents; it is created through repeated human decisions. If everyone waits for permission, protection, or perfect conditions, nothing changes.

Until then, the silent staff meeting where leaders ask for ideas and no one speaks will remain the most honest measure of the acquisition culture.

Fear will continue to govern unless individuals decide otherwise. The next era of acquisition professionals will demand a mindset marked by uncommon courage — one that pairs seasoned judgement with a warrior’s resolve; that understands transformation is a shared effort. And if the Department does not move together, then it will not move at all.

Bonnie Evangelista is a seasoned acquisition leader with 17 years of experience modernizing federal acquisition and accelerating the delivery of innovative capabilities for civilian and defense agencies. She is currently a Senior Advisor for Acquisition Policy at the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy and previously supported the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul initiative at the General Services Administration as well as held acquisition leadership roles with the Chief Digital and AI Office, the Joint AI Center, Army’s Defensive Cyber Operations, and the Transportation Security Administration. Bonnie is widely recognized for her expertise in rapid and creative acquisition pathways and her leadership in shaping forward-leaning procurement policy and practice.

This article would not have been possible without the contributions, insight, and intellectual rigor of Andrew Bosworth. His perspective on risk, incentives, and industrial base dynamics sharpened both the structural framing and the urgency of this argument.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Spc. Kelsey Kollar via DVIDS.

warontherocks.com · Madeline Field · February 17, 2026

14. China Now Finds Itself in al-Qaeda’s Crosshairs

​Summary:

Clarke and Webber argue China is being elevated in al-Qaeda messaging, highlighted by a recent statement from AQAP emir Saad bin Atef al Awlaqi that threatens China over abuses against Uyghur Muslims and frames Beijing as a “pagan, infidel” enemy. They note jihadist groups often issue expansive threats that exceed capabilities, and attacks inside China remain rare due to intensive internal security and controlled media. Still, the shift matters because AQAP is using China to energize recruitment, signal relevance, and insert itself into anti great-power narratives, alongside other actors that already target Chinese interests abroad. The authors warn China’s expanding global footprint could increase exposure of Chinese personnel, infrastructure, and shipping.

Comment: Not a headline I expected to read. AQAP is conducting target set expansion as narrative strategy. It is competing for attention and recruits by grafting China onto a familiar grievance frame tied to Uyghur repression. The most immediate risk signal is not mainland China, but overseas Chinese interests. “Land and sea” language hints at flexible target categories that exploit geography, ports, and commercial routes. In a cognitive warfare lens, this is a legitimacy bid. By claiming to defend an abandoned Muslim cause, AQAP seeks moral authority that can mobilize proxies, sympathizers, and copycat violence even without direct reach.

China Now Finds Itself in al-Qaeda’s Crosshairs

warontherocks.com · February 18, 2026

Colin Clarke and Lucas Webber

February 18, 2026

https://warontherocks.com/2026/02/china-now-finds-itself-in-al-qaedas-crosshairs/

Could China replace the United States atop the target list of transnational jihadist groups like al-Qaeda? A recent statement released by Sheikh Saad bin Atef al Awlaqi, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, directly threatened China, labeling its government as a “pagan, infidel” enemy whose actions against Uyghur Muslims justify future attacks. The statement marks a clear escalation in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s anti-China rhetoric. But will it lead to a shift in operational goals?

Jihadist groups have long exaggerated their capabilities, using their media and propaganda platforms to issue wide-ranging threats against an expansive list of adversaries, both the “near enemy” and the “far enemy.” In practice, jihadist attacks against Chinese targets have mostly been sporadic and opportunistic. Unlike Western nations, Chinese internal security services maintain draconian surveillance over the population, making terrorist attacks on Chinese territory extremely rare. Even when they do occur, the media reporting is limited and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.

Yet even if al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s operational capabilities remain unchanged, and thus limited in reach, the message expansion is notable. Historically, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s propaganda has mostly been targeted at local rivals, including the Yemeni government and other regional enemies. This shift to focus on China is a way for the jihadist chapter to energize new recruits while signaling its relevance and inserting itself into the anti-great-power narrative, a space inhabited by a range of other non-state actors, including groups like the Baluchistan Liberation Army in Pakistan and the Islamic State Khorasan Province in Afghanistan, both of which have repeatedly targeted Chinese interests in South Asia.

BECOME A MEMBER

What Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Is Saying

While Jews and Americans are still frequently referenced as the “Crusader-Zionist Alliance” and a “dual evil” in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s propaganda, China is no longer treated merely as a peripheral actor. On the contrary, Beijing is now singled out as a regime whose “every move” is being monitored and that will be “held accountable” for abuses in Xinjiang, a province in western China home to the country’s Uyghur minority. This represents the acceleration of a broader trend in which al-Qaeda branches increasingly frame China’s domestic repression and global footprint, especially in Muslim-majority regions, as legitimate grounds for perpetrating jihadist violence.

Awlaqi’s latest statement begins by praising “heroic operations” against Jews and Americans, but then pivots to China and embeds Beijing directly into al-Qaeda’s justificatory narrative. Awlaqi accuses China of persecuting “our Uyghur Muslim brothers,” portraying China not simply as a distant non-Muslim power but as an active oppressor of Muslims whose behavior demands an eventual response. The promise that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will “go beyond targeting interests on land and sea” if China does not change its “behavior and practices” is a deliberately expansive formulation that could encompass diplomatic facilities, commercial shipping, overseas workers, or critical infrastructure linked to Chinese projects abroad. The escalation in rhetoric evokes a similar trajectory in al-Qaeda’s anti-American messaging, with the group’s longtime leader, Osama bin Laden, narrowing his focus to the United States in communiques throughout the late 1990s, in the period that preceded the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

By framing potential attacks as a form of accountability for China’s repressive actions against Uyghurs, the statement recasts China from a secondary background actor into a central antagonist in a narrative of the global persecution of Muslims, a similar narrative to what bin Laden frequently revisited in his speeches. The closing assertion that “Tomorrow is near for those who wait. So wait, for we too are waiting” conveys that retaliation against China is not hypothetical but imminent, even if the exact timing and location remain unspecified. This preserves operational ambiguity while reinforcing the idea that Chinese interests now coalesce with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s declared target set. And while jihadist statements can at times be hyperbolic, these groups operate on extended time horizons, playing the long game and positioning themselves to exact revenge on those countries and governments it excoriates in its messaging.

The way China is introduced and described is different in tone from most previous jihadist propaganda. The shift clearly demonstrates that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is deliberately elevating Beijing within al-Qaeda’s enemy hierarchy. Earlier jihadist materials mentioned China only obliquely when cataloguing states that oppress Muslims, especially in “East Turkestan,” but without a detailed focus or clear operational intent. In this latest statement, by contrast, China receives its own dedicated section, is labeled “pagan” and “infidel,” and is tied explicitly to a concrete grievance set: the treatment of Uyghur Muslims. This signals that Beijing is no longer just part of an abstract category of non-Muslim powers but a clearly defined adversary whose specific policies in Xinjiang are sufficient to justify violence. The insistence that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is monitoring “every move” China makes against Uyghurs also implies that further repression or high-profile incidents in Xinjiang could be used as a tripwire for future operations.

The statement’s China-specific language is carefully defensive in tone, designed to present any attack on Chinese interests as the result of Beijing’s own actions. Awlaqi does not speak of attacking China for ideological reasons alone. Instead, he anchors the threat in a promise to hold China “accountable” for its “behavior and practices” toward Uyghurs, which have included extreme surveillance, religious persecution, and even sending Uyghurs to indoctrination camps in Xinjiang province. This suggests that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s leaders seek to frame terrorist violence as revenge, a response to injustice rather than as unprovoked aggression. This mirrors broader al-Qaeda messaging that positions China as a persecutor of Muslims at home and a supporter of hostile regimes abroad, especially in regions where Beijing has deepened its political and economic footprint. The reference to targeting Chinese “interests on land and sea” is particularly significant for a Yemen-based group whose theater borders vital maritime routes, hinting that Chinese commercial shipping or port-linked activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden could be portrayed as legitimate targets if al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula chooses to act.

The China-specific content is aimed not only at Beijing but also at a wider jihadist and sympathizer audience. By foregrounding Uyghur suffering and vowing to hold the Chinese regime accountable, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula positions itself as a champion of Muslims whom many perceive as abandoned by major states and international institutions. This allows al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to align with, and compete against, other jihadist actors who have made Xinjiang central to their propaganda, and to encourage supporters in regions where China’s presence is more visible, such as Pakistan, East Africa, or the Sahel, to view attacks on Chinese projects and personnel as consistent with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s call.

The threat to Chinese interests “on land and sea” thus serves as a strategic signal that Chinese nationals and infrastructure worldwide are increasingly seen, within al-Qaeda’s ideological framework, as legitimate and symbolically powerful targets. From a counter-terrorism perspective, the strategic conclusion to draw is that, as groups like al-Qaeda attempt to strengthen their organizational and operational capabilities, Chinese personnel and property abroad could become more attractive targets for jihadist groups. Accordingly, China will need to augment its global counter-terrorism capabilities and perhaps adopt a more robust force posture. This can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. A more visible and muscular Chinese security presence, especially in the Middle East, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, could provoke more attacks. The United States has grappled with this dynamic for decades, suffering terrorist attacks against American personnel and interests in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and many other countries.

The Evolution of Al-Qaeda’s Anti-China Rhetoric

Over more than three decades, al-Qaeda’s attitude toward China has shifted from relative indifference and occasional tactical accommodation to increasingly hostile rhetoric, explicit threats, and support for attacks on Chinese nationals and interests. In the 1990s, the organization focused primarily on the United States, its Western allies, and local “apostate” regimes, generally treating China as a secondary actor whose foreign policy appeared less directly interventionist in Muslim lands. Bin Laden even hinted at a potential alignment with Beijing against Washington, warning China about U.S. and Israeli intentions while publicly claiming to know little about Uyghur grievances in Xinjiang.

Within the broader jihadist milieu, however, some figures highlighted Chinese repression earlier than al-Qaeda’s core leadership. Abu Musab al Suri’s 1999 work on Central Asia portrayed Xinjiang or “East Turkestan” as occupied Muslim territory and argued that the region represented a strategic weak point for Islam’s enemies, while Jalaluddin Haqqani reportedly hosted Uyghur fighters in Afghan camps and championed their cause. These remained minority positions. During the post–Cold War “unipolar moment,” al-Qaeda’s leadership largely prioritized confrontation with the United States and its partners rather than with the rising but still less prominent China.

By the mid-2000s, as China’s global profile grew, al-Qaeda’s rhetoric began to harden. In 2006, bin Laden condemned the United Nations as a “hegemonic organization of universal infidelity,” describing the U.N. Security Council as dominated by “Crusader International and pagan Buddhism” and assigning China the role of representing “Buddhists and pagans of the world.” Ayman al Zawahiri started referencing “East Turkestan” in his messages, while jihadist intellectual Akram Hijazi warned that China could supplant the United States as the new “head of the snake,” a theme later echoed in al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent publications. The 2009 Urumqi riots and ensuing crackdowns marked a decisive inflection point: Abu Yahya al Libi urged Uyghurs to wage war on Beijing, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb threatened Chinese workers in Algeria, and extremist forums circulated calls to kill Han Chinese in retaliation for the repression. At the same time, the Turkestan Islamic Party emerged as a prominent Uyghur jihadist group closely linked to al-Qaeda, using al-Fajr Media Centre and its own outlets to spotlight Xinjiang and frame “East Turkestan” as a core jihadist front.

In the early 2010s, media such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent’s Resurgence and Hitteen, and the Pakistani Taliban’s Azan regularly highlighted Uyghur suffering, helping internationalize the East Turkestan cause. The Turkestan Islamic Party’s expansion into Syria and continued presence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region reinforced these narratives, and in 2016, its emir, Abdul Haq al Turkistani, publicly reaffirmed allegiance to al-Qaeda. Zawahiri praised East Turkestan militants as part of a pantheon of jihadist heroes and labeled China’s government “atheist occupiers” and “Chinese invaders,” explicitly linking repression in Xinjiang to a broader struggle against an international anti-Islam order. South Asian jihadist media, especially Urdu language outlets like Nawai Afghan Jihad (later Nawai Ghazwa e Hind) and Hitteen, deepened these themes with historical accounts of Chinese control over Xinjiang, descriptions of internment and surveillance, and emotive testimonies about Uyghur women and families, while also accusing Pakistani elites of trading support for Beijing’s Xinjiang and Syrian policies for economic benefits through projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East Africa affiliate, has become one of the most aggressive branches in pairing anti-China messaging with violence. Its Shahada News Agency has condemned the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa as exploitative, warned of alleged Chinese plans for military bases in Somalia, and denounced Chinese military aid to Somali forces, while regularly citing abuses against Uyghurs to link local grievances in Somalia and Kenya to events in Xinjiang. Operationally, al-Shabaab claimed the 2015 bombing of Mogadishu’s Jazeera Palace Hotel and said it intended to hit Chinese embassy staff, and it has raided China Communications Construction Company worksites and convoys in Kenya, including along the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transit Corridor. In June 2025, Shahada warned against “covert” Chinese influence in Somalia, accusing Beijing of “debt trap diplomacy,” economic domination, and support for Somali security forces, and again invoked Uyghur repression to justify treating Chinese interests as legitimate targets.

The COVID-19 pandemic offered jihadists a new frame to deepen anti-China narratives. As the virus spread from Wuhan, several outlets depicted the outbreak as divine retribution for Beijing’s persecution of Muslims, particularly in Xinjiang and Myanmar. In February 2020, the Turkestan Islamic Party’s Islam Awazi released a video titled “The Perspective of the Mujahideen Regarding the Corona Outbreak in China,” portraying the virus as God’s “vengeance” for Chinese actions in Xinjiang. Tehrir-e-Taliban’s Maktaba e Umar newsletter carried editorials by Mufti Usman Mansoor and Sheikh Gul Muhammad Bajauri, likening COVID-19 to the plagues of Pharaoh, arguing that China had “enslaved” Uyghurs and Rohingya and was now being punished, and criticizing Pakistani clerics who aligned with Beijing on political questions. As the pandemic normalized, al-Qaeda and its allies folded COVID-19 into a broader narrative of divine retribution but refocused on concrete Chinese policies rather than the virus itself.

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 created a strategic dilemma for al-Qaeda: China’s repression in Xinjiang and expanding regional presence kept it a central rhetorical target, yet the Taliban quickly sought Chinese recognition and investment, especially in infrastructure and mining. Al-Qaeda’s leadership responded by intensifying criticism of Chinese policy while carefully avoiding overt mention of Taliban-Chinese relations. In July 2021, an as Sahab video denounced “corporate robber barons in Communist China,” and a 9/11 anniversary production with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Khalid Batarfi expressed solidarity with “Turkestan” and condemned Xinjiang repression without referencing Kabul’s outreach to Beijing. Batarfi repeated these themes in a November 2021 al-Malahem interview, and Zawahiri briefly mentioned Turkestan in a March 2022 series, again sidestepping Taliban-Chinese ties.

While the aforementioned examples may seem uncoordinated or simply reactive to current events, another vantage point shows an escalation in both frequency and the visceral nature of these threats. These are indications that if certain jihadist groups’ latent operational capabilities improve, this could very well translate into a higher operational tempo of plots and attacks directed at China and Chinese interests.

China as Jihadist Enemy Number One?

Within this evolving environment, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has taken an increasingly prominent role. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s chief propagandist, the late Anwar al Awlaki, had already listed China among states “occupying Muslim lands,” grouping it with the United States and Russia. Under Batarfi, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issued statements of solidarity with “Turkestan” and framed Xinjiang as part of a global war on Islam. The latest statement by current emir Awlaqi escalates further, praising “heroic operations” against Jews and Americans and then warning that the “pagan, infidel Chinese regime” is being monitored for every move against “our Uyghur Muslim brothers,” promising that if Beijing does not change course al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will “hold it accountable” and “go beyond targeting interests on land and sea” because “tomorrow is near for those who wait.” This explicit elevation of China to enemy status and threat to strike Chinese interests aligns with the broader al-Qaeda shift from episodic references to a sustained, operationally tinged hostility.

Elsewhere, al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch, Jamaa Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin, has attacked industrial sites and kidnapped foreign workers, including Chinese staff, though it has not yet built a distinct anti-China propaganda line, treating Chinese nationals as part of a wider pool of foreign targets. Islamic State branches, particularly Islamic State Khorasan Province, have likewise capitalized on abuses in Xinjiang and Beijing’s ties to the Taliban, explicitly calling for attacks on Chinese nationals. In mid-January, the Islamic State Khorasan Province claimed a bombing attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul that killed seven and wounded more than a dozen. Meanwhile, non-jihadist groups such as Baloch separatists and Philippine Maoist guerrillas have adopted anti-China themes around China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects and maritime disputes. This convergence of grievances suggests that as China’s power and presence expand, attacks on Chinese interests are likely to increase in frequency and geographic scope.

Awlaqi’s threats against China represent something of a continued evolution of how al-Qaeda views its enemies, particularly within the group’s broader global network. For years, most anti-China propaganda emanated from al-Qaeda core and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Over time, al-Shabaab began to direct its ire toward Beijing as well. But now, with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula focusing more on China, it means that one of the organization’s most capable branches now has the Chinese Communist Party in its crosshairs. A recent report by the U.N. Monitoring Team covering al-Qaeda and the Islamic State noted increasing cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Houthis, as well as between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis. While it may be premature to speculate on operational coordination against targets, the changing dynamics of these relationships warrant note. As a proxy of Iran, it seems unlikely that the Houthis would engage in anti-Chinese activity, but if the situation continues to escalate, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula could seek to attack Chinese shipping interests near the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, or the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Chinese embassies, hotels that cater to Chinese businessmen and government officials, and other Chinese infrastructure abroad could also be targeted.

Beijing’s elevation to the pantheon of al-Qaeda’s enemies may outpace the capabilities of jihadist groups to mount operations against Chinese interests around the globe. But as history has shown, jihadist groups are patient. As it continues to expand its footprint abroad, whether through its Belt and Road Initiative or through political, diplomatic, and military engagements throughout the Global South, China’s status as a great power will inevitably make it a focus of transnational terrorist and insurgent narratives and propaganda. China’s treatment of its Uyghur Muslim population evokes tangible grievances among the umma, or worldwide community of Muslims, a catch-all term that groups like al-Qaeda see themselves as defending.

Over time, as groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula rebound and rebuild operational capacity, the result could be an increase in terrorist attacks against Chinese targets in the Middle East, especially in areas where jihadist groups remain active.

BECOME A MEMBER

Lucas Webber is a researcher focused on global security issues and violent non-state actors. He is co-founder/editor at militantwire.com, senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, and research fellow at the Soufan Center.

Colin P. Clarke is the executive director of the Soufan Center, where he studies terrorism, insurgency, and armed conflict.

Image: Albertaont via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · February 18, 2026

15. Putin, Xi and Trump Are Launching a Freedom Counterrevolution

​Summary:

Hal Brands argues the post Cold War order is being undone by a “freedom counterrevolution” led by Putin, Xi, and POTUS. He says all three view 1989 and its aftermath as a catastrophe, even though it looked like a Western miracle. Putin seeks to tear down the post Cold War settlement by weaponizing globalization, using energy and “dirty money,” running disinformation and cyberattacks, and waging war on Ukraine. Xi fears 1989 style ideological contagion, tightens party discipline, and warns cadres against “universal values.” POTUS rejects globalization and allied free riding, using tariffs, pressure on the EU, and territorial talk, betting chaos restores US power.

Comment: Dr. Brands treats narrative reversal as strategy: each leader is trying to delegitimize the moral language of the post Cold War era and replace it with sovereignty, spheres, and coercion. Through a cognitive warfare lens, the fight is over memory and meaning, not just borders. If 1989 becomes “catastrophe,” constraint on force and repression weakens. Dr. Brands implies a paradox: these counterrevolutionaries can fracture the old order together, but their end states collide, so today’s alignment can become tomorrow’s conflict.

If disorder can “throw doors open” for rivals, where is the line between useful disruption and self inflicted strategic decline?

Putin, Xi and Trump Are Launching a Freedom Counterrevolution

February 12, 2026 at 12:00 AM EST

By Hal Brands

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-02-12/putin-xi-and-trump-are-launching-a-freedom-counterrevolution?srnd=undefined&sref=hhjZtX76

Peace and dialogue have fallen out of style: Putin at Munich in 2007.Photographer: Oliver Lang/DDP/AFP/Getty Images

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

• The annual Munich Security Conference was once a prominent gathering for Western leaders, but this year the three most important leaders, US President Donald Trump, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, are absent.
• Putin, Xi, and Trump view the geopolitical revolution that followed the Cold War as a catastrophe and are now reshaping the world, with Putin trying to tear down the post-Cold War world, Xi seeking to impose China's influence, and Trump aiming to rebuild US power.
• The counterrevolutionaries, led by Putin, Xi, and Trump, have won for the moment, and their actions may throw doors open for further conflict and competition, as they struggle against one another over what comes next.

There was a time when Munich really mattered. For a generation after the Cold War, the annual Munich Security Conference was a mecca for leaders of a Europe whole and free, a confab for the Western coalition that bestrode the globe. Just five years ago, US President Joe Biden told the attendees that democracy must triumph and humanity must never return the “rigid blocs of the Cold War.”

Yet it is fitting that the three most important leaders of our moment — US President Donald Trump, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Russian strongman Vladimir Putin — are absent from Munich this week. All three view the geopolitical revolution that followed the Cold War as a catastrophe — and these counterrevolutionaries are now reshaping the world.

For most Western observers, the events of 1989 were a miracle. The fall of the Berlin Wall brought the peaceful unification of a divided Germany and a divided continent. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the Soviet Union, soon followed. Markets and democracy were sweeping the globe. A single, integrated order under Western leadership seemed achievable.

Yet for Putin, Xi and Trump, this moment of miracles was a dark time. Putin memorably said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” because it broke a great empire and unbalanced the world. What resulted, he told a Munich audience in 2007, was a unipolar America that rampaged across the globe, rolling back rival spheres of influence and tearing down unfriendly regimes.

“No one feels safe” in a world with “one master, one sovereign,” he argued — certainly not a post-Soviet Russia bent on rebuilding its illiberal empire. Putin has spent a quarter-century trying to tear down the post-Cold War world.

He weaponized globalization, whether by using Russian energy and dirty money to weaken Europe, or by using digital connectivity for disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. He also launched a bloody bid to reverse the growth of a US-led Europe. His assaults on Ukraine, in 2014 and especially 2022, brought large-scale conflict back to a region whose peace and unity had been crowning achievements of a more hopeful age.

Putin’s closest ally, Xi, is also a 1989 revisionist. How could he not be, given that the unrest that eventually shattered communist regimes in Eastern Europe that year also spread to his China, causing a near-death experience for its own Communist Party at Tiananmen Square?

The Soviet Union collapsed, he later said, because “nobody was man enough to stand up and resist” internal divisions and ideological weakness — a lesson he invokes to insist on iron discipline within the Chinese Communist Party. In 2013, his government ordered all cadres to be on guard against dangerous influences — “human rights,” “universal values,” “constitutional democracy” — that an ideologically dominant West sought to impose.

The irony is that China was arguably the greatest winner of the post-Cold War era, given that globalization ignited its economic ascent. Yet China, like Russia, has been complicit in that order’s demise.

The “China shock” — the flood of cheap exports in the early 2000s — shattered the political consensus supporting globalization in the US. China’s mammoth manufacturing capacity and predatory trade practices now threaten to deindustrialize entire regions. Its rare-earth export controls demonstrate the dangers of interdependence by threatening to close factories around the world. Beijing’s military buildup imperils American power projection and East Asia’s decades-long peace.

Xi and his acolytes welcome the disruption: They tout an epic geopolitical transition as China overtakes America and imprints its own influence on the globe. Yet if Beijing and Washington are rivals, the mightiest of the post-Cold War counterrevolutionaries is Donald Trump.

Trump's revisionism, too, is ironic, since the events of 1989 left his country supreme. Yet in Trump's telling, those events — and the euphoria they fostered — drove the US into decline.

Globalization brought deindustrialization, open borders and the rise of a hostile China. Hubris and overreach in the Middle East spent down US power. Free-riding allies exploited a superpower, militarily and economically. America’s recent history, Trump’s latest National Security Strategy argues, is a catalog of errors. Breaking the post-Cold War order is the key to rebuilding US power.

“Davos Man” has been dethroned by “Tariff Man,” as Trump's protectionism transforms trade relationships. Trump makes US allies pay into the American economy through asymmetric tariffs and investments.

His administration has taken aim at the European Union — that symbol of post-Cold War integration — with tariffs, political meddling and taunts about “civilizational erasure.” Threats to take Greenland and Canada place Trump alongside leaders — like Xi and Putin — who dream of violently destroying the status quo. Sovereignty and unilateral advantage are in; positive-sum global visions are out.

Trump argues that these measures will bring national rejuvenation. He’s surely right that some post-Cold War habits — the tendency to treat allies as strategic protectorates, the emphasis on globalization over economic security — are out of date.

Yet it’s also possible that the chaos Trump is causing, not least within the Western community that convenes at Munich, will throw doors open for Xi and Putin, who hated the post-Cold War era because they hated American hegemony. The counterrevolutionaries have won, for the moment. They may struggle violently against one another over what comes next.

Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the author of The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World, and a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners.

More From Bloomberg Opinion:

• Xi’s Military Purge Might Be Dangerous for the US: James Stavridis
• China’s Internet Is a Map of Xi’s Insecurities: Catherine Thorbecke
• Four Fatal Problems in the New US Approach to China: Hal Brands

This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

​16. China’s Digital Yuan and the Fight for Southeast Asia’s Financial Infrastructure

​Summary:

Hugh Harsono argues Beijing is expanding influence in Southeast Asia by pushing the digital yuan as financial infrastructure in the gray zone. He frames digital payment rails, data flows, and blockchains as national “operating systems,” warning that adopting China’s CBDC can outsource monetary “master keys” and create a potential “kill switch” via monitoring and network control. He contrasts China’s state ledger with Japan and South Korea’s regulated, bank issued stablecoin approach, which he says diffuses risk and preserves interoperability without granting one state centralized control. He notes China’s e-CNY pilots since 2020, cross-border expansion with Laos, an interest-bearing move announced Dec. 29, 2025, and Southeast Asia as the testing ground where trade friction, tourism, and platform adoption shape leverage.

Comment: Competition among China, Japan, and South Korea suggests Southeast Asia’s payments layer is becoming strategic terrain, where plural ecosystems can deny Beijing unilateral leverage.

China’s Digital Yuan and the Fight for Southeast Asia’s Financial Infrastructure

irregularwarfare.org · Hugh Harsono · February 17, 2026

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-digital-yuan-southeast-asia-financial-infrastructure/

While China’s Belt and Road Initiative often emerges in headlines, a far less visible but potentially more critical campaign is underway in the digital domain. Across Southeast Asia, Beijing is expanding its financial infrastructure reach through the digital yuan, operating firmly in the gray zone by leveraging emerging technology to export digital authoritarianism.

As a result, digital payment systems, financial data flows, and blockchain technology have become the new “operating systems” of national sovereignty. In this sense, adopting China’s digital yuan is akin to a nation outsourcing its economic master keys. While the “user,” which in this case represents Southeast Asian-based central banks or monetary authorities, gains a sleek and efficient interface for trade, China’s “system administrator” status retains the ability to monitor traffic and potentially shut down the network. In effect, the digital yuan has the potential to displace local currencies. If successful, this provides Beijing additional leverage at the expense of other nations’ monetary sovereignty.

For those focused on great power competition, this dynamic is one to watch: if China’s state-controlled model prevails, it establishes a new global standard where surveillance and economic coercion are built-in features of digital financial infrastructure. Conversely, Japan and South Korea advancing their own alternative versions of digital money diffuses risk by relying on a diverse ecosystem of private issuers, rather than a singular state-controlled ledger. If this model succeeds, it denies any single government a “kill switch” over another’s economy, ensuring that Southeast Asia’s digital financial infrastructure remains interoperable, yet competitive and free from geopolitical manipulation.

Digital Money in the Context of Irregular Competition

While stablecoins and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are both forms of digital money emphasizing price stability and liquidity, CBDCs are issued and regulated by a country’s central bank. China’s digital yuan (also called the electronic Chinese yuan, or e-CNY), a CBDC, exemplifies this model, enabling seamless integration of payment systems within existing surveillance and policy tools. Using this model, China has positioned itself over the past two decades as the dominant liquidity provider across Southeast Asia, with initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and most recently, the cross-border expansion of China’s digital yuan with the Bank of Laos.

In contrast, stablecoin issuers are most often private, quasi-private, and/or decentralized organizations, with stablecoins operating within state-provided regulatory frameworks. Japan and South Korea’s embrace of stablecoins reflects an approach that prioritizes interoperability and private sector innovation while retaining regulatory oversight. Rather than rolling out a CBDC over time, both governments have enabled stablecoin issuance under strict regulatory frameworks, with both countries showing a preference for bank-issued stablecoins.

The difference between a centralized state-controlled infrastructure (i.e. CBDCs) and private sector innovation is significant from an irregular warfare perspective. State-controlled digital currencies can function as instruments of influence, whether through the implementation of state policy, the manipulation of interest rates, or the facilitation of state-sponsored surveillance.

In contrast, stablecoins are more easily embedded into existing financial systems. In contested environments, this difference is critical, as a centralized CBDC could enable an issuer to freeze the assets of dissidents at any time through a “kill switch.” Conversely, decentralized stablecoins are less influenced by direct state restrictions, serving as a financially resilient lifeline for a nation’s population.

Digital Yuan as Strategic Infrastructure

China’s digital yuan is among the most robust CBDC projects globally. First piloted in early 2020, it has evolved into a significant tool for consumers, enterprises, and the Chinese government alike. The digital yuan gained visibility at the 2022 Winter Olympics and has continued to expand through pilot programs with other jurisdictions, including Hong Kong and Thailand in 2024. However, usage of the digital yuan has predominantly been relegated to government entities and institutions, with China’s massive consumer base primarily accessing digital payments solely via Alipay and WeChat Pay.

Seeking to incentivize wider adoption, on December 29, 2025, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) announced that it would begin paying interest on the electronic Chinese yuan (e-CNY), making it the world’s first interest-bearing CBDC. Allowing the e-CNY to accrue interest addresses a key barrier to retail uptake. Expanded access through commercial banks, combined with the prospect of returns, is expected to further incentivize consumer use.

In the same December 2025 announcement introducing interest on the e-CNY, the PBOC also unveiled a new management and operational framework for the digital currency, aimed at further promoting its international use. This announcement followed the September 2025 launch of a Shanghai-based international operations center for the e-CNY, focused on growing a cross-border digital payment platform, blockchain service platform, and a digital asset platform. While innovative, these new use cases cannot be separated from China’s broader regulatory approach to digital finance.

One such regulatory approach is the Chinese government’s continued prohibition of cryptocurrency-related activities, which further highlights the digital yuan’s role as the only state-sanctioned, blockchain-based digital payments alternative. By remaining steadfast in its cryptocurrency ban, Beijing has effectively limited competition that could undermine its monetary sovereignty or capital controls. In this context, the digital yuan serves as a policy tool to solidify state control over China’s financial system while expanding China’s influence in the evolving global digital payments landscape.

Although China’s e-CNY stands out in terms of scale and state sponsorship, adopting it for usage by Southeast Asian countries would undoubtedly increase dependency on Chinese-controlled infrastructure, data standards, and regulatory assumptions. In irregular warfare terms, this creates leverage, with China potentially holding influence over everyday economic activities both domestically and abroad.

Digital Currency Experimentation in Southeast Asia

As China, Japan, and South Korea advance competing models of digital money, Southeast Asia has become the testing ground in which their strategic visions collide. The region is a hotbed for digital currency experimentation, particularly given its propensity for digital payments and mobile-first approach to Internet access. Under these conditions, digital payments serve as a critical part of digital infrastructure sovereignty, with control over retail and wholesale trade flows being a significant economic lifeline for states.

Several experiments stand out. For instance, in early 2023, the Bank of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic tested its digital lap kip (DLak) with help from Japan-based Soramitsu, which previously helped launch Cambodia’s Project Bakong in late 2020. Additionally, Soramitsu’s Mutsumi project, launched in mid-2023, leverages Bakong and stablecoins to support Japanese Small and Medium-sized Enterprises that need digital payments for e-commerce to other countries within Southeast Asia.

However, while the Bakong and DLak have seen increased usage, with Bakong volumes comprising a significant portion of Cambodia’s overall gross domestic product (GDP), the digital yuan stands out among other CBDCs in the region due to its volume. Additionally, China’s strength as the leading trading partner for most, if not all, countries in Southeast Asia makes yuan-denominated trade a preferred choice for reducing payment friction, a particularly important note for both trade and tourism.

Stablecoins as Shadow Infrastructure in Contested Environments

Stablecoins currently function as a de facto financial infrastructure across parts of Southeast Asia, particularly in areas with significant economic instability. For example, Myanmar’s exiled National Unity Government adopted popular stablecoin Tether (USDT) as its official currency in 2021. Moreover, stablecoin usage is on the rise in high-growth economies like the Philippines and Thailand. And efforts to legitimize stablecoin usage in Japan and South Korea are adding legitimacy to its use in Southeast Asia, especially when compared to the risks associated with the digital yuan.

From an irregular warfare perspective, this is significant because stablecoins rapidly fill governance vacuums. When state financial institutions lose legitimacy, stablecoins can maintain functionality, creating an alternative financial layer that exists outside direct state control yet can be used at the everyday level. In such environments, power stems from platforms that convert other types of money into digital assets, along with digital wallets and compliance mechanisms, in contrast to control over physical infrastructure.

Both Japan and South Korea are enabling bank-issued stablecoins that can easily integrate into existing regional payment systems. In contrast, the digital yuan centralizes monetary authority and data visibility. As a result, stablecoins, particularly those issued by Japan and South Korea, are increasingly attractive to countries seeking to build their own digital infrastructure sovereignty, whether this be sovereignty from authoritarian governments or other external powers.

Conclusion

China’s digital yuan represents one of the world’s most advanced and strategically deployed CBDC projects globally. With the introduction of its first-ever cross-border pilot like the China-Laos settlement system, reinforced by the addition of interest-bearing e-CNY accounts, the PBOC has effectively released a “system update” designed to lock Southeast Asia into Beijing’s proprietary “operating system.”

If the digital yuan were to achieve wide-scale adoption beyond China’s borders, participating nations could find their monetary policy dictated by Beijing through a reliance on foreign digital financial infrastructure. In contrast, despite sovereign CBDC projects by Southeast Asian nations being more limited in scope and influence, stablecoins preserve a degree of financial neutrality, allowing national economies to remain interoperable with the free market without relinquishing digital infrastructure sovereignty.

As digital currencies become increasingly embedded in trade, tourism, and everyday commerce, competition over financial levers will shape the structure of irregular warfare campaigns. Understanding digital money as infrastructure, and ensuring digital infrastructure sovereignty for countries, is essential for policymakers and practitioners alike to navigate the realm of competition in Southeast Asia and beyond.

Hugh Harsono’s research interests focus on emerging technologies’ impact on international security, technology policy, and strategic competition. Hugh received his graduate and undergraduate degrees from the University of California, Berkeley.

Main Image generated by ChatGPT using DALL·E, OpenAI (January 2026).

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

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irregularwarfare.org · Hugh Harsono · February 17, 2026

17. Asia After America: How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

​Summary:

Zack Cooper argues the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia-Indo-Pacific failed because Washington kept expansive ends while starving the means, creating a “Lippmann gap” that erodes credibility and deterrence. The original rebalance had three pillars: security, prosperity, governance. Only security received sustained effort. Trade and development agendas collapsed after the TPP failure, weak IPEF follow-on, and renewed protectionism, while democracy and anticorruption messaging became inconsistent and politically costly. The result is a quiet retrenchment toward defending the first island chain, especially Taiwan, while Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands drift toward Beijing.

Excerpts:

As Washington retrenches, Beijing is likely to test the remaining American positions, raising questions about what Washington is and isn’t willing to defend. Chinese forces are already pushing closer to Taiwan and operating more frequently and in larger numbers around Japan, around the Philippines, and farther into the Western Pacific. To date, the United States has been most clear about what it will do to protect its closest allies but more ambiguous when it comes to other partners’ defense. Friends that Washington asks to do more are likely to press for clearer U.S. commitments in return. Such clarity might deter dangerous tests of those commitments, but it also entails risk. Removing ambiguity about what the United States considers to be within its defense perimeter—especially when it comes to contested outlying islands, which are harder to defend—would make it necessary to react more forcefully to any violation to maintain deterrence. In cases in which the United States is genuinely willing to escalate, clarity is often the best policy, but that means that vaguer commitments will likely be tested.

Finally, the United States will need to decide whether to retrench abruptly or incrementally. A slow withdrawal might prevent panic but leave all allies and partners fearful that they could be next on the chopping block; a rapid adjustment could avoid a slow-moving landslide but cause immediate instability if allies and partners do not have time to prepare. Either way, Washington will need to reset allies’ expectations about future American policies, making some disruption unavoidable. But a one-time change in the U.S. defensive position might be preferable to repeated reminders that the United States is shifting its posture. Allied leaders must be quietly consulted beforehand, however, so that they can adjust their own strategies accordingly and express confidence about the new approach to their publics.

It would have been far better for the United States to properly resource a strategy featuring deep economic engagement and support for good governance alongside a stronger security posture. Yet wondering whether that version of the pivot to Asia would have succeeded is now just an academic exercise. An incomplete pivot, with expansive security objectives but no economic or governance strategy to speak of, will certainly not succeed. Instead, it will risk—in fact, it is already risking—a catastrophic failure of deterrence. Moving on from the pivot and accepting retrenchment is not the best way to protect U.S. interests in Asia. But it is unavoidable.

In 2024, Fumio Kishida, then Japan’s prime minister, told the U.S. Congress that he detected “an undercurrent of self-doubt among some Americans about what [the United States’] role in the world should be.” Today, that undercurrent looks more like a tsunami, and countries in the Asia-Pacific region are already seeking higher ground. What is left in its wake—where the United States maintains its commitments, and where it pulls back—will affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Asia. It is therefore time for Americans to discuss not what would make for an ideal strategy, but how to enact a realistic one. Even that may not be enough to contain China’s growing influence. But after falling short of its grand ambitions in Asia, the United States has left itself no other option.

Comment: Does anyone feel like this is a wake-up call for us? Are we ready to cede Asia to Chinese influence and domination? Or is it a fait accompli, a self fulfilling prophecy, or foregone conclusion because of our failures? Is retrenchment in the best interests of the US?

A first-island-chain strategy becomes brittle if partners’ political cohesion and economic options shrink, because deterrence is social and institutional, not just kinetic. China’s best move may be political segmentation: peeling partners through selective coercion and inducements rather than frontal military tests. U.S. credibility now hinges less on slogans and more on predictable trade, aid, and governance choices that make alignment affordable for regional elites.

If the U.S. cannot deliver prosperity and governance at scale, what is the minimum viable coalition that still deters China without provoking allied hedging?

Does narrowing to Taiwan reduce risk, or does it invite China to apply pressure everywhere else because the perimeter is now explicit?

What is the real center of gravity: forward forces, or the political will of Manila, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo to absorb costs over time?

Asia After America

Foreign Affairs · More by Zack Cooper · February 17, 2026

How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

Zack Cooper

March/April 2026 Published on February 17, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/asia-after-america-cooper

Looking out over the East China Sea from Yonaguni, Japan, November 2023 Issei Kato / Reuters

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How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

Zack Cooper

March/April 2026​

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The pivot to Asia has failed. A decade and a half ago, in 2011, President Barack Obama committed to rebalancing U.S. strategy and resources to focus on the Asia-Pacific. “Let there be no doubt,” he pledged on a visit to Australia, “The United States of America is all in.” Although the phrasing changed and policymakers and politicians argued about the tactical details, Obama’s successors affirmed the logic behind the pivot, which soon became the core bipartisan assumption of American strategy. In speech after speech, U.S. officials emphasized that the only way to prevent China from dominating Asia was for the United States and its allies and partners to make a major investment in the region’s political, economic, and military stability.

Yet nearly 15 years later, U.S. leaders have still not matched their words with action. American promises to foster greater prosperity and better governance now elicit eye rolls throughout Asia. A perpetually distracted United States neglects much of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Few today are asking when the pivot will come. Instead, the question in regional capitals is how far the United States will pull back.

With the United States facing divisions at home and distractions abroad, it has become clear that deep engagement across all of Asia is no longer realistic. Yet the assumptions behind the pivot have persisted, as have the calls to finally give the effort priority. The problem is that having a strategy that cannot be executed in the foreseeable future creates dangers of its own. During World War II, the political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote that “foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power” and warned that not doing so “leads to disaster.” Today, Washington has a “Lippmann gap” in Asia: means have failed to match ends for so long that U.S. commitments have lost credibility. The longer the gap between pledges and action is allowed to remain, the greater the risk of a disastrous failure of deterrence.

The pivot to Asia was based on the assumption that U.S. power was capable of fostering strong regional economies, governments, and militaries that could prevent China from overturning the regional order. Today, however, Washington is not seriously contesting Beijing’s economic and political influence across much of the region, particularly on the Asian mainland. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly narrows U.S. regional security objectives to protecting the first island chain—a string of archipelagoes that runs through Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines—but this retrenchment has been proceeding quietly for years.

Parts of this thin defensive line rest on shaky ground: countries that are economically dependent on China and thus vulnerable to its political pressure and influence campaigns. China will naturally seek to displace the United States if Washington scales back its commitments. The pivot aimed to make that difficult, if not impossible, by locking in U.S. engagement and ensuring that countries in the region were strong and confident enough to uphold their interests. By serving as a counterweight to China’s massive economy and substantial political influence, the thinking went, the United States gave these countries options. But as the United States curtails its economic and political engagement, it faces the prospect that China could pick off U.S. allies and partners one by one. Many of these countries are already rethinking their alignment decisions and concluding that Beijing may be a more appealing partner—or an inevitable regional hegemon.

As a result, any U.S. strategy that focuses primarily on the military defense of a handful of countries on the first island chain may not be sustainable. But the better option—a comprehensive pivot—is now a practical impossibility. What is left is a strategy based on shoring up a defensive line that might not hold forever but could contain Chinese expansion for now. If executed well, such a strategy could buy enough time for missteps by China to create new openings for the United States and its allies and partners in Asia. Chinese regional dominance is by no means assured. Beijing is increasingly overconfident and is likely to overplay its hand. Still, Chinese leaders are now the ones with the cards to play. The pivot was meant to anchor U.S. leadership in Asia; its unraveling could leave China to set the rules.

THREE-POINT TURN

When it introduced the pivot, the Obama administration outlined three pillars on which the rebalance depended: security, prosperity, and good governance. The central logic was that promoting all three would make the United States’ Asian partners stronger and better able to defend their sovereignty, thus preventing China from overturning the regional order. In practice, however, only the security pillar received sustained U.S. attention and resources. Washington deepened its alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea and pledged to shift 60 percent of U.S. Navy assets to the Indo-Pacific. But it never delivered on its vision for economic engagement or good governance.

At first, the United States had a plan for regional economic engagement. The Obama administration championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-country trade agreement that included many of Washington’s most important regional partners. The objective, in Obama’s words, was to enshrine “an open international economic system, where rules are clear and every nation plays by them.” But the United States proved unwilling to be bound by the very rules it had helped write. The Senate refused to ratify the TPP by the end of Obama’s term, and then the first Trump administration withdrew from the accord altogether in 2017 and began imposing tariffs on Chinese goods. The Biden administration did little to change course. It kept most of Trump’s tariffs in place and showed no interest in joining the successor to the TPP. An intended replacement put forward in 2022, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, did not offer increased access to the U.S. market, disappointing foreign partners. As Singapore’s ambassador to the United States lamented in 2023, “We’re not getting the kind of trade agenda that we would have liked” from the Biden administration.

In Trump’s second term, coercive and protectionist economic policies, combined with the dissolution of development aid and humanitarian assistance programs, have made the situation worse. For leaders in Asia who want to deliver economic growth to their people, a more protectionist United States is less attractive as a partner—and China looks more attractive by comparison. Asian officials are fond of saying that they “don’t want to choose” between Washington and Beijing. But regional leaders worry that, when it comes to their economic relationships, choices are becoming unavoidable, and many may favor China.

U.S. commitments have lost credibility.

The pivot’s governance pillar has crumbled even more spectacularly. Democracy, anticorruption, and human rights were important elements of this agenda when it was first announced. The Obama and Biden administrations made the promotion of democracy and human rights central to their policies, seeing them as both moral and strategic imperatives. This aroused suspicion across much of Asia, where less than half of people live in free societies. When the Biden administration held its 2021 Summit for Democracy, it excluded Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. The omissions put many South and Southeast Asian governments on the defensive, worried that the United States was undermining their domestic political systems.

The second Trump administration has been quiet about human rights and democracy, which has comforted some autocrats. Yet many regional leaders find it troubling that the United States is now rejecting many of the rules, norms, and institutions that it once advanced as part of its good governance initiative. Washington is using economic coercion against its own allies and partners. It has launched military strikes against Iran and Venezuela, which many smaller Asian countries worry will be perceived as a dangerous precedent that China or other great powers might use to justify attacks on weaker neighbors. Finally, U.S. anticorruption efforts stalled when Trump paused enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act shortly after his 2025 inauguration. Countries are now supporting major commercial projects that involve the Trump family in hopes of currying favor with the U.S. government.

Not surprisingly, Washington’s reputation has taken a hit across much of Asia. According to a 2025 Pew Research Center survey conducted during the first few months of Trump’s second term, favorable attitudes toward the United States in Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea had declined by nine to 16 percentage points from a year earlier. If the United States continues to embrace force and coercion—dismissing the rules, norms, and institutions that once tied American hands but bought the country influence—its favorability ratings will decline further, and other countries will be even less inclined follow Washington’s lead.

PIVOT WITHIN THE PIVOT

As the economic and governance agendas have collapsed, the full weight of the rebalance has come to rest on the security pillar. Yet even on security, Washington has not delivered all it initially promised. The United States has remained distracted by crises elsewhere in the world. It never shifted away from the Middle East, and the Biden administration, faced with a major war in Europe, rightly chose to support Ukraine. The Trump administration’s focus on the Americas adds yet another competing priority. As a result, U.S. leaders have never had enough time to consistently engage South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Only Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have attracted sustained attention and resources from the United States.

The problem has worsened lately. In the last year, top-tier U.S. military assets—carrier strike groups and air and missile defense units—have been pulled away from Asia to assist with other missions. Recent increases in overall U.S. defense spending have barely kept pace with inflation, and even if the Trump administration succeeds in forcing allies and partners to spend more, their contributions cannot offset China’s massive outlays. This leaves Washington without the means to execute a region-wide approach. Recognizing this constraint, U.S. policymakers have tightened their focus, concentrating American diplomacy and defense strategy on the Taiwan Strait to the detriment of other parts of the region. This shift has been most obvious under the Trump administration, but it has been underway for nearly a decade.

Nowhere are the effects more evident than in South Asia. For two decades, U.S. officials pursued a deeper relationship with India. But the second Trump administration has undone much of this progress. American intervention in the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan created the perception that Trump was prioritizing Islamabad over New Delhi, and the fallout has pierced hopes that India might align more with the United States. The Quad, the security partnership among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, had strong backing in Trump’s first term but now appears to be on the verge of obsolescence: a planned 2025 summit never materialized because of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s obvious irritation with Trump and Trump’s apparent indifference to the group.

At a U.S.–South Korean military exercise in Yeoju, South Korea, August 2025 Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters

The story is not much better in Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands. In his first term, Trump admirably improved ties with the Philippines, Vietnam, and many Pacific Island countries. Today, the U.S. treaty alliance with the Philippines remains strong, with frequent bilateral meetings and deepening defense cooperation. Yet other Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, are reevaluating their policies toward the United States. Singapore’s prime minister has lamented that the United States “is rejecting the very system it created,” by adopting protectionist policies and imposing tariffs on its friends. This view is also held by many Pacific Island countries, where Washington’s downgrading of issues that matter to them—including development, public health, and climate change—is incentivizing closer cooperation with Beijing.

The one subregion the United States seems committed to is Northeast Asia, home to Washington’s top security concern: China. In the 2025 National Security Strategy, China is mentioned more than any other U.S. adversary, and Taiwan is mentioned more than any other American ally or partner. The section on deterring military threats in Asia is almost entirely focused on preventing an invasion of Taiwan; North Korea is not mentioned once. In effect, the United States has narrowed its conception of its security interests in Asia to cross-strait security.

Yet even U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan remains muddled. Trump insists that Chinese leader Xi Jinping will not take Taiwan on his watch, and his administration has pressed regional allies to allow American forces to use their territory and to contribute their own forces if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait. But Trump himself has not publicly stated what he would do in a cross-strait conflict, instead commenting in January that it is “up to Xi” how to handle Taiwan. He has even referred to the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a “G-2,” suggesting he is interested in some kind of great-power compact.

The basic logic of the pivot was that it was in the United States’ interest to help build strong economies, effective governments, and capable militaries across Asia because this would make it harder for China to overturn the regional order through coercion or the use of force. Countries in Asia would then be free to make the choices that benefited them most, which Washington assumed meant continued cooperation with the United States. But with all three pillars cracked or crumbled, the constraints U.S. policymakers tried to place on China’s regional influence are giving way.

IN SEARCH OF PLAN B

As Washington’s economic and political engagement recedes, with no reversal in sight, military deterrence is all that remains of U.S. strategy in Asia. But the United States’ traditional approach to regional security, weakened as it has been, is increasingly courting danger. Its original objective was to prevent China from altering the territorial status quo anywhere in the region, which required the United States to maintain a forward defense perimeter up to the coast of the Asian continent. Washington aimed to help allies and partners with which Beijing or Pyongyang had territorial or maritime disputes—including India, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—to deter the use of force or coercion. The United States regularly sent ships and aircraft just off China’s coast in an effort to prevent China from coercing Washington’s friends or exerting control over disputed territories, waters, and airspace. It also invested in regional militaries to ensure that they could better defend themselves and work more closely with American forces. And as the American military edge deteriorated, the United States called on receptive Asian allies to increase their own defense spending and host additional U.S. forces on their territory.

The main problem with this approach was that it required not just American military engagement but also a positive economic and governance agenda to be successful. Building effective militaries requires dynamic economies and efficient governments, and only a network of strong regional militaries can help smaller states defend their interests against China. Without steady U.S. support for economic growth, good governance, and regional integration, the entire region’s deterrence posture suffers. Making matters worse, a growing chorus of critics in Washington argues that it is no longer powerful enough to execute such an expansive strategy, that the strategy is needlessly provocative to Beijing, and that too few countries in the region are willing or able to step up military cooperation with the United States. Others insist that the American people are tired of foreign entanglements and unwilling to support the rise in military spending that this strategy demands.

In short, meeting the most expansive version of American security aims in Asia has become unrealistic. The gap between those objectives and U.S. and allied capabilities is apparent to all, including China. And Beijing has been only too willing to take advantage. Despite long-standing U.S. opposition to Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea, Beijing has restarted its island-building campaign there. It is also stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, raising the risk of a cross-strait crisis. Deterrence is eroding across the region, intensifying the danger of a major war in the years ahead.

Military deterrence is all that remains of U.S. strategy in Asia.

Avoiding that outcome requires that the United States align its commitments and capabilities. Yet there is danger in pushing retrenchment too far, such as by concentrating U.S. defenses along the second island chain, thousands of miles east of the Chinese mainland (or even on the third island chain, which includes Hawaii). In this scenario, Australia and Japan, established U.S. allies that lie at the southern and northern ends of the second chain, could still anchor the American regional military presence. Between them, the defensive line would comprise many small isles stretching over thousands of miles, including the Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands (most notably Guam), Yap, and Palau. This strategy would exclude several friends in East Asia from the U.S. defense perimeter—the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan—effectively conceding that the United States would not defend them against an attack.

A second-island-chain strategy would push many Asian leaders to cut deals with Beijing. All of Southeast Asia would be within China’s sphere of influence, so the Philippines and other claimants bordering the South China Sea would have little hope of upholding their rights in disputed waters. South Korea would find itself isolated and surrounded by nuclear powers in China, North Korea, and Russia; without the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, Seoul would have to choose between acquiring its own nuclear weapons and submitting to demands from Pyongyang and Beijing. Taiwan, which China would never permit to have nuclear weapons, would likely be forced to unify with the mainland or face an unwinnable war.

There is no guarantee that China would be satisfied with this U.S. withdrawal, either. It is likely that a stronger, more confident Beijing would expand its horizons to match its growing capabilities. Japan, then, could be particularly vulnerable. Beijing is already contesting Japan’s legal claims to Okinawa and other parts of the Ryukyu Island chain. Japan’s westernmost island, Yonaguni, is only 70 miles from Taiwan, so defending it and isles near it with conventional weapons would be difficult, perhaps impossible, if Chinese forces were stationed in Taiwan. The United States could threaten nuclear escalation to deter Chinese encroachment, but that threat might not seem credible amid a broader regional withdrawal. Japan might then decide to go nuclear itself or at least reach a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, to more credibly defend its territory.

The geography of the second island chain presents a final problem. These small, remote islands and the facilities they house would be vulnerable to Chinese military strikes and political influence. Without facilities in the Philippines and Taiwan able to track Chinese air and naval forces passing through the first island chain, it would be harder to detect these forces before they reached Guam or other second-island-chain territories. Additionally, leaders in some Pacific Islands might prefer to remain neutral and accept Chinese investment offers rather than allow the United States to operate from their territory. This is already a concern in Yap, where Chinese companies are rebuilding a World War II–era airfield. A second-­island-­chain defensive line might therefore look more like a set of scattered defense bubbles than a full-fledged defensive perimeter. Ultimately, this minimal strategy might not protect U.S. territories in the Pacific and could leave even the most capable American allies feeling they had no choice but to submit to a vast Chinese sphere of influence.

Withdrawal to the second island chain, in sum, would likely be catastrophic. The more realistic option is thus U.S. retrenchment to the first island chain. This approach would trim U.S. commitments while retaining some of the most capable U.S. allies and partners, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The United States would likely maintain its presence in Australia and South Korea, given its enduring alliances with both countries and its desire to avoid leaving crucial allies out of the U.S. defense perimeter, a costly mistake Washington made ahead of the Korean War. But it would leave most of the rest of the region off the list of U.S. priorities, including the treaty ally Thailand and the emerging great power India. In practice, this could mean, for example, abrogating the U.S. alliance with Thailand and stating explicitly that the United States will not intervene if China encroaches on the territory or maritime claims of partners on the Asian mainland.

This strategy still faces several challenges. First, it is not clear that American leaders would be willing to devote the resources it requires. Although Trump has floated a $1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027, few in Congress seem inclined to support what would amount to a 50 percent increase in defense spending. The United States would still have commitments up and down the first island chain, including to the Philippines and Taiwan, neither of which can deter China without considerable U.S. assistance. Additional defense spending, or at least redeployments from other regions, might therefore be necessary. After all, China can focus most of its military might on its near seas, whereas Asia remains one of several areas of operation for the U.S. military. If Beijing fields nine aircraft carriers by 2035, as a recent Pentagon report predicted it will, U.S. forces would be badly outnumbered, even if Washington economized elsewhere.

Furthermore, the first-island-chain strategy would require key allies and partners to strengthen their cooperation with Washington while the United States pulled back elsewhere. The United States simply cannot balance China’s military power unless Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan spend more on defense, give U.S. forces greater access to their territory, or do both. Yet their leaders could be wary of doing more if they see overall commitment to U.S. alliances waning; some might even consider whether it would be wiser to improve relations with Beijing than to give in to Washington’s demands. This problem is compounded by domestic divisions in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Political parties in each country take sharply different approaches to foreign policy, so changes of government often bring strategic reassessments. The more the United States is seen as unpredictable and coercive, the more pressure there will be on a new leader to change course. And as Beijing’s economic and political influence grows, it will become harder for Washington to respond to Chinese efforts to affect decision-making in Manila, Seoul, and Taipei.

This strategy would also do little to discourage the rest of the region from engaging more deeply with China, because it would not make the United States more attractive as an export market or more active diplomatically. Thailand is already strengthening economic and military ties with Beijing. If others, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, also choose to work more closely with China, the United States could be forced to watch from the sidelines as Beijing builds a sphere of influence covering most of continental Asia and part of maritime Asia, as well—making a defense of the first island chain increasingly difficult to sustain.

HARD CHOICES

However flawed a pullback to the first island chain may be, it is the most likely outcome in the years ahead. The challenge will be to shore up this thin defensive line as much as possible to maintain deterrence for as long as possible. Allies and partners along that chain will need to be strong and confident enough to work with the United States to counterbalance China, even in the absence of a U.S. economic and political strategy in the region. What will determine success, therefore, is not just how well Washington resources its military posture but also how it navigates complex regional geopolitics.

American policymakers will need to decide whether the United States can build an interlocking set of security alliances or let a scattering of individual defense partnerships suffice. The Biden administration encouraged allies and partners in Asia to work more closely together, whereas the Trump administration has at times preferred a bilateral approach because it maximizes U.S. leverage. Even an informal arrangement bringing American allies together would require a substantial investment of time and resources from Washington and regional capitals. Some countries would no doubt remain hesitant to cooperate with one another because of historical tensions, legal restrictions on foreign entanglements, fears of being dragged into others’ conflicts, and concerns about China’s response. Yet without deeper defense industry cooperation and operational integration among regional militaries, it might not be possible to build a sufficiently strong defensive system along the first island chain.

The United States will also have to decide how to handle allied interest in acquiring nuclear weapons—something it has, until now, opposed. If the United States abrogates some of its commitments and pulls back some of its conventional forces, the likelihood of allied proliferation will increase. Japan and South Korea, in particular, may pursue nuclear deterrents of their own if they perceive U.S. extended deterrence to be weakening. Simply rejecting nuclear discussions may not dampen interest, particularly in Seoul, which is surrounded by nuclear-armed states. Indeed, some in Washington might even welcome allied proliferation to offset the worsening conventional military balance and thereby deter encroachment by China or North Korea. One option to examine seriously is the development of nuclear sharing arrangements, which might mollify Asian allies without resulting in significant regional or global nuclear proliferation.

There is danger in pushing retrenchment too far.

As Washington retrenches, Beijing is likely to test the remaining American positions, raising questions about what Washington is and isn’t willing to defend. Chinese forces are already pushing closer to Taiwan and operating more frequently and in larger numbers around Japan, around the Philippines, and farther into the Western Pacific. To date, the United States has been most clear about what it will do to protect its closest allies but more ambiguous when it comes to other partners’ defense. Friends that Washington asks to do more are likely to press for clearer U.S. commitments in return. Such clarity might deter dangerous tests of those commitments, but it also entails risk. Removing ambiguity about what the United States considers to be within its defense perimeter—especially when it comes to contested outlying islands, which are harder to defend—would make it necessary to react more forcefully to any violation to maintain deterrence. In cases in which the United States is genuinely willing to escalate, clarity is often the best policy, but that means that vaguer commitments will likely be tested.

Finally, the United States will need to decide whether to retrench abruptly or incrementally. A slow withdrawal might prevent panic but leave all allies and partners fearful that they could be next on the chopping block; a rapid adjustment could avoid a slow-moving landslide but cause immediate instability if allies and partners do not have time to prepare. Either way, Washington will need to reset allies’ expectations about future American policies, making some disruption unavoidable. But a one-time change in the U.S. defensive position might be preferable to repeated reminders that the United States is shifting its posture. Allied leaders must be quietly consulted beforehand, however, so that they can adjust their own strategies accordingly and express confidence about the new approach to their publics.

It would have been far better for the United States to properly resource a strategy featuring deep economic engagement and support for good governance alongside a stronger security posture. Yet wondering whether that version of the pivot to Asia would have succeeded is now just an academic exercise. An incomplete pivot, with expansive security objectives but no economic or governance strategy to speak of, will certainly not succeed. Instead, it will risk—in fact, it is already risking—a catastrophic failure of deterrence. Moving on from the pivot and accepting retrenchment is not the best way to protect U.S. interests in Asia. But it is unavoidable.

In 2024, Fumio Kishida, then Japan’s prime minister, told the U.S. Congress that he detected “an undercurrent of self-doubt among some Americans about what [the United States’] role in the world should be.” Today, that undercurrent looks more like a tsunami, and countries in the Asia-Pacific region are already seeking higher ground. What is left in its wake—where the United States maintains its commitments, and where it pulls back—will affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Asia. It is therefore time for Americans to discuss not what would make for an ideal strategy, but how to enact a realistic one. Even that may not be enough to contain China’s growing influence. But after falling short of its grand ambitions in Asia, the United States has left itself no other option.

ZACK COOPER is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a Lecturer at Princeton University. Between 2005 and 2008, he served at the U.S. Department of Defense and on the National Security Council. He is the author of Tides of Fortune: The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries.

Foreign Affairs · More by Zack Cooper · February 17, 2026

18. U.S. and Japan: A New Conservative Axis

​Summary:

Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi turned a risky snap election into a historic mandate, with the LDP winning 316 of 465 seats and the broader ruling bloc reaching 352. The authors frame her agenda as growth plus security: a two-year suspension of the 8 percent food consumption tax, investment in AI and semiconductors, relaxed arms export limits, a national intelligence organization, and revisions to Japan’s security documents. Beijing’s coercion over Taiwan talk backfired, they claim, and a March 19 Washington meeting with POTUS could consolidate a U.S.-Japan conservative alignment amid Asia-Indo-Pacific turbulence.

Comment: Beijing’s pressure campaigns may be losing marginal leverage against economically resilient democracies once leaders can translate coercion into domestic legitimacy. The center of gravity in the alliance could shift toward integrated economic security policy, where tax relief, industrial policy, and defense posture are treated as one package.

U.S. and Japan: A New Conservative Axis

realclearworld.com · James Carter & Mieko Nakabayashi

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2026/02/17/us_and_japan_a_new_conservative_axis_1165267.html

When Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called snap elections four months into her tenure, the commentariat scoffed. Winter election? No policy record? Approval ratings near 70%, but untested at the ballot box? Conventional wisdom said she was overreaching.

Conventional wisdom was incinerated.

Voters delivered a sweeping mandate. The Liberal Democratic Party captured 316 of 465 seats—an outright two-thirds supermajority, the largest achieved by a single party in the postwar era. With coalition partner Japan Innovation Party seats included, the ruling bloc now commands 352 seats.

This is not a routine victory. It is the largest mandate in modern Japanese history—bigger even than those won by her late mentor, Shinzo Abe. After years of revolving-door prime ministers, Japan has chosen its most powerful leader in decades.

The message from Tokyo mirrors one heard in Washington in 2016 and again in 2024: voters want strength, growth, and national revival—not technocratic drift.

The Hudson Institute’s experts, in “Japan’s Historic Election: Insights from Hudson Experts,” noted Takaichi’s cross-generational appeal, including dominance among young voters. That fact alone demolishes the tired claim that conservative populism is a geriatric phenomenon. Like President Donald Trump, Takaichi speaks directly to citizens who believe their country has been mismanaged by cautious elites.

Her agenda is unapologetically growth-first. She plans a two-year suspension of the 8% consumption tax on food—relief aimed squarely at households battered by inflation. In 2024, Japanese families spent 28.3% of their budgets on food, a 43-year high. Cutting the food VAT is economically meaningful and politically symbolic. People eat. Corporations do not.

She is also leaning into economic security: strategic investment in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and resilient supply chains; relaxation of arms-export limits; a national intelligence organization; and revisions to Japan’s three national security documents. Defense and growth are no longer siloed. They are integrated.

And she has confronted Beijing’s bullying head-on. When China retaliated with tourism restrictions, seafood bans, and export controls after Takaichi expressed support for Taiwan, voters rewarded her firmness. The lesson is unmistakable: strength deters; appeasement invites pressure.

Here is where the Trump-Takaichi alignment becomes geopolitically decisive.

President Trump offered his “Complete and Total Endorsement” before the election. The two leaders are expected to meet during a March 19 state visit in Washington, D.C. They are philosophically aligned: hawkish on defense, skeptical of open-ended immigration, supportive of industrial policy when it serves national resilience, and committed to challenging China’s coercive expansionism.

Trump understands leverage. Japan understands geography. Together, they can anchor a durable Western Pacific balance of power.

Critics, of course, warn of fiscal overreach. Japan’s FY2026 budget totals ¥122 trillion—roughly $783 billion—the largest on record. The Bank of Japan is normalizing policy as inflation rises. Debt exceeds 240% of GDP. Without a credible plan for discipline, markets could challenge Tokyo in a scenario marked by sudden financial instability and shaken investor confidence.

That risk is real.

Takaichi won decisively and now has unusual latitude. But markets do not vote in elections. They price bonds. If she cannot identify meaningful areas for spending restraint—or offer a convincing medium-term consolidation path—bond yields will climb and confidence in her government will erode.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume recklessness. Japan’s financial architecture—its Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and its major banks—has managed a complex equilibrium for decades. Takaichi has tools: gradual monetary normalization, calibrated bond purchases, and potentially selective use of Japan’s $1.3–1.4 trillion foreign-exchange reserves. The reserves generated ¥5.4 trillion in profit last fiscal year alone—more than enough to offset the revenue loss from suspending the food tax without issuing large volumes of new debt.

The real test is credibility. “Responsible yet aggressive,” as Takaichi describes her strategy, must not become merely aggressive.

For Washington, the calculus is clear. A stronger, more confident Japan reduces the burden on the United States. Takaichi plans to deepen cooperation with Australia, India, South Korea, and the Philippines. She will strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base and screen sensitive inbound investments. These steps reinforce—not undermine—the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Trump’s instinct is to negotiate hard. But Japan under Takaichi is not an adversary to be squeezed; it is a force multiplier. Pressuring Tokyo over manageable financial adjustments while both nations confront Beijing would be strategically incoherent.

The larger pattern is unmistakable. From Washington to Tokyo, voters are rejecting managerial centrism in favor of leaders who promise to return power to citizens, revive growth, and defend sovereignty. The old ruling class—comfortable, cautious, and frequently wrong—is on notice.

Takaichi has won the right to govern boldly. But bold governance is harder than bold campaigning. Markets must be reassured. China must be deterred without stumbling into escalation.

Still, for now, Japan’s Iron Lady stands at the apex of her power—and she will soon sit across from an American president who respects strength. If both leaders remember that allies are assets, not obstacles, the March summit could mark the consolidation of a new conservative axis—pro-growth, pro-sovereignty, and unafraid to confront the gathering storm in Asia.

James Carter is a Principal with Navigators Global. He previously served as Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Labor (2006-07) and as the Director of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Prosperity (2021-23). Mieko Nakabayashi is a Professor of Political Science at Waseda University. Previously, she was an elected member of Japan’s House of Representatives between 2009 and 2012.

Related Topics: Japan, Trump administration, Politics, conservatism

realclearworld.com · James Carter & Mieko Nakabayashi

19. The Globalist Delusion: Why America Must Build a New Operating System by Nadia Schadlow

​Summary:

Nadia Schadlow argues the post Cold War “global-first” mindset has become a failing operating system. It pushed leaders toward supranational process and multilateral rulemaking, but delivered uneven outcomes on climate, migration, pandemics, development, and nonproliferation. She contends the nation-state remains the only actor with real accountability, resources, and coercive capacity to solve problems, so legitimacy and effectiveness should be re-anchored in state decision, capacity, and responsibility. Global bodies still matter for convening and coordination, but they should stop substituting procedure for delivery and stop obscuring agency behind “global” framing.

Excerpt:

A state-centric operating model starts from a simple but hopeful premise that democratic states, working with partners, remain capable of shaping outcomes. Global frameworks have proved insufficient for many of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. Progress is more likely to come from persuasion, coalitions of the willing, and direct cooperation among governments. This concrete action will not just produce tangible and positive results; it will also uphold democratic values—and in a more convincing way than the lofty bureaucratic architecture of global institutions ever could. The United States and other democratic states must stop deferring to the sclerotic global order and find their own solutions to the major problems of the age.

Comment: Her “state-first” cure implies fewer universal bargains and more coalitions of the willing, built for speed, enforcement, and measurable outcomes. The argument is also an indictment of bureaucratic comfort: process becomes a shield for leaders who want moral posture without operational ownership. What problems actually require universal buy-in, and which are better solved by clubs that can enforce standards and impose costs? If “global” language hides agency, who benefits most from that fog, and how do we force clarity without collapsing cooperation?

The Globalist Delusion

Foreign Affairs · More by Nadia Schadlow · February 17, 2026

Why America Must Build a New Operating System

Nadia Schadlow

March/April 2026 Published on February 17, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/globalist-delusion-nadia-schadlow

Rob Dobi

Why America Must Build a New Operating System

Nadia Schadlow

March/April 2026​

​

Power shifts are never easy. A major one is now underway, not between rival states, but between competing approaches to international order. Call it a clash of two operating systems. One view holds that the most pressing issues of the day can be addressed only through a framework of global and supranational institutions and multilateral rules. The other insists that the nation-state remains the foundation of legitimate authority and effective action, and that outcomes ultimately depend on the decisions, capacities, and accountability of individual states.

For much of the post–Cold War era, what one can call a “global first” approach dominated international thinking. Governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental actors shared the assumption that challenges to do with security, economic disruption, migration, pandemics, and climate change required global solutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization accelerated economic globalization, reinforcing the belief among leaders in the United States and elsewhere that global institutions were best suited to manage complexity and preserve peace. For decades, these institutions (and the governments and the phalanx of nongovernmental organizations that supported them) advanced a common creed: that only global bodies could tackle the defining problems of the age.

Yet the results of this global-first model have been uneven at best. Despite decades of negotiations, global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, and no major economy is on track to meet the targets set by the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change. Record numbers of people have been displaced, migration has destabilized domestic politics in many countries, and armed conflicts are more numerous and protracted than at any point since the end of the Cold War. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed failures in global health governance, while progress toward the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals has fallen dramatically short of ambitions.

At the same time, China rose rapidly within this global order, accumulating economic, technological, and military power while selectively exploiting international rules and arrangements. Today, China is mounting the most serious strategic challenge the United States has faced since the end of the Cold War, discrediting the notion that deeper integration and multilateral engagement would produce a more cooperative and stable international system.

Instead of assessing why decades of global efforts have failed, many leaders dig in their heels. The current UN secretary-general, António Guterres, frequently laments that multilateralism is “under fire,” warning that there is no path forward except through “collective, common-sense action for the common good.” What this view leaves largely unexamined is the possibility that the fault lies in the limitations of the global-first approach itself.

In the 2010s, long-simmering doubts about the post–Cold War global order rose to the surface. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union in 2016, as well as mounting impatience in Europe and elsewhere with supranational institutions, had already begun to erode many of the assumptions that shaped the policies of Western governments after 1991. U.S. President Donald Trump accelerated this shift when he assumed office in 2017, but he did not start it.

In his second term, Trump argued in his September 2025 address to the United Nations that despite the organization’s “tremendous, tremendous potential,” it was not “coming close to living up to that potential.” The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy states that “the world’s fundamental political unit is and will remain the nation-state.” Trump’s withdrawal from dozens of international organizations, his call in January for a “Board of Peace” that would bypass the UN Security Council, his cuts to international aid, and his challenges to trade and immigration orthodoxies have been widely denounced, but the president’s actions reflect a broader rejection of global-first pieties. His clear priority, in places such as Iran and Venezuela, is to act on the basis of national interest and collective defense without first deferring to global bodies.

Beneath Trump’s theatrics, however, lies a coherent claim: only states generate problems (their industries pollute), experience those problems (their citizens suffer), and hold the means to address problems (through revenues, infrastructure, and services). Only states acting to advance their own interests—whatever the implications for so-called international order and norms—can solve problems that global institutions and processes have so far failed to fix.

The global frame functions much like the passive voice in English: it conveniently detaches agency from problems and obscures true causes. It also produces elaborate organizational processes that impede real progress. Even advocates of global approaches acknowledge that international negotiations often entangle officials in dense webs of meetings, procedures, and rules. These layers of complexity slow action or prevent it altogether.

Disagreements over these competing operational approaches matter. They are straining alliances, complicating partnerships, and fueling accusations of isolationism, while leaving many of the world’s most vulnerable populations no better off. By challenging failing global frameworks, a state-centric approach could produce truly positive change—and place states back at the center of practical action.

THE GROWTH OF THE GLOBAL

The United States both shaped and was shaped by the rise of the global order in the twentieth century. The horrors of World War I, in which industrialized warfare killed an estimated 20 million people, severely undermined faith in the nation-state as the foundation of international order. The League of Nations emerged just afterward as the first major supranational experiment in collective security. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson described the league as a “community of power,” arguing that states must yield freedom of action to a common council to preserve peace. The novelist H. G. Wells went further, arguing that “there can be no great alleviation of the evils that now blacken and threaten to ruin human life altogether, unless all the civilized and peace-seeking peoples of the world are pledged and locked together under a common law and a common world policy.”

But the league failed to prevent the chaos of World War II, and it is doubtful that it would have succeeded even had the United States joined. After that war, countries again sought to build a more durable peace. The United States emerged as the principal architect of the post-1945 international system, using its unmatched economic and military power to forge new global institutions. It led the creation of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which governed global trade for nearly five decades before the creation of the World Trade Organization.

Over time, member states ceded elements of their sovereignty—authorizing the UN Security Council to define threats to peace, empowering the WTO to adjudicate trade disputes and authorize retaliatory tariffs, and allowing the IMF to lend large sums to states with balance-of-payment problems—in exchange for the promise of a more stable world. State power would be constrained not only by domestic constitutions but also by international law and the rules of international institutions.

In Europe, where nationalism had fueled some of the twentieth century’s most devastating conflicts, pressure grew to find alternatives to the power of the nation-state. The European Economic Community, founded in 1957 and later broadened into the European Union, rested on the belief that economic interdependence could tame conflict. By deepening integration and limiting national sovereignty, European leaders argued, war could be made not only undesirable but implausible.

Devotion to global process replaced attention to outcomes.

Over time, transnational and supranational efforts to move beyond the nation-state gained ground, and international institutions steadily widened their authority. The UN now encompasses dozens of funds, programs, and specialized agencies. The IMF evolved from a narrow focus on balance-of-payments support into a far broader role in macroeconomic surveillance, crisis lending, and structural reform, while the WTO grew into an expansive regime governing services, intellectual property, and dispute settlement. At the same time, many of these bodies became less accountable to states. Donor states are often frustrated that UN development agencies consider themselves to be autonomous from the governments that fund them, even when those governments ask for audits of how their money is spent. Member states exercise tenuous control over the World Bank. As staff, budgets, and mandates expanded, these institutions increasingly evolved from instruments of states into bodies with their own agendas.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War contributed to the widespread belief that a new international community was emerging and that the ascendancy of the United States as the sole superpower would usher in a system of collective security and an ever-growing democratic zone of peace. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, U.S. President George H. W. Bush hailed the arrival of a new era. Later, after the United Nations condemned Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he observed that countries could now “seize the opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance.”

China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 rested on a similar set of assumptions. U.S. and European policymakers believed that integrating China into global markets and institutions would encourage the country’s economic liberalization, expose Beijing to international rules and norms, and gradually temper its strategic ambitions. As China grew wealthier and more embedded in the global economy, many expected it to become a responsible stakeholder in the liberal international order. That did not happen; China instead used its access to the world economy to grow rich and threaten that order.

This global mindset was also reinforced by the rise of multinational corporations, increasingly treated as global actors. Although formally subject to national laws, their scale and reach often allow them to shape state behavior. Technology firms influence regulatory outcomes on taxation, privacy, and market access; energy companies negotiate directly with governments over investment, sanctions, and climate policy; and financial firms, whose assets often exceed the GDP of many countries, exert influence through capital allocation and engagement with regulators and central banks.

Bahrainian Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa with Trump in Davos, Switzerland, January 2026 Jonathan Ernst / Reuters

All the while, global groupthink deepened. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan popularized the idea of “problems without passports,” arguing that many challenges were too diffuse for individual states to address alone. The UN’s 2000 Millennium Declaration framed hunger, poverty, conflict, and social injustice, for example, as global problems, a vision embodied in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals. Although the UN now concedes that many targets will not be met, it largely avoids questioning whether its original ambitions were realistic. Most recently, the organization has promoted global approaches to managing the risks of artificial intelligence.

A global mindset seized much of civil society and the commentariat. By the 1970s, an informal global governance movement had emerged alongside formal institutions, arguing that interdependence required stronger multilateral cooperation or “common management,” the phrase employed by the Trilateral Commission, one of the transnational bodies established in that era. By the 1990s, such ideas had hardened into dogma. Influential commentators such as Thomas Friedman hailed globalization as the dominant force shaping domestic politics and foreign relations, and thousands of nongovernmental organizations became formally linked to the UN, embedding nonstate actors into global institutions.

The global frame has found its way into many U.S. and European initiatives. The Biden administration’s Build Back Better World initiative was rooted in “a unified vision for global infrastructure development.” The European Union’s Global Gateway project aims to tackle the “most pressing global challenges,” including climate change, pandemics, and the security of global supply chains. A powerful global architecture came to define the post–Cold War order. Yet this order turned out to be as fragile as it was ambitious.

THE LIMITS OF THE GLOBAL

More than 75 years since the post–World War II push toward global approaches, the optimism that animated support for these institutions has given way to a more sobering reality. The architecture of global governance expanded, but that governance did not become more effective. The global order was supposed to generate collective strength: countries, working together, could do more and make resources go further. In practice, however, it created layers of bureaucracy that siphoned resources away from addressing the problems at hand. Devotion to process replaced attention to outcomes.

Tackling climate change has been approached primarily through global, multilateral frameworks for more than three decades under the auspices of the UN. Despite the constant warnings about the existential threat of climate change, global emissions of carbon dioxide had reached their highest level on record in 2025. All G-20 countries are off track to meet the 2015 Paris accords’ goal of limiting global warming to below two degrees Celsius by the end of the century. The global approach to reducing carbon emissions is clearly not working.

In the realm of human rights, multilateral responses have too often proved ineffective or counterproductive. The willingness of international institutions, particularly the UN, to treat authoritarian regimes as legitimate participants has insulated these countries from reproach and censure. Nowhere is this failure more evident than in the UN Human Rights Council, which has been regularly co-opted by some of the world’s worst human rights violators. While the council issues resolutions and hosts dialogues, Iran kills and imprisons civilians with impunity and China subjects Uyghur Muslims to a harsh regime of arbitrary detention and surveillance. Multilateral human rights mechanisms have often shielded perpetrators rather than constrained them.

In development, increasingly ambitious yet abstract agendas advanced by international institutions often overlook the socioeconomic conditions that determine whether aid truly works. Despite wide variation in state capacity and local circumstances, initiatives such as the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals rest on the premise that “all countries and all stakeholders” can deliver any number of outcomes, from ending the AIDS epidemic to eradicating extreme poverty by 2030. Yet hundreds of millions of people still lack reliable access to electricity, food insecurity has worsened, and water stress continues to intensify across many regions. While the United Nations highlights the global decline in poverty between 1990 and 2015, it also concedes that a substantial share of the world’s population will remain poor well beyond 2030. Similarly, the World Bank acknowledges that progress on poverty reduction has stalled and that, at current rates, lifting everybody above even a modest threshold of roughly six dollars per day would take more than a century. It is unclear how recommitting to those same global processes, such as additional summits and greater international coordination, would produce better outcomes.

The remedy for the shortcomings of global institutions is the nation-state.

After the Cold War, it was widely assumed that free trade would alleviate global poverty. Liberal commerce would lift all boats, and a supranational rule setter, the WTO, would ensure an ever-rising tide. In practice, however, the WTO struggled to make trade genuinely free. Persistent distortions, such as China’s subsidies and unfair trade practices and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (which shields European producers through subsidies and price supports), highlight the WTO’s inability to curb entrenched protectionism. These weaknesses are compounded by the WTO’s failure to clearly distinguish between state-owned and private firms, a flaw most evident in cases involving China, in which the line between state and market is blurred.

Migration has become a central flash point in the clash between global and national approaches. Migrants increasingly try to enter countries as asylum seekers even when their motivations are largely economic. This dynamic has strained asylum systems and roiled the politics of many receiving countries. Yet rather than confronting whether the system is working as intended, its defenders call for increased funding for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, reinforcing a model that expands humanitarian administration without resolving the underlying drivers of displacement.

In the realm of nonproliferation and direct threats to the United States and its allies, global approaches have repeatedly fallen short. For decades, the UN, other multilateral bodies, and ad hoc coalitions relied on diplomacy, inspections, and economic pressure to constrain the nuclear ambitions of states such as Iran and North Korea. In both cases, agreements and UN resolutions slowed aspects of these programs at times but failed to halt their underlying momentum.

In Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action temporarily constrained elements of the country’s nuclear program without dismantling its enrichment capabilities or the infrastructure needed to resume progress. In North Korea, successive agreements, talks, and sanctions failed to prevent Pyongyang from advancing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, allowing it to cross the nuclear threshold. In both cases, regimes used negotiations to buy time, relief, or legitimacy while continuing to expand their capabilities. Meaningful disruption of Iran’s nuclear trajectory occurred only through direct U.S. and Israeli military action—measures that invariably drew international condemnation—while the absence of comparable enforcement against North Korea allowed Pyongyang to emerge as a de facto nuclear-armed state. Together, these cases suggest that insisting on multilateral consensus and global approval has not prevented proliferation and has often enabled it by prioritizing process over outcomes.

The UN Security Council meeting in New York City, January 2026 Eduardo Munoz / Reuters

Across these and other areas, many leaders confronted with today’s cascading crises come to the same diagnosis: too little global cooperation. Instead of considering alternative approaches, supporters of the global frame insist that the clear remedy is to reinforce existing institutions by affording them more authority, funding, and effort.

In economic policy, a 2023 IMF report warned that geoeconomic fragmentation undermines shared goals and argued that restoring trust requires a “robust global financial safety net with a well-resourced IMF at its center.” This logic, however, conflates coordination with institutional centralization, overlooking the limits of centralized authority. The same reflex appears in security, often at the expense of U.S. interests. As conflicts have multiplied, calls to revitalize collective security have focused on strengthening the UN Security Council, despite decades of paralysis caused by the politicized use of the veto and great-power rivalry. From Syria to Ukraine to Gaza, UN deadlock has neither deterred aggression nor protected U.S. allies, forcing Washington to rely on ad hoc coalitions and unilateral action. Global security mechanisms frequently fail to safeguard American interests, but many policymakers argue that they simply need to be empowered further.

A similar pattern characterizes climate policy. Missed targets have prompted demands for more ambitious pledges and financing instead of serious reassessment of whether consensus-driven frameworks can deliver results amid divergent national priorities. The pattern repeats in global health, where failures exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic led to demands for a stronger World Health Organization when scrutiny of the performance of centralized global processes in major crises was more warranted.

These cases point to a broader tendency: when global frameworks underperform, their advocates refuse to change course. Yet cooperation has often advanced more effectively through regional arrangements, bilateral agreements, and policies aligned with the capacities of particular states. The question is not whether cooperation is necessary—of course, it is—but whether reinforcing the same global approaches again and again protects vital interests or merely mistakes process for progress.

SOLID STATE

A new operating system is worth a try. The remedy for the shortcomings of global institutions is not greater deference to them but a return to square one: the nation-state. A state-anchored approach recognizes that it is states, not global institutions, that are directly accountable to citizens. In democracies, governments face political consequences when they fail, a chain of accountability weakened when authority is delegated to international organizations. States also possess the capabilities to solve problems. Although global bodies can convene debates and issue resolutions, the power to fund, regulate, and fight resides with sovereign governments. A state-first approach thus strengthens both accountability and effectiveness.

Effective cooperation is best pursued through coalitions of the willing, not through frameworks that diffuse authority across multilateral forums with divergent interests. Collective action works when participating states agree on means and ends. Insisting that decision-making include actors with conflicting objectives often produces paralysis, not progress. A state-based approach accepts that cooperation cannot be presumed, especially with rivals or adversaries, and that broad, consensus-driven arrangements are unlikely to deliver meaningful outcomes. Instead, it prioritizes practical collaboration among allies and partners through intelligence sharing, coordinated policy, and shared capacity, grounded in real power, compatible political systems, and aligned national interests.

A state-anchored approach also acknowledges that time is a decisive dimension of success in any policy domain. When countries become trapped in prolonged multilateral negotiations, time becomes a liability, delaying action while problems compound. Global processes move slowly, if at all. States offer a better chance of acting with speed and flexibility and of delivering results.

Global planning produces grand targets without mechanisms for delivery.

The actions of states could be more effective than those of global bodies in various areas. Consider climate policy. A state-anchored approach could better align climate objectives with the realities of countries’ needs for energy security, growth, and technological development. Emerging energy options such as geothermal and nuclear fission and fusion will mature only when national governments provide the regulatory frameworks, financing, infrastructure, and policy commitments to support their advancement. The economic historian Daniel Yergin has written in these pages that the energy transition will unfold differently in different parts of the world, at different rates, with varied mixes of fuels and technologies, shaped by governments establishing their own paths. In practice, a state-anchored approach to climate change recognizes where responsibility, authority, and capacity truly reside.

In a similar vein, states should forge an international trading regime through their actions, not their submission to multilateral bodies. In a world of divergent economic systems, bilateral and regional trade agreements offer a more practical approach to trade governance and strategic interests than do institutions such as the WTO. Unlike multilateral frameworks that require consensus among dozens of countries, often with incompatible economic models, these agreements allow similar states to negotiate rules that are more likely to be implemented and enforced. Trade agreements among institutionally compatible partners will work better than universal regimes that attempt to impose common rules across fundamentally different systems. In an increasingly fragmented global economy, this model offers a realistic path forward: trade integration among willing, capable, and trustworthy partners instead of lowest-common-denominator rules that fail to discipline the most distortive practices.

In global health, one of Washington’s most successful initiatives was the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, launched in 2003. Designed and driven by the United States, the state-centric program made hundreds of investments that resulted in major reductions in mortality and infection rates related to HIV/AIDS, especially in Africa. Its success demonstrated the effectiveness of targeted, data-driven assistance anchored in national leadership and accountability. Years later, the Obama administration implicitly recognized this reality with its Global Health Security Agenda, which emphasized concrete state commitments to strengthen national public health capacities, not new global rules. Its premise was that only strong and capable state institutions could handle pandemics. That initiative functioned as a corrective to WHO-led frameworks that had set obligations without producing sustained national improvements.

In defense, NATO offers a good example of the state-based approach. Although Article 5 in NATO’s charter commits allies to common defense, it deliberately preserves national sovereignty: each state retains control over its forces and the authority to decide how and when they are employed. The alliance does not replace national militaries; it depends on them. Deterrence flows from state capacity: the quality, readiness, and credibility of national forces, combined with the political will behind them. A common defense organization works because it aligns state capabilities toward a common purpose.

German soldiers holding NATO and German flags in Kaunas, Lithuania, February 2026 Janis Laizans / Reuters

Beyond formal alliances, smaller, purpose-built coalitions have often proved more effective than universal frameworks in addressing concrete threats. These include the AUKUS agreement among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, as well as bilateral cooperation between Japan and the United States. These agreements work because they have the backing and direction of the United States. Consider, for example, the fact that American assistance was vital in saving Ukraine from complete Russian conquest. Russia was not deterred from invading Ukraine by global institutions or universal norms, but it has been constrained by NATO’s arms transfers and sustained military support for Kyiv. Global forums condemned the invasion, but it was NATO’s material power, coordination, and credibility that limited the war’s geographic spread and raised the costs of further escalation. Likewise, the territorial defeat of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in Syria and Iraq in 2019 was achieved not through UN processes, but through U.S.-led coalitions of willing states combining intelligence sharing, targeted military force, and partner capacity building. Across these cases, security outcomes have depended less on global institutions than on coalitions of capable states acting decisively when interests align.

A similar logic applies in counterproliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative, a voluntary counterproliferation framework launched by the George W. Bush administration in 2003, was not a treaty or supranational body but a practical mechanism designed to strengthen national authorities, share intelligence, and interdict shipments of illicit weapons—such as nuclear materials and missile components. It relied on coordinated national action, not formal supranational institutions, to fulfill its mission. This flexibility allowed the framework to adapt through regional initiatives, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, and to remain effective as proliferation pathways evolved.

In development, a growing body of scholarship suggests that international efforts to support poorer economies cannot overcome the limitations of state capacity and ill-conceived domestic policy choices. Economists such as William Easterly and David Dollar have long argued that differences in economic policy among developing countries at the national level explain much of the variation in growth performance, especially among African countries, and that no amount of foreign aid can substitute for domestic reform. Top-down global planning produces grand targets without mechanisms for delivery.

Against this backdrop, Africa may be emerging as a testing ground for a different model that treats national governments as the primary drivers of reform, not mere implementers of global agendas. Despite decades of international spending, nearly half of sub-Saharan Africa’s population lacks access to electricity. In January 2025, 12 African countries launched National Energy Compacts with country-specific targets, explicitly anchoring responsibility in national policy and institutions. Given the mixed record of global frameworks, this state-anchored approach offers a pragmatic test of whether national ownership can deliver results.

COURSE CORRECTION

The record of the past several decades should invite humility but not resignation. Across many arenas, the results delivered by so-called global solutions have been mixed at best, suggesting that an operating model defaulting to universal frameworks deserves reexamination. This does not mean abandoning international cooperation. Reorienting toward state-anchored approaches and an emphasis on outcomes reflects a belief that cooperation matters too much to accept arrangements that fail to deliver. It is a necessary correction to ensure that cooperation actually works.

A state-centric shift does not reject multilateral institutions. It calls for a more realistic appraisal of their limits and a clearer focus on what they do best: convening, sharing information, and enabling coordination when interests align. Too often, global bodies are asked to perform operational tasks for which they lack authority and capacity. Only states possess the political authority, citizen accountability, and implementation capacity to deliver durable results that large global frameworks have repeatedly failed to achieve.

This debate is no longer abstract. The divide between globally minded and state-centered policymakers has become a prominent fault line in contemporary geopolitics, shaping transatlantic debates in particular. In Washington, leaders are doubtful that existing global institutions are delivering concrete outcomes, while their European counterparts continue to stress the importance of these institutions in sustaining the postwar order. At its core, this debate reflects a shared concern: that democratic governance must adapt if it is to remain effective, credible, and capable of producing results in a more competitive world. Slow, consensus-bound systems have left democratic states less able to respond to emerging challenges, especially from China. Beijing, for instance, has exploited process-heavy governance by flouting international rules in subsidizing its steel and solar industries, knowing that by the time cases wind through the WTO, competitors have often already been wiped out.

A state-centric operating model starts from a simple but hopeful premise that democratic states, working with partners, remain capable of shaping outcomes. Global frameworks have proved insufficient for many of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. Progress is more likely to come from persuasion, coalitions of the willing, and direct cooperation among governments. This concrete action will not just produce tangible and positive results; it will also uphold democratic values—and in a more convincing way than the lofty bureaucratic architecture of global institutions ever could. The United States and other democratic states must stop deferring to the sclerotic global order and find their own solutions to the major problems of the age.

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NADIA SCHADLOW is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. In 2017, she served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategy in the first Trump administration.

Foreign Affairs · More by Nadia Schadlow · February 17, 2026

20. U.S. Plans to Deploy More Missile Systems in the Philippines, Challenging China

​Summary:

Washington says it will increase deployments of “cutting-edge missile and unmanned systems” to the Philippines as part of alliance talks in Manila, aiming to deter Beijing’s coercion in the South China Sea. The joint statement reaffirmed the 1951 mutual-defense treaty and condemned what both sides called China’s illegal and deceptive actions. The move builds on recent deployments such as the Army’s Typhon system and a Marine anti-ship launcher positioned during exercises, with another opportunity tied to the large April drills. The step also signals Manila’s centrality to any Taiwan contingency planning.

Comment: The Philippines is becoming a "forward fires testbed" in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, with escalation risk rising as capabilities persist beyond exercises. The deterrence logic assumes Beijing reads dispersed, mobile launchers as denial. BUt it will likely read the actions as a provocation or at least describe them so. We cannot allow Chinese cognitive warfare to deter us from taking the necessary actions for mutual defense (and peace through strength). Alliance reassurance is being operationalized in hardware, not just communiques, which may harden Manila’s stance in gray-zone incidents which I think is a good thing.

U.S. Plans to Deploy More Missile Systems in the Philippines, Challenging China

WSJ

Commitment to key Asian ally coincides with increased pressure on other defense partners

By

Gabriele Steinhauser

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Feb. 17, 2026 6:56 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-plans-to-deploy-more-missile-systems-in-the-philippines-challenging-china-d0f42427?gaa_at=eafs

A Typhon missile system during an exercise. Sgt. Perla Alfaro/ U.S. Army

SINGAPORE—The U.S. plans to deploy more advanced missile systems and other weapons in the Philippines to deter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, the State Department said Tuesday, affirming a policy that has angered Beijing.

Senior officials from the U.S. and the Philippines met in Manila this week for annual talks on their alliance, which rests on a mutual-defense treaty signed in 1951. Their strongly worded statement—which condemned what it said were Beijing’s illegal and deceptive activities in the South China Sea—comes when the Trump administration has increased pressure on, and at times openly questioned, other longstanding defense alliances, especially in Europe.

More than any other Southeast Asian nation, the Philippines has openly challenged China’s claims to much of the South China Sea, a strategic thoroughfare for about a third of global maritime trade. It has taken Beijing to court over its claims and regularly calls out so-called gray-zone deployments by Chinese ships and vessels that have blocked the Philippines’s access to disputed maritime features.

In recent years, both Manila and Washington have made moves to deepen their alliance, drawing more pushback from Beijing.

In 2024, the U.S. Army moved its Typhon missile system, which could strike commercial and military targets on the Chinese mainland, to a base in the northern Philippines and then kept it there after joint exercises. Last year, the Marines deployed a shorter-range, antiship missile launcher, known as the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or Nmesis, to another Philippine island close to Taiwan.

Nmesis equipment was transported for military drills with the U.S. in the Philippines last year. Jim Gomez/AP

Tuesday’s statement didn’t say what kind of weapons the U.S. plans to install next, saying only that both countries would “work to increase deployments of U.S. cutting-edge missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines.” One opportunity for such a deployment will be the two countries’ largest annual exercises that begin in April.

The Philippines—along with troops and weapons systems installed there—would be a central piece of any U.S. actions to defend Taiwan should China decide to invade or blockade the self-governed island. The Chinese foreign ministry didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on Tuesday, when much of the country was shut down for the Lunar New Year.

In Tuesday’s statement, both the U.S. and the Philippines reiterated their commitment to the mutual-defense treaty, saying that the pact extended to armed attacks against either country’s forces, aircraft and vessels.

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Appeared in the February 18, 2026, print edition as 'U.S. Plans to Boost Arms in Philippines'.

Gabriele Steinhauser is The Wall Street Journal’s Southeast Asia bureau chief. Before that, she covered sub-Saharan Africa for eight years, most recently as the Journal’s Africa bureau chief. Based in Johannesburg, Gabriele reported on life, politics, economics and public health on the continent and managed a team of correspondents.

She has chronicled the fall of some of Africa’s longest-serving leaders, the economic and social fallout of the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine and, most recently, a surge in new and old conflicts in Africa, focusing on the impact on civilians.

Gabriele, who started her career as a Journal intern, was previously based in Brussels, where she was one of the lead reporters covering the eurozone debt crisis, including the bailouts of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain and the monetary union’s struggle to survive. She has also worked as a business writer for the Associated Press and an editor on the Journal's Europe desk in Brussels and London.

Born in Munich, Germany, Steinhauser holds a master's in international relations from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland and a master's from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism.

WSJ

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

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