Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"We live in a world where the funeral matters more than the dead, the wedding more than the love and the physical rather than the intellect. We live in a container culture, which despises the content."

– Eduardo Galeano

"Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these things. Among them are a few Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician or businessman. Their number is negligible and they are stupid."

– President Dwight Eisenhower, (in a letter) November 8, 1954.

Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind.”

― Bertrand Russell

1. [Exclusive] "Prisoners in the North are defecting, want to go to South Korea" Interview with a North Korean soldier captured in the battlefield

2. Chinese influence in South Korea a focus in Yoon impeachment hearings, analysts say

3. Donald Trump's Mission: Make America's Allies Spend More on Defense

4. AI Data Center With Up to 3 Gigawatts of Power Is Envisioned for South Korea

5. The American threat to South Korea’s conservatives

6. 1 of 2 N. Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine voices intent to go to S. Korea: report

7. Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0

8. N. Korea imports missile parts under guise of civilian trade

9. Discussing withdrawal of North Korean troops in Ukraine war ending talks?

10. 4 officials under Moon get suspended prison terms in N. Korean fishermen deportation case

11. China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity

12. Yoon to attend 1st preliminary hearing of his criminal trial

13. South Korea’s Democracy and Martial Law: A New Future Emerging in Crisis

14. ‘I want to defect to South’: North Korean soldier captured in Kursk breaks silence

15. Ukraine broadcasts appeal to North Korean soldiers to surrender

16. S. Korea to provide protection in case captured N. Korean soldiers want to come to South

1. [Exclusive] "Prisoners in the North are defecting, want to go to South Korea" Interview with a North Korean soldier captured in the battlefield

This is apparently the first ever video interview conducted by Korean media (Chosun Ilbo) with captured north Korean prisoners. It is in Korea but the Google translation of the article provides a wide range of interesting insights. Note this member of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) (kind of the nK SOCOM/CIA) said he was training as an international student. I assess that to mean he was being prepared for an overseas espionage assignment.

This is a Google translation of the Chosun Ilbo article. A 7 minute video (in Korean) is at the link. And photos, maps, and graphics are at the link.

Excerpts:

-What is your original unit?

“Reconnaissance General Bureau.”

-Did you serve as a private?

“Yes, I am old enough to be discharged. I enlisted in 2015.”

-I heard you served as a reconnaissance or sniper.

"yes."

-What story brought you to Russia?

“I was training as an international student. I didn’t know I would be participating in combat.”

-When did you first know you were going to be involved in combat?

“We came to the Kursk region, and there was a place called the waiting area, and they told us about it there.”

-How did you get to Kursk?

“Take the train, take the plane, take the bus.”

-How many people came together?

“About 2,500 people came.”

https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2025/02/19/2BJNO4FH2RGNDHZZDGW2NSGUC4/

[Exclusive] "Prisoners in the North are defecting, want to go to South Korea" Interview with a North Korean soldier captured in the battlefield

https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2025/02/19/2BJNO4FH2RGNDHZZDGW2NSGUC4/

Our paper met two North Korean POWs who were captured last month after being deployed to the Russian military. Mr. Lee (26, left) and Mr. Baek (21), who were deployed after 10 and 5 years of military service respectively, said that they were members of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and were under the surveillance of North Korean security agents. / Correspondent Jeong Cheol-hwan

Kyiv (Ukraine) = Reporter Jeong Cheol-hwan

Posted 2025.02.19. 05:03

Updated

2025.02.19. 08:08

Last month, our paper met with two North Korean prisoners of war who were captured while being deployed to the Kursk Front in Russia to help Russia, which had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Mr. Lee (26, left) and Mr. Baek (21), who were deployed after 10 and 5 years of military service respectively, said that they were members of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and were under the surveillance of North Korean security agents. / Kiev (Ukraine) = Correspondent Jeong Cheol-hwan

The paper recently met two North Korean prisoners of war who were captured by the Ukrainian army during the war with Russia on the 9th of last month at a prisoner-of-war camp in Ukraine. This is the world’s first media interview with North Korean prisoners of war. Reconnaissance and sniper Lee Mo (26) and rifleman Baek Mo (21), who served in the North Korean army for 10 and 4 years respectively and were deployed to Kursk, Russia in October and November of last year, were each staying in solitary cells deep in the detention facility. The North Korean soldiers were all known to be members of the Storm Corps, but in interviews, both stated that they were “soldiers from the Reconnaissance General Bureau.”

In the interview, Lee and Bae revealed for the first time that the prisoners were spying on and controlling the North Korean army in Kursk and fanning hostility by lying that “South Korean troops deployed in Ukraine are attacking North Korean troops with drones.” Lee said, “(The security agents) said that all Ukrainian drone pilots are South Korean soldiers.”

Both are only children. Mr. Lee is from Pyongyang and said, “I came here on October 10th last year after hearing that I was going abroad to receive training.” Mr. Baek said, “My father died the year I enlisted, so I was left with only my single mother (50).” The two, who are still in their early to mid-20s, said, “My dream was to go to college and study after I was discharged.” Mr. Lee also said, “I want to go to South Korea.”

The interview with the North Korean POWs was conducted after a complex negotiation process. When I held the hands of the two young men, they were so rough and thick that I couldn’t believe they were in their 20s. I could feel the fine scars and tree bark-like calluses from long hours of labor and harsh training on both palms. The two responded to the farewell message, “Let’s meet again in good health,” with a hug. The two interviews will be published in two parts. The first is with sniper Lee.

※Editor’s Note: In reporting on the interview with the North Korean POWs deployed to Russia, this magazine did not reveal the POWs’ real names, nor did it specifically reveal some information that could lead to their identities. This is a measure to protect the POWs’ human rights in accordance with international law regarding prisoners of war. However, since the Ukrainian government has already revealed the two men’s faces multiple times in the photos and videos and they have been spread worldwide for over a month, we have decided that mosaicing them will not help, and have decided, after an editorial meeting, to use the photos and videos without mosaics.

◇“I didn’t see my parents even once during my 10 years of military service… Most soldiers are only sons”

Mr. Lee, a 26-year-old North Korean soldier who was interviewed by this newspaper, is pictured shortly after he was arrested by Ukrainian authorities last month. He has a wound on his jaw and his face is wrapped in a bandage. Regarding his injury at the time, Mr. Lee said, "The bullet went through my arm, broke my bone, and went through my jaw, completely breaking it." /Telegram

North Korean soldier Ri Mo (right), who was captured last month after fighting Ukrainian troops in Kursk, Russia, is being interviewed by correspondent Jeong Cheol-hwan (left). Compared to immediately after his capture last month, the wounds on his face have healed significantly. Ri revealed that all of his comrades who were deployed with him have died, and sighed, saying, “Most of them were only sons. How must their parents feel?” / Correspondent Jeong Cheol-hwan

<1> 26-year-old sniper Lee

North Korean soldier Lee ○○ (26), who was deployed to Kursk Oblast, Russia, where Russia and Ukraine are engaged in combat, was captured as a prisoner of war after being injured late last year. He had suffered serious injuries to his right arm and jaw when he was captured by the Ukrainian military on the 9th of last month. In the video that first revealed his existence to the world, he was unable to speak, his jaw tightly wrapped, and his expression was clearly strained. When we met him in a solitary cell in a prison camp in Ukraine about a month later, he had recovered significantly. The pressure bandage on his jaw had been removed, and he was able to speak, albeit slurred. The large gunshot wound on his jaw was visible as it healed.

Graphics = Kim Hyun-guk

There was a small Chinese TV in his room, and music was playing. When we were about to start the interview, he picked up the remote control and turned down the TV volume. He asked questions in the middle of the story, saying, “You said you were a reporter, right?” Lee said that although he was from Pyongyang, where the privileged class of North Korea lived, he had suffered a lot due to the difficult environment. He then swallowed his tears as he said, “Now I have come to the battlefield and have survived many near-death experiences.”

-Are both your parents in Pyongyang?

“(Nodding)”

-There will be brothers too.

“I am Hanana.”

-Your parents don't know that Mr. ○○ is here.

“Yes. I don’t know. I haven’t had any contact with the house since three months before I left.”

-When did you leave for Russia?

“We left on October 10th. We originally went to Chagang Province to help with the recovery from flood damage, but withdrew after a month… We went to the training ground and trained, and left in early October and arrived in Russia.”

Graphics = Yang Jin-kyung

-So when did you arrive in Kursk?

“It was probably mid-December. I was transferred here after training in Vladivostok (Russia).”

-Is there anything you would like to say to your parents?

“Honestly, my mother and father are sick. They are seriously ill. My father has difficulty moving, and my mother has difficulty even digesting food. If the government of our country finds out that I was captured and that I am a prisoner, my father and mother will not be able to stay in Pyongyang.”

(However, the Ukrainian government already released a video of him last month. Accordingly, it is presumed that their identities have been confirmed. In order to reveal the truth about North Korea, our newspaper is also publishing his remarks as they are.)

-What is your original unit?

“Reconnaissance General Bureau.”

-Did you serve as a private?

“Yes, I am old enough to be discharged. I enlisted in 2015.”

-I heard you served as a reconnaissance or sniper.

"yes."

-What story brought you to Russia?

“I was training as an international student. I didn’t know I would be participating in combat.”

-When did you first know you were going to be involved in combat?

“We came to the Kursk region, and there was a place called the waiting area, and they told us about it there.”

-How did you get to Kursk?

“Take the train, take the plane, take the bus.”

-How many people came together?

“About 2,500 people came.”

-North Korea is currently refusing to acknowledge the fact that our young people are coming here to fight.

“It’s a secret.”

-Why do you think that is?

“The possibility that external conditions (the stance on external relations) may be damaged, etc.”

-Did you have any difficulties with the Russian military?

“We didn’t talk much with the lower ranks, and everything was organized at the higher ranks. Things like ammunition and clothing were all negotiated at the higher ranks and supplied, so we didn’t really talk to the soldiers or the Russians.”

-How did you communicate?

“I used a smartphone translator.”

-Did you use a smartphone while you were in Pyongyang?

“I first used the smartphone translation function here because I had never dealt with foreigners before.”

-Is the deployed unit (Storm Corps) a loyal unit?

“Because it has high combat power. It is said to be at the forefront of construction, combat missions, etc… Do you know about the Samjiyon construction?”

-What is that?

“It’s a construction project to build Samjiyon City (a tourist city strategically redeveloped by Kim Jong-un). (Our unit) left in December to do the construction, and there was a lot of snow and cold. In 2019. When we got there, we went into the mountains where there was no one, and the snow reached up to our chests. We had to build barracks there, but if we used a pickaxe all day to dig up a single stone this big, a single stone from a lump of ground, our hands would freeze (a motion as if saying that they were freezing). The weather was harsh. It was so cold that if you peed, it would immediately freeze and fall off.”

-Where is it colder compared to Kursk?

“It’s colder there. There’s nothing here.”

-How about a meal while you're here?

“My jaw hasn’t healed yet, so I can’t eat hard food. Like porridge… Or I want to eat ramen, but I can’t eat ramen.”

-Why did you get injuries to your jaw and arms?

“We entered the battle on January 5th. All the units that were at the forefront were sacrificed first. Many were sacrificed because of drones and artillery fire. Russia did not properly fire artillery (for defense), so we made many reckless sacrifices. Even when they did fire artillery, they only fired toward the rear (of the Ukrainian military), so we made reckless sacrifices.”

Ukrainian drone camera footage from December last year showing a scene of an attack on a suspected North Korean soldier. There is a Santa Claus doll hanging from the front. /Ukrainian Special Operations Forces

-How many people went out that day?

“We’re going to do a rear-end strike team, and three of us… The rest of the company is going to start attacking from the beginning and end of the windbreak. We’re going to jump in and start attacking while creating confusion from the rear. But we got ambushed when we got in there… We might not have been ambushed, but we got caught because of the drone.”

-Didn't you learn much about drones during your training?

“I learned it. There is no separate combat format for drones or anything like that. When we were training, we trained like ‘only the fast ones survive.’ We only trained to run when they appear, hide in a concealed place, or shoot from the ground with a gun, but we never trained to shoot down drones directly.”

-So, you must have learned a little about drones while making sacrifices.

"yes."

-What happened after it was discovered by the drone?

“There were three of us in my group, but the leader and my subordinate had already been shot and fell, and I was the only one left. So I was desperately shooting at the ground, trying to hide in a favorable terrain, and then I got shot.”

-Where did it hit?

“The bullet went through his arm, broke his bone, and passed through his jaw. His jaw was completely shattered. Then he lost consciousness… He must have lost a lot of blood, so he fell unconscious. When I opened my eyes, it was night. I was hit at dawn. When I tried to get up, I felt dizzy because I grabbed my head and turned it… After sitting there for a while, I decided to go back the way I came, and that’s when I met our (North Korean) soldiers. But it wasn’t our company, it was a different company from our battalion. They bandaged up [his jaw and arm] like this.”

-If you took such emergency measures, why didn't you come back together?

“If you look at it that way… Do you know what a ‘Devil’s Drone’ is?”

◇“All my comrades in the company died and I was the only one who survived… If I had a grenade, I might have blown myself up.”

-What is that?

“It was a huge drone carrying a bomb… It was a drone with a thermal imaging sensor that dropped bombs every night. It kept circling in the sky, and the drone searched for it with its thermal imaging sensor and dropped grenades, so we couldn’t go there. So we went to an area we controlled and hid there. But at around 3 a.m., the Ukrainian military, riding in armored vehicles, fired machine guns from the armored vehicles, and sent Ukrainian soldiers into our controlled area to conduct an operation. So we were all doomed if we stayed in that hiding place, so we said, ‘Let’s get out now,’ and on our way back, another drone attacked and saved us. One or two people died, and I was the only one who survived.”

-There were several people, but only one survived.

“There were five people besides me, and all five of them were sacrificed.”

-What happened next?

“It was a dark night, and since I didn’t know the terrain very well, I just went there thinking, ‘If I just get over that ridge, it’ll be my area,’ but it wasn’t.”

-You're going in the wrong direction.

“Because I went the wrong way… I had to find my way back and go again, and I was taken prisoner while I was climbing. At the time, I couldn’t use my arms and I had no bulletproof vest, no grenades, no knives, no weapons. And because I was injured, I couldn’t carry heavy things… So even if I resisted in that state, I would have definitely been captured. If I had had a grenade, I might have blown myself up… .”

-Were you ordered to blow yourself up?

“In our People’s Army, prisoners are like traitors.” (Meaning that they were instructed to blow themselves up if captured)

-What should I do going forward?

“I have a lot on my mind.”

-You'll probably think a lot about your parents too.

“I miss my parents so much that I can’t stand it. (Thinks for a while) My place of service is Sincheon, South Hwanghae Province. It’s close to Pyongyang. (But) I never went home during my military service.”

-You haven't been there once in 10 years?

“Yes. I’ve talked to my parents on the phone many times, but I’ve never met them.”

-If you go back north now, there will be many more hardships.

“Of course.”

-Do you have anything set in stone about the future?

“(Nodding) 80% of the decision has been made.”

-How did you decide?

“(After thinking for a while) You said you were a reporter, right? (After thinking for a while) First, I will apply for refugee status and (after thinking for a while) I will go to South Korea. If I apply for refugee status, will you accept me?” (Regarding this, a Ukrainian official said, “Whether North Korean prisoners of war can go to South Korea depends on the South Korean government.”)

-Is there anything you would like to say to your comrades in Kursk?

“First of all, I am curious about the current combat situation. Has Kursk been completely liberated now?” (meaning that the Ukrainian army has been driven out)

-No. We were not liberated.

"(sigh)."

-Is there a possibility that (North Korean troops) will be deployed somewhere other than Kursk?

“You said you were going to liberate Kursk. Isn’t that what’s in the Kursk area? Isn’t that where uranium and nuclear energy are?”

-There is a nuclear power plant, a nuclear power plant. (The dispatched North Korean troops) are supposed to guard that.

"yes."

-That is a very important matter as we carry out the operation in Kursk now.

“(Nodding)”

-Do you remember anyone among the comrades from the unit you were deployed with?

“Almost all of them were sacrificed. Everyone who came into the army with me was sacrificed. In my company, all of my comrades were sacrificed. None of them were sacrificed.”

-How many people are in a company?

“There were about 63 to 65 of us… There were about eight of us in our corps. They were all killed. I was the only one left. It was my first time fighting in my life. When I went and saw the bodies of my comrades, I had many thoughts. (They were afraid of being captured) They blew themselves up, but their heads and upper bodies were gone… I was lying down in this freezing cold with snow falling, and the smell of blood still remains….”

-What were you instructed to do with the bodies of your colleagues?

“I said I would find the body and take it away after the battle was over….”

-Have you never actually seen it in action?

“(Nodding).”

- (Even if the body is recovered) it will be difficult to identify it.

“(Sigh) Ahh… What about those parents? (In North Korea) they usually have one or two children, but most of them are only sons. (Sigh) I was the last one in my company to participate in the battle. The platoons that had gone before were all mobilized, so there were a lot of casualties and people were taken to the hospital. Until then, we had been helping the companies that were fighting, carrying the wounded, and providing supplies, and then we were mobilized because we were short on personnel. But who would have thought there would be so many deaths… So I participated in the battle last, and it was really intense… It was the first time I saw (people) die. It was the first time I saw someone get shot right next to me or die from a grenade explosion. The people I had talked to and fought with didn’t say anything.”

-You said devil drone earlier, because it looks like a ghost. You mentioned reconnaissance drone, but what other drones are there?

“Suicide drone. We let our guard down with drones. Drones were the worst… . Many casualties occurred because of drones.”

- Are there people from the Ministry of State Security (North Korea's intelligence agency) in the unit?

“There are one or two people from each battalion (about 500 people).”

-Do these people usually exercise a lot of ideological and disciplinary control?

“They control us both ideologically and operationally. (The security service people) said before I went into battle that (Ukrainian military) drone pilots, all of those drone pilots were South Korean soldiers.”

-Did you all believe that and fight like that?

“(Nodding).”

-While fighting, there will be Ukrainian troops, but you will think that you are fighting with South Korean soldiers.

“(Nodding).”

-Are you saying that's why we have to fight more tenaciously?

“This is our first time experiencing actual combat. It probably won’t be easy to fight. From the beginning of the training, it’s been a bit, how should I put it, more ideologically vicious than physically. It’s like a mountain march, physical training, shooting training, and it’s all purely evil… . We trained desperately because we thought it would be shameful to fall, so it’ll be hard.”

-Did you hear a lot about South Korea when you were in the North?

“I haven’t heard much about it.”

-Have you ever watched a drama or listened to music?

“I’ve listened to some music, but I haven’t watched the drama. If you watch the drama wrong, you can get arrested.”

-What did you originally want to do? Please tell us more.

“(After discharge) I studied and tried to go to college. Originally, if you look at my father’s relatives, they were all from a family of scientists. So I also wanted to study… . I had a lot of hardships at home. My family was so poor that I had a hard time, and I suffered a lot financially, so I had a lot of hardships with money and other things. Also, after serving in the military, I was mentally and physically devastated, and I think I experienced all the adverse conditions a human being can experience. I almost died many times… . Now I’ve really survived a near-death experience and become a prisoner. (Sigh) I also want to fulfill my dreams so as not to disappoint my parents. I want to make my dreams bloom. (Sigh) I’m still young.”

◇4 keywords to read North Korean soldiers

Construction of Samjiyon City : A large-scale construction project carried out by North Korea's Kim Jong-un in Samjiyon City, Ryanggang Province, near Mt. Baekdu from 2018 to 2021. It is evaluated that Samjiyon, which was called 'the city of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il' and the city of revolution, was transformed into 'the city of Kim Jong-un.' North Korea is propagandizing that it has been redeveloped into an international tourist destination by building high-rise hotels and other facilities.

Storm Corps : An elite special forces unit under the North Korean Special Operations Forces. It is similar in nature to the South Korean Special Warfare Command (Special Forces), but is larger in scale and has a wider operational scope. The total number of troops is estimated to be 40,000 to 80,000, and it is composed of young soldiers in their 10s and 20s. It is known that many of the North Korean soldiers dispatched to Kursk, Russia, which has been at war with Ukraine since last year, belong to this unit.

Chagang Province flood : A large-scale flood that occurred in Chagang Province in northern North Korea in July of last year. It was a disaster in which floods and landslides occurred simultaneously in the areas around the Amnok River and its tributary, the Jangja River, causing great loss of life and property. It is reported that more than 200 houses were buried and the number of casualties reached 1,000. It is also reported that the refusal of international aid caused residents to become dissatisfied with the Kim Jong-un regime.

Kursk Nuclear Power Plant : A nuclear power plant in Kursk Oblast, western Russia, bordering Ukraine. Two reactors are in operation. It is located about 60 km from the Ukrainian border. Safety concerns have been raised as Ukraine recently invaded Kursk Oblast and fighting has broken out in some areas. It is reported that most of the North Korean troops deployed were deployed to Kursk.

2. Chinese influence in South Korea a focus in Yoon impeachment hearings, analysts say

Excerpts:

"I would expect Beijing to increase its efforts, as it sees South Korea's political upheaval as ripe for Chinese malicious intervention," said Dennis Wilder, a senior fellow at the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University.

"China's goal will be to weaken the democracy and to support those in favor of better ties with Beijing at the expense of the U.S. alliance," said Wilder, who served as the CIA's deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific from 2015 to 2016.

"The key to defeating China's ambition is intense and sustained counterintelligence programs. The United States has a great deal to teach South Korea in this area, and the CIA and the FBI should work with the South Koreans to improve their ability to spot and deter Chinese covert operations," Wilder added.

"Everything on the Korean Peninsula affects U.S. security,” said David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. "President Yoon is right to call attention to what China is doing. Ideally, it would be wonderful to have a coordinated [U.S.] response with South Korea.”

Chinese influence in South Korea a focus in Yoon impeachment hearings, analysts say

February 18, 2025 10:21 PM

By Christy Lee

https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-influence-in-south-korea-a-focus-in-yoon-impeachment-hearings-analysts-say/7980160.html

Acting head of the Constitutional Court Moon Hyung-bae and other judges arrive for the impeachment trial of South Korea's impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol at the Constitutional Court in Seoul, South Korea, Feb.18, 2025.

WASHINGTON —

South Korea’s Constitutional Court is approaching the final phase of proceedings before it decides in March whether to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol over his brief martial law bid in December.

Since its first official hearing on Jan. 14, exactly a month after the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon, the court has held nine hearings; the last is scheduled for Thursday.

China has become a central issue at some of the hearings, with analysts saying that South Korea-U.S. counterintelligence coordination is crucial in deterring Beijing influence operations that threaten both countries.

Yoon's attorney, Cha Gi-hwan, raised concerns about what he alleged was China's interference in South Korean politics, elections and media at several proceedings, apparently in defense of Yoon's statement made in December.

Yoon had said "anti-state forces" were operating in South Korea while explaining his decision to impose martial law at the time and highlighted Chinese nationals using a drone to film a U.S. aircraft carrier docked at the port city of Busan.

He had said the opposition parties blocked a revision to anti-espionage law, preventing the prosecution of foreign nationals spying on South Korea.

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) pushed for an amendment to the law to broaden its scope from targeting "enemy states" to include "foreign countries,” citing threats posed by Chinese espionage. The opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) blocked the revision for fear of potential misuse of the law.

Cha said at a hearing on Feb. 11 that China has been interfering in South Korean politics by having its companies and people residing in South Korea fund and support pro-China politicians, manipulate public opinion and spread fake news unfavorable to those who oppose pro-China politicians running for election.

Chinese Ambassador to Seoul Dai Bing on Feb. 10 denied widespread accusations among Yoon's supporters that Beijing interfered in South Korean politics and elections. He wrote on X that Beijing "has all along upheld the principle of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs."

Growing threat

In testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month, Dartmouth University professor Jennifer Lind said the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conducts malign influence operations that aim "to bolster authoritarianism, discredit democratic governance and reshape global norms in China's interests."

The Senate hearing was about “The Malign Influence of the People’s Republic of China” in the U.S. and abroad.

Analysts in Washington said if Yoon is removed from the office, China will conduct full-fledged malign operations in the country.

"I would expect Beijing to increase its efforts, as it sees South Korea's political upheaval as ripe for Chinese malicious intervention," said Dennis Wilder, a senior fellow at the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University.

"China's goal will be to weaken the democracy and to support those in favor of better ties with Beijing at the expense of the U.S. alliance," said Wilder, who served as the CIA's deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific from 2015 to 2016.

"The key to defeating China's ambition is intense and sustained counterintelligence programs. The United States has a great deal to teach South Korea in this area, and the CIA and the FBI should work with the South Koreans to improve their ability to spot and deter Chinese covert operations," Wilder added.

"Everything on the Korean Peninsula affects U.S. security,” said David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. "President Yoon is right to call attention to what China is doing. Ideally, it would be wonderful to have a coordinated [U.S.] response with South Korea.”

US-South Korea coordination

If the court decides to remove Yoon from office, main opposition party leader Lee Jae-myung is considered a candidate for an election to be held within 60 days.

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said, "Statements by party chief Lee Jae-myung indicate the party will pursue a more conciliatory policy toward China and North Korea, more antagonistic toward Japan, and place less emphasis on strengthening the alliance with the United States."

Klingner, formerly the CIA's deputy division chief, told VOA on Thursday, "The Trump administration will look for South Korea and other Indo-Pacific democracies to pursue stronger policies against the multifaceted China threat, including supporting roles in Taiwan contingencies. The [main] Democratic Party of Korea would resist such entreaties, which will cause strains with Washington."

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said at a news conference after meeting with NATO defense ministers in Belgium on Thursday that working with Pacific allies South Korea, Japan and Australia will be "critical" in dealing with the Chinese threat.

Korean Service's Kim Hyungjin contributed to this report.

3. Donald Trump's Mission: Make America's Allies Spend More on Defense

There are two funding issues.

First is each ally's contribution to their own defense. The target for NATO members had been 2% of its GDP.

Second is the incremental cost funding for US forces stationed in a host nation. Traditionally and usually per the Status of Forces Agreement the host nation agrees to fund the incremental costs which are the unique costs associated with the US forces being stationed in the host country and over and above what the costs are for the force if it were stationed in the US. This "payment" usually comes in the form of services - the payment to utilities companies, the salaries of host nation workers supporting US forces on the US the bases, and facilities construction. No money goes from the host nation to the US treasury.

Donald Trump's Mission: Make America's Allies Spend More on Defense

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 18, 2025

US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been hugely controversial. In the first month, he has chided and even threatened US friends and allies. He seems particularly determined to upset US partners in North America – a bizarre development no one anticipated.

Trump has talked up annexing Canada and Greenland. He has hinted at attacking Mexico over the drug trade. He suggested the US might snatch the Panama Canal from Panama.

The response has been predictable. At a recent US-Canada hockey game, Canadians booed the singing of the US national anthem and fights between the players broke out immediately.

Trump seems to thrive on disruption – even for its own sake.

It is not clear why else Trump has staked out these rather extreme position. Canada, for example, will obviously not join the US unless it is coerced. The US has not had war plans against Canada in almost a century, and it would be shocking if the US public supported an invasion of Canada.

It would create an insurgency right on America’s border and destroy allied trust in the US overnight. The whole idea is so fantastical that one wonders why Trump keeps mentioning it.

These early comments portend an erratic course for Trump’s foreign policy. On Ukraine, for example, it is a good bet that Trump will swerve repeatedly.

He clearly has a personal fondness for Vladimir Putin, but he will also not wish to be blamed for Ukraine’s destruction. His predecessor – Joe Biden – never recovered in the polls from the perception that he ‘lost’ Afghanistan in 2021.

But there is one area, ironically, where Trump’s disruption-for-its-own-sake may help US foreign policy – the long-running US effort to get its allies to spend more on defense and develop better, more capable, more deployable militaries.

The Allied Free-Riding Debate

American presidents and secretaries of defense have famously complained for decades that US allies do not spend enough on defense. For years, American pundits have suggested that US allies treat the country as ‘Uncle Sucker’ – always willing to pay more for defense while allies cut their own defense spending.

The best known measure of this claim is the NATO exhortation that its members spend 2% of their gross domestic product on defense. Many members have not met that benchmark for a long time.

Over time, this has resulted in European militaries which often cannot deploy far from their shores without US infrastructural and logistical support. In the 2011 Libyan war, for example, Britain and France pushed to intervene, but after a brief run of air sorties, they could not maintain their operational tempo without US support.

Ostensibly, Germany – one of the worst European free-riders – had a revelation that it must step up after Russia invaded Ukraine. Little came of that.

In east Asia, the problem is a little better. America’s South Korean ally has spent well-above 2% for most of its history. It can fight and defeat North Korean conventionally without US assistance. But Japan, like those European allies, has been woefully deficient – although it, like Germany, is now signaling a build-up.

Trump is Obsessed with the US being ‘Ripped Off’

Other US presidents in the last twenty-five years – George Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden – could not cajole these allies to credibly commit to greater spending. These presidents and their staffs were committed liberal internationalists.

They genuinely believed in multilateral institutions and US alliances. So their threats at allies were not credible; NATO states did not believe the US would walk away.

By contrast, Trump’s threats are credible. He does like international organizations or US allies much. His instinct is to withdraw the US from these bodies.

Trump deeply believes that the US is being ‘ripped off’ by its allies and trade partners. This is why he so vigorously supports tariffs. It is also why he keeps telling US allies to spend way more on defense. Unlike in his first term, his foreign policy team this time around agrees with him.

President of the United States Donald Trump speaking with attendees at the 2019 Student Action Summit hosted by Turning Point USA at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, Florida.

There is a wide consensus in academic international relations that alliances are good for states. They allow a country to project power more easily and provide support in a conflict. So previous US abandonment threats were often not credible.

However, Trump prefers disruption and rejects the US foreign policy consensus.

Partial abandonment of allies will do a lot of damage as a result, but a silver lining outcome will be likely be that they finally spend more.

About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly

Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. You can find him on X: @Robert_E_Kelly.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 18, 2025

4. AI Data Center With Up to 3 Gigawatts of Power Is Envisioned for South Korea

AI Data Center With Up to 3 Gigawatts of Power Is Envisioned for South Korea

Few global facilities possess more than a gigawatt of power, making electricity for artificial-intelligence computing increasingly scarce

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/ai-data-center-with-up-to-3-gigawatts-of-power-is-envisioned-for-south-korea-5141bd77?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos3

By Asa Fitch

and Timothy W. Martin

Feb. 18, 2025 8:00 am ET

While the data centers of South Korea now largely meet domestic demand, the country is regarded by investors as having what is needed for a facility with global reach. Photo: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg

An investor group is planning one of the world’s largest data centers for artificial intelligence in South Korea, a sign of red-hot AI demand across the globe despite concern about the AI boom’s staying power.

If completed as envisioned by its backers, the data center will cost as much as $35 billion and pack up to 3 gigawatts of power. That is nearly three times the planned capacity of a data-center complex in Texas that OpenAI and SoftBank Group are funding as part of their Stargate project in the U.S.

Globally, it is rare for a single site’s available power—which determines how many number-crunching AI chips can be installed—to exceed 1 gigawatt. Power availability has become a constraint as AI models have become more complex and require more chips that gobble up more electricity. According to the research group Epoch AI, developing the largest AI models will likely require more than 5 gigawatts of electricity by 2030.

In the U.S., areas with affordable land and access to sufficient power and data connectivity have become increasingly scarce, posing a challenge to companies eager to expand. As America’s grid runs into challenges, other countries are moving fast to add to their data-center footprints.

The project in South Korea is planned in the country’s southwestern region, far from its capital, Seoul. Construction is set to begin early this year and complete by 2028. The backers—an investor group organized under a company called Stock Farm Road—plan to put in $10 billion to start and invest up to $35 billion over the long term. That company’s founders are Brian Koo, grandson of the founder of the South Korean conglomerate LG, and Amin Badr-El-Din, the founder and chief executive of BADR Investments, based in London and Jordan.

Koo said that while South Korea’s data centers now largely meet domestic needs, the country has the right ingredients for a bigger facility that could serve the world.

Brian Koo is one of the founders of Stock Farm Road. Photo: Han Myung-Gu/WireImage/Getty Images

Getting the site up and running faces significant challenges. The investors said they have signed an agreement with South Korea’s South Jeolla province, which could assist with access to energy and water, among other resources. A strained supply chain for data-center construction and persistent supply constraints on AI chips from Nvidia threaten to hold back many such projects around the world.

OpenAI and SoftBank are spearheading the $500 billion Stargate project in the U.S., and European and Middle Eastern entities are increasingly pursuing data-center projects. In Asia, the South Korean site would be competing against data-center campuses sprouting up in Malaysia, Thailand, India and other countries where land and labor cost less.

“If they can do it cheaply and timely, there’s definitely an opportunity there” for the South Korean facility, said Jingwen Ong, a research manager who oversees the Asia-Pacific region at the research firm DC Byte.

Write to Asa Fitch at asa.fitch@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com

5. The American threat to South Korea’s conservatives

Professor Robertson raises the key and fundamental question: Will the US act against South Korean core interests?

Excerpts:

For decades, South Korea’s conservatives have shaped policy around an unspoken assumption: that the U.S. will never act against Seoul’s core interests. This belief has led them to dismiss critics who warn of U.S. strategic flexibility and to ignore signs that Washington is increasingly willing to make decisions based on its own priorities.

Direct U.S.-North Korea negotiation would force a painful reckoning. It would demonstrate that American foreign policy is dictated by national interest, not ideological loyalty or shared sacrifice.

More importantly, it would highlight the fundamental weakness in South Korea’s conservative approach: the failure to develop a foreign policy that does not depend entirely on Washington’s goodwill.

The U.S. meeting with Russia to discuss Ukraine’s future without Ukraine should be a wake-up call for South Korea. If Washington is willing to engage with Moscow at Kyiv’s expense, there is no guarantee it won’t do the same with Pyongyang at Seoul’s expense. South Korean conservatives, who have built their political identity on unwavering faith in the U.S., could soon find themselves abandoned, their worldview shattered, and their influence diminished.

The inevitable consequence would be a radical shift in South Korean conservatism. As faith in the U.S. alliance crumbles, a new brand of conservatism would emerge—one that is more ethno-nationalist, fiercely independent, and determined to pursue an autonomous nuclear deterrent.

South Korean conservatives would likely embrace a more self-reliant defense strategy, including an accelerated push for nuclear armament, much like Park Chung-hee once envisioned. Additionally, the idea of reunification could take on a more elitist and economically motivated character, with certain factions viewing it as an opportunity for consolidation of power and profit (for some) rather than national unity. The era of uncritical pro-Americanism would give way to a pragmatic, self-serving elitist nationalism, fundamentally reshaping the political landscape of South Korea for generations to come.

The American threat to South Korea’s conservatives

Within a single term, could we see the foundations of contemporary South Korean conservatism crumble?

https://www.junotane.com/p/the-american-threat-to-south-koreas-conservatives?utm

Feb 18, 2025

At conservative protests in South Korea, it is not uncommon to see demonstrators waving American flags - or even (in)famously dressing up as Captain America. The symbolic act underscores a deep-rooted belief that the United States is an unwavering ally, committed to South Korea, and acting in its interests. The emergence of America First policies and Washington’s growing tendency to prioritize its own strategic interests over those of its allies upends this conviction. Within a single term, could we see the foundations of contemporary South Korean conservatism crumble?

The U.S.-Russia discussions about Ukraine in Saudi Arabia, notably excluding Ukraine itself, raise a disturbing precedent in international diplomacy. If the United States is willing to negotiate the future of a sovereign nation without its direct involvement, one must ask: Could South Korea face a similar fate?

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Given Washington’s strategic flexibility and prioritization of its own national interests, it is entirely plausible that the U.S. could soon engage in direct talks with North Korea while sidelining South Korea. Ending North Korea’s Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and accepting its mid and short-range nuclear arsenal. Such a scenario would be an existential crisis for South Korean conservatives, whose pro-American stance has been a cornerstone of their political identity since the late 1990s (it’s important to note that South Korea’s conservatives were not always slavishly pro-American. They were, once upon a time, pro-Korean, accepting the U.S. begrudgingly as necessary, but less often fully trusting in U.S. motives).

The notion of a U.S.-North Korea negotiation without South Korea is not far-fetched. It is a deep-seated and very real South Korean concern. The Trump administration’s direct talks with Kim Jong-un in 2018-2019 demonstrated that Washington is willing to break long-standing diplomatic norms when it sees fit. The exclusion of Japan and South Korea from these talks alarmed U.S. allies in the region. While Trump ultimately failed to reach a deal, the precedent was set: the U.S. is capable of bypassing allies if it believes doing so serves its strategic interests.

In the case of Ukraine, the U.S. is moving toward a pragmatic approach that prioritizes a negotiated settlement with Russia over Kyiv’s and Brussels’ objectives. If the same principle is applied to the Korean Peninsula, Washington may one day view direct engagement with Pyongyang as the quickest path to regional stability—even if that comes at Seoul’s expense.

There are several reasons why the U.S. might choose to negotiate with North Korea without South Korea’s direct involvement.

First, Washington's overriding interest in promoting an America First foreign policy could drive it to engage with Pyongyang directly if it sees an opportunity to limit North Korea’s ICBM ambitions. North Korea is not a direct threat to the U.S. but rather only U.S. interests. ICBMs makes it a direct threat. If the U.S. believes that an agreement with Pyongyang could serve the defense of the U.S., it might consider Seoul’s objections a secondary concern.

Additionally, despite the long-standing alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, Washington’s primary regional focus is countering China rather than managing inter-Korean relations. If direct engagement with North Korea could contribute to this broader Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea’s position might be disregarded. From a purely strategic perspective, a deal with Pyongyang—especially one that imposes constraints on North Korea’s ICBM program—could be more valuable to the U.S. than adhering to Seoul’s preferred approach.

Political considerations within the U.S. also play a role. The unpredictability of American foreign policy means that a future administration, Republican or Democrat, could decide that engaging North Korea directly is the best course of action. The Trump-Kim summits provided a precedent, showing that a U.S. president could pursue diplomacy with Pyongyang in ways that break traditional norms. If such a move is politically advantageous or seen as a legacy-defining opportunity, South Korea’s exclusion might not be a significant deterrent.

Moreover, a divergence in threat perception between Washington and Seoul is increasingly evident. South Korean conservatives view North Korea as an existential threat, while the U.S. sees Pyongyang as a manageable challenge. This fundamental difference means that Washington could prioritize diplomacy with North Korea even if it conflicts with South Korea’s hardline stance.

The assumption that American interests will always align with Seoul’s is proving to be an outdated notion.

While President Yoon Suk-yeol has embraced an overtly pro-U.S. stance, prioritizing Washington’s strategic goals without reservation, former President Park Chung-hee pursued a far more independent foreign policy that prioritized South Korea’s national interests. Park was deeply skeptical of American intentions, particularly regarding security commitments, and sought to develop South Korea’s own nuclear weapons program to reduce reliance on U.S. guarantees. He also negotiated substantial financial compensation from the U.S. in exchange for sending South Korean troops to Vietnam, ensuring economic benefits for his country. Yoon, in contrast, has shown little inclination to demand reciprocity from Washington, instead aligning South Korea closely with U.S. policy objectives even at the risk of alienating other regional actors. This stark contrast highlights how South Korean conservatives have shifted from a pragmatic nationalism under Park to a more deferential and dependency-driven approach under Yoon.

South Korea’s conservative bloc over recent years has relied on unwavering faith in the U.S. alliance as the foundation of its security policy. This time has passed.

If Washington were to engage in direct diplomacy with Pyongyang without Seoul’s involvement, it would shatter these foundational assumptions. The conservative narrative—built on the notion that U.S. interests are permanently aligned with South Korea’s—would be exposed as an illusion. The political consequences would be severe:

Crisis of legitimacy: Conservative leaders would struggle to explain to their base why the U.S. was willing to cut deals with the very regime they have demonized for decades.
Internal fractures: The South Korean right could face internal divisions, with some advocating for a more independent foreign policy and others doubling down on their U.S.-aligned stance.
Rise of alternatives: If conservatives are seen as overly dependent on Washington, centrist or progressive parties advocating for a more autonomous foreign policy could gain traction.

For decades, South Korea’s conservatives have shaped policy around an unspoken assumption: that the U.S. will never act against Seoul’s core interests. This belief has led them to dismiss critics who warn of U.S. strategic flexibility and to ignore signs that Washington is increasingly willing to make decisions based on its own priorities.

Direct U.S.-North Korea negotiation would force a painful reckoning. It would demonstrate that American foreign policy is dictated by national interest, not ideological loyalty or shared sacrifice.

More importantly, it would highlight the fundamental weakness in South Korea’s conservative approach: the failure to develop a foreign policy that does not depend entirely on Washington’s goodwill.

The U.S. meeting with Russia to discuss Ukraine’s future without Ukraine should be a wake-up call for South Korea. If Washington is willing to engage with Moscow at Kyiv’s expense, there is no guarantee it won’t do the same with Pyongyang at Seoul’s expense. South Korean conservatives, who have built their political identity on unwavering faith in the U.S., could soon find themselves abandoned, their worldview shattered, and their influence diminished.

Share Junotane

The inevitable consequence would be a radical shift in South Korean conservatism. As faith in the U.S. alliance crumbles, a new brand of conservatism would emerge—one that is more ethno-nationalist, fiercely independent, and determined to pursue an autonomous nuclear deterrent.

South Korean conservatives would likely embrace a more self-reliant defense strategy, including an accelerated push for nuclear armament, much like Park Chung-hee once envisioned. Additionally, the idea of reunification could take on a more elitist and economically motivated character, with certain factions viewing it as an opportunity for consolidation of power and profit (for some) rather than national unity. The era of uncritical pro-Americanism would give way to a pragmatic, self-serving elitist nationalism, fundamentally reshaping the political landscape of South Korea for generations to come.

6. 1 of 2 N. Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine voices intent to go to S. Korea: report

1 of 2 N. Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine voices intent to go to S. Korea: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 19, 2025

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- One of the two North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine has expressed his wish to go to South Korea, a news report said Wednesday, in what would be the first known case for a North Korean captive to voice an intent to defect to the South.

A North Korean solider, identified only by his surname Ri, said in an interview with the Chosun Ilbo that he never knew he would engage in combat against Ukraine as he was told that he would be sent to Russia for training as an overseas student.

"I have made up my mind 80 percent ... Above all, I will seek refuge and am thinking about going to the Republic of Korea (ROK). If I apply for asylum, would they take me?" Ri said, when asked about his plan for the future.

Ri is one of the two wounded North Korean soldiers captured by Ukrainian forces last month during combat against Ukraine in Russia's Kursk region.

It marked the first time that a North Korean solider captured by Ukraine has expressed an intent to defect to South Korea since North Korea sent around 11,000 troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine.

A wounded soldier, suspected to be North Korean and captured by Ukrainian forces, is seen in this file photo posted on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Telegram on Jan. 11, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Ri, born in 1999 and served as a scout sniper in North Korea, said he belongs to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the North's intelligence agency.

"(Officials from the North's state security ministry) said pilots of the Ukrainian military's drones are all ROK soldiers," Ri said, adding that he engaged in combat with Ukraine while believing he was fighting against South Korean troops.

Ri, who sustained serious wounds to his jaw and arm, said almost all his comrades from a military unit were killed due to Ukraine's drones and artillery attacks. He also said he could have tried to blow himself up if he had a grenade because being held prisoner in North Korea amounts to a betrayal.

As a North Korean solider captured by Ukraine has expressed his wish to defect, what draws attention will be whether the South Korean government would kick off consultations with Ukraine over the issue.

South Korea's Constitution stipulates that the entire Korean Peninsula is defined as its territory, effectively recognizing all residents on the peninsula as its nationals.

"As North Korean soldiers are our nationals according to the Constitution, (the government) plans to hold discussions with Ukraine if they request defection to South Korea," foreign ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong told a press briefing last month.

The National Intelligence Service, Seoul's spy agency, also cast a similar stance during a parliamentary session in January that what intent North Korean prisoners have is very important.

But it remains unknown whether the process to bring such North Korean captives to South Korea would be smooth, as the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (POWs) stipulates that POWs shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.

Some experts, however, argue that the North's case may be an exception to such a repatriation duty under reference documents of the International Committee of the Red Cross, given that Ri could face serious human rights violations if he is sent back to North Korea.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 19, 2025

7. N. Korea orders surprise amnesty for Kim Yo Jong children rumors

Do I want to be lenielty forgiven? Does that mean I only get 5 months hard labor instead of 6? (note sarcasm)

N. Korea orders surprise amnesty for Kim Yo Jong children rumors

On Dec. 31 of last year, Korean Central Television ran a scene of Kim walking with two children during a report on New Year celebrations at Rungrado 1st of May Stadium

https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-orders-surprise-amnesty-for-kim-yo-jong-children-rumors/

By Jeong Seo-yeong - February 19, 2025

Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and senior Workers' Party official, walks with two children outside May Day Stadium during a New Year's celebration broadcast by North Korean state television on Jan. 1. (Korean Central Television via YouTube/Screen capture)

Rumors remain rife in North Korea after the country’s media late last year disclosed images of children presumed to be those of Deputy Department Director Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Several people found themselves in trouble as rumors spread that the two children who appeared in broadcasts were Kim Yo Jong’s. However, the People’s Committee of South Pyongan province recently issued an extraordinary internal order to “leniently forgive people who spread rumors.”

“Some people are having a tough time after being dragged off by party organizations or even local branches of the Ministry of State Security to write self-criticism letters and the like as talk circulates about Comrade Kim Yo Jong and her children, but the party committee of South Pyongan province got directly involved on Feb. 7 and issued an internal order,” a source in South Pyongan province told Daily NK on Friday.

On Dec. 31 of last year, Korean Central Television ran a scene of Kim walking with two children during a report on New Year celebrations at Rungrado 1st of May Stadium.

According to the source, rumors quickly spread among Pyongsong residents that the two children who appeared in the broadcast were Kim’s children, though some residents were unsure about this.

Some Pyongsong residents ran afoul of the authorities for spreading rumors and were summoned by party organizations to write self-criticism letters, with suspects even dragged off to the Ministry of State Security in severe cases. The situation is ongoing.

“People were certain that the children belonged to Comrade Kim Yo Jong, even though the TV didn’t introduce them as such,” the source said. “Almost everyone said so, and even officials appeared unsure, and with the party and judicial agencies doing nothing to stop the talk, rumors that the children were Kim’s naturally continue.”

When the rumors began circulating, party and law enforcement organizations issued an internal order for officials and their families to “watch what they say and do and keep an eye on public opinion because the rumors could transcend simple interest to become big political problems.” In other words, officials took a wait-and-see approach rather than aggressively respond.

However, as rumors gradually spread about the so-called “Mount Paektu bloodline,’ including Kim Yo Jong’s children, the matter was reported to Pyongyang and some people were summoned by party organizations and the Ministry of State Security.

However, with South Pyongan province’s People Committee suddenly issuing an order to “forgive” people who spread rumors about Kim’s children on Feb. 7, all those in hot water were released or freed from restrictions, the source said.

People responded with surprise, the source said. “The Supreme Leader’s [Kim Jong Un] and Comrade Kim Yo Jong’s children are a sensitive matter, and we’d never seen the authorities tell officials not to punish people who spread rumors about them,” they said. “It’s quite surprising because such things usually get you dragged off immediately or subject to criticism.”

However, some people have criticized the rumors, saying the party never officially said they were Kim’s children and that people “shouldn’t mind whose children they are and instead raise their own children well,” the source said.

Read in Korean

7. Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0

So many other scenarios to consider such as Kim facing a severe internal instability threat. You can't look at any of the scenarios below and ignore the impact of potential internal instability in the north.

Excerpts:

In a series of scenario planning exercises hosted by KIMEP University’s DPRK Strategic Research Center on January 31st, we explored Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0, contingent on four scenarios:

The U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve
The U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen
The U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen
The U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve

We considered the likelihood of four factors:

Bilateral or multilateral agreements
Deals involving DPRK military and diplomatic security
Deals involving development assistance
The DPRK to implement political and economic reforms

Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0 - Daily NK English

How shifting U.S.-China relations and global priorities could reshape Trump's approach to North Korea in a potential second term

By Dr. Jacob Reidhead - February 19, 2025

dailynk.com · by Dr. Jacob Reidhead · February 18, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump in Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. The two leaders have not met face-to-face since. / Image: Rodong Sinmun

A second Trump-Kim Jong-un meeting is likely under Trump 2.0, but what will come of it?

A Glimpse at U.S.-China Relations under Trump 2.0

Whether or not Trump and Kim rekindle their bromance diplomacy, Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0 are also likely to be influenced by U.S.-China relations.

In short, even under Trump and Kim’s best intentions, Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0 are highly contingent on American priorities amid a host of global conflicts and the fluid triad of relations among the U.S., China, and the DPRK.

Four scenarios – a planning exercise

In a series of scenario planning exercises hosted by KIMEP University’s DPRK Strategic Research Center on January 31st, we explored Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0, contingent on four scenarios:

The U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve
The U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen
The U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen
The U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve

We considered the likelihood of four factors:

Bilateral or multilateral agreements
Deals involving DPRK military and diplomatic security
Deals involving development assistance
The DPRK to implement political and economic reforms

Scenario 1

In Scenario 1, the U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve.

Under Scenario 1, a Trump-Kim meeting is very likely. If talks proceed in a low-threat context, denuclearization may be on the table, but substantial outcomes are not likely unless both parties fully commit to the process. In an environment with positive U.S.-China relations and reduced tensions in East Asia, Trump will likely not see this as a high priority. The biggest obstacles in this scenario are not the negotiations themselves, but the global crises competing for Trump’s attention.

Scenario 2

In Scenario 2, the U.S. engages DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen.

Worsening U.S.-China relations would definitely make multilateral cooperation on the DPRK less likely, but rather elevate the security threat in East Asia. This scenario may turn Trump’s attention towards East Asia. The DPRK may take advantage of this scenario by raising tensions, and U.S.-DPRK negotiations may start on rockier ground, but Trump may also be more invested in finding a resolution.

A similar deal may be possible under Scenario 2 as in Scenario 1, if Trump takes a pragmatic approach – arms control in exchange for aid and continued talks – and avoids inflammatory topics. Amid heightened security concerns between the U.S. and China, denuclearization will be an absolute non-starter.

In short, a Trump-Kim reunion is even more likely under Scenario 2 than Scenario 1, but any deal will necessarily be more pragmatic and focus on achievable short-term goals.

Scenario 3

In Scenario 3, the U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK, and U.S.-China relations worsen.

Scenario 4

In the final scenario, the U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK, despite improvements in U.S.-China relations.

This scenario could emerge if Trump’s China policy is influenced by the tech CEOs in his coalition, and he remains too preoccupied with Ukraine, Gaza, and other global crises, therefore prioritizing them over the DPRK. As with the last scenario, transparent multilateral frameworks are highly unlikely. China is likely to engage with the DPRK pragmatically and behind closed doors.

Unlike Scenario 3, improved U.S.-China relations may lower the overall threat level in East Asia, making provocations on the Korean peninsula less likely to destabilize the region. As a result, Xi and the U.S. may pay less attention to the DPRK, resulting in a neglected DPRK resorting to greater agitation, potentially through weapons tests and expanding its military alliance with Russia.

Pyongyang’s prospects

Scenario planning reveals a few insights into Pyongyang’s prospects over the coming four years. From the DPRK’s perspective, Scenario 2 may be the most ideal as U.S.-China tensions in East Asia may provide Trump with greater incentives to strike a deal. Even in the event of favorable U.S.-China relations, multilateral talks are unlikely.

The RoK will not be happy with any scenario that deprioritizes the DPRK’s complete denuclearization, but South Korea’s incoming president will likely go along with any talks that at least address security. To that end, Scenario 2 may also be the best optimal outcome for Seoul.

From the U.S. and China’s perspective, Scenarios 1 and 4 are ideal, as stepping back from military and trade hostilities will provide each the chance to address rising economic and budgetary concerns. The DPRK is presently not a priority for either major power, but both would like to avoid a crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Realistically, there is a strong likelihood that no country’s ideal is realized.

Scenario 3 most closely resembles the status quo under the Biden administration, and at present, U.S.-China divisions appear to be widening. Even if Trump does engage with the DPRK, it’s difficult to see either side striking a meaningful, long-term framework due to the multitude of distractions competing for Trump’s attention, not to mention North Korea’s reluctance to trade away its most valuable bargaining chip.

It seems the DPRK’s prospects may yet depend on its delicate balancing of provocation and negotiation – in order to extract maximum concessions without drawing too much ire from its would-be appeasers.

Citations:

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/24/world/asia/trump-north-korea-nuclear-talks.html

[1] https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/donald-trump-says-he-will-reach-out-to-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un-again/
https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/trump-to-pursue-complete-denuclearization-of-north-korea-white-house-says/
[3] https://time.com/7201565/person-of-the-year-2024-donald-trump-transcript/
https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-kim-trump-us-nuclear-ce6d2842f8de1265a6a9042990c1d6d4
[5] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-denuclearization-russia-china
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/27/trump-elon-musk-sriram-krishnan
[7] https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3290861/china-should-seize-moment-promote-peace-korean-peninsula
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/opinion/us-north-korea-china-russia-axis.html
[10] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-denuclearization-russia-china
[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/world/asia/north-korea-trump.html
https://www.dw.com/en/south-korea-fears-being-sidelined-by-trump-kim-revival/a-71493990
[13] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3287522/how-xis-korean-peninsula-warning-highlights-beijings-political-headache-all-sides
[14] https://www.jstor.org/stable/447045
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/china-russia-north-korea/
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/26/axis-of-impunity-putin-kim-deal-underlines-new-challenges-to-world-order
[1] If anything, Trump’s team is trying to moderate expectations. National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes tried to walk back Trump’s reference to North Korea as a nuclear power and insist that Trump will pursue complete denuclearization.[2]
Time Person of the Year interview, Trump mentioned Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, Iran, and Russia multiple times. By contrast, he mentioned North Korea only once and in reference to its activities in Ukraine.[3] A similar question of priorities may be raised for Kim as the DPRK is tied up in these same conflicts.[4]
[5] If Musk and other tech CEOs in Trump’s inner circle foster stronger U.S.-China business relations and cooperation, the U.S. and China may conceivably cooperate on North Korea as well.[6]
[7] However, North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine adds much uncertainty to an already strained Sino-DPRK relationship.[8] Coming full circle, some see the gap between China and North Korea as America’s opportunity to impede further consolidation of an authoritarian bloc.[9]
[10]
[11] An incoming progressive president in South Korea would not be delighted to see the bar lowered on denuclearization, but would nonetheless join talks once a preliminary framework has been achieved.[12]
[13]
[14] Analysts wonder if the DPRK’s recent alliance with Russia isn’t a page from that same playbook.[15] At present, Putin also seems unconcerned that his deal with Kim may throw a wrench in the world order.[16]

dailynk.com · by Dr. Jacob Reidhead · February 18, 2025

8. N. Korea imports missile parts under guise of civilian trade

Should be no surprise.

When will we execute a strategic strangulation campaign?

N. Korea imports missile parts under guise of civilian trade - Daily NK English

Precision machine parts, chips and special alloys soon to be imported via Russia and Southeast Asia will presumably all be used to enhance the performance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles

By Jeong Tae Joo - February 18, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · February 18, 2025

North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported on Aug. 5, 2024, that a “ceremony for celebrating the transfer and receiving of new-type tactical ballistic missile system took place on Aug. 4” and that “a ceremony for transferring 250 new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers, produced at major munitions enterprises, to the first-line units on the border of the DPRK took place in the capital city of Pyongyang with splendor.” (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

North Korea is importing parts and materials that are ostensibly for civilian manufacturing and research but are actually intended for the development of nuclear weapons and missiles, Daily NK has learned.

“Trading companies with overseas operations received orders from the Party’s Munitions Industry Department on Feb. 12 to actively cooperate with importing samples of precision parts and special alloys to further the development of missile guidance and control systems, warheads and engines,” a source in North Korea told Daily NK recently.

According to the source, these orders were delivered on the same day to North Korean companies with branches overseas such as the Myongan Trading Company and the Tongmyong Technology Trade Company. These two companies — which operate in Russia and Laos, respectively — are believed to run foreign currency-earning operations staffed by North Korean IT professionals, with the proceeds going toward nuclear weapon and missile development.

The Munitions Industry Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea plans to label precision machine parts and chips imported from Russia and Southeast Asia as being used for manufacturing routine electronic equipment. But in reality, those parts will be used to develop missile guidance and control systems.

“A key task for the armament sector in the first half of the year is to enhance the precision of missile guidance and control mechanisms. The parts being imported will play a key role in making missile targeting more accurate,” the source said.

The high-performance semiconductors and microcontrollers that North Korea is importing under false pretenses are needed to develop guidance and control mechanisms for ballistic missiles. In addition, the special alloys and heat-resistant carbon fiber that are supposedly being imported for research purposes are intended to strengthen missile warheads and improve the performance of missile propellant.

Related organizations have already set about acquiring the materials that the Munitions Industry Department has designated as key import items for the first half of the year.

The North Korean authorities are seeking to circumvent sanctions on North Korea by importing parts and materials nominally designated for civilian industrial and research purposes but actually intended for use in developing nuclear weapons and missiles.

But North Korea maintains the legality of these activities. “The Munitions Industry Department insisted that North Korea is ‘just conducting legal trade as other countries do’ and that ‘it goes without saying that trading companies need to support these imports,’” the source said.

After North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the North in the form of Resolution 1718. The sanctions resolution prohibited anything related to nuclear weapons or missiles from being exported to the North.

But North Korea has managed to continue developing nuclear weapons and missiles by importing key components and materials, while concealing their true purpose behind a façade of civilian manufacturing and research.

The precision machine parts, chips and special alloys that will soon be imported via Russia and Southeast Asia will presumably all be used to enhance the performance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. There are concerns that these efforts pose a serious threat to international security.

“Officials feel confident they can perfect the missiles as long as they have enough precision parts. The Munitions Industry Department will probably accelerate imports of these materials according to plan,” the source said.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · February 18, 2025

9. Discussing withdrawal of North Korean troops in Ukraine war ending talks?

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

Discussing withdrawal of North Korean troops in Ukraine war ending talks?

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/us-russia-ukraine-peace-talks-02182025151344.html

WASHINGTON-Lee Sang-min lees@rfa.org

2025.02.18

US-Russia meeting held in Saudi Arabia on the 18th

/federation

00:00 /03:25

Anchor : The United States and Russia have agreed to form a high-level negotiation team to end the war in Ukraine . Attention is being paid to whether the issue of North Korean troops deployed to Russia will be discussed in future negotiations . Reporter Lee Sang-min reports .

State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce announced in a press release on the 18th that Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in Saudi Arabia that day .

Bruce said the meeting was a follow-up to President Donald Trump's conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the 12th , and was attended by National Security Adviser Mike Walz and Trump's Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff .

On the Russian side, it was reported that along with Minister Lavrov, President Putin's adviser Yuri Ushakov attended.

Mirror , Ukraine agree to form high-level negotiating team for end of war

He said the two sides agreed during the meeting to establish a consultative mechanism to address bilateral relations issues with a view to taking necessary steps to normalize the operation of the diplomatic missions of the two countries .

It also introduced that they agreed to appoint high-level negotiation teams to find a way to bring the Ukraine conflict to a permanent , sustainable and mutually acceptable end as soon as possible .

They went on to say that they agreed to lay the foundation for future cooperation on mutual geopolitical understanding and historic economic and investment opportunities that will arise after a successful end to the conflict in Ukraine.

In addition, the parties to today's meeting pledged to continue to engage to ensure that this consultation process proceeds in a timely and productive manner.

“ One phone call , one meeting is not enough to build lasting peace, ” Bruce said. “ We have to act , and today we have taken an important step . ” Related Articles

Trump-Putin Call: “Ukraine War End Negotiations Begin”

Korea, UN: “North Korea-Russia Illegal Military Cooperation Must Immediately Stop”

Meanwhile, according to Russian media outlets such as RIA Novosti, Minister Lavrovo said at a press conference after the meeting that " the conversation was very fruitful " and that " both sides listened to each other sincerely . "

He said he had detailed the Russian position, saying " there is reason to believe that the American side has a better understanding of our position . "

He specifically stressed to the United States that " NATO expansion and Ukraine 's accession to NATO pose a direct threat to the interests and sovereignty of the Russian Federation , " and that " the deployment of NATO member states' troops in Ukraine is unacceptable, regardless of the flag they fly . "

As the U.S. and Russia have agreed to form a high-level negotiation team to end the war in Ukraine, attention is being paid to whether the issue of North Korean troops deployed to Russia will be discussed in future negotiations.

The State Department and the White House did not respond to RFA ’s inquiries as of the afternoon of the 18th regarding whether the issue of North Korean troops deployed will be included in future negotiations with Russia .

Former US official : “ Dispatch of North Korean workers likely to be discussed ”

North Korean workers at work at a Russian construction site. /Yonhap

Sydney Seiler, former National Intelligence Council (NIC) National Intelligence Analyst for North Korea, predicted on the 18th to Radio Free Asia (RFA) that the North Korea issue will be addressed on two levels in future negotiations between the United States and Russia .

The first would be to end the war in Ukraine by halting the dispatch of troops, ammunition and weapons systems to North Korea, said former analyst Seiler .

Second, at a strategic level, the United States expected that discussions would take place on Russia distancing itself from North Korea in order to comply with UN Security Council resolutions restricting arms sales and technology transfers with North Korea.

This, he predicted, would include the issue of North Korean workers who could potentially be used in post-war reconstruction efforts in Ukraine under the guise of “ peaceful reconstruction activities . ” This is Lee Sang-min of RFA’s Free Asia Broadcasting . Park Jeong-woo, editor , and Lee Kyung-ha , web editor.

10. 4 officials under Moon get suspended prison terms in N. Korean fishermen deportation case

This is one of the most disgraceful tragedies in modern South Korean history.

(LEAD) 4 officials under Moon get suspended prison terms in N. Korean fishermen deportation case | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · February 19, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with ruling in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- Four former high-ranking officials from the previous Moon Jae-in administration were given suspended prison sentences on Wednesday for their involvement in the forced repatriation of two North Korean fishermen in 2019.

In November 2019, the Moon government sent back two North Korean fishermen who were captured near the eastern inter-Korean sea border while sailing southward aboard a fishing boat.

The government cited the fishermen's confession to killing 16 fellow crew members as the reason for denying them protection and repatriating them.

In 2023, four officials under the Moon administration were indicted on charges of forcing government agency personnel to deport the fishermen despite their wishes to defect to South Korea.

They are former national security adviser and Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong; Noh Young-min, former presidential chief of staff; Suh Hoon, former chief of the National Intelligence Service; and former Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul.

On Wednesday, the Seoul Central District Court sentenced Chung and Suh to 10 months in prison, while Noh and Kim received six-month prison terms on charges of abuse of power and others.

All sentences were suspended on the condition that they would be automatically nullified after two years unless the four receive finalized court rulings of license suspension or harsher penalties during the period.

The court found the four officials guilty of prioritizing speed over careful legal review in their decision to repatriate the fishermen.

However, while acknowledging their guilt, the court took into account the severity of the crimes allegedly committed by the two North Koreans in issuing the suspended sentences instead of immediate imprisonment.

The court defended its ruling as the "most reasonable" result that "acknowledges the illegality of the defendants' behaviors while withholding actual penalties."

The court also raised concerns about the timing of their indictments, noting that the four officials were indicted three years after the incident, following the change of administration in 2022.

"The case was initiated by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) itself, becoming the complainant after the leadership of both the prosecution and the NIS changed with the new administration," the court said.

Former national security adviser and Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong (R) and Suh Hoon, former chief of the National Intelligence Service, speak to reporters at the Seoul Central District Court in the capital on Feb. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · February 19, 2025

11. China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity

But I am not sure we truly understand the relations among China, RUssia and north Korea. As I and others have written, it my assessment is that while China does not appreciate Putin's aggression in Ukraine (except for the dilemmas it creates for the US and Europe) it does not want Putin to lose. I think China will refrain from any public support and certainly not provide any traceable Chinese military support in order to protect its reputation and give it flexibility. But I think north Korea provides a convenient "cut-out" for China. Kim can provide lethal aid and the growing public relationship between north Korea and Russia actually might provide China cover while Xi provides either tacit or explicit approval to Kim behind the scenes. Now I have not seen any evidence of recent Chinese military transfers to north Korea. In fact I have not seen any reports since China provided the "logging trucks" some years ago. These are the 11 or 12 axle trucks that north Korea turned into TELs for its missile program.

And we should note that it appears that Russia is providing funds (and probably other advanced technology) to Kim and that is certainly going a long way to keeping Kim's regime afloat and improving his military capabilities. While among the 3 "No's" of China - it does not want war on the Korean peninsula, it also does not want the chaos of regime collapse and the threat that would be to China. The aid from Russia in return for renting north Korean troops may be as much as the Sunshine Policy of the late 1990s which was likely responsible for preventing the collapse of the regime following the arduous march of the great famine of 1994-1996.

Excerpts:

China is concerned that the United States might redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea. Tokyo has openly raised the idea of positioning U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. And surely Beijing is also monitoring increasingly serious conversations among South Koreans about whether they should have their own nuclear arsenal.

Needless to say, if any of this happens, Beijing would see its own strategic position worsen. It could explain why China joined a joint declaration with South Korea and Japan in May 2024, reiterating the call for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As such, China may be inclined to facilitate denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Unlike the last U.S.-North Korean summit in Hanoi in 2019, which took place amid heightened Sino-American competition, Beijing’s support for Washington’s negotiations with Pyongyang could significantly enhance U.S. bargaining power. Although North Korea has shown little interest in negotiations with the United States, China could be a difference-maker.

And there is another x-factor: Should the Ukraine conflict end in 2025, Russia may reassess its strategic interests and potentially reduce its intensified cooperation with North Korea. On Geopolitics Decanted, long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explained, “Russia is both unwilling and unable to replace China as a major sponsor of North Korea. The current relations between Russia and North Korea are unlikely to survive the end of hostilities in Europe.” As a result, Russo-North Korean ties are likely to weaken once the war concludes, probably prompting North Korea to seek closer, albeit still limited, relations with China. In this dynamic between China and North Korea, China would hold the upper hand. If Washington and Beijing can sustain cooperation on North Korean nuclear issues, favorable conditions for negotiations with Pyongyang could emerge over time.

China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Choong-Koo Lee · February 19, 2025

One year ago, experts had many reasons to think China and North Korea would become closer than ever before. But that’s not what happened. Instead, Beijing and Pyongyang have become distinctly discordant and discourteous. This gap between the expectations and the reality raises questions about the true nature of Sino-North Korean relations, especially since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia seems to have come at the expense of its relationship with China. Although it might be difficult to imagine, this path could lead China and the United States to a place where they could cooperate on North Korea and nuclear proliferation.

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The Pendulum Swings

Since its founding, North Korea has typically been close to either the Soviet Union (and now Russia) or China — not both. For instance, in the mid-1960s, North Korea’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union coincided with weaker Sino-North Korean relations. And since the establishment of ties between China and the United States during the Nixon administration, Sino-North Korean relations have largely been shaped by China’s relationship with the United States. However, as the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, North Korea lost this alternative and became more dependent on China, making it vulnerable to Beijing’s stance and pressure. While improving relations with the United States and South Korea could have provide an alternative, which was explored in the Geneva Agreed Framework in the 1990s, the second North Korea crisis of the early 2000s obstructed this path. As a result, North Korea had little choice but to deepen its dependence on China.

As North Korea worked to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, Beijing often sought closer cooperation with Washington. For example, in 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s historic southern tour and China’s decision to prioritize economic reform and openness, the Chinese government reduced its security and economic support for North Korea and revised food trade terms to require hard currency payment through the following year. Rather than vetoing a U.N. Security Council vote condemning North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China abstained. As a result, Sino-North Korean relations deteriorated and by 1999, political exchanges had ceased for six years. Ties began to normalize only after China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Pyongyang in April 1999.

Years later, China found its relationship with North Korea diminished once again when Xi Jinping sought to establish “New Great Power Relations” with Washington. These efforts, emphasizing non-collision, non-confrontation, and mutual respect between the United States and China, implied greater Sino-American cooperation on addressing North Korean nuclear issues. In response to North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, China backed a U.N. Security Council Resolution against Pyongyang. While China didn’t take proactive measures to prevent North Korea from evading sanctions through China’s own economy, its coordination on international sanctions marked a significant improvement compared to its previous stance, which had unilaterally advocated North Korea since Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2009. During the Sino-American summit in June 2013, Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, further widening diplomatic distance with North Korea, which had formally declared its nuclear weapons development policy that same year. By 2018, China resumed high-level talks with North Korea only after the prospect of the negotiations between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. With the exchange realized amid intensifying Sino-American strategic competition, North Korea and China could hold five rounds of summitry, including Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019.

Interestingly, in 2024, Sino-American relations related to Korea appeared to stabilize after President Joe Biden and Xi held a phone conversation and agreed to manage strategic competition through guardrails designed to prevent unintended escalation. Subsequently, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and its Chinese counterpart held a working group meeting to address risks of inadvertent conflict. In mid-April, the defense secretaries of both nations met, signifying the reopening of military communication between the United States and China. The improvement in the Sino-American relationship suggested a potential weakening of Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang. As Sino-American discussions also addressed North Korea’s provocations, Beijing was compelled to take a more active role in diplomacy on Pyongyang’s aggressive actions. For example, China resumed high-level talks with South Korea and engaged in foreign ministerial-level dialogues and summitry with South Korea and Japan, where North Korea’s provocations were a key topic of discussion — much to the Kim regime’s discontent.

At the same time, the recent Russo-North Korean military alliance treaty marked the return of Russia as a viable alternative partner. In July 2023, when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang, Kim granted full ceremonial treatment to a letter from President Vladimir Putin, receiving it inside his office, whereas he accepted Xi’s confidential letter in a corridor outside his office — an apparent diplomatic slight. Following Putin’s fifth inauguration as president in May 2024, North Korea began addressing him as “the respected comrade,” a title previously reserved for Xi. When Russia and North Korea signed their treaty last summer, Moscow pledged mutual military assistance and economic cooperation to circumvent international sanctions. After early October 2024, North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia in the Ukraine conflict highlighted a deepening rift in its relationship with Beijing. On an episode of Geopolitics Decanted, Sergey Radchenko, having recently returned from a research trip to China, observed, “I bet you [Chinese officials] were not informed about the treaty that was about to be signed, or at least if they were informed, they were not consulted on this subject about the treaty between Russia and North Korea. I’m sure they’re not very happy about this.”

From Hope to Discord

The beginning of 2024 showcased efforts by China and North Korea to commemorate the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. At the end of 2023, the foreign ministries of both countries designated 2024 as the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship.” On Jan. 1, Kim and Xi exchanged congratulatory telegrams. Xi emphasized the geopolitical closeness of the two nations, while Kim expressed that strengthening their traditional friendship aligned with the expectations and aspirations of both peoples. Soon after, Sun Weidong, a vice minister of foreign affairs in China, visited Pyongyang to meet the North Korean foreign minister, Choi Sun-Hee, where they agreed on an annual path to celebrate a year meant to be auspicious.

As a first step, a cultural delegation from Liaoning province traveled to Pyongyang in late January, participating in the Lunar New Year festival with dance and orchestral performances. Following this, a North Korean delegation led by Kim Song-Nam, the head of the Worker’s Party of Korea International Department, conducted a 20-day visit to China from March 21 to April 12. The delegation engaged in discussions with senior Chinese officials, including Wang Huning and Cai Qi — members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party — and Wang Yi, the minister of foreign affairs.

Against the backdrop of renewed Sino-American military communications, China sent a high-ranking political delegation to North Korea to attend the friendship year’s April 12 opening ceremony. Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the third-ranking member of the Chinese leadership, led the delegation. Zhao’s leadership marked an upgrade from the previous year, when the delegation was led by Li Hongzhong, vice chairman of the same committee. Zhao’s visit reflected China’s intention to prioritize Sino-North Korean ties, a move seen as critical to restraining Pyongyang’s provocative behavior while managing Sino-American conflict risks. Zhao met with Kim before departing from the Pyongyang International Airport. Beyond this visit, however, interactions between the two nations were limited to minor exchanges such as a local business association’s visit from Dandong in late May, prior to the Russo-North Korean summit in June 2024.

Since the Russo-North Korean summit in Vladivostok in September 2023, Kim has refrained from calling Xi “the respected comrade.” In July of last year, reports surfaced that Kim had instructed North Korean diplomats in China “not to mind China” in their official duties. Against this backdrop, claims arose that China intended to expel North Korean laborers, sparking speculation of political friction between the two nations, though Beijing denied the claims. Further doubts emerged the same month, at the Korean War armistice anniversary ceremony — the Chinese ambassador to North Korea was conspicuously absent from this important event, citing illness.

Although China and North Korea maintained appearances for the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic ties in October, Pyongyang’s deepening relationship with Moscow loomed over that ceremony. At around the same time, North Korea began deploying troops to Russia, prompting the United States to pressure China to curb Russo-North Korean military cooperation. While not exerting immediate pressure on Pyongyang, China signaled a willingness to discuss the issue of North Korean troops with the U.S. government. As a result, Sino-North Korean relations remained strained.

There was no closing ceremony for the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship” in 2024.

What’s Next?

The most important factor that has influenced Sino-North Korean relations since the early 1970s has been Sino-American relations. The conventional wisdom is that ties between China and the United States are set to worsen, particularly with Trump back in the Oval Office. However, Trump has emphasized maintaining friendly relations with Beijing. At the same time, he has imposed tariffs on China. Like many things involving the American president, it can be hard to understand what he is going to do next. As such, we would be wise to refrain from automatically assuming that America will be tougher on China under Trump, as many have. Relations might actually improve and, if they do, relations between China and North Korea could be expected to remain distant and perhaps even continue to worsen. If that happens, Washington could be in a position to leverage improved ties with Beijing to affect a number of challenges, including North Korea’s behavior. While it surely seems far-fetched today, it will be worth monitoring whether the United States and China can find common ground to reverse North Korea’s nuclear development.

China is concerned that the United States might redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea. Tokyo has openly raised the idea of positioning U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. And surely Beijing is also monitoring increasingly serious conversations among South Koreans about whether they should have their own nuclear arsenal.

Needless to say, if any of this happens, Beijing would see its own strategic position worsen. It could explain why China joined a joint declaration with South Korea and Japan in May 2024, reiterating the call for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As such, China may be inclined to facilitate denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Unlike the last U.S.-North Korean summit in Hanoi in 2019, which took place amid heightened Sino-American competition, Beijing’s support for Washington’s negotiations with Pyongyang could significantly enhance U.S. bargaining power. Although North Korea has shown little interest in negotiations with the United States, China could be a difference-maker.

And there is another x-factor: Should the Ukraine conflict end in 2025, Russia may reassess its strategic interests and potentially reduce its intensified cooperation with North Korea. On Geopolitics Decanted, long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explained, “Russia is both unwilling and unable to replace China as a major sponsor of North Korea. The current relations between Russia and North Korea are unlikely to survive the end of hostilities in Europe.” As a result, Russo-North Korean ties are likely to weaken once the war concludes, probably prompting North Korea to seek closer, albeit still limited, relations with China. In this dynamic between China and North Korea, China would hold the upper hand. If Washington and Beijing can sustain cooperation on North Korean nuclear issues, favorable conditions for negotiations with Pyongyang could emerge over time.

Become a Member

Choong-Koo Lee, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. His research has covered North Korea, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the impact of emerging technologies on security and defense. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses or the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

Image: Rodong Sinmun via KCNA Watch.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Choong-Koo Lee · February 19, 2025

12. Yoon to attend 1st preliminary hearing of his criminal trial

(LEAD) Yoon to attend 1st preliminary hearing of his criminal trial | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 19, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's planned attendance; CHANGES headline)

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- Impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol will attend the first preliminary hearing of his criminal trial on insurrection charges this week, his lawyer said Wednesday.

The hearing is scheduled to be held at the Seoul Central District Court at 10 a.m. Thursday, concurrently with a hearing to review Yoon's request to cancel his arrest and release him.

"President Yoon plans to attend the hearing on the request to cancel his arrest," Yun Gap-geun, the lawyer, said in a notice to the press.

A person close to the president clarified that the two hearings will be held simultaneously.

"It's possible he will state his position," the person said.

Yoon has been held at a detention center since mid-January after being detained by investigators on charges of inciting an insurrection through his short-lived imposition of martial law in December.

A preliminary hearing is held to clarify the main disputes of a case and plan for future proceedings. It does not require the defendant's attendance.

Security will be heightened around the court ahead of the proceedings, according to the compound's management.

The Seoul District Court Complex said it plans to cordon off some entrances to the court, heighten security checks on visitors and ban the entry of all unregistered vehicles.

"There is a high probability that a large number of people will gather, given the scheduled hearings and multiple reports of assembly," the court management said.

President Yoon Suk Yeol attends the eighth hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul's Jongno district on Feb. 13, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 19, 2025

13. South Korea’s Democracy and Martial Law: A New Future Emerging in Crisis

A naive conclusion? I hope it can be realized.

Excerpt:

To prevent the recurrence of this unfortunate moment in political history, institutional politics and civic politics must work together to develop democracy harmoniously. Political parties and politicians must make greater efforts to address issues that resonate with the public and collaborate with citizens to address them. The core problem in South Korean politics today is that established parties and political forces engage in extreme political propaganda without public discourse. The martial law crisis is an extreme manifestation of this issue—it plunged democracy into crisis and compelled citizens to return to the streets. Beyond opposing martial law and demanding impeachment, many citizens are now calling for deeper reflection and restructuring of representative democracy to strengthen the connection between civic politics and institutional politics. The role of institutional political actors should be to transform the voices emerging from public demonstrations into tangible political change.

South Korea’s Democracy and Martial Law: A New Future Emerging in Crisis

Date2025-02-19
PublisherEast Asia Foundation
AuthorYong-Jae Lee(Professor, Dept. of Social Welfare at Hoseo University)
https://keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/South_Koreas_Democracy_and_Martial_Law_A_New_Future_Emerging_in_Crisis?ckattempt=1
EAF Policy Debates_No.229.pdf

Summary

The abrupt declaration of martial law in South Korea was swiftly ended thanks to the prompt response of citizens and the National Assembly. However, as the situation developed into an impeachment crisis, ideological and political polarization in South Korea has deepened, even leading to violent protests by far-right groups, raising concerns about a crisis of democracy. Yet, this martial law crisis has also revealed new forms of democratic civic movements. These include political participation by Millennials and Gen Z, or the MZ generation, alongside the older democratization generation, protests incorporating popular culture such as light sticks and K-pop, more open and expansive modes of expression and diverse participation methods through social media. It has demonstrated that the MZ generation and the older democratization generation can effectively handle political polarization in a sustainable manner, indicating that South Korea’s democracy is evolving in a positive direction. Even amid rapid social changes, citizens with a sense of public duty to protect the community and democracy are continuing to evolve.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s abrupt and incomprehensible declaration of martial law on Dec. 3 has sparked intense debate regarding the country’s democracy. Is this event indicative of a fundamental issue within South Korean democracy or is it merely a deviation by a few anachronistic political leaders? If democracy is regressing, is it due to institutional flaws or cultural factors? How can South Koreans address the growing political polarization and social conflict and restore the true function of politics? What hope can they find in the new forms of protest opposing martial law and calling for impeachment? Finally, where are South Korea’s democracy and civil society headed? These questions demand analysis and reflection.

President Yoon, who took office in May 2022, is now facing the risk of impeachment after unexpectedly declaring martial law. The sudden declaration was swiftly concluded in just 155 minutes when the National Assembly passed a resolution demanding its repeal, followed by the president’s official announcement lifting the order. Immediately after the declaration, citizens, together with National Assembly aides, confronted military and police forces to ensure the resolution was passed.

Although Yoon’s abrupt declaration of martial law was swiftly repealed due to rapid civic action and the National Assembly’s decision, citizens could not help but feel disillusioned, questioning whether this was truly South Korea in 2024. The declaration lacked a justifiable reason that the majority of people could accept and was shocking to citizens who had been enjoying a peaceful night far removed from a national emergency such as war or rebellion, which might have been grounds for martial law. The martial law order included bans on all political activities, including those of the National Assembly and local councils, control over the media, prohibition on strikes and slowdowns, and mandatory return to duty for medical residents under threat of punishment. These measures were difficult for citizens to comprehend. Moreover, there were allegations that the military and police attempted to seize control of the National Assembly, with plans to arrest and detain the Speaker, incumbent lawmakers, and leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties. In addition, military forces stormed the National Election Commission, a constitutionally independent institution, further raising concerns, with substantial evidence that defies belief.

With the National Assembly having passed the motion to impeach President Yoon on Dec. 14 and the Constitutional Court’s impeachment trial now underway, South Korean politics is experiencing its most severe ideological conflicts and political polarization. With the far-right and far-left actively mobilizing in response to the impeachment crisis, concerns are rising that the situation may escalate into irreparable ideological divisions. Those who support martial law and oppose impeachment have resorted to extreme actions, including causing disturbances at the Seoul Western District Court during President Yoon’s detention hearing, displaying unprecedented levels of aggression. Some within these groups have also been observed provoking media outlets and vulnerable individuals, engaging in incomprehensible acts. Furthermore, public trust in the police and judiciary, which should be responsible for managing and controlling such social conflicts and violent actions, is simultaneously declining, raising fears of potential social breakdown.

A Crisis for South Korean Democracy?

The extreme events unfolding in the impeachment crisis following the declaration of martial law raise concerns about a crisis in South Korea’s democracy. Once regarded as a model in Asia for its rapid political and economic development, South Korea now finds itself on the verge of regressing to a pre-modern form of democracy due to this unexpected political crisis. The country’s remarkable democratic history, built through citizen-led uprisings such as the April 19 Revolution, the May 18 Democratic Uprising, and the June Democracy Movement against past military regimes and dictatorship, is now in serious jeopardy. The older generation, who actively participated in past democratization movements and witnessed the growth of democracy firsthand, cannot help but feel a deep sense of disillusionment, sorrow and despair in the face of the current situation. Concerned that South Korea’s democracy is moving backward, they are once again stepping forward as active political participants during this impeachment crisis.

South Korea’s democracy is at a critical juncture, testing whether it has the strength to sustain itself in a new era. Beyond the older generation that has actively safeguarded and advanced democracy through past civic revolutions, the younger generation now faces the test of how they will act to protect democracy. Both the older generation and the Millennials and Gen Z, also known as the MZ generation, are being observed for how they will respond to the extreme political and ideological polarization brought about by the unexpected martial law and impeachment crisis, as well as the rise of ultra-hardline conservatism and increasingly extreme and violent expressions of opinion. Of particular importance is how young people in their teens to 30s, who have not directly experienced South Korea’s historical struggles for democracy, will react to the illegal and violent intrusion at the Seoul Western District Court by President Yoon’s supporters, the growing far-right movement and political polarization.

Further complicating the situation, not only have new technologies and forms of communication such as social media and AI become commonplace, there are now clear cultural differences between generations pursuing distinct values and directions. This moment serves as a test of whether democracy is sustainable and, if so, how democratic citizens should respond to crises like the one we face today. Therefore, rather than dwelling on concerns about the regression and crisis of South Korean democracy, this impeachment crisis should be viewed as an opportunity to explore and define what a new and evolving South Korean democracy can be.

Discovering New Methods of Democratic Participation

South Korea, whose democratic stability is being tested, has discovered a new form of democracy through this martial law crisis. First, there is a diversification and expansion of the generations participating in democratic civic movements. The sight of young people, who were previously less visible at protests, taking to the streets signals a shift in the demographics of democratic participation. It has become evident that not only the older generation, who actively protested for democracy in the past, but also younger people in their teens to 30s are participating in shaping the world in their own ways. While the participating generations may have changed, the civic power behind South Korean democracy continues to evolve into a broader and more inclusive form, where both older and younger generations participate in their respective ways.

Second, there is a convergence of democratic civic movements and popular culture. Instead of traditional protest songs, K-pop was seamlessly incorporated into the protests, creating a new protest culture where people of all generations waved light sticks and candles in unison to the music. In fact, during the impeachment rally held in front of the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul, which gathered over a million people, the songs that resonated were not traditional protest anthems but K-pop tracks. The organizers of the impeachment rally accepted online song requests, and the playlist included tracks such as Rosé’s APT, Aespa’s Whiplash, SHINee’s Ring Ding Dong, Yoon Soo-il’s Apartment, Kim Yeon-ja’s Amor Fati, and Infinite Orbit’s To You. A playlist compiling the music played at the protest even surfaced online. What was once unimaginable—a protest resembling a K-pop concert—has now become a reality, where democracy as a shared social value intersects with popular culture in an unprecedented way.

Third, democratic opinions were expressed in more open and expansive ways. A prime example of this is the new protest culture created by the MZ generation during the impeachment rallies—the use of meme banners infused with humor. Although organizations such as “The National Lying-in-Bed Union,” “Cold Hands and Feet Association,” and “Dragon Preservation Society” do not actually exist, these humorous meme banners were prominently displayed at the protests, showcasing a new kind of protest culture. After the martial law crisis erupted, an online community shared a satirical image of President Yoon sitting across from Chief Presidential Secretary Chung Jin-seok and People Power Party leader Han Dong-hoon with a stiff expression, accompanied by the caption: “What did I declare after my second round of drinks last night?”—mocking the president’s known fondness for alcohol and suggesting that he made an ill-advised decision while intoxicated. Another image, titled “The Plan for the Destruction of Conservatism is Going Well,” featured a smiling former President Moon Jae-in from the progressives and Yoon Suk-yeol walking side by side. Instead of rigid slogans of the past, the protests embrace satire rooted in daily life and free thought, enabling more creative and participatory expressions of opinion.

Fourth, there was diversification in the methods of participating in democratic civic movements. One particularly notable example was the “pay-it-forward relay,” in which food and drinks were prepaid for protest participants. People prepaid for meals and beverages at nearby restaurants and cafes and then shared this information via social media so that protesters could easily access them. While some celebrities took part, the initiative was widely supported by ordinary citizens, particularly those in their teens and twenties. Most of those who participated in the pay-it-forward relay used nicknames instead of real names, and many referenced the names of their favorite idol group members. Civic engagement extended beyond direct protest participation to include acts of support for participants and the active use of social media to facilitate and coordinate such efforts.

South Korea’s Evolving New Democracy

In today’s era where citizens engage with new technologies, the martial law crisis and impeachment proceedings have demonstrated that South Korea’s democracy is evolving and showcasing new methods of democratic participation. In contrast to past civic movements where citizens resisted unjust governmental power by singing protest songs in the streets, today’s activism has transformed into a model where individuals utilize social media to share, communicate and engage in their own ways. Despite these changes, the citizens’ commitment to fairness, common sense and the pursuit of democracy remains steadfast. Although the declaration of martial law and the impeachment crisis have had many negative economic and political impacts on society, the impeachment rallies—where solidarity and generosity transcended generations—clearly illustrated the future of South Korean democracy.

Above all, this impeachment crisis has served as a test of whether the MZ generation, which prioritizes individual happiness over collective interests and prefers social media-based activities, can shape the future of South Korean democracy. The MZ generation demonstrated a new form of democratic participation—one that safeguards the public good of democracy without compromising individual autonomy and uniqueness. The protest culture introduced by the MZ generation has set a clear precedent for an evolving and developed democracy in South Korea. In response to the belief that the Yoon administration’s martial law declaration undermined democratic progress, the MZ generation rallied in a new form of civic resistance—holding light sticks and playing K-pop music. Observing the democratic resilience displayed by the MZ generation in the face of an unprecedented declaration of martial law and impeachment crisis in the 21st century is both moving and reassuring.

Observing the protest culture that emerged during the impeachment crisis, we can identify the following evolved forms of democratic participation in South Korea. First is a pursuit of the latest trends and unique cultural experiences. Popular culture is seamlessly integrated with democratic values, making protest sites vibrant with the latest pop music, diverse attractions and entertainment. Any form of pop culture that can bring together people across generations will likely be present at protest sites. Second, digital technology is utilized more actively. Even if protest participants do not know each other, they share information about participation methods and event details in advance via social media, making participation more interactive. Social media is used to gather people, facilitate in-person meetings at the protest, provide real-time updates on the situation and share satirical content. Third, horizontal relationships among participants are maintained, and individual preferences and privacy are respected. Despite the collective nature of protests, no centralized organization controls the participants beyond the event organizers. Protesters freely participate according to their own will and preferences, without external interference. No one is concerned about the identities of other participants or intrudes on their personal space. However, since they share common motives and goals, they form a stronger and more cohesive movement than any structured organization. Fourth, convenience and accessibility are prioritized. People integrate protests into their daily lives, participating in the most convenient and comfortable ways—whether individually, with family members, or alongside colleagues and friends.

The Power of Civic Politics to Build a Better Democracy

The declaration of martial law and the impeachment crisis have left a significant stain on South Korea’s political history. However, they have also reinforced the belief that South Korean society possesses the resilience to restore democracy and its political system when challenged. Both the older generation, who experienced past democratization movements, and the MZ generation have demonstrated that they can effectively address ideological and political polarization in a sustainable way that suits the new era.

Civic participation is the true power of democracy. It was the citizens who built South Korea’s democracy, and it is the citizens who will advance it. As extreme right-wing and left-wing forces intensify polarization, social instability grows, making it increasingly difficult to protect and maintain democracy. However, as long as the immense power of civic politics demonstrated during this martial law crisis continues, South Koreans can be confident that their democracy will progress in a positive direction. Civic politics, in which citizens actively participate with a shared sense of responsibility to protect both their community and democracy, is the foundation of this strength.

Civic participation operates independently of elite party politics, which is characterized by extreme political confrontation. It allows individuals to become political actors based on their own ideological positions. Though informal and not rooted in structured organizations, civic engagement is one of the most crucial forces sustaining South Korean democracy beyond party politics. When citizens create open platforms for public discourse, acquire and share information, and advocate for their views, their political influence becomes substantial. Conversely, party politics cannot succeed without the support and collaboration of citizens, making civic politics more powerful than institutionalized party politics. The failure of martial law to gain public support was ultimately due to its disregard for civic politics. The lack of open public discourse and shared information among citizens in the public sphere were its biggest flaw.

To prevent the recurrence of this unfortunate moment in political history, institutional politics and civic politics must work together to develop democracy harmoniously. Political parties and politicians must make greater efforts to address issues that resonate with the public and collaborate with citizens to address them. The core problem in South Korean politics today is that established parties and political forces engage in extreme political propaganda without public discourse. The martial law crisis is an extreme manifestation of this issue—it plunged democracy into crisis and compelled citizens to return to the streets. Beyond opposing martial law and demanding impeachment, many citizens are now calling for deeper reflection and restructuring of representative democracy to strengthen the connection between civic politics and institutional politics. The role of institutional political actors should be to transform the voices emerging from public demonstrations into tangible political change.

--- The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the East Asia Foundation.

About the Author

Yong-Jae Lee(Professor, Dept. of Social Welfare at Hoseo University)

Yong-Jae Lee earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in Social Welfare from Chung-Ang University and served as a visiting scholar at San Jose State University in the United States. He has worked as a policy secretary for a Member of the National Assembly in the National Assembly's Health and Welfare Committee and as a senior researcher at the Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service before joining the Department of Social Welfare at Hoseo University in 2008. His primary research areas include health insurance, long-term care insurance for the elderly, and community welfare. At Hoseo University, he teaches courses on social welfare law and practice, social welfare policy, and social welfare research and data analysis. He currently serves as a board member of the Korean Academy of Community Social Welfare and the Korean Academy of Long-Term Care and actively advises government ministries such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Employment and Labor, major public institutions, and local governments, including Chungcheongnam-do and Cheonan City.

14. ‘I want to defect to South’: North Korean soldier captured in Kursk breaks silence

Recall that RFA is broadcasting this back into north Korea. Kim cannot keep this information from the Korean people in the north.

‘I want to defect to South’: North Korean soldier captured in Kursk breaks silence

The soldier confirmed earlier intelligence reports of heavy casualties in drone attacks, language barrier.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/02/19/north-korea-soldier-interview-02192025/

2025.02.19

An undated photo on Jan. 11, 2025 from the Telegram account of V_Zelenskiy_official shows an alleged soldier presented as North Korean detained by Ukrainian authorities at an undisclosed location in Ukraine, following his capture by the Ukrainian army. Part of the photo has been blurred by RFA. (V_Zelenskiy_official/Telegram/AFP)

TAIPEI, Taiwan – A North Korean soldier captured in Russia has given the first public account of conditions supporting Russian forces, struggling with a language barrier, inadequate support and Ukrainian drones on what he had been told was a training mission.

The soldier, identified as Ri and aged 26, told South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo newspaper that he was worried about the consequences for his family if North Korean authorities found out he had been taken prisoner, and he said he would like to apply for asylum in South Korea, if it would take him.

Ri, from Pyongyang, was among an estimated 12,000 North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia’s Kursk region to fight Ukrainian forces who occupied parts of the area in August. He said he got to Kursk with about 2,500 other North Koreans, by train, plane and bus.

Neither Russia nor North Korea have acknowledged the presence of the North Koreans.

“We were told we were here for training, not to fight,” Ri told the South Korean daily in an interview, published on Wednesday, at an unidentified detention center in Ukraine.

“When we arrived in Kursk, we were informed otherwise.”

Ri said he was part of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an intelligence agency, and had served in the military since 2015. He was part of a three-man unit conducting disruption operations when they were attacked from the air.

“The drone spotted us, and both my commander and another soldier were shot. I tried to reach cover while returning fire but was also hit,” he said.

“I had never seen someone die before. Seeing friends get shot or blown apart by grenades … it stays with you.”

An image made from video released by the Ukrainian drone warfare unit Magyar’s Birds. The unit said it shows the bodies of North Korean soldiers killed in the Kursk region. Part of the image has been blurred by RFA. (Magyar’s Birds)

His arm was shattered and he was also wounded in the jaw in the drone attack that killed his two comrades and knocked him out cold as darkness fell. He was being taken back to the rear by another North Korean unit but they were unable to escape the drones.

Eventually, all of his rescuers were killed and he was captured, he said.

Ri’s account of conditions in Kursk confirmed Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence reports of heavy casualties among the North Koreans, which Ri attributed to drones and inadequate Russian artillery support.

Smartphone app

Ri also confirmed problems with communication between North Korean and Russian forces.

He said interaction with the Russians was minimal, as direct contacts were mostly handled at higher command levels. Supplies, such as ammunition and winter gear, were distributed through command structures, further reducing the need for direct contacts.

When conversations did occur, they relied on translation applications, Ri explained.

“We used smartphone translators to communicate,” Ri said. “It was the first time I ever used such technology. In North Korea, we never interacted with foreigners.”

Ukraine reported in early February an estimated 4,000 casualties among the North Koreans, saying they proved to be easy targets for Ukrainian drones since they were unfamiliar with drone warfare and were struggling to adapt.

Ri said the North Korean troops were told that Ukrainian drones were operated by South Korean soldiers, reinforcing their will to fight. There is no evidence that South Korea is involved in the conflict.

Ukraine broadcasts appeal to North Korean soldiers to surrender

The move marks Kyiv’s latest psychological warfare tactic to encourage North Koreans in Kursk to defect.

https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/02/17/north-korea-ukraine-radio-broadcast/

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2025.02.16

A radio is placed on a side table next to a bed in the makeshift shelter of a kindergarten’s basement in Lysychansk, eastern Ukraine, on May 14, 2022. (Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP)

TAIPEI, Taiwan – Ukrainian troops have begun broadcasting surrender appeals in Korean, assuring North Korean soldiers fighting in Kursk they will be treated humanely as prisoners of war, according to a Ukrainian activist group. The report comes after Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia had requested a few thousands more troops from North Korea.

As many as 12,000 North Korean soldiers are in Russia to fight Ukrainian forces who occupied parts of the Kursk region in August, according to Ukraine and the United States, although neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has acknowledged their presence.

InformNapalm, an investigative group covering Russia’s war against Ukraine, shared a video of a broadcast on its Telegram channel, saying that Ukrainian forces started radio transmissions aimed at North Korean troops.

“Your leadership is sending you to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia started this war 10 years ago,” a man speaking with a South Korean accent can be heard in what InformNapalm said was the radio broadcast.

Radio Free Asia has not been able to independently verify the video.

The radio broadcast is the latest example of Ukraine’s psychological warfare tactics to encourage North Koreans fighting in Kursk to defect.

Ukraine has also been distributing Korean-language leaflets that encourage defection and offer instructions to North Koreans on how to surrender and include promises of humane treatment, and point out the futility of dying in a foreign war.

The leaflets are dropped from drones and even by artillery, to get them to the North Koreans. Integrated with Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” project, the campaign also provides a hotline and Telegram chatbot for safe surrender coordination.

Ukrainian intelligence has released intercepted communications and reports detailing the severe conditions faced by North Korean soldiers under Russian command, aimed to highlight the exploitation and high casualty rates among the troops, fostering doubt and encouraging them to abandon their posts.

Reports have surfaced of North Korean soldiers resorting to suicide, to avoid capture, reflecting the desperate circumstances they face.

(LEAD) S. Korea to provide protection in case captured N. Korean soldiers want to come to South | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 19, 2025

(ATTN: CLARIFIES quote in 5th para)

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is willing to provide protection and support if North Korean soldiers captured in Ukraine request to come to the South, Seoul's foreign ministry said Wednesday, following reports that a North Korean soldier held by Ukrainian forces expressed his intent to defect.

In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo daily, published Wednesday, one of the two North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine expressed his wish to go to South Korea, in what would be the first such known case since North Korea sent around 11,000 troops in support of Russia's war against Ukraine.

He is one of the two wounded North Korean soldiers captured by Ukrainian forces last month during combat in Russia's western Kursk border region.

"North Korean soldiers are constitutionally recognized as our citizens and respecting their free will regarding repatriation aligns with international law and customary practices," the foreign ministry said.

"Accordingly, the government will provide necessary protection and support if they request to come to South Korea, in line with the fundamental principles and relevant laws of accepting all individuals," the ministry said.

South Korea has relayed this position to Ukraine and will continue to engage in necessary consultations with Kyiv, the ministry added.

The ministry also noted that individuals should not be forcibly returned to a place where they may face persecution.

Regarding the media report, the ministry voiced regret and concern over the way the two captured soldiers were exposed, such as showing their faces in the news article.

"Under the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war must be treated humanely," the ministry said. "The publication of the report raises concern about potential harm to them and their families and we express concern and regret about the situation."

The captive, identified only by his last name Ri, told the newspaper that he never knew he would engage in combat against Kyiv as he was told that he would be sent to Russia for training as an overseas student.

Ri also said the North Korean authorities had told him that the South Korean military are flying drones to attack them.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 19, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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