​Quotes of the Day:

"Stupidity is the same as evil if you judge by the results."

– Margaret Atwood.

"Stupidity is far more dangerous than evil for evil takes a break from time to time stupidity does not"

– Anatole France

"Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replaced, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mas.s"

– Immanuel Kant

1. Office of Inspector General USAID Semiannual Reports to Congress

2. Endgame in Ukraine: Time for a Real Strategy

3. Greenlandic politician describes struggle to remember 'America has good people'

4. China’s Securing, Shaping, and Exploitation of Strategic Spaces: Gray Zone Response and Counter-Shi Strategies: A Small Wars Journal Pocket Book

5. C.I.A. Plans Largest Mass Firing in Nearly 50 Years

6. Senate Republicans approve budget framework, pushing past Democratic objections after all-night vote

7. Report to Congress on U.S. Special Operations Forces

8. Trump Administration Designates Eight Cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

9. U.S. Military Action in Mexico: Almost Certainly Illegal, Definitely Counterproductive

10. As Defense preps for mass firings, Hegseth says a hiring freeze and more firings are coming

11. DoD reviewing 'non-essential' consultancy contracts for termination

12. ​The Pentagon’s New Defense Budget Cuts Send Shockwaves Through Palantir’s Stock

13. The breakdown of the CIA

14. Lawmakers to DOGE: Use a scalpel, not a sledgehammer at the Pentagon

15. Trump’s Turn to Russia Spooks U.S. Allies Who Fear a Weakened NATO

16. Xi Is Trying to Secure the Devotion of China’s Military

17. SOCOM looking to acquire new drone-launched glide bombs

18. From Strategy to Action: Rethinking How the State Department Works

19. China touts ‘window for peace’ as Trump loses patience with Ukraine

20. The Cargo Cult Science Empire: American political warfare as applied soft science, and Trump's Gorbachev moment

21. Pentagon hits pause on plan to carry out mass firings of civilian employees, officials say

1. Office of Inspector General USAID Semiannual Reports to Congress

​This is from my good friend Jon Lindborgh who I served with in the Philippines when he was the Mission Director for USAID in the Philippines. At the link below are the IG's semi annual reports going back to 2009. 

Jon's comments

This is what a real audit and oversight process of a federal agency like USAID looks like. With all the focus on DOGE reviews, under the U.S. Government Inspectors General (IG) Act, the IG issues a Semiannual Report that provides a comprehensive account of completed audit, investigative, and other oversight work. In short, there are well-established systems for oversight of U.S. Government spending through the Inspectors General system. https://lnkd.in/g-BkxE8v

​Here is the link to the 56 page 2024 semi annual report through 30 September https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/USAID-OIG-SARC-Fall-2024-FINAL.pdf. The report is data filled and transparent. Below is a graphic showing the results of the IGs' work for the 6 month period. I agree with Jon. This is an excellent example of what IG's are supposed to do.

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Agency for International Development

Semiannual Reports to Congress

https://oig.usaid.gov/our-work/semiannual-report?page=1

Under the IG Act, OIG issues its Semiannual Report to Congress to provide agency leaders, Congress, and other stakeholders with a comprehensive account of our completed audit, investigative, and other oversight work. We report on significant findings, referrals, and related agency actions; as well as descriptions of outstanding recommendations, the results of peer reviews, and other important information over the reporting period.

​

Semiannual Reports to Congress

Under the IG Act, OIG issues its Semiannual Report to Congress to provide agency leaders, Congress, and other stakeholders with a comprehensive account of our completed audit, investigative, and other oversight work. We report on significant findings, referrals, and related agency actions; as well as descriptions of outstanding recommendations, the results of peer reviews, and other important information over the reporting period.

2024

Nov 29, 2024

Semiannual Report to Congress (April 1–September 30, 2024)

Semiannual Reports

May 31, 2024

Semiannual Report to Congress (October 1, 2023-March 31, 2024)

Semiannual Reports

2. Endgame in Ukraine: Time for a Real Strategy

​Excerpts:

The U.S. should adopt a more agile and flexible approach to adjust to this reality and appreciate the potential benefits it offers, rather than viewing it as only a negative and dangerous development. The U.S. must refrain from pursuing the same traditional approach, which has consistently resulted in taking sides and being a part of the problem rather than the solution. Otherwise, we risk a future where countries turn to China for peacemaking and to the U.S. only for warcraft. Ultimately, diplomacy—including engagement with potential spoilers like China—remains the only viable path to a resolution that prevents prolonged instability and greater geopolitical fragmentation.

But, Ukraine’s struggle must also be understood within a postcolonial framework. As a country forcibly colonized by the USSR, Ukraine has a long history of subjugation, including the Holodomor, the loss of sovereignty under Soviet rule, and a series of betrayals in the post-Soviet era. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum saw Ukraine relinquish its nuclear deterrence in exchange for territorial integrity, only to have that guarantee broken by Russia. Furthermore, democratic grassroots movements in 2004 and 2014 were undermined by Russian interference, fostering deep skepticism among Ukrainians about great-power diplomacy.

Any diplomatic resolution must consider these historical grievances and ensure that Ukraine is not merely a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical contest. If negotiations fail to provide strong guarantees for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty, diplomacy risks reinforcing spheres of influence rather than genuinely resolving conflicts. The core challenge remains: how can diplomacy secure Ukraine’s long-term independence and prevent a world in which smaller states are increasingly vulnerable? Any proposed peace settlement must answer these fundamental questions.

Endgame in Ukraine: Time for a Real Strategy

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/21/endgame-in-ukraine-time-for-a-real-strategy/

by Siamak Naficy

|

02.21.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has actively engaged with multiple global crises, including brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, initiating talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and advocating for an end to the war in Ukraine. While some of his proposals, such as forcibly relocating Palestinians from Gaza or suggesting Canada join the U.S. as its 51st state, have been dismissed as unrealistic, his proactive approach raises a key question: Why has the Biden administration been so reluctant to pursue diplomatic solutions in Gaza and Ukraine, allowing Trump to position himself—rightly or wrongly—as a candidate for peace?

While there is no certainty that Trump’s diplomatic efforts will succeed—his plans for Gaza could further destabilize the region, and his outreach to Putin may not lead to concrete outcomes—the critical issue is not whether his initiatives will work, but that he is offering an alternative path. In contrast, the Biden administration has emphasized strengthening multilateral ties with allies like Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, while also leaning on figures with a history of interventionist policies. This has created a reluctance to push for an end to conflicts that have devastated civilians and destabilized entire regions.

This contrast calls for a thoughtful reassessment of U.S. strategic priorities. While the multilateral approach championed by Biden is important for long-term stability, the hesitancy to directly address the urgent crises in Gaza and Ukraine has allowed Trump to carve out a space as someone willing to challenge the status quo in pursuit of peace, even if his methods remain controversial. Ultimately, this evolving dynamic forces a broader reflection on how the U.S. approaches diplomacy, conflict resolution, and its role in shaping global stability.

As the war nears a potential climax, Trump is correct in asserting that the United States should recalibrate its approach. Wars end in diplomacy when battlefield conditions dictate it. The United States must acknowledge that neither side can achieve an outright military victory and instead shift toward brokering a negotiated settlement. The alternative—prolonging the war indefinitely—risks deeper destabilization and the potential collapse of the Ukrainian state.

The Reality of the War

Discussions about the war in Ukraine often remain detached from battlefield realities. The conflict, now a grinding war of attrition, is reaching a decisive moment. Ukraine has suffered immense losses—numbers vary hugely but at least between 46,000 and 100,000 troops have been killed or injured since the conflict’s onset, and with likely many more wounded. Both sides are approaching a culmination point. Russia lacks the capacity to conquer and govern all of Ukraine due to insufficient troop numbers for an effective occupation. Meanwhile, Ukraine lacks the capability to expel Russian forces from entrenched positions. The much-heralded 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, despite significant Western support, failed to achieve substantial territorial gains.

A complete military defeat of Russia is highly improbable, particularly given its nuclear capabilities. More likely, the war will remain unresolved, with Russia achieving some of its strategic objectives while continuing to disrupt Ukraine’s reconstruction and repatriation of refugees. Ongoing missile and drone attacks will likely deter investment, crippling Ukraine’s long-term stability and potentially leading to a failed-state scenario. This conflict is not just a regional war but a pivotal moment that will shape the future of the international order.

The Case for Diplomacy

A diplomatic settlement is not an endorsement of aggression; it is a necessity. Ukraine has admirably defended itself, but at some point, it must consolidate its gains rather than pursue unattainable objectives. Strategy must be grounded in realism and pragmatism, acknowledging that total victory is unlikely.

To be sure, since 2014, Russia has consistently disregarded Ukrainian sovereignty, from the annexation of Crimea to the full-scale invasion in 2022. Moscow did not adhere to the Minsk Agreements, which were intended to reduce tensions in Donetsk and Luhansk. Instead, Russia used these diplomatic efforts to entrench its influence while continuing to destabilize Ukraine.

Framing the war as one of “prolongation” without specifying agency obscures the reality: Russia initiated and continues to drive this conflict. However, without clear diplomatic initiatives, the risk of further regional instability remains high—whether in the Balkans, Moldova, Belarus, or Kaliningrad. Prolonging the conflict without a viable endgame risks further fracturing Europe.

In the short term, escalation—through increased military aid and economic pressure—can serve to improve Ukraine’s bargaining position and demonstrate the resolve of the international community. However, this also raises the question of what a sustainable diplomatic solution looks like for Ukraine.

Though ruthless, Vladimir Putin is not worse than Joseph Stalin or Mao Zedong in his treatment of his own people or his respect for human rights. Stalin and Mao were responsible for the deaths of millions, yet the United States engaged diplomatically with both when it served national interests. During the Cold War, agreements with the Soviet Union and China were pursued not out of trust but out of strategic necessity. As Ronald Reagan famously stated, borrowing a Russian proverb: “Trust, but verify” (doveryai, no proveryai).

This pragmatic diplomacy worked during the Cold War, and there is no reason to believe it cannot work today. Putin’s actions, however aggressive, are calculated within the framework of Russian national interests. If he claims he is willing to negotiate, the U.S. should test his sincerity. A diplomatic engagement could either force him to follow through or expose his reluctance, shaping global perceptions accordingly.

The Broader Geopolitical Stakes

Even if Russia secures territorial gains, its broader strategic concerns—particularly NATO’s expansion—will remain unresolved. Future negotiations will need to address arms control, military confidence-building measures, and economic relations to ensure long-term stability in the region.

Justice and stability are often in tension; insisting on absolute justice without regard for order may result in achieving neither. Ukraine’s conflict is not just a bilateral issue—it has profound implications for U.S.-Russia-NATO relations. Ukraine alone cannot negotiate Europe’s entire security framework. The United States and NATO must engage in these discussions.

If negotiations fail to provide strong guarantees for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty, diplomacy risks reinforcing spheres of influence rather than genuinely resolving conflicts.

European leaders are now considering increased support for Ukraine to compensate for declining U.S. assistance. Their ability to mobilize significant resources—whether in military aid, financial backing, or civilian relief—will directly impact Ukraine’s position at the negotiating table. If Europe steps up in the short term, it could bolster Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations and necessitate greater European involvement in brokering peace—a role the U.S. has not actively pursued.

European and Western support for Ukraine has played a critical role in both strengthening Kyiv’s position and ensuring that Russia faces consequences for its aggression. In the short term, escalation—through increased military aid and economic pressure—can serve to improve Ukraine’s bargaining position and demonstrate the resolve of the international community. However, this also raises the question of what a sustainable diplomatic solution looks like for Ukraine and whether any settlement could avoid the precedent that multipolarity simply returns the world to a Great Game era, where smaller nations are at the mercy of larger powers.

Trump has called for China to be involved and China has also signaled interest in peace negotiations. If Ukraine welcomes Chinese involvement and Beijing is willing to participate, the U.S. will struggle to exclude them from the process. As the U.S. confronts the challenges presented by Russia, China, and the shifting global landscape, it must acknowledge the prominence of the Asian century. While the crisis in Ukraine rightfully garners attention, the gravitational pull of Asia on the United States cannot be ignored. The United States will inevitably be pulled to prioritize Asia more firmly. The important question then is whether this fact can be managed awkwardly or gracefully. Balancing power dynamics, reevaluating the enduring nature of alliances, and considering the perspectives of smaller powers are crucial steps in addressing the complexities of our contemporary world.

It is crucial to acknowledge and accept the current multipolar world, wherein nations like China— and eventually India and others—will assume a more significant, perhaps even leading, role in diplomacy and conflict resolution. Surely, the more rapprochements are engineered (by anyone) the better for all stakeholders and populations (the military-industrial complex excepting). Moreover, the more China expands its reach and ventures into new territories, the more resentment it may provoke. The potential emergence of an “ugly Chinese” could be a worse alternative to the “ugly American,” which might ultimately redound to the United States.

The U.S. should adopt a more agile and flexible approach to adjust to this reality and appreciate the potential benefits it offers, rather than viewing it as only a negative and dangerous development. The U.S. must refrain from pursuing the same traditional approach, which has consistently resulted in taking sides and being a part of the problem rather than the solution. Otherwise, we risk a future where countries turn to China for peacemaking and to the U.S. only for warcraft. Ultimately, diplomacy—including engagement with potential spoilers like China—remains the only viable path to a resolution that prevents prolonged instability and greater geopolitical fragmentation.

But, Ukraine’s struggle must also be understood within a postcolonial framework. As a country forcibly colonized by the USSR, Ukraine has a long history of subjugation, including the Holodomor, the loss of sovereignty under Soviet rule, and a series of betrayals in the post-Soviet era. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum saw Ukraine relinquish its nuclear deterrence in exchange for territorial integrity, only to have that guarantee broken by Russia. Furthermore, democratic grassroots movements in 2004 and 2014 were undermined by Russian interference, fostering deep skepticism among Ukrainians about great-power diplomacy.

Any diplomatic resolution must consider these historical grievances and ensure that Ukraine is not merely a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical contest. If negotiations fail to provide strong guarantees for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty, diplomacy risks reinforcing spheres of influence rather than genuinely resolving conflicts. The core challenge remains: how can diplomacy secure Ukraine’s long-term independence and prevent a world in which smaller states are increasingly vulnerable? Any proposed peace settlement must answer these fundamental questions.

Tags: grand strategy, Military strategy, Russia-Ukraine War, strategy

About The Author

• 
  
• Siamak Naficy
• Siamak Tundra Naficy is a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis. An anthropologist with an interdisciplinary approach to social, biological, psychological, and cultural issues, his interests range from the anthropological approach to conflict theory to wicked problems, sacred values, cognitive science, and animal behavior. The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

3. Greenlandic politician describes struggle to remember 'America has good people'

​A view from Greenland.

Excerpts:

SUMMERS: I'm curious - what kind of relationship would you like to see between our two countries moving forward? We have that long - that decadeslong history. What is a way that there could be a relationship between Greenland and the U.S. that benefits the Greenlandic people who live here? What would you say?

NATHANIELSEN: I think just rewind, like, eight months because that's - we had a good relationship. We had a memorandum of understanding that we wanted to expand on mineral exploration, and we also wanted to discuss further military presence in Greenland in terms of installations that could have dual use, so both benefiting military purposes but also the people of Greenland. We had a good relationship, and we were positive towards both American investments and collaboration, and that has been pretty hard-hit the last couple of months.

SUMMERS: You're saying we had a good relationship.

NATHANIELSEN: We had a good...

SUMMERS: We had good opinions. That is in the past tense. Can you just paint a picture for us of what this has done for people here, for their views of Americans, for their views of the relationship with America?

NATHANIELSEN: A lot of people are struggling to remind themselves that America also has good people, that we have friends in America, that America is an ally, because, frankly, the last couple of months have shown an America that is a bad ally, that is a bully that doesn't respect our democracy, doesn't respect our government, that treat us as a commodity, that seems indifferent to what the Greenlandic people want. And that is both hurtful and frightening because we are microstate. We are such a small population. We totally rely on a good relationship with a big partner. So for us, it has really damaged, I think, our relationship, and I think it's very sad because we have so much to gain from each other. I think it was an open door. There was absolutely no barriers towards American interest into Greenland just a couple of months ago.

Greenlandic politician describes struggle to remember 'America has good people'

February 20, 20255:08 PM ET

Heard on All Things Considered

https://www.npr.org/2025/02/20/nx-s1-5304030/greenlandic-politician-describes-struggle-to-remember-america-has-good-people

By 

Matt Ozug

, 

Juana Summers

, 

Ashley Brown

, 

Vincent Acovino

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NPR's Juana Summers speaks with Greenlandic parliamentary candidate Naaja Nathanielsen about the continued Trump administration push to acquire the territory.

JUANA SUMMERS, HOST:

President Trump's calls for the U.S. to take over the territory have sparked alarm and outrage. Denmark, which is responsible for Greenland's security, recently announced that it would further boost its defense spending. Last week, lawmakers on Capitol Hill held a hearing focused on Trump's ambitions.

In Greenland, Naaja Nathanielsen was watching. She's running for parliament in next month's elections, and I met her at her office in Nuuk earlier today. On one wall next to her desk, a piece of art caught my eye. It's an illustration of the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, gavel in hand. On the lectern, the words, fight for the things that you care about, but do it in a way that will lead others to join you.

I started by asking Naaja Nathanielsen for her reaction when she heard Trump's goal to take over her country, which she learned of when seeing a post from Trump's Truth Social platform.

NAAJA NATHANIELSEN: Well, I read a social media post 23 December. I actually took it much more serious, and I think also I got this feeling that this is going to be something we're going to be debating for a long time.

SUMMERS: What was it about what he said and what he's been saying that made you take it more seriously?

NATHANIELSEN: I think it was use of control and ownership which had rendered a more serious vibe to it, if you will. And also, I think since then, I've seen more and more people come out with similar stances and different suggestions - some in form of meme, some in form of just social media posts, some in form of op-eds in serious papers, now latest Senate hearing, right? So I think it has degrees of seriousness to it now that it didn't have the last time around.

SUMMERS: I don't know how much of that Senate hearing you were able to see or digest, but what do you make of some of the arguments coming out of the States? There are a number of bills moving through our government suggesting - authorizing the president, President Trump, to go into negotiations to purchase Greenland, suggesting - a recent bill suggesting Greenland being renamed as Red, White and Blueland. What do you think when you hear that?

NATHANIELSEN: Well, first of all, I watched the Senate hearing, and I was quite offended by the idea that we are a commodity for sale. People forget that we are actually a people. We are a people in our own right, with our own culture. We don't want to be Americans. It does not mean we don't want to trade with America or have connections to America, but we are not Americans. So I think it's offending on many levels and shows a lack of insight, also in diplomacy, I think, because I don't believe in this bullying tactic. I don't think that's a way to gain true allies and true partnerships, and I think it's a very short-termed way of trying to get your way. History has shown us that is not a way to obtain lasting peace.

SUMMERS: I think if President Trump or a member of his administration or an ally were sitting here, they'd make the case that the interest that the U.S. has in Greenland is rooted in Arctic security and the strategic location of this island. What do you make of the security-based argument? Of course, the countries have had relationships for a long time. The United States has had, and still has, a military base here. What do you make of that?

NATHANIELSEN: Well, we've been all along saying we have an over 80-year-long relationship with the U.S., and we do recognize we're part of the American interest fair (ph) in terms of national security. And we've been pushing for many years now the idea to have more monitoring of the Arctic, both in submarine and in the air, so we don't oppose that. But again, it does not follow from that that we want to be American or that the U.S. needs ownership of Greenland to obtain these goals. It is absolutely possible without the use of force or threats or acquirement.

SUMMERS: I'm curious - what kind of relationship would you like to see between our two countries moving forward? We have that long - that decadeslong history. What is a way that there could be a relationship between Greenland and the U.S. that benefits the Greenlandic people who live here? What would you say?

NATHANIELSEN: I think just rewind, like, eight months because that's - we had a good relationship. We had a memorandum of understanding that we wanted to expand on mineral exploration, and we also wanted to discuss further military presence in Greenland in terms of installations that could have dual use, so both benefiting military purposes but also the people of Greenland. We had a good relationship, and we were positive towards both American investments and collaboration, and that has been pretty hard-hit the last couple of months.

SUMMERS: You're saying we had a good relationship.

NATHANIELSEN: We had a good...

SUMMERS: We had good opinions. That is in the past tense. Can you just paint a picture for us of what this has done for people here, for their views of Americans, for their views of the relationship with America?

NATHANIELSEN: A lot of people are struggling to remind themselves that America also has good people, that we have friends in America, that America is an ally, because, frankly, the last couple of months have shown an America that is a bad ally, that is a bully that doesn't respect our democracy, doesn't respect our government, that treat us as a commodity, that seems indifferent to what the Greenlandic people want. And that is both hurtful and frightening because we are microstate. We are such a small population. We totally rely on a good relationship with a big partner. So for us, it has really damaged, I think, our relationship, and I think it's very sad because we have so much to gain from each other. I think it was an open door. There was absolutely no barriers towards American interest into Greenland just a couple of months ago.

SUMMERS: That was Naaja Nathanielsen. She's running for parliament and has served as minister of business, trade, mineral resources, justice and gender equality in the Greenlandic government.

Copyright © 2025 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information.

NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.

4. China’s Securing, Shaping, and Exploitation of Strategic Spaces: Gray Zone Response and Counter-Shi Strategies: A Small Wars Journal Pocket Book

China’s Securing, Shaping, and Exploitation of Strategic Spaces: Gray Zone Response and Counter-Shi Strategies: A Small Wars Journal Pocket Book

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/21/chinas-securing-shaping-and-exploitation-of-strategic-spaces-gray-zone-response-and-counter-shi-strategies-a-small-wars-journal-pocket-book/

by SWJ Staff

|

02.21.2025 at 04:15am

Version 1.0.0

China’s Securing, Shaping, and Exploitation of Strategic Spaces: Gray Zone Response and Counter-Shi Strategies: A Small Wars Journal Pocket Book is by Dr. Robert J. Bunker.

Purchase this thought-provoking book here. Available in both paperback and digital formats.

Please enjoy this short preview of the book:

Circa 2019: “The timing of Dr. Robert J. Bunker’s new SWJ pocket book is apropos given the increasing intransigence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in both its domestic ‘police state’ security policies and foreign ‘expansionistic’ economic and military activities. This authoritarian regime-bereft of its former Marxist and Maoist ideologies except in name only-under the iron fisted leadership of ‘president for life’ Xi Jinping is increasingly in the news for the many draconian and predatory behaviors and actions in which it is now engaging.” — Dave Dilegge, Founder of Small Wars Journal 

Tags: China, Deng Xiaoping, Grey Zone, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, Robert J. Bunker, SWJ Book Excerpt, Unrestricted Warfare, US-China, Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, Xi Jinping

About The Author

• 
  
• SWJ Staff
• SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.
• 
  

5. C.I.A. Plans Largest Mass Firing in Nearly 50 Years

What will be the second and third order effects of this negative and positive?

As an aside, DEI is dead, so let's move on. But let's not purge people who were doing a job because it was their job.  Let's not purge people because they are accused of being "DEI-hires." Such actions are just as wrong as the actions the anti-woke faction accuses the woke faction of doing. We need to spend more time and resources hunting down the agents of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea as well as violent extremist organizations who have infiltrated the US rather than those who have worked in DEI or are accused of being "DEI-hires." Of course our adversaries love that all the intelligence community is consumed with the administration's anti-DEI crusade. They hold to Bonaprate's dictum, "never interrupt an enemy when he is making a mistake." They could never have imagined that the woke versus anti-woke factions could create such divisiveness in the US They could not have imagined creating such a campaign of subversion but they are very happy to exploit it and reap the benefits of it.

The intelligence failures of the future cannot be blamed on DEI. They will be blamed on the purges that came with anti-DEI efforts.

I am reminded of Captain Willard's quote in Apocalypse Now: 

Every minute I stay in this room, I get weaker. And every minute Charlie squats in the bush, he gets stronger.

Every minute we spend on anti-DEI we grow weaker. And every minute our adversaries watch us focus on DEI their subversion camping became more successful

Excerpts:

While presidents often order policy changes at the agency, it is rare for career officers who carried out the priorities of a previous administration to be fired, the former officials said. Former President Barack Obama, for example, ended the C.I.A. interrogation program started under former President George W. Bush but did not fire the officers accused of torturing Al Qaeda prisoners.

The C.I.A. last conducted a large-scale firing in 1977, when President Jimmy Carter ordered the agency to move away from covert action. Stansfield Turner, the C.I.A. director at the time, moved to fire 198 officers involved in clandestine action. But even that downsizing was done with some care, sparing some people who were close to retirement age.

C.I.A. Plans Largest Mass Firing in Nearly 50 Years

The possible purge of officers working on recruiting and diversity comes as the agency moves to comply with the spirit of an executive order banning efforts to diversify the federal work force.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/us/politics/cia-firings.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

Expanding the diversity of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies was a priority of William J. Burns, the former C.I.A. director.Credit...Jason Andrew for The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes and Seamus Hughes

Reporting from Washington

• Feb. 20, 2025

The C.I.A. has moved to dismiss an unspecified number of officers who were working on recruiting and diversity issues, according to former officials, in what would be one of the largest mass firings in the agency’s history.

The possible purge of the officers comes as the agency moves to comply with the spirit of President Trump’s executive order banning efforts to diversify the federal work force.

The C.I.A. on Friday began calling in officers who had been put on administrative leave and telling them to resign or be fired, but a federal court soon halted that action. A judge in the Eastern District of Virginia is scheduled to hold a hearing on Monday to consider a temporary restraining order against the agency.

In a court filing on Thursday, the government lawyers said that John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, could seek to fire more people, following the White House executive order ending diversity hiring. A lawyer for the officers, Kevin Carroll, said the filing suggested the firings were only beginning.

While presidents often order policy changes at the agency, it is rare for career officers who carried out the priorities of a previous administration to be fired, the former officials said. Former President Barack Obama, for example, ended the C.I.A. interrogation program started under former President George W. Bush but did not fire the officers accused of torturing Al Qaeda prisoners.

The C.I.A. last conducted a large-scale firing in 1977, when President Jimmy Carter ordered the agency to move away from covert action. Stansfield Turner, the C.I.A. director at the time, moved to fire 198 officers involved in clandestine action. But even that downsizing was done with some care, sparing some people who were close to retirement age.

Mr. Carroll, a former C.I.A. officer and the lawyer representing 21 intelligence officers who have sued to stop the new firings, said about 51 officers working in diversity and recruiting were having their positions reviewed.

None of the officers the agency wants to fire are diversity experts, Mr. Carroll said. He and other former officials said the officers had been ordered during the Biden administration to take the posts because of their skills at persuasion and recruiting, abilities that in some cases they honed while working as spies overseas.

“No one joins the C.I.A. to be a diversity recruiter,” Mr. Carroll said.

Some officials previously said they hoped that the agency would be spared diversity-related firings, and that officers would be able to return to their old jobs of recruiting spies overseas.

Former officials said that the national security exception the White House put in place on downsizing the federal government should have prevented the firings. Mr. Carroll said Mr. Trump’s executive order required only that the agency end diversity programs, not that the people carrying out the initiatives be fired.

In the legal filing Thursday, government lawyers argued that a restraining order blocking the firings would “harm the public interest.” It would constrain Mr. Ratcliffe’s ability to make personnel decisions, and authority the lawyers noted that the Supreme Court has said is due “extraordinary deference.”

Expanding the diversity of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies was a priority of William J. Burns, who led the agency during the Biden administration, and Avril Haines, the former director of national intelligence.

Mr. Carroll said his clients had been carrying out orders of the intelligence leaders and Congress, which mandated efforts to diversify the intelligence agencies in recent authorization acts.

“More than any other organization in the U.S. government, the C.I.A. has a requirement for diversity,” Mr. Carroll said. “We need to have people who can mix in overseas.”

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

6. Senate Republicans approve budget framework, pushing past Democratic objections after all-night vote

From the AP:

Why this matters:

• Republicans used their majority power to muscle the package to approval on a largely party-line vote, 52-48, with all Democrats and one Republican senator – Rand Paul of Kentucky – opposing it. 
• 
  
• The package that senators are pushing forward is what Republicans view as a down payment on Trump’s agenda, part of a broader effort that will eventually include legislation to extend some $4.5 trillion in tax breaks and other priorities. The package would allow up to $175 billion to be spent on border security, including money for mass deportation operations and building the U.S.-Mexico border wall, in addition to a $150 billion boost to the Pentagon and about $20 billion for the Coast Guard.

Senate Republicans approve budget framework, pushing past Democratic objections after all-night vote

AP · February 20, 2025

By LISA MASCARO, KEVIN FREKING and MATT BROWN

Updated 5:13 AM EST, February 21, 2025

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https://apnews.com/article/senate-budget-trump-tax-cuts-deportations-48f6565ccb0fd6002734dbb5c3c3ffb7?

WASHINGTON (AP) — Republican senators pushed a $340 billion budget framework to passage early Friday, chugging through an all-night session and Democratic opposition in a step toward unleashing money the Trump administration says it needs for mass deportations and border security that top their agenda.

The hours-long “vote-a-rama” rambled along in a dreaded but crucial part of the budget process, as senators considered one amendment after another, largely from Democrats trying to halt it. But Republicans used their majority power to muscle the package to approval on a largely party-line vote, 52-48, with all Democrats and one GOP senator opposing it.

“What we’re doing today is jumpstarting a process that will allow the Republican Party to meet President Trump’s immigration agenda,” Senate Budget Committee chair Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said while opening the debate.

Graham said President Donald Trump’s top immigration czar, Tom Homan, told senators that the administration’s deportation operations are “out of money” and need more funding from Congress to detain and deport immigrants.

With little power in the minority to stop the onslaught, Democrats instead used the all-night debate to force GOP senators into potentially embarrassing votes — including the first one, on blocking tax breaks to billionaires. It was turned back on procedural grounds. So were many others.

“This is going to be a long, drawn-out fight,” Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer of New York warned. Hours later, Schumer said it “was only the beginning” of what could become a months-long debate.

The package is what Republicans view as a down payment on Trump’s agenda, part of a broader effort that will eventually include legislation to extend some $4.5 trillion in tax breaks and other priorities. That’s being assembled by House Speaker Mike Johnson in a separate budget package that also seeks up to $2 trillion in reductions to health care and other programs.

Trump has preferred what he calls one “big, beautiful bill,” but the White House is open to the Senate’s strategy of working on the border package first, then turning to tax cuts later this year.

As voting began, the president signaled his go-ahead, posting a thank you to Senate Majority Leader John Thune “and the Republican Senate, for working so hard on funding the Trump Border Agenda.”

Republican Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky cast the lone GOP vote against the framework.

What’s in the Senate GOP package

The Republican Senate package would allow up to $175 billion to be spent on border security, including money for mass deportation operations and building the U.S.-Mexico border wall, in addition to a $150 billion boost to the Pentagon and about $20 billion for the Coast Guard.

But there won’t be any money flowing just yet, as the process has several steps ahead. The budget resolution is simply a framework that sends instructions to the various Senate committees — Homeland Security, Armed Services, Judiciary — to hammer out the details. Everything will eventually be assembled in another package, with another vote-a-rama down the road.

Sen. John Barrasso, R-Wyo., the No. 2-ranking Senate Republican, said GOP lawmakers are acting quickly to get the administration the resources they have requested and need to curb illegal border crossings.

“The budget will allow us to finish the wall. It also takes the steps we need toward more border agents,” Barrasso said. “It means more detention beds. ... It means more deportation flights.”

Republicans insist the whole thing will be paid for, rather than piled onto debt, with potential spending cuts and new revenues.

The committees are expected to consider rolling back the Biden administration’s methane emissions fee, which was approved by Democrats as part of climate change strategies in the Inflation Reduction Act, and hoping to draw new revenue from energy leases as they aim to spur domestic energy production.

One amendment that was accepted after several hours of debate was actually a Republican effort to fend off criticism that the package would be paid for by cutting safety net programs. The amendment from Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, said Medicaid and Medicare would be strengthened during the budget process.

Democrats brought a slew of amendments

First up from Democrats was a vote to prevent tax breaks for billionaires — an amendment that was repeated in various forms throughout the night.

Democrats argue that the GOP tax cuts approved in 2017 flowed to the wealthiest Americans, and extending them as Trump wants Congress to do later this year would prolong the giveaway. Even though the billionaire amendments failed, they picked up some Republican support. Sen. Susan Collins of Maine voted for several of them, and Sen. Josh Hawley of Missouri voted for another.

Schumer launched a strategy earlier this week to use the budget debate to focus on both the implications of the tax policy and the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency, which is slashing across the federal government.

It’s a better approach for Democrats than arguing against tougher border security and deportations, which divides the party.

All told, senators processed almost three dozen amendments on reversing DOGE cuts, protecting federal workers from being fired, ensuring U.S. support for Ukraine as it battles Russia and others.

Sen. Patty Murray of Washington, the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, said the single biggest driver of the national debt since 2001 has been a series of Republican-led tax cuts.

“And you’ll never guess what our Republican colleagues on the other side of the aisle are focused on right now, nothing to lower the cost of eggs, it’s actually more Republican tax cuts,” Murray said.

She called the budget plan a “roadmap for painful cuts to programs families count on each and every day, all so they can give billionaires more tax cuts.”

Congress is racing itself

The budget resolution is setting up what’s called the reconciliation process, which used to be rare, but is now the tool often used to pass big bills on party-line votes when one party has control of the White House and Congress, as Republicans do now.

But Republicans are arguing with themselves over how to proceed. The House is marching ahead on its “big, beautiful bill,” believing they have one chance to get it right. The Senate views its two-bill strategy as more practical, delivering on border security first, then turning to taxes later.

Budget rules allow for passage by a simple majority vote, which is key in the Senate, where it typically takes 60 votes to break a filibuster on big items. During Trump’s first term, Republicans used the reconciliation process to pass GOP tax cuts in 2017. Democrats used reconciliation during Joe Biden’s presidency to approve COVID-19 relief and the Inflation Reduction Act.

Trump appears to be stirring the fight, pitting Republicans in the House and Senate against each other to see which one delivers fastest.

___

Associated Press writer Darlene Superville contributed to this report.

AP · by MATT BROWN · February 20, 2025

7. Report to Congress on U.S. Special Operations Forces

​This is the first of the periodic routine reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) since the new administration has assumed office. While it includes the routine overview of all SOF, it includes analysis of some Administration's sational security priorities such as support to border operations and designating cartels as foreign terrorist organizations as well as the as yet unknown effects of the pause in the Air Force recognition and Army reductions and their impact on AFSOC and ARSOF.

The 15 page report can be downloaded here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048/83

Report to Congress on U.S. Special Operations Forces - USNI News

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · February 19, 2025

The following is the Feb. 18, 2025, Congressional Research Service report, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Considerations for Congress.

From the report

Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations. In 1986, Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning, passed legislation (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen special operations’ position within the defense community and to improve interoperability among the branches of U.S. SOF. These actions included the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as a new unified command.

As of 2025, USSOCOM consists of approximately 70,000 Active Duty, Reserve Component, and civilian personnel assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and sub-unified commands. USSOCOM’s components are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC), the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and the Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified command.

USSOCOM also includes seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs are sub-unified commands under their respective Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). TSOCs are special operational headquarters elements designed to support a GCC’s special operations logistics, planning, and operational command and control requirements.

Considerations for Congress include the Administration’s national security priorities, Army Special Forces force structure reductions, and Air Force Special Operations Power Projection Wings and a pause in Air Force reorganization.

Download the document here.

Related

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · February 19, 2025

8. Trump Administration Designates Eight Cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Trump Administration Designates Eight Cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/trump-administration-designates-eight-cartels-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations/

A vehicle set on fire by cartel gunmen during clashes with security forces in Culiacan, Mexico, August 29, 2024. (Jesus Bustamante/Reuters)

By David Zimmermann

February 19, 2025 5:51 PM

76 Comments

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The Trump administration is designating eight Latin American cartels, including Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua and El Salvador’s MS-13 gangs, as foreign terrorist organizations in an effort to combat drug trafficking and migrant smuggling.

The move is in line with President Donald Trump’s day-one executive order that authorized the FTO label for international cartels. Tren de Aragua and MS-13 were specifically cited in the executive order. The label also applies to six cartels based in Mexico: Sinaloa, Jalisco New Generation, Gulf, Northeast, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, and United.

The designation was announced Wednesday and will be published in the Federal Register on Thursday.

Usually the State Department’s FTO designations are reserved for groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS instead of money-driven cartels.

When he returned to office last month, Trump declared a national emergency authorizing the military to help secure the southern border. American troops could also be used to target drug cartels across the U.S.-Mexico border.

Trump’s border czar Tom Homan has threatened to use military action if Mexican cartels attack American troops along the southern border.

“I think the cartels would be foolish to take on the military, but we know they’ve taken on the Mexican military before, but now we have the United States military,” Homan told ABC News earlier this month.

“Do I expect violence to escalate? Absolutely, because the cartels are making record amounts of money,” Homan said. “We’re taking money out of their pocket.”

Mexican drug cartels have been launching suicide drones equipped with explosives toward U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents and military personnel at the border, according to multiple news outlets.

The CIA has already been gathering intelligence on these groups via covert drone missions over Mexico, CNN reported this week. CIA Director John Ratcliffe is committed to tackling drug trafficking, said a spokesperson, who declined to comment on the drone missions.

Elon Musk suggested the U.S. could initiate drone strikes against the newly designated FTOs.

Trump is moving quickly to crack down on transnational crime organizations, compared to his first term. While he wanted to designate Mexican drug cartels as FTOs in 2019, Trump halted the plan at the time. Trump’s desire to designate the drug cartels as FTOs at that time came in response to the deaths of nine members of an American Mormon family, including six children, who were killed by cartel violence in Mexico. Since then, he has upped his rhetoric against such violence.

On Wednesday, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum admitted she doesn’t accept the present U.S. designation if it means the cartels are targeted by U.S. military operations in Mexico.

“If they make this decree to investigate even more in the United States the money laundering and the criminal groups that operate in the United States, that carry out those drug sales, it’s very good,” Sheinbaum said. “What we do not accept is the violation of our sovereignty.”

David Zimmermann

David Zimmermann is a news writer for National Review. Originally from New Jersey, he is a graduate of Grove City College and currently writes from Washington, D.C. His writing has appeared in the Washington Examiner, the Western Journal, Upward News, and the College Fix. @dezward01

9. U.S. Military Action in Mexico: Almost Certainly Illegal, Definitely Counterproductive

​Conclusion:

When asked about potential use of military force in Mexico during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that though that was an option at the President’s disposal, he hoped instead to cooperate with Mexico on counternarcotics. The Trump administration should indeed focus on U.S.-Mexican cooperation rather than unilateral military action south of the border. Not only would unilateral military action likely be unlawful, U.S. attacks in Mexico would sabotage the President’s own stated priorities on immigration, put U.S. citizens and interests in harm’s way in Mexico. Attacking the country’s southern neighbor out of a desire for spectacle or illusory counter-narcotics gains would not justify the almost certain adverse consequences for the United States.

U.S. Military Action in Mexico: Almost Certainly Illegal, Definitely Counterproductive

justsecurity.org · by Brian Finucane · February 20, 2025

February 20, 2025

When former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper disclosed that President Donald Trump had privately proposed launching missile strikes against drug labs in Mexico (strikes that Trump reportedly said the U.S. should deny responsibility for) during his first term, the revelation was met with astonishment. In the subsequent years, the once fringe idea of turning the U.S. war on drugs into more of an actual shooting war has however gained traction. Indeed, during the 2024 GOP presidential primary, the candidates sought to outdo one another with proposals for U.S. military action in Mexico. With President Trump once again the commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces, military action against drug trafficking organizations in Mexico is all too plausible—including because of his administration’s recent designation of a number of drug trafficking organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and revelations of increased U.S. aerial surveillance of drug labs in Mexico.

Such a use of force would, absent a change of circumstances, be hard to square with domestic or international law. Moreover, it would likely sabotage Trump’s own stated policy priorities relating to migration and could lead to retaliation against American citizens.

Trump and the Use of Force

After winning the 2024 election and even prior to returning the Oval Office, President Trump began publicly ruminating about potential military action against a range of targets in the western hemisphere and beyond. Although his proposals to annex Greenland, reclaim the Panama Canal, and “own” the Gaza Strip are sufficiently outlandish and resource intensive that Trump is unlikely to ever actually attempt to implement them, musings about military action in Mexico are different.

Trump’s track record on the use of force is relevant here. Although adverse to large-scale foreign military deployments in his first term, the United States under his leadership engaged in new conflicts and expanded and intensified existing ones. Trump’s prior administration turned frequently to airstrikes against terrorists (including escalating the U.S. air wars in Somalia and Afghanistan); raids by special operations forces; and crowing over the killing of “high-value targets” such as Islamic State leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi who he claimed “died like a dog.” During his first term, Trump also ordered actions other presidents eschewed. For example, he directed attacks against Syria in retaliation for its use of chemical weapons in 2017 and 2018—something President Obama had refrained from in 2013 and which likely violated international, if not also domestic law.

Further, Trump also authorized the controversial drone strike in 2020 against Iranian general Qassem Soleimani—who both the Bush and Obama administrations had abstained from attacking due to serious concerns over Iranian retaliation, particularly given the U.S. military footprint within striking distance for Tehran and allied paramilitary groups. The prior designation of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) (in which Soleimani was a senior commander) as an FTO seemed to have greased the skids bureaucratically to using other, more kinetic counterterrorism tools. Significantly, Trump appears not to have fully appreciated the risks of Iranian retaliation. He seemed taken aback by Iran’s unprecedent ballistic missile barrage at U.S. troops in Iraq—and immediately sought to deescalate the situation, including by downplaying the traumatic brain injuries Iran inflicted on U.S. troops as “headaches.”

These uses of force under Trump 1.0 may be instructive as to the President’s willingness to approve dramatic and sometimes ineffective or even heedless military action. The pattern appears to continue in the nascent second Trump administration. In early February, the Trump administration made much of U.S. airstrikes on ISIS in Somalia which included the president posting a video of the attack on social media.

Repurposing the War on Terror Playbook

It seems all too plausible that Trump would order airstrikes on Mexican drug trafficking organizations just as he had proposed to Secretary Esper—perhaps borrowing elements of the U.S. war on terror. Comments by Trump and a number of his close advisors suggest that the administration already has such a playbook in mind, with airstrikes and potentially raids by special operations forces against jihadi terrorists being repurposed for targeting another species of violent non-state actor on the territory of the United States’ southern neighbor.

While in Congress, Trump’s National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz co-introduced the AUMF Cartel, a war authorization modeled on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force—the principal statutory basis for the U.S. war on terrorism for more than two decades. The proposed AUMF would have granted the president sweeping authority to use force against drug trafficking organizations in Mexico.

The second Trump administration has already begun to cast drug trafficking organizations as terrorists and hint at possibly using the tools of counter-terrorism direct action. Effective February 20, 2025, the State Department for the first time designated eight drug trafficking organizations, six of them Mexican entities, as FTOs. Although this step does not by itself provide authority for the use of force, in the past it has paved the way to military action, including the strike on Soleimani. Certainly the rhetoric from key figures close to President Trump suggests that the administration views FTO designation as a stepping stone to using force. Soon after the designations were publicly revealed, Elon Musk commented on social media that listing “means they’re eligible for drone strikes.” The Trump administration’s “border czar” Tom Homan said in November that the president was “committed to calling [the cartels] terrorist organizations and using the full might of the United States special operations to take them out.” Secretary of Defense Hegseth recently emphasized on Fox News that “all options will be on the table if we’re dealing with what are designated to be foreign terrorist organizations who are specifically targeting Americans on our border.”

The administration may have already undertaken steps to enable the use of force in Mexico if the president so decides. According to CNN, in the weeks since Trump took office there has been a significant increase in U.S. military surveillance flights along the U.S.-Mexico border, which some current and former U.S. officials worried could be part of an effort to develop targets for U.S. strikes. The New York Times has reported an increase in U.S. surveillance flights in Mexican airspace during the second Trump administration—though reportedly these operations are currently conducted with Mexican consent. More generally, the CIA under Trump 2.0 also reportedly aims to “take on a significant role fighting Mexican drug cartels.”

It is of course possible that the Trump administration’s saber rattling is simply posturing for domestic political purpose and/or with the objective of pressuring Mexico to step up its own efforts to counter drug trafficking organizations. Relatedly, the administration may be hoping that talk of U.S. military action and increased aerial surveillance persuades Mexico to increase cooperation on counter-narcotics. Indeed, National Security Advisor Waltz has referenced prior joint U.S.-Colombian counter-drug efforts as a potential model to emulate. Mexico, however, previously participated in a version of “Plan Colombia,” the Mérida Initiative beginning under former President Felipe Calderón, and it appears very unlikely the current Mexican government would agree to a repeat of “Plan Mexico.”

Weak Checks on the U.S. President Using Force

Although Article I of the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to “Declare War,” today, as a practical matter, the President would claim broad discretion to order military action against targets in Mexico—even without authorization from Congress. The notional legal guardrails on the U.S. president using force are weak—both because the rules themselves are so permissive and because it is the executive branch itself that enforces the ostensible limits. Here’s why.

Despite the express allocation of numerous war powers to Congress in the Constitution (including the Declare War clause), over time the executive branch has taken an increasingly capacious view of the president’s authority to direct the use of force under Article II of the Constitution as commander in chief, even in the absence of congressional authorization. The executive branch legal doctrine for the president’s authority to use force unilaterally is articulated in a series of legal opinions issued by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) which acts as something of a Supreme Court within the executive branch. According to the dominant OLC framework, whether the president may unilaterally use force depends on a two-part test. The president must be able to establish, first, that the use of force serves a national interest, and second, that the nature, scope, and duration of the anticipated hostilities will not rise to the level of “war in the constitutional sense.”

The former prong, however, has been deemed to include everything from self-defense to matters divorced from any threat of attack on the United States, like regional stabilization, rendering it close to meaningless. In the context of potential U.S. military counter narcotics operations in Mexico, it is entirely plausible that the executive branch would invoke the protection of U.S. citizens from the lethal threat of fentanyl as a national interest justifying the unilateral use of military force.

The latter prong of the test, which is a safeguard against unilateral military action that by its “nature, scope, and duration” implicates, in the executive branch’s view, Congress’s Article I power to Declare War, should in principle be more constraining. OLC has identified one particularly salient factor in reviewing whether an anticipated military operation amounts to this level of “war in the constitutional sense:” the risk of escalation. In assessing the risk of escalation, the OLC has considered whether U.S. forces would suffer or inflict substantial casualties and thus has looked closely at the presence of ground troops given “the difficulties of disengaging ground forces from situations of conflict, and the attendant risk that hostilities will escalate.”

As applied to potential military action in Mexico, it is easy to imagine OLC concluding that a campaign of airstrikes on drug trafficking organizations even if accompanied by cross-border military raids would be sufficiently limited and the risk to U.S. forces low enough that such operations would not constitute “war” in the constitutional sense. In terms of recent precedents as to what does and does not constitute “war” under OLC’s framework, the Biden administration took the position that a 15 month military campaign of airstrikes and naval actions against the Houthis in Yemen and the Red Sea was not “war” and thus did not require congressional authorization.

International law also imposes legal limits on U.S. military action and ought to pose a significant hurdle to U.S. attacks on its southern neighbor. The Mexican government is extremely unlikely to consent to U.S. military strikes or raids on its territory and has repeatedly vowed to defend its sovereignty. Absent Mexico’s consent, international law bars U.S. military action in Mexico subject to a narrow exception. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Article 51 of the Charter also provides that the treaty does “impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in the event of an armed attack.

The U.S. government might try to argue that the harm caused to U.S. citizens by the scourge of fentanyl smuggled in from Mexico entitles the United States to use force in self-defense.

The administration has emphasized that fentanyl trafficking “kills tens of thousands of Americans each year.” To underscore the threat, a recent White House factsheet stressed that “[m]ore Americans are dying from fentanyl overdoses each year than the number of American lives lost in the entirety of the Vietnam War.”

Although the traffic in fentanyl is both a foreign policy challenge and serious public health crisis, it does not constitute an “armed attack” for the purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The tragic deaths of Americans from the opioid epidemic do not provide any legal basis for the use of force against Mexico in supposed self-defense. In the absence of such an armed attack, any use of force by the United States on Mexican territory—even if directed at the personnel and facilities of drug trafficking organizations—would violate the UN Charter.

Moreover, as I have previously argued, because treaties such as the UN Charter are “laws” for the purposes of the constitution’s Take Care Clause, a violation of the UN Charter would also breach the president’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

OLC has, however, opined in 1989 memo that the president may unilaterally “override” the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force to launch military action in another country. Although this legal opinion does not engage with the president’s duties under the Take Care Clause and the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee recently called for its withdrawal, it nonetheless remains in force as the authoritative executive branch legal position. As a consequence, the president has a permission slip to use military force even if it violates the UN Charter. Indeed, during his first term Trump ordered airstrikes against Syria in 2017 and 2018 in apparent violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter without even attempting to justify the attacks under international law.

Not only does existing executive branch legal doctrine afford the U.S. president broad latitude to use military force even in the absence of congressional authorization and even if it would violate international law, it is generally up to the executive branch itself to judge the application of these doctrines. Congress is not bound, of course, by OLC’s opinions, but it has struggled to assert itself meaningfully on unilateral executive branch uses of force. For its part, judicial intervention is almost nonexistent.

Moreover, there are serious questions as to the current role of lawyers within the Trump administration and whether and to what extent they are constraining the actions of the White House. In a recent article raising concerns about the processes and substance of lawyering within the second Trump administration, Jack Goldsmith and Bob Bauer asked bluntly: “Is Trump getting legal advice, and, if so, from whom?”

In sum, even though U.S. military action in Mexico would almost certainly be unlawful, as a practical matter such illegality may not serve as an effective impediment.

Attacking Mexico Would be Self-Sabotage

Even if the White House convinces itself it has the legal latitude to launch attacks in Mexico or simply disregards the law entirely, the practical consequences of unilateral U.S. military action in Mexico should give the Trump administration pause. Attacking drug cartels in Mexico would not only be ineffective, it would sabotage the administration’s own stated priorities. Moreover, such a use of military force could well lead to retaliation against U.S. citizens or interests Mexico.

First off, there is little evidence indicating that U.S. strikes against drug labs or kingpins would significantly impact the quantities of fentanyl smuggled over the border. Fentanyl labs are low-tech and easily rebuilt. Scores of top traffickers have been killed or imprisoned since Mexico launched its own war on drugs in 2006. New leaders quickly emerge. Certainly, U.S. military counter-narcotic efforts in Afghanistan over the course of two decades (including bombing drug labs) yielded underwhelming results.

Although President Trump may care more about the spectacle of U.S. military action than its effectiveness (a tendency reflected in his recent posting on social media of U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Somalia) his administration should take heed of how both the Mexican government and the cartels may retaliate in response to U.S. attacks.

U.S.-Mexican cooperation on a range of issues, including trade, law enforcement, and especially migration—would likely be collateral damage to any unilateral use of force by the United States in Mexico. Over the past decade, the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations have all leaned on Mexico to prevent migrants from reaching the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexico’s response in 2024, for example, helped reduce crossings by more than 60 percent between December 2023 and June 2024. More than any border wall, outsourcing migration enforcement to Mexico reduced the number of undocumented migrants crossing into the United States.

U.S. military action in Mexico—even under the remote possibility that the U.S. succeeded in reaching its targets without harming bystanders—would be opposed by the Mexican government. Mexico could respond by curtailing or terminating assistance in stemming the passage of migrants through its territory. Further, the unilateral bombing of drug labs or killing of narcos would also shut down the possibility of counter-narcotic cooperation with Mexico in the future.

In addition, Mexican drug cartels have generally refrained from intentionally targeting U.S. interests in Mexico as well as Americans living and vacationing in the country. Were the U.S. military to attack these drug trafficking organizations, they may well respond by retaliating against U.S. citizens and interests in an effort to coerce the U.S. government to halt its operations. Given the wide variety of U.S. economic interests in Mexico—from Wal-Mart to auto factories to U.S. owned boutique hotels—there would be broad U.S. exposure. At the very least, U.S. businesses in Mexico would likely need to invest more in more security.

Conclusion

When asked about potential use of military force in Mexico during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that though that was an option at the President’s disposal, he hoped instead to cooperate with Mexico on counternarcotics. The Trump administration should indeed focus on U.S.-Mexican cooperation rather than unilateral military action south of the border. Not only would unilateral military action likely be unlawful, U.S. attacks in Mexico would sabotage the President’s own stated priorities on immigration, put U.S. citizens and interests in harm’s way in Mexico. Attacking the country’s southern neighbor out of a desire for spectacle or illusory counter-narcotics gains would not justify the almost certain adverse consequences for the United States.

Editor’s note: This piece is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions

IMAGE: US Marine Corps deployed at the southern border in San Diego, reinforce the US-Mexico border wall as pictured from Colonia Libertad in Tijuana, Baja California state, Mexico on February 5, 2025. (Photo by GUILLERMO ARIAS/AFP via Getty Images)

justsecurity.org · by Brian Finucane · February 20, 2025

10. As Defense preps for mass firings, Hegseth says a hiring freeze and more firings are coming

As Defense preps for mass firings, Hegseth says a hiring freeze and more firings are coming

SecDef says a "reevaluation of our probationary workforce" will be followed by wider dismissal of "redundancies" and "underperformers."

By Eric Katz and Meghann Myers

February 20, 2025 07:12 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

Updated: Feb. 20, 9:55 p.m. ET.

The Defense Department is preparing for mass firings of civilian employees, according to several current employees and internal communications, bringing the Trump administration’s federal-workforce-reduction efforts to the government’s largest agency. The dismissals are expected to begin as soon as Friday, according to multiple employees informed of the plans.

In a video posted to social media late on Thursday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed that the department was doing a "reevaluation of our probationary workforce" in compliance with the Office of Personnel Management’s Jan. 20 directive.

Hegseth added that this would be just the start of a more comprehensive "really thorough look at our workforce top to bottom, and it will be top to bottom, to see where we can find and eliminate redundancies. Now common sense would tell us where we should start, right? We start with poor performers amongst our probationary employees because that is common sense and you want the best and brightest."

The secretary also said that he would soon impose a department-wide hiring freeze and "take more time to identify, on a performance-based standard, who we're going to hire, and reward hardworking employees who are central to the core warfighting mission. So we're going to take a little bit more time, make sure top to bottom we're doing a review, those who we need, who are the best and brightest are going to stay. Those who are underperformers won't."

He gave no timeframe for these moves. He also did not say how they might comport with laws that give hiring preference to veterans and offer broad protections to career federal employees.

After the department was largely exempted from President Trump’s federal hiring freeze, much of its civilian workforce had expected it would again be carved out from the mandate to fire probationary employees—generally speaking, that means workers hired or promoted within the past year. The administration gave word this week, however, that it expected the Pentagon to cut its own workforce.

On Thursday, commands and agencies across Defense continued to compile lists of probationary employees, including ones that are to be exempted from firing. Some employees have been told to expect few exemptions within their commands or teams, while others reported their leaders were pushing for more.

A warning email

Members of the White House’s DOGE office made their first Pentagon visit last Friday, according to a social-media post. That same day, an official in the Pentagon’s policy shop sent a warning email to staff.

“The news on probationary employees is very concerning – to the individuals, their offices, and our organization overall,” the official wrote. “If someone in Policy is in a probationary status, it’s because Policy went through a great deal of effort to bring them onboard to fill critical roles in our support to the Secretary of Defense, and those individuals are making important contributions to our mission.”

Probationary employees are an easy target for staff reductions, as it becomes much harder to fire a federal employee without substantial cause once they have completed their first year of service.

Orders to get moving

The situation developed rapidly this week and supervisors, employees and human resources staff scrambled to share pertinent information.

One Defense Information Systems Agency employee said their leadership team was notified Monday evening that they must move ahead with identifying and, eventually, firing probationary employees. DISA leaders were seeking to “limit the damage” by exempting at least some employees based on mission needs, but no final decisions had been made as of Tuesday afternoon, the employee said.

On Wednesday, leaders of a component of the Air Force Material Command told employees that they were working with the Air Force to “clarify who specifically by-name might be affected and to ensure we thoughtfully implement any direction that formalizes.”

“Currently, we have no specific details about which positions might be affected, the timeline, or means for any potential actions,” the leadership team said in a message to staff.

The message said that employees should update and save their resumes, download their performance reviews, and retain copies of their personal records and certifications. Employees were also advised to save their supervisors' contact information.

“We understand this news is concerning,” the message said. “We are committed to keeping you informed and providing support throughout this process.”

Army commands have received the same guidance, according to a source who spoke with Defense One. Another source said Space Force organizations were told to submit their lists on Wednesday afternoon.

On Thursday, Army Medical Command leaders told their staff via an email that they could be affected, although the command’s leaders “have not yet received specific details regarding how this will be implemented.”

“Thank you for your professionalism and unwavering commitment to Army Medicine,” the email said. “As we navigate these changes together, we will continue to share updates as soon as they become available.”

An Army Medical Command employee who provides care to active-duty personnel, dependents, and retirees said their name was included in a list of probationary employees sent up the chain of command. Initially, the employee had been told their position was safe from cuts, but “the mood has definitely shifted and all of that ‘no way it’ll happen to you’ is gone now.”

One Navy employee who joined their command’s all-hands meeting on Thursday said they were told to expect the termination notices to hit inboxes as soon as that evening. Another Navy civilian was told in a similar all-hands meeting that firings would commence Friday morning.

“HR has been telling us to download all of our documents and prepare to be terminated,” the second Navy employee said.

On one Air Force command-wide call, a lieutenant general broke down crying as she relayed the news about upcoming firings, according to an employee present on the call. That employee was told by management the firings would “come hard and fast,” and in a matter of days rather than a week.

Elsewhere, leaders of a Navy agency, the name of which Defense One is withholding to protect against reprisals, sent their staff a message in which they said they were reviewing a list of 700 probationary employees to pick 29 to exempt. The message said the agency’s list noted veterans, military spouses, and members of other favored hiring groups.

“I want to ensure you that we are working with the highest levels of Navy leadership to ensure [we retain] the largest number possible of our talented people,” the message reads. “While we wait for further guidance, let’s please all do our best to support each other during this challenging time.”

As employees reported that morale has tanked as a result of the news this week, leaders attempted to reassure employees of their value.

“Please know that your contributions are invaluable, and our mission remains critical,” the Army Medical Command leaders said in their email. “We are truly grateful for your dedication, resilience, and continued service.”

One DOD civilian told Defense One that employees are cleaning out their workspaces in anticipation of firing, having heard from other federal agencies that fired employees were not given time to gather their belongings.

The White House has released no comprehensive tally of workers fired. So far, as many as 10,000 have been fired at the Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Veterans Affairs, and other departments, as well as at the Environmental Protection Agency, OPM, and DOGE—formerly known as the U.S. Digital Service—itself.

OPM data shows that the federal government hired more than 200,000 employees over the past year.

Audrey Decker contributed to this report.

Do you work in the national-security sphere? Tell us how these efforts are affecting you. Contact Meghann Myers ( mmyers@defenseone.com; Signal: meghann.myers55), Eric Katz (ekatz@govexec.com; Signal: erickatz.28), or Audrey Decker (adecker@defenseone.com, Signal: adecker.59).

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

11. DoD reviewing 'non-essential' consultancy contracts for termination

​Whew. Thankfully this will not affect all the pro bono work I do!

DoD reviewing 'non-essential' consultancy contracts for termination - Breaking Defense

The memo mandates an assessment of "the essentiality of contracts ... for the purpose of terminating or descoping contracts for activities that are not essential for the Department to fulfill its statutory purposes."

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · February 20, 2025

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — The Defense Department has ordered all acquisition shops to review consulting service contracts to determine whether they are essential to Trump administration priorities, and terminate those deemed not to fit that bill.

“To ensure we are accountable for every dollar we spend and that we are aligned with the President of the United States’ America First priorities and Secretary of Defense [Pete] Hegseth’s direction, Component heads will conduct a comprehensive review and validation of existing contracts for consulting services,” states the Feb. 18 memo [PDF] memo signed by Steven Morani, who is performing the duties of DoD’s undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment.

The memo mandates an assessment of “the essentiality of contracts … for the purpose of terminating or descoping contracts for activities that are not essential for the Department to fulfill its statutory purposes.”

Components are organizations within the Pentagon that have acquisition authority. Morani’s memo, first reported by DefenseScoop, is addressed to “senior Pentagon leadership, defense agencies and DoD field activities directors.”

The DoD review is taking place in two parts: first looking at contracts let under the General Services Administration vehicle, then other types of contracts. Component heads have until March 19 to submit to the results of the first review and until April 19 for the second.

The memo doesn’t define “consulting services,” so it is unclear what exactly will fall under the review and how much money is currently being spent on these types of contracts.

However, according to a 2023 report by the Government Accountability Office, DoD spent between $184 billion to $226 billion from 2017 to 2022 on all types of “service contracts,” including administrative and technical support. That said, the report noted that data is hard to collect as the various offices within the DoD do not use the same criteria to keep track of such spending.

Morani explains that if certain consultancy contracts are found to be “essential,” then a “short justification” including a validation of the requirement by “a General Officer/Senior Executive Service member” should be provided.

The memo comes against the backdrop of Hegseth ordering Pentagon leaders to redirect roughly $50 billion planned for the fiscal 2026 budget request towards a set of priorities that better align with Trump’s goals for the department, as well as the arrival of Elon Musk’s DOGE team at the Pentagon.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · February 20, 2025

12. ​The Pentagon’s New Defense Budget Cuts Send Shockwaves Through Palantir’s Stock

Follow the money (or stock market).

​The Pentagon’s New Defense Budget Cuts Send Shockwaves Through Palantir’s Stock

• https://dsa.si/news/the-pentagons-new-defense-budget-cuts-send-shockwaves-through-palantirs-stock/31948/?utm
• 
  
• Palantir Technologies experienced a 10% drop in shares, closing at $112.06 due to anticipated defense budget cuts.
• The Pentagon plans to reduce the defense budget by 8% annually over the next five years, impacting companies in the defense sector.
• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s directive could reshape the financial outlook for contractors like Palantir.
• Exemptions include southern border operations and missile defense, but uncertainty remains pervasive.
• The situation highlights the vulnerability of large companies to shifts in government priorities.
• Investors and analysts are closely monitoring how Palantir adapts to potential reductions in defense spending.
• In these volatile times, maintaining vigilance is key for stakeholders.
• A chilling wind swept through Wall Street as Palantir Technologies faced a sudden downturn. As afternoon shadows lengthened, shares of the data analytics giant spiraled, diving 10% to close at $112.06, devouring nearly two weeks of hard-earned gains. News broke that the Pentagon readied plans for substantial defense budget cuts, sparking worries about future revenues for companies nestled in the defense sector.
• Inside the corridors of power, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had charged top military brass with the daunting task of trimming the defense budget by a staggering 8% annually over the next five years. Sources close to the deliberations implied this stark directive, detailed in a confidential memo, could reshape the fiscal landscape for defense contractors like Palantir. Despite a lack of immediate market tremors early in the day, investors pulled back with force once the news hit, casting a long shadow over Palantir’s financial horizon.
• Not all is uniformly grim — certain strategic areas, such as southern border operations and missile defense, will remain untouched by these looming cuts, offering a ray of hope. However, the scope of these exclusions does little to mask the broader uncertainty.
• For stakeholders observing from their digital perches, the unfolding narrative underscores a key takeaway: even giants are not immune when government priorities shift. As the situation evolves, investors and analysts will be keenly watching how Palantir and similar titans adapt to what might soon be a significantly leaner era for defense spending. In volatile times, vigilance becomes not just a strategy, but a necessity.

Is Palantir’s Downturn a Buying Opportunity or a Warning Sign?

• How-To Steps & Life Hacks
• 1. Diversification Strategy: With the defense budget cuts looming, investors should consider diversifying their portfolio beyond defense-oriented firms. Look for companies that have a balanced mix of government and commercial contracts.
• 2. Monitor Government Spending: Stay informed about government spending priorities. Use tools like government finance reports or notifications about budget allocations to anticipate which sectors will be affected next.
• 3. Risk Management: Implement risk management strategies such as stop-loss orders to protect against sudden market downturns.
• Real-World Use Cases
• Palantir’s software is widely used in various sectors:
• – Defense: For mission-critical operations, data fusion, and situational awareness.
• – Healthcare: Used in data analysis during the COVID-19 pandemic to track virus spread and effectiveness of interventions.
• – Finance: Helping financial institutions detect fraud and streamline compliance.
• Market Forecasts & Industry Trends
• As government budgets tighten, companies like Palantir may shift focus towards private sector applications and overseas contracts. According to a report by MarketsandMarkets, the data analytics market is expected to grow from $23 billion in 2020 to $133 billion by 2026, suggesting room for growth outside traditional defense contracts.
• Reviews & Comparisons
• Palantir is often compared to platforms like Snowflake and AWS in terms of data analysis and cloud solutions:
• – Palantir: Known for deep analytics and complex data integration.
• – Snowflake: Highlights ease of use and operational simplicity.
• – AWS: Offers vast cloud computing capabilities but requires more setup for analytics.
• Controversies & Limitations
• While Palantir is renowned for its analytics, its close ties with government and military operations sometimes attract criticism and concern over data privacy and ethical use of AI.
• Features, Specs & Pricing
• Palantir’s main platforms include Gotham (for defense and intelligence operations) and Foundry (for data integration and analysis). Pricing is not publicly disclosed and often tailored to individual client requirements.
• Security & Sustainability
• Palantir invests heavily in cybersecurity due to its government contracts. However, the sustainability of relying predominantly on government contracts is uncertain, indicating a need for diversification.
• Insights & Predictions
• – Short Term: Potential stock volatility due to defense budget cuts.
• – Long Term: Expansion into international and commercial markets could offset losses from reduced government spending.
• Pros & Cons Overview
• Pros:
• – Advanced analytics capabilities.
• – Secured government contracts ensure steady revenue, to an extent.
• Cons:
• – Over-reliance on government contracts.
• – High pricing and perceived lack of transparency.
• Actionable Recommendations
• – Investors: Consider buying opportunities during downturns if you believe in Palantir’s long-term potential.
• – Companies: Explore Palantir’s software for advanced data analytics capabilities but remain aware of pricing structures.
• Quick Tips
• – Stay Updated: Regularly check government spending announcements for impact on related stocks.
• – Investigate Alternatives: Explore other data analytics platforms to understand market offerings.
• For further insights on data analytics, check out Palantir Technologies or leading financial advisories for investment strategy adjustments.
• In navigating uncertain times, vigilance, informed decisions, and adaptability remain key to resilience.

13. The breakdown of the CIA

​We have CIA officers. Agents are those who are recruited from other countries to spy for us. A CIA officer is not an agent.

But Mr. Luttwak makes some strong and troubling allegations (and the subtitle is insulting) of which very few of us are in a position to really know what is the ground truth (I certainly do not) and maybe that is a good thing (perhaps this is excellent disinformation - make the enemy think we are a bunch of bumbling idiots).

Excerpts:

What is missing though, is that crucial line: “going where no one else can go”. The truth is that the most secret of all CIA secrets is that NOCs only serve in very safe countries, most unlikely to arrest (let alone torture) agents if they are detected. Think of France, Italy or Thailand: all places where reporters, tourists and maiden aunts travel safely every day.

One NOC who tripped up while trying to cajole secrets from a trade official — the latter was willing if the NOC slept with him, became indignant when she refused, and reported her to local security — did all she did (and refused to do) in a major European capital. Once the scandal came out, she was flown back to the US without incident. Another NOC officer I knew was competent enough to operate covertly in Warsaw, but only when Poland was no longer a communist country and was trying to join Nato.

There have been a few cases of US citizens recruited to visit dangerous countries, including one case I know of which ended in disappearance and probable death. But that particular individual was not a trained CIA officer, willing to risk all for the country, but rather an older gent hired expressly for the job. Remarkably unqualified, he would not have uncovered any secrets even if he had stayed uncaught.

In other words, then, the CIA does not have true undercover agents, genuinely competent intelligence officers who can enter foreign countries covertly, that is through legal entry points but with a persuasive false identity, or else in clandestine fashion by slipping over the border undetected. Without one or the other, the CIA will always find it impossible to have officers in hostile countries.

The breakdown of the CIA

Agents can't cope with danger

unherd.com · by Edward Luttwak · February 20, 2025

John Ratcliffe, Trump’s appointee as CIA director, says that he wants officers who are “willing to go to places no one else can go and do things that no one else can do”. This, one might have thought, is a straightforward enough description of any intelligence operative worth his keep, just as country analysts in Langley must be really fluent in foreign languages to do their jobs effectively. Certainly, Ratcliffe seems keen to employ only the best at the CIA, and has offered eight months of pay and benefits to those who prefer to leave.

Yet barely had Ratcliffe opened his mouth than he faced furious attack. The CIA’s carefully cultivated friends in the press — media relations, Hollywood included, are the agency’s outstanding skill — assailed the director and the White House for a dangerous misstep. “He might be right that a leaner CIA could be meaner,” proclaimed David Ignatius in The Washington Post. “But how can he be sure the buyouts aren’t paring more muscle than fat?” Actually one must hope that many, very many, will take their chance to leave. The sad truth, confirmed by my extended work for one CIA director and many encounters in the field, is that it lost its way years ago — and now increasingly relies on secrecy to conceal its decay.

The CIA does have plenty of people who serve in “stations” overseas. That is a dramatic term, for those places are actually humdrum offices in US diplomatic offices in foreign countries. That is where CIA officers work when they serve abroad, in full view of their host country’s intelligence services, which can keep them under constant observation if they so wish. That happens in China and Russia, of course, but also in places like Athens. Because Greece is a country where CIA employees have been attacked even after the Cold War, officers stationed there are still monitored for their own good.

It is therefore obvious that officers working out of embassies find it impossible to “do things that no one else can do” — or indeed very much at all. In allied countries, CIA officers need not be detected, let alone followed, because they are “declared” to their host country. Not that this really matters: everyone knows who they are anyway.

The CIA does have another category of officers, one it strives very hard to misrepresent as the real thing, as people willing to do “what no one else can do”. These are the NOCs — the “non-official cover officers” — who do not live in diplomatic housing and do not work in diplomatic offices. Instead they live “on the economy” in regular flats and houses, pretending to be business people, or retirees, or artists, or anything else that sounds sufficiently innocuous.

That begs the question: why is Ratcliffe complaining? The NOCs seem to fit the bill of intrepid field officers, and the CIA certainly does its best to keep their true identity secret. Some years ago, in fact, its officials made a huge fuss when a NOC’s identity was compromised in the course of a political controversy leading up to the Iraq War.

What is missing though, is that crucial line: “going where no one else can go”. The truth is that the most secret of all CIA secrets is that NOCs only serve in very safe countries, most unlikely to arrest (let alone torture) agents if they are detected. Think of France, Italy or Thailand: all places where reporters, tourists and maiden aunts travel safely every day.

One NOC who tripped up while trying to cajole secrets from a trade official — the latter was willing if the NOC slept with him, became indignant when she refused, and reported her to local security — did all she did (and refused to do) in a major European capital. Once the scandal came out, she was flown back to the US without incident. Another NOC officer I knew was competent enough to operate covertly in Warsaw, but only when Poland was no longer a communist country and was trying to join Nato.

There have been a few cases of US citizens recruited to visit dangerous countries, including one case I know of which ended in disappearance and probable death. But that particular individual was not a trained CIA officer, willing to risk all for the country, but rather an older gent hired expressly for the job. Remarkably unqualified, he would not have uncovered any secrets even if he had stayed uncaught.

In other words, then, the CIA does not have true undercover agents, genuinely competent intelligence officers who can enter foreign countries covertly, that is through legal entry points but with a persuasive false identity, or else in clandestine fashion by slipping over the border undetected. Without one or the other, the CIA will always find it impossible to have officers in hostile countries.

“The CIA does not have true undercover agents.”

Take Iran for example. The CIA considers the Islamic Republic a no-go zone — because, ever since the seizure of its embassy in 1979, the US has had no diplomatic presence there. For that reason, Langley has no officers who can enter the Islamic Republic, blend into the population, and begin to conduct operations.

Actually both those things are highly feasible: there is no way that the gendarmerie, the regular army or the Revolutionary Guards could possibly guard Iran’s 3,662 miles of land borders against infiltration. As for blending in, Tehran is full of people who do not speak Persian or only very badly. We do know that the Mossad gets in and out of Iran at will. Smuggling agents in either covertly or clandestinely, the Israelis regularly pull off spectacular coups against their Iranian foe. That includes everything from the theft of truckloads filled with nuclear programme documents, to the killing of heavily guarded nuclear scientists. Mossad even got Ismail Haniyeh, the erstwhile leader of Hamas, by blowing him up while he was staying in a heavily defended Revolutionary Guards VIP guesthouse — within a supposedly “secure” government zone in Tehran.

One could reasonably argue that the US is powerful enough not to need such exploits. Yet the CIA certainly needs to operate in Iran — and in China and Russia — to achieve something much less dramatic than assassinations: verifying “assets”. To take a theoretical example, imagine a medical doctor from Isfahan, recruited by the CIA on a visit to Frankfurt. Before returning home, he agrees to send information he hears from his son: a nuclear engineer, or perhaps an officer in the Revolutionary Guards, in exchange for money deposited to a German bank.

There is no need for James Bond skills to check the source’s credentials. A world-class holiday destination, complete with stunning Safavid architecture around its vast main square, Isfahan will always attract foreign tourists. Nor would an agent need much to verify the authenticity of the new asset. Things would be as simple as visiting the doctor in his office and verifying he exists: tourists get upset stomachs all the time. With a few questions, none of them compromising, the officer could also ensure that the man recruited in Frankfurt really is a doctor, and not a trolling security man or else just a con artist angling for a quick buck.

That is only a hypothetical example , but there is clear evidence that verification has been a severe problem in the real world too. For decades, the Agency has struggled to verify its assets: it was only after the fall of the Soviet Union that the CIA realised that most of its “agents in place” actually worked for the Russians, while genuine defectors were compromised by clumsy attempts at communication by CIA officers operating out US embassy facilities who tried and failed to avoid detection.

There have been major analytical failures too. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the Agency wrongly predicted that the Zelensky government would not fight in earnest, suggesting that Russian troops would conquer Kyiv within 24 hours. That frightened the White House into evacuating all US diplomats, which in turn caused another 20 countries to do the same. That might even have demoralised Zelensky into surrendering — but for the fact he already knew the CIA was incompetent.

The essential problem is the lack of language skills. Because they could not move about to talk to people, the CIA officers in Kyiv had no “situational awareness” and no understanding of the bitter determination to resist the Russians. Even Obama’s CIA director, famed for his supposed Middle East expertise, apparently struggled with Arabic. Despite studying the language in Cairo, and serving in Saudi Arabia, he asked me to stick to English when we once met. With personnel like that, it obviously becomes much harder to engage with sources abroad, let alone survive for months at a time in hostile territory.

The reason for this inadequacy, it turns out, is not that Americans are notoriously lazy about learning foreign languages. Rather, the wound is self-inflicted by the Agency itself, something I totally failed to understand for many years, even though I worked closely with one CIA director and was a close friend of two more. The situation only became clear when my truly stellar research assistant, who went on to a splendid career elsewhere in government, applied to join the Agency at my suggestion.

Despite knowing two difficult languages really well, my colleague was rejected very early in the process. Why? Because of the CIA’s inflexible method of “vetting” applicants. They were not interviewed by experienced operators, nor by accomplished analysts with a deep understanding of their patch. Instead, would-be agents have to fill out tedious security forms, listing every place where they ever lived, or even just slept in for a single night. They also have to list every person they have ever had dealings with — whether tenants or landlords, lovers or friends, no matter how fleeting the relationship ultimately was.

It goes without saying that the sort of young American suited to life as a NOC — those who have studied or lived overseas, and are equally comfortable working or flirting in foreign languages — stand no hope of passing the security screening. Many of the security people I have run into seem to be Mormons, disciplined folk who forgo alcohol and even coffee. Applicants born in Utah, raised in Utah, who studied in Utah and married a spouse from Utah sail through the application process. But when tasked with working an asset overseas, they are destined to fail.

That, of course, leads to one further question: why? Why has the CIA been so obsessed with security that it excludes the people it needs? One explanation is that it is just too big. With over 20,000 staff, it employs far too many people to be vetted by individual experts. Rather, it must rely on very stringent criteria, applied by rather simple people, to exclude all risk — and the most promising candidates. Whatever the cause, anyway, it’s clear that Ratcliffe is right to make room for fresh talent, whether hard-nosed agents in the field or insightful analysts back home.

Professor Edward Luttwak is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.

​14. Lawmakers to DOGE: Use a scalpel, not a sledgehammer at the Pentagon

​But basing decisions only on the DOGE wiz kids' cold interpretations of the data will by definition be a sledge hammer. If everything is assessed on a balance sheet with only costs and benefits there will be no understanding of the real world and an appreciation of the necessary intangibles that do not show up on a balance sheet but are necessary for the mission of protecting national security and national prosperity. The DOGE wiz kids likely have no coup d'oiel. There is no algorithm for coup d'oiel.

But it is going to happen (the culling first). Just wait around for the pendulum to swing when critical positions that have been cut will have to be rehired because it turns out they are ...well... critical positions.

Lawmakers to DOGE: Use a scalpel, not a sledgehammer at the Pentagon

Cutting first and asking questions later could hurt national security, HASC members say.

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

A V-BAT drone sits ready for use during a Defense Innovation Unit Blue UAS Refresh Challenge at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, on Nov. 4, 2024. U.S. Marine Corps / Lance Cpl. Richard PerezGarcia

Cutting first and asking questions later could hurt national security, HASC members say.

|

February 20, 2025 03:17 PM ET

• Pentagon
• Congress
• Acquisition

By Jennifer Hlad

Managing Editor, Defense One

February 20, 2025 03:17 PM ET

• Pentagon
• Congress
• Acquisition

WAIKIKI, Hawaii—As DOGE focuses its attention on the Pentagon, two members of the House Armed Services committee are urging caution.

“I welcome the audit. I welcome the transparency,” Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., said in Feb. 14 remarks at the Honolulu Defense Forum. “We've always wanted a successful audit of the Pentagon, and we've not had a good audit of the Pentagon that's passed. So I’m glass-half-full on that. All I ask is…don’t throw the baby out with the bath waters…because we’ve been doing that in some of these agencies.”

Bacon used the example of cuts to U.S. foreign aid that could have had significant consequences: “We put a foreign-aid freeze out there, and we realized at the last minute—thankfully, if we had gone another couple minutes it would have been too late—that we prevented the funding of the Kurds that were detaining 10,000 ISIS terrorists. We were within a day or two of releasing these guys because the funding was pulled.”

Rep. Pat Ryan, D-NY, shares Bacon’s concern, and noted in his remarks and in an interview with Defense One that the U.S. military “cannot afford to have any blinks or any pauses” in successful programs.

“I think the focus [of the Trump administration] on driving defense innovation and understanding the urgency, specifically in INDOPACOM, presents a real opportunity,” Ryan said. “The worry I have is: so much of the momentum we have established in things like Replicator, we can’t take our foot off the gas on that… The biggest mistake we can make is: new administration comes in, says ‘Oh, the old guys did this. Everything’s bad that they did,’ and that would dramatically hurt the warfighters and hurt our national security.”

While Ryan said he is in favor of “creative disruption,” he hopes the Pentagon can avoid “destruction.”

On the topic of reform, Ryan and Bacon both praised the Defense Innovation Unit and said the rest of the DOD should take a page from their playbook as the Pentagon works to change its acquisition culture.

“There is no doubt that we’re finding innovations and some new ideas, but we’re having a hard time fielding that at a level that will have an impact [in a] fight with China or a fight with Russia,” Bacon said. “There’s a lot of talk. We’ve got to figure out how to get things into mass production and get things fielded at the unit level, at a level that makes a difference.”

Ryan said the Pentagon has a tendency to engage in “innovation theater,” meaning a loud display of ineffective effort. He said Indo-Pacific Command leader Adm. Sam Paparo “so clearly can articulate where he sees the adversary, what the needs are, what his sort of operational concept is. And yet, if you look at what we’re doing and where dollars are flowing and where programs of record are, and even where leaders’ attention is, it is nowhere near in alignment there, which is incredibly scary and dangerous, given again, the urgency moment that we’re at.”

15. Trump’s Turn to Russia Spooks U.S. Allies Who Fear a Weakened NATO

Trump’s Turn to Russia Spooks U.S. Allies Who Fear a Weakened NATO

Allies say they are concerned Putin will feel emboldened to attack alliance territory

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trumps-turn-to-russia-spooks-u-s-allies-who-fear-a-weakened-nato-dfd6b5ae?st=riL36a&utm

British and Romanian soldiers practice an assault during a NATO training exercise in Smardan, Romania. Photo: Andrei Pungovschi/Getty Images

By Daniel Michaels

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, Nancy A. Youssef

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 and Alexander Ward

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Updated Feb. 20, 2025 2:08 pm ET

President Trump’s tirades against Ukraine and the start of peace talks between the U.S. and Russia have come as painful blows to America’s closest allies, raising profound questions about whether the NATO alliance can survive.

American and European supporters of the 32-country military bloc say that by siding with Europe’s longstanding adversary, Trump has done serious damage to its greatest asset: the deterrence that comes from the alliance’s ironclad commitment to collective defense.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, formed at the Cold War’s dawn to face down threats from Moscow, is based on the principle that countries sworn to protect each other—with nuclear weapons, if necessary—are stronger together than separately.

“The first time one NATO member thinks the others won’t defend it, that’s the beginning of the end,” said Peter Bator, a former ambassador to NATO of the Slovak Republic.

Allied officials have said they also fear the Pentagon will pull a significant number of troops from Europe. Last week, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told European counterparts that the U.S. planned to withdraw some forces from Europe, a person familiar with the matter said.

The U.S., Hegseth said at NATO, “will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency. Rather, our relationship will prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security.” 

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the U.S. wouldn’t tolerate an imbalanced relationship with Europe. Photo: Marek Antoni Iwanczuk/Zuma Press

Army officials say they haven’t received orders to draft withdrawal plans for U.S. troops in Europe, but many say they expect them. The Pentagon declined to comment. 

Trump during his first term berated U.S. allies for failing to meet spending commitments and freeloading on American protection. 

At a NATO summit in 2018 he threatened to withdraw the U.S. if allies didn’t invest more in their militaries. Most have significantly increased outlays since 2014, though still not as high as Trump has said he would like.

Now Trump isn’t questioning NATO’s existence. Hegseth told his peers at NATO: “The United States remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense partnership with Europe. Full stop.”

But to officials who have spent time in the alliance, Trump’s words and actions send a different message, that he doesn’t support them. And they fear Russian President Vladimir Putin will feel emboldened to attack alliance territory in some way.

British soldiers took part in NATO training exercises in Romania.

Andrei Pungovschi/Getty Images

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D., N.H.), the minority leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who recently returned from meetings in Ukraine and Europe, said Trump’s actions amount to appeasement.

Trump’s criticism of Ukraine “gives Vladimir Putin the opportunity, if he’s not stopped in Ukraine, to go into a NATO ally,” Shaheen told a New Hampshire news program Wednesday. 

That, she said, would trigger NATO’s collective-defense rule, potentially pulling the U.S. into a war if Trump were to abide by the terms of the treaty, which is one of the things European leaders say has been thrown into doubt.

Some observers see in Trump’s moves an effort to jolt allies into action, though they say it could backfire.

“Trump’s comments are so disconnected from reality and the prevailing NATO line to date that they are having a significant shock effect,” said retired Army Maj. Gen. Gordon Davis, a former senior civilian official at NATO. “If Trump’s line of attack continues, he is likely to cause greater mistrust and resistance and less cooperation and support from NATO allies for U.S. efforts to end the Ukraine conflict.”

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President Trump was speaking to reporters at Mar-a-Lago, hours after U.S. and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia. Photo: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters; Sven Hoppe/Pool/Shutterstock

Europeans are already assessing a future sharply different from the past 75 years.

The U.S. will also not co-sponsor a United Nations resolution on the three-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion that supports Kyiv and blames Moscow for the aggression, according to a U.N. official. The official added that it is unclear the U.S. will vote in favor of the resolution when it comes up for a vote in the U.N. General Assembly.

The reason for not signing onto the resolution is unclear. Reuters first reported that the U.S. wouldn’t sign the document.

Meanwhile, a European official said it was unclear if the U.S. would sign on to a Group of Seven nations’ statement that similarly criticized Russia for its invasion, saying there were “live discussions” about “how the conflict is framed.” If the U.S. doesn’t join its fellow members in the statement, however, it would show a clear break in unity within the bloc. Trump, in his discussions with Putin about improving U.S.-Russia ties, floated welcoming Russia back into the group, from which it was exiled after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

“Europeans would like more robust language about the nature of Russia’s illegal invasion than the U.S. is currently comfortable with,” the European official said. The Financial Times first reported on the continuing negotiations of the G-7 statement.

Trump’s increased hostility to Ukraine and Europeans could backfire on at least one front, say defense officials: orders for American weapons. Since Trump won the November election, Europeans have touted big purchases of U.S. arms as a way to solidify trans-Atlantic ties and appease Trump. 

“This is not an exercise,” said Nico Lange, a former chief of staff to the German defense minister. “Europeans have to get ready now to replace U.S. military capabilities in Europe if the U.S. are fading them out.”

While some Europeans, led by French President Emmanuel Macron, have advocated spending European money on European weapons, many others have argued that U.S. weapons carry an implied assurance of U.S. support. Now that assumption is less certain.

“Europeans should move away from the idea of buying American and force their industries to more production quickly,” said Lange. 

In a sign of that shift, Denmark on Wednesday announced a significant increase in military spending and resources for its domestic arms industry.

The impact of Trump’s swerve could take time to emerge. 

European and U.S. officials gathered for the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949.

Associated Press, US National Archives and Records Administration/Shutterstock

“We are at the very beginning of what is probably a lengthy process,” said Bator in Slovakia. “It seems Trump has a much more detailed plan for how to make Europeans finally wake up than he has for what to do with Russia and how to end the conflict in Ukraine.”

An early indication of Trump’s intentions could come from European troop deployments. The Pentagon can quickly shrink its European footprint by not replacing rotating forces in the region, defense officials said.  

European officials say that in talks last week they were told U.S. troops wouldn’t be pulled from Europe, but Europeans are increasingly uncertain how long that might hold. Roughly 100,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Europe, of which about 60,000 are permanently based there. The rest are on rotations that generally last for several months.

Even before the administration’s recent moves and comments, it was hinting at shifts in European military posture. Trump and his team are already implementing parts of the Project 2025 conservative policy blueprint whose drafters include newly appointed administration officials. The plan calls for the U.S. military to shift resources to the Navy to combat threats from China. 

Danish troops attend a NATO ceremony in Latvia. Photo: valda kalnina/Shutterstock

Under Project 2025, Europe would bolster its own defense, decreasing reliance on the U.S. Army, which instead would focus on missions such as protecting the U.S. border with Mexico. 

Questions about the future of the U.S. military in Europe came as the Pentagon was awash in uncertainty after members of the Department of Government Efficiency arrived last week, promising cuts similar to ones already made in other government offices. Probationary employees have been told they could lose their jobs and others feared the administration could eliminate departments altogether. 

Others, who accepted a Trump administration proposal to resign in return for pay through September, have yet to receive a reply confirming the department had accepted their departure, leaving them confused about whether to keep coming to work, Pentagon officials said. 

“There is no plan,” one defense official said. “And it makes it hard for everyone to focus on the job.”

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com, Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

Appeared in the February 21, 2025, print edition as 'Allies’ Fears Grow as U.S. Tilts to Russia'.

16. Xi Is Trying to Secure the Devotion of China’s Military

This is the difference between the armies for free nations and those of dictators/authoritarian regimes. Soldiers are naturally loyal to their ideas and ideals of their nation (e.g., support and defend the Constitution of the U.S.) and they fight for the soldier on their left and right. On the other hand dictators have to force loyalty and indoctrinate their forces and assign political officers to units to ensure the "ideological purity" of the soldiers.

The sad irony is that some can make the case this was what DEI was all about - ideological indoctrination. But the danger is that the purges of DEI could be seen to parallel the purges that take place in authoritarian regimes.

Xi Is Trying to Secure the Devotion of China’s Military

Chinese leader deploys soldiers on a campaign of films, quizzes and political study

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-military-xi-jinping-speeches-16ac3256?mc_cid=bc1f06ee7f

People watch a video at a military museum in Beijing. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

By Chun Han WongFollow

Feb. 20, 2025 5:30 am ET

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has purged dozens of military commanders in his latest bid to wipe out corruption and disloyalty—a scourge he blames on a weakening of ideological zeal and moral rectitude.

To remedy that, Xi has launched a campaign to reshape minds in one of the world’s largest armed forces. Since he ordered the indoctrination drive last summer, China’s two million soldiers, sailors and airmen have been studying Xi’s speeches, learning Communist Party rules and seeking inspiration from revolutionary exploits.

Military leaders hammered home the message in a six-part documentary, “To Harden With Fire,” showcasing heroic exploits, new capabilities and cutting-edge weapons—and arranged screenings for the rank and file.

“We must uphold the party’s absolute leadership over the military,” Xi told senior commanders at a June conclave when he launched the indoctrination campaign. “The gun barrel must always be grasped by people who are loyal and reliable to the party.”

The campaign is meant to boost discipline and patriotic fervor as Xi presses ahead with his sweeping purge, which has battered morale and raised questions about China’s ability to build a modern fighting force.

Whether Xi can enforce loyalty without undermining military readiness could shape the outcome of China’s quest to become a first-rate military power that can protect its global interests, compete with the U.S. for strategic dominance and potentially seize Taiwan, the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as its territory. 

For China’s leaders, the military is also the ultimate guarantor of Communist Party rule and their personal authority. The People’s Liberation Army swept Mao Zedong to power in 1949, helped Deng Xiaoping crush the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and remains an influential constituency in Chinese politics.

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing were eventually crushed by China’s military. Photo: Jacques Langevin/Getty Images

The party enforces control over the armed forces through political officers, who share decision-making authority with military commanders and can veto orders that are seen as contrary to the party’s priorities—a Soviet-influenced arrangement known as the dual-leadership system. Major units have party committees that can decide important matters including combat, training and personnel.

The emphasis on political control, some experts say, could end up undercutting China’s ambitions to challenge Western military might.

“If you’re spending time on political education, that’s time you could have spent training, practicing and preparing to fight,” said Phillip Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. “Ideological indoctrination is a tax on military preparedness.”

Since taking power in 2012, Xi has used anticorruption purges to assert his authority and advance plans to modernize a military that hasn’t fought a full-scale war since 1979. The goal is to create a more nimble, 21st-century force that can integrate air, sea and land operations, project power and wage war in the digital age.

Xi tossed out dozens of generals during his early years as leader, replaced them with officers whom he considered to be more professional and politically reliable, and overhauled the military’s command structure to put himself more firmly in control.

Military delegates left a political gathering in Beijing last year. Photo: Getty Images

He ramped up defense purges again in the summer of 2023, starting with officers commanding China’s nuclear arsenal, reaching into the military’s highest echelons and defense contractors that produce stealth fighters and other advanced armaments.

More than two dozen senior PLA officers and defense-industry executives have been placed under investigation or removed from public office over the past year and a half, according to official disclosures reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Other officers and executives may have been purged in recent months, analysts said, noting their unexplained absences from high-profile meetings. 

Prominent targets included a top admiral who was considered a Xi protégé and oversaw political indoctrination, and a defense minister and his predecessor. Senior executives in the defense industry have come under investigation or disappeared from view, including the chief designer of the J-20 stealth fighter—China’s rough equivalent to the American F-22—whose biography vanished from his company’s website in recent months.

Xi ordered the military indoctrination drive in the midst of this crackdown. Units across the country leapt into action, running seminars, quizzes and essay contests. Some arranged pilgrimages to revolutionary sites and cultural shows to celebrate the history of the PLA ahead of its centennial in 2027.

The military’s flagship newspaper, PLA Daily, launched a front-page column to document how combat forces and support units were channeling Xi’s ideas in lectures, combat drills and field operations.

The Central Military Commission, which commands the armed forces, approved two new anthologies of Xi’s remarks on political discipline in the military for all personnel to study. The commission launched a new education campaign this month on the theme of “forging political loyalty and fighting hard battles well.”

Members of China’s navy visited a naval museum in Qingdao, China, last year. Photo: Florence Lo/Reuters

Key themes include the need for unwavering commitment to Xi’s leadership and his military modernization program.

In China, ideological education has been a staple of military training since the Mao era, aimed at deepening loyalty to the Communist Party. Current guidelines generally require military units to spend 42 to 54 days a year on political indoctrination, including at least one session a month.

Under regulations updated in 2020, major formations at the brigade level should allocate no less than 20% of their annual education time to “ideological and political” training, while smaller combat units must devote at least 40%. 

Political officers often arrange weekly sessions to discuss party policies with service personnel. One army brigade in central China had its troops study Xi’s military directives in daily sessions meant for consuming the news.

Xi’s emphasis on indoctrination, alongside corruption purges, could set back his plans to modernize the military, according to M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

“The purges, along with the ideological campaign, can induce much greater caution into decision-making within the PLA at all levels, as officers will worry about making the ‘wrong’ decision that could expose them to punishment later,” Fravel said. “This dynamic likely extends to China’s defense industries, too.”

The military has in the past warned against excessive political education, citing its impact on readiness. When one air-force unit ran 132 ideological classes in 2020, sometimes four lessons in a day, its personnel became “overwhelmed with education,” the PLA Daily reported. 

Xi has repeatedly stressed the party’s pre-eminence in military affairs, telling senior commanders in June that they must “integrate the party’s leadership into all aspects and processes in war preparation and warfare.”

Chinese state media have at times acknowledged issues inherent to the military’s dual-leadership system, such as by questioning the military competence of political officers and criticizing their perceived subpar understanding of tactics and operational matters.

Some units have tried to address this problem by putting their political officers through combat-skills competitions, testing their ability in matters such as marksmanship, fitness and field tactics. One brigade did so last year after finding that its political officers were showing “weak battlefield awareness” and “insufficient military literacy,” according to the PLA Daily. 

Such training, however, doesn’t address a fundamental issue with the dual-leadership system. The need for unit commanders to justify themselves to political commissars “slows down your decision-making and reaction time in combat,” said Saunders, the National Defense University researcher. “It might lead to suboptimal decisions, if they have to always look over their shoulders.”

Write to Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com

Appeared in the February 21, 2025, print edition as 'Xi Seeks the Devotion of China’s Military'.

17. SOCOM looking to acquire new drone-launched glide bombs

SOCOM looking to acquire new drone-launched glide bombs

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · February 20, 2025

U.S. Special Operations Command wants to arm lightweight drones with new glide bombs, and it’s gearing up to evaluate vendors’ solutions.

A technology assessment event hosted by the SOFWERX innovation hub, in partnership with Army Special Operations Command and Army Space and Missile Defense Command, is slated for April.

The aim is to “advance efforts in developing and producing an advanced light-weight precision glide munition,” according to a special notice.

“USSOCOM is seeking industry submissions for a precision glide munition that is smaller than the GBU-69 and that can be delivered by light-weight uncrewed aircraft,” officials wrote. “The government is interested in the development and eventual fielding of a low-cost, light-weight, precision, unpowered, air-launched glide munition to fill the gap for glide munitions smaller than the GBU-69” for use by special operations forces.

The GBU-69/B — which can be carried by AC-130 gunships or unmanned aerial systems — is 42 inches in length, has a 4.5-inch diameter and a wingspan of 28 inches, and weighs 60 pounds, according to manufacturer Dynetics, a Leidos company. The system has previously been launched from an Army MQ-1C Gray Eagle Extended Range drone manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, per a 2019 GA-ASI press release.

SOCOM wants a similar type of weapon that weighs 30 pounds or less, including the warhead, according to assessment criteria.

“Warhead types are interchangeable by the operator and should include: airburst with adjustable height above ground setting, point detonation, and penetration,” officials wrote.

The munition should be able to hit targets upwards of 100 kilometers away from the host air vehicle that launches it.

“The munition will have a built-in data link to send its location and receive in-flight instructions to change targets or self-destruct,” per the assessment criteria.

The system must be able to navigate in an electromagnetically contested environment and not be dependent on GPS. The command would prefer at least three methods of navigation, officials noted.

SOFWERX is requesting information from industry about “existing mature capabilities” that might fit the bill for the Gliding Offensive Lightweight Unmanned Munition (GOLUM) assessment event in Tampa, Florida, the city where SOFWERX and SOCOM headquarters are both located.

“USSOCOM will downselect those respondents/submissions they feel have the highest potential to satisfy their technology needs. Favorably evaluated submissions will receive an invitation to attend the AE on/around 18 March 2025,” per the notice.

The assessment event is slated for the April 8-10 timeframe. Afterward, the command seeks to enter into Federal Acquisition Regulation-based or non-FAR agreements with vendors whose solutions are favorably evaluated by subject matter experts from Army Special Operations Command and Army Space and Missile Defense Command, according to officials.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_

In This Story

• drones
• Munitions
• SOCOM
• SOFWERX
• special operations forces

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · February 20, 2025

18. From Strategy to Action: Rethinking How the State Department Works

​There is a need for strategic planning in how to develop and execute foreign policy in support of the national security strategy. And then there is strategic planning for how to manage, develop, and advance the organization's full range of capabilities from organizational structure, to professional education and training to talent management.

Excerpts:

Policy engineering could also improve accountability and learning. Here, a pilot, perhaps run by the Office of Policy Planning, could work with a small group of bureaus and embassies to test structured semi-annual or annual assessments. These assessments could identify priorities and proximate objectives, lessons learned from implementation, and recommendations for further action, including requests of department leadership to help resource and scale successful policies. Congressional appropriators, in particular, might appreciate the department’s attention to identifying and weeding out poorly performing efforts.

Finally, policy engineering will only reach its full potential if it is a high-level priority. The secretary of state could model prioritization by announcing his or her own proximate objectives each year, including how the department will know if it is making progress in meeting them. Additionally, the secretary could preside over an annual award to recognize the department’s best policy engineering efforts. A future secretary might also link policy engineering with the department’s budget process and use the learning it generates to justify resource requests.

Effective foreign policymaking does not merely spring from the department’s wealth of knowledge and experience. While recent modernization efforts have rightly focused on helping the department develop, acquire, and retain expertise, that expertise needs an organizational culture which prioritizes action. Translating expertise into action is a craft that goes beyond what one can reasonably learn on the job. It should have basic prescriptive steps that can be taught and refined over the course of one’s career.

In a recent report, former Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard Verma admits that the department must continue “looking for ways to become more efficient and capable through better strategic planning [and] training… ” We agree. In today’s age of unprecedented peril, with limited resources and in long-term competition with determined foes, the State Department must focus on the handful of initiatives that can make a real difference. Advancing a method for policy engineering is the right next step in service of this endeavor.

From Strategy to Action: Rethinking How the State Department Works - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Peter Lohman · February 21, 2025

U.S. diplomacy faces a paradox: The State Department is filled with some of the most knowledgeable foreign policy experts in the world, yet its impact is diluted by bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of focus.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in his initial guidance to employees, called for a “more innovative, nimble, and focused State Department.” He lamented the department’s relegation to a “secondary role” in U.S. foreign policy, as other agencies are perceived to move faster and more effectively. Several studies in recent years have identified similar shortcomings.

The State Department’s perceived shortcomings stem from an organizational culture that for too long has relied on educated guesswork and ad hoc implementation. In fulfilling its core duty of advancing U.S. interests overseas, the department has often emphasized the art of foreign policymaking at the expense of disciplined methods. While recent modernization efforts have prioritized expanding staff and expertise, continued gaps in diplomatic tradecraft and culture hinder turning that expertise into policy action.

Suggestions to add rigor to the State Department’s work often collide with two practical realities: First, each new presidential administration brings differing views of U.S. interests. Second, every new challenge to U.S. national security carries unique tradeoffs of risks and benefits.

Yet, the variability of the ends and contexts of U.S. foreign policy should not excuse a lack of structure in its design and implementation. The State Department should treat policymaking — the practice of applying specialized knowledge to the practical solution of public problems — as the discipline that it is: One that includes clear methods for design, implementation, and adaptation. The department should adopt, teach, and refine this method of “policy engineering” and use it to harness the workforce’s tremendous expertise to more effectively advance U.S. interests abroad.

Become a Member

The Gap Between Planning and Doing

The State Department’s traditional method for policymaking is heavy on planning but light on coordinated action. Consider the department’s Managing for Results framework, which mandates every regional and functional bureau, and embassy, outline its high-level goals every four years — what the department calls “strategic planning.” Department staff spend hours poring over the latest National Security Strategy and other strategic guidance to craft over 200 individual plans for virtually every country and transnational issue in the world. The resulting plans provide general direction but fail to incite specific, coordinated action for pursuing U.S. interests.

Take, for example, the fact that very few of these strategic plans influence the department’s day-to-day expenditure of time and resources. While the Managing for Results framework includes recommendations for how to communicate long-term objectives and design foreign assistance programs, it provides little structure for how staff should achieve these long-term goals. Ultimately, the work of following through on the department’s myriad plans is largely ad hoc and voluntary, with limited accountability for progress.

We have experienced this problem firsthand through successive tours in Washington and abroad. Searching for ways to help prioritize among seemingly infinite daily demands, we and our colleagues regarded the department’s formal plans as too amorphous to provide value.

Lacking guidance, staff often defaulted to the most immediate task rather than ones tied to achieving long-term goals. Policy work devolved into a handful of initiatives working at small scale and often cross-purposes — an approach insufficient to tackling the biggest challenges. Resources were misallocated using a “spread-the-peanut-butter” approach whereby time, expertise, and funding went to many problems with the goal of satisfying as many bureaucratic stakeholders as possible.

This ad hoc approach serves as a tax on the department’s already overburdened staff, time, and resources. Absent prioritization, every challenge appears “underfunded,” and few are solved. Congress and presidential administrations become frustrated with the department’s inability to deliver. Worse yet, other parts of the federal government less adept at diplomacy are asked to step in, increasingly marginalizing the State Department over time.

The result is a paradoxical situation whereby the department’s vast foreign policy expertise serves more as a burden than a blessing. Without a method of translating expertise into action, department staff are overwhelmed with information and pulled in divergent directions, challenging everyone’s ability to focus on the most important tasks.

Harvard Business School Professor Frances Frei has a term for large organizations that struggle to prioritize among competing demands, expend enormous staff time focused on inward-facing tasks like email correspondence, and leave their workforce suffering from a general sense of fatigue and aimlessness: “exhausted mediocrity.” She argues that a workforce focused on doing everything rather than the most important things will exhaust itself and disappoint its customers. In our experience, this aptly describes what ails the State Department.

Policy Engineering: Turning Ideas into Action

One effective way to cure the department’s exhausted mediocrity is to fill the space between the formal planning process and the department’s day-to-day work. We call this policy engineering, building on former State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow’s efforts to draw lessons from the field of engineering, which similarly applies specialized knowledge to complex problems. Policy engineering is an iterative method for policymakers to ensure big picture goals connect to action in the field. It is meant to upgrade what Zelikow calls the “software” of public policy: the methods and routines the department uses to solve problems. The U.S. Army’s doctrine for the operations process also provides a useful model.

Policy engineering at the State Department would begin with policy design. Rather than the department’s existing planning process, which burdens staff with writing four-year plans with vague, long-term goals, policy engineering starts with prioritizing action, in coordination with the National Security Council and relevant agencies. Working from direction provided by the National Security Strategy and other high-level plans, bureaus and individual embassies would specify a limited set of near-term objectives that, if pursued over the next 6–12 months, would help achieve the administration’s long-term foreign policy goals. These near-term objectives must be proximate, concrete definitions of success paired with key results that could be reasonably assessed and achieved. The intent of policy design is to keep staff focused on forward-looking objectives amid the demands of the daily grind. In addition, the design phase would involve assigning teams to lead implementation, identifying resources and tools of implementation (i.e., programs, engagements, events), and setting deadlines for review. The policy design phase is largely absent in the State Department’s current organizational culture.

The department’s bureaus and embassies would turn design into action through policy implementation. This entails delivering demarches, negotiating treaties, implementing new projects, or other activities specified in the design stage. With clear policy designs guiding their work, diplomats in the field would be empowered to solve problems that arise during implementation. During implementation, staff would detail their efforts and gather evidence, including objective and subjective judgments, to evaluate progress. Written staff work —primarily in the form of cables from the field, memos to department leadership, and State Department input into interagency meetings — would communicate these judgments, including whether resources are adequate to accomplish the stated policy goal.

These observations would feed continuous policy adaptation, when bureaus and embassies would guide department and interagency changes in design and implementation. Key questions include: What policy interventions have been tried and what has been learned? Should assumptions change? Is the policy sufficiently maximizing the strengths of the United States and its allies and partners while exploiting competitors’ weaknesses? Does design and implementation adequately capture not just the risks of action but also of inaction? Most importantly, how should policy design, implementation, and resourcing change to incorporate these lessons?

The three steps outlined above are intended to serve as a framework rather than formal stages in a sequenced process. Rarely in the messy practice of foreign policymaking do policy responses advance neatly from design to implementation to success, making iterative moves during policy adaptation critical.

Getting Started: Benefits and Recommendations

State Department staff can implement these techniques and begin improving the organization’s policymaking immediately. However, to firmly integrate policy engineering into the culture and practice of the department, institutional upgrades will be needed.

Adopting a standard, department-wide method for policy engineering would be a good starting point (one might call this a cornerstone of “diplomatic doctrine”). The secretary’s Office of Policy Planning could serve as a hub for this work, refining the method over time. The Foreign Service Institute could include classes on policy engineering as part of its new core curriculum, using historical case studies to teach staff foreign policy design, implementation, and adaptation in different contexts and at different levels of the organization.

Policy engineering could also improve accountability and learning. Here, a pilot, perhaps run by the Office of Policy Planning, could work with a small group of bureaus and embassies to test structured semi-annual or annual assessments. These assessments could identify priorities and proximate objectives, lessons learned from implementation, and recommendations for further action, including requests of department leadership to help resource and scale successful policies. Congressional appropriators, in particular, might appreciate the department’s attention to identifying and weeding out poorly performing efforts.

Finally, policy engineering will only reach its full potential if it is a high-level priority. The secretary of state could model prioritization by announcing his or her own proximate objectives each year, including how the department will know if it is making progress in meeting them. Additionally, the secretary could preside over an annual award to recognize the department’s best policy engineering efforts. A future secretary might also link policy engineering with the department’s budget process and use the learning it generates to justify resource requests.

Effective foreign policymaking does not merely spring from the department’s wealth of knowledge and experience. While recent modernization efforts have rightly focused on helping the department develop, acquire, and retain expertise, that expertise needs an organizational culture which prioritizes action. Translating expertise into action is a craft that goes beyond what one can reasonably learn on the job. It should have basic prescriptive steps that can be taught and refined over the course of one’s career.

In a recent report, former Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard Verma admits that the department must continue “looking for ways to become more efficient and capable through better strategic planning [and] training… ” We agree. In today’s age of unprecedented peril, with limited resources and in long-term competition with determined foes, the State Department must focus on the handful of initiatives that can make a real difference. Advancing a method for policy engineering is the right next step in service of this endeavor.

Become a Member

Peter Lohman is a State Department foreign service officer. He has served in Chennai, Jerusalem, Jakarta, and Washington. His most recent assignment was as the director for Southeast Asia on the National Security Council. He was a cavalry officer in the U.S. Army before entering the State Department.

Dan Spokojny is the founder of fp21, a nonprofit dedicated to improving the State Department. He previously served in government for more than a decade as a foreign service officer and a legislative staffer in Congress. He teaches U.S. foreign policy at George Washington University, is a member of the Editorial Board of The Foreign Service Journal, and is a former member of the Governing Board of the American Foreign Service Association.

The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the views or positions of the U.S. government.

Image: Josh Lintz via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Peter Lohman · February 21, 2025

19. China touts ‘window for peace’ as Trump loses patience with Ukraine

Will China fill the vacuum? Can it really broker a peace?​ I am scratching my head for an example of when China has really brokered an effective peace? Perhap the China experts can provide some useful examples.

China touts ‘window for peace’ as Trump loses patience with Ukraine | CNN

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · February 21, 2025

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese counterpart Wang Yi meet on the sidelines of a G20 gathering in Johannesburg on February 20.

Russian Foreign Ministry/Reuters

Hong Kong CNN —

A “window for peace is opening” in Ukraine, China’s top diplomat told a meeting of G20 foreign ministers on Thursday, as the Trump administration ramps up its push to end the war in close coordination with Russia.

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on the margins of the gathering in South Africa, the first high-level talks between the two close partners since US President Donald Trump upended America’s stance on the conflict this month with a sweeping pivot toward Moscow.

That’s seen top Trump officials hold bilateral talks with Moscow over Kyiv’s head and launch a barrage of criticism against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, with a senior American official warning on Thursday that the US is losing patience with Kyiv.

The G20 foreign ministers’ meeting, which was not attended by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, came as the breakneck diplomacy has left Europe and China on the sidelines and raised questions about a shifting balance of power in a fraught geopolitical landscape.

China “supports all efforts dedicated to peace, including the recent consensus reached between the US and Russia,” Wang told counterparts at the gathering in Johannesburg.

A “window for peace is opening” on the war, he added.

The war and US relations were among subjects discussed between the top Chinese diplomat and Lavrov on the meeting sidelines, a Russian readout said. The two sides – which have tightened their relations during the war – also praised their growing cooperation.

On Ukraine, both countries appeared to agree that it was necessary to address the conflict’s “root causes” – an apparent veiled reference to NATO – with Russia’s readout attributing this sentiment to Wang and China’s attributing this to Lavrov.

Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago in an uninterrupted onslaught that has killed tens of thousands and displaced about 10 million people. The invasion has also laid waste to Ukrainian cities and drawn allegations of war crimes by Moscow’s forces, which are entrenched in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine.

Even though Russia invaded its neighbor, Beijing and Moscow have blamed NATO expansion as the cause of the conflict – part of their broader shared opposition to the US system of alliances they see as positioned against their interests.

Lavrov earlier this week praised Trump for being what he described as “the first Western leader” to acknowledge publicly that the “cause of the Ukrainian conflict was the efforts … to expand NATO.”

Russia has long claimed that expansion of the US-led defense alliance put its security under threat, necessitating its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. That claim has been dismissed by Western leaders as a bogus justification for launching its war.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivers a speech in Beijing on December 31.

Ju Peng/Xinhua/Getty Images

Related article What China fears most about Trump’s turn toward Russia

The sharp shift in US positioning on the conflict was underscored Thursday as Trump’s national security adviser Michael Waltz described the US president’s “frustration” with Zelensky following a meeting between the Ukrainian leader and the US’ Russia-Ukraine envoy Keith Kellog in Kyiv.

“President Trump is obviously very frustrated right now with President Zelensky — the fact that — that he hasn’t come to the table, that he hasn’t been willing to take this opportunity that we have offered,” Waltz told a news briefing in Washington, referencing an economic deal that the Trump administration has so far been unsuccessful in convincing Kyiv to accept.

“I think he eventually will get to that point, and I hope so very quickly,” Waltz said, echoing comments he made before the Kellogg-Zelensky meeting, urging the Ukrainian leader to “sign the deal.”

The proposal on the table is for the US to take 50% of Ukraine’s rare earth mineral revenues as payment for past aid to Kyiv – with no guarantee of future assistance, CNN previously reported.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky meets with US special envoy Keith Kellogg in Kyiv on February 20.

Evgeniy Maloletka/AP

Trump-Zelensky rift

Waltz’s comments came amid what has been a deepening rift between Trump and Zelensky that has cast more uncertainty over how Ukraine’s interests would be represented in future talks on ending the war.

Trump ramped up his long-standing criticism of Ukraine’s leader in recent days, parroting Kremlin rhetoric that wrongly accuses Kyiv of starting the war with Russia and questioning Zelensky’s legitimacy to lead since he suspended an election due to the invasion.

After Zelensky hit back, accusing the US president of being in a “disinformation space,” Trump escalated the fight on Wednesday, calling Zelensky “a Dictator without elections” in a scathing post on his platform Truth Social.

Rescuers of the State Emergency Service work to extinguish a fire in a building after a drone strike in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on January 28.

Sergey Bobok/AFP/Getty Images

Related article US resisting including reference to ‘Russian aggression’ in G7 Ukraine anniversary statement

Following talks Thursday with envoy Kellogg, Zelensky appeared keen to stress Ukraine’s interest in maintaining strong US relations.

“General Kellogg’s meeting is one that restores hope, and we need strong agreements with America, agreements that will really work,” Zelensky said in his nightly address to the Ukrainian people.

“Economy and security must always go hand in hand, and the details of the agreements matter: the better the details, the better the result.”

Kellogg and Zelensky’s team had discussed Ukraine’s prisoners of war, and “the need for a reliable and clear system of security guarantees so that the war does not return,” the Ukrainian president added.

Kellogg said he understood Ukraine’s need for security guarantees following his arrival in Kyiv on Wednesday. Talks between the envoy and the Ukrainian leader were not followed by a joint news conference at the request of the US side, a Zelensky aide told CNN.

The meeting followed a sit down earlier this month between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance on the sidelines of a security conference in Munich.

In his comments Thursday, national security adviser Waltz defended Washington’s “shuttle diplomacy” approach to speak with Russian and Ukrainian counterparts separately.

CNN’s Nick Paton Walsh and Gul Tuysuz in Kyiv, Alejandra Jaramillo, Alayna Treene, Kevin Liptak, Max Saltman, Victoria Butenko, Rob Picheta and Anna Chernova contributed to this report.

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · February 21, 2025

20. The Cargo Cult Science Empire: American political warfare as applied soft science, and Trump's Gorbachev moment

A powerful essay that is worth reflecting upon (and why I have long been an advocate for American Political Warfare - real political warfare, not partisan political warfare)

Conclusion:

President Trump is taking a wrecking ball to the very top layers of America’s political warfare apparatus; USAID is one, but others will follow. It’s not clear whether the American Empire can reinvent itself quickly enough to avoid collapse. As discussed above, the collapse of the USSR was triggered by Gorbachev taking initiative in dismantling its most obviously stupid, inefficient and evil parts. He was as surprised as anyone when those parts turned out to have had been loadbearing.

The Cargo Cult Science Empire

American political warfare as applied soft science, and Trump's Gorbachev moment

https://postkahanism.substack.com/p/the-cargo-cult-science-empire?utm

Baruch Hasofer

Feb 19, 2025

President Trump’s DOGE, headed by Elon Musk, is dismantling what it perceives to be inefficient and useless American institutions. I believe that these institutions are neither inefficient nor useless. Rather, they are the cornerstones of the apparatus of American covert statecraft built in the aftermath of World War 2 as an applied soft sciences project. Destroying them in the name of efficiency might have the same effect on the American Empire as Gorbachev’s reforms did on the USSR. Gorbachev did not want to destroy the Soviet Union but rather to make it more efficient, but in the end, his intentions proved irrelevant.

The beginning

In May 1948, George Kennan, the US State Department Policy Planning Director, outlined the need for an American political warfare apparatus in a document called The Inauguration Of Organized Political Warfare. Covert political warfare had been employed by the USSR and British Empire extensively, but the Americans had been handicapped by such sentiments as an imaginary “difference between peace and war.” This apparatus would engage in the “employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its political objectives.” It would work through networks of private intermediaries to ensure the necessary outcomes, overtly and covertly; this would achieve deniability and a “remote and deeply concealed official control”.

The context for Kennan’s suggestion was that America had conquered half of the globe at the same time as it developed the atomic bomb, which it immediately gave away to its best frenemy, the USSR. Conventional warfare on a WW2 scale was out of the question; it would simply cost too much in lives and resources. Further, direct military conquest and occupation are not very efficient or progressive ways to control a client state and exploit its resources. They breed resentment and resistance, which can be capitalized upon by one’s enemies. They also pose a drain on one’s military forces, who will at best be sitting around on occupation duty and at worst sucked into an open ended, bloody, expensive counterpartisan war. The veterans of America’s covert operations during WW2 knew this all very well, having spent the war making military occupation as costly and unpleasant as possible for the Axis powers. Therefore, America’s elite rejected this mode of imperial conquest and management.

Losing wars, winning at geopolitics

Since 1945, the American military has fought four major wars, two of them against irregular forces. It lost in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and managed draws in Korea and Iraq. Yet despite this unimpressive military record, the postwar American empire has only gone from strength to strength. This is because American power is not based on prowess in conventional warfare, which serves mostly as a backstop and deterrent. It is based on an extensive apparatus, outlined by Kennan above, which wages permanent political warfare on America’s enemies, allies and own population.

Better living through science

The shape and activities of this apparatus were delineated by men who had served in the Office of Strategic Services and Office of War Information during WW2. These agencies were militarized arms of the New Deal. They focused heavily on operational research and analysis, and drew from the best scholars the US had to offer. A seminal example was Professor Carleton Coon, whose illustrated books on anthropology I highly recommend.

Professor Coon (on the left)

During WW2, Coon led operational OSS teams in North Africa and served as the Tangier Station Chief. After the war, he wrote a proposal called “The World after the War: OSS-SOE: The Invisible Empire”, which suggested building a clandestine organization of applied social scientists using their mastery of the study of human relations to manage geopolitics and statecraft behind the scenes; in other words, the temporary wartime work of the OSS would be continued perpetually in peacetime.

Coon was not an exception. WW2 found the leading American scholars of every branch of soft science serving in the OSS and OWI, applying their academic skillset to the war. Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, ethnographers and economists all pitched in. After the war, many of them continued to work with the government in one capacity or another. In a broad sense, their work was what Kennan proposed: organized political warfare.

The American Empire that these men built is one run not on explicit military force, but on an apparatus practicing applied soft science. Progress and efficiency were the focus of the New Deal state and its soft scientists were no different. The most progressive, efficient way to project power and mobilize the resources of client countries was to identify and gain control of their key institutions and personnel: political and military leaders, academics, journalists and editors, cultural icons, entertainers, industrialists. Criminal and terrorist networks were also invaluable assets to develop; they could provide many covert services, including drug and weapons distribution networks, money laundering, human trafficking and mass atrocities which could be used to justify desired measures.

All of these measures required selection and training of the appropriate assets, preferably in a way which would allow fine grained control of their behavior. Applied psychology was very important here, and manifested itself in projects like MKULTRA. In this context, spooky government connections to the Laurel Canyon music scene and the Manson Family are more understandable. Developing entertainment icons who would influence the conscious and subconscious minds of hundreds of millions of people across the world provided a tremendous return on investment and paved the way for a level of the control apparatus where entertainers from the target country could be selected, recruited, trained and used to broadcast precise political messages.

The Mighty Wurlitzer

Obviously, none of this could be done overtly. As Kennan recognized, it had to be covert and deniable. Therefore, the apparatus which was built consists of government agencies working through networks of private intermediaries such as foundations and NGOs working as contractors, subcontractors and so forth. This statecraft is practiced in the interests of the US government as a whole, but also its private clients such as multinational corporations, whose interests are thought to be contiguous with those of the US.

Properly implemented and coordinated, this apparatus has allowed the barely perceptible control of target countries on multiple levels, from the most private and intimate behavior of key population segments all the way up to national policy decisions. With agencies like USAID working through opaque webs of cutouts, not only were US government fingerprints obscured until recently, but the people interested in uncovering them have often been silenced. Frank Wisner, a senior CIA official, referred to it as “the Mighty Wurlitzer,” on which he could play any tune-paint any picture he wanted in the minds of target demographics. Again, this is a far more efficient, cost effective and powerful means of control than direct military conquest.

Wisner

Of course, the apparatus works the same way on US soil as it did overseas. In a globalized, interconnected world, it pretty much had to; you could not serve one message to Americans and another to, say, Cambodians for very long. Further, if you have a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail; there is no reason to use a different tool to use the same sorts of problems in America than you use overseas, except for propriety, which quickly wears thin in the absence of transparency. If you can use your toolbox to fix elections in client states, then why not in America? If you can get a client state to go to war for you, then why not get America to go to war?

“For all I know, our navy was shooting at whales out there”-LBJ. By the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the American political warfare apparatus had been operating in Indochina for 19 years.

Everything worked fine until it didn’t

All of this worked alright until quite recently. Unless you happened to be caught up in some war the apparatus was covertly running, if you were an American, you were basically doing well. American construction workers had a higher standard of living than European programmers and third world doctors. Soccer moms with bullshit jobs living in McMansions and driving late year Escalades were normal in America but completely unimaginable in most of the rest of the world; America’s status as the metropole of a global empire had a lot to do with that. Even today, Alabama’s GDP per capita is higher than that of the UK, France and Japan.

The causes of the problems that the apparatus is now suffering are twofold. The first is that, at their heart, the soft sciences are cargo cult bullshit. As rough heuristic guides to getting stuff done, some of them work, some of the time, when implemented by serious people like Carleton Coon. But as toolsets for discovering objective truths about the human condition, they suck. Given the perverse structure of American academia (built after WW2 by similar people to those who built the political warfare apparatus,) the soft sciences quickly started turning out people who not only weren’t interested in finding out the truth about anything, but didn’t even really believe the truth existed as such, and had no qualms about disbursing and receiving grants to promote plainly ridiculous lies. This in itself would not have degraded the effectiveness of the apparatus very much, because those grants really played the function of cover for overseas and domestic covert political warfare operations, except for the second problem: while the apparatus was been capable of making itself opaque to the public in the more innocent and primitive past, that opacity no longer works given modern public cynicism and widely available analysis tools.

In combination, these problems resulted in the apparatus both running on totally bullshit grants and these grants being used by its enemies to make it look ludicrous and fraudulent. The worst part is that the nature of its mission makes it difficult for its leadership to effectively defend their work-to explain that while the programs look like total crap, they are absolutely essential to the continued functioning of the American Empire, the high living standard of its metropolitan residents, the thriving bottom line of its corporations. The staff of the apparatus have to stick to their cover story, and many of them have, by this point, even come to believe it.

President Trump is taking a wrecking ball to the very top layers of America’s political warfare apparatus; USAID is one, but others will follow. It’s not clear whether the American Empire can reinvent itself quickly enough to avoid collapse. As discussed above, the collapse of the USSR was triggered by Gorbachev taking initiative in dismantling its most obviously stupid, inefficient and evil parts. He was as surprised as anyone when those parts turned out to have had been loadbearing.

21. Pentagon hits pause on plan to carry out mass firings of civilian employees, officials say

Pentagon hits pause on plan to carry out mass firings of civilian employees, officials say | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky · February 21, 2025

Aerial view of the Pentagon on March 31, 2024.

Daniel Slim/AFP/Getty Images

CNN —

The Defense Department has temporarily paused a plan to carry out mass firings of civilian probationary employees until Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel can carry out a more thorough review of the impacts such firings could have on US military readiness, two defense officials familiar with the matter told CNN.

The pause comes after CNN reported on Wednesday that the mass terminations, which could affect over 50,000 civilian employees across the Pentagon, could run afoul of Title 10 section 129a of the US code. Following that report, Pentagon lawyers began reviewing the legality of the planned terminations more closely, the officials said.

That law says that the secretary of defense “may not reduce the civilian workforce programmed full-time equivalent levels unless the Secretary conducts an appropriate analysis” of how those firings could impact the US military’s lethality and readiness. The law also says that mitigating risk to US military readiness takes precedence over cost.

A senior defense official told CNN on Wednesday that such an analysis had not been carried out before military leaders were ordered to make lists of employees to fire.

The office of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declined to comment.

Throughout this week, defense officials had been scrambling and working late into the night to create lists of individual workers who should be exempted from the firings because they are critical to ongoing mission support, including those who work in cybersecurity, intelligence, operations, foreign military sales and other critical national security roles, several defense officials said.

Hegseth said in a video posted to X on Thursday that the department was focusing on terminating lower-performing employees first. But defense officials told CNN that the Office of Personnel Management is using a broad justification for the firings, arguing to DoD that these probationary employees don’t contribute positively to the Pentagon’s overall performance because they are no longer needed.

This story has been updated with additional reporting.

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky · February 21, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com