Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"An investment in knowledge always pays the best interest."

- Benjamin Franklin [1706-90]

"Education is a better guard of liberty than a standing army."

- Edward Everett [1794-1865]

"He who opens a school door closes a prison."

- Victor Hugo [1802-85]

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 2023

2. In China, a Web of Actors Weave Foreign Policy

3. Putin Doesn’t Have a Plan to Win

4. Blinken Has Tense Meeting With Chinese Official Amid Spy Balloon Furor

5. US warns allies at Munich that China may increase support for Russia

6. US, Syrian forces capture ISIS official in helicopter raid

7. The Blind Spot: How a gap in Climate Security Strategy leads to opportunities for maligned actors in Strategic Competition.

8. Asia’s coming great demographic divide

9. Aging Societies (Asia)

10. A controversial idea: Jets for Ukraine in exchange for treaty talks with Moscow

11. Kirby: No timeline for end of US support to Ukraine

12. Blinken: Determination that Russia committed crimes against humanity ‘starkly clear’

13. Putin Is Angry: Russia Has Suffered 200,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine

14. Axis of Convenience

15. Russia’s military planners in Ukraine muddled by anachronism

16. US troops capture ISIS official tied to attacks on prisons

17. ‘Russia thinks they can just wait us out’: US must be ironclad on defending Ukraine, security experts say

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 2023

Mpas/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2023

Key Takeaways

United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.
Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment.
The Kremlin continues to fail to honor its commitments to financially incentivized volunteer forces, which will likely have detrimental ramifications on Russia’s ability to generate volunteer forces in the long-term.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promoted the Western and Eastern Military District (WMD/EMD) commanders after confirming their appointments to the roles as part of an ongoing effort to present the Russian military as a well-organized fighting force.
Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have rebuffed overtures from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD.
Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and in the Kreminna area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian authorities continue to exaggerate the extent of a Ukrainian threat to Russia’s border regions, attempting to convince the public of the “existential necessity” of the war in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 2023

Feb 18, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick Kagan

February 18, 7 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure throughout the country. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 18 that Russian forces launched 16 missiles targeting civilian infrastructure in Khmelnytskyi City and Ukraiinsk in Donetsk Oblast (about 30km west of Donetsk City).[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian air defense systems shot down two Kalibr missiles of four launched earlier in the day but did not release the total number of intercepted missiles towards the end of the day.[2] Ukrainian officials also did not release information about the type of missiles Russian forces used during this attack as of the time of this publication. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure facilities in Khmelnytskyi City and oblast and Kryvyi Rih.[3] Ukrainian nuclear enterprise Energoatom reported that two Russian missiles flew dangerously close to the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[4]

Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs. Prominent Russian news aggregator Readovka told its audience of almost 1.7 million subscribers that Russian forces need to prioritize the “decommissioning” of the NPPs’ external electrical infrastructure in hopes that doing so would lead to the emergency shutdown of NPPs in Ukraine.[5] Readovka did not advocate for Russian forces to directly strike nuclear power plants or attempt to cause radiological events, but rather to target separate substations that would cut off electrical supply essential to the safe operation of the plants thereby forcing Ukrainian officials to shut the plants down in ways that would make it very difficult to restart them. Readovka stated that the destruction of such targets for the three Ukrainian NPPs outside of Russian-occupied areas “will cause damage many times greater than the last few massive missile strikes.”[6] Readovka claimed with low confidence that the February 18 missile strike on Khmelnytskyi City may have targeted one such substation that supports the Khmelnytskyi NPP, though Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces hit a military facility and civilian infrastructure.[7] Readovka had previously advocated for such strikes noting that Russia’s massive missile strikes have not generated the desired effect of prompting the Ukrainian government‘s capitulation.[8] ISW has no other evidence that Russia is pursuing or considering such a course of action but observes that the Russian militarization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the use of Zaporizhzhia NPP grounds to fire at Ukrainian positions, and the reported Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia NPP transmission lines all suggest that it is not beyond the realm of the conceivable that the Kremlin might pursue actions with the intent of forcing the emergency shutdowns of Ukrainian nuclear reactors.

The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment. A prominent Russian milblogger broke the news to his over one million subscribers that Russian military officials fired Press Secretary of the DNR’s Military Command Eduard Basurin on February 17.[9] This milblogger reported that the Russian defense establishment seeks to replace all commanders of the DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militias with professional Russian officers as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR and LNR militias under the Russian MoD. Many Russian milbloggers met the news with discontent, disappointment, and outrage, stating that the DNR and LNR commanders have practical experience fighting Ukraine and are better than the “real” Russian commanders even if DNR and LNR commanders do not have formal military education, know the military‘s peacetime functions, have the right bureaucratic experiences, or meet the Russian military’s physical fitness requirements.[10] Some milbloggers stated that a purge of the DNR and LNR officers would degrade Russian fighters’ morale and undercut support for the Russian military establishment.[11] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that he will meet with DNR commanders in the near future to discuss Basurin’s alleged dismissal and stated that the news must be some kind of fake propaganda because firing DNR and LNR commanders would be unacceptable.[12] Prigozhin will likely exploit this episode in his ongoing informational counteroffensive against the Russian MoD if Basurin’s dismissal is confirmed.[13]

The DNR and LNR’s 1st and 2nd army corps are not and never have been a professional military or even an effective fighting force. These Russian proxies were ineffective at capturing and holding ground during the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and required reinforcements from the conventional Russian military to capture Debaltseve in 2015.[14] DNR and LNR unit effectiveness has not improve since 2014, and the proxy forces and have continued to be ineffective in the renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Russian milblogger community’s reaction to the professionalization of the DNR and LNR forces indicates that the ultranationalist community values ideological commitment to the DNR’s and LNR’s brand of Russian nationalism over military professionalism, competence, and fighting effectiveness.

The Kremlin continues to fail to deliver on previous financial promises to volunteer forces, a failure that will likely have detrimental ramifications on Russia’s ability to generate volunteer forces in the long-term as it seeks to professionalize and expand the army. Prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian military is not delivering promised financial compensation to Russian combatants across many units and noted that the problem is particularly affecting elements of the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS).[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sought to establish BARS as an active reserve by recruiting volunteer reservists for three-year contract service starting in fall 2021 and offered minor financial compensation of 4,000 to 9,000 rubles (about $54 to $122) per month with other benefits, but this initiative failed almost immediately.[16] Milbloggers also noted that the Russian bureaucracy is making it impossible for volunteers who had joined the Russian war effort in spring–summer 2022 to obtain documents proving that they participated in combat — documents necessary to collect their promised payments. One milblogger noted that Russian officials must resolve these concerns soon or there will be “an explosion” of discontent.[17] Another milblogger noted that the Russian General Staff should be punished for the mistreatment of BARS personnel since the active reserve was the Russian General Staff’s initiative.[18] The milbloggers also noted that Russian mobilized servicemen who had fought on the Svatove-Kreminna line in late September 2022 are not receiving compensation for their injuries and added that officials in military recruitment centers are understaffed and incapable addressing these issues.[19]

The Kremlin’s uninterest in paying volunteer formations may kill any incentive among Russians to sign contracts with the Russian MoD during or after the war because of growing mistrust that promised financial incentives will materialize. ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD likely did not reach its recruiting targets for volunteers over summer 2022 due to pervasive underlying distrust of the Russian military to honor its promises against the backdrop of a bloody war, and that the Russian military will likely further undermine its reputation by failing to pay and recognize volunteers.[20] The widespread distrust and of the Russian MoD may increasingly erode Russians’ willingness to enter contract service and increase the Russian military‘s dependance on forced mobilization and recruitment practices. Integration of select irregular forces such as the Donetsk or Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) may further alienate irregular volunteer formations, and ISW had been observing ongoing conflicts between irregular formations due to the Russian military command’s unequal treatment.[21] ISW had also previously assessed that the Kremlin would deplete Russian state budgets at the federal and s federal subject level if it delivers the promised payments and long-term benefit commitments.[22] The Kremlin’s failure to create and properly support BARS formations also indicates that the Kremlin will be unlikely to establish effective volunteer reserves — during wartime or peacetime.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promoted the Western and Eastern Military District (WMD/EMD) commanders after confirming their appointments as district commanders. Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted WMD Commander Yevgeny Nikiforov and EMD Commander Rustam Muradov to Colonel General after the Russian MoD formally named the two as military district commanders.[23] Nikiforov and Muradov have likely held these positions for at least several months without the rank of Colonel-General that is typical for military district commanders.[24] The Kremlin likely ordered the Russian MoD to formally confirm Russia’s four military district commanders in part to present the Russian military as an organized institution with a clear chain of command following months of confusion about what commanders were in charge of the war in Ukraine.

Chechen Republic leader Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have rejected overtures from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD, suggesting that this campaign may fail to restore Prigozhin’s waning influence. Kadyrov likely responded to the Russian MoD’s confirmation of the four military district commanders on February 17, stating that Chechen formations will follow the orders of any commander appointed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and that Chechen combat officers have an excellent well-coordinated relationship with the MoD.[25] Kadyrov’s endorsement of the Russian MoD follows Prigozhin’s attempt to court Kadyrov’s support through a publicized visit to a wounded Akhmat Special Forces commander on February 16.[26] Prigozhin appears to be intensifying his informational campaign against the MoD, stating on February 18 that the Wagner Group is not subordinate to the MoD and ”has nothing to do with the Russian Army.”[27] Prigozhin’s and Kadyrov’s divergent attitudes towards the MoD are notable as Prigozhin used Kadyrov’s criticism of Russian military officials in October 2022 to undermine the MoD and establish the Wagner Group as Russia’s elite force in Ukraine.[28] Kadyrov likely refused to join Prigozhin’s renewed informational attack against the MoD because his formal ties to the Kremlin and position in the Russian government are more beneficial than any political relationship with Prigozhin could be. Prigozhin is likely trying to enlist ultranationalist figures within the Kremlin and select Russian milbloggers to support his quest for authority in Russia but will likely find that those with ties to the Kremlin may turn away from him to retain their patronage.[29]

Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Tavriisk operational direction Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on February 18 that Russian forces likely do not have the potential to conduct large-scale assaults throughout Donetsk Oblast and are beginning to lose momentum along this sector of the front.[30] Dmytrashykivskyi also stated that Russian forces are committing motorized rifle detachments to offensive operations throughout Donetsk Oblast with insufficient equipment and without armored vehicle support.[31] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military’s costly campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted the necessary Russian equipment and manpower reserves for large-scale offensives in Ukraine.[32] The Russia military's likely degraded ability to conduct mechanized maneuver warfare tactics may be denying the Russian military any tactical advances throughout Ukraine outside of marginal gains in the Bakhmut area.[33] ISW has observed that there are likely some Russian conventional units uncommitted in the current fighting that may constitute a reserve to support the ongoing offensive, although likely not on a large scale or in a way that would likely generate significant Russian momentum. ISW will explore this topic in more detail in its special edition on February 19.

United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine.[34] Harris stated during the Munich Security Conference that Russian forces “have pursued a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population” by committing murder, torture, rape, and deportation. Harris noted that Russian forces forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of people from Ukraine to Russia, including children. Harris noted that after the review of evidence there is “no doubt” that Russia committed crimes against humanity. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken added that the US reserves the determination of crimes against humanity for the “most egregious crimes.”[35]

Ukraiinsk in Donetsk Oblast (about 30km west of Donetsk City).[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian air defense systems shot down two Kalibr missiles of four launched earlier in the day but did not release the total number of intercepted missiles towards the end of the day.[2] Ukrainian officials also did not release information about the type of missiles Russian forces used during this attack as of the time of this publication. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure facilities in Khmelnytskyi City and oblast and Kryvyi Rih.[3] Ukrainian nuclear enterprise Energoatom reported that two Russian missiles flew dangerously close to the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[4]Zaporizhzhia NPP, the use of Zaporizhzhia NPP grounds to fire at Ukrainian positions, and the reported Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia NPP transmission lines all suggest that it is not beyond the realm of the conceivable that the Kremlin might pursue actions with the intent of forcing the emergency shutdowns of Ukrainian nuclear reactors.milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment. A prominent Russian milblogger broke the news to his over one million subscribers that Russian military officials fired Press Secretary of the DNR’s Military Command Eduard Basurin on February 17.[9] This milblogger reported that the Russian defense establishment seeks to replace all commanders of the DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militias with professional Russian officers as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR and LNR militias under the Russian MoD. Many Russian milbloggers met the news with discontent, disappointment, and outrage, stating that the DNR and LNR commanders have practical experience fighting Ukraine and are better than the “real” Russian commanders even if DNR and LNR commanders do not have formal military education, know the military‘s peacetime functions, have the right bureaucratic experiences, or meet the Russian military’s physical fitness requirements.[10] Some milbloggers stated that a purge of the DNR and LNR officers would degrade Russian fighters’ morale and undercut support for the Russian military establishment.[11] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that he will meet with DNR commanders in the near future to discuss Basurin’s alleged dismissal and stated that the news must be some kind of fake propaganda because firing DNR and LNR commanders would be unacceptable.[12] Prigozhin will likely exploit this episode in his ongoing informational counteroffensive against the Russian MoD if Basurin’s dismissal is confirmed.[13]milblogger community’s reaction to the professionalization of the DNR and LNR forces indicates that the ultranationalist community values ideological commitment to the DNR’s and LNR’s brand of Russian nationalism over military professionalism, competence, and fighting effectiveness.milbloggers claimed that the Russian military is not delivering promised financial compensation to Russian combatants across many units and noted that the problem is particularly affecting elements of the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS).[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sought to establish BARS as an active reserve by recruiting volunteer reservists for three-year contract service starting in fall 2021 and offered minor financial compensation of 4,000 to 9,000 rubles (about $54 to $122) per month with other benefits, but this initiative failed almost immediately.[16] Milbloggers also noted that the Russian bureaucracy is making it impossible for volunteers who had joined the Russian war effort in spring–summer 2022 to obtain documents proving that they participated in combat — documents necessary to collect their promised payments. One milblogger noted that Russian officials must resolve these concerns soon or there will be “an explosion” of discontent.[17] Another milblogger noted that the Russian General Staff should be punished for the mistreatment of BARS personnel since the active reserve was the Russian General Staff’s initiative.[18] The milbloggers also noted that Russian mobilized servicemen who had fought on the Svatove-Kreminna line in late September 2022 are not receiving compensation for their injuries and added that officials in military recruitment centers are understaffed and incapable addressing these issues.[19]Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD, suggesting that this campaign may fail to restore Prigozhin’s waning influence. Kadyrov likely responded to the Russian MoD’s confirmation of the four military district commanders on February 17, stating that Chechen formations will follow the orders of any commander appointed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and that Chechen combat officers have an excellent well-coordinated relationship with the MoD.[25] Kadyrov’s endorsement of the Russian MoD follows Prigozhin’s attempt to court Kadyrov’s support through a publicized visit to a wounded Akhmat Special Forces commander on February 16.[26] Prigozhin appears to be intensifying his informational campaign against the MoD, stating on February 18 that the Wagner Group is not subordinate to the MoD and ”has nothing to do with the Russian Army.”[27] Prigozhin’s and Kadyrov’s divergent attitudes towards the MoD are notable as Prigozhin used Kadyrov’s criticism of Russian military officials in October 2022 to undermine the MoD and establish the Wagner Group as Russia’s elite force in Ukraine.[28] Kadyrov likely refused to join Prigozhin’s renewed informational attack against the MoD because his formal ties to the Kremlin and position in the Russian government are more beneficial than any political relationship with Prigozhin could be. Prigozhin is likely trying to enlist ultranationalist figures within the Kremlin and select Russian milbloggers to support his quest for authority in Russia but will likely find that those with ties to the Kremlin may turn away from him to retain their patronage.[29]Dmytrashykivskyi also stated that Russian forces are committing motorized rifle detachments to offensive operations throughout Donetsk Oblast with insufficient equipment and without armored vehicle support.[31] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military’s costly campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted the necessary Russian equipment and manpower reserves for large-scale offensives in Ukraine.[32] The Russia military's likely degraded ability to conduct mechanized maneuver warfare tactics may be denying the Russian military any tactical advances throughout Ukraine outside of marginal gains in the Bakhmut area.[33] ISW has observed that there are likely some Russian conventional units uncommitted in the current fighting that may constitute a reserve to support the ongoing offensive, although likely not on a large scale or in a way that would likely generate significant Russian momentum. ISW will explore this topic in more detail in its special edition on February 19.milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment.Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD.Hryanykivka (55km northwest of Svatove) and Synkivka (45km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast, and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) in Luhansk Oblast.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian units from the western group of forces seized Hryanykivka.[37] A Russian milblogger expressed doubt that Russian forces could take Kupyansk (46km northwest of Svatove) despite Russian claimed capture of Hryanykivka.[38] ISW has no independent verification that Russian forces seized Hryanykivka.Zarichne (17km west of Kreminna).[42] A milblogger claimed that infantry elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) conducted offensive battles near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[43] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to advance toward Russian positions near the Balka Zuravka gully, near Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[44] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to regain lost positions near Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna) on February 17.[45]Vyimka, Fedorivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka, Rozdolivka, Paraskoviivka, and Berkhivka; and within 12km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Chasiv Yar.[46] Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances northwest of Bilohorivka (21km northeast of Bakhmut) and near Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[47] Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Russian forces closer to Zaliznianske (11km north of Bakhmut) and a section of the E40 highway north of Bakhmut.[48] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on February 17 that Wagner Group fighters completely captured Paraskoviivka (7km north of Bakhmut) and posted a picture of Wagner Group fighters in the settlement that was later geolocated, indicating that Wagner Group fighters likely captured at least northern Paraskoviivka.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Paraskoviivka and that Russian forces conducted assaults on Berkhivka (5km north of Bakhmut), where fighting is reportedly ongoing on the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are currently clearing Paraskoviivka and surrounding areas and that the capture of the settlement will allow Russian forces to launch further assaults on Ukrainian positions in northern Bakhmut and its suburbs.[51] Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[52] Geolocated footage published on February 17 indicates that Russian forces have advanced closer to the T0504 highway northeast of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 18 that Russian forces advanced close to the southern and southeastern outskirts of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on February 17.[54]Paraskoviivka allows Russian forces to threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from the north into Bakhmut, with one Russian source claiming that the capture of the settlement indicates that the operational encirclement of Bakhmut is near.[57] A Russian milblogger reiterated longstanding Russian claims that Russan forces can interdict all Ukrainian GLOCs into Bakhmut and claimed that Russian artillery units can now also interdict the T0516 highway between Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kostyantynivka, which Ukrainian forces reportedly use to transfer personnel and equipment to the grouping in Bakhmut.[58] The Ukrainian military’s continued ability to send significant amounts of personnel and equipment to Bakhmut and the surrounding areas casts doubt on these Russian claims.Vodyane, Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the northern outskirts of Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Russian forces aim to encircle the settlement instead of continuing frontal assaults on Ukrainian positions in the western part of the settlement.[60] Geolocated footage published on February 18 shows elements of DNR 1st Army Corps 3rd Brigade, now the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Southern Military District, shelling Ukrainian positions near Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka).[61]Mykilske (27km southwest of Vuhledar) and that positional battles are ongoing around Vuhledar.[63] Odesa Oblast head Serhiy Bratchuk amplified footage on February 17 showing Chechen Akhmat Special Forces reportedly deploying to positions in the direction of Vuhledar.[64]Novomykhailivka (about 70 northeast of Melitopol).[69]ISW reported on February 16 that the Samara Oblast military prosecutor’s office arrested two mobilized personnel from the 1444th regiment.[76] Russian authorities likely hope the publicized apology and arrest of these units will discourage other soldiers from joining the series of video complaints from mobilized units. Russian mobilized units continue to film video complaints, however. A Ukrainian source on February 18 amplified a video appeal from mobilized soldiers from Omsk to Omsk Oblast Governor Alexander Burkov.[77] The soldiers criticized their forward deployment, lack of coherent orders, fragmented deployment out of their original unit, and use as infantrymen despite training as artillerymen.[78]fined a local resident 150,000 rubles (about $2,027) — minus 50,000 rubles (about $676) as credit for time the man spent in jail during investigations — for protesting mobilization in September 2022.[89]Key Takeaways

United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.
Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment.
The Kremlin continues to fail to honor its commitments to financially incentivized volunteer forces, which will likely have detrimental ramifications on Russia’s ability to generate volunteer forces in the long-term.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promoted the Western and Eastern Military District (WMD/EMD) commanders after confirming their appointments to the roles as part of an ongoing effort to present the Russian military as a well-organized fighting force.
Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have rebuffed overtures from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD.
Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and in the Kreminna area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian authorities continue to exaggerate the extent of a Ukrainian threat to Russia’s border regions, attempting to convince the public of the “existential necessity” of the war in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground assaults on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on February 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Hryanykivka (55km northwest of Svatove) and Synkivka (45km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast, and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) in Luhansk Oblast.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian units from the western group of forces seized Hryanykivka.[37] A Russian milblogger expressed doubt that Russian forces could take Kupyansk (46km northwest of Svatove) despite Russian claimed capture of Hryanykivka.[38] ISW has no independent verification that Russian forces seized Hryanykivka.

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Kreminna and Lyman on February 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Kreminna itself and Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[39] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces continue to prioritize the Kreminna direction, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.[40] Haidai stated that Russian forces have not made advances near Kreminna, but have intensified artillery fire in the area.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Zarichne (17km west of Kreminna).[42] A milblogger claimed that infantry elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) conducted offensive battles near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[43] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to advance toward Russian positions near the Balka Zuravka gully, near Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[44] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to regain lost positions near Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna) on February 17.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces secured marginal advances amidst continued offensive operations around Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself; within 23km north of Bakhmut near Vyimka, Fedorivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka, Rozdolivka, Paraskoviivka, and Berkhivka; and within 12km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Chasiv Yar.[46] Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances northwest of Bilohorivka (21km northeast of Bakhmut) and near Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[47] Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Russian forces closer to Zaliznianske (11km north of Bakhmut) and a section of the E40 highway north of Bakhmut.[48] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on February 17 that Wagner Group fighters completely captured Paraskoviivka (7km north of Bakhmut) and posted a picture of Wagner Group fighters in the settlement that was later geolocated, indicating that Wagner Group fighters likely captured at least northern Paraskoviivka.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Paraskoviivka and that Russian forces conducted assaults on Berkhivka (5km north of Bakhmut), where fighting is reportedly ongoing on the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are currently clearing Paraskoviivka and surrounding areas and that the capture of the settlement will allow Russian forces to launch further assaults on Ukrainian positions in northern Bakhmut and its suburbs.[51] Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal advances in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[52] Geolocated footage published on February 17 indicates that Russian forces have advanced closer to the T0504 highway northeast of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 18 that Russian forces advanced close to the southern and southeastern outskirts of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on February 17.[54]

Russian sources continue to falsely assert that the encirclement of Bakhmut is imminent and that Russian forces are interdicting most Ukrainian logistics in the area. Advisor to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Yan Gagin claimed on February 18 that Russian forces have cut off supplies to the Ukrainian grouping in Bakhmut and that Russian forces have started the operational encirclement of the city.[55] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger directly refuted Gagin’s claim and stated that discussions of operational encirclement are premature as Ukrainian forces continue to reinforce their positions in the Bakhmut area.[56] Russian sources claimed that the reported capture of Paraskoviivka allows Russian forces to threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from the north into Bakhmut, with one Russian source claiming that the capture of the settlement indicates that the operational encirclement of Bakhmut is near.[57] A Russian milblogger reiterated longstanding Russian claims that Russan forces can interdict all Ukrainian GLOCs into Bakhmut and claimed that Russian artillery units can now also interdict the T0516 highway between Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kostyantynivka, which Ukrainian forces reportedly use to transfer personnel and equipment to the grouping in Bakhmut.[58] The Ukrainian military’s continued ability to send significant amounts of personnel and equipment to Bakhmut and the surrounding areas casts doubt on these Russian claims.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 36km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the northern outskirts of Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Russian forces aim to encircle the settlement instead of continuing frontal assaults on Ukrainian positions in the western part of the settlement.[60] Geolocated footage published on February 18 shows elements of DNR 1st Army Corps 3rd Brigade, now the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Southern Military District, shelling Ukrainian positions near Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on February 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Avdiivka).[62] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are attempting to conduct offensive operations from positions west of Mykilske (27km southwest of Vuhledar) and that positional battles are ongoing around Vuhledar.[63] Odesa Oblast head Serhiy Bratchuk amplified footage on February 17 showing Chechen Akhmat Special Forces reportedly deploying to positions in the direction of Vuhledar.[64]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov published footage showing 43 buses with Wagner Group personnel moving via Melitopol in the Zaporizhia direction.[65] Geolocated footage also showed servicemen with Wagner uniforms and symbology at a bus stop in Melitopol.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported on February 11 that Wagner recruited 1,200 convicts in occupied Crimea, but the relationship between the two reports is unclear at this time.[67] Fedorov also reported that Russian forces have also deployed mobilized men from Vladivostok to Melitopol and are studying underground tunnels in Melitopol, possibly for fortification purposes.[68] Fedorov added that Russians are using sea shipping containers to build fortifications near Novomykhailivka (about 70 northeast of Melitopol).[69]

Ukrainian forces are continuing to repel Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Dnipro River delta. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on February 18 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to land on an unspecified island in the delta using a civilian boat.[70] Ukrainian forces also reportedly conducted 70 fire missions striking Russian positions and equipment on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[71] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in Nova Kakhovka and Pishchanivka.[72] Russian forces continued to shell settlements on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River and Ochakiv in Mykolaiv Oblast.[73]

Geolocated footage shows that Russian occupation officials installed air defense systems on top of a building in Sevastopol.[74]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities appear to have made an example out of two mobilized soldiers in the 1444th regiment from Samara Oblast whose video complaints about a lack of proper documentation, payments, and instructions went viral. A Russian opposition source published a video on February 17 showing the mobilized soldiers publicly apologizing for their complaint to an assembled crowd of Russian forces. Russian military police escort the soldiers and guide them into the back of a vehicle for apparent redeployment.[75] ISW reported on February 16 that the Samara Oblast military prosecutor’s office arrested two mobilized personnel from the 1444th regiment.[76] Russian authorities likely hope the publicized apology and arrest of these units will discourage other soldiers from joining the series of video complaints from mobilized units. Russian mobilized units continue to film video complaints, however. A Ukrainian source on February 18 amplified a video appeal from mobilized soldiers from Omsk to Omsk Oblast Governor Alexander Burkov.[77] The soldiers criticized their forward deployment, lack of coherent orders, fragmented deployment out of their original unit, and use as infantrymen despite training as artillerymen.[78]

Russian authorities continue to exaggerate the extent of a Ukrainian threat to Russia’s border regions, attempting to convince the public of the “existential necessity” of the war in Ukraine. A Russian opposition news source reported on February 17 that the Russian State Duma will consider a bill that proposes to extends benefits to children as from occupied areas of Ukraine as well as from regions of Krasnodar Krai, Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Kursk Oblast, and Rostov Oblast that were “systemically” subjected to Ukrainian shelling.[79] Ukrainian forces do not hold positions that are within tube artillery firing range of Rostov Oblast’s western most administrative borders.[80] The implausibility of Ukrainian forces conducting routine shelling of many of Russia’s border regions severely undermines the legitimacy of Russian claims of Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory generally.

Meduza amplified reporting from Russian opposition outlet Faridaily on February 18 that the Kremlin has prepared a test version of an information database on Russian civilians eligible for military service.[81] The database, in theory, will allow Russian officials to prevent men from fleeing mobilization and to prevent the unlawful mobilization or conscription of Russian men. The database reportedly will begin official operations in April 2024 but may go into use as early as spring 2023.[82]

French retail firm Auchan categorically denied on February 18 the facts and interpretation of facts of the Le Monde, The Insider, and Bellingcat report published February 17 that stated that the Russian military likely relied on a Russian subsidiary of Auchan for the basic provisioning of Russian forces in Ukraine.[83] Auchan added that Auchan subsidiaries remain open to provide food to the Russian populace and provide no voluntary and active help or charity support to non-civilian consumers.[84]

The International Institute for Strategic Studies on February 17 amplified an article from Military Balance+ on February 9 that stated that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev visited a Rainbow Manufacturing Design Bureau facility in Dubna, Russia.[85] Military Balance+ stated that Medvedev used the visit to claim that Russia would see an increase in weapon deliveries, to highlight the construction of additional production facilities, and to view a never-before-seen missile allegedly in the final stages of development: Izdeliye 720 (apparently modeled after the Kh-69 land-attack cruise missile).[86]

Russian authorities continue to prosecute residents for alleged sabotage attacks and resistance. The Siberian branch of Radio Liberty reported on February 17 that police in Kansk, Krasnoyarsk Krai tortured a teacher arrested for defacing a military service advertisement in hopes of forcing him to confess to a September 24 arson attack on a military registration and enlistment office in Kansk.[87] Astra Press reported on February 17 that Moscow authorities detained a refugee from Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine for allegedly burning down a relay cabinet that regulates train traffic lights on the Podolsk-Hryvnia rail line.[88] A Russian human rights project stated on February 17 that the regional court of Makhachkala, Dagestan fined a local resident 150,000 rubles (about $2,027) — minus 50,000 rubles (about $676) as credit for time the man spent in jail during investigations — for protesting mobilization in September 2022.[89]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 18 that Russian forces shell civilian areas under Russian control to discredit Ukrainian forces among residents of occupied areas.[90]

Russian Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appeared to praise Russian efforts to use Ukrainian children as a means of Russifying occupied areas. Kadyrov lauded Chechen Kuchaloi Raion Ministry of Internal Affairs Head Rustam Aguyev for taking the daughter of a Ukrainian family in Donetsk Oblast under his “patronage.”[91] ISW has previously reported that Russian forced adoption programs, evacuation schemes, and children’s “vacation” programs may amount to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and constitute a wider ethnic cleansing effort.[92]

Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Administration Serhiy Khlan stated on February 17 that Russian forces are gradually expanding the zone of forced evacuation for residents of Kherson Oblast on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River from 15km to 30km.[93]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[4] https://t.me/babel/28505; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/30289; https://... io/news/2023/02/18/ugroza-udara-po-reaktoru-snova-byla-vysokoy-energoatom-zayavil-chto-nad-yuzhno-ukrainskoy-aes-proleteli-dve-krylatye-rakety; https://twitter.com/VVoytsitska/status/1626893263524270082

[7] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3671836-russian-missile-hits-military-facility-in-khmelnytskyi.html

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/explainer-russian-conscrip... http://bars2021 dot tilda.ws/info

[23] https://t.me/readovkanews/52891 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/52893 ; ... ru/politics/17/02/2023/63efc1699a7947105dd12034

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/18/vorog-ne-maye-potenczialu-dlya-provedennya-velykyh-shturmovyh-dij/

[31] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/18/vorog-ne-maye-potenczialu-dlya-provedennya-velykyh-shturmovyh-dij/

[81] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/18/frantsuzskaya-set-ashan-otritsaet-chto-snabzhala-armiyu-rf-v-ukraine-ranee-zhurnalisty-zayavili-chto-kompaniya-peredala-noski-sigarety-i-topory-dlya-voennyh

[82] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/18/frantsuzskaya-set-ashan-otritsaet-chto-snabzhala-armiyu-rf-v-ukraine-ranee-zhurnalisty-zayavili-chto-kompaniya-peredala-noski-sigarety-i-topory-dlya-voennyh

[83] https://www.auchan-retail dot com/fr/position-dauchan-retail/

[84] https://www.auchan-retail dot com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2023_02_17_Position-Auchan-Retail-FR.pdf

[89] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-16-17; https://ovd dot news/express-news/2023/02/17/uchastnika-protestov-protiv-mobilizacii-v-mahachkale-prigovorili-k-150

understandingwar.org

2. In China, a Web of Actors Weave Foreign Policy

Excerpts:

From around 2002, as China was internationalizing, the provinces were encouraged to build and maintain relationships with other regions in Southeast Asia. While this has allowed China to fulfill two competing objectives, economic growth while defending territorial ambitions, it also increased the autonomy of provincial governments, whose actions in foreign policy sometimes do not match the interests of the central government. In 2012, even though it sought to reduce tensions with Vietnam, the Chinese government accepted a petition from Hainan province to elevate the status of Sansha, the Chinese administrative unit covering the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, in the background of a Vietnamese maritime law.

Due to the nature of the political regime in China, it is frequently interpreted by the outside world as a uniform and unitary actor, when in reality the picture is far more complicated. While Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee exert the most influence, it is undeniable that there are many actors at play, which affect how China takes a decision abroad — including the decision to send an alleged surveillance balloon across the U.S. mainland days ahead of a planned visit by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

In China, a Web of Actors Weave Foreign Policy

Beijing is often framed as a unitary actor, but the reality is that many actors influence policy decisions.

thediplomat.com · by Carlo J.V. Caro · February 15, 2023

A CNN article published last Thursday reported that U.S. officials believe that the balloon which crossed over the United States in early February might be part of a broader intelligence surveillance program, but that President Xi Jinping might not have been aware of that specific operation.

While I do not have the information necessary to determine if Xi was aware or not, the reality is that while China is a one party state, its foreign policy does not belong to any single actor. The Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the provincial governments, among other actors, all have divergent interests and influences that affect how China acts and reacts to a particular event.

While it is evident that decision-making and power in Mao’s China was extremely centralized, after 1978 with the reforms that Deng Xiaoping implemented, leadership took a different turn, and its formula became more influenced by a collective group of actors. Since then, China has witnessed the accumulation of actors who can exert political power, and influence foreign policy. While they might have opposing objectives, the main actor, the Chinese Communist Party, relies on all of them for political and economic balance.

While Xi has increasingly concentrated power around himself, leaders after Mao do not possess Mao’s absolute authority because they lack his revolutionary legitimacy as well as an absolute control over the People’s Liberation Army. The PLA has in turn enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy, regardless of any consequences to China.

Xi Jinping and the CCP are interdependent with different actors and are unable to ignore their influence in China’s foreign policy. These actors have sufficient power to act and affect a situation, and Xi is limited in denouncing an action from the People’s Liberation Army, or even provincial governments, when those actions are said to be taken in the name of Chinese sovereignty, even if such actions clash with Xi’s interests or those of the Chinese Communist Party and the elaboration of its foreign policy. This clash between different actors in China is frequently witnessed in the South China Sea, where different actors invoke national interests in the search for their own gains, be it commercial profit, state financing, or political prestige.

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The nature of the state in China limits the degree of action the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can take in the implementation and coordination of policies, while leaving the elaboration of policies to the Chinese Communist Party. The minister of foreign affairs is outranked by other officials and not always briefed on foreign policy decisions. For example, in 2012 when the Ministry of Public Security decided to roll out new passports that included disputed islands as part of Chinese territory, the minister of foreign affairs was not consulted. While the Central Military Commission and the State Council are on the same footing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not on the same level as the People’s Liberation Army, which means that it cannot condition PLA actions even when these have negative repercussions over Chinese foreign policy.

Contrary to other actors, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had aimed for a moderate approach to volatile issues in the South China Sea, as witnessed by the ministry’s disagreements with Chinese publications calling for an aggressive Chinese presence. However, the ministry’s stance hardened following public opinion in support of China’s ambitions, specifically after the Hainan Island incident and the sinking of a Vietnamese vessel in 2020.

The People’s Liberation Army is able to exert more influence due to its operational autonomy and the participation of its members in the media. While the PLA has a limited influence in the elaboration of China’s foreign policy through the official channels, the reality is that it enjoys a large degree of autonomy to decide how it will implement those policies. The PLA can take decisions on its own and with its own interests in mind. This is problematic considering the lack of coordination and oversight from civilians and the military, which allows the PLA to accentuate tensions for their own gain.

The PLA is also in an excellent position to shape public opinion, which in turn helps to influence the elaboration of China’s foreign policy. Military officers are often embedded in the media to provide their nationalist point of view, such as when retired Rear Admiral Luo Yuan called to bomb American aircraft carriers in the South China Sea or in the aftermath of the Hainan Island incident, when the Chinese military accused the United States of provoking the crash.

Despite the importance of Xi’s position, the Politburo Standing Committee has a central but complex part in the elaboration of matters of conflict. Members of the committee heavily debate decisions so that they are adopted by consensus, and yet the influence of outsiders is not outside the norm. Now retired General Xiong Guangkai, who had been in charge of military intelligence issues, played a key role in the Hainan Island incident, which resulted in the detainment of the U.S. crew. He wielded important influence for more than a decade, thanks to a decision-making system that values the acquisition of information from different sources, and which, tied with a complex system of deliberation, complicates a united response in terms of foreign policy.

As a result of the decentralization experienced after Deng Xiaoping, provincial governments have turned into more powerful actors. The importance of provincial governments is further enhanced by the fact that provincial party secretaries have more or less the same rank as some ministers of the central government. Up to six provincial secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party are members of the Politburo and thus hold a higher rank than the State Council, which deliberates questions of foreign policy.

From around 2002, as China was internationalizing, the provinces were encouraged to build and maintain relationships with other regions in Southeast Asia. While this has allowed China to fulfill two competing objectives, economic growth while defending territorial ambitions, it also increased the autonomy of provincial governments, whose actions in foreign policy sometimes do not match the interests of the central government. In 2012, even though it sought to reduce tensions with Vietnam, the Chinese government accepted a petition from Hainan province to elevate the status of Sansha, the Chinese administrative unit covering the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, in the background of a Vietnamese maritime law.

Due to the nature of the political regime in China, it is frequently interpreted by the outside world as a uniform and unitary actor, when in reality the picture is far more complicated. While Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee exert the most influence, it is undeniable that there are many actors at play, which affect how China takes a decision abroad — including the decision to send an alleged surveillance balloon across the U.S. mainland days ahead of a planned visit by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Carlo J.V. Caro

Carlo J.V. Caro is a political and military analyst. He has a graduate degree from Columbia University.

thediplomat.com · by Carlo J.V. Caro · February 15, 2023

3. Putin Doesn’t Have a Plan to Win

But does he have a plan to not lose?

Putin Doesn’t Have a Plan to Win

He’s murdering his own troops by the thousands as a signal to Washington.

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.Follow

Feb. 17, 2023 5:34 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-doesnt-have-a-plan-to-win-nato-west-ukraine-military-force-saddam-hussein-nuclear-war-invasion-anniversary-88b04384?mod=itp_wsj&ru=yahoo

The similarities between Saddam Hussein and Vladimir Putin deserve more notice than they often get, from their exceptionally brutal childhoods, to their knack for dutifully serving and then displacing mentors, to their imperial and historical dreams.

Their propensity, or that of anyone in their position really, for miscalculation also always seemed likely to become an important theme sooner or later.

Saddam’s final choice wasn’t a miscalculation, though. His adversaries in the George W. Bush administration demanded his sole nonnegotiable: relinquishing power. They were prepared even to send armored brigades to Baghdad to enforce their will.

Nothing like that has been required of Mr. Putin.

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As diplomatic historian Melvyn Leffler points out in his level-headed new account of U.S.-Iraq relations, Saddam otherwise displayed a “remarkable flexibility” in his career. He ate a lot of defeat to stay in power. He ceded the strategic Shatt al-Arab passage in 1975 to appease the hated shah of Iran. He disastrously paused his already ill-advised 1980 Iranian invasion in hopes of enticing the Khomeini regime to talk. He threw in the towel after eight years and 500,000 deaths with nothing to show. He promptly let his army be destroyed all over again in Kuwait so he could proclaim himself a victor merely for surviving.

After stumbling outside of Kyiv, Mr. Putin has been fighting the battle of Moscow, in my view. He doesn’t have a plan for victory in Ukraine.

He wouldn’t be Saddam-like, though, if he didn’t think throwing away another 100,000 Russian lives might serve his interests. He yanked a military commander in Gen. Sergei Surovikin, who, whatever his faults, knew his business. He sussed out the situation. He proposed to retreat, dig in and avoid giving more ground.

Blinken Has Tense Meeting With Chinese Official Amid Spy Balloon Furor

By Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger

Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger reported this article from the security conference in Munich.

Published Feb. 18, 2023
Updated Feb. 19, 2023, 7:47 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · February 19, 2023

The meeting resumed diplomatic contact between Washington and Beijing that had been frozen since the U.S. shot down a Chinese spy balloon.

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A high-altitude surveillance balloon was recovered this month off the coast of South Carolina.Credit...MCS1 Tyler Thompson/U.S.Navy

Published Feb. 18, 2023Updated Feb. 19, 2023, 7:47 a.m. ET

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken held what American officials described as a confrontational meeting with his Chinese counterpart on Saturday night in Munich, warning him that the flight of a Chinese surveillance balloon across the United States “must never happen again.”

He also cautioned Beijing against providing “material support” to Russia’s war in Ukraine, a prospect he later suggested China was now “strongly” considering.

The U.S. description of the meeting, which resumed diplomatic contact between Washington and Beijing after it broke down over the balloon episode, said nothing about how the Chinese official, Wang Yi, responded. But a brief summary on official Chinese state media described an equally sharp exchange.

Mr. Wang, according to that account, said it was up to the United States to “solve the damage caused by the indiscriminate use of force” when it shot down the large balloon off South Carolina.

The two descriptions suggested that both Washington and Beijing were digging in, two weeks after the episode. American officials had clearly hoped to find a path toward a resolution that would allow Mr. Blinken to reschedule a visit to China, the first in years by a U.S. secretary of state, that he had abruptly canceled as the balloon drifted from Montana to the East Coast.

Notably, neither country said anything about seeking a new date for Mr. Blinken’s trip. Mr. Blinken also told NBC that he had spoken “very clearly and very directly” to Mr. Wang about the balloon incident, and that there had been “no apology” from Mr. Wang during the meeting. It was another reminder that Chinese-U.S. relations have fallen to perhaps their lowest point since Richard Nixon opened a channel of communication to China’s leadership a half-century ago.

While President Biden often talks of aspiring to a relationship in which the two nations are in vigorous competition but not conflict, many at the Munich Security Conference — an annual meeting of diplomatic, intelligence officials and lawmakers — expressed concerns that the handling of the balloon episode merely highlighted how the two countries had failed to de-escalate, even when no lives were lost.

Hours before the two men met, Mr. Wang appeared before the conference and, to the astonishment of many Western officials, doubled down on China’s claim that the balloon had been a “civilian” research craft blown off course by high winds, calling the American decision to shoot it down “absurd and hysterical.”

Wang Yi, China’s senior foreign affairs official, called the United States’ response to the Chinese spy balloon “hysterical” when he spoke in Munich on Saturday.

A State Department description of Mr. Blinken’s message to Mr. Wang, using the abbreviation for the People’s Republic of China, said the United States “will not stand for any violation of our sovereignty, and that the P.R.C.’s high-altitude surveillance programs — which has intruded into the air space of over 40 countries across 5 continents, has been exposed to the world.”

The U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard have since recovered much of the balloon’s equipment — contained in a payload about the size of a small regional airliner — and American officials have said they intend to make public details about the sensors they found. Officials have already said the craft’s surveillance equipment was visible, contradicting China’s claims that it was a weather balloon.

Mr. Blinken also renewed warnings that China should not assist Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, amid growing concerns that Beijing is inching closer to doing just that, including by providing satellite imagery to Russia’s private Wagner militia and electronics that might aid Russia in building military hardware.

In his interview with NBC’s “Meet the Press,” which was taped on Saturday night for broadcast on Sunday, Mr. Blinken said the United States would soon be offering new information to demonstrate Beijing was “strongly considering providing lethal assistance to Russia.”

While the State Department sought to portray Mr. Blinken’s tone as tough, its official statement on the meeting said that he had stressed to Mr. Wang “the importance of maintaining diplomatic dialogue and open lines of communication at all times,” and that “we do not want conflict with the P.R.C. and are not looking for a new Cold War.”

That phrase was particularly notable given that Mr. Wang had said, during earlier remarks on Saturday at the conference, that “the Cold War mentality is back” in global affairs.

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in Munich on Saturday.Credit...Pool photo by Petr David Josek

The meeting on Saturday night came two weeks after Mr. Blinken abruptly canceled a long-planned trip to Beijing intended as a step toward soothing relations between the United States and China that have been inflamed in recent years, with some analysts worried about the growing potential for future military conflict.

The canceled trip and subsequent war of words set relations back further. After Mr. Biden ordered the craft shot down, China rejected a request from Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III to speak with his Chinese counterpart — a development that U.S. officials called troubling.

China initially struck a contrite tone about the balloon, saying that it was a weather craft that had drifted off course. But in the following days — especially after the U.S. military identified and shot down three other objects that it now concedes were probably innocuous craft — Beijing’s tone hardened.

Mr. Wang called the United States’ reaction an effort “to divert attention from its domestic problems,” and he said that shooting down the balloon had been “100 percent an abuse of the use of force,” adding that the United States had violated an international convention governing airspace.

Despite the pointed rhetoric, said Danny Russel, a vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, an independent research organization, “the fact that the meeting occurred and that both sides can claim to have delivered their points on the spy balloon may help the two sides put the incident behind them and move on to rescheduling Blinken’s trip to Beijing — which is where the real work needs to get done.”

Mr. Wang has been using the conference in Munich as a platform to tell European leaders and diplomats that China is ready to bolster ties with them and to try to play a role in ending the war in Ukraine. In his public remarks on Saturday, he said that China would soon offer a peace proposal to stop the fighting. But Mr. Blinken warned in a separate event against the allure of cease-fires that Russia might exploit to regroup for new offensives.

Mr. Wang’s entreaties came after China’s leader, Xi Jinping, ended his “zero Covid” policy this winter, paving the way for the country to step back into the spotlight on the world stage. The Chinese government is grappling with a slowing economy and is seeking to bolster trade ties with Europe, amid animosity fueled in part by China’s diplomatic support of Russia.

Mr. Wang also met with Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany on the sidelines of the Munich conference on Saturday, and afterward, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, said on Twitter that China was “ready to fully resume exchanges with Germany and other European countries in various fields.”

Edward Wong contributed reporting from Madrid.

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · February 19, 2023

5. US warns allies at Munich that China may increase support for Russia

US warns allies at Munich that China may increase support for Russia | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand · February 18, 2023

CNN —

The US has recently begun seeing “disturbing” trendlines in China’s support for Russia’s military and there are signs that Beijing wants to “creep up to the line” of providing lethal military aid to Russia without getting caught, US officials familiar with the intelligence told CNN.

The officials would not describe in detail what intelligence the US has seen suggesting a recent shift in China’s posture, but said US officials have been concerned enough that they have shared the intelligence with allies and partners at the Munich Security Conference over the last several days.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken raised the issue when he met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on Saturday on the sidelines of the conference, officials said.

“The Secretary was quite blunt in warning about the implications and consequences of China providing material support to Russia or assisting Russia with systematic sanctions evasion,” a senior State Department official told reporters.

Vice President Kamala Harris also alluded to China’s support for Russia during her speech in Munich.

Antony Blinken and Wang Yi

Blinken and Chinese counterpart meet in first face-to-face since spy balloon shot down

“We are also troubled that Beijing has deepened its relationship with Moscow since the war began,” Harris said Saturday. “Looking ahead, any steps by China to provide lethal support to Russia would only reward aggression, continue the killing, and further undermine a rules-based order.”

Officials said the US is seeing China publicly trying to present itself as a proponent of peace – Wang said in Munich on Saturday that Beijing would be introducing a “peace plan” for Ukraine and Russia – and maintain relationships with Europe, while at the same time quietly aiding Russia’s war effort and considering the provision of lethal aid.

“This warfare cannot continue to rage on. We need to think about what efforts we can make to bring this warfare to an end,” Wang said at the conference.

CNN asked European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Saturday whether she believed, after hearing Wang’s speech, that China is listening to Europe’s message to not support Russia. “The opposite,” she said, has been seen so far.

“We’ve seen that China and Russia signed an unlimited partnership, and I think we need more proof and more action to see that China is not supporting Russia,” she told CNN. “So far, we see the opposite. And therefore, there is an open question on the table.”

In a clip of an interview with CBS’ “Face the Nation” released on Saturday, Blinken said the US has been monitoring possible increased support for Russia from China “very closely” and has “made very clear” to Beijing the consequences of providing weapons or ammunition to the Kremlin.

“To date, we have seen Chinese companies – and, of course, in China there is really no distinction between private companies and the state – we have seen them provide non-lethal support to … Russia for use in the Ukraine,” Blinken said.

Vice President of the United States Kamala Harris speaks at the Munich Security Conference in Munich, Saturday, Feb. 18, 2023. The 59th Munich Security Conference (MSC) is taking place from Feb. 17 to Feb. 19, 2023 at the Bayerischer Hof Hotel in Munich.

Michael Probst/AP

US declares Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine

“The concern that we have now is based on information we have that they’re considering providing lethal support. And we’ve made very clear to them that that would cause a serious problem for us and in our relationship,” he added.

As CNN previously reported, the Biden administration last month raised concerns with China about evidence it has suggesting that Chinese companies have sold non-lethal equipment to Russia for use in Ukraine, in an effort to ascertain how much Beijing knows about the transactions, according to two US officials.

That equipment has included items like flak jackets and helmets, multiple sources familiar with US and European intelligence told CNN. But China has stopped short of the more robust military assistance, like lethal weapons systems for use on the battlefield in Ukraine, that Russia has requested because it has not wanted to be seen as a pariah on the world stage, officials said.

But there are signs now that Beijing could now be considering it, the officials said, and Biden administration officials are warning publicly and privately that the US is monitoring closely for any violations of western sanctions prohibiting military support for Russia.

China and Russia publicly declared a “no-limits” friendship just before Russia invaded Ukraine last year, and Wang is set to visit Russia this month, CNN has reported.

This story has been updated with additional details.

CNN’s Nic Robertson, Kylie Atwood, Jennifer Hansler and Aaron Pellish contributed to this report.

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand · February 18, 2023

6. US, Syrian forces capture ISIS official in helicopter raid

Another "forgotten war."

US, Syrian forces capture ISIS official in helicopter raid

BY JULIA SHAPERO - 02/18/23 10:24 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3865013-us-syrian-forces-capture-isis-official-in-helicopter-raid/

U.S. and allied Syrian forces apprehended an ISIS official in a helicopter raid in eastern Syria on Saturday, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

The raid resulted in the capture of Batar, an ISIS Syria Province official who was reportedly involved in planning attacks on detention centers guarded by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and manufacturing improvised explosive devices, CENTCOM said in a press release.

“Extensive planning went into this operation to ensure its successful execution,” officials wrote.

They also noted that no civilians, Syrian Defense soldiers, or U.S. forces were killed or injured in the raid. They did not, however, provide additional information or evidence against Batar.

CENTCOM claimed in a second release, shared on Twitter, that coalition forces were attacked by rockets in northern Syria on Saturday — but no injuries or equipment losses were reported.

No one had claimed responsibility for the attack as of Saturday evening, and officials are investigating the incident, according to the statement.

The most recent event comes just two days after four American soldiers and a combat dog were injured in a separate helicopter raid that killed senior ISIS leader Hamza al-Homsi.

U.S. forces also killed a key ISIS figure in Somalia in late January. Bilal al-Sudani, an operative and facilitator for ISIS’s international network, had been involved in helping expand the terrorist organization in Afghanistan and across Africa.

7. The Blind Spot: How a gap in Climate Security Strategy leads to opportunities for maligned actors in Strategic Competition.

The Blind Spot: How a gap in Climate Security Strategy leads to opportunities for maligned actors in Strategic Competition.

by Major Alexander Kenna and Major Matthew Alexander

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/blind-spot-how-gap-climate-security-strategy-leads-opportunities-maligned-actors-strategic

As the US military continues to develop its climate security strategy and action plans, the current publications and programs only briefly mention proactive international actions by enhancing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts. However, this approach is not a sufficient response to the complexity of climate insecurity. The current lines of effort for the DOD Climate Adaptation Plan would benefit from an additional measure that is proactive and international at its base.

The oversight of the near-term consequences of destructive climate events such as drought, flooding, rising sea levels, etc., resulting in resource scarcity for vulnerable populations has allowed adversaries of the United States to capitalize on these vulnerable states. This allows these maligned actors access economic, military, and political advantages through providing resources and infrastructure to these fragile populations. While the United States needs to focus first domestically, neglecting international efforts to combat climate insecurity will only further the loss in adversarial competition while endangering US national security.

Through three case studies, we have found that destructive climate events may not be the direct cause of instability; however, they can serve as a threat multiplier that exacerbates underlying vulnerabilities and facilitates insecurity. Climate insecurity has a strategic role worldwide that can increase the chances of competition. Climate security creates a field for the United States to advance influence and compete with adversaries by building and strengthening partnerships while discrediting its competitors.

This oversight in strategy and the evidence of its consequences are demonstrated in three regions of the world: The Syrian drought and the rise of ISIL, state and non-state actors taking advantage of Central America, and China expanding its reach in the Pacific. These three regions represent third-party actors competing for the influence of smaller governments for strategic gains, and the United States has or is currently falling short.

Syria: The Boiling Point

In Syria, an extreme drought gave the momentum for ISIL to cause regional instability and promote its goals of a global caliphate. The drought of the fertile crest from 2006–2011 exacerbated the vulnerabilities of a low-threshold Syrian population while revealing the low-capacity government of the Assad regime, leading to civil war and the eventual rise of ISIL. Before the drought and the mass exodus of people toward urban centers, poverty, and water scarcity were already pervasive within Syrian society, as employment and essential services were scarce. The drought further exposed the Syrian government’s inability to support its population, heightening grievances and resulting in significant migration not only in the middle east but throughout Europe. Accordingly, ISIL was able to capitalize on these grievances and use them as a base for recruitment, leading to an expanded presence that challenged governments in Syria and Iraq and whose effects are felt globally. Ultimately, this regional impact attracted the involvement of global powers such as Russia and the United States, who became involved with competing agendas and remain so today with no foreseeable end in sight.

Central America: The Rock in a Hard Place

Central American climate insecurity leaves opportunities for state and non-state actors to exploit the western hemisphere while threatening the US southern border. In the region, specifically the northern triangle with Nicaragua, climate insecurity issues are caused two-fold by the dry corridor to the west and hurricanes to the east. In combination, these factors degrade countries’ resiliency while increasing instability. The region comprises developing countries with primarily agricultural economies and a history of civil wars and corruption. The low-capacity governments open the door of opportunity for state and non-state actors to increase their influence and legitimacy.

These climate events are also increasing in severity. The existing competition of control by transnational criminal organizations, such as MS-13 and other gangs and cartels, ultimately threatens US national security through the increase of decades-long perpetuated cycles of immigration of those attempting to escape the regional violence and now amplified with climate refugees.

Low-capacity governments looking for relief can be subjected to economic statecrafts, like the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, when no other alternatives exist. The People’s Republic of China already has 21 Latin American countries committed to the Belt and Road Initiative. Addressing the issues of mass migration through the US southern border by the US government has been primarily a reactive approach rather than proactive. Relations between Nicaragua and Russia have steadily grown, with authoritarian President Daniel Ortega receiving military equipment and training aid. Rivals of the United States can weaponize mass migrations by increasing instability.

The Emerging Challenges of the Pacific

China is expanding its reach in the Pacific by exploiting countries most susceptible to rising sea levels. To the world’s surprise, China secretly signed a bilateral security agreement with the Solomon Islands in April 2022. The deal is the first known security pact between China and any nation in the Pacific. It allows China to send security personnel and base naval ships on the Solomon Islands. The security agreement comes when the Pacific finds itself amid strategic competition from heightened tensions between China and the United States. The agreement caught many off guard and is seen as a sign of China’s growing influence and ability to undermine the United States on the global stage.

Pacific Island Countries, like the Solomons, find themselves at the center of strategic competition between China and the United States. Given their location, Pacific Island Countries represent the gateway to Asia and play a pivotal role in movement across the Pacific. Seemingly neglected by great powers over the past decades, these islands are now embroiled in a contest for influence as tensions have recently heightened between the two nations. The small nation islands were left reeling from shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, and their inability to diversify their economies has had consequential effects, rendering them vulnerable to external influence. The competition between China and the United States elevated during the Summer of 2022 as China seeks to sign security agreements and economic deals as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States has pledged additional funding to the islands and reopened embassies to counter Beijing’s strategy. As China and the United States are focused on thwarting each other’s influence through security and economic agreements in the region, the Pacific Islands Nations remain steadfast that their primary concern is the threat of climate change.

These nations are susceptible to destructive climate events as most of their communities reside in low-lying areas. This susceptibility and other preexisting vulnerabilities leave the islands at significant risk. As a result, rising powers, such as China, can view an opportunity, such as climate insecurity, as a window of opportunity to leverage for strategic gains. Therefore, the United States must support and engage on issues deemed vital by the region while strengthening its objectives.

Defend Forward

Adversaries of the United States have been mastering the trade of influencing vulnerable states for years, and the United States is losing ground in the dynamic environment of strategic competition. Climate insecurity has become a shared threat across the world as an increase in global temperatures has and will continue to, lead to a rise in the number and strength of natural disasters, extreme weather events, floods, heatwaves, wildfires, warming oceans, severe drought, and rising sea levels. The threat of climate insecurity has been and will continue to be a point of leverage for state and non-state actors for malign regional influence. How will the United States respond? The 2022 National Security Strategy focuses heavily on global competition and the impact of climate instability, but never in conjunction. US climate insecurity defense efforts are focused primarily on domestic and operational resiliency and contributing to reducing greenhouse gases.

A Defend Forward effort, similar to US Cyber Command’s, with a whole of government approach, would benefit the US in strategic competition and climate security efforts. For specific applications, the effort would collaborate with existing intelligence organizations and develop models to understand, identify, and prioritize efforts at the national level. Delegation of planning and action would be given to each Geographic Combatant Command, working closely with climate security experts. USAFRICOM has already taken the initial steps by addressing climate security issues for the continent at a symposium in February 2022.

Additionally, tactical assessments and engagements of prioritized areas can be executed by existing mobile forces with an enduring global presence once identified. For instance, the US Army Civil Affairs, which specializes in understanding, engaging, and impacting the civil domain, along with other Special Operations Forces, could be mobilized before the execution of planning and funding of projects. The Defend Forward effort could be financed through existing programs focusing on climate security, such as the Build Back Better World Initiative and the PREPARE Action Plan. The tools exist to resolve regional climate insecurity issues that threaten US national security and exacerbate competition. A Defend Forward line of effort can mitigate regional instability and close the door of opportunity for maligned actors created by climate insecurity.

About the Author(s)

Matthew R. Alexander

Major Matthew R. Alexander is an Army Special Operations Civil Affairs Officer with over 11 years in service with multiple deployments to the Middle East and Latin America. He holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the University of Oklahoma and recently received a Master of Science degree in Information Strategy and Political Warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School.

Alexander R. Kenna

Major Alexander R. Kenna is an Army Special Operations Civil Affairs Officer with over 12 years in service with multiple deployments to the Middle East and Latin America. He holds a Master of Arts in Business Management and Leadership from Webster University and recently received a Master of Science in Information Strategy and Political Warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School.

8. Asia’s coming great demographic divide

Excerpts:

In the 21st century, 98% of population growth will be in less-developed countries and the world population is expected to peak before the century’s end.

Demographic change within Asia’s aging powers contributes to increased investments in Asia’s growing states, creating new opportunities for them to benefit from competition among states such as China, Japan and South Korea.

But domestic leaders across the region face mounting political pressures due to inadequate infrastructure for growing cities, another demographically driven challenge.

Asia’s population changes underscore the interconnectedness of the region and the shared challenges that states face. Rather than pushing them further away from each other, Asia’s demographic differences are bringing many states closer together.

Asia’s coming great demographic divide

China, Japan and South Korea set to fall of old-age demographic cliffs while youthful India and Philippines can’t stop mass emigration

asiatimes.com · by Andrew L Oros · February 19, 2023

The trend of Asian populations growing and moving to cities — providing cheap labor, demand for modern infrastructure and high economic growth — has reached a turning point with China now joining countries with shrinking populations in the region.

Still, the aging and shrinking countries of Northeast Asia are likely to continue to be Asia’s major powers for the foreseeable future but will link in new ways to Asia’s still-growing states.

Asia’s dominant economies — China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — are together experiencing unprecedented rapid population aging. It was only in 1999 that any major country had ever reached a median age above 40, with Japan at 40.4.

Japan continued to have the highest median age in the world in 2021 at 48.4, and its neighbors are close behind. In contrast, the majority of the world’s population lives in poor countries with young median ages — including several Indo-Pacific states such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Asia’s varied demographic transitions are creating surprising new connections. Manufacturing superpowers Japan and South Korea have shifted much of their production to places with more youthful populations. In 2018, over one-quarter of Vietnam’s GDP was created by just one South Korean firm, Samsung.

This is not a one-way street, as production in Vietnam constituted 30% of Samsung’s global sales that year. Youthful countries in the Indo-Pacific such as India and the Philippines also account for some of the world’s largest sources of emigration.

Vietnamese factory workers in a row. Image: Facebook

South Korea is an example of the trends in other Northeast Asian states — including Japan, Taiwan, China and Russia as well as North Korea to a lesser extent — where populations are rapidly aging and have begun to shrink in total size.

Despite South Korea’s continuing rise as an economic powerhouse and its recent increases in defense spending, the country will face real challenges in the coming years. Its working-age population will shrink dramatically and its long-standing practice of conscripting young men into mandatory military service will yield fewer and fewer soldiers.

South Korea will see a nearly 35% reduction in the working-age population (20–64 years old) from now until 2050 based on current fertility rates. Taiwan and China will see 28.6% and 20.6% reductions respectively. For China, that is a decrease of over 186 million people in this age group over the next 27 years.

Immigration is one option to maintain robust working-age populations. A group of regional states — including Australia, New Zealand and Singapore — have embraced this approach to offsetting below-replacement birth rates in their native populations, resulting in continued population growth.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have experimented with receiving more foreign workers but so far have not instituted new programs at a scale that would have a noticeable effect on their rapid aging. Given China’s large population size, immigration is simply not an option to offset a shrinking working-age population.

Vietnam is an example of a group of regional states that are barely managing to maintain a stable population without immigration or rapid aging, while also experiencing numerous internal demographic shifts. The population shift from rural to urban areas is a driver for an urban labor market that fuels Vietnam’s export-driven growth.

The Vietnamese media and public are concerned about the increasing numbers of their young workers moving to foreign countries. At the same time, the growing symbiosis between South Korea and Vietnam is an excellent example of Asia’s demographic interconnectedness, as South Korea continues to locate its lower-cost manufacturing operations in other countries.

Several “middle power” states in the Indo-Pacific are projected to grow and age much more slowly — and are poised to benefit from a “demographic dividend” that Northeast Asian states experienced decades ago.

Young women are set to power India’s economy for years to come. Photo: AFP / Bhagirath Basnet / The Times Of India

India will become the world’s most populous country as early as 2024, with a projected population growth of around 256 million by 2050 — versus a combined projected population loss of 176 million by Russia, Japan and China combined, in addition to more rapid aging of those populations.

This group of states faces very different demographics-related challenges more in line with population-growth fears commonly heard in the twentieth century, such as concerns about having too many mouths to feed and not enough employment options, and the potential resulting political instability.

In the 21st century, 98% of population growth will be in less-developed countries and the world population is expected to peak before the century’s end.

Demographic change within Asia’s aging powers contributes to increased investments in Asia’s growing states, creating new opportunities for them to benefit from competition among states such as China, Japan and South Korea.

But domestic leaders across the region face mounting political pressures due to inadequate infrastructure for growing cities, another demographically driven challenge.

Asia’s population changes underscore the interconnectedness of the region and the shared challenges that states face. Rather than pushing them further away from each other, Asia’s demographic differences are bringing many states closer together.

Andrew L Oros is a Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington College, Maryland, and Mansfield-Luce Asia Scholars Network scholar.

This article, republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.

asiatimes.com · by Andrew L Oros · February 19, 2023

9. Aging Societies (Asia)

Aging Societies

The New York Times · by Claire Moses · February 19, 2023

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Asia’s population is shrinking faster than any other continent’s.

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Seniors lining up for food aid vouchers in Hong Kong. Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

Feb. 19, 2023, 7:48 a.m. ET

Asia faces a problem: Its population is aging faster than any other continent’s. A growing percentage of people in Japan, South Korea and China are over 65, and those countries’ economies are suffering because of a lack of available workers. Governments are struggling to find the money to support retirees.

The problem is pronounced in Japan. I spoke to Motoko Rich, The Times’s Tokyo bureau chief, about what it means when a society ages this quickly.

Claire: You’ve reported on the rapidly graying populations of Japan and other Asian countries. How much is Asia aging, and how did we get here?

Motoko: Let’s start with Japan. Almost a third of the population is over 65. For comparison, in the U.S. that number is about 17 percent. And experts say South Korea and China are on track to reach similar levels in the coming years.

Credit...Source: United Nations Population Division

One reason is the low birthrates in these countries. In China, it was because of the one-child policy. In Japan and Korea, gender inequality and the high cost of raising children played important roles. Because of high expectations at home, it’s hard for women to combine parenting with having a fulfilling career. As a result, more women are postponing childbirth or deciding not to have children at all.

Life expectancy is also long in these countries. Looking from afar, there are some jolly aspects to that, like happy centenarians who are living healthy lives on the Japanese island of Okinawa. But there’s a dark side. Japan has the highest percentage of old people with dementia. And there are not enough workers to take care of them and even to fill the jobs to run the economy.

I understand why an aging population poses challenges within a country. What does it mean for people living elsewhere?

It’s coming for you. Population growth in the U.S. is at extremely low levels. Italy’s population is aging at the fastest rate in the West. Other countries will look toward Asia and learn from it. They’ll see what to do or what not to do.

You can compare the issue to how people used to view climate change: It was happening for many years, but we weren’t paying attention. Societies need to plan for aging, and they’re not well set up to do so. It’s not an in-your-face crisis — it’s a slow-rolling crisis.

Older people in Asia are often in good physical health. What about their mental health?

Mental health is a huge problem. Some people die alone, as my colleague Norimitsu Onishi wrote a few years ago. People have fewer children than they used to. Those children move to cities, and are not in a position to take care of their parents who are left behind in depopulating areas. So old people are living in isolation.

Other than older people working longer, what are some potential solutions?

Bringing in workers from other countries seems to be the only solution, but Japan is notoriously opposed to immigration. A few years ago it changed its laws to allow some workers, but the parameters were strict and it didn’t have a major impact.

Japan is not the only country in the region struggling with this. Last year in China, deaths outnumbered births for the first time in six decades. How is China dealing with its aging population?

China has been scrambling to forestall the decline by ending its one-child policy and encouraging families to have more children, including — like in Japan — the subsidizing of assisted reproductive technology, in the hopes that it will spur more births.

You recently wrote a story about older people in Tokyo working manual jobs. How did you get that idea?

I wanted to do the story because I see it everywhere. A few years into living here, I hired movers. When they showed up, they looked like grandparents. My husband and I kept offering to help — they seemed way too old to be doing this kind of labor. When you open the door for a delivery, often the person looks too old to still be working.

If you go into the post office or banks, there’ll often be a selection of reading glasses at the counter. There are also little nooks where people can hang their canes. In train stations, there’s more seating for older people, but also more old people nimbly climbing the stairs than I was used to seeing in New York. It’s very clearly an older society.

Motoko Rich is The Times’s Tokyo bureau chief. Her first front-page story from Japan was about the middle-aged dissolution of a beloved boy band.

10. A controversial idea: Jets for Ukraine in exchange for treaty talks with Moscow

A controversial idea: Jets for Ukraine in exchange for treaty talks with Moscow - Breaking Defense

Giving excess fighter jets to Ukraine now will help ensure its safety in the future - but the NATO nations should have strings attached, write Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake.

By ROBBIN LAIRD and ED TIMPERLAKE

on February 17, 2023 at 11:05 AM

breakingdefense.com · by Robbin Laird · February 17, 2023

F-16 Fighting Falcons from Eglin Air Force Base fly over a high school football game in Niceville, Fla., Sept. 24, 2021. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Tristan McIntire)

This is the latest in a series of regular columns by Robbin Laird, where he will tackle current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise in both the US and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives of the past should inform decisions being made today.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the NATO nations have largely followed a “new weapon of the month club” approach. It often feels like leadership in Washington, London and elsewhere puts up a good face about having a strategic plan, then quickly capitulates when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy makes a full-court press to the public.

The result: a steady flow of land-based weapons going to Ukraine with no strings attached. And while there are good reasons to support Ukraine — they are, without question, the victim in this war — this situation is becoming untenable. Simply sending more armored vehicles to Ukraine without a clear calculus behind it will only mean pushing Ukrainian forces into a death trap of a war of attrition, with a country with 11 time zones and a historical willingness to throw as many bodies at a problem as possible.

It’s time the NATO nations remember that if they are supplying the weapons, they should have a political say in what happens with Ukraine’s future. And it’s time for them to realize a path forward for ending the conflict. We need war termination, and we need airpower as a way to enhance Ukrainian capabilities and to inform the Russians that Ukraine will never be theirs.

Our proposal: the West should train Ukrainian pilots on modern aircraft and then provide them with enough jets and airborne ISR assets that they can control their own airspace. And in exchange, Zelenskyy should be told to accept a new boundary with Russia and call a truce.

We know Ukraine has stated it will never accept the lost territory Russia has claimed over the last year. In fact, Ukrainian leaders say, they will not only take those back but then also push into the Donbas. In our estimation, that is simply not realistic; a much more likely outcome is a continued, unending war of attrition with hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides thrown into a meat grinder. Meanwhile, the risk of Russian strongman Vladimir Putin deciding to pull the nuclear option hovers over everything — the single action that must be avoided at all costs.

It is not in the interests of other nations to keep that nuclear threat in play, nor to face the continued humanitarian and economic disaster that the war has created. And these nations are not helpless. As Matthew Paris argued recently in The London Times:

“We do understand, of course, that our weaponry is meant for defence, not attack — but in the heat and uncertainty of war the boundary between those two ideas is hazy indeed. We cannot allow an impression to arise that we in the West are just there to supply free weaponry. We are paying the piper here. The tune is not for Zelensky alone to choose.”

NATO leaders should make it clear they will not provide more weapons if Zelenskyy will not work towards an agreement with Russia that allows them to keep some of the territory they have claimed. It’s not fair or just that Ukraine loses this territory, but it is realistic that it has to happen.

But we will not leave Kyiv defenseless long-term. The other side of this deal is the proliferation of Ukrainian air power. We need to prepare for the defense of Ukraine after the war, even as that war still rages, and airpower is the only means to do so.

The Russians need to understand that the ability of the Ukrainians to conduct effective operations against their aggression will only go up as the Ukrainians — already trained by the California Air National Guard in the Western way of air-enabled ground maneuver operations — shift to modern airpower to be able to defend themselves in the future.

The introduction of airpower is not simply part of the “new weapon a month club” approach. It is about laying the foundation for deterrence in the future and laying down a marker to Moscow that the United States or whatever Western powers provide aircraft is doing so to end the war, not bleed the Ukrainians to death, or let the wars threaten World War III until we are in it.

Understanding why building Ukrainian airpower represents a major shift and transition towards the future is underscored by our recent discussion of the airpower option with our friend and colleague Dave Deptula of the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies.

Deptula underscored that their more than 20 years of partnership with the California Air National Guard has given the Ukrainians an understanding of the multi-role use of combat aircraft and added that the Ukrainians are in fact much more knowledgeable and agile in the use of airpower than might be realized. Deptula made it clear that “Airpower is critical to determining the fate of Ukraine.”

Time is a factor here. Brian J. Morra, author and a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, told us that, “There is no time to waste. If Russian Air Force Commander General Surovikin has the authority from General Staff Chief Gerasimov to shape Russian air operations in 2023, it will be difficult for Ukraine to counter him with their current aviation assets. It’s important to note that Surovikin shifted the air campaign dramatically when he took overall theater command in October 2022. Up to that point, the Russian Air Force was losing far too many aircraft flying close air support missions. So, he changed the emphasis to long-range strikes with cruise missiles, ASMs, and ballistic missiles. Surovikin also moved bombers from two bases in Western Russia after the Ukrainians struck the facilities in late 2022. Russian bombers continue to strike Ukraine, but now they are launching their missiles from deep within Russia, staging from distant bases where the Ukrainians can’t get at them.

“The Russian Air Force pilots are not the bumblers the western press has made them out to be. They were employed poorly until Surovikin’s changes, but they have performed well under duress. I think we’ll see the Russian Air Force perform even better in 2023.”

In other words, there is a short window to work the airpower dimension as part of shaping an American and perhaps Western strategy towards the war. If one combines the use of air defense systems with the provision of new combat aircraft and appropriate strike systems, the Ukrainians could craft a system of defensible airbases as well. This would be crucial to their future defense after the war, and crucial in terminating the war now.

The USAF is in the throes of reducing its inventory of combat air in the hopes of building up new capabilities. A Ukrainian Air Force could be built from this stockpile alone. Other NATO nations can clearly contribute, but the need is to have cohesive airpower for defense of the Ukrainian territory.

We should help create this reality only by positioning the West for war termination. We have to be clear and honest about what American objectives are in this conflict: they are not to support an endless war.

The current approach fuels a long ground war of attrition. Instead, let us force the Russians to face the reality of a Ukrainian air force, equipped from USAF and NATO air forces, to persuade them to negotiate a termination to the conflict — and ensure the Ukrainians are equipped so that they are never invaded again.

Robbin Laird is a member of the board of contributors to Breaking Defense and Ed Timperlake is former CO of VMFA-321 a Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.

11. Kirby: No timeline for end of US support to Ukraine

Kirby: No timeline for end of US support to Ukraine

BY STEPHEN NEUKAM - 02/19/23 9:41 AM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/3865273-kirby-no-timeline-for-end-of-us-support-to-ukraine/

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said on Sunday the U.S. would support Ukraine in its war against Russia for “as long as it takes,” as the Biden administration faces calls from Republican lawmakers to provide a timeline for the end of American support to Kyiv.

“We don’t know, we would like to see it end now,” Kirby said in an interview on “Fox News Sunday.” “As [President Biden] has said … we’re going to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, and he means that. As long as it takes.”

Kirby’s comments come as some Republican lawmakers have pressured the Biden administration to provide Congress with a timeline on when it plans to cease its support of Ukraine.

Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) has led a charge recently for the Biden administration to provide more transparency on U.S. spending on Ukraine, arguing last week that the president must provide a plan for ending the conflict.

“Before President Biden spends another taxpayer dollar in Ukraine, he must lay out a clear plan for ending the conflict in a way that advances our national security interests,” Vance said in a statement. “No more blank checks. It is past time for the President to tell the American people how this comes to an end.”

Kirby on Sunday pushed back against the idea that the U.S. had provided Ukraine with a “blank check.”

“First of all, there’s been no blank checks,” Kirby said just before the war’s one-year anniversary, which will be marked on Friday. “Every single item that we have sent into Ukraine has been done in full consultation with the Congress and we have really enjoyed terrific bipartisan support … we fully expect that that will continue.”

Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. has sent more than $113 billion in support to Kyiv.

12. Blinken: Determination that Russia committed crimes against humanity ‘starkly clear’

Again, what kind of mechanism can be established to hold Putin and his war criminals accountable?

Blinken: Determination that Russia committed crimes against humanity ‘starkly clear’

BY STEPHEN NEUKAM - 02/19/23 7:55 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3865200-blinken-determination-that-russia-committed-crimes-against-humanity-starkly-clear/

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a new interview that the determination that Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Moscow’s war against Ukraine is “starkly clear,” saying U.S. officials will examine every legal possibility to hold Russia accountable.

“The determination that we made — crimes against humanity — that the vice president announced today is unfortunately, starkly clear,” Blinken said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”

“And we’ve seen that almost from day one.”

Blinken’s remarks come after Vice President Harris said in a speech on Saturday that the U.S. had formally determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity.

“The United States has formally determined that Russia has committed crimes against humanity, and I say to all those who have perpetrated these crimes, and to their superiors, who are complicit in these crimes, you will be held to account,” Harris said in Germany.

Blinken during the CBS interview cited some of the horrific details that have been chronicled from the war, including the Russian targeting of civilians and the forced displacement of children, placing them in centers in Russia. Blinken said Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to erase Ukrainian identity.

“President Putin has been trying from day one to erase Ukraine’s identity, to erase its future,” Blinken said. “That’s what’s going on, and that too, is a crime against humanity.”

Blinken also raised concerns over the relationship between Russia and China, saying Beijing is planning on supplying Russia with lethal support — everything from “ammunition to the weapons themselves” — as the war nears its one-year anniversary.

“We’ve been concerned from day one about that possibility,” Blinken said. “The concern that we have now is based on information we have that they’re considering providing lethal support, and we’ve made very clear to them that that would cause a serious problem for us and in our relationship.”

13. Putin Is Angry: Russia Has Suffered 200,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine

An incredible number of casualties. How accurate are the estimates?

Putin Is Angry: Russia Has Suffered 200,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · February 18, 2023

It is no secret that Russian forces have taken heavy casualties in Ukraine. But the exact numbers have been up for debate, with each warring party and independent entity claiming a different figure.

Recently, U.S. officials came out with an assessment that the Russian forces have suffered around 200,000 killed and wounded troops.

Now, British Military Intelligence is corroborating those numbers in its latest operational update on the conflict.

Heavy Russian Casualties in Ukraine

The British Military Intelligence assesses that the Russian military and mercenary forces “have likely suffered” between 175,000 to 200,000 casualties since the start of the war on February 24.

These figures include between 40,000 to 60,000 troops killed in action.

These are devastating casualties for a military that lost approximately 15,000 men in its last major war in Afghanistan—which lasted a decade (1979-1989) and not just 11 months as the current conflict.

The figures also indicate the poor medical services of the Russian forces.

Depending on which figure of killed in action is accurate, we are talking about a ratio of one in five or one in three killed compared to those wounded.

“By modern standards, these figures represent a high ratio of personnel killed compared to those wounded. This is almost certainly due to extremely rudimentary medical provision across much of the force,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

The Russian casualties have skyrocketed since the Kremlin initiated a partial mobilization in September.

The British Military Intelligence added that “artillery has almost certainly inflicted the majority of Russia’s casualties.”

Both sides have been using artillery profusely. The Ukrainian forces have a qualitative advantage because of the Western weapon systems they operate, including the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and M-777 155mm howitzer with the M982 Excalibur precision-guided munition.

But Russian forces have a quantitative superiority, firing more than 20,000 artillery shells a day on some occasions.

As far as the infamous Wagner Group private military company, the British Military Intelligence assessed that it has experienced a casualty rate “of up to 50%.”

According to the U.S. intelligence assessments, the Kremlin has deployed as many as 50,000 Wagner Group mercenaries in Ukraine, the vast majority of who are convicts. Indeed, only 10,000 are contractors and the rest 40,000 inmates who opted for a chance at freedom in exchange for six months in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Assessment

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been releasing a daily update on the Russian casualties.

Overall, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense claimed that as of Friday, Ukrainian forces have killed approximately 141,260 Russian troops (and wounded approximately twice to thrice that number),

Destroyed equipment includes: 298 fighter, attack, bomber, and transport jets, 287 attack and transport helicopters, 3,298 tanks, 2,322 artillery pieces, 6,520 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 467 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 18 boats and cutters, 5,187 vehicles and fuel tanks, 241 anti-aircraft batteries, 2,013 tactical unmanned aerial systems, 221 special equipment platforms, such as bridging vehicles, and four mobile Iskander ballistic missile systems, and 871 cruise missiles shot down by the Ukrainian air defenses.

Expert Biography: A 19FortyFive Defense and National Security Columnist, Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

19fortyfive.com · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · February 18, 2023

14. Axis of Convenience

Excerpts:

For Iran, the turn toward Moscow has not been easy. Tehran long hesitated with its policy of “looking East,” including to Russia, and following the nuclear deal debacle, both the public and the political system were split into two camps. Some Iranians supported building ties with Russia, whereas others continued to oppose it. But the country’s hard-liners generally favor improving relations with Moscow, and they swept Iran’s 2021 presidential election, gaining control over all the country’s levers of power.

That is not to say the Iranian-Russian partnership will be smooth. There are still many disputes that will complicate their ties. Russia will have to balance relations with Iran and its warming ties to Israel, as well as its relationships with Tehran’s Gulf Arab rivals. Moscow and Tehran will also continue to compete in areas such as the energy sector. After the West ramped up its sanctions on Russia, for example, Moscow diverted its oil to China, undercutting Iranian sales. Tehran had to slash oil prices in response.

But both governments appear to be working hard to figure it out. They have a track record of compartmentalizing and being pragmatic in their relationship, working together where they can while ignoring areas of contention. They will continue to push back against Western influence, cushion themselves against isolation, and build alternative coalitions to the U.S.-led order wherever possible. Russia and Iran may not trust or even like each other, but they know how to collaborate in ways that will be useful in the years ahead.

Axis of Convenience

Why Iran’s Partnership With Russia Endures

By Dina Esfandiary

February 17, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Dina Esfandiary · February 17, 2023

In July 2022, as Russia’s offensive in Ukraine was sputtering and Moscow was running low on weapons, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made a major announcement: Iran was providing or preparing to send Russia unmanned aerial vehicles. Tehran denied the accusation, but it quickly became apparent that Sullivan was correct. Between September and November, Russia bought hundreds of Iranian-made Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. Moscow then used these drones, which are small, simple, and hard to detect, to target Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, helping knock out roughly half the country’s power. The drones also helped exhaust Ukrainian resources, allowing the Russians to preserve their own.

In a way, it made perfect sense for Iran to sell weapons to Russia. Iran and Russia are now both isolated from most of the world’s great powers, and so they need all the help they can get. Yet the degree of cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in Ukraine is remarkable in light of the two powers’ acrimonious past. There is no love lost between Russia and Iran, which have a tumultuous history of distrust and betrayal. They fought against each other in multiple wars. Russia meddled in domestic Iranian affairs. Even on geopolitical issues where they famously cooperate, such as the Syrian civil war, the two countries have frequently sparred.

The current relationship between Iran and Russia is still not exactly warm; it looks much more like a business partnership than a genuine friendship. But although a formal alliance between Iran and Russia is still a long way away, their cooperation could prove highly effective. The two sides have grown adept at compartmentalizing different facets of their relationship to ensure that they can partner when it suits them. Their ties span the economic, political, and military spheres. And both Iran and Russia have discovered that the other has much to offer. “We are both antisanctions and against the intervention of the West in the affairs of other countries,” a Iranian diplomat told me, speaking on the condition of anonymity. (The Iranian government has a fraught internal debate over just how close its ties to Moscow should be.) Their partnership, he said, “was only natural.”

ODD COUPLE

For centuries, the Iranian-Russian relationship was plagued by animosity. Sometimes, it featured outright conflict. From when they first made diplomatic contact in the sixteenth century through the eighteenth century, the two states sporadically fought wars. Then, from 1804 to 1813 and again from 1826 to 1828, the two states faced off in sizable conflicts over the control of disputed territories in the South Caucasus. For Iran, both these wars ended in defeat. The Persian Empire was forced to sign punishing peace agreements that ceded massive chunks of territory to Russia, and to this day, Iranians cite the settlement that followed the latter defeat (called the Treaty of Turkmenchay) as a national humiliation. Russia also intervened in Iran’s domestic affairs repeatedly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including by stymying domestic political reforms, attempting to seize more territory, and backing parts of the elite in power struggles against others. This made many Iranians increasingly nervous and afraid of what they saw as the bully to the north.

Despite the continued threat posed by Russia, Iran intensified its political and trade relations with Moscow in the early 1920s. During the Cold War, the United States successfully worked to bring Iran into its orbit and away from the Soviet Union, but Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 isolated Tehran from the West and gave its new regime a need to build relations with Moscow. Even though their two systems had sharp ideological differences (the Soviet Union was avowedly atheist, whereas Iran was a self-proclaimed Islamic Republic), the two states shared a common enemy in the United States, giving them an incentive to collaborate.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Iran and Russia further deepened. In 1995, Russia agreed to supply the light water reactor for Iran’s nuclear power plant in Bushehr. The two governments also boosted military ties, and by 2000, Iran was the third-largest market for Russian weapons. In 2007, Russia promised to sell Tehran the S-300 missile defense system. Trade ties, political relations, high-level exchanges, and security cooperation kept increasing, especially after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.

Centuries of distrust between Iran and Russia now seem like ancient history.

But the two states still remained wary partners. Iran believed that Russia dragged its feet in delivering supplies for its Bushehr power plant and in delivering the S-300 system. After a series of plane crashes, Iran also concluded that Russian aerospace equipment was inferior to Western gear. Even the countries’ cooperation in Syria has been complicated. Tehran wanted Moscow on board with its campaign to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power, but it believed it could dictate the terms of Russia’s involvement; after all, Iran had experience in Syria and soldiers on the ground, whereas Russia was only supposed to provide air cover. But Russia saw itself as the bigger, more capable partner, and it acted as such. Moscow even surprised and antagonized Tehran by striking a cease-fire agreement (albeit one never fully implemented) with Washington in 2016. Iran and Russia continued to work together when their interests aligned, including to keep Assad in office, but they did so with a watchful eye.

Then Russia invaded Ukraine, and Iranian-Russian collaboration ascended to new heights. The two countries conducted multiple high-level meetings, including between Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tehran in July 2022. They deepened their economic ties. During the first ten months of 2022, for instance, Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent, and Russian imports from Iran increased by ten percent. They began removing the dollar from bilateral trade, and they signed a memorandum of understanding that Russia will invest $40 billion in Iranian gas projects, $6.5 billion of which was already contracted out by November.

Iranian-Russian military ties have become especially significant. In addition to the Shahed-136, Iran sent Russia its Mohajer-6 drone, one of its top airborne combat attack vehicles. According to Reuters, Iran pledged to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, potentially including the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, although the United States said it has no evidence such transfers have happened. Iran has also supplied Russia with ammunition and body armor. Iranian military advisers have traveled to the Ukrainian battlefield to provide Russian commanders with assistance, and The Washington Post reported that Iran agreed to help Russia manufacture drones.

This collaboration is not a one-way street. In December, the British ambassador to the United States told Reuters that Russia was poised to offer Iran unprecedented amounts of military support. Later that month, Western intelligence officials reported that Russia was preparing to supply Iran with Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Iran confirmed this purchase in January and added that the jets would be delivered after March. Tehran has also bought helicopters as well as air defense and missile systems from Russia. The level of dialogue between Iranian and Russian military and intelligence officials was already close, but it has become even closer. Centuries of distrust between the states now seem like ancient history.

ENEMY OF MY ENEMY

The new, tighter Iranian-Russian partnership is still the product of circumstance. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would have gone banging on Tehran’s door were it not for the war in Ukraine, which has heightened Russia’s need for weapons while cutting it off from most of the world’s leading suppliers of technology. Iran’s stance is also the product of external stress. As talks on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal have faltered since 2021, Tehran found itself increasingly alone. This isolation was compounded by the protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the Iranian morality police in September 2022, which Tehran responded to with beatings, arrests, and hangings. It linked up with Moscow less because it liked Russia and more because it was one of the few remaining countries willing and able to help.

But historical contingencies frequently lead to durable and consequential unions, and Moscow and Tehran’s bond could prove no exception. The partnership’s enabling conditions, after all, are unlikely to dissipate. Russia’s war in Ukraine is set to grind on, and the Iranian regime shows no signs of moderating its behavior. As a result, neither state can count on emerging from international isolation.

The two countries also have much more they can provide each other. Tehran, for example, could teach Russia a thing or two about how to circumvent sanctions, including setting up bartering deals such as the one they discussed in May 2022, where Iran would import Russian steel in exchange for car parts and gas turbines. Iran also has a formidable military-industrial complex that it developed under sanctions, which could potentially make it a supplier for Moscow. Russia is now an attractive market for the Iranian military, which wants to showcase and export its weapons. Russia can also continue providing Iran with more of its own arms, despite military losses in Ukraine. And Russia has a vote on the United Nations Security Council, which could be useful if the Iranian nuclear crisis again comes before the body.

Russia will have to balance relations with Iran and its warming ties to Israel.

For Iran, the turn toward Moscow has not been easy. Tehran long hesitated with its policy of “looking East,” including to Russia, and following the nuclear deal debacle, both the public and the political system were split into two camps. Some Iranians supported building ties with Russia, whereas others continued to oppose it. But the country’s hard-liners generally favor improving relations with Moscow, and they swept Iran’s 2021 presidential election, gaining control over all the country’s levers of power.

That is not to say the Iranian-Russian partnership will be smooth. There are still many disputes that will complicate their ties. Russia will have to balance relations with Iran and its warming ties to Israel, as well as its relationships with Tehran’s Gulf Arab rivals. Moscow and Tehran will also continue to compete in areas such as the energy sector. After the West ramped up its sanctions on Russia, for example, Moscow diverted its oil to China, undercutting Iranian sales. Tehran had to slash oil prices in response.

But both governments appear to be working hard to figure it out. They have a track record of compartmentalizing and being pragmatic in their relationship, working together where they can while ignoring areas of contention. They will continue to push back against Western influence, cushion themselves against isolation, and build alternative coalitions to the U.S.-led order wherever possible. Russia and Iran may not trust or even like each other, but they know how to collaborate in ways that will be useful in the years ahead.

DINA ESFANDIARY is Senior Adviser in the Middle East and North Africa Program at the International Crisis Group and a co-author of Triple Axis: Iran’s Relations with Russia and China.

Foreign Affairs · by Dina Esfandiary · February 17, 2023

15. Russia’s military planners in Ukraine muddled by anachronism

Features

February 17, 2023

Russia’s military planners in Ukraine muddled by anachronism

The IISS’ Military Balance Report forecasts a spring offensive in Ukraine, with both sides preparing defensive and offensive strategies and western advisors pushing for a combined arms approach to counter Russia’s twentieth-century tactics.

Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite

https://www.army-technology.com/features/%ef%bf%bcrussias-military-planners-in-ukraine-muddled-by-anachronism/

Russian forces have struggled to have the decisive impact expected of them in Ukraine. Credit: Shutterstock/Alex Vog

The Ukraine War has been a bloody, drawn-out conflict without any easily conceivable end. Although a decisive end is not in yet perceivable, striking insights into the likely preparations for a spring offensive were delivered 15 February, at the launch of the Military Balance Report from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

Describing the complicated action-reaction dynamic expected to unfold over the next year, Ben Barry, IISS senior fellow of land warfare and a former director of British Army staff at the Ministry of Defence, surmised the thinking at the heart of the conflict in Ukraine:

“We can be absolutely certain that Ukraine has prepared a defence in depth and that it’s probably concentrating its armoured units in formations as counterattack forces.

“And indeed, I imagine the Ukrainian command would let a serious Russian offensive advance into that territory, inflicting attrition with artillery fire and anti-tank fire, and would then use its armour to deliver decisive counterattacks before going over to the counter-offensive.

“I’m pretty certain that, if the Russian command is applying its own military doctrine, it will be seeking to do the same.”

Russia looks to the past

Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has been mired in command-and-control failures, apparent in Kherson and Kharkiv, with a gradual centralisation of operational command. John Chipman, chairman of the IISS, remarked that while the Russian Forces had shown some battlefield adaptation, including the use of Iranian weaponry and the integration of the Wagner private mercenary army, Russian forces “nevertheless have relied on Russia’s twentieth-century military history for inspiration, using mass provided by personnel and artillery-heavy assaults to grind out victories on the battlefield.”

The theme of anachronistic planning on the part of Russian command was carried forward by Barry, who’s assessment of civilian satellite imagery notes that Russia has “at great effort” built linear networks of anti-tank defences, obstructions such as dragon’s teeth and ditches, and all round defensive hedgehogs at road junctions and towns: “I suspect the Russian military planners would seek encouragement from the Battle of Kursk in 1944, where a deeply layered Soviet defence absorbed two large German armoured spearheads, destroyed them with counteroffensives, and then went over to the strategic offence.”

In the meantime, Barry believes that Moscow will continue to fortify its defences and to launch “First World War style attritional attack” through the remainder of the winter, accepting heavy losses as it pursues the short-term objectives to gain full control of the Donbas, Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts. “It’s not clear if they can yet concentrate enough capable and competent formations to achieve this.”

By springtime, political factors will imperil both sides to engage, with the earliest attacker benefiting from military first-mover advantages but exposed to counterattacks by defender’s artillery and armour. “I’m certain both sides are pressing to do this.

“Now, providing that Ukrainian allies can supply sufficient ammunition and equipment,” says Barry, “political and battlefield leadership, as well as western weapons, may well give Ukraine tactical advantage. But it’s not clear to me that Kiev has enough combat power to rapidly eject Russian forces.”

Manpower and attrition in Ukraine

The question of Ukraine’s capacity to resist attritional attacks lays at the centre of any outlook over the nation’s prospects for victory. Henry Boyd, research fellow for defence and military analysis at the IISS has looked extensively at reports of manpower capability across the duration of the conflict and find that attrition, “certainly for the next year” should not be a limiting factor for the Ukrainian forces’ capability, “but it is one that they will have to bear in mind in terms of their ability to spend blood and treasure.”

Having mobilised earlier than Russia, Ukraine had access to a greater pool of manpower during last year, to the point that Russia was suffering in terms of the numeric balance of military strength before its own mobilisation in the later part of 2022.

During the early stages of the war, Ukraine was able to recruit highly skilled personnel. Many reserve members who had participated in the attritional conflict in the Donbas between 2014 and 2022 were activated and sent back to their respective units.

The casualty rate is not as high as the Russians’, but it is still high enough to be a concern for the future. “I don’t think Ukraine can afford the kind of brutal squandering of manpower in the same way the Wagner group have undertaken in some of their most recent offensives.”

“I think that speaks to some of the reported desire from western advisors to the Ukrainian armed forces,” says Boyd, to shift their offensive approach away from a more traditional Soviet-derived model and towards a western combined arms approach, that “may be a less risky strategy in terms of manpower expenditure for them.”

16. US troops capture ISIS official tied to attacks on prisons

US troops capture ISIS official tied to attacks on prisons

It's the third raid against ISIS in Syria in less than a week.

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED FEB 18, 2023 6:55 PM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · February 18, 2023

American forces, working with the Syrian Democratic Forces, captured an ISIS provincial official in a helicopter raid in eastern Syria this morning, U.S. Central Command announced.

The ISIS official, identified solely as “Batar,” was ”involved in planning attacks on SDF-guarded detention centers and manufacturing improvised explosive devices,” per CENTCOM. No American or allied fighter was injured, nor were any civilians, CENTCOM said.

No additional information on the raid was immediately available.

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The raid is the latest in recent days targeting ISIS officials and commanders. On Wednesday, U.S. forces killed Ibrahim Al Qahtani, identified as an ISIS official tied to prison breaks. On Thursday, another raid in eastern Syria killed Hamza al-Homsi, an ISIS commander in the region. Four American service members and a military service dog were wounded by an explosion during the raid.

Since the terrorist group’s final stronghold of Baghouz fell in 2019, American troops and the Syrian Democratic Forces have been hunting members of the organization. ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi died last February in a U.S. raid.. His similarly named successor Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was killed in November in a firefight with the anti-Assad forces of the separate Free Syrian Army. In total, American forces carried out 313 operations against the militants in 2022.

The United States has been stepping up anti-ISIS operations in recent months. In January American special operations forces killed an ISIS leader and other members in Somalia. That was notable for being a helicopter raid involving ground combat troops, rather than the airstrikes the U.S. mainly does in Somalia against the militant group al-Shabaab. The three raids this past week mark one of the highest intensities of operations in the last several months.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · February 18, 2023

17. ‘Russia thinks they can just wait us out’: US must be ironclad on defending Ukraine, security experts say

‘Russia thinks they can just wait us out’: US must be ironclad on defending Ukraine, security experts say

Stars and Stripes · by Doug G. Ware · February 17, 2023

Soldiers from Battery A, 41st Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, conduct live-fire exercises using the M109 Paladins at the Grafenwoehr Training Area on March 14, 2022. The first class of 635 Ukrainian fighters has finished a five-week advanced U.S. training course in Germany on sophisticated combat skills and armored vehicles, including M109 Paladins, that will be critical in the coming spring offensive against the Russians, the Pentagon said Friday, Feb. 17, 2023. ((Capt. Patrick M. Connelly/U.S. Army via AP))

WASHINGTON – Continued military aid for Ukraine to help beat back invading Russian forces is necessary to ward off a new era of tyrannical aggression and the U.S. must make Russian President Vladimir Putin understand the West won’t give up the fight, a panel of security experts said Friday.

“[Western aid] is critically important,” said Emily Harding, the deputy director of the International Security Program for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. “As much as Ukraine is doing amazing things in this war, they cannot arm themselves for a long fight.”

The think tank held a panel discussion Friday on the war in Ukraine as it approaches its one-year anniversary on Feb. 24. Since Russian forces began their attack nearly 12 months ago, the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in weapons and equipment to Ukraine in its fight against Russia. Over time as the fighting has grown fiercer and the Ukrainians needs to fight off the Russians have become greater, the U.S. has expanded the types of weapons it has provided, including the Patriot air-defense system, long-range precision rockets, armored assault vehicles and tanks. Ukrainians have even requested fighter jets as they prepare for an expected Russian offensive in the spring.

Michael Vickers, who was the undersecretary of defense for intelligence for four years during former President Barack Obama’s administration, said the top priorities for U.S. should include sending more long-range bombing equipment such as the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS.

“It’s number one on my list,” Vickers said. “We also ought to be giving them more of what they have if we’re going to win this.”

Earlier this month, President Joe Biden agreed for the first time to give Ukraine long-range small-diameter bombs, but Vickers said sending ATACMS would greatly expand long-range capabilities for Ukraine. Biden, however, has yet to yield to Ukraine’s request for U.S. fighter jets. The country has planes of its own, but some can’t fly and none of them are as sophisticated as American-made F-16s, F-18s and F-35s.

Vickers said it’s important for the United States and its Western allies to drive home the message that they won’t get tired of defending Ukraine. If support for Ukraine weakens, it would only encourage Putin and other dictators to take territory that they want by force, the panelists said.

“We need to be in this to win it and really make it clear, rather than, ‘We’re with them as long as it takes, but we hope they get this over with soon,’” Vickers said.

Russia’s expectation is we will tire of the war, Harding said.

“[Russia] thinks they can just wait us out,” she said. “They think they can drive wedges into the West and that, eventually, we’ll lose patience with this kind of conflict. Any signal that we send that we are not in it for the long fight just lends credence to their hope that they can wait us out.”

Since the war began, some polling has shown most Americans support defending Ukraine, but the majority could be shrinking as the war drags on. The experts said Friday that type of dwindling support is precisely what Putin wants. Many Western experts and officials have said Putin’s goal is to create a new version of the former Soviet Union, a superpower that controlled much of Europe. That desire, the panelists said, could keep the Ukraine war going into 2024 or longer.

“Putin’s objectives haven’t changed. So, we need to show him that … not only can’t he achieve [those], he going to lose more,” Vickers said. “The only way that Ukraine can really lose is if the West, led by the United States, gives up. Then I think it would have far-reaching consequences.”

Some U.S. officials and experts, including former Defense Secretary Mark Esper, have stated their support for continuing U.S. military aid to Ukraine in recent weeks and have said weapons and equipment should be sent quicker because a slow, drawn-out process only gives Russia time to regroup and plan.

“We have done sort of the right things, and we have said sort of the right things, but what we haven’t really seen is a sense of commitment, of urgency and scale,” said Eliot Cohen, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. “What I would like to see us do is full commitment, that we’re in this to win and to really defeat Russia.”

He said any fears that U.S. support for Ukraine could provoke Russia into expanding the war are unfounded.

“The escalatory argument is ridiculous,” said Cohen, a foreign policy adviser for former President George W. Bush. “What exactly are the Russians going to do that they haven’t already done? They’re going to begin, what, attacking Ukrainian power plants? The only kind of escalation that would be meaningful would be nuclear weapons. There’s a whole bunch of very, very good reasons why the Russians would not do that. So, this is just one of those cases where we have been deterring ourselves.”

Biden is scheduled Monday to travel to Poland, which borders Ukraine on the west, to mark the one-anniversary of the war. He’s set to give a speech in Warsaw on Tuesday and spell out how the U.S. will “continue to stand with the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes,” the White House said.

While in Poland, Biden will meet with Polish President Andrzej Duda and other regional leaders before returning to the United States on Wednesday.

Stars and Stripes · by Doug G. Ware · February 17, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 2023

Feb 18, 2023 - Press ISW

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Aging Societies

The Morning

A controversial idea: Jets for Ukraine in exchange for treaty talks with Moscow - Breaking Defense

Giving excess fighter jets to Ukraine now will help ensure its safety in the future - but the NATO nations should have strings attached, write Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake.

Kirby: No timeline for end of US support to Ukraine

Blinken: Determination that Russia committed crimes against humanity ‘starkly clear’

Putin Is Angry: Russia Has Suffered 200,000 Dead or Wounded in Ukraine

Heavy Russian Casualties in Ukraine

The Ukrainian Assessment

Axis of Convenience

Why Iran’s Partnership With Russia Endures

By Dina Esfandiary

ODD COUPLE

ENEMY OF MY ENEMY

￼Russia’s military planners in Ukraine muddled by anachronism

Russia looks to the past

Manpower and attrition in Ukraine

US troops capture ISIS official tied to attacks on prisons​

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED FEB 18, 2023 6:55 PM EST​

The latest on Task & Purpose

‘Russia thinks they can just wait us out’: US must be ironclad on defending Ukraine, security experts say

In China, a Web of Actors Weave Foreign Policy

Beijing is often framed as a unitary actor, but the reality is that many actors influence policy decisions.

Russia’s military planners in Ukraine muddled by anachronism

US troops capture ISIS official tied to attacks on prisons

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED FEB 18, 2023 6:55 PM EST