Quotes of the Day:

"We live in a world where the funeral matters more than the dead, the wedding more than the love and the physical rather than the intellect. We live in a container culture, which despises the content."

 – Eduardo Galeano

"Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these things. Among them are a few Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician or businessman. Their number is negligible and they are stupid."

– President Dwight Eisenhower, (in a letter) November 8, 1954.

Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind.”

― Bertrand Russell

1. So, About VP Vance's Speech

2. Cutting Aid Makes the World More Dangerous: Central America 2019 Proved It

3. How Dirty Money From Fentanyl Sales Is Flowing Through China

4. The Sort of Alliance: India and America Keep Getting Closer

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2025

6. Iran Update, February 18, 2025

7. Defense Department firings expected to start soon, officials say

8. Trump wants Greenland and Gaza. That might embolden China on Taiwan.

9. Political lessons for Australia from the war in Ukraine

10. Donald Trump's Mission: Make America's Allies Spend More on Defense

11. European Capitals Clash Over Ukraine as Trump Makes Overtures to Putin

12. Trump’s Pivot Toward Putin’s Russia Upends Generations of U.S. Policy

13. America’s Long-Range Retaliation

14. China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity

15. What Trump's freeze in federal funding means for the global fight against AIDS

16. How the U.S. Government Controls Ukrainian Media

17. China’s Political Warfare: The Fight for Taiwan on the Information Battlefield

18. Zelensky Decries Peace Talks Without Ukraine, Trump Says He Had His Shot For Years

19. CIA MQ-9 Reapers Are Covertly Spying On Mexican Drug Cartels: Reports

20. Under Trump, CIA plots bigger role in drug cartel fight

1. So, About VP Vance's Speech

​There has been a lot of controversy over the VP's speech in Munich.

This is a very positive assessment that you will not find in the mainstream media.

Tough (and very important) questions for Europe from CDR Salamander in his conclusion:

Americans cannot love Europe more than the Europeans. What we can do is love Western values that come from the best of The Enlightenment, those values that brought civilization to an uncivilized planet.

If the Europeans cannot stand for what we believe to be Western values, then they will have to define what values they do stand for.

If you don’t have freedom of speech, respect for the democratic system, and a focus on raising the quality of life for your citizens, then what exactly will you have in Europe? Is that something the American people will continue to want to risk global nuclear war to defend?

So, About VP Vance's Speech

Christoph, I can tell you it played well in Statesboro

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/so-about-vp-vances-speech?utm

CDR Salamander

Feb 18, 2025

Over the weekend, I listened to/watched Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in the background while I was doing other things while putter’n around the house.

Hey, I was a career US Navy officer. I can multi-task.

Over the next couple of days after, I started to read the commentary after the speech, the reaction to it—especially from the guy above, Christoph Heusgen, who was running it. Yes, he was one of the German diplomats who laughed at President Trump during his 2018 UN speech when Trump warned the Germans about reliance on Russian energy…and there he is a few days ago, crying over…Vance’s speech?

BTW, according to his bio, Heusgen spent some of his undergrad time at Georgia Southern University in Statesboro, Georgia. BZ to him. I can’t say he’s never seen America outside the Acela Corridor.

However, Christoph, the tears. Dude. There’s no man-crying in Statesboro unless your dog died, your tractor broke, or your daughter gets married. Didn’t you learn anything, son? Sad.

So, back to the speech. Fair note, as you may have gathered, I like the speech a lot—so biases up front. Regulars know that it echos many of the positions I have staked out, and warnings I have given here over the last two decades—many written in the years I lived on the Continent as as NATO staff officer.

I’m sorry…much of the commentary, and Heusgen’s strange reaction, just didn’t seem to mesh with the speech I heard. As I learned a long time ago, when in doubt, go to the primary source, first-person, and the transcript.

So, that is what we’re going to do. This isn’t a full Fisking, but I think we need to be clear about what Vance said. Once we do that, I will largely leave it up to you as to why so many in the European and Western left are reacting the way they are.

Just strange…but let’s dive in to it.

In the opening, does this sound like the start of a hostile attack, or perhaps the affectionate words of a friend?

…the first time I was ever in Munich was with my wife, actually, who’s here with me today on a personal trip, and I’ve always loved the city of Munich, and I’ve always loved its people, and I just want to say that we’re very moved, and our thoughts and prayers are with Munich and everybody affected by the evil inflicted on this beautiful community. We’re thinking about you, we’re praying for you, and we will certainly be rooting for you in the days and weeks to come.

This is what has the Europeans upset. They are not used to having to reflect on what they are doing. Friends don’t let friends self-destruct. BZ to Vance to speak to friends as a friend.

…the Trump administration is very concerned with European security and believes that we can come to a reasonable settlement between Russia and Ukraine, and we also believe that it’s important in the coming years for Europe to step up in a big way to provide for its own defense, the threat that I worry the most about vis-a-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s not any other external actor.

And what I worry about is the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared with the United States of America.

Now I was struck that a former European commissioner went on television recently and sounded delighted that the Romanian government had just annulled an entire election. He warned that if things don’t go to plan, the very same thing could happen in Germany, too.

Now these cavalier statements are shocking to American ears. For years, we’ve been told that everything we fund and support is in the name of our shared democratic values. Everything from our Ukraine policy to digital censorship is billed as a defense of democracy.

But when we see European courts canceling elections and senior officials threatening to cancel others, we ought to ask whether we’re holding ourselves to an appropriately high standard. And I say ourselves because I fundamentally believe that we are on the same team. We must do more than talk about democratic values, we must live them.

I had an exchange with a colleague on the continent who is a good faith actor on the national security stage and has significant concerns. His points were solid and very understandable from an European perspective.

Here, in part, was my response to his concerns;

However, a lot of the disconnect is, as we’ve discussed here before, the European press.

Since the WaPo and NYT—both located in one-party leftist enclaves—do not understand anyone to the right of Sen. Warner (D-VA), Europeans don’t either. It does not help that those who “have been to America” have usually just spent time in the deeply Democratic DC to Boston corridor. They have no idea what the American “right” is—a vastly different creature than European “right.” Since Obama’s second term, it has only gotten worse than it was when I lived for years on the Continent in the 00s.

The American left, and Democrats in general, are easier for Europeans to understand because they receive friendly treatment in WaPo and NYT and, as internationalists, comfortably fit into the European center-left/center-right uniparty.

When it comes to right of center and libertarian minded Americans like Vance when they speak of freedom of speech/religion etc, it is helpful to remember that the USA is a revolutionary nation, and the center-right in the USA still holds to those ideals as outlined in our Constitution.

We had a revolution (also a civil war, especially in my part of the country that was generally pro-Crown), specifically against an oppressive state that clamped down on speech (1st Amendment), press (1st A), protest (assembly 1st A), organizations (1st A., association), religion (1st A, the NY colony was anti-Catholic, Virginia anti-Quaker, and the Wars of Religion were still not ancient history). The British government wanted to enforce it by disarming the public, which is why we have the right to be armed (2nd A).

It is baked in the the American character, to the left and right of center, to hold any government and its desire to control the people in question. It was the whole purpose to our revolution…the first of The Enlightenment that eventually seeped—from The Enlightenment not the USA—to Europe, especially after Napoleon and 1848 etc.

So, back to the Vance speech—this is when he really started to bite.

And we believe those things are certainly connected. And unfortunately, when I look at Europe today, it’s sometimes not so clear what happened to some of the Cold War’s winners. I look to Brussels, where EU commissars warn citizens that they intend to shut down social media during times of civil unrest the moment they spot what they’ve judged to be, quote, “hateful content.” I look to my own country, where police have carried out raids against citizens suspected of posting anti-feminist comments online as part of, quote, “combating misogyny on the internet, a day of action.”

I look to Sweden, where two weeks ago the government convicted a Christian activist for participating in Koran burnings that resulted in his friend’s murder. As the judge in his case chillingly noted, Sweden’s laws to supposedly protect free expression do not, in fact, grant, and I’m quoting, “a free pass to do or say anything without risking offending the group that holds that belief.”

And perhaps most concerningly, I look to our very dear friends in the United Kingdom, where the backslide away from conscience rights has placed the basic liberties of religious Britons in particular in the crosshairs. A little over two years ago, the British government charged Adam Smith-Connor, a 51-year-old physiotherapist and an army veteran, with the heinous crime of standing 50 meters from an abortion clinic and silently praying for three minutes.

Not obstructing anyone, not interacting with anyone, just silently praying on his own. After British law enforcement spotted him and demanded to know what he was praying for, Adam replied simply it was on behalf of the unborn son he and his former girlfriend had aborted years before.

Now the officers were not moved. Adam was found guilty of breaking the government’s new buffer zones law, which criminalizes silent prayer and other actions that could influence a person’s decision within 200 meters of an abortion facility. He was sentenced to pay thousands of pounds in legal costs to the prosecution.

Now I wish I could say that this was a fluke, a one-off crazy example of a badly written law being enacted against a single person.

But no, this last October, just a few months ago, the Scottish government began distributing letters to citizens whose houses lay within so-called safe access zones, warning them that even private prayer within their own homes may amount to breaking the law. Naturally, the government urged readers to report any fellow citizens suspected guilty of thought crime. In Britain and across Europe, free speech, I fear, is in retreat.

Well meaning Europeans, friends of the USA, had no problem pointing out America’s failures to live up to its ideals when it came to the civil rights struggles in the 1960s.

This is no different.

As I and other warned starting over two decades ago, Europe’s inaction on migration will eventually force it to behave in ways that it does not want to behave, to do things it did not want to do.

I thought it was going to be against the illegal immigrants and unassimilated migrants, but I was mostly wrong. Most of Europe is instead going after its indigenous population that has been there since the Late Bronze Age Collapse.

Vance made an effort to be fair. We have similar issues on our side of the Atlantic as well.

And in the interest of (comity), my friends, but also in the interest of truth, I will admit that sometimes the loudest voices for censorship have come not from within Europe, but from within my own country, where the prior administration threatened and bullied social media companies to censor so-called misinformation. Misinformation, like, for example, the idea that coronavirus had likely leaked from a laboratory in China, our own government encouraged private companies to silence people who dared to utter what turned out to be an obvious truth.

As we have the same values from The Enlightenment, we also have similar opponents of those values.

So I come here today not just with an observation, but with an offer. Just as the Biden administration seemed desperate to silence people for speaking their minds, so the Trump administration will do precisely the opposite, and I hope that we can work together on that. In Washington, there is a new sheriff in town, and under Donald Trump’s leadership, we may disagree with your views, but we will fight to defend your right to offer it in the public square, agree or disagree.

How could this idea, the marketplace of idea, be “not acceptable” in a free society, confident in itself, its culture, and its people?

Are we in the West better than this? Of course we are.

Now the good news is that I happen to think your democracies are substantially less brittle than many people apparently fear, and I really do believe that allowing our citizens to speak their mind will make them stronger still. Which of course brings us back to Munich, where the organizers of this very conference have banned lawmakers representing parties on both the left and the right from participating in these conversations.

Now again, we don’t have to agree with everything or anything that people say, but when people represent, when political leaders represent an important constituency, it is incumbent upon us to at least participate in dialogue with them.

Now to many of us on the other side of the Atlantic, it looks more and more like old entrenched interests hiding behind ugly Soviet-era words like misinformation and disinformation who simply don’t like the idea that somebody with an alternative viewpoint might express a different opinion or, God forbid, vote a different way or even worse, win an election.

The saying goes, “Follow the money.”

For others who did not care about the Western Values issues, they do care about spending money on defense. This is where they got upset.

…President Trump has made abundantly clear, he believes that our European friends must play a bigger role in the future of this continent. We don’t think, you hear this term, burden sharing, but we think it’s an important part of being in a shared alliance together that the Europeans step up while America focuses on areas of the world that are in great danger.

A decade before President Trump came down the Trump Tower escalator, many of us who, like Vance, are pro-Europe and pro-NATO, have been warning about the corrosive effect on this side of the Atlantic of the under-investment on defense by the Europeans. If, in 2025, this is still shocking to you, then for the sake of world peace, get out of the national security arena.

What is the positive vision that animates this shared security compact that we all believe is so important? And I believe deeply that there is no security if you are afraid of the voices, the opinions, and the conscience that guide your very own people. Europe faces many challenges, but the crisis this continent faces right now, the crisis I believe we all face together, is one of our own making. If you’re running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you, nor for that matter is there anything that you can do for the American people who elected me and elected President Trump.

This becomes an even larger burr under the European saddle. It is easy to come to these conferences and look to other nations as your problem, to tut-tut how disappointed you are in others, it is something different to have a friend tell you that you need to fix yourself first. It is hard to hear, but it is what friends do to those who they truly value. They don’t let them destroy themselves.

You cannot win a democratic mandate by censoring your opponents or putting them in jail, whether that’s the leader of the opposition, a humble Christian praying in her own home, or a journalist trying to report the news. Nor can you win one by disregarding your basic electorate on questions like who gets to be a part of our shared society.

…No voter on this continent went to the ballot box to open the floodgates to millions of unvetted immigrants.

But you know what they did vote for? In England, they voted for Brexit, and agree or disagree, they voted for it. And more and more all over Europe, they’re voting for political leaders who promise to put an end to out-of-control migration.

Now I happen to agree with a lot of these concerns, but you don’t have to agree with me. I just think that people care about their homes, they care about their dreams, they care about their safety and their capacity to provide for themselves and their children.

And they’re smart. I think this is one of the most important things I’ve learned in my brief time in politics. Contrary to what you might hear a couple of mountains over in Davos, the citizens of all of our nations don’t generally think of themselves as educated animals or as interchangeable cogs of a global economy.

And it’s hardly surprising that they don’t want to be shuffled about or relentlessly ignored by their leaders. It is the business of democracy to adjudicate these big questions at the ballot box. I believe that dismissing people, dismissing their concerns, or worse yet, shutting down media, shutting down elections, or shutting people out of the political process, protects nothing. In fact, it is the most sure-fire way to destroy democracy.

And speaking up and expressing opinions isn’t election interference, even when people express views outside your own country and even when those people are very influential. And trust me, I say this with all humor, if American Democracy can survive ten years of Greta Thunberg’s scolding, you guys can survive a few months of Elon Musk.

Why can’t everyone at least agree on that point?

Regulars here know that none of what Vance said should be new to anyone. We have been discussing it here for over two decades and others with much broader reach have as well.

Vance’s speech ends with a message that should not be 'unacceptable' to any fair-minded person concerned with the future of Europe.

But what no democracy, American, German, or European, will survive is telling millions of voters that their thoughts and concerns, their aspirations, their pleas for relief are invalid or unworthy of even being considered. Democracy rests on the sacred principle that the voice of the people matters. There’s no room for firewalls. You either uphold the principle or you don’t.

Europeans, the people, have a voice. European leaders have a choice. And my strong belief is that we do not need to be afraid of the future. You can embrace what your people tell you, even when it’s surprising, even when you don’t agree.

And if you do so, you can face the future with certainty and with confidence, knowing that the nation stands behind each of you. And that, to me, is the great magic of democracy. It’s not in these stone buildings or beautiful hotels. It’s not even in the great institutions that we have built together as a shared society. To believe in democracy is to understand that each of our citizens has wisdom and has a voice.

And if we refuse to listen to that voice, even our most successful fights will secure very little. As Pope John Paul II, in my view, one of the most extraordinary champions of democracy on this continent or any other, once said, “Do not be afraid.” We shouldn’t be afraid of our people, even when they express views that disagree with their leadership. Thank you all.

Good luck to all of you. God bless you.

Americans cannot love Europe more than the Europeans. What we can do is love Western values that come from the best of The Enlightenment, those values that brought civilization to an uncivilized planet.

If the Europeans cannot stand for what we believe to be Western values, then they will have to define what values they do stand for.

If you don’t have freedom of speech, respect for the democratic system, and a focus on raising the quality of life for your citizens, then what exactly will you have in Europe? Is that something the American people will continue to want to risk global nuclear war to defend?

Read the text yourself. Does it rate this response from the German Defense Minister?

2. Cutting Aid Makes the World More Dangerous: Central America 2019 Proved It

​Conclusion:

President Trump claims he wants to protect the bottom line of the United States and maintain economic and national security; dismantling USAID directly contradicts those claims. In 2019, his administration also openly admitted that it did not assess existing programs’ effectiveness or impact on addressing issues of pressing national importance, such as organized crime and migration.[16] In essence, the administration, much like it is today, displays an astonishing contempt for Congress and its role in allocating funds to necessary programs. The President’s adoption of Project 2025 and similar policies that advocate for a reduction in foreign aid fail to recognize critical roles in fostering stability and curbing transnational crime. If Marco Rubio and members of Congress cannot or will not stop the bleeding of USAID, it is up to organizations working in crime prevention, security, and community relations to find ways to mitigate and fix the harm already done. A strategic recommitment to foreign assistance is an investment in global peace and safeguarding America’s security and prosperity.

Cutting Aid Makes the World More Dangerous: Central America 2019 Proved It

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/17/cutting-aid-makes-the-world-more-dangerous-central-america-2019-proved-it/

by Laura Iesue

|

02.17.2025 at 10:29pm

International aid is crucial for promoting global stability, advancing U.S. foreign (and domestic) interests using soft power, and maintaining our position as an influential global superpower on the world stage.[1] Foreign aid, specifically the US Department of Aid (USAID), has been pivotal in addressing security concerns abroad, especially in Latin America.[2] Indeed, foreign aid has been responsible for addressing the drivers of migration from Central America, combatting organized crime and drug production in places such as Mexico and Colombia, gang eradication in Haiti and other Central American locales, and addressing other pressing humanitarian and security concerns in areas such as Venezuela, the Caribbean and elsewhere.[3][4]

Considering that the US spends less than one percent of its entire federal budget on foreign aid programs, this is a small bill to pay, and it has tremendous direct and indirect benefits for our nation.[5][6] While policymakers and international aid advocates repeatedly echo this argument, President Trump continues his dismantling of USAID with Elon Musk’s help, with no formal federal approval. If repeatedly discussing the social good of foreign aid and USAID cannot dissuade the dismantling process, highlighting the negative consequences might help organizations that want to mitigate the damage. We will have a proliferation of previously established and new threats to address now that these aid programs are not in place.

We have been here before. Specifically, we saw a smaller-scale version of aid disruption in 2019 in Central America. The first Trump administration decided to suspend and reprogram approximately $396 million in foreign assistance intended for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—the Northern Triangle of Central America. Ironically, US Congress members on both sides of the political aisle had previously supported comprehensive aid strategies to address issues of violence and migration in the region, allocating 2.6 billion dollars in foreign assistance to Central America from 2016 to 2019.[7][8] This abrupt suspension of foreign aid, including the closure of key programs and offices involved on the ground capacity-building programs such as law enforcement training, violence reduction programs, migration resettlement, economic development programs, and others, ultimately led to the termination and restructuring of critical services in these countries, exacerbating vulnerabilities and increasing migration pressures.

While this move was intended to pressure Central America to curb migration to the United States, the withdrawal had unintended and detrimental consequences. These countries experienced increased violent crime and strengthened organized crime networks, which fostered mistrust toward the United States. It also exacerbated migration; we see this today with more migrants coming to our borders. In short, the aid disruption fundamentally reversed much of the progress made to address the root causes of migration in the region. As the US reevaluates its foreign aid strategies under the current administration, it is crucial to consider the far-reaching impacts of aid revocation on global security strategic interests.

Escalation of Violent Crime

Historically, foreign aid through USAID has been crucial in funding community-based crime prevention programs in the Northern Triangle. These initiatives, when paired with other foreign assistance programs, have been instrumental in reducing homicide rates and other forms of violence. For instance, between 2015 and 2017, El Salvador experienced a 42% decline in homicide rates, while Guatemala and Honduras saw 13% and 23% reductions.[9]

In at-risked areas where USAID and the State Department provided more targeted programs, such as community-based crime prevention programs, homicide rates declined by 66 percent to 78 percent.[10]

Aid suspension disrupted many of these programs, leading to downsizing and/or outright termination in some cases. A community-based policing project from 2019, which I engaged in evaluating, was in place to improve overall police performance and citizen-police attitudes. These programs were cut abruptly, with police units scrambling to find access to the tools, workforce, and organizational oversight to conduct their jobs effectively. As a result, many programs were left unfinished, with mixed implementation successes. The disruption of such services eliminated critical support systems that were effective in mitigating violence, leaving communities vulnerable to escalating crime rates and further exacerbating already high levels of mistrust in police. In sum, the abrupt cessation of funding undermined years of progress in criminal justice reform in Central America.

Empowerment of Organized Crime

The withdrawal of US assistance in 2019 strengthened organized crime groups in the region. For example, a report from Insight Crime in 2019 highlighted that cutting aid significantly impacted programs focused on fighting corruption, preventing youth violence, and combating organized crime, including funding for criminal investigation units, violence prevention programs, and anti-corruption efforts. As a result, the suspension of aid weakened regional efforts to address these critical issues, with some areas seeing increased organized crime and political corruption.[11] Much like the trends in violent crime, the absence of US involvement in the region diminished the capacity of local institutions to address issues surrounding organized crime. It also created a power vacuum that criminal groups could fill to strengthen their operations in Central America.

Erosion of Trust in the United States

The decision to revoke aid has also led to a significant erosion of trust in the United States among Central American nations. These countries have long viewed US assistance as a symbol of partnership and commitment to regional stability. While our relationship with the region has never been perfect, sudden withdrawal was perceived as a betrayal by allies, fostering resentment and skepticism toward US intentions.[12] Our abrupt removal from the region undermined collaborative strategies to address challenges with migration, security, economic development, and decreased goodwill. Even upon our return, it left our allies questioning whether we were reliable partners and whether we would leave these strategic partnerships again. This uncertainty has encouraged them to seek alternative alliances to help meet shared objectives. In 2025, we have certainly justified their misgivings regarding U.S.-Central American partnerships. If we know that the 2019 decision to revoke aid to Central America had far-reaching and detrimental effects, why are we doing it again?

Restore USAID and Our Ability to Use Soft Power on the Global Scale

To promote global stability and safeguard its national interests, the United States must recognize that revoking aid makes the world more dangerous. A commitment to continued support is not merely an act of charity but a strategic imperative for a safer and more secure world. To say this is simply a piece of U.S. diplomacy that needs to be removed to lower the budget deficit is disingenuous.

An immediate restoration of USAID and its operations abroad is necessary to mitigate these adverse effects. Eliminating our use of USAID damages America’s global standing and harms our national security interests. Our removal from the international aid field allows countries like China to fill our leadership roles.[13] Indeed, China has already begun making inroads into Latin America, with approximately 150 billion dollars being sent to the region since 2005. This is more than combined lending from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the CAF-Development Bank of Latin America.[14]

Further, we need to restore USAID’s operations to continue our approach to addressing security-based issues such as organized crime and the root causes of migration. Central America in 2019 provides a precise case study of the dangers of revoking aid—rising crime, increased migration pressures, and the proliferation of criminal networks all stem from reduced U.S. engagement. I agree with Eric Olson that we are fundamentally tying our own hands in our fight against organized crime.[15] Still, we are also faltering in our other long-term strategic goals and interests in the region. While traditional aid approaches are not a quick fix (nothing good ever is!), shutting down assistance is simply counterproductive in addressing our long-term security concerns.

President Trump claims he wants to protect the bottom line of the United States and maintain economic and national security; dismantling USAID directly contradicts those claims. In 2019, his administration also openly admitted that it did not assess existing programs’ effectiveness or impact on addressing issues of pressing national importance, such as organized crime and migration.[16] In essence, the administration, much like it is today, displays an astonishing contempt for Congress and its role in allocating funds to necessary programs. The President’s adoption of Project 2025 and similar policies that advocate for a reduction in foreign aid fail to recognize critical roles in fostering stability and curbing transnational crime. If Marco Rubio and members of Congress cannot or will not stop the bleeding of USAID, it is up to organizations working in crime prevention, security, and community relations to find ways to mitigate and fix the harm already done. A strategic recommitment to foreign assistance is an investment in global peace and safeguarding America’s security and prosperity.

Endnotes

[1] Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown. “Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy.” Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213.

[2] “Trump’s Pause of U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America: An ‘America Last’ Policy.” Washington Office on Latin America. 2025, https://www.wola.org/analysis/trumps-pause-of-u-s-foreign-assistance-to-latin-america-an-america-last-policy/.

[3] Peter J. Meyer, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2025 Appropriations.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 15 November 2024,https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48266/2.

[4] Ibid. and Op. cit., Washington Office on Latin America at Note 2.

[5] “In Focus: U.S. Agency for International Development: An Overview.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 14 August 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10261/8.

[6] Ellen Knickmeyer, and Meg Kinnard, “What to Know about USAID, and Why It’s a Target for the Trump Administration,” Associated Press. 3 February 2025, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-to-know-about-usaid-and-why-its-a-target-for-the-trump-administration.

[7] Chelsa Kenney, “Northern Triangle of Central America: The 2019 Suspension and Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects.” Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office. 24 September 2021, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-104366.

[8] Peter J. Meyer, “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10371/15.

[9] “Central America and U.S. Assistance.” US Global Leadership Coalition. July 2019, https://www.usglc.org/media/2019/04/USGLC-Fact-Sheet-Central-America.pdf.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Héctor Silva Ávalos, “Why US Aid Cuts to Central America Will Help Organized Crime.” Insight Crime. 24 May 2019, https://insightcrime.org/news/why-us-aid-cuts-central-america-help-organized-crime/.

[12] Teresa Welsh, “Trump Funding Cuts Hurt 80% of USAID Central America Programs: Report.” Devex. 16 October 2021, https://www.devex.com/news/trump-funding-cuts-hurt-80-of-usaid-central-america-programs-report-101936.

[13] “China’s Growing Global Influence: What’s at Stake?” US Global Leadership Coalition. April 2021, https://www.usglc.org/chinas-growing-influence-is-america-getting-left-behind/.

[14] Matt Ferchen, “How China Is Reshaping International Development.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 8 January 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/01/how-china-is-reshaping-international-development?lang=en.

[15] Eric L. Olson, “US Ties Its Hands in Fight Against Organized Crime,” 7 February 2025, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/us-ties-its-hands-fight-against-organized-crime.

[16] “Assessing the Impact of Cutting Foreign Assistance to Central America.” Washington D.C.: Hearing Before the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade. 25 September 2019, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110041/documents/HHRG-116-FA07-Transcript-20190925.pdf.

Tags: Foreign Aid, USAID

About The Author

• 
  
• Laura Iesue
• Dr. Laura Iesue is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology. She received her PhD of Sociology from the University of Miami, with specialties in criminology and race, ethnicity and immigration studies. Dr. Iesue conducts comparative research on violence among individuals, assesses how violence impacts individual and community behavior, and considers how criminal justice and developmental programs aimed at curbing violence may or may not work in the long-term. She has conducted research on violence and migration in Central American contexts, gender-based violence, and the coping strategies of journalists who experience violence. She is also the lead-PI on a cross-national research study on COVID-19, Crime and Health which is being conducted in the Netherlands, Pakistan, Ukraine, Denmark, Guatemala and the United States and the co-founder of Stop Global Violence, a research group that explores the consequences of wars, violent conflicts and traumatic international events.

3. How Dirty Money From Fentanyl Sales Is Flowing Through China

​Please go to the link to view the interactive article. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-fentanyl-trade-network-9685fde2?st=bT7U5d&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Follow the money.

How Dirty Money From Fentanyl Sales Is Flowing Through China

Chinese money brokers are teaming up with Mexican cartels, greasing the wheels of the fentanyl trade, U.S. officials say

A composite image of handouts from court documents relating to more than $50 million in drug proceeds prosecutors say Chinese brokers were laundering for associates of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel. Photo: U.S. District Court

By Patricia KowsmannFollow

, Dylan TokarFollow

 and Brian SpegeleFollow

Feb. 18, 2025 9:00 pm ET

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On an October morning in 2022, an alleged drug trafficker drove a white pickup truck into the parking lot of a Global Fresh Market in San Gabriel, Calif., and stopped alongside a blue Maserati.

After a quick discussion with a woman in the Maserati, the man placed a large black bag in the sportscar’s back seat. Members of a U.S. government task force, who were watching, say it contained some $300,000 in cash.

The drop was part of what U.S. officials say is a new front in America’s war on drugs: an emerging partnership that has made China a crucial pit stop for dirty money flowing from the U.S.’s fentanyl crisis, according to law-enforcement officials and court documents.

Chinese money brokers, part of an underground banking system that has long served the country’s immigrant diaspora, have become go-to partners for fentanyl traffickers and other criminal groups needing to launder illicit drug profits, officials say.

Long operating in the shadows, the Chinese brokers use intermediaries, such as the woman in the Maserati, to collect drug profits from fentanyl dealers. Then, through a series of transactions, they sell those dollars to Chinese customers who want cash in the U.S. for purposes such as buying real estate or other investments, but can’t legally send money directly from China because of capital controls there.

The drug dealers end up with clean money in the process, law-enforcement officials say.

In the case involving the Maserati, dubbed “Operation Fortune Runner,” members of the Drug Enforcement Administration task force spent years investigating one such network, including thousands of hours of street-level surveillance. Traffic stops of suspects turned up cash stowed in a Fruity Pebbles cereal box and a gift bag with “Happy Birthday” printed on the side.

A birthday gift bag possessing alleged drug-trafficking proceeds.

A birthday gift bag possessing alleged drug-trafficking proceeds. Photo: U.S. District Court

The investigation eventually led to indictments of 24 individuals last year, involving more than $50 million in drug proceeds prosecutors say Chinese brokers were laundering for associates of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel.

Evidence of a deepening relationship between drug cartels and Chinese money brokers presents a challenge for President Trump, who has vowed to end the fentanyl crisis that causes the death of tens of thousands of Americans every year.

So far, his focus has been on cutting off the flow of fentanyl and the precursor ingredients that are used to make it into the U.S., imposing tariffs against producing countries, including a new 10% tariff on Chinese imports to the U.S. earlier this month.

But shutting down the sprawling network of money brokers, who U.S. officials think are critical to greasing the wheels of the trade, could also prove difficult.

In testimony to the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party last year, a former DEA official estimated global drug sales reach $500 billion to $750 billion annually. The official said he believed Chinese networks were laundering a sizable chunk of it.

“The fentanyl crisis starts in China, and it ends in China,” Jarod Forget, DEA’s acting chief of operations, said in an interview.

China’s Foreign Ministry, in a written response to questions, didn’t directly address the role of Chinese nationals laundering drug proceeds. It said the root of the fentanyl crisis lies in the U.S. itself, and Trump’s tariffs ignored the results of U.S.-China cooperation, which has included cracking down on fentanyl production in China.

“Blaming others will not solve this problem,” the Foreign Ministry said. “Pressure and threats are not the right way to deal with China.”

While deaths from overdoses have fallen, fentanyl remains the U.S.’s deadliest drug. Last year, the amount of fentanyl the DEA seized—more than 55 million pills and nearly 8,000 pounds of powder—was estimated by the DEA to be enough to kill every American.

How the system works

Drug cartels have always faced the problem of getting their profits from illegal sales in the U.S. converted into clean money and sent back home. Some have tapped middlemen who charge a high commission to help launder the money through a series of transactions that involve Colombian pesos, in what is known as the black-market peso exchange, according to U.S. officials.

Chinese money brokers came in with a much faster and cheaper service. They had a competitive edge because so many people in China want U.S. dollars, U.S. officials say.

The transaction begins in the U.S. Drug traffickers sell fentanyl or other narcotics to U.S. customers for cash. They then turn over that cash to a Chinese money broker.

The Chinese money broker now advertises the U.S. dollars on WeChat, a Chinese app. To buy them, a Chinese customer will transfer yuan, including a commission, into the broker’s bank account in China.

The Chinese broker then releases the U.S. dollars to Chinese customers who want to spend money in the U.S., acquiring real estate, paying college tuition, gambling, or making other investments.

Now the Chinese money broker needs to get the yuan to the drug traffickers in Mexico. One way to do that is for the broker to exchange the yuan for pesos in Mexico through a business that is looking to buy Chinese goods for export to Mexico.

The Chinese goods are exported to Mexico and sold. The Chinese broker now has Mexican pesos, which it can hand over to the Mexican cartel, minus a 1–2% commission.

Under China’s capital controls, meant to keep too much money from flowing out of the country, Chinese citizens are limited to buying only $50,000 worth of foreign currency each year. As China’s economy slows and its real-estate and stock markets languish, more Chinese want to move money overseas to protect their wealth. Tapping into underground banks connected to the fentanyl trade is a way to do that, U.S. officials say. 

This is how it works: The Mexican cartels’ U.S. operatives provide the U.S. cash they received from selling fentanyl to a broker working for a Chinese money-laundering ring, all in the U.S. Through the Chinese messaging app WeChat, the brokers advertise the cash to people in China who could use the money on U.S. soil, according to current and former law-enforcement officials.

Once a Chinese buyer of the U.S. dollars is found, that person transfers the equivalent in Chinese yuan, plus a hefty commission, to a bank account in China belonging to the money launderers. The Chinese customer then receives access to the cash bought in the U.S.

The cartel’s money, now clean, is sitting in the Chinese money broker’s bank account in China. The money can then get back to the cartel in a couple of ways. It can be used to buy fentanyl precursors for the cartel, starting the cycle again.

Or, the yuan can be used to buy Chinese manufactured goods that are then shipped to Mexico and sold for pesos, which are then handed to the cartels.

Some Chinese nationals using the service might not know it involves drugs, U.S. officials say. 

“This is now one of the most prominent, if not the most prominent way in the world that people launder money,” said Craig Timm, a former money-laundering official in the U.S. Department of Justice who is now at the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists.

Chinese money brokers have also differentiated themselves from competitors by taking on some of the risk associated with this multistep process. Instead of waiting until the process is complete to release pesos to Mexican cartels, they operate essentially on credit, transferring money to drug traffickers soon after receiving a cash delivery in the U.S., officials say.

The commission they charge drug traffickers is small, because they also make money from selling U.S. dollars to customers of their underground banking network.

“When the Colombians controlled it, it cost 7% to 10%. The Chinese were charging 1% to 2%. It was unheard of,” said Chris Urben, a former DEA agent who saw firsthand the emergence of Chinese money launderers in the New York area.

“All of a sudden, we were seeing Chinese money launderers picking up drug money all across the U.S.,” added Urben, now a managing director at private investigations firm Nardello & Co.

U.S. crackdown

Many former law-enforcement officials say more cooperation with China is needed.

“A lot of the money under the scheme is flowing through banks in China where the Chinese have oversight,” said Anthony Ruggiero, a former senior U.S. Treasury official now at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The DEA and other agencies have launched a spate of investigations in the U.S. In one case, two Chinese nationals were charged with laundering money for Mexican cartels after agents went undercover as money couriers. Both were later convicted, with one of the men receiving a 10-year sentence in December for taking part in efforts to launder $62 million.

The task force surveilling the cash drop in San Gabriel, Calif., in 2022 was part of a special DEA team that worked wiretaps on drug trafficking investigations. Their target was an alleged Chinese money-laundering ring run by a man named Sai Zhang who did business with alleged drug dealers, including the Sinaloa cartel, and cash runners such as the woman in the blue Maserati, who wasn’t identified in court records.

Officers spent several years following the suspects, watching them pick up and drop off bags throughout the Los Angeles area.

On the October morning in San Gabriel, officers said they were relying on a wiretapped phone conversation between two members of Zhang’s ring who were organizing the pick up of $300,000.

After the bag was handed off to the blue Maserati, agents followed the car to a residence, where the money was allegedly mixed with other drug proceeds and parceled out to underground banking customers, people familiar with the matter said. Later, police pulled over a driver who had left the residence and found $25,000, according to court documents.

Zhang was among the people charged with laundering money, running an unlicensed money transmitting business and facilitating drug trafficking. He has pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial. A lawyer for Zhang didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Chinese authorities said in June they had arrested in the mainland one of the men indicted for allegedly working with the network.

Write to Patricia Kowsmann at patricia.kowsmann@wsj.com, Dylan Tokar at dylan.tokar@wsj.com and Brian Spegele at Brian.Spegele@wsj.com

Appeared in the February 19, 2025, print edition as 'How Chinese Brokers Took Over Money Laundering of Fentanyl'.

4. The Sort of Alliance: India and America Keep Getting Closer

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

The future of U.S.-India relations appears promising, characterized by closer geopolitical alignment and mutually beneficial economic engagements. As both nations navigate the complexities of a multipolar world, their partnership stands as a testament to shared democratic values and common strategic interests. While challenges remain, the commitment to collaboration and dialogue bodes well for the continued strengthening of this vital bilateral relationship.

Trump’s “sovereigntist” strategy provides a unique opportunity for India to engage with the U.S. on its own terms, leveraging its geopolitical importance without compromising its multi-alignment policy. As Prime Minister Modi concluded his “extremely fruitful” U.S. visit, the tangible outcomes and reaffirmed commitments signal a new chapter in U.S.-India relations – one poised to shape the geopolitical and economic landscape of the 21st century.

The Sort of Alliance: India and America Keep Getting Closer

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew Latham · February 18, 2025

The recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington, D.C., marks a pivotal moment in U.S.-India relations, signaling a trajectory toward deeper geopolitical alignment and enhanced economic collaboration. While India maintains its policy of strategic autonomy, often termed “multi-alignment,” the convergence of interests between the world’s oldest and largest democracies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This evolving relationship reflects both the structural changes in the international order and the political calculations of a second Trump presidency.

India and America: A Sort of Alliance?

The global order is undergoing a profound transformation, shifting from unipolarity – or U.S. hegemony – toward a multipolar system where regional powers such as India play increasingly independent roles. In this evolving landscape, New Delhi’s strategic importance to Washington has grown exponentially. The Biden administration sought to deepen ties with India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, and under President Donald Trump’s second term, this trend appears poised to accelerate. Trump’s “sovereigntist” vision of foreign policy, as outlined in his recent New York Times article, prioritizes transactional partnerships that enhance U.S. strategic flexibility rather than rigid alliances based on ideological commitments. India’s pragmatic approach to international relations aligns well with this philosophy.

Trump’s “sovereigntist” outlook, which emphasizes national sovereignty and strategic self-sufficiency, suggests a reordering of traditional alliances in favor of adaptable partnerships. This aligns well with India’s own approach to global diplomacy. While Trump has often been skeptical of NATO and multilateral institutions, he has simultaneously pursued strong bilateral relationships with key partners like India. In this framework, New Delhi is not just a regional power but a crucial component of America’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly as Washington seeks to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Both nations share growing concerns over China’s assertiveness. Beijing’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific, including increased naval operations in the Indian Ocean and along the disputed Himalayan border with India, have strengthened the case for deeper U.S.-India security cooperation. This partnership is exemplified by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia, which aims to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Regular summits and joint military exercises underscore the commitment to this shared vision.

During the recent summit, Trump and Modi outlined plans for significant defense collaboration, including India’s potential acquisition of advanced U.S. defense systems such as F-35 stealth fighter jets. If realized, this move would significantly enhance India’s conventional deterrence capabilities and symbolize a shift toward greater U.S.-India military cooperation. However, India’s longstanding reliance on Russian arms, dating back to the Cold War, will not be easily overcome. New Delhi will continue to balance its defense partnerships, reflecting its commitment to strategic autonomy rather than exclusive alignment with Washington.

Economic Synergy and Trade Relations

Beyond security cooperation, economic ties between the U.S. and India are witnessing a transformative phase. Bilateral trade relations have often been strained by disputes over tariffs and market access, but recent discussions suggest a commitment to resolving these frictions. Modi and Trump announced negotiations for a comprehensive trade deal that could serve as the foundation for a more robust economic partnership.

India has pledged to increase its purchase of U.S. goods, including oil, gas, and military equipment, with the goal of doubling bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030. Trump, who has long criticized India’s high tariffs on American products, Harley-Davidson motorcycles for example, secured Modi’s commitment to reducing these trade barriers – a symbolic but important gesture of goodwill.

Additionally, India’s rise as a global technology hub has made it an attractive partner for American businesses. The U.S. seeks to counterbalance China’s dominance in critical sectors such as semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence. India’s growing tech industry, bolstered by initiatives like “Make in India” and “Digital India,” presents a viable alternative. The recent agreement to facilitate greater technology transfers between the two nations highlights the increasing interdependence of their economies.

Trump’s “Sovereigntist” Vision and the U.S.-India Partnership

Trump’s foreign policy has been defined by a “sovereigntist” approach that prioritizes national interests over multilateral commitments. His administration’s decision to reduce America’s reliance on traditional alliances like NATO, coupled with his skepticism of institutions such as the United Nations, signals a shift toward flexible, interest-driven partnerships. This outlook makes India an ideal strategic partner.

Unlike the Cold War-era alliance system, where smaller states aligned firmly with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, the contemporary world order is characterized by “multi-alignment.” India exemplifies this strategy by maintaining close relations with Russia, engaging with China in BRICS, and expanding its partnerships with the U.S. and Europe. This approach allows India to maximize its strategic options while avoiding entanglements in great-power conflicts.

From Washington’s perspective, India’s geopolitical weight makes it an indispensable counterbalance to China. While Modi’s government has resisted outright military alliances, it has demonstrated a willingness to engage in deeper security cooperation when it serves India’s interests. This pragmatism aligns with Trump’s transactional foreign policy ethos, which values results over ideological consistency.

The Indian Diaspora: A Political and Economic Force

A key factor influencing U.S.-India relations is the growing influence of the Indian-American diaspora. As of 2023, approximately 5.2 million people of Indian origin reside in the United States, with about 3.9 million being 18 years or older. This community is among the fastest-growing immigrant groups in the country, with the number of Americans identifying solely as Asian Indian increasing by over 50% to nearly 4.4 million between 2010 and 2023.

Indian-Americans are distinguished by their high educational attainment and economic success. In 2019, 75% of Indian adults aged 25 and older held a bachelor’s degree or higher, the highest level among all Asian-American groups. This emphasis on education has translated into substantial economic achievements. In 2022, the median household income for Indian-American families was $145,000, significantly surpassing the median of $100,000 for Asian-American households overall.

The community’s economic influence is notable, with Indian-Americans playing pivotal roles in sectors such as technology, medicine, and finance. As of 2024, individuals of Indian descent lead 25 of the 500 largest American companies, including major corporations like Microsoft and Google. This representation underscores the community’s substantial contributions to the U.S. economy and its integral role in fostering closer U.S.-India relations

Politically, Indian-Americans have traditionally leaned Democratic, but recent trends suggest increasing engagement with the Republican Party, particularly among wealthier and business-oriented segments of the community. Large-scale public events attended by prominent Republican leaders during Modi’s U.S. visits reflect a bipartisan interest in courting the Indian diaspora.

Trump’s outreach to Indian-Americans aligns with his broader effort to diversify the GOP’s voter base. By fostering closer ties with India, the Republican Party seeks to appeal to a constituency that values strong U.S.-India relations. The increasing involvement of Indian-American donors in Republican campaigns further incentivizes the Trump administration to deepen economic and strategic cooperation with New Delhi.

Conclusion

The future of U.S.-India relations appears promising, characterized by closer geopolitical alignment and mutually beneficial economic engagements. As both nations navigate the complexities of a multipolar world, their partnership stands as a testament to shared democratic values and common strategic interests. While challenges remain, the commitment to collaboration and dialogue bodes well for the continued strengthening of this vital bilateral relationship.

India’s nuclear weapons program is one of the world’s most advanced.

Trump’s “sovereigntist” strategy provides a unique opportunity for India to engage with the U.S. on its own terms, leveraging its geopolitical importance without compromising its multi-alignment policy. As Prime Minister Modi concluded his “extremely fruitful” U.S. visit, the tangible outcomes and reaffirmed commitments signal a new chapter in U.S.-India relations – one poised to shape the geopolitical and economic landscape of the 21st century.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, writing a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew Latham · February 18, 2025

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2025

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025

Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment. NBC reported on February 18 that four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials stated that intelligence from the United States and unspecified close American allies shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine and that his goals "remain maximalist." One congressional official stated that there is "zero" intelligence showing that Putin is interested in a "real peace deal right now." Intelligence officials stated that Putin has no plans to withdraw troops from Ukraine or to pull any personnel or equipment from western Russia. The six officials stated that Putin may agree to a ceasefire and peace deal in order to give the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, and there is an idea among Western officials that Putin may "go through the motions" of negotiations in order to see what concessions he can get and to reintegrate Russia back into the global community. The two congressional officials and a former senior US administration official noted that Putin's "broad ambitions" have remained unchanged from the end of the Biden administration into the new Trump administration.

Western intelligence assessments suggest that Putin has not changed his theory of victory in Ukraine and still believes that Russia's military superiority is such that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine on the battlefield. The six official sources told NBC that Putin still thinks that he can "wait out" Ukraine and Europe to eventually control all of Ukraine. A Western intelligence official noted that Putin "thinks he is winning" and does not feel pressure to stop hostilities due to Russian battlefield losses. Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and that Russia did not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up similar to that in September 2022 because Russia is not trying to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine rapidly. Putin's theory of victory assumes that the Russian military can sustain slow, creeping advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.

Many recent Russian statements show that Putin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise. Kremlin officials have repeatedly denied Ukraine's sovereignty over its internationally recognized 1991 borders and the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov most recently claimed on February 16. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have promoted false narratives that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" as part of efforts to claim that Zelensky does not have the authority to negotiate with Russia or that Russia does not have to honor any agreements that Zelensky may sign in the future. Putin and other Russian officials have also demanded that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, while denying that Russia will make any territorial concessions of its own.

Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a boilerplate readout of the meeting, during which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. Russian officials, including Peskov, Lavrov, and Ushakov, broadly stated that the talks went well, claiming that the discussions were the start of a long process and that Russia and the United States will continue dialogue on these issues. Lavrov claimed that the meeting was "useful" and that Russia and the United States began to "hear each other" and share a "determination to move forward." The Russian MFA's readout emphasized the Russian-American bilateral aspects of the talks, including normalizing bilateral relations, establishing a dialogue for future economic and energy cooperation, and resuming communications on international issues. The Russian MFA's readout also emphasized that Russia and the United States have a "special responsibility" as nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council to resume communicating on international issues. ISW continues to note that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as the heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status. The Russian MFA readout only briefly mentioned Ukraine, claiming that the delegations "exchanged views" on the situation "around Ukraine" and mutually committed to resolving the war.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment.

• Many recent Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise.

• Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine.

• Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.

• Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war.

• Russian officials in Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.

• Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the US than for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises in 2025 and 2026.

• US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain that the Russian military command's lack of response to systemic issues is limiting Russian advances near Pokrovsk.

• Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported on February 18 that Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov announced that regional authorities are raising one-time payments for recruits who sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from 400,000 rubles ($4,369) to 1.1 million rubles ($12,015).

• Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.

6. Iran Update, February 18, 2025

​Damn. I wish ISW would not use axis of resistance in this way. Do not legitimize their actions by using resistance. We should preserve resistance to define the people who resist totalitarian/authoritarian/dictatorial rule and seek to gain their freedom.

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-18-2025

NOTE: CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.

A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17. A commander within the Northern Democratic Brigade—a faction of the SDF—said that the SDF, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Council (SDF) agreed to merge SDF and AANES-affiliated security forces into the Syrian army after discussion on February 17 about negotiations with Damascus. The SDF reportedly agreed to several conditions, including to remove non-Syrian fighters from the SDF’s ranks. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said in a February 18 interview with Kurdish media that the Syrian government also requested that the SDF transfer certain security issues to the Syrian state, including control over ISIS prisons. Abdi said that the SDF was "open to cooperation" in these fields but did not explicitly specify whether the SDF had agreed to the conditions. Non-Syrian fighters within the SDF likely primarily refer to foreign Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters operating within northern Syria. Abdi recently confirmed that these fighters had come to Syria to support the SDF’s fight against ISIS and reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from Syria if the SDF, Turkey, and Turkish-backed forces reached a ceasefire in northern Syria. Turkey, which has worked with the Syrian government to pressure the SDF to disarm, has long demanded that the SDF expel PKK members from its ranks, although it has often conflated the two and has also, in effect called for the SDF’s destruction.

There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively. Abdi said that there are still disagreements between Damascus and the SDF, though the two parties have continued to prepare suitable preconditions for negotiations. Abdi or the Syrian government have not yet publicly agreed on the specific mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Defense Ministry. Abdi’s demand that the SDF integrate as a "bloc" was one of the main sticking points of negotiations in the past two months, and it is unclear if either side has relaxed their views on this issue. Abdi’s public congratulations to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on assuming the presidency and invitation for Shara to visit northeastern Syria suggests that the SDF continues to be willing to engage positively with the Syrian government.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) backfilled the IDF in numerous positions along the southeastern Lebanese border on February 18, in accordance with the ceasefire deadline. The IDF withdrew from at least ten southeastern Lebanese towns on February 18. Lebanese and Israeli media reported that the IDF withdrew from Yaroun, Maroun al Ras, Mhaibib, Blida, Mays al Jabal, Houla, Markaba, Odaisseh, and Kfar Kila. The LAF backfilled the IDF in all of these towns. The IDF recently announced it would withdraw most of its forces from southern Lebanon on February 18 but keep Israeli troops stationed on five strategically significant hills. This includes Shaked Ridge, south of Blida, and Tzivoni Ridge, near Houla, in southeastern Lebanon.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remains at seven semi-permanent positions in Quneitra and Daraa provinces in southern Syria. Israeli media reported on February 18 that the IDF has seven outposts that serve as “operational hubs” in Syria. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces entered al Asbah and al Asha in Quneitra Province on February 17.

Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani advocated for other countries to lift financial sanctions on Syria at the al Ula Conference on Emerging Market Economies in Saudi Arabia on February 16. The conference explored possible technical assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to integrate Syria’s central bank back into the international financial system. The IMF’s Managing Director said that the IMF began communicating with Syrian officials to understand how to rebuild Syria’s connection to international finance at the al Ula conference. Shaibani met with Saudi Minister of Finance Mohammed bin Abdullah al Jadaan on the sidelines of the conference.

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-Damascus Negotiations: A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17. There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively.



• SDF Negotiating Position: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is under tremendous pressure from internal SDF rivals, external Kurdish rivals, longtime enemies, and his allies to integrate with the Damascus government. This pressure appears to be pushing the SDF to gradually moderate its demands. Abdi probably sees an opportunity to avoid a major conflict with Damascus and solidify his own position, though he presumably recognizes that integration with the Syrian army is fraught with risk given the outstanding issues regarding integration.

• Iraqi Financial System and Iranian-backed Militias: The Iraqi Central Bank reportedly banned five local banks from US dollar transactions to combat money laundering and smuggling. The Iraqi Central Bank may have banned these banks under US pressure.

7. Defense Department firings expected to start soon, officials say

Defense Department firings expected to start soon, officials say

Pentagon agencies were told to submit lists of probationary employees after members of Elon Musk’s DOGE arrived, people familiar with the matter said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/02/18/pentagon-layoffs-musk-doge-trump/

Updated

February 18, 2025 at 7:07 p.m. ESTtoday at 7:07 p.m. EST

The Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

By Dan Lamothe, Alex Horton and Hannah Natanson

The Trump administration has directed defense agencies to turn over a list of their probationary employees by the end of Tuesday, with the expectation that many could be fired as soon as this week, according to five people familiar with the matter.

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The directive coincides with the arrival at the Pentagon of personnel from billionaire tech mogul Elon Musk’s U.S. DOGE Service, which has overseen the firing of thousands of probationary employees in other federal agencies and coordinated the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

It was not immediately clear whether any probationary employees in the Defense Department will be exempt from plans to reduce headcount, but the expectation is that many will not, said people familiar with the matter who, like some others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

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The Pentagon referred questions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which has had a leading hand in reshaping the government during President Donald Trump’s first month in office. Spokespeople for the OPM and DOGE did not respond to requests for comment.

If implemented widely, cuts to probationary employees across the Defense Department could result in thousands of dismissals. The Pentagon, with a budget of more than $840 billion, is the federal government’s largest agency. It has about 950,000 civilian employees, including tens of thousands of military veterans, with roles ranging from welders responsible for vehicle maintenance to administrative staff assisting in offices and engineers overseeing highly specialized weapons programs. Probationary employment for federal workers generally lasts one year but can extend to two or three years in some positions.

The Pentagon also oversees about 1.3 million active-duty service members and nearly 800,000 more who are in the National Guard and reserves, but the Trump administration has exempted service members from its sweeping budget cuts.

Musk’s involvement in Pentagon personnel and budgeting matters will certainly raise questions about potential conflicts of interest. His companies have received billions of dollars in U.S. government contracts, including at the Defense Department, which has a growing interest in the capabilities offered by SpaceX.

One contract for $1.8 billion was awarded to the company to help build a network of spy satellites for the Pentagon’s National Reconnaissance Office in 2021, Reuters reported. The Pentagon also pays for Starlink, a satellite-based internet service that is overseen by Musk and has proved vital for Ukrainian troops to communicate on the battlefield.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last week acknowledged that DOGE was due to arrive at the Pentagon and said he would welcome its teams. He said he already had been in contact with Musk, whom he called a “great patriot, interested in advancing the ‘America First’ agenda” of Trump.

“There are waste, redundancies and headcounts in headquarters that need to be addressed,” Hegseth said while traveling in Stuttgart, Germany. “There’s just no doubt.”

Hegseth cited Defense Department programs examining climate change but said DOGE efforts will be coordinated with his team to make sure they are not “to the detriment of American operational or tactical capabilities.” He affirmed that Musk was accurate to say that “billions of dollars” could be saved in the Defense Department, with the money spent instead on combat troops.

The Musk team has struggled to discern the roles of employees in other departments, leading to mistakes. Last week, some dismissals in the Energy Department were initiated, then paused, after alarm was raised about the effects of the cuts on nuclear defense programs.

Leaders across the Defense Department compiled lists of personnel they believed were mission critical and should be exempt from dismissal. But some staffers said they didn’t really expect to be seriously considered, citing the OPM’s authority to grant such requests and interpretation of guidance that approvals would be rare. Chaos surrounding fast-moving and sudden directives seemed to be a feature, rather than a bug, said a staffer with the U.S. Cyber Command.

One military officer said Tuesday that it was not yet clear how the possible DOGE-mandated cuts may affect his office, which is part of the U.S. intelligence community. He works with five employees considered probationary, performing work he characterized as vital to national security, and is waiting to see whether any will be exempted.

The officer said that in his agency probationary status lasts one year for military veterans and two years for civilians. Some of those hired as Defense Department civilians previously worked as defense contractors in similar roles and are considered experts in their fields, the officer said.

Probationary employees working with classified programs can’t simply be fired, the officer said. They must be escorted off their installation, give up their badge and be formally “read out” of their program, a process that involves debriefings and returning classified information.

“Morale is not great,” the officer said. “No one trusts that they won’t jack this whole thing up.”

Trump presidency

Follow live updates on the Trump administration. We’re tracking President Donald Trump’s progress on key campaign promises and lawsuits challenging Trump’s executive orders and actions.

U.S. DOGE Service: Elon Musk and his team have moved to dismantle some U.S. agencies, push out hundreds of thousands of civil servants and gain access to some of the federal government’s most sensitive payment systems. But many of these moves appear to violate federal law, according to several government officials.

Trump’s Cabinet: Several of Trump’s Cabinet picks, including Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Tulsi Gabbard, Marco Rubio and Pete Hegseth have been confirmed. We’re tracking the nominations here.

Tariffs: Trump imposed 25 percent tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. The move came a week after Trump’s 10 percentage point increase in tariffs on Chinese goods took effect, prompting retaliatory measures from Beijing. Previously, Trump granted Mexico and Canada a 30-day reprieve on tariffs. Here’s what could get more expensive with Trump’s tariffs.

Federal workers: Trump targeted federal workers in his opening act — putting federal diversity, equity and inclusion employees on leave; banning remote work; and stripping employment protections from civil servants. In its latest move, the White House offered a “deferred resignation” to federal employees.

By Dan Lamothe

Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 15 years, traveling extensively, embedding with five branches of service and covering combat in Afghanistan.follow on X@danlamothe

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Alex Horton is a national security reporter for The Washington Post focused on the U.S. military. He served in Iraq as an Army infantryman. Send him secure tips on Signal at alex.horton85follow on X@AlexHortonTX

By Hannah Natanson

Hannah Natanson is a Washington Post reporter covering national education. Reach her securely on Signal at 202-580-5477.follow on Xhannah_natanson

8. Trump wants Greenland and Gaza. That might embolden China on Taiwan.

Trump wants Greenland and Gaza. That might embolden China on Taiwan.

Trump’s transactional style is unnerving many in Taiwan, who fear it will encourage Chinese leader Xi Jinping in his ambitions to take control of the island.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/18/trump-china-taiwan-bargaining-chip/

February 18, 2025 at 5:00 a.m. ESTToday at 5:00 a.m. EST

Guards at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei lower the flag of Taiwan in August 2023. (An Rong Xu for The Washington Post)

By Katrina Northrop and Vic Chiang

TAIPEI, Taiwan — President Donald Trump has spent his first few weeks in the White House talking about land deals like the real estate developer he once was.

He has threatened to annex Greenland — refusing to rule out military force to do so — and has suggested using “economic force” to make Canada the 51st American state. He has repeatedly talked about taking over the Gaza Strip — referring to the area as the “Riviera of the Middle East” — and his envoys are trying to broker a deal with Russia that could cost Ukraine some of its land.

This transactional approach is unnerving many in Taiwan, who fear it will embolden Chinese leader Xi Jinping to press ahead with his plans for “reunification” with Taiwan, an island democracy of 23 million people that has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Some fear Trump and Xi might even use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in a trade deal.

“Trump’s rhetoric is doing China’s work for it in Taiwan,” said Ryan Hass, a China and Taiwan expert at the Brookings Institution and a former national security official in the Obama administration.

“With each statement by Trump that degrades the principle that territorial boundaries must not be redrawn by force or coercion, propagandists in Beijing likely are giving each other high-fives,” Hass said.

Xi, the strongest Chinese leader in decades, has made “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” one of his top priorities, and that includes taking control of Taiwan, where nationalist forces fled when a civil war ended with Communist victory in 1949.

Over the past three years, Beijing has dramatically stepped up military intimidation of Taiwan, sending rising numbers of warplanes and navy ships to probe the island’s defenses. This effort has only intensified since Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing considers a “dangerous separatist,” became president in May.

This is fueling fears in Taiwan that Xi might try to launch a military invasion of the island — using the same justification that Trump uses when talking about Greenland, for example — and making it more difficult for Washington to credibly object.

If the United States is threatening other nations with its military might, said Wei-Ting Yen, a political scientist at Academia Sinica, Taiwan’s national academy, “then what’s the moral ground on which we can say China cannot invade Taiwan?”

Soldiers line up in front of the Taiwanese flag and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of Taiwan, at a military base in Taitung, Taiwan, on Jan. 21. (Ritchie B. Tongo/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

Taiwan relies on the United States for robust, if unofficial, political and military support under Washington’s long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which avoids clarifying whether the United States would militarily intervene to protect the island if China tried to take it over. This is designed to deter Beijing and Taipei from provoking a conflict.

Trump has injected new uncertainty into that fragile positioning, criticizing Taiwan but also giving Taipei reason for optimism.

In his first month back in the White House, Trump has accused Taiwan of stealing the United States’ semiconductor business and argued that Taipei does not pay enough for its own defense against China. Taiwan spends about 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense — more than most NATO allies — but Trump has suggested it should spend 10 percent.

At the same time, Trump appointed several China hawks — and vocal supporters of the island and its vibrant democracy — to key positions, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Michael Waltz. Rubio has already spoken positively about Taiwan, and his department last week removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from its website.

The relationship between the world’s two biggest economies is in a turbulent moment. They are already in the beginnings of a trade war, with Trump this month imposing a blanket 10 percent tariff on all Chinese goods and Beijing punching back with a slew of retaliatory economic measures.

While the leaders of Mexico and Canada struck deals to delay tariffs, Xi and Trump have not spoken since the tariffs took effect.

Graham Allison, a former U.S. defense official and political scientist who maintains strong links with Beijing, said both leaders seem willing to come to the negotiating table and “do business” with each other.

That business, Allison added, may come at a cost for Taiwan.

“Taiwan will be depreciated in the triangular relationship,” he said, referring to the relationship between the United States, China and Taiwan. “I see no evidence whatever that [Trump] believes the U.S. has any vital interest in Taiwan.”

The prospect of some type of grand bargain involving Taiwan has become all the more pressing given the recent turn of events in Ukraine, another geopolitical flash point with many similarities to Taiwan.

Fumio Kishida, the Japanese prime minister when Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, repeatedly warned of Chinese military aggression against Taiwan, saying that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

The Trump administration this week opened talks with Russia about ending the war in Ukraine — without Ukrainian officials present. Many see ominous parallels with China and Taiwan.

Chinese officials will view this as an American “sellout” of Ukraine, said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.

“The negotiation on Ukraine … reinforces the Chinese conviction that if a strong power is determined to invade a smaller one, it eventually can and will get away with it,” she said.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te inspects an F-16 fighter jet during his visit to an air base in Taitung on Jan. 21. (Ritchie B. Tongo/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

For the past three years, Taipei has appealed to the United States that Taiwan, like Ukraine, is a beacon of democracy on the front lines of authoritarianism. Taiwanese officials have argued that helping Ukraine fight Russia is imperative to deterring a Chinese attack on the island.

But that no longer strikes a chord in Trump’s Washington, said Alexander Huang, the director of international affairs for the main opposition party, the Kuomintang, which has historically favored closer ties with Beijing.

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party-led government is “still in the loop of the usual narrative and belief that value diplomacy is right and the United States will support Taiwan because of democracy,” Huang said. “That won’t happen.”

Now, the only currency that matters in Washington is interests, not values.

“How to make Taiwan a partner that’s advancing U.S. interests in the region, and protecting Taiwan’s own interests, is a very, very important topic,” Huang said.

Lai’s government has already changed its approach in an attempt to appeal to a skeptical Trump and is doing its best to convince him that the United States and Taiwan share overlapping interests.

Lai on Friday laid out a three-pronged plan for avoiding U.S. tariffs and currying favor with Trump.

This includes balancing Taiwan’s large trade surplus with the United States — which makes it a potential target of Trump’s tariffs — encouraging more investments from high-tech Taiwanese firms in the United States, and boosting defense spending.

“We aim to help the new U.S. administration understand that Taiwan is an indispensable partner for America’s manufacturing revitalization and for securing its leadership in high technology,” Lai said in a news conference after a national security meeting about coping with the challenges of the Trump administration.

“Taiwan-U.S. cooperation will create a shared win-win outcome,” he said.

One Taiwanese official familiar with negotiations, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal discussions, described the strategy as a “gift basket” for Trump.

Taiwanese officials went to the United States last week to offer to buy more U.S. liquefied natural gas in an attempt to redress the trade imbalance.

Lai also pledged on Friday to increase defense spending to more than 3 percent of GDP annually.

Members of Lai’s DPP say this boost should underscore Taipei’s commitment to self-defense — and its opposition to geopolitical horse-trading.

Wang Ting-yu, a DPP lawmaker and chair of the foreign affairs and defense committee, condemned the prospect of other countries negotiating over its future.

“Taiwan is my home; it’s my country,” he said in an interview. “It’s not anyone else’s bargaining chip.”

By Katrina Northrop

Katrina Northrop is a China correspondent for The Washington Post. Previously, she covered China's global impact on business and technology for The Wire China. Her work has also been published in The New York Times, The Atlantic, and The Providence Journal. follow on X@NorthropKatrina

By Vic Chiang

Vic Chiang joined The Washington Post’s China Bureau in 2022. He was previously a reporter at Deutsche Welle in Taipei, where he covered news of China and Taiwan with a focus on politics and human rights.

9. Political lessons for Australia from the war in Ukraine

​Excerpts:

A final lesson of the last three years for Australia’s political leaders, and indeed every citizen of our nation, is about will. The central insight from Ukraine must be that no one will help a nation that doesn’t demonstrate the will to defend itself. There are many dimensions to this demonstration of will. Ultimately, it is about building national resilience in all its forms. The concept of sovereign resilience, which includes the requirement to mobilise people, ideas and industry for large military and national challenges, must be implemented from the top of our nation’s political leadership.

Three years after Russia began its catastrophic invasion of Ukraine, Australians have been given an opportunity to ponder what we value as individuals and as one of the world’s most successful democracies.

That opportunity, for our politicians, our government, business and community leaders and for every citizen of this country, has been underpinned by the courage, resilience and essential goodness of Ukrainian citizens and soldiers. They have demonstrated a form of overwhelming will and sacrifice not often seen in nations. And despite the horror we feel in watching the Russian barbarians seek to extinguish an entire people and its culture in the past three years, there is also a sense of privilege we might feel in having been able to observe the rare demonstration of uncommon valour by an entire nation.

But in learning from Ukraine, our political leaders must have the courage to ask and answer the following: does Australia, with its short attention spans and its societal avoidance of personal and political risk, possess a similar will to defend our own democratic systems?

Political lessons for Australia from the war in Ukraine | Lowy Institute

lowyinstitute.org · by Mick Ryan

Three years ago, Russian forces moved across the Ukrainian northern, eastern and southern frontiers, as well as in a coordinated series of missile and air assault actions, in the hope of a short, ten-day lightning war. The ultimate objective was that the Ukrainian government would fall, to be replaced by a Russian puppet government that would keep NATO out and Russia in.

In On War, Carl von Clausewitz describes how “the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made”. Ukraine, facing an existential crisis, has leveraged all its national resources to achieve the supreme political goal of retaining Ukrainian sovereignty. Russia, which has invented this crisis and constructed a make-believe tale about NATO encroachment and Nazi leadership in Ukraine, faced no existential challenge. And yet, Putin has manufactured a political environment where there is no Russian national life, in the economy, in schools or in the media, without total commitment to winning the war.

Writing in the early days of the war, I described how no responsible military or political institution will be able to ignore the lessons that will emerge from Ukraine. Very few people anticipated the profound impacts this war would have on European and global political and security affairs. The insights from this conflict about the changing character of war extend from the technological to the industrial, the tactical to the political. With this as context, what might be the key insights that the past three years have provided for Australian politicians?

Australia needs a new theory of conventional deterrence for non-nuclear middle powers that is more sophisticated than possession of three submarines and a small stockpile of missiles.

A first lesson is the need to invest in deterrence. Deterrence is a national undertaking to discourage or restrain another nation-state or non-state entity from taking unwanted actions. It possesses a psychological dimension and aims to affect a potential aggressor’s decision-making process. One of the crucial responsibilities of national political leadership is to deter aggression against the nation they lead, and to resource their participation in multinational efforts to deter coercion, aggression and conflicts. The West now exists in an environment where predatory authoritarian regimes see democratic political weakness as provocative. While Australia has embraced deterrence in its most recent National Defence Strategy, it remains purely a military strawman. At heart, Australia needs a new theory of conventional deterrence for non-nuclear middle powers that is more sophisticated than possession of three submarines and a small stockpile of missiles. More elements of conventional deterrence, including civil defence, a capable sovereign defence industry, robust cyber defences, missile defence and plans for mobilisation of industry and people, are needed.

A second lesson for Australia’s political leadership regards the pace of political and strategic decision-making. The speed of planning, decision-making, action and adaptation is increasing due to faster media cycles, the greater visibility of friendly and enemy systems from drones and open-source intelligence, the proliferation of different ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and AI-enabled decision support. Political and military institutions must ensure that their people and institutions are able to intellectually and physically deal with this new environment through better use of time for improved decision-making.

Political leaders need to be able to explain deterring war. This has been something that Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy has excelled at throughout this war (Ukraine President/Flickr)

In the 2024 Australian National Defence Strategy, the government proposed that defence’s procurement decision-making does not pass the test of timely 21st-century decision-making. This is largely a result of a dwindling risk appetite by politicians and public servants in the modern era. This root cause is likely to have impacts in many other elements of the national security enterprise. For example, decision-making about the provision of military assistance to Ukraine has been slower than required by battlefield and strategic realities.

Understanding escalation management and red lines is another crucial lesson of the past three years. A nation must be opaque enough in its decision-making to not provide warning to an adversary about future intentions, but transparent enough to prevent that enemy from making decisions that escalate situations out of control. National leaders and alliances must never reveal all their red lines nor publicly take counsel of their fears about enemy responses.

There was probably a much better appreciation of this issue among Cold War-era politicians. Contemporary politicians need to improve their performance, however. The frequent debates in recent years about whether providing a few tanks or artillery systems to Ukraine would escalate the war not only demonstrated strategic immaturity and risk aversion but also resulted in Ukraine being unable to exploit battlefield opportunities at the end of 2022 and since.

The three years since February 2022 has also reinforced the crucial nature of alliances. The war would have turned out very differently if the NATO alliance and its military, intelligence, informational and diplomatic support had not been provided to Ukraine. NATO has been reinvigorated and expanded over the last three years in a way that has been fundamental in deterring Russia from expansion of the war. Modern political leaders must not only understand the importance of alliances in securing their countries, but how alliances contribute to a more secure and prosperous global environment. It is necessary to invest in alliances and advocate for them with both domestic and international audiences.

The experience of Ukraine offers a salutary lesson to this generation that large-scale war is always possible.

Strategic communication by political leaders with citizens is a fifth and vital lesson from the past three years. Advanced new technologies now provide the means to target and influence various populations in a way that has not been possible before. But this is just the medium; the message is also crucial. Political leaders need to be able to explain deterring war, and if possible, the key decisions in war. This has been something that Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy has excelled at throughout this war.

In the book War in Ukraine, Thomas Mahnken and Joshua Baker write that “in the months leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there was plenty of wishful thinking that such a war would be irrational”. This appears to have been a widely held view among many politicians in the West before the war. Thus, a sixth lesson is about the possibility of war. The political cultures in western nations, including our own, are not well informed about war and its consequences. The post-Cold War generation, seduced by the economic growth and increased globalisation, have come to believe that large-scale war is not possible in the 21st century. There has been a marked decline in the study of military history and war more generally in higher education institutions. But good strategy always assumes war is possible.

The experience of Ukraine offers a salutary lesson to this generation that large-scale war is always possible, particularly when authoritarian leaders with few limits on their power seek to remove examples of other political systems from the view of their citizens. War, unfortunately, is the ultimate sword of Damocles that hangs over humanity. One thing that makes it more likely is for political leaders to avoid understanding war and its causes.

A final lesson of the last three years for Australia’s political leaders, and indeed every citizen of our nation, is about will. The central insight from Ukraine must be that no one will help a nation that doesn’t demonstrate the will to defend itself. There are many dimensions to this demonstration of will. Ultimately, it is about building national resilience in all its forms. The concept of sovereign resilience, which includes the requirement to mobilise people, ideas and industry for large military and national challenges, must be implemented from the top of our nation’s political leadership.

Three years after Russia began its catastrophic invasion of Ukraine, Australians have been given an opportunity to ponder what we value as individuals and as one of the world’s most successful democracies.

That opportunity, for our politicians, our government, business and community leaders and for every citizen of this country, has been underpinned by the courage, resilience and essential goodness of Ukrainian citizens and soldiers. They have demonstrated a form of overwhelming will and sacrifice not often seen in nations. And despite the horror we feel in watching the Russian barbarians seek to extinguish an entire people and its culture in the past three years, there is also a sense of privilege we might feel in having been able to observe the rare demonstration of uncommon valour by an entire nation.

But in learning from Ukraine, our political leaders must have the courage to ask and answer the following: does Australia, with its short attention spans and its societal avoidance of personal and political risk, possess a similar will to defend our own democratic systems?

lowyinstitute.org · by Mick Ryan

10. Donald Trump's Mission: Make America's Allies Spend More on Defense

​There are two funding issues.  

First is each ally's contribution to their own defense. The target for NATO members had been 2% of its GDP.

Second is the incremental cost funding for US forces stationed in a host nation. Traditionally and usually per the Status of Forces Agreement the host nation agrees to fund the incremental costs which are the unique costs associated with the US forces being stationed in the host country and over and above what the costs are for the force if it were stationed in the US. This "payment" usually comes in the form of services - the payment to utilities companies, the salaries of host nation workers supporting US forces on the US the bases, and facilities construction. No money goes from the host nation to the US treasury.  

Donald Trump's Mission: Make America's Allies Spend More on Defense

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 18, 2025

US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been hugely controversial. In the first month, he has chided and even threatened US friends and allies. He seems particularly determined to upset US partners in North America – a bizarre development no one anticipated.

Trump has talked up annexing Canada and Greenland. He has hinted at attacking Mexico over the drug trade. He suggested the US might snatch the Panama Canal from Panama.

The response has been predictable. At a recent US-Canada hockey game, Canadians booed the singing of the US national anthem and fights between the players broke out immediately.

Trump seems to thrive on disruption – even for its own sake.

It is not clear why else Trump has staked out these rather extreme position. Canada, for example, will obviously not join the US unless it is coerced. The US has not had war plans against Canada in almost a century, and it would be shocking if the US public supported an invasion of Canada.

It would create an insurgency right on America’s border and destroy allied trust in the US overnight. The whole idea is so fantastical that one wonders why Trump keeps mentioning it.

These early comments portend an erratic course for Trump’s foreign policy. On Ukraine, for example, it is a good bet that Trump will swerve repeatedly.

He clearly has a personal fondness for Vladimir Putin, but he will also not wish to be blamed for Ukraine’s destruction. His predecessor – Joe Biden – never recovered in the polls from the perception that he ‘lost’ Afghanistan in 2021.

But there is one area, ironically, where Trump’s disruption-for-its-own-sake may help US foreign policy – the long-running US effort to get its allies to spend more on defense and develop better, more capable, more deployable militaries.

The Allied Free-Riding Debate

American presidents and secretaries of defense have famously complained for decades that US allies do not spend enough on defense. For years, American pundits have suggested that US allies treat the country as ‘Uncle Sucker’ – always willing to pay more for defense while allies cut their own defense spending.

The best known measure of this claim is the NATO exhortation that its members spend 2% of their gross domestic product on defense. Many members have not met that benchmark for a long time.

Over time, this has resulted in European militaries which often cannot deploy far from their shores without US infrastructural and logistical support. In the 2011 Libyan war, for example, Britain and France pushed to intervene, but after a brief run of air sorties, they could not maintain their operational tempo without US support.

Ostensibly, Germany – one of the worst European free-riders – had a revelation that it must step up after Russia invaded Ukraine. Little came of that.

In east Asia, the problem is a little better. America’s South Korean ally has spent well-above 2% for most of its history. It can fight and defeat North Korean conventionally without US assistance. But Japan, like those European allies, has been woefully deficient – although it, like Germany, is now signaling a build-up.

Trump is Obsessed with the US being ‘Ripped Off’

Other US presidents in the last twenty-five years – George Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden – could not cajole these allies to credibly commit to greater spending. These presidents and their staffs were committed liberal internationalists.

They genuinely believed in multilateral institutions and US alliances. So their threats at allies were not credible; NATO states did not believe the US would walk away.

By contrast, Trump’s threats are credible. He does like international organizations or US allies much. His instinct is to withdraw the US from these bodies.

Trump deeply believes that the US is being ‘ripped off’ by its allies and trade partners. This is why he so vigorously supports tariffs. It is also why he keeps telling US allies to spend way more on defense. Unlike in his first term, his foreign policy team this time around agrees with him.

President of the United States Donald Trump speaking with attendees at the 2019 Student Action Summit hosted by Turning Point USA at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, Florida.

There is a wide consensus in academic international relations that alliances are good for states. They allow a country to project power more easily and provide support in a conflict. So previous US abandonment threats were often not credible.

However, Trump prefers disruption and rejects the US foreign policy consensus.

Partial abandonment of allies will do a lot of damage as a result, but a silver lining outcome will be likely be that they finally spend more.

About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly

Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. You can find him on X: @Robert_E_Kelly.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 18, 2025

11. European Capitals Clash Over Ukraine as Trump Makes Overtures to Putin

​Excerpts:

EU officials in Brussels met with Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg. Afterward, a senior European official said Kellogg offered little detail on what the U.S. wants to see from the Europeans as part of a security guarantee; Kellogg didn’t say what role Washington thought European troops should play if they were sent to Ukraine under a peace plan.

The official said it remained unclear how much weight Kellogg would have in relaying European views and concerns into the negotiations over the war’s outcome. Kellogg is expected to visit Ukraine this week.

The scene a day earlier, when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz scornfully left a meeting in Paris that French President Emmanuel Macron hastily had organized to plan a response to Trump, echoed the worst days of the euro crisis more than a decade ago when EU governments spent long nights bickering without result.

Macron is scheduled to host Romania’s interim president Wednesday, and they will hold a videoconference with other European leaders who didn’t attend Monday’s gathering, the French president’s office said.

Despite Macron’s efforts, European unity is now being tested by domestic politics. Even Scholz’s more-hawkish opponent in elections this Sunday, Friedrich Merz, is avoiding commitment to more support for Ukraine. “Germany will not and must not become a party to the war,” he said in an interview.

In a further sign of the continent’s drift, the Paris meeting attendee who is taking the boldest public stance on Ukraine isn’t from the EU. It is British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who is scheduled to visit Trump next week to discuss options and try to win a role for Europe in peace talks.

Europe’s demonstrations of unity over recent years surprised even its own officials. When Britain in 2016 voted to quit the EU, many feared the bloc would splinter, but it pulled together. The Covid crisis began with discord, as EU countries resurrected borders within their borderless free-trade zone. Within months, though, not only had the barriers fallen but the EU reached an unprecedented deal to jointly bankroll a recovery fund. 

And when Russian President Vladimir Putin three years ago launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU, Britain and other European allies joined with the U.S. to support Kyiv and punish Moscow.

Those achievements were accomplished through initiatives and concessions from European leaders including Macron, Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who stretched EU authority to create policies for the bloc on Covid and Russia’s aggression.

European Capitals Clash Over Ukraine as Trump Makes Overtures to Putin

Stunned by Trump’s outreach to Russia over Ukraine, European leaders are groping for common ground

https://www.wsj.com/world/european-leaders-trump-russia-ukraine-talks-865da56a?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Daniel Michaels

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 and Laurence Norman

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Feb. 18, 2025 9:00 pm ET

French President Emmanuel Macron greets German Chancellor Olaf Scholz as he arrives for a meeting on Ukraine and European security. Photo: abdul saboor/Reuters

BRUSSELS—Europe over recent years has come together against the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The European Union held strong in the face of Britain’s exit. 

But faced with its biggest crisis in years—President Trump’s high-speed effort to end the war in Ukraine by negotiating directly with Russia—Europe has reverted to form in a blur of inconclusive meetings and squabbling governments. 

Just when the continent is urgently seeking leadership, no leader has emerged. Instead, looming national elections are hindering decisions in some of the EU’s biggest countries, and diverging political poles are impeding compromise.  

Europe’s inability to step up was laid bare by its absence from a meeting Tuesday in Saudi Arabia between U.S. and Russian diplomats, who sketched out plans to negotiate over Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said any talks that don’t include his country were doomed. 

Later, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, and the foreign ministers of Britain, Germany, France and Italy spoke to Secretary of State Marco Rubio about the talks.

“Russia will try to divide us. Let’s not walk into their traps,” Kallas said on X, advocating cooperation with the U.S. for “a just and lasting peace—on Ukraine’s terms.”

Macron and Scholz at the Élysée Palace, in Paris, where European leaders gathered. Photo: Nathan Laine/Bloomberg News

EU officials in Brussels met with Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg. Afterward, a senior European official said Kellogg offered little detail on what the U.S. wants to see from the Europeans as part of a security guarantee; Kellogg didn’t say what role Washington thought European troops should play if they were sent to Ukraine under a peace plan.

The official said it remained unclear how much weight Kellogg would have in relaying European views and concerns into the negotiations over the war’s outcome. Kellogg is expected to visit Ukraine this week.

The scene a day earlier, when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz scornfully left a meeting in Paris that French President Emmanuel Macron hastily had organized to plan a response to Trump, echoed the worst days of the euro crisis more than a decade ago when EU governments spent long nights bickering without result.

Macron is scheduled to host Romania’s interim president Wednesday, and they will hold a videoconference with other European leaders who didn’t attend Monday’s gathering, the French president’s office said.

Despite Macron’s efforts, European unity is now being tested by domestic politics. Even Scholz’s more-hawkish opponent in elections this Sunday, Friedrich Merz, is avoiding commitment to more support for Ukraine. “Germany will not and must not become a party to the war,” he said in an interview.

In a further sign of the continent’s drift, the Paris meeting attendee who is taking the boldest public stance on Ukraine isn’t from the EU. It is British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who is scheduled to visit Trump next week to discuss options and try to win a role for Europe in peace talks.

Europe’s demonstrations of unity over recent years surprised even its own officials. When Britain in 2016 voted to quit the EU, many feared the bloc would splinter, but it pulled together. The Covid crisis began with discord, as EU countries resurrected borders within their borderless free-trade zone. Within months, though, not only had the barriers fallen but the EU reached an unprecedented deal to jointly bankroll a recovery fund. 

And when Russian President Vladimir Putin three years ago launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU, Britain and other European allies joined with the U.S. to support Kyiv and punish Moscow.

Those achievements were accomplished through initiatives and concessions from European leaders including Macron, Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who stretched EU authority to create policies for the bloc on Covid and Russia’s aggression.

Destruction from Russian shelling near Pokrovsk, Ukraine, in January. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for Wall Street

The current crisis is fundamentally different and one that Europe, for all its progress, is unprepared to handle. It revolves around Europe’s closest ally, the U.S., and a field where Europe has never unified: foreign policy.

In areas where EU countries function as one, such as competition regulation and foreign trade, its members have surrendered sovereignty to the bloc, represented by the European Commission. In other areas, including taxation and foreign policy, the 27 members remain sovereign states pursuing their own agendas. 

Occasionally, as after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the members unite against a foreign challenge. More often they bicker, as during the euro crisis, the Second Gulf War in 2003 and Israel’s war in Gaza. 

Today’s upheaval is all the more traumatic for Europeans because it is happening inside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the one trans-Atlantic institution that has been sacrosanct for 75 years. Only NATO binds Washington to almost every European capital. Significantly, U.S. leadership in NATO has never been questioned. The U.S. created the alliance in the face of threats from Moscow at the Cold War’s dawn at the request of Europeans.

U.S. leadership in NATO has let Europe off the hook on finding common ground regarding external threats. It has also let them skimp on security and military spending for generations. For the past decade, European military outlays have risen. Nonetheless, under pressure from Trump, Europeans are being forced to confront their shortfalls on both policy and spending, and are struggling to agree on an approach.

The Europeans say they want to coalesce in response to Trump.

“I think Europe needs to get its act together,” Finnish President Alexander Stubb said before Monday’s meeting. He said any peace talks should include Ukraine, Russia, the U.S. and Europe, with Europe including the EU, the U.K. and other allies. To represent what would be more than 30 countries, he advocates a special envoy.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Brussels in December. Photo: Olivier Matthys/Associated Press

Who that envoy would be, he said, “That’s for the European leaders to decide.”

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, a former Dutch prime minister, said before Monday’s Paris meeting that he had spoken with European leaders and told them, “Well, if you want a place at the table, make sure you come up with relevant proposals.”

One of the few proposals under debate for a step Europe could take regarding Ukraine—one that U.S. officials have called for—is the idea of using European troops, among others, to enforce a peace deal with Russia. Macron one year ago suggested putting European troops in Ukraine to help Kyiv. Scholz and other leaders rejected the idea.

Now the concept is getting some endorsement, most vocally from Britain’s Starmer. Britain and France have Europe’s largest military forces in NATO, though Starmer is an EU outsider.

Macron hoped his Paris gathering would enable Europe to provide common answers to questions that Washington posed last week in a written questionnaire sent to European capitals. Questions included: Would they be prepared to put troops on the ground in a cease-fire, and what other capabilities were they prepared to commit to Ukraine to lock in robust security guarantees?

European Commission headquarters in Brussels. Photo: nicolas tucat/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Macron also hoped to advance a European package of financial support for European military spending and its arms industry, which is expected to include new money for Ukraine. The first part of that plan is targeted for March, EU officials say.

Scholz, who left the meeting early, said now wasn’t the time for Europe to be focused on its role in a peace plan that didn’t yet exist. It should focus on supporting Ukraine’s war efforts, he said. Germany remains deeply committed to the NATO model of trans-Atlantic cooperation, while France has long sought to buttress European military strength as an element of what Macron calls strategic autonomy.

Scholz bolted Monday’s meeting to campaign before Sunday’s election, a showdown that has cramped his room to maneuver on the Ukraine question. Poland, which is headed toward presidential elections in May, staunchly supports Ukraine, but leaders fearing blowback have hesitated on committing troops to a peace mission. And Macron, while still wielding foreign policy powers, was weakened by parliamentary elections that he called last year.

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com

Appeared in the February 19, 2025, print edition as 'Europeans Bicker As They Are Left Out of Peace Talks'.

12. Trump’s Pivot Toward Putin’s Russia Upends Generations of U.S. Policy

​After spending the first third of my military service as a cold warrior (the "final decade") it is hard for me to come to grips with such relations with Putin.

Excerpts:

As far as Mr. Trump is concerned, Russia is not responsible for the war that has devastated its neighbor. Instead, he suggests that Ukraine is to blame for Russia’s invasion of it. To listen to Mr. Trump talk with reporters on Tuesday about the conflict was to hear a version of reality that would be unrecognizable on the ground in Ukraine and certainly would never have been heard from any other American president of either party.

In Mr. Trump’s telling, Ukrainian leaders were at fault for the war for not agreeing to surrender territory and therefore, he suggested, they do not deserve a seat at the table for the peace talks that he has just initiated with Mr. Putin. “You should have never started it,” Mr. Trump said, referring to Ukrainian leaders who, in fact, did not start it. “You could have made a deal.”Speaking at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, he went on: “You have a leadership now that’s allowed a war to go on that should have never even happened.” By contrast, Mr. Trump uttered not one word of reproach for Mr. Putin or for Russia, which first invaded Ukraine in 2014, waged a low-intensity war against it through all four years of Mr. Trump’s first term and then invaded it in 2022 aiming to take over the whole country.

Mr. Trump is in the middle of executing one of the most jaw-dropping pivots in American foreign policy in generations, a 180-degree turn that will force friends and foes to recalibrate in fundamental ways. Ever since the end of World War II, a long parade of American presidents saw first the Soviet Union and then, after a brief and illusory interregnum, its successor Russia as a force to be wary of, at the very least. Mr. Trump gives every appearance of viewing it as a collaborator in future joint ventures.

He makes clear that the United States is done isolating Mr. Putin for his unprovoked aggression against a weaker neighbor and the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people. Instead, Mr. Trump, who has always had a perplexing fondness for Mr. Putin, wants to readmit Russia to the international club and make it one of America’s top friends.

News analysis

Trump’s Pivot Toward Putin’s Russia Upends Generations of U.S. Policy

As peace talks opened in Saudi Arabia, President Trump made clear that the days of isolating Russia are over and suggested that Ukraine was to blame for being invaded.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/us/politics/trump-russia-putin.html

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, far left, met with Saudi officials and Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, far right, in the Saudi capital. No Ukrainian representatives were present.Credit...Pool photo by Evelyn Hockstein

By Peter Baker

Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent, a former Moscow bureau chief and the author of books on President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. He reported from Washington.

• Feb. 18, 2025

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For more than a decade, the West has faced off against the East again in what was widely called a new cold war. But with President Trump back in office, America is giving the impression that it could be switching sides.

Even as American and Russian negotiators sat down together on Tuesday for the first time since Moscow’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago, Mr. Trump has signaled that he is willing to abandon America’s allies to make common cause with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.

As far as Mr. Trump is concerned, Russia is not responsible for the war that has devastated its neighbor. Instead, he suggests that Ukraine is to blame for Russia’s invasion of it. To listen to Mr. Trump talk with reporters on Tuesday about the conflict was to hear a version of reality that would be unrecognizable on the ground in Ukraine and certainly would never have been heard from any other American president of either party.

In Mr. Trump’s telling, Ukrainian leaders were at fault for the war for not agreeing to surrender territory and therefore, he suggested, they do not deserve a seat at the table for the peace talks that he has just initiated with Mr. Putin. “You should have never started it,” Mr. Trump said, referring to Ukrainian leaders who, in fact, did not start it. “You could have made a deal.”

Speaking at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, he went on: “You have a leadership now that’s allowed a war to go on that should have never even happened.” By contrast, Mr. Trump uttered not one word of reproach for Mr. Putin or for Russia, which first invaded Ukraine in 2014, waged a low-intensity war against it through all four years of Mr. Trump’s first term and then invaded it in 2022 aiming to take over the whole country.

Mr. Trump is in the middle of executing one of the most jaw-dropping pivots in American foreign policy in generations, a 180-degree turn that will force friends and foes to recalibrate in fundamental ways. Ever since the end of World War II, a long parade of American presidents saw first the Soviet Union and then, after a brief and illusory interregnum, its successor Russia as a force to be wary of, at the very least. Mr. Trump gives every appearance of viewing it as a collaborator in future joint ventures.

He makes clear that the United States is done isolating Mr. Putin for his unprovoked aggression against a weaker neighbor and the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people. Instead, Mr. Trump, who has always had a perplexing fondness for Mr. Putin, wants to readmit Russia to the international club and make it one of America’s top friends.

Image

The bodies of three Ukrainian civilians massacred by invading Russian troops in Bucha, Ukraine, in April 2022.Credit...Daniel Berehulak for The New York Times

“It’s a disgraceful reversal of 80 years of American foreign policy,” said Kori Schake, who is the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and was a national security aide to President George W. Bush.

“Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. refused to legitimate Soviet conquest of the Baltic States, and it gave heart to people fighting for their freedom,” she continued. “Now we’re legitimating aggression to create spheres of influence. Every American president of the last 80 years would oppose President Trump’s statement.”

In Mr. Trump’s circle, the pivot is a necessary corrective to years of misguided policy. He and his allies see the cost of defending Europe as too high, given other needs. Coming to some kind of accommodation with Moscow, in this view, would allow the United States to bring home more troops or shift national security resources toward China, which they see as “the biggest threat,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it last month.

The U.S. reversal has certainly been pronounced over the past week. Just days after Vice President JD Vance excoriated European allies, saying “the threat from within” was more worrisome than Russia, Mr. Rubio met with Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, and talked up “the incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians” if they could simply dispose of the Ukraine war.

No Ukrainian leaders were in the room for the meeting, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, much less other Europeans, although Mr. Rubio called several foreign ministers afterward to brief them. Instead, by all appearances, this was a meeting of two big powers dividing up areas of dominance, a modern-day Congress of Vienna or Yalta Conference.

Mr. Trump has long seen Mr. Putin as a compatriot, a strong and “very savvy” player whose effort to bully Ukraine into making territorial concessions was nothing short of “genius.” Mr. Putin, in his eyes, is someone worthy of admiration and respect, unlike the leaders of traditional U.S. allies like Germany, Canada or France, for whom he exhibits scorn.

Indeed, Mr. Trump has spent the first month of his second term stiffing the allies, not only leaving them out of the emerging Ukraine talks but threatening tariffs against them, demanding they increase their military spending and asserting claims over some of their territory. His billionaire patron Elon Musk has publicly backed the far-right Alternative for Germany party.

“For now, the Europeans see this as Trump normalizing Russia relations while treating his allies, the Europeans, as untrusted,” said Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, an international consulting firm. “Supporting the AfD, who the German leaders consider a neo-Nazi party, makes Trump look like an adversary to Europe’s largest economy. It’s an extraordinary change.”

Mr. Trump vowed during the campaign that he could end the Ukraine war in 24 hours, which he has failed to do, and in fact said he would bring peace to Ukraine even before his inauguration, which he also failed to do. After a nearly 90-minute phone call with Mr. Putin last week, Mr. Trump assigned Mr. Rubio and two other advisers, Michael Waltz and Steve Witkoff, to pursue negotiations.

The concessions that Mr. Trump and his team have floated sound like a Kremlin wish list: Russia gets to keep all of the Ukrainian territory it illegally seized by force. The United States will not provide Ukraine with security guarantees, much less allow it into NATO. Sanctions will be lifted. The president has even suggested that Russia be readmitted to the Group of 7 major powers after it was expelled for its original 2014 incursion into Ukraine.

What would Mr. Putin have to give up for a deal? He would have to stop killing Ukrainians while he pockets his victory. Mr. Trump has not highlighted other concessions he would insist on. Nor has he said how Mr. Putin could be trusted to keep an agreement given that he violated a 1994 pact guaranteeing Ukrainian sovereignty and two cease-fire deals negotiated in Minsk, Belarus, in 2014 and 2015.

Mr. Trump’s evident faith in his ability to seal a deal with Mr. Putin mystifies veteran national security officials who have dealt with Russia over the years.

“We should be talking to them in the same way that we talked to Soviet leaders throughout the Cold War,” said Celeste A. Wallander, who dealt with Russia and Ukraine issues as assistant secretary of defense under President Joseph R. Biden Jr. “Which is you don’t trust them.”

“When you do negotiations,” she continued, “you do them with the presumption that they will violate them. You try to find overlapping interests, but recognize that our interests are fundamentally in conflict and we’re trying to manage a dangerous adversary, not become best friends.”

Speaking with reporters on Tuesday, Mr. Trump made it sound as if he did consider Russia to be a friend — but not Ukraine. “Russia wants to do something,” he said. “They want to stop the savage barbarianism.”

Mr. Trump expressed dismay about the killing and destruction wrought by what he called a “senseless war,” comparing scenes from the front to the Battle of Gettysburg with “body parts all over the field.” Ukraine, he said, was “being wiped out” and the war had to end. But he did not say who was wiping out Ukraine, leaving it clear he faulted its own leaders and dismissing their insistence to be part of any negotiations.

Image

President Trump at his Mar-a-Lago club in Florida on Tuesday. He expressed dismay over the toll in Ukraine but did not name Russia as being responsible for it.Credit...Al Drago for The New York Times

“I hear that they’re upset about not having a seat,” Mr. Trump said. “Well, they’ve had a seat for three years. And a long time before that. This could have been settled very easily. Just a half-baked negotiator could have settled this years ago without, I think, without the loss of much land, very little land. Without the loss of any lives. And without the loss of cities that are just laying on their sides.”

He repeated his claim that the invasion would not have happened had he been president, ignoring the fact that Russian-sponsored forces had waged war inside Ukraine all four years of his first term. “I could have made a deal for Ukraine that would have given them almost all of the land,” he said without explaining why he did not try to negotiate peace when he was in office.

As he often does, Mr. Trump flavored his comments with multiple false claims. Among them, he said that the United States has contributed three times as much aid to Ukraine since the war started as Europe has. In fact, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Europe has allocated $138 billion compared with $119 billion from the United States.

He also denigrated President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, saying more than once that “he’s down at 4 percent in approval rating.” In fact, Mr. Zelensky’s approval rating has fallen from its once-stratospheric heights, but only to around 50 percent — not that different from Mr. Trump’s own.

Mr. Trump also agreed with a Russian talking point that Ukraine should have new elections to play a part in negotiations. “Yeah, I would say that when they want a seat at the table, you could say the people have to — wouldn’t the people of Ukraine have to say, like, you know, it’s been a long time since we had an election?” he said. “That’s not a Russia thing. That’s something coming from me and coming from many other countries also.”

What other countries he did not say. Nor did he say anything about the need for elections in Russia, where any voting is controlled by the Kremlin and its allies.

Mr. Trump’s remarks were not scripted and came in response to questions by reporters. But they reflected how he sees the situation and foreshadowed the next few months. They also sent fresh shock waves through Europe, which is coming to grips with the fact that its chief ally in the new cold war no longer sees itself that way.

“Some of the most shameful comments uttered by a president in my lifetime,” Ian Bond, deputy director of the Center for European Reform in London, wrote online. “Trump is siding with the aggressor, blaming the victim. In the Kremlin they must be jumping for joy.”

Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent for The Times. He is covering his sixth presidency and sometimes writes analytical pieces that place presidents and their administrations in a larger context and historical framework. More about Peter Baker

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump

13. America’s Long-Range Retaliation

​Excerpts:

The U.S. military’s successful retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria conducted on the evening of Feb. 2, 2024, marked a significantly important moment in American military history. Underscored by the use of the U.S.-based B-1 and its supreme firepower, the United States displayed to the world it would not sit idly by as actions from foreign nations resulted in the death of Americans. Although the use of the B-1 was initially perceived as escalatory, tensions between the United States and Iran decreased, American lives were saved, and U.S. adversaries were put on notice. At the time and place of its choosing, the U.S. military can and will project power in defense of its troops, its citizens, and freedom.

America’s Long-Range Retaliation - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ross Hobbs · February 19, 2025

On Feb. 2, 2024, two U.S. Air Force B-1B aircraft, on direct order from the president, released thousands of pounds of precision weapons onto targets in the Middle East as part of a large-scale U.S. retaliatory mission. The B-1s flew approximately 17 hours and 7,000 miles enroute from the continental United States to strike their targets, then turned around and flew back to the United States, marking the 34-hour mission as America’s first-ever mission of its type.

While the mission itself was unprecedented in duration and execution, its true significance lies in what was signaled. By launching bombers from U.S. soil to conduct precision strikes thousands of miles away, the United States demonstrated not only its ability to retaliate decisively but also its capacity to do so without relying on forward bases — a capability with far-reaching implications for deterrence. This was more than a military response. It was a strategic message to Iran and other adversaries that attacks on U.S. personnel will not go unanswered, and that American power projection remains unmatched, even in an era of evolving threats and contested airspace. As tensions in the Middle East escalated, this mission served as both retaliation and a warning: U.S. forces are never beyond reach, and neither are those who seek to harm them.

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Precursors to the U.S. Retaliation

On Jan. 28, five days before the B-1 strikes, an Iranian-aligned militia group targeted Tower 22, a U.S. logistical support base located in Northeast Jordan. According to the Department of Defense, this attack resulted in the death of three U.S. service members and injured more than 40 others. The weapons used to kill and injure these U.S. personnel were one-way attack drones, which hit base housing units when most of the service members were asleep. Intelligence services quickly determined the drones were produced and supplied by Iran.

Due to the crash of a B-1 on Jan. 4, a small detachment of 250 personnel and B-1 aircraft from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, temporarily relocated to Dyess Air Force Base, Texas. This relocation facilitated Ellsworth’s personnel to continue flying training operations while the airfield was closed for the accident investigation. The relocation movement to Dyess occurred around Jan. 26, only two days before the Tower 22 attack, and one week prior to the unforeseen mission. Despite the challenges Ellsworth personnel faced due to the short-notice relocation of operations to a different location, the transition to Dyess was a set up for success. Dyess is not only a primary B-1 base with all of the support capabilities necessary for operations, but it is also the primary hub for B-1 formal training, the B-1 Weapons School, B-1 Operational Test, and a B-1 combat squadron. The temporary relocation put personnel from all three B-1 combat squadrons together, alongside the best and brightest in the B-1 community. When the unexpected orders from the president were received, the combined team went to work. Like never before, personnel from both Ellsworth and Dyess operated seamlessly to plan the complex mission, ready aircraft, and load weapons — while working with a very short timeline and no room for failure.

On the evening of Feb. 1, 2024, crews from the 34th Bomb Squadron launched their B-1s into the dark night sky over West Texas. That night, the crews knew the challenge that lay ahead of them and the significance of what they were about to do. With overwhelming support from the entire B-1 community and other organizations throughout the U.S. military, the crews likely felt a sense of distinctive confidence as their heavy aircraft lifted airborne and pointed East.

The B-1B jets and crews were ready and bound for a mission they had practiced several times. For several years, the Air Force has conducted long-range missions where bombers take off from the United States, execute a mission thousands of miles away, then land back in the U.S. The Department of Defense uses these missions for strategic “deterrence and assurance,” which seeks to deter conflict with adversary nations, while also increasing interoperability with coalition partners throughout the world. These missions span thousands of miles and can last more than 24 hours. Though the process for the mission was familiar to the crews, this time was markedly different as they were now flying B-1s loaded with live Joint Direct Attack Munitions bound for enemy targets in the Middle East.

Iranian Provocation

For years, Iran has indigenously produced one-way attack drones and other weapons, then intentionally supplied them to extremist militia groups throughout the Middle East. Using Iranian-aligned militia groups like Kataib Hizballah as proxy forces, Iran is able to fulfill its own regional interests, while also minimizing attribution or association. Prior to Oct. 7, 2023, militia group attacks upon U.S. forces were rare, but after Hamas’ deadly attack on Israel, that all changed. After U.S. political and military leadership vowed support to Israel, the Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria made a clear shift to targeting U.S. forces, likely at the behest of Iran.

Between Oct. 18, 2023, and Jan. 28, 2024, U.S. forces in the Middle East were attacked with Iranian-produced weapons 166 times, averaging over one attack per day for more than three months straight. These attacks resulted in the injuring of 186 U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria. Despite the high number of attacks in such a short period of time, the first publicized deaths of U.S. personnel due to these attacks occurred at Tower 22. U.S. military air and ground forces had conducted retaliatory strikes over the prior three months, but militia group attacks against U.S. forces were unrelenting. The U.S. needed a stronger response. It was time to call in the heavy-hitting B-1.

America’s Retaliation

According to a Department of Defense statement released immediately following the strikes, U.S. military forces attacked 85 targets throughout Iraq and Syria with a total of 125 precision munitions. These targets included command and control centers, intelligence facilities, and weapons storage facilities used by Iranian-aligned militia groups to attack U.S. forces in the region. The strikes were executed by multiple aircraft, including B-1s. While the exact number of B-1 targets and weapons released during the strikes is not public knowledge, the two B-1s with the largest weapon payload in the Air Force inventory likely played a key role in the destruction of the 85 total targets. Notably, the timing of the strikes in the Middle East appeared to be aligned with the timing of the dignified transfer service of the three U.S. service members killed at Tower 22. In attendance for the service at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, were President Joe Biden, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff C.Q. Brown.

U.S. strikes against Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria are vastly more complicated than they may appear. Unlike U.S. operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaeda, or other violent extremist groups, the Iranian-aligned militias can include members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. U.S. senior political and military leaders have to carefully weigh the decision of target importance versus the likelihood of killing Iranians, which could increase tensions with Iran and potentially lead to war. A recent reminder of this heavy decision was the Jan. 2, 2020, killing of Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s direct retaliation upon U.S. bases.

Message Sent and Received

“Let all those who might seek to do us harm know this: If you harm an American, we will respond.”

– President Joe Biden

With a significant U.S. military force posture already in the Middle East, there was likely already sufficient capability to strike the targets assigned to the B-1. So, why would the president authorize the use of U.S.-based bombers to strike targets in the Middle East? The clear answer is messaging.

After more than three months of continuous attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria, the large-scale retaliatory strikes on Feb. 2, 2024, were the beginning of America’s unambiguous message to Iran and its proxy forces — attacks against U.S. forces must stop. According to U.S. officials and other sources, attacks by Iranian-aligned militia groups targeting U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria ceased almost entirely. Over the subsequent months, additional attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria were minimal as the militia groups recovered and shifted their focus elsewhere. The U.S. message sent with the stamp of the B-1 was clearly received by Iran, resulting in de-escalation and reduced likelihood of war between the two nations.

If America’s power projection capability was ever questioned, the B-1 retaliatory strikes showcased a tangible consequence to others throughout the world, especially adversarial nations like China, Russia, and North Korea. The U.S. military proved unequivocally it could launch bombers from the continental United States, strike targets in unison with other forces, and then return home to safety. With stated resolve from Defense Secretary Austin, “the U.S. military can do this again at the time and place of its choosing.” This message has become even more crucial as the United States strives to deter China away from potential military conflict with Taiwan in 2027.

The U.S. strikes communicated a clear commitment to protect U.S. troops from attacks by foreign nations. Since 2001, over 7,000 service members have died during combat operations. However, these deaths were not directly linked to a nation-state, especially one considered an adversary in the U.S. defense strategy. With Iran’s direct connection to the Tower 22 attack, the death of 3 U.S. service members and injuring of over 40 others was clearly unacceptable.

History in the Making

Since the beginning of the U.S. Air Force in 1947 and even beforehand, bombers have conducted thousands of long-range strike missions. However, these missions have predominantly been executed from deployed locations, with only a small handful of these missions ever launched from the continental United States. Notably, U.S.-based B-2s struck targets in Afghanistan in 2002 and U.S.-based B-1s struck targets in Libya in 2011, but both missions landed elsewhere before returning to the United States. With due credit to these missions and all those beforehand, the B-1 mission in 2024 completed ground-breaking and important accomplishments for the U.S. military.

According to Air Force Global Strike Command, this B-1 mission was America’s first-ever combat mission where a U.S. military aircraft departed the continental United States to strike enemy targets, then landed back in the United States without stopping in between. For several years, the Air Force has generated similar long-range training missions, but the Pentagon proved they are for far more than just show.

This mission was the B-1’s longest-recorded combat mission. Although not the longest B-1 flight ever, the 34-hour combat mission surpassed the duration of any of the B-1’s astonishing 12,000-plus combat missions flown since its combat debut in 1998. As plans for the B-1’s retirement over the next decade move forward, this mission reaffirmed the B-1 still has a critical role to play in U.S. national defense.

The generation of this short-notice combat mission, made possible by the two B-1 bases of Ellsworth and Dyess, was likely the B-1 community’s greatest joint combat mission. Over the nearly two decades of B-1 combat operations in the Middle East, the two bases have undoubtedly worked together, but never like this. More importantly, this mission displayed to adversarial nations that the Air Force’s bomber fleet has resilience, flexibility, and readiness capabilities beyond simple numbers of aircraft or personnel.

The mission required perfect timing from the B-1 crews, from 17 hours away. As the B-1s and other U.S. forces were executing perfectly synchronized strikes in retaliation, the bodies of the three fallen U.S. soldiers were returned home through the dignified transfer service at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. Through this, the Pentagon publicly showcased that U.S. bombers can execute precision from thousands of miles away while harmonized with U.S. strategic-level actions — a level of excellence unproven by any other nation.

Closing Thoughts

The U.S. military’s successful retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria conducted on the evening of Feb. 2, 2024, marked a significantly important moment in American military history. Underscored by the use of the U.S.-based B-1 and its supreme firepower, the United States displayed to the world it would not sit idly by as actions from foreign nations resulted in the death of Americans. Although the use of the B-1 was initially perceived as escalatory, tensions between the United States and Iran decreased, American lives were saved, and U.S. adversaries were put on notice. At the time and place of its choosing, the U.S. military can and will project power in defense of its troops, its citizens, and freedom.

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Ross Hobbs is an active-duty Air Force officer and Air War College student completing a Senior Developmental Education Fellowship. He is a graduated Squadron Commander, USAF Weapons School graduate, and Joint All-Domain Strategy graduate from USAF Air Command and Staff College.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force or any other organization of the U.S. government.

Image: U.S. Air Force photo via William Lewis.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Ross Hobbs · February 19, 2025

14. China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity

But I am not sure we truly understand the relations among China, RUssia and north Korea. As I and others have written, it my assessment is that while China does not appreciate Putin's aggression in Ukraine (except for the dilemmas it creates for the US and Europe) it does not want Putin to lose. I think China will refrain from any public support and certainly not provide any traceable Chinese military support in order to protect its reputation and give it flexibility. But I think north Korea provides a convenient "cut-out" for China. Kim can provide lethal aid and the growing public relationship between north Korea and Russia actually might provide China cover while Xi provides either tacit or explicit approval to Kim behind the scenes. Now I have not seen any evidence of recent Chinese military transfers to north Korea. In fact I have not seen any reports since China provided the "logging trucks" some years ago. These are the 11 or 12 axle trucks that north Korea turned into TELs for its missile program.

And we should note that it appears that Russia is providing funds (and probably other advanced technology) to Kim and that is certainly going a long way to keeping Kim's regime afloat and improving his military capabilities. While among the 3 "No's" of China - it does not want war on the Korean peninsula, it also does not want the chaos of regime collapse and the threat that would be to China. The aid from Russia in return for renting north Korean troops may be as much as the Sunshine Policy of the late 1990s which was likely responsible for preventing the collapse of the regime following the arduous march of the great famine of 1994-1996.

Excerpts:

China is concerned that the United States might redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea. Tokyo has openly raised the idea of positioning U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. And surely Beijing is also monitoring increasingly serious conversations among South Koreans about whether they should have their own nuclear arsenal.

Needless to say, if any of this happens, Beijing would see its own strategic position worsen. It could explain why China joined a joint declaration with South Korea and Japan in May 2024, reiterating the call for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As such, China may be inclined to facilitate denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Unlike the last U.S.-North Korean summit in Hanoi in 2019, which took place amid heightened Sino-American competition, Beijing’s support for Washington’s negotiations with Pyongyang could significantly enhance U.S. bargaining power. Although North Korea has shown little interest in negotiations with the United States, China could be a difference-maker.

And there is another x-factor: Should the Ukraine conflict end in 2025, Russia may reassess its strategic interests and potentially reduce its intensified cooperation with North Korea. On Geopolitics Decanted, long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explained, “Russia is both unwilling and unable to replace China as a major sponsor of North Korea. The current relations between Russia and North Korea are unlikely to survive the end of hostilities in Europe.” As a result, Russo-North Korean ties are likely to weaken once the war concludes, probably prompting North Korea to seek closer, albeit still limited, relations with China. In this dynamic between China and North Korea, China would hold the upper hand. If Washington and Beijing can sustain cooperation on North Korean nuclear issues, favorable conditions for negotiations with Pyongyang could emerge over time.

China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Choong-Koo Lee · February 19, 2025

One year ago, experts had many reasons to think China and North Korea would become closer than ever before. But that’s not what happened. Instead, Beijing and Pyongyang have become distinctly discordant and discourteous. This gap between the expectations and the reality raises questions about the true nature of Sino-North Korean relations, especially since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia seems to have come at the expense of its relationship with China. Although it might be difficult to imagine, this path could lead China and the United States to a place where they could cooperate on North Korea and nuclear proliferation.

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The Pendulum Swings

Since its founding, North Korea has typically been close to either the Soviet Union (and now Russia) or China — not both. For instance, in the mid-1960s, North Korea’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union coincided with weaker Sino-North Korean relations. And since the establishment of ties between China and the United States during the Nixon administration, Sino-North Korean relations have largely been shaped by China’s relationship with the United States. However, as the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, North Korea lost this alternative and became more dependent on China, making it vulnerable to Beijing’s stance and pressure. While improving relations with the United States and South Korea could have provide an alternative, which was explored in the Geneva Agreed Framework in the 1990s, the second North Korea crisis of the early 2000s obstructed this path. As a result, North Korea had little choice but to deepen its dependence on China.

As North Korea worked to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, Beijing often sought closer cooperation with Washington. For example, in 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s historic southern tour and China’s decision to prioritize economic reform and openness, the Chinese government reduced its security and economic support for North Korea and revised food trade terms to require hard currency payment through the following year. Rather than vetoing a U.N. Security Council vote condemning North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China abstained. As a result, Sino-North Korean relations deteriorated and by 1999, political exchanges had ceased for six years. Ties began to normalize only after China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Pyongyang in April 1999.

Years later, China found its relationship with North Korea diminished once again when Xi Jinping sought to establish “New Great Power Relations” with Washington. These efforts, emphasizing non-collision, non-confrontation, and mutual respect between the United States and China, implied greater Sino-American cooperation on addressing North Korean nuclear issues. In response to North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, China backed a U.N. Security Council Resolution against Pyongyang. While China didn’t take proactive measures to prevent North Korea from evading sanctions through China’s own economy, its coordination on international sanctions marked a significant improvement compared to its previous stance, which had unilaterally advocated North Korea since Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2009. During the Sino-American summit in June 2013, Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, further widening diplomatic distance with North Korea, which had formally declared its nuclear weapons development policy that same year. By 2018, China resumed high-level talks with North Korea only after the prospect of the negotiations between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. With the exchange realized amid intensifying Sino-American strategic competition, North Korea and China could hold five rounds of summitry, including Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019.

Interestingly, in 2024, Sino-American relations related to Korea appeared to stabilize after President Joe Biden and Xi held a phone conversation and agreed to manage strategic competition through guardrails designed to prevent unintended escalation. Subsequently, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and its Chinese counterpart held a working group meeting to address risks of inadvertent conflict. In mid-April, the defense secretaries of both nations met, signifying the reopening of military communication between the United States and China. The improvement in the Sino-American relationship suggested a potential weakening of Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang. As Sino-American discussions also addressed North Korea’s provocations, Beijing was compelled to take a more active role in diplomacy on Pyongyang’s aggressive actions. For example, China resumed high-level talks with South Korea and engaged in foreign ministerial-level dialogues and summitry with South Korea and Japan, where North Korea’s provocations were a key topic of discussion — much to the Kim regime’s discontent.

At the same time, the recent Russo-North Korean military alliance treaty marked the return of Russia as a viable alternative partner. In July 2023, when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang, Kim granted full ceremonial treatment to a letter from President Vladimir Putin, receiving it inside his office, whereas he accepted Xi’s confidential letter in a corridor outside his office — an apparent diplomatic slight. Following Putin’s fifth inauguration as president in May 2024, North Korea began addressing him as “the respected comrade,” a title previously reserved for Xi. When Russia and North Korea signed their treaty last summer, Moscow pledged mutual military assistance and economic cooperation to circumvent international sanctions. After early October 2024, North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia in the Ukraine conflict highlighted a deepening rift in its relationship with Beijing. On an episode of Geopolitics Decanted, Sergey Radchenko, having recently returned from a research trip to China, observed, “I bet you [Chinese officials] were not informed about the treaty that was about to be signed, or at least if they were informed, they were not consulted on this subject about the treaty between Russia and North Korea. I’m sure they’re not very happy about this.”

From Hope to Discord

The beginning of 2024 showcased efforts by China and North Korea to commemorate the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. At the end of 2023, the foreign ministries of both countries designated 2024 as the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship.” On Jan. 1, Kim and Xi exchanged congratulatory telegrams. Xi emphasized the geopolitical closeness of the two nations, while Kim expressed that strengthening their traditional friendship aligned with the expectations and aspirations of both peoples. Soon after, Sun Weidong, a vice minister of foreign affairs in China, visited Pyongyang to meet the North Korean foreign minister, Choi Sun-Hee, where they agreed on an annual path to celebrate a year meant to be auspicious.

As a first step, a cultural delegation from Liaoning province traveled to Pyongyang in late January, participating in the Lunar New Year festival with dance and orchestral performances. Following this, a North Korean delegation led by Kim Song-Nam, the head of the Worker’s Party of Korea International Department, conducted a 20-day visit to China from March 21 to April 12. The delegation engaged in discussions with senior Chinese officials, including Wang Huning and Cai Qi — members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party — and Wang Yi, the minister of foreign affairs.

Against the backdrop of renewed Sino-American military communications, China sent a high-ranking political delegation to North Korea to attend the friendship year’s April 12 opening ceremony. Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the third-ranking member of the Chinese leadership, led the delegation. Zhao’s leadership marked an upgrade from the previous year, when the delegation was led by Li Hongzhong, vice chairman of the same committee. Zhao’s visit reflected China’s intention to prioritize Sino-North Korean ties, a move seen as critical to restraining Pyongyang’s provocative behavior while managing Sino-American conflict risks. Zhao met with Kim before departing from the Pyongyang International Airport. Beyond this visit, however, interactions between the two nations were limited to minor exchanges such as a local business association’s visit from Dandong in late May, prior to the Russo-North Korean summit in June 2024.

Since the Russo-North Korean summit in Vladivostok in September 2023, Kim has refrained from calling Xi “the respected comrade.” In July of last year, reports surfaced that Kim had instructed North Korean diplomats in China “not to mind China” in their official duties. Against this backdrop, claims arose that China intended to expel North Korean laborers, sparking speculation of political friction between the two nations, though Beijing denied the claims. Further doubts emerged the same month, at the Korean War armistice anniversary ceremony — the Chinese ambassador to North Korea was conspicuously absent from this important event, citing illness.

Although China and North Korea maintained appearances for the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic ties in October, Pyongyang’s deepening relationship with Moscow loomed over that ceremony. At around the same time, North Korea began deploying troops to Russia, prompting the United States to pressure China to curb Russo-North Korean military cooperation. While not exerting immediate pressure on Pyongyang, China signaled a willingness to discuss the issue of North Korean troops with the U.S. government. As a result, Sino-North Korean relations remained strained.

There was no closing ceremony for the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship” in 2024.

What’s Next?

The most important factor that has influenced Sino-North Korean relations since the early 1970s has been Sino-American relations. The conventional wisdom is that ties between China and the United States are set to worsen, particularly with Trump back in the Oval Office. However, Trump has emphasized maintaining friendly relations with Beijing. At the same time, he has imposed tariffs on China. Like many things involving the American president, it can be hard to understand what he is going to do next. As such, we would be wise to refrain from automatically assuming that America will be tougher on China under Trump, as many have. Relations might actually improve and, if they do, relations between China and North Korea could be expected to remain distant and perhaps even continue to worsen. If that happens, Washington could be in a position to leverage improved ties with Beijing to affect a number of challenges, including North Korea’s behavior. While it surely seems far-fetched today, it will be worth monitoring whether the United States and China can find common ground to reverse North Korea’s nuclear development.

China is concerned that the United States might redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea. Tokyo has openly raised the idea of positioning U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. And surely Beijing is also monitoring increasingly serious conversations among South Koreans about whether they should have their own nuclear arsenal.

Needless to say, if any of this happens, Beijing would see its own strategic position worsen. It could explain why China joined a joint declaration with South Korea and Japan in May 2024, reiterating the call for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As such, China may be inclined to facilitate denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Unlike the last U.S.-North Korean summit in Hanoi in 2019, which took place amid heightened Sino-American competition, Beijing’s support for Washington’s negotiations with Pyongyang could significantly enhance U.S. bargaining power. Although North Korea has shown little interest in negotiations with the United States, China could be a difference-maker.

And there is another x-factor: Should the Ukraine conflict end in 2025, Russia may reassess its strategic interests and potentially reduce its intensified cooperation with North Korea. On Geopolitics Decanted, long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explained, “Russia is both unwilling and unable to replace China as a major sponsor of North Korea. The current relations between Russia and North Korea are unlikely to survive the end of hostilities in Europe.” As a result, Russo-North Korean ties are likely to weaken once the war concludes, probably prompting North Korea to seek closer, albeit still limited, relations with China. In this dynamic between China and North Korea, China would hold the upper hand. If Washington and Beijing can sustain cooperation on North Korean nuclear issues, favorable conditions for negotiations with Pyongyang could emerge over time.

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Choong-Koo Lee, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. His research has covered North Korea, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the impact of emerging technologies on security and defense. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses or the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

Image: Rodong Sinmun via KCNA Watch.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Choong-Koo Lee · February 19, 2025

​15. What Trump's freeze in federal funding means for the global fight against AIDS

​These comments resonated with me. It begs a fundamental question of what kind of country do we want America to be and what does make America great?

But I am sure most will skip or delete this article based on the subject line and since it comes from NPR. (but I still listen to it daily and I am probably one of only a few people who watch Fox news and listen to NPR).

Excerpts:

KELLY: So what would you say to the argument that America has plenty of problems here at home, America has to take care of Americans first, and something like PEPFAR is not going to be something that the U.S. is going to fund going forward? I mean, what is the argument for what the U.S. might gain by investing in programs like this?

BEKKER: I mean, I think there are a number, and I want to say this with heartfelt sincerity. PEPFAR and other programs that USAID and - you know, and America has provided for the global community is what made and makes America great, in my opinion. It truly does set the country apart as an extraordinary world leader. The incredible expertise that has been generated by having the resources, the ability to treat, the ability to keep our health systems together, has enabled us to be able to pivot when other epidemics and problems have come along. And, you know, there's no doubt we are likely to see more of these.

So perhaps my comment is that, you know, we've built an amazing global expertise, a global understanding of communicable diseases, which affect the globe as a whole. And I think that's important to acknowledge as well, as a - sort of a dividend, if you like, of this investment.

What Trump's freeze in federal funding means for the global fight against AIDS

https://www.npr.org/2025/02/18/nx-s1-5299204/what-trumps-freeze-in-federal-funding-means-for-the-global-fight-against-aids

February 18, 20255:16 PM ET

Heard on All Things Considered

By 

Michael Levitt

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John Ketchum

, 

Mary Louise Kelly

, 

Alejandra Marquez Janse

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Just a few weeks into his second term, President Trump froze funding for programs that play a big role in Global aid. One of those programs is the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS or PEPFAR.

MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:

South Africa has more people living with HIV than any other country - some 8 million people infected with the virus that causes AIDS. So when President Trump froze all global health aid last month, the impact for those working on the ground to fight the disease was profound. That is because PEPFAR, the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, contributes about $400 million a year to programs in South Africa. Linda-Gail Bekker runs one of those programs. She is director of the Desmond Tutu HIV Centre in Cape Town, which counts on U.S. dollars for some 80% of its funding. When we reached her today in Cape Town, I asked how'd she first hear of the freeze on foreign aid? What was her first thought?

LINDA-GAIL BEKKER: Well, we received a - what is now very well known as a stop work order. And this we received on 27 January. And I think it's absolutely correct to say we were completely caught off guard. And it took some time for us to understand exactly what that meant but then became very clear that this meant no work, no spending, no activities at all and that all staff would have to be put on furlough or in some kind of suspended work situation. This meant that in clinics, counselors would suddenly be, you know, off the floor. Certain clinics were completely closed. Other treatment programs were shut down - you know, extraordinary impact literally from one day to the next.

KELLY: So the funding freeze has been lifted for now, temporarily. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio says there are supposed to be waivers for life-saving medicine. Is the money flowing? Have any doors reopened?

BEKKER: So the way, certainly, the treatment care and prevention programs work within the PEPFAR house - if you like - is the funding flows either through USAID or through CDC. So the CDC...

KELLY: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

BEKKER: Correct.

KELLY: Yeah.

BEKKER: So the CDC component has issued some instructions to people, and so there is some movement towards reopening and resuming activities on that side. But the USAID side - there have been occasional messages to either say the stop work order remains in place. Please abide with it. Others have said, you know, hold on. We're coming (laughter). But, you know, there really has been very little communication from USAID.

KELLY: So I want to understand the stakes here. South Africa - Sub-Saharan Africa in general - has been the epicenter of the HIV crisis for so long. But in recent years, there was so much progress. AIDS-related deaths have plummeted. New infections have plummeted because of the availability of prevention drugs and treatments. Do you worry this current situation could threaten that progress?

BEKKER: Profoundly, Mary Louise. I mean, we - PEPFAR - I was there at the time when PEPFAR kicked in, in 2003. It was truly an emergency and an incredible lifesaver. And the first very important component of this was just to save young lives, keep families together, make sure that breadwinners continue to be able to provide, and very importantly, that children who were dying in droves would have their lives saved.

More recently, we've been making progress, one, towards self-reliance as a country but secondly also to bringing this epidemic under control. I am very concerned that by stopping this the way it has stopped, we are going to see regression on that progress because the virus does not stop. It doesn't care what the politics are.

KELLY: So what would you say to the argument that America has plenty of problems here at home, America has to take care of Americans first, and something like PEPFAR is not going to be something that the U.S. is going to fund going forward? I mean, what is the argument for what the U.S. might gain by investing in programs like this?

BEKKER: I mean, I think there are a number, and I want to say this with heartfelt sincerity. PEPFAR and other programs that USAID and - you know, and America has provided for the global community is what made and makes America great, in my opinion. It truly does set the country apart as an extraordinary world leader. The incredible expertise that has been generated by having the resources, the ability to treat, the ability to keep our health systems together, has enabled us to be able to pivot when other epidemics and problems have come along. And, you know, there's no doubt we are likely to see more of these.

So perhaps my comment is that, you know, we've built an amazing global expertise, a global understanding of communicable diseases, which affect the globe as a whole. And I think that's important to acknowledge as well, as a - sort of a dividend, if you like, of this investment.

KELLY: Linda-Gail Bekker, thank you.

BEKKER: Real pleasure. Thank you.

KELLY: She is director of the Desmond Tutu HIV Centre in Cape Town, South Africa.

16. How the U.S. Government Controls Ukrainian Media

This kind of reporting generates opposition to USAID from a different side of the political spectrum. And most Americans are unaware of this kind of work that USAID does (or did).

They think USAID merely hands out condoms and food. The have no idea that it conducts such activities as these:

 Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) - USAID

Mission:

The DRG Bureau within USAID promotes democratic governance, human rights, and civil society development worldwide.

Activities:

• Supports free and fair elections, rule of law, and accountable governance.
• Strengthens civil society organizations and independent media.
• Promotes human rights and combats corruption.
• Provides assistance to democratic movements and political transitions.

USAID's Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS) 

 ​Established to strengthen the agency's capacity to prevent conflict, address fragility, and respond to global crises in a more strategic and integrated way. The bureau's mission and activities include:

Core Objectives

1. Prevent conflict and instability in fragile states
2. Respond to global crises more effectively
3. Act as a stabilizing force during times of political transition

Key Functions

1. Technical Leadership: CPS serves as the U.S. Government's technical lead on conflict and violence prevention, as well as the implementation of political transition and stabilization programs in countries important for U.S. national security.
2. Crisis Response: The bureau creates a stand-alone, but interconnected, entity to focus on non-humanitarian aspects of crises, providing USAID with holistic crisis-response capabilities.
3. Conflict Assessment: CPS conducts conflict assessments and generates analyses on potential drivers of resilience to withstand conflict in countries experiencing political crises or emerging from conflict.
4. Program Design and Implementation: The bureau assists USAID Missions and staff overseas in designing and delivering state-of-the-art conflict mitigation, violence prevention, and peacebuilding interventions.
5. Interagency Coordination: CPS enhances civilian-military communication, coordination, and collaboration to inform and support both U.S. foreign policy and national security policy.

Specific Activities

1. Conflict and CVE Assessments: The bureau conducts conflict and countering violent extremism (CVE) assessments to inform program design.
2. Early Warning Systems: CPS develops and maintains early-warning and other data analysis systems to anticipate and respond to potential conflicts.
3. Training and Capacity Building: The bureau provides training to government, interagency, and non-government partners on tools for designing programs and ensuring a peacebuilding approach in conflict-affected environments
4. People-to-People Reconciliation Fund: CPS administers this fund, which supports programs aimed at healing social divisions and promoting reconciliation in conflict-affected communities
5. Complex Crises Fund Management: The bureau manages the Complex Crises Fund (CCF), which provides flexible funding for conflict prevention and response

By consolidating expertise and resources from various offices, the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization aims to address the complex challenges of conflict-affected and fragile states more effectively, ultimately supporting USAID's broader mission of promoting global stability and development.

How the U.S. Government Controls Ukrainian Media

USAID funded the vast majority of 'independent' media in Ukraine. What American taxpayers don't realize is that their money went to suppressing the truth.

By Tanya Lukyanova

02.18.25 — International

https://www.thefp.com/p/us-government-controls-ukrainian-media

A journalist looks at a damaged house after a Russian drone attack on January 22, 2025, in Sumy, Ukraine. (Denys Kryvopyshyn via Getty Images)

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38

The camera was rolling when chaos erupted. It was January 21, 2024, and an independent Ukrainian journalist named Ostap Stakhiv was livestreaming a call with Vasyl Pleskach, a man claiming he was being illegally detained by Ukraine’s infamous military conscription unit, the TCC. The agency has been accused of kidnapping men from the street and forcing them to the front lines. Those who resist have sometimes been tortured—and in several well-documented cases—killed.

In the middle of the interview, Stakhiv called the police to see if they would free Pleskach from the clutches of the TCC. Just then, with the police still on the line, a burly figure entered Vasyl’s frame, walked over to Pleskach, and struck him hard in the face. His phone tumbled to the ground, landing sideways, but still recording. “They’re beating him right now,” Stakhiv told the police, as Vasyl’s picture went haywire. “People are watching it live. They’re beating him as we speak. Go to my YouTube channel and see it for yourself.” Off-screen, Pleskach’s screams were audible for another minute before the line was disconnected.

None of Ukraine’s media outlets covered the beating, but about a month later, a Ukrainian media outlet, Babel, ran an article about Stakhiv. Its headline? “Ostap Stakhiv—a Failed Politician and Antivaxxer—Created a Vast Anti-Conscription Network.” It accused the journalist of obstructing Ukraine’s mobilization efforts, pushing Kremlin narratives, and undermining trust in the military. (Babel did not respond to a request for an interview from The Free Press.)

Other Ukrainian outlets, including Detector Media and Bihus Info, chimed in with similar stories—some even containing identical phrasing. “Whole paragraphs were copied word for word,” Jean Novoseltsev, another independent journalist in Ukraine, told The Free Press. “You can tell they were sent the same memo.” (Detector Media and Bithus Info did not respond to an email requesting an interview.)

By the fall, Ukraine’s security agency (SBU) had arrested Stakhiv, holding him without bail for 60 days. Most of the media framed the charges as exposing a “traitor” who had “disclosed Ukrainian military positions.”

If you’re assuming that Babel, Detector Media, and Bihus Info are news organizations controlled by the Ukrainian government, think again.

The three publications—and many of the others that attacked Stakhiv—get no government funding, at least not from Ukraine. Rather, according to Oksana Romaniuk, director of the Institute of Mass Information, a press freedom group, nine out of 10 media outlets in Ukraine “survive thanks to grants” from the West.

The primary funder of these outlets is an NGO called Internews. In 2024, they provided “comprehensive support” for 536 media outlets in Ukraine, per their annual report, and trained over 5,000 journalists. Some Ukrainian publications rely on Internews for 80 percent of their funding.

And where does Internews get its money? Until last week, when the spigot was turned off, it came primarily from USAID, to the tune of $473 million since 2008.

Internews says that its mission is to “train journalists, advance internet freedom, and help media outlets become financially sustainable—so that everyone has trustworthy information to make informed decisions and hold power to account.” As of 2023, it claims to have “trained” over 9,000 journalists, aided 4,291 media outlets, and reached 778 million people around the world with its broadcasts. Its ties to USAID go beyond grants: Its CEO Jeanne Bourgault spent six years at USAID and is married to a USAID adviser, Ray S. Jennings. (Internews did not respond to a request for an interview.)

In a recent radio interview, Romaniuk lauded the support in part because the advertising market in Ukraine has largely disappeared due to the war, and many of these outlets would fold without it. (Many are now struggling financially since USAID put a halt to its funding.) A second reason, though, was that “the media makes the government accountable to society. And if there is no proper support for the media. . . what happens then? Corruption flourishes. Abuses of power, restrictions on human rights, etc., grow,” she said.

There’s no doubt that USAID’s media program in Ukraine has done some good, fostering a competitive Ukrainian media environment. But critics charge that that money comes with strings. Rather than holding the government accountable, the USAID/Internews–funded Ukrainian media have at times acted as the government’s loudest cheerleaders—to the point of smearing and discrediting independent journalists, like Stakhiv, who dare to challenge the preferred government narrative. Instead of watchdogs, they became guard dogs, ensuring that certain stories the government doesn’t want told remain hidden.

Members of the Kharkiv Regional Recruitment Office check a civilian's documentation as they attempt to find men of fighting age in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on August 8, 2024. (Narciso Contreras via Getty Images)

Wartime censorship is a universal, timeless practice. So it’s no surprise that Ukraine, which has been fighting for its existence since Russia invaded in 2022, would exert considerable control over what the country’s media publishes. A 2023 State Department report on human rights practices notes that the Ukrainian government “banned, blocked, or sanctioned media outlets and individual journalists deemed a threat to national security or who expressed positions authorities believed undermined the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Investigative journalists who criticized the government, the report notes, were occasionally targeted by negative social media campaigns, often amplified by government-aligned channels. In these conditions, self-censorship has also flourished.

True, the restrictions in Ukraine remained far less repressive than in Russia, where the government passed a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalized dissent, and even made it a crime to call it a war, punishable with a prison sentence of up to 15 years. In Ukraine, the war has prompted the government to pass laws banning statements that “threatened the country’s territorial integrity, promoted war, instigated racial or religious conflict, or supported Russia’s aggression against the country.” Broadcast media, which had been largely controlled by a handful of oligarchs, has been consolidated, and now primarily shows government-approved programming. In 2022, six major television stations started producing around-the-clock coverage to convey to the public a unified wartime message.

“They banned all TV channels, which gave way to this one unified TV marathon,” Novoseltsev told The Free Press. “For two years now, they’ve been reporting how Ukraine is winning, we have practically no losses, our president is the fairest of them all, and the entire world is behind us. . . people soon realized it was propaganda.”

The State Department report noted there were instances in which “the government practiced censorship, restricted content, and penalized individuals and media outlets for reportedly criticizing measures taken by authorities or expressing pro-Russia views, through imposing financial sanctions, banning websites, and blocking television channels.”

What’s not mentioned in the report is the fact that the U.S. government itself has been funding these very practices. It is one thing for a country to pass laws that restrict speech in times of war. It is quite another when “independent” media outlets, funded by American taxpayer dollars for the express purpose of holding their government accountable, engage in that same censorship, and orchestrate smear campaigns against journalists who report on abuses.

One of the most blatant abuses, which has been going on since 2023, is the military recruiter practice of snatching men from the streets, breaking into apartments, and even torturing men who have refused to join the military. Dozens of videos documenting these abuses have been widely shared on social media. Ukrainians want news about these abuses.

But in USAID-funded outlets, coverage was scarce to nonexistent.

“Some would report isolated incidents if they went viral,” Novoseltsev said. “But that was it. Others ignored the issue entirely.”

A Free Press review of USAID-funded media bore this out. Bihus Info, which was among the outlets that smeared Stakhiv, has never reported on forced conscription at all. In the comments section under some of their videos, viewers demanded, “When will you investigate the TCC?”

Some USAID-funded publications, now pleading for donations after the Trump administration suspended the Internews/USAID grants they had relied on, insist they operated independently. Yet, the experience of Astra, an independent outlet in Russia, where Internews also hands out media grants, suggests otherwise.

When Astra applied for Internews funding, it was told the grant required an “Internews-appointed editor.” Astra’s editor-in-chief, Anastasia Chumakova, was stunned.

“Why on earth would foundations edit texts, and why do independent media agree to it? Are you sure the word ‘independent’ goes with this?” she wrote on Telegram.

In late 2022, Novoseltsev became one of a handful of Ukrainian journalists who began reporting on forced conscription—mainly because hardly anyone else was doing it. He interviewed dozens of people with firsthand experiences with the TCC, livestreamed conversations on his YouTube channel, and amassed 140,000 subscribers in the process.

Then, in January 2024, his YouTube channel was blocked. He met with his YouTube manager and recorded the conversation. The manager was surprised to hear about the ban; he didn’t know anything about it. But he told Novoseltsev he had to assume it was government censorship. “On our end, we don’t want to argue with that,” said the manager. Novoseltsev’s channel was never reinstated.

Within days, Novoseltsev found himself facing criminal charges, accused of “obstructing Ukrainian Armed Forces.” In late July, he was arrested. The headlines in the USAID-funded media followed a now-familiar pattern: “SBU Detained Propagandist, Opponent of Mobilization Jean Novoseltsev for Calls to Resist Conscription,” said Babel, in a typical headline.

He was described as a “pseudo-journalist,” a “provocateur,” and a “propagandist.” Some articles, he noted wryly, were “remarkably similar” to those written about Stakhiv.

“I dare them to find a single piece of propaganda I pushed,” he said. “Give me one example. All of my statements are video-recorded, so it should be easy enough to find.”

Authorities accused him of disrupting mobilization, inciting armed resistance, and leaking military information—claims that he says never even made it into his case file. What did? A single phrase he had said: “If you force men to the front with a whip, you won’t get motivated troops. You’ll get an army of slaves.”

After three days in prison, his supporters crowdfunded his bail. He currently awaits trial, which authorities keep delaying—likely because they have no case, he said.

When asked whether his reporting plays into Kremlin hands, Novoseltsev was defiant. “It’s those who drag unmotivated men onto the frontlines against their will, they play into Kremlin hands. Not those who report on it.”

Novoseltsev continues to report on forced conscription, among other subjects, with streams on various video-hosting platforms and on his Telegram channel. On January 19, he launched a new YouTube channel. He called it MUGA: Make Ukraine Great Again.

17. China’s Political Warfare: The Fight for Taiwan on the Information Battlefield

​ Americans are so afraid of even mentioning political warfare. But our adversaries are conducting it all around us. (You may not be interested in political warfare but political warfare is interested in you – with no apologies to Trotsky)

Excerpt:

It is essential for the United States to recognize that China’s political warfare is inextricably linked with its information warfare, and that this “combined arms, multi-domain” capability poses an existential threat to Taiwan and the United States. Further, although China seeks to win without fighting, its political/information warfare provides it a formidable advantage if it initiates a kinetic war. The United States is beyond the “admire the problem” phase: it is time to recognize the nature of the political/information warfare threat and to implement the recommendations herein to begin effectively fighting back. 

China’s Political Warfare: The Fight for Taiwan on the Information Battlefield 

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/19/chinas-political-warfare-the-fight-for-taiwan-on-the-information-battlefield/

by Peter Tozzi

|

02.19.2025 at 06:01am

China is at war. While annexing Taiwan is China’s immediate objective, defeating America is its ultimate goal. General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated his intent to “reunify” Taiwan with China. A successful takeover of Taiwan would grant China a power projection platform into the Pacific, threatening America’s allies and partners. It would also challenge the United States in the long-term, threatening to displace the U.S.-led rules-based international order.  

To achieve these ambitions, China wages political warfare against Taiwan and the United States. Political warfare is “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of [a major kinetic] war, to achieve its national objectives” (i.e., from using economic coercion to employing propaganda campaigns), and it is inextricably linked with information warfare. On the information battlefield, China spreads propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation; sows discord within democratic societies; and exerts transnational repression. 

China’s political warfare poses an existential threat. It is designed to defeat both countries without fighting a major kinetic war—specifically, without Taiwan and America fighting back. China’s victory ultimately means destruction of democratic governance, freedoms, and sovereignty of both Taiwan and the United States. 

Last October, the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Accountability reported that the U.S. government is unprepared to “identify, counter, and deter” China’s political warfare. As America prepares to defeat China’s kinetic warfare, it must concurrently prepare to defeat China’s political and information warfare. Failure to prepare allows China to continue unabated its elite capture; malign influence and interference; and expansionist aggression, thus threatening Taiwan, the United States, and other democracies around the world.  

This article addresses China’s political warfare against Taiwan and the United States and provides recommendations for the new Trump administration on how to counter and defeat China’s political warfare. 

Target: Taiwan  

China intends on subjugating Taiwan and uses political warfare to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. China’s political warfare against Taiwan is a party/state-civil society effort, directed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP’s modus operandi is to generate propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation to divide and conquer adversaries. Its political warfare against Taiwan is broad and includes information warfare, cyber warfare, media warfare, legal warfare, gray zone operations, hybrid warfare, and cognitive warfare.  

China overtly and covertly influences a multitude of actors to do its bidding through united fronts, a Leninist strategy that involves “co-opting,” “demoralizing,” and “subverting enemy elites.” The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Political Work Department plan and coordinate influence operations, to include elite capture and deception. Party/state-controlled media outlets like Xinhua News Agency and PLA Daily disseminate propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. 

The CCP has reportedly co-opted Want Want snack company chairman Tsai Eng-meng, who owns major media outlets like China Times and TVBS News. These outlets publish pro-China content and censor information critical of the CCP. China targets the Taiwanese population via social media platforms, and uses content farms, LINE (a popular communication app in Taiwan), TikTok, Facebook, and YouTube to spread propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. Chinese so-called netizens and the “50-Cent Army” flood the cyberspace with propaganda. Co-opted YouTube personalities parrot propaganda, by stating, for example, that Taiwan is a part of China or that China is not committing genocide against the Uyghurs.  

Narrative Building 

China builds narratives that instill fear, create confusion, and sow the seeds of doubt among the Taiwanese. Such narratives include that the previous “independence-leaning” Tsai Ing-wen administration was not legitimate, the “reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland is inevitable, and Taiwan cannot count on America in the event China invades it.  

China desires to increase support for “re-unification” within Taiwan and uses cognitive warfare to stoke fear and confusion within the Taiwanese people. For example, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing influenced domestic and foreign news outlets to publish articles postulating that the PLA may invade Taiwan while major world powers were distracted with controlling the pandemic’s spread.  

Currently, the most salient narrative is “America Skepticism Theory,” which the CCP uses to drive a wedge between Taiwan and America. The narrative asserts that the United States exploits Taiwan as a “tool” against China and will “abandon” Taiwan in an event of war. To undermine U.S. credibility, China points to examples of America’s unreliability, such as its disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. These narratives impact the Taiwanese people’s trust in the United States. Academia Sinica’s Institute of European and American Studies “American Portrait” survey indicated roughly an 11 percent decrease in trust of the United States among Taiwanese respondents between 2021 and 2022. While the survey did not definitively conclude reasons for the decrease, it seems likely that China’s political/information warfare played a role in undermining public trust in America’s security commitments.  

Election Interference 

China’s political warfare against Taiwan goes farther than just building narratives: it also attempts to delegitimize democratic processes, institutions, and elected officials. China invests enormous resources to interfere with and influence Taiwan’s elections. That Taiwan is a vibrant democracy poses an existential threat to the CCP. In the 2018 midterm elections, the UFWD propped up the pro-China candidate Han Kuo-yu from the increasingly pro-unification Kuomintang in his bid for mayor of Kaohsiung. Through mass media campaigns, fake social media accounts, and infusion of non-attributable funding through united front organizations, Han was elected mayor of this traditional Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stronghold. In the 2020 presidential elections, the UFWD propped up Han against incumbent President Tsai. When Han lost, China led a disinformation campaign claiming that the election results were skewed in President Tsai’s favor. 

In the leadup to the 2024 election, China used misinformation and disinformation campaigns to discredit the DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te as a “separatist” who heightens cross-strait tensions that will lead to war. These campaigns likely involved the use of generative AI to create false personas and deep fakes that afford the image that “reunification” viewpoints are more widespread than they actually are. However, by electing Lai as president the Taiwanese demonstrated to China that they reject “reunification.”  

Transnational Repression 

As part of its global campaign to crush criticism and dissent, China executes pervasive and brutal transnational repression. Its targets include civil liberties activists and diasporic communities like the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Chinese Christians, and Falun Gong practitioners. For example, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in San Francisco in November 2023, the CCP funded and coordinated pro-CCP demonstrators, who violently attacked pro-democracy demonstrators in the streets. Further, enabled by digital colonization of Huawei and other enterprises, China conducts global digital surveillance to track dissidents and to pressure them into silence.  

Political asylees who take refuge in Taiwan fear China’s repressive reach. Transnational repression has far-reaching consequences, and people risk having their rights stripped in democratic societies for daring to oppose Chinese propaganda. This was the case for Chen Siming, a political activist who was stranded in Taoyuan Airport in September 2023 after refusing to catch a connecting flight from Thailand back to China. Chen feared that if he returned home, he would be arrested because of his criticism of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. He pleaded with the Taiwanese government to not repatriate him. Taiwan allowed Chen to stay until he was granted political asylum in Canada. 

What if China Attacks? 

China’s ruler Xi Jinping has repeatedly told his military to prepare for kinetic war, and he expects to win that war. China’s increasingly aggressive gray zone operations—“coercive actions falling below the threshold of armed conflict, surpassing normal diplomatic, economic, and other activities to achieve national objectives”—around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal, and Pag-asa Island—may trigger war in the West Philippine Sea. If China starts a war with the Philippines, America will engage in accordance with its Mutual Defense Treaty.  

War could also start with a deliberate attack to annex Taiwan: Xi’s immediate goal to “unify” Taiwan is central to his vision of China’s “national rejuvenation.” Xi could realize his “China Dream” and obtain a power projection platform to break the first island chain. The PLA’s incessant joint air, maritime circumnavigation, and live-fire drills around Taiwan telegraph that if China cannot achieve “peaceful reunification,” it will attack.  

China’s doctrine is to strike first, perhaps under the pretext of political provocation. With a well-prepared political warfare apparatus, China will frame the narrative during the opening salvoes of the war—delegitimizing the United States and allies and partners, and attempting to divide any coalition supporting Taiwan and the United States.  

For example, through media warfare China will paint Taiwan as the villain and the United States as the interloper-aggressor. It will embed its propagandists and selected foreign reporters with the PLA on the front lines of the conflict. China watched as Hamas did this in its October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, and noted how embedding supported Hamas’ psychological warfare and propaganda. In a war to annex Taiwan, China will utilize foreign “talking heads” to legitimize its invasion. It will use multiple platforms to consolidate a pro-China coalition, employing social media influencers to post videos denouncing the U.S. coalition or political commentators to write “objective” articles that convey Beijing’s perspective of the conflict. 

In addition, China will likely attempt to further isolate Taiwan by severing its remaining diplomatic or para-diplomatic relations with other countries. Just last year, China plucked Nauru from Taiwan’s list of remaining diplomatic partners. In a war over Taiwan, isolation may come in the form of co-optation of state leaders, but also from pressure from pro-CCP diaspora and United Front groups creating domestic upheaval. If China can successfully use propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation campaigns to galvanize protestors to support its cause, it could compel nations to abandon relations with Taiwan.  

Finally, China will likely use transnational repression to coerce diasporic communities into fighting against the U.S.-led coalition. Instead of merely silencing these communities, it will attempt to impel them towards violence. Through digital surveillance and local agents, Beijing may threaten to blackmail or harass individuals and their family members. By weaponizing INTERPOL’s “red notices,” China may threaten to forcibly repatriate diasporic communities if they remain inactive during the conflict.  

Recommendations 

The Trump administration must urgently take the following steps to counter and defeat China’s political warfare. By failing to do so, America will lose this cold war with China, and may risk losing a kinetic war if China attacks.  

First, correctly identify the threat. The U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Accountability made steps in the right direction by properly identifying China’s political warfare as an “existential threat.” However, the Department of Defense’s 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, which guides military and civilian operators in combatting threats to America on the information battlefield, does not address political warfare at all. Although this is a broad strategy, it is vital to properly identify and name the threat, as U.S. State Department official George Kennan did regarding the Soviet Union’s political warfare in 1948. 

Second, the administration should create a policy and supporting strategy to actively counter and defeat China’s political warfare. The strategy must be a whole-of-government and whole-of-society effort similar to the approach taken during the Reagan administration to defeat the Soviet Union in the first Cold War. The United States should go on the offense to counter China in this war. For example, on the narrative battlefield America should support the notion that Taiwan’s democracy is an alternative to the CCP’s totalitarian regime, which claims that the CCP speaks for all Chinese people and that only it can rule them. 

Third, the Defense Department should institute systematic education regarding China’s political warfare. The 2023 strategy clearly emphasizes the need for education to prepare Public Affairs Officers and others for the fight. However, now nearly two years later the curriculum at the Defense Information School still fails to address China’s political warfare. Specifically, the Public Affairs & Communication Strategy Qualification Course prepares officers and senior non-commissioned/petty officers to be strategic communicators, yet it still provides no foundation on China’s political warfare goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics. If the Defense Department’s frontline strategic communicators are to play a meaningful role in implementing the strategy, then they urgently need education and training on China’s political warfare. Curriculum should include the history, theory, doctrine, and practice of China’s political warfare; political warfare mapping; and counter-political warfare objectives, strategies, and tactics.  

Fourth, government agencies (Defense, State, Commerce, Education, etc.) should partner with civil society organizations with emphasis on those with a proven track record of success. Some long-established U.S. government-partner think tanks and research institutions can claim only theoretical knowledge, but Taiwan’s civil society organizations such as Doublethink Lab and Taiwan FactCheck Center actively identify and counter China’s political/information warfare on a daily basis. Further, Kuma Academy and Academia Formosana successfully promote greater awareness of malign influence among civilians through workshops and civil defense training. 

Conclusion 

It is essential for the United States to recognize that China’s political warfare is inextricably linked with its information warfare, and that this “combined arms, multi-domain” capability poses an existential threat to Taiwan and the United States. Further, although China seeks to win without fighting, its political/information warfare provides it a formidable advantage if it initiates a kinetic war. The United States is beyond the “admire the problem” phase: it is time to recognize the nature of the political/information warfare threat and to implement the recommendations herein to begin effectively fighting back. 

Tags: China, information warfare, political warfare, Taiwan, US National Security

About The Author

• 
  
• Peter Tozzi
• Peter Tozzi is a researcher in the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica and a graduate student at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan focusing on Chinese political warfare and global malign influence and interference. He is also a research fellow at the American Council on Women, Peace, and Security focusing on the Chinese Communist Party’s genocide against Uyghur women and children. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the named institutions.

18. Zelensky Decries Peace Talks Without Ukraine, Trump Says He Had His Shot For Years

​Excerpts:

While today marks the first time high-level meetings were held between the U.S. and Russia since the all-out war in Ukraine began, this is an extremely fragile process, something Rubio acknowledged.

“Today is the first step of a long and difficult journey but an important one,” he explained, heaping praise on Trump for being “the only leader in the world that could initiate that process.”

No date has yet been set on when Ukraine will get a seat at the negotiating table. Clearly angered, Zelensky said he expects a delegation led by Trump peace envoy Keith Kellogg to arrive in Kyiv on Thursday. However, it remains to be seen whether that visit will make the Ukrainian leader any more reassured about how this peace process will play out.

Zelensky Decries Peace Talks Without Ukraine, Trump Says He Had His Shot For Years​ 

Shock waves are being felt in Kyiv and and Europe as America's position on Ukraine and Russia is morphing at a breakneck pace.

Howard Altman

Posted 12 Hours Ago

927

twz.com · by Howard Altman

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky complained that peace talks about Ukraine are taking part without his country’s participation and seemingly to Russia’s benefit. Speaking to reporters after the U.S. and Russia wrapped up the first sessions of negotiations to stop the nearly three-year-old war, Zelensky said he wants the conflict to end, “but we want it to be fair and that no one decides anything behind our backs.” Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump seemed to blame Ukraine for not seeking an earlier peace deal and sided with the Russian position that Zelensky should face new elections.

“You cannot make decisions without Ukraine on how to end the war in Ukraine, on any conditions,” he stated after meeting with Turkish President Recep Erdogan.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, who hosted the talks in Riyadh, originally invited Zelensky to take part in the meeting. However, both the U.S. and Russia objected, according to Bloomberg, citing sources.

"Prince Mohammed had wanted Zelenskiy to be represented at the talks but both the Americans and the Russians had insisted that they wanted to meet without the Ukrainians, according to a person with knowledge of the Saudi preparations."https://t.co/LKufBpfanp

— Status-6 (Military & Conflict News) (BlueSky too) (@Archer83Able) February 18, 2025

Earlier Tuesday, Trump dismissed concerns that Ukraine has not had a seat at the table during negotiations, essentially blaming Kyiv for not negotiating a way out of the war earlier.

“They’re upset about not having a seat, well, they’ve had a seat for three years, and a long time before that,” Trump told reporters Tuesday afternoon. “This could have been settled very easily…”

Trump’s message to Ukrainians who feel let down by his administration:

"I hear they're upset about not having a seat. Well, they've had a seat for three years." pic.twitter.com/Gz4GHiawYT

— Polymarket Intel (@PolymarketIntel) February 18, 2025

Trump echoed comments earlier in the day by a top U.S. negotiator who pushed back on the notion that Ukraine and European allies are being left out of this process.

“If you’re going to bring both sides together, you have to talk to both sides,” said U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who took part in the Riyadh peace talks. “And we’ll continue to remind everyone literally within minutes of President Trump hanging up with President Putin he called and spoke with President Zelensky. So shuttle diplomacy has happened throughout history, it’s happened all over the world. We are absolutely talking to both sides.”

Waltz was part of high-ranking delegations from Washington and Moscow that met for nearly five hours in the Saudi capital to find a way to end the conflict. They came away with a four-point agreement focused mostly on improving U.S.-Russian relations that badly deteriorated after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago. It called for normalizing bilateral relations, creating “high-level” teams to find a way to end the war “as quickly as possible,” laying the groundwork for future bilateral political and economic agreements and pleading to keep the peace process moving forward.

The four points were drastically different from positions Rubio held while a U.S. Senator before becoming Secretary of State.

The four points of the agreement reached between Russia and the U.S. today. (U.S. State Department)

The talks, led by Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, were a stunning turnaround from the stance Washington held under the Biden administration. After Russia launched its full-on invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, then-President Joe Biden organized an international effort to isolate Russian President Vladimir Putin and impose harsh economic sanctions on his country. Today’s agreement opens the door to reversing that.

“Should this conflict come to an acceptable end, the incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians, geopolitically on issues of common interest, and frankly economically on issues that hopefully will be good for the world and will also improve our relations in the long term between these two important countries,” Rubio told reporters in Riyadh after the talks wrapped up.

Rubio’s comments caused consternation among allies. The negotiations were held without Russia offering any concessions and as U.S. relations with Europe are plummeting in the wake of the Trump administration’s sudden foreign policy shifts.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio after meeting with Russian officials in Riyadh today:

There is an incredible opportunity to partner with the Russians geopolitically, on issues of common interest, and, frankly, economically. pic.twitter.com/zPNFo016i5

— Clash Report (@clashreport) February 18, 2025

Rubio deflected a question about whether Trump would end the sanctions.

“There are sanctions that were imposed as a result of this conflict. And so I would say to you that in order to bring an end to any conflict there has to be concessions made by all sides,” Rubio explained. “We’re not going to predetermine what those are. We’re certainly not going to negotiate this today or in a press conference for that matter.”

Any future deal will also involve a discussion about Ukrainian territory seized by Russia, said Waltz.

“We know just the practical reality is that there is going to be some discussion of territory and there is going to be a discussion of security guarantees,” he stated.

That territory could conceivably include not just land Russia captured, which is about 20% of Ukraine including Crimea, but territory it annexed from four Ukrainian regions that is even larger. Waltz said that is on the table as well.

“I think that those are things to be discussed,” he told reporters.

REPORTER: Is it acceptable to the US for Russia to retain any territory that it has annexed since the beginning of the war in February 2022?

MIKE WALTZ: Well I think those are things, those are to be discussed pic.twitter.com/bO7CVuGpzZ

— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) February 18, 2025

Speaking to reporters after the meeting as well, Lavrov echoed Rubio’s goals and said that Washington and Moscow agreed to appoint representatives to carry out “regular consultations” on Ukraine.

“I have reason to believe that the American side has started to better understand our position,” the Russian foreign minister said.

That position may be just a stalling tactic, intelligence officials and political leaders told NBC News.

“…intelligence from the United States and close allies shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine,” the network reported, citing four Western intelligence officials and two U.S. congressional officials.

“We have zero intelligence that Putin is interested in a real peace deal right now,” one of the congressional officials said.

“He thinks he’s winning,” one of the Western intelligence officials said, adding that Russian losses on the battlefield are not pressuring Putin to stop fighting.

No way! Putin isn’t interested in a real peace deal and just wants more land? Shocking. Unbelievable. Never saw that coming. pic.twitter.com/SaGCrGbTZA

— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) February 18, 2025

Meanwhile, European leaders left out of the negotiations and angered by how the U.S. is handling the process, continued to find a way to play a role. French President Emmanuel Macron is planning a second meeting, scheduled for Wednesday, to find ways to guarantee Ukraine’s security, Reuters reported. Additional European nations and Canada were invited to take part.

That follows a meeting held in Paris on Monday seeking commitments for a European peacekeeping force on the ground in Ukraine to bolster any successful negotiation to end the war. The meeting ended without a consensus.

Foreign troops on Ukrainian soil after a peace deal is a non-starter, Lavrov said.

“The presence of troops from NATO countries, whether under foreign flags, EU flags, or their own national flags, does not change anything. This is, of course, unacceptable to us,” the Russian foreign minister exclaimed.

Lavrov: NATO or EU troops in Ukraine are unacceptable

"The presence of troops from NATO countries, whether under foreign flags, EU flags, or their own national flags, does not change anything. This is, of

course, unacceptable to us," Lavrov

pic.twitter.com/0gBN9kgsiN

— Tymofiy Mylovanov (@Mylovanov) February 18, 2025

On Monday, Russian ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya outlined another key demand of the talks, making it clear that Moscow wants to force Zelensky out of office. The Russian ambassador called Zelensky “the self-proclaimed Ukrainian president” and referred to his government as “the Zelensky cabal,” saying that neither had “a role to play in the new Ukraine.”

However, Zelensky won the second round of Ukraine’s 2019 presidential election in a landslide and there have been no elections because the country is under martial law, and voting has been considered logistically unfeasible and challenging after so many residents fled the war.

Despite that, Trump seemed to concede Nebenzya’s point as well Tuesday afternoon.

Zelensky wants “a seat at the table… but the people of Ukraine have to say, like, ‘you know, it’s been a long time since we’ve had an election,'” Trump told reporters. “That’s not a Russia thing. That’s something coming from me and coming from many other countries also.”

REPORTER: “We're hearing that Russia wants to force Ukraine as a condition for a peace deal. Is that something the US would support?”

TRUMP: “We have a situation where we haven't had elections in Ukraine, where we have martial law … the leader in Ukraine, I hate to say it, but… pic.twitter.com/JILCUKjcx4

— Polymarket Intel (@PolymarketIntel) February 18, 2025

While today marks the first time high-level meetings were held between the U.S. and Russia since the all-out war in Ukraine began, this is an extremely fragile process, something Rubio acknowledged.

“Today is the first step of a long and difficult journey but an important one,” he explained, heaping praise on Trump for being “the only leader in the world that could initiate that process.”

No date has yet been set on when Ukraine will get a seat at the negotiating table. Clearly angered, Zelensky said he expects a delegation led by Trump peace envoy Keith Kellogg to arrive in Kyiv on Thursday. However, it remains to be seen whether that visit will make the Ukrainian leader any more reassured about how this peace process will play out.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

twz.com · by Howard Altman

19. CIA MQ-9 Reapers Are Covertly Spying On Mexican Drug Cartels: Reports

CIA MQ-9 Reapers Are Covertly Spying On Mexican Drug Cartels: Reports

CIA drone flights over Mexico reportedly began under Biden, but have greatly expanded under Trump amid talk of direct action against the cartels.

Joseph Trevithick

Updated 15 Hours Ago

369

twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is reportedly flying unarmed MQ-9 Reapers inside Mexican airspace to snoop on drug cartels. The overflights are said to have built off a covert CIA drone surveillance program that began under President Joe Biden, focused on finding labs producing the narcotic Fentanyl inside Mexico. The use of Reapers, which are capable of being armed, comes amid talk of unprecedented direct action by American forces against Mexico’s cartels, operations that could include drone strikes as TWZ previously highlighted in an in-depth feature.

CNN first reported the CIA MQ-9 flights over Mexico earlier today. The exact size of the agency’s Reaper fleet and how those drones may be configured compared to ones in service elsewhere, including with the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is unknown. Current generation Reapers can stay aloft for more than a day at a time depending on their configuration and loadout. MQ-9s can carry an array of precision-guided bombs and missiles, as well as a wide variety of sensors internally and in underwing pods, along with other stores. There is also considerable evidence of a very close working relationship when it comes to drone operations between the CIA and the U.S. military’s secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), as well as Air Force Special Operations Command.

An example of a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper armed with Hellfire missiles and also carrying a range-extending external fuel tank. Air National Guard

“The … flights were communicated to Congress by the Trump administration using a particular notification reserved for new or updated covert programs that the CIA intends either to conceal or deny, a source familiar with the matter said — suggesting that the flights represent a distinct escalation,” according to CNN. “The notifications made no mention of Mexican partners, the source said.”

TWZ has reached out to the CIA and the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C. for more information.

“The CIA has flown surveillance drones to hunt cartels inside Mexico before, according to a former and a current U.S. official, under at least one small program that partnered with Mexican authorities,” the report added.

It is interesting to note here that CBP has, at least in the past, flown its unarmed Reapers, which it refers to as Predator B drones, inside Mexican airspace in cooperation with that country’s government.

“CBP also uses Predator B aircraft to perform bi-national law enforcement operations with the government of Mexico through coordination at the Information Analysis Center located at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico,” according to a 2017 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a Congressional watchdog. “We found that 7 percent of Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 were in foreign airspace located in Mexico or 1,615 flight hours.”

A pair of CBP MQ-9 Reaper, or Predator B, drones. CBP

A separate report today from The New York Times does not mention the use of MQ-9s, specifically, but provides additional context about CIA drone flights over Mexico.

“The United States has stepped up secret drone flights over Mexico to hunt for fentanyl labs, part of the Trump administration’s more aggressive campaign against drug cartels, according to U.S. officials,” according to that report. “The covert drone program, which has not been previously disclosed, began under the Biden administration, according to U.S. officials and others familiar with the program.”

“C.I.A. officers in Mexico pass information collected by the drones to Mexican officials,” the Times‘ story adds. “The drones have proved adept at identifying labs, according to people with knowledge of the program. Fentanyl labs emit chemicals that make them easy to find from the air.”

The ability of aerial platforms to use multi-spectral imaging capabilities to detect chemical plumes is not new, as TWZ has reported on in the past.

A side-by-side example of a traditional image captured by an aerial platform and one of the same spot taken using a multi-spectral camera showing chemical plumes not visible to the naked eye. National Guard Bureau via FOIA

Depending on their exact sensor configuration, CIA drones, including MQ-9s, would be able to gather other kinds of data via cameras and radars, as well as collect signals intelligence, such as communications chatter between cartel members. Uncrewed aircraft could also use sensors to geolocate emitters like radios and cellphones and otherwise track the movements of targets of interest. This, in turn, could be used to help establish so-called “patterns of life” for a specific individual or group of individuals. That data can then be used to further refine intelligence-gathering efforts, as well as support the planning and execution of targeted raids or strikes. The U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence community have honed the ability to use sensor-packed aircraft, crewed and uncrewed, to find and fix often hard-to-locate targets after two decades of counter-terrorism operations. These skill sets continue to be actively demonstrated in places like Syria on a regular basis.

Northrop Grumman’s AN/ZPY-5 Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER), which has flown on CBP Reapers and certain U.S. military aircraft, is just one particularly prime example of relevant known available sensor capabilities. VADER is a fast-scanning active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar with ground moving target indicator (GMTI) with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging modes. It can produce high-quality map-like images even through cloud cover, smoke, and dust, and also at night. Objects detected using the GMTI functionality can be overlaid on those images and changes in their positions can be tracked from one scan to the next.

A view of the feed from VADER. DHS

There have been previous reports, including one from The Washington Post just yesterday, about President Donald Trump’s administration directing the CIA to take a larger role in the counter-drug fight south of the border, in general.

The U.S. military has already publicly acknowledged an increase in aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activity on its end involving crewed aircraft in support of counter-drug and border security operations. This has involved flights in U.S. airspace along the southern border, as well as in international airspace around Mexico.

“We’ve … increased some uniquely military capabilities that will get after the point you make, the cartels, which are driving illegal migration, and that’s primarily through airborne ISR to get more information on those and figure out how we can counter their actions,” U.S. Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing last week.

U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon and Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft have been tracked conducting these flights, as TWZ has previously reported. A separate past report from CNN says that U-2S Dragon Lady spy planes have been utilized, as well.

A stock photo of a US Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, one of the highly capable US military crewed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft now being actively used to surveil Mexico. USAF

“We have a number of intel analysts that work with … lead federal agencies to provide intelligence that gets after the cartel networks that drive the production and distribution of Fentanyl and pushes it across the border,” Guillot also said during last week’s hearing. In addition, “we do have intelligence sharing with Mexico to show them what we see.”

TWZ has previously highlighted how the use of more capable and strategic-focused aerial ISR platforms, especially the Rivet Joint, already represented a significant new development in operations around Mexico. The reported covert CIA drone flights inside Mexican airspace, especially if they are being conducted without any cooperation or coordination with authorities in that country, is another major escalatory step.

“It’s part of this little campaign,” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said today in response to questions about the reported CIA drone flights, but did not elaborate. Earlier this month, Sheinbaum directed the deployment of 10,000 additional military personnel to the border with the United States to help with counter-drug operations.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. YURI CORTEZ/AFP via Getty Images YURI CORTEZ

“We cannot rule out espionage because we do not know exactly what was done,” Mexican Defense Minister Ricardo Trevilla said last week about the U.S. military’s increased aerial ISR activity in U.S. and international airspace around his country.

Today’s reports from CNN and The New York Times both stress that the CIA drones flying over Mexico are not currently armed and that there are no immediate plans to use them to conduct strikes. However, the news can only prompt additional discussions about whether it might be a prelude to U.S. direct action against the cartels from the air and/or on the ground. The Trump administration is also working toward formally designating at least some of Mexico’s drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, which would expand the scope of actions that U.S. authorities could take against them.

Any direct action targeting Mexican drug cartels, especially without a new level of cooperation and trust with the Mexican government, would have major ramifications on both sides of the border. Striking any target from the air in a neighboring country you are not otherwise at war with is a major escalation and it’s unclear if the Trump administration will end up going that route. However, collecting key intelligence, including from covert CIA MQ-9 flights, would be a first step.

“Trump’s first option would likely be airstrikes — with drones and/or standoff weapons being the most likely choice — for several reasons.”

“As we have previously reported, Mexico’s increasingly well-armed drug cartels pose a serious threat to external forces. Some cartel units are extremely well-equipped and have adopted some of the latest features of warfare. They have been using drones to attack enemies for years now, for instance.”

This is terrifying. Video released by the Mexican cartel and paramilitary group CJNG show the extent of militarization of their special forces. Scores of armed & kitted out fighters in standardized uniforms line a large convoy of up-armored troop transport vehicles and technicals pic.twitter.com/Kffz6UYwIX

— Hugo Kaaman (@HKaaman) July 18, 2020

“These organizations also often move around in increasingly well protected so called ‘narco tanks.’“

“Cartels can also have defacto control over large areas with lots of support at the ready. Inner circles around key drug lords are among the most heavily defended and fortified positions in these areas, which makes them challenging targets. But the same ‘find and fix’ tactics that have been used to take out terrorists in the Middle East, especially with the help of drones, could potentially be brought to bear to help solve that problem. Unless Mexico agrees to their employment, they would not be operating in totally permissible airspace. While Mexico’s air defenses are extremely rudimentary, this could still be an issue.”

“Any sort of ground raid without prior authority from Mexico raises the concern that any U.S. troops inadvertently left behind or otherwise captured could be without legal protection. That’s why U.S. military deployments frequently take place with Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) giving military personnel and civilian contractors protection from being subject to unfair criminal or civil justice systems.”

…

“While far less risky to U.S. troops, the downside of relying solely on airpower is the loss of valuable intelligence U.S. forces could gather on the ground to rapidly exploit, as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Details about existing U.S. military activities on the ground in Mexico, understood to primarily revolve around advise and assist and training support type missions, are limited. Members of the U.S. Army’s 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) reportedly just recently deployed to the country to help train members of the Mexican Marine Corps through the end of March. Mexico’s Marines have now long been among the country’s military units most heavily committed to the counter-drug fight.

Whatever the Trump administration’s exact plans to go after the cartels might be, the CIA already looks to have taken a leading role, including with its reported covert drone flights.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick

20. Under Trump, CIA plots bigger role in drug cartel fight

​I guess these will not be covert actions since there is no longer any plausible deniability. (note sarcasm)

Keep in mind: Covert action is defined in Title 50 of the U.S. Code as an activity or activities of the U.S. government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.

Under Trump, CIA plots bigger role in drug cartel fight

The spy agency is developing plans to fulfill the president’s campaign pledges, but critics warn of a backlash.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/02/17/trump-cia-mexico-cartels/

February 17, 2025

The U.S.-Mexico border as seen from a Marine Corps helicopter last month near San Diego. (Jae C. Hong/AP)

By Warren P. Strobel and Isaac Stanley-Becker

The Central Intelligence Agency is poised to take a larger, more aggressive role under President Donald Trump in the battle against Mexican-based drug cartels, devising and evaluating plans to share more intelligence with regional governments, train local counternarcotics units and possibly conduct other covert actions, according to people familiar with the matter.

The expanded focus on cartels, which smuggle fentanyl and other narcotics into the United States, represents a new and potentially risky priority for the spy agency, which in recent years has made espionage against China, counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and Africa, and support for Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion its main concerns.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe intends to shift agency resources to its counternarcotics mission and apply insights from its two decades of tracking, infiltrating and disrupting terrorist networks to fighting the cartels, said a person familiar with his plans who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the subject’s sensitivity and because the approach isn’t finalized yet.

“Lessons learned in the counterterrorism realm are applicable to the counternarcotics mission and the counter-cartel mission,” this person said. “The full weight of those has not been brought to bear on this problem.”

A CIA spokesperson said in a statement that “countering drug cartels in Mexico and regionally is a priority for CIA as a part of the Trump Administration’s broader efforts to end the grave threat from narco-trafficking. Director Ratcliffe is determined to put CIA’s unique expertise to work against this multifaceted challenge.”

Mexican soldiers at a new military checkpoint at an international port of entry this month in Ciudad Juárez. (John Moore/Getty Images)

The emphasis will be on increased U.S. support to antidrug forces within Mexico and elsewhere in the hemisphere, people familiar with the emerging plan said. Less clear is whether armed U.S. personnel, either from the military’s Special Operations forces or the CIA, could be tasked with taking direct action against cartel leaders on Mexican soil, something former intelligence and military officials warn would spark a ferocious backlash and harm U.S.-Mexican relations, including counternarcotics cooperation.

“I don’t think people fully understand what that could mean,” said a former U.S. intelligence official who served in the region. “It’s one thing to do that in a lawless environment, like Yemen or Somalia or Afghanistan.”

The Pentagon has no such plans at the moment, a U.S. military official said.

The spy agency’s expanded role is one part of what Trump has promised will be a broad offensive against the cartels and illegal immigration. He has moved U.S. troops to the southern border and threatened tariffs on Mexico and Canada. The U.S. military has also significantly increased the number of airborne electronic surveillance flights, aimed at the cartels, along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Former U.S. intelligence, military and diplomatic officials said Trump’s more muscular approach is likely to alienate Mexico, which is bruised by a long history of U.S. intervention. Additional intelligence sharing and training will help, they said, but are unlikely to produce the rapid, visible results that Trump wants.

“You can’t go in with guns blazing,” said Daniel Gerstein, a retired U.S. Army colonel who served in Colombia and led an extensive study of more than two decades of counternarcotics work there for the Rand think tank, where he is a senior policy researcher. “I don’t see this as the kind of approach that’s going to be very successful.”

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, facing Trump’s tariff threat, said she would move 10,000 troops to the border. But she has insisted that Mexico will deal with Washington as an equal, not a subordinate.

Trump has falsely claimed that 300,000 Americans die annually from drugs entering the United States through Mexico. The true number is about 90,000, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and overdose deaths started declining in 2023.

Focusing on Latin America provides Ratcliffe an avenue to demonstrate that the CIA — which Trump has long distrusted — is attending to the president’s priorities of crime, drugs and migration, the former intelligence official said.

It remains unclear what other programs in the CIA’s classified budget may be cut to fund more work on narcotics, and two former U.S. officials said the trade-off could mean pulling back on other priorities, such as China. Ratcliffe, though, has said repeatedly that gathering intelligence on China is his No. 1 priority. And amid Trump’s wide-ranging reshaping of the federal government, the CIA chief has signaled he plans to trim the agency’s workforce, offering employees there a “deferred resignation” package. It is unclear how many CIA personnel would take the buyout.

The CIA has large stations in Mexico and Colombia, but for its new effort it would need to expand its presence in other capitals and increase staffing at its Langley, Virginia, headquarters outside Washington, the former intelligence official said, adding, “Where are these bodies coming from?”

Trump in a Jan. 20 executive order tasked U.S. spy agencies under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence with helping Secretary of State Marco Rubio determine which Mexican cartels, and which groups in El Salvador and Venezuela, should be designated as foreign terrorist organizations. While Trump set a 14-day deadline for receiving the recommendations, no action has been announced. The White House referred questions to the State Department, which did not respond to a request for comment.

Executive orders for President Donald Trump to sign in the Oval Office on Jan. 20. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

Trump toyed with the same idea during his first term after the killing in 2019 of nine U.S. citizens from a Mormon community in Mexico, but he never acted on it. The threat of a terrorist designation served as a bargaining chip that helped American law enforcement leaders extract concessions from the Mexican government, said a former U.S. official, who warned that should Trump act on his threat now, it would be perceived as opening the door for unilateral U.S. action in Mexico, including military action.

Robert S. Litt, former general counsel for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said a foreign terrorist designation could allow U.S. authorities to engage in the kind of surveillance ordinarily aimed at foreign powers and their agents. But a criminal wiretap can be conducted under existing authorities and does not require such a designation, he said.

Litt said existing U.S. law also permits covert action against cartels as a counternarcotics matter, pending a presidential finding that such an action is important to U.S. national security. But a foreign terrorist designation might enable covert action against cartels under any existing findings, he said.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe after he was sworn in on Jan. 23 in Washington. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

The CIA has a long, secretive role in the fight against narcotics trafficking in Mexico. For years, it has worked closely and quietly with the Mexican army to go after drug lords.

While Mexico’s cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has fractured in recent years, particularly since the 2020 arrest in California of former Mexican defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos on drug charges, the Mexican government has continued working with the CIA, according to former U.S. and Mexico officials.

Even before Trump took office, U.S. intelligence agencies began devoting greater attention to the fentanyl trade, as U.S. deaths from the synthetic opioid spiked. Ratcliffe’s predecessor as CIA director, William J. Burns, told Congress in 2023 that the United States had shared intelligence with Mexican authorities that led to “some very successful action against the Sinaloa cartel.”

Crucial information about the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals, cartels’ financial networks and drug production sites, Burns said, was gleaned from an electronic surveillance program known as Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Last year, lawmakers endorsed an amendment to legislation reauthorizing FISA that added international narcotics trafficking to the definition of “foreign intelligence information,” allowing targeted surveillance of non-U.S. citizens abroad. Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas), who sponsored the amendment, said it would allow the U.S. government to “target the affiliates of cartels, such as bankers, accountants, and others who help operate their business.”

Trump and some of his allies, including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, have in the past called for repealing Section 702 over its impacts on Americans’ privacy. Gabbard, during her confirmation hearing, said her views had changed.

U.S. Marines adjust concertina wire along the U.S.-Mexico border in Southern California on Feb. 6. (Jorge Duenes/Reuters)

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-Texas) a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said intelligence — including intelligence partnerships with foreign allies — is important in shutting down drug cartels. “To date, the Trump administration’s actions have been counterproductive to those goals,” he said.

“This administration has not put forward a credible plan to counter cartel violence or protect American citizens from transnational crime. Instead, Trump’s strategy has mostly consisted of bombastic threats to invade Mexico, impose punishing tariffs on U.S.-Mexico trade, or designate cartels as foreign terrorist organizations,” Castro said.

Trump has advocated a more muscular approach to drug trafficking than his predecessors and at one point in his first term proposed launching missiles at Mexican drug labs, according to his former defense secretary Mark T. Esper. During the 2024 campaign, he declared that “it will be the policy of the United States to take down the cartels, just as we took down ISIS, and the ISIS caliphate,” referring to the Islamic State militant group.

Former U.S. officials said there are important differences between the “war on terrorism” and Trump’s war on the cartels.

For instance, the United States trained and equipped “vetted” local forces in Afghanistan. But there — unlike in Mexico — the U.S. military and its proxies controlled swaths of territory. Even so, creating trusted local security units took years and significant funding.

“I don’t think Trump is searching for things that can be done slowly and methodically,” the former intelligence official said.

Students at the Ignacio Zaragoza National Academy of Police Training and Development take part in a drill in 2015 in Amozoc, Mexico. The academy was built with resources from the Merida Initiative. (Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP/Getty Images)

William Brownfield, a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia and head of the State Department’s international narcotics bureau, said the United States previously trained and screened Mexican counternarcotics units under a 2007-2021 security cooperation agreement called the Merida Initiative. Those units were responsible for capturing Joaquin “Chapo” Guzman, a leader of the Sinaloa cartel, he said.

“That worked for a while. Is it going to work now, with Sheinbaum? I don’t know,” said Brownfield, now at the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan think tank.

“Mexico, it’s a hard nut to crack,” in part because of the country’s “visceral reaction” — based on history — to any U.S. military or law enforcement presence on its soil, Brownfield said. “There’s absolutely no way you can do this without provoking” residual anger that dates to the Mexican-American War.

The increased focus on intelligence collection and sharing is also reflected in Trump’s picks for diplomatic posts. His nominee for ambassador to Mexico, Ron Johnson, spent more than two decades at the CIA before he served as ambassador to El Salvador in Trump’s first term.

Gerstein, the Rand researcher, said intelligence is a critical part of counternarcotics work. The United States shared copious intelligence with Colombian authorities on the locations of coca fields and rebel groups, he said.

But Gerstein said drug interdiction and eradication must be paired with “soft power” approaches like economic development and institution building to be successful. “You’ve got to do all four of those” simultaneously, he said.

Mary Beth Sheridan and Karen DeYoung contributed to this report.

By Warren P. Strobel

Warren P. Strobel is a reporter at The Washington Post covering U.S. intelligence. He has written about U.S. security policies under seven presidents. He received numerous awards, and was portrayed in the movie "Shock and Awe," for his skeptical reporting on the decision to invade Iraq. Send him secure tips on Signal at 202 744 1312follow on X@wstrobel

By Isaac Stanley-Becker

Isaac Stanley-Becker is an intelligence and national security reporter. He can be reached on Signal at 773-480-2423.follow on Xisaacstanbecker

21.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com