Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Don’t be in such a hurry to condemn a person because he doesn’t do what you do, or think as you think or as fast. There was a time when you didn’t know what you know today.”

- Malcolm X

“Even totalitarianism did not become totalitarianism in one big step. The totalitarians started out demonizing their victims and then playing fast and loose with the laws to crack down on them. That is what is being done now by those who are demonizing for dollars. The communists demonized the capitalists, the Nazis demonized the Jews, and other opportunists have demonized whoever was handy."

- Dean Kalahar, The best of Thomas Sowell

“None of us today need feel any urge, in the name of good will, to downplay our differences. On the contrary, in a certain sense we can be proud of our differences, because they arise from good will itself---for love of country; for concern for the challenges of our time; from respect for, and yes, even outright enjoyment of, the democratic processes of disagreement and debate. Today our very differences attest to the greatness of our nation. For I can think of no country on Earth where two political leaders could disagree so widely yet come together in mutual respect. To paraphrase Mr. Jefferson: We are all Democrats, we are all Republicans, because we are all Americans.”

-Ronald Reagan in a speech at the opening of the Carter Presidential Center in 1986

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2023

2. 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

3. U.S. Human-Rights Report Cites Allies and Adversaries

4. Japanese leader arrives in Kyiv as China's Xi visits Russia

5. World on 'thin ice' as UN climate report gives stark warning

6. The doomers are wrong about humanity’s future — and its past

7. Don’t Panic About Taiwan

8. This Week, Fort Pickett Will Replace Its Confederate Name, a First for an Army Base Following Renaming Commission

9. Special Operations News Update - March 20, 2023 | SOF News

10. Taiwan’s president to visit U.S., raising prospect of friction with China

11. I Supported the Invasion of Iraq by Tom Nichols ·

12. Explaining China’s Diplomatic Strategy on Ukraine

13. 20 Years After The Invasion Of Iraq, Americans Still Want The U.S. Involved In World Affairs

14. U.S. Intel Helped India Rout China in 2022 Border Clash: Sources

15. How the Ukraine War Accelerates the Defense Strategy

16. Fighting Autocracy Means Fighting Corruption

17. Maritime Sabotage: Protecting Europe’s Soft Underbelly

18. The state of the U.S. Navy as China builds up its naval force and threatens Taiwan

19. 20 Years Later, Terrorism Simmers from Iraq to Afghanistan, Officials Warn

20. The Unknowable Future of Warfare

21. AFSOC Selects MQ-9B SkyGuardian for UAS Family of Systems Concept

22. Uncovering the unheard: Researchers reveal inaudible remote cyber-attacks on voice assistant devices

23. Policy lessons from the Iraq War for those who wish to forget

24. How dangerous is TikTok really for the U.S.?

25. Ban TikTok? Yes, But Congress Needs to Explain Why

26. The Lesson of Newburgh (Civil-military relations)

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2023

Maps/grpahics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2023

Key Takeaways

Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than Putin likely desires.
Putin is likely increasing his attempts to rally the rest of the world against the West, although it remains unlikely that he will achieve decisive effects in this effort.
Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to maintain powerful political leverage and regional connections despite some officials’ attempts to distance themselves. Russian authorities are likely unsure of how to redefine Wagner’s new role following Prigozhin’s overextension of Wagner resources and support.
The Russian information space continues to respond to the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s issuance of arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova with ire and anxiety.
Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that the frequency of large Russian missile attacks has decreased.
Russia requested that the UN Security Council discuss Israeli airstrikes in Syria possibly in retaliation for Israel’s approval of export licenses for anti-drone jamming systems for Ukraine.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline and made marginal gains near Avdiivka.
Russian sources claim that Russian forces are building up defensive fortifications and repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian sources accused unknown actors of planting a bomb that exploded near a gas pipeline in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.
Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged Russian difficulties obtaining components for high-tech industrial production.
Ukrainian partisans killed Russian-appointed head of the Kherson Oblast pre-detention center Serhii Moskalenko with an improvised explosive device on March 17.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 20, 2023

Mar 20, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2023

Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 20, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian forces made marginal gains in and around Bakhmut amid a reported increase in the tempo of Russian operations around Avdiivka. Russian forces likely made additional gains in southwestern and northern Bakhmut as well as northwest of Bakhmut between Bohdanivka and Khromove as of March 20.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 19 that Russian troops attacked toward Berdychi (10km northwest of Avdiivka), which indicates that Russian forces likely advanced west of Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka) and captured Stepove (just west of Krasnohorivka).[2] Russian forces are likely increasing the tempo of operations north of Avdiivka in an effort to set conditions for the encirclement of the settlement and are reportedly employing a greater number of aviation units in the area to support these operations.[3] Avdiivka Mayor Vitaly Barabash told AFP News on March 20 that Russian forces are increasingly using Kh-59, Kh-101, Kh-555, and S-300 missiles in the Avdiivka area.[4] A Ukrainian military spokesperson stated on March 20 that Russian forces have lost about three unspecified companies (likely referring to infantry) in assaults on Avdiivka since March 19.[5] ISW previously reported that this increased tempo of Russian operations in the Avdiivka area has reportedly led to major losses and is likely a misguided effort to pull Ukrainian forces away from other areas of the front.[6] ISW has not observed Russian forces arraying substantial combat power along the outskirts of Donetsk City, and it is unlikely that Russian forces will be able to sustain this temporary increased tempo. ISW assesses that the overall Russian spring offensive is likely approaching culmination, and Russian forces may be intensifying efforts to make even marginal gains before they lose the initiative in Ukraine.[7] It remains possible that Russian advances could prompt Ukraine to withdraw from Bakhmut and/or Avdiivka although neither appears likely at this time.

Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 20 and offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than what Putin was likely seeking. Xi and Putin touted the strength of Chinese-Russian relations in their meeting on March 20, but offered differing interpretations of the scale of future relations in articles they published on March 19.[8] Putin published an article in Chinese state media in which he argued that Russia and China are building a partnership for the formation of a multipolar world order in the face of the collective West’s seeking of domination and the United States pursuing a policy of dual containment against China and Russia.[9] Xi offered a less aggressive overarching goal for Russian-Chinese relations in his article published in Russian state media outlet Rossiskaya Gazeta, in which he noted that Russia and China are generally pursuing a multipolar world order but not specifically against an adversarial West.[10] Xi instead focused heavily on presenting China as a viable third-party mediator to the war in Ukraine whose plan for negotiations ”reflects the unity of views of the world community on overcoming the Ukrainian crisis.”[11] Putin wrote that Russia welcomes China’s willingness to ”play a constructive role in crisis management” regarding the war in Ukraine, but Putin likely was hoping for Xi to adopt a similarly aggressive rhetorical line against the West.[12]

Xi’s refusal to explicitly align China with Russia in Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West is a notable departure from China’s declared “no limits partnership” with Russia preceding the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[13] Xi’s rhetoric suggests that he is not inclined to fully give Russia the economic and political support that Russia needs to reverse setbacks in Ukraine. Putin and Xi offered somewhat similar visions for increased Chinese-Russian economic partnership, and it is likely that the two will sign bilateral trade and economic agreements during Xi’s visit, some of which will likely aim to facilitate schemes for sanctions evasion.[14] Xi will also likely offer a more concrete proposal for a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine, although it remains unclear what his proposal will entail and how receptive the Kremlin will be to it. The prospects of China supplying Russia with military equipment also remain unclear.

Putin is likely increasing his attempts to rhetorically rally the rest of the world against the West, although it remains unlikely that he will achieve decisive effects through this effort. Putin attended the International Parliamentary Conference “Russia-Africa in a Multipolar World” on March 20 and stated that Russia and states in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America uphold the norms of social principles, morality, and traditions and oppose neo-colonial ideology.[15] Putin’s depiction of an envisioned Chinese-Russian axis against the West and his comments at the conference likely amount to an intensified proposal to non-aligned countries to form a defined anti-Western bloc. Putin likely hoped that Xi would offer a similar vision to augment this proposal, and Xi’s refusal to do so likely weakens the impacts of Putin’s efforts. The attractiveness of a potential anti-Western Chinese-Russian-based geopolitical bloc lies more with China’s economic and political power than with Russia’s declining economic strength and its military power badly degraded by fighting in Ukraine. Russia’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to generate support for its war in Ukraine continue to produce few tangible results, and an intensified effort to rally the rest of the world against the West will not likely be more effective.

Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to maintain powerful political leverage and regional connections within Russia despite some officials’ attempts to distance themselves from the Wagner Group. Prigozhin claimed on March 20 that Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev personally invited a Wagner representative to Krasnodar Krai, overruled local refusals to bury Wagner mercenaries, and informed the representative that the Wagner Group will face no further obstacles burying its dead.[16] Prigozhin on March 18 claimed that authorities in Goryachiy Klyuch, Krasnodar Krai, reneged on an agreement to bury Wagner personnel.[17] A Goryachiy Klyuch official initially told a Wagner representative that Kondratyev stripped him of authority to cooperate with Wagner, which ISW assessed as an indicator of weakening connections between Prigozhin and regional officials.[18] Prigozhin’s ability to reach out to Kondratyev directly and resolve the situation suggests that his leverage in the krai remains strong. Goryachiy Klyuch officials’ initial refusal to bury Wagner mercenaries and ongoing clashes between Prigozhin and St. Petersburg officials over Wagner burials indicate that some authorities do seek to distance themselves from Wagner PMC, however. [19]

Russian authorities are likely unsure of how to redefine Wagner’s new role following Prigozhin’s overextension of Wagner resources and support. The destruction of Wagner forces near Bakhmut is likely forcing Prigozhin and Russian officials to reconsider the role of Wagner while Prigozhin works to rebuild his forces. Several news sources reported on March 20 that Russian political party “A Just Russia – for Truth” leader Sergey Mironov publicly advocated for the legalization of private military companies – such as the Wagner Group – and proposed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) take control of their oversight, which would likely be a major limitation on Prigozhin’s current freedoms as Wagner’s financier.[20] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger on March 19 accused the Russian MoD of sabotaging Wagner efforts to replenish its ranks in Ukraine with Wagner fighters from further abroad by canceling military transport flights.[21] If true, this report would suggest that the Russian MoD is attempting to prevent Wagner from regaining political leverage and rebuilding its military capabilities in Ukraine while maintaining Wagner’s role abroad. Prigozhin himself appears to be taking every opportunity to increase his media relevance and maintain the Wagner Group’s prominence in the process. Prigozhin has publicized an array of statements picking fights with local officials, amplifying disputes over Wagner burials, commenting on the expansion of Russian censorship laws, commemorating the alleged one-year anniversary of Wagner involvement in Ukraine, and more since March 18 alone.[22]

The Russian information space continues to respond to the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s issuance of arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova with ire and anxiety. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 20 that the Kremlin is “calm” about Putin’s arrest warrant and called its issuance “outrageous and unacceptable.”[23] The Russian Investigative Committee, however, opened a criminal case against ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan and several ICC judges on March 20, indicating that Russian leadership feels the need to posture proactively in its response to the ICC despite promises that the arrest warrants are meaningless in the eyes of the Russian government.[24] Russian Security Council Deputy Head Dmitry Medvedev relatedly threatened a missile strike against the ICC and suggested that ”it is quite possible to imagine the point of application of a hypersonic missile carrier from the North Sea from a Russian ship to the Hague courthouse.”[25] Medvedev has notably made continuous inflammatory and escalated threats against the collective West, and his threats should not be taken as more than aggressive informational posturing on the part of the Kremlin.[26] The range of ostensibly diverging Russian responses to the ICC arrest warrants suggests that this event will likely remain a point of neuralgia in the Russian information space and will likely lead to continued legislative and informational responses.

Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on March 20 that the frequency of large Russian missile attacks has decreased. Yusov stated that Russia does not have many Kalibr, Iskander, and Kinzhal missiles left, but still has many S-300 surface-to-air missiles.[27] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces continue to deplete their missile arsenal and may constrain how often and at what scale to conduct missile strikes but will likely continue to threaten Ukrainian critical infrastructure and civilians.[28]

Russia requested that the UN Security Council discuss Israeli airstrikes in Syria possibly in retaliation for Israel’s approval of export licenses for anti-drone jamming systems for Ukraine. Israeli news outlet The Times of Israel reported on March 18 that Russia’s UN representative told the UN Security Council that Israel’s airstrikes in Syria must stop.[29] An Israeli official claimed that Israel had not expected Russia to call for the discussion and feared that Russia would promote a resolution against Israel. Russia’s comments about Israeli airstrikes in Syria occurred after Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen notified Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about the approval of the export licenses on Cohen’s visit to Ukraine on March 15.[30]

Key Takeaways

Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than Putin likely desires.
Putin is likely increasing his attempts to rally the rest of the world against the West, although it remains unlikely that he will achieve decisive effects in this effort.
Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to maintain powerful political leverage and regional connections despite some officials’ attempts to distance themselves. Russian authorities are likely unsure of how to redefine Wagner’s new role following Prigozhin’s overextension of Wagner resources and support.
The Russian information space continues to respond to the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s issuance of arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova with ire and anxiety.
Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that the frequency of large Russian missile attacks has decreased.
Russia requested that the UN Security Council discuss Israeli airstrikes in Syria possibly in retaliation for Israel’s approval of export licenses for anti-drone jamming systems for Ukraine.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline and made marginal gains near Avdiivka.
Russian sources claim that Russian forces are building up defensive fortifications and repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian sources accused unknown actors of planting a bomb that exploded near a gas pipeline in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.
Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged Russian difficulties obtaining components for high-tech industrial production.
Ukrainian partisans killed Russian-appointed head of the Kherson Oblast pre-detention center Serhii Moskalenko with an improvised explosive device on March 17.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk on March 19 and 20. Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed on March 20 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault near Hryanykivka (14km northeast of Kupyansk) and that unspecified artillery elements operating in the area of responsibility of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) destroyed three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Hryanykivka, Vilshana (12km northeast of Kupyansk), and Pershotravneve (20km east of Kupyansk).[31] Zybinsky claimed that Russian forces destroyed another two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Hryanykivka and Orlianka (22km east of Kupyansk) on March 19.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hryanykivka on March 18 and 19 and that Ukrainian forces withdrew forces to the west (right) side of the Oskil River, although ISW has not seen visual confirmation of these claims.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove on March 19 and 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) on March 19 and 20.[34] Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal gains north of Novoselivske close to the N-26 highway.[35] Zybinksy claimed that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) disrupted Ukrainian force rotations at forward positions near Kotlyarivka (27km northwest of Svatove) and Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove) on March 20.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kreminna area on March 19 and 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna and within 25km south of Kreminna near Dibrova, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamianske, and Spirne.[37] Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces likely advanced to the outskirts of Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[38] Geolocated footage published on March 19 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal gains southwest of Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and conducted unsuccessful assaults in the direction of Makiivka, Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Terny (17km west of Kreminna) on March 19 and 20.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut on March 19 and 20. Geolocated footage posted on March 19 shows that Russian forces have advanced in southwestern Bakhmut just south of Korsunskoho Street, about 7km northwest of Bakhmut between Bohdanivka and Khromove, and in northern Bakhmut near the AZOM complex.[41] Geolocated footage posted on March 20 also indicates that Wagner forces have made advances near the Mariupolske Cemetary in southwestern Bakhmut.[42] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on March 20 that Wagner controls 70 percent of Bakhmut.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 19 that Wagner Group forces are fighting at five points along the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway and advancing towards the road itself.[44] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner made gains northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) and towards Novomarkove (14km northwest of Bakhmut) between March 19 and 20.[45] Several Russian sources reported that Wagner has also advanced in central and southwestern Bakhmut and is fighting in the Avangard Stadium, 800m from the Bakhmut City Administration building.[46] Russian sources notably appear to be concerned about the prospect of Ukrainian counterattacks in Bakhmut, and several claimed that Ukrainian forces are amassing west of Bakhmut near Kostyantynivka and Chasiv Yar.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 19 and 20 that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bohdanivka (6km northwest), and Hrykorivka (10km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on March 19 and 20 and made marginal gains in the Avdiivka area as of March 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 19 that Russian troops attacked toward Berdychi (10km northwest of Avdiivka), which indicates that Russian forces likely advanced west of Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka) and captured Stepove (just west of Krasnohorivka) in order to launch attacks on Berdychi.[49] Geolocated footage posted on March 18 shows that Russian forces have advanced north of Avdiivka between Krasnohorivka and Kamianka.[50] Geolocated footage posted on March 19 additionally indicates that Russian forces have advanced near Vodyane, about 6km southwest of Avdiivka.[51] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces are trying to bypass Avdiivka from the north along the Krasnohorivka-Stepove line and that Russian forces captured Kamianka (4km northeast of Avdiivka) on March 20.[52] Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces have entered the southwestern outskirts of Avdiivka itself and are fighting near the Palace of Technology and Sports and in the 9th Quarter neighborhood, although a prominent milblogger emphasized that reports of fighting in Avdiivka are premature.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations on March 19 and 20 near Avdiivka itself; in the Avdiivka area near Kamianka, Severne (5km west of Avdiivka), and Berdychi; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane and Pervomaiske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[54] A milblogger posted footage of elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly fighting near Marinka.[55]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk City on March 19 or 20. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, namely naval infantry elements, once again tried to move on Ukrainian positions in southeastern Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) from the dacha area near Mykilske.[56] The Russian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson claimed on March 19 that Russian motorized rifle elements destroyed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Novodariivka (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, about 45km west of Vuhledar).[57]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claim that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations near Charivne (20km west of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (5km south of Orikhiv), Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv), and Mala Tokmachka (10km southwest of Orikhiv) on March 19.[58] Milbloggers published footage on March 19 purportedly showing elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelling Ukrainian forces near Robotyne and Orikhiv.[59] It is unclear if this footage is from an earlier assault, possibly on March 15, however.[60] ISW previously reported that Ukrainian forces’ reconnaissance near Novodanylivka generated an unusually large response from Russian milbloggers despite the frequent occurrence of such actions on other areas of the frontline.[61]

Russian sources claim that Russian forces attempt to use civilians to build defensive fortifications in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and Crimea. Independent Russian news outlet Verstka reported on March 18 that Russian occupation authorities are recruiting civilians to build defenses and dig trenches in occupied Crimea and offering up to 7,000 rubles (about $90) per day, meals, and accommodations.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 19 that civilian specialists have undertaken projects to strengthen defensive lines in Zaporizhia Oblast.[63] Russian occupation authorities’ efforts to use civilians to build fortifications could indicate that Russian forces are concerned about their ability to hold occupied territory but need to use military personnel in more immediate capacities.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 20 that explosions in occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea, destroyed a shipment of Kalibr cruise missiles being transported by train.[64] Russian sources reported explosions and a drone sighting in Dzhankoy prior to the GUR’s statement confirming the explosion.[65]

Russian news aggregators claimed that unknown actors planted a bomb next to a gas pipeline in occupied Simferopol, Crimea causing an explosion and fire on March 19.[66] Russian news aggregators claimed that the explosion did not disrupt the gas supply or damage the pipeline infrastructure.[67]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Zaporizhia, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts on March 19 and 20.[68]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged Russian difficulties obtaining components for high-tech industrial production – likely referring to electronics and microchips – in his address to the Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) on March 20. Putin argued that Russian industry will use import substitution to boost Russian domestic production, presenting the situation as a positive turn.[69] Russian defense-industrial base (DIB) production appears to continue to struggle, however.[70] Many Russians seek to address general shortages and outmaneuver Western sanctions through covert imports. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 18 that volunteers provisioning Russian forces import goods from Laos.[71] An aircraft tracker and image analyst on Twitter stated on March 19 that an Iranian cargo airline that consistently flies cargo sorties to Moscow sent another flight from Tehran to Moscow.[72] ISW has previously reported on similar Russian attempts to import foreign military and dual-use goods to fill shortages or reduce strain on the Russian DIB.[73]

Russian authorities continue to crack down on limited domestic resistance to mobilization or to the war in Ukraine. A Russian opposition news source reported on March 17 that Russian federal state censoring agency Roskomnadzor blocked a website that aided Russians in evading mobilization.[74] Several Russian sources reported on March 18 and 20 that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) detained two Saratov Oblast residents for committing an arson attack against the relay boxes at the Zorinsky-Trofimovsky-2 rail station in Saratov Oblast.[75] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed the men set fire to the relay boxes for a bounty from an unspecified actor.[76] A Russian activist group claimed on March 18 that unknown actors committed an arson attack against a relay box in Grelovo Raion in Saint Petersburg but failed to damage the inside controls.[77]

Russian mobilized soldiers fighting in Donetsk Oblast and their families continue to appeal to Russian authorities, complain to their loved ones, and resist forward deployments due to poor conditions on the front lines. An independent Russian media outlet amplified footage on March 18 of mobilized soldiers from Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast appealing to Russian President Vladimir Putin to do something about their extremely high casualty rate.[78] The soldiers claimed that they suffered a 70 percent casualty rate after their commanders ordered them to storm Avdiivka and that the commanders will send them to storm Avdiivka again all the same.[79] Radio Liberty’s Siberian branch, Siber Realii, on March 17 cited the friend of a mobilized soldier from Siberia claiming that the soldier’s battalion lost 298 of its 300 soldiers after conducting an assault on Avdiivka.[80] Siber Realii reported that a mobilized soldier from Volchikha, Altai Krai told his family on March 13 that he refused to fight further in Avdiivka after being thrown unprepared against Ukrainian defenses.[81]

Russian authorities continue to conduct large-scale recruitment campaigns for contract soldiers.[82] Russian military registration and enlistment offices continue to summon men to “verify information,” likely attempting to pressure men into signing contracts and setting conditions for covert mobilization.[83]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans killed a Russian collaborator in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on March 17. Ukrainian sources and geolocated imagery confirmed on March 20 that Ukrainian partisans assassinated Russian-appointed head of the Kherson Oblast pre-detention center Serhii Moskalenko on March 17.[84] The Russian Investigative Committee claimed on March 19 that an unknown person planted an explosive device in the car of the Russian occupation law enforcement officer in occupied Yuvileine, Kherson Oblast, while he, his wife, and daughter were in the car.[85]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to deport children and other vulnerable people to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation and safety efforts. Advisor to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Rodion Miroshnik claimed on March 20 that 10 Ukrainian children and their mothers or grandmothers arrived at a sanatorium in Moscow Oblast, where they will remain for three weeks.[86] Miroshnik emphasized that the project “Helping Ours” helps facilitate the travel and ensures that children and their mothers safely arrive in Russia and receive care from Russian doctors at the facility.[87] Miroshnik claimed that volunteers of the LNR and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) have planned at least two upcoming trips for Donbas children and their mothers to Russia in an unspecified timeframe.[88] Miroshnik stated that crowdfunding efforts fund the trips to Russia.[89] Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian occupation officials sent a large group of children from Mariupol to St. Petersburg on March 20, reportedly for vacation.[90] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 20 that Russian occupation forces threatened families in occupied Tokmak that Russian forces would take away their children if they did not receive Russian passports.[91]

Russian officials are continuing efforts to intensify law enforcement measures in occupied territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin asked in a speech to Russian Ministry of International Affairs (MVD) personnel that MVD employees recruit personnel for territorial units in occupied Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.[92] Putin also called on the Russian MVD to supply the new units with special hardware and information equipment.[93] Putin also stated that Russian MVD employees are intensifying measures to counter crime on the Russia-Ukraine border even more vigorously.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified elements of the Vitebsk-based Belarusian 103rd Air Assault Brigade began conducting tactical exercises in an unspecified location on March 20.[95]

Mobilized Russian soldiers continue training in Belarus. A local Saratov Oblast news outlet reported on March 19 that Russian volunteers collected foodstuff to transport to fighters of the Russian “94th Regiment” that is currently undergoing combat training in Belarus.[96] The ”94th Regiment” is likely a new unit made of mobilized servicemen, as there is no known 94th Regiment in the Russian military.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[29] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/foreign-ministry-said-concerned-by-worsening-russian-tone-over-israel-actions-in-syria/

[30] https://www.axios.com/2023/03/15/israel-ukraine-anti-drone-system-approv...

[31] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17312897

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/24944

[33] https://t.me/rybar/44826

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

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[36] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17312897

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rSsCgHkAPqRixo3xVk...

[38] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1637679541186441216; https://tw... https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1637777829499658243

[39] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1637446087031021569 ; https://twitt...

[40] https://t.me/rybar/44826 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11503

[41] https://twitter.com/small10space/status/1637387894988890113 ; https://...

[42] https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1637827324480565250; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1637816859302023177

[43] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/623 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/4...

[44] https://t.me/milchronicles/1683; https://t.me/basurin_e/261

[45] https://t.me/rybar/44810 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/11260 ; https://t...

[46] https://t.me/readovkanews/55062 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/261; https:/...

[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46194; https://t.me/readovkanews/54999; ht...

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

[50] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1637132738531565568 ; https://tw...

[51] https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1637504360128151553; https:/... https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1637504363613630465

[52] https://t.me/rybar/44809; https://t.me/readovkanews/55006; https://t.m...

[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80924; https://twitter.com/tretter50001/statu...

[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

[55] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20079

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/11482; https://t.me/wargonzo/11503; https://t.me...

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/24941

[58] https://t.me/rybar/44828; https://t.me/rybar/44829; https://t.me/rybar... https://t.me/vrogov/8223; https://t.me/vrogov/8221 ; https://t.me/rybar/44805 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/11256; https://t.me/milchronicles/1682; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/11916; https://t...

[59] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20061; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20071;...

[60] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[62] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1613

[63] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7385

[64] https://gur.gov.ua/content/vybukh-u-misti-dzhankoi-znyshchyv-rosiiski-kr...

[65] https://t.me/vchkogpu/37252; https://twitter.com/DI_Ukraine/status/1637922346064281603

[66] https://t.me/readovkanews/55079

[67] https://t.me/bazabazon/16437

[68]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gw2dfuzGryLdj21fwa...

[69] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70744

[70]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46192%20; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/11515

[72] https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1637483366718009345?s=20; https://ge...

[73]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[74] https://zona dot media/news/2023/03/17/iditelesom

[75] https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/57165; https://t.me/vchkogpu/37212; https://www.5-tv dot ru/news/424692/vsaratovskoj-oblasti-zaderzali-dvoih-muzcin-zapopytku-diversii-nazd-putah/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80938

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80938

[77] https://t.me/activatica/31762

[78] https://t.me/sotaproject/55601

[79] https://t.me/sotaproject/55601

[80] https://www.sibreal.org/a/mobilizovannye-iz-sibiri-otkazyvayutsya-voevat...

[81] https://www.sibreal.org/a/mobilizovannye-iz-sibiri-otkazyvayutsya-voevat...

[82] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/10160; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/6021; https://vk dot com/wall-22300697_10529 ; https://t.me/vottaktv/37305; https://t.me/bazabazon/16408

[83] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-mar-17-18; https://t.me/astrapres... ru/novosti/191318-voenkomat-obyasnil-razdachu-povestok-v-tulskoy-oblasti.html; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/6027; https://t.me/bloodysx/26436; https...

[84] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-tymchasovo-okupovanii-terytorii-likvidovano-zradnyka-ukrainy-serhiia-moskalenka.html; https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/20/na-hersonshhyni-likviduvaly-chergovogo-zradnyka/; https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1637448781242200065?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1637187793867685888?s=20 ; https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/6206 ; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1637461904556797953 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1637441873689169920 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881

[85] https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-tymchasovo-okupovanii-terytorii-likvidovano-zradnyka-ukrainy-serhiia-moskalenka.html ; https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/20/na-hersonshhyni-likviduvaly-chergovogo-zradnyka/ ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1637448781242200065?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1637187793867685888?s=20 ; https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/6206 ; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1637461904556797953 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1637441873689169920 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881

[86] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10821

[87] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10821

[88] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10821

[89] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10821

[90] https://t.me/andriyshTime/7859

[91] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/20/rosiyany-zmushuyut-meshkancziv-tot-pysaty-vidmovu-vid-ukrayinskogo-gromadyanstva/]

[92] https://t.me/readovkanews/55091

[93] https://t.me/readovkanews/55091

[94] https://t.me/readovkanews/55091

[95] https://t.me/modmilby/24683

[96] https://saratov24 dot tv/news/vyacheslav-maksyuta-zadumalsya-o-prekrashchenii-volonterskoy-deyatelnosti-dlya-boytsov/

2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR

MARCH 20, 2023

The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – the Human Rights Report – cover internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements. The U.S. Department of State submits reports on all countries receiving assistance and all United Nations member states to the U.S. Congress in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 1974.

TRANSLATIONS

IN THIS SECTION /

PREFACE

Preface

For nearly 50 years, the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have served as a vital resource for governments, researchers, advocacy groups, journalists, and voices of conscience worldwide that work to promote respect for human rights and accountability for injustice. The individual reports cover 198 countries and territories, providing factual, objective information based on credible reports of the events that occurred throughout 2022. These reports are meticulously compiled by U.S. Department of State employees in Washington, D.C., and at our overseas missions throughout the world, who collectively spend thousands of hours preparing the reports using credible information from U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, foreign government officials, nongovernmental and international organizations, jurists and legal experts, journalists, academics, human rights defenders, labor activists, and published reports. We take seriously our responsibility to ensure their accuracy.

Each country report speaks for itself, describing reports of practices in calendar year 2022 in light of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Some of the reports highlight record violations and abuses that are appalling in their scale and severity. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022 has resulted in massive death and destruction, with reports of members of Russia’s forces committing war crimes and other atrocities, including summary executions of civilians and horrific accounts of gender-based violence, including sexual violence against women and children. In Iran, the regime responded with brutality and violence to peaceful protests across the country following the tragic death of Mahsa Jina Amini while in the custody of the so-called “morality police.” This year’s country report documents in detail the Iranian regime’s violent crackdown and its continued denial of the Iranian people’s universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedoms of expression and religion or belief.

In Xinjiang, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the country report describes how genocide and crimes against humanity continued to occur against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups. In Burma, the report relays how the military regime continues to use violence to brutalize civilians and consolidate its control, reportedly killing more than 2,900 people and detaining more than 17,000 since the February 2021 military coup. As part of our efforts to ensure accountability in Burma, I made the important determination in March 2022 that the military had committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim, repledging U.S. efforts to promote justice and accountability for abuses faced by Rohingya and other ethnic and religious minority groups across Burma. As reflected in the report on Afghanistan, the Taliban’s oppressive and discriminatory measures against women and girls have been relentless. No other country in the world bars women and girls from getting an education, which is an internationally recognized human right. The Taliban’s edict barring female employees of non-governmental organizations from the workplace imperils tens of millions of Afghans who depend on humanitarian assistance for their survival. No country can achieve peace and prosperity when half its population is cut off from society and the economy.

Protracted human rights crises, as in South Sudan where a constant stream of subnational violence, combined with the transitional government’s lack of progress in implementing long overdue commitments, have continued to cause misery and death. The report on Syria describes how the regime continues to jail, torture, and kill political opponents, human rights defenders, and journalists. Over 154,000 persons remain disappeared or unjustly detained by the regime, ISIS, and other parties to the conflict. Authoritarian governments – like those in Cuba, Belarus, and Venezuela, among others – have condemned hundreds or thousands of peaceful protestors to lengthy and unjust prison sentences. In Cambodia, brave trade union activists who have led hundreds in a peaceful strike for over a year, have been reportedly met with arrest, detention, and other efforts to demoralize workers and silence their voices.

Still, we see people of courage and conscience standing up, at great personal risk, for universal human rights, to protect the wellbeing of their communities and for the future of their countries. These human rights defenders work tirelessly to expose injustice, corruption, and abuse and to press for transparency and accountability.

The 2022 country reports also illuminate the compounding impacts of human rights violations and abuses on persons in marginalized communities who also suffer disproportionately from the negative effects of economic inequality, climate change, migration, food insecurity, and other global challenges. In line with President Biden’s June 15, 2022, Executive Order, the 2022 country reports specifically include enhanced reporting on so-called conversion “therapy” practices, which are forced or involuntary efforts to change a person’s sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression, as well as additional reporting on the performance of unnecessary surgeries on intersex persons.

Democracy, human rights, and labor rights are mutually reinforcing, and support for democratic renewal is essential to promoting these rights. President Biden will co-host the second Summit for Democracy with the Governments of Costa Rica, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Zambia on March 29-30, 2023. Together, we will showcase the great progress made by Summit partners and the importance of working together to meet the many challenges to democracy.

As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes, all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. We submit these country reports in service to our common humanity.

3. U.S. Human-Rights Report Cites Allies and Adversaries

Excerpts:

Next week, the Biden administration will co-host the second Summit for Democracy with the governments of Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea and Zambia, in an effort to showcase efforts made by partner nations committed to the promotion of democratic practices.

...

The last Summit for Democracy, in 2021, included a list of invitees that raised questions about the sincerity of the effort. Invited to the two-day event weren’t only democratic Western allies, but also countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan, which at the time had been cited by the State Department for “significant human-rights issues,” including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and torture.

China and Russia objected to the last summit, with their ambassadors to Washington issuing a joint commentary calling the gathering a product of Washington’s “Cold-War mentality” that would “stoke up ideological confrontation and a rift in the world.”

The Biden administration, with its public commitments to promoting democracy, has been accused of adhering to a double standard when it comes to human-rights abuses in countries with which the U.S. has a strategic interest. Washington continues to conduct business with Saudi Arabia after the release of an intelligence report that determined that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s day-to-day leader, ordered the operation that led to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.

U.S. Human-Rights Report Cites Allies and Adversaries

‘We don’t pull our punches’ in the annual assessment, says Secretary of State Antony Blinken

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-human-rights-report-cites-allies-and-adversaries-7b1ba21f

By Vivian SalamaFollow

March 20, 2023 1:53 pm ET

WASHINGTON—U.S. allies including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Pakistan are among the countries cited by the State Department as committing serious human-rights violations in a new report aimed at advocating for democratic practices around the world.

The 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, released Monday, provides a detailed record of violations and abuses of persons in marginalized communities, some of whom also suffer disproportionately from economic inequality, climate change, migration, food insecurity and other global challenges.

From Iran’s brutal and violent suppression of peaceful protests often led by women, to what the report describes as “genocide and crimes against humanity” against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs in China, there continues to be a “backsliding of human rights conditions,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said.

As the U.S. strives to gather support around the world for its confrontations with China and Russia, Mr. Blinken sought to head off any hurt feelings over the report, which includes a number of allied nations.

“The goal of this report is not to lecture or to shame but rather is to provide a resource for those individuals working around the world to safeguard and uphold human dignity when it’s under threat,” Mr. Blinken told reporters.

“We have those tough discussions across the board with friends, adversaries, competitors alike. The report itself makes that very clear,” he said. “We don’t pull our punches with anyone as we call these things. Sometimes we do it more publicly, sometimes we do it privately, and we try to determine in each instance how we hopefully can be most effective in advancing human rights.”

President Biden has said that a “fundamental challenge of our time” is to prove that democracies can deliver for their people, respect the dignity of their citizens and empower them more than the world’s authoritarian leaders. Administration officials have said that the U.S.’s numerous allies are a strength that China and Russia lack and want others to see Washington as a more reliable partner than Beijing.

Next week, the Biden administration will co-host the second Summit for Democracy with the governments of Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea and Zambia, in an effort to showcase efforts made by partner nations committed to the promotion of democratic practices.

The new report offers a long list of abuses in Saudi Arabia, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including censorship and unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists. Another Arab Gulf ally, the U.A.E., is cited for a range of abuses, from incommunicado detention to laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.

Other allies cited in the report for troubling trends include India and Egypt.

In India, the report said, “significant human rights issues” included violence or threats against religious minorities, social status or sexual orientation, arbitrary arrest and detention and life-threatening prison conditions. Egypt was cited for extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance by state security, torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government, and serious restrictions on free expression and media.

The U.S. continues to engage with countries highlighted in the report. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin proceeded this month with meetings in Cairo with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi and the nation’s defense minister even after the government banned journalists from covering the meeting. Also this month, Mr. Blinken visited India, Ethiopia and Uzbekistan, and raised the report’s findings in person.

The report also condemns the rapidly declining human-rights situation in Afghanistan as the Taliban “took expansive measures to bar women and girls from participation in public and political life, including restricting their access to education at all levels beyond primary school, employment, and freedom of movement and dress.”

The chaotic final withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021, leading to the Taliban takeover, came amid warnings that the Islamist group would revert to its brutal governing practices for which it was known before the U.S. invasion in 2001, including the banning of women and girls from public life.

The last Summit for Democracy, in 2021, included a list of invitees that raised questions about the sincerity of the effort. Invited to the two-day event weren’t only democratic Western allies, but also countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan, which at the time had been cited by the State Department for “significant human-rights issues,” including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and torture.

China and Russia objected to the last summit, with their ambassadors to Washington issuing a joint commentary calling the gathering a product of Washington’s “Cold-War mentality” that would “stoke up ideological confrontation and a rift in the world.”

The Biden administration, with its public commitments to promoting democracy, has been accused of adhering to a double standard when it comes to human-rights abuses in countries with which the U.S. has a strategic interest. Washington continues to conduct business with Saudi Arabia after the release of an intelligence report that determined that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s day-to-day leader, ordered the operation that led to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.

Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.

Write to Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 21, 2023, print edition as 'U.S. Cites Its Allies, Adversaries On Rights'.

4. Japanese leader arrives in Kyiv as China's Xi visits Russia

I did not expect that Prime Minister Kishida would visit Kyiv.

Japanese leader arrives in Kyiv as China's Xi visits Russia

AP · by KARL RITTER · March 21, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrived in Kyiv for a surprise visit shortly after noon Tuesday, hours after Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in neighboring Russia for a three-day trip. Moscow’s invasion will be in the spotlight at both meetings.

Footage shown on Japanese national broadcaster NHK showed Kishida walking on the platform of Kyiv Central Station, escorted by a few people who appeared to be Ukrainian officials.

It was uncertain whether either meeting would change the course of the almost 13-month war in Ukraine, but the talks about 800 kilometers (500 miles) apart highlighted the war’s repercussions for international diplomacy as countries line up behind rival parties.

They came after a week in which China and Japan both enjoyed diplomatic successes that have emboldened their foreign policy.

Kishida will meet President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Ukrainian capital, coinciding with Xi’s talks with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Kishida will “show respect to the courage and patience of the Ukrainian people who are standing up to defend their homeland under President Zelenskyy’s leadership, and show solidarity and unwavering support for Ukraine as head of Japan and chairman of G-7,” during his visit to Ukraine, the Japanese Foreign Ministry said in announcing his trip to Kyiv.

At the talks, Kishida will show his “absolute rejection of Russia’s one-sided change to the status quo by invasion and force, and to affirm his commitment to defend the rules-based international order,” the ministry’s statement said.

Putin warmly welcomed Xi to the Kremlin on Monday, starting a three-day visit the two major powers described as an opportunity to deepen their “no-limits friendship.”

Russia-Ukraine war

At Ukraine's front, police try to evacuate holdout families

Japan's Kishida heading to Ukraine for talks with Zelenskyy

Russia to hold UN meeting on Ukraine kids taken to Russia

Ukraine hints it hit Russian missiles in occupied Crimea

At a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on Tuesday, Xi said that he invited Putin to visit China at some point this year to attend a top-level meeting of China’s One Belt, One Road regional initiative, which seeks to extend Beijing’s influence through economic cooperation projects.

The invitation comes days after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Putin. Neither Russia nor China recognize the court’s jurisdiction.

Moscow and Beijing have both weathered international condemnation of their human rights record. The Chinese government has been widely condemned for alleged atrocities against Uighur Muslims in its far western Xinjiang region. The allegations include genocide, forced sterilization and the mass detention of nearly 1 million Uighurs. Beijing has denied the allegations.

Japanese public television channel NTV showed Kishida riding a train from Poland heading to Kyiv. His surprise trip to Ukraine comes just hours after he met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi, and the week after a breakthrough summit with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yoel.

In New Delhi, Kishida called for developing and Global South countries to raise their voices to defend the rules-based international order and help stop Russia’s war.

Japan, which has territorial disputes over islands with both China and Russia, is particularly concerned about the close relationship between Beijing and Moscow, which have conducted joint military exercises near Japan’s coasts.

Meanwhile, China looks to Russia as a source of oil and gas for its energy-hungry economy, and as a partner in standing up to what both see as U.S. aggression, domination of global affairs and unfair criticism of their human rights records.

Kyiv’s Western allies have expressed concern that China might help Russia’s war effort, though Beijing insists it is a neutral broker in peace efforts.

Ukraine’s military intelligence spokesman late on Monday said that Kyiv is not aware of any Chinese arms transfers to Russia so far. Andriy Yusov said on Ukrainian TV that while Beijing has provided some dual-use technology to Moscow, such as semiconductor chips, “there is no talk about weapons so far, and no such (supplies) have been recorded.”

Kishida, who is to chair the Group of Seven summit in May, is the only G-7 leader who hasn’t visited Ukraine and was under pressure to do so at home. U.S. President Joe Biden took a similar route to visit Kyiv last month, just before the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Due to limitations of Japan’s pacifist constitution, his trip was arranged secretly. Kishida is Japan’s first postwar leader to enter a war zone. Kishida, invited by Zelenskyy in January to visit Kyiv, was also asked before his trip to India about a rumor of his possible trip at the end of March, denied it and said nothing concrete has been decided.

Japan has joined the United States and European nations in sanctioning Russia over its invasion and providing humanitarian and economic support for Ukraine.

Japan was quick to react because it fears the possible impact of a war in East Asia, where China’s military has grown increasingly assertive and has escalated tensions around self-ruled Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory.

In Beijing, foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said that Beijing’s contacts with Russia will help to bring about peace. “President Putin said that Russia appreciates China’s consistent position of upholding fairness, objectivity and balance on major international issues,” he said. “Russia has carefully studied China’s position paper on the political settlement of the Ukrainian issue, and is open to peace talks.”

Asked about Kishida’s trip to Kyiv, he added, “We hope Japan could do more things to deescalate the situation instead of the opposite.”

Kishida is expected to offer continuing support for Ukraine when he meets with Zelenskyy.

Television footage on NTV showed Kishida getting on a train from the Polish station of Przemysl near the border with Ukraine, with a number of officials.

Due to its pacifist principles, Japan’s support for Ukraine has also been limited to non-combative military equipment such as helmets, bulletproof vests and drones, and humanitarian supplies including generators.

Japan has contributed more than $7 billion to Ukraine, and accepted more than 2,000 displaced Ukrainians and helped them with housing assistance and support for jobs and education, a rare move in a country that is known for its strict immigration policy.

AP reporter Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo contributed to this report.

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Follow the AP’s coverage of Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by KARL RITTER · March 21, 2023

5. World on 'thin ice' as UN climate report gives stark warning

World on 'thin ice' as UN climate report gives stark warning

AP · by SETH BORENSTEIN and FRANK JORDANS · March 20, 2023

BERLIN (AP) — Humanity still has a chance, close to the last, to prevent the worst of climate change’s future harms, a top United Nations panel of scientists said Monday.

But doing so requires quickly slashing nearly two-thirds of carbon pollution by 2035, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change said. The United Nations chief said it more bluntly, calling for an end to new fossil fuel exploration and for rich countries to quit coal, oil and gas by 2040.

“Humanity is on thin ice — and that ice is melting fast,” United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said. “Our world needs climate action on all fronts — everything, everywhere, all at once.”

Stepping up his pleas for action on fossil fuels, Guterres called for rich countries to accelerate their target for achieving net zero emissions to as early as 2040, and developing nations to aim for 2050 — about a decade earlier than most current targets. He also called for them to stop using coal by 2030 and 2040, respectively, and ensure carbon-free electricity generation in the developed world by 2035, meaning no gas-fired power plants either.

That date is key because nations soon have to come up with goals for pollution reduction by 2035, according to the Paris climate agreement. After contentious debate, the U.N. science report approved Sunday concluded that to stay under the warming limit set in Paris the world needs to cut 60% of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2035, compared with 2019, adding a new target not previously mentioned in six previous reports issued since 2018.

“The choices and actions implemented in this decade will have impacts for thousands of years,” the report said, calling climate change “a threat to human well-being and planetary health.”

“We are not on the right track but it’s not too late,” said report co-author and water scientist Aditi Mukherji. “Our intention is really a message of hope, and not that of doomsday.’’

With the world only a few tenths of a degree away from the globally accepted goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) since pre-industrial times, scientists stressed a sense of urgency. The goal was adopted as part of the 2015 Paris climate agreement and the world has already warmed 1.1 degrees Celsius (2 degrees Fahrenheit).

This is likely the last warning the Nobel Peace Prize-winning collection of scientists will be able to make about the 1.5 mark because their next set of reports may well come after Earth has either passed the mark or is locked into exceeding it soon, several scientists, including report authors, told The Associated Press.

After 1.5 degrees “the risks are starting to pile on,” said report co-author Francis X. Johnson, a climate, land and policy scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute. The report mentions “tipping points” around that temperature of species extinction, including coral reefs, irreversible melting of ice sheets and sea level rise of several meters (several yards).

“1.5 is a critical critical limit, particularly for small islands and mountain (communities) which depend on glaciers,” said Mukherji.

“The window is closing if emissions are not reduced as quickly as possible,” Johnson said in an interview. “Scientists are rather alarmed.”

Many scientists, including at least three co-authors, said hitting 1.5 degrees is inevitable.

“We are pretty much locked into 1.5,” said report co-author Malte Meinshausen, a climate scientist at the University of Melbourne in Australia. “There’s very little way we will be able to avoid crossing 1.5 C sometime in the 2030s ” but the big issue is whether the temperature keeps rising from there or stabilizes.

Guterres insisted “the 1.5-degree limit is achievable.” Science panel chief Hoesung Lee said so far the world is far off course.

If current consumption and production patterns continue, Lee said, “the global average 1.5 degrees temperature increase will be seen sometime in this decade.”

Scientists emphasize that the world or humanity won’t end suddenly if Earth passes the 1.5 degree mark. Mukherji said “it’s not as if it’s a cliff that we all fall off.” But an earlier IPCC report detailed how the harms — including even nastier extreme weather — are much worse beyond 1.5 degrees of warming.

“It is certainly prudent to be planning for a future that’s warmer than 1.5 degrees,” said IPCC report review editor Steven Rose, an economist at the Electric Power Research Institute in the United States.

If the world continues to use all the fossil fuel-powered infrastructure either existing now or proposed, Earth will warm at least 2 degrees Celsius since pre-industrial times, the report said.

Because the report is based on data from a few years ago, the calculations about fossil fuel projects already in the pipeline do not include the increase in coal and natural gas use after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It comes a week after the Biden Administration in the United States approved the huge Willow oil-drilling project in Alaska, which could produce up to 180,000 barrels of oil a day.

The report highlights the disparity between rich nations, which caused much of the problem because carbon dioxide emissions from industrialization stay in the air for more than a century, and poorer countries that get hit harder by extreme weather. Residents of poorer climate-vulnerable nations are “up to 15 times more likely to die in floods, droughts and storms,” Lee said.

If the world is to achieve its climate goals, poorer countries need a three-to-six times increase in financial help to adapt to a warmer world and switch to non-polluting energy, Lee said. Countries have made financial pledges and promises of a damage compensation fund.

Developed nations “are expected to speed up the fight against climate change and do their decarbonization much faster than developing countries like Brazil. However, this does not take away our responsibility to do our part,” Brazil’s climate change chief, Ana Toni, said. “It will be our populations in developing countries, which are more vulnerable.”

The report offers hope if action is taken, using the word “opportunity” nine times in a 27-page summary. But that word is overshadowed by 94 uses of the word “risk.”

“The pace and scale of what has been done so far and current plans are insufficient to tackle climate change,” IPCC chief Lee said. ”We are walking when we should be sprinting.”

Lee said the panel doesn’t tell countries what to do to limit worse warming, adding “it’s up to each government to find the best solution.”

“The solutions are at hand,” U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris said in a conference call about wildfires. “So let that be an alarm that lets us know that we must act with haste.”

“How many reports that chill us to the bone do we need to read before we make the changes required?” asked Tina Stege, climate envoy for Marshall Islands, which are vulnerable to rising seas. “These changes will require some sacrifice — but aren’t they worth it when a liveable future on this planet is what is at stake?”

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Fabiano Maisonnave in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, contributed to this report. Borenstein reported from Kensington, Maryland.

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Follow Seth Borenstein and Frank Jordans on Twitter at @borenbears and @wirereporter

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Follow AP’s climate and environment coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/climate-and-environment

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Associated Press climate and environmental coverage receives support from several private foundations. See more about AP’s climate initiative here. The AP is solely responsible for all content.

AP · by SETH BORENSTEIN and FRANK JORDANS · March 20, 2023

6. The doomers are wrong about humanity’s future — and its past

Read this in conjunction with the report on climate change.

The doomers are wrong about humanity’s future — and its past

The necessity of progress.

Vox · by Bryan Walsh · March 20, 2023

If I wanted to convince you of the reality of human progress, of the fact that we as a species have advanced materially, morally, and politically over our time on this planet, I could quote you chapter and verse from a thick stack of development statistics.

I could tell you that a little more than 200 years ago, nearly half of all children born died before they reached their 15th birthday, and that today it’s less than 5 percent globally. I could tell you that in pre-industrial times, starvation was a constant specter and life expectancy was in the 30s at best. I could tell you that at the dawn of the 19th century, barely more than one person in 10 was literate, while today that ratio has been nearly reversed. I could tell you that today is, on average, the best time to be alive in human history.

But that doesn’t mean you’ll be convinced.

In one 2017 Pew poll, a plurality of Americans — people who, perhaps more than anywhere else, are heirs to the benefits of centuries of material and political progress — reported that life was better 50 years ago than it is today. A 2015 survey of thousands of adults in nine rich countries found that 10 percent or fewer believed that the world was getting better. On the internet, a strange nostalgia persists for the supposedly better times before industrialization, when ordinary people supposedly worked less and life was allegedly simpler and healthier. (They didn’t and it wasn’t.)

Looking backward, we imagine a halcyon past that never was; looking forward, it seems to many as if, in the words of young environmental activist Greta Thunberg, “the world is getting more and more grim every day.”

So it’s boom times for doom times. But the apocalyptic mindset that has gripped so many of us not only understates how far we’ve come, but how much further we can still go. The real story of progress today is its remarkable expansion to the rest of the world in recent decades. In 1950, life expectancy in Africa was just 40; today, it’s past 62. Meanwhile more than 1 billion people have moved out of extreme poverty since 1990 alone.

But there’s more to do — much more. That hundreds of millions of people still go without the benefit of electricity or live in states still racked by violence and injustice isn’t so much an indictment of progress as it is an indication that there is still more low-hanging fruit to harvest.

The world hasn’t become a better place for nearly everyone who lives on it because we wished it so. The astounding economic and technological progress made over the past 200 years has been the result of deliberate policies, a drive to invent and innovate, one advance building upon another. And as our material condition improved, so, for the most part, did our morals and politics — not as a side effect, but as a direct consequence. It’s simply easier to be good when the world isn’t zero-sum.

Which isn’t to say that the record of progress is one of unending wins. For every problem it solved — the lack of usable energy in the pre-fossil fuel days, for instance — it often created a new one, like climate change. But just as a primary way climate change is being addressed is through innovation that has drastically reduced the price of clean energy, so progress tends to be the best route to solving the problems that progress itself can create.

Though historians still argue over what the writer Jason Crawford calls “the roots of progress,” the fundamental swerve was the belief that, after eons of relatively little meaningful change, the future could actually be different, and better. But the doomerism that risks overtaking us erodes that belief, and undercuts the policies that give it life.

The biggest danger we face today, if we care about actually making the future a more perfect place, isn’t that industrial civilization will choke on its own exhaust or that democracy will crumble or that AI will rise up and overthrow us all. It’s that we will cease believing in the one force that raised humanity out of tens of thousands of years of general misery: the very idea of progress.

How progress solves the problems we didn’t know were problems

Progress may be about where we’re going, but it’s impossible to understand without returning to where we’ve been. So let’s take a trip back to the foreign country that was the early years of the 19th century.

In 1820, according to data compiled by the historian Michail Moatsos, about three-quarters of the world’s population earned so little that they could not afford even a tiny living space, some heat and, hopefully, enough food to stave off malnutrition.

It was a state that we would now call “extreme poverty,” except that for most people back then, it wasn’t extreme — it was simply life.

What matters here for the story of progress isn’t the fact that the overwhelming majority of humankind lived in destitution. It’s that this was the norm, and had been the norm since essentially… forever. Poverty, illiteracy, premature death — these weren’t problems, as we would come to define them in our time. They were simply the background reality of being human, as largely unchangeable as birth and death itself. And there were only the slightest inklings at the time that this could or should change.

But those inklings were there, and over time, they began to take root. The Scientific Revolution began in the 1500s, as figures like the English philosopher Francis Bacon introduced the idea that through trial and experimentation, scientific knowledge could be advanced, and with it, the human condition itself.

Over time, the abstract concepts and discoveries of the Scientific Revolution led to the machines and raw power of what would be dubbed the Industrial Revolution; to James Watts’s steam engine and Michael Faraday’s electric generator and Richard Arkwright’s Cromford Mill, the progenitor of the modern factory.

Advances in our ability to generate energy, advances in our ability to harness that energy for work, and advances in our ability to create an economic system that got the most out of both of those factors all intermingled. And that is when human life began to truly change, in a way that was so massive and, eventually, so all-encompassing, that we still struggle to grasp its sheer scale. Economic historian Deirdre McCloskey has simply dubbed it “the Great Fact.”

The simplest fact about the Great Fact might be this: Without it, chances are I wouldn’t be writing this article and you wouldn’t be reading it

In his 2022 book Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the 20th Century, the economic historian Brad DeLong uses a simple data point to describe just how much progress occurred after 1870, once the advances of the Industrial Revolution had been fully consolidated and political improvements began to follow economic ones.

In 1870, an average unskilled male worker in London could earn enough per day to buy 5,000 calories worth of food for himself and his family. That was more than in 1600, but not significantly more, and not enough to easily feed everyone consistently, given that mean household size in England at the time was just under five people.

By 2010 — the end of what DeLong in his book called “the long twentieth century” — that same worker could afford to buy the equivalent of 2.4 million calories of food per day, a nearly 50,000 percent increase.

The simplest fact about the Great Fact might be this: Without it, chances are I wouldn’t be writing this article and you wouldn’t be reading it.

Between 10,000 BCE and 1700, the average global population growth rate was just 0.04 percent per year. And that wasn’t because human beings weren’t having babies. They were simply dying, in great numbers: at birth, giving birth, in childhood from now-preventable diseases, and in young adulthood from now-preventable wars and violence.

We were stuck in the Malthusian Trap, named after the 18th-century English cleric and economist Thomas Malthus. The trap argues that any increase in food production or other resources that allowed the population to grow was quickly consumed by that increased population, which then led to food shortages and population decline.

(It’s striking that one of the few real spikes in wages and standard of living in pre-industrial times came in the aftermath of the Black Death, which killed off perhaps 30 percent of Europe’s population. Those who survived were able to command higher wages to work empty land — but a deadly pandemic is no reasonable person’s idea of a sustainable economic growth program.)

Viewed from one angle, the human population before the Industrial Revolution was in an ecological balance of the sort we might aim to preserve if humanity were just another wild species plowing its environmental niche, its numbers kept in check by violence, disease, and starvation.

But that nearly flat line of population growth, century after century, hides an untellable story of misery and suffering, one of children dead before their time, of families snuffed out by starvation, of potential and of people that would never have the chance to be realized. It was a story, as the writer Bill Bryson has put it, of “tiny coffins.”

In the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been slower and later, but shouldn’t be underestimated

It was only with the progress of industrialization that we broke out of the Malthusian Trap, producing enough food to feed the mounting billions, enough scientific breakthroughs to conquer old killers like smallpox and the measles, and enough political advances to dwindle violent death.

Between 1800 and today, our numbers grew from around 1 billion to 8 billion. And that 8 billion aren’t just healthier, richer, and better educated. On average, they can expect to live more than twice as long. The writer Steven Johnson has called this achievement humanity’s “extra life” — but that extra isn’t just the decades that have been added to our lifespans. It’s the extra people that have been added to our numbers. I’m probably one of them, and you probably are too.

The Malthusian Trap isn’t easy to escape, and the progress we’ve earned has hardly been uninterrupted or perfectly distributed. The past two centuries have seen by far the bloodiest conflicts in human history, punctuated by the invention of weapons that could conceivably end humanity. Well into the 20th century, billions still lived lives that were materially little different from their impoverished ancestors.

But if progress hasn’t yet fully broken the Malthusian Trap physically, it did so psychologically. Once we could prove in practice that the lot of humanity didn’t have to be hand-to-mouth existence, we could see that progress could continue to expand.

The long twentieth century came late to the Global South, but it did get there. Between 1960 and today, India and China, together home to nearly one in every three people alive today, have seen life expectancy rise from 45 to 70 and 33 to 78, respectively. Per-capita GDP over those years rose some 2,600 percent for India and an astounding 13,400 percent for China, with the latter lifting an estimated 800 million people out of extreme poverty.

In the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been slower and later, but shouldn’t be underestimated. When we see the drastic decline in child mortality — which has fallen since 1990 from 18.1 percent of all children in that region to 7.4 percent in 2021 — or the more than 20 million measles deaths that have been prevented since 2000 in Africa alone, this is progress continuing to happen now, with the benefits overwhelmingly flowing to the poorest among us.

The simplest argument for why we need to continue to build on that legacy is found in the places where it has continued to fall short. The fact that as of 2016 some 13 percent of the world still lacked access to electricity — the invisible foundation of modernity — is just as worthy of our worry. The fact that 85 percent of the world — a little less than 7 billion people — lives on less than $30 a day should keep us awake at night.

Because that, as much as any existential challenge we fear hurtling toward us, shouldn’t simply be accepted as inevitable.

How progress can solve the problem of being human

On January 6, 1941 — 11 months before Pearl Harbor — President Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave his State of the Union speech. But it’s better known by another name: the Four Freedoms speech.

As much of the world was engulfed in what would become the greatest and bloodiest conflict in human history, Roosevelt told Congress that “we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms”: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

There are human values that can’t be captured in dry economic statistics: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. If our world had somehow become as rich and as long-lived as it is today with a system of political liberties and human rights frozen in 1820, we might barely consider it progress at all.

Except that we have seen startling improvements in everything from political liberty to democratic representation to human rights to even the way we treat some (if not all) animals.

In 1800, according to Our World in Data, zero — none, nada, zip — people lived in what we would now classify as a liberal democracy. Just 22 million people — about 2 percent of the global population — lived in what the site classifies as “electoral autocracies,” meaning that what democracy they had was limited, and limited to a subset of the population.

One hundred years later, things weren’t much better — there were actual liberal democracies, but fewer than 1 percent of the world’s population lived in them.

All you have to do is roll the clock back a few decades to see the way that rights, on the whole, have been extended wider and wider: to LGBTQ citizens, to people of color, to women

But in the decades that followed FDR’s “Four Freedoms” speech, things changed radically, thanks to the defeat of fascist powers, the spread of civil rights within existing democracies, and eventually, the collapse of the communist world.

Today just 2 billion people live in countries that are classified as closed autocracies — relatively few legal rights, no real electoral democracy — and most of them are in China.

That doesn’t mean that the liberal democracies that exist are perfect by any means, the US very much included. Nor does it mean that periods of advancement weren’t followed by periods of retrenchment or worse. Progress, especially in politics and morals, doesn’t flow as steadily as a calendar — just compare Germany in 1929 to Germany in 1939.

But all you have to do is roll the clock back a few decades to see the way that rights, on the whole, have been extended wider and wider: to LGBTQ citizens, to people of color, to women. The fundamental fact is that as much as the technological and economic world of 2023 would be unrecognizable to people in 1800, the same is true of the political world.

Nor can you disentangle that political progress from material progress. Take the gradual but definitive emancipation of women. That has been a hard-fought, ongoing battle, chiefly waged by women who saw the inherent unfairness of a male-dominated society.

But it was aided by the invention of labor-saving technologies in the home like washing machines and refrigerators that primarily gave time back to women and made it easier for them to move into the workforce.

These are all examples of the expansion of the circle of moral concern — the enlargement of who and what is considered worthy of respect and rights, from the foundation of the family or tribe all the way to humans around the world (and increasingly non-human animals as well). And it can’t be separated from the hard fact of material progress.

The pre-industrial world was a zero-sum one — that, ultimately, is what the Malthusian Trap means. In a zero-sum world, you advance only at the expense of others, by taking from a set stock, not by adding, which is why wars of conquest between great powers were so common hundreds of years ago, or why homicide between neighbors was so much more frequent in the pre-industrial era.

We have obviously not eradicated violence, including by the state itself. But a society that can produce more of what it needs and wants is one that will be less inclined to fight over what it has, either with its neighbors or with itself. It’s not that the humans of 2023 are necessarily better, more moral, than their ancestors 200 or more years ago. It’s that war and violence cease to make economic sense.

But just as every bloody day of the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates that moral and political progress hasn’t eradicated our violent tendencies, the material progress that has helped meet our most basic needs has opened the door to new, knottier problems: to climate change caused by industrialization, to the ills of a longer-lived society, to the mental health challenges that arise once we no longer need to worry about surviving and instead need to worry about living.

And with it comes the temptation to turn back and give in.

How progress creates new problems — and solves them anew

On September 7, 1898, just as the world was finally escaping the Malthusian Trap, the chemist William Crookes told the British Association for the Advancement of Science that we were in danger of falling back into it.

According to Crookes, the UK’s rapidly growing population was at risk of running out of food. There wasn’t more room for additional farmland on the isles, which meant the only way to increase the food supply was to boost agricultural productivity. That required nitrogen fertilizer, but existing supplies of nitrogen at the time came from natural sources like guano deposits in Peru, and they were running out. The world faced, he said, “a life-and-death question for generations to come.”

On the face of it, this appeared to be Malthus’s revenge. The British population had exploded, but now it was meeting its natural limits, and nature’s correction was coming.

But Crookes had a solution, one he believed we could literally pull out of thin air. The Earth’s atmosphere is 78 percent nitrogen. Crookes challenged his audience to develop a way for humanity to artificially fix atmospheric nitrogen in a way that could be used to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, and with it, produce enough food for Britain and the world.

Less than 20 years later, two German scientists managed to do just that, developing the Haber-Bosch process to synthesize ammonia out of atmospheric nitrogen and hydrogen, which became a cornerstone of synthetic fertilizer. Combined with the increasing mechanization of agriculture, food production kept growing, and now it’s estimated that half the population alive today is dependent on the existence of synthetic fertilizer.

Viewed from this angle, the story of synthetic fertilizer from Crookes to Haber and Bosch is one of just-so progress, of technological advancement rising to meet growing need. And so it is.

But the story doesn’t stop there. The synthetic fertilizer industry produces about 2.6 gigatons of carbon per year — more than aviation and shipping combined. Its abundance has led to overapplication, so much so that about two-thirds of the nitrogen farmers apply to crops isn’t used by plants at all, but rather becomes run-off into the surrounding environment as a pollutant, causing dead zones like the massive one found in the Gulf of Mexico. Oh, and Fritz Haber himself later dedicated his career to developing chemical weapons that would kill thousands in World War I.

So the Haber-Bosch process solved one problem, while creating new ones.

That’s the story of progress as well.

In fact, you’d be hard pressed to find a single scientific or technological advancement that doesn’t create an element of blowback. Breakthroughs in nuclear physics made possible the creation of zero-carbon nuclear plants — and also, the nuclear bombs that still hold the world hostage.

The introduction of antibiotics may have added as much as eight years to global life expectancy, but the more they’re used, the more resistance builds up, paving the way for the next potential pandemic of antibiotic-resistant infections.

Striking gains in agricultural productivity have eliminated the threat of famine in all but the poorest countries, but also contributed to a problem that was basically unheard of until recently: widespread obesity.

Advances in animal breeding and diet have made meat cheap and widespread, but at the cost of local pollution and the creation of a factory farming system that sentences billions of domesticated animals to lives of terrible suffering.

Above all else is climate change. If there was a single material ingredient to the Industrial Revolution and all that followed, it was coal. Coal fired the factories, coal fueled the railroads, coal made industrialization happen. It’s still coal, along with other fossil fuels like oil and natural gas, that provides the bulk of global energy consumption — energy consumption that has risen more than 3,000 percent since 1800.

And coal and its fellow fossil fuels are by far the top contributors to climate change. Coal helped create progress, and coal helped create climate change. And if the story ended there, it might be reasonable to look at progress very differently. It might even be reasonable to agree with de-growthers whose demand, at the end of the day, is that we must stop economic growth and throw it in reverse, or face doom.

But the story doesn’t end there.

The solutions produced by progress create new problems, but almost every time, we’ve managed to find new solutions.

The Haber-Bosch process created the new problem of fertilizer overapplication and pollution, but smart agriculture can get the same or greater crop yields with less fertilizer — a change that is already underway — while synthetic biology offers the promise of engineering crops that can effectively fertilize themselves.

Before the Industrial Age, we lived in balance, but that balance, for the bulk of humanity, was a terrible place to be — worse, by many measures, than any future we could fear

Obesity has proven to be a stubbornly resistant health problem, but new drugs and surgical treatments are poised to make it easier to lose weight even in an environment where food is everywhere.

Climate change will be the most difficult challenge of all, but progress is bringing down the cost of renewable energy, reducing energy waste, and putting new forms of cleaner energy on the horizon. Progress — and that is the word — on climate policy and innovation has already bent the curve away from the worst-case climate scenarios. We’re not on course for utopia, but we no longer appear to be headed toward doom either. (At least, not this particular doom.)

Before the Industrial Age, we lived in balance, but that balance, for the bulk of humanity, was a terrible place to be — worse, by many measures, than any future we could fear. With industrialization, after tens of thousands of years on this planet, we began to change that.

But we also began a race: Could we keep inventing new technologies, new approaches, that would keep us ahead of the new challenges that progress created? Could we keep solving the problems of success?

So far, the answer has been a qualified yes. Past performance is no guarantee of future results, but we have every reason to believe that we have far more race to run.

That race can feel exhausting, even pathological — the endless sentence of a species that can never seem to be satisfied. Doomerism, at its heart, may be that exhaustion made manifest.

But just as we need continued advances in clean tech or biosecurity to protect ourselves from some of the existential threats we’ve inadvertently created, so do we need continued progress to address the problems that have been with us always: of want, of freedom, even of mortality. Nothing can dispel the terminal exhaustion that seems endemic in 2023 better than the idea that there is so much more left to do to lift millions out of poverty and misery while protecting the future — which is possible, thanks to the path of the progress we’ve made.

And we’ll know we’re successful if our descendants can one day look back on the present with the same mix of sympathy and relief with which we should look back on our past. How, they’ll wonder, did they ever live like that?

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Vox · by Bryan Walsh · March 20, 2023

7. Don’t Panic About Taiwan

I am sure many will find fault with this.

What strikes me is the idea that we can provide defense support to Taiwan in such a way that will signal to the PRC that it won't create the impression that the window for attack on Taiwan is closing. So do we want the PRC to believe that the window for an attack on Taiwan remains open? Then why provide support to bolster Taiwan's defenses if we want the PRC to believe that the window for attack remains open? Why provide defense support to leave Taiwan vulnerable?

Conclusion:

To that end, Washington should assure Beijing that it is not bent on promoting Taiwan’s permanent separation or formal independence from China. U.S. officials and representatives should not refer to Taiwan as a country, ally, or strategic asset, or attempt to sow discord or encourage regime change in China, which would provoke rather than deter Beijing. Washington should help bolster Taiwan’s defenses, but it should do so without signaling dramatic changes in U.S. military support, which risk inadvertently creating the impression that Beijing has a limited window to invade. Beijing, Washington, and Taipei must avoid creating the very do-or-die scenario that they fear.

Don’t Panic About Taiwan

Alarm Over a Chinese Invasion Could Become a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

By Jessica Chen Weiss

March 21, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Jessica Chen Weiss · March 21, 2023

In the West and parts of Asia, concern is mounting that China might invade Taiwan to distract from mounting domestic challenges or because Chinese leaders imagine that their window of opportunity to seize the island is closing. Facing an economic slowdown and rising unemployment, some analysts argue, Beijing might be tempted to launch a military offensive to rally popular support. In January 2023, for instance, Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, speculated that Chinese President Xi Jinping might create an external crisis “to divert domestic attention or to show to the Chinese that he has accomplished something.”

Other analysts warn of an impending war because China’s rise is slowing. In their view, Beijing might try to seize the opportunity to use force against Taiwan while it has the advantage. Admiral Mike Gilday, chief of U.S. naval operations, suggested in October 2022 that China could try to take Taiwan as early as 2022 or 2023. Other U.S. officials, including Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William Burns, the director of the CIA, have cautioned that Xi has not yet decided to invade Taiwan. But there is growing concern among some Western security analysts and policymakers that once the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes it has the military capability to invade Taiwan and hold the United States at bay, Xi will order an invasion.

Fears that China will soon invade Taiwan are overblown. There is little evidence that Chinese leaders see a closing window for action. Such fears appear to be driven more by Washington’s assessments of its own military vulnerabilities than by Beijing’s risk-reward calculus. Historically, Chinese leaders have not started wars to divert attention from domestic challenges, and they continue to favor using measures short of conflict to achieve their objectives. If anything, problems at home have moderated Chinese foreign policy, and Chinese popular opinion has tended to reward government bluster and displays of resolve that do not lead to open conflict.

If Western policymakers exaggerate the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, they might inadvertently create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead of worrying that Beijing will gin up a foreign crisis to bolster its standing at home or assuming that Beijing feels pressured to invade in the near term, the United States should focus on arresting—or at least decelerating—the action-reaction spiral that has steadily ratcheted up tensions and made a crisis more likely. That does not mean halting efforts to bolster Taiwan’s resilience to Chinese coercion or to diversify the United States’ defense posture in the region. But it does mean avoiding needless confrontation and identifying reciprocal steps that Washington and Beijing could take to lower the temperature.

The hard but crucial task for U.S. policymakers is to thread the needle between deterrence and provocation. Symbolic displays of resolve, unconditional commitments to defend Taiwan, and pledges of a surge in U.S. military power in the region could stray too far toward the latter, inadvertently provoking the very conflict U.S. policymakers seek to deter.

WAG THE DOG?

Although the logic of diversionary aggression has an intuitive appeal, there is little reason to think that domestic challenges will tempt China’s leadership to launch a war abroad. In a 2008 review of cross-national studies of international conflict, the scholars Matthew Baum and Philip Potter found little consistent evidence of world leaders starting military hostilities to whip up domestic support. Moreover, authoritarian leaders may be less likely than democratic ones to initiate crises in the wake of domestic unrest because they have greater latitude to repress their people, the political scientist Chris Gelpi has found. And rather than embark on risky military adventures, leaders facing domestic challenges often choose other means to quell discontent, including working with other states to address threats from within—for instance, by settling border disputes to calm unrest on their frontiers—or resorting to repression.

China’s response to once-in-a-generation protests against its draconian COVID-19 restrictions late last year is a case in point. After demonstrators took to the streets in dozens of cities carrying sheets of blank paper—symbols of resistance in the face of censorship—the Chinese government did not seek to deflect attention from domestic discontent with aggressive foreign policy measures. Instead, it eased its COVID-19 restrictions, detained and interrogated protesters, and continued its post–pandemic efforts to reassure foreign investors.

Chinese leaders have given few signs that domestic insecurity might prompt them to lash out against Taiwan. On the contrary, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party leadership have sought to project an image of confidence and patience in the face of growing international risks and challenges. Despite pessimism in China about trends in public opinion that show Taiwan pulling away from the mainland politically and culturally, Xi told the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022 that “the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification.”

Xi has sought to project an image of confidence and patience.

Historically, Chinese leaders have tended to temper their foreign policy during times of domestic turmoil. Sometimes, they have engaged in harsh rhetoric and saber rattling, but they have only rarely launched military operations in such periods. Even Chairman Mao Zedong, who ordered the shelling of offshore islands in 1958, sought to mobilize the Chinese population while avoiding an outright war over Taiwan, warning that China must only fight battles it is sure of winning.

According to the political scientist M. Taylor Fravel, China has compromised in 15 of the 17 territorial disputes it has settled with its neighbors since 1949—most of them during periods of regime insecurity arising from domestic political challenges, including unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, and renewed unrest in Xinjiang in the early 1990s. In an analysis of Beijing’s behavior in militarized interstate disputes between 1949 and 1992, moreover, the political scientist Alastair Johnston found “no relationship between domestic unrest and China’s use of force externally.” If anything, the frequency of China’s involvement in militarized interstate disputes declined when domestic unrest increased. On the whole, in other words, Chinese leaders have done the opposite of what many analysts are warning: they have sought to reduce external tensions in order to tackle domestic challenges from a position of greater strength while attempting to deter foreign efforts to exploit internal tensions.

Beijing’s behavior in the East and South China Seas has followed this pattern. During two flare-ups with Tokyo in the 1990s over the island chain known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, for instance, Chinese leaders quashed expressions of popular antipathy toward Japan with the aim of preserving economic ties with Tokyo, according to the international relations scholars Phillip Saunders and Erica Downs. And the political scientist Andrew Chubb has shown that between 1970 and 2015, Chinese leaders tended to be less aggressive at sea during periods of internal strife. When Beijing did act assertively in these maritime territorial disputes, it did so mainly to thwart perceived challenges with new capabilities, not to distract from heightened domestic insecurity.

BARK NOT BITE

Claims that Beijing is looking for opportunities to lash out for domestic political purposes aren’t just wrong. They are dangerous because they imply that U.S. actions have no bearing on China’s calculus on Taiwan and that the only way to deter Beijing from diversionary aggression is to deny it the ability to prevail in such an endeavor.

Domestic considerations and the military balance of power are not the only factors Xi will weigh when deciding whether to attack Taiwan. Even if he prefers to avoid a near-term conflict and believes that China’s military prospects will improve over time, he might still order a military operation if he and other Chinese leaders perceive a sharp increase in the risk that Taiwan could be lost. As Fravel has shown, China has often used military force to counter perceived challenges to its sovereignty claims in territorial and maritime disputes.

Such challenges, including U.S. actions that endorse Taiwan as an independent state or suggest that Washington might be on the cusp of restoring a formal alliance with the island, might trigger such a reaction from China. Even so, Beijing has less risky ways to respond to perceived provocations, including rhetoric and actions that could burnish its nationalist credentials without escalating to military conflict. As I have previously argued in Foreign Affairs, China’s leaders frequently engage in rhetorical bluster to appease domestic audiences and minimize the popular costs of not using military force. They may also choose from a variety of escalatory measures short of war to signal resolve and impose costs on Taiwan, including military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to squeeze the island and deter it from pulling away from the mainland. Behavior of this sort should not be mistaken for preparations for war.

KEEP CALM

In any society, there are people who go looking for a fight. But among the ranks of China’s top leaders, those people still appear to be less influential than those who recognize that it is better to win without fighting. Although Xi warned in 2021 that China would take “decisive measures” if provoked by “forces for Taiwan independence,” the CCP reiterated in 2022 that “peaceful reunification” remains its “first choice.” Even the hawkish Qiao Liang, a retired major general in the Chinese air force, has cautioned against the tide of nationalist agitation for action against Taiwan. “China’s ultimate goal is not the reunification of Taiwan, but to achieve the dream of national rejuvenation—so that all 1.4 billion Chinese can have a good life,” Qiao said in a May 2020 interview. He went on to warn that taking Taiwan by force would be “too costly” and should not be Beijing’s top priority.

At present, Chinese leaders are still pressing the PLA to prepare for a possible war over Taiwan, which indicates that they are uncertain about their ability to win. So long as these doubts linger, the use of force to take the island will remain an option of last resort. These leaders cannot count on a swift victory to bolster their domestic popularity, and there is no evidence that they are preparing for an imminent invasion. As John Culver, a former U.S. intelligence analyst focused on East Asia, has noted, preparing to seize Taiwan would be an enormous, highly visible effort. In the months before an invasion, such preparations would be impossible to keep secret.

For now, the best way to prevent a showdown is to recognize that mutual efforts to show resolve and threaten punishment are not enough to keep the peace. China, Taiwan, and the United States must resist analysis that could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy and make sure that alternatives to conflict remain viable.

To that end, Washington should assure Beijing that it is not bent on promoting Taiwan’s permanent separation or formal independence from China. U.S. officials and representatives should not refer to Taiwan as a country, ally, or strategic asset, or attempt to sow discord or encourage regime change in China, which would provoke rather than deter Beijing. Washington should help bolster Taiwan’s defenses, but it should do so without signaling dramatic changes in U.S. military support, which risk inadvertently creating the impression that Beijing has a limited window to invade. Beijing, Washington, and Taipei must avoid creating the very do-or-die scenario that they fear.

JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University and a Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

Foreign Affairs · by Jessica Chen Weiss · March 21, 2023

8. This Week, Fort Pickett Will Replace Its Confederate Name, a First for an Army Base Following Renaming Commission

This Week, Fort Pickett Will Replace Its Confederate Name, a First for an Army Base Following Renaming Commission

military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 20, 2023

Fort Pickett, Virginia, will be the first Army installation to be renamed as part of a service-wide plan this year to scrub base names that honor Confederate rebels who waged war against the United States.

Fort Pickett, an Army National Guard installation 60 miles south of Richmond, will be redesignated Fort Barfoot on Friday, honoring Col. Van T. Barfoot, a World War II Medal of Honor recipient with deep Virginia ties.

"It is such a tremendous honor to name an installation where military forces train to defend our freedoms in honor of Col. Van T. Barfoot," Maj. Gen. Timothy P. Williams, the adjutant general of Virginia, said in a statement. "His magnificent military career was marked by heroism and decades of selfless service to our nation, and his legacy will serve as an inspiration for current and future generations of service members."

Eight other Army bases are set to be renamed after recommendations from the congressionally mandated Naming Commission, a committee formed to review the military's references to the Confederate rebels who seceded from the United States, largely to protect and grow the slave trade, spurring the Civil War.

Barfoot enlisted in the Army in 1940 and later earned his Medal of Honor through heroic actions during an assault in Italy in May 1944. At the time a technical sergeant, equivalent to a sergeant first class today, Barfoot crawled toward a German machine-gun position that was pinning down his unit. He threw a grenade, killing two Germans and injuring an additional three, according to his award citation. He moved to another machine-gun position and killed two more Germans and took three prisoners, prompting one of the final enemy machine-gun teams to surrender to Barfoot. He went on to capture 17 prisoners total.

Later that same day, the Germans launched a counterattack against Barfoot's platoon. Facing multiple enemy tanks, Barfoot fired a bazooka at one, disabling it and killing the crew. He then grabbed two seriously wounded American soldiers and carried them to a safe position 1,700 yards away.

Barfoot went on to serve a long Army career, deploying to both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. He retired in 1970 and died in 2012, in Richmond, at the age of 92.

Meanwhile, George Pickett, the installation's original namesake, was a poorly performing cadet and ranked last in the West Point class of 1846. When the Civil War began, there was a high demand for junior officers in the Confederate forces, and he eventually moved his way up the ranks. He is most famous for the so-called "Pickett's Charge," ordered by Gen. Robert E. Lee during the Battle of Gettysburg, a bungled attempt for a swift battlefield victory that cost the Confederates dearly. Pickett led three divisions to move roughly one mile across an open field, but they were severely punished by Union artillery and gunfire. The high-profile blunder ended with more than 5,000 Confederates dead or wounded, about half of their entire force in the battle. The Union lost 1,500 soldiers during the engagement.

Last week, the service also mandated National Guard units that once fought for the Confederacy strip Civil War battle streamers from their guidons. Many of those units were key in early Southern victories but had those rebel combat awards attached to the same unit flags as streamers earned through American battles in World War II and the Global War on Terrorism.

Other bases set to be redesignated include Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Fort Hood, Texas. It's unclear when those posts will be renamed, but the changes are expected to occur within a year.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 20, 2023

9. Special Operations News Update - March 20, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - March 20, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · March 20, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Army A/MH-6X Mission Enhanced Little Birds land during Weapons and Tactics Instructor course in Yuma, Arizona. Photo by Zachary M. Ford, DoD, April 4, 2016.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Parachute Fatality. A member of the U.S. Army Parachute Team died after sustaining injuries during a training jump at Homestead Air Reserve Base in Florida. Sgt. 1st Class Michael Ty Kettenhofen died on Monday, March 13, 2023. He joined the Golden Knights parachute team in 2020 and had over 1,000 jumps. “Soldier from Army’s Golden Knights dies in training accident”, Military Times, March 16, 2023.

NSW Officer Selection. Cole Black writes on ruthless selection of officers for Naval Special Warfare. He argues that the pool of candidates is weighted in favor of graduates from the Naval Academy; and that perhaps more outreach should be done with ROTC and OCS programs. “Does the Officer Selection Process for Naval Special Warfare Leave a Lot of Talent on the Beach?”, SOFREP, March 18, 2023.

Honor Project. Chapter XLIII of the Special Forces Association recently hosted an event where former Green Berets talked about their experiences in Special Forces. “Special Forces Association preservers stories of vets”, CDA Press, March 19, 2023.

AFSOC to Receive Three MQ-9Bs. A new contract with Air Force Special Operations Command will result in three MQ-9B SkyGuardian remotely piloted aircraft systems. “AFSOC Selects MQ-9B SkyGuardian for UAS Family of Systems Concept”, UAS Magazine, March 8, 2023.

SOF and Weaponizing Rights. Major Joseph Bedinfield, a Civil Affairs officer, argues that weaponizing ‘rights’ offers US Army special operations forces (ARSOF) an innovative option to gain an advantage in irregular warfare and strategic competition. The global competition for influence shows no signs of slowing down, and the rights as weapons framework offers ARSOF an opportunity “. . . to dominate the information environment, inspire partners to action, and potentially win the battle before the first shot is fired.” “Weaponizing Rights: An Untapped Tool for Special Operations Forces”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 15, 2023.

AFSOC and Balikatan 2023. Units of the Air Force Special Operations Command will be taking part in an exercise to be held in the Philippines. Two AC-130J gunships, MQ-9, and other AFSOC personnel will support the event. “27th Special Operations Wing to participate in Balikaton 2023”, 27th SOW PA, March 16, 2023.

International SOF

Israeli SOF ‘on Strike’? Israeli reservists who in the Military Intelligence’s Special Operations Division are protesting due to moves to overhaul the government’s judicial system. “Hundreds of elite IDF reservists stop showing up for duty over judicial overhaul”, The Times of Israel, March 19, 2023.

South Africa’s Underwater Elite. Explore the difficult path to becoming a military diver in South Africa. Before you even begin dive training you must successfully complete the 18-month Special Forces Operator training course. Learn more in “Special Forces Diver”, DAN Southern Africa, March 15, 2023.

Canada’s SOF Aviation. The 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron is an air force unit which supports the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command or CANSOFCOM. It was founded during the Second World War and is based at CFB Petawawa, Ontario, Canada. “Canada’s 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron”, Grey Dynamics, January 1, 2023.

Somalia’s SF Training. The United States will continue to train up the Danab Brigade – one of the elite forces fighting to reclaim parts of Somalia from Al Shabaab. “US signs deal to continue training Somalia’s special forces”, Garowe Online, March 16, 2023.

SOF History

OIF. On March 19, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began. Special operations forces played a big role in the invasion of Iraq. JSOTF-W conducted CTBM in the West and UW in the South. Elements of the 10th SFG(A) linked up with Kurdish forces in northern Iraq. Read more about the invasion in this 15-slide briefing on the early days of OIF.

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/09-F-1449_Operation_Iraqi_Freedom_OIF_History_Brief.pdf

160th SOAR and OIF. Attack helicopters of the 160th SOAR struck Iraqi targets along the southern and western borders. The MH-60 “Black Hawk” Direct Action Penetrators (DAPs) and AH-6M “Killer Egg” attack helicopters eliminated over 70 Iraqi observations posts, crippling the enemy’s ability to effectively gauge the size and scope of the incoming ground assault.

Skyhook Extraction and the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces used the Fulton Extraction as a method of exfiltrating individuals from denied areas. The origins of of the Fulton Extraction come from the 1920s – 1930s when mail pickups were conducted by aircraft in remote locations. Some reports say that British intelligence used the method to recover personnel from occupied Europe during World War II. Later, U.S. Special Forces and the CIA would use the pickup method in the 1950s through the later part of the 20th century. Read more in “Skyhook Extraction Mechanism Instructions”, Central Intelligence Agency (Online Museum).

Australian SAS Soldier Arrested. A decorated former special forces officer faces life in prison after being charged with war crimes under Australian law. It is alleged that he murdered an Afghan man while deployed to Afghanistan with the Australian Defense Forces. He served in the SAS’s 3 Squadron in 2012. “Former SAS soldier charged with Afghanistan war war crime”, The Age, March 20, 2023.

“Paddy” Mayne and the SAS. During World War II one of the heroes of the UK’s special operations community emerged from the ranks of the Special Air Service. Robert Blair Mayne first served in the desert of North Africa fighting the Italians and the Germans. He eventually rose to become one of the leading figures of the British SAS. “How a Rivalry Propelled This Irish Special Forces Trooper to the Top”, by Gavin Mortimer, HistoryNet, March 17, 2023.

Ukraine Conflict

Battle of Bahkmut. The longest fight of the Ukraine conflict continues. The Ukrainians continue to hold the western portion of the small industrial city while the Russians hold the eastern portion and are advancing from the north and south. One road leads from Bahkmut to the west; used for Ukrainian resupplies, personnel replacement, and evacuation of the dead and wounded. View the situation on a Google map.

Ex-Navy SEAL (Korea) Arrested. A former Korean Navy special forces officer who went to Ukraine a year ago to help that country defend itself against Russia has been arrested upon his return to Korea. “Ex-Navy SEAL admits violating passport law”, The Korea Herald, March 20, 2023.

Russia’s Armata Tank. When the T-14 Armata tank was revealed in a 2015 May Victory Day parade it embarrassingly broke down. Seven years later the tank can be declared dead. Read about the demise of the Russia’s latest prototype tank. “Armata – the story is over”, by Sergio Miller, Wavall Room, February 10, 2023.

Trouble in Moldova. The Russians are busy in the small country just to the west of Ukraine. There are concerns that Russia actively using hybrid warfare in an attempt to replace the current government with one more to their liking. “Moldova facing Russian hybrid warfare: defence minister”, France 24, March 3, 2023. See also “Russia’s secret document for destabilizing Moldova”, Yahoo! News, March 14, 2023.

Russian PSYOPS. Oscar Rosengren provides a detailed examination of Russian influence operations in northern Europe; to include methods, tools, and other activities that target Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. “Russian Psyops in Northern Europe”, Grey Dynamics, March 15, 2023.

National Security

Syria – and Turkish Interference. The United States is actively conducting operations against ISIS targets in Syria. Many of these operations are done in joint operations with the US and the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF). However, cyclical meddling by Turkey has been a thorn in the side – causing the SDF to divert attention from counter-ISIS operations to security its front lines against possible Turkish incursions. Read more in “Operation Claw-Sword Exposes Blind Spots in the US’ NE Syria Strategy”, Newslines Institute, March 7, 2023.

Podcast – Somalia – the ‘Forever War’. Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage of The New York Times are interviewed about the al Shabaab insurgency in Somalia. Schmitt recently embedded with U.S. special operations forces in that country. Lawfare Podcast, March 16, 2023, 46 minutes.

Somali Increases Size of Security Forces. The last African Union soldier will leave Somalia in December 2024. The government is increasing the number of army and police personnel to respond to the al Shabaab threat. “Somali Leaders Agree to Increase Troop Numbers”, Voice of America, March 19, 2023.

Flintlock 2023 – Opening Ceremonies. Participants from 29 countries kicked off the command post and field training portion of Exercise Flintlock 2023 at four locations. The annual special operations exercise is supported by SOCAFRICA. “Flintlock 2023 opens with ceremonies across Ghana and cote d’Ivoire”, USAFRICOM, March 16, 2023.

Upcoming Events

April 5-6, 2023. San Diego, California

Warrior West

ADS

April 14-16, 2023. Fort Benning, Georgia

Best Ranger Competition

May 8-11, 2023. Tampa, Florida

SOF Week

USSOCOM

Books, Videos, and Podcasts

Book Review – Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, by Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Syracuse University Press, 2022, Second Edition. Joseph Huddleston, an Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, reviews a recent book describing the plight of Western Sahara and the effort of Morocco to maintain control of the territory.

https://www.e-ir.info/2023/03/14/review-western-sahara/

Video – SOCKOR Year of the Tiger Recap. A short video looks back at 2022. Special Operations Command Korea, DVIDS, February 27, 2023, 3 minutes.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/874733/sockor-year-tiger-recap

Podcast – Gen Bryan Fenton, USSOCOM Commander. The commander of the United States Special Operations Command spends an hour talking about the SOF community. SOFcast, March 15, 2023, 1 1/2 hours.

Podcast – Leadership. Tim Burke, a member of the special operations community (82nd, SF, and the Unit), is interviewed on on leadership and how humility plays an important part in personal growth and leading others to be their very best. The Pinelander Podcast, March 16, 2023, one hour.

Podcast – Sax & the Spy. Merryl Goldberg, a 25 year old musician, is asked to go behind the Iron Curtain in 1985 to help rescue a group of Russian musicians. The saxophonist from Boston used sheet music to hide coded information. DIA Connections, Defense Intelligence Agency, March 13, 2023, 32 minutes. Listen to this fascinating story. Read more in “How a Saxophonist Tricked the KGB by Encrypting Secrets in Music”, Wired.com, June 8, 2022.

Podcasts Channels

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

sof.news · by SOF News · March 20, 2023

10. Taiwan’s president to visit U.S., raising prospect of friction with China

Taiwan’s president to visit U.S., raising prospect of friction with China

The Washington Post · by Meaghan Tobin · March 21, 2023

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will visit the United States at the end of the month, stopping over in New York and California on her way to and from Central America, where she will try to shore up ties with the island democracy’s few remaining diplomatic allies.

With Beijing aggressively pushing to upend the U.S.-led international order, Honduran President Xiomara Castro last week said her country was looking to forge diplomatic relations with China, which means it would cut off official relations with Taiwan. The move would leave just 13 countries that recognize Taiwan.

Tsai will travel from March 29 to April 7, stopping first in New York before heading to Guatemala and Belize and traveling through Los Angeles on the return leg, a spokesperson from Taiwan’s office of the president confirmed on Tuesday. The spokesperson did not provide an itinerary for Tsai’s U.S. engagements.

The trip, which will mark Tsai’s seventh visit to the United States since taking office in 2016, will include a meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) at the Reagan Library in California on April 5, according to people familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the plans have not been announced.

Tsai’s meeting with McCarthy comes in the wake of a highly publicized visit by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan last August, which resulted in an aggressive show of Chinese military force that included ballistic missiles fired over Taiwan and into Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have said that Beijing “firmly opposes any form of official interaction between the U.S. and the Taiwan region,” and “firmly opposes the U.S. having any form of contact with ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist elements.” Beijing claims Taiwan as part of its territory and says it seeks “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party.

Observers in Taiwan have suggested that this time, Beijing’s retaliation has taken the form of Honduran threats to break off ties with Taipei.

Chong-Han Wu, associate professor of diplomacy at National Chengchi University in Taipei, predicted that Castro would follow through on breaking off ties as part of a stronger response from Beijing in “revenge for Tsai’s visit.”

McCarthy, who last year had said he wanted to visit Taiwan if he became speaker, has not ruled out a future trip to Taiwan — perhaps next year — and has said that China cannot dictate his travel.

Transits of the United States by high-level Taiwanese officials are in keeping with “long-standing U.S. practice,” said a senior Biden administration official on Monday evening, noting that every Taiwanese president has done so.

Since the United States does not maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, regular trips by Taiwanese leaders are routinely framed by both sides as transits rather than official visits.

“Transit diplomacy is, to a considerable extent, a thermometer of Taiwan’s relations with the U.S.,” said Chung Chih-tung, assistant research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a government-funded think tank. Though unofficial, Tsai’s trip reaffirms the U.S. support for Taiwan, said Chung, and lets Taipei know “they are not alone in confronting China’s pressure, especially with allies like the United States.”

Tsai’s previous U.S. trips have been met with “minimal” Chinese response, the Biden administration official noted in a call with reporters in advance of the announcement of the visit by Tsai’s office.

Tsai’s trip to also comes as her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou makes the first visit of any president of Taiwan to China. Ma is a leader in the opposition Kuomintang, or Nationalist, Party, which favors closer ties with Beijing.

McCarthy’s office has been advised that the KMT would probably exploit any trip he made to Taiwan for political purposes in the run-up to next year’s presidential election. The KMT has sought to portray Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party’s cross-strait policy as unnecessarily provocative, saying it is increasing the risk of war with China.

The senior official said “transits are not visits, they are private and unofficial.” The official also said that Taiwan officials have typically met with members of Congress on their stops in the United States.

“We see no reason for Beijing to turn this transit … which is consistent with long standing U.S. policy into anything other than what it is,” the official said. “It should not be used as a pretext to step up any aggressive activity around the Taiwan Strait.”

The administration does not expect to see a repeat of last August in response to Tsai’s transit through the United States, the official said.

“This is … a pretty standard transit well within precedent,” the official said. “So our expectation is that the PRC is not going to step up any aggressive activity,” the official said, using the abbreviation for China’s official name, the People’s Republic of China.

White House and State Department officials spoke with Chinese Embassy officials in Washington and U.S. Embassy officials in Beijing spoke with Chinese officials there over the last several weeks about a potential Tsai trip, emphasizing how it was standard practice and within precedent, officials said.

The official said that the U.S.’s “one-China policy” remains unchanged, a policy that recognizes Beijing as the sole legal government of China, acknowledges Beijing’s position that there is only one China, but does not endorse China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.

“The United States opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side,” the official said. “We don’t support Taiwan independence, and we expect cross strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.”

Vic Chiang and Pei-Lin Wu in Taipei contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Meaghan Tobin · March 21, 2023

11. I Supported the Invasion of Iraq by Tom Nichols ·

Intro:

I supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I have changed my mind about some things but not everything, and I hope you’ll bear with me in a somewhat longer edition of the Daily today for a personal exploration of the issue.

Conclusion:

Twenty years later, that’s where I remain. The cause was just, but there are times when doing what’s right and just is not possible. For almost 15 years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Allied victory over Iraq, the United States had the chance to deepen the importance of international institutions. We squandered that opportunity because of poor leadership, Pentagon fads (the “Office of Force Transformation” was disbanded in 2006, shortly before Bush finally removed Rumsfeld), and amateurish historical analogies.

Still, there’s too much revisionist history about the Iraq War. You’ll see arguments that experts supported it. (Most academics and many civilians in D.C. did not.) You’ll hear that it was a right-wing crusade backed only by a Republican minority. (Also wrong.) Had the war been executed differently, we might be having a different conversation today.

The fact remains that the United States is a great power protecting an international system it helped to create, and there will be times when military action is necessary. Fortunately, most Americans still seem to grasp this important reality.

Would I argue for another such operation today? If the question means “another massive preventive war far from home,” no. I have consistently opposed war with Iran and any direct U.S. involvement in Ukraine. I wrote a book in 2008 warning that we should strengthen the United Nations and other institutions to stop the growing acceptance around the world of preventive war as a normal tool of statecraft.

I also, however, supported the NATO operation in Libya, and I have called for using American airpower to blunt Assad’s mass murders in Syria. Iraq was a terrible mistake, but it would be another mistake to draw the single-minded conclusion (much as we did after Vietnam) that everything everywhere will forever be another Iraq. The world is too dangerous, and American leadership too necessary, for us to fall into such a facile and paralyzing trap.

I Supported the Invasion of Iraq

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · March 20, 2023

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Twenty years after the United States led a coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the conventional wisdom is now that the postwar fiasco proved that the war was a mistake from its inception. The war, as it was executed, was indeed a disaster, but there was ample cause for launching it.

First, here are four new stories from The Atlantic:

Just War

I supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I have changed my mind about some things but not everything, and I hope you’ll bear with me in a somewhat longer edition of the Daily today for a personal exploration of the issue.

In retrospect, almost no American war except the great crusade against the Axis seems to have been necessary, especially for the people who have had to go and fight such conflicts. How could we have asked our military men and women to endure death and mutilation and horror in 1991 so that a bunch of rich Kuwaitis could return to their mansions, or in 2003 so that we could finally settle scores with a regional dictator? Yesterday, The Bulwark ran a searing, must-read reminiscence of the Iraq War written by a U.S. veteran that reminds us how high-flown ideas such as “national interest” or “international order” play little role on the actual battlefield.

And yet, there are just wars: conflicts that require the use of armed force on behalf of an ally or for the greater good of the international community. I was an advocate for deposing Saddam by the mid-1990s on such grounds. Here is what I wrote in the journal Ethics & International Affairs on the eve of the invasion in March 2003:

The record provides ample evidence of the justice of a war against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Iraq has shown itself to be a serial aggressor led by a dictator willing to run imprudent risks, including an attack on the civilians of a noncombatant nation during the Persian Gulf War; a supreme enemy of human rights that has already used weapons of mass destruction against civilians; a consistent violator of both UN resolutions and the terms of the 1991 cease-fire treaty, to say nothing of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions before and since the Persian Gulf War; a terrorist entity that has attempted to reach beyond its own borders to support and engage in illegal activities that have included the attempted assassination of a former U.S. president; and most important, a state that has relentlessly sought nuclear arms against all international demands that it cease such efforts.

Any one of these would be sufficient cause to remove Saddam and his regime(and wars have started over less), but taken together they are a brief for what can only be considered a just war.

Today, there is not a word of this I would take back as an indictment of Saddam Hussein or as justification for the use of force. But although I believed that the war could be justified on these multiple grounds, the George W. Bush administration chose a morally far weaker argument for a preventive war, ostensibly to counter a gathering threat of weapons of mass destruction. (Preemptive war, by the way, is a war to avert an imminent attack, and generally permissible in international law and custom. Preventive war is going to war on your own timetable to snuff out a possible future threat, a practice long rejected by the international community as immoral and illegal. The Israeli move at the opening of the Six-Day War, in 1967, was preemptive; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in 1941, was preventive.)

Of course, the Iraqi dictator was doing his damndest to convince the world that he had weapons of mass destruction, because he was terrified of admitting to his worst foe, Iran, that he no longer had them. (He sure convinced me.) But this was no evidence of an imminent threat requiring instant action, and the WMD charge was the shakiest of limbs in a tree full of much stronger branches.

Bush used the WMD rationale as just one in a kitchen sink of issues, likely because his advisers thought it was the case that would most resonate with the public after the September 11 terror attacks. For years, most Western governments saw terrorism, rogue states, and WMD as three separate problems, to be handled by different means. After 9/11, these three issues threaded together into one giant problem—a rogue state supporting terrorists who seek to do mass damage—and the tolerance for risk that protected the Iraqi tyrant for so many years evaporated.

In 2003, I was far too confident in the ability of my own government to run a war of regime change, which managed to turn a quick operational victory into one of the greatest geopolitical disasters in American history. Knowing what I now know, I would not have advocated for setting the wheels of war in motion. And although Bush bears the ultimate responsibility for this war, I could not have imagined how much Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s obsession with “transformation,” the idea that the U.S. military could do more with fewer troops and lighter forces, would undermine our ability to conduct a war against Iraq. As Eliot Cohen later said, “The thing I know now that I did not know then is just how incredibly incompetent we would be, which is the most sobering part of all this.”

My own unease about the war began when America’s de facto military governor, Paul Bremer, disbanded the Iraqi military and embarked on “de-Baathification,” taking as his historical analogy the “denazification” of Germany after World War II. This was bad history and bad policy, and it created a massive unemployment problem among people skilled in violence while punishing civilians whose only real association with Baathism was the party card required for them to get a good job.

And yet, for a few years more, I stayed the course. I believed that Iraqis, like anyone else, wanted to be free. They might not be Jeffersonian democrats, but they hated Saddam, and now they had a chance at something better. Like many of our leaders, I was still amazed at the collapse of the Soviet Union, appalled at Western inaction in places like Rwanda, and convinced (as I still am) that U.S. foreign policy should be premised on a kind of Spider-Man doctrine: With great power comes great responsibility.

Unfortunately, in my case, this turned into supporting what the late Charles Krauthammer in 1999 called “a blanket anti-son of a bitch policy,” which he described as “soothing, satisfying and empty. It is not a policy at all but righteous self-delusion.” Krauthammer was right, and people like me were too willing to argue for taking out bad guys merely because they were bad guys. But that word blanket was doing a lot of lifting in Krauthammer’s formulation; perhaps we cannot go after all of them, but some sons of bitches should be high on the list. For me, Saddam was one of them.

The question now was whether even Saddam Hussein was worth the cost. Twenty years ago, I would have said yes. Today, I would say no—but I must add the caveat that no one knew then, nor can anyone know now, how much more dangerous a world we might have faced with Saddam and his psychopathic sons still in power. (Is the world better off because we left Bashar al-Assad in power and allowed him to turn Syria into an abattoir?) Yes, some rulers are too dangerous to remove; Vladimir Putin, hiding in the Kremlin behind a wall of nuclear weapons, comes to mind. Some, however, are too dangerous to allow to remain in power, and in 2003, I included Saddam in that group.

In 2007, Vanity Fair interviewed a group of the war’s most well-known supporters. Even the ur-hawk Richard Perle (nicknamed in Washington the “Prince of Darkness” when he worked for Ronald Reagan) admitted that, if he had it to do over again, he might have argued for some path other than war. But the comment that sticks with me to this day, and the one that best represents my thinking, came from Ambassador Kenneth Adelman. In 2002, Adelman famously declared that the war would be “a cakewalk,” but five years later, he said:

The policy can be absolutely right, and noble, beneficial, but if you can’t execute it, it’s useless, just useless. I guess that’s what I would have said: that Bush’s arguments are absolutely right, but you know what? You just have to put them in the drawer marked CAN’T DO. And that’s very different from LET’S GO.

Twenty years later, that’s where I remain. The cause was just, but there are times when doing what’s right and just is not possible. For almost 15 years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Allied victory over Iraq, the United States had the chance to deepen the importance of international institutions. We squandered that opportunity because of poor leadership, Pentagon fads (the “Office of Force Transformation” was disbanded in 2006, shortly before Bush finally removed Rumsfeld), and amateurish historical analogies.

Still, there’s too much revisionist history about the Iraq War. You’ll see arguments that experts supported it. (Most academics and many civilians in D.C. did not.) You’ll hear that it was a right-wing crusade backed only by a Republican minority. (Also wrong.) Had the war been executed differently, we might be having a different conversation today.

The fact remains that the United States is a great power protecting an international system it helped to create, and there will be times when military action is necessary. Fortunately, most Americans still seem to grasp this important reality.

Would I argue for another such operation today? If the question means “another massive preventive war far from home,” no. I have consistently opposed war with Iran and any direct U.S. involvement in Ukraine. I wrote a book in 2008 warning that we should strengthen the United Nations and other institutions to stop the growing acceptance around the world of preventive war as a normal tool of statecraft.

I also, however, supported the NATO operation in Libya, and I have called for using American airpower to blunt Assad’s mass murders in Syria. Iraq was a terrible mistake, but it would be another mistake to draw the single-minded conclusion (much as we did after Vietnam) that everything everywhere will forever be another Iraq. The world is too dangerous, and American leadership too necessary, for us to fall into such a facile and paralyzing trap.

12. Explaining China’s Diplomatic Strategy on Ukraine

Excerpts:

All of this makes it difficult for the United States, the European Union, NATO, and their democratic allies in the Indo-Pacific – not to mention Ukraine – to truly trust China as a mediator.

There is a consensus in Washington that the Russian challenge is acute but temporary, but that in the long run the only country with the real ability to challenge the rule-of-law-based democratic international order will be China. Of course, the U.S., Europe, and their Indo-Pacific allies want a quick end to the war to avoid further collateral damage. But anyone with a modicum of strategic acumen knows that if the war ends on Chinese-brokered terms, with China getting the most out of the mediated resolution, then the post-war global landscape will be exponentially more difficult for the democratic world, whether viewed in terms of China’s diplomatic projection capabilities, an increasingly insecure Taiwan, or the formation of a Sino-Russian-Saudi-Iranian alliance to settle oil transactions in China’s national currency (renminbi) in order to challenge the hegemony of the U.S. dollar.

Therefore, Ukraine and the democratic world at large must act quickly and decisively to put strategic limits on China’s role in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Explaining China’s Diplomatic Strategy on Ukraine

China has been sending strong signals that it plans to use its economic clout to bring Ukraine to the bargaining table – to Russia’s benefit.

thediplomat.com · by Jianli Yang · March 21, 2023

China’s leader Xi Jinping is in Moscow this week, where he will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This comes after a recent phone call between the foreign ministers of China and Ukraine. Following Beijing’s successful mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China is now posturing as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war. This is not just for show. From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – whose ultimate goal is global economic, ideological, and military dominance – this is a necessary step for China.

The West continues to prop up Ukraine. If China doesn’t intervene, Russia will soon fail, and this is where China has the most to lose – not only by potentially losing the bulwark of the Putin regime, but also by losing the economic opportunity to rebuild Ukraine and instead bleeding out China’s pre-war economic investment in the country. The CCP sees this as the best time for it to play a mediating role. The Chinese regime is eager to assume this role as soon as possible, capitalizing on the momentum it gained by successfully mediating between the Saudis and Iranians.

According to information released by Beijing in January, China is focused on spearheading diplomatic breakthroughs in the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Iran-Saudi proxy conflict. Diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have already been restored, as of March 10, following China’s mediation.

China’s overall strategic principle toward Ukraine is to play the economic card to make Kyiv recognize and even embrace China’s primary role as a mediator in the war. In any mediation, China would seek to preserve Putin’s regime, gain the greatest economic opportunities for Ukraine’s reconstruction, and enhance China’s leadership position in the international arena.

China’s economic relations with Ukraine before last year’s Russian invasion were remarkably strong. Chinese investors and the Ukrainian government signed a number of cooperation agreements (including for the manufacture of aircraft engines) between 2017 and 2019. China overtook Russia as Ukraine’s top trading partner in 2019. In 2021, total bilateral trade reached $19 billion, an increase of nearly 80 percent since 2013. In the first 11 months of 2021, the value of new contracts signed by Chinese companies in Ukraine approached $7 billion. And during 2020 and 2021, Ukraine and China signed several agreements to strengthen cooperation in infrastructure financing and construction.

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Ukraine imports machinery, equipment, and various consumer goods from China, while China imports minerals, corn, sunflower oil, and key components such as aircraft engines and missile parts from Ukraine.

As China knows, Ukraine understands that fighting Russia and preparing for economic reconstruction must be done simultaneously, and that no country can match China’s economic volume. That means China can make an offer that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cannot refuse. Zelenskyy will not refuse China’s economic assistance; his goal is to unite all the forces that can be united, except Putin’s Russia.

In light of this understanding, China will seek to induce Ukraine to recognize and even embrace Beijing’s primary role as a mediator in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Rather than questioning values (who is right or wrong in the conflict), China is simply using an economic “carrot and stick” approach.

On February 18, top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi presented a peace plan for Ukraine at the Munich Security Conference and met with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. Less than a week later, on February 24, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Crisis in Ukraine.”

The same day, to much less fanfare, China republished a document outlining tax guidelines for Chinese citizens investing in Ukraine. In early March, Chinese-controlled media outlets, including Phoenix Television, conducted a series of interviews with various parties, including Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk, to spread the word that the Ukrainian side welcomes Chinese economic investment.

Last week, Beijing announced indirectly through major foreign media outlets, such as The Wall Street Journal, that Xi would hold his first dialogue with Zelenskyy since the invasion.

On March 16, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang spoke by telephone with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba, the first such contact since Qin took up his post in December. In their conversation, Qin said that in the past 31 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China-Ukraine relations have maintained good momentum. He also said China is willing to work with Ukraine to promote the development of stable, long-term relations, and that there is great potential for a strong bilateral relationship.

Kuleba expressed Ukraine’s commitment to building mutually respectful ties with China. He said that China is an important partner of Ukraine, and also an indispensable power in international affairs. He congratulated China on the recent successful reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Ukraine, he added, looks forward to enhancing and diversifying economic cooperation with China.

Kuleba introduced the latest situation of the Ukrainian crisis and the prospects for peace talks and thanked China for providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine. He also said that China’s position paper on the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis reflects its sincerity in promoting a ceasefire and stopping the war, adding that he hoped to maintain communication with China.

Qin stressed that “China has always upheld an objective and fair stance on the Ukraine issue, committed itself to promoting peace talks, and called on the international community to create conditions for peace talks.” He added, “China is worried that the crisis will escalate and may spiral out of control, and hopes that all parties will remain calm, rational and exercise restraint, resume peace talks as soon as possible, and promote a return to the track of political settlement.”

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“We hope that Russia and Ukraine will keep hope for dialogue and negotiation, and will not close the door to a political solution, no matter how difficult and challenging it is. China will continue to play a constructive role for a ceasefire to stop the war, ease the crisis and restore peace,” Qin said.

Ukraine will continue to reserve a role in its future reconstruction for China and Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, regardless of the form of management, and China’s intention is clearly to continue good relations with Ukraine. The task of Qin’s new team in 2023 is to reactivate the previously agreed projects and play the economic card to ensure that Ukraine’s policy toward China remains within manageable limits.

However, China faces several fundamental obstacles to the success of its Russia-Ukraine strategy. First, since the war broke out last February, China has adopted a seemingly neutral position. But everyone knows that Beijing sides with Russia, and it has never condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, or even called the invasion a war.

Second, aside from China’s “pro-Russia neutrality,” Russia lacks broad support from the international community (including the United Nations). Very few countries, with some exceptions in the developing world, have bought into Russia’s narrative of the war.

Third, the terms of a possible ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia are up in the air. It is doubtful that China could come up with armistice conditions that would satisfy both sides, especially on the territorial issue. The issue of Crimea’s status is especially sensitive. Russia regards it as a critical security interest, but awarding Crimea to Russia would put the CCP in a bind. Beijing consistently denies Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty; in order to be consistent, China must regard Crimea as part of “one Ukraine.” As for Ukraine’s position, the Ukrainians are determined to regain all of their territory, or at least the Donbas.

Finally, as reported in the media, U.S. intelligence agencies have confirmed that China is supplying Russia with shipments of lethal weapons. Customs data obtained by Politico show that 1,000 Chinese assault rifles have been shipped directly to Russia, as well as drones and body armor shipped through Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

All of this makes it difficult for the United States, the European Union, NATO, and their democratic allies in the Indo-Pacific – not to mention Ukraine – to truly trust China as a mediator.

There is a consensus in Washington that the Russian challenge is acute but temporary, but that in the long run the only country with the real ability to challenge the rule-of-law-based democratic international order will be China. Of course, the U.S., Europe, and their Indo-Pacific allies want a quick end to the war to avoid further collateral damage. But anyone with a modicum of strategic acumen knows that if the war ends on Chinese-brokered terms, with China getting the most out of the mediated resolution, then the post-war global landscape will be exponentially more difficult for the democratic world, whether viewed in terms of China’s diplomatic projection capabilities, an increasingly insecure Taiwan, or the formation of a Sino-Russian-Saudi-Iranian alliance to settle oil transactions in China’s national currency (renminbi) in order to challenge the hegemony of the U.S. dollar.

Therefore, Ukraine and the democratic world at large must act quickly and decisively to put strategic limits on China’s role in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

GUEST AUTHOR

Jianli Yang

Dr. Jianli Yang is the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and author of “For Us, The Living: A Journey to Shine the Light on Truth.”

thediplomat.com · by Jianli Yang · March 21, 2023

13. 20 Years After The Invasion Of Iraq, Americans Still Want The U.S. Involved In World Affairs

Conclusion:

As the war in Ukraine continues, public opinion on the United States’s role in the world may shift in response to what party leaders say about the conflict and how it develops. However, while the parties’ views have diverged, there isn’t much evidence that Americans overall have become notably more isolationist. That could change, though, given what we’re hearing from Trump and DeSantis. Since the Iraq War began 20 years ago, it’s become even clearer that partisanship can greatly influence public opinion on international issues, just as it can for domestic ones. Looking ahead, it’s possible we could see a larger partisan split on America’s role in the world.

20 Years After The Invasion Of Iraq, Americans Still Want The U.S. Involved In World Affairs

FiveThirtyEight · by Geoffrey Skelley · March 20, 2023

Iraq War

Mar. 20, 2023, at 6:00 AM

The U.S. invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003, beginning a war that most Americans now think was a mistake.

Mario Tama / Getty Images

The two likely rivals for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024 both openly oppose interventionist policies in Ukraine, like providing the country with further assistance in its war against Russia. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis made waves last week when he said defending Ukraine from Russian aggression was not “vital” to American interests. In doing so, he aligned himself with former President Donald Trump. Their shared position on U.S. involvement could be taken as evidence of an isolationist realignment on the American right, especially as polling suggests Republicans are less likely than Democrats to support aiding Ukraine.

What a difference 20 years can make. Back in 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq under the leadership of Republican President George W. Bush, it was the right that favored global intervention. From the war’s start to its conclusion in 2011,

Republicans were far more likely than Democrats to say that the U.S. made the “right decision” in putting American boots on the ground in Iraq.Yet while partisan attitudes toward American involvement in these recent foreign conflicts have seemingly flipped, it’s unclear how the American public as a whole now feels about our country’s place in the world. Several factors make it hard to tell how much American opinion has shifted toward isolationism. Foreign policy is not only about the use of military force, after all, and public opinion remains more supportive than not of the U.S. playing a major role in global affairs. Meanwhile, the influence of political leaders and partisanship on Americans’ attitudes complicate a common narrative among political and media circles that the country wants to become less involved internationally.

Fact is, Americans have long preferred engagement in global issues. Since the 1970s, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has asked Americans if they think it would be best for the U.S. to take an “active role” in world affairs or best to “stay out.” In 2022, 60 percent preferred an active role, while 39 percent wanted to stay out. This marked a decline in support for a more involved U.S., which had hit a recent high of 70 percent in 2018. But in the long run, the 2022 result fell right into a half-century trend.

“I’m really boggled by that,” said Dina Smeltz, a senior fellow at the Chicago Council who studies foreign policy and public opinion. “Think about all of the changes since the ’70s — the internet, the way we do business, the way we bank, drones, the end of the Cold War, 9/11.” This trend is also striking because whatever conflict or international issue was top of mind at the time of polling likely influenced what respondents thought of when it came to the country being active in or staying out of world affairs. That means these results reflect a steady level of support even as the meaning of “active” is in the eye of the beholder and could vary from direct military involvement in conflicts like Iraq, military aid in places like Ukraine or assertive diplomacy on issues like arms control or climate change.

Yet some things have been shifting underneath that larger story of stability. “I think there are certain pockets that are less supportive of some aspects of U.S. foreign-policy activity,” said Smeltz. This shows up most clearly when it comes to how attitudes break down by party identification. Before and during the Iraq War, Republicans expressed more support than Democrats did for an active U.S. But that dynamic had clearly reversed by the time Trump sat in the White House.

In 2022, just 55 percent of Republicans said they wanted the U.S. to play an active role in world affairs — the lowest share of GOP support in Chicago Council’s nearly 50 years of polling. In contrast, 68 percent of Democrats preferred an active U.S. that same year. And the Chicago Council’s polling is far from alone in finding a partisan reshuffling on America’s role in the world. Similar polling from Gallup found that Democrats became more likely than Republicans to want the U.S. to take a leading or major role in world affairs during Barack Obama’s presidency, whereas Republicans were far more likely to answer that way during Bush’s time in the White House.

Other polls have asked whether Americans are more outward- or inward-facing about political challenges, but there’s little evidence the public wants the U.S. to be much less involved in international affairs. For years, the Pew Research Center has asked whether Americans want the U.S. to pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home, or if they think it’s best for the future of the U.S. to be active in world affairs. Between 2004 and 2014, Americans increasingly thought the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas — a period that covers most of the Iraq War era. But since 2017, Pew’s polling has found close to a 50-50 split on this question. This upward trend for global engagement suggests Americans have become less isolationist in recent years. This could partly be due to the passing of time since the height of the Iraq War, as well as less concern about the economy — often viewed as the top “problem at home,” to connect to Pew’s question’s wording — shortly after the most difficult years of the Great Recession.

But like the Chicago Council’s polling, Pew’s data also shows a clear partisan reversal over roughly the past two decades. In 2004, a year after the U.S. invaded Iraq, 53 percent of Republicans wanted the U.S. to be active in world affairs, compared with 37 percent of Democrats. In 2021 and 2022, however, 60 percent or more of Democrats preferred an active U.S. in world affairs, compared with about a third of Republicans.

Partisanship plays a large role in influencing foreign-policy views — just as it does for domestic issues. In general, Americans aren’t that familiar with international affairs, so political leaders and media can heavily sway attitudes among the broader public. This is not to say Americans are sheep. In fact, studies suggest that differences between the foreign-policy opinions of experts aren’t that different from those of the general public. Still, what leaders and media say can sharply impact public opinion on the same side of the aisle.

Trump exemplifies this phenomenon. His backing for more limited U.S. involvement in foreign affairs — including threats of reducing our commitment to NATO — and protectionist outlook on trade have more broadly pushed Republicans toward the less interventionist worldview we see in recent polls. “He talked about how we shouldn't be giving all this money abroad. And for a while, we saw a drop in support for NATO among Republicans,” Smeltz explained. “He turned a lot of things upside down.” Conversely, Trump also may have encouraged Democrats to become more supportive of an increasingly engaged U.S. in world affairs — motivated in part by their opposition to Trump’s politics.

Turning the clock back to 2003, Republicans were more supportive than Democrats of the invasion of Iraq, which made sense given a GOP administration led the country into the conflict. At the war’s start, around 9 in 10 Republicans backed sending troops, compared with around half of Democrats in Pew’s polling. Even as support for the war fell, that partisan divide still grew slightly by the end of Bush’s presidency in 2008.

Iraq was the “ultimate expression of partisan divisions” regarding war, said Adam Berinsky, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies public opinion and military conflicts from World War II to Iraq. “[Americans] would either follow their leaders, in the case of Republicans, or [as with Democrats,] their feelings about Bush would be so strong that they would use that as a negative cue, saying that ‘if Bush supports this, there's no way that I'm going to support that.’” In other words, public opinion regarding military conflicts tends to be similar to how it works on issues closer to home. “It has the same sort of cleavages that we should see on the domestic stage, rather than politics stopping ‘at the water's edge,’” Berinsky told me.

The degree of U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Ukraine is night and day, but partisanship still works the same 20 years later. With a Democrat in the White House promoting aid for Ukraine, it wasn’t hard to anticipate months ago that we’d start to see partisan division over U.S. assistance, Berinsky said. And lo, Pew found in January that support for U.S. aid to Ukraine had slipped far more among Republicans than Democrats.

Americans as a whole aren’t necessarily more isolationist today, but that doesn’t mean they’re open to putting troops in Ukraine. Only 1 in 5 backed deploying our military directly to Ukraine to fight Russia, according to a May 2022 survey by the Associated Press/NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. And it would not be surprising if the Iraq War (and Afghanistan War) have made political leaders wary about using large-scale military force. After all, 63 percent of Americans told a 2021 AP/NORC survey that the Iraq War had not been worth fighting, including majorities of Democrats and Republicans, although Republicans felt less negative about the conflict. A similar 62 percent of Americans overall also said the war in Afghanistan hadn’t been worth fighting, either.

But that doesn’t mean Americans aren’t supportive of an active U.S. foreign policy. “Just because somebody doesn't think the United States should intervene militarily around the world doesn't mean they don't support all the other aspects of American foreign policy, including diplomacy, trade, even bases overseas,” Smeltz said. She stressed that the media and some political leaders habitually conflate America’s international engagement with the use of military force. In fact, studies have shown that members of the media, in particular, believe Americans are much more isolationist than they actually are.

Even on the subject of military force, though, Americans appear willing to support the use of U.S. troops under certain circumstances. For instance, the Chicago Council’s 2022 poll found majority support for using the U.S. Navy to prevent China from blockading Taiwan, and the May 2022 poll from AP/NORC found majority backing for deploying U.S. troops to defend a NATO ally if Russia attacked it, unlike for Ukraine, which is not a NATO member.

As the war in Ukraine continues, public opinion on the United States’s role in the world may shift in response to what party leaders say about the conflict and how it develops. However, while the parties’ views have diverged, there isn’t much evidence that Americans overall have become notably more isolationist. That could change, though, given what we’re hearing from Trump and DeSantis. Since the Iraq War began 20 years ago, it’s become even clearer that partisanship can greatly influence public opinion on international issues, just as it can for domestic ones. Looking ahead, it’s possible we could see a larger partisan split on America’s role in the world.

FiveThirtyEight · by Geoffrey Skelley · March 20, 2023

14. U.S. Intel Helped India Rout China in 2022 Border Clash: Sources

This is a good example of assisting a friend, partner, or ally and the power of US intelligence as well as the importance of conducting combined training exercises with partner forces.

As an aside go to the links to see the twitter reporting from the public affairs officer on these two events.

Excerpt:

Aside from the exercises themselves, which China considers provocative, the visiting Americans also conducted a promotion ceremony for four of the unit’s officers at a staging area in the shadow of Nanda Devi, the second-tallest peak in India and a source of deep cultural significance to the surrounding communities. They also performed a spontaneous, open-air rock concert at one of the bases with their local counterparts. Public affairs officials publicized both events – which took place in late November and early December, days before the Arunachal Pradesh clash – a move the intelligence assessment says enraged Beijing. Several current and former officials say that appeared to be by design.

U.S. Intel Helped India Rout China in 2022 Border Clash: Sources

By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report7 min

March 20, 2023

View Original

A previously unreported act of intelligence-sharing prevented another deadly standoff in disputed Himalayan territory and rattled the Chinese government, sources say.

India was able to repel a Chinese military incursion in contested border territory in the high Himalayas late last year due to unprecedented intelligence-sharing with the U.S. military, U.S. News has learned, an act that caught China’s People’s Liberation Army forces off-guard, enraged Beijing and appears to have forced the Chinese Communist Party to reconsider its approach to land grabs along its borders.

The U.S. government for the first time provided real-time details to its Indian counterparts of the Chinese positions and force strength in advance of a PLA incursion, says a source familiar with a previously unreported U.S. intelligence review of the encounter into the Arunachal Pradesh region. The information included actionable satellite imagery and was more detailed and delivered more quickly than anything the U.S. had previously shared with the Indian military.

It made a difference.

The subsequent clash on Dec. 9 involving hundreds of troops wielding spiked clubs and Tasers did not result in any deaths as previous encounters have, rather it was limited to a dozen or so injuries and – most conspicuously – a Chinese retreat.

“They were waiting. And that’s because the U.S. had given India everything to be fully prepared for this,” the source says. “It demonstrates a test case of the success of how the two militaries are now cooperating and sharing intelligence.”

Several current and former analysts and officials, some speaking on the condition of anonymity, confirmed details of the encounter as well as the American role, to include unprecedented support the U.S. military provided to India on the ground – the fruits of a new era of cooperation between the two powers in recognition of their shared ambitions to push back on Chinese expansionism.

And while the new partnership yielded effective results in this relatively obscure and isolated corner of the world, it has vast implications for how the U.S. and its allies can effectively offset Beijing’s ambitions for land grabs there – and elsewhere.

“The PLA is generally in a probing-and-testing phase. They want to know how the Indians can and will respond and to see what the Indians can detect,” says Vikram Singh, a former top official for regional issues at the Pentagon, now with the United States Institute of Peace think tank. “It’s about China preparing for future conflict.”

The source familiar with the assessment of this intelligence – deemed to be highly reliable – says the U.S. government in the weeks before the encounter was fully cognizant that China was carrying out test exercises in the region to see if it could seize a new foothold in the remote mountain passes there or in other territory to which both China and India lay claim.

Several hundred PLA troops operating on the Chinese side planned to see if they could move forward and stay along the part of the border that is not officially demarcated as they have done in the past, most notably in 2020 in the Galwan Valley, several thousand miles to the west, the last time the two militaries clashed. That brawl caused a dozen or more deaths on both sides.

But unlike the previous encounters, the Indian forces identified the Chinese positions using the intelligence provided by the U.S. and maneuvered to intercept them.

The basis for the new intelligence-sharing arrangement stems from an agreement the Indian and U.S. governments signed in 2020 known as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation, or BECA. It was the fourth agreement that secured new levels of integration between the two powers in military, logistics, compatibility and security information exchanges.

Though the BECA itself is public knowledge, the follow-through of actually sharing intelligence to actionable effect has not been previously reported.

It remains unclear why the Chinese chose to move on the contested territory in Arunachal Pradesh at that time. As with previous encounters where its forces did not emerge victorious, its state news services and public officials have remained fairly quiet about the embarrassing encounter. A spokesman for its foreign ministry said days later that the situation at the border was “generally stable.”

The Chinese government declined to respond to several questions about the incident and its aftermath, with a spokesperson telling U.S. News only, “We do not have information on this issue for now.”

However, a separate U.S. intelligence assessment considered of lower reliability than the first suggests the Chinese paid particular attention to several U.S. military activities in another region in the weeks before – all part of unprecedented training exercises the Indian military hosted with the 11th Airborne Division, reactivated in 2022 and based in Alaska, tasked with operations in the Pacific region.

Aside from the exercises themselves, which China considers provocative, the visiting Americans also conducted a promotion ceremony for four of the unit’s officers at a staging area in the shadow of Nanda Devi, the second-tallest peak in India and a source of deep cultural significance to the surrounding communities. They also performed a spontaneous, open-air rock concert at one of the bases with their local counterparts. Public affairs officials publicized both events – which took place in late November and early December, days before the Arunachal Pradesh clash – a move the intelligence assessment says enraged Beijing. Several current and former officials say that appeared to be by design.

“It certainly looked like it was designed to annoy the Chinese, which I completely appreciate,” says Singh. “That was certainly the kind of thing the Chinese would view as a signal, as a message, and that they would potentially want to respond to.”

When asked whether the 11th Airborne sees any connection between the morale-raising events and the subsequent clash, a spokesman declined to comment on any intelligence assessments.

"But we are excited to continue working and training with our counterparts in the Indian army during exercises like Yudh Abhyas,” added the spokesman, John Pennell, referring to the formal name of what will now be annual exercises. “As for the promotions and impromptu music, that was simply a friendly effort to acknowledge the hard work and professionalism of our soldiers and an opportunity to relax with friends after an intense training mission."

India has traditionally shied away from formal military alliances, preferring to maintain security by courting several patrons as, for example, it continues to do with Russia, capitalizing on a long history of arming its military with Soviet weaponry and equipment.

That began to change in the years leading up to 2020, when several Indian troops died in the Galwan Valley clash and a time when the White House under then-President Donald Trump sought to accelerate cooperation with New Delhi.

Several former officials who worked on the BECA and other agreements said the Galwan Valley clash spurred the Indians to realize the need for more of the kind of geospatial intelligence that the U.S. can deliver.

“The current standoff stems directly from the growing strategic competition between China and India,” private intelligence firm The Soufan Center concluded in an analysis in early February, specifically citing the Arunachal Pradesh brawl.

“China views the strategic partnership between India and the West as a challenge to its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the standoff, as both countries put forth fewer diplomatic resources to resolve the dispute while dealing with pandemic-related crises,” it added. “Indian foreign policy is very likely to pivot around tackling the Chinese security threat and ensuring its own ascent in the Asian power balance.”

New Delhi has irritated the last several U.S. presidential administrations by suddenly pulling out of planned arms purchases of U.S. drones, for example, or insisting on maintaining its economic and energy ties with Russia – a move analysts attribute to the vastness of the resources India must secure for its people, 800 million of whom require government food assistance.

Yet all presidents since Barack Obama have realized that India remains a vital partner for the 21st century, if not the most important one, according to several people who worked in those administrations. The Americans who work with their Indian counterparts on a regular basis know New Delhi is never going to enter into a formal alliance, they say, so they’re not disappointed.

And others point out that the new arrangement has had the desired effect for the Indian government after routing their Chinese counterparts in the Arunachal Pradesh region.

“This will definitely rattle the Chinese because they will have not experienced this before, and they perhaps had a sense of superiority that they were able to do this with different skirmishes in the past,” the source says. “This time they did not hold the advantage like they did before.”

Tags: United States, India, China, U.S. intelligence, military, world news

15. How the Ukraine War Accelerates the Defense Strategy

Excerpts:

A year after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is fair to ask if there are only marginal learning gains to be had at this protracted stage of the conflict. But the Defense Department has not crested the learning curve just yet. Among other things, the United States and its allies are experiencing how to train new recruits who will immediately be pressed into combat, expedite training on sophisticated weaponry, and repair war-torn equipment. So long as the department continues to improve its ability to support Ukraine, benefits for Taiwan will accrue.

How and when the Russia-Ukraine war ends is unclear, and risks, particularly of escalation, remain. Nevertheless, mixed in with the unspeakable human tragedy of this war is real momentum for widespread change in the Defense Department and its allied and partner counterparts. This momentum, along with the continued freedom of the Ukrainian people and the diminution of the Russian Armed Forces and Putin’s kleptocracy, is the dividend from investments in Ukraine. The key now is to spend it wisely.

How the Ukraine War Accelerates the Defense Strategy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jim Mitre · March 21, 2023

Defense strategists have long held that rigorous — if not ruthless — prioritization is the key to success. Frederick the Great captured this sentiment best when saying: “Little minds try to defend everything at once, but sensible people look at the main point only; they parry the worst blows and stand a little hurt if thereby they avoid a greater one. If you try to hold everything, you hold nothing.”

The 2022 National Defense Strategy’s prioritization is crystal clear: China, not Russia, is the Defense Department’s top priority. Yet as the Russia-Ukraine war rages on and the Defense Department continues pouring resources into the effort, is this a failure of prioritization that bends or breaks the strategy? No. It’s the opposite. A counterintuitive result of the war in Ukraine is that it enhances the Defense Department’s ability to outpace its top strategic competitor, China.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is causing regional instability in Europe with global implications that directly affect U.S. interests. The war is also a horrific tragedy and atrocity that has shattered the lives of millions, and the stories of individuals directly affected are heartbreaking. For security and humanitarian interests, it is therefore right and good for the U.S. government to aid in the defense of Ukraine.

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As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky correctly noted, U.S. security assistance to Ukraine is an “investment.” In return, the Biden administration is defending a democratic nation from autocratic aggression and facilitating the destruction of the Russian military, but not just that.

The Defense Department’s actions to support Ukraine today are stimulating the capability development and organizational change needed to deter a China-Taiwan war tomorrow. In particular, the experience of supplying weapons and intelligence to a partner nation in midst of a conflict improves the U.S. military’s ability to do so for Taiwan. The logic of the U.S. defense strategy calls for the Pentagon to build off this momentum and institutionalize these nascent changes, not walk away from them. If it does, the benefits of supporting Ukraine will outweigh the costs even when evaluated through the narrow lens of how this war affects Taiwan.

Trading Taiwan for Ukraine?

The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies China as the nation’s most consequential strategic competitor and “pacing challenge” for concept and capability development in what President Biden calls the “decisive decade.” Citing the president’s guidance in the 2022 National Security Strategy, the U.S. defense strategy rationalizes that China is the only state with both the ambition to reshape the international order and the power to do so. By contrast, Russia is identified as a secondary security priority and an “acute threat” in large part because its invasion of Ukraine undermines regional stability in Europe and presents a real risk of nuclear escalation.

The war in Ukraine makes this acute threat a significant resource demand. Since the expansive Russian invasion in February 2022, the U.S. government has committed to provide Ukraine with $32.2 billion in security assistance (equipment, training, maintenance, and sustainment), and more is likely on the way. Moreover, there are added yet nontrivial costs for U.S. operations and maintenance to station over 20,000 additional U.S. troops in Europe to support the war effort and deter Russian attacks on NATO territory.

The Biden administration has noted that U.S. arms for Ukraine have “in no way” affected the provision of arms for Taiwan. This is technically correct because military aid to these two allies is supplied via different pathways — Taiwan by foreign military sales and Ukraine by excess defense stockpiles. For example, Taiwan has purchased Stinger missiles directly from Raytheon on multiple occasions, while Ukraine received Stringer missiles directly from existing Defense Department stocks. But there are real tradeoffs between supporting Ukraine and Taiwan.

The administration’s position discounts the fact that changes in authorization and a reduction of existing stockpiles will squeeze production and likely cause competition between Ukraine and Taiwan for future arms. Or that much of the equipment provided to Ukraine — such as air defense systems, coastal defense systems, and unmanned aerial systems — could instead help improve Taiwan’s ability to defend against a concerted Chinese attack today. Or the opportunity cost of exerting political capital in Congress for a defense of Taiwan supplemental appropriation. Or that senior government officials and organizations only have so much mental bandwidth and crises like Ukraine (or the Islamic State before it) tend to draw attention like the ball at a children’s soccer game.

Many China hawks criticize the U.S. government’s degree of resourcing for Ukraine’s defense. They view significant elements of it as a zero-sum tradeoff with resourcing efforts to deter war with China. Given the substantial U.S. investment in the Russia-Ukraine war, these critics rightly question whether the Defense Department is actually prioritizing China and Taiwan and faithfully adhering to its own strategy. The China hawks’ logic rests on four critical facts. First, the 2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes China above Russia, a point the drafters have underscored well into the war. Second, Beijing is determined to reunify with Taiwan, peacefully if possible, but by force if necessary. Third, the military balance is in doubt and likely eroding — America is not adequately prepared for a Taiwan fight. Fourth, senior members of the Biden administration, intelligence community, and military have stated that China plans to have the ability to seize Taiwan by 2027 (if not 2025) and its plans to absorb Taiwan are on a “faster timeline than previously thought.” Therefore, China hawks reason, devoting resources to Ukraine — or anything else — that could otherwise be used to bolster Taiwan and establish a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific runs counter to the administration’s own stated strategic aims.

Independent of whether 2027 is an accurate assessment of when China may be planning to use military force to reunify with Taiwan, the gravity of the situation calls for the Pentagon to support Taipei with a sense of urgency. The flaw in the China hawks’ logic is that it fails to account for how the Defense Department’s investment in Ukraine provides a real and tangible sense of urgency rather than a conceptual one. Coming to the defense of a nation in the throes of war is simply more galvanizing than planning to support a nation from a hypothetical attack, even if that hypothetical attack is highly plausible in the near-term. The urgency with which the Defense Department is moving now is creating the change necessary to substantially improve its ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat China in war.

Innovation in War

Wars create space for new ideas and experimentation that bend or ignore prohibitive processes or policies. Given the current state of force modernization within the Defense Department, such space is desperately needed. Since the reemergence of great power competition in 2014 (when Russia seized Crimea and China militarized the South China Sea), the Defense Department has spent considerable energy reaching out to the commercial sector to draw on advanced technologies that can enhance military capabilities. For a host of reasons, including acquisition obstacles, cultural resistance, stringent Congressional oversight, and uncertainty about how capabilities will work against China or fit into an “aspirational” U.S. operational concept, these efforts have yet to achieve their desired results. Eight years later, the department’s budget request for fiscal year 2023 emphasized investments for research and development into breakthrough capabilities more than investments in novel weapons systems that are ready for full-scale production. The recently released budget request for fiscal year 2024 importantly shifts its focus to procurement, but there are still simply too few prototypes that cross the “valley of death” and are adopted at scale. The trajectory is sound but the pace too slow.

Accelerating U.S. Capability Development

Militaries around the world are observing Ukraine to draw lessons about the future character of warfare. Presumably, the Chinese military is paying as close attention to the war as the American military is, and both are engaged in passive learning from Russia’s and Ukraine’s development of improvised solutions on the battlefield, use of loitering munitions and Artificial Intelligence, and performance in urban conflict. U.S. capability development has certain advantages over China’s. The Defense Department is directly supporting the conflict, so it is actively learning about supporting a partner during a conflict and the effects of various U.S. weapons on the battlefield. Direct support helps the Defense Department understand what actually works, and therefore is ready to be scaled. Or that which can be procured from the commercial sector already at scale.

The Russia-Ukraine war is creating a sense of urgency to break down barriers to the Defense Department’s partnership with the commercial sector. This cooperation is, for example, leading to an “explosion of activity” in European Command to adopt more commercial solutions; integrating data streams from multiple commercial vendors; and sharing this information with Ukrainian forces via a mesh of Starlink’s space-based satellites to provide actionable intelligence to operational and tactical decision-makers. Furthermore, the urgency of war is breaking down bureaucratic stovepipes within the Defense Department that limit data access. The department is now fusing data to create a common operating picture of transportation operations, including a key hub delivering weapons to Ukraine. The war is even enhancing cross-vendor collaboration for “MacGyver solutions” such as that between L3 Harris and Raytheon for the VAMPIRE counter-drone system.

Few of the Defense Department’s capability enhancements are new technological inventions. Rather, they are new uses of existing technology or adoption of technology at greater scale. Not all these specific capabilities would be useful in a China conflict but some, such as better leveraging of commercial space-based communications and sensors, certainly would be. More importantly, the Defense Department must capture these organizational changes within policies and processes so they are not one-offs or crisis response efforts. The department has a long history of demonstrating how it can overcome roadblocks during crises, but the past eight years show how it struggles to do so during peacetime. Locking in these nascent organizational changes will make the department more adept at adopting innovative capabilities in a timely manner and at scale.

Improving Security Cooperation During Conflict

The war is also exercising the Defense Department’s ability to conduct security cooperation with a partner nation — and other allies and partners around the world — during a high-intensity conflict. Despite U.S. support in training and equipping Ukraine before the war, there has been a much deeper level of cooperation on operational planning, intelligence sharing, and materiel support provided during hostilities. Much of this is only possible because Ukraine withstood the initial siege of Kyiv. It was only after the early tide turned that U.S. security cooperation intensified and by all accounts it continues to be refined and improved over the course of the war. In a plausible scenario where China attempts to seize Taiwan via a fait accompli, Taiwan may not be able to withstand the initial assault without significant U.S. security cooperation. Materiel support must be provided in advance. However, political constraints that limit the level of official engagement between the U.S. and Taiwanese armed forces mean that strategic planning and intelligence sharing would likely be immature prior to the onset of hostilities.

Given the magnitude of the challenge that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army poses to Taiwan, the margin for error in ensuring effective strategic planning and information sharing with Taiwan is extremely low. In particular, the use of information — and the ability to gather, transmit, process, and act on it and prevent adversaries from doing so — is of critical if not utmost importance in a potential China war. The Defense Department must have well-honed processes to provide essential information to Taiwan and allies like Japan and Australia, while also drawing on their sensor and communications grids to create a coalition-wide common operating picture. The Ukraine war is providing the Defense Department with important experience streamlining key aspects of this process. The department has been clear that it is not providing targeting information to Ukraine — an added level of precision and timing that would likely be critical in a war with China. Nonetheless, if these organizational changes can survive beyond this war and the U.S. government can apply them to Taiwan, the department could merge key elements of its sensing and targeting networks with Taiwan’s and significantly increase the effectiveness and resilience of both in the face of attacking Chinese forces.

Stress-Testing the Defense Industrial Base

The realization that great powers have substantial staying power that can turn a short, sharp war into a protracted battle of attrition is hardly new. For example, before the Russia-Ukraine war it was well documented that U.S. stockpiles of precision-guided weapons were insufficient for a war with China. Some critical weapons were projected to run out in days or weeks of high-intensity combat. They actually did run low in conflicts against non-state actors — which has damning implications for a war against a great power.

But realizing a problem is different than experiencing it first-hand. The U.S. and allied industrial base are straining to produce munitions and key supplies. This effort is highlighting bottlenecks and areas where performance must improve to support a war with China. Certainly, such a conflict would stress the industrial base in different ways — air- and sea-launched missiles might be in greater demand than artillery shells, for example. But some steps the Defense Department is taking to support Ukraine will be generalizable such as accelerating contracting processes, multi-year production contracts, and multi-country procurements. Bolstering the U.S. and allied industrial base and accelerating the process of getting weapons in the hands of those that need them will put the department in a better position to sustain a prolonged war with China.

Credibility

While the importance of reputation to credibility is hotly debated, America’s support for Ukraine certainly does not hurt. In the aftermath of the Afghanistan exit, many questioned the accuracy of U.S. intelligence, competence of the U.S. military to provide security assistance, and strength of U.S. security commitments to allied and partner nations. U.S. support for Ukraine may be reversing such perceptions.

The U.S. intelligence community scored an early coup by correctly informing the world about Vladimir Putin’s decision-making and even the Russian war plan prior to the invasion. While it didn’t fully convince all allies and partners, this success stands in contrast to perceived past U.S. intelligence failures like the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, extensive U.S.-led security assistance provided to Ukraine since 2014 is clearly having positive results on the battlefield. The fact that the United States is making real sacrifices and rallying allies and partners behind Ukraine — a county with which it had no formal security guarantee — is significant. Japan, Australia, and the Philippines are likely taking note of effective U.S. leadership in the coalition supporting Ukraine. Were China to invade Taiwan, U.S. intelligence would need to provide indications and warning to prepare Taiwan, the United States, and other allies and partners like Japan. Timely and accurate warning could also rally global public opinion toward imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on China. Continued domestic support for Ukraine in the United States, and particularly in Europe despite refugee flows and spiraling energy costs, should affect Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s calculus of whether the United States and its allies and partners would maintain the will to fight for Taiwan over time. Furthermore, that the war is a “catastrophic strategic disaster” for Russia might add to doubts China could have about invading Taiwan.

Conventional Deterrence

The war is creating long-term opportunities to reduce U.S. investments in Europe that could accelerate execution of a China-focused strategy. The more the Russian military is destroyed on the battlefield and its industrial base “hobbled” through economic sanctions, the more difficult it will be for Russia to reconstitute its conventional force structure. As others have noted, this provides an opening for a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, should European allies make the necessary investments in their armed services and defense sectors. Russia will remain a threat to European security so long as Putin remains in power, and the threat may be graver — a smaller conventional force may provide less of a buffer before Russia contemplates nuclear options. But for the next five to possibly 10-plus years, NATO will retain conventional military dominance in Europe. Consequently, NATO will retain a favorable military balance of power in Europe even with a reduction of U.S. force presence from pre-war levels.

The Defense Department has thus far actually increased U.S. force presence in Europe in response to the war. But adhering to the defense strategy’s priorities warrants informing NATO allies that the post-war direction the Pentagon is inclined to take involves European force presence reductions below pre-war levels. This would not necessitate a change in the leading role of the United States in NATO. Rather, it is a logical conclusion that a reduced conventional threat in Europe can be addressed with fewer forces. The risk to the 2022 National Defense Strategy is that the Defense Department does the opposite. Similar to how superfluous rotations of forces to the Middle East after March 2019 undermined the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the department could find itself sustaining a presence in Europe that might crowd out investments that would have more value in the posture-starved Indo-Pacific.

Spend Wisely

To realize the U.S. defense strategy, the Pentagon must ensure resources are appropriately prioritized to maintain deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But good strategies aren’t deterministic plans. They’re flexible heuristics that help organizations manage complex and uncertain futures. Ignoring Ukraine to focus on Taiwan isn’t discipline, it’s myopia. The way in which the Defense Department is supporting Ukraine — leading a coalition to support a partner nation in the throes of conflict with arms and information — means that the United States will be better positioned to defend Taiwan in the future, not in spite of Ukraine but because of it.

A year after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is fair to ask if there are only marginal learning gains to be had at this protracted stage of the conflict. But the Defense Department has not crested the learning curve just yet. Among other things, the United States and its allies are experiencing how to train new recruits who will immediately be pressed into combat, expedite training on sophisticated weaponry, and repair war-torn equipment. So long as the department continues to improve its ability to support Ukraine, benefits for Taiwan will accrue.

How and when the Russia-Ukraine war ends is unclear, and risks, particularly of escalation, remain. Nevertheless, mixed in with the unspeakable human tragedy of this war is real momentum for widespread change in the Defense Department and its allied and partner counterparts. This momentum, along with the continued freedom of the Ukrainian people and the diminution of the Russian Armed Forces and Putin’s kleptocracy, is the dividend from investments in Ukraine. The key now is to spend it wisely.

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Jim Mitre is a senior international/defense researcher and director of the International Security and Defense Policy Program at the RAND Corporation.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jim Mitre · March 21, 2023

16. Fighting Autocracy Means Fighting Corruption

Excerpts:

Governments are not the only friends and allies the United States has. Civil society organizations and journalists are perhaps the most vital soldiers in the crusade against corruption. They are often the most familiar with the actors involved, and are often the most knowledgeable on the social norms and institutional forces that can be leveraged to shame or prosecute perpetrators. Biden should follow through on his promise to “support civil society and others engaged in advocacy and action” by pushing his anti-corruption coalition to ensure that these groups are well-resourced and well-funded. Greater resources will make these groups more effective, and help provide them with greater security when they are targeted with legal prosecution, harassment, and even violence.

U.S. diplomats have an important role to play as well. More focused anti-corruption training from the State Department would help them to better identify the workings of corrupt networks in local countries. This training would work best if implemented early and often in officers’ careers. Ideally, diplomats would learn to identify victims of corruption and work with local actors to show how corruption results in lost livelihoods and lost lives. Making it easier for diplomats to meet and work with civil society actors would also go a long way toward convincing locals that foreign officials care about them too, not only those in power.

The Ukrainian people are paying the price of unchecked corruption, but they are not alone. Across the world corruption threatens all people who aspire to healthier, greener, more peaceful, and more democratic existences. And it threatens U.S. security as well. Washington should seize this strategic moment to fight back against corruption and the authoritarians who thrive off it.

Fighting Autocracy Means Fighting Corruption - War on the Rocks

KELLY M. MCFARLAND AND DANIEL J. HENDERSON

warontherocks.com · by Kelly M. McFarland · March 21, 2023

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appointment of a new director for the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine is the most recent in a series of actions taken to eradicate the country’s endemic corruption and move closer to the European Union. This move comes on the heels of a government shakeup under a renewed anti-corruption campaign, which saw over a dozen government officials dismissed or reassigned, including the deputy head of the president’s office, the deputy defense minister, the deputy minister of infrastructure, and even the minister of defense. With these policies, Ukraine is now writing a roadmap for countering corruption even while fighting for its survival. Zelensky has not fixed the problem, but he has taken another step toward ridding Ukraine of lingering Soviet legacies, and reminded the world of the stark contrasts between his government and Russia’s.

Corruption is located on the fault line in today’s geopolitical competition between democracies and authoritarians. As the Biden administration seeks to situate this competition as the main struggle the world will face in the coming decades, anti-corruption efforts could very well be the key to success or failure. While no government or society is entirely free of corruption, kleptocratic structures are the foundation of most authoritarian regimes and have become a key strategy in their foreign policies. Authoritarians use corruption to gain, and maintain, their power.

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At the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, we have argued that, to effectively challenge this entrenched system of global corruption, the United States and its partners should launch a much larger and more sustained campaign against corrupt networks, kleptocracies, and those who enable them. The invasion of Ukraine provides a key moment that the international anti-corruption community can use to build support for this effort. Ultimately, the Biden administration and the U.S. Congress should take legislative action, such as passing the Enablers Act, to root out corruption at home, while using diplomatic tools to support local civil society groups and build a coalition of allies and partners abroad. Zelensky’s vow to combat corruption in Ukraine, even amidst a war, is a hopeful sign.

Corruption Unbound

Kleptocrats continue to benefit from the interconnectivity and complexity of today’s financial systems, which facilitate corruption on an unprecedented global scale. According to the World Economic Forum, “the global cost of corruption is at least $2.6 trillion, roughly 5 percent of global gross domestic product, and the World Bank estimates that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes annually.” Meanwhile, Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index suggests that the world is collectively failing in the struggle against corruption. Last year, 26 countries received their lowest score ever and 155 countries either remained level or declined in their corruption scores over the past decade.

This is not just a case of unearned dollars, yachts, or mansions. The cost of this corruption can also be measured in lives lost. The recent earthquakes in Turkey painfully illustrate this point. Over 40,000 people have died after buildings collapsed on them while they slept — buildings that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan allowed to be built by his friends and allies. These construction projects, doled out as patronage, cut corners and failed to follow code. Compounding this failure, Erdogan has stacked his government with cronies unprepared to do their jobs, leading to a horrendous government response rate and leaving many to die beneath the rubble.

Turkey is not alone. Research has shown that anywhere that corruption runs rampant, deaths from natural disasters, and especially earthquakes, are bound to be high. Across the globe, the healthcare sector showed particular vulnerability to corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nations with the lowest scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index routinely showed the worst management of the pandemic, as their permissive structures allowed money to be drained from funds meant to fight COVID-19, while doctors and nurses in deeply corrupt countries were left without resources or pay. Corruption in the health sector hastens the spread of all disease, not just COVID-19, and, what’s more, makes it harder for governments and health experts to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Taking Corruption on the Road

Corruption also has national security stakes for the United States. The Russian and Chinese governments, unsatisfied with the domestic corruption that props up their autocratic regimes, have begun to use corruption as a tool of grand strategy. According to corruption specialist Josh Rudolph, there are three ways in which authoritarians spread their dark money abroad: corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference. Ultimately, the goal of strategic corruption is to create an increased level of influence in target countries, to weaken democracy from the inside, and to gain space to operate or spread authoritarian governance.

Under the prince of kleptocrats, Vladimir Putin, Russia has been using strategic corruption across all areas for some time now. Putin uses state-owned enterprises in the energy and defense sector, private business surrogates, money laundering, and financing of political campaigns to gain influence over critical state institutions in foreign countries to shape their national politics.

Arguably the most important weapon in Russia’s strategic corruption toolkit is its vast energy resources. Russia has used all the tools at its disposal, including kickbacks, bribes, stoppages, and entrenched middle men to gain leverage over governments through its supply of oil and gas. The recent European response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the power of Russia’s energy weapon, as European governments have had to scramble to determine new supply sources to offset Russia’s stranglehold on gas and have had to deal with rising costs to consumers.

Russia has also become adept at using dark money to support the rise of populism in the West. Since 2014, the Kremlin has spent $300 million to support foreign officials and political parties, according to a U.S. intelligence report. This includes €9.4 million ($10.1 million) to French far-right populist Marie Le Pen, who notably endorsed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia’s use of dark money has been most prolific in Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia the Russian government has funneled money to far-right political groups through Russian-connected businesses. These groups then push for a deepening of their countries’ economic and energy ties to Russia, giving Putin another corrupt lever to pull as he tries to influence foreign governments.

China has also begun to play this game. Beijing has elevated strategic corruption to undermine alternative forms of government and international order, promote positive depictions of the Chinese Communist Party, and gain leverage over external businesses, governments, and politicians. China’s tool of choice is infrastructure projects connected with its Belt and Road Initiative, which provides massive amounts of money to fund corrupt actors across Eurasia.

Sri Lanka best illustrates this approach. Chinese dark money was used to secure control of port infrastructure that enhances China’s military reach in the region. Chinese officials spent years cultivating ties with former Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa. Beijing viewed Rajapaksa as a key asset in their “efforts to tilt influence away from India in South Asia.” The Chinese government provided funds to build a port in an area deemed not economically viable but that was part of Rajapaksa’s home district. As suspected, the port was a failure and the Sri Lankan government “loaned” the port to China for 99 years in December 2017. China’s corrupt practices in Sri Lanka undoubtedly aided in creating that country’s broken economy, which eventually led to the government’s downfall and the current political crisis.

Pandora’s Briefcase

Over the last decades, criminals, kleptocrats, and their enablers have chipped away at domestic boundaries, rendering them almost meaningless. Corruption is made more widespread due to facilitators in every country, including in democracies such as the United States. Clandestine financial flows have exploded in recent decades, “enabled by the flourishing of legal and financial services that specialize in providing anonymity in cross-border transactions.”

The Pandora Papers, a high-level expose of the dark world of kleptocrats, billionaires, and politicians, paint a damning portrait of the ways in which corrupt actors launder their money around the world to hide it from prying eyes. Not only did the papers highlight the role of the U.S. financial system in the movement of illicit funds, but they also described how South Dakota now rivals financial service providers in Caribbean tax havens when it comes to enabling kleptocracy. In America, it still requires more personal information to acquire a library card than it does to create a shell company.

Among other striking examples, the Pandora Papers describe how Russian President Putin most likely purchased a multimillion-dollar home in Monaco for the mother of his illegitimate daughter, almost certainly using pilfered Russian state funds. They also describe how billionaire Czech politician Andrej Babis, who recently lost his bid for the country’s presidency, purchased a $22 million house in Cannes in 2009 that sports a movie theater and multiple swimming pools using a shell company that hid his identity. Meanwhile, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, whose country received $1.5 billion of aid from the United States in 2020 alone, spent nearly $70 million from unknown sources on three ocean-front homes next to each other in Malibu over a three-year span in the last decade.

A number of white-collar professions facilitate this type of behavior, thereby threatening democracy. These include hedge funds, private equity firms, real estate agents, and title insurers, not to mention company formation agents, art and antiquities dealers, lawyers, accountants, covert public relations firms, luxury car and yacht sellers, and cryptocurrency businesses. It also apparently includes FBI agents: The former special agent in charge of the agency’s counterintelligence division in New York was charged with, among other things, violating economic sanctions. This retired FBI official supposedly accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars from Oleg Deripaska, a Russian aluminum magnate who is sanctioned by the United States and has close ties to Putin, in return for helping him investigate rival oligarchs and get off the U.S. sanctions list.

Recognizing the role of these facilitators serves as a reminder that for the United States and its democratic allies the fight against corruption begins at home. Democracies around the world owe their legitimacy to their ability to provide citizens with good governance and quality services, both of which are weakened by corruption. By ignoring or tolerating the role of corrupt actors in their economies, democracies undo themselves from within.

An Anti-Corruption Strategy

If the problem before us feels deep and vast, that is because it is. This is why the United States should not attempt to go it alone. Instead, Washington can flex its diplomatic muscles as it has done throughout the war in Ukraine and build a coalition of like-minded democracies to embark on a wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign with a domestic and foreign policy component. What good are new laws or enhanced enforcement to fight money laundering in the United States if money can be easily moved to European banks?

The good news is that the Biden administration has made this type of campaign a priority, and recognizes the importance of an anti-corruption coalition. From the U.S. Treasury Department’s recent rulings on beneficial ownership information as part of the Corporate Transparency Act to the U.S. Agency for International Development’s “dekleptification guide,” a whole-of-government approach to anti-corruption efforts is taking shape. Additionally, the Biden administration’s campaign within the G20 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for a global minimum tax rate represent the type of coalition building that will form the foundation for an anti-corruption coalition. The biggest missing piece now is the funding and attention required to ensure that these agencies can carry through on these rulings and strategies.

The bad news is that recent stumbles in the U.S. Senate and the Court of Justice of the European Union continue to hobble anti-corruption efforts. The United States has introduced over 150 pieces of legislation targeting corrupt actors, but this scattershot approach to policy lacks the strategic coherence that tackling this problem requires. The Enablers Act, which would require non-financial entities such as law firms and art dealers to also investigate their clients, represents a more focused approach to preventing corrupt actors from laundering money through the United States. Unfortunately, the Senate failed to pass it in the last session of Congress despite bipartisan support. If congressional gridlock prevents the bill from passing in the 118th Congress, President Joe Biden should explore the possibility of enacting its key provisions through executive action.

Furthermore, the European Union, a key ally in any anti-corruption coalition, took a large step backwards in the fight for more financial transparency when its Court of Justice invalidated the 5th E.U. Anti-Money Laundering Directive on privacy grounds. The directive guaranteed public access to information on a company’s true owners, a key tool in the hands of civil society actors seeking to expose local corruption. Despite this, though, the Biden administration can still work with other allies, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as with individual European countries to promote greater level of transparency domestically. And, as the European Union enters the sixth round of revision on their money-laundering tools, they should not give up the fight for more transparency. It is encouraging that E.U. officials have already announced that they are working to reconcile their directives with the privacy and data protection laws that blocked the necessary action in this round.

Governments are not the only friends and allies the United States has. Civil society organizations and journalists are perhaps the most vital soldiers in the crusade against corruption. They are often the most familiar with the actors involved, and are often the most knowledgeable on the social norms and institutional forces that can be leveraged to shame or prosecute perpetrators. Biden should follow through on his promise to “support civil society and others engaged in advocacy and action” by pushing his anti-corruption coalition to ensure that these groups are well-resourced and well-funded. Greater resources will make these groups more effective, and help provide them with greater security when they are targeted with legal prosecution, harassment, and even violence.

U.S. diplomats have an important role to play as well. More focused anti-corruption training from the State Department would help them to better identify the workings of corrupt networks in local countries. This training would work best if implemented early and often in officers’ careers. Ideally, diplomats would learn to identify victims of corruption and work with local actors to show how corruption results in lost livelihoods and lost lives. Making it easier for diplomats to meet and work with civil society actors would also go a long way toward convincing locals that foreign officials care about them too, not only those in power.

The Ukrainian people are paying the price of unchecked corruption, but they are not alone. Across the world corruption threatens all people who aspire to healthier, greener, more peaceful, and more democratic existences. And it threatens U.S. security as well. Washington should seize this strategic moment to fight back against corruption and the authoritarians who thrive off it.

Become a Member

Kelly M. McFarland is a U.S. diplomatic historian and the director of programs and research at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. He recently authored the institute’s latest New Global Commons Working Group report, Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad. He also hosts the institute’s Diplomatic Immunity podcast. Prior to Georgetown, he served in the U.S. Department of State as an intelligence analyst. Follow him on Twitter @mcfarlandkellym

Daniel J. Henderson is the assistant director of programs and publications editor at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. He previously worked at the Council on Foreign Relations as a program coordinator for Washington External Affairs. He produces the institute’s podcast, Diplomatic Immunity, and edits its online magazine, The Diplomatic Pouch. Follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Hendo

Image: President of Russia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Kelly M. McFarland · March 21, 2023

17. Maritime Sabotage: Protecting Europe’s Soft Underbelly

Excerpts:

If the alliance successfully organizes resources to protect, defend, and repair critical undersea infrastructure, it will have opportunities to export know-how and capability to other partners concerned about attacks on their infrastructure, like India, Australia, or Taiwan. Taking a leading role in Europe will position the alliance to contribute to critical infrastructure protection globally.

The attack on the Nordstream pipelines threatens Europe and the maritime infrastructure on which it relies. If attackers, whether a pro-Ukrainian group, the Russian Navy, or some other entity, can damage subsea pipelines in the Baltic, a region on the fast track to becoming a “NATO lake,” then critical infrastructure like gas pipelines, submarine cables, liquified natural gas terminals, or even oil platforms are not safe anywhere. Attacks on pipelines or cables in the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, or the North Sea may be next. NATO has an opportunity to meet the moment: it can help unify Europe’s efforts to protect maritime infrastructure by preparing to mitigate the damage from future attacks and through deterrence—messaging that future attacks will be costly for any attacker. So far, the small steps the alliance has taken are a good start, but more needs to be done.

Maritime Sabotage: Protecting Europe’s Soft Underbelly - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Walker D. Mills · March 20, 2023

The September 2022 attacks on the Nordstream 1 and 2 pipelines convinced many in Europe that malign actors have the capability and intent to attack critical undersea infrastructure. While the attacks targeted gas pipelines, equally vulnerable is the vast system of fiber-optic and data cables that underpin the global exchange of information, including transatlantic financial transactions.

The Nordstream attacks occurred on a section of the pipeline located just outside Swedish and Danish territorial waters. Attackers damaged the pipelines in a series of explosions that left gas bubbling up from the bottom of the Baltic Sea for days—an act of energy and environmental sabotage. Multiple investigations into the attacks are ongoing. Moscow was identified as the key suspect in the immediate aftermath, but new reporting has revealed that some Western intelligence officials believe that a pro-Ukrainian group may be responsible. Both Russian and Ukrainian governments have denied any responsibility or prior knowledge of the attacks. But at the same time, Moscow has shown no shame in continuing its campaign of terror against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and has also been fingered in a string of security incidents around critical infrastructure in Europe, including German trains, Norwegian oil platforms, a Polish port, and Dutch offshore wind farms.

As the war in Ukraine stretches into a second year, Europe has awoken to the reality that maritime infrastructure is vulnerable and that NATO states need to prioritize the security of the critical infrastructure on which their economies depend. In a recent commentary, Alessio Patalano of King’s College London described undersea infrastructure as the “lifelines of modern prosperity” and a critical arena where adversaries can challenge European security. Because much of the critical maritime infrastructure in Europe is inherently multinational, and the key capabilities are expensive, the alliance has a natural role to play in organizing the defense of maritime infrastructure and helping governments pool their resources.

Underwater but Indispensable

European undersea infrastructure crisscrosses the North Sea, the Baltic, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean, underpinning vast swaths of the European economy. Pipelines that carry gas from Norway to the United Kingdom and continental Europe, or from North Africa to Europe, are just as important as the Nordstream pipelines—more so now that European imports of Russian gas have fallen precipitously. Liquified natural gas terminals in Europe are also now more important than ever as the continent tries to diversify its energy suppliers. Offshore electricity generation by wind farms or tidal generation systems may also be vulnerable.

In addition to gas pipelines, European consumers receive electricity via subsea cables. Last year a new cable capable of carrying up to 1,400 megawatts of electricity from Norway to the United Kingdom began operation. Another cable is planned to link wind farms in Morocco with British consumers. In the Mediterranean, Egypt recently announced a plan to deliver as much as 3,000 megawatts of electricity to Greece via a subsea cable.

And submarine cables don’t just carry electricity; they also carry data. As much as 99 percent of all global data traffic—from video calls to online purchases and music streaming—flows through cables that travel along the bottom of the sea. These submarine cables carry $10 trillion of financial transactions daily, underpinning the global economy. They also carry sensitive diplomatic and military communications, including the bandwidth the US military uses for drone operations. The world’s reliance on submarine cables will only increase in the coming years. The proliferation of 5G networks might double the bandwidth demand on submarine cables every two years for the foreseeable future.

Neglected Vulnerabilities

Even if Moscow is not responsible for the Nordstream attacks, Russia has a history of sabotaging undersea infrastructure. In 1959, during the Cold War, a Soviet trawler damaged subsea cables off the coast of Newfoundland. In 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea, one of its first moves was to cut communications cables with the mainland, though they were above ground. Russian forces have maintained a steady stream of attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure since their 2022 invasion. Russia was suspected of being at fault when the cables linking Norway to the island of Svalbard were mysteriously severed in 2021. Then, in early 2022, Russian Navy exercises over cables that connect Ireland and the United Kingdom were interpreted as an implicit threat of action against the cables. In October, Norway reported unidentified drones flying near its oil platforms offshore, and officials worried Russian agents were responsible. In January, Polish police discovered a trio of divers suspected of carrying out underwater reconnaissance near the port of Gdansk who claimed they were diving for amber—in the middle of the night. In February, Dutch military intelligence publicly accused a Russian ship of attempting to map out energy infrastructure in the North Sea, specifically offshore wind farms. The Russian Navy is also one of only a few navies that operate vessels capable of severing or otherwise damaging submarine cables at depth, though it is relatively straightforward to damage pipelines or cables with divers, mines, or remote vehicles as they pass through shallow water. It should not come as a surprise if Russia continues to target undersea infrastructure for intelligence gathering or sabotage.

Kinetic methods are not the only way to damage submarine infrastructure. Submarine infrastructure can also be vulnerable to cyberattacks. In 2021, hackers disrupted the operation of the Colonial Pipeline in the United States, which supplied 45% of the East Coast’s petroleum fuel needs. And in 2017, a cyberattack against Maersk, a maritime logistics company, crippled port operations worldwide. Ukraine’s energy grid has become a repeated target of Russian cyber attacks since the early days of the invasion in 2022. While not attacks against undersea infrastructure, these incidents show the interest in attacking logistics infrastructure, and similar attacks could be aimed at undersea targets. Undersea infrastructure, like pipelines and cables, make excellent targets for two reasons—they have tremendous strategic value, and as the Nordstream attacks have demonstrated, it is very challenging to assign attribution.

What should be done? Europe must take maritime infrastructure protection seriously, and NATO is best positioned to lead the effort. The alliance’s strategic concept specifically spells out the importance of maritime security as “key to our peace and prosperity” and cautions that adversaries are “investing in technologies that could… target our civilian and military infrastructure.”

And to an extent, the alliance has stepped up. After the Nordstream attacks, a “flood” of NATO and allied warships began patrolling the North Sea and the Baltic. Still, this effort is unsustainable and unlikely to deter further attacks because monitoring, let alone repairing, maritime infrastructure requires special equipment like submersibles and underwater drones. It is not feasible to patrol all of the cable and pipeline routes, which total over 1.2 million kilometers, nor is it realistic to harden them against sabotage. Sebastian Bruns, a naval expert at the University of Kiel, compared the task of patrolling all the subsea cable routes to “the assignment of two cop cars to watch over the entire highway network of the United States.” It is equally improbable that naming and shaming Russia would deter future attacks by itself. Recent research into historical cases of maritime sabotage concluded that half of the time, even a loss of surprise wasn’t enough to prevent maritime sabotage.

In February, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that NATO was establishing an “undersea infrastructure coordination cell” that would help “boost the security of Allied undersea infrastructure.” This move is a small step in the right direction and likely foreshadows a more prominent role for NATO in undersea infrastructure protection throughout Europe. The European Defense Agency has also signaled interest in undersea infrastructure and will hold its first symposium on Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection in April.

But more action is needed. The Alliance should ensure that it has the resources to respond to attacks on submarine infrastructure by quickly repairing or replacing damaged infrastructure and responding to aggression in kind. One path forward might be to create a standing naval task group with cable and infrastructure repair ships. NATO already has standing mine countermeasure groups. The naval analyst Joshua Tallis recently argued that “NATO’s standing naval forces offer a relatively low-cost means of sending high-value political signals of alliance unity and defense,” but they are overdue for an update. Organizing a standing naval force around critical maritime infrastructure would be an excellent next step.

Individual nations have also begun recognizing the threat and investing in capability on their own, but their efforts would be best organized under the umbrella of the alliance. As an island nation, the United Kingdom is particularly vulnerable to attacks on subsea infrastructure. Since 2010, it has increased electricity imports by nearly tenfold. The British government recently took a positive step by announcing it would acquire specialized ships that carry remotely operated vehicles for inspecting subsea infrastructure. It should come as no coincidence that now-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak was the author of a pivotal 2017 report on undersea cable security. The French military has also invested in subsea capability and released a “seabed warfare strategy” in early 2022. Italian defense experts have also called for more “robust deterrence capabilities” to “ensure persistent protection for critical underwater cable bundles and key energy infrastructures connecting its mainland and Europe with suppliers in North Africa and the Middle East.”

Meanwhile, the Italian Navy has begun working with an Italian telecom company to improve its monitoring of threats to subsea cables. Moving forward, NATO should focus the efforts of individual members on deterrence and mitigation. The alliance needs to reiterate the message that an attack on subsea infrastructure, even in international waters, is akin to an attack on a member of the alliance—and make clear that the alliance has the means to respond in kind.

If the alliance successfully organizes resources to protect, defend, and repair critical undersea infrastructure, it will have opportunities to export know-how and capability to other partners concerned about attacks on their infrastructure, like India, Australia, or Taiwan. Taking a leading role in Europe will position the alliance to contribute to critical infrastructure protection globally.

The attack on the Nordstream pipelines threatens Europe and the maritime infrastructure on which it relies. If attackers, whether a pro-Ukrainian group, the Russian Navy, or some other entity, can damage subsea pipelines in the Baltic, a region on the fast track to becoming a “NATO lake,” then critical infrastructure like gas pipelines, submarine cables, liquified natural gas terminals, or even oil platforms are not safe anywhere. Attacks on pipelines or cables in the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, or the North Sea may be next. NATO has an opportunity to meet the moment: it can help unify Europe’s efforts to protect maritime infrastructure by preparing to mitigate the damage from future attacks and through deterrence—messaging that future attacks will be costly for any attacker. So far, the small steps the alliance has taken are a good start, but more needs to be done.

Walker D. Mills is a Marine Corps infantry officer, a nonresident fellow at Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future War, and a nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo: US Navy, Photographer’s Mate Second Class William Krumpelman

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irregularwarfare.org · by Walker D. Mills · March 20, 2023

18. The state of the U.S. Navy as China builds up its naval force and threatens Taiwan

A very interesting 60 minutes segment on the navy. I learned a lot. You can watch it at the link or read the transcript below.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-navy-readiness-as-china-builds-up-naval-force-threatens-taiwan-60-minutes-2023-03-19/

The state of the U.S. Navy as China builds up its naval force and threatens Taiwan

CBS News · by Norah O'Donnell

The United States Navy helped secure victory in two world wars and the Cold War. Today the Navy remains a formidable fighting force, but even officers within the service have questioned its readiness.

While the U.S. spent 20 years fighting land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon watched China, its greatest geopolitical rival of the 21st century, build the largest navy in the world. China has threatened to use that navy to invade Taiwan, an important American ally.

As tensions with China continue to rise, we wanted to know more about the current state of the U.S. Navy, and how it's trying to deter China, while preparing for the possibility of war.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: The Navy's always on alert. One third of the Navy is always deployed and operating at all times. The Navy's mustering right now about 300 ships, and there are about 100 ships at sea right now all around the globe.

Admiral Samuel Paparo commands the U.S. Pacific Fleet, whose 200 ships and 150,000 sailors and civilians make up 60% of the entire U.S. Navy. We met him last month on the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz deployed near the U.S. territory of Guam, southeast of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, or PRC.

Admiral Samuel Paparo 60 Minutes

Norah O'Donnell: You've been operating as a naval officer for 40 years. How has operating in the Western Pacific changed?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: In the early 2000s the PRC Navy mustered about 37 vessels. Today, they're mustering 350 vessels

This month, China's new Foreign Minister Qin Gang delivered a stern warning to the U.S.

He said that if Washington does not change course in its stance towards China, "conflict and confrontation" is inevitable.

This past August, when then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi became the most senior U.S. political figure to visit Taiwan in 25 years, China called it a "blatant provocation."

The People's Liberation Army fired ballistic missiles into the sea around Taiwan and encircled the island with aircraft and warships.

Norah O'Donnell: So are Chinese warships now operating closer to Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi's visit?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes.

The best guess anyone has about China's ultimate intentions for Taiwan comes from the CIA. According to its intelligence assessment, China's President Xi Jinping has ordered the People's Liberation Army to be prepared to take back the island by force by 2027.

Norah O'Donnell: And if China invades Taiwan, what will the U.S. Navy do?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: It's a decision of the president of the United States and a decision of the Congress. It's our duty to be ready for that. But the bulk of the United States Navy will be deployed rapidly to the Western Pacific to come to the aid of Taiwan if the order comes to aid Taiwan in thwarting that invasion.

Norah O'Donnell: Is the U.S. Navy ready?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: We're ready, yes. I'll never admit to being ready enough.

President Biden has declared four times, including on 60 Minutes, that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan, which is a democracy and the world's leading producer of advanced microchips.

TOPGUN graduates compare the film to the real thing

To reach the USS Nimitz, we first traveled to America's westernmost territory, the island of Guam, in the middle of the Pacific.

Guam was taken by Imperial Japan two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. U.S. marines recaptured it two and a half years later, and the island, about the size of Chicago, became an indispensable strategic foothold in the Western Pacific, as it remains today.

From Guam, we boarded a Navy C-2 Greyhound. The Cold War-era transport plane takes people and supplies back and forth from land to the carrier. It was a short flight to the ship…

…and an even shorter landing

Before Admiral Paparo rose to lead the Pacific Fleet, he flew jets and graduated from the school known as "Top Gun."

Norah O'Donnell: When you talk about ships, what's the most powerful in the U.S. Navy?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: It's an aircraft carrier and its airwing is capable of 150 strike or air-to-air sorties per day, with at its surge levels, the ability to deliver 900 precision-guided munitions every day, and reloadable every night

Norah O'Donnell: So even though China now has the largest Navy in the world, they don't have anything like this in terms of aircraft carriers.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: They do not. But they're working towards it. And they have-- they have two operational aircraft carriers right now.

That's China's two diesel-fueled carriers, to the U.S.'s 11 nuclear-powered ones that can carry a total of about a thousand attack aircraft… more than the navies of every other nation on earth, combined.

Lt. Cmdr. David Ash: I'll tell you this: we are here to stay, right, in the South China Sea, and in this part of the world. And I think that's the message that we really want to convey to not only China, but the entire world. We will sail wherever international law allows.

Norah O'Donnell: Do you get briefed on China's growing military threat and the progress that their navy is making?

Lt. Cmdr. David Ash: Absolutely. Yeah, absolutely we do. And they are making great progress in a lot of key areas.

Norah O'Donnell: The Chinese?

Lt. Cmdr. David Ash: The Chinese are, from a military standpoint.

This video, from weapons systems officer Lt. Cmdr. Matthew Carlton, shows his F/A-18 strafing ground targets with a machine gun on a U.S. weapons range near Guam.

The pilots on the Nimitz also conduct air-to-air combat or dogfighting drills daily.

USS Nimitz at sea 60 Minutes

Norah O'Donnell: How aggressive has China become in the air?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Aggressive. And-- just some examples include-- unsafe, unprofessional intercepts where they move within single digits of feet of other aircrafts, flashing the weapons that they have onboard to the air crew of the other aircraft, operating in international airspace. Maneuvering their aircraft in such a way that denies the ability to turn in one direction. If they're safe and professional, then there's no problem. Everybody has the right to fly and sail wherever international law dictates.

Norah O'Donnell: But the Chinese are pushing that.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: They are pushing it.

China's increasingly aggressive moves in the Western Pacific — encroaching on territory, illegal fishing and building bases in the middle of the South China Sea-- have pushed nations like Japan and the Philippines to forge closer military ties to the U.S.… and this past week, Britain, the U.S. and Australia signed a landmark deal to jointly develop nuclear-powered attack submarines to patrol the Pacific.

This is how China and Taiwan appear on most maps.

This is how the Chinese Communist Party sees the Western Pacific, including the South and East China Seas from Beijing. Taiwan is the fulcrum in what China's leaders call "the first island chain," a constellation of U.S. allies that stretches across its entire coast. Control of Taiwan is the strategic key to unlocking direct access to the Pacific and the sea lanes where about 50% of the world's commerce gets transported.

Norah O'Donnell: China has accused the United States of trying to contain them. What do you say to China?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: I would say, "Do you need to be contained? Are you expanding? Are you an expansionist power?" To a very great extent, the United States was the champion for China's rise. And in no way are we seeking to contain China. But we are seeking for them to play by the rules.

China's navy, a branch of the People's Liberation Army, is now the world's largest. China is also using its 9,000 mile coastline to rewrite the rules of fighting at sea, as these images from Chinese state media show. Its military has invested heavily in long-range precision guided weapons, like the DF-21 and DF-26, that can be used to target ships.

China's People's Liberation Army rocket force calls them "carrier killers" and has practiced shooting them at mockups of American ships in the desert that look a lot like the Nimitz.

Norah O'Donnell: Since the United States has been operating in the Western Pacific, China's backyard, they've been developing missiles to attack our assets, haven't they? Specific missiles.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Absolutely, yes. First I'll say the United States is also a Western Pacific nation. So it's not--

Norah O'Donnell: Guam--

Admiral Samuel Paparo: It's not China's backyard, it's-- you know, it is a free and open Indo-Pacific that encompasses numerous partners and treaty allies. And yes-- we have seen them greatly enhance their power projection capability.

Norah O'Donnell: How much do you worry about the PLA Rocket Force?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: I worry. You know, I-- I'd be a fool to not worry about it. Of course I worry about the PLA Rocket Force. And of course I work every single day to develop the tactics and the techniques and the procedures to counter it, and to continue to develop the systems that can also defend-- against them.

Norah O'Donnell: About how far are we from mainland China?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Fifteen hundred nautical miles.

Norah O'Donnell: They can hit us.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes they can. If they've got the targeting in place, they could hit this aircraft carrier. If I don't want to be hit, there's something I can do about it.

U.S. Navy planners aren't just plotting how to evade China's rocket force, but also how they could effectively fight back. From the vicinity of Guam, none of the aircraft on this ship has the range to approach Taiwan without refueling in the air.S

Ships like the U.S. Destroyer Wayne E. Meyer, part of the Nimitz strike group, would need to sail much closer towards China to fire their missiles at any force invading Taiwan.

One naval scholar we spoke to likened it to a boxing match in which a fighter—in this case China-- has much longer arms than their potential opponent, the U.S.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: I'll give you a lot of examples where a shorter fighter was able to prevail-- over a long-arm fighter by-- being on their toes, by maneuvering, And we can also stick and move-- while we're developing those-- those longer-range weapons.

There is another area of modern naval warfare where the U.S. had a head start and retains a deep advantage over China.

Norah O'Donnell: I just noticed out of the corner of my eye.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: This is a 688 class, a Los Angeles-class attack submarine. This is the most capable submarine on the planet. You know, with the exception of the Virginia class, our newer class of submarines.

The exact number is classified - but our best estimate is that there are about a dozen nuclear-powered fast attack submarines patrolling the Pacific at any time. They are difficult to detect and track…something China is trying to solve.

Norah O'Donnell: How much more advanced is U.S. submarine technology than Chinese capability?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: A generation.

Norah O'Donnell: A generation.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: And-- by generation, think 10 or 20 years. But broadly, I don't really talk in depth about submarine capabilities. It's the silent service.

Since Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, China's military leaders have themselves been mostly silent and ignored efforts by the U.S. military to keep the lines of communication open – even when a Chinese spy balloon breached American airspace and was shot down by the U.S.

Norah O'Donnell: If the U.S. and Chinese militaries can't communicate over a Chinese spy balloon, then what's gonna happen when there's a real crisis in the South China Sea or with Taiwan?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: We'll hope that they'll answer the phone. Else, we'll do our very best assessment, based on the things that they say in open source, and based on their behavior to divine their intentions. And we'll act accordingly.

Norah O'Donnell: Doesn't that make the situation even more dangerous if U.S. and Chinese militaries are not talking?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes.

Several sources within the Pentagon tell 60 Minutes that if China invaded Taiwan, it could very well kick off in outer space, with both sides targeting the other's satellites that enable precision-guided weaponry. Cyber attacks on American cities and the sabotage of ports on the West Coast of the U.S. mainland could follow.

Norah O'Donnell: One recent-- nonclassified war game had the U.S. prevailing but losing 20 ships, including two carriers. Does that sound about right?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: That is a plausible outcome. I can imagine a more pessimistic outcome. And I can imagine a more optimistic outcome. We should be clear-eyed about the costs that we're potentially incurring

There are about 5,000 Americans on board the Nimitz. The ship is nearly half a century old. Given the Navy's current needs in the Pacific and because there's fuel left in its nuclear reactors, the carrier's life at sea is going to be extended.

Norah O'Donnell: Is it your hope that the power of the U.S. Navy, the force posture of the U.S. Navy, will deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: It's not my hope. It's my duty. In conjunction with allies and partners to deliver intolerable costs to anybody that would upend the order in violation of the nation's security or in violation of the nation's interests.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: The saying, which is, "Si Pacem, Para Bellum," which is, "If you want peace, prepare for war."

60 Minutes has spent months talking to current and former naval officers, military strategists and politicians about the state of the U.S. Navy. One common thread in our reporting is unease, both about the size of the U.S. fleet and its readiness to fight. The Navy's ships are being retired faster than they're getting replaced, while the navy of the People's Republic of China or PRC, grows larger and more lethal by the year. We asked the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Samuel Paparo, about this on our visit to the USS Nimitz, the oldest aircraft carrier in the Navy.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: We call it the Decade of Concern. We've seen a tenfold increase in the size of the PRC Navy.

Norah O'Donnell: Technically speaking, the Chinese now have the largest navy in the world, in terms of number of ships, correct?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes. Yes.

Norah O'Donnell: Do the numbers matter?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes. As the saying goes, "Quantity has a quality all its own."

Norah O'Donnell: At some point, are they gonna reach numbers that we can't prevail over?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: I'm not comfortable with the trajectory.

Rep. Mike Gallagher: If you look at a map of the Indo-Pacific, one thing becomes clear. There's a lot of water on that map. And so ours has to be a maritime strategy.

Republican Mike Gallagher and Democrat Elaine Luria served together on the House Armed Services Committee in the last Congress.

Democrat Elaine Luria and Republican Mike Gallagher 60 Minutes

Norah O'Donnell: What is it about the U.S. Navy that has allowed the two of you to find common cause?

Rep. Mike Gallagher: I think we-- share a sense of the urgency of the moment. We see increasing threats from China in particular in the Indo-Pacific. We feel like we're not moving fast enough to build a bigger Navy.

Congressman Gallagher is a Marine veteran who represents Green Bay, Wisconsin. He chairs the new House Committee on China. He's concerned that under the Navy's current plan, the fleet will shrink to 280 ships by 2027, the same year the CIA says China has set for having the capability to take Taiwan by force.

Rep. Mike Gallagher: So we will be weakest when our enemy is potentially strongest.

Rep. Elaine Luria: China's increased rhetoric and potential aggression against Taiwan, you know, we're gonna have to be ready to respond today with the forces we have today.

Former Congresswoman Elaine Luria represented Virginia Beach until this past January. An Annapolis graduate, Luria had a 20-year naval career before being elected to Congress.

Norah O'Donnell: What would you say the state of the U.S. Navy is today?

Rep. Elaine Luria: I think the Navy has not received the attention and resources that it needs over two decades. I mean, I served on six different ships. Every single one of those ships was either built during or a product of the fleet that was built-- in the Cold War.

Both Mike Gallagher and Elaine Luria have lobbied for government money for the shipyards in or near their districts, but they say this is less about jobs and more about national security.

Rep. Elaine Luria: If we don't get this right, all of these other things we're doing in Congress ultimately-- might not matter.

Rep. Mike Gallagher: If you think about what a coherent grand strategy vis-à-vis China would be, the hard power would be the most important part of that. And the Navy would be the most important component of your hard power investments.

Over the last two decades, the Navy spent $55 billion on two investments that did not pan out. The first was a class of Destroyers known as the Zumwalt. The futuristic fighting ships were supposed to revolutionize naval warfare. Thirty-two were ordered, but only three were ever launched. The cost of each ship, by one estimate, was upwards of $8 billion, making them the three most expensive Destroyers ever put to sea.

Another example is the Littoral Combat Ship or LCS, designed to be a fast all-purpose warship for shallow waters. Thirty billion dollars later the program ran aground after structural defects and engine trouble. Within the Navy, the LCS earned the unfortunate nickname, little cr**py ship.

Norah O'Donnell: The Navy's last few decades have been described as a lost generation of shipbuilding. Is that overly dramatic?

Rep. Mike Gallagher: I don't think so. We're still struggling to build ships on time-- on budget. And that's something we absolutely need to fix going forward.

This past week, we spoke with Admiral Mike Gilday at the Pentagon. He is the chief of Naval Operations and is responsible for building, maintaining, and equipping the entire U.S. Navy.

Norah O'Donnell: Is the Navy in crisis?

Admiral Mike Gilday: No, the Navy's not in crisis. The Navy is out on point every single day.

Norah O'Donnell: Is it being outpaced by China?

Admiral Mike Gilday: No. Our Navy's still in a position to prevail. But that's not blind confidence. We are concerned with the trajectory that China's on, with China's behavior. But we are in a good position right now-- if we did ever get into a fight against them.

Norah O'Donnell: How would you describe what China has been able to do militarily over the last 20 years?

Admiral Mike Gilday: The most alarming thing is the growth of not only their conventional forces but also their strategic nuclear forces, their cyber capability, their space capability, and how they are using that to force other nations'-- navies out of certain areas in the South China Sea-- instead of-- recognizing international law, they want to control where those goods flow and how.

Norah O'Donnell: What lessons did the U.S. Navy learn from some of the shipbuilding mistakes of the last 20 years?

Admiral Mike Gilday: I think one of the things that we learned-- was that we need to-- have a design well in place before we begin bending metal. And so we are going back-- to the past, to what we did in the '80s and the '90s, the Navy has the lead.

Toshi Yoshihara: There is a tendency among the great powers to look at each other's naval build ups with deep suspicion.

Toshi Yoshihara of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments may know more than any scholar in the west about China's navy.

Toshi Yoshihara: China will have about 440 ships by 2030. And that's according to the Pentagon.

Norah O'Donnell: Why is China able to build more warships more quickly than the U.S.?

Toshi Yoshihara: China has clearly invested in this defense industrial infrastructure to produce these ships, which allows them to produce multiple ships simultaneously, essentially outbuilding many of the western navies combined.

China's navy piggybacks on a booming commercial shipbuilding industry kept afloat by generous state subsidies, inexpensive materials and cheap labor.

In the United States, it's a different story.

After the Cold War ended, the shipbuilding industry consolidated and many of the yards where ships were both built and maintained closed down.

Norah O'Donnell: What do you see when you see China's shipbuilding program?

Admiral Mike Gilday: It's very robust.

Norah O'Donnell: Do we have enough shipyards?

Admiral Mike Gilday: No. I wish that we had more commercial shipyards. And-- over my career, we've gone from more than 30 shipyards, down to about seven that we rely upon on a day-to-day basis to build ships.

One of those yards is run by Huntington Ingalls Industries, which built the state-of-the-art new Ford-class aircraft carrier.

After controlled explosions in 2021, to prove it could withstand combat, the Ford got closer to deployment, six years late and billions of dollars over budget.

Ford-class aircraft carrier 60 Minutes

The Navy is not just struggling to build new ships on time. According to the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, there's a multi-year backlog repairing the ships in the fleet.

Admiral Mike Gilday: Our maintenance backlog is one of the primary things that I'm working on to correct. So just three years ago, we had 7,700 delay days. That is, extra days in a shipyard by ships when they weren't operational. We have cut that down to 3,000. We are not satisfied.

Norah O'Donnell: Maintenance delays mean sailors can't come home 'cause the ship that's supposed to replace them is not ready. It means longer deployments. It means away from your family more. That's a big strain on the workforce.

Admiral Mike Gilday: The more ships that we can have available to send at sea, alleviates many of those problems that you pointed out. Sailors join the Navy to see the world. And so it's my job to make sure that those maintenance delays go to zero and we can get those ships to sea as quickly as possible.

Norah O'Donnell: In the last year alone, at least 10 sailors assigned to ships undergoing maintenance or working at maintenance facilities have died by suicide.

Admiral Mike Gilday: It is a problem that we're taking very, very seriously. And down to every leader in our Navy, everybody has a responsibility to look out for each other, take care of each other, There is no wrong door to knock on when you need help.

Admiral Gilday says the U.S. Navy's main advantage over China is America's sailors. His goal is to modernize the U.S. fleet and have those sailors serving alongside hundreds of unmanned vessels by 2045.

Admiral Mike Gilday: I think unmanned is the future. And so I think that-- some 40% of our fleet in the future, I believe, is gonna be unmanned.

Norah O'Donnell: Are these, like, underwater drones?

Admiral Mike Gilday: Some of them are. Highly capable-- capable of delivering mines, and perhaps other types of weapons.

Admiral Gilday is talking about the ORCA - an extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle.

Norah O'Donnell: Can you say what it will do, or is that classified?

Admiral Mike Gilday: Well-- at a minimum, it'll have a clandestine mine laying capability. So it'd be done-- in a way that-- is very secretive-- but very effective.

Norah O'Donnell: But the GAO reports that it's already a quarter of a billion dollars over budget and three years behind schedule.

Admiral Mike Gilday: Uh, that particular platform is behind schedule. It's the first of a kind. When it delivers, I see a very high return on investment-- from that particular platform.

Norah O'Donnell: Because?

Admiral Mike Gilday: Because-- it will be among the most lethal and stealthy platforms-- in the arsenal of the U.S. military.

The Navy's total budget request for fiscal year 2024 is over a quarter of a trillion dollars, an $11 billion increase from last year. The focus is on China.

Norah O'Donnell: The U.S. defense posture is viewed as aggressive by the Chinese. The foreign minister just said, "Look, stop the containment. This may lead to conflict."

Admiral Mike Gilday: Perhaps the Chinese minister doesn't like the fact that the U.S. Navy is operating in collaboration with dozens of navies around the world to ensure that the mar-- maritime commons remains free and open for all nations. The Chinese wanna dictate those terms. And so they don't like our presence. But our presence is not intended to be provocative. It's intended to assure and to assure-- to reassure allies and partners around the world that those sea lanes do remain open. The global economy literally floats on seawater.

Produced by Keith Sharman and Roxanne Feitel. Associate Producer, Eliza Costas. Edited by April Wilson.

Norah O'Donnell is the anchor and managing editor of the "CBS Evening News." She also contributes to "60 Minutes."

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CBS News · by Norah O'Donnell

19. 20 Years Later, Terrorism Simmers from Iraq to Afghanistan, Officials Warn

20 Years Later, Terrorism Simmers from Iraq to Afghanistan, Officials Warn

Threats are rising once again, two decades after the American invasion that unleashed them all.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron

DOHA, Qatar—“No, it wasn’t worth it.”

That’s how an advisor to Iraq’s prime minister responded to journalist Peter Bergen’s oft-asked question about the American invasion of Iraq. Bergen posed it on stage at a conference of counterterrorism professionals here just a few days shy of the 20th anniversary of the invasion’s start, and Mohammed Al-Darraji answered bluntly.

The human and financial cost of the American destabilization of Iraq left behind a failed state. And in recent weeks, new alarms are sounding about the security threats simmering from Iraq to Afghanistan that can be traced back to that fateful decision so long ago.

In their own remembrances this week, Western news pages and airwaves are filled with heartrending stories recalling the horrors of that war, the folly of nation-building, the unpunished culpability of the American politicians who ordered it, the way it changed the military, the lasting trauma of its veterans, and the relentless grief for those who died. Our collective sentiment for the Iraq War remains overwhelmingly negative, angry, and unsettled.

But looking forward, the outlook for Iraq, the region, and the adjacent global war on terrorism is once again alarmingly bleak. In the past month, generals, journalists, officials, and activists have issued new warnings.

"Saddam [Hussein]'s brutal regime was replaced with a dysfunctional kleptocracy that can't deliver to its people," Simona Foltyn, an international journalist who lives in Baghdad, said at the Global Security Forum last week.

The annual counterterrorism-focused event included a panel on Iraq, and gloom about the past war and the future was palpable. Despite five successful elections and relatively peaceful power transfers since Saddam, Foltyn said Iraq's fragile post-war political system is more entrenched than most outsiders realize.

"There's almost an infinite level of fragmentation...that keeps destabilizing the country.," she said.

And should democratic governance fail, Muqtada al-Sadr is still there, waiting to take advantage.

Omar Muhammed, formerly known as the activist MosulEye, was less interested in reliving the invasion than highlighting Iraq’s long list of current problems, like water, energy dependence, and thousands of missing or encamped people from the war and later ISIS occupation.

“Every day there is a new problem or a new challenge in Iraq. Every day there is more and more poverty,” and drinking water “is as scarce as any other material.” The U.S. invasion in 2003, he said, “destabilized the entire social stability of the country.”

Gen. Erik Kurilla knows this. The commanding general of U.S. Central Command has been shuttling to the region at a frenetic pace. He told the Senate last week that ISIS, now based in Syria, “maintains the capability to conduct operations within the region and has the desire to strike outside of it.”

Kurilla likes to talk about ISIS as three parts. First is the “at-large” organization, about which he says, “I think we have contained ISIS, but the ideology is uncontained and unconstrained.”

Second is the ISIS army in detention. “There are over 10,000 ISIS detainees spread across 26 different prisons in northeast Syria,” Kurilla said.

Last year, 1,000 made it over the outside wall in a breakout and 400 were killed in a 10-day fight with U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces.

Third is the camps for refugees and displaced persons, as at al-Hol, where 51,000 people live, over half of whom are children. “They're at risk from radicalization. About 50 percent of the camp holds some—espouses, some form of ideology according to the camp guards, the camp administrators, and the residents. And the other half are trying to escape ISIS.” Half of the internally displaced persons there are from Iraq. The repatriation rate back to Iraq is so slow Kurilla estimates it will take another four years to move them all out.

It is all a direct result of the spiral of chaos caused by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. By now it’s well documented that the invasion sparked a series of violent extremist terrorist movements and a corrupt trail of divided governments. Al-Qaeda gave way to the Islamic State has mostly morphed from the Iraq-Syria border regions clear into Afghanistan. There, with no U.S. troop presence since the evacuation of 2021, the threat from ISIS-Khorasan is much worse.

“It is my commanders' estimate that they can do an external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months with little to no warning,” which includes targets in Europe, Kurilla told the committee. He estimates ISIS-K could have the ability to strike the United States homeland in six months.

Since the U.S. withdrawal, the Islamic State in Afghanistan has tripled its attacks, increased propaganda, and is expanding to become a regional organization by "actively trying" to absorb minor groups. "IS-K is growing in strength."

There has been a pile of informed ink written about the Iraq War’s 20-year legacy, much of it hard to read. And there is good documentation of Iraq’s difficulties today. But as the world (and the Pentagon) focuses on the pending Cold War with China and Russia’s hot war in Ukraine, we should also be reminded by this anniversary that there is simply more work ahead of us in Iraq—and because of it.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron

20. The Unknowable Future of Warfare

It will take place in the human domain, that much I am sure of. But that is derived from cognitive biases.

Excerpts:

Some of the influences on thinking come at the level of perception and cognition. Jervis’ seminal work on political psychology brought critical insights about thinking and rationality into the realm of national security. He highlights how an understanding of the influence of cognitive biases as well as the challenges that come from the use of historical analogies can enable leaders to work toward countering the negative impacts of those biases and improve their perceptions and decisions.[18] They can consult with people detached from the issue to ensure they are not becoming trapped by their experiences and position. They can consider how evidence may support multiple explanations and not simply their own, as well as seek out information that could disprove their beliefs.[19] Taking steps to counteract the ways that certain cognitive functions that can lead them astray will not guarantee success, but it can help leaders avoid common traps. If nothing else, thinking through those influences can introduce more humility by reminding leaders of their own fallibility.

Leaders can also use the common distortions that result from those cognitive processes, along with the tendencies of past leaders, as indicators for when more careful thought may be needed. If cognitive functions commonly lead to beliefs that the other side is highly centralized and carefully orchestrates its moves, then leaders should at least pause when they find themselves thinking along those lines.[20] If American leadership tends to underappreciate a nation’s resilience and willingness to fight, as well as its resourcefulness and ability to find allies, perhaps current strategists should make it a point to begin planning from the opposite perspective.[21] If previous generations regularly assumed success would result from some technological advancement, even though technologies are rarely monopolized and adversaries often find ways to limit their effectiveness, then leaders should guard against ideas that suggest complex international conflicts can be solved by a silver bullet. [22] By making the effort to think more seriously about their own thinking, leaders and strategists can work to avoid common missteps and better prepare themselves to capitalize on the surprises that await them.

As much as leaders believe they can discern what is to come, the fact is the future remains unknown. Consequently, they should adopt a posture of humility regarding the future, and devote more time to their own thinking and to the pursuit of flexibility than to guessing correctly about what may come. Doing so will help minimize the impact of surprises and best posture them to pursue American interests whatever the future brings.

The Unknowable Future of Warfare

thestrategybridge.org · March 20, 2023

In 1960, British physicist and novelist C. P. Snow famously stated that it was a mathematical certainty that nuclear war would occur within the decade. Thankfully, despite his confident pronouncements about it being a scientific fact and something scientists knew “with the certainty of established truth,” nuclear weapons were never used in anger.[1] While Snow’s convictions seem silly today, he is by no means an aberration in his failure to foresee the future. After the Boston Tea Party, British Prime Minister Lord North assured the House of Commons that London could bring Boston back into compliance with four or five frigates and that military force was unnecessary.[2] French General Ferdinand Foch reportedly declared in 1904 that “airplanes are interesting toys but of no military value.”[3] Dick Cheney believed Iraqis would welcome Americans as liberators in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also stated, “The Gulf War in the 1990s lasted five days on the ground. I can’t tell you if the use of force in Iraq today would last five days, or five weeks or five months. But it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that.”[4] While all of these seem foolish in hindsight, they came from knowledgeable and intelligent people and were entirely reasonable in their context. And yet, they proved to be fundamentally wrong.

“Frederick North, 2nd Earl of Guilford” painted by Nathaniel Dance-Holland (Wikimedia)

Leaders and strategists would do well to remind themselves of past failures to predict the future, as they are just as fallible as their predecessors and equally susceptible to adopting visions of what is to come that later prove erroneous. Consequently, they should assume a more modest and skeptical approach to future projections and focus more on improving flexibility and critical thinking than correctly predicting what lies around the corner. Doing so offers the best chance to successfully navigate the unforeseen twists ahead.

Unfortunately, while it seems to be a natural tendency of humans to believe they can predict some things about the future, Americans’ faith in the idea of progress can unintentionally give leaders greater confidence in their predictions than those who came before them. The belief that humanity will only increase its collective knowledge and understanding about the world can give the impression that the mistakes of the past were simply due to the ignorance of the age, and that further advancements can enable leaders and strategists today to avoid the errors of their forebears. It is easy to believe that, given all that humanity has discovered and learned, the uncertainty of the future will be one more challenge of the human condition that we will be able to overcome. Interestingly, this is not a new phenomenon—Bernard Brodie noted over 60 years ago how faith in science as a source of progress can produce unwarranted confidence in predictions about the future of war.[5]

The rise of big data analytics is a specific and more recent manifestation of that broader trend. The explosion of information about what has happened can give the illusion that we can predict what will happen, especially since analytics are seemingly able to do so in other venues. However, despite the promise of predictive analytics, researchers are far from able to predict interstate conflict, and no system of early warning has proven to be a reliable tool for policy-making.[6] The most pernicious problem is the fundamental complexity regarding processes of peace and conflict.[7] As two researchers in Science write:

“It is futile to pin one’s hopes of future predictive performance on extrapolations from previous successes in much less complex areas, such as billiards, planetary movements, or traffic systems, or for that matter in simpler political settings such as electoral competition, where both the theoretical principles are well known and events of interest occur with high frequency.”[8]

While analysts can provide insights into local regions or states that may be ripe for violence, it remains impossible to know when the fighting will occur, what will set it in motion, or what course it will take after it begins. Interstate conflict is even more difficult given that it typically encompasses an unwieldy set of actors that act, by definition, in rule-breaking ways.[9] Of course, data analytics may overcome those obstacles one day—it would be contrary to the central ideas of this essay to boldly claim it could not. But in its current state, it should not warrant significant boosts to a leader’s confidence about predictions of the future.

Buy on Amazon

The simple fact is that the future remains unknown and spurns prediction. Although this realization is obvious once stated, leaders and strategists often talk and act as if they can see beyond the horizon. National security discourse is replete with confident declarations about what the next war will be fought over and what it will look like in terms of character and intensity. Those predictions can also appear more inevitable the more effort is devoted to preparing for them. The current dialogue about the possibility of future conflict with China over Taiwan serves as a poignant example. Yet, history suggests the need for more skepticism in strategic thought. In his book Why Nations Go to War, John Stoessinger maintains that leaders often possess significant misperceptions about their adversaries and how wars will unfold prior to hostilities.[10] Bernard Brodie similarly argues that “in wars throughout history, future events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations of both sides, victor as well as loser, to have been seriously wrong. ‘Wars…are the graveyards of the predictions concerning them.’”[11] Leaders must remember that all outlooks on future wars are works of imagination, regardless of how informed they are by the present situation or historical data. As Lawrence Freedman notes, “They cannot be anything else because the future is not preordained.”[12]

While leaders and strategists need to be reminded of the hidden nature of the future, it does not mean that they should abandon any attempt to penetrate the fog.

All is not hopeless though. While leaders and strategists need to be reminded of the hidden nature of the future, it does not mean that they should abandon any attempt to penetrate the fog. The future of America’s security requires them to make decisions today about where to invest time, treasure, and talent based on some vision of the future, regardless of how wrong it may be. However, the shrouded character of the future does suggest that leaders should approach it with the understanding that there is a decent chance they will get it wrong. Intellectual humility and a healthy skepticism toward their prophetic abilities should serve as the starting point when approaching decisions about the future. From there, two other broad recommendations follow.

Buy on Amazon

First, there should be a greater emphasis on flexibility—flexibility in strategy, training, and acquisition. As Freedman highlights, the extensive destruction and costs of modern war have led to an overemphasis on the first blow of future wars in hopes of achieving a quick victory. Consequently, strategists have devoted less thought to what comes with the second and third blows, much less to what comes when the war reaches an impasse after years of fighting.[13] While strategists cannot predict what will come after the first blows, they can at least devote more thought to those possibilities and build in elasticity to help them adapt when needed. Robert Jervis wisely advised that instead of pursuing a dominant strategy, “the policy advocate should try to reach the more modest goal of developing policies that have high payoffs if the assumptions about the adversary that underlie them are correct, yet have tolerable costs if these premises are wrong.”[14] Flexibility and resiliency in strategy and planning can help posture forces for the surprises that will inevitably come. Of course, leaders should not neglect other factors in their pursuit of flexibility. They cannot, for example, wholly sacrifice the need to concentrate forces and effort for the sake of increased flexibility. However, the current balance calls for an increased emphasis on the latter.

By creating forces better prepared to operate in the unknown, the military can posture itself for a future full of uncertainty.

The same goes for training. More attention should be devoted to preparing forces to operate in the unanticipated situations. The American military underwent significant training overhauls to make it more realistic in the aftermath of its failures in Vietnam.[15] The Army’s National Training Center, the Navy’s Top Gun, and the Air Force’s Red Flag were all products of a desire to prepare warfighters for the intensity and challenges of war. While those reforms have been crucial toward producing a more capable force, there needs to be an increased focus on adapting to unexpected situations and scenarios. The current approach of practicing against adversary tactics and capabilities that are informed by current intelligence is necessary, but red teams should also attempt to introduce unforeseen tactics and capabilities. Exercises should also avoid shying away from impacts from other domains. For example, they could simulate a network outage at an operations center, a disrupted logistic flow for maintenance, or the loss of a satellite communication capability. By creating forces better prepared to operate in the unknown, the military can posture itself for a future full of uncertainty.

Thankfully, leaders have already begun emphasizing flexibility in acquisitions, though much work remains to be done.[16] Investments in long-term breakthrough technologies are still necessary, but America also needs the ability to rapidly iterate in order to respond to developments in the field as they arise. The wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have all shown that the United States rarely enters a war with capabilities tailor-made for the fighting it encounters. The defense acquisition system must be able to adapt to those requirements at a quicker pace than its adversaries.

Second, leaders and strategists need to think more seriously about their own thinking. Brodie perceptively noted, “It is characteristic of our convictions, in strategy as in all affairs of life, that we tend to regard them as natural and inevitable.”[17] However, once examined, it becomes clear that the ideas evolved in a traceable way based on experiences, personality, cognitive functions, and context. Leaders and strategists need to consider those influences as they can prove useful in exposing unfounded confidence.

Bernard Brodie Lecturing (Walter Sanders/Life Magazine, 1946)

Some of the influences on thinking come at the level of perception and cognition. Jervis’ seminal work on political psychology brought critical insights about thinking and rationality into the realm of national security. He highlights how an understanding of the influence of cognitive biases as well as the challenges that come from the use of historical analogies can enable leaders to work toward countering the negative impacts of those biases and improve their perceptions and decisions.[18] They can consult with people detached from the issue to ensure they are not becoming trapped by their experiences and position. They can consider how evidence may support multiple explanations and not simply their own, as well as seek out information that could disprove their beliefs.[19] Taking steps to counteract the ways that certain cognitive functions that can lead them astray will not guarantee success, but it can help leaders avoid common traps. If nothing else, thinking through those influences can introduce more humility by reminding leaders of their own fallibility.

Leaders can also use the common distortions that result from those cognitive processes, along with the tendencies of past leaders, as indicators for when more careful thought may be needed. If cognitive functions commonly lead to beliefs that the other side is highly centralized and carefully orchestrates its moves, then leaders should at least pause when they find themselves thinking along those lines.[20] If American leadership tends to underappreciate a nation’s resilience and willingness to fight, as well as its resourcefulness and ability to find allies, perhaps current strategists should make it a point to begin planning from the opposite perspective.[21] If previous generations regularly assumed success would result from some technological advancement, even though technologies are rarely monopolized and adversaries often find ways to limit their effectiveness, then leaders should guard against ideas that suggest complex international conflicts can be solved by a silver bullet. [22] By making the effort to think more seriously about their own thinking, leaders and strategists can work to avoid common missteps and better prepare themselves to capitalize on the surprises that await them.

As much as leaders believe they can discern what is to come, the fact is the future remains unknown. Consequently, they should adopt a posture of humility regarding the future, and devote more time to their own thinking and to the pursuit of flexibility than to guessing correctly about what may come. Doing so will help minimize the impact of surprises and best posture them to pursue American interests whatever the future brings.

Cameron Ross is an officer in the United States Space Force and is currently a student at the School for Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Space Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Soldiers Beach, Norah Head NSW, Australia, 2021 (Nicole Avagliano)

Notes:

[1] C.P. Snow. "Risk of Disaster or a Certainty." New York Times (1923-), Aug 17, 1981.

[2] John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 10.

[3] John Andreas Olsen, Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 94.

[4] Reuters Staff, “Factbox: Iraq War, The Notable Quotes,” Reuters, Mar 11, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-quotes-idUSL212762520080311

[5] Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 406.

[6] Lars-Erik Cederman and Nils B. Weidmann. 2017. “Predicting Armed Conflict: Time to Adjust Our Expectations?” Science 355 (6324): 474–75. doi:10.1126/science.aal4483.

[7] Cederman and Weidmann, 475.

[8] Cederman and Weidmann, 475.

[9] Cederman and Weidmann, 475.

[10] John George Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 11th ed (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010), 315–24.

[11] Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, New RAND ed (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 2007), 406.

[12] Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War (New York, N.Y: Hachette Books Group, 2018), 287.

[13] Freedman, 277–78.

[14] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, New edition. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pres, 2017), 111.

[15] James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 155–73.

[16] David Vergun, “New DoD Directive Will Improve Acquisition Reform, Officials Say,” DoD News, Dec 4, 2020. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2434691/new-dod-directive-will-improve-acquisition-reform-officials-say/

[17] Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 19.

[18] Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, xc.

[19] Jervis, 423–24.

[20] Jervis, 423–24.

[21] Freedman, 286.

[22] Freedman, The Future of War, 279.

thestrategybridge.org · March 20, 2023

21. AFSOC Selects MQ-9B SkyGuardian for UAS Family of Systems Concept

AFSOC Selects MQ-9B SkyGuardian for UAS Family of Systems Concept | UASMagazine.com

uasmagazine.com

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. announced a new contract with U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to provide three MQ-9B SkyGuardian® remotely piloted aircraft systems to its first U.S. customer.

AFSOC’s acquisition of MQ-9B builds on more than 20 years as a GA-ASI partner and more than 14 years flying the MQ-9A Reaper, operating more than 40 aircraft in harsh environments around the world.

MQ-9B will feature a key role in developing AFSOC’s new Adaptive Airborne Enterprise (A2E) concept, which envisions AFSOC projecting air power for special operations forces from beyond the horizon, using a family of large UAS and expendable, small UAS from permissive to denied environments.

“We’re very excited to continue our great partnership with AFSOC well into the future,” said David R. Alexander, president of GA-ASI. “MQ-9B is the ideal platform for inserting air-launched effects into potentially hostile environments. The MQ-9B’s combination of range, endurance, reduced manpower footprint, and overall flexibility will make it a true centerpiece of AFSOC’s future family of advanced UAS systems.”

MQ-9B represents the next generation of UAS, having demonstrated airborne endurance of more than 40 hours in certain configurations, automatic takeoffs and landings under SATCOM-only control, as well as a GA-ASI-developed Detect and Avoid System, among other upgrades. Its development is the result of a company-funded effort to deliver a UAS that can meet the stringent airworthiness certification requirements of various global military and civil authorities.

MQ-9B has garnered significant interest from customers throughout the world. After the UK Ministry of Defence selected MQ-9B SkyGuardian for its upcoming Protector program, the Belgian Ministry of Defense signed a contract for SkyGuardian. The Japan Coast Guard is currently operating MQ-9B in the SeaGuardian® configuration, which the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) also recently selected for its Medium-Altitude, Long-Endurance (MALE) RPAS Trial Operation Project beginning in April.

uasmagazine.com

22. Uncovering the unheard: Researchers reveal inaudible remote cyber-attacks on voice assistant devices

Graphic at the link. https://www.utsa.edu/today/2023/03/story/chen-nuit-research.html

Uncovering the unheard: Researchers reveal inaudible remote cyber-attacks on voice assistant devices

utsa.edu · by Ari Castañeda

MARCH 20, 2023 — Guenevere Chen, an associate professor in the UTSA Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, recently published a paper on USENIX Security 2023 that demonstrates a novel inaudible voice trojan attack to exploit vulnerabilities of smart device microphones and voice assistants — like Siri, Google Assistant, Alexa or Amazon’s Echo and Microsoft Cortana — and provide defense mechanisms for users.

The researchers developed Near-Ultrasound Inaudible Trojan, or NUIT (French for “nighttime”) to study how hackers exploit speakers and attack voice assistants remotely and silently through the internet.

Chen, her doctoral student Qi Xia, and Shouhuai Xu, a professor in computer science at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs (UCCS), used NUIT to attack different types of smart devices from smart phones to smart home devices. The results of their demonstrations show that NUIT is effective in maliciously controlling the voice interfaces of popular tech products and that those tech products, despite being on the market, have vulnerabilities

"The technically interesting thing about this project is that the defense solution is simple; however, in order to get the solution, we must discover what the attack is first,” said Xu.

The most popular approach that hackers use to access devices is social engineering, Chen explained. Attackers lure individuals to install malicious apps, visit malicious websites or listen to malicious audio.

For example, an individual’s smart device becomes vulnerable once they watch a malicious YouTube video embedded with NUIT audio or video attacks, either on a laptop or mobile device. Signals can discreetly attack the microphone on the same device or infiltrate the microphone via speakers from other devices such as laptops, vehicle audio systems, and smart home devices.

“If you play YouTube on your smart TV, that smart TV has a speaker, right? The sound of NUIT malicious commands will become inaudible, and it can attack your cell phone too and communicate with your Google Assistant or Alexa devices. It can even happen in Zooms during meetings. If someone unmutes themselves, they can embed the attack signal to hack your phone that’s placed next to your computer during the meeting,” Chen explained.

Once they have unauthorized access to a device, hackers can send inaudible action commands to reduce a device’s volume and prevent a voice assistant’s response from being heard by the user before proceeding with further attacks. The speaker must be above a certain noise level to successfully allow an attack, Chen noted, while to wage a successful attack against voice assistant devices, the length of malicious commands must be below 77 milliseconds (or 0.77 seconds).

“This is not only a software issue or malware. It’s a hardware attack that uses the internet. The vulnerability is the nonlinearity of the microphone design, which the manufacturer would need to address,” Chen said. “Out of the 17 smart devices we tested, Apple Siri devices need to steal the user’s voice while other voice assistant devices can get activated by using any voice or a robot voice.”

NUIT can silence Siri’s response to achieve an unnoticeable attack as the iPhone’s volume of the response and the volume of the media are separately controlled. With these vulnerabilities identified, Chen and team are offering potential lines of defense for consumers. Awareness is the best defense, the UTSA researcher says. Chen recommends users authenticate their voice assistants and exercise caution when they are clicking links and grant microphone permissions.

She also advises the use of earphones in lieu of speakers.

“If you don’t use the speaker to broadcast sound, you’re less likely to get attacked by NUIT. Using earphones sets a limitation where the sound from earphones is too low to transmit to the microphone. If the microphone cannot receive the inaudible malicious command, the underlying voice assistant can’t be maliciously activated by NUIT,” Chen explained.

Research toward the development of NUIT was partially funded by a grant from the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program (MSIPP). The $5 million grant supports research by the Consortium On National Critical Infrastructure Security (CONCISE) and allows the creation of certification related to leveraging Artificial Intelligence (AI) and block-chain technology to enhance critical infrastructure cybersecurity posture.

UTSA is a nationally recognized leader in cybersecurity. It is one of few colleges or universities in the nation – and the only Hispanic Serving Institution – to have three National Centers of Academic Excellence designations from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Security Agency.

Additionally, the university is home to five cybersecurity research centers and institutes— the Cybersecurity Manufacturing Innovation Institute, the National Security Collaboration Center, the Institute for Cyber Security, the Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security and the Cyber Center for Security and Analytics.

EXPLORE FURTHER

⇒ Learn about the UTSA Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

UCCS has a uniquely integrated campus cybersecurity model and is considered the center of cybersecurity education for the University of Colorado system. The university is primed to meet the cybersecurity needs of our nation, from education and research partnerships to developing the cybersecurity workforce of the future.

UTSA Today is produced by University Strategic Communications,

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Send your feedback to news@utsa.edu.

UTSA Today is produced by University Communications and Marketing, the official news source of The University of Texas at San Antonio. Send your feedback to news@utsa.edu. Keep up-to-date on UTSA news by visiting UTSA Today. Connect with UTSA online at Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Instagram.

Events

Monday, March 20, 11:30 a.m.

This Is How We Really Make It

Prisca Dorcas Mojica Rodríguez was born in Managua, Nicaragua but calls Nashville, Tennessee home. She is a feminist, theologian, storyteller, and advocate.

Virtual Event

Monday, March 20, 12:00 p.m.

An Introduction To Citation Managers: Which One Is Right For You?

This workshop will explain what a citation manager is and how it can help you organize your citations, insert citations as you write your paper, and generate your bibliography.

Virtual event

Tuesday, March 21, 9:00 a.m.

COLFA Research Conference & Showcase

The 23rd Annual COLFA Research Conference & Showcase offers graduate and undergraduate students pursuing majors within COLFA the opportunity to present their original work in a forum of interested and critically engaged minds. Attendees will also have the chance to network with faculty and learn about experiential learning opportunities in COLFA.

HEB Ballroom 1 & 2, Main Campus

Tuesday, March 21, 12:00 p.m.

An Introduction To Citation Managers: Which One Is Right For You?

This workshop will explain what a citation manager is and how it can help you organize your citations, insert citations as you write your paper, and generate your bibliography.

Virtual event

Tuesday, March 21, 1:00 p.m.

Reproductive Justice Panel

Zaena Zamora executive director of Frontera Fund, Anna Rupani of Fund Texas Choice, and Kamyon Conner of Texas Equal Access Fund will be on a panel for reproductive justice.

Virtual Event

Tuesday, March 21, 5:30 p.m.

Simplifying Citations With Zotero

Citation managers such as Zotero can help you store and organize the citations you find during your research. Zotero can also generate bibliographies in various styles, insert in-text citations and allow you to share sources with collaborators.

Virtual event

Wednesday, March 22, 3:00 p.m.

Taste of Success: Dr. Chris Packham

Come join us at "Taste of Success" in the Loefller Room to hear about the opportunities that the Department of Physics and Astronomy has to offer with guest speaker Dr. Chris Packham.

Loeffler Room (BSB 3.03.02,) Main Camus

Submit an Event

Spotlight

University of Texas at San Antonio receives ‘transformational’ $40M gift

utsa.edu · by Ari Castañeda

23. Policy lessons from the Iraq War for those who wish to forget

Excerpts:

1. Just because the United States did something poorly does not mean it was a failure or that it should never be done again.

2. Expectation management can make or break a war.

3. Patient, persistent presence can pay off.

4. If the United States is going to avoid making the same mistakes it made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it needs to find a way to better balance its global policies and resources.

Policy lessons from the Iraq War for those who wish to forget

By Ben Connable

atlanticcouncil.org · · March 20, 2023

Twenty years ago, I joined 160,000 of my closest friends to help invade Iraq. I then returned from 2004 through 2006 to help fight the insurgency. I continued to work with Iraqis and on Iraq policy after my last tour. Iraq became a permanent fixture in my life. But twenty years after the 2003 invasion, Iraq has been all but erased from the collective Western consciousness. That is frustrating for those, like me, who continue to work with Iraqis still in need of our support. Counterintuitively, this ebb of Western interest is also a symbol of relative success. Westerners who have been involved with Iraq through the invasion and in the difficult years that followed have pushed hard to help return Iraq to “normal country operations.” In other words, it would be good if Iraq to stabilized to the point that it no longer required exigent support.

Well, for better and for worse, “normal” has been achieved. Iraq is chaotic but relatively more stable than it has been in many years. It is a messy and sometimes violent, but nonetheless functioning, democracy. Iraqis probably have a much greater say in their own lives today than they did under Saddam Hussein’s rule. Iraq does not pose a military threat to its neighbors. But reduced international interest in Iraq means it receives less assistance. Compared to even the late 2010s, there are fewer military advisors and diplomats on the ground helping the Iraqis build and sustain their security forces, government institutions, and civil-society organizations. The Islamic State is a latent but still powerful threat. Iran, China, and Russia are filling the vacuum left by the West in ways that are inimical to Western policy goals.

Perhaps the worst part of this collective disinterest in Iraq is that disinterest has morphed into collective amnesia. For many in the West—including policymakers and military officers—Iraq was a bitter experience best forgotten. After “Iraq,” only the words “counterinsurgency” and “Afghanistan” are less welcomed in the halls of policy. Of course, from a rational perspective, it is counterproductive to forget about Iraq, even while Russia’s war in Ukraine dominates the headlines and competition with China soaks up all residual policy interest. As someone who still thinks about the past and present in Iraq, I offer a few lessons that may have broader policy relevance:

1. Just because the United States did something poorly does not mean it was a failure or that it should never be done again.

The occupation of Iraq went poorly. Pre-war planning discounted the enormous challenges that would follow the destruction of the Iraqi government. Coalition ground forces were completely unprepared for post-invasion duties. Tens of thousands had to adapt, and those of us serving on the ground did our best to help stabilize Iraq. Together with the Iraqis, we achieved some success. Iraq in 2023 is no Hanging Gardens of Babylon, but it could have been far worse. If we had better prepared to help the Iraqis in 2002, it could have gone better. At least a modicum of stability could have been achieved sooner. And while the United States’ track record of replacing dictators and violent theocracies with functioning democracies is not great, it is illogical to equate inadequate planning and performance alone with the idea that either democratization or counterinsurgency are inherently bad concepts.

2. Expectation management can make or break a war.

When a battalion of US Marines landed in Da Nang, South Vietnam, in 1965, Americans had no expectation that the United States would have to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops and see 58,000 of them get killed over the next decade. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and quickly roped in its European allies, it did so with the explicit expectation of immediate withdrawal, not to fight a twenty-year insurgency. And when the US-led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, it also did so with a plan for almost immediate withdrawal, not another twenty-year commitment. In each of these cases—Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq—a primarily US failure to foresee and then set expectations for long-term commitment eroded both the United States’ and its allies’ will to fight. Better expectation management up front can help sustain political will for the patient, persistent presence needed to succeed.

3. Patient, persistent presence can pay off.

While coalition governments and senior planners neither foresaw nor desired a long war in Iraq, thoughtful leaders on the ground almost immediately realized the need for a stable and enduring commitment. Coalition forces had to give the Iraqis space and time to untangle the post-Saddam mess into which they had been thrust. Coalition officials began employing the phrase “patient, persistent presence” at least as early as 2004, and probably even 2003. This was a concise recognition of the empirical evidence showing that counterinsurgency takes time. It was also an acknowledgment—one that the Iraqis needed to know, not just hear—that we were going to stay to help. When we wavered, like we did from 2003 to 2006 and again in 2011, things got worse. When we firmly demonstrated our commitment, like we did in 2007 and 2014, things generally got better. Coalition presence was no panacea, but if we had been consistently patient, we could have saved more lives.

Now, twenty years have passed since the invasion. The Eye of Sauron—a facetious Tolkienian nickname for the myopic and fickle US foreign-policy gaze—has shifted away from the Middle East, at least for now. Counterinsurgency training is all but gone from training syllabi, for now. Many Americans have collectively bought into the poorly crafted lie that the Islamic State has been defeated, for now. I fear that at some point, this myopia will come back to bite Americans in our collective rear ends. So, I add here one more point:

4. If the United States is going to avoid making the same mistakes it made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it needs to find a way to better balance its global policies and resources.

As much as the dwindling core of Iraqophiles love talking about our beloved second home, none of us look forward to the day when we gray-haired experts are called in to help the next generation of Western policymakers figure out how they can avoid their own fast-moving mess.

Ben Connable is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a retired Marine Corps Middle East area and intelligence officer with extensive experience in Iraq and the broader region.

atlanticcouncil.org · by dmalloy · March 20, 2023

24. How dangerous is TikTok really for the U.S.?

Excerpts:

Any banning of an app wholesale will have free expression and free speech implications for the U.S. — one that is sure to come under scrutiny by the courts along with young adults who are TikTok’s dominant user base.

Some privacy researchers don’t see TikTok as the problem but rather the lack of commitment in the U.S. to digital privacy more generally. Rather than dealing with problems piecemeal, as they arise, observers argue that the U.S. needs to enact some form of national privacy legislation, which China and the European Union have both done.

“Overall, we need federal privacy legislation, we need an end to these massive data brokers, and we need to realize that this isn’t just a problem when China does it,” said Quintin. “It’s a problem when anybody does it.”

However, addressing perceived national security threats from China has been more appealing for lawmakers than addressing these overarching tech regulation issues.

“The U.S. is at a level of political dysfunction where the only thing that can make Congress move is to be able to show that you’re tough on China,” said Creemers.

How dangerous is TikTok really for the U.S.?

Lawmakers are homing in on an effort to restrict the social app, perhaps even finally banning it. Are they overreacting?

Lili Pike, China Reporter, and Benjamin Powers, Technology ReporterMarch 20, 2023

grid.news · by Lili Pike, China Reporter, and Benjamin Powers, Technology Reporter

Concerns about the national security risks posed by TikTok, the wildly popular Chinese-owned social media app, have reached a fever pitch. U.S. cities and states have blocked its use on government-owned devices, and universities have barred it from campus networks.

Now, the Biden White House is reportedly mulling a national ban if the Chinese owners of ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, don’t sell their stakes — a prospect endorsed by a bipartisan group of lawmakers in Congress. That includes members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, who have summoned the embattled company’s CEO to testify at a hearing on Thursday.

Despite these warnings, the app’s popularity in the U.S. has skyrocketed. With roughly 80 million daily active users in the U.S., TikTok has emerged as a strong competitor to homegrown tech companies like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat.

For many Americans, one big question remains: How bad is TikTok, really? Experts told Grid that it’s impossible to rule out the possibility of the Chinese government accessing data from the app. It’s not clear whether the Chinese government is interested in the information TikTok collects on its users, but several plausible scenarios worry people who study tech and national security. They include the Chinese government directing TikTok to make changes to the algorithm it uses to serve videos to users in an effort to influence election outcomes or using private information gathered by the app to blackmail dissidents or government officials.

Still, given the range of data that is already public from other sources, and other overarching concerns about app data collection, many experts said TikTok is getting outsized attention.

“In a geopolitical context, it’s viewed as problematic because it is something outside of our control,” said Jess Maddox, an assistant professor of digital media technology at the University of Alabama. “We’ve all heard the hypotheticals about what TikTok and [its owner] ByteDance in China could be doing with our data. I think it comes down to a lack of control over user data and user protections.”

What data does TikTok gather?

The data that TikTok tracks includes a user’s contacts, email address, keystroke patterns in the app, the videos they watch and the IP addresses of the phones or computers they use to access the app, according to an analysis by the Washington Post.

That’s a lot of information — but on their face, the kind of data TikTok collects appears to be similar to that of U.S. peers like Facebook or Google, which analyze your behavior online or track your GPS position in the background. Other commonly collected types of data include which posts a user likes — or doesn’t — what posts a person lingers on, who their friends are, what a person searches for and where they are, said Cooper Quintin, a senior staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation

In an individual sense, that data isn’t very useful — unless someone is targeting you specifically for some reason. But aggregating many users’ data together allows companies and governments to see trends, connect data points and draw broader conclusions than any one set of data alone.

That said, security researchers have criticized some of TikTok’s data collection practices as they relate to the privacy of individual users. TikTok has reportedly utilized geolocation data to attempt to identify leaks within the company, showing a willingness to utilize fine-tuned data for dubious ends.

Could the Chinese government access this data?

That’s an open question.

ByteDance is currently registered in the Cayman Islands — not China, even if it is headquartered there. TikTok Ltd., the U.S. TikTok subsidiary, is registered in the Cayman Islands as well, though it is also incorporated in Delaware and California.

TikTok stores data from American users in the U.S. to assuage national-security fears, but news reports have documented that ByteDance employees in China were able to access TikTok data of U.S. users.

TikTok executives have repeatedly said that it does not and would not share user data with the Chinese government, even if the government asked it to do so. However, the country’s National Intelligence Law, enacted in 2017, mandates that “all organizations and citizens shall support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with the law and shall protect national intelligence work secrets they are aware of.” That clause is central to the U.S. government’s concerns about TikTok’s control of U.S. user data.

Even without that law, Chinese authorities have significant power over the tech industry, said Rogier Creemers, an assistant professor at the University of Leiden who focuses on Chinese tech policy. That power has been made clear through the disappearance of several high-profile Chinese technology company executives, including Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma, from public view for large stretches after reports of friction with the government.

“This is a system that, where necessary, can intervene at the highly personal level, in a way that is meant to be scary,” Creemers said.

Although it is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, and its founder Zhang Yiming is largely based in Singapore, ByteDance’s headquarters remain in China. That means China authorities could potentially wield their influence to get what it wants from the company. ByteDance has had to make concessions to the government before: Zhang had to write an apology letter in 2018 saying a ByteDance subsidiary — a humor app — didn’t live up to “core socialist values” after authorities shut the app down over issues with its content.

Chinese companies certainly aren’t alone in facing this kind of pressure. Apple and other U.S. companies operating in China have also come under scrutiny regarding whether the servers in their country are protected from Chinese government intrusion. Apple stores its Chinese customers’ data on servers accessible to the Chinese government and has taken down thousands of apps that are available outside the country.

What could this data be used for?

If the government was indeed able to gain access to the data that TikTok gathers, it could be leveraged for a variety of purposes — from blackmail to the aforementioned election interference.

Some researchers argue that the security risk depends in large part on which Americans’ data is exposed.

“Insofar as a foreign power’s access to this data poses a national security risk, it depends entirely on who the user is,” wrote the authors of a report from the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Internet Governance Project.

A person’s location, job or family connections could make their data more or less of a U.S. national security risk, they argue, as could whether the way a person using the service allows TikTok to identify and track them or expose confidential information about the U.S. government.

“We couldn’t figure out how big data could be used in a way to jeopardize national security short of having people in sensitive national security positions handle data in a way that would compromise national security,” said Karim Farhat, one of the report’s authors and the assistant director of the Internet Governance Project.

The Chinese government also has other ways to collect masses of data on people in the U.S., raising questions about where TikTok falls in terms of its usefulness to Beijing.

China has been accused or suspected of hacks that breached U.S. entities like the White House Office of Management and Budget, exposing the personal details of thousands of federal employees and the credit reporting behemoth Equifax. The latter breach involved Social Security numbers, addresses and other details for nearly half the U.S. population.

“I think what we don’t have, even at the classified level, is a very specific mechanism where it would be very clear that, if the Chinese intelligence and security services would get their hands on [TikTok user] data, they would be able to, from that, derive these actionable points, which they could then use in the following ways,” said Creemers. “I think it’s a far more general sense that might present a relatively easy channel for our adversary to get their hands on data in our population. We want to close it up. I think it doesn’t go much beyond that level of generality.”

Creemers and other researchers did say, though, that big data from TikTok could potentially be marshaled for election interference. “There could be a selective promotion or demotion of content that is even targeted to individual users, based on where they are geographically, who they might vote for, what political leanings they would have,” said Lindsay Gorman, a senior fellow at the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund and a former Biden administration adviser. “TikTok has all that data about U.S. voters and then could target information left and right, literally, to individual citizens based on its control over the algorithm. And so the really big concern, I think, is from the propaganda and information manipulation side of things.”

How has TikTok tried to ease concerns about the security of its data?

TikTok has spent millions of dollars working to separate its U.S. data operations from its Chinese owners after President Donald Trump famously pushed the idea of banning the app. More recently, the company had been negotiating with the Biden administration on potential data safeguards that would satisfy U.S. security concerns without requiring a change of ownership. Even so, the Biden administration is now advocating for ByteDance‘s Chinese owners to sell their stakes.

Right now, that means U.S. users’ data is stored on servers in the U.S. and Singapore. TikTok is also pursuing a $1.5 billion corporate restructuring plan called “Project Texas,” which would mean the U.S. cloud data company Oracle would be able to oversee what was going on with data, along with the U.S. government, and make sure it didn’t pass through mainland China, where ByteDance is headquartered. But this has done little to dissuade U.S. lawmakers, from President Biden and members of Congress to state and local officials, from continuing to single out the app as a unique threat to national security.

This month, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced a bill that would expand the scope of the executive branch to allow the Commerce Department to review software updates or data transfers by tech platforms in which a foreign adversary has an interest. It comes just before the CEO of TikTok is set to testify before Congress, an eagerly awaited hearing that is likely to get contentious. The fate of that Senate bill, and the outcomes of the hearing, could plot the fate of the app, for better or worse.

Any banning of an app wholesale will have free expression and free speech implications for the U.S. — one that is sure to come under scrutiny by the courts along with young adults who are TikTok’s dominant user base.

Some privacy researchers don’t see TikTok as the problem but rather the lack of commitment in the U.S. to digital privacy more generally. Rather than dealing with problems piecemeal, as they arise, observers argue that the U.S. needs to enact some form of national privacy legislation, which China and the European Union have both done.

“Overall, we need federal privacy legislation, we need an end to these massive data brokers, and we need to realize that this isn’t just a problem when China does it,” said Quintin. “It’s a problem when anybody does it.”

However, addressing perceived national security threats from China has been more appealing for lawmakers than addressing these overarching tech regulation issues.

“The U.S. is at a level of political dysfunction where the only thing that can make Congress move is to be able to show that you’re tough on China,” said Creemers.

Thanks to Brett Zach for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Lili Pike, China Reporter, and Benjamin Powers, Technology Reporter

25. Ban TikTok? Yes, But Congress Needs to Explain Why

As I have written many people view TikTok as a public good. I saw the TikTok commercial on cable and network news again last evening. It is so heartwarming to see the father teaching his daughter superior reading skills based on instructions from TikTok. (note sarcasm).

Ban TikTok? Yes, But Congress Needs to Explain Why

When the company’s CEO comes to Washington this week to testify, lawmakers should use the opportunity to educate, not lecture.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-20/ban-tiktok-yes-but-congress-needs-to-explain-why?sref=hhjZtX76

ByJulianna Goldman

March 20, 2023 at 7:30 AM EDTUpdated onMarch 20, 2023 at 12:42 PM EDT

If members of Congress want to ban TikTok, they need to do a better job explaining why. Simply lecturing the company’s CEO when he testifies in Washington this week isn’t going to cut it.

It’s clear that TikTok, which is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, won’t operate as it does today in perpetuity. Republicans, Democrats and the intelligence community are concerned that any company with Chinese ownership ultimately answers to the Chinese government, which raises a host of national security issues — from data security to propaganda — for a platform used by more than 100 million Americans, predominantly those under 35. Late last week, reports surfaced of a Justice Department investigation into the company’s surveillance of Americans.

Ban TikTok? Yes, But Congress Needs to Explain Why

When the company’s CEO comes to Washington this week to testify, lawmakers should use the opportunity to educate, not lecture.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-20/ban-tiktok-yes-but-congress-needs-to-explain-why?sref=hhjZtX76

ByJulianna Goldman

March 20, 2023 at 7:30 AM EDTUpdated onMarch 20, 2023 at 12:42 PM EDT

If members of Congress want to ban TikTok, they need to do a better job explaining why. Simply lecturing the company’s CEO when he testifies in Washington this week isn’t going to cut it.

The Lesson of Newburgh – Miles Smith IV

America's history of appreciating the military is worth keeping, but the country doesn't need the military in politics.

lawliberty.org · by Miles Smith IV · March 20, 2023

Two hundred and forty years ago this week, a group of officers of the Continental Army gathered in Newburgh, New York. The officers—relatively youthful men, many of them with their professional lives still ahead—had fought for seven years against the military might of the British Empire. On the Virginia Peninsula a year and a half earlier, they defeated Earl Cornwallis and his army at the Battle of Yorktown. Their fame spread across the world. Now forever a part of one of the great fighting forces of the age, the men of the Continental Army might have met in Newburgh to celebrate their exploits.

But instead, the soldiers were angry. Some were downright furious.

The Continental Congress, the erstwhile government of the newly independent United States, had been slow (even negligent) in paying the army. As a cost-saving measure, Congress stopped paying the army in 1782. The guarantee of life pensions, offered by Congress during the Revolutionary War to keep officers in the army, was nowhere to be found.

A group of officers, enraged at the perceived shameful treatment of the army by Congress, began preparing ways to find redress. Without informing the army’s high command, they circulated an unsigned letter urging a meeting at Newburgh in March 1783, ostensibly to discuss a range of possibilities including marching on Congress. George Washington caught wind of the meeting, which he called irregular and disorderly. He ordered the officers to a second meeting, overseen by a high-ranking officer. He also ordered a written report of the meeting, hinting that he himself would not attend.

When the second meeting occurred on March 15, the resentful and fuming officers were stunned when Washington himself appeared and asked to speak. Washington understood the officers’ frustrations but rebuked any attempt to coerce the civilian government with military force. Anyone “who wickedly attempts to open the floodgates of civil discord and deluge our rising empire in blood” should, he demanded, be opposed by the army. Coups, Washington made clear, would not only never be instigated by his army, they would also be opposed by the army. The civilian government of the United States must be protected, even when it acted inconsistently or imprudently.

After speaking, Washington took a letter out from a member of Congress of his pocket. He looked at it for a moment and held it uneasily. Slowly, he pulled his reading glasses from the pocket and haltingly put them on. Most of the soldiers had never seen Washington wear them. “Gentlemen,” Washington said gently, “you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country.” The sight of a greying and aging Washington—loyal to the government as ever—shamed the conspirators, many of whom began to openly weep. The Newburgh Conspiracy was dead, and so was the first major threat to civilian government in the new republic.

The legacy of the Newburgh Conspiracy is often treated as a part of Washington’s personal legacy, and for good reason. Washington’s actions between 1781 and when he became President in 1789 prepared the way for constitutional government and the maintenance of civilian leadership throughout American history. Washington’s good example, however, was not the last word on the question of the military’s relationship to politics. While Americans have elected generals to high office since the eighteenth century, they have simultaneously retained a sense of caution regarding military men.

Following Washington, it took three decades before the next general made a serious bid for the presidency: Andrew Jackson. Political opponents, and even some of his supporters, had concerns over the elevation of a general to the chief executive. Henry Clay asked, somewhat sarcastically, if killing 2,500 British soldiers meaningfully qualified someone for the presidency. William Henry Harrison’s record was scrutinized when he ran in 1840, not only for being a military general but for being a general without a significant victory to his name. When Zachary Taylor ran in 1848, his surrogates argued that his lack of political experience made him a superior candidate (Taylor claimed to never have voted before because soldiers had to be above politics).

The generals elected to the White House in the Early Republic understood the tension between the enduring civilian government and the military’s subordination to that civilian government. Few ever appeared in uniform unless they were speaking to veterans, and even then, most chose to wear the black broadcloth suits of a civilian.

When Jackson assumed the presidency in 1829, he walked to the capitol in his inaugural parade with a few aged Revolutionary War veterans. William Henry Harrison included a few military units, mainly for their bands. Zachary Taylor’s inauguration appeared decidedly unmilitary, despite him only being a few months out of the army.

The militarization of American society became more pronounced after the Civil War, and that continued into the twentieth century. The mass volunteer mobilizations and the unpopular but enduring draft imposed by the federal government of the United States during the Civil War made the army a fact of life for more men and women than it had ever been before: 2.2 million men served in the Union army. This represented a massive percentage of men under arms, given the North’s 1861 population of 31 million. The war’s conclusion saw parades in Washington DC of the victorious Federal Army. Those parades were far and away the largest military celebrations held in the United States to date. The Grand Army of the Republic became a major fraternal organization. By 1890, its membership peaked at half a million men.

While we appreciate the American military and its role in maintaining the liberties of the United States when necessary, we might also look to Washington and remind ourselves that we don’t need the military in politics.

The process repeated itself in the aftermath of World War I and more particularly after World War II. The era of total war militarized societies in ways the Founding Fathers could not have imagined. The military’s raw size in manpower numbers meant that most men of military age by 1950 had some experience with at least one of the United States’ armed services. Armies performed political and societal purposes in ways they never had before. Military service became a marker of basic civic participation. Blue star and gold star families marked their losses publicly.

Military service was so synonymous with basic civic participation that candidates for office made it a foundational aspect of their public service. Every president from Harry Truman to George H. W. Bush had some active duty military experience. Whereas in the Early Republic, military service was regarded with suspicion, by the middle of the twentieth century, it was seen as normative and even necessary. The eighteenth-century republic’s fears regarding professional soldiers, standing armies, and their intrusiveness into civilian politics gave way to an expectation of and even comfort with military men at the helm of civic and political life in the United States.

Generals became more ubiquitous in political life, and so did the military’s presence in civil religion. Dwight Eisenhower’s election brought a general to the presidency for the first time in sixty years. But as President Eisenhower meticulously delineated the civilian government from the military. He never appeared in uniform and was careful not to staff the government with too many military men.

Eisenhower in fact became suspicious of the ties between the military and both American politics and the economy. In his farewell address in January 1961, Eisenhower warned of the emerging military-industrial complex. Few in power heeded the general’s admonition. Since the Cold War, policing, federal and state politics, infrastructure maintenance, and even research have seen an increased presence of the American military. Civic activities at professional sporting events are completely dominated by the presence of military imagery and often time military personnel.

Candidates for office in both parties regularly tout their military service as evidence of their ability to “lead” in their campaigns for higher office. This disposition to give governance over to the military has been particularly pronounced on the American right in the era of Donald Trump, who made a point of including an outsized number of generals in his administration. Trump quickly learned that American generals and soldiers, even those who serve politicians after their retirement, are often uncomfortable with partisan politics.

The lesson of Washington at Newburgh is not, however, simply that generals and soldiers should not be partisan. The lesson is that military men are not necessary or even preferable for the maintenance of a republican society. The American constitution and the republic it governs do not need “leaders”—they need citizens. The continued preference and often fawning partiality American voters show military men are not the fault of dutiful veterans who run for office, but it nonetheless feeds a broader political and cultural vice whereby Americans treat military men as uniquely suited to govern them. Indeed, no less a military man than Dwight Eisenhower saw society’s militarization as deeply problematic.

So, while we appreciate the American military and its role in maintaining the liberties of the United States when necessary, we might also look to Washington and remind ourselves that we don’t need the military in politics. Our history of appreciating military men is worth keeping. So too is our history of suspicion about their broader role in politics and society.

lawliberty.org · by Miles Smith IV · March 20, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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