Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Have more than you show, Speak less than you know."

-William Shakepeare

"An intellectual is someone whose mind watches itself."

- Albert Camus

"There is only one way to happiness. Stop worrying about things you cannot control."

- Epictetus

1. U.S. calls for UNSC action against N. Korean missile tests, again to no avail

2. U.S. lawmaker calls for increased missile defense against N. Korean provocation

3. Ｎ. Korea threatens ‘tactical nuclear strike’ on Cheongju and Gunsan airbases

4. Get Ready: North Korea Testing ICBMs Is the New Normal

5. N. Korea’s ICBM provocation to alienate S. Korea and U.S.

6. Suspected spies for North refuse to cooperate

7. Waging balloon warfare

8. Here’s What to Watch as North Korea Ratchets Up Nuclear Tensions

9. Potential radiation exposure to North Koreans near test site overlooked: report

10. S.Korea Needs Own Nuclear Arms to Deter N.Korea

11. Remembering Carter’s 1994 Pyongyang peace mission

12. Failure of US North Korea policy is a bipartisan affair - Responsible Statecraft

13. Thefts of farm machinery parts on the rise ahead of spring farming season

14. Researching North Korea online? You could be victim of a malware attack

15. U.S. must field space-based kill capabilities to deter enemies

16. Interview: Siegfried Hecker on two decades of missed chances to deal with North Korea's nuclear program

1. U.S. calls for UNSC action against N. Korean missile tests, again to no avail

Of course China and Russia will protect north Korea. But we have to do this if only to expose Chinese and Russian complicity in protecting north Korea and its malign activities.

U.S. calls for UNSC action against N. Korean missile tests, again to no avail | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 21, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Monday called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to hold North Korea to account for its recent missile provocations but to no avail due to opposition from two veto-wielding members of the council -- China and Russia.

The U.S.' call came in the first UNSC meeting of the year to be held on North Korea.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield is seen speaking during a U.N. Security Council meeting held in New York on Feb. 20, 2023 to discuss North Korea's recent missile provocations in this image captured from the website of the United Nations. (Yonhap)

"The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms the DPRK's February 18 and February 19 launches of three ballistic missiles," U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield told the Security Council, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Our repeated failures to respond emboldened the DPRK to conduct these destabilizing and exploratory launches without fear of consequences," the U.S. diplomat added, calling for a UNSC presidential statement condemning the North's latest missile provocations.

North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile on Saturday (Korea time), followed by two short-range ballistic missile launches on Monday.

The latest North Korean missile launches followed an unprecedented 69 ballistic missile tests in 2022, which marked a new record of ballistic missiles fired by North Korea in any given year.

The UNSC held 10 meetings last year to specifically discuss North Korea's missile threats, but all 10 meetings had ended without any outcome due to opposition from China and Russia, both veto power-wielding permanent members of the Security Council.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 19, 2023, shows the North's firing of a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile at a lofted angle the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

"The reality is that those who shield the DPRK from the consequences of its exploratory missile tests put the Asian region and entire world at risk of conflict," Thomas-Greenfield declared.

"If two member states continue to prevent this council from carrying out its mandate, we should expect the DPRK to continue to defiantly develop and test these weapons. The council's lack of action is worse than shameful. It is dangerous," she added.

Still, China again opposed taking any action against Pyongyang, while accusing the United States of escalating tension and provoking North Korea.

"The U.S. announced joint military exercises on a higher level and bigger scale, and timely deployment of strategic assets (to the Korean Peninsula)," a Chinese envoy to the United Nations told the Security Council through an interpreter.

"Such moves are highly provocative to the DPRK and aggravate the sense of insecurity. Relevant countries should seriously reflect on the relevant causality," the Chinese diplomat added.

Russia's envoy to the United Nations nearly shared China's view, accusing the U.S. of provoking North Korea.

"We have heard a lot about the missile launch today, but no attention was paid, for example, to the fact that the day before the authorities of the Republic of Korea, the United States announced that they could have staff exercises, which include, according to the mass media, visiting a port with nuclear equipped U.S. submarines," the Russian envoy said, referring to South Korea by its official name.

The Russian diplomat argued that the "unprecedented military maneuvers in the region" by the U.S. are "clearly anti-Pyongyang in nature."

"The DPRK is simply responding to that with missile tests," he said.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/OXCeVChXcgA

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 21, 2023

2. U.S. lawmaker calls for increased missile defense against N. Korean provocation

We can never have enough missile defense.

U.S. lawmaker calls for increased missile defense against N. Korean provocation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 21, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- The head of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services called for efforts to enhance U.S. missile defense against North Korea's evolving missile threat on Monday.

Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) also highlighted the need for stepped up efforts to accelerate development of the next generation interceptor.

"The recent North Korean ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) test is a stark reminder that Kim Jong-un is an unstable dictator with a growing nuclear arsenal capable of ranging the U.S. homeland," the U.S. lawmaker said in a released statement.

"Protecting the U.S. homeland must be paramount as we develop our 2024 budget, and this includes fully-funding homeland missile defense assets," he added.

Pyongyang conducted its first ICBM test of the year on Saturday (Korea time). North Korea also fired two short-range ballistic missiles on Monday.

North Korea conducted an unprecedented 69 ballistic missile tests in 2022, marking a new annual record of ballistic missile launches, which previously stood at 25.

"What has to be done is clear," insisted Rogers.

"We must accelerate our missile defense development to outpace the DPRK threat. This includes speeding up the Next Generation Interceptor, putting more interceptors in the ground, and looking to space-based missile defenses," he said.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/Y4WafE_W9jw

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 21, 2023

3,. Ｎ. Korea threatens ‘tactical nuclear strike’ on Cheongju and Gunsan airbases

These threats are not a surprise. Many of the weapons the nKPA has been developing in recent years has been to attack these (and other) key bases. One of the important lines of effort in the nKPA camping plan is to prevent the ROK/US alliance from generating sufficient air power to attack the north, its C2, missiles, integrated air defense, artillery and maneuver forces.

Ｎ. Korea threatens ‘tactical nuclear strike’ on Cheongju and Gunsan airbases

donga.com

Posted February. 21, 2023 07:42,

Updated February. 21, 2023 07:42

Ｎ. Korea threatens ‘tactical nuclear strike’ on Cheongju and Gunsan airbases. February. 21, 2023 07:42. ysh1005@donga.com,yea@donga.com.

On Monday, two days after launching a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, North Korea made another provocation by launching a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), most likely a super-large radiation gun (KN-25), setting the South Korea-U.S. air bases as the target of its “tactical nuclear weapon.”

The North responded to South Korea and the U.S.’ armed protest by mobilizing B-1B strategic bombers and F-35A stealth fighter jets against Pyongyang, which launched Hwasong-15 the previous day. Its intention seems to be to escalate tensions with a series of provocations until the joint air exercises of South Korea and the U.S. in mid-March to make a “power to power” confrontation on the edge of a cliff.

According to the military, two SRBMs were fired into the East Sea from the Sookchon area of Pyongnam around 7 and 7:11 a.m. on Monday. Their ranges were estimated at 390 and 340 kilometers, respectively.

“In response to the South Korea-U.S. joint drills, a 600-millimeter multiple rocket launcher (MRL) was aimed with a virtual simulator and fired at the ‘enemy’s operational airfield,’” reported the North’s Korean Central News Agency about an hour after the provocation. “We set virtual targets with ranges of 395 and 337 kilometers from the launch site and fired them into the East Sea,” “The 600-millimeter MRL is the latest type of multi-launch precision strike weapon system, a means of tactical nuclear attack that boasts a staggering force of allocating four shots for each operational airfield,” it added. In fact, if the drop points of the North’s SRBMs turned South, they would hit Cheongju Air Base in North Chungcheong Province and Gunsan U.S. Air Base in North Jeolla Province, home to F-35A and F-16 fighter jets, respectively.

“It is a threat to wipe out the core air power of the South and the U.S. with a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the event of an emergency,” a source in the military said. “A blatant warning that the top targets for tactical nuclear weapons are the South Korea-U.S. airbases, following the Hwasong-15 provocation aimed at Washington.”

한국어

donga.com

4. Get Ready: North Korea Testing ICBMs Is the New Normal

Every test makes the ROK/US alliance stronger and trilateral cooperation (ROK/Japan US) more effective.

One important option is information and influence. We have not yet pulled the trigger on information as President Yoon has alluded to in recent months.

Excerpts:

Our response options are poor. Sanctions mitigate the problem – i.e., they keep North Korea from building even more missiles and nukes – and should only be traded away for genuine concessions which can be verified. China is North Korea’s patron and could probably help. But the Sino-US relationship is strained, and one lost area of cooperation is reining in Pyongyang. Missile defense is better than nothing, but it does not work very well.

The emerging option is to match North Korea missile for missile, bomb for bomb, via South Korea’s own counter-nuclearization. This is risky. China’s response will be harsh. But it is not clear what else might convince the North Koreans to slow down. Nothing else has worked.

Get Ready: North Korea Testing ICBMs Is the New Normal

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 20, 2023

North Korea Just Tested Another ICBM: This Will Continue Indefinitely It is not surprising at all anymore that North Korea tests missiles. It launched another intercontinental ballistic missile in a test this weekend. And as usual, there is no obvious way for the rest of the world to stop them.

Sanctions can make it harder for Pyongyang to test even more than it already does. The problem would almost certainly be worse without them, but North Korea’s commitment to testing no matter how much it impoverishes its long-suffering people is clear.

An agreement with North Korea, in which it restrained its testing, would be ideal. But this has proven elusive for decades, and trust that the North Korean leadership will keep its word is low.

Missile defense is usually where this debate ends up. Ukraine and Israel have successfully used missile defense in recent years. But North Korea’s missiles will almost certainly be armed with nuclear weapons, which means missile defense must work perfectly to avert a disaster. That is obviously very unlikely.

Why ICBMs?

North Korea’s military threat to South Korea and other states turns almost completely to missiles now. The North Korean People’s Army is famously large; conscription applies to the whole country. But it is also backward. Its weapons date to the Cold War, and the closed, secretive country is unable to generate the modern technologies necessary to keep up with the South Korean military, much less that of its US ally. In a conventional military conflict, it is widely assumed North Korea would lose along the lines of Iraq’s defeats in its wars with the US in 1990 and 2003.

Barring the acquisition of nuclear weapons, these defense pressures almost certainly would have forced reform on the system, much the way Mikhail Gorbachev tried to reform the Soviet Union due to Cold War competition with the US. But reform is all but out of the question for North Korea.

If it opens or liberalizes, then it will inevitably become more like South Korea, raising the question of why North Korea continues to exist at all. This is why decades of Chinese entreaties for North Korea to change as China has changed have been ignored.

Hence, North Korea must build nuclear weapons and put them on missiles. This is the only way to keep its opponents at bay while simultaneously retaining its grossly inefficient and brutally totalitarian domestic governance.

For years, those missiles were aimed primarily at South Korea and Japan (and China). But even more valuable is directly threatening the US. North Korea’s relentless drive for ICBMs means US military involvement in a Korean contingency could provoke a North Korean nuclear strike on the American homeland. That will give any US president pause before committing to South Korea.

This does not insure a North Korean victory in a war, but it does nearly eliminate the chance that the US or South Korea will ever strike North Korea first.

There is No Solution; This Will Go On and On

As noted above, there is no obvious solution to this problem. For many years, the US and its partners successfully delayed the problem. Sanctions, threats, and various efforts to talk to North Korea kicked the can down the road for a while. That is, North Korea’s nuclearization and missilization have been in sight since the 1990s. But outside powers were successfully able to cajole North Korea into going slow. Kim Jong Il, the father of current leader Kim Jong Un, signaled interest in a deal several times. Even after he crossed the nuclear threshold in 2006, he did not race to ever larger and better weapons.

The current Kim, though, has. He has significantly accelerated both the missile and nuclear programs. North Korean nuclear ICBMs are here to stay. Kim has made it clear that he will not give them up.

Our response options are poor. Sanctions mitigate the problem – i.e., they keep North Korea from building even more missiles and nukes – and should only be traded away for genuine concessions which can be verified. China is North Korea’s patron and could probably help. But the Sino-US relationship is strained, and one lost area of cooperation is reining in Pyongyang. Missile defense is better than nothing, but it does not work very well.

The emerging option is to match North Korea missile for missile, bomb for bomb, via South Korea’s own counter-nuclearization. This is risky. China’s response will be harsh. But it is not clear what else might convince the North Koreans to slow down. Nothing else has worked.

Expert Biography: Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 20, 2023

5. N. Korea’s ICBM provocation to alienate S. Korea and U.S.

The Donga Ilbo is one of the few media outlets that continue to focus on the costs of missile testing and the diversion of resources from the Korean people in the north. This needs a ket theme and message in our influence campaign.

Excerpt:

While the North Korean regime is focused on increasing its military power, its economic situation is becoming worse. As its food production volume decreased by one-fourth compared to last year, many people are dying from starvation. The sum of its cost to launch missiles, including up to 30 million dollars per ICBM launch, is equivalent to one year’s worth of rice to feed its people. The only things that the North can get in return for a meaningless provocation strategy are extreme isolation and poverty. Those are the only things North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will leave behind to his daughter who accompanies him often to signal succession and future generations.

N. Korea’s ICBM provocation to alienate S. Korea and U.S.

donga.com

Posted February. 20, 2023 07:33,

Updated February. 20, 2023 07:33

N. Korea’s ICBM provocation to alienate S. Korea and U.S.. February. 20, 2023 07:33. .

North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-15 in Sunan, Pyongyang on Saturday. It has been 48 days since it launched a short-range ballistic missile on January 1. The long-range missile, which reached a maximum altitude of 5,768 kilometers, traveled over 900 kilometers and fell into the East Sea. “We will respond to hostilities against us with overwhelming actions,” Kim Yo Jong said in a briefing on the following day.

The latest ICBM launch signals that North Korea’s strategic provocations against the U.S. are becoming more serious. The Hwasong-15, which has a range of 13,000 kilometers, is a projectile that can hit any location in the U.S. territory with a nuclear weapon if launched at a normal angle. North Korea launched Hwasong-17, which is called the ‘monster ICBM,’ in November last year and is making efforts to enhance its mid-range missiles by establishing the solid fuel ICBM operation unit earlier this month. North Korea repeatedly made clear its intention to directly address the U.S. by saying that it is not interested in dealing with South Koreans.

North Korea is likely to escalate its level of nuclear and missile provocations further on the excuse of the scheduled joint exercises between South Korea and the U.S. In fact, additional provocations are expected during the periods of South Korea and the U.S.’s Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-top Exercise to be conducted at The Pentagon this week and ‘Freedom Shield’ joint military exercises in next month. The North may launch a solid-fuel ICBM, which was revealed at the recent military parade, or conduct its seventh nuclear test.

Foreign ministers of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, who were in Germany to attend the Munich Security Conference, had an emergency meeting and discussed response measures. They collectively condemned North Korea’s ICBM launch in a joint press conference and emphasized that the North will face even stronger sanctions from the international community. It is meaningful that the three ministers took swift joint action. While North Korea made provocations to alienate South Korea and the U.S., multilateral solidarity in Northeast Asia is becoming stronger.

While the North Korean regime is focused on increasing its military power, its economic situation is becoming worse. As its food production volume decreased by one-fourth compared to last year, many people are dying from starvation. The sum of its cost to launch missiles, including up to 30 million dollars per ICBM launch, is equivalent to one year’s worth of rice to feed its people. The only things that the North can get in return for a meaningless provocation strategy are extreme isolation and poverty. Those are the only things North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will leave behind to his daughter who accompanies him often to signal succession and future generations.

한국어

donga.com

6. Suspected spies for North refuse to cooperate

Tuesday

February 21, 2023

dictionary + A - A

Suspected spies for North refuse to cooperate

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/21/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-National-Intelligence-Service/20230221182852266.html

One of four South Korean activists accused of inciting sedition on behalf of North Korea enters Seoul Central District Court in Seocho District, southern Seoul on Jan. 31. [YONHAP]

Four South Korean activists arrested earlier this month on charges of inciting sedition on orders from North Korea are refusing to cooperate with investigators from the state prosecution service, according to prosecution officials on Tuesday.

The four suspects, who resided in Changwon, South Gyeongsang before their arrest, are accused of establishing an underground organization called the Self-Reliant People’s Liberation Front in 2016 to foment unrest against the South Korean government and the U.S. military presence in the South.

All four were transferred to the custody of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office on Feb. 17 after the Seoul Central District Court approved their arrest warrants but have declined to speak with either investigators or a human rights compliance officer.

Prosecution officials said the four suspects have resisted summons for questioning while under arrest in various ways, such as lying flat in their jail cells or staging a sit-in when officials came to escort them to interrogation rooms.

The legal team representing the four suspects filed a complaint to the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials on Jan. 28, alleging that investigators from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) threatened one of their clients before their arrest warrants were approved by the court.

A prosecution official who spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity said it was “unfortunate” that the four suspects have refused to meet with the compliance officer tasked with ensuring the conditions of their detention does not violate their rights.

The four suspects also filed a petition to the Constitutional Court on Feb. 8, alleging the charges against them are part of a “North Korea-related scaremongering” campaign by the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration.

They have also filed a petition requesting the court examine the constitutionality of current laws which permit the NIS and police to detain suspects accused of violating the National Security Act for up to 20 days, while allowing the prosecution service to keep suspects under arrest for 30 days as part of their investigation.

Although the group requested a court review the legality of both their detention and arrest processes, their request was dismissed.

An official at the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office told reporters on condition of anonymity that the court’s dismissal “confirmed that the detentions and arrests were procedurally legitimate, and that there were clear grounds for the suspects’ detention and arrest.”

Earlier, prosecution officials said that the four suspects used their liberal activism as a front to advance Pyongyang’s agenda in the South.

Although the NIS is still in the process of decoding directives allegedly received by the suspects from the North, intelligence officials told reporters that the majority of the content decrypted thus far contains orders to mobilize protests against South Korea’s conservative government.

South Korean officials have also said that the four met North Korean intelligence agents in various Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia.

The four suspects are all members of the South Gyeongsang Progressive Alliance, which since last year has held demonstrations demanding the resignation of President Yoon Suk Yeol and the suspension of joint military exercises by South Korea and the United States.

BY KIM MIN-JOONG,MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

7. Waging balloon warfare

The north and South have long been deploying balloons against each other. It is not new for the two Koreas.

Waging balloon warfare

The Korea Times · February 21, 2023

By Donald Kirk

NEW YORK ― An entire new menace now threatens the world's warring factions. Who would have thought balloons would raise such a ruckus? Think about it, though. Just about any country, or any terrorist grouping, should be able to launch a balloon.

The danger is not just that instruments carried by the balloon can spy on bases and people down below. They can also carry bombs for dropping when directed by their navigators thousands of miles away. Drones can do the same thing but make a lot more noise, carry much more equipment and are far easier to detect.

It's hard to believe the Americans, the Canadians and no doubt others are just catching up with such a seemingly simple device. How can it be that a balloon, cruising tens of thousands of meters above the earth's surface, would prove to be the latest weapon in the inventory of great powers?

Nor is it just the Chinese who are launching them. Now it turns out the Americans have been playing with them too. It's safe to assume a number of other nations will be getting into the act, discovering the ease with which balloons can soar out of the sight of devices ordinarily so great at seeing anything up there from low-flying satellites to spy planes within air defense identification zones that are outside national space but close enough for intruding aircraft to be expected to identify themselves.

The balloon phenomenon has immediate significance for South Korea. North Korea has launched a number of drones over the South. Some have made it back to the North while others have crashed. Think of what the North Koreans can do if tempted to wage balloon warfare against the South.

For that matter, shouldn't the Chinese be expected to launch balloons over numerous other countries, including both North and South Korea? And why shouldn't South Korea send some balloons over the North?

Come to think of it, defectors from North Korea have been firing balloons from just below the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas over North Korea for years. They're laden with propaganda leaflets exposing the Kim dynasty and other news and views that North Koreans never get to see or hear. Kim Jong-un's sister, Yo-jong, has bitterly denounced them, indicating some of them are reaching their intended audience.

South Korean authorities have periodically cracked down on activists for their leaflet campaign, but it's easy to imagine South and North engaging in balloon warfare for real, beginning by using them to gather intelligence. Think of the challenge a balloon campaign would present to the South's air force, madly pursuing balloons right up to the DMZ.

First, though, they'd have to spot them, and that won't be easy. Not long ago, fighter planes and helicopters were unable to intercept a flight of North Korean drones. Reconnaissance balloons might be still more difficult, especially if they soared thousands of meters into the skies.

For now, though, American intelligence people need to figure out how the Chinese balloons worked, how much material they were sending back to operators in China, how they controlled their flight patterns and how valuable they really were as weapons in a new, dangerous Cold War that could turn hot any time.

We're not even sure if U.S. navy divers in the Atlantic off the South Carolina coast have recovered the working parts that are key to the success of the first balloon to be shot down by a missile fired from a U.S. air force plane. All we know is the Chinese had been conducting the balloon program for several years before the Americans began to catch up with what they were doing.

The primary responsibility for finding the balloons over North America rests with NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command. Although NORAD may be expected to be able to track the flight of any aircraft approaching the United States and Canada, incredibly, it was caught flat-footed by the appearance of the immense balloon that finally was seen high above Montana.

NORAD physicists, engineers and technicians can "hear" a North Korean nuclear test whenever Kim wants to test one. They've been waiting for months for Kim to order the North's seventh underground nuclear warhead, but nothing seems to have prepared NORAD for the shock of the Chinese balloons.

Call them China's once secret weapon. In a war of wits and nerves as well as strength and power, it's wise to expect the unexpected, including hot air blowing in from China.

Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) writes from Washington and Seoul about confrontation in Asia.

The Korea Times · February 21, 2023

8. Here’s What to Watch as North Korea Ratchets Up Nuclear Tensions

A useful run down.

Here’s What to Watch as North Korea Ratchets Up Nuclear Tensions

Russia, China can block more sanctions at United Nations
Kim Jong Un has been clear on his plans for nuclear arms

ByJon Herskovitz

February 20, 2023 at 1:19 AM ESTUpdated onFebruary 20, 2023 at 3:25 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-20/here-s-what-to-watch-as-north-korea-ratchets-up-nuclear-tensions?sref=hhjZtX76

North Korea set off a fresh cycle of provocations by firing three missiles in two days, issuing threats to the US over its joint military drills and parading in Pyongyang its newest rockets designed to deliver nuclear warheads to the American mainland.

Leader Kim Jong Un opened the year with a pledge to exponentially increase his nuclear arms program and has ignored repeated calls to return to stalled US-led talks on winding down his atomic ambitions.

After weathering global sanctions for a series of nuclear and missile tests in 2017, Kim likely sees little chance of more coming: Long-time partners China and Russia last year used their power at the UN Security Council to block any new penalties.

At this point, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities may have risen to a stage where the US may not be able to offer enough incentives to roll them back.

Here are major items to watch in the coming months.

1. Nuclear tests

Kim told his ruling party more than two years ago that he’s seeking tactical nuclear weapons for strikes on battlefields, and wants to increase the yield of thermonuclear bombs his regime can mount on long-range missiles.

That means North Korea’s next nuclear test may consist of two blasts. The first would be of a miniaturized weapon that could be mounted on longer-range artillery. The second would be of a bomb more powerful than one it detonated in 2017, which had an estimated yield of between 120-250 kilotons, roughly ten times the power what the US dropped on Hiroshima in World War II.

All six of North Korea’s previous nuclear tests have been conducted at its mountainous Punggye-ri test site. The US, South Korea and Japan have warned for months that the facility appears ready for another test.

Read: Even a Small Nuclear Test by North Korea Would Be a Big US Worry

2. ICBMs

At a military parade in February, the state let the world know what its priorities are for intercontinental ballistic missile development. The event was North Korea’s biggest-ever display of ICBMs, made up of just two models.

The first was its Hwasong-17, which experts say is designed to carry as many as three warheads to the US. The first full test of the missile blew up over the skies of Pyongyang last year, but North Korea has claimed successful launches since then.

The regime will likely further flight test the missile and its multiple warhead configuration to determine how well it can survive reentry into the atmosphere and strike potential targets.

The second missile is a solid-fuel ICBM. North Korea rolled out five canisters for the missiles at the parade, without showing the actual weapon it has tried for years to develop. The solid-propellant missiles would be easier to deploy and quicker to fire than the state’s current arsenal of liquid-fuel ICBMs, giving Washington less time to shoot one down.

Read: Kim Jong Un Puts New ICBM, And a Potential Heir, on Parade

3. Operational Exercises

Instead of one-off tests of a missile to evaluate performance, North Korea has been favoring exercises that show it can strike on short notice, according to Ankit Panda, a senior fellow in the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“In the coming months, North Korea could carry out additional liquid-propellant ICBM tests, including simultaneous or closely staggered launches of multiple ICBMs to simulate the operational conditions for a strategic retaliatory attack on the U.S,” Panda wrote in a February article for Seoul-based NK News.

North Korea has shown it wants to coordinate various assets to simulate an attack, like in did in November when it fired at least 23 missiles from separate locations, including the first ballistic missile to fly over a nautical border with South Korea.

4. Solid-fuel engine

North Korea tested a new, large-diameter, solid-propellant missile engine in December of last year. Apart from its use in a potential ICBM, North Korea could use the engine for intermediate-range missiles to strike Japan as well as hit US nuclear assets in places such as Guam.

Read: North Korea Tests New Engine for Long-Range Missile Strikes

5. Drones

North Korea sent drones across the border with South Korea in December and Kim has laid out plans for development of unmanned aerial vehicles as one of his priorities. NK News has said that the state hasn’t unveiled any new unmanned aerial vehicle or combat drone designs since 2012. Its current stocks of larger drone systems are based on older models procured from Russia and China, the US Defense Intelligence Agency has said.

Read: South Korea Deploys Jets After North Sends Drones Across Border

6. Markets

South Koreans have lived with the threat from North Korea for decades and individual provocations from its neighbor rarely cause much of a move in markets. But some South Korean defense stocks have been rising this year, extending their gains from 2022 when expectations for bigger overseas orders amid Russia’s war in Ukraine boosted shares.

Shares of Hanwha Aerospace Co. have jumped about 19% so far in 2023 while Firstec Co. has climbed roughly 4%, after both companies gained in 2022. Other defense stocks, however, have fallen this year after a rally in 2022. LIG Nex1 Co. has slumped roughly 19% this year after jumping more than 34% last year. Hyundai Rotem Co. is down about 9% so far in 2023 after a 37% rally in 2022.

Explainer: How Kim Jong Un Keeps Advancing His Nuclear Program: QuickTake

— With assistance by Youkyung Lee

(Updates share price moves in final paragraph.)

Here’s What to Watch as North Korea Ratchets Up Nuclear Tensions

Russia, China can block more sanctions at United Nations
Kim Jong Un has been clear on his plans for nuclear arms

ByJon Herskovitz

February 20, 2023 at 1:19 AM ESTUpdated onFebruary 20, 2023 at 3:25 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-20/here-s-what-to-watch-as-north-korea-ratchets-up-nuclear-tensions?sref=hhjZtX76

At this point, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities may have risen to a stage where the US may not be able to offer enough incentives to roll them back.

Here are major items to watch in the coming months.

1. Nuclear tests

Read: Even a Small Nuclear Test by North Korea Would Be a Big US Worry

2. ICBMs

The regime will likely further flight test the missile and its multiple warhead configuration to determine how well it can survive reentry into the atmosphere and strike potential targets.

Read: Kim Jong Un Puts New ICBM, And a Potential Heir, on Parade

3. Operational Exercises

— With assistance by Youkyung Lee

(Updates share price moves in final paragraph.)

9. Potential radiation exposure to North Koreans near test site overlooked: report

Just Imagine the radiation problems if nuclear weapons are used in a war.

Excerpts:

The report pointed out that the South Korean government has yet to disclose the full reports on radiation exposure tests conducted in 2017 and 2018 for 40 escapees from Kilju County, where the Punggye-ri nuclear test site is located.

Some of the test results obtained by the National Assembly revealed that varying degrees of chromosomal abnormalities were observed in nine of the 40 escapees who were tested. The tests were carried out by the Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences, and then submitted to the Ministry of Unification.

The report urged the South Korean government to inform North Korean escapees from cities and counties near the Punggye-ri site about radiation exposure risks, and provide examination and necessary treatment for all those who are willing.

Shin Hee-suk, a legal analyst with the TJWG, said the South Korean government should be more transparent about the findings from past investigations, and conduct additional investigation of North Korean escapees from the regions belonging to the range of possible leakage.

“South Korea, based on the available results results, can raise awareness within the international community and together urge North Korea to conduct an investigation of the impact on its population,” Shin said.

Potential radiation exposure to North Koreans near test site overlooked: report

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · February 21, 2023

Areas within a 40km radius of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. (Transitional Justice Working Group)

Hundreds of thousands of North Korean residents near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site are living under the possible risk of nuclear radiation exposure, a Seoul-based nongovernmental organization said in a report Tuesday, and called it a serious human rights question that is often overshadowed by security concerns.

In the report, the Transitional Justice Working Group said existing literature on the North Korean nuclear issue so far has been marked by a lack of attention to how people living near the site are affected.

“Six nuclear tests have made Punggye-ri and Mount Mantap internationally famous, but there has been a dearth of studies on how many people live near the site of repeated tests of increasing magnitude, what they eat and drink and how their health is affected,” the TJGW said.

The residents in the vicinity of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site were likely not being informed of the possible risks of exposure to radiation and contamination of the area, the report said. It was also questionable whether North Korea had the capacity to provide medical treatment to those suffering from exposure to radiation.

Lee Young-hwan, the TJWG’s executive director, said interviews of North Korean escapees from near the site showed they were “unaware of nuclear tests being conducted there, much less the dangers of a possible radiation exposure.”

“The North Korean government has a responsibility to inform its people of the risks facing them, and take steps to protect them from the possible harms,” he said.

“There are simple steps, such as telling them to refrain from using groundwater from the areas of nuclear leaks and radioactive contamination as drinking water. It doesn’t take sophisticated technologies to allow the residents to stay informed.”

The report said the South Korean government, as a “key stakeholder,” has failed to address this risk properly.

The comparison of exposure risk of the nine North Korean escapees with abnormalities in the 2017 and 2018 tests. (Transitional Justice Working Group)

The report pointed out that the South Korean government has yet to disclose the full reports on radiation exposure tests conducted in 2017 and 2018 for 40 escapees from Kilju County, where the Punggye-ri nuclear test site is located.

Some of the test results obtained by the National Assembly revealed that varying degrees of chromosomal abnormalities were observed in nine of the 40 escapees who were tested. The tests were carried out by the Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences, and then submitted to the Ministry of Unification.

The report urged the South Korean government to inform North Korean escapees from cities and counties near the Punggye-ri site about radiation exposure risks, and provide examination and necessary treatment for all those who are willing.

Shin Hee-suk, a legal analyst with the TJWG, said the South Korean government should be more transparent about the findings from past investigations, and conduct additional investigation of North Korean escapees from the regions belonging to the range of possible leakage.

“South Korea, based on the available results results, can raise awareness within the international community and together urge North Korea to conduct an investigation of the impact on its population,” Shin said.

By Kim Arin (arin@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · February 21, 2023

10. S.Korea Needs Own Nuclear Arms to Deter N.Korea

Easy to say. But is it feasible? What would be the concept of employment of South Korea nuclear weapons? Will Kim even be deterred in any significant way by South Korean nuclear weapons? What will be the political and economic impact if the ROK develops its own nuclear weapons.

But I am glad to read these editorials and the debate because it means that there appears to be broad support for the defense of the ROK by South Koreans. Koreans are trying to determine the best way to defend South Korea and deter.

And to the editorial writers: What swit faction are you calling for? A strike on north Korea? And the key question: are there any actions that the rok and US alliance can take that can convince the north to scrap its nuclear ambitions? I think the answer to that question depends on an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Conclusion:

But the response from South Korea and the U.S. has been slow. The two allies conducted an aerial drill on Sunday involving the U.S.' B-1B strategic bomber, but that will not be enough to convince North Korea to scrap its nuclear ambitions. South Korea warned that North Korea will pay a "heavy price" for its provocation, but how heavy is that likely to be? The only way to convince North Korea is for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapon. The time is nearing when no other option is viable.

S.Korea Needs Own Nuclear Arms to Deter N.Korea

english.chosun.com

February 20, 2023 13:27

North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the East Sea on Saturday that flew 900 km at an altitude of around 5,700 km before landing in the ocean near Japan's Hokkaido Island. If fired at a normal angle, the ICBM could have flown 14,000 km to reach any point on the U.S. mainland. The Hwasong-15 ICBM is a liquid-fuel missile that the North has already tested several times, and the latest launch seems to be intended to flaunt the completion of development. The North is also developing solid-fuel ICBMs.

North Korea was thought to be having trouble developing re-entry technology, but it seems to have overcome the problem. Images captured in Japan show the Hwasong-15 reentering the earth's atmosphere relatively intact.

The North claimed the launch was a spontaneous training exercise at the orders of leader Kim Jong-un and took just nine hours and 22 minutes to prepare. But the preparation time could be shortened significantly with a solid-fuel missile, and North Korea's ultimate goal is to arm itself with an arsenal of solid-fuel missiles that would force the U.S. and South Korea to reassess their missile defense system.

North Korea is well on its way to achieving five major weapons development goals that Kim announced in early 2021, including development of a hypersonic missile and an ICBM capable of carrying multiple warheads. The regime aims to complete all five goals by 2026, but it could reach them as early as next year.

But the response from South Korea and the U.S. has been slow. The two allies conducted an aerial drill on Sunday involving the U.S.' B-1B strategic bomber, but that will not be enough to convince North Korea to scrap its nuclear ambitions. South Korea warned that North Korea will pay a "heavy price" for its provocation, but how heavy is that likely to be? The only way to convince North Korea is for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapon. The time is nearing when no other option is viable.

Read this article in Korean

english.chosun.com

11. Remembering Carter’s 1994 Pyongyang peace mission

Many of us thought we were going to war in 1994.

Remembering Carter’s 1994 Pyongyang peace mission

‘We were really close to a war; Jimmy Carter saved us from that,’ said US diplomat Danny Russel

asiatimes.com · by Mike Chinoy · February 21, 2023

With his decision to leave the hospital for final hospice care at his Plains, Georgia, home, 98-year-old Jimmy Carter has ensured his living presence during a major chunk of his memorialization as the United States’ longest-living and, post-White House, highest-achieving former president. Asia Times’ contribution is this memory, shared with our readers by former longtime CNN correspondent Mike Chinoy. -Editors

On June 15, 1994, Jimmy Carter, his wife Rosalynn, and a handful of aides crossed the world’s most volatile frontier. In a half century of tortured relations between Washington and Pyongyang, there had never been a scene like this: a former president of the United States setting foot in North Korea on a mission of peace against a backdrop of growing fears of war.

In the previous month, North Korea had announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, threatened to expel IAEA inspectors and begun removing 8,000 spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. US experts believed the rods, if reprocessed, would provide North Korea enough plutonium for four or five atomic bombs.

The administration of President Bill Clinton accelerated a drive for UN sanctions and began to beef up its military posture in South Korea. Pentagon planners examined options for taking out North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. A second Korean war seemed a frighteningly real possibility.

Jimmy Carter’s successful effort to defuse an exceptionally dangerous crisis remains one of his greatest achievements. I was CNN’s Beijing bureau chief at the time, and my team and I were the only foreign journalists permitted to accompany Carter on his historic visit. CNN’s access was the result of several previous trips, two of which had included meetings with Kim Il Sung.

The most recent had been in April 1994, when my crew and I had been allowed to accompany a group of foreign VIPs organized by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Reunification Church to mark Kim’s 82nd birthday. We were able to videotape Kim’s meeting with the group, in which he talked about the nuclear issue. Kim then hosted us for a memorable lunch, after which I did the first-ever live shot from North Korean TV and included clips of Kim’s comments in my report.

The worldwide impact of that broadcast – at the time, CNN was the only TV network with global reach, and this was the first time the Great Leader had ever spoken for foreign television – appears to have been the key factor in Pyongyang’s decision to grant CNN access for the Carter trip.

“My old friends!” Kim’s gravelly voice boomed out across the vast reception hall of the cavernous Kumsusan Palace, as he held out his hand to greet us. Kim was in good humor, laughing and joking as cameraman Mitch Farkas shot video. Soon after, Carter arrived and, with our camera rolling, the two men warmly shook hands. My crew and I were then ushered out as Carter and Kim began their discussions.

Former US President Jimmy Carter, left, and then-North Korean leader Kim Il Sung talk during the former president’s 1994 trip to the communist country to discuss its nuclear arms program. Photo: JoongAng Ilbo

From the outset, it was clear that Carter understood Kim Il Sung’s almost desperate desire to be treated with respect by the United States.

That night, I finished my live report by noting that “North Korea for years has sought recognition and legitimacy from the United States. To have a former American president here is precisely the kind of gesture the North Koreans have been seeking. Whether that will translate into substantive progress on the nuclear issue, however, is another question.”

Returning to the Koryo Hotel, I found an urgent message from CNN International Editor Eason Jordan, who, along with cameraman Farkas, had accompanied Kim and Carter to a cultural performance, while producer Tim Schwarz and I had handled the transmission. Eason asked us to come to the Presidential Guest House immediately.

Moments after we arrived, Carter walked in, and we helped him get on the phone with CNN, where he told White House correspondent Wolf Blitzer that Kim Il Sung had pledged not to eject international inspectors from North Korea’s nuclear facilities, and to allow continuing monitoring of the Yongbyon complex as long as “good faith efforts” were being made to resolve the crisis.

Describing the move as a positive step, Carter called on the Clinton administration to pull back from its sanctions drive and immediately open high-level talks with Pyongyang.

As I watched Carter announce the breakthrough via telephone on CNN, Clinton and his top national security aides were holding a council of war in the White House situation room, discussing the possibility of sending more troops, planes, and ships to South Korea, even considering a US air raid on the Yongbyon facility. As Carter spoke, the senior officials gathered around a TV set.

Many members of the administration had been uncomfortable with the Carter mission from the start, doubting the wisdom of any self-appointed emissary trying to engage Kim Il Sung while the US was seeking to mobilize world opinion for sanctions – and questioning in particular the suitability of a man who, as president, had often been labeled a weak and ineffective figure.

Now here he was, not only negotiating in public, but apparently securing concessions the administration had itself been unable to achieve. As one senior State Department official later told me, “It was humble pie in living color for Clinton. Through CNN, Carter had jammed the bureaucracy, and gave those arguing for restraint the ammunition they needed.”

The next morning, Eason Jordan and Mitch Farkas accompanied Carter as he went boating with Kim, while I appeared on “Larry King Live,” only to have King interrupt our conversation to do an update about O J Simpson. The North Korean leader took the former president on his official yacht, an opulent vessel with huge picture windows and an all-glass elevator, to continue their talks.

At mid-day, after the two men had spoken for more than three hours, Eason and Mitch returned to the hotel. “You won’t believe what Carter told Kim,” Eason exclaimed. “He announced that the Americans had agreed to stop the sanctions push now. And we have the whole exchange on tape!”

I was astonished. The tape showed Carter stating, “I would like to inform you that they [the US government] have stopped the sanctions activity at the United Nations.”

Carter added that if the North Koreans froze their nuclear program, it was his understanding that the US was also willing to discuss helping North Korea acquire a light-water reactor, which would produce much less plutonium than the old, Soviet-model graphite-based reactors the North Koreans were currently using.

Suddenly, the elements of a compromise appeared to be taking shape. But our report on Carter’s statement triggered a firestorm of controversy.

Moments after it aired, angry and embarrassed administration officials insisted that Carter was wrong, and that the US had not dropped its sanctions bid. A few hours later, a flustered-looking President Clinton made the same point in front of TV cameras.

Nonetheless, before leaving Pyongyang, Carter told me he was confident he had made major progress. And he reiterated the importance of direct dealings with Kim Il Sung. “You have to have direct communication with the only man in the country who can make a decision,” he insisted.

Carter and Kim in Pyongyang. Photo: Al Jazeera

The North Koreans were pleased as well. Before we set off for the TV station for our final transmission, a senior official on Kim Il Sung’s staff, with great solemnity, gave each member of the CNN team a lapel button of the Great Leader.

“I better not wear this on air,” I joked to Eason Jordan. “There are probably a lot of people who already think we are dupes of the North Koreans just for being here.”

The next day, Carter arrived in Seoul with another bombshell – a proposal from Kim Il Sung for a face-to-face meeting with his arch-rival, South Korean president Kim Young-sam.

Had Carter not been able to convince the South Korean leader to agree, his whole mission risked failure. But the former president, using the same combination of sincerity, persistence and respect that he had employed in Pyongyang, was able to transform a suspicious and alarmed Kim Young-sam into a receptive and cooperative partner. Immediately after meeting Carter, the South Korean president accepted Kim Il Sung’s offer of talks.

Confronted with a barrage of criticism for his on-air comments in Pyongyang, Carter backtracked on what he had said in our presence about sanctions, telling reporters that he was only expressing a “personal opinion” that the sanctions bid would be halted. “I regret the misunderstanding,” he announced. “It was my fault.”

But in fact, it seems clear Carter was playing a complicated game, seeking to circumvent what he viewed as a mistaken and dangerous US policy by pulling the elements of a nuclear deal together himself. He may well have misspoken, but it was equally possible that he was trying to “create his own reality,” deliberately exceeding administration guidelines to elicit more concessions from Kim Il Sung and buttress his case for a compromise solution.

It was here that CNN’s role – the fact that Carter’s statements were captured on camera and transmitted and broadcast almost instantaneously – changed the entire dynamic of diplomacy.

The whole world knew what Carter had said and done at the same time as the key policymakers in Washington and other capitals became aware of his actions. Detailed consultations were no longer possible before senior American and South Korean officials were forced to respond.

The result was that in the 48 hours immediately after our controversial broadcast, it was possible to see an almost hour-by-hour evolution in US policy towards North Korea taking place on CNN’s air. As the impact of the concessions Carter had secured in Pyongyang sank in, the tone of officials from President Clinton on down shifted from calling for UN sanctions to welcoming new high-level negotiations.

For all the criticism of Carter’s role, it quickly became clear that the former president’s intervention had halted a dangerous slide toward confrontation.

Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack three weeks after the Carter visit. He was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il. But four months later, building on the momentum Carter had created, the US and North Korea signed an agreement in Geneva intended to pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis.

Although it ultimately unraveled during the administration of George W Bush, the 1994 Agreed Framework did lead to a freeze in North Korea’s plutonium program that lasted almost a decade, and to a slow thaw in relations that climaxed in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 The shadow of war over the Korean peninsula – for a time, at least – receded.

Shortly after the Carter trip, I spoke with Danny Russel, then a diplomat specializing in North Korea at the US Embassy in Seoul and later President Barack Obama’s assistant secretary of state for East Asia. “We were right at the edge of the cliff,” Russel told me. “We were really close to a war. Jimmy Carter saved us from that.”

The author meeting Kim Il Sung in 1992. Photo courtesy of Mike Chinoy

Mike Chinoy is a non-resident senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s US-China Institute. He spent 24 years as a foreign correspondent for CNN and visited North Korea 17 times. He is the author of China Live: People Power and the Television Revolution, from which portions of this article are drawn, as well as Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. His latest book is Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People’s Republic.

asiatimes.com · by Mike Chinoy · February 21, 2023

12. Failure of US North Korea policy is a bipartisan affair - Responsible Statecraft

A review of Sig Hecker's new book from the Quincy Institute.

All the critiques of every US presidential administration rest on the assumption that Kim Jong Un (and his father and grandfather) can be negotiated with and will give up nuclear weapons with the right incentive. Again, that indicates a lack of understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Conclusion:

“Hinge Points”is a detailed and extensive account of how North Korea became the world’s eighth declared nuclear weapons state. The Biden administration should heed its warnings and learn from the mistakes of its predecessors so that it does not make more bad choices with bad consequences.

Failure of US North Korea policy is a bipartisan affair - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Daniel Larison · February 20, 2023

North Korea

Failure of US North Korea policy is a bipartisan affair

A new book analyzes the many ‘hinge points,’ particularly during the Obama years, that could have produced better outcomes.

February 20, 2023

Written by

Daniel Larison

Failure of US North Korea policy is a bipartisan affair

U.S. North Korea policy has been failing for decades under administrations of both parties. Since the turn of the century, North Korea has gone from having no nuclear weapons to having several dozen and the increasingly effective means of delivering them, and it has done this despite the insistence of the United States and its allies that this outcome is unacceptable.

There is no policy that cries out for revisiting core assumptions and learning from past failures than the policy that has aimed at blocking and then reversing North Korea’s nuclearization. Fortunately, there is a new book, “Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” that provides guidance on where Washington went wrong and how it may still be able to correct course.

The author, Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, argues that the United States failed to prevent the growth of North Korea’s arsenal by making the wrong choices at critical moments, or “hinge points,” when Washington erred in not properly assessing the risks of disengagement and walking away from agreements, and by relying too much on pressure tactics. Hecker is unsparing in his criticisms of the bad policy choices he identifies, but he delivers his assessments in a sober, matter-of-fact way. He faults each administration for its mistakes regardless of party affiliation.

The key flaws of U.S. policy in Hecker’s view were in repeatedly failing to do technically informed risk/benefit analysis and failing to understand North Korea’s dual-track approach to diplomacy and to building up its nuclear program. The United States did not appreciate that North Korea gave priority to one track or the other depending on circumstances, and thus failed to take advantage of North Korean openings. As Hecker puts it, “[Washington] ruled out a political middle ground by forcing Pyongyang early on to choose between diplomacy or the nuclear program.”

Hecker’s account offers valuable insights into the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and into the policy decisions made in Washington over the last 20 years. As a technical expert who traveled many times to see North Korean nuclear facilities with a delegation involved in Track 2 diplomacy, he has an important perspective on the emergence of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and the failings of U.S. policy in curbing it.

Time after time, the United States accepted greater risk of a growing North Korean arsenal rather than taking a chance on imperfect but important limitations on North Korea’s capabilities. Hecker does not make this direct comparison in the book, but we have seen a similar dynamic in the debate over the nuclear deal with Iran for years. In that debate, opponents have obsessed over alleged weaknesses in the deal and use them as an excuse to destroy the entire agreement. Conjuring up distant future proliferation dangers, critics of an existing agreement tore down the barriers to proliferation in the present.

Beginning with the Bush administration’s decision to abandon the Agreed Framework, the United States missed opportunities that would have constrained North Korea’s program even if it would not have eliminated it. Hecker rightly judges the decision to break the Agreed Framework as the most significant of the hinge points. He pins the blame squarely on hardliners in the Bush administration, including John Bolton in particular: “Bolton’s hammer [to smash the Framework] gave us the North’s bombs.”

If the United States had been willing to settle for getting something with North Korea at any one of these hinge points, it would have been better off and in a better position to make additional diplomatic gains down the road. The recurring pattern at each of the hinge points in every administration was that Washington opted for inflexibility and hardline demands when there were opportunities to find limited but workable compromises that could have served as the foundation for further diplomatic progress.

At each hinge point, there was a chance for U.S.-North Korean relations to improve, or at least to stabilize, and because the United States kept choosing poorly the relationship deteriorated and North Korea’s arsenal continued to grow larger and more dangerous. In some cases, this was the result of deliberate sabotage by hardliners inside the administration, as it was with Bolton under both Bush and Trump, and in others it was the result of neglect and an unwillingness to respond to North Korean offers because of hardened mistrust.

The first half of the book focuses on the seven visits to North Korea that Hecker made along with his colleagues. The ability of his private group to visit and get important technical information about North Korean facilities over several years is a testament to the value of Track 2 diplomacy and to the benefits that can come from regular contacts between our two countries.

The history of U.S.-North Korean relations over the last 20 years shows that the United States and its allies would have been far better off if they had been engaging more frequently and more consistently than they did, and it is at least possible that they would have been able to obtain more concessions from North Korea on the nuclear issue if they had been willing to accept limited gains instead of chasing after the distant goal of denuclearization.

While Hecker holds every administration accountable for its mistakes, his account of the Obama administration’s failures is in some ways the most scathing because he holds it responsible for having flubbed three of the six critical moments that he identifies. He concludes that “the consequences of [Obama’s] inaction on North Korea turned out to be one of his biggest foreign policy failures — one that made the world a much more dangerous place.” It is perhaps not a surprise then that Obama and his officials have almost nothing to say about North Korea in their respective memoirs, as Hecker notes in his last chapter on the Obama years.

The contrast between Obama’s relative neglect of North Korea and his deep involvement in securing a nonproliferation agreement with Iran was “stark,” as Hecker puts it, and this makes Obama’s North Korea policy that much more puzzling to him. Obama was very interested in issues of arms control and nonproliferation before and during his presidency, and his focus on these issues led him to some of his most significant foreign policy achievements.

Maybe Obama assumed that negotiating with Iran was a better use of his time because the Iranian government had not crossed the line of leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty and testing nuclear weapons, as North Korea had, and an agreement to keep Iran from crossing those lines would have been easier to get than to negotiate one to reverse nuclearization that had already happened. Perhaps he concluded that the damage was already done and there was little to do except wait with so-called strategic patience. Regardless, he perpetuated a failed policy and delivered a worse situation to his successor than the one he had inherited.

“Hinge Points”is a detailed and extensive account of how North Korea became the world’s eighth declared nuclear weapons state. The Biden administration should heed its warnings and learn from the mistakes of its predecessors so that it does not make more bad choices with bad consequences.

Written by

Daniel Larison

13. Thefts of farm machinery parts on the rise ahead of spring farming season

Possibly a critical indicator of the severe situation in the north. Is internal instability on the horizon?

Thefts of farm machinery parts on the rise ahead of spring farming season

“Farms have recently been mobilizing young farmers to steal tires, bearings, storage batteries and other crucial parts from other farms,” a source told Daily NK

By Mun Dong Hui - 2023.02.20 5:00pm

dailynk.com

North Korean farmers conducting the fall harvest in Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province. (Rodong Sinmun)

Thefts of parts for tractors and rice transplanter machines are occuring while preparations for farm machinery inauguration ceremonies are underway, a source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK last Tuesday.

“Because farms can’t find the parts they need even in markets, the only thing they can do is steal them,” he said.

North Korea holds farm machinery inauguration ceremonies ahead of the annual rice planting for farmers to pledge to do their best during the farming season.

However, the farm machinery exhibited during these ceremonies sometimes fail to work properly.

This year, to prevent such embarrassments from happening, farm machinery is being repaired and serviced ahead of the ceremonies. However, with needed parts hard to come by, more and more people involved in the ceremonies are simply stealing what they need.

In fact, shortages of parts for farm machinery is nothing new in North Korea.

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has had difficulty getting parts it needs due to the border closure and resulting economic troubles, making the repair and servicing of farm machinery all the more difficult.

This situation has led to a vicious cycle of neighbors stealing each other’s farm machinery parts, yet North Korean authorities are doing nothing about it.

“Farms have recently been mobilizing young farmers to steal tires, bearings, storage batteries and other crucial parts from other farms,” the source told Daily NK.

“There has been an uproar since a crew of thieves from Sangpal Farm in Mundok County, South Pyongan Province got arrested as they were ripping off Ripsok Farm and Ryongnim Farm.”

Article 91 of North Korea’s criminal code calls for terms of short-term labor of up to one year for theft of property of the state or social collective organizations.

The same article calls for terms of “reform through labor” for up to four years if large amounts of property are stolen, and terms of four to nine years of reform through labor if “especially large amounts” of property are stolen.

Equipment used by farms is state property, so the authorities naturally treat the stealing of farm machinery parts as theft of state property.

However, in the case of the thefts in Mundok County, exactly how the culprits were punished remains unknown.

Rodong Sinmun reported in a front page article last Tuesday that 15,000 tractors and about 8,000 rice transplanter machines had been repaired, and that the results were “growing by the day.”

In a page five article from Feb. 7, the same paper said officials were working hard to ensure the supply of needed parts at Namdong Farm in Pyongwon County.

“Of course, many things are in short supply,” the article said, adding, “However, [farmers] are resolving the problems by themselves by utilizing each other’s strengths and wisdom.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

14. Researching North Korea online? You could be victim of a malware attack

Beware.

Researching North Korea online? You could be victim of a malware attack

techradar.com · by Sead Fadilpašić · February 20, 2023

People with an interest in all things North Korea are being targeted with a very specific malware.

Cybersecurity researchers from Trend Micro (opens in new tab) (via BleepingComputer) have recently observed Earth Kitsune, a nascent threat actor, breaching a pro-North Korea website, and then using that site to deliver a backdoor dubbed WhiskerSpy.

The malware allows the threat actors to steal files, take screenshots, and deploy additional malware to the compromised endpoint.

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WhisperSpy malware

According to the researchers, when certain people visit the website and look to run video content, they’ll be prompted to install a video codec first. Those that fall for the trick would download a modified version of a legitimate codec (Codec-AVC1.msi), which installs the WhiskerSpy backdoor.

The backdoor grants the threat actors a number of different capabilities, including downloading files to the compromised endpoint, uploading files, deleting them, listing them, taking screenshots, loading executables and calling its export, and injecting shellcode into processes.

The backdoor then communicates with the malware's command and control (C2) server, using a 16-byte AES encryption key.

But not all visitors are at risk. In fact, chances are that only a small portion of the visitors are being targeted, as Trend Micro discovered that the backdoor only activates when visitors from Shenyang, China, or Nagoya, Japan, open the site.

> North Korean hackers target phones, Windows devices with new malware (opens in new tab)

> FBI confirms North Korean Lazarus Group was behind major Harmony crypto heist (opens in new tab)

> We've also listed the best endpoint protection services around (opens in new tab)

Truth be told, people from Brazil would also be prompted to download the backdoor, but researchers believe Brazil was only used to test if the attack works or not.

After all, the researchers found the IP addresses in Brazil belonged to a commercial VPN service.

Once installed, the malware goes to lengths to persist on the device. Apparently, Earth Kitsune uses the native messaging host in Google’s Chrome browser to install a malicious extension called Google Chrome Helper. This extension would run the payload every time the browser starts.

Here's our rundown of the best firewalls right now

techradar.com · by Sead Fadilpašić · February 20, 2023

15. U.S. must field space-based kill capabilities to deter enemies

U.S. must field space-based kill capabilities to deter enemies

By Robert Joseph - - Monday, February 20, 2023

washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

OPINION:

The missile threat from North Korea is rapidly outpacing our planned response in both numbers and sophistication. We must deploy advanced capabilities in space if we are to meet our national security requirements. The greatest obstacle to moving forward is ideology, not technology or affordability. Failing to act will leave the United States open to nuclear blackmail and attack.

Earlier this month, Kim Jong Un presided over yet another military parade, this time to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army. The most prominent weapons on display were the intercontinental range ballistic missiles with the ability to strike anywhere on the U.S. homeland.

These included at least 11 Hwasong 17 missiles on transportable erector launchers and five other launchers with canisters reportedly representing mock-ups of solid fueled long-range missiles currently under development. Once fielded, these missiles will represent a major advancement in the threat as their greater mobility will significantly complicate the targeting challenge to destroy them on the ground — left of launch, in Pentagonese. In turn, their improved survivability will place even more reliance on the ability to intercept these missiles in flight.

U.S. intelligence agencies will be keen to assess the implications of the weapons Pyongyang has shown the world. The fact that both the Hwasong 17 and the canisterized mockups have been seen before should not lead to the conclusion that their appearance is just for show. Instead, the numbers and types of missiles observed is further evidence that the North is aggressively expanding its missile force sufficient to overwhelm American defenses, a stated goal of the Kim regime.

In December, Pyongyang announced that the latest solid rocket motor test was successful. And in the past year, the North has conducted a record number of ballistic missile tests of all ranges. Accompanying the growth in the missile threat is an equally rapid increase in the North’s nuclear weapons arsenal, with Western estimates predicting that North Korea could have in excess of 200 warheads in the next four years.

This unprecedented expansion of the North’s capabilities to hold American cities hostage puts enormous pressure on U.S. missile defenses to protect the homeland. These defenses were designed 20 years ago for a different threat, to intercept “handfuls of missiles,” not the much larger force being built by North Korea.

The key questions are: Can the next-generation interceptors currently being developed keep pace with the emerging threat, particularly as the threat continues to accelerate both quantitatively and qualitatively? Would adding more of these new interceptors, even with multiple kill capabilities, be an effective and executable option, or would it simply extend obsolescence? While many of the operational capabilities of the next-generation interceptor are classified, we now know enough about the threat to question the efficacy of the program of record in meeting the threat. Simply put, unless we pursue further advanced capabilities, the missile threat from North Korea will outpace the U.S. ability to defend against it.

Moreover, the question of missile defense requirements reaches beyond the need to defend against North Korea. Given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated threats of limited nuclear strikes and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s military buildup in preparation for war against Taiwan, we need to reassess the role of defenses in deterring their coercive threats, as well as the capabilities needed to achieve this objective.

To strengthen deterrence of Moscow and Beijing from threatening and executing such attacks, it is not necessary to create an impenetrable shield capable of intercepting every Russian and Chinese ballistic and hypersonic missile. Rather, the goal should be to strengthen deterrence through defenses that increase the uncertainties in the calculations of the attacker — to undermine his confidence that he will achieve the attack’s objectives. Again, the current U.S. response is neither designed for nor capable of countering the threat.

To defend against North Korea and Iran in the future and to deter Russian and Chinese coercive attacks, the United States must field space-based capabilities, including space-based kill capabilities. While past Republican and Democratic administrations have favored ground- and sea-based capabilities, the threat has fundamentally changed. Today, a space-kill capability has become a critical component of the layered missile defense architecture. It is technologically feasible and affordable and the only means to provide an effective boost phase defense needed to defeat present and emerging threats.

Ground- and sea-based interceptors cannot substitute for space-based assets as they cannot be cost-effectively scaled to counter the threats. In the meantime, while space-based capabilities are developed, ground- and sea-based interceptors should be upgraded to improve reliability and operational effectiveness. Promising airborne boost phase capabilities should also be pursued. These can serve as an interim hedge against the threat and a supplement to the space-based force in the future.

As far as the United States is concerned, the Biden administration will almost certainly oppose any effort to deploy advanced missile defenses in space out of misplaced concern about militarizing space. This ideological resistance ignores the actions of Russia and China, both of whom are deploying advanced space and counterspace capabilities. But Congress, as it has done in the past, can act by first funding the development and testing of critical capabilities, such as sensors, that will provide key elements of the infrastructure for a U.S. space-based system. This will allow a new president to accelerate the fielding of the missile defenses essential to meet our national security deterrence and defense requirements.

• Robert Joseph served as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security in the George W. Bush administration.

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washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

16. Interview: Siegfried Hecker on two decades of missed chances to deal with North Korea's nuclear program

Interview: Siegfried Hecker on two decades of missed chances to deal with North Korea's nuclear program

thebulletin.org · by John Mecklin · February 20, 2023

Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un shake hands at the Hanoi Summit in Vietnam, February 27, 2019. Photo credit: White House

From early 2004 until late 2010, former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker had unparalleled access to North Korean nuclear facilities and scientists and officials connected to them. During his many visits, taken with other scientists and scholars as a private citizen but with the knowledge of the US government, Hecker had a few nearly shocking experiences; at one point, he was shown a half-pound piece of plutonium in North Korea’s Radiochemical Laboratory, apparently to document, for the world, the North’s nuclear accomplishments. He also gained a nuanced appreciation for North Korea’s negotiating strategy vis-a-vis the United States. That dual-track strategy—within which North Korean leaders simultaneously pursued a nuclear weapons capability and some form of rapprochement with the United States—serves as a through-line in Hecker’s new book, Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program.

Via his visits to the North and subsequent research outside the country, Hecker came to believe that the standard US narrative about its various failed attempts to negotiate an end to the North Korean nuclear program was seriously askew. That US narrative portrays North Korea as unreliable, a serial violator of diplomatic agreements, a country that uses provocations to extort rewards from the West. Instead, Hecker found that the story of the growth of North Korea’s

nuclear arsenal in the 21st century can more accurately be told as a series of missed opportunities—what he calls “hinge points”—when diplomatic openings that could have led to controls on the North’s nuclear program were undermined, sometimes by Pyongyang but at least as often (and perhaps more consequentially) by Washington.

I spoke with Hecker (who is also chair of the Bulletin’s Board of Sponsors) at some length about his book and how three successive US presidential administrations failed to take advantage of an apparent willingness by the North Koreans to accept a fundamentally new relationship with the United States—along with significant controls on their nuclear program. Those failures, Hecker said, center on the US government’s unwillingness to make what he calls “technically informed risk-management decisions.”

Editor’s note: This interview has been edited for length and clarity. An excerpt from Hinge Points can be read here.

John Mecklin: Your book, which I enjoyed a great deal, goes through a whole series of missed opportunities with North Korea that you call hinge points. I know you can’t go through all of them, because there were a lot, through history. But why don’t you go through one or two to give our readers a flavor of what you were talking about, in terms of what a hinge point is?

Siegfried Hecker: It’s a turning point where key decisions have serious consequences. These typically followed advances in North Korea’s nuclear enterprise—what Washington called provocations. Examples are missile or satellite launches, or the discovery of a covert uranium enrichment program. In the book, I describe that, at such key hinge points, the US government unfortunately did not make technically informed risk-management decisions.

The first big hinge point was at the beginning of the [George W.] Bush administration—at a meeting in October of 2002. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly made the first Bush administration visit to Pyongyang. During the summer, the administration was made aware that North Korea was pursuing, clandestinely, a uranium enrichment centrifuge program, the second path to the bomb [the first path involving plutonium].

This was during the Agreed Framework, a Clinton-era deal that was consummated in 1994, in which North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium production complex. In return, the US would provide two light-water nuclear reactors for the production of electricity. These would be paid for primarily by South Korea and Japan. The North Koreans did shut down their small plutonium-production reactor and the entire Yongbyon nuclear complex in 1994 in return for the promise of two light-water reactors.

When the Bush administration got word of North Korea’s clandestine efforts to develop uranium centrifuges, it confronted the North Koreans at the October 2002 meeting. In the book, I describe how the Americans walked away from the deal. John Bolton later said the uranium enrichment revelations were the hammer he needed to shatter the Agreed Framework. It was a hinge point because it had disastrous consequences. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, restarted the Yongbyon nuclear complex, built the bomb, and a few years later tested one.

Mecklin: Let me play just a little bit of devil’s advocate. Throughout the book, you say better integration of technical analysis would allow a rational, cost-benefit kind of assessment of dealing with North Korea. But they really did lie about uranium enrichment. Would better analysis of any kind affect the kind of hawkish people like [former State Department official and later national security adviser] John Bolton, who can pop in and ruin negotiations like this?

Hecker: You are right. Bolton was determined to kill the Clinton-era Agreed Framework because they believed it to be fatally flawed. North Korea, they asserted, should never be allowed to have a civilian nuclear program. There was no need for a risk-benefit analysis because there were no benefits in dealing with them. They believed the country shouldn’t even exist.

Mecklin: But you state in the book that they should have looked at the tradeoffs before they walked away.

Hecker: Absolutely, because without assessing the technical risks of walking away, their decision put North Korea on a fast track to build the bomb. When Bush came into office, North Korea had no nuclear weapons. The plutonium path to the bomb was frozen, because the Yongbyon nuclear complex had been shut down since 1994. They were, indeed, covertly pursuing a nascent uranium enrichment program.

John Bolton’s view was, they cheated, and we hammered them. In the book, I explain what they got in return. North Korea expelled the international inspectors and American technical teams and restarted the nuclear reactor to make more plutonium. They removed the used reactor fuel rods that had been stored in a spent fuel pool for eight years and extracted some 25 to 30 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, enough for five or six bombs. They built the bomb and tested a nuclear device in October 2006. As for the uranium centrifuge program, they had greater freedom to scale it up.

The bottom line was that the Bush administration, which was determined to get tough on North Korea to keep it from the bomb, left office with North Korea likely possessing five bombs or so.

Mecklin: There were a couple of attempts during the last two years of the Bush administration to restart negotiations, but they didn’t really work. You state in the book that North Korea had a dual-track strategy. Was North Korea ever really serious about diplomacy?

Hecker: Yes, as the North’s political support collapsed at the end of the Cold War, Kim Il-sung decided it was better to seek strategic accommodation with the United States. The Russians had deserted them after the breakup of the Soviet Union. China, which the North always felt wielded a heavy hand in its support, decided to recognize South Korea as well. North Korea’s economy was collapsing, and Kim sought normalization with Washington to improve its external security environment and focus on the country’s dire economic situation.

Triple threat: Russia, Iran, and North Korea trade arms to get around sanctions

The dual-track strategy that Kim, and later his son and grandson, pursued was to engage in diplomacy plus nuclear development—variously emphasizing one or the other but never completely abandoning either. Which one was prioritized depended on the external environment, the domestic situation, and their technical advances. Even during times of diplomacy, they hedged with continued nuclear developments because they were never certain that the US would follow through on its commitments. These, in turn, often led to the hinge points I describe.

The Bush administration did attempt diplomacy a couple of times during its second term, but it remained largely mired in indecision, repeatedly short-circuiting itself. That happened in September 2005 when the United States signed the Six-Party agreement but immediately issued a unilateral statement that walked back key provisions. North Korea responded with the nuclear test in 2006. Following the test, the administration again returned to diplomacy in 2007 and 2008 with Ambassador Chris Hill. I witnessed some of the disablement actions the North Koreans took in the Yongbyon nuclear complex in those years, but in the end, time ran out.

Mecklin: When Obama came in, one would think that the difference in political point of view would have made a difference, that there could have been some sort of meeting of minds during the Obama years. But there wasn’t. Why is that? What happened?

Hecker: I don’t know, but perhaps someday when North Korea opens up its archives, we’ll get the real answer. I expected President Obama to pursue greater diplomatic outreach to North Korea in the spirit of his early pronouncement to countries like Iran and North Korea, “I will reach out my hand if you unclench your fist.” Instead, the North Koreans greeted Obama with a rocket launch on April 4, the day before his famous Prague disarmament speech.

Near the end of Bush’s term, in August 2008, the game had changed because Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke. With Kim’s life in danger, the North’s decision making was driven by putting succession planning on strong footing. That likely included having to demonstrate a credible deterrent with a second nuclear test, since the first one didn’t work so well. Obama considered that part of Pyongyang’s play book—a cycle of provocation, extortion, and reward—which he was determined to end.

He responded by orchestrating a UN Security Council condemnation of the launch. That was just what Pyongyang expected, which it used as a pretext to move its nuclear program forward. It expelled the international inspectors and Americans who had been allowed back in the nuclear complex during the last two years of Bush administration diplomacy. It restored the disabled Yongbyon facilities to their original state. And, six weeks later, Pyongyang detonated its second nuclear device, this one successfully. It was another hinge point.

Mecklin: You also wrote about a Leap Day hinge point. Can you explain?

Hecker: On February 29, 2012, the Obama administration struck its first deal with the North. It would have frozen the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which by then also housed a uranium centrifuge facility that the North Koreans showed me and Stanford University colleagues in late 2010. It also called for a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. The deal was negotiated during Kim Jong-il’s reign and signed by Kim Jong-un after his father’s death in December 2011.

But the two sides had different understandings of what constituted a missile test. Two weeks after the Leap Day signing, Pyongyang attempted to launch an Earth observation satellite, which they claimed was permitted. The Obama administration viewed that as a disguised missile test and walked away. To them it proved that Pyongyang was not a reliable negotiating partner—which lasted to the end of the administration. By walking away, the Americans remained locked out of Yongbyon, and the North Koreans stepped up their nuclear program to have enough bomb fuel for 25 nuclear weapons by the time Obama left office. It was another hinge point.

Mecklin: Not to rush too quickly through the Obama years, but the overview of all of this is a whole series of presidents failed to really make progress. But when Donald Trump came into office, everybody thought, “Oh, this is terrible. This is just going to get terrible with North Korea.” And for a while it did, but actually he did some things that I think you assessed fairly positively in the book. And I was just wondering: Can you take us through the hinge points in the Trump era?

Hecker: As you said, President Trump’s first year—2017— was probably the most dangerous year with North Korea. When Trump threatened Kim Jong-un with “fire and fury,” they likely had an arsenal of more than 25 nuclear weapons and a much more potent missile force with the means to destroy a good part of South Korea and/or Japan. However, the point I make in the book is that each of the Kims had a serious interest in diplomacy to seek diplomatic accommodation with the United States. I demonstrate that, in the latter half of 2017, going into 2018, Kim Jong-un also turned in that direction. Trump reciprocated after the fire-and-fury comment, and after calling Kim Jong-un the “little rocket man.”

By this time, Kim Jong-un had tested what was likely a hydrogen bomb, more than 200 kilotons of yield, their sixth nuclear test. He fired an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States, although it was done in a lofted trajectory. At the time of this enormously dangerous situation, both decided to try diplomacy. They did so in Singapore at their first summit in June of 2018. In the book, I give Trump credit for reaching out and doing just that—setting the stage.

When Trump and Kim Jong-un sat down in Singapore, they laid out the right framework, although without details, to achieve both normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea—which is what North Korea had been wanting for the better part of 30 years—and denuclearization. It was to be a path for North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons toward a nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula. They instructed their people to develop the steps to move in that direction.

Trump was widely criticized for giving Kim Jong-un the visibility on the international stage to meet with the US president. I thought it was precisely the right thing to do. Before the Singapore summit, we knew so little about Kim Jong-un. Here was a guy who had his finger on the nuclear button, and we knew almost nothing about him. We knew even less about his military.

We learned a lot more about Kim Jong-un at the summit. In the book, I show in detail how both sides failed between Singapore and the February 2019 Hanoi Summit. They should have been able to agree on steps the United States would take toward normalization and steps North Korea needed to take to denuclearize. Both Trump and Kim Jong-un erred by not doing so.

Trump, in my opinion, let himself be influenced by John Bolton not to make a deal. This isn’t just my opinion; John Bolton explains in his book that he was quite proud of it, actually. He convinced Trump that it was better for him to walk away. Kim Jong-un made the mistake that he did not allow his diplomats to work with US special envoy to North Korea Steve Biegun, a very accomplished diplomat working under Trump, to negotiate these details before the summit so that positive steps could be taking taken at Hanoi.

Why US policy on North Korea should prioritize nonproliferation, not denuclearization

So, they both made these mistakes. But the bottom line, the hinge point, is Trump walked away. He said he hoped to keep good relationships with Kim Jong-un. But for Kim, it was an enormous embarrassment. When Trump returned home, he was congratulated by both sides of the political spectrum for walking away. It was said that no deal was better than a bad deal. It was generally believed that Kim did not offer enough to get the kind of sanctions relief he was apparently requesting. Yet I believe that Kim was willing to take big steps to scale back the nuclear weapons program, although he told Trump it couldn’t be done all at once and had to be done in parallel with US steps toward normalization. These steps included shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear complex again. In one of Kim’s letters to Trump, he also offered to shut down the Nuclear Weapons Institute.

Mecklin: That was my question. Did they really not understand what was offered?

Hecker: In most likelihood, Bolton understood, but as he stated in his book, he did not want any deal with North Korea. The Yongbyon complex was called old and used up by critics of a deal, but it wasn’t. The Nuclear Weapons Institute, as I’ve tried to explain in the book, is their Los Alamos, their Lawrence Livermore laboratory, the brain center of their nuclear weapons program. If you take away Los Alamos and Livermore in the US program, you don’t have nuclear weapons for the future.

All these things were in play at Hanoi, but Trump didn’t pursue them. Instead he walked away. Would these have led to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? The answer is, we don’t know. It would have taken a lot of work to get there. But what I’ve tried to explain is that, at each hinge point, we were in a position to take the risk to see how far we can get. Whether it would have been possible required a technically informed risk/benefit analysis. Instead, the decisions were made strictly on a political basis—in Trump’s case, because it looked better for him. As I show in the book, in each case the North Koreans took advantage of the Americans walking away to beef up their nuclear and missile programs. These were a disaster for our country.

Mecklin: That disaster has had implications up to the current day. I can’t perceive that there’s much if any actual focus in the Biden administration on North Korea right now. But I’m going to appoint you as President Biden’s lead advisor right now. What would you tell them about what we ought to be doing regarding North Korea now, given this history that you’ve lived through?

Hecker: Let me start with the ramifications of Hanoi for today. Kim Jong-un walked away greatly embarrassed. I wrote a piece right after the Hanoi Summit to counter those people who said Trump was right to walk away, and I said, “Was he really?” I described the concerns I had.

Since then, Pyongyang has again put its nuclear program at the top of its priorities. Diplomacy was not only put on the back burner, but it appears Kim has disengaged from Washington. Trump tried again after Hanoi. He met Kim Jong-un at the DMZ; but it was too late. And then the pandemic hit, which also made it more difficult to get back together.

I have worked with every administration since I first went to North Korea in 2004. It didn’t matter whether they were Republican or Democrat; I was trying to help them, to provide technical input and share what I had learned. Shortly after the elections, I gave my input to the Biden administration. It was talk to Kim quickly to see if they could change the game.

One of the game-changers that I suggested was to drop Washington’s refusal to allow North Korea to have civilian nuclear and space programs. The technical risks of such programs were manageable. The political benefits would flow from the fact that it would demonstrate to North Korea that we are taking their concerns seriously. I suggested that we engage the North Koreans in what I called cooperative conversion—that is, together work with them to convert their military nuclear and missile programs to civilian programs. By doing it together, step by step, we could do it in a verifiable manner.

But like every administration, they took many months to do a North Korea policy review while the opportunity for re-engagement slipped away. At the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which Hanoi Summit critics called “used up,” North Korea continued to produce more highly enriched uranium and restarted the 5-megawatt electric nuclear reactor to produce more plutonium and tritium, required for much more destructive hydrogen bombs. They increased the pace of missile development and last year conducted a record number of missile launches. Pyongyang matched the technical advances with more aggressive nuclear weapons postures.

My greatest concern is that following the February 4, 2022, Xi–Putin summit in China, North Korea moved away from the United States and closer to both Russia and China. Every indication since, including Pyongyang’s open support of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, is that Kim Jong-un has given up on North Korea’s 30-year quest of serious diplomacy with Washington to seek normalization with the United States.

So today we’re in a situation where the North Koreans aren’t interested. I don’t think there’s much we can do right now. It is a pity that the Biden administration has paid so little attention to North Korea in its first two years. At least, it has underscored the strength of its alliance with the South. That’s where we are.

One ray of hope is that the North Koreans tend to be pragmatic and quick on their feet to adapt to changing circumstances. Should Russia continue to fare poorly in Ukraine, and should North Korea’s economy continue to suffer—be it because like the Soviet Union, it spent too much on defense or because of the lingering effects of the COVID pandemic—will Washington be ready if Kim Jong-un turns back to diplomacy? Kim Jong-un knows that to revive the North’s economy he needs a change for the better in the external security environment—for that he must push for a less hostile relationship with the United States.

I think the administration needs to be prepared with something different than what the previous three administrations did. It needs to learn from the mistakes of the past. The book provides many lessons learned from those mistakes. Over the years, North Korea’s position has strengthened, not weakened. For Washington, even the first steps toward denuclearization have become longer and more difficult. We’ve had the opportunities before when it was easier. Now, it’s going to be really difficult.

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thebulletin.org · by John Mecklin · February 20, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

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Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

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V/R

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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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