​Quotes of the Day:

“Always forgive your enemies; nothing annoys them so much.”

– Oscar Wilde

“Never open the door to a lesser evil, for other and greater ones invariably slink in after it.”

– Baltasar Gracian, The Art of Worldly Wisdom: A Pocket Oracle

“A queen offers her hand to be kissed, & can form it into a fist

while smiling the whole damn time.”

― Elizabeth Acevedo, Clap When You Land

1. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Opening Address at Ninth Congress of WPK

2. THE DIRE TOLL OF NORTH KOREAN HUMAN TRAFFICKING

3. China applauds North Korea on party conclave in ‘new historical period’ of ties

4. S. Korea’s Yoon Prolongs Cycle of Convicted Presidents

5. Parliamentary subcommittee approves bill preventing presidential pardons for insurrection

6. N. Korea preparing for military parade involving 12,000 personnel: lawmaker

7. N. Korea's party congress closely watched for message to U.S., new weapons

8. China, Russia send congratulations to N. Korea over party congress opening

9. Pyongyang holds public struggle session over South Korean content distribution

10.North Korea opens Ninth Party Congress with optimistic message on economy

11. Ukrainian national sentenced to prison for aiding North Korean IT workers

12. Ex-President Yoon apologizes for suffering caused by martial law but defends his decree

13. U.S. says Yoon's life sentence matter for S. Korea's judicial system, reaffirms 'ironclad' alliance commitment

14. Senior U.S. diplomat cites Korea Zinc's multibillion-dollar investment

15. Seoul 'strongly protests' Japan FM's territorial claim to Dokdo, calls for retraction

1. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Opening Address at Ninth Congress of WPK

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un opens the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress by claiming the past five years delivered a “turn” in socialist construction despite sanctions, disasters, and public health shocks. He argues the Eighth Congress corrected unrealistic economic goals, scrapped outdated plans, and replaced “transitional” habits with “scientific” planning, producing visible gains in industry, infrastructure, housing, and the capital and regions. He also claims stronger external standing that improved conditions for development. Kim then pivots to governance, warning that defeatism, formalism, conservatism, and weak leadership remain “artificial obstacles.” He describes extensive congress preparations, vetting, and delegate composition, and frames the congress as a new long-term plan and a tightening of party leadership.

Comment: This is a legitimacy brief that converts hardship into proof of leadership competence and unity. The “negative elements” list signals an internal discipline campaign and probable cadre reshuffling. It is an indication that Kim Jong Un assesses he is facing internal instability issues. By foregrounding planning and “internal forces,” Kim is preparing the public for sustained mobilization, not relief. The Korean people in the north face even greater sacrifice and suffering to keep the Kim family regime in power.

Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Opening Address at Ninth Congress of WPK

Date: 20/02/2026 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source

https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1771539529-716101143/respected-comrade-kim-jong-uns-opening-address-at-ninth-congress-of-wpk/

Pyongyang, February 20 (KCNA) -- The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un made an opening address at the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The full text of his opening address is as follows:

Dear delegates,

Today, we are opening the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, which will set up another new milestone in the sacred struggle for the development of our Party and socialist construction.

The past five years since the Eighth Congress of the WPK was a proud period when the whole Party and all the people brought about an epochal turn in implementing the socialist cause of our own style on the strength of solid unity.

Our socialist construction spanning long years has not been plain sailing, but never has there been such a period as this one, in which we achieved so great successes despite the severity of trials and difficulties.

When we convened the Eighth Party Congress, the subjective and objective conditions of our revolution were literally so harsh that we could hardly maintain our own existence.

The hostile forces grew more reckless in their schemes for harsh blockade and sanctions against us, and we were also confronted with successive natural calamities and the global public health crisis. This severely hindered the development of all our sectors, and it also seriously threatened the security of our state and the safety of our people.

Worse still, economic work in the country was being conducted in transitional and temporary ways just as it had been since several decades ago; all economic sectors were struggling to maintain the status quo without the orientation of their development.

Consequently, we were compelled to conclude the seventh term of the Party Central Committee as we fell fairly short of attaining the goals of the five-year strategy for national economic development that had been decided upon by the Seventh Party Congress.

However, everything has fundamentally changed today, five years from then.

The Eighth Party Congress critically reviewed and analyzed the unscientific nature of the above goals that had been pursued during the seventh-term Party Central Committee, before resolutely scrapping all that had gone out of date.

Given the then circumstances, it clarified the objectives of its work for the coming years and the direction for its development, and to this end put forward reasonable policies as regards the major theoretical and practical matters.

The plans for all the sectors were ambitious yet clear.

The work plans were drawn up and decided upon through strict scientific review and discussions, and they were based on the principle that we should achieve all that was within our power at the moment and do so without fail by making the seemingly impossible possible.

Even though they were facing difficult circumstances, the Party, the people and the army hardened their determination and made proactive efforts to this end; by successfully carrying out the Party's decisions in all realms such as politics, the economy, national defence, culture and diplomacy, they achieved notable, comprehensive and radical successes, and in the course of this, they substantially increased our country's internal forces.

In particular, the economic sector, which is the major front of socialist construction, fulfilled the five-year plan for national economic development in the main and made dynamic progress in reinforcing and readjusting the technical infrastructure and functions of the key industries. As a result, not a few sectors of our economy have freed themselves from the protracted obsolescence and stagnation, and instead built up their foundations and potentials to achieve significant growth under a plan.

And gigantic plans for transforming the capital city and the regions simultaneously and bringing about a substantial improvement in the people's living standards were pushed forward vigorously by the Party and the state; thus, the expected successes were achieved in these undertakings and a correct direction was confirmed for carrying them on more proactively.

In view of the external relations, too, the position of our state was firmly consolidated as an irreversible one, bringing about a great change in the global political landscape and in the influence on our state. This created favourable conditions and circumstances for giving a greater spur to our socialist construction.

Now all the people are witnessing every moment of the day the reality changing at a speed incomparable with that of the past, and have a clear understanding of and conviction about the road they should take and the prospect of the development of our state.

Five years ago we convened the Eighth Congress of the Party with the conviction, will and determination to break through the worst difficulties facing the revolution by our own efforts and usher in a new era of advance and development without fail, but today we are here at its Ninth Congress, filled with optimism and confidence in the future.

This is indeed a great change and development, as well as a success we can be proud of at the present stage.

Moreover, the precious successes achieved and monumental structures created in the course of the efforts to greet this Congress with high political enthusiasm and labour achievements rounded off the struggle of the past five years, thereby making this a congress that signifies a success and promises a greater success, both in name and in reality.

All the successes achieved during the period under review are a great gain from the devoted struggle our Party members, working people and service personnel have waged supporting the Party's lines and policies unyieldingly with one mind in the face of all difficulties.

I extend my heartfelt and warmest thanks to all the Party members, working people, service personnel and citizens for having turned the eighth term of the Party Central Committee into a period of great upsurge in socialist construction and made contributions to greeting the Ninth Party Congress as a precious one of reviewing, as a glorious one, with a staunch and proactive pioneering spirit and indomitable fighting spirit.

I also pay ennobling tribute to the revolutionary comrades and martyrs who dedicated their valuable lives to the sacred cause of achieving the prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people during the period under review.

And my warm greetings go to Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) and other overseas compatriots' organizations and all the overseas compatriots that share will and mind for the prosperity and development of their socialist homeland.

Comrades,

This Congress will correctly review and analyze the work done during the period of the eighth term of the Party Central Committee, establish the lines and policies for developing our socialist construction onto a higher stage, and take organizational and institutional measures for readjusting and consolidating the Party's leadership ability.

Today, our Party is faced with heavy and urgent historic tasks of boosting economic construction and the people's standard of living and transforming all realms of state and social life as early as possible. This requires us to wage a more active and persistent struggle without allowing even a moment's standstill or stagnation.

In particular, the period of the new long-term plan is a crucial period when we should push forward full steam with the regional development policy in the new era, the rural revolution programme and other intermediate- and long-range plans we adopted and have launched to realize the centuries-old desire of the people.

In contrast, not a few serious shortcomings and negative elements, such as deep-rooted defeatism, irresponsibility, conservatism, formalism and immaturity in leadership ability, are latent at present in the work of the Party and government organs and officials, and this constitutes an artificial obstacle to the work of our Party and state which aspire to rapid development in all fields.

Therefore, we should not only take pride in the successes we achieved during the period under review but also review shortcomings from a critical and developmental point of view, work out the struggle plan for the next stage in an elaborate and scientific way and strengthen the leadership forces capable of leading the implementation of the plan.

Therefore, in preparing the Ninth Party Congress, the Party Central Committee focused on correctly drawing experience and lessons from the successes and shortcomings during the period under review and taking appropriate measures accordingly.

In order to make substantial preparations for the Party Congress, the Party Central Committee organized a non-permanent preparatory committee for the Congress, set up necessary panels and dispatched fact-finding groups according to directions and sectors to get them to gain a full understanding of the five-year work of the relevant sectors and units and to make a correct analysis of problems and their root cause.

And on the basis of their activities it assessed how the members of the eighth-term Party central leadership played their role and whether they correctly guided the development of their sectors and units.

Each field and each sector carried out the work of scientifically setting the goals and working out the plans for development to be achieved in the period of the new long-term plan and presenting them to the preparatory committee, and the departments of the Party Central Committee also presented innovative and detailed suggestions on the future plans and measures for carrying them out.

And there was an in-depth study of the issues arising in further enhancing the leadership functions of the Party in line with the requirements of the five-point Party-building line in the new era, including the issues related to the revision of Party Rules and the reorganization of the leadership forces of the Party.

In the run-up to the Party Congress, Party organizations at all levels reviewed the work of their leadership bodies by focusing on correctly drawing experience and lessons, and the election of delegates to the Party Congress and the nomination of observers were also completed.

Accordingly, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee carried out a rigorous final examination of the qualifications of the delegates to the Party Congress who had been elected at provincial Party conferences.

The result of the examination appraised that all the comrades elected as delegates are fully qualified as they are core elements of our Party who have so far achieved marked results in improving the work of their sectors and units and who are capable of playing a significant role in the struggle to implement the decisions of the Ninth Party Congress in the future.

Participating in this Congress are 5 000 delegates in total--224 members of the eighth-term Party central leadership and 4 776 delegates elected by all Party organizations.

Among them are 1 902 delegates of Party and political workers, 747 delegates of state administrative and economic officials, 474 delegates of service personnel, 32 delegates of officials of working people's organizations, 321 delegates of officials in the sectors of science, education, public health, sports, culture and art and the mass media, and 1 524 delegates of officials and hard-core Party members involved in field labour.

Of them 413 are women.

The Congress is also attended by 2 000 observers nominated by Party organizations at all levels, including officials from the departments of the Party Central Committee.

Dear delegates,

We are now at this significant venue with the high honour and heavy mission of being delegates to the Party Congress, entrusted by all the Party members in reflection of their organizational will.

So great are the concern and expectations of all the Party members and other people across the country for the Ninth Party Congress, which will mark another watershed in our Party's sacred struggle to realize the rights, interests and long-cherished desires of the people. And all of us have shouldered a heavy mission of making sincere, active and responsible efforts to ensure that the Congress does its work satisfactorily.

Solemnly pledging, on behalf of all the participants in this Congress, the ninth of its kind in the glorious history of the Workers' Party of Korea, that the Congress will be absolutely faithful to the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism,

And fully convinced that the Congress will be a significant, historic occasion vigorously guiding the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of Juche thanks to the high political consciousness and enthusiasm of all the delegates,

I declare the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea open. -0-

www.kcna.kp (2026.02.20.)

2. THE DIRE TOLL OF NORTH KOREAN HUMAN TRAFFICKING

​Summary:

Mohona Ganguly argues north Korea sustains its nuclear program with hard currency from illicit networks, and that human trafficking imposes the greatest human toll. She describes two main trafficking channels abroad: state-dispatched overseas labor and participation in trafficking tied to organized crime groups. she cites forced labor in camps inside north Korea and says 80,000 to 120,000 people are held. Overseas workers in multiple industries face surveillance, passport seizure, long hours, and wage confiscation, with the state reportedly withholding up to 90 percent and generating an estimated $200 to $500 million annually. She links possible DPRK involvement to casino-linked trafficking in Southeast Asian SEZs, and details seafood processing in China using north Korean labor that can reach U.S. supply chains. She recommends a two-pronged U.S. approach: diplomatic and investigative action against SEZ casino trafficking, and stronger trade enforcement and labor investigations to block imports made with forced labor.

Comment: We must never overlook the evil nature of the Kim family regime. Kim Jong Un cannot be given a pass on human rights or illicit activities that keep him in power and fund his nuclear weapons and military. This is why human rights are a moral imperative AND a national security issue. The regime turns bodies into budget. It is a revenue model dressed as patriotism. Supply chains are battlefields. If goods enter U.S. markets, the cash can loop back to weapons. Partnerships with criminals add deniability. Deniability is a shield and a weapon in the gray zone.

If trafficking revenue is tied to downstream processing and trade, where can the United States cut the cash flow with the least friction and the clearest proof?

If the system depends on Office 39 and dispatch organs, what pressure points disrupt selection, movement, and wage capture without endangering victims further?

If SEZ casinos function as lawless nodes for scams and trafficking, what combined diplomatic and investigative actions change host-state incentives from indifference to enforcement?

THE DIRE TOLL OF NORTH KOREAN HUMAN TRAFFICKING

2/19/2026

By Mohona Ganguly, Former HRNK Research Intern

Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO of HRNK

https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/february-19th-2026

Part I: Introduction

           The DPRK’s nuclear arsenal has long been considered to be not only its most salient means of attack against its rivals, but also a symbol of “national pride.” North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, regards the nuclear program to be of personal importance to him due to its potential to grant him space and prominence on the international stage and its supposed representation of economic prosperity and national security (Pak 2020, 228). As such, it is of paramount importance to the DPRK government that the nuclear program be properly funded. In order to secure this financial support, North Korea has actively developed and maintained a series of illicit networks to generate hard currency. Some prominent examples of these illicit activities are Cybercrime, with trained hackers and groups associated with the DPRK stealing millions of dollars in cryptocurrency from international agencies and companies (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 17), smuggling of drugs and counterfeit luxury goods (Patel 2025, Presentation 11, Slide 7), the government’s active collaboration with international Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Hong Kong-based Triad, the Russian Mafia, and the Irish Republican Army (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 2), and its sales of arms and missiles (Patel 2025, Presentation 5, Slide 8). However, the DPRK’s illicit activity that has arguably the direst consequences and human toll is its participation in human trafficking. This memo seeks to analyze the active North Korean human trafficking network through a systems-based approach, with special emphasis on its origins and current activities, and to provide a series of recommendations for the United States to actively take measures to prevent these crimes.

Part II. Overview of North Korean Human Trafficking

           The DPRK exploits its citizens and others abroad through its extensive human trafficking network. The regime engages in vast human trafficking maneuvers within North Korea’s borders, particularly through forcible imprisonment in labor camps, with an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people being held within these facilities (U.S. State Department 2024). However, the DPRK receives a portion of the hard currency it requires to fund its nuclear program through its human trafficking activities abroad. These illicit networks take two primary forms: sending North Korean citizens overseas to work (U.S. State Department 2024) or actively participating in trafficking rings headed by international OCGs or other entities (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10).

           The DPRK often sends its citizens abroad to work through bilateral arrangements with foreign governments or businesses (U.S. State Department 2024). These North Koreans work in a variety of industries overseas, such as in restaurants, factories, seafood processing plants, apparel, footwear manufacturing, shipbuilding, and textiles (U.S. State Department 2024).

The workers often migrate to countries with diplomatic relationships with North Korea, such as Russia, China, the UAE, and Malaysia (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This action is directly in violation of the sanctions placed against North Korean labor overseas in 2019, and furthermore, the workers face a hazardous journey to their destination countries, grueling work conditions, and constant surveillance at their workplaces (U.S. State Department 2024). The workers are also forced to give up their passports, effectively trapping them within their destination countries (U.S. State Department 2024).

Figure 1: Destination Countries for North Korean Overseas Workers

(North Korea in the World 2022)

Figure 2: North Korea’s Major Labor Export Industries

(Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 24)

       The laborers work 12 to 16 hours a day and face the fear of potential retaliation against them and their families back in North Korea should they complain (U.S. State Department 2024). These factors have led international organizations and experts to characterize this “work expatriation” process as a form of human trafficking, with some even deeming it, “state-sponsored slavery.” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 3). The DPRK uses these workers as a means of procuring hard currency through seizing their wages. Their salaries are often distributed directly into accounts held by the North Korean government, which legitimizes its retention of the wages by claiming that they are, “voluntary contributions,” by the workers to promote the country’s common good (U.S. State Department 2024). Ultimately, the workers receive only a fraction of their salaries, with the DPRK withholding up to 90 percent of their earnings (U.S. State Department 2024). This in turn generates millions of dollars in hard currency for the regime (U.S. State Department 2024). The exact amount of revenue generated through North Korean labor trafficking alone is estimated to be between $200 and $500 million dollars, which could account for a significant portion of the costs needed to maintain the DPRK’s nuclear program, which itself, the South Korean government projects, costs $1 billion dollars (CBS News 2017). Therefore, the DPRK’s labor trafficking does not only exact an immense human cost but also provides a sizable amount of the illicit funding they need to manage their nuclear program.

           The DPRK does not restrict its participation in international human trafficking to its citizens, however. Its partnerships with OCGs have also enabled them to participate in criminal activities internationally, including illicit human trafficking operations (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 10). One of the most prominent of these illicit connections is North Korea’s involvement in the Asian casino and gaming sector. The DPRK has strong ties with the 14k Triad, a factionalized organized crime group with illicit networks all throughout Asia (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Some members of the 14k triad have been actively involved in the gaming and casino sector, particularly to gain and eventually launder illicit revenue, and the DPRK is highly suspected to be a part of these schemes as an additional means of sanctions evasion because of their demonstrated close collaborations with the group (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). In 202c it was discovered that Alvin Chau, the CEO of the Macau junket operator Suncity Group, was allegedly closely involved with Broken Tooth, an influential gangster and the leader of the 14k triad faction of Macau (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Chau reportedly has strong ties to oil smuggling operations associated with the DPRK and has received an estimated $15 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank hack (which federal investigators at the time linked in part to North Korean hackers), which was deposited in the Suncity junket account (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Furthermore, Broken Tooth (whose real name is Wan Kuok-Kai), became an investor in Southeast Asian casinos in 2012 (after completing a 14-year prison sentence) and claimed in 2018 that he made hundreds of millions in cryptocurrency through his casino ventures (Patel 2025, Presentation 5.5, Slide 8). These revenues have been attained through online and “above ground” casinos, primarily through illicit means like gambling, cryptocurrency investments, and, most notably, through human trafficking (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). The above ground, “brick-and-mortar” casinos have long served as hubs for transnational human trafficking, and the 14k triad as an organization have been notable perpetrators of trafficking through these means (Owen and Seshadri 2024, 8). Therefore, North Korea’s intimate involvement with Chau, Broken Tooth, and the 14k triad as a whole, signals that they are involved in human trafficking operations taking place in these casinos as a means to earn hard currency through these transactions to fund their nuclear program.

Part III: Case Study 1 - Cambodia and Myanmar Human Trafficking

           One of the most prominent instances of human trafficking within a 14k triad casino enterprise with a potential illicit connection to North Korea is the exposure of the extensive trafficking rings operating in “special economic zones” throughout Southeast Asia. These SEZs are industrial parks with relaxed regulations that serve as one-stop tax offices to emulate foreign investment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). However, they also eventually become borderline lawless areas, controlled solely on the whims of private security firms, with the local authorities not having the capacity or the desire to attempt to maintain control over them (Kennedy and Southern 2022). After the Covid-19 pandemic saw a sharp decrease in casino revenue because of travel restrictions halting visits from foreign tourists, those casinos located in SEZs or border towns in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, among other Southeast Asian countries, became a hotbed for online scam proliferation, and with it, human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Many victims, who are mostly young women from Thailand, are lured to these SEZs through online connections promising them decent jobs at the casinos (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Rescuers and survivors of these compounds have described the victims trafficked into these zones as being beaten, starved, deprived of water, electrocuted, and outright sold to other companies if they fail to perform their duties to their customers (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Enslaved workers are often bought and sold through transactions between companies on a human trafficking Telegram channel known as White Shark (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Videos of workers being handcuffed, tortured, and even tasered in their rooms by their captors are common (Kennedy and Southern 2022). There have also been numerous reported instances of workers having committed suicide due to their treatment (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The local governments have been indifferent to these crimes occurring on their borders and as such have not taken significant action to combat this crisis (Kennedy and Southern 2022). The “slaves-for-scams” crisis has become so dire in Cambodia that the United States made the decision to downgrade the nation to a Tier 3, or the lowest possible level, in its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Myanmar has also seen a rise in city-like SEZs surrounding Chinese-owned casino enterprises, which were already linked to human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Ekapop Lueangprasert, a local Thai official who has helped to rescue over 140 victims, aided a victim in her escape from a Myaweddy casino by swimming across the Moei River to Thailand, and to safety (Kennedy and Southern 2022).

           There are numerous perpetrators involved in these illicit schemes, including Zhao Wei, the Chinese businessman who owns the Kings Roman company, and Huang Mingxuan, a Hong Kong resident (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Zhao has invested over a billion dollars into the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, a self-governed casino and adjacent enclave on the Medong River that has become a hotspot for human trafficking (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Another very influential figure in the online scam and casino human trafficking ring is Broken Tooth, Wan Kuok-Koi, himself (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan has utilized his organization, the World Hongman Association, as a means of investing in these casinos and SEZs, and has framed these ventures as a means of promoting his patriotism, or Chinese national pride (Kennedy and Southern 2022). Wan’s connections with the DPRK and his status as a “founding” figure of these SEZs and human trafficking enterprises calls into question North Korea’s own involvement in these illicit activities. Their longstanding relationship with the 14k triad and their willingness to perform illicit activities and strengthen these networks to fund and bolster their nuclear arsenal increases the likelihood of their involvement in this scheme (Owen and Seshadri, 8). Therefore, specifically targeting human trafficking rings such as these can potentially stall, or halt altogether, any monetary benefits the DPRK may be receiving from these operations.

Part IV: Case Study 2 - North Korean Labor in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants

           A significant instance of the DPRK trafficking its own citizens abroad for the purpose of working to generate hard currency for their nuclear program is their longstanding partnership with China’s seafood processing industry. Approximately 3,000 North Korean workers were employed at seafood processing plants in the northeastern city of Hunchun in China before the Covid-19 pandemic (Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim 2021). Working conditions for these laborers are grim, as the North Koreans are subjected to unpaid overtime, routine health and safety standard violations, and cramped and squalid living quarters (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). North Korean workers also face discrimination and isolation from their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5). They are reportedly forced to wear blue headbands to distinguish themselves from the Chinese workers, and are forced to finish their three-year contracts with no sick days or without filing any complaints (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). On the other hand, Chinese workers are granted job protections and are allowed to take time off (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Furthermore, the North Koreans working in these plants are paid significantly less than their Chinese co-workers, with them receiving approximately $300, while the Chinese workers earned $540 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). These conditions have led to international human rights organizations, and survivors themselves, characterizing the workers’ conditions in these plants as meeting the necessary criteria for human trafficking, as “they are paid a pittance, constantly surveilled, and are unable to leave” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 8).

       The North Korean workers are considered to be more “valuable” in the eyes of their Chinese employers, with Li Shasha, a manager at a Chinese processing plant called Yanbian Shenghai Industry and Trade Co., claiming that North Korean employees are “more stable and unlikely to leave” compared to their Chinese counterparts (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). This reliance on the North Korean workers has led to an increase in demand for them, which in turn has propelled the DPRK to increase the “supply” of workers to China (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7). However, in August of 2023, China repatriated North Korean workers en masse, leading to a stalling in the trafficking of workers (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14). However, there appears to be no plans on either country’s end to permanently halt this arrangement, as the DPRK has indicated that it intends to send entirely new teams to China to replace them (Scarlatoiu 2023, 14).

       The DPRK is eager to continue this program by such means because they receive significant revenues from the workers within these processing plants. Of the $300 they earn, the workers only receive $70, as the rest is taken by the North Korean government as a form of, “patriotic contributions” (Scarlatoiu 2023, 6). Additionally, no wages are handed directly to the employees; rather, they are marked directly in the company’s account books as a payment (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). The Chinese companies then pay the DPRK authorities directly, in hard Chinese currency (Scarlatoiu 2023, 12). These wage contributions are highly suspected to be appropriated by the government as yet another means of funding their nuclear program. As such, the government is able to benefit from their citizens’ labor, while said workers are forced into squalid working conditions with no means of escape. These decisions also affect supply chains throughout the world, as American chains, restaurants, and grocery stores, such as ALDI, have been found to have been carrying seafood products that were processed by North Korean workers, which leads to even more profits for the DPRK (Scarlatoiu 2023, 7).

Part VI - Systems Analysis and DPRK Government Agencies Involved in Human Trafficking

           Using the systems model, the DPRK government’s use of human trafficking performs the function of generating funds for the nuclear program, and also moving “goods” (in this case, labor and victims themselves) to achieve this goal. By potentially aiding the 14k triad and other OCGs in their casino human trafficking ventures, they receive some of the revenue gained and are therefore able to bolster their nuclear arsenal. By trafficking their own citizens in the overseas labor market, they create a “supply” for labor and also movement to evade the sanctions. They are also able to generate funds through this labor trafficking, as they appropriate most of their citizens’ wages and also profit off of the overseas trade of the goods North Korean workers produce.

           Numerous government agencies are involved in both main aspects of North Korean human trafficking. The most prominent of these agencies is Office 39, which handles most of the financial aspects of North Korea’s illicit networks (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). Some of their activities include managing and facilitating the DPRK’s hard currency earnings, smuggling goods, and counterfeiting (Patel 2025, Presentation 4, Slide 13). As such, Office 39 would be actively involved in any of North Korea’s casino ventures with the Triad and other OCGs. Office 39 also handles a very distinct responsibility in regard to labor trafficking out of North Korea (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 9). Office 39 assigns North Korean workers to industries overseas, with some of their own departments, such as the External Construction General Bureau and the Bong-Hwa General Bureau, assigning each worker to a different industry (in this case, Construction and Logging and Garment work, respectively) (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 9).

Figure 3 - Departments Within Office 39 and Respective Industries

(Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 39)

      Other government agencies are also actively involved in recruiting and screening North Koreans to work abroad. These include, but are not limited to, the Central Party’s Overseas Dispatch Department and the Provincial Party’s 2nd Department (Overseas Dispatch Department) (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The departments who have the ultimate decision in who goes abroad are officials from the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), particularly those from the Organization and Guidance Department (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). The Ministry of Social Security is additionally responsible for security screenings and clearances (Scarlatoiu 2023, 10). For the actual journey, the Foreign Ministry issues passports, while other departments train workers for overseas jobs (such as the Hotel Management Department and the Mansudae Art Studio) (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 22). Overall, numerous government agencies are involved in the process of selecting, assigning, and dispatching workers, and also managing the revenues they generate overseas.

Figure 4: North Korea’s Chain of Command for Dispatching and Assigning Overseas Workers

(Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 22)

Part VII: Treatment of North Korean Scientists Assigned to the Nuclear Program

           The importance of the nuclear program, and thus the illicit activities that are utilized to finance it, is highlighted by the DPRK’s treatment of the nuclear scientists who spearhead these programs. In North Korea, training of these scientists is considered paramount to the success of not only the program, but the country itself. For example, recruitment for these positions begins extremely early, with young students being selected based on their aptitude for the sciences starting in elementary school (Collins 2024, 17). These students are engaged in a rigorous training regimen and pursue further education and research opportunities at universities such as the Mathematics Research Institute of the National Academy of Sciences, Kim Il-sung University, KCUT, the University of Science, Kim Hyong-jik University of Education, the Railroad College, and the College of Machinery (Collins 2024, 18). Many of these students are sent abroad to continue their studies, with notable host institutions including the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna, near Moscow, and the Harbin Institute of Technology, one of China’s premier engineering schools (Collins 2024, 19). After they finish their studies, the nuclear scientists are assigned to different locations and facilities throughout North Korea, with the vast majority being assigned to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (Collins 2024, 22)

           Under the rule of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, these scientists were forced to live under squalid conditions, being forced to live a life of relative poverty (Collins 2024, 36). According to one source, 80% of these nuclear scientists had to find work outside of their research in order to support their families (Collins 2024, 36). However, under Kim Jong-un, these workers are afforded substantially more respect, and patience in regard to their scientific processes, marked by trial-and-error (Collin 2024, 36). This demonstrates not only the importance of the nuclear program to Kim but also illuminates the stark contrast between the two groups of laborers whose work supports the nuclear program. While the scientists construct and design the nuclear arsenal and are granted respect for their efforts, the workers whose wages provide financial support for the program continue to suffer abuses and be sent abroad, with no acknowledgement.

Part VIII: Recommendations and Overall Strategy

           Due to the multifaceted and complex nature of North Korea’s human trafficking operations, I would suggest that the U.S. Government adopt a “two-pronged” approach towards preventing further operations. This plan would involve addressing both main types of human trafficking (the DPRK working with foreign OCGs and participating in labor trafficking of its own citizens) separately. This will allow for each type to be adequately handled, while also helping to stop any further trafficking and also stemming the flow of cash towards North Korea’s nuclear program from these operations.

Addressing North Korea’s Operations with OCGs

           The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN should first take diplomatic action to prevent human trafficking occurring at casinos in SEZs. These agencies should encourage the countries being affected by these operations, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, to end their indifferent posture and take concrete legislative measures to curb these illicit activities, possibly in conjunction with each other should there be any issues with jurisdiction over the SEZs. Some of these measures could include establishing clear standards for payment types and transparency in casinos, requiring additional licensing for accepting cryptocurrency, getting rid of private security companies, vetting employees and guests, and making identification mandatory for checking in. The State Department could emphasize this as a major priority in its diplomatic dealings with the countries involved, and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN could also suggest a Security Council or Arria-Formula meeting to discuss the matter. Further, U.S. and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies could launch formal investigations into cryptocurrency usage at these casinos as well as attempting to track victims of other human trafficking schemes from those casinos which have already been discovered. Other international human trafficking prevention non-profits or NGOs, such as Polaris, may also be involved to help search, identify, and care for victims. By setting these measures in place and also launching these investigations, one can potentially rescue any victims within these casino rings and also prevent North Korea from receiving any cryptocurrency payments for these transactions to fund their nuclear programs.

Addressing Labor Trafficking Outside North Korea

           The U.S. State Department and Permanent Mission to the UN should take measures to apply diplomatic pressure on those countries that have aided or facilitated North Korean overseas labor trafficking. Firstly, they should formally request China, Russia, the UAE, and other countries involved in this trafficking to demonstrate that they have taken measures to prevent any further reliance on North Korean labor, and they should also be tasked with proving that they are no longer employing any North Korean workers.

           The Food and Drug administration (FDA), U.S. Department Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Department of Commerce should also take steps to determine whether imports have been processed or made with North Korean labor. One way to begin this process would be to identify companies from nations that have used North Korean labor in the past. For example, imports from Chinese companies that have used seafood processed by North Korean workers and which have imported products to the United States before, such as Hunchun Pagoda Industry Co. Ltd. and Yantai Dachen Hunchun Seafood Products (Scarlatoiu 2023, 5) should be thoroughly inspected. If they are determined to have used North Korean labor, they should be denied entry in accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930 (Scarlatoiu 2023, 15).

           The United States should also encourage the International Labor Organization (ILO) to conduct an investigation into processing plants and companies that have used North Korean labor. This is because many countries that have been proven to have utilized North Korean labor, such as China and Russia, have ratified several of the ILO’s Core Conventions (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 5). Using North Korean labor has violated numerous of these conventions, such as the Forced Labor Convention of 1930 and the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize Convention of 1948 (Scarlatoiu et. al 2022, 10). As these workers are surveilled, live in fear for their lives and their families’ safety if they do not comply, and have their passports confiscated, they are subjected to forced labor and have had the right to freely associate stripped from them. As such, these nations have violated the conventions, and the ILO should investigate.

           By taking these actions, the United States can prevent any profits from goods made with North Korean forced labor from reaching the DPRK and potentially funding its nuclear program. They can also move towards bringing the labor trafficking out of North Korea to a halt, saving these workers from dire working conditions and further curtailing the DPRK’s cash flow.

VIII. Concluding Remarks

           Along with its many other extensive illicit networks, North Korea has relied heavily on human trafficking as a means of funding its nuclear arsenal. By actively participating with OCGs in their human trafficking ventures, and encouraging labor trafficking of its own citizens abroad, North Korea has continued to receive the funds they need through the suffering of others. By adopting these measures, we will not only have come closer to achieving our objective of weakening North Korea’s illicit networks and their nuclear program through cutting off their valuable sources of hard currency, but we will have spared victims of their crimes from further pain and humiliation, and there is no price that can equate to that.

Mohona Ganguly is a former HRNK Research Intern. She is a graduate of Cornell University, having majored in Industrial and Labor Relations, and received her Master of Public Administration (MPA) from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. She currently serves as Policy Chair for the South Asian Legal Defense Fund. She is driven by her commitment towards advancing human rights and labor justice. Her academic and professional interests focus on labor rights and international law, especially how they interact with issues related to North Korea and Asia as a whole.

References

1) Collins, Robert. “Slaves to the Bomb - The Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists.” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024.

2) “How U.S. Seafood Fans May Help Fund North Korea.” CBS News, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-us-seafood-fans-may-unwittingly-help-fund-north-korea/.

3) Kennedy, Lindsey, and Nathan Paul Southern. “Inside Southeast Asia’s Casino Scam Archipelago.” – The Diplomat, August 2, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/inside-southeast-asias-casino-scam-archipelago/.

4) “North Korean Overseas Workers.” North Korea in the World, June 11, 2021. https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/economic/north-korean-overseas-workers.

5) Owen, Allison, and Chandana Seshadri. “North Korean Activity in the Casino and Gaming Sector.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 2024. https://static.rusi.org/north-korean-activity-in-casino-gaming-industry_0.pdf.

6) Pak, Jung H. Becoming Kim Jong Un: A former CIA officer’s insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Leader. S.l.: Random House, 2020.

7) Patel, Kris, “4. DPRK Govt Basics” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, January 28, 2025)

8) Patel, Kris, “5. Basics of DPRK illicit activities” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, February 3rd , 2025)

9) Patel, Kris, “5.5 Basics of DPRK illicit activities” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, February 4th , 2025)

10) Patel, Kris, “11. Other Illicit Activities - Not Cybercrime” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, March 5th, 2025)

11) Sullivan,Tim, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade- 8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.

12) Scarlatoiu, Greg. “How Forced Labor in China Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain.” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, October 24, 2023. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/documents/Greg Scarlatiou - CECC testimony - revised as of 10.26.pdf.

13) Scarlatoiu, Greg, Raymond Ha, and Hyunseung Lee. “North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia.” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2022. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.

14)“2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea.” U.S. Department of State, 2024. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/.

3. China applauds North Korea on party conclave in ‘new historical period’ of ties

​Summary:

China’s Communist Party Central Committee sent a formal message congratulating the Workers’ Party of Korea on its ninth congress, saying bilateral ties have entered a “new historical period” and praising claimed economic gains and improved livelihoods under Kim Jong Un. Beijing signaled it will deepen party-to-party exchanges and frame cooperation as supporting regional peace and stability in the Asia-Indo-Pacific. The report also notes Russia’s parallel outreach, with United Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev lauding “strategic partnership” and shared resistance to “external pressure.” Kim told delegates the party faces urgent tasks to advance economic development and living standards.

Comment: Beijing is using party diplomacy to normalize and legitimize north Korea’s strategic trajectory while avoiding explicit endorsement of its weapons programs.  The “new historical period” line reads as signaling alignment management: reassurance to Pyongyang, warning to Washington, and room for Beijing to calibrate pressure later. The China-Russia parallel messaging suggests a tightening political front, with narrative emphasis on stability and anti-coercion rather than reform. Add in Iran and we have the "CRInK" at full strength.

What concrete concessions, if any, will China demand from north Korea in return for rhetorical cover and economic linkage?

China applauds North Korea on party conclave in ‘new historical period’ of ties

Message from Communist Party of China’s Central Committee lauds Workers’ Party for helping to develop North Korean economy, improving lives

Dewey Simin Beijing

Published: 4:00pm, 20 Feb 2026Updated: 7:27pm, 20 Feb 2026

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3344118/china-applauds-north-korea-party-conclave-new-historical-period-ties-xinhua?utm

Dewey Simin Beijing

Published: 4:00pm, 20 Feb 2026Updated: 7:27pm, 20 Feb 2026

China has joined Russia in congratulating North Korea on the conclave of its ruling party, hailing economic achievements under the leadership of Kim Jong-un and pledging to work with Pyongyang to promote regional peace.

According to state news agency Xinhua, the Central Committee of China’s Communist Party sent a congratulatory message to Pyongyang on Thursday, asserting that the ruling Workers’ Party had in recent years helped to develop the North Korean economy and improve the lives of its people.

The Workers’ Party’s ninth congress – and the first such meeting in five years – was of “great significance”, the committee said in its note, and wished the North Korean people “continued success in their socialist construction under the strong leadership” of the party and its leader, Kim.

“In recent years, under the strategic guidance of the top leaders of the two parties and countries, China-North Korea relations have entered a new historical period,” ran the message from the Central Committee, China’s highest political-executive organ.

It added that China had always attached strong importance to developing relations with North Korea and was willing to deepen exchanges and contribute to regional peace, stability, development and prosperity.

Xi says China stands firm on strategic ties with North Korea

The Workers’ Party opened its rare congress – held only every five years – on Thursday, where Pyongyang will outline major policy goals in areas ranging from defence to diplomacy and economy. The meeting is expected to run for several days.

According to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim said: “Ahead of our party are heavy and urgent tasks of advancing economic development and improving people’s livelihoods, and transforming all aspects of social life in the country as quickly as possible.”

Dmitry Medvedev, chairman of the ruling United Russia party, also sent a congratulatory letter, according to KCNA. The letter stated that the traditional friendship and strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea had helped them to defy “external pressure” and ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Medvedev stressed the role of the ruling parties of the two countries in advancing relations, adding that he expected to “further advance trustworthy discussions between the two parties on a wide scale, including matters of mutual interest”, the KCNA report said.

North Korea has in recent years sought to bolster ties with China and Russia, two of its closest partners, amid mounting pressures from the West, particularly over its nuclear and missile programmes.

The top leaders of the three countries met in Beijing in September for China’s Victory Day military parade.

It was the first time they had appeared together in person, in what analysts saw as a strong signal of unity against the US-led West.

Xi Jinping greets WWII veterans with Putin and Kim

In talks with Kim the day after the parade, Chinese President Xi Jinping described their two countries as “good neighbours, good friends and good comrades who have shared weal and woe and helped each other in time of need”.

Xi also said Beijing attached great importance to the traditional friendship between China and North Korea and that “no matter how the international landscape may evolve, this position will stay unchanged”.

Dewey Sim

Dewey Sim is a reporter for the China desk covering Beijing's foreign policy. He was previously writing about Singapore and Southeast Asia for the Post's Asia desk. A Singapore native, Dewey joined the Post in 2019 and is a graduate of the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and

4. S. Korea’s Yoon Prolongs Cycle of Convicted Presidents

​Summary:

A Seoul court sentenced former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to life imprisonment for sedition tied to his December 3, 2024 martial law bid, widening rather than closing the country’s political rupture. Yoon apologized for public hardship but said the verdict was predetermined “political retaliation” and urged supporters to unite, while his lawyers criticized the ruling and weighed an appeal. The governing Democrats press the case as proof of democratic self-defense, while conservatives splinter between boycott agitation and institutional acceptance. With local elections approaching and economic headwinds rising, the crisis risks becoming durable rather than episodic.

Comment: POTROK could now score the greatest "political coup" to unify the ROK. All he would need to do is pardon the former President or at least commute the sentence (if that is within the ROK legal system). That would undercut the opposition and leave whtm without a martyr. But I do not think that is in the cards.

The sentence becomes a mobilizing symbol for both camps, so street politics likely intensify.

Civil-military trust will take a direct hit because senior uniformed leaders are implicated alongside the former president.

Some questions for the ROK (And others could benefit from considering):

What standard should define “sedition” when an elected leader claims constitutional necessity?

Does punishing a coup attempt deter future adventurism, or normalize winner-take-all judicial warfare?

How does Seoul protect military professionalism while prosecuting senior officers without politicizing the force?

S. Korea’s Yoon Prolongs Cycle of Convicted Presidents

Conviction uncertain to end political crisis

Feb 20, 2026

By: Shim Jae Hoon

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/south-korea-yoon-cycle-convicted-presidents?utm

Yoon in court. Photo from Korea Times

The Seoul court’s sentencing of former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on February 19 to life imprisonment on sedition charges is sending shockwaves across the country, prompting concern over the likelihood of worsening political unrest.

If the court’s verdict ends one phase of legal combat, its political impact presents another facet of a running political crisis. It appears to have intensified rather than resolved political divisions, with the ruling Democratic Party, which took power last June in the wake of Yoon’s impeachment, seeking to squeeze every drop of political benefit from the current campaign, condemning Yoon’s quixotic declaration of martial law on the night of December 3, 2024.

Yoon apologized today [February 20] for his short-lived declaration of martial law, saying, however, that while he was sorry for the “frustration and hardship” brought upon the people by his martial law decree, he stood behind the “sincerity and purpose” behind his actions. The life sentence, he said according to Reuters, was “predetermined” and political retaliation.

“Forces that seek to smear a decision made to save the nation as an ‘insurrection’ and to use it beyond political attacks as an opportunity to purge and eliminate their opponents will only grow more rampant going forward,” he said. He also questioned whether an appeal would have meaning in what he described as an environment where judicial independence could not be guaranteed, while telling supporters to “unite and rise.”

The verdict “looks to be an excessive [sentencing] for a matter dealing with politics,” said one business figure in Seoul, asking that he not be quoted by name for fear of government reaction. But his cautious comment itself testifies to the tension still simmering at the end of a protracted crisis triggered by Yoon’s arbitrary declaration, which lasted for just six hours. First Lady Kim Keon Hee, Yoon’s wife, has also been jailed for accepting valuable gifts, such as Chanel handbags and diamond necklaces from the controversial Unification Church, making the couple the first to be simultaneously under detention.

Steady parade of convictions

All three recent South Korean presidents have been jailed, most recently Park Geun-hye, who was impeached and sentenced to more than 20 years for bribery and coercion, although she was later pardoned. Before that, her immediate predecessor Lee Myung-bak was sentenced to 15 years in 2018 for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power. While that record is viewed by some as a testament to the country’s strong rule of law and the independence of its judiciary, others describe it as a cycle of toxic legacy of political polarization and political revenge.

At earlier court hearings, an independent counsel nominated by the national assembly demanded a death sentence, insisting that Yoon’s martial law declaration amounted to an act of “sedition” and “insurrection” aimed at subverting the country’s constitutional process.

Yoon, however, has defended his action on the grounds that the Democratic Party, then leading the opposition, was using its numerical strength on the floor of parliament to block his political agenda. He has justified his action on the need to break constitutional immobility with the opposition blocking his political agenda, including the passage of the state budget.

Protesters celebrate the conviction. AFP Photo

Under South Korea’s legal procedure, Yoon can expect to have two more hearings in the process to defend his case, prompting speculation that his life term may face changes. But the center-left Democratic Party is headed by Jung Chung Rae, a hardliner who remains unmoved, continuously campaigning for Yoon’s execution. “If you don’t deal severely with cases involving sedition and insurrection now, it can open the door for more such seditions in the future,” he has declared.

Conservatives badly split

The court’s conviction has left Yoon’s conservative People Power Party badly split, with one faction calling for a nationwide campaign to boycott the verdict. This internal split is expected to worsen in the months ahead, with the country scheduling new local government elections in June. Today, South Korea remains acutely divided regionally over how to deal with Yoon’s conviction, with the conservative southeastern region supportive of Yoon and southwestern provinces of Cholla region sympathetic to the Democrats’ center-left progressive line. While Yoon’s group is calling for street demonstrations against the government of President Lee Jae Myung, the Democrats are demanding stronger punishment.

People Power, now in opposition, is itself torn between hardliners demanding continuing rounds of street demonstrations calling for a boycott of the verdict, while another group is calling for clear, unambiguous acceptance of the sentence, conceding that his action amounted to a serious challenge against the country’s democratic institutions, achieved at the cost of many demonstrations for ending control by a succession of military regimes.

But the party’s “realist” group, headed by incumbent Seoul mayor Oh Se Hoon, is urging that the party unambiguously accept the court’s verdict, saying South Korea should move ahead to a mature democracy, rejecting Yoon’s “regressive” adventurism. Such moderate views reflect the results of the majority of South Koreans hoping to maintain Korea’s hard-won democratic process through years of pro-democracy movements against the army-led military regimes.

New polls in June

Further complicating the situation is the timetable for the next local government elections, scheduled in four months. The Lee government is facing tricky political challenges with the economy slowing and trade prospects darkening. For the first time in many years, the economy grew at an exceptionally low pace of less than one percentage point last year.

At the same time, South Korea’s main economic engine of exports faces exceptional challenges from a huge US tariff regime, with the rate raised on imports to the US from 15 percent to 25 percent. With the Lee administration under obligation to invest at least US$20 billion each year in the US for the next 10 years, in exchange for a lower 15 percent levy, the Korean won is showing signs of weakening, despite stock market outperformance.

The prospect of a looming economic crisis presents a narrow choice for the ruling Democrats. Additional court hearings on Yoon’s case are expected to be impacted by the economic situation as well as by political divisions.

In addition to Yoon, the court has also convicted a number of senior military leaders headed by former Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun, who received a 30-year prison sentence, and Major General Noh Sang Won, a top military intelligence commander, to an 18-year prison term on charges of collaborating with Yoon. On top of these military leaders now criminally implicated, former Prime Minister Han Duck Soo also stands accused of assisting in Yoon’s abortive coup.

While the conviction of military leaders in uniform has worried the country’s large military establishment, Han’s possible conviction for suspicion of endorsing the coup may impact the country’s huge technocratic community, which plays an integral role in running the economy.

Several national police leaders are also on trial for failing to have Yoon delivered for questioning. With so many power holders facing possible convictions, the ongoing legal process is expected to have a strong political impact for years to come.

Shim Jae Hoon is a former Seoul correspondent for the now-defunct Far Eastern Economic Review and a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel

5. Parliamentary subcommittee approves bill preventing presidential pardons for insurrection

Comment: So short sighted. So vindictive. This just solidifies or hardens the political divisions in Korea. And the General Assembly should not limit the President's pardon powers. 

Parliamentary subcommittee approves bill preventing presidential pardons for insurrection | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220010400320?section=national/politics

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- A parliamentary subcommittee led by the ruling party on Friday approved a bill aimed at preventing presidential pardons for individuals convicted of insurrection.

The subcommittee of the National Assembly's legislation and judiciary committee passed an amendment to the Pardon Act that would prohibit or restrict pardons for those found guilty of insurrection or offenses against the state.

The amendment was approved under the leadership of the Democratic Party after lawmakers from the main opposition People Power Party walked out in protest.

Under the proposed revision, an exception would allow a pardon if three-fifths of the members of the National Assembly give their consent.

The approval came a day after former President Yoon Suk Yeol was handed life in prison for leading an insurrection over his short-lived imposition of martial law in late 2024.

A subcommittee of the parliamentary legislation and judiciary committee holds a meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul on Feb. 20, 2026. (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · February 20, 2026

6. N. Korea preparing for military parade involving 12,000 personnel: lawmaker

​Comment: No matter what anyone might think about north Korea and the Kim family regime, I still sympathize with these soldiers. No one knows the cold and the hardship of parading like soldiers in the nKPA. At least when American soldiers marched in DC last June they had a good time doing so. There are no good times for the soldiers in north Korean parades. 

N. Korea preparing for military parade involving 12,000 personnel: lawmaker | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220006800315?section=nk/nk

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has been preparing for a large-scale military parade involving some 12,000 personnel to mark a key party congress, an opposition lawmaker said Friday, citing satellite imagery.

The satellite imagery compiled by Vantor Inc. from Feb. 9-17 and analyzed by the Korea Defense Security Forum showed some 12,000 people gathered at the Mirim air field in Pyongyang, according to Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the main opposition People Power Party.

The imagery did not yet show movements of large weapons systems usually showcased during the North's military parades, with the defense institute projecting the North to start bringing armored weapons and missile launchers to the site in phases.

The imagery also showed preparations for large-scale mass games involving card sections taking part at Kim Il Sung Square in the capital.

"The military parade for the ninth party congress is expected to involve mass weapons and personnel, surpassing the scale of the previous political event," Yu said. "It will be a stage to flaunt the North's deepening ties with Russia, attended by senior officials."

North Korea kicked off the ninth party congress Thursday, the first since 2021, in a key party event that will set forth the country's major policy on diplomacy, defense, the economy and other areas.

In 2021, the North held a large-scale military parade marking the eighth party congress involving some 15,000 personnel and 172 pieces of equipment.

This satellite imagery, provided by Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the main opposition People Power Party on Feb. 20, 2026, shows satellite imagery showing preparations for a military parade under way in Pyongyang. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 20, 2026

7. N. Korea's party congress closely watched for message to U.S., new weapons

​Comment: Yes enquiring minds want to know what Kim Jong Un wants us to see.

But we should also be concerned with what he does not want us to see.

All warfare is based on deception.

(News Focus) N. Korea's party congress closely watched for message to U.S., new weapons | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220004400315?section=nk/nk

By Park Boram

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea will set the tone for its major state policies for the next five years at the ongoing party congress, with its response to Washington's dialogue overture and a plan to develop new weapons likely on the agenda, experts said Friday.

Also attracting attention is whether North Korea will formalize the status of its leader Kim Jong-un's teenage daughter, Ju-ae, as an heir amid the South Korean spy agency's evaluation that she may be positioned to succeed Kim as state leader.

The ruling Workers' Party of Korea kicked off its congress in Pyongyang the previous day, the highest decision-making body in North Korea, which is held every five years to set major policy goals under leader Kim.

Typically running several days, the congress evaluates the results of the previous congress' policy goals, puts forth new ones for the next five years on the economy, defense and diplomacy and makes major personnel decisions.

The key focus of this year's session is the regime's foreign policy, which may shape Pyongyang's response to overtures from U.S. President Donald Trump and President Lee Jae Myung to resume dialogue.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at the opening of a congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on Feb. 19, 2026, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Experts said Pyongyang may shy away from an outright rejection or acceptance of Washington's overture but would still leave the door open for potential talks ahead of Trump's summit talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April.

In his second term, Trump has repeatedly expressed a desire to meet with Kim again, but his latest call for a meeting with the North Korean leader went unanswered during his visit to South Korea in late October on the occasion of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings.

In a parliamentary speech in September last year, Kim said he has no reason to avoid meeting the United States but made giving up the U.S. goal of denuclearizing Pyongyang a prerequisite for talks.

"Rather than directly addressing the U.S., (the North) may try to use a more comprehensive term, such as hostile forces or foes" in an effort to leave room, said Yang Moo-jin, a senior professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.

Meanwhile, the North is widely expected to further escalate its hostilities toward South Korea, possibly codifying its declaration of "hostile" relations with Seoul into the party charter and issuing messages reaffirming its animosity.

In 2023, Kim declared the two Koreas as "hostile to each other" and has since directed the country's hostile policies toward Seoul, even as the Lee administration seeks to resume dialogue to ease military tensions and build trust.

Another major point of attention is North Korea's plans for new weapons development.

Kim said last month the ninth congress "will clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering up the country's nuclear deterrent."

After announcing a five-year defense enforcement plan at the 2021 congress, which included developing a nuclear-powered submarine, the ninth session could assert North Korea's status as a "nuclear-armed state" and outline plans for more advanced weapons.

This file image captured from the Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 28, 2026, shows a test of an upgraded multiple rocket launcher attended by leader Kim Jong-un and conducted the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea is reportedly preparing a military parade marking the latest party congress, which could showcase new additions to the country's defense arsenal.

Also on the radar is whether the congress will feature Kim's widely publicized daughter, Ju-ae, as his successor, reaffirming the Kim family's fourth-generation hereditary power succession.

Ju-ae emerged at the forefront last year, accompanying Kim at major events, including his trip to China in September and a visit to the family mausoleum on New Year's Day this year. North Korea has, however, not confirmed the daughter's name or her official status so far.

Some analysts project that she may receive an official title at the congress, while others argue she is still too young to assume a formal post.

As in the eighth party congress, this year's meeting is also highly likely to focus on economic development and the people's livelihoods as a means of appease the public that has been gripped for decades by international sanctions and economic difficulties.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) and his daughter, Ju-ae, watch a New Year's performance in Pyongyang in this Korean Central News Agency file photo on Jan. 1, 2026. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 20, 2026

8. China, Russia send congratulations to N. Korea over party congress opening

​Comment: the CRInK is alive (at least 75%)

China, Russia send congratulations to N. Korea over party congress opening | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220002400315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- China and Russia, traditionally aligned with North Korea, have sent congratulatory letters to the North in recognition of its opening of the first congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in five years, state media reported Friday.

Dmitry Medvedev, chief of the ruling United Russia party, sent a letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Wednesday, which was followed the next day by a letter from the central committee of China's Communist Party, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

North Korea kicked off a party congress Thursday, the highest decision-making organ in the country and the first since 2021, to set major policy goals on the economy, defense and other key areas.

In his letter, Medvedev, a close confidant of Russian President Vladimir Putin, said the two countries' traditional friendship and strategic partnership help them defy "external pressure" and ensure "peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region," according to the KCNA.

Medvedev stressed the role of the ruling parties of the two countries in advancing bilateral relations, adding that he expects to "further advance trustworthy discussions between the two parties on a wide scale, including matters of mutual interest."

The Chinese ruling party, meanwhile, said that the two countries have entered a "new historic era" under the "strategic guidance of their national leaders," emphasizing its "high-level focus" on relations with the WPK.

"(We) are willing to jointly guide the solid and stable development of China-North Korea relations by strengthening communications and deepening exchanges on experiences in state management ... and to promote regional peace and stability," the Chinese party said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at the opening of a congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on Feb. 19, 2026, in this photo from the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 20, 2026

9. Pyongyang holds public struggle session over South Korean content distribution

​Summary:

Pyongyang city police reportedly convened downtown residents on Feb. 1 in Sosong District for a public “struggle session” that condemned a man arrested Nov. 30 for consuming and distributing South Korean videos, music, and TV programs. Authorities said an October investigation into “reactionary thought and culture” led to the arrest, and accused him of using a NoteTel media player plus USB drives and SD cards, coding singer names with numbers and hiding files off-site to evade detection. A source described him as emaciated after months of interrogation, and said the renewed public sessions have deepened fear across the capital.

Comment: The regime is treating South Korean culture as political warfare, using public humiliation to reinforce deterrence. Youth are the center of gravity, so enforcement becomes theater as much as law. The “coding” tradecraft suggests a mature underground market, not isolated curiosity.

If K-content is such a threat to the regime, why does it keep spreading inside the most controlled city in north Korea?

What breaks first for the regime: the USB supply chain, or the belief that fear still works on the young?

Why are the ROK and US governments hindering information flow to the north in contravention to the recommendations laid out in the 2104 UN Commission of Inquiry that all nations provide information to the Korean people in the north.

Pyongyang holds public struggle session over South Korean content distribution

dailynk.com · February 20, 2026

A man arrested in November was publicly convicted for distributing South Korean videos, music, and TV programs

By Jeong Seo-yeong - February 20, 2026

https://www.dailynk.com/english/pyongyang-holds-public-struggle-session-over-south-korean-content-distribution/

Pyongyang's Songhwa Street at night. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Pyongyang city police summoned downtown residents on Feb. 1 to a public struggle session in Sosong district, where authorities publicly convicted a man arrested in November for possessing and distributing South Korean videos, music, and television programs, a Daily NK source in Pyongyang said recently, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

City police launched an investigation into what authorities described as rapidly growing infiltration of reactionary thought and culture in Pyongyang in October of last year. During the probe, they arrested the man on Nov. 30. He was held and investigated for several months on charges of consuming South Korean TV programs, movies, and music via a NoteTel portable media player and of distributing such content on portable storage devices.

During the public trial, police said the man cleverly distributed USB drives and SD cards containing music files, assigning numbers to each South Korean singer’s name, and hid his illicit material at a third location to avoid detection.

Young people targeted

Authorities were particularly critical of the man for distributing content primarily to young people, accusing him of “spiritually corrupting countless young people with horrible anti-Republic acts.” City police framed the offense not as a personal failing but as a serious crime against the socialist system, warning that individuals engaged in reactionary behavior continued to emerge despite sustained eradication efforts.

“The man at the struggle session was just skin and bones, perhaps because he’d undergone months of horrible questioning,” the source said. “He just stood there in handcuffs, his head bowed, throughout the entire session. And as soon as it ended, they put him in a vehicle again.”

The source added that while several people had previously been caught violating the law on reactionary thought and culture, the resumption of harsh public struggle sessions has cast a pall over the city. “Tension hangs over Pyongyang,” the source said.

Read in Korean

A Note to Readers

Daily NK operates networks of sources inside North Korea who document events in real-time and transmit information through secure channels. Unlike reporting based on state media, satellite imagery, or defector accounts from years past, our journalism comes directly from people currently living under the regime.

We verify reports through multiple independent sources and cross-reference details before publication. Our sources remain anonymous because contact with foreign media is treated as a capital offense in North Korea—discovery means imprisonment or execution.

This network-based approach allows Daily NK to report on developments other outlets cannot access: market trends, policy implementation, public sentiment, and daily realities that never appear in official narratives. Maintaining these secure communication channels and protecting source identities requires specialized protocols and constant vigilance.

Daily NK serves as a bridge between North Koreans and the outside world, documenting what’s happening inside one of the world’s most closed societies.

dailynk.com · February 20, 2026

10. North Korea opens Ninth Party Congress with optimistic message on economy

​Summary:

north Korea opened the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress in Pyongyang, with KCNA signaling a formal agenda of reviewing the Central Committee’s work, revising party rules, and electing new leadership. Kim Jong Un struck an unusually upbeat economic tone, claiming the 2021–2025 plan was “basically fulfilled” despite sanctions and praising “favorable” external conditions, while also warning that “deep-rooted” defeatism, irresponsibility, and weak leadership still block progress. The setup points to tighter party discipline, more centralized control, and a likely cadre reshuffle as the congress proceeds.

Comment: "Honest review?" I think reporters should be careful about their interpretations and not appear to accept regime propaganda as the truth. Such statements contribute to legitimizing the regime. 

The optimism is a legitimacy operation: he is selling competence before he sells new burdens. The “deep-rooted” critique is a targeting list, aimed at enforcing obedience and preempting blame for what comes next. If “temporary” fixes are condemned, private market oxygen likely shrinks, and the center tightens its grip on allocation.

If the plan was “basically fulfilled,” why does he need the "purge language" about incompetence and defeatism?

What is the regime’s real center of gravity here, production, distribution, or belief in the story of success?

Which signals would prove this congress is preparing for external bargaining, and which would prove it is preparing for internal coercion?

​Korean watchers will conduct a deep assessment.

North Korea opens Ninth Party Congress with optimistic message on economy

In speech on opening day, leader Kim Jong Un vows honest review of 'deep-rooted' problems among party members

Colin Zwirko February 20, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/north-korea-opens-ninth-party-congress-with-optimistic-message-on-economy/

Kim Jong Un delivers a speech on the first day of the Ninth Party Congress on Feb. 19 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Feb. 20, 2026)

North Korea’s ruling party opened the Ninth Party Congress on Thursday, according to state media, where leader Kim Jong Un made an optimistic speech on the country’s future and vowed to fix “deep-rooted” incompetence.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday that 5,000 party members and other delegates at the congress will first “review” the past work of the Party Central Committee before discussing amendments to party rules and then electing new central leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).

It did not specify how long the congress will last.

In an opening speech, Kim Jong Un expressed “confidence” in the country’s current state of affairs and said “everything has fundamentally changed” for the better since the Eighth Party Congress in Jan. 2021.

This includes overcoming the “barbaric blockade” of economic sanctions imposed by “hostile forces,” and “creating favorable conditions” in foreign relations to help accelerate the economy.

He has yet to go into detail on foreign policy and military goals.

In his speech at the opening of the previous congress, Kim admitted that “almost all sectors fell a long way short of the set objectives.” He reminded the country of this situation again on Thursday, saying the economy was stagnant and directionless from 2016 to 2021 and that officials were “scrambling merely to maintain the status quo.”

By contrast, the 2021-2025 five-year plan for national economic development “was basically fulfilled,” and “a considerable number of sectors of our economy have broken free from prolonged backwardness and stagnation.”

“Never has there been such a period as this one, in which we achieved so great successes despite the severity of trials and difficulties,” he stated, adding that “all the people are witnessing every moment of the day the reality changing at a speed incomparable with that of the past.”

The Ninth Party Congress is taking place at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Feb. 20, 2026)

Kim Jong Un and a range of top officials on stage make up the congress presidium | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Feb. 20, 2026)

Peter Ward, an expert on the North Korean economy at the Sejong Institute, said Kim’s criticism of “transitional and temporary” economic work in the past appeared to be a reference to private markets, reaffirming the regime’s focus on strengthening central economic planning.

“We should not expect any pro-market reforms” at the Party Congress, he told NK News. “It seems like they’re continuing to push for greater state control generally.”

Kim declared in his speech that the ruling party is “filled with optimism and confidence in the future.” Instead of focusing on policy failures like in the past, this event is “a congress signifying success and pledging even greater success.”

Still, he said “deep-rooted defeatism, irresponsibility, conservatism, formalism and immaturity in leadership ability are latent at present in the work of the Party and government organs and officials,” posing obstacles to development.

According to Kim, all officials and delegates attending the congress already passed detailed evaluations and have good records. But a reshuffle in key positions under Kim is still likely due to the third agenda on electing the party’s central leadership body. 

The leader previewed the second agenda on “the revision of the WPK rules,” saying he plans to strengthen the party’s power “in line with the requirements of the five-point Party-building line in the new era.”

Kim also mentioned “revolutionary comrades and martyrs” who died for the country and sent greetings to overseas diaspora organizations. He did not specifically mention soldiers currently deployed to Russia to fight against Ukraine.

• READ MORE: What to expect at North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress, from nukes to US ties

State media coverage in the coming days is expected to delve into more detail on North Korea’s positions on inter-Korean relations, the U.S., nuclear weapons and domestic economic projects.

The Eighth Party Congress went on for eight days, followed by a military parade two days later. 

Kim delivered the most significant and detail-heavy speech, including his foreign policy and weapons development plans, on day four of the congress in 2021. The following days focused on deliberating over proposals for a new five-year plan.

NK Pro analysis of satellite imagery shows a military parade will take place in central Pyongyang after this congress as well. 

According to KCNA, 38 party members under Kim Jong Un took up positions on stage as the congress presidium, led by Pak Thae Song, Choe Ryong Hae and Jo Yong Won. Photos show a total of 110 officials at four rows of desks on stage.

Kim said in his speech that 413 of the 5,000 delegates attending the congress are women, or 12% of the total.

The event is being held at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang, the location of the last two Party Congresses.

Edited by Kristen Talman

Updated on Feb. 20 at 9:32 a.m. KST with additional details from state media, and at 11:55 a.m. with expert comments

11. Ukrainian national sentenced to prison for aiding North Korean IT workers

​Summary:

Oleksandr Didenko, a 29-year-old from Kyiv, was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 60 months for a scheme that stole U.S. identities and sold them to north Korea IT workers so they could fraudulently get remote jobs at 40 U.S. companies. He pleaded guilty to wire-fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft, forfeited over $1.4 million, and was ordered to pay restitution. DOJ says he ran “Upworksell.com,” managed up to 871 proxy identities, and supported multiple U.S.-based “laptop farms” that hosted employer-issued computers.

Ukrainian national sentenced to prison for aiding North Korean IT workers

US says Oleksandr Didenko helped DPRK operatives infiltrate 40 companies, using identities stolen from Americans

Shreyas Reddy February 20, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/ukrainian-national-sentenced-to-prison-for-aiding-north-korean-it-workers/

North Koreans using computers | Image: NK News (Sept. 2015)

A Ukrainian national has been sentenced to five years in prison for helping North Korean IT workers infiltrate dozens of American companies in a scheme that stole the identities of hundreds of people, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced Thursday.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Oleksandr Didenko, 29, after he pleaded guilty in November to charges of wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft in support of Pyongyang’s illicit revenue generation, the DOJ said in a press release.

The Kyiv resident agreed to forfeit more than $1.4 million, including roughly $181,438 in U.S. currency and cryptocurrency seized from him and his co-conspirators. The court also ordered him to serve 12 months of supervised release and pay $46,547.28 in restitution.

“Defendant Didenko’s scheme funneled money from Americans and U.S. businesses, into the coffers of North Korea, a hostile regime,” U.S. attorney Jeanine Pirro said after the sentencing.

“Today, North Korea is not only a threat to the homeland from afar, it is an enemy within,” she added.

Thursday’s sentencing comes as part of a broader U.S. crackdown targeting DPRK IT worker cells, laundering mechanisms and digital infrastructure supporting North Korea’s sanctions evasion.

North Korea’s army of IT professionals have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, with the 11-nation Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team estimating last year that between 1,000 and 2,000 operatives were working overseas.

Using stolen, fabricated or borrowed identities from willing partners, these workers are increasingly infiltrating leading companies worldwide to earn salaries that allegedly go toward Pyongyang’s nuclear and weapons development.

The DOJ previously said Didenko stole the identities of numerous U.S. citizens and sold them to overseas IT workers, some of whom he knew were North Korean, to help them secure remote jobs at 40 U.S. companies. 

Beginning in 2021, the workers used stolen identities to secure employment on freelance platforms based in California and Pennsylvania, where they advertised themselves as contract gig workers and bid on IT work contracts.

Through his U.S.-registered freelance jobs platform Upworksell.com, Didenko managed as many as 871 proxy identities and facilitated the operation of at least three U.S.-based “laptop farms” in Virginia, Tennessee and California by paying individuals to host company-issued computers at their residences.

Didenko’s website also helped the overseas IT workers access the U.S. financial system through money service transmitters and transfer income to foreign bank accounts.

The IT worker clients earned hundreds of thousands of dollars for their work, much of which was falsely reported to U.S. agencies under the names of the people whose identities had been stolen, according to the DOJ. 

The department eventually unsealed charges against Didenko in May 2024 and alleged that he, Arizona native Christina Chapman and three overseas DPRK workers were involved in defrauding more than 300 companies. 

Polish authorities arrested the Ukrainian national the same month and subsequently extradited him to the U.S. in Dec. 2024.

Edited by David Choi

12. Ex-President Yoon apologizes for suffering caused by martial law but defends his decree

​Summary:

After receiving a life sentence for leading an “insurrection” tied to his Dec. 3, 2024 martial law order, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol issued a statement that mixed apology and defiance. He said he regretted the “despair and suffering” the decree caused, yet insisted the move was “solely for the country and the people” and aimed at “saving the nation.” He rejected the court’s logic that deploying troops to the National Assembly constituted insurrection, and he cast doubt on whether an appeal is meaningful, citing concerns about judicial independence.

Comment:  Yoon is trying to preserve a legitimacy narrative for supporters while limiting personal culpability. By questioning appeals and judicial independence, he signals continued political mobilization, not closure. The case will likely deepen polarization because the legal outcome is framed as retaliation by one camp and rule-of-law enforcement by the other. If this assessment is correct one way to undermine Yoon's legitimacy would be to pardon him but the General Assembly may remove that option from POTROK.

(LEAD) Ex-President Yoon apologizes for suffering caused by martial law but defends his decree | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · February 20, 2026

(ATTN: ADDS details throughout; RECASTS lead)

By Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- Former President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday apologized for suffering caused by his short-lived imposition of martial law in late 2024 but defended that his decree was solely aimed at saving the nation.

Yoon made the remarks a day after he was handed life in prison for leading an insurrection, capping a chapter that plunged the nation's democracy into the worst crisis in decades. In the statement, however, there was little indication that Yoon would appeal.

In the statement, Yoon disputed the Seoul Central District Court's ruling on Thursday that sentenced him to life in prison after finding him guilty of leading an insurrection through his declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, 2024.

"It is difficult to accept the logic that troops going to the National Assembly amounted to insurrection," Yoon said in the statement shared by his legal team.

Former President Yoon Suk Yeol (Yonhap)

In its ruling, the court stressed that at the core of the case was Yoon's deployment of troops to the National Assembly during martial law, ruling that he aimed to paralyze the functions of a constitutional body.

"My judgment and decision to declare martial law on Dec. 3 was solely for the country and the people," he said. "While it was a decision to save the nation, I deeply apologize to the people for making you experience much despair and suffering due to my shortcomings."

The former president also questioned the point of appealing, claiming the independence of the judiciary could not be ensured. His lawyers earlier said they would decide whether to appeal after consulting with Yoon.

Yoon made the surprise declaration of martial law with the stated aim of eradicating anti-state forces, but the order was lifted six hours later following a vote by the National Assembly.

Special counsel Cho Eun-suk's team had sought the death penalty for Yoon and has indicated that it would appeal.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Chae Yun-hwan · February 20, 2026

13. U.S. says Yoon's life sentence matter for S. Korea's judicial system, reaffirms 'ironclad' alliance commitment

​Comment: I tire of hearing of conservative mouthpieces who say the US should "rescue" Yoon. TheState Department is saying the only right thing it can say here.

U.S. says Yoon's life sentence matter for S. Korea's judicial system, reaffirms 'ironclad' alliance commitment | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220010900315

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. State Department said Friday that former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol having received a life sentence over his failed martial law attempt in 2024 is a matter for the Asian country's judicial system, reaffirming Washington's "ironclad" commitment to the bilateral alliance.

On Thursday, the Seoul Central District Court sentenced Yoon to life in prison for his botched bid to impose martial law, describing the attempt as an insurrection marked by the deployment of troops to the National Assembly.

"The United States and the ROK share a commitment to the rule of law. This is a matter for the ROK's judicial system, and the United States respects the independence of its democratic institutions," a State Department spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency via email. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

"The U.S. commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance is ironclad. We continue to advance U.S. and mutual interests with our ally, the ROK."

The State Department in Washington, D.C. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 20, 2026

14. Senior U.S. diplomat cites Korea Zinc's multibillion-dollar investment

​Summary:

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau highlighted Korea Zinc’s planned U.S. investment as a flagship example of economic diplomacy. Writing on X, he said Korea Zinc will invest $6.6 billion to build a new metals refinery in Clarksville, Tennessee. The project is described as a nearly 7 million square foot integrated smelter that would process 1.1 million tons of ore into zinc annually using advanced technology. Landau said the facility should create about 420 new jobs and boost local construction firms and suppliers. Korea Zinc plans to begin producing 11 critical minerals at the site starting in 2029.

Senior U.S. diplomat cites Korea Zinc's multibillion-dollar investment | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220010200320

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau on Friday highlighted a South Korean company's investment in the United States as a key example of investment pledges made under the Donald Trump administration.

In a post on the social media platform X, Landau pointed to Korea Zinc Co., the world's largest refined zinc smelter, and its multibillion-dollar project in Tennessee.

"Here's a great example: Korea Zinc is investing $6.6 BILLION in a new metals refinery in Clarksville, Tennessee, that will include a nearly 7-million-square-foot integrated smelter, processing 1.1 million tons of ore into zinc each year using advanced technology," he said.

The diplomat added that the project is expected to create 420 new jobs in Clarksville and provide a significant boost to local construction companies and suppliers.

"Win-win economic diplomacy!" he said.

Korea Zinc plans to build the nonferrous metal smelter in Clarksville and begin producing 11 critical minerals starting in 2029.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · February 20, 2026

​15. Seoul 'strongly protests' Japan FM's territorial claim to Dokdo, calls for retraction

​Comment: Two steps forward, one step backward.

Seoul 'strongly protests' Japan FM's territorial claim to Dokdo, calls for retraction | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260220008700315

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea on Friday "strongly protested" the Japanese foreign minister's renewed territorial claim to the easternmost South Korean islets of Dokdo and lodged a formal complaint with the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.

Japanese Minister Toshimitsu Motegi referred to the islets by their Japanese name, Takeshima, claimed they are part of Japanese territory and vowed a resolute government response during a parliamentary speech earlier in the day.

His remarks continue the territorial claim to Dokdo reiterated annually by former Japanese foreign ministers over the past decade in their parliamentary speeches, rekindling diplomatic friction with Seoul.

"The (South Korean) government strongly protests Japan's reiteration of its unjust territorial claim to Dokdo in the foreign minister's parliamentary speech and urges its immediate retraction," the foreign ministry said in a release.

The ministry said such a claim by Japan has no power to affect South Korea's sovereignty over the islets, pledging to take "resolution action" against such provocations.

"Dokdo is clearly our own territory historically, geographically and under international law and Japan should realize that repeating its unjust claim does not help effort to build future-oriented South Korea-Japan relations," the ministry noted.

Kim Sang-hoon, director general for Asia-Pacific affairs at Seoul's foreign ministry, also lodged a complaint as he called in Hirotaka Matsuo, deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.

Dokdo has long been a recurring source of tension between South Korea and Japan as Tokyo continues to make sovereignty claims in its policy papers, public statements and school textbooks.

Hirotaka Matsuo, deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, arrives at the South Korean foreign ministry in Seoul on Feb, 20, 2026, as Seoul protests the Japanese foreign minister's territorial claim to Dokdo during a parliamentary speech. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 20, 2026

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com